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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the Philippines
+1898-1912, by James H. Blount
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
+
+Author: James H. Blount
+
+Release Date: June 28, 2011 [EBook #36542]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by the
+Digital & Multimedia Center, Michigan State University
+Libraries.)
+
+
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+               THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+                               1898-1912
+
+
+                                   By
+                            JAMES H. BLOUNT
+
+   Officer of United States Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899-1901
+       United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901-1905
+
+
+
+                               With a Map
+
+                          G. P. Putnam's Sons
+                          New York and London
+                        The Knickerbocker Press
+                                  1912
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                            Copyright, 1912
+                                   By
+                            James H. Blount
+
+                   The Knickerbocker Press, New York
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                                   To
+                           JOHN DOWNEY WORKS
+                             OF CALIFORNIA
+                 AS FINE A TYPE OF CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN
+                                AS EVER
+            GRACED A SEAT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
+                                  WHO
+        BELIEVING, WITH THE WRITER, AS TO THE PHILIPPINES, THAT
+             INDEFINITE RETENTION WITH UNDECLARED INTENTION
+                                   IS
+                          INDEFINITE DRIFTING
+                  HAS READ THE MANUSCRIPT OF THIS WORK
+                            AS IT PROGRESSED
+           LENDING TO ITS PREPARATION THE AID AND COUNSEL OF
+                        AN OLDER AND A WISER MAN
+                                  AND
+                       THE CONTAGIOUS SERENITY OF
+                   CONFIDENCE THAT RIGHT WILL PREVAIL
+                  THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED BY
+                               The Author
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+                                          Pardon, gentles all,
+                        The flat unraised spirit that hath dared
+                        On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth
+                        So great an object.
+
+                                                       Henry V.
+
+
+To have gone out to the other side of the world with an army of
+invasion, and had a part, however small, in the subjugation of a
+strange people, and then to see a new government set up, and, as
+an official of that government, watch it work out through a number
+of years, is an unusual and interesting experience, especially to
+a lawyer. What seem to me the most valuable things I learned in the
+course of that experience are herein submitted to my fellow-countrymen,
+in connection with a narrative covering the whole of the American
+occupation of the Philippines to date.
+
+This book is an attempt, by one whose intimate acquaintance with two
+remotely separated peoples will be denied in no quarter, to interpret
+each to the other. How intelligent that acquaintance is, is of course
+altogether another matter, which the reader will determine for himself.
+
+The task here undertaken is to make audible to a great free nation the
+voice of a weaker subject people who passionately and rightly long to
+be also free, but whose longings have been systematically denied for
+the last fourteen years, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes viciously,
+and always cruelly, on the wholly erroneous idea that where the end is
+benevolent, it justifies the means, regardless of the means necessary
+to the end.
+
+At a time when all our military and fiscal experts agree that having
+the Philippines on our hands is a grave strategic and economic mistake,
+fraught with peril to the nation's prestige in the early stages of our
+next great war, we are keeping the Filipinos in industrial bondage
+through unrighteous Congressional legislation for which special
+interests in America are responsible, in bald repudiation of the
+Open Door policy, and against their helpless but universal protest,
+a wholly unprotected and easy prey to the first first-class Power with
+which we become involved in war. Yet all the while the very highest
+considerations of national honor require us to choose between making
+the Filipino people free and independent without unnecessary delay,
+as they of right ought to be, or else imperilling the perpetuity
+of our own institutions by the creation and maintenance of a great
+standing army, sufficient properly to guard overseas possessions.
+
+A cheerful blindness to the inevitable worthy of Mark Tapley himself,
+the stale Micawberism that "something is bound to turn up," and
+a Mrs. Jellyby philanthropy hopelessly callous to domestic duties,
+expenses, and distresses, have hitherto successfully united to prevent
+the one simple and supreme need of the situation--a frank, formal,
+and definite declaration, by the law-making power of the government,
+of the nation's purpose in the premises. What is needed is a formal
+legislative announcement that the governing of a remote and alien
+people is to have no permanent place in the purposes of our national
+life, and that we do bona fide intend, just as soon as a stable
+government, republican in form, can be established by the people
+of the Philippine Islands, to turn over, upon terms which shall be
+reasonable and just, the government and control of the islands to
+the people thereof.
+
+The essentials of the problem, being at least as immutable as human
+nature and geography, will not change much with time. And whenever
+the American people are ready to abandon the strange gods whose
+guidance has necessitated a new definition of Liberty consistent with
+taxation without representation and unanimous protest by the governed,
+they will at once set about to secure to a people who have proven
+themselves brave and self-sacrificing in war, and gentle, generous,
+and tractable in peace, the right to pursue happiness in their own way,
+in lieu of somebody else's way, as the spirit of our Constitution,
+and the teachings of our God, Who is also theirs, alike demand.
+
+After seven years spent at the storm-centre of so-called "Expansion,"
+the first of the seven as a volunteer officer in Cuba during and after
+the Spanish War, the next two in a like capacity in the Philippines,
+and the remainder as a United States judge in the last-named country,
+the writer was finally invalided home in 1905, sustained in spirit,
+at parting, by cordial farewells, oral and written, personal and
+official, but convinced that foreign kindness will not cure the
+desire of a people, once awakened, for what used to be known as
+Freedom before we freed Cuba and then subjugated the Philippines; and
+that to permanently eradicate sedition from the Philippine Islands,
+the American courts there must be given jurisdiction over thought
+as well as over overt act, and must learn the method of drawing an
+indictment against a whole people.
+
+Seven other years of interested observation from the Western Hemisphere
+end of the line have confirmed and fortified the convictions above
+set forth.
+
+If we give the Filipinos this independence they so ardently desire
+and ever clamor for until made to shut up, "the holy cause,"
+as their brilliant young representative in the American House
+of Representatives, Mr. Quezon, always calls it, will not be at
+once spoiled, as the American hemp and other special interests so
+contemptuously insist, by the gentleman named, and his compatriot,
+Seņor Osmeņa, the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and the rest of
+the leaders of the patriot cause, in a general mutual throat-cutting
+incidental to a scramble for the offices. This sort of contention is
+merely the hiss of the same old serpent of tyranny which has always
+beset the pathway of man's struggle for free institutions.
+
+When first the talk in America, after the battle of Manila Bay,
+about keeping the Philippines, reached the islands, one of the
+Filipino leaders wrote to another during the negotiations between
+their commanding general and our own looking to preservation of
+the peace until the results of the Paris Peace Conference which
+settled the fate of the islands should be known, in effect, thus:
+"The Filipinos will not be fit for independence in ten, twenty, or a
+hundred years if it be left to American colonial office-holders drawing
+good salaries to determine the question." Is there not some human
+nature in that remark? Suppose, reader, you were in the enjoyment
+of a salary of five, ten, or twenty thousand dollars a year as a
+government official in the Philippines, how precipitately would you
+hasten to recommend yourself out of office, and evict yourself into
+this cold Western world with which you had meantime lost all touch?
+
+The Filipinos can run a far better government than the Cubans. In 1898,
+when Admiral Dewey read in the papers that we were going to give Cuba
+independence, he wired home from Manila:
+
+
+    These people are far superior in their intelligence, and more
+    capable of self-government than the people of Cuba, and I am
+    familiar with both races.
+
+
+After a year in Cuba and nearly six in the Philippines, two as an
+officer of the army that subjugated the Filipinos, and the remainder
+as a judge over them, I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral
+Dewey, but with this addition, viz., that the people of those islands,
+whatever of conscious political unity they may have lacked in 1898,
+were welded into absolute oneness as a people by their original
+struggle for independence against us, and will remain forever so
+welded by their incurable aspirations for a national life of their
+own under a republic framed in imitation of ours. Furthermore, the one
+great difference between Cuba and the Philippines is that the latter
+country has no race cancer forever menacing its peace, and sapping
+its self-reliance. The Philippine people are absolutely one people,
+as to race, color, and previous condition. Again, American sugar and
+tobacco interests will never permit the competitive Philippine sugar
+and tobacco industries to grow as Nature and Nature's God intended;
+and the American importers of Manila hemp--which is to the Philippines
+what cotton is to the South--have, through special Congressional
+legislation still standing on our statute books--to the shame of the
+nation--so depressed the hemp industry of the islands that the market
+price it brings to-day is just one half what it brought ten years ago.
+
+If three strong and able Americans, familiar with insular conditions
+and still young enough to undertake the task, were told by a President
+of the United States, by authority of Congress, "Go out there and
+set up a stable native government by July 4, 1921, [1] and then come
+away," they could and would do it; and that government would be a
+success; and one of the greatest moral victories in the annals of
+free government would have been written by the gentlemen concerned
+upon the pages of their country's history.
+
+We ought to give the Filipinos their independence, even if we have
+to guarantee it to them. But, by neutralization treaties with the
+other great Powers similar to those which safeguard the integrity and
+independence of Switzerland to-day, whereby the other Powers would
+agree not to seize the islands after we give them their independence,
+the Philippines can be made as permanently neutral territory in
+Asiatic politics as Switzerland is to-day in European politics.
+
+
+James H. Blount.
+
+1406 G Street, N. W.,
+Washington, D. C.,
+July 4, 1912.
+
+
+P.S.--The preparation of this book has entailed examination of a
+vast mass of official documents, as will appear from the foot-note
+citations to the page and volume from which quotations have been
+made. The object has been to place all material statements of fact
+beyond question. For the purpose of this research work, Mr. Herbert
+Putnam, Librarian of Congress, was kind enough to extend me the
+privileges of the national library, and it would be most ungracious
+to fail to acknowledge the obligation I am under, in this regard,
+to one whom the country is indeed fortunate in having at the head
+of that great institution. I should also make acknowledgment of the
+obligation I am under to Mr. W. W. Bishop, the able superintendent
+of the reading-room, for aid rendered whenever asked, and to my
+life-long friends, John and Hugh Morrison, the most valuable men,
+to the general public, except the two gentlemen above named, on the
+whole great roll of employees of the Library of Congress.
+
+
+J. H. B.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                                 Pages
+Chapter I
+
+Mr. Pratt's Serenade                                              1-15
+
+    Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at Singapore,
+    in the British Straits Settlements, finding Aguinaldo a political
+    refugee at that place at the outbreak of our war with Spain,
+    April 21, 1898, arranges by cable with Admiral Dewey, then at
+    Hong Kong with his squadron, for Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong
+    and thence to Manila, to co-operate by land with Admiral Dewey
+    against the Spaniards, Pratt promising Aguinaldo independence,
+    without authority. Mr. Pratt is later quietly separated from the
+    consular service.
+
+Chapter II
+
+Dewey and Aguinaldo                                              16-45
+
+    After the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey brings
+    Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong, whither he had proceeded from
+    Singapore, lands him at Cavite, and chaperones his insurrection
+    against the Spaniards until the American troops arrive, June 30th.
+
+Chapter III
+
+Anderson and Aguinaldo                                           46-66
+
+    General Anderson's official dealings with Aguinaldo from June 30,
+    1898, until General Merritt's arrival, July 25th,
+
+Chapter IV
+
+Merritt and Aguinaldo                                            67-87
+
+    General Merritt's five weeks' sojourn in the Islands, from July 25,
+    1898, to the end of August, including fall of Manila, August 13th,
+    and our relations with Aguinaldo during period indicated.
+
+Chapter V
+
+Otis and Aguinaldo                                              88-106
+
+    Dealings and relations between, September-December,
+1898.
+
+Chapter VI
+
+The Wilcox-Sargent Trip                                        107-120
+
+    Two American naval officers make an extended tour through
+    the interior of Luzon by permission of Admiral Dewey and with
+    Aguinaldo's consent, in October-November, 1898, while the Paris
+    peace negotiations were in progress. What they saw and learned.
+
+Chapter VII
+
+The Treaty of Paris                                            121-138
+
+    An account of the negotiations, October-December, 1898. How we came
+    to pay Spain $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 insurrection. Treaty
+    signed December 10, 1898.
+
+Chapter VIII
+
+The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation                       139-151
+
+    President McKinley's celebrated proclamation of December 21,
+    1898, cabled out to the Islands, December 27, 1898, after the
+    signing of the Treaty of Paris on the 10th, and intended as
+    a fire-extinguisher, in fact acted merely as a firebrand, the
+    Filipinos perceiving that Benevolent Assimilation meant such
+    measure of slaughter as might be necessary to "spare them from
+    the dangers of" the independence on which they were bent.
+
+Chapter IX
+
+The Iloilo Fiasco                                              152-163
+
+    By order of President McKinley, General Otis abstains from
+    hostilities to await Senate action on Treaty of Paris.
+
+Chapter X
+
+Otis and Aguinaldo (Continued)                          164-185
+
+    Still waiting for the Senate to act.
+
+Chapter XI
+
+Otis and the War                                               186-223
+
+    Covering the period from the outbreak of February 4, 1899, until
+    the fall of that year.
+
+Chapter XII
+
+Otis and the War (Continued)                            224-269
+
+    From the fall of 1899 to the spring of 1900.
+
+Chapter XIII
+
+Macarthur and the War                                          270-281
+
+    Carries the story up to the date of the arrival of the Taft
+    Commission, sent out in the spring of 1900, to help General
+    MacArthur run the war.
+
+Chapter XIV
+
+The Taft Commission                                            282-344
+
+    Shows how the Taft Commission, born of the McKinley Benevolent
+    Assimilation theory that there was no real fundamental opposition
+    to American rule, lived up to that theory, in their telegrams
+    sent home during the presidential campaign of 1900, and in 1901
+    set up a civil government predicated upon their obstinate but
+    opportune delusions of the previous year.
+
+
+            "The papers 'id it 'andsome
+            But you bet the army knows."
+
+
+Chapter XV
+
+Governor Taft--1901-2                                          345-402
+
+    Shows the prematurity of a civil government set up under pressure
+    of political expediency, and the disorders which followed.
+
+Chapter XVI
+
+Governor Taft--1903                                            403-436
+
+    Shows divers serious insurrections in various provinces amounting
+    to what the Commission itself termed, in one instance, "a reign of
+    terror"--situations so endangering the public safety that to fail
+    to order out the army to quell the disturbances was neglect of
+    plain duty, such neglect being due to a set policy of preserving
+    the official fiction that peace prevailed, and that Benevolent
+    Assimilation was a success.
+
+Chapter XVII
+
+Governor Taft--1903 (Continued)                         437-445
+
+    Shows the essentially despotic, though theoretically benevolent,
+    character of the Taft civil government of the Philippines, and
+    its attitude toward the American business community in the Islands.
+
+Chapter XVIII
+
+Governor Wright--1904                                          446-498
+
+    Shows the change of the tone of the government under Governor
+    Taft's successor, his consequent popularity with his fellow-country
+    men in the Islands, and his corresponding unpopularity with the
+    Filipinos. Shows also a long series of massacres of pacificos by
+    enemies of the American government between July and November,
+    1904, permitted out of super-solicitude lest ordering out the
+    army and summarily putting a stop to said massacres might affect
+    the presidential election in the United States unfavorably to
+    Mr. Roosevelt, by reviving the notion that neither the Roosevelt
+    Administration nor its predecessor had ever been frank with the
+    country concerning the state of public order in the Islands.
+
+Chapter XIX
+
+Governor Wright--1905                                          499-514
+
+    Shows the prompt ordering of the army to the scene of the
+    disturbances after the presidential election of 1904 was safely
+    over, and the nature and extent of the insurrections of 1905.
+
+Chapter XX
+
+Governor Ide--1906                                             515-523
+
+    Describes the last outbreak prior to the final establishment of
+    a state of general and complete peace.
+
+Chapter XXI
+
+Governor Smith--1907-9                                         524-557
+
+    Describes divers matters, including a certificate made March 28,
+    1907, declaring that a state of general and complete peace had
+    prevailed for the two years immediately the preceding. Describes
+    also the formal opening of First Philippine Assembly by Secretary
+    of War Taft in October, 1907, and his final announcement to them
+    that he had no authority to end the uncertainty concerning their
+    future which is the corner-stone of the Taft policy of Indefinite
+    Tutelage, and that Congress only could end that uncertainty.
+
+Chapter XXII
+
+Governor Forbes--1909-12                                       558-570
+
+    Suggests the hypocrisy of boasting about "the good we are doing"
+    the Filipinos when predatory special interests are all the while
+    preying upon the Philippine people even more shamelessly than
+    they do upon the American people, and by the same methods, viz.:
+    legislation placed or kept on the statute-books of the United
+    States for their special benefit, the difference being that
+    the American people can help themselves if they will, but the
+    Philippine people cannot.
+
+Chapter XXIII
+
+"Non-Christian" Worcester                                      571-586
+
+    Professor Worcester, the P. T. Barnum of the "non-Christian tribe"
+    industry, and his menagerie of certain rare and interesting wild
+    tribes still extant in the Islands, specimens of which you saw at
+    the St. Louis Exposition of 1903-4; by which device the American
+    people have been led to believe the Igorrotes, Negritos, etc.,
+    to be samples of the Filipino people.
+
+Chapter XXIV
+
+The Philippine Civil Service                                   587-594
+
+    Showing how imperatively simple justice demands that Americans,
+    who go out to enter the Philippine Civil Service should, after
+    a tour of duty out there, be entitled, as matter of right, to
+    be transferred back to the Civil Service in the United States,
+    instead of being left wholly dependent on political influence to
+    "place" them after their final return home.
+
+Chapter XXV
+
+Cost of the Philippines                                        595-603
+
+    In life, and money, together with certain consolatory reflections
+    thereon.
+
+Chapter XXVI
+
+Congressional Legislation                                      604-622
+
+    Showing how a small group of American importers of Manila
+    hemp--hemp being to the Philippines what cotton is to the
+    South--have so manipulated the Philippine hemp industry as to
+    depress the market price of the main source of wealth of the
+    Islands below the cost of production; also other evils of taxation
+    without representation.
+
+Chapter XXVII
+
+The Rights of Man                                              623-632
+
+    Industrial slavery to predatory interests and physical slavery
+    compared.
+
+Chapter XXVIII
+
+The Road to Autonomy                                           633-646
+
+    Shows how entirely easy would be the task of evolving the American
+    Ireland we have laid up for ourselves in the Philippines into
+    complete Home Rule by 1921, the date proposed for Philippine
+    independence in the pending Jones bill, introduced in the House
+    of Representatives in March, 1912.
+
+Chapter XXIX
+
+The Way Out                                                    647-655
+
+    Shows how, by neutralization treaties with the other powers, as
+    proposed in many different resolutions, of both Republican and
+    Democratic origin, now pending in Congress, whereby the other
+    powers should agree not to annex the Islands after we give them
+    their independence, the Philippines can be made permanently neutral
+    territory in Asiatic politics exactly as both Switzerland and
+    Belgium have been for nearly a hundred years in European politics.
+
+Index                                                              657
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+                                                                    Page
+The Capture of Aguinaldo, March 23, 1901--The Central
+Fact of the American Military Occupation                    Frontispiece
+    From the Drawing by F. C. Yohn
+    Copyright by Charles Scribner's Sons
+
+Bird's-eye View of the Philippine Archipelago, Showing
+Preponderating Importance of Luzon                                   228
+
+Outline Sketch of the Theatre of Operations in Luzon, 1899           232
+
+Sketch Map of the Philippines                                     At End
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+MR. PRATT'S SERENADE
+
+                        Had I but served my God with half the zeal
+                        I served my king, he would not in mine age
+                        Have left me naked to mine enemies.
+
+                                      King Henry VIII., Act III., Sc. 2.
+
+
+Any narrative covering our acquisition of the Philippine Islands
+must, of course, centre in the outset about Admiral Dewey, and the
+destruction by him of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on Sunday
+morning, May 1, 1898. But as the Admiral had brought Aguinaldo down
+from Hong Kong to Manila after the battle, and landed him on May
+19th to start an auxiliary insurrection, which insurrection kept the
+Spaniards bottled up in Manila on the land side for three and a half
+months while Dewey did the same by sea, until ten thousand American
+troops arrived, and easily completed the reduction and capture of the
+beleaguered and famished city on August 13th, it is necessary to a
+clear understanding of the de facto alliance between the Americans and
+Aguinaldo thus created, to know who brought the Admiral and Aguinaldo
+together and how, and why.
+
+The United States declared war against Spain, April 21, 1898,
+to free Cuba, and at once arranged an understanding with the Cuban
+revolutionists looking to co-operation between their forces and ours
+to that end. For some years prior to this, political conditions in the
+Philippines had been quite similar to those in Cuba, so that when, two
+days after war broke out, the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General
+of the United States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements,
+found Aguinaldo, who had headed the last organized outbreak against
+Spain in the Philippines, temporarily sojourning as a political
+refugee at Singapore, in the Filipino colony there, he naturally
+sought to arrange for his co-operating with us against Spain, as
+Gomez and Garcia were doing in Cuba. Thereby hangs the story of
+"Mr. Pratt's Serenade." However, before we listen to the band whose
+strains spoke the gratitude of the Filipinos to Mr. Pratt for having
+introduced Aguinaldo to Dewey, let us learn somewhat of Aguinaldo's
+antecedents, as related to the purposes of the introduction.
+
+The first low rumbling of official thunder premonitory to the war
+with Spain was heard in Mr. McKinley's annual message to Congress of
+December, 1897, [2] wherein he said, among other things:
+
+
+    The most important problem with which this government is now
+    called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns
+    its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection.
+
+
+In that very month of December, 1897, Aguinaldo was heading a
+formidable insurrection against Spanish tyranny in the Philippines,
+and the Filipinos and their revolutionary committees everywhere were
+watching with eager interest the course of "The Great North American
+Republic," as they were wont to term our government.
+
+The Report of the First Philippine Commission sent out to the Islands
+by President McKinley in February, 1899, of which President Schurman
+of Cornell University was Chairman, contains a succinct memorandum
+concerning the Filipino revolutionary movement of 1896-7, which had
+been begun by Aguinaldo in 1896, and had culminated in what is known as
+the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato, [3] signed December 14, 1897. This treaty
+had promised certain reforms, such as representation in the Spanish
+Cortez, sending the Friars away, etc., and had also promised the
+leaders $400,000 if Aguinaldo and his Cabinet would leave the country
+and go to Hong Kong. "No definite time was fixed," says President
+Schurman (vol. I., p. 171), "during which these men were to remain
+away from the Philippines; and if the promises made by Spain were not
+fulfilled, they had the right to return." Of course, "the promises made
+by Spain" were not fulfilled. Spain thought she had bought Aguinaldo
+and his crowd off. "Two hundred thousand dollars," says Prof. Schurman,
+"was paid to Aguinaldo when he arrived in Hong Kong." But instead of
+using this money in riotous living, the little group of exiles began
+to take notice of the struggles of their brothers in wretchedness
+in Cuba, and the ever-increasing probability of intervention by the
+United States in that unhappy Spanish colony, which, of course, would
+be their opportunity to strike for Independence. They had only been
+in Hong Kong about two months when the Maine blew up February 15,
+1898, Then they knew there would be "something doing." Hong Kong
+being the cross-roads of the Far East and the gateway to Asia, and
+being only sixty hours across the choppy China Sea from Manila, was
+the best place in that part of the world to brew another insurrection
+against Spain. But Singapore is also a good place for a branch office
+for such an enterprise, being on the main-travelled route between the
+Philippines and Spain by way of the Suez Canal, about four or five days
+out of Hong Kong by a good liner, and but little farther from Manila,
+as the crow flies, than Hong Kong itself. Owing to political unrest
+in the Philippines in 1896-7-8, there was quite a colony of Filipino
+political refugees living at Singapore during that period. Aguinaldo
+had gone over from Hong Kong to Singapore in the latter half of April,
+1898, arriving there, it so chanced, the day we declared war against
+Spain, April 21st. He was immediately sought out by Mr. Pratt, who
+had learned of his presence in the community through an Englishman
+of Singapore, a former resident of Manila, a Mr. Bray, who seems to
+have been a kind of striker for the Filipino general. Aguinaldo had
+come incognito. Out of Mr. Pratt's interview with the insurgent chief
+thus obtained, and its results, grew the episode which is the subject
+of this chapter.
+
+A word just here, preliminary to this interview, concerning the
+personal equation of Aguinaldo, would seem to be advisable.
+
+While I personally chased him and his outfit a good deal in the latter
+part of 1899, in the northern advance of a column of General Lawton's
+Division from San Isidro across the Rio Grande de Pampanga, over the
+boggy passes of the Caraballa Mountains to the China Sea, and up the
+Luzon West Coast road, we never did catch him, and I never personally
+met him but once, and that was after he was captured in 1901. He
+was as insignificant looking physically as a Japanese diplomat. But
+his presence suggested, equally with that of his wonderful racial
+cousins who represent the great empire of the Mikado abroad, both a
+high order of intelligence and baffling reserve. And Major-General
+J. Franklin Bell, recently Chief of Staff, United States Army, who
+was a Major on General Merritt's staff in 1898, having charge of the
+"Office of Military Information," in a confidential report prepared
+for his chief dated August 29, 1898, "sizing up" the various insurgent
+leaders, in view of the then apparent probability of trouble with them,
+gives these notes on Aguinaldo, the head and front of the revolution:
+"Aguinaldo: Honest, sincere, and * * * a natural leader of men." [4]
+
+Any one acquainted with General Bell knows that he knows what he is
+talking about when he speaks of "a natural leader of men," for he is
+one himself. Our ablest men in the early days were the first to cease
+considering the little brown soldiers a joke, and their government an
+opera-bouffe affair. General Bell also says in the same report that he,
+Aguinaldo, is undoubtedly endowed in a wonderful degree with "the power
+of creating among the people confidence in himself." He was, indeed,
+the very incarnation of "the legitimate aspirations of" his people,
+to use one of the favorite phrases of his early state papers, and
+the faithful interpreter thereof. That was the secret of his power,
+that and a most remarkable talent for surrounding himself with an
+atmosphere of impenetrable reserve. This last used to make our young
+army officers suspect him of being what they called a "four-flusher,"
+which being interpreted means a man who is partially successful in
+making people think him far more important than he really is. But
+we have seen General Bell's estimate. And the day Aguinaldo took the
+oath of allegiance to the United States, in 1901, General MacArthur,
+then commanding the American forces in the Philippines, signalized the
+event by liberating 1000 Filipino prisoners of war. General Funston,
+the man who captured him in 1901, says in Scribner's Magazine for
+November, 1911, "He is a man of many excellent qualities and * * *
+far and away the best Filipino I was ever brought in contact with."
+
+Aguinaldo was born in 1869. To-day, 1912, he is farming about twenty
+miles out of Manila in his native province of Cavite; has always
+scrupulously observed his oath of allegiance aforesaid; occasionally
+comes to town and plays chess with Governor-General Forbes; and
+in all respects has played for the last ten years with really fine
+dignity the rôle of Chieftain of a Lost Cause on which his all had
+been staked. He was a school-teacher at Cavite at one time, but is not
+a college graduate, and so far as mere book education is concerned, he
+is not a highly educated man. Whether or not he can give the principal
+parts of the principal irregular Greek verbs I do not know, but his
+place in the history of his country, and in the annals of wars for
+independence, cannot, and for the honor of human nature should not,
+be a small one. Dr. Rizal, the Filipino patriot whose picture we print
+on the Philippine postage stamps, and who was shot for sedition by the
+Spaniards before our time out there, was what Colonel Roosevelt would
+jocularly call "one of these darned literary fellows." He was a sort of
+"Sweetness and Light" proposition, who only wrote about "The Rights of
+Man," and finally let the Spaniards shoot him--stuck his head in the
+lion's mouth, so to speak. Aguinaldo was a born leader of men, who knew
+how to put the fear of God into the hearts of the ancient oppressors
+of his people. Mr. Pratt's own story of how he earned his serenade
+is preserved to future ages in the published records of the State
+Department. [5] We will now attempt to summarize, not so eloquently as
+Mr. Pratt, but more briefly, the manner of its earning, the serenade
+itself, and its resultant effects both upon the personal fortunes of
+Mr. Pratt and upon Filipino confidence in American official assurances.
+
+It was on the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1898, that Mr. Pratt
+was confidentially informed of Aguinaldo's arrival at Singapore,
+incognito. "Being aware," says Mr. Pratt, "of the great prestige of
+General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at
+home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control
+that he could, I determined at once to see him." Accordingly, he did
+see him the following Sunday morning, the 24th.
+
+At this interview, it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then
+at Hong Kong with his squadron awaiting orders, should so desire,
+Aguinaldo should proceed to Hong Kong to arrange for co-operation
+of the insurgents at Manila with our naval forces in the prospective
+operations against the Spaniards.
+
+Accordingly, that Sunday, Mr. Pratt telegraphed Dewey through our
+consul at Hong Kong:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong arrange
+    with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if
+    desired. Telegraph.
+
+
+Admiral Dewey (then Commodore) replied:
+
+
+    Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
+
+
+This message was received late Sunday night, April 24th, and was
+at once communicated to Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt then did considerable
+bustling around for the benefit of his new-found ally, whom, with
+his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names
+he "succeeded in getting off," to use his phrase, by the British
+steamer Malacca, which left Singapore for Hong Kong, April 26th. In
+the letter reporting all this to the State Department, Mr. Pratt
+adds that he trusts this action "in arranging for his [Aguinaldo's]
+direct co-operation with the commander of our forces" will meet
+with the Government's approval. A little later Mr. Pratt sends the
+State Department a copy of the Singapore Free Press of May 4, 1898,
+containing an impressive account of the above transaction and the
+negotiations leading up to it. This account describes the political
+conditions among the population of the Philippine archipelago, "which,"
+it goes on to say, "merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to
+rise en masse." Speaking of Pratt's interview with Aguinaldo, it says:
+
+
+    General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the
+    Philippines. * * * American protection would be desirable
+    temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted
+    hereafter in Cuba.
+
+
+Mr. Pratt also forwards a proclamation gotten up by the Filipino
+insurgent leaders at Hong Kong and sent over to the Philippines in
+advance of Admiral Dewey's coming, calling upon the Filipinos not
+to heed any appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to
+rally to the support of the latter. This manifesto of the Filipinos
+is headed, prominently--for all we know it may have had a heading
+as big as a Hearst newspaper box-car type announcement of the latest
+violation of the Seventh Commandment--: "America's Allies."
+
+It begins thus:
+
+
+    Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
+    within our reach. * * * The Americans, not from mercenary motives,
+    but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many
+    persecuted people, have considered it opportune * * * etc. [Here
+    follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an American
+    squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines. * * * The
+    Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reinforcements coming
+    from Spain; * * * we insurgents must attack by land. Probably
+    you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans
+    have arms and will find means to assist us. There where you
+    see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our
+    redeemers! [6]
+
+
+For twelve days after his letter to the State Department enclosing
+the above proclamation, Mr. Pratt, so far as the record discloses,
+contemplated his coup d'état in silent satisfaction. Since its
+successful pulling off, Admiral Dewey had smashed the Spanish fleet,
+and Aguinaldo had started his auxiliary insurrection. The former was
+patting the latter on the back, as it were, and saying, "Go it little
+man." But nobody was patting Pratt on the back, yet. Therefore, on June
+2d, Mr. Pratt writes the State Department, purring for patting thus:
+
+
+    Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo has been
+    received by the natives and the confidence with which he already
+    appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted,
+    I think, that I did not over-rate his importance and that I
+    have materially assisted the cause of the United States in the
+    Philippines in securing his co-operation. [7]
+
+
+A glow of conscious superiority, in value to the Government, over
+his consular colleague and neighbor, Mr. Wildman, at Hong Kong,
+next suffuses Mr. Pratt's diction, being manifested thus:
+
+
+    Why this co-operation should not have been secured to us during
+    the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hong
+    Kong, and that he was allowed to leave there without having been
+    approached in the interest of our Government, I cannot understand.
+
+
+Considering that in his letter accepting the nomination for the
+Vice-Presidency two years after this Mr. Roosevelt compared Aguinaldo
+and his people to that squalid old Apache medicine man, Sitting Bull,
+and his band of dirty paint-streaked cut-throats, Mr. Pratt's next
+Pickwickian sigh of complacent, if neglected, worth is particularly
+interesting:
+
+
+    No close observer of what had transpired in the Philippines during
+    the past four years could have failed to recognize that General
+    Aguinaldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filipino
+    insurgents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in
+    the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice
+    and honor.
+
+
+In other words, knowing the proverbial ingratitude of republics,
+Mr. Pratt is determined to impress upon his Government and on the
+discerning historian of the future that he was "the original Aguinaldo
+man." A week later (June 9th) Mr. Pratt writes the Department enclosing
+copies of the Singapore papers of that date, giving an account of
+a generous outburst of Filipino enthusiasm at Singapore in honor
+of America, Admiral Dewey, and, last, if not least, Mr. Pratt. He
+encloses duplicate copies of these newspaper notices "for the press,
+should you consider their publication desirable." His letter begins:
+
+
+    I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion of
+    the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo's recent successes
+    near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in
+    Singapore and presented an address. * * *
+
+
+He then proceeds with further details of the event, without
+self-laudation. The Singapore papers which he encloses, however, not
+handicapped by the inexorable modesty of official correspondence,
+give a glowing account of the presentation of the "address," and
+of the serenade and toasts which followed. Says one of them, the
+Straits Times:
+
+
+    The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon
+    in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to
+    Raffles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an outlying part. From
+    a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the natives of
+    the Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the
+    consulate. Their object was to present an address to Hon. Spencer
+    Pratt, United States Consul-General, and, partly, to serenade him,
+    for which purpose some twenty-five or thirty of the Filipinos
+    came equipped with musical instruments.
+
+
+First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading and
+presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the Filipino
+community of Singapore. The address pledged the "eternal gratitude"
+of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee,
+alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been
+enabled by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey
+by Consul Pratt to arouse 8,000,000 of Filipinos to take up arms
+"in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of which your
+country is the foremost champion" and trusted "that the United States
+* * * will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you,
+sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to
+us our independence under the protection of the United States."
+
+Mr. Pratt arose and "proceeded speaking in French," says the
+newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtless what
+it was--"to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were
+now proving themselves fit for self-government." The gentleman from
+Alabama then went on to review the mighty events and developments of
+the preceding six weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st,
+
+
+    the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader,
+    General Emilio Aguinaldo, co-operating on land with the Americans
+    at sea, etc. You have just reason to be proud of what has
+    been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your
+    fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I
+    learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore,
+    I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me
+    that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated
+    with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the
+    latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.
+
+
+Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration:
+"At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served,
+and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, [8] there was
+no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments."
+
+Then followed a general drinking of toasts to America, Dewey, Pratt,
+and Aguinaldo. Then the band played. Then the meeting broke up. Then
+the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States,
+retired to the seclusion of his apartments in Raffles Hotel, and,
+under the soothing swish of his plunkah, forgot the accursed heat of
+that stepping-off place, Singapore, and dreamed of future greatness.
+
+A few days later the even tenor of Mr. Pratt's meditations was
+disturbed by a letter from the State Department saying, in effect,
+that it was all right to get Aguinaldo's assistance "if in so doing
+he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to
+gratify." [9] But it did not tell him to tell the Filipinos so. For
+Aguinaldo was keeping the Spaniards bottled up in the old walled city
+of Manila on short and ever shortening rations, and American troops
+were on the way to join him, and the shorter the food supply grew
+in Manila the readier the garrison would be to surrender when they
+did arrive, and the fewer American soldiers' lives would have to be
+sacrificed in the final capture of the town. Every day of Aguinaldo's
+service under the Dewey-Pratt arrangement was worth an American life,
+perhaps many. It was too valuable to repudiate, just yet. July 20th,
+the State Department wrote Mr. Pratt a letter acknowledging receipt of
+his of June 9th "enclosing printed copies of a report from the Straits
+Times of the same day, entitled 'Mr. Spencer Pratt's Serenade,'
+with a view to its communication to the press," and not only not
+felicitating him on his serenade, but making him sorry he had ever
+had a serenade. It said, among other things:
+
+"The extract now communicated by you from the Straits Times of the
+9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as
+to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and
+produced an impression which this government would feel compelled
+to regret." [10] Hapless Pratt! "Feel compelled to regret" is State
+Department for "You are liable to be fired."
+
+The letter of reprimand proceeds:
+
+"The address * * * discloses an understanding on their part that * * *
+the ultimate object of our action is * * * the independence of the
+Philippines * * *. Your address does not repel this implication * * *".
+
+The letter then scores Pratt for having called Aguinaldo "the man
+for the occasion," and for having said that the "arrangement" between
+Aguinaldo and Dewey had "resulted so happily," and after a few further
+animadversions, concludes with this great blow to the reading public
+of Alabama:
+
+"For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be
+given to the press lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to
+views the expression of which it had not authorized."
+
+"The Department" was very scrupulous about even the appearance, at
+the American end of the line, of "lending a sanction" to Pratt's
+arrangement with Aguinaldo, while all the time it was knowingly
+permitting the latter to daily risk his own life and the lives of
+his countrymen on the faith of that very "arrangement," and it was
+so permitting this to be done because the "arrangement" was daily
+operating to reduce the number of American lives which it would be
+necessary to sacrifice in the final taking of Manila. The day the
+letter of reprimand was written our troop-ships were on the ocean,
+speeding toward the Philippines. And Aguinaldo and his people were
+fighting the Spaniards with the pent-up feeling of centuries impelling
+their little steel-jacketed messengers of death, thinking of "Cuba
+Libre," and dreaming of a Star of Philippine Independence risen in
+the Far East.
+
+Such are the circumstances from which the Filipino people derived
+their first impressions concerning the faith and honor of a strange
+people they had never theretofore seen, who succeeded the Spaniards
+as their overlords. Mr. Pratt was subsequently quietly separated from
+the consular service, and doubtless lived to regret that he had ever
+unloosed the fountains of his Alabama French on the Filipino colony
+of Singapore.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DEWEY AND AGUINALDO
+
+                    Armaments that thunderstrike the walls
+                    Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake
+                    And monarchs tremble in their capitals.
+
+                                                          Childe Harold.
+
+
+The battle of Manila Bay was fought May 1, 1898. Until the thunder of
+Dewey's guns reverberated around the world, there was perhaps no part
+of it the American people knew less about than the Philippine Islands.
+
+We have all heard much of what happened after the battle, but
+comparatively few, probably, have ever had a glimpse at our great
+sailor while he was there in Hong Kong harbor, getting ready to go
+to sea to destroy the Spanish armada. Such a glimpse is modestly
+afforded by the Admiral in his testimony before the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [11]
+
+Asked by the Committee when he first heard from Aguinaldo and his
+people in 1898, Admiral Dewey said [12]:
+
+
+    I should think about a month before leaving Hong Kong, that is,
+    about the first of April, when it became pretty certain that there
+    was to be war with Spain, I heard that there were a number of
+    Filipinos in the city of Hong Kong who were anxious to accompany
+    the squadron to Manila in case we went over. I saw these men two
+    or three times myself. They seemed to be all very young earnest
+    boys. I did not attach much importance to what they said or to
+    themselves. Finally, before we left Hong Kong for Mirs Bay [13]
+    I received a telegram from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore
+    saying that Aguinaldo was there and anxious to see me. I said to
+    him "All right; tell him to come on," but I attached so little
+    importance to Aguinaldo that I did not wait for him. He did not
+    arrive, and we sailed from Mirs Bay without any Filipinos.
+
+
+From his testimony before the Committee it is clear that Admiral
+Dewey's first impressions of the Filipinos, like those of most
+Americans after him, were not very favorable, that is to say, he did
+not in the outset take them very seriously. It will be interesting
+to consider these impressions, and then to compare them with those he
+gathered on better acquaintance from observing their early struggles
+for independence. The more intimate acquaintance, as has been the case
+with all his fellow countrymen since, caused him to revise his first
+verdict. Answering a question put by Senator Carmack concerning what
+transpired between him and the Philippine Revolutionists at Hong Kong
+before he sailed in search of the Spanish fleet, the Admiral said [14]:
+
+
+    They were bothering me. I was getting my squadron ready for battle,
+    and these little men were coming on board my ship at Hong Kong and
+    taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest
+    importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing; that
+    is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had
+    been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not
+    go. One of them didn't go because he didn't have any tooth-brush.
+
+    Senator Burrows: "Did he give that as his reason?"
+
+    Admiral Dewey: "Yes, he said 'I have no tooth-brush.'"
+
+    They used to come aboard my ship and take my time, and finally
+    I would not see them at all, but turned them over to my staff.
+
+
+Now the lack of a tooth-brush is hardly a valid excuse for not going
+into battle, however great a convenience it may be in campaign. But
+the absence of orders from your commanding officer stands on a very
+different footing. Aguinaldo had not yet arrived. Three hundred years
+of Spanish misgovernment and cruelty is not conducive to aversion
+to fictitious excuses by the lowly in the presence of supreme
+authority. The answer was amusingly uncandid, but disproved neither
+patriotism nor intelligence.
+
+Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong from Singapore a day or so after
+Admiral Dewey had sailed for Manila. Of the battle of May 1st,
+no detailed mention is essential here. Every schoolboy is familiar
+with it. It will remain, as long as the republic lasts, a part of
+the heritage of the nation. But the true glory of that battle, to my
+mind, rests, not upon the circumstance that we have the Philippines,
+but upon the tremendous fact that before it occurred the attitude of
+our State Department toward an American citizen sojourning in distant
+lands and becoming involved in difficulties there had long been,
+"Why didn't he stay at home? Let him stew in his own juice"; whereas,
+since then, to be an American has been more like it was in the days
+of St. Paul to be a Roman citizen.
+
+May 16th, our consul at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, succeeded in
+getting the insurgent leader and his staff off for Manila on board
+the U. S. S. McCulloch by authority of Admiral Dewey. Like his
+colleague over at Singapore, Consul Wildman was bent on the rôle of
+Warwick. Admiral Dewey was quite busy there in Manila Bay the first
+two or three weeks after the battle, but yielding to the letters
+of Wildman, who meantime had constituted himself a kind of fiscal
+agent at Hong Kong for the prospective revolution in the matter of
+the purchase of guns and otherwise, the Admiral told the commanding
+officer of the McCulloch that on his next trip to Hong Kong he might
+bring down a dozen or so of the Filipinos there. The frame of mind
+they were in on reaching Manila, as a result of the assurances of
+Pratt and Wildman, is well illustrated by a letter the latter wrote
+Aguinaldo a little later (June 25th) which is undoubtedly in keeping
+with what he had been telling him earlier:
+
+
+    Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the
+    sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under
+    which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or
+    the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings
+    for the Filipinos. [15]
+
+
+And at the time, they were.
+
+"Every American citizen who came in contact with the Filipinos at
+the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months
+after hostilities began," said General Anderson in an interview
+published in the Chicago Record of February 24, 1900, "probably
+told those he talked with * * * that we intended to free them from
+Spanish oppression. The general expression, was 'We intend to whip
+the Spaniards and set you free.'"
+
+The McCulloch arrived in Manila Bay with Aguinaldo and his outfit,
+May 19th. Let Admiral Dewey tell what happened then [16]:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo came to see me. I said, "Well now, go ashore there; we
+    have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavite, go ashore and start
+    your army." He came back in the course of a few hours and said,
+    "I want to leave here; I want to go to Japan." I said, "Don't give
+    it up, Don Emilio." I wanted his help, you know. He did not sleep
+    ashore that night; he slept on board the ship. The next morning
+    he went on shore, still inside my lines, and began recruiting men.
+
+
+Enterprises of great pith and moment have often turned awry and lost
+the name of action for lack of a word spoken in season by a stout
+heart. Admiral Dewey spoke the word, and Aguinaldo, his protégé,
+did the rest. "Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did
+wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle * * *."
+[17] In fact, the desperate bravery of those little brown men
+after they got warmed up reminds one of the Japs at the walls of
+Peking, in the advance of the Allied Armies to the relief of the
+foreign legations during the Boxer troubles of 1900. Admiral Dewey
+told the Senate Committee in 1902 that Aguinaldo actually wanted to
+put one of the old smooth-bore Spanish guns he found at Cavite on a
+barge and have him (Dewey) tow it up in front of Manila so he could
+attack the city with it. "I said, 'Oh no, no; we can do nothing until
+our troops come.'"
+
+Otherwise he was constantly advising and encouraging him. Why? Let the
+Admiral answer: "I knew that what he was doing--driving the Spaniards
+in--was saving our troops." [17] In other words they were daily dying
+that American soldiers might live, on the faith of the reasons for
+which we had declared war, and trusting, because of the words of our
+consuls and the acts of our admiral, in the sentiment subsequently
+so nobly expressed by Mr. McKinley in his instructions to the Paris
+peace Commissioners:
+
+
+    The United States in making peace should follow the same high
+    rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. [18]
+
+
+"I did not know what the action of our Government would be," said
+the Admiral to the Committee, [19] adding that he simply used his
+best judgment on the spot at the time; presumably supposing that his
+Government would do the decent thing by these people who considered
+us their liberators. "They looked on us as their liberators," said
+he. [20] "Up to the time the army came he (Aguinaldo) did everything I
+requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I
+saw him almost daily. [21] I had not much to do with him after the
+army came." [22]
+
+That was no ordinary occasion, that midsummer session of the
+Senate Committee in 1902. It was a case of the powerful of the earth
+discussing a question of ethics, even as they do in Boston. The nation
+had been intoxicated in 1898 with the pride of power--power revealed
+to it by the Spanish War; and in a spirit thus mellowed had taken
+the Philippines as a sort of political foreign mission, forgetting
+the injunction of the Fathers to keep Church and State separate,
+but not forgetting the possible profits of trade with the saved. A
+long war with the prospective saved had followed, developing many
+barbarities avenged in kind, and the breezes from the South Seas were
+suggesting the aroma of shambles. "How did we get into all this mess,
+anyhow?" said the people. "Let us pause, and consider." Hear the
+still small voice of a nation's conscience mingling with demagogic
+nonsense perpetrated by potent, grave, and reverend Senators:
+
+
+    Admiral Dewey: "I do not think it makes any difference what my
+    opinion is on these things."
+
+    Senator Patterson: "There is no man whose opinion goes farther
+    with the country than yours does, Admiral, and therefore I think
+    you ought to be very prudent in expressing your views."
+
+    Senator Beveridge (Acting Chairman): "The Chairman will not permit
+    any member to lecture Admiral Dewey on his prudence or imprudence."
+
+
+This of course would read well to "Mary of the Vine-clad Cottage"
+out in Indiana, whose four-year-old boy was named George Dewey--,
+or to her counterpart up in Vermont who might name her next boy
+after the brilliant and distinguished Acting Chairman, in token of
+her choice for the Presidency.
+
+
+    Senator Patterson: "I was not lecturing him."
+
+    Senator Beveridge: "Yes; you said he ought to be prudent."
+
+    Senator Patterson: "And I think it was well enough to suggest
+    those things." [23]
+
+
+Thawed into theorizing by these indubitably genuine evidences of
+a nation's high regard, the man of action tried to help the nation
+out. He said he had used the Filipinos as the Federal troops used the
+negroes in the Civil War. Senator Patterson struck this suggestion
+amidships and sunk it with the remark that the negroes were expecting
+freedom. Admiral Dewey had said "The Filipinos were slaves too"
+and considered him their liberator. [24] But he never did elaborate
+on the new definition of freedom which had followed in the wake of
+his ships to Manila, viz., that Freedom does not necessarily mean
+freedom from alien domination, but only a change of masters deemed
+by the new master beneficial to the "slave."
+
+Apropos of why he accepted Aguinaldo's help, the Admiral also said:
+
+
+    I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure the Filipinos
+    could not take Manila, and I thought that the closer they invested
+    the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived to march
+    in. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they were doing
+    our work. [25]
+
+
+Asked as to how big a force Aguinaldo had under arms then and
+afterwards, the Admiral said maybe 25,000, adding, by way of
+illustration of the pluck, vim, and patriotism of his valuable new-made
+friends, "They could have had any number of men; it was just a question
+of arming them. They could have had the whole population." [26]
+Eleven months after that, when we captured the first insurgent capital,
+Malolos, General MacArthur, the ablest and one of the bravest generals
+we ever set to slaughtering Filipinos, said to a newspaper man just
+after a bloody and of course victorious fight: "When I first started in
+against these rebels, I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented
+only a faction." "I did not like," said this veteran of three
+wars, who was always "on the job" in action out there as elsewhere,
+"I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon * * *
+was opposed to us * * * but after having come thus far, and having
+been brought much in contact with both insurrectos and amigos, I have
+been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are
+loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads". [27]
+
+Is it at all unlikely that Admiral Dewey did in fact say of his
+protégés, the Filipinos, to an American visiting Manila in January,
+1899, three or four weeks before the war broke out, "Rather than
+make a war of conquest upon the Filipino people, I would up anchor
+and sail out of the harbor." [28]
+
+If Dewey and MacArthur were right, then, about the situation around
+Manila in 1898, it was a case of an entire people united in an
+aspiration, and looking to us for its fulfilment.
+
+When the American troops reached the Philippines and perfected
+their battle formations about Manila, and the order to advance
+was given, they did "march in," to use Admiral Dewey's expression
+above quoted. But they did not let the Filipinos have a finger in the
+pie. The conquest and retention of the islands had then been determined
+upon. The Admiral's reasons for saddling his protégé with a series of
+bloody battles and a long and arduous campaign are certainly stated
+with the proverbial frankness of the sailorman: "I wanted his help,
+you know." But what was Aguinaldo to get out of the transaction,
+from the Dewey point of view?
+
+"They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards. I do not think they looked
+much beyond that," [29] said the Admiral to the Senate Committee. Let
+us see whether they did or not. Aguinaldo had been shipped by the
+Honorable E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at
+Singapore, from that point to Hong Kong on April 26th, consigned to
+his fellow Warwick, the Honorable Rounseville Wildman, Consul-General
+of the United States at the last-named place, and had been received
+in due course by the consignee. May 5th, at Hong Kong, the Filipino
+Revolutionary Committee had a meeting, the minutes of which we
+subsequently came into possession of, along with other captured
+insurgent papers. The following is an extract from those minutes:
+
+
+    Once the President [Aguinaldo] is in the Philippines with his
+    prestige, he will be able to arouse the masses to combat the
+    demands of the United States, if they should colonize that country,
+    and will drive them, the Filipinos, if circumstances render it
+    necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even
+    if later they should succumb to the weight of the yoke of a new
+    oppressor. If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental
+    principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an
+    attempt will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them. It
+    is probable then that independence will be guaranteed. [30]
+
+
+The truth is that instead of leaving everything to the chance of
+our continuing in the same unselfish frame of mind we were really in
+when the Spanish-American War started, Aguinaldo and his people, not
+sure but what in the wind-up they might even be thrown back upon the
+tender mercies of Spain, played their cards boldly and consistently
+from the beginning with a view of organizing a de facto government
+and getting it recognized by the Powers as such at the very earliest
+practicable moment. They believed that the Lord helps those who help
+themselves. They had anticipated our change of heart and already had
+it discounted before we were aware of it ourselves. They were already
+acting on the idea that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty
+while public opinion in the United States concerning them was in a
+chrysalis state, and trying to develop a new definition of Liberty
+which should comport with the subjugation of distant island subjects
+by a continental commonwealth on the other side of the world based on
+representative government. The prospective subjects did not believe
+that a legislature ten thousand miles away in which they had no vote
+would ever give them a square deal about tariff and other laws dictated
+by special interests. They had had three hundred years of just that
+very sort of thing under Spain and instinctively dreaded continuance
+of it. That their instincts did not deceive them, our later study of
+Congressional legislation will show. The Filipinos had greatly pondered
+their future in their hearts during the last twelve months of Spain's
+colonial empire, watching her Cuban embarrassments with eager eye.
+
+Having seen the frame of mind in which they approached the contract
+implied in Admiral Dewey's cheery words, "Well now, go ashore there
+and start your army," what were the facts of recent history within
+the knowledge of both parties at the time? What had been the screams
+of the American eagle, if any, concerning his moral leadership of
+the family of unfeathered bipeds?
+
+President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December, 1897,
+[31] calling attention to conditions in Cuba as intolerable,
+had declared that if we should intervene to put a stop to them,
+we certainly would not make it the occasion of a land-grab. The
+other nations said: "We are from Missouri." But Mr. McKinley said,
+"forcible annexation" was not to be thought of by us. "That by
+our code of morality would be criminal," etc. So the world said,
+"We shall see what we shall see." Then had come the war message
+of April 11, 1898, [32] reiterating the declaration of the Cuban
+message of December previous, that "forcible annexation by our code of
+morality would be criminal aggression." In other words we announced
+to the overcrowded monarchies of the old world, whose land-lust is
+ever tempted by the broad acres of South America, and ever cooled
+by the virile menace of the Monroe doctrine, that we not only were
+against the principle of land-grabbing, but would not indulge in the
+practice. Immediately upon the conclusion of the reading of the war
+message, Senator Stewart was recognized, and said, among other things:
+"Under the law of nations, intervention for conquest is condemned,
+and is opposed to the universal sentiment of mankind. It is unjust,
+it is robbery, to intervene for conquest." Then Mr. Lodge stood up,
+"in the Senate House a Senator," and said:
+
+
+    We are there [meaning in this present Cuban situation] because we
+    represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new time, and
+    Spain is over against us because she is mediæval, cruel, dying. We
+    have grasped no man's territory, we have taken no man's property,
+    we have invaded no man's rights. We do not ask their lands. [33]
+
+
+These speeches went forth to the world almost like a part of the
+message itself. And Admiral Dewey, like every other American, in
+his early dealings with Aguinaldo, after war broke out, must have
+assumed a mental attitude in harmony with these announcements. But
+the world said, "All this is merely what you Americans yourselves
+call 'hot air.' We repeat, 'We are from Missouri.'" Then we said:
+"Oh very well, we will show you." So in the declaration of war against
+Spain we inserted the following:
+
+
+    Fourth: That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
+    intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
+    said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its
+    determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government
+    and control of the island to its people.
+
+
+This meant, "It is true we do love the Almighty Dollar very dearly,
+oh, Sisters of the Family of Nations, but there are some axiomatic
+principles of human liberty that we love better, and one of them is the
+'unalienable right' of every people to pursue happiness in their own
+way, free from alien domination." All these things were well known to
+both the contracting parties when Admiral Dewey set Aguinaldo ashore
+at Cavite, May 20, 1898, and got him to start his insurrection "under
+the protection of our guns," as he expressed it. [34] Accordingly,
+when the insurgent leader went ashore, the declaration of war was
+his major premise, the assurances of our consuls and the acts of our
+Admiral pursuant thereto were his minor premise, and Independence was
+his conclusion. Trusting to the faith and honor of the American people,
+he took his life in his hands, left the panoplied safety of our mighty
+squadron, and plunged, single-handed, into the struggle for Freedom.
+
+What was the state of the public mind on shore, and how was it
+prepared to receive his assurances of American aid? Consider the
+following picture in the light of its sombre sequel.
+
+Just as the war broke out, Consul Williams had left Manila and gone
+over to Hong Kong, where he joined Admiral Dewey, and accompanied him
+back to Manila, and was thus privileged to be present at the battle
+of Manila Bay, May 1st. Under date of May 12th, from his consular
+headquarters aboard the U. S. S. Baltimore, he reports [35] going
+ashore at Cavite and being received with enthusiastic greetings by
+vast crowds of Filipinos. "They crowded around me," says Brother
+Williams, "hats off, shouting 'Viva los Americanos,' thronged about
+me by hundreds to shake either hand, even several at a time, men,
+women, and children, striving to get even a finger to shake. So I
+moved half a mile, shaking continuously with both hands."
+
+Tut! tut! says the casual reader. What did the Government at
+Washington know of all these goings on, that it should be charged
+later with having violated as binding a moral obligation as ever a
+nation assumed? It is true that the news of the Williams ovation,
+as in the case of the Pratt serenade, reached Washington only by the
+slow channels of the mail. But Washington did in fact receive the
+said news by due course of mail. When it came, however, Washington
+was nursing visions of savages in blankets smoking the pipe of peace
+with the agents of the Great White Father in the White House--i.e.,
+thought, or hoped, the Filipinos were savages--and remained as deaf
+to the sounds of the Williams ovation as it had been to the strains
+of the Pratt serenade.
+
+However, hardly had Admiral Dewey taken his binoculars from the gig
+that carried Aguinaldo ashore to raise his auxiliary insurrection,
+when he called his Flag Secretary, or the equivalent, and dictated
+the following cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by
+    the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render
+    assistance that will be valuable. [36]
+
+
+This sounds a little more serious than "earnest boys" alleging the
+lack of a toothbrush as an excuse for declining mortal combat, does
+it not? How valuable did this assistance prove? Admiral Dewey had to
+wait three and one half months for the army to arrive, and this is
+how the commanding general of the American forces describes conditions
+as he found them in the latter part of August:
+
+
+    For three and one half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron
+    and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled. All
+    commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food
+    supplies were nearly exhausted. [37]
+
+
+And, he might have added, the taking of the city was thus made
+perfectly easy. Otherwise, as Aguinaldo put it in one of his letters
+to General Otis, we would not have taken a city, but only the ruins
+of a city. Admiral Dewey said to the Senate Committee in 1902: "They
+[the Spaniards] surrendered on August 13th, and they had not gotten
+a thing in after the 1st of May." [38]
+
+In the early part of the next year, 1899, President McKinley sent
+out a kind of olive-branch commission, of which President Schurman
+of Cornell University was Chairman. The olive branch got withered
+in the sulphur of exploding gun-powder, so the Commission contented
+itself with making a report. And this is what they said concerning
+what followed the Dewey-Aguinaldo entente:
+
+
+    Shortly afterwards, the Filipinos began to attack the
+    Spanish. Their number was rapidly augmented by the militia who
+    had been given arms by Spain, all of whom revolted and joined
+    the insurgents. Great Filipino successes followed, many Spaniards
+    were taken prisoners, and while the Spanish troops now remained
+    quietly in Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves masters
+    of the entire island [of Luzon] except that city. [39]
+
+
+Of conditions in July, sixty days after Admiral Dewey had on May 20th
+said to Aguinaldo in effect, "Go it, little man, we need you in our
+business," Mr. Wildman, our Consul at Hong Kong, writing to the State
+Department, said, in defending himself for his share in the business
+of getting Aguinaldo's help under promises, both express and implied,
+which were subsequently repudiated, that after he, Wildman, put the
+insurgent chief aboard the McCulloch, May 16th, bound for Manila to
+co-operate by land with our navy: "He * * * organized a government
+* * * and from that day to this he has been uninterruptedly successful
+in the field and dignified and just as the head of his government,"
+[40] a statement which Admiral Dewey subsequently endorsed. [41]
+
+We have seen the preliminaries of this "government" started under
+the auspices of our Admiral and under what he himself called "the
+protection of our guns" (ante). Let us note its progress. If you
+turn the leaves of the contemporaneous official reports, you see
+quite a moving picture show, and the action is rapid. On May 24th,
+still "under the protection of our guns," Aguinaldo proclaimed his
+revolutionary government and summoned the people to his standard for
+the purpose of driving the Spaniards out forever. The situation was an
+exact counterpart of the cotemporary Cuban one as regards identity of
+purpose between "liberator" and "oppressed." His proclamation promised
+a constitutional convention to be called later (and which was duly
+called later) to elect a President and Cabinet, in whose favor he
+would resign the emergency authority now assumed; referred to the
+United States as "undoubtedly disinterested" and as considering the
+Filipinos "capable of governing for ourselves our unfortunate country";
+and formally announced the temporary assumption of supreme authority
+as dictator. Copies of these proclamations were duly furnished Admiral
+Dewey. The latter was too busy looking after the men behind his guns
+and watching the progress of his plucky little ally to study Spanish,
+so he forwarded them to the Navy Department without comment--"without
+reading them," said he to the Senate Committee in 1902. [42] When his
+attention was called to them before the Committee by one of the members
+reading them, his comment was, "Nothing about independence there, is
+there?" [43] It seems to me it did not take an international lawyer
+to see a good deal "there," about independence. In a proclamation
+published at Tarlac in the latter part of 1899, which appears to have
+been a sort of swan-song of the Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo had
+said, in effect, "Certainly Admiral Dewey did not bring me from Hong
+Kong to Manila to fight the Spaniards for the benefit of American
+Trade Expansion," and in this proclamation he claimed that Admiral
+Dewey promised him independence. It is true, that in a letter to
+Senator Lodge, which that distinguished gentleman read on the floor
+of the Senate on January 31, 1900, Admiral Dewey denounced this last
+statement as false. It is also true that those Americans are few and
+far between who will take Aguinaldo's word in preference to Admiral
+Dewey's. Certainly the writer is not one of them. But Aguinaldo
+is no Spanish scholar, being more of a leader of men than a master
+of language, and what sort of an interpreter acted between him and
+the Admiral does not appear. Certainly he never did get anything in
+writing from Admiral Dewey. But after the latter brought him to Manila,
+set him to fighting the common enemy, and helped him with guns and
+otherwise in quickly organizing an army for the purpose, the Admiral
+was at least put on inquiry as to just what Aguinaldo supposed he was
+fighting for. What did the Admiral probably suppose? He told the Senate
+Committee that the idea that they wanted independence "never entered
+his head." The roar of mighty guns seems to have made it difficult for
+him to hear the prattlings of what Aguinaldo's proclamations of the
+time called "the legitimate aspirations of a people." The milk in the
+cocoanut is this: How could it ever occur to a great naval commander,
+such as Admiral Dewey, familiar with the four quarters of the globe,
+that a coterie of politicians at home would be so foolish as to buy
+a vast straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the South
+Seas which had been a nuisance to every government that ever owned
+them? But let us turn from the Senate Committee's studies of 1902 to
+the progress of the infant republic of 1898 at Cavite.
+
+The same day the above proclamations of May 24th were issued, we
+find Consul Williams, now become a sort of amphibious civilian
+aide to Dewey, having his consular headquarters afloat, on the
+U. S. S. Baltimore, of the squadron, writing the State Department,
+describing the great successes of the insurgents, his various
+conferences with Aguinaldo and the other leaders, and his own
+activities in arranging the execution of a power of attorney whereby
+Aguinaldo released to certain parties in Hong Kong $400,000 then
+on deposit to his credit in a Hong Kong bank, for the purpose of
+enabling them to pay for 3000 stand of arms bought there and expected
+to arrive at Cavite on the morrow, and for other needed expenses of the
+revolutionary movement. He says, in part: "Officers have visited me
+during the darkness of the night to inform the fleet and me of their
+operations, and to report increase of strength. When General Merritt
+arrives he will find large auxiliary land forces adapted to his service
+and used to the climate." [44] Throughout this period Admiral Dewey
+reports various cordial conferences with Aguinaldo, though he is not so
+literary as to vivify his accounts with allusions to the weather. In
+one despatch he states that he has "refrained from assisting him * * *
+with the forces under my command" [45]--explaining to him that "the
+squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops."
+
+Six days after the issuance of the Dictatorship proclamations above
+mentioned, viz., on May 30th, Admiral Dewey cables the Navy Department
+[46]:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited Olympia yesterday. He
+    expects to make general attack May 31st.
+
+
+He did not succeed entirely, but there was hard fighting, and the
+cordon around the doomed Spaniards in Manila and its suburbs was
+drawn ever closer and closer.
+
+The remarkable feat of Aguinaldo's raising a right formidable fighting
+force in twelve days after his little "Return from Elba," which force
+kept growing like a snowball, is difficult, for one who does not know
+the Filipinos, and the conditions then, to credit. It is explained
+by the fact that Admiral Dewey let him have the captured guns in the
+Cavite arsenal, that Cavite was a populous hotbed of insurrection,
+and that many native regiments, or parts of regiments, quite suited
+to be the nucleus of an army, having lots of veteran non-commissioned
+officers, deserted the Spaniards and went over to the insurgents,
+their countrymen, as soon as Aguinaldo arrived.
+
+On June 6th, we have another bulletin sent to the Navy Department
+by Admiral Dewey, transmitting with perceptible satisfaction further
+information as to the progress of his indefatigable protégé:
+
+
+    Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of Cavite
+    during the last week; they have had several small victories,
+    taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops,
+    not native. [47]
+
+
+Along about this period Aguinaldo happens to get hold of a belated
+copy of the London Times of May 5, 1898. It contains considerable
+speculation on the future of the Philippines which casts a shadow
+over the soul of the president of the incipient republic. Having read
+President McKinley's immortal State papers about the moral obliquity
+of "forcible annexation," he is moved to write direct to the source
+of those noble sentiments. The letter is dated June 10, 1898. It is
+addressed, with a quaintness now pathetic, "To the President of the
+Republic of the Great North American Nation." It greets the addressee
+with "the most tender effusion of" the writer's soul, expresses his
+"deep and sincere gratitude," in the name of his people, "for the
+efficient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give
+it to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination,
+as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba" and then proceeds to
+tell of "the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading
+in the Times the astounding statement that you, sir, will retain
+these islands," etc. He proceeds:
+
+
+    The Philippine people * * * have seen in your nation, ever since
+    your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here
+    * * * the angel who is the harbinger of their liberty; and they
+    rose like a single wave * * * as soon as I trod these shores; and
+    captured in ten days nearly the whole garrison of this Province
+    of Cavite in whose port I have my government--by the consent of
+    the Admiral of your triumphant fleet. [48]
+
+
+The writer closes his letter with an impassioned protest against
+the occurrence of what is suggested in the Times, and speaks of
+his fellow-countrymen as "a people which trusts blindly in you not
+to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and
+independent," and adds his "fervent prayers for the ever-increasing
+prosperity of your powerful nation." [49]
+
+But the signer of the foregoing letter did not spend all his time
+praying for us, as may be observed in this bulletin from Admiral Dewey
+concerning the way he was lambasting the common enemy, sent the Navy
+Department, June 12th:
+
+
+    Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded
+    Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat
+    most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until
+    the arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised. [50]
+
+
+Four days later Washington chided the hapless Pratt at Singapore about
+having talked to Aguinaldo of "direct co-operation" with Admiral Dewey,
+saying: "To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General
+Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he
+was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to
+gratify." [51] This communication goes on to advise Mr. Pratt that the
+Department cannot approve anything he may have said to Aguinaldo on
+behalf of the United States which would concede that in accepting his
+co-operation we would owe him anything. Yet it did not tell Admiral
+Dewey to quit coaching him, because the service he was rendering
+was too valuable. There is no communication to Admiral Dewey about
+"hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify" in the official
+archives of those times. There was Admiral Dewey coaching Aguinaldo
+and telling him to wait for the main attack until General Merritt
+should arrive with our troops. Why? Because he expected Merritt to
+co-operate with Aguinaldo, and of course Aguinaldo expected exactly
+what Dewey expected.
+
+In reviewing the history of those times the writer has not been
+so careless as to have overlooked Senator Lodge's elaborate speech
+in the Senate on March 7, 1900, wherein attention is called to the
+circumstance that a few days after Aguinaldo landed at Cavite, the
+Navy Department cabled cautioning Dewey to have no alliance with him
+that might complicate us, and that the Admiral answered he had made no
+alliance and would make none. But if actions speak louder than words,
+the Senator's point does not rise above the dignity of a technicality.
+
+The same day the State Department reprimanded Pratt, as above
+indicated, viz., June 16th, Consul Williams at Manila wrote them
+a glowing communication [52] about how "active and almost uniformly
+successful" Aguinaldo was continuing to be. But no resultant enthusiasm
+is of record. Two days later, on June 18th, Aguinaldo issued his
+first formal Declaration of Independence. The infant republic was now
+less than a month old, but it already had a fine set of teeth. The
+Spaniards had seen them. The proclamation was of course addressed to
+the Filipino people, and called on them to rally to the cause, but
+he was also driving at recognition by the Powers. It read in part:
+"In the face of the whole world I have proclaimed that the aspiration
+of my whole life, the final object of all my wishes and efforts,
+is your independence, because I have the inner conviction that it is
+also your constant longing." [53] Many Americans insist that this is
+mere "hot air" and that the average Filipino peasant does not think
+much more than his plough animal, the scoffer himself being stupidly
+unaware that this has been precisely the argument of tyranny in all
+ages. But the pride a people will have in seeing the best educated
+and most able men of their own race in charge of their affairs seems
+to me too obvious to need elaboration. It was always accepted by us
+as axiomatic until we took the Philippines. It is a cruel species of
+wickedness for an American to tell his countrymen that the Filipino
+people do not want independence, for some of them may believe it.
+
+The Declaration of Independence of June 18th is known to students
+of Philippine political archæology as the Proclamation establishing
+the "dictatorial" government. The principal thing it did was to
+supplement the absolute dictatorship proclaimed May 24th by provisions
+for organizing in detail. It also declared independence. A more
+elaborate Declaration followed on June 23d, known as the proclamation
+establishing the "revolutionary" government. This made provision
+for a Congress, a Cabinet, and courts. Of course it was only a paper
+government the day the ink dried on it. But we will follow it through
+its teething, and adolescence, to the attainment of its majority at
+an inauguration where the president was driven to the place of the
+taking of the oath of office in a coach and four, through a short
+and very self-respecting heyday, and a longer peripatetic existence,
+to final dissolution. The document of June 23d reminds us of a fact
+which in reading it at this late date we are apt to forget, viz.,
+that the Filipinos did not know at what moment their powerful ally,
+the American squadron, might up anchor and sail away to the high
+seas, to meet another Spanish fleet; thus leaving them to the tender
+mercies of the Spaniards, possibly forever. So they were losing no
+time. In fact, they had set to work from the very beginning with a
+determination to try and secure recognition from the Powers at the
+earliest moment. In appealing to the public opinion of the world with a
+view of paving the way to recognition by the Powers--which recognition
+would mean getting arms for war with Spain or any other power without
+the inconveniences of filibustering--Aguinaldo says on behalf of his
+people in the proclamation of June 23d, above mentioned, that they
+"now no longer limit themselves to asking for assimilation with the
+political constitution of Spain, but ask for a complete separation
+(and) strive for independence, completely assured that the time has
+come when they can and ought to govern themselves."
+
+Mr. Frank D. Millet, who reached Manila soon enough (in July) to
+see the ripples of this proclamation, describes the effect on the
+people. While Mr. Millet is one of the best men that anybody ever knew,
+a proposition as to which I am quite sure the President of the United
+States and many people great and small in many lands would affirm my
+judgment, [54] still, he writes from a frankly White Man's Burden or
+land-grabbing standpoint--is in harmony with his environment. At
+page 50 of his book, [55] he reproduces the proclamation last
+above quoted from, and adds the following satirical comment: "This
+flowery production was widely circulated and had a great effect on
+the imagination of the people, who, in the elation of their present
+success in investing the town and in their belief that the United
+States was beginning a campaign in the Philippines to free them from
+Spanish oppression (italics mine) shortly came to think that they
+were already a nation."
+
+Copies of these June proclamations also, as in the case of those
+of May 24th, were duly forwarded by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey
+[56] and by him forwarded to Washington without comment. In his
+letter transmitting them to Dewey, Aguinaldo announces that his
+government has "taken possession of the various provinces of the
+archipelago." Just exactly how many provinces he had control of on
+June 23d will be examined later. The very same day the proclamation
+of June 23d declaring independence was issued, Admiral Dewey cabled
+the Navy Department [57]: "Aguinaldo has acted independently of the
+squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress which has been
+wonderful. I have allowed him to take from the arsenal such Spanish
+arms and ammunition as he needed." After adding that "Aguinaldo
+expects to capture Manila without any assistance," the Admiral,
+evidently divining the temptation that was then luring the political
+St. Anthonies at Washington, volunteers this timely suggestion:
+
+
+    In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more
+    capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am
+    familiar with both races. [57]
+
+
+That there may be no doubt about the motive behind that suggestion,
+it may be noted here that the Admiral told the Senate Committee in
+1902: "I wrote that because I saw in the newspapers that Congress
+contemplated giving the Cubans independence." [58]
+
+But this is not all. On August 13th, the day after the Peace
+Protocol was signed, Mr. McKinley wired Admiral Dewey asking about
+"the desirability of the several islands," the "coal and mineral
+deposits," and in reply on August 29th, the Admiral wrote:
+
+
+    In a telegram sent the Department on June 23d, I expressed the
+    opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence
+    and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba,
+    and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them
+    has confirmed me in this opinion. [59]
+
+
+As a result of one year's stay in Cuba, and six in the Philippines--two
+in the army that subjugated the Filipinos and four as a judge over
+them--I heartily concur in the above opinion of Admiral Dewey,
+but with this addition: Whatever of solidarity for governmental
+purposes the Filipinos may have lacked at the date of the Admiral's
+communications, they were certainly welded into conscious political
+unity, as one people, in their war for independence against us.
+
+In the 1609 or Douay (pronounce Dewey) version of the Bible, the
+Latin Vulgate, Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer only says "Lead
+us not into temptation," while Matthew adds "but deliver us from
+evil." The Dewey suggestions to the Washington Government in 1898
+remind a regretful nation of both the evangelical versions mentioned,
+for the first seems to say what Luke says, and the second seems to
+add what Matthew adds.
+
+There is not an American who has known the Filipinos since the
+beginning of the American occupation who doubts for a moment that
+but for our intervention a Republic would have been established out
+there under the lead of Aguinaldo, Mabini, and their associates,
+which would have compared well with the republican governments
+between the United States and Cape Horn. The writer doubts very
+much if President Taft is of a contrary opinion. The real issue is,
+now that we have them, should we keep them in spite of the tariff
+iniquities which the Trusts perpetrate on them through Congress,
+until they have received the best possible tuition we can give them,
+or be content to give them their independence when they are already at
+least as fit for it as the Republics to the South of us, guaranteeing
+them independence by international agreement like that which protects
+Belgium and Switzerland?
+
+Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and emphasize
+on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the capacity of
+the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made in lucid
+language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek. General
+Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first American
+troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May 1st,
+and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat as
+a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United States
+of retaining the Philippines. "I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey,"
+says General Anderson in the North American Review for February, 1900,
+"that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to
+hold the Philippines if they were captured." He adds: "Whether Admiral
+Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give
+Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized,
+the Filipinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather
+than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition,
+as I did subsequently at his request."
+
+General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured
+prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the
+Filipinos--1300 at one clip in the month of June at Olongapo. [60]
+These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented the Filipinos from
+taking until Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon,
+he promptly sent Captain Coghlan with the Raleigh and another of his
+ships to the scene of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the
+German "Hoch der Kaiser" etc. or words to that effect, and made him
+go about his business and let our ally alone. Then Captain Coghlan
+took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them over to Aguinaldo by
+direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as well as the test of,
+an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring into the partnership
+something you lack. The navy had no way to keep prisoners of war. There
+can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey's original notions about meeting
+the problems presented by his great victory of May 1, 1898, had been
+followed, we never would have had any trouble with the Filipinos;
+nor can there be any doubt that he made them his allies and used
+them as such. They were very obedient allies at that, until they
+saw the Washington Government was going to repudiate the "alliance,"
+and withhold from them what they had a right to consider the object
+and meaning of the alliance, if it meant anything.
+
+The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the
+National Geographic Society in Washington, "We blundered into
+colonization." [61] As we have seen, Admiral Dewey repeatedly
+expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the Filipinos
+were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more capable
+of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when
+he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for
+self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a
+coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part
+of the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the
+mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong as the gateway to
+the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the carrying trade of
+the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at Manila by way of
+rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that the taking of the
+islands was a dubious step from a financial standpoint, and a still
+more dubious one from the strategic standpoint of defending them by
+land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or any other first-class
+power. At this late date, when the passions and controversies of that
+period have long since subsided, is it not perfectly clear that after
+he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey not only dealt with the
+Filipinos, until the army came out, substantially as Admiral Sampson
+and General Shatter did with the Cubans, but also that he did all he
+properly could to save President McKinley from the one great blunder
+of our history, the taking of the Philippine Islands?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+ANDERSON AND AGUINALDO
+
+                        Well, honor is the subject of my story.
+
+                                            Julius Cæsar, Act. I, Sc. 2.
+
+
+The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898,
+ten days after the outbreak of the war with Spain, having necessitated
+sending troops to the Philippines to complete the reduction of the
+Spanish power in that quarter, Major-General Wesley Merritt was on
+May 16th selected to organize and command such an expedition.
+
+"The First Expedition," as it was always distinguished, by the officers
+and men of the Eighth Army Corps, there having been many subsequent
+expeditions sent out before our war with the Filipinos was over,
+was itself subdivided into a number of different expeditions, troops
+being hurried to Manila as fast as they could be assembled and properly
+equipped in sufficient numbers. The first batch that were whipped into
+shape left San Francisco under command of Brigadier-General Thomas
+M. Anderson, on May 25th, and arrived off Manila, June 30th. General
+Merritt did not arrive until July 25th. It was General Anderson,
+therefore, who broke the ice of the American occupation of the
+Philippines.
+
+In his annual message to Congress of December, following, [62]
+summing up the War with Spain and its results, Mr. McKinley gives
+a brief account of the First Expedition. After recounting Admiral
+Dewey's victory of May 1st previous, he states that "on the seventh
+day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory at
+Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of the fleet what troops
+would be required." President McKinley does not give the Admiral's
+answer, though he does state that it was received on the 15th day of
+May. The Admiral's answer appears, however, in the Report of the Navy
+Department for 1898, Appendix, page 98. It was: "In my best judgment,
+a well-equipped force of 5000 men." But the President's message does
+state that he at once sent a "total force consisting of 641 officers
+and 15,058 enlisted men."
+
+The difference of view-point of the Admiral and the President is clear
+from the language of both. In recommending 5000 troops, the Admiral
+had said they would be necessary "to retain possession [of Manila]
+and thus control Philippine Islands." This counted, of course, on the
+friendship of the people, as in Cuba. "I had in view simply taking
+possession of the city." said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [63]
+
+The purpose of the President in sending three times as many troops as
+were needed for the purpose Admiral Dewey had in mind is indicated in
+his account of what happened. After describing the taking of Manila
+by our troops on August 13th, the presidential message says:
+
+
+    By this the conquest of the Philippine Islands, virtually
+    accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed
+    by Admiral Dewey's victory of May 1st, was formally sealed. [64]
+
+
+Admiral Dewey contemplated that we should merely remain masters of the
+situation out where he was until the end of the war. President McKinley
+set about to effect "the conquest of the Philippine Islands." The
+naval victory of Manila Bay having made it certain that at the
+conclusion of our war against a decadent monarchy we would at last
+have an adequate coaling station and naval base in the Far East, the
+sending of troops to the Philippines, in appropriate prosecution of
+the war, to reduce and capture Manila, the capital and chief port,
+raised the question at once "And then what?"
+
+The genesis of the idea of taking over the archipelago is traceable
+to within a few days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet.
+
+Within a few days after the official news of the battle of Manila
+Bay reached Washington, the Treasury Department set a man to work
+making a "Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions of the
+Philippine Islands." [65] The Interior Department also awoke, about
+the same time to possibilities of an El Dorado in the new overseas
+conquest. "In May, 1898," says Secretary of the Interior, C. N. Bliss,
+in a letter intended for the Peace Commissioners who met at Paris
+that fall, "by arrangement between the Secretary of War with this
+Department"--Mr. Bliss's grammar is bad, but his meaning is plain--"a
+geologist of the United States Geological Survey accompanied the
+military expedition to the Philippines for the purpose of procuring
+information touching the geological and mineral resources of said
+islands." [66] This report, which accompanies the Bliss letter, reads
+like a mining stock prospectus. That summer an Assistant Secretary of
+the Treasury, presumably echoing the sentiments of the Administration,
+came out in one of the great magazines of the period, the Century,
+with an article in which he said: "We see with sudden clearness that
+some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their
+force. * * * A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force
+* * * the mainspring of commercialism." [67] Of course, the writer did
+not mention that Manila is an out-of-the-way place, so far as regards
+the main-travelled routes across the Pacific Ocean, and also forgot
+that, as has been suggested once before, the carrying trade of the
+world, and the shippers on which it depends, in the contest of the
+nations for the markets of Asia, would never take to the practice of
+unloading at Manila by way of rehearsal, before finally discharging
+cargo on the mainland of Asia, where the name of the Ultimate
+Consumer is legion. Nevertheless "Expansion"--of Trade, mainly--was
+the slogan of the hour, and any one who did not catch the contagion
+of exuberant allusion to "Our New Possessions" was considered crusty
+and out of date. People who referred back to the political maxims of
+Washington's Farewell Address, and the cognate set represented by the
+Monroe Doctrine, were regarded merely as not knowing a good thing
+when they saw it. So on rode the country, on the crest of the wave
+of war. When President McKinley sent the troops to the Philippines,
+their job was to hurry up and effect what his subsequent message to
+Congress describing their work called "the conquest of the Philippine
+Islands." That is, they were to effect a constructive conquest of
+the archipelago before Spain should sue for peace. It never seemed
+to occur to anybody at home that the Filipinos would object. If the
+country had, through some divine interposition, gotten it into its
+head that the Filipinos were quite a decent lot and really did object
+very bitterly, it would have risen in its wrath and smitten down any
+suggestion of forcing a government on them against their will. But
+nobody knew anything about them. They were a wholly new proposition.
+
+General Anderson was of course furnished with a copy of the President's
+instructions to his chief, General Merritt. They are quite long,
+and go into details about a number of administrative matters that
+would necessarily come up after the city should surrender, such as
+the raising of revenue, the military commander's duty under the law
+of nations with regard to the seizure of transportation lines by
+land or sea, the protection of places of worship from desecration or
+destruction, and the like. The only portion of them that is essential
+to a clear understanding of subsequent events is now submitted:
+They are dated Executive Mansion, May 18, 1898, and read in part [68]:
+
+
+    PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MERRITT
+
+    The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by
+    the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the
+    garrisons, and acquisition of control of the bay, have rendered
+    it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted
+    by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable
+    and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the
+    Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of
+    the Spanish power in that quarter, and of giving order and security
+    to the islands while in the possession of the United States.
+
+    For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General
+    Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions
+    as to the manner in which the movements shall be conducted.
+
+    The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's
+    territory is the severance of the former political relations of the
+    inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under
+    this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they
+    perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons
+    and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is
+    my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted
+    with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest
+    extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be
+    the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon
+    his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation declaring
+    that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines
+    nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them
+    in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal
+    and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or
+    by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its
+    efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive
+    the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should
+    be as free from severity as possible. Though the powers of the
+    military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately
+    upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal
+    laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights
+    of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime,
+    are to be considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
+    compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended
+    or superseded by the occupying belligerents; and in practice they
+    are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force
+    and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as
+    they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so
+    far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. * * *
+    The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations
+    will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.
+
+    While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will
+    be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt
+    measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the
+    people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance
+    of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or
+    expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute
+    new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or
+    to create such supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In
+    the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided
+    by his judgment and experience and a high sense of justice.
+
+
+While this document declares the purpose of our government to be a "two
+fold purpose," viz., first, to make an appropriate move in the game
+of war, and, second, to police the Islands "while in the possession
+of the United States," it is wholly free from inherent evidence of any
+intention out of harmony with the policy as to Cuba. In fact when the
+city of Santiago de Cuba surrendered to our forces in July thereafter,
+and it became necessary to issue instructions for the guidance of the
+military commander there, exactly the same instructions were given him,
+[69] verbatim et literatim. But in respect of the Cuban instructions
+there was never any concealment practised or necessary because the
+Cubans had been assured by the Teller amendment to the resolutions
+declaring war against Spain that we had no ulterior designs on their
+country, and that, as soon as peace and public order were restored,
+we intended "to leave the government and control of the island to its
+people." The Cuban instructions were therefore frankly and promptly
+published in General Orders No. 101 by the War Department, July 18,
+1898, five days after they were received from the President, and
+were then translated into Spanish and spread broadcast over Santiago
+province without unnecessary delay. I remember poring over a Spanish
+copy of General Orders 101, at Santiago de Cuba, shortly after the
+fall of that city, which copy was one of many already posted about
+that city by direction of General Wood. The words "the powers of the
+military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately
+upon the political condition of the inhabitants" never disturbed the
+Cuban leaders in the least, because they were read in the light of the
+disclaimer contained in the declaration of war. On the other hand,
+the proclamation which the military commander in the Philippines
+was enjoined by his instructions to publish "immediately upon his
+arrival in the islands," which arrival occurred July 25th, was not so
+published until after we had taken Manila, August 13th, and then it
+copied only the glittering generalities of the instructions themselves,
+such as the part assuring the people that we had not come to make war
+on them and that vested rights would be respected, but it carefully
+omitted the words about the powers of the military occupant being
+absolute and supreme, because when the army arrived it found a native
+government that had already issued its declaration of independence,
+was making wonderful progress against the common enemy, and was able
+to put up a right good fight against us also, in case we should deny
+them independence. [70]
+
+General Anderson arrived in Manila Bay, June 30, 1898, with about
+2500 men, and when General Merritt arrived, July 25th, we had about
+10,000 all told, while the Filipinos had half again that many, and
+there were 12,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila. General Anderson had not
+been long camped on the bayshore, under cover of the Navy's guns and
+in the neighborhood of Aguinaldo's headquarters, before he understood
+the whole situation clearly and wrote the War Department as follows:
+
+
+    Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt,
+    I think I should state to you that the establishment of a
+    provisional government on our part will probably bring us in
+    conflict with insurgents.
+
+
+This letter is dated July 18, 1898. [71]
+
+When General Anderson arrived in the islands on June 30th,
+the Washington Government was still wrestling with the angel of
+its announced creed about "Forcible Annexation" being "criminal
+aggression," and Mr. McKinley had to get both that angel's shoulders on
+the mat and put him out of business before he could get his own consent
+to giving any instructions to his generals which might sanction their
+killing people for objecting to forcible annexation. Hence his early
+anxiety to avoid a rupture with the Filipino leaders. The first stage
+of this wrestling coincides in point of time with General Anderson's
+tenure as the ranking military officer commanding our forces in
+the Philippines, which was from June 30th until the date of General
+Merritt's arrival, July 25th. As already made plain, the President's
+instructions for the guidance of the military commander were entirely
+free from any land-grabbing suggestion. On the other hand, when General
+Anderson left San Francisco for Manila, May 25th, there was already
+talk in the United States about retaining the Islands, if they were
+captured, for he so informed Admiral Dewey in the first interview
+they had after the transports which brought his command cast anchor
+near our squadron in Manila Bay on the last day of June. "I was the
+first to tell Admiral Dewey," says he, in the North American Review
+for February, 1900, "that there was any disposition on the part of the
+American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The
+current opinion was setting that way when the expeditionary force
+left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise."
+
+Relegated by the circumstances to his own discretion as to how he
+should act until Washington knew its mind, General Anderson's attitude
+in the outset represented a "peace-at-any-price" policy, suffused
+with benevolent pride at championing the cause of the oppressed, but
+secretly knowing from the beginning that it might become necessary
+later to slaughter said "oppressed," should they seriously object to
+a change of masters.
+
+"On July 1st," says General Anderson, in the North American Review
+article above quoted, "I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey." Of
+the Admiral's dealings with the insurgent chief prior to this time,
+the General says in this same article:
+
+"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did
+or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would
+be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring
+this from their acts rather than from their statements." This last
+quoted passage was read to Admiral Dewey by a member of the Senate
+Committee in 1902, along with other parts of the magazine article
+cited, and he was asked to comment on the same. He said:
+
+"These are General Anderson's statements. They are very interesting,
+indeed; I am here to make my own statements."
+
+He had stated that he never did specifically promise Aguinaldo
+independence, and the questioner was trying to show that his acts had
+amounted to assurances and therefore had committed the Government to
+giving the Filipinos their independence. Then Senator Patterson began
+another question, and had gotten as far as "I want to know whether
+your views--" when out came this, as of a sailor-man clearing decks
+for action:
+
+"I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them yesterday and
+I do not like them to-day." So the Admiral's feelings were respected
+and the question was not pressed. There is no doubt at all that in
+the Philippines in the summer of 1898 the army turned the back of its
+hand to Aguinaldo as soon as it got there and baldly repudiated what
+the navy had done in the way of befriending the Filipinos. But both
+had acted under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
+and Navy--the President. The Admiral's sensitiveness on the subject
+ought to have been respected. And it was.
+
+By the time Admiral Dewey and General Anderson decided to call on
+"Don Emilio," the day after the General's arrival, the unexpected
+intimations which the latter brought, as to the Washington programme
+for the Philippine revolutionists being different from that as to Cuba,
+had begun to get in its work on the former. Not being a politician,
+the gallant Admiral was there ready and able to carry out any orders
+his government might send him, whenever the politicians should decide
+what they wanted to do. But in the absence of orders, he began to
+trim his sails a bit, so as to be prepared for whatever might be the
+policy. Accordingly, before he and the General started out to pay their
+call on "Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, President of the Revolutionary
+Government of the Philippines and General in Chief of its Army"--as he
+had styled himself in his proclamation of June 23d,--the Admiral said,
+"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your
+blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." And says he, in telling this, "We
+went in that way." [72] The reason of thus avoiding too much ceremony
+toward our "ally" claiming to represent an existing government which
+had lately declared its independence, is explained by an expression
+of the Admiral's concerning said Declaration of Independence itself:
+"That was my idea, not taking it seriously." At that same hearing the
+Admiral explained with much genuine feeling that from the day of the
+naval battle of May 1st until the arrival of the army "these great
+questions" were coming up constantly and he simply met them as they
+arose by acting on his best judgment on the spot at the time. But what
+a terrible mistake it was not to take that Declaration of Independence
+of June 23d, seriously, backed as it was by an army of 15,000 men
+flushed with victory, and under the absolute control of the author of
+the Declaration! Of course the Declaration had been published to the
+army. Could its author have checked them by repudiating it even if
+he had wanted to? As Aguinaldo himself expressed what would happen in
+such a contingency, "They would fail to recognize me as the interpreter
+of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me
+by another more careful of his own honor and dignity." [73]
+
+This Dewey-Anderson call on Aguinaldo was on July 1st. Admiral Dewey
+now began to foresee that the Washington programme was going to
+put him in an awkward position. So he began to take Aguinaldo more
+seriously. On July 4th, he wired Washington: "Aguinaldo proclaimed
+himself President of the Revolutionary Republic on July 1st." [74]
+It was on July 7th that Admiral Dewey captured 1300 armed Spanish
+prisoners, the garrison of Isla la Grande, off Olongapo, and turned
+them over to the forces of the Aguinaldo government because he had
+no way to keep them. [75] Was not that taking that government a
+bit seriously? How wholly unauthorized by the facts was this of "not
+taking it seriously," on the part of "The Liberator of the Filipinos,"
+[76] the immortal victor of Manila Bay, who two months before had
+taught the nation the magnitude of its power for good, in a cause as
+righteous as the crusades of old, and more sensible!
+
+But to return to General Anderson's account in the North American
+Review of his call, with Admiral Dewey, on the insurgent chief: "He
+asked me at once whether the 'United States of the North' either had,
+or would recognize his government. I am not quite sure as to the form
+of the question, whether it was 'had' or 'would'? In either form it was
+embarrassing." General Anderson then tells of Aguinaldo's returning
+his call: "A few days thereafter he made an official call, coming
+with cabinet, staff, and band. He asked if we, the North Americans,
+as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I
+said I could not answer that, but that in 122 years we had established
+no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied
+attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no
+authority for colonies, and I have no fear.'" General Anderson adds:
+"It may seem that my answer was evasive, but I was at the time trying
+to contract with the Filipinos for horses, fuel, and forage."
+
+While this history must not lapse into an almanac, it may not be
+amiss to follow these early stages of this matter through a few more
+successive dates, because the history of that period was all indelibly
+branded into Filipino memory shortly afterward with the red-hot iron
+of war.
+
+July 4th, General Anderson writes the Filipino candidate for
+Independence inviting him to "co-operate with us in military operations
+against the Spanish forces." [77] This was written not to arrange
+any plan of co-operation but in order to get room about Cavite as a
+military base without a row. In his North American Review article
+General Anderson says that on that same day, the Fourth of July,
+Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and review "in honor of
+our national holiday." "He did not come," says the article, "because
+he was not invited as President but as General Aguinaldo." An odd
+situation, was it not? Here was a man claiming to be President of a
+newly established republic based on the principles set forth in our
+Declaration of Independence, which republic had just issued a like
+Declaration, and he was invited to come and hear our declaration read,
+and declined because we would not recognize his right to assert the
+same truths. On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
+it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our Declaration
+before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.
+
+July 6th, General Anderson writes telling Aguinaldo that he is
+expecting more troops soon and therefore "I would like to have your
+excellency's advice and co-operation." [78]
+
+July 9th, General Anderson writes the War Department that Aguinaldo
+tells him he has about 15,000 fighting men, 11,000 armed with guns,
+and some 4000 prisoners, [79] and adds: "When we first landed he
+seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly but I have now come
+to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and
+seems willing to co-operate."
+
+July 13th, we find Admiral Dewey also still in a co-operative mood. On
+that day he cables the Navy Department of the capture of the 1,300
+prisoners on July 7th, mentioned above, which capture was made, it
+appears, because Aguinaldo complained to him that a German war-ship
+was interfering with his operations, [80] the prisoners being at once
+turned over to Aguinaldo, as stated above.
+
+July 18th, is the date of the letter to the War Department
+in which General Anderson states that the establishment of a
+provisional government by us will probably mean a conflict with the
+insurgents. This was equivalent to saying that they will probably be
+ready to fight whenever we assert the "absolute and supreme" authority
+that the President's instructions had directed to be asserted by the
+army as soon as it should arrive in the Philippines. Yet in the fall
+of 1899, President McKinley said he "never dreamed" that Aguinaldo's
+"little band" would oppose our rule to the extent of war against it. It
+would have been more accurate if the martyred Christian gentleman
+who used those words had said he "always hoped" they would not,
+instead of "never dreamed" they would. This letter of July 18th,
+informs the Department:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo has declared himself dictator and self-appointed
+    president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute
+    method of procedure under it.
+
+
+July 19th, General Anderson sends Major (now Major-General) J. F. Bell,
+to Aguinaldo, and asks of him a number of favors, such as any
+soldier may properly ask of an ally, for example, permission to see
+his military maps, etc., and that Aguinaldo "place at his [Bell's]
+disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also
+give him [Bell] a letter or pass addressed to your subordinates which
+will authorize them to furnish him any information they can * * *
+and to facilitate his passage along the lines, upon a reconnaissance
+around Manila, on which I propose to send him." [81] All of which
+Aguinaldo did.
+
+Military training is very keen on honor. Talk about what the French
+call foi d'officier,--the "word of an officer"! Did ever a letter from
+one soldier to another more completely commit the faith and honor of
+his government, to recognition of the existence of an alliance? "In
+122 years we have established no colonies," he had told Aguinaldo. "It
+looks like we are about to go into the colonizing business," he had,
+in effect, said to Admiral Dewey, about the same time.
+
+July 21st, General Anderson writes the Adjutant-General of the army
+as follows:
+
+
+    Since I last wrote, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate
+    system of military government. * * * It may seem strange that I
+    have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator,
+    his declaration of martial law, etc. I wrote such a protest but
+    did not publish it at Admiral Dewey's request. [82]
+
+
+When he wrote this letter, General Anderson was evidently beginning
+to have some compunctions about the trouble he now saw ahead. He was
+a veteran of the Civil War, whose gallantry had then been proven on
+many a field against an enemy compared with whom these people would
+be a picnic. But things did not look to the grim old hero like there
+was going to be a square deal. So he put this in the letter:
+
+
+    I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
+    the natives. They are not ignorant savage tribes, but have
+    a civilization of their own, and although insignificant in
+    appearance are fierce fighters and for a tropical people they are
+    industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work than a
+    regiment of volunteers.
+
+
+Of course, this slam at "volunteers" was a bit rough. But the
+battle-scarred veteran's sense of fair play was getting on his
+nerves. He foresaw the coming conflict, and though he did not shirk it,
+he did not relish it. He understood the "game," and it seemed to him
+the cards were stacked, to meet the necessity of demonstrating that
+forcible annexation, instead of being criminal aggression, was merely
+Trade Expansion, and that his government was right then irrevocably
+committing itself, without any knowledge of, or acquaintance with,
+the Filipinos, to the assumption that they were incapable of running
+a government of their own.
+
+The next day, July 22d, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo a letter
+advising him that he was without orders as yet concerning the question
+of recognizing his government. But that this letter was neither a
+protest nor in the nature of a protest, is evident from its text:
+
+
+    I observe that Your Excellency has announced yourself dictator
+    and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military
+    capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I
+    have no orders from my government on the subject. [83]
+
+
+Yet General Anderson's letter to the Adjutant-General of the army
+of July 18th [84] uses the words "since reading the President's
+instructions to General Merritt," etc., showing that he had a copy
+of them; and those instructions order and direct (see ante) that
+as soon as the commanding general of the American troops arrives
+he is to let the Filipinos know that "the powers of the military
+occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the
+political condition of the inhabitants." A charitable view of the
+matter would be that, technically, those were Merritt's orders,
+not Anderson's. But the whole scheme was to conceal the intention
+to assume supreme authority and keep Aguinaldo quiet "until," as
+General Merritt afterwards expressed it in his report, "I should be
+in possession of the city of Manila, * * * as I would not until then
+be in a position to * * * enforce my authority, in the event that his
+[Aguinaldo's] pretensions should clash with my designs." [85]
+
+The same day that General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo his billet doux
+about the dictatorship, viz., July 22d, he cabled Washington a much
+franker and more serious message; which read: "Aguinaldo declares
+dictatorship and martial law over all islands. The people expect
+independence." The very next day, July 23d, he wrote Aguinaldo asking
+his assistance in getting five hundred horses, and fifty oxen and
+ox-carts, and manifesting considerable impatience that he had not
+already complied with a similar request previously made "as it was
+to fight in the cause of your people." [86] The following day, July
+24th, replying to General Anderson's letter of the 22d wherein General
+Anderson had advised him that he was as yet without orders concerning
+the question of recognizing his government, Aguinaldo wrote:
+
+
+    It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any
+    of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North
+    American nation, which had struggled first for its independence,
+    and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually
+    struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with
+    greater benevolence than any other nation. [87]
+
+
+That cablegram of July 22d, above quoted, in which the commanding
+general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington
+government, "The people expect independence," is the hardest thing in
+the published archives of our government covering that momentous period
+for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. [88] After
+the war with the Filipinos broke out Mr. McKinley said repeatedly in
+public speeches, "I never dreamed they would turn against us." You do
+not find the Anderson cablegram of July 22d in the published report of
+the War Department covering the period under consideration. General
+Anderson addressed it to the Secretary of War and signed it, and,
+probably for lack of army cable facilities, got Admiral Dewey to send
+it to the Secretary of the Navy for transmission to the Secretary of
+War. [89] Certain it must be that at some Cabinet meeting on or after
+July 22, 1898, either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War
+read in the hearing of the President and the rest of his advisers that
+message from General Anderson, "The people expect independence." The
+object here is not to inveigh against Mr. McKinley. It is to show
+that, as Gibbon told us long ago, in speaking of the discontent of
+far distant possessions and the lack of hold of the possessor on the
+affections of the inhabitants thereof, "the cry of remote distress
+is ever faintly heard." The average American to-day, if told the
+Filipinos want independence, will give the statement about the same
+consideration Mr. McKinley did then, and if told that the desire
+among them for a government of their people by their people for their
+people has not been diminished since the late war by tariff taxation
+without representation, and the steady development of race prejudice
+between the dominant alien race and the subject one, he will begin
+to realize by personal experience how faintly the uttered longings
+of a whole people may fall on distant ears.
+
+We saw above that in a letter written July 21st, the day before the
+telegram about the "people expect independence," which letter must
+have reached Washington within thirty days, General Anderson not
+only notified Washington all about Aguinaldo's government and its
+pretensions, but stated that at the request of Admiral Dewey he had
+made no protest against it. [90] Yet straight on through the period
+of General Merritt's sojourn in the Islands, which began July 25th,
+and terminated August 29th, we find no protest ordered by Washington,
+and we further find the purpose of the President as announced in
+the instructions to Merritt, "The powers of the military occupant
+are absolute and supreme" throughout the Islands, not only not
+communicated to the Filipino people, but deliberately suppressed
+from the proclamation published by General Merritt pursuant to those
+instructions. [91]
+
+Comments and conclusions are usually impertinent and unwelcome save as
+mere addenda to facts, but in the light of the facts derivable from
+our own official records, is it any wonder that General Anderson,
+a gallant veteran of the Civil War, and perhaps the most conspicuous
+figure of the early fighting in the Philippines, delivered an address
+some time after he came back home before the Oregon Commandery of
+the Loyal Legion of the United States [92] on the subject, "Should
+republics have colonies?" and answered the question emphatically "No!"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+MERRITT AND AGUINALDO
+
+                    There are no tricks in plain and simple faith.
+
+                                           Julius Cæsar, Act IV., Sc. 2.
+
+
+Major-General Wesley Merritt's account of the operations of the troops
+under his command in the First Expedition to the Philippines may be
+found in volume i., part 2, War Department Report for 1898. He left
+San Francisco accompanied by his staff, June 29, 1898, arrived at
+Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th, received the surrender of the city of
+Manila August 13th, and sailed thence August 30th, in obedience to
+orders from Washington to proceed without unnecessary delay to Paris,
+France, for conference with the Peace Commissioners. According to
+General Merritt's report, about the time he arrived Aguinaldo had
+some 12,000 men under arms, with plenty of ammunition, and a number
+of field-pieces. The late lamented Frank D. Millet has preserved for
+us, in his Expedition to the Philippines, some valuable and intimate
+studies of this army of Filipino besiegers whom our troops found
+busily at work when they arrived in the Islands:
+
+
+    It was an interesting sight at Camp Dewey to see the insurgents
+    strolling to and from the front. Pretty much all day long they
+    were coming and going, never in military formation, but singly,
+    and in small groups, perfectly clean and tidy in dress, often
+    accompanied by their wives and children, and all chatting as
+    merrily as if they were going off on a pigeon shoot. The men who
+    sold fish and vegetables in camp in the morning would be seen
+    every day or two dressed in holiday garments, with rifle and
+    cartridge boxes, strolling off to take their turn at the Spaniards.
+
+
+The reader will readily understand that there were many times as many
+volunteers as guns. Mr. Millet continues:
+
+
+    When they had been at the front twenty-four hours they were
+    relieved and returned home for a rest. They generally passed
+    their rifles and equipments on to another man and thus a limited
+    number of weapons served to arm a great many besiegers. They had
+    no distinctive uniform, the only badge of service being a red
+    and blue cockade with a white triangle bearing the Malay symbol
+    of the sun and three stars, and sometimes a red and blue band
+    pinned diagonally across the lower part of the left sleeve. * * *
+    Many of them * * * had belonged to the native volunteer force.
+    * * * The recruits were soon hammered into shape by the veterans
+    of the rank and file. * * * Their men were perfectly obedient
+    to orders * * * and they made the most devoted soldiers. There
+    was no visible Commissary or Quartermaster's Departments, but
+    the insurgent force was always supplied with food and ammunition
+    and there was no lack of transportation. The food issued at the
+    front was mostly rice brought up in carromatas to within a few
+    hundred yards of the trenches, when it was cooked by the women.
+    * * * Each man had a double handful of rice, sometimes enriched
+    by a small proportion of meat and fish, which was served him in
+    a square of plantain leaf. Thus he was unencumbered with a plate
+    or knife or fork and threw away his primitive but excellent dish
+    when he had "licked the platter clean." It was noticeable that
+    the insurgents carried no water bottles nor haversacks, and no
+    equipments indeed, but cartridge boxes. They did not seem to be
+    worried by thirst like our men.
+
+
+"Although insignificant in appearance, they are fierce fighters," wrote
+General Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the army in July. [93]
+
+General Merritt states in his report that Aguinaldo had "proclaimed an
+independent government, republican in form, with himself as President,
+and at the time of my arrival in the Islands the entire edifice
+of executive and legislative departments had been accomplished, at
+least on paper." [94] Of course at that time we were still officially
+declining to take Filipino aspirations for independence seriously,
+and preferred to treat Aguinaldo's government as purely a matter of
+stationery. As a matter of fact, an exhaustive examination of the
+official documents of that period, made with a view of ascertaining
+just how much of that Aguinaldo government of 1898 was stationery
+fiction and how much was stable fact, has absolutely surprised one
+man who was out there from 1899 to 1905 (the writer), and I have no
+doubt will be interesting, as mere matter of political necrology,
+to any American who was there "in the days of the empire" as the
+"ninety-niners" called it.
+
+Early in the spring of 1899, Mr. McKinley sent out the Commission of
+which President Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, to try to
+stop the war. They bent themselves to the task in a spirit as kindly
+as that in which we know Mr. McKinley himself would have acted. They
+failed because the war was already on and the Filipinos were bent on
+fighting for independence to the bitter end. But they learned a good
+deal about the facts of the earlier situation. Speaking of these in
+their report to the President [95] with especial reference to the
+period beginning with Aguinaldo's landing at Cavite in May, after
+describing how the Filipino successes in battle with the Spaniards
+finally resulted in all of them being driven into Manila, where they
+remained hemmed in, they say:
+
+
+    While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the
+    Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire island
+    except that city.
+
+
+"For three and one half months," says General Otis in describing
+the facts of this same situation a year later, "the insurgents on
+land had kept Manila tightly bottled [meaning while Admiral Dewey
+had been blockading the place by water] * * * and food supplies were
+exhausted." [96] "We had Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island
+was held not by the Spanish but by the Filipinos," said General
+Anderson, in the North American Review for February, 1900. "It is a
+fact that they were in possession, they had gotten pretty much the
+whole thing except Manila," said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [97]
+
+General Merritt took Manila August 13th, and sailed away for Paris
+August 31st, and only a week after that General Otis wired Washington
+(under date of September 7th) from Manila: "Insurgents have captured
+all Spanish garrisons in island [of Luzon] and control affairs outside
+of Cavite and this city." [98]
+
+The recruiting by Aguinaldo of an army of 40,000 men with guns
+within one hundred days after his little "Return from Elba"--"15,000
+fighting men, 11,000 of them armed with guns," in fifty days, [99]
+which number had swelled to nearly 40,000 men with guns in another
+fifty days (by August 29th) [100]--is no more remarkable than his
+progress in organizing his government and making its grip on the
+whole island of Luzon effective in a short space of time.
+
+As all Americans who know the Filipinos know how fond they are of what
+government offices call "paper work," and how their escribientes [101]
+can work like bees in drafting documents, it might be easy to ignore
+Aguinaldo's various proclamations, already hereinbefore noticed in
+Chapter II., as representing merely "a government on paper," were
+there no other proof. But among the insurgent captured papers we
+found long afterward, there is a document containing the minutes of
+a convention of the insurrecto presidentes from all the pueblos of
+fifteen different provinces, on August 6, 1898, which throws a flood
+of light on the subject now under consideration. [102] This convention
+was held at Bacoor, then Aguinaldo's headquarters, a little town on
+the bay shore between Manila and Cavite. The minutes of the convention
+recite that its members had been previously chosen as presidentes
+of their respective pueblos in the manner prescribed by previous
+decrees issued by Aguinaldo (already noticed), and that thereafter
+they had taken the oath of office before Aguinaldo as President of the
+government, etc. They then declare that the Filipino people whom they
+speak for are "not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside
+from the rational aspirations for a free and independent life," and
+"proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the Independence
+of the Philippines." They also re-affirm allegiance to Aguinaldo as
+President of the government and request him to seek recognition of it
+at the hands of the Powers, "because," says the paper, "to no one is it
+permitted to * * * stifle the legitimate aspirations of a people"--as
+if Europe cared a rap what we did to them except in the way of regret
+that it did not have a finger in the pie. However, they were not only
+apprehensive, on the one hand, lest we might be tempted to take their
+country away from Spain for ourselves, but also, on the other hand,
+lest we might in the wind-up decide to leave them to Spain at the end
+of the war. That this last was not an idle fear is shown by the fact
+that during the deliberations of the Paris Peace Commission, Judge
+Gray urged, in behalf of his contention against taking the islands
+at all, that if Dewey had sunk the Spanish fleet off Cadiz, instead
+of in Manila Bay, and the Carlists had incidentally helped us about
+that time, we would have been under no resulting obligation "to stay
+by them at the conclusion of the war." [103] When the presidentes in
+convention assembled as aforesaid got through with their whereases and
+resolutions they presented them to His Excellency the President of the
+Republic, Aguinaldo, who then issued a proclamation which recited,
+among other things: "In these provinces [the fifteen represented
+in the convention] complete order and perfect tranquillity reign,
+administered by the authorities elected" [104] according to his
+previous decrees as Dictator, which decrees have already been placed
+before the reader. The proclamation claims that the new government
+has 9,000 prisoners of war and 30,000 combatants. The former claim
+no one having any acquaintance with those times and conditions
+will question for a moment. As to the 30,000 combatants, if he had
+11,000 men armed with guns on July 9th and 40,000 on August 29th,
+why not 30,000 on August 6th? Of course, men without guns, bolo men,
+do not count for much in a serious connection like this now being
+considered. In November, 1899, at San José, in Nueva Ecija province,
+I heard General Lawton tell Colonel Jack Hayes to disarm and turn
+loose 175 bolo men the colonel had just captured and was lining up on
+the public square as we rode into the town. But we are considering how
+much of a government the Filipinos had in 1898, because the answer is
+pertinent to what sort of a government they could run if permitted now
+or at any time in the future; and, physical force being the ultimate
+basis of stability in all government, when we come to estimate how much
+of an army they had when their government was claiming recognition as a
+legitimate living thing, we must remember that "It was just a question
+of arming them. They could have had the whole population." [105]
+
+Now the great significant fact about this Bacoor convention of
+presidentes of August 6th--a week before Manila surrendered to our
+forces--is that in it more than half the population of the island of
+Luzon was represented. The total population of the Philippines is
+about 7,600,000, [106] and, of these, one-half, or 3,800,000 [107]
+live on Luzon. The other islands may be said to dangle from Luzon
+like the tail of a kite. Taking the tables of the American census
+of the Philippines of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123), as a basis on which
+to judge what Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th amounted to if true,
+the population of the provinces thus duly incorporated into the new
+government and in working order on that date, was, in round numbers,
+about as follows: South of Manila:--Cavite, 135,000; Batangas, 260,000;
+Laguna, 150,000; Tayabas, 150,000; North of Manila:--Bulacan, 225,000;
+Pampamga, 225,000; Nueva Ecija, 135,000; Tarlac, 135,000; Pangasinan,
+400,000; Union, 140,000; Bataan, 45,000; Zambales, 105,000. This
+represents a total of more than 2,000,000 of people.
+
+But Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th are not the only evidence as to
+the political status of the provinces of Luzon in August, 1898. Toward
+the end of that month, Maj. J. F. Bell, Chief of General Merritt's
+Bureau of Military Information, made a report on the situation as
+it stood August 29th, the report being made after most careful
+investigation, and intended as a summary of the then situation
+according to the most reliable information obtainable, in order that
+General Merritt might know, as far as practicable, what he would be
+"up against" in the event of trouble with the insurgents. [108]
+
+This report not only corroborates Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th,
+but it also concedes to the Aguinaldo people eight other important
+provinces--four south of the Pasig River with a total population of
+about 630,000, [109] the only four of southern Luzon not included in
+Aguinaldo's claim of August 6th, thus conceding him practically all
+of Luzon south of the Pasig; and it furthermore concedes him four
+great provinces of northern Luzon with a total population of nearly
+600,000. [110] General Bell states that these last are "still in the
+possession of the Spanish," but practically certain to be with the
+insurgents in the very near future. "Insurgents have been dispatched
+to attack the Spanish in these provinces," says the Bell report.
+
+In this same report Major Bell said: "There is not a particle of doubt
+but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt of any
+government to reorganize a colonial government here." [111] When the
+insurgent government was finally dislodged from its last capital and
+Aguinaldo became a fugitive hotly pursued by our troops, he started
+for the mountains of northern Luzon, passing through provinces he
+had never visited before. The diary of one of his staff officers,
+Major Villa, in describing a brief stop they made in a town en route
+(Aringay, in Union province) says: "After the honorable President
+had urged them [the townspeople] to be patriotic, we continued the
+march." [112] They certainly did "continue the march." The Maccabebe
+scouts, of which the writer commanded a company at the time, took
+the town a few hours later, Aguinaldo's rear-guard retiring after
+a brief resistance, following which we found, among the dead in the
+trenches, a major other than Villa. Certainly, to read this little
+extract from the diary of Aguinaldo's retreat is to feel the pulse
+of northern Luzon as to its loyalty to the revolution at that time,
+and is corroborative of these claims of Aguinaldo made in August,
+1898, supplemented, as we have seen them, by General Bell's appraisal.
+
+As to the political conditions which prevailed in southern Luzon,
+particularly in the Camarines, in August and the fall of 1898,
+information derived from one who was there then would seem appropriate
+here. Major Blanton Winship, Judge Advocate's Corps, U. S. A., Major
+Archibald W. Butt, the late lamented military aide to President Taft,
+and the writer, lived together in Manila, in 1900, at the house of a
+Spanish physician, a Dr. Lopez, who had been a "prisoner" at Nueva
+Caceres, a town situated in one of the provinces of southern Luzon
+(Camarines) in the fall of 1898. Dr. Lopez had a large family. They had
+also been "prisoners" down there. No evil befell them at the hands of
+their "captors." They had the freedom of the town they were in. They
+had good reason to be pretty well scared as to what the insurgents
+might do to them. But they were never maltreated. The main impression
+we got from Dr. Lopez and his family was that the political grip of
+the Aguinaldo government on southern Luzon was complete during the
+time they were "prisoners" there. If anybody doubts the absoluteness
+of the grip of the Revolutionary government on the situation in the
+provinces which were represented at the Bacoor convention of August 6,
+1898, above mentioned, when the Filipino Declaration of Independence
+was signed and proclaimed, let him ask any American who had a part
+in putting down the Philippine insurrection what a presidente, an
+insurrecto presidente, in a Filipino town, was in 1899 and 1900. He
+was "the whole thing." Even to-day the presidente of a pueblo is as
+absolute boss of his town as Charles F. Murphy is of Tammany Hall. And
+a town or pueblo in the Philippines is more than an area covered
+by more or less contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more like a
+township in Massachusetts. So that when you account governmentally for
+the pueblos of a given province, you account for every square foot of
+that province and for every man in it. For several years before our war
+with Spain, nearly every Filipino of any education and spirit in the
+archipelago belonged to the secret revolutionary society known as the
+Katipunan. This had its organization in every town when Dewey sank the
+Spanish fleet and landed Aguinaldo at Cavite. The rest may be imagined.
+
+By September, 1898, Aguinaldo was absolute master of the whole of
+Luzon. Before the Treaty of Paris was signed (December 10, 1898), in
+fact while Judge Gray of the Peace Commission was cabling President
+McKinley that not to leave the government of the Philippines to the
+people thereof "would be to make a mockery of instructions," Aguinaldo
+had become equally absolute master of the situation throughout the
+rest of the archipelago outside of Manila.
+
+Toward the end of July, 1898, our Manila Consul, Mr. Williams, who
+was one of our consular triumvirate of would-be Warwicks, or "original
+Aguinaldo men," of 1898, used to have nice talks with Aguinaldo about
+the lion and the lamb lying down together without the lion eating the
+lamb, and in one instance, at least, he goes so far as to represent
+Aguinaldo as willing to some such arrangement--e. g., annexation, or
+some vague scheme of dependence. But whenever we hear from Aguinaldo
+over his own signature, we hear him saying whatever means in Tagalo
+"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." For instance, at page 15, of Senate
+Document 208, he writes Williams, under date of August 1st, with
+fine courtesy:
+
+
+    I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness and
+    ingenuity which you have displayed in painting in an admirable
+    manner the benefits which, especially for me and my leaders, and
+    in general for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of
+    these islands with the United States of America. Ah! that picture,
+    so happy and so finished * * * This is not saying that I am not
+    of your opinion * * * You say all this and yet more will result
+    from annexing ourselves to your people * * * You are my friend
+    and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But why should
+    we say it? Will my people believe it? * * * I have done what they
+    desire, establishing a government * * * not only because it was my
+    duty, but also because had I acted in any other manner they would
+    fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations,
+    and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more
+    careful of his own honor and dignity.
+
+
+Now that we know what was in the Filipino mind when General Merritt
+arrived in the Philippines, let us see what was in the American
+military mind out there at the same time. Says General Merritt:
+"General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his
+services as a subordinate leader." We trust the reason of this
+at once suggests itself from what has preceded, including General
+Anderson's dealings with the insurgent chief. The latter wanted some
+understanding as to what the intentions of our government were, and
+what was to be the programme afterward, should he and his countrymen
+assist in the little fighting that now remained necessary to complete
+the taking of Manila. Those intentions were precisely what Merritt
+was determined to conceal. "As my instructions from the President
+fully contemplated the occupation of the Islands by the American
+land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupant
+are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political
+condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any
+direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in
+possession of the city of Manila." [113]
+
+On one occasion General Merritt passed through the village of Bacoor
+where Aguinaldo had his headquarters, but, says Mr. Millet [114]
+in mentioning this, "They never met." After the taking of the city,
+General Merritt remembered that with some 13,000 Spanish prisoners
+to guard, and a city of 300,000 people, all but a sprinkling of whom
+were in sympathy with the insurgent cause, on his hands, and an army
+of at least 14,000 insurgents--probably far more than that--clamoring
+without the gates of that city, and only 10,000 men of his own with
+whom to handle such a situation, frankness was out of the question,
+in view of his orders from the President. [115] Therefore, on the day
+after the city surrendered, General Merritt issued a proclamation,
+copying [116] verbatim from Mr. McKinley's instructions (ante)
+such innocuous milk-and-water passages as the one which assured the
+people that our government "has not come to wage war upon them * * *
+but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their
+personal and religious rights; all persons who, by active aid or honest
+submission, co-operate with the United States * * * will receive the
+reward of its support and protection." But he carefully omitted the
+words quoted above about the powers of the military occupant being
+absolute and supreme, "lest his [Aguinaldo's] pretensions," to use
+General Merritt's expression, "should clash with my designs." "For
+these reasons," says General Merritt (p. 40), "the preparations for
+the attack on the city were * * * conducted without reference to the
+situation of the insurgent forces."
+
+Here General Merritt is speaking frankly but not accurately. He means
+he made his preparations without any more reference to the situation
+of the insurgent forces than he could help. As a matter of fact,
+their situation bothered him a good deal. They were in the way. For
+instance, there was a whole brigade of them at one point between
+our people and Manila. "This," says General Merritt (p. 41), "was
+overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange if possible
+with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to
+move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control
+of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made,"
+etc. That reads very well--that about "arrange if possible," "no
+objection was made," etc.,--does it not? Nothing there through which
+"the lustre and the moral strength" of the motives that prompted the
+Spanish war might be "dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt
+us," [117] is there? It was stated above that General Merritt was
+speaking frankly in this report. He was. He probably did not know how
+General Greene carried out the order to "arrange if possible with the
+insurgent brigadier-commander." But it so happened that there was a
+newspaper correspondent along with General Greene who has since told
+us. This gentleman was Mr. Frank D. Millet, from whom we have already
+above quoted, the correspondent of the London Times and of Harper's
+Weekly. General Greene had known him years before in the campaigns of
+the Turco-Russian war. Mr. Millet had been a war correspondent in those
+campaigns also, and General Greene was there taking observations. So
+that in the operations against Manila, Mr. Millet, being an old friend
+of General Greene's, known to be a handy man to have around in a close
+place, was acting as a civilian volunteer aide to the general. [118]
+Here is Mr. Millet's account of what happened, taken from his book,
+The Expedition to the Philippines:
+
+
+    On the afternoon of the 28th [of July, 1898], General Greene
+    received a verbal message from General Merritt suggesting that
+    he juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines, always on
+    his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the
+    commanding general to any recognition of the native leaders
+    or opening up the prospect of an alliance. This General Greene
+    accomplished very cleverly.
+
+
+Mr. Millet then goes on to tell how General Greene persuaded one
+of Aguinaldo's generals (Noriel) to evacuate certain trenches so he
+(Greene) could occupy them, "with a condition attached that General
+Greene must give a written receipt for the entrenchments." This
+condition, Mr. Millet says, was imposed by "the astute leader"
+(Aguinaldo). General Greene's "cleverness" consisted in purposely
+failing and omitting to give the receipt, which Mr. Millet says
+"looked very much like a bargain concluded over a signature, and was
+a little more formal than General Greene thought advisable." The key
+to this sorry business may be found in the first paragraph of General
+Merritt's instructions to all his generals at the time:
+
+
+    No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent
+    generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy trenches, but if
+    refused not to use force. [119]
+
+
+"I am quite unable to explain," says Mr. Millet (p. 61), "why we
+did not in the very beginning make them understand that we were
+masters of the situation, and that they must come strictly under our
+authority." The obvious reason was that a war of conquest to subjugate
+a remote people struggling to be free from the yoke of alien domination
+was sure to be more or less unpopular with many of the sovereign
+voters of a republic, and more or less dangerous therefore, like all
+unpopular wars, to the tenure of office of the party in power. So that
+in entering upon a war for conquest, a republic must "play politics,"
+using the military arm of the government for the twofold purpose of
+crushing opposition and proving that there is none.
+
+The maxim which makes all fair in war often covers a multitude of
+sins. But let us turn for a moment from strategy to principle, and
+see what two other distinguished American war correspondents were
+thinking and saying about the same time. Writing to Harper's Weekly
+from Cavite, under date of July 16th, concerning the work of the
+Filipinos during the eight weeks before that, Mr. O. K. Davis said:
+"The insurgents have driven them [the Spaniards] back over twenty
+miles of country practically impassable for our men. * * * Aguinaldo
+has saved our troops a lot of desperately hard campaigning * * *. The
+insurgent works extend clear around Manila, and the Spaniards are
+completely hemmed in. There is no hope for them but surrender." Writing
+to the same paper under date of August 6th, Mr. John F. Bass says:
+"We forget that they drove the Spaniards from Cavite to their present
+intrenched position, thus saving us a long-continued fight through
+the jungle." This gentleman did not tackle the question of inventing
+a new definition of liberty consistent with alien domination. He
+simply says: "Give them their liberty and guarantee it to them." In
+the face of such plucky patriotism as he had witnessed, political
+casuistry about "capacity for self-government" would have hung its
+head. Yet Mr. Bass was by no means a novice. He had served with the
+British army in Egypt in 1895, through the Armenian massacres of 1896,
+and in the Cretan rebellion and Greek War of 1897. His sentiments were
+simply precisely what those of the average American not under military
+orders would have been at the time. After the fall of Manila he wrote
+(August 17th): "I am inclined to think that the insurgents intend to
+fight us if we stay and Spain if we go."
+
+There were 8500 American troops in the taking of the city of Manila,
+on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos were ignored by them, although they
+afterwards claimed to have helped. As a matter of fact, the Spanish
+officers in command were very anxious to surrender and get back to
+Spain. The Filipinos had already made them "long for peace," to use
+a famous expression of General J. F. Bell. The garrison only put up
+a very slight resistance, "to save their face," as the Chinese say,
+i. e., to save themselves from being court-martialed under some
+quixotic article of the Spanish army regulations. The assault was
+begun about 9.30 A.M., and early that afternoon the Spanish flag
+had been lowered from the flag-staff in the main square and the
+Stars and Stripes run up in its stead, amid the convulsive sobs of
+dark-eyed seņoritas and the muttered curses of melodramatic Spanish
+cavaliers. Thanks to the Filipinos' three and one half months' work,
+the performance only cost us five men killed out of the 8500. The
+list of wounded totalled 43. Our antecedent loss in the trenches
+prior to the day of the assault had been fourteen killed and sixty
+wounded. So the job was completed, so far as the records show, at a
+cost of less than a score of American lives. [120]
+
+As Aguinaldo's troops surged forward in the wake of the American
+advance they were stopped by orders from the American commander, and
+prevented from following the retreating Spaniards into Manila. They
+were not even allowed what is known to the modern small boy as "a
+look-in." They were not permitted to come into the city to see the
+surrender. President McKinley's message to Congress of December,
+1898, describes "the last scene of the war" as having been "enacted
+at Manila its starting place." [121] It says: "On August 13th,
+after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in which the
+squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally." In this
+connection, by way of explaining Aguinaldo's treatment at the hands of
+our generals from the beginning, the message says, "Divided victory
+was not permissible." "It was fitting that whatever was to be done
+* * * should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States
+alone." But what takes much of the virtue out of the "strong arm"
+proposition is that Generals Merritt and Anderson were carrying out
+President McKinley's orders all the time they were juggling Aguinaldo
+out of his positions before Manila, and giving him evasive answers,
+until the city could be taken by the said "strong arm" alone. For,
+as the message puts it, in speaking of the taking of the city, "By
+this the conquest of the Philippine Islands * * * was formally sealed."
+
+When General Merritt left Manila on August 30th, he proceeded to Paris
+to appear before the Peace Commission there. His views doubtless
+had great weight with them on the momentous questions they had to
+decide. But his views were wholly erroneous, and that they were so
+is not surprising. As above stated, he did not even meet Aguinaldo,
+purposely holding himself aloof from him and his leaders. He never did
+know how deeply they were incensed at being shut out of Manila when
+the city surrendered. In his report prepared aboard the steamship
+China, en route for Paris, he says: "Doubtless much dissatisfaction
+is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents, but * * * I am of the
+opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances,"
+etc. (p. 40). If General Merritt had caught the temper of the trenches
+he would have known better, but he saw nothing of the fighting prior
+to the final scene, nor did he take the field in person on the day of
+the combined assault on the city, August 13th, and therefore missed
+the supreme opportunity to understand how the Filipinos felt. Says
+General Anderson in his report:
+
+
+    I understood from the general commanding that he would be
+    personally present on the day of battle. * * * On the morning of
+    the 13th, General Babcock came to my headquarters and informed
+    me that the major-general commanding would remain on a despatch
+    boat. [122]
+
+
+Indeed, so reduced was Manila, by reason of the long siege conducted by
+the insurgents, that the assault of August 13th, not only was, but was
+expected to be, little more than a sham battle. Says Lieutenant-Colonel
+Pope, chief quartermaster, "On the evening of August 12th an order was
+sent me to report with two battalions of the Second Oregon Volunteers,
+under Colonel Summers the next day on the Kwong Hoi to the commanding
+general on the Newport, as an escort on his entrance into Manila. At
+the hour named, I reported etc." [123] As soon as Spanish "honor"
+was satisfied, up went the white flag and General Merritt was duly
+escorted ashore and into the city, where he received the surrender
+of the Spanish general.
+
+In the Civil War, General Merritt had received six successive
+promotions for gallantry, at Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, Five Forks,
+etc., and had been with Sheridan at Winchester. So the way he
+"commanded" the assault on Manila is proof only of the obligations
+we then owed the Filipinos. They had left very little to be done.
+
+In his account of General Merritt's original personal disembarkation
+at Cavite, Mr. Frank Millet acquaints his readers with a Philippine
+custom we afterwards grew quite familiar with and found quite useful,
+of keeping your shoes dry in landing from a rowboat on a beach
+by riding astride the shoulders of some husky native boatman. The
+boatmen make it a point of special pride not to let their passengers
+get their feet wet. Mr. Millet tells us that a general in uniform
+looks neither dignified nor picturesque under such circumstances,
+and that therefore he will not elaborate on the picture, but that it
+is suggestive "more of the hilarious than of the heroic." Presumably
+when General Merritt went ashore on August 13th, from the despatch
+boat from which he had been watching the assault on Manila, to
+receive the surrender of the Spanish general, he followed the same
+custom of the country he had used on the occasion of his original
+disembarkation. So that in the taking of Manila, we were probably
+literally, as well as ethically, like General Mahone of Virginia as
+he is pictured in a familiar post-bellum negro story, according to
+which the general met a negro on a steep part of the road to heaven,
+told him that St. Peter would only admit mounted parties, mounted
+the negro with the latter's consent, rode on his back the rest of
+the toilsome journey to the heavenly gate, dismounted, knocked,
+and was cordially welcomed by the saint at the sacred portal thus:
+"Why how d' ye do, General Mahone; jess tie yoh hoss and come in."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+OTIS AND AGUINALDO
+
+                            Where people and leaders are agreed,
+                            What can the archon do?
+
+                                                        Athenian Maxims.
+
+
+Major-general Elwell S. Otis and staff arrived at Manila August 21,
+1898. [124] He relieved General Merritt and succeeded to the command
+of the American troops in the Philippines, August 29th. Archbishop
+Chapelle, who was papal delegate to the Philippines in 1900, once
+said to the writer at Manila, in that year, that General Otis was
+"of about the right mental calibre to command a one-company post
+in Arizona." The impatience manifested in the remark was due to
+differences between him and the commanding-general about the Friar
+question. The remark itself was of course intended, and understood, as
+hyperbole. But the selection of General Otis to handle the Philippine
+situation was a serious mistake. He was past sixty when he took
+command. He continued in command from August 29, 1898, to May 5,
+1900, a period of some twenty months. The insurrection was held in
+abeyance for some five months after he took hold, the leaders hoping
+against hope that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to
+them as it did Cuba to the Cubans; and during all that time General
+Otis was apparently unable to see that war would be inevitable in the
+event the decision at Paris was adverse to Filipino hopes. A member
+of General Otis's staff once told me in speaking of the insurrection
+period that his chief pooh-poohed the likelihood of an outbreak
+right along up to the very day before the outbreak of February 4,
+1899, occurred. Before the insurrection came he would not see it,
+and after it came he--literally--did not see it; that is to say,
+during fifteen months of fighting he commanded the Eighth Army Corps
+from a desk in Manila and never once took the field. His Civil War
+record was all right, but he was now getting well along in years. He
+was also a graduate of the Harvard Law School of the Class of 1861,
+rather prided himself on being "a pretty fair jack-leg lawyer," and had
+a most absorbing passion for the details of administrative work. They
+used to say that the only occasion on which General Otis ever went
+out of Manila the whole time he was there was when he went up the
+railroad once to Angeles to see that a proper valuation was put on a
+then recently deceased Quartermaster's Department mule. When he left
+the Islands he remarked to a newspaper man that he had had but one "day
+off" since he had been there. Unswerving devotion to a desk in time of
+war, on the part of the commanding general of the army in the field,
+seemed to him an appropriate subject for just pride. This showed his
+limitations. He was a man wholly unable to see the essentials of an
+important situation, or to take in the whole horizon. He was known
+to the Eighth Corps, his command, as a sort of "Fussy Grandpa," his
+personality and general management of things always suggesting the
+picture of a painfully near-sighted be-spectacled old gentleman busily
+nosing over papers you had submitted, and finding fault to show he knew
+a thing or two. However, he had many eminently respectable traits, and
+did the best he knew how, though wholly devoid of that noble serenity
+of vision which used to enable Mr. Lincoln, amid the darkest and most
+tremendous of his problems, to say with a smile to Horace Greeley:
+"Don't shoot the organist, he's doing the best he can."
+
+Before General Otis relieved General Merritt, the latter had written
+Aguinaldo politely requesting him to move his troops beyond certain
+specified lines about the city, [125] and Aguinaldo had replied
+August 27th, agreeing to do so, but asking that the Americans promise
+to restore to him the positions thus vacated in the event under the
+treaty the United States should leave the Philippines to Spain. [126]
+August 31st, Otis notified Aguinaldo, then still at Bacoor, his first
+capital, that General Merritt had been unexpectedly called away,
+and that he, Otis, being unacquainted with the situation must take
+time before answering the Aguinaldo letter to Merritt of the 27th. On
+September 8th, he did answer, in a preposterously long communication
+of about 3000 words, which says, among other things: "I have not been
+instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in
+regard to its legitimate holdings here"; and therefore declines to
+promise anything about restoring the insurgent positions in the event
+we should leave the Islands to Spain under the treaty. Commenting
+on this in the North American Review for February, 1900, General
+Anderson says: "I believe we came to the parting of the ways when we
+refused this request." General Anderson was right. General Merritt
+had on August 21st sent Aguinaldo a memorandum by the hand of Major
+J. Franklin Bell which promised: "Care will be taken to leave him
+[Aguinaldo] in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the
+government." [127] In the rôle of political henchman for President
+McKinley, which General Otis seems to have conceived it his duty to
+play from the very beginning in the Philippines, it thus appears that
+he was not troubled about keeping unsullied the faith and honor of
+the government as pledged by his predecessor. His 3000-word letter to
+Aguinaldo of September 8th ignores Merritt's promise as coolly as if
+it had never been made. His only concern appears to have been to leave
+the government free to throw the Filipinos overboard if it should
+wish to. He peevishly implies later on that Aguinaldo's requests in
+this regard were merely a cloak for designs against us (p. 40). But
+his real reason is given in a sort of stage "aside"--a letter to
+the Adjutant-General of the army dated September 12, 1898, wherein he
+explains: "Should I promise them that in case of the return of the city
+to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be placed
+by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe that
+they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the international
+obligations resting upon us * * * no such promise can be given." [128]
+In the sacred name of National Honor what of the Merritt promise? You
+only have to turn a few pages in the War Department Report for 1899
+from the Merritt promise to the Otis repudiation of it. Yes, General
+Anderson was right. It was when General Otis practically repudiated
+in writing the written promise of his predecessor, General Merritt,
+that we "came to the parting of the ways" in our relations with the
+Filipinos. Let no American suppose for a moment that the author of
+this volume is engaged in the ungracious, and frequently deservedly
+thankless task of mere muck-raking. He never met General Otis but once,
+and then for a very brief official interview of an agreeable nature. He
+is only attempting to make a small contribution to the righting of a
+great wrong unwittingly done by a great, free, and generous people to
+another people then struggling to be free--a wrong which he doubts
+not will one day be righted, whether he lives to see it so righted
+or not. General Otis's letter to the Adjutant-General of the army of
+September 12th, above quoted, shows that he was holding himself in
+readiness to carry out in the Philippines any political programme the
+Administration might determine upon, which would mean that he would
+afterwards come home and tell how entirely righteous that programme
+had been. Had the Administration hearkened back to Admiral Dewey's
+suggestion that the Filipinos were far superior to the Cubans, and
+decided to set before General Otis in the Philippines the same task
+it had set before General Wood in Cuba, we would have heard nothing
+about Filipino "incapacity for self-government." General Otis would
+have taken his cue from the President, his commander-in chief, and
+said: "I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral Dewey." Then he
+would have gone to work in a spirit of generous rivalry to do in the
+Philippines just what Wood did in Cuba. And the task would have been
+easier. Had the Administration taken the view urged by Judge Gray,
+as a member of the Paris Peace Commission, that "if we had captured
+Cadiz and the Carlists had helped us [we] would not owe duty to stay
+by them at the conclusion of the war," [129] and therefore we were not
+bound to see the Filipinos through their struggle, General Otis would
+have adopted that view with equal loyalty and in the presidential
+campaign of 1900, he would have furnished the Administration with
+arguments to justify that course. This would have been an easy task,
+also, for two of Spain's fleets had been destroyed by us, leaving
+her but one to guard her home coast cities, and making the sending
+of reinforcements to the besieged and demoralized garrison of Manila
+impossible. The native army she relied on throughout the archipelago
+had gone over bodily to the patriot cause, and there was no hope
+of successful resistance to it. But General Otis did not have the
+boundless prestige of Admiral Dewey and so volunteered no advice. As
+soon as the Administration chose its course, he set to work to prove
+the correctness of it. From him, of course, came all the McKinley
+Administration's original arguments against doing for the Filipinos
+as we did in the case of Cuba. He was the only legitimate source
+the American people could look to at that time to help them in their
+dilemma. They were standing with reluctant feet where democracy and
+its antithesis meet, and Otis was their sole guide. But the guide
+was of the kind who wait until you point and ask "Is that the right
+direction?" and then answer "Yes." Four days after General Otis sent
+his above quoted letter of September 12th, to Adjutant-General Corbin,
+Mr. McKinley signed his instructions to the Paris Peace Commissioners,
+directing them to insist on the cession of Luzon at least, the
+instructions being full of eloquent but specious argument about the
+necessity of establishing a guardianship over people of whom we then
+knew nothing. From that day forward General Otis bent himself to the
+task of showing the righteousness of that course. "I will let nothing
+go that will hurt the Administration," was his favorite expression
+to the newspaper correspondents when they used to complain about
+his press censorship. Hypocrisy is defined to be "a false assumption
+of piety or virtue." The false assumption of piety or virtue which
+has handicapped the American occupation of the Philippines from the
+beginning, and which will always handicap it, until we throw off the
+mask and honestly set to work to give the Filipinos a square deal on
+the question of whether they can or cannot run a decent government of
+their own if permitted, is traceable back to the Otis letter to the
+Adjutant-General of September 12, 1898, ignoring General Merritt's
+promise to leave Aguinaldo "in as good condition as he was found by
+the forces of the government" in case we should, under the terms of
+the treaty of peace, leave the Islands to Spain.
+
+General Otis's letter of September 8th to Aguinaldo is apparently
+intended to convince him that he ought to consider everything the
+Americans had done up to date as exactly the correct thing, according
+to the standards of up-to-date, philanthropic, liberty-loving nations
+which pity double-dealing as mediæval; and that he should cheer up,
+and feel grateful and happy, instead of sulking, Achilles-like, in his
+tents; and furthermore--which was the crux--that he must move said
+tents. General Otis does not forget "that the revolutionary forces
+under your command have made many sacrifices in the interest of civil
+liberty (observe, he does not call it independence) and for the welfare
+of your people"; admits that they have "endured great hardships, and
+have rendered aid"; and avers, as a reason for Aguinaldo's evacuating
+that part of the environs of Manila occupied by his troops: "It [the
+war with Spain] was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake
+* * * not for * * * aggrandizement or for any national profit." After
+stating, as above indicated, that he does not yet know what the
+policy of the United States is to be "in regard to its legitimate
+holdings here," General Otis proceeds to declare that in any event
+he will not be a party to any joint occupation of any part of the
+city, bay, and harbor of Manila--the territory covered by the Peace
+Protocol of August 13th--and that Aguinaldo must effect the evacuation
+demanded in the letter of General Merritt "before Tuesday the 15th"
+(of September), i.e., within a week. Aguinaldo finally withdrew his
+troops, after much useless parleying and much waste of ink.
+
+There was some of the parleying and ink, however, that was not wholly
+wasted. But to properly appreciate it as illustrative of the fortitude
+and tact which the early Filipino leaders seem to have combined in
+a remarkable degree, some prefatory data are essential.
+
+Aguinaldo's capital was then at Bacoor, one of the small coast villages
+you pass through in going by land from Manila to Cavite. From Manila
+over to Cavite by water is about seven miles, and by land about three
+or four times that. The coast line from Manila to Cavite makes a
+loop, so that a straight line over the water from Manila to Cavite
+subtends a curve, near the Cavite end of which lies Bacoor. Thus,
+Bacoor, being at the mercy of the big guns at Cavite, and also easily
+accessible by a land force from Manila, to say nothing of Dewey's
+mighty armada riding at anchor in the offing, was a good place to
+move away from. There it lay, right in the lion's jaws, should the
+lion happen to get hungry. Aguinaldo had reflected on all this,
+and had determined to get himself a capital away from "the city,
+bay, and harbor of Manila," that is to say, to take his head out
+of the lion's jaws. General Otis's demand of September 8th that
+he move his troops out of the suburbs of Manila determined him to
+move his capital as well. He moved it to a place called Malolos, in
+Bulacan province. Bulacan lies over on the north shore of Manila Bay,
+opposite Cavite province on the south shore. Malolos is situated some
+distance inland, out of sight and range of a fleet's guns, and about
+twenty-odd miles by railroad northwest of Manila. Malolos was also
+desirable because it was in the heart of an insurgent province having a
+population of nearly a quarter of a million people, a province which,
+by reason of being on the north side of the bay, was sure to be in
+touch, strategically and politically, with all Luzon north of the
+Pasig River, just as Cavite province, the birthplace of Aguinaldo,
+and also of the revolutionary government, had been with all Luzon
+south of the Pasig. Should the worst come to the worst--and as has
+already been indicated, the insurgents played a sweepstake game from
+the beginning for independence, with only war as the limit--northern
+Luzon had more inaccessible mountains from which to conduct such
+a struggle for an indefinite period than southern Luzon. But while
+the Otis demand of September 8th decided the matter of the change
+of capital, Aguinaldo could not afford to tell his troops that he
+was moving them from the environs of Manila because made to. He was
+going to accept war cheerfully when it should become necessary to
+fight for independence, but he still had some hopes of the Paris
+Peace Conference deciding to do with the Philippines as with Cuba,
+and wished to await patiently the outcome of that conference. Besides,
+he was getting in shipments of guns all the time, as fast as the
+revenues of his government would permit, and thus his ability to
+protract an ultimate war for independence was constantly enlarging
+by accretion. The Hong Kong conference of the Filipino revolutionary
+leaders held in the city named on May 4, 1898, at which Aguinaldo
+presided, and which mapped out a programme covering every possible
+contingency, has already been mentioned. Its minutes say:
+
+
+    If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles
+    of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will
+    be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them. [130]
+
+
+On the other hand, the minutes of this same meeting as we saw
+recognized that America might be tempted into entering upon a career
+of colonization, once she should get a foothold in the islands. The
+programme of Aguinaldo and his people was thus, from the beginning,
+not to precipitate hostilities until it should become clear that,
+in the matter of land-grabbing, the gleam of hope held out by the
+American programme for Cuba was illusive. According to the minutes of
+the meeting alluded to, such a contingency would, of course, "drive
+them, the Filipinos * * * to a struggle for their independence,
+even if they should succumb to the weight of the yoke," etc. Such
+a struggle, as all the world knows, did ultimately ensue. That
+part of the parleying following Otis's demand of September 8th
+(that Aguinaldo move his troops) which was not useless was this:
+In order to "save their face," with the rank and file of their
+army, the Filipino Commissioners asked General Otis "if I [Otis,]
+would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw
+to the lines which I designated--something which he could show to
+the troops." [131] So, on September 13th, General Otis wrote such a
+"request," and Aguinaldo moved his troops as demanded, but no farther
+than demanded. He wanted to be in the best position possible in case
+the United States should finally leave the Philippines to Spain,
+and always so insisted. Long afterward General Otis insinuated in
+his report that this insistence, which was uniformly pressed until
+after the Treaty was signed, was mere dishonest pretence, to cloak
+warlike intentions against the United States. Yet, as we have seen
+above, one of our Peace Commissioners at Paris, Judge Gray, just
+about the same time, was taking that contingency quite as seriously
+as did Aguinaldo. And early in May, 1898, our Secretary of the Navy,
+Mr. Long, had cabled Admiral Dewey "not to have political alliances
+with the insurgents * * * that would incur liability to maintain their
+cause in the future." [132] Before moving his troops pursuant to the
+Otis demand of September 8th, the Otis "request" was duly published
+to the insurgent army, and as the insurgents withdrew, the American
+troops presented arms in most friendly fashion. "They certainly made a
+brave show," says Mr. Millet (Expedition to the Philippines, p. 255),
+"for they were neatly uniformed, had excellent rifles, marched well,
+and looked very soldierly and intelligent." "The withdrawal," says
+General Otis (p. 10), "was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched
+out in excellent spirits, cheering the American forces." Absolute
+master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with complete
+machinery of government in each province for all matters of justice,
+taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 men at his beck, and his
+whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated
+his permanent government--permanent as opposed to the previous
+provisional government--with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet,
+patterned after our own, [133] just as the South American republics
+had done before him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the
+new capital, on September 15, 1898. The next day, September 16th, at
+Washington, President McKinley delivered to his Peace Commissioners,
+then getting ready to start for the Paris Peace Conference, their
+letter of instructions, directing them to insist on the cession by
+Spain to the United States of the island of Luzon "at least." [134]
+In other words, the day after the little Filipino republic, gay
+with banners and glad with music, started forth on its journey,
+Mr. McKinley signed its death-warrant. The political student of 1912
+may say just here, "Oh, I read all that in the papers at the time,
+or at least it was all ventilated in the Presidential campaign of
+1900." Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Paris Peace Commission were
+not made public until after the Presidential election of 1900. To be
+specific, they were first printed and given out to the public in 1901,
+in Senate Document 148, having been extracted from the jealous custody
+of the Executive by a Senate resolution. It was not until then that the
+veil was lifted. By that time, no American who was not transcendental
+enough to have lost his love for the old maxim, "Right or wrong, my
+country," cared to hear the details of the story. The Filipinos and
+"our boys" had been diligently engaged in killing each other for a
+couple of years, and the American people said, "A truce to scolding;
+let us finish this war, now we are in it."
+
+But to return from the death-warrant of the Philippine republic
+signed by Mr. McKinley on September 16th, to its christening,
+or inauguration, the day before. Mr. Millet gives an intensely
+interesting account of the inaugural ceremonies of September 15th,
+which as Manila correspondent of the London Times and Harper's Weekly
+he had the good fortune to witness. Says he:
+
+
+    The date was at last * * * fixed for September 15th. A few days
+    before Aguinaldo had made a triumphant entry into Malolos in
+    a carriage drawn by white horses, and there had been a general
+    celebration of his arrival, with speeches, a gala dinner, open air
+    concerts, and a military parade. Mr. Higgins (an Englishman), the
+    manager of the Railway, kindly offered to take me up to Malolos to
+    witness the ceremony of the inauguration of the new government.
+    * * * The only other passenger was to be Aguinaldo's secretary
+    * * * a small boyish-looking young man. * * * [135]
+
+
+It seems there had been a strike of the native employees of the
+railway up the road.
+
+
+    Mr. Higgins calmly remarked to the secretary that, in his opinion,
+    if the affairs of the Filipino government were managed in the
+    future as they were at present, the proposed republic would be
+    nothing but a cheap farce. The secretary timidly asked what there
+    was to complain about.
+
+
+Then came a tirade from Higgins, ending with, "I am going to lay this
+* * * before Aguinaldo to-day, and I shall expect you to arrange an
+interview for my friend and myself." Then, turning to the astonished
+Millet, he said in English: "It does these chaps good to be talked
+to straight from the shoulder. Since they came to Malolos, the earth
+isn't big enough to hold them."
+
+This scene on the train is, decidedly, as Thomas Carlyle would say,
+"of real interest to universal history." Mr. Millet's Government was
+a lion about to eat a lamb, but the head of his nation, Mr. McKinley,
+clothed with absolute authority in the premises for the nonce, was
+balking at the diet. Now, Mr. Millet rather admired the British
+boldness, just as a Northern man likes to hear a Southerner talk
+straight from the shoulder to a "darkey." As soon as the era of good
+feeling was over, our people quit treating the Filipinos as Perry
+did the Japanese in 1854, and began calling them "niggers." In fact
+the commanding general found it necessary a little later to put a
+stop to this pernicious practice among the soldiers by issuing a
+General Order prohibiting it. But Mr. Millet's admiration would have
+been somewhat toned down had he known what we found out later. The
+real secret of Higgins's personal arrogance was this. The Filipino
+government needed his railroad in its business. During the war
+which followed, the insurgents long controlled a large part of this
+railway, from Manila to Dagupan, which was the only railway in the
+Philippines. The railway properties suffered much damage incident
+to the war, and--just how willingly is beside the question--the
+company rendered material aid to the insurgent cause. So much did
+they render, that when Higgins had the assurance later to want our
+Government to pay the damages his properties had suffered at the
+hands of the insurgents, our government at Manila promptly turned his
+claim down. Subsequently the London office of his company actually
+inveigled the British Foreign Office into making representation to
+our State Department about the matter--obviously a very grave step,
+in international law. The claim was promptly turned down by Washington
+also, and, happily, that "closed the incident." [136]
+
+Having exploded Mr. Millet's bubble, let us resume the thread of
+his story:
+
+
+    We reached the station [at Malolos] in about an hour and a half.
+    * * * The town numbers perhaps thirty or forty thousand people.
+    * * * From the first humble nipa shack to the great square where
+    the convent stands, thousands of insurgent flags fluttered from
+    every window and every post. * * * Every man had an insurgent
+    tri-color cockade in his hat.
+
+
+Then follows a detailed account of being introduced, after some
+ceremony, to Aguinaldo, who is described as "a small individual,
+in full evening black suit, and flowing black tie." Higgins made his
+complaint about the strikers, and Aguinaldo said, "I will attend to
+this matter of the strikers," and then changed the topic, asking if
+the visitors did not wish to attend the opening of the Congress--which
+they did.
+
+From Mr. Millet's account, it is evident that, like Admiral Dewey
+and most of the Americans who first dealt with the Filipinos except
+Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and J. F. Bell, he failed to take
+the Filipinos as seriously as the facts demanded. At that time the
+Japanese had not yet taught the world that national aspirations are
+not necessarily to be treated with contumely because a people are small
+of stature and not white of skin. Consul Wildman at Hong Kong at first
+wrote the State Department quite peevishly that Aguinaldo seemed much
+more concerned about the kind of cane he should wear than about the
+figure he might make in history. Wildman did not then know, apparently,
+that canes, with all Spanish-Filipino colonial officialdom, were
+badges of official rank, like shoulder-straps are with us. The reader
+will also remember the toothbrush incident hereinbefore reproduced,
+told by Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee, in 1902. That incident,
+naturally enough, amused the Committee not a little. But we who know
+the Filipino know it was merely an awkward and embarrassed answer due
+to diffidence, and made on the spur of the moment to cloak some real
+reason which if disclosed would not seem so childish.
+
+Misunderstanding is the principal cause of hate in this world. When
+you understand people, hatred disappears in a way strikingly analogous
+to the disappearance of darkness on the arrival of light. The more
+you know of the educated patriotic Filipino, the more certain you
+become that the government we destroyed in 1898 would have worked
+quite as well as most any of the republics now in operation between
+the Rio Grande and Patagonia. The masses of the people down there,
+the peons, are probably quite as ignorant and docile as the Filipino
+tao (peasant), and I question if the educated men of Latin America,
+the class of men who, after all, control in every country, could,
+after meeting and knowing the corresponding class in the Philippines,
+get their own consent to declare the latter their inferiors either
+in intelligence, character, or patriotism.
+
+But to return to the inauguration. Mr. Millet saw the inaugural
+ceremonies in the church, and heard Aguinaldo's address to the
+Congress. Of the audience he says "few among them would have escaped
+notice in a crowd for they were exceptionally alert, keen, and
+intelligent in appearance." Of this same Congress and government,
+Mr. John Barrett, who was American Minister to Siam about that
+time, and is now (1912) head of the Bureau of American Republics
+at Washington--an institution organized and run for the purpose
+of persuading Latin-America that we do not belong to the Imperial
+International Society for the Partition of the Earth and that we are
+not in the business of gobbling up little countries on pretext of
+"policing" them--said in an address before the Shanghai Chamber of
+Commerce on January 12, 1899:
+
+
+    He [Aguinaldo] has organized a government which has practically
+    been administering the affairs of that great island [Luzon] since
+    the American occupation of Manila, which is certainly better
+    than the former administration; he has a properly constituted
+    Cabinet and Congress, the members of which compare favorably with
+    Japanese statesmen.
+
+
+The present Philippine Assembly had not had its first meeting when I
+left the Islands in the spring of 1905. It was organized in 1907. In
+the summer of 1911, I had the pleasure of renewing an old and very
+cordial acquaintance with Dr. Heiser, Director of Public Health
+of the Philippine Islands, who is one of the most considerable men
+connected with our government out there, and is also thoroughly in
+sympathy with its indefinite continuance in its present form. The
+Doctor is a broad-gauged man likely to be worth to any government,
+in matters of Public Health, whatever such government could reasonably
+afford to pay in the way of salary, and is doubtless well-paid by the
+Philippine Insular Government. He can hardly be blamed, therefore,
+for being in sympathy with its indefinite continuance in its present
+form. Doctor Heiser is a man of too much genuine dignity to be very
+much addicted to slang, but when I asked him about the Philippine
+Assembly, I think he said it was "a cracker-jack." At any rate,
+I have never heard any legislative body spoken of in more genuinely
+complimentary terms than those in which he described the Philippine
+Assembly. I learned from him incidentally that their "capacity for
+self-government" is so crude, however, as yet, that the members have
+not yet learned to read newspapers while a colleague whose seat is
+next to theirs is addressing the house and trying to get the attention
+of his fellows, nor do they keep up such a buzz of conversation that
+the man who has the floor cannot hear himself talk. They listen to
+the programme of the public business.
+
+Some five years ago in an article written for the North American Review
+concerning the Philippine problem, the author of the present volume
+said, among other things: "During nearly four years of service on the
+bench in the Philippines the writer heard as much genuine, impassioned,
+and effective eloquence from Filipino lawyers, saw exhibited in the
+trial of causes as much industrious preparation, and zealous, loyal
+advocacy of the rights of clients, as any ordinary nisi prius judge
+at home is likely to meet with in the same length of time." [137] Any
+country that has plenty of good lawyers and plenty of good soldiers,
+backed by plenty of good farmers, is capable of self-government. As
+President Schurman of Cornell University, who headed the first
+Philippine Commission, the one that went out in 1899, said in closing
+his Founder's Day Address at that institution on January 11, 1902:
+"Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better
+than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans." The
+Malolos government which Mr. Millet saw inaugurated on September 15,
+1898, would probably have filled this bill. Had the Filipino people
+then possessed the consciousness of racial and political unity as a
+people which was developed by their subsequent long struggle against
+us for independence, and which has been steadily developing more and
+more under the mild sway of a quasi-freedom whose princely prodigality
+in spreading education is marred only by its declared programme that
+no living beneficiary thereof may hope to see the independence of
+his country, and that the present generation must resign itself to
+tariff schedules "fixed" at Washington, there is no reasonable doubt
+that the original Malolos government of 1898 would have been a very
+"decent kind of government."
+
+All through the last four months of 1898, the two hostile armies faced
+each other in a mood which it needed but a spark to ignite, awaiting
+the outcome of the peace negotiations arranged for in September,
+commenced in October, and concluded in December. While they are thus
+engaged about Manila, let us turn to a happier picture, the situation
+in the provinces under the Aguinaldo government.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE WILCOX-SARGENT TRIP
+
+                A smiling, peaceful, and plenteous land
+                As yet unblighted by the scourge of war;
+                Where happiness and hospitality walk hand in hand
+                And new-born Freedom bows to Law.
+
+                                                              Anonymous.
+
+
+In the last chapter, we saw Aguinaldo's republic formally established
+at Malolos, September 15th, claiming jurisdiction over all Luzon. In
+Chapter IV., entitled "Merritt and Aguinaldo," we saw the political
+condition of southern Luzon in August, 1898, and the following months,
+and verified the correctness of Aguinaldo's claims as to complete
+mastery there then. Let us now examine the state of affairs in northern
+Luzon in the fall of 1898.
+
+In Senate Document 196, 56th Congress, 1st Session, dated February
+26, 1900, transmitted by Secretary of the Navy Long, in response to
+a Senate resolution, may be found a report of a tour of observation
+through the half of Luzon Island which lies north of Manila and the
+Pasig River, made between October 8 and November 20, 1898,--note
+the dates, for the Paris Peace Conference began October 1st and
+ended December 10th,--by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Naval Cadet
+L. R. Sargent. This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under
+date of November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy Department
+for its information, with the comment that it "in my opinion contains
+the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the
+present state of the northern part of Luzon Island." The Admiral's
+endorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report. It
+appears in a book afterwards published by Paymaster Wilcox in 1901,
+entitled Through Luzon on Highways and Byways. The book is merely an
+elaboration of the report, and reproduces most of the report, if not
+all of it, verbatim. The book of Paymaster Wilcox may be treated as,
+practically, official, for historical purposes. The preface recites
+that in October, 1898, American control was effective only in Manila
+and Cavite, that the insurgents, under Aguinaldo, who had proclaimed
+himself President of the whole Archipelago, immediately after Dewey's
+victory, were in supposedly complete possession of every part of
+the Island outside of these two cities, that their lines were so
+close to the outposts of our army that their people could at times
+converse with our soldiers, and that General Otis's authority did
+not extend much beyond a three-mile radius from the centre of Manila,
+while Admiral Dewey held and operated the navy-yard at Cavite. "Even
+the country between Manila and Cavite was in the hands of Aguinaldo,
+so much so that our officers had been refused permission to land at
+any intermediate point by water, and were prohibited from traversing
+the distance by road." Wilcox and Sargent procured leave of absence
+from Admiral Dewey to make their trip. They went first to Malolos, but
+failed to get anything in the way of safe-conduct from Aguinaldo. He
+is described, however, as of "great force of character * * * and
+he dominates all around him with a power that seems peculiar to
+himself." Wilcox had seen him before at Cavite. "He adroitly read
+between the lines that the Government of the United States did not
+then, nor would it at any future time, recognize his authority,"
+says the writer.
+
+Our travellers left Manila, October 8, 1898, on the Manila-Dagupan
+Railway, for a place called Bayambang, which is the capital of
+Pangasinan province, about one hundred miles north of Manila. In
+Pangasinan "the people were all very respectful and polite and offered
+the hospitality of their homes." From Bayambang they struck off from
+the railroad and proceeded eastward comfortably and unmolested a day's
+journey, to a town in the adjoining province of Nueva Ecija (Rosales)
+where they received a cordial reception at the hands of the Presidente
+(Mayor)--Aguinaldo's Presidente of course, not the Presidente left
+over from the Spanish régime. "At this time all the local government
+of the different towns was in the hands of Aguinaldo's adherents,"
+says the descriptive itinerary we are following. The tourists were
+provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort,
+"which was continued by relays all the way to Aparri" (the northernmost
+town of Luzon, at the mouth of the Cagayan River). Paymaster Wilcox
+says he carried five hundred Mexican dollars in his saddle-bags,
+but used only a trifling portion of this amount, "for in every town
+my entertainment was given without pay." They went from Rosales to
+Humingan, in Nueva Ecija. At Humingan they were again entertained
+by the Presidente at dinner, with music following, and comfortably
+housed. The Presidente made many inquiries about "the War with
+Spain and their own future." Their future, as revealed by the raised
+curtain of a year later, was that their country was being overrun by
+Lawton's Division of the Eighth Army Corps, the author of this volume
+having passed through this same town of Humingan in November, 1899,
+as an officer of the scouts used to develop fire for General Lawton's
+column. They journeyed eastward through the province of Nueva Ecija
+from Humingan to a little village (Puncan) in the foothills of the
+mountains they planned to cross. Of this place and the hospitality
+there, our traveller remarks: "I shall never forget the welcome of the
+local official" the Presidente. Thence they proceeded a few more stages
+and parasangs, northward over the Caranglan pass, into Nueva Vizcaya
+province, the watershed of north central Luzon, and thence down the
+valley of the Cagayan River via Iligan and Tuguegarao to Aparri, being
+always hospitably entertained in every town through which they passed
+by the Presidente or Mayor of the town, the local representative of
+the Philippine republic. In the New York Independent of September 14,
+1899, Cadet Sargent, in an article about this trip, gives the words
+of the new Filipino national Hymn, which he describes as sung with
+great enthusiasm everywhere he and Wilcox were entertained in the
+various towns. I desire to preserve a sample verse of it here. The
+music it is set to is much like the Marseillaise--quite as stirring:
+
+
+                    Del sueņo de tres siglos
+                    Hermanos Despertad!
+                    Gritando "Fuera Espaņa!
+                    Viva La Libertad!"
+
+
+which, being interpreted, means:
+
+
+                    From the sleep of three centuries
+                    Brothers, awake!
+                    Crying "Out with Spain!
+                    Live Liberty!"
+
+
+Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through
+the provinces of southern Luzon about this same time, under similar
+friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and
+misery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now
+know, have found similar conditions.
+
+Some suspicions were aroused on one or two occasions, but once the
+local authorities became convinced that the trip was being made
+by consent of "The Illustrious Presidente" (Aguinaldo--"El Egregio
+Presidente" is the Spanish of it) all was sunshine again. The Mayor
+of each town--the Presidente--would receive from the escort coming
+with them from the last town they had stopped at, a letter from the
+Mayor, or Presidente, of said last town; the old escort would return to
+their town, and a new one would be provided to give them safe-conduct
+to the next town. This was no new-fangled scheme of Aguinaldo's. It
+was an ancient custom of the Spanish Government, and was an ideal
+nucleus of administration for the new government. Curiously enough,
+the army knew practically nothing of this trip in the days of the
+early fighting. All that country was to us a terra incognita, until
+overrun by Captain Bacthelor, with a part of the 25th Infantry
+in the fall of 1899, the following year. So was the rest of the
+archipelago a like terra incognita, until likewise slowly conquered
+by hard fighting. That is why we so utterly failed to understand
+what a wonderfully complete "going concern" Aguinaldo's government
+had become throughout the Philippine archipelago before the Treaty of
+Paris was signed. Descending from the watershed of north central Luzon
+in the province of Nueva Viscaya already mentioned, our travellers
+reached the town of Carig, in the foothills which fringe that side
+of the watershed. There they were met by Simeon Villa, military
+commander of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to
+Aguinaldo afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along
+with Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901. Villa's immediate superior was
+Colonel Tirona, at Aparri, the colonel commanding all the insurgent
+forces of the Cagayan valley. Villa was accompanied by his aide,
+Lieutenant Ventura Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the
+author of the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for
+playing a minor part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish army
+committed under Villa's orders just prior to, or about the time of,
+the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and sentenced, but later
+liberated under President Roosevelt's amnesty of 1902. He was guilty,
+but the deceased, so the people in the Cagayan valley used to say,
+in being tortured to death, got only the same sort of medicine he had
+often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad theory
+of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases. Villa was a Tagal
+and had come up from Manila with the expedition commanded by Colonel
+Tirona, which expedition was fitted out with guns furnished Aguinaldo
+by Admiral Dewey, or, if not furnished, permitted to be furnished. But
+Guzman was a member of one of the wealthiest and most influential
+native families of that province (Isabela). General Otis's reports
+are full of the most inexcusable blunders about how "the Tagals"
+took possession of the various provinces and made the people do this
+or that. Villa's relations with Guzman were just about those of a New
+Yorker or a Bostonian sent up to Vermont in the days of the American
+Revolution to help organize the resistance there, in conjunction with
+one of the local leaders of the patriot cause in the Green Mountain
+State. Both were members of the Katipunan, the Filipino Revolutionary
+Secret Society, an organization patterned after Masonry, membership
+in which was always treated by the Spaniards as sedition, and usually
+visited with capital punishment. Nearly every Filipino of any spirit
+belonged to it on May 1, 1898, the date of the naval battle of Manila
+Bay. It is the all-pervading completeness of this organization at that
+time--it could give old Tammany Hall cards and spades--which explains
+the astonishing rapidity of Aguinaldo's political success, i.e., the
+astonishing rapidity with which the Malolos Government acquired control
+of Luzon between May and October, 1898. Their cabalistic watchword was
+"Paisano" (fellow-countryman), their battle cry "Independence." In
+the fall of 1898, at the time of this Wilcox-Sargent trip through
+Luzon, the Filipinos really "had tasted the sweets of Independence,"
+to use the phrase of the people of Iloilo in declining on that ground
+to surrender to General Miller in December thereafter and electing the
+arbitrament of war. The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history
+of that Cagayan valley as almost any other American. It is true there
+were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the Spaniards. But they
+were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries of tyranny. They do
+not prove unfitness for self-government. I for one prefer to follow
+the example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil
+over all those matters. With the Spaniards it was a case of Sauve qui
+peut. With the Filipinos, it was a case, as old man Dimas Guzman,
+father to this Lieutenant Ventura we have just met, used to put
+it, of Me las vais a pagar, which, liberally interpreted, means,
+"The bad quarter of an hour has arrived for the Spaniards. The day
+of reckoning has come." I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life
+imprisonment for being accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer
+above named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as archfiend of the
+gruesome occasion. I am quite sure I would have hung Villa without any
+compunction at that time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried
+to get hold of him, but Governor Taft's Attorney-General, Mr. Wilfley,
+wrote me that Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on
+British territory, and extradition would involve application to the
+London Foreign Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough
+of our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed under
+our predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now
+practising medicine in Manila. More than one officer of the American
+army that I know, afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost
+as cruel as Villa did to that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant
+Piera. On the whole, I think President Roosevelt acted wisely and
+humanely in wiping the slate. We had new problems to deal with, and
+were not bound to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over from
+the Spanish régime.
+
+It appears that Villa became a little suspicious of the travellers. He
+detained them at Carig seven days. Finally there came a telegram from
+his chief at Aparri, Colonel Tirona, to our two travellers, which read:
+"I salute you affectionately, and authorize Villa to accompany you to
+Iligan." At Iligan, the capital of Isabela province, the travellers
+were lavishly entertained. They were given a grand baile (ball) and
+fiesta (feast), a kind of dinner-dance, we would call it. To the light
+Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then universal acknowledgment
+of the authority of the Aguinaldo government, and the perfect
+tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in the Cagayan
+valley, I may add that as judge of that district in 1901-2 there came
+before me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact would be
+brought out of this or that difference among the local authorities
+having been referred to the Malolos Government for settlement. And
+they always waited until they heard from it. The doubting Thomas will
+attribute this to the partiality of the Filipinos to procrastination
+in general. I know it was due to the hearty co-operation of the
+people with, and their loyalty to, the then existing government,
+and to their pride in it. Mr. Sargent tells a characteristic story
+of Villa, whose vengeful feeling toward the Spaniards showed on all
+occasions. The former Spanish governor of the province was of course
+a prisoner in Villa's custody. Villa had the ex-governor brought in,
+for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them,
+"This is the man who robbed this province of $25,000 during the last
+year of his office." From Iligan our travellers proceeded to Aparri,
+cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in fact, as
+Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period seeking
+recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of profound
+peace and tranquillity--free from brigandage and the like. At Aparri
+the visitors were cordially welcomed by Colonel Tirona, and much
+fęted. While they were there, Tirona transferred his authority to a
+civil régime. Says Paymaster Wilcox:
+
+
+    The steamer Saturnus, which had left the harbor the day before
+    our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the Senators
+    from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the
+    independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel
+    Tirona considered the information of sufficient reliability to
+    justify him in regarding Philippine Independence as assured,
+    and warfare in the Islands at an end.
+
+
+He then goes on to describe the inauguration of civil government
+in Cagayan province. I hope all this will not weary the American
+reader. It was vividly interesting to me when I read it for the first
+time thirteen years afterward, in 1911, because it was such unexpected
+information, so surprising. It will be equally interesting to all other
+Americans who participated in putting down the subsequent insurrection
+and in setting up the Taft civil government in that same valley three
+years later. I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor
+Taft in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not
+have occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then
+existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Of
+course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzon goes,
+so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail to the
+Luzon kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out there,
+and Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French and to
+France. Luzon is about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that
+really matter, [138] are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode
+Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos. Describing
+the ceremonies of the inauguration of civil government in Cagayan,
+the Wilcox-Sargent report to Admiral Dewey says:
+
+
+    The Presidentes of all the towns in the province were present at
+    the ceremony. * * * Colonel Tirona made a short speech. * * * He
+    then handed the staff of office to the man who had been elected
+    "Jefe Provincial" [Governor of the Province]. This officer also
+    made a speech in which he thanked the military forces * * * and
+    assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated
+    by the people, where every man, woman, and child stood ready to
+    take up arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with
+    the last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever
+    to bring them back to their former state of dependence. He then
+    knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and took the oath of
+    office. [139]
+
+
+Does not such language in an official report made by officers of
+the navy to Admiral Dewey in November, 1898, show an undercurrent
+of deep feeling at the position the Administration had put Admiral
+Dewey in with Aguinaldo, when it decided to take the Philippines,
+and accordingly sent out an army whose generals ignored his protégé?
+
+The speech of the provincial governor was followed, says the
+Wilcox-Sargent report (same page) by speeches from "the other
+officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of
+the three departments--justice, police, and internal revenue. Every
+town in this province has the same organization." Article III. of
+Aguinaldo's decree of June 18th, previous, providing an organic
+law or constitution for his provisional government (see Chapter
+II., ante) had provided precisely the organization which Wilcox
+and Sargent thus saw working at Aparri and throughout the Cagayan
+valley in October, 1898. The importance of all this to the question
+of how the Filipinos feel toward us to-day, in this year of grace,
+1912, and to the element of righteousness there is in that feeling,
+is too obvious to need comment. Americans interested in business in
+the Philippines come back to this country from time to time and give
+out interviews in the papers declaring that the Filipinos do not want
+independence. What they really mean is that it makes no difference
+whether they want it or not, they are not going to get it. And it
+is precisely these Americans, and their business associates in the
+United States, who have gotten through Congress the legislation which
+enables them to give the Filipino just half of what he got ten years
+ago for his hemp, and other like legislation, and the Filipinos
+know it. The gulf in the Philippines between the dominant and the
+subject race will continue to widen as the years go by, so long as
+indirect taxation without representation continues to be perpetrated
+at Washington for the benefit of special interests having a powerful
+lobby. If the American people themselves are groaning under this very
+sort of thing, and apparently unable to help themselves, what is the a
+priori probability as to our voteless and therefore defenceless little
+brown brother. Like the sheep before the shearer, he is dumb. But to
+return to our travellers and their journey.
+
+
+    A Norwegian steamer came into port [meaning the harbor of Aparri]
+    that afternoon, and this seemed our only hope. She was chartered by
+    two Chinamen * * *. At first they refused us permission to embark,
+    and declined to put in at any port on the west coast. No sooner
+    was this related to Colonel Tirona than he sent notice that the
+    ship could not clear without taking us and making a landing where
+    we desired. This argument was convincing.
+
+
+Colonel Tirona provided them with a letter addressed to Colonel
+Tiņo at Vigan, the chief town of the west coast of Luzon and the
+capital of the province of Ilocos Sur, which province fronts the China
+Sea. Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent proceeded aboard the Norwegian steamer
+from Aparri westward, doubling the northwest corner of Luzon, and
+steaming thence due south to the nearest port. Vigan was the Filipino
+military headquarters of the western half of northern Luzon, just as
+Aparri was at the same time of the eastern half. On the west coast
+the travellers were treated always courteously, but with considerable
+suspicion. The explanation is easy. That region is in closer touch
+with Manila, and with what is going on and may be learned at the
+capital, than is the Cagayan valley which our tourists had just
+left. They bade the commanding officer at Vigan good-bye, November
+13, 1898. Passing south through Namacpacan (which the command I was
+with took a year or so later), they came to San Fernando de Union,
+some twenty miles farther south along the coast road. Here they met
+Colonel Tiņo and presented their letter from Tirona. He gave them a
+dinner, of course. How a Filipino does love to entertain, and make
+you enjoy yourself! Talk about your "true Southern hospitality"! You
+get it there. "Speeches were made, and great things promised by
+the Philippine republic in the near future" says Mr. Wilcox. After
+the dinner and speech-making came the inevitable dance. After that
+Colonel Tiņo started them off on their journey southward toward Manila
+duly provided with carriages. Passing Aringay on November 18, 1898
+[140] our travellers finally reached Dagupan, the northern terminus
+of the Manila-Dagupan Railway, and there took a train for Manila,
+120 miles away.
+
+In his report covering the fall of 1898, General Otis always scoldingly
+says of the Filipinos that in all the parleyings of his commissioners
+with Aguinaldo's commissioners before the outbreak, the latter never
+did know what they really wanted. The truth was they believed the
+Americans were going to do with them exactly as every other white
+race they knew of had done with every other brown race they knew of,
+but they did not tell General Otis so. Mr. Wilcox, a more friendly
+witness of that same period states their position thus at page twenty
+of the report to Admiral Dewey: "They desire the protection of the
+United States at sea, but fear any interference on land." "On one
+point they seemed united, viz., that whatever our government may have
+done for them, it had not gained the right to annex them," adding, in
+relation to the physical preparations to make good this contention,
+in the event of war, "The Philippine Government has an organized
+force in every province we visited."
+
+The whole tone of the Wilcox-Sargent report and the subsequent
+Wilcox book is an implied reiteration, after intimate, extended,
+and friendly contact with the people of all Luzon north of the Pasig
+River, of Admiral Dewey's telegram sent to the Navy Department, June
+23, 1898: "The people are far superior in intelligence and capacity
+for self-government to the people of Cuba and I am familiar with both
+races." In fact Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent do not raise the question of
+"capacity for self-government" at all, any more than Commodore Perry
+did when similarly welcomed in 1854 by the Japanese.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE TREATY OF PARIS
+
+                                No man can serve two masters.
+
+                                                        Matthew vi., 24.
+
+                Confine the Empire within those limits which
+                nature seems to have fixed as its natural bulwarks
+                and boundaries.
+
+                                                  Augustus Cæsar's Will.
+
+
+This is a tale of three cities, Paris, Washington, and Manila.
+
+Article III. of the Peace Protocol signed at Washington, August 12,
+1898, provided:
+
+
+    The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor
+    of Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace which
+    shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the
+    Philippines. [141]
+
+
+The "Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain" including the
+telegraphic correspondence between President McKinley and our Peace
+Commissioners pending the negotiations, were sent to the Senate,
+January 30, 1899, just one week before the final vote on the treaty,
+but the injunction of secrecy was not removed until January 31,
+1901--after the presidential election of 1900. They then were
+published as Senate Document 148, 56th Congress, 2d Session. It was
+not until then that the veil was lifted. The instructions to the Peace
+Commissioners were dated September 16, 1898. The Commissioners were:
+William R. Day, of Ohio, Republican, just previously Secretary of
+State, now (1912) Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
+States; Whitelaw Reid, Republican, then editor of the New York Tribune,
+now Ambassador to Great Britain, and three members of the United States
+Senate, Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine,
+Republicans, and George Gray, of Delaware, Democrat. Senator Davis
+died in 1900, and Senator Frye in 1911. Senator Gray has been, since
+1899, and is now, United States Circuit Judge for the 3d Judicial
+District. Among other things, the President's instructions to the
+Commissioners said:
+
+
+    It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
+    should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in
+    facing war. * * * The lustre and the moral strength attaching
+    to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate
+    judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour
+    be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us * * * into an
+    adventurous departure on untried paths.
+
+
+By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get down
+to this:
+
+
+    Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial
+    opportunity. * * * The United States cannot accept less than the
+    cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon.
+
+
+Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to
+recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in
+the councils of the Administration [142] declared in one of the great
+reviews of the period: "We see with sudden clearness that some of the
+most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force." Among
+these "revered maxims" thus suddenly fossilized by his ipse dixit,
+Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the teachings of "Washington's
+Farewell Address and the later crystallization of its main thought
+by President Monroe"--the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of
+these "A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force * * *
+the mainspring of commercialism."
+
+As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which renominated
+Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900, Senator Lodge,
+speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris, said: "We make
+no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely
+on account of others. We believe in Trade Expansion."
+
+"Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand," said Mr. Vanderlip's
+Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, about the same
+time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty was made.
+
+The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at Paris,
+October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move of the
+Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent events,
+especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter described
+(Chapter IX.).
+
+"Spanish communication represents," says Judge Day's cablegram to
+the President, [143] "that status quo has been altered and continues
+to be altered to the prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it
+describes as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops."
+
+Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the obvious,
+called the Filipinos our allies.
+
+The Spanish initial move was more immediately prompted by the fact
+that in point of absolute astronomical time Manila, though captured
+when it was morning of August 13th there, was captured when it was
+evening of August 12th, at Washington, and the protocol was signed
+at Washington in the evening of August 12th. While this point was
+material, because we had captured $900,000 in cash in the Spanish
+treasury at Manila and much other property, the title to which, under
+the laws of war between civilized nations, depended on just what
+time it was captured, the matter was finally swallowed up and lost
+sight of in the agreement to give Spain a lump $20,000,000 for the
+archipelago. But the initial move had other aspects. In the event we
+should take the Philippines off her hands, Spain was going to insist
+that we should get back from the Filipinos, our "allies," and restore
+to her all the Spaniards they captured after August 12th. She knew
+that in all probability if we bought the Islands we would be buying
+an insurrection, and she was "taking care of her own" at our expense.
+
+The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a
+bird's-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we should
+take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley cabled
+Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was signed,
+asking as to "the desirability of the several islands," "coal and
+other mineral deposits," and "in a naval and commercial sense which
+(of the several islands) would be most advantageous." [144] Admiral
+Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was "the most desirable,"
+but volunteered no advice. He did state, "No coal of good quality can
+be procured in the Philippine Islands," which is still true. Allusion
+is made to this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is
+there set forth. On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President
+McKinley suggesting that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him
+"whether it would be better * * * to retain Luzon * * * or the whole
+group." Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey before
+General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in writing "on
+general question of Philippines," and that "his report is in your hands
+in response to both questions." But the commission replied that Admiral
+Dewey had sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene's
+and nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion
+from Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis's Report
+(p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently,
+been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898,
+suggesting that we "interfere as little as possible in the internal
+affairs of the Islands." No; Admiral Dewey must be acquitted of having
+ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy the Philippines.
+
+On October 7th the Commission telegraphed Washington that General
+Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian Consul at
+Manila, M. André, and that "Consul says United States must take all
+or nothing"; that "if southern islands remained with Spain they would
+be in constant revolt, and United States would have a second Cuba";
+that "Spanish government would not improve," and "would still protect
+monks in their extortion."
+
+To this advice there was absolutely no answer. It was a case of "all or
+nothing," and it had already become a case of "all" when on September
+16th previous Mr. McKinley signed his original instructions to the
+Commission stating "The United States cannot accept less than Luzon."
+
+The Commission's telegram of October 7th goes on to quote from the
+Belgian Consul's opinion that "Present rebellion represents only one
+half of one per cent. of the inhabitants." The Consul was not before
+them in person. They were quoting from a memorandum submitted by him
+to General Merritt at Merritt's request, made at Manila and dated
+August 29th, the day General Merritt sailed away from Manila bound
+for Paris via the Suez Canal. He had brought the memorandum along
+with him. From the previous chapters the reader will, of course,
+understand that Americans and Europeans at Manila in August, 1898,
+were paying very little attention to Aguinaldo and his claims as to
+the extent of his authority in the provinces. It is therefore not
+surprising that M. André's memorandum of August 29th should have made
+the foolish statement, "Present rebellion represents only one half of
+one per cent. of inhabitants." But it is eternally regrettable that his
+statement on this point had any weight with the Commissioners, for it
+was, or by that time at least (October 7th) had become, just about 99
+1/2 per cent. wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, by October 7th
+it would have been more accurate to have said, in lieu of the above,
+"Present rebellion represents practically whole people." You see,
+we started an insurrection in May, in October it had become a full
+grown affair, and in December we bought it. The telegram of October
+7th also quoted General Merritt as saying, "Insurgents would be
+victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past,"
+and as considering it "feasible for United States to take Luzon
+and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her
+colonies." These are about the only two sound suggestions General
+Merritt made to that Commission. In the next breath they quote him as
+saying, "Natives could not resist 5000 troops." The fact that they
+did resist more than 120,000 troops, that it took more than that,
+all told, to put down the insurrection, is sufficient to show how
+much General Merritt's advice was worth. He was right on two points,
+as indicated. Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but
+one left to protect her home coast cities. The death knell of her once
+proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not
+possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides the
+Filipinos would have "eaten them up." General Merritt's suggestion to
+"hold them as England does her colonies" was also sensible. In fact
+that was the only thoroughly honest thing to have done, if we were
+going to take them at all. England never acts the hypocrite with her
+colonies. She makes them behave. She does not let native people preach
+sedition in native newspapers, because of "sentimental bosh" about
+freedom of the press, until the whole country becomes a smouldering
+hot-bed of sedition. She has blown offending natives from the cannon's
+mouth, when deemed necessary to cure them and their country of the
+desire for independence. If we are going to have colonies at all, we
+ought to govern them with the upright downright ruthless honesty of
+the British. It is more merciful in the long run. But we ought not to
+have colonies at all. For if there is one thing this republic stands
+for, above all other things, it is the righteousness of aversion to
+a foreign yoke.
+
+In their telegram of October 7th, [145] the Peace Commissioners,
+now squarely confronted with the question of forcible annexation,
+begin to let the Administration down easy. They say:
+
+
+    General Anderson in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June and
+    July seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native
+    authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. Merritt and Dewey
+    both kept clear of any compromising communications.
+
+
+A despatch sent by Judge Day certainly comes from high authority. The
+word "compromising" is therefore important. To say that Admiral
+Dewey did not treat Aguinaldo as an ally is to raise a mere technical
+point. But Aguinaldo never did get anything from him in writing. What
+he got consisted more of deeds than words. And actions speak louder
+than words. We had an alliance with Aguinaldo, a most "compromising"
+alliance and afterwards repudiated it. Admiral Dewey made it and
+General Merritt repudiated it. Dewey did, without the President's
+knowledge, exactly what the President and the American people would
+have had him do at the time. And Merritt did exactly what the President
+ordered him to do. But between the making of the alliance, and the
+repudiation of it, the President and the American people changed their
+minds. I say the American people, because they afterwards ratified
+all that Mr. McKinley did. You see the bitterness that lies away down
+in the secret recesses of the hearts of the Filipino people to-day
+has its source at this point. They had "a gentleman's agreement,"
+as it were, with us, not in writing, made at a time when the thought
+of a colony had never entered our minds. They fought in a common
+cause with us on the faith of that agreement--drove the Spaniards
+into Manila in numerous victorious engagements involving much loss
+of life, on their part, keeping the Dons thereafter bottled up in
+Manila on the land side while their "ally" Admiral Dewey was doing the
+same on the sea side. The said Dons were living on horses and rats,
+and famine was imminent when our troops arrived and began to finish
+the work of taking the beleaguered city. And then, having changed our
+minds and decided to annex the islands, we repudiated our "gentleman's
+agreement," on the idea that the end justified the means. And the end,
+as it has turned out, did not even justify the means, seeing that the
+islands have proved a heavy financial liability instead of a profitable
+asset. Judge Day's telegram to Secretary Hay of October 12th (p. 27)
+contains this curious and surprising passage as to Cuba:
+
+
+    Senator Gray in favor of accepting sovereignty unconditionally
+    * * * that we may thereby avoid future complications with Cubans,
+    claiming sovereignty while we are in process of pacifying island
+    * * * We desire instructions on this point.
+
+
+The future of Cuba, however, trembled in the balance but for
+a moment. Before "the shell-burred cables" had had time to quit
+vibrating with the question thus propounded, there came back this
+splendidly clean-cut answer from the President:
+
+
+    We must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolution of
+    Congress [declaring war].
+
+
+In characterizing Judge Gray's position, above indicated, as
+"surprising," no reflection upon him is intended. On the contrary, such
+a position, assumed by a man of such conceded intellectual probity,
+is illuminating as to the attitude subsequently taken concerning the
+Philippines by the Democratic Senators who voted for the treaty. This
+attitude is stated by Senator Lodge, in his History of the War with
+Spain, with all the incisive forcefulness to which the country has so
+long been accustomed in the public utterances of that distinguished
+man, and, seeing that no promise had been made, as in the case of
+Cuba, Senator Lodge's statement of the position of those who voted
+for the treaty should forever set at rest the stale injustice, still
+occasionally repeated, that Mr. Bryan, "played politics" in 1898-9 in
+urging his friends in the Senate to vote for its ratification. Says
+Senator Lodge (History of the War with Spain, p. 231):
+
+
+    The friends of ratification took the very simple ground that
+    the treaty committed the United States to no policy, but left
+    them free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands;
+    that the American people could be safely entrusted with this
+    grave responsibility, and that patriotism and common sense alike
+    demanded the end of the war and the re-establishment of peace,
+    which could only be effected by the adoption of the treaty.
+
+
+October 14th, Washington wires the commission that Admiral Dewey has
+just cabled:
+
+
+    It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands
+    should be decided as soon as possible. * * * General anarchy
+    prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives
+    appear unable to govern.
+
+
+In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true some
+wild rumors then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans
+at Manila which of course were impossible of verification. I say
+"unfortunately" with some earnestness, because it does not appear on
+the face of his message that they were mere rumors. And, that they
+were wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared
+up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order and
+tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzon at that time has been,
+it is believed, put beyond all doubt. But what manna in the wilderness
+to the McKinley Administration, now that it was bent on taking the
+islands, was that Dewey message of October 14th, "The natives appear
+unable to govern"!
+
+On October 17th, Mr. Day wires Mr. Hay that the Peace Commissioners
+feel the importance of preserving, so far as possible, the condition
+of things existing at the time of signing the protocol, to prevent
+any change in the status quo. He says:
+
+
+    Might not our government * * * take more active and positive
+    measures than heretofore for preservation of order and protection
+    of life and property in Philippine Islands?
+
+
+How could we, when Aguinaldo and his people were in the saddle all
+over Luzon, had taken the status quo between their teeth and run away
+with it, and were prepared to fight if bidden to halt and dismount;
+and, which is more, were preserving order perfectly themselves?
+
+On October 19th, Mr. Hay repeated by wire to Mr. Day a cablegram from
+General Otis which said: "Do not anticipate trouble with insurgents
+* * * Affairs progressing favorably."
+
+General Otis was making a desperate effort to humor Mr. McKinley's
+"consent-of-the-governed" theory and programme. But it was a situation,
+not a theory, which confronted him.
+
+The date of the high-water mark of the Paris peace negotiations is
+October 25th. On that day, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
+
+
+    Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning Philippine
+    Islands are set forth in statements transmitted (by cable also)
+    herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
+    instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in
+    joint commission almost immediately.
+
+
+Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, sent a joint signed statement. They
+urged taking over the whole archipelago, saying that, as their
+instructions provided for the retention at least of Luzon, "we do not
+consider the question of remaining in the Philippine Islands as at
+all now properly before us." They also urged that as Spain governed
+and defended the islands from Manila, we became, with the destruction
+of her fleet and the surrender of her army, "as complete masters of
+the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the
+conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take
+unopposed possession." The vice of this proposition, from the strategic
+as well as the ethical point of view, is of course clear enough now.
+
+Spain's government was already tottering in the Philippines when the
+Spanish-American war broke out. To be "as complete masters as she had
+been" was like becoming the recipient of a quit-claim deed. Also, ours
+was not a case of taking "unopposed possession." An adverse claimant,
+relying on immemorial prescription, was in full possession; all the
+tenants on the land had attorned to him, and he and they were ready to
+defend their claim against all comers with their lives. They reminded
+one of the recurrent small farmer whom some great timber or other
+corporation seeks to oust, patrolling his land lines rifle in hand,
+on the lookout for the corporation's agent and the sheriff with the
+dispossessory warrant.
+
+Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid go on to say:
+
+
+    Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be practically
+    as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part.
+
+
+Hardly any one can fail to read with interest the following accurate
+and vivid picture which they give of the physical strategic unity of
+the Philippine Islands:
+
+
+    There is hardly a single island in the group from which you cannot
+    shoot across to one or more of the others--scarcely another
+    archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so
+    closely together and so interdependent.
+
+
+This explains also why the Filipino people are a people. Whenever
+the American people understand that, they will give them their
+independence, unless they get an idea that government of their people
+by their people for their people would be distasteful to them.
+
+In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Washington on October
+25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid also say:
+
+
+    Public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to
+    retain whole of Philippine Islands.
+
+
+Archbishop Chapelle was in Paris at the time of these negotiations. He
+afterwards told the writer in Manila that he got that $20,000,000 put
+in the Treaty of Paris. The Church preferred that our title should be
+a title by purchase rather than a title by conquest, and Mr. McKinley
+was vigorously urging the latter. Between the legal effects of the
+two, there is a world of difference. The Church outgeneralled the
+President--checkmated him with a bishop. Look at that part of the
+treaty which affects church property:
+
+
+    Article VIII. The * * * cession * * * cannot in any respect impair
+    the property or rights * * * of * * * ecclesiastical * * * bodies.
+
+
+The Church of Rome, or at least some of the ecclesiastical
+bodies pertaining to it in the Philippines, owned the cream of the
+agricultural estates. By the treaty they have not lost a dollar. It
+might have been otherwise, had not Mr. McKinley's original claim of
+title by conquest been overcome at Paris.
+
+Judge Day's memorandum of his own views, telegraphed on October 25th
+along with those of his colleagues, stated that he was unable to agree
+that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group; that
+
+
+    In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often
+    declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs
+    of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be
+    consistent in demands in making peace * * * with due regard to
+    our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and
+    naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
+
+
+Again, he says:
+
+
+    We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a government [he of
+    course did not know what a complete government they had already
+    formed] or to battle against a foe which * * * might readily
+    overcome them.
+
+
+He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards then
+in the Philippines were to get away, and how completely they were at
+the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces. "On all hands"
+says Judge Day, "it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are
+unfit for self-government." Of course we knew absolutely nothing worth
+mentioning about the Filipinos at that time. Judge Day then proposes,
+for the reasons indicated, to accept Luzon and some adjacent islands,
+as being of "strategic advantage," and to leave Spain the rest, with
+a "treaty stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the
+United States." It seems to me that Judge Day's scheme was the least
+desirable of all.
+
+Senator Gray's memorandum of the same date is a red-hot argument
+against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins thus:
+
+
+    The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippine
+    Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
+    accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
+    upon through our history. * * * It will make necessary * * *
+    immense sums for fortifications and harbors * * * Climate and
+    social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth * * *.
+    On whole, instead of indemnity, injury * * *. Cannot agree that
+    any obligation incurred to insurgents * * *. If we had captured
+    Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not be our duty to stay by
+    them at the conclusion of war * * *. No place for * * * government
+    of subject people in American system * * *. Even conceding all
+    benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon * * * the moral
+    grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations
+    of the world * * * for doubtful material advantages and shameful
+    stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. * * *
+    Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us
+    simply keep our word * * *. Above all let us not make a mockery
+    of the [President's] instructions, where, after stating that we
+    took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity * * *
+    and that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for
+    conquest, the President * * * eloquently says: "It is my earnest
+    wish that the United States in making peace should follow the
+    same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war."
+
+
+The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:
+
+
+    The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter
+    is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.
+
+
+Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is
+sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the
+matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On
+October 27th, the Commission wired Washington:
+
+
+    Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr. Reid.
+
+
+It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying to
+find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in sudden
+disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made plain
+the inflexible determination of the American people not to assume the
+Cuban debt. The Ambassador said: "Montero Rios [146] could not return
+to Madrid now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness,"
+and asked delay to see "if some concessions elsewhere might not be
+found which would save Spanish Commissioners from utter repudiation at
+home." There is no doubt that the talk we are now considering was a
+"heart-to-heart" affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of
+the most important talks that have occurred between any two men in
+this world in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint
+to the effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment
+seemed rather inclined to retain the Philippines, "It was possible,"
+he said, "but not probable that out of these conditions the Spanish
+Commissioners might find something either in territory or debt [147]
+which might seem to their people at least like a concession.!" [148]
+
+It was the leaven of this hint that leavened the whole loaf. There
+was doubtless much informal parleying after that, but finally, the
+American Commissioners, having become satisfied that Spanish honor
+would not be offended by an offer having the substance, if not the
+form, of charity, and being very tired of Spain's sparring for wind
+in the hope of a European coalition against us should war be resumed,
+submitted the following proposal:
+
+
+    The Government of the United States is unable to modify the
+    proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago
+    of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners are
+    authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed
+    to, the sum of $20,000,000.
+
+
+This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement that
+
+
+    Upon the acceptance * * * of the proposals herein made * * *
+    but not otherwise, it will be possible * * * to proceed to the
+    consideration * * * of other matters.
+
+
+Also, our Commissioners wired Washington:
+
+
+    If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition * * * nothing
+    remains except to close the negotiations.
+
+
+This was very American and very final. Washington answered: "Your
+proposed action approved."
+
+November 29th, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
+
+
+    Spanish Commissioners at to-day's conference presented a definite
+    and final acceptance of our last proposition.
+
+
+And that is how that twenty millions found its way into the treaty--not
+forgetting the prayers and other contemporaneous activities of
+Archbishop Chapelle.
+
+After the tremendous eight weeks' tension had relaxed, and before
+the final reduction to writing of all the details, we see this dear
+little telegram, from Secretary of State Hay, himself a writer of note,
+come bravely paddling into port, where it was cordially received by
+both sides, taken in out of the wet, and put under the shelter of
+the treaty:
+
+
+    Mr. Hay to Mr. Day: In renewing conventional arrangements do not
+    lose sight of copyright agreement.
+
+
+And here is the last act of the drama:
+
+
+    Mr. Day to Mr. Hay, Paris, December 10, 1898: Treaty signed at
+    8.50 this evening.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION
+
+    Prometheus stole the heavenly fire from the altar of Jupiter to
+    benefit mankind, and Jupiter thereupon punished both Prometheus
+    and the rest of mankind by creating and giving to them the woman
+    Pandora, a supposed blessing but a real curse. Pandora brought
+    along a box of blessings, and when she opened it, everything flew
+    out and away but Hope.
+
+                                                    Tales from Æschylus.
+
+
+The ever-memorable Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, the Pandora
+box of Philippine woes, was signed December 21, 1898, and its contents
+were let loose in the Philippines on January 1, 1899.
+
+Let us consider for a moment the total misapprehension of conditions
+in the islands under which Mr. McKinley drafted and signed that famous
+document--a misapprehension due to General Otis's curious blindness
+to the great vital fact of the situation, viz., that the Filipinos
+were bent on independence from the first, and preparing to fight
+for it to the last. Take the following Otis utterance, for example,
+concerning a date when practically everybody in the Eighth Army Corps,
+and every newspaper correspondent in the Philippines, recognized that
+war would be certain in the event the Paris Peace negotiations should
+result, as common rumor then said they would result, in our taking
+over the islands:
+
+
+    My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of
+    the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a
+    despatch sent to Washington on December 7th, wherein I stated
+    that conditions were improving, and that there were signs of
+    revolutionary disintegration. [149]
+
+
+There can be no doubt that, at the date of that despatch, General
+Otis had been given to understand that under the Treaty of Paris
+we were going to keep the islands if the treaty should be ratified,
+and also that the if might give the Administration trouble, should
+trouble arise with the Filipinos before the if was disposed of at
+home. As heretofore intimated, in addition to his preference for
+legal and administrative work to the work of his profession, in the
+Philippines General Otis constituted himself from the beginning a
+political henchman. Ample evidence will be introduced later on to
+show beyond all doubt that all through the early difficulties, when
+the American people should have been frankly dealt with and given the
+facts, General Otis would, in the exercise of his military powers
+as press censor, always say to the war correspondents, "I will let
+nothing go that will hurt the Administration."
+
+Let us see what the real facts of the Philippine situation were at
+the date of the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, or, which is the same
+thing, when General Otis sent his despatch of December 7th. When
+the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of
+Manila and Cavite, with less than 20,000 men under his command,
+and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all the rest of the
+archipelago, with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command,
+armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy
+with the army of their country. We have already seen the conditions
+in the various provinces at that time and also the inauguration of
+the native central government. Let us now examine the military figures.
+
+Ten thousand American soldiers were on hand when Manila was captured,
+August 13th, and 5000 more had arrived under command of Major-General
+Elwell S. Otis a week or so after the fall of the city. [150] They had
+13,000 Spanish soldiers to guard. In addition to this, by the terms of
+the capitulation, the city (population say 300,000), its inhabitants,
+its churches and educational establishments, and its private property
+of all descriptions had been placed "under the special safeguard of
+the faith and honor of the American army." [151] Some 4500 to 5000
+more troops began to swarm out of San Francisco bound for Manila in
+the latter part of October, 1898, the last of them reaching Manila
+December 11th, the day after the Treaty of Paris was signed. After
+that there were no further additions to General Otis's command prior
+to the outbreak of war with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899. [151] Of
+these (approximately) 20,000 men, only 1500 to 2000 were regulars,
+having the Krag-Jorgensen smokeless gun. The rest were State volunteers,
+armed with the antiquated Springfield rifles, the same the 71st New
+York and the 2d Massachusetts had been permitted to carry into the
+Santiago campaign the summer before. Aguinaldo's people were equipped
+entirely with Mausers captured from the Spaniards, and other rifles,
+bought in Hong Kong mostly, using smokeless ammunition. Major (now
+Major-General) J. F. Bell, who is, in the judgment of many, one of the
+best all-round soldiers in the American army to-day, was in charge
+of the "Division of Military Information" at Manila both before and
+after the taking of the city. General Bell has done many fine things,
+in the way of reckless bravery in battle at the critical moment and of
+bold reconnoitring in campaign, and what he fails to find out about
+an enemy, or a prospective enemy, is not apt to be ascertainable. In
+a report bearing date August 29, 1898, [152] prepared in anticipation
+of possible trouble with the Filipinos, he estimated the number of
+men under arms that Aguinaldo had at between 35,000 and 40,000. This
+estimate is based by General Bell in his report on the number of guns
+out in the hands of the Filipinos, which he figures thus:
+
+
+    Captured from Spanish militia                     12,500
+    From Cavite arsenal                                2,500
+    From Jackson & Evans (American merchants
+        trading with Hong Kong)                        2,000
+    From Spanish (captured in battle)                  8,000
+    In hands of Filipinos previous to May 1, 1898     15,000
+                                                      ------
+                            Total                     40,000
+
+
+From this number General Bell deducts several thousands as having
+been recaptured by the Spaniards, or bought in. I at once hear some
+former comrade-in-arms of the Philippine insurrection say: "Oh,
+no. They couldn't have had as many as 40,000 guns, or near that." I
+thought the same thing when I first read General Bell's report on the
+matter. But he removes the doubt thus: "They are being continually
+sent away to other provinces."
+
+We did not understand Aguinaldo's movements then. All his troops were
+not around Manila. From what I learned from General Lawton and his
+staff in 1899, my belief is that Aguinaldo had perhaps 30,000 men
+with guns around Manila, and out along the railroad, at the time of
+the outbreak of February 4th. It is idle, of course, at this late
+date, to claim that the Filipinos were not bent on independence
+from the first. The matured plans of their leaders, formulated at
+Hong Kong May 4, 1898, before they ever started the insurrection,
+preserved in the captured minutes of the meeting already noticed,
+[153] provide the programme to be adopted in the event we should be
+tempted to keep the islands. In that event, they were prepared against
+surprise, or any necessity for making new plans, and were agreed to
+accept war as inevitable. From the first, they made ready for it.
+
+Governmentally and strategically, the Philippine Islands, except
+Mohammedan Mindanao, which is a separate and distinct problem,
+may be described very simply and sufficiently as consisting of the
+great island of Luzon, on which Manila is situated, and the Visayan
+group. [154] We are already familiar with the conditions in Luzon in
+December, 1898. You hear a great deal about the Philippine archipelago
+consisting of a thousand and one islands, but there are only eight
+that are, broadly speaking, worth considering here. The moment a jagged
+submarine ledge peeps out of the water it becomes an island. And even
+before that it may wreck a ship. But we are talking about islands
+that need to be charted on the sea of world politics. The Visayan
+Islands that really count at all in a great problem such as that we
+are now considering, are but six in number: Panay, capital Iloilo;
+Cebu, capital Cebu; Bohol, Negros, Samar, and Leyte. [155] Iloilo is
+some three hundred and odd miles south of Manila, and, besides being
+the capital of Panay, is the chief port of the Visayas and the second
+city of the archipelago, Cebu being the third. Under the Spaniards,
+as now under us, a vessel might clear from either of these places
+for any part of the world. As we saw in the chapter preceding this,
+as early as November 18th, Admiral Dewey had cabled Washington that
+the entire island of Panay was in possession of insurgents, except
+Iloilo. By the end of December, all the Spanish garrisons in the
+Visayan Islands had surrendered to the insurgents. (Otis's Report,
+p. 61.) Iloilo did not surrender to the insurgents until the day
+before Christmas. But let us not anticipate.
+
+December 13th, General Otis received a petition for protection signed
+by the business men and firms of Iloilo (p. 54), sent of course
+with the approval of the general commanding the imperilled Spanish
+garrison. December 14th, he wired Washington for instructions as
+to what action he should take on this petition, saying, among other
+things, "Spanish authorities are still holding out, but will receive
+American troops"; and adding one of his inevitable notes of optimism as
+to the tameness of Filipino aspirations (at Iloilo) for independence:
+"Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation."
+
+General Otis knew the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the
+insurgents down at Iloilo, and eagerly awaited a reply. President
+McKinley was then away from Washington, on a southern trip, to Atlanta
+and Macon, Georgia, and other points, and nobody at home was giving
+any thought to the Filipinos, while they were knocking successively
+at the gates of the various Visayan capitals, and receiving the
+surrender of their Spanish defenders. It was getting toward the
+yuletide season. President McKinley was engaged, quite seasonably,
+in putting the finishing touches to the great work of his life,
+which was welding the North and the South together forever by wise
+and kindly manipulation of the countless opportunities to do so
+presented by the latest war. It was a season of general peace and
+rejoicing in a thrice-blessed land, and nobody in the United States
+was looking for trouble with the Filipinos. With our people it was a
+case of ignorance being bliss, so far as the Philippine Islands and
+their inhabitants were concerned. In his Autobiography of Seventy
+Years, Senator Hoar tells of an interview with President McKinley
+concerning his (the Senator's) attitude toward the Treaty of Paris,
+early in December, 1898. [156] "He greeted me with the delightful and
+affectionate cordiality which I always found in him. He took me by the
+hand, and said: 'How are you feeling this winter, Mr. Senator?' I was
+determined there should be no misunderstanding. I replied at once:
+'Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President.' The tears came into
+his eyes and he said, grasping my hand again: 'I shall always love
+you whatever you do.'"
+
+It behooves this nation, and all nations, to consider those
+tears. They explain all the subsequent history of the Philippines
+to date. Mr. McKinley had proved himself a gallant soldier in his
+youth, and he knew something of the horrors of war. He was also
+one of the most amiable gentlemen that ever lived. But it is no
+disrespect to his memory to say that while Mr. McKinley was a good
+man, Senator Hoar was his superior in moral fibre, and he knew it,
+and he knew the country knew it. He knew that Senator Hoar was going
+to fight the ratification of the treaty to the last ditch, speaking
+for the Rights of Man and such old "worn out formulæ," and that his
+only defence before the bar of history would have to rest on "Trade
+Expansion," alias the "Almighty Dollar." Those tears were harbingers
+of the coming strife in the Philippines. They were shed for such lives
+as that strife might cost. They were an assumption of responsibility
+for such shedding of blood as the treaty might entail. The President
+returned to Washington from his southern trip on December 21st, and
+on December 23d (p. 55) cabled General Otis the following reply to
+his request of December 14th for instructions:
+
+
+    Send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect
+    life and property. It is most important that there should be no
+    conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory but firm.
+
+
+Senator Hoar had put Mr. McKinley on notice that he was going to
+present the ethics of the case in the debate on the treaty. Congress
+had gone home for the holidays, and after it re-assembled in January
+the treaty would come up. The vote was sure to be close, and a too
+vigorous manifestation of belief on the part of the Filipinos that
+this nation was not closing the war with Spain animated by "the same
+high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war" (Mr. McKinley's
+instructions to the Peace Commissioners) might defeat the ratification
+of the treaty. Indeed, the final vote of February 6th, was so
+close that the Administration had but one vote to spare. The final
+vote was fifty-seven to twenty-seven--just one over the necessary
+two-thirds. The smoke of a battle to subjugate the Filipinos might
+"dim the lustre and the moral strength," as Mr. McKinley had expressed
+it in his instructions to the Peace Commissioners, of a war to free
+the Cubans. Therefore there must be no trouble, at least until after
+the ratification of the treaty. President McKinley had invented in
+the case of Cuba a very catchy phrase, "Forcible annexation would be
+criminal aggression," and every time anybody now quoted it on him
+it tended to take the wind out of his sails. So benevolently eager
+was that truly kind-hearted and Christian gentleman to avoid the
+appearance of "criminal aggression" that he evidently got to thinking
+about that telegram of December 23d in which he had authorized General
+Otis to send troops to the relief of the beleaguered Spanish garrison
+at Iloilo, and also about the message from Admiral Dewey received
+November 18th previous, to the effect that the entire island of Panay
+except Iloilo was then already in the hands of the insurgents. The
+result was that he decided not to let his conciliatory proclamation
+of December 21st await the slow process of the mails, and therefore,
+though it consisted of something like one thousand words, he had it
+cabled out to General Otis in full on December 27th. It is now here
+reproduced in full because it precipitated the war in the Philippines,
+and is the key to all our subsequent dealings with them [157]:
+
+
+    THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION
+
+    Executive Mansion, Washington,
+          December 21, 1898.
+
+
+    The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila
+    by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral
+    Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender
+    of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the
+    Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty
+    therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the
+    United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at
+    Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of
+    American arms, the future control, disposition, and government
+    of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In
+    the fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and
+    the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the
+    actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the
+    Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military
+    government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city,
+    harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible
+    despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. In performing this
+    duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to
+    make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in
+    succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former
+    political relations, and in establishing a new political power, the
+    authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing
+    of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for
+    the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It
+    will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to
+    announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not
+    as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives
+    in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and
+    religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by
+    honest submission, co-operate with the Government of the United
+    States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive
+    the reward of its support and protection. All others will be
+    brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness
+    if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. Within the
+    absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and
+    must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation
+    of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws
+    of the territory in respect to private rights and property and
+    the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in
+    force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far
+    as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government
+    are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy
+    of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by
+    officers chosen, as far as practicable, from the inhabitants of
+    the islands. While the control of all the public property and
+    the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while
+    the use and management of all public means of transportation
+    are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States,
+    private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations,
+    is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes
+    and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late
+    government become payable to the authorities of the United States
+    unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates
+    or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether
+    general or local. If private property be taken for military use,
+    it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation,
+    and when payment in cash is not practicable, receipts are to be
+    given. All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual
+    possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will
+    be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and
+    wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement
+    of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such
+    duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their
+    importation. Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount
+    aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect,
+    and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring
+    them in every possible way that full measure of individual
+    rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and
+    by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of
+
+    BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION
+
+    substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary
+    rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting the
+    temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the
+    governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of
+    authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles
+    to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government
+    upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of
+    the United States.
+
+
+        William McKinley.
+
+
+The words used in the foregoing proclamation which were regarded by
+the Filipinos as "fighting words," i. e., as making certain the long
+anticipated probability of a war for independence, are those which
+appear in italics. The rest of the proclamation counted for nothing
+with them. They had been used to the hollow rhetoric and flowery
+promises of equally eloquent Spanish proclamations all their lives,
+they and their fathers before them.
+
+In suing to President McKinley for peace on July 22d, previous, the
+Prime Minister of Spain had justified all the atrocities committed
+and permitted by his government in Cuba during the thirty years'
+struggle for independence there which preceded the Spanish-American
+War by saying that what Spain had done had been prompted only by a
+"desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature
+independence." [158]
+
+Clearly, from the Filipino point of view, the United States was now
+determined "to spare them from the dangers of premature independence,"
+using such force as might be necessary for the accomplishment of that
+pious purpose.
+
+The truth is that, Prometheus-like, we stole the sacred fire from the
+altar of Freedom whereupon the flames of the Spanish War were kindled,
+and gave it to the Filipinos, justifying the means by the end; and
+"the links of the lame Lemnian" have been festering in our flesh ever
+since. The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was a kind of Pandora
+Box, supposed to contain all the blessings of Liberty, but when the
+lid was taken off, woes innumerable befell the intended beneficiaries,
+and left them only the Hope of Freedom--from us. Verily there is
+nothing new under the sun. It is written: "Thou shalt not steal"
+anything--not even "sacred fire." There is no such thing as nimble
+morality. The lesson of the old Greek poet fits our case. So also,
+indeed, do those of the modern sage, Maeterlinck, for the Filipinos
+could have found their own Bluebird for happiness. The record of
+our experience in the Philippines is full of reminders, which will
+multiply as the years go by, that, after all, every people have an
+"unalienable right" to pursue happiness in their own way as opposed to
+somebody else's way. That is the law of God, as God gives me to see the
+right. Conceived during the Christmas holiday season and in the spirit
+of that blessed season and presented to the Filipino people on New
+Year's Day, received by them practically as a declaration of war and
+baptized in the blood of thousands of them in the battle of February
+4th thereafter, the manner of the reception of this famous document,
+the initial reversal and subsequent evolution of its policies, and
+all the lights and shadows of Benevolent Assimilation will be traced
+in the chapters which follow.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE ILOILO FIASCO
+
+            The King of France with forty thousand men
+            Marched up the hill and then marched down again.
+
+                                                     Old English Ballad.
+
+
+We have already seen how busily Aguinaldo occupied himself during
+the protracted peace negotiations at Paris in getting his government
+and people ready for the struggle for independence which he early and
+shrewdly guessed would be ultimately forthcoming. General Otis was in
+no position to preserve the status quo. The status quo was a worm in
+hot ashes that would not stay still. The revolution was a snow-ball
+that would roll. The day after Christmas, General Otis at last sent
+an expedition under General Marcus P. Miller to the relief of Iloilo,
+but when it arrived, December 28th, the Spaniards had already turned
+the town over to the insurgent authorities, and sailed away. When
+General Miller arrived, being under imperative orders from Washington
+to be conciliatory, and under no circumstances to have a clash with
+the insurgents, the Administration's most earnest solicitude being
+to avoid a clash, at least until the treaty of peace with Spain
+should be ratified by the United States Senate, he courteously asked
+permission to land, several times, being refused each time. With
+a request of this sort sent ashore January 1, 1899, he transmitted
+a copy of the proclamation set forth in the preceding chapter. The
+insurgent reply defiantly forbade him to land. Therefore he did not
+land--because Washington was pulling the strings--until after the
+treaty was ratified. "So here we are at Iloilo, an exploded bluff,"
+wrote war correspondent J. F. Bass to his paper, Harper's Weekly.
+
+By the time the treaty was ratified the battle of Manila of February
+4th had occurred, and the pusillanimity of self-doubting diplomacy
+had given way to the red honesty of war. [159]
+
+As was noticed in the chapter preceding this, by the end of December,
+1898, all military stations outside Luzon, with the exception of
+Zamboanga, in the extreme south of the great Mohammedan island of
+Mindanao near Borneo, had been turned over by the Spaniards to the
+insurgents. When General Miller, commanding the expedition to Iloilo,
+arrived in the harbor of that city with his teeming troop-ships and
+naval escorts on December 28th, an aide of the Filipino commanding
+general came aboard the boat he was on and "desired to know," says
+General Miller's report, [160] "if we had anything against them--were
+we going to interfere with them." General Miller then sent some of
+his own aides ashore with a letter to the insurgent authorities,
+explaining the peaceful nature of his errand. They at once asked if
+our people had brought down any instructions from Aguinaldo. Answering
+in the negative, General Miller's aides handed them his olive-branch
+letter. They read it and said they could do nothing without orders
+from Aguinaldo "in cases affecting their Federal Government." The grim
+veteran commanding the American troops smoked on this for a day or
+so, and then asked a delegation of insurgents that were visiting his
+ship by his invitation--they would not let him land, you see--whether
+if he landed they would meet him with armed resistance. The Malay
+reverence for the relation of host and guest resulted in an evasive
+reply. They could not answer. But after they went back to the city
+they did answer. And this is what they wrote:
+
+
+    Upon the return of your commissioners last night, we * * *
+    discussed the situation and attitude of this region of Bisayas in
+    regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government
+    of Luzon (the Aguinaldo government, of course); and * * * I have
+    the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people,
+    the army, and the committee, we insist upon our pretension not
+    to consent * * * to any foreign interference without express
+    orders from the central government of Luzon * * * with which we
+    are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices. * * *
+    If you insist * * * upon disembarking your forces, this is our
+    final attitude. May God forgive you, etc."
+
+                                        Iloilo, December 30, 1898. [161]
+
+
+This letter is recited in General Miller's report to be from "President
+Lopez, of the Federal Government of Visayas." General Miller then
+wrote Otis begging permission to attack on the ground that upon the
+success of the expedition he was in charge of "depends the future
+speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements in the islands." War
+correspondent Bass, who was on the ground at the time, also wrote
+his paper: "The effect on the natives will be incalculable all over
+the islands." But General Otis was trying to help Mr. McKinley nurse
+the treaty through the Senate on the idea that there weren't going to
+be any "insurrectionary movements in the islands," that all dark and
+misguided conspiracies of selfishly ambitious leaders looking to such
+impious ends would fade before the sunlight of Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+Cautioning Otis against any clash at Iloilo, Mr. McKinley wired January
+9th: "Conflict would be most unfortunate, considering the present.
+* * * Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, and must weaken and
+discourage them. They will see our benevolent purpose, etc." [162]
+
+The Iloilo fiasco did indeed furnish to the insurgent cause aid and
+comfort at the psychologic moment when it most needed encouragement to
+bring things to a head. It presented a spectacle of vacillation and
+seeming cowardice which heartened the timid among the insurgents and
+started among them a general eagerness for war which had been lacking
+before. In one of his bulletins [163] to Otis, General Miller tells of
+two boats' crews of the 51st Iowa landing on January 5th, and being met
+by a force of armed natives who "asked them their business and warned
+them off," whereupon they heeded the warning and returned to their
+transport. This regiment had then been cooped up on their transport
+continuously since leaving San Francisco November 3d, previous,
+sixty-three days. They were kept lying off Iloilo until January 29th,
+and then brought back to Manila and landed, after eighty-nine days
+aboard ship, all idea of taking Iloilo before the Senate should act
+having been abandoned.
+
+The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was received by cable in
+cipher, at Manila, December 29th, and as soon as it had been written
+out in long hand General Otis hurried a copy down to General Miller
+at Iloilo by a ship sailing that day, so that General Miller might
+"understand the position and policy of our government." But he
+forgot to tell Miller to conceal the policy for the present. [164]
+So the latter, on January 1st, not only sent a copy of it to the
+"President of the Federal Government of Visayas," Mr. Lopez, [165]
+but in the note of transmittal he "asked," says his report, "that they
+permit the entry of my troops." [166] What a fatal mistake! Here was
+a proclamation representing all the "majesty, dominion, and power" of
+the American Government, signed by the President of the United States,
+in terms asserting immediate, absolute, and supreme authority, and the
+natives were "asked" if they would "permit" its enforcement. General
+Miller's report says that he also had the proclamation "translated
+into Spanish and distributed to the people." [167] "The people laugh
+at it," he says. "The insurgents call us cowards and are fortifying
+at the point of the peninsula, and are mounting old smooth-bore
+guns left by the Spaniards. They are intrenching everywhere,
+are bent on having one fight, and are confident of victory. The
+longer we wait before the attack the harder it will be to put down
+the insurrection." This is especially interesting in the light of
+President McKinley's justification of the wisdom of temporizing--on
+the idea that delay would weaken the insurgents and could not hurt
+us. "Let no one convince you," writes Miller to Otis on January 5th,
+"that peaceful means can settle the difficulty here."
+
+The appeal to Otis to permit commencement of operations was without
+avail. Otis was the Manila agent of the Aldrich Old Guard in the
+Senate, in charge of the pending treaty. He would simply send the
+disgusted Miller messages not to be hasty, assuring him that the
+firing of a shot at Iloilo would mean the precipitation of general
+conflict about Manila and all over the place, and that this would
+be "most disappointing to the President of the United States, who
+continually urges extreme caution and no conflict." [168]
+
+The Administration was counting senatorial noses at the time, and
+that its anxiety was justified is apparent from the fact already
+noted, that on the final vote whereby the treaty was ratified it had
+but one vote to spare. So General Miller sat sunning himself on the
+deck of his transport, and watching the insurgents working like ants
+at their fortifications, and vainly wishing his 2500 men could get
+ashore at least long enough to stretch themselves a bit. John F. Bass,
+correspondent for Harper's Weekly, left Iloilo, returned to Manila,
+and wrote his paper on January 23d: "I returned to Manila well knowing
+that there was nothing more to be done in Iloilo until the Senate
+voted on the Treaty of Peace."
+
+On the eighth day after General Miller had asked permission of the
+Iloilo village Hampdens to enforce the orders of the President of
+the United States, the "Federal Government of the Visayas," through
+its President, Seņor Lopez, finally deigned to notice Mr. McKinley's
+proclamation. It said under date of January 9th:
+
+
+    General: We have the high honor of having received your message,
+    dated January 1st, of this year, enclosing letter of President
+    McKinley. You say in one clause of your message: "As indicated in
+    the President's cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants
+    of the island of Panay ought to obey the political authority of the
+    United States, and they will incur a grave responsibility if, after
+    deliberating, they decide to resist said authority." So the council
+    of state of this region of Visayas are, at this present moment,
+    between the authority of the United States, that you try to impose
+    on us, and the authority of the central government of Malolos.
+
+
+Then follows this remarkable statement of the case for the Filipinos:
+
+
+    The supposed authority of the United States began with the
+    Treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of
+    the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and
+    natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, (and)
+    sacrifices. [169]
+
+
+General Otis was fond of throwing cold water on any particularly
+eloquent Filipino insurrecto document he had occasion to put in
+his reports by saying that Mabini was "the brains of" the Malolos
+Government--meaning the only brains it had [170]--and that he probably
+wrote such document, whatever it might be. But here is a piece of
+real eloquence, originating away down in the Visayan Islands, as
+far away from Malolos as Colonel Stark and his "Green Mountain Boys"
+were from Washington and Hamilton in 1776 and after. What then is the
+explanation of composition so forceful in its impassioned simplicity,
+and in the light of subsequent events, so pathetic? There is but
+one explanation. It came from the heart. It was the cry of the Soul
+of Humanity seeking its natural affiliations. It was the language
+of what Aguinaldo's early state papers always used to call the
+"legitimate aspirations of" his people--legitimate aspirations which
+we later strangled. The reason of the writer's earnestness is that a
+few months later he helped do some of the strangling. Thirteen years
+afterwards, a thorough acquaintance with the Filipino side of the
+matter, derived from an examination of the information which has been
+gradually accumulated and published by our government during that time,
+causes him to say, "Father forgive me, for I knew not what I did." The
+35,000 volunteers of 1899 knew nothing about the Filipinos or their
+side of the case. We were like the deputy sheriff who goes out with
+a warrant duly issued to arrest a man charged with unlawful breach
+of the peace. It is not his business to inquire whether the man is
+guilty or not. If the man resists arrest, he takes the consequences.
+
+On the second day after the above defiance of the President of the
+United States was served up to General Miller, that gallant officer
+having dutifully swallowed it, sent an officer ashore on a diplomatic
+mission. The name and rank of this military ambassador were Acting
+Assistant Surgeon Henry DuR. Phelan, who clearly appears to have been
+a man of keen insight and considerable ability. His written report
+to General Miller of what transpired is a document of permanent
+interest and importance to the annals of men's struggles for free
+institutions. [171] It states that at the meeting the spokesman
+of the Filipinos, Attorney Raimundo Melliza, began by saying that
+"all the Americans owned was Manila." That was unquestionably true,
+so our ambassador, it seems, did not gainsay it. Dr. Phelan suggested
+that the Americans had sacrificed lives and money in destroying the
+power of Spain. The spokesman, Attorney Melliza, replied that "they
+also had made great sacrifice in lives, and that they had a right to
+their country which they had fought for, and that we are here now to
+take from them what they had won by fighting; that they had been our
+allies, and we had used them as such." Dr. Phelan's report goes on to
+say: "I replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time,
+* * * and that as soon as order was assured it would be withdrawn
+* * *. They smiled at this." Well they might. Fourteen years have
+elapsed since then, and the law-making power of the United States has
+never yet declared whether the American occupation of the Philippine
+Islands is to be temporary, like our occupation of Cuba was, or
+permanent, like the British occupation of Egypt is. True, Dr. Phelan
+said "military" occupation, but the smile was provoked by the
+suggestion of temporariness. After the committee smiled, they remarked:
+
+
+    We have fought for independence and feel that we have the power
+    of governing and need no assistance. We are showing it now. You
+    might inquire of the foreigners if it is not so.
+
+
+Dr. Phelan's report proceeds:
+
+
+    They stated that their orders were not to allow us to disembark,
+    and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without
+    express orders from their government.
+
+
+In regard to the Treaty of Paris, the spokesman, Lawyer Melliza, said:
+
+
+    International law forbids a nation to make a contract in regard
+    to taking the liberties of its colonies.
+
+
+Lawyer Melliza was wrong. If he had said "the law of righteousness,"
+instead of "international law," his proposition, thus amended, would
+have been incontrovertible. On September 19, 1911, one of the great
+newspapers of this country, the Denver Post, sent out to the members
+of the Congress of the United States, and to "The Fourth Estate" also,
+the newspaper editors, a circular letter proposing that we sell the
+Philippine Islands to Japan. A member of the United States Senate
+sent this answer:
+
+
+    I do not favor your proposition. Selling the Islands means selling
+    the inhabitants. The question of traffic in human beings, whether
+    by wholesale or retail, was forever settled by the Civil War.
+
+
+About the same time a leading daily paper of Georgia had an editorial
+on the Denver Post's proposition, the most conspicuous feature of
+which was that Japan was too poor to pay us well, should we contemplate
+selling the Filipinos to her, so it was no use to discuss the matter
+at length.
+
+No; Lawyer Melliza's proposition has no standing in international
+law yet. But it has with what Mr. Lincoln's First Inaugural called
+"the better angels of our nature," if we stop to reflect.
+
+Another interesting feature of the Phelan report to General Miller
+is the following:
+
+
+    I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could occupy the
+    city would they agree to it. He replied most emphatically that
+    they would.
+
+
+At that time, in January, 1899, while the debate on the treaty was
+in progress in the United States Senate, there was hardly a province
+in that archipelago where you would not have encountered the same
+inflexible adherence to the Aguinaldo government.
+
+Dr. Phelan's report closes thus:
+
+
+    At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that as this question
+    involved the integrity of the entire republic, it could not
+    be further discussed here, but must be referred to the Malolos
+    Government.
+
+
+There is one other statement made by the spokesman of the Filipinos,
+at their meeting with Dr. Phelan, which arrested and gripped my
+attention. That it may interest the reader as it did me, it will need
+but a word or so as preface. In the fall of that same year, 1899,
+when my regiment, the 29th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reached the
+Islands, it was supposed that the insurrection had about played out,
+i.e., that it had been "beaten to a frazzle," because the Filipinos no
+longer offered to do battle in force in the open. Yet all that fall,
+and all through 1900 and after, a most obstinate guerrilla warfare
+was kept up. Anywhere in the archipelago you were liable to be fired
+on from ambush. At first we could not understand this. Later we found
+out it was the result of an order of Aguinaldo's, faithfully carried
+out, not to assemble in large commands, but to conduct a systematic
+guerrilla warfare indefinitely. We learned this by capturing a copy
+of the order, which was quite elaborate. Dr. Phelan's report says:
+
+
+    I told him [Melliza] that the city was in our power, and that we
+    could destroy it at any time * * *. Lawyer Melliza replied that
+    he cared nothing about the city; that we could destroy it if we
+    wished * * *. "We will withdraw to the mountains and repeat the
+    North American Indian warfare. You must not forget that."
+
+
+Later, they did.
+
+On January 15th, General Otis wrote General Miller [172] again
+cautioning him against any clash at Iloilo, and saying of conditions
+at Manila and Malolos: "The revolutionary government is very anxious
+for peaceful relations."
+
+Three days later Senator Bacon saw the situation with clearer vision
+from the other side of the world than General Otis could see it
+under his nose, and said on the floor of the Senate on January 18th
+concerning the conditions at Manila and Malolos:
+
+
+    While there is no declaration of war, while there is no avowal
+    of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other with
+    such divers intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to
+    ignite the magazines which is to explode. [173]
+
+
+The spark was ignited on February 4, 1899, by a sentinel of the
+Nebraska regiment firing on some Filipino soldiers who disregarded
+his challenge to halt, and killing one of them. War once on, General
+Miller was directed on February 10th, after he had lain in Iloilo
+harbor for forty-four days, to take the city. So at last he gave
+written notice to the insurgents in Iloilo demanding the surrender
+of the city and garrison "before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant"
+and requesting them to give warning to all non-combatants. [174]
+Thereupon the insurgents set fire to the city and departed.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+OTIS AND AGUINALDO (Continued)
+
+                A word spoken in due season, how good is it!
+
+                                                       Proverbs xv., 23.
+
+
+In the last chapter we saw the début of the Benevolent Assimilation
+programme at Iloilo. We are now to observe it at Manila. General Otis
+says in his report for 1899 [175]:
+
+
+    After fully considering the President's proclamation and the
+    temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political
+    problems and the friendly intentions of the United States
+    Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain
+    words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of
+    cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc.,
+    * * * which might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to
+    incite widespread hostilities among the natives. * * * It was my
+    opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the
+    paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government
+    would be clearly brought within the comprehension of the people.
+
+
+Accordingly, he published a proclamation as indicated, on January 4th,
+at Manila. In a less formal communication concerning this proclamation,
+viz., a letter to General Miller at Iloilo, General Otis comes to
+the point more quickly thus:
+
+
+    After some deliberation we put out one of our own which it was
+    believed would suit the temper of the people. [176]
+
+
+The only thing in the Otis proclamation specifically directed toward
+soothing "the temper of the people" was a hint that the United
+States would, under the government it was going to impose, "appoint
+the representative men now forming the controlling element of the
+Filipinos to civil positions of responsibility and trust" (p. 69). And
+this, far from soothing Filipino temper, was interpreted as an offer
+of a bribe if they would desert the cause of their country. The bona
+fides of the offer they did not doubt for a moment. In fact it caught
+a number of the more timid prominent men, especially the elderly ones
+of the ultraconservative element preferring submission to strife. But
+the younger and bolder spirits were faithful, many of them unto death,
+and all of them unto many battles and much "hiking." [177]
+
+General Otis's report goes on to tell how, about the middle of January,
+after he had published his sugar-coated edition of the presidential
+proclamation at Manila, it then at last occurred to him that General
+Miller might have published the original text of it in full at Iloilo,
+and, "fearing that," says he, "I again despatched Lieut. Col. Potter to
+Iloilo"--evidently post-haste. But it appears that when the breathless
+Potter arrived, the lid was already off. The horse had left the stable
+and the door was open, as we saw in the preceding chapter. However,
+as the Otis report indicates in this connection (p. 67), copies of
+the original McKinley proclamation, as published in full at Iloilo by
+General Miller, were of course promptly forwarded by the insurgents at
+Iloilo to the insurgent government at Malolos. So all that General Otis
+got for his pains was detection in the attempt to conceal the crucial
+words asserting American sovereignty in plain English. He tells us
+himself that as soon as the Malolos people discovered the trick, "it
+[the proclamation] became"--in the light of the Otis doctoring--"the
+object of venomous attack." His report was of course written long after
+all these matters occurred, but its language shows a total failure
+on the part of its author, even then, to understand the cause of the
+bitterness he denominates "venom." This bitterness grew naturally
+out of what seemed to the Filipinos an evident purpose of the United
+States to take and keep the Islands and an accompanying unwillingness
+to acknowledge that purpose, as shown by the conspicuous discrepancies
+between the original text of the proclamation as published at Iloilo
+by General Miller, on January 1st, and the modified version of it
+given out by General Otis at Manila on January 4th. "The ablest of
+the insurgent newspapers," says he (p. 69), "which was now issued
+at Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna * * * attacked the
+policy * * * as declared in the proclamation, and its assumption of
+sovereignty * * * with all the vigor of which he was capable." The
+nature of Editor Luna's philippics is not described by General Otis
+in detail, the only specific notion we get of them being from General
+Otis's echo of their tone, which, he tells us, was to the effect that
+"everything tended simply to a change of masters." But in another part
+of the Otis Report (p. 163) we find an epistle written about that
+time by one partisan of the revolution to another, whose key-note,
+given in the following extracts, was doubtless in harmony with the
+Luna editorials:
+
+
+    We shall not have them (Filipinos enough to conduct a decent
+    government) in 10, 20, or a 100 years, because the Yankees
+    will never acknowledge the aptitude of an "inferior" race to
+    govern the country. Do not dream that when American sovereignty
+    is implanted in the country the American office-holders will
+    give up. Never! If * * * it depends upon them to say whether the
+    Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country
+    * * * they will never say it."
+
+
+Is not the American who pretends that he would have done anything but
+just what the Filipinos did, had he been in their place, i.e., fought
+to the last ditch for the independence of his country, the rankest
+sort of a hypocrite? General Otis was a soldier, and his views may
+have been honestly colored by his environment. But how at this late
+date can any fair-minded man read the above extracts illustrative
+of the temper in which the Filipinos went to war with us without
+acknowledging the righteousness of the motives which impelled them?
+
+Aguinaldo promptly met General Otis's proclamation of January 4th
+by a counter-proclamation put out the very next day, in which he
+indignantly protested against the United States assuming sovereignty
+over the Islands. "Even the women," says General Otis (p. 70), "in a
+document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after
+the men were all killed off they were prepared to shed their patriotic
+blood for the liberty and independence of their country." General
+Otis actually intended this last as a sly touch of humor. But when
+we recollect Mr. Millet's description (Chapter IV. ante) of the women
+coming to the trenches and cooking rice for the men while the Filipinos
+were slowly drawing their cordon ever closer about the doomed Spanish
+garrison of Manila in July and August previous, fighting their way over
+the ground between them and the besieged main body of their ancient
+enemies inch by inch, while Admiral Dewey blockaded them by sea,
+General Otis's sly touch of humor loses some of its slyness. "The
+insurgent army also," he says (p. 70), "was especially affected * * *
+and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility
+in war with the United States troops * * * whom it had commenced to
+insult and charge with cowardice."
+
+The benighted condition of the insurgents in this regard was directly
+traceable to the Iloilo fiasco. It was that, principally, which made
+the insurgents so foolishly over-confident and the subsequent slaughter
+of them so tremendous. Further on in his report General Otis says, with
+perceptible petulance, in summing up his case against the Filipinos:
+
+
+    The pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself
+    for Spain * * * was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant
+    masses.
+
+
+Speaking of his own modified version of the Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation, General Otis says (p. 76):
+
+
+    No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual
+    declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly
+    advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5th, issued the
+    following
+
+
+--giving the reply proclamation in full. No man can read the Otis
+report itself without feeling that if he, the reader, had been playing
+Aguinaldo's hand he would have played it exactly as Aguinaldo did. To
+General Otis the government at Malolos--"their Malolos arrangement," he
+used to call it--seemed quite an impudent little opera-bouffe affair,
+"a tin-horn government," as Senator Spooner suggested in the same
+debate on the treaty, in which he called his rugged and fiery friend
+from South Carolina, Senator Tillman, "the Senator from Aguinaldo,"
+and immediately thereafter, with that engaging frankness that always so
+endeared him to his colleagues on both sides of the Chamber, removed
+the sting from the jest by admitting that neither he (Spooner),
+nor Tillman, nor anybody else in the United States, knew anything
+about Aguinaldo or his government. But in the calmer retrospect of
+many years after, we have seen, through the official documents which
+have become available in the interval, that said government was in
+complete and effective control of practically the whole archipelago,
+and had the moral support of the whole population at a time when our
+troops controlled absolutely nothing but the two towns of Manila and
+Cavite. Therefore, when we read in the Aguinaldo proclamation such
+phrases as, "In view of this, I summoned a council of my generals and
+asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of
+both bodies I" did so and so; "My government cannot remain indifferent
+to" this or that act of the Americans assuming sovereignty over the
+islands; "Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities
+if" etc.; they do not sound to us so irritatingly bombastic as they
+did to General Otis, distributed under his nose as the proclamation
+containing them at once was, by thousands, throughout a city of which
+he was nominally in possession, but nine-tenths of whose 300,000
+inhabitants he was obliged to believe in sympathy with the insurgents.
+
+"My government," says the Aguinaldo proclamation, "rules the whole
+of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of Mindanao." Except as to
+Mindanao, which cut absolutely no figure in the insurrection until well
+toward the end of the guerrilla part of it, we have already examined
+this claim and found by careful analysis that it was absolutely true
+by the end of December, 1898.
+
+After a rapid review of how he had been aided and encouraged in
+starting the revolution against the Spaniards by Admiral Dewey, and
+then given the cold shoulder by the army when it came, Aguinaldo's
+manifesto says:
+
+
+    It was also taken for granted that the American forces would
+    necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed
+    to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great
+    hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence
+    in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its
+    independence and for the abolition of slavery, and which posed as
+    the champion and liberator of oppressed peoples. We felt ourselves
+    under the safeguard of a free people.
+
+
+That this statement also was authorized by the facts is evident from
+the minutes of the Hong Kong meeting of May 4th, already noticed,
+presided over by Aguinaldo, and called to formulate the programme
+for the insurrection he was about to sail for the Philippines to
+inaugurate, in which, after much discussion among the revolutionary
+leaders it was agreed that while they must be prepared for all possible
+contingencies, yet,
+
+
+    if Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles
+    of its constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will
+    be made to colonize the Filipinos or annex them. [178]
+
+
+In short, the Aguinaldo proclamation of January 5th suggests with
+a briefness which Filipino familiarity with the great mass of
+facts already laid before the reader in the preceding chapters made
+appropriate, all the causes for which the Malolos Government was ready,
+if need be, to declare war, and winds up by boldly serving General
+Otis with notice that if the Americans try to take Iloilo and the
+Visayan Islands "my government is disposed to open hostilities."
+
+On January 9th President McKinley cabled out to General Otis asking
+if it would help matters to send a commission out to explain to
+the Filipinos our benevolent intentions. This idea thus suggested
+materialized, a few weeks later, in the Schurman Commission, of which
+more anon. The next day, January 10th, General Otis answered endorsing
+the sending of "commissioners of tact and discretion," and adding: [178]
+
+
+    Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control ignorant
+    classes. [179]
+
+
+As a matter of fact the leaders were leading. They were not arguing
+with the tide. They were merely riding the crest of it. Actually,
+General Otis would have stopped "The Six Hundred Marseillaise Who
+Knew How to Die"--the ones whose march to Paris, according to Thomas
+Carlyle, inspired the composition of the French national air, "The
+Marseillaise"--and tried to parley with the head of the column on the
+idea of getting them to abandon their enterprise and disperse to their
+several homes. He also says, in the cablegram under consideration:
+
+
+    If peace kept for several days more immediate danger will have
+    passed.
+
+
+In other words, he was holding off the calf as best he could pending
+the ratification of the treaty. From the text itself, however, of
+General Otis's report, it is clear enough, that even he was getting
+anxious to give the Filipinos a drubbing as soon as the treaty should
+be safely passed. Referring to a message from the President enjoining
+avoidance of a clash with the Filipinos he says (p. 80):
+
+
+    The injunction of his Excellency the President of the United
+    States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent
+    effect upon the command. Officers and men * * * were restless
+    under the restraints * * * imposed, and * * * eager to avenge the
+    insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and
+    aggressive demonstrations of the insurgent army who continue to
+    throng the streets of the business portion of the city.
+
+
+See the lamb kick the lion viciously in the face, and observe the
+lion as he first lifts his eyes heavenward and says meekly: "Thy
+will be done. This is Benevolent Assimilation"; and then turns them
+Senate-ward and murmurs: "I cannot stand this much longer, kind
+sirs. Say when!" The way war correspondent John F. Bass puts the
+situation about this time in a letter to his paper, Harper's Weekly,
+was this:
+
+
+    Jimmie Green [180] bites his lip, hangs on to himself, and finds
+    comfort in the idea that his time will come.
+
+
+After Aguinaldo's ultimatum of January 5th about fighting if we took
+Iloilo, General Otis refrained from taking Iloilo, and continued to
+communicate with the insurgent chieftain, appointing commissioners
+to meet commissioners appointed by him. These held divers and sundry
+sessions, whose only result was to kill time, or at least to mark
+time, while the Administration was getting the treaty through the
+Senate. The object of these meetings is thus set forth in the military
+order of January 9, 1899, appointing the Otis portion of the Joint
+High Parleying Board:
+
+
+    To meet a commission of like number appointed by General Aguinaldo,
+    and to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive
+    at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires
+    of the Filipino people and the people of the United States, that
+    peace and harmonious relations between these respective peoples
+    may be continued. [181]
+
+
+The minutes of the first meeting of this board, prepared by the
+Spanish-speaking clerk or recorder, recite the above declared
+purpose verbatim, in all its verbosity, and then go on to say that
+our side asked
+
+
+    That the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo give
+    their opinion as to what were the purposes, aspirations, aims,
+    and desires of the people of the archipelago.
+
+
+The next paragraph is almost Pickwickian in its unconscious terseness:
+
+
+    To this request the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo
+    made response that in their opinion the aspirations, purposes,
+    and desires of the Philippine people might be summed up in two
+    words "Absolute Independence."
+
+
+Of course even General Otis does not reproduce this laconic answer
+as part of his petulant summing up of how little the Filipinos knew,
+before the outbreak of February 4th, as to what they really wanted. He
+merely alludes to it as being of record elsewhere. It is one oĢ
+the various pieces of jetsam and flotsam that have floated from the
+sea of those great events to the shores of government publications
+since. The minutes of these meetings may be found among the hearings
+before the Senate Committee of 1902. [182]
+
+General Otis's report complains that Aguinaldo's commissioners did not
+know what they wanted, "could not give any satisfactory explanation"
+of the "measure of protection" they wanted, they having declared
+that they would greatly prefer the United States to establish a
+protectorate over them to keep them from being annexed by some other
+power. But he fails to state, which is a fact shown by the minutes of
+the meeting of January 14 (p. 2721), that the Filipino commissioners
+did say that this was a question which would only be reached between
+their government and ours when the latter should agree to officially
+recognize the former. To quote their exact language, which is rather
+clumsily translated, they said: "The aspiration of the Filipino
+people is the independence with the restrictions resulting from the
+conditions which its government may agree with the American, when
+the latter agree to officially recognize the former."
+
+It is perfectly clear from the voluminous minutes of the proceedings
+that the Filipinos were only seeking some declaration of the purpose
+of our government which would satisfy their people that the programme
+was something more than a mere change of masters. "They begged,"
+says General Otis (p. 82), "for some tangible concession from the
+United States Government--one which they could present to the people
+and which might serve to allay excitement." General Otis of course had
+no authority to bind the government and so could make no promise. But
+the day this Otis-Aguinaldo parleying board had its second meeting,
+January 11th, and probably with no more knowledge of its existence
+than the reader has of what is going on in the Fiji Islands at the
+moment he reads these lines, Senator Bacon introduced in the United
+States Senate some resolutions which were precisely the medicine the
+case required and precisely the thing the Filipinos were pleading
+for. These resolutions concluded thus:
+
+
+    That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or
+    intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
+    said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their
+    determination when an independent government shall have been duly
+    erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to
+    said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just,
+    all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon
+    leave the government and control of the islands to their people.
+
+
+They were a twin brother to the Teller Cuban resolution which was
+incorporated into the resolution declaring war against Spain, being
+verbatim the same, except with the necessary changes of name, of
+"islands" for "island," etc.
+
+On January 18th, while the futile parleying board aforesaid was still
+futilely parleying at Manila, Senator Bacon made an argument in the
+Senate in support of his resolution, whose far-sighted statesmanship,
+considered in relation to the analogies of its historic setting,
+most strikingly reminds us of Burke's great speech on conciliation
+with America delivered under similar circumstances nearly a century
+and a quarter earlier. After alluding to the naturalness of the
+apprehension of the Filipinos "that it is the purpose of the United
+States Government to maintain permanent dominion over them," [183]
+Senator Bacon urged:
+
+
+    The fundamental requirement in these resolutions is that the
+    Government of the United States will not undertake to exercise
+    permanent dominion over the Philippine Islands. The resolutions
+    are intentionally made broad, so that those who agree on that
+    fundamental proposition may stand upon them even though they
+    may differ materially as to a great many other things relative
+    to the future course of the government in connection with the
+    Philippine Islands.
+
+
+Senator Bacon then quoted the following from some remarks Senator
+Foraker had previously made in the course of the great debate on
+the treaty:
+
+
+    I do not understand anybody to be proposing to take the Philippine
+    Islands with the idea and view of permanently holding them.
+    * * * The President of the United States does not, I know, and no
+    Senator in this chamber has made any such statement;
+
+
+and added:
+
+
+    If the views expressed by the learned Senator from Ohio in
+    his speech * * * are those upon which we are to act, there is
+    very little difference between us; and there will be no future
+    contention between us * * * if we can have an authoritative
+    expression from The Law-Making Power of the United States in a
+    joint resolution that such is the purpose of the future. [184]
+
+
+Says the Holy Scripture: "A word spoken in season, how good is it!"
+Had the Bacon resolutions passed the United States Senate in January,
+1899, we never would have had any war with the Filipinos. [185]
+They would have presented at the psychologic moment the very thing
+the best and bravest of the Filipino leaders were then pleading
+with General Otis for, something "tangible," something "which they
+could present to their people and which would allay excitement,"
+by allaying the universal fear that we were going to do with them
+exactly as all other white men they had ever heard of had done with
+all other brown men they had ever heard of under like circumstances,
+viz., keep them under permanent dominion with a view of profit.
+
+In his letter accepting the nomination for the Presidency in 1900,
+Mr. McKinley sought to show the Filipinos to have been the aggressors
+in the war by a reference to the fact that the outbreak occurred
+while the Bacon resolution was under discussion in the Senate. This
+hardly came with good grace from an Administration whose friends in
+the Senate had all along opposed not only the Bacon resolution but
+also all other resolutions frankly declaratory of the purpose of our
+government. The supreme need of the hour then was, and the supreme
+need of every hour of every day we have been in the Philippines since
+has been, "an authoritative expression from the law-making power of
+the United States"--not mere surmises of a President, confessedly
+devoid of binding force, but an authoritative expression from the
+law-making power, declaratory of the purpose of our government with
+regard to the Philippine Islands. Secretary of War Taft visited Manila
+in 1907 to be present at the opening of the Philippine Assembly. In
+view of the universal longing which he knew existed for some definite
+authoritative declaration as to whether our government intends to
+keep the Islands permanently or not, he said:
+
+
+    I cannot speak with authority * * *. The policy to be pursued
+    with respect to them is, therefore, ultimately for Congress to
+    determine. * * * I have no authority to speak for Congress in
+    respect to the ultimate disposition of the Islands. [186]
+
+
+This bitter disappointment of the public expectation and hope
+of something definite, certainly did not lessen the belief of
+the Filipinos that we have no notion of ever giving them their
+independence. Had the Senate known what the Filipino commissioners
+were so earnestly asking of the Otis commissioners in January,
+1899, the Bacon resolution would probably have passed. In fact it
+is demonstrable almost mathematically that, had the Administration's
+friends in the Senate allowed that resolution to come to a vote before
+the outbreak of February 4th, instead of filibustering against it until
+after that event, it would have passed. As stated in the foot-note, the
+roll-call on the final vote on it, which was not taken until February
+14th, showed a tie--29 to 29, the Vice-President of the United States
+casting the deciding vote which defeated it. Much dealing with real
+life and real death has blunted my artistic sensibilities to thrills
+from the mere pantomime of the stage. But as here was a vote where,
+had a single Senator who voted No voted Aye, some 300,000,000 of
+dollars, over a thousand lives of American soldiers killed in battle,
+some 16,000 lives of Filipino soldiers killed in battle, and possibly
+100,000 Filipino lives snuffed out through famine, pestilence, and
+other ills consequent on the war, would have been saved, I can not
+refrain from reproducing the vote--perhaps the most uniquely momentous
+single roll-call in the parliamentary history of Christendom [187]:
+
+
+Ayes
+
+            Bacon                   Jones of Nevada
+            Bate                    Lindsay
+            Berry                   McLaurin
+            Caffery                 Martin
+            Chilton                 Money
+            Clay                    Murphy
+            Cockrell                Perkins
+            Faulkner                Pettigrew
+            Gorman                  Pettus
+            Gray                    Quay
+            Hale                    Rawlins
+            Harris                  Smith
+            Heitfield               Tillman
+            Hoar                    Turner
+            Jones of Arkansas
+
+
+Nays
+
+            Allison                 Mantle
+            Burrows                 Morgan
+            Carter                  Nelson
+            Chandler                Penrose
+            Deboe                   Platt of Connecticut
+            Fairbanks               Platt of New York
+            Frye                    Pritchard
+            Gear                    Ross
+            Hanna                   Shoup
+            Hawley                  Simon
+            Kyle                    Stewart
+            Lodge                   Teller
+            McBride                 Warren
+            McEnery                 Wolcott
+            McMillan
+
+
+In January, 1899, the out-and-out land-grabbers had not yet made bold
+to show their hand, the friends of the treaty confining themselves
+to the alleged shame of doing as we had done with Cuba, on account
+of the supposed semi-barbarous condition of "the various tribes out
+there," leaving the possibility of profit to quietly suggest itself
+amid the noisy exhortations of altruism. It was not until after the
+milk of human kindness had been spilled in war that Senator Lodge
+said at the Philadelphia National Republican Convention of 1900:
+
+
+    We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the
+    Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade
+    Expansion.
+
+
+Speaking (p. 82) of the meetings of what for lack of a better term
+I have above called the Otis-Aguinaldo Joint High Parleying Board,
+General Otis says in his report:
+
+
+    Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion,
+    * * * and * * * amusement.
+
+
+The Filipino newspapers called attention to the fact that large
+reinforcements of American troops were on the way to Manila, and very
+plausibly inferred that the parleying was for delay only. By January
+26th the politeness of both the American and the Filipino commissioners
+had been worn to a frazzle, and they adjourned, each recognizing that
+the differences between them could ultimately be settled only on the
+field of battle, in the event of the ratification of the treaty.
+
+January 27th, General Otis cabled to Washington a letter from
+Aguinaldo, of which he says in his report: "I was surprised * * *
+because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose
+to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the
+arbitrament of war" (p. 84). General Otis was "surprised" to the
+last. Aguinaldo's letter is not at all surprising, though extremely
+interesting. It sends General Otis a proclamation issued January 21st,
+announcing the publication of a constitution modelled substantially
+after that of the United States, even beginning with the familiar
+words about "securing the blessings of liberty, promoting the general
+welfare," etc., and concludes with an expression of confident hope that
+the United States will recognize his government, and a bold implication
+of determination to fight if it does not. On the evening of February
+4th an insurgent soldier approaching an American picket failed to
+halt or answer when challenged, and was shot and killed. Nearly
+six months of nervous tension thereupon pressed for liberation in
+a general engagement which continued throughout the night and until
+toward sundown of the next day, thus finally unleashing the dogs of
+war. In the Washington Post of February 6, 1899, Senator Bacon is
+quoted as saying:
+
+
+    I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be necessary to
+    carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain that we
+    could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate
+    adopted my resolution, or a similar resolution announcing our
+    honest intentions with regard to the Philippines.
+
+
+Said the New York Criterion of February 11, 1899:
+
+
+    Whether we like it or not, we must go on slaughtering the natives
+    in the English fashion, and taking what muddy glory lies in this
+    wholesale killing until they have learned to respect our arms. The
+    more difficult task of getting them to respect our intentions
+    will follow.
+
+
+The Washington Post of February 6, 1899, may not have quoted Senator
+Bacon with exactitude. But what the Senator did say on the floor of
+the Senate is important, historically. Under date of February 22,
+1912, Senator Bacon writes me, in answer to an inquiry:
+
+
+    I enclose a speech made by me upon the subject in the Senate
+    February 27, 1899, and upon pages 6, 7, and 8 of which you will
+    find a statement of my position, and the reasons given by me
+    therefor. Of course you cannot go at length into that question
+    in your narration of the events of that day, but my position was
+    that, while I did not approve of the war, and did not approve
+    of the enslavement of the Filipinos, and while if I had my way I
+    would immediately set them free, at the same time, as war was then
+    flagrant, and there were then some twenty odd thousand American
+    troops in the Philippine Islands, we must either support them or
+    leave them to defeat and death. I do not know how far you can use
+    anything then said by me, but if you make allusion to the fact
+    that I was willing to supply money and troops to carry on the war
+    in the Philippines, I would be glad for it to be accompanied by a
+    very brief statement of the ground upon which I based such action.
+
+
+The above makes it unnecessary to quote at length from the speech
+referred to, which may be found at pp. 2456 et seq of the Congressional
+Record for February 27, 1899. However, there is one passage in the
+speech to which I especially say Amen, and invite all whose creed of
+patriotism is not too sublimated for such a common feeling to join
+me in so doing. Senator Bacon will now state the creed:
+
+
+    The oft-repeated expression "our country, right or wrong" has a
+    vital principle in it, and upon that principle I stand.
+
+
+The Senator immediately follows his creed with these commentaries:
+
+
+    In this annexation of the Philippine Islands through the
+    ratification of the treaty, and in waging war to subjugate the
+    Filipinos, I think the country, acting through constitutional
+    authorities, is wrong. But it is not for me to say because the
+    country has been committed to a policy that I do not favor and
+    have opposed, in consequence of which there is war, that I will
+    not support the government.
+
+
+Under the civilizing influence of Krag-Jorgensen rifles and the moral
+uplift of high explosive projectiles, what our soldiers used to call,
+with questionable piety, "the fear of God," was finally put into the
+hearts of the Filipinos, after much carnage by wholesale in battle
+formation and later by retail in a species of guerrilla warfare as
+irritating as it was obstinate. But they have never yet learned to
+respect our intentions, because under the guidance of three successive
+Presidents we have studiously refrained from any authoritative
+declaration as to what those intentions are. We are loth to hark back
+to the only right course, a course similar to our action in Cuba,
+because of the expense we have been to in the Philippines. But we also
+know that the islands are and are likely to continue, a costly burden,
+a nuisance, and a distinct strategic disadvantage in the event of war;
+and that Mr. Cleveland was right when he said:
+
+
+    The government of remote and alien people should have no permanent
+    place in the purposes of our national life.
+
+
+The mistaken policy which involved us in a war to subjugate the
+Filipinos, following our war to free the Cubans, will never stand
+atoned for before the bar of history, nor can the Filipinos ever in
+reason be expected to respect our intentions, until the law-making
+power of the government shall have authoritatively declared what
+those intentions are--i. e., what we intend ultimately to do with the
+islands. Senator Bacon's resolutions of 1899 were, are, and always
+will be the last word on the first act needed to rectify the original
+Philippine blunder, "announcing" as they would, to use the language
+attributed to their distinguished author by the Washington Post of
+February 6, 1899, above-quoted, "our honest intentions with regard to
+the Philippines." So eager is the exploiter to exploit the islands,
+and so apprehensive is the Filipino that the exploiter will have more
+influence at Washington than himself and therefore be able ultimately
+to bring about a practical industrial slavery, that common honesty
+demands such a declaration. To doctor present Filipino discontent
+with Benevolent Uncertainty is a mere makeshift. The remedy the
+situation needs is simple, but as yet untried--Frankness. The chief
+of the causes of the present discontent among the Filipinos with
+American rule is precisely the same old serpent that precipitated
+the war thirteen years ago, to wit, lack of a frank and honest
+declaration of our purpose. The trouble then lay, and still lies,
+and, in the absence of some such declaration as that proposed by
+the Bacon resolution, will always lie in what seemed then, and still
+seems, to the Filipinos "an evident purpose to keep the islands and
+an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that purpose." Some
+may object that one Congress cannot bind another. The same argument
+would have killed the Teller amendment to the declaration of war with
+Spain avowing our purpose as to Cuba. Such an argument assumes that
+this nation has no sense of honor, and that it should cling for a
+while longer to the stale Micawberism that the Islands may yet pay,
+before it decides whether it will do right or not, and signalizes
+such decision by formal announcement through Congress. To men capable
+of such an assumption as the one just indicated, this book is not
+addressed. Three successive Presidents, Messrs. McKinley, Roosevelt,
+and Taft, have with earnest asseveration of benevolent intention tried
+without success all these years to win the affections of the Filipino
+people, and to make them feel that "our flag had not lost its gift of
+benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores," as Mr. McKinley
+used to say. But the corner-stone of the policy was laid before we
+knew anything about how the land lay, and on the assumption, made
+practically without any knowledge whatever on the subject, that the
+Filipino people were incapable of self-government. The corner-stone
+of our Philippine policy has been from the beginning precisely that
+urged by Spain for not freeing Cuba, viz., "to spare the people from
+the dangers of premature independence." The three Presidents named
+above have always been willing to imply independence, but never to
+promise it. And the unwillingness to declare a purpose ultimately to
+give the Filipinos their independence has always been due to the desire
+to catch the vote of those who are determined they shall never have
+it. In this inexorable and unchangeable political necessity lies the
+essential contemptibleness of republican imperialism, and the secret
+of why the Filipinos, notwithstanding our good intentions, do not like
+us, and never will under the present policy. How can you blame them?
+
+Yet the more you know of the Filipinos, the better you like
+them. Self-sacrificing, brave, and faithful unto death in war, they
+are gentle, generous, and tractable in peace. Moreover, respect
+for constituted authority, as such, is innate in practically every
+Filipino, which I am not sure can be predicated concerning each and
+every citizen of my beloved native land. And we can win the grateful
+and lasting affection of the whole seven or eight millions of them any
+day we wish to. How? Have done with vague, vote-catching Presidential
+obiter, and through your Congress declare your purpose!
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+OTIS AND THE WAR
+
+                Am I the boss, or am I a tool,
+                Am I Governor-General or a hobo--hobo;
+                Now I'd like to know who's the boss of the show,
+                Is it me, or Emilio Aguinaldo?
+
+                                Army Song of the Philippines under Otis.
+
+
+"The thing is on," said General Hughes, Provost Marshal of Manila, to
+General Otis, at Malacaņan palace, on the night of February 4, 1899,
+about half past eight o'clock, as soon as the firing started. [188]
+He was talking about something which every American in Manila except
+General Otis had for months frankly recognized as inevitable--the war.
+
+On the day of the outbreak of February 4th, General Otis had under
+his command 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men, say in round numbers
+a total of 21,000. Of these some 15,500 were State volunteers mostly
+from the Western States, and the rest were regulars. All the volunteers
+and 1650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to
+their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of
+ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. The
+total force which he was thus entitled to command for any considerable
+period consisted of less than 4000. Of the 21,000 men on hand as
+aforesaid, on February 4th, deducting those at Cavite and Iloilo,
+the sick and wounded, those serving in civil departments, and in the
+staff organizations, the effective fighting force was 14,000, and of
+these 3000 constituted the Provost Guard in the great and hostile
+city of Manila. [189] Thus there were only 11,000 men, including
+those entitled to discharge, available to engage the insurgent army,
+"which," says Secretary of War Root, "was two or three times that
+number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native
+troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army."
+
+Such was the predicament into which General Otis's supremely zealous
+efforts to help the Administration get the treaty through the Senate
+by withholding from the American people the knowledge of facts which
+might have put them on notice that they were paying $20,000,000 for
+a $200,000,000 insurrection, had brought us. This is not a tale of
+woe. It is a tale of the disgust--good-humored, because stoical--which
+finally found expression at the time in the army song that heads this
+chapter, disgust at unnecessary sacrifice of American life which could
+so easily have been prevented had General Otis only revealed the real
+situation in time to have had plenty of troops on hand. It is a requiem
+over those brave men of the Eighth Army Corps from Pennsylvania,
+Tennessee, and the Western States that bore the brunt of the early
+fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed in 1899 as the
+result of an unpreparedness for war due to anxiety not to embarrass
+Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the Senate,
+an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in order
+to conceal from the people of the United States the unanimity of the
+desire of the Filipinos for Independence.
+
+It is quite true that none of our people then in the Islands realized
+this unanimity in all its pathos at the outset, but it soon became
+clear to everybody except the commanding general. It naturally dawned
+on him last of all, because he did not visit the most reliable sources
+of information, to wit, the battlefields during the fighting, and
+therefore did not see how tenaciously the Filipinos fought for the
+independence of their country. Moreover, General Otis tried to think
+till the last along lines in harmony with the original theory of
+Benevolent Assimilation. Hence Mr. Root's nonsense of 1899 and 1900
+about "the patient and unconsenting millions" dominated by "the Tagalo
+tribe," which nonsense was immensely serviceable in a campaign for the
+presidency wherein antidotes for sympathy with a people struggling
+to be free were of supreme practical political value. General Otis
+actually had Mr. McKinley believing as late as December, 1899, at
+least, that the opposition to a change of masters in lieu of Freedom
+was confined to a little coterie of self-seeking politicians who were
+in the business for what they could get out of it, and that the great
+majority would prefer him, Otis, to Aguinaldo, as governor-general. It
+is difficult on first blush to accept this statement as dispassionately
+correct, but there is no escape from the record. Mr. McKinley said
+in his annual message to Congress in December, 1899, in reviewing
+the direction he gave to the Paris peace negotiations which ended
+in the purchase of the islands, and the war with the Filipinos which
+had followed, and had then been raging since February 4th previous,
+"I had every reason to believe, and still believe that the transfer
+of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of
+the great mass of the Filipino people."
+
+Yet every American soldier who served in the Philippines at the time
+knows that Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand,
+because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their
+aspirations. [190]
+
+During the presidential campaign of 1900, while the war with the
+Filipinos was still raging, partisan rancour bitterly called in
+question the sincerity of President McKinley's statement in his annual
+message to Congress of December, 1899, that he then still believed "the
+transfer of sovereignty was in accord with the wishes and aspirations
+of the great mass of the Filipino people," on the ground that he must
+by the time he made that statement have understood how grossly--however
+honestly--General Otis had misled him as to the unanimity and tenacity
+of the Filipino purpose. But it is only necessary to read Admiral
+Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902 to understand
+Mr. McKinley's allusion in this same message to Congress of 1899 to
+"the sinister ambition of a few leaders," and this, once understood,
+explains the other statement of the message. Admiral Dewey came
+home in the fall of 1899 and undoubtedly filled Mr. McKinley with
+the estimate of Aguinaldo which makes such painful reading in the
+Admiral's testimony of 1902 before the Senate Committee, where he
+abused Aguinaldo like a pick-pocket, so to speak, saying his original
+motive was principally loot. [191] In the fall of 1899 Aguinaldo had
+issued a proclamation claiming that Admiral Dewey originally promised
+him independence, and Admiral Dewey had bitterly denounced this as a
+falsehood, so that the Admiral always cherished a very real resentment
+against the insurgent chief thereafter. His estimate of the Filipino
+leader as being in the insurrection merely for what he could get out
+of it was wholly erroneous, and has long since been exploded, all our
+generals of the early fighting and all Americans who have known him
+since being unanimous that Aguinaldo was and is a sincere patriot;
+but it undoubtedly explains Mr. McKinley's still clinging, in 1899,
+to the notion derived from General Otis that the insurrection did not
+have the moral and material backing of the whole Filipino people. The
+Filipino leaders were familiar with the spirit of our institutions. The
+men who controlled their counsels were high-minded, educated, patriotic
+men. "For myself and the officers and men under my command," wrote
+General Merritt to Aguinaldo in August, 1898, just after the fall
+of Manila, "I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the
+abilities and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the
+Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect." [192]
+
+The leaders believed that the American people did not fully understand
+the identity of the Philippine situation with that in Cuba, and that
+if they had, the treaty would not have been ratified. They also knew
+the supreme futility of trying to get the facts before the American
+people by peaceful means. And it was really with the abandon of genuine
+patriotism that they plunged their country into war. We did not know
+it then, but we do know it now. It would be simply wooden-headed to
+affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us. Of course
+some of the jeunesse dorée, as General Bell calls them in one of his
+early reports, [193] grew very aggressive and insulting toward the
+last. But the thinking men went into the war for independence in a
+spirit of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," to correct the
+impression General Otis had communicated to Mr. McKinley, and through
+him to our people, in the hope that the more lives they sacrificed
+in such a war (they risked--and many of them lost--their own also),
+the nearer they would come to refuting the idea that they did not
+know what they wanted. It was the only way they had to appeal to
+Cæsar, i.e., to the great heart of the American people. As the war
+grew more and more unpopular in the United States, the impression
+was more and more nursed here at home that the people did not really
+want independence, but were being coerced; and that they were like
+dumb driven cattle. The striking similarity of these suggestions
+to those by which tyranny has always met the struggles of men to
+be free, did not seem to occur to the American public. They were
+accepted as authoritative, being convenient also as an antidote to
+sympathy. General Otis had suppressed such words as "sovereignty,"
+"protection," and the like from his original sugar-coated edition
+of the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, offering an elaborate
+cock-and-bull explanation of why he did so. The Filipino answer to
+this took the form of a very clever newspaper cartoon, representing an
+American in a carromata--a kind of two-wheeled buggy--with a Filipino
+between the shafts pulling it; which cartoon of course, never reached
+the United States. The Filipinos had never heard the story on General
+Mahone about "tie yoh hoss an' come in," [194] but they had heard of
+the jinrickshaws of Japan, and they had read in Holy Writ and elsewhere
+of conquered people becoming hewers of wood and drawers of water to
+invading conquerors. And they are not without a sense of humor. It is
+a common mistake with many Americans--for quite a few among us suffer
+intellectually from over-sophistication--to suppose we monopolize all
+the sense of humor there is, and that that alone is proof of a due
+sense of proportion. At any rate, the Filipinos, with all due respect
+to General Otis's good intentions, understood that "sovereignty" and
+"protection" meant alien domination, so there was nothing in the Otis
+notion that for them those words had a "peculiar meaning which might
+be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite," etc. [195]
+
+Having now gotten into a war on the theory that only a small fraction
+of the Filipino people were opposed to a new and unknown yoke in
+lieu of the old one, General Otis still continued to try to square
+his theory with the facts. For many months he sat at his desk in
+Manila cheerily waging war with an inadequate force, and retaining in
+the service and on the firing line after their terms of enlistment
+expired, under pretence that they consented to it willingly, a lot
+of fellows from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States, who
+had volunteered for the war with Spain, with intent to kill Spaniards
+in order to free Cubans, and not with intent to kill Filipinos for
+also wanting to be free. Seeing nothing of the fighting himself,
+he of course failed to get a correct estimate of the tenacity of
+the Filipino purpose. No purpose is here entertained to suggest
+that any of those early volunteers went around preaching mutiny,
+or feeling mutinous. They did not originally like the Filipinos
+especially; furthermore, they liked the Philippines less than they
+did the Filipinos, and they had a vague notion that some one had
+blundered. But it was not theirs to ask the reason why. Besides,
+the orders from Washington being not to clash with the Filipinos
+at least until the treaty was ratified, the Filipino soldiers and
+subaltern officers had been calling them cowards for some time with
+impunity. So that as soon as the treaty was safely "put over," they
+were very glad to let off steam by killing a few hundred of them. But
+their hearts were not in the fight, in the sense of clear and profound
+conviction of the righteousness of the war. However, war is war, and
+they were soldiers, and "orders is orders," as Tommy Atkins says. So
+let us turn to an honester, if grimmer, side of the picture.
+
+The first battle of the war began about 8:30 o'clock on the night
+of February 4th, and lasted all through that night and until about
+5 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. Our casualties numbered
+about 250 killed and wounded. The insurgent loss was estimated at
+3000. "Those of the insurgents will never be known," says General
+Otis. [196] "We buried 700 of them." [197] There was fighting pretty
+much all around Manila, for the insurgents had the city almost hemmed
+in. An arc of a circle, broken in places possibly, but several miles
+long, drawn about the city, would probably suggest the general idea
+of the enemy's lines. They had been allowed to dig trenches without
+interference while the debate in the Senate on the treaty was in
+progress, pursuant to the temporary "peace-at-any-price" programme. The
+arc was broken into smithereens by 5 P.M. of February 5th. When the
+morning of February 6th came Col. James F. Smith, commanding the First
+Californias, was non est inventus, and so was a large part of his
+regiment. "No one seemed to know definitely his location," says the
+Otis Report. [198] As a matter of fact he had taken two battalions of
+his regiment and waded clean through the enemy's lines, and had to be
+sent for to come back to form again with the line of battle needed to
+protect the city. So the Californias probably carried off the pick of
+the laurels of the first day's fighting. General Anderson, commanding
+the First Division of the Eighth Corps, threw them some very handsome
+well earned bouquets in his report, stating also that their colonel
+had shown "the very best qualities of a volunteer officer"--why he
+limited it to "volunteer" does not appear, but is inferable from the
+well-known disposition of all regulars to consider all volunteers
+"rookies" [199]--and recommended that he be made a brigadier general,
+which shortly afterward was done. [200]
+
+It would be invidious to follow the various phases of the subsequent
+early fighting, and single out one or more States [201] and tell of the
+hard earned and well deserved honors they won, because space forbids
+a proper tribute to the heroism of all of them. As for the regulars,
+[202] they were the same they were at Santiago de Cuba, the same
+they always are anywhere you put them. When a newspaper man would
+come around a regular regiment during the fighting before Santiago
+he would be told that they had no news to give him, "We ain't heroes,
+we're regulars," they would say. After the outbreak of February 4th,
+all our people did well, acted nobly, "Angels could no more." Neither
+could devils, as shown by the losses inflicted on the enemy.
+
+There was more fighting outside Manila during the next two or three
+days, and when that was done the somewhat shattered insurgent legions
+had recoiled to the distantly visible foot-hills, convinced that
+their notion they could take Manila was very foolish and very rash.
+
+At the town of Caloocan, some three or four miles out to the north
+of Manila, were located the shops and round houses of the Manila and
+Dagupan Railway, which runs from Manila in a northwesterly direction
+about 120 miles to Dagupan, and was then the only railroad in the
+archipelago. It was fed by a vast rich farming country, the great
+plain of central Luzon. Naturally, the central plain which fed the
+railroad that traversed it and kept its teeming myriads of small
+farmers in touch with the great outside world was to be sooner or
+later, the theatre of war. To seize transportation is instinctively
+the first tactical move of a military man. Lieutenant-General Luna,
+commander-in-chief, next to Aguinaldo, of the revolutionary forces, the
+man whom later Aguinaldo had shot, was just then at Caloocan with 4000
+men. So it fell to General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of
+the Eighth Corps, to move on Caloocan, which he did on February 10th.
+
+John F. Bass, correspondent for Harper's Weekly, writing from Manila
+a short time after this, describes this movement. It was our first
+move away from the city of Manila. With a few masterly strokes of the
+pen, which I regret there is not space to reproduce here in full,
+Mr. Bass gives a vivid picture of the various engagements, and of
+"a background of burning villages, smoke, fire, shot, and shell, the
+ceaseless tramp of tired and often bleeding feet," etc. "Heroism,"
+he says, "became a matter of course and death an incident." Finally
+his story pauses for a moment thus: "The natural comment is that
+all this is merely war--the business of the soldier. True, nor do
+I think Jimmie Green [Mr. Bass's name for our "Tommy Atkins"] is
+troubled with heroics. He accepts the situation without excitement
+or hysterics. He has little feeling in this matter for his heart is
+not in this fight." Here brother Bass's moralizing ceases abruptly,
+and the contagious excitement of the hour catches him, just as it
+always does the average man under such circumstances:
+
+
+    From La Loma church you may get the full view of our long line
+    crossing the open field, evenly, steadily, irresistibly, like an
+    inrolling wave on the beach * * *. Watch the regiments go forward,
+    and form under fire, and move on and on, and you will exclaim:
+    "Magnificent," and you will gulp a little and feel proud without
+    exactly knowing why. Then gradually the power of that line will
+    force itself upon you, and you will feel that you must follow,
+    that wherever that line goes you must go also. By and by you will
+    be sorry, but for the present the might of an American regiment
+    has got possession of you.
+
+
+Anybody who has ever been with an American regiment in action knows
+exactly how the man who wrote that felt. The American who has never
+had the experience Mr. Bass describes above has missed one way of
+realizing the majesty of the power of the republic whereof he is
+privileged to be a citizen. For if there is one national trait which
+more than any other explains the greatness of our country, it is the
+instinct for organization, the fondness for self-multiplication to
+the nth power by intelligent co-operation with one's fellows to a
+common end. Especially is the experience in question inspiring where
+the example of the field officers is particularly appropriate to the
+occasion. Take for instance the following, concerning the conduct of
+Major J. Franklin Bell in this advance on Caloocan, from the report
+of Major Kobbe, Commanding the Artillery:
+
+
+    As the right cleared the head of the ravine, I could see
+    Maj. J. F. Bell * * * leading a company of Montana troops in front
+    of the right * * * advancing, firing, toward intrenchments * * *.
+    He was on a black horse to the last * * * leading and cheering
+    the men. His work was most gallant and * * * especially cheering
+    to me. [203]
+
+
+No mere scribe can magnify General Bell's matchless efficiency in
+action, but it is certainly inspiring to contemplate. There are no
+"fuss and feathers" about him. Yet his power, proven on many a field
+in the Philippines, to kindle martial ardor by example, suggests the
+ubiquitous "Helmet of Navarre" of Lord Macaulay's poem.
+
+A little later correspondent Bass develops what he meant by "by
+and by you will be sorry." You see it is not comfortable business,
+this of hustling about among the dead and dying. In the excitement,
+you are so liable to step on the face of some poor devil you knew
+well, maybe a once warm friend. In this connection Mr. Bass says:
+"There is this difference between the manner in which American and
+Filipino soldiers die. The American falls in a heap and dies hard;
+the Filipino stretches himself out, and when dead is always found in
+some easy attitude, generally with his head on his arms. They die
+the way a wild animal dies--in just such a position as one finds a
+deer or an antelope which one has shot in the woods."
+
+So far as the writer is advised and believes, nobody who knows
+John F. Bass ever suspected him of being a quitter. He must have
+been reading the London Standard, which said about that time:
+"It is a little startling to find the liberators of Cuba engaged
+in suppressing a youthful republic which claims the sacred right of
+self-government." Bass had written his newspaper in August previous,
+after observing how pluckily the Filipinos had fought and licked
+the Spaniards: "Give them their independence and guarantee it to
+them." The overwhelming sentiment of the Eighth Army Corps when we
+took the Philippines was against taking them; and those who had kept
+informed knew that the Senate had ratified the treaty by a majority
+only one more than enough to squeeze it through, the vote having been
+57 to 27, at least 56 being thus indispensable to make the necessary
+constitutional two-thirds of the 84 votes cast; and that Wall Street
+and the White Man's Burden or land-grabbing contingent--"Philanthropy
+and Five per cent," as Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage put
+it at the time--were responsible for these shambles Mr. Bass describes.
+
+At this juncture some soft-headed gentleman asks: "What is this
+man who writes this book driving at? Is he trying to show that the
+American soldiers in the Philippines in February, 1899, all wanted
+to quit as soon as the war broke out?" Not at all. In the first
+place it hardly lay in American soldier nature to want to quit when
+Aguinaldo was telling us "if you don't take your flag down and out of
+these islands at once and promptly get out yourselves along with it,
+I will proceed to kick you out and throw it out." And in the next
+place, in the war with the Filipinos, as in all other wars, fuel was
+added to the flame as soon as the war broke out. Among the Americans,
+charges soon came into general circulation and acceptance that the
+Filipinos had planned (but been frustrated in) a plot looking to a
+general massacre of all foreigners in Manila. This alleged plot was
+supposed to have been scheduled to be carried out on a certain night
+shortly after February 15, 1899. Among the Filipinos, on the other
+hand, counter-charges soon followed, and met with general credence,
+that the Americans made a practise of killing prisoners taken in
+battle, including the wounded. Neither charge was ever proven, but
+both served the purpose, at the psychologic moment, of possessing
+each side with the desire to kill, which is the business of war. Let
+us glance briefly at these recriminations.
+
+Between pages 1916 and 1917 of Senate Document 331, part 2 [204] may
+be found a photo-lithograph of the celebrated alleged order of the
+Filipino Revolutionary Government of February 15, 1899, to massacre
+all foreign residents of Manila. In his report for 1899 [205] General
+Otis himself describes this order as one "which for barbarous intent
+is unequalled in these modern times in civilized warfare," and speaks
+of it as "issued by the Malolos Government through the responsible
+officer who had raised and organized the hostile inhabitants within
+the city." After Aguinaldo was captured in 1901, according to an
+account given by General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902, of
+a conversation with the insurgent leader, the latter was shown a copy
+of this document purporting to have been signed by General Luna, one of
+his generals. He disclaimed having in any way sanctioned it, in fact
+disclaimed any prior knowledge of it whatsoever, [206] a disclaimer
+which General MacArthur appears to have accepted as true, frankly and
+entirely. At page 1890 of the same volume, Captain J. R. M. Taylor,
+14th U. S. Infantry, a gallant soldier and an accomplished scholar,
+who was in charge in 1901 of the captured insurgent records at Manila,
+states that he was "informed" that the document was originally "signed
+by Sandico, then Secretary of the Interior" of the revolutionary
+government. Captain Taylor made an attempt to run the matter down,
+but obtained no evidence convincing to him. A like investigation by
+General MacArthur in 1901 had a like result. [207]
+
+On the other hand, Major Wm. H. Bishop, of the 20th Kansas, was
+credited in a soldier's letter written home, which first came to light
+in this country, with killing unarmed prisoners during the advance on
+Caloocan. The charges originated with a private of that regiment. Major
+Bishop denied the charges. [208] An investigation followed, in the
+course of which somebody made an innuendo, or charge--it is not
+important which--that other officers used their influence to prevent
+a full ventilation of the matter, specifically, General Funston,
+then Colonel of the 20th Kansas, and Major Metcalf, of the same
+regiment. These last two also made a most vigorous general denial,
+and nothing whatever was established against them. The whole matter
+was finally disposed of by being forwarded to the War Department at
+Washington by General Otis on July 13, 1899, some six months after the
+occurrences alleged, with the remark that he (General Otis) "doubted
+the wisdom of a court-martial" of the soldier who had made the charge
+against Major Bishop, "as it would give the insurgent authorities a
+knowledge of what was taking place, and they would assert positively
+that our troops practised inhumanities, whether the charges could
+be proven or not" and that they would use the incident "as an excuse
+to defend their own barbarities." [209] The last endorsement on the
+papers preceding General Otis's final endorsement was one by Colonel
+Crowder, now (1912) Judge Advocate General of the United States Army,
+in which he said: "I am not convinced from a careful reading of this
+report, that Private Brenner has made a false charge against Captain
+Bishop"; adding that "considerations of public policy, sufficiently
+grave to silence every other demand, require that no further action
+be taken in this case." [210] The "considerations of public policy"
+were of course those indicated in General Otis's final endorsement on
+the papers, already quoted. They were compellingly controlling, in my
+judgment, independently of the merits. Washing one's soiled linen in
+public is never advisable, and placing a weapon in your enemy's hand
+in time of war is at least equally unwise. Some shreds of this once
+much mooted matter doubtless still linger in the public memory. It
+has been thus briefly ventilated here solely to trace the genesis of
+the bitterness of that war, and of numerous later barbarities avenged
+in kind. The bitterness thus early begun grew as the war went on,
+until every time a hapless Filipino peasant soldier speaking only
+two or three words of Spanish would falsely explain, when captured,
+that he was a non-combatant, an amigo (friend), it usually at once
+filled the captor with vivid recollections of slain comrades, and of
+rumored or sometimes proven mutilation of their bodies after death,
+and these reflections would at once fill him with a yearning desire
+to blow the top of the amigo's head off, whether he yielded to the
+desire or not. Of no instance where he did so yield am I aware. But
+I do know that the invariable statement of all Filipinos unarmed and
+un-uniformed when captured, to the effect that they were amigos, became
+to the American soldier not remotely dissimilar to the waving of a red
+rag at a bull. Of course this was also due, largely, to the guerrilla
+practice of hiding guns when hard-pressed and actually plunging at
+once into some make-believe agricultural pursuit. As for Major Bishop,
+it is inconceivable to me that he gave any order to kill unarmed
+prisoners. Even admitting for the sake of the argument that he is a
+fiend, he is not a fool. As a matter of fact, he was a brave soldier,
+as all the reports show, and is a reputable lawyer, having many warm
+friends whose opinion of any man would command respect anywhere. The
+truth of the whole matter probably is that just before going into
+battle, when our troops were in an ugly temper by reason of the
+rumors of barbarities alleged to have been perpetrated by the enemy,
+or contemplated by him, the word was passed along the line to "Take no
+more prisoners than we have to," and that that thought originated with
+some irresponsible private soldier of the line inflamed by stories
+of mutilation of our dead or of maltreatment of our wounded. Such a
+"word," so passed from man to man, can, in the heat of conflict,
+very soon evolve into something having for practical purposes all
+the force and effect of an order.
+
+Through the foregoing, and like causes, including the "water cure,"
+later invented to persuade amigos to discover the whereabouts of hidden
+insurgent guns or give information as to the movements of the enemy,
+[211] our war with the Filipinos became, before it was over, a rather
+"dark and bloody" affair, accentuated as it was, from time to time,
+by occasional Filipino success in surprising detachments from ambush,
+or by taking them unawares and off their guard in their quarters,
+and eliminating them, the most notable instance of the first being
+the crumpling of a large command of the 15th Infantry by General Juan
+Cailles, in southern Luzon, and the most indelibly remembered and
+important example of the second being the massacre of the 9th Infantry
+people at Balangiga, in Samar, in the fall of 1901. Certainly more
+than one American in that long-drawn-out war did things unworthy of
+any civilized man, things he would have believed it impossible, before
+he went out there, ever to come to. Personally, I have heard, so far
+as I now recollect, of comparatively few barbarities perpetrated
+by Filipinos on captured American soldiers. Barbarities on their
+side seemed to have been reserved for those of their own race whom
+they found disloyal to the cause of their country. Personally I
+have never seen the water-cure administered. But I once went on
+a confidential mission by direction of General MacArthur, in the
+course of which I reported first, on arriving in the neighborhood
+of the contemplated destination, to a general officer of the regular
+army who is still such to-day. [212] That night the general was good
+enough to extend the usual courtesy of a cot to sleep on, in the
+headquarters building. Toward dusk I went to dine with a certain
+lieutenant, also of the regular army. [213] As we approached the
+lieutenant's quarters a sergeant came up with a prisoner, and asked
+instructions as to what to do with him. The lieutenant said: "Take
+him out and find out what he knows. Do you understand, Sergeant?" The
+sergeant saluted, answered in the affirmative, and moved away with
+his prisoner. We went in to the lieutenant's quarters, and while at
+dinner heard groans outside. I said "What is that, Jones?" [214]
+Jones said: "That's the water-cure he's giving that hombre. [215]
+Want to see it?" I replied that I certainly did not. Returning that
+night to the general's headquarters, after breakfast the next morning
+I met my friend Jones coming out of the general's office. I said:
+"What's the matter, what are you doing here," he having mentioned
+the evening before an expedition planned for the morrow. He said:
+"Well, I've just had a talk with the general to see if I could get my
+resignation from the army accepted?" "Why?" said I. "Well," was the
+reply, "that ----" (designating the prisoner of the night before by a
+double barrelled epithet) "died on me last night." Just how the matter
+was hushed up I have never known, but Jones was never punished. More
+than one general officer of the United States Army in the Philippines
+during our war with the Filipinos at least winked at the water-cure
+as a means of getting information, and quite a number of subalterns
+made a custom of applying it for that purpose. It was practically
+the only way you could get them to betray their countrymen. Did
+I report the incident to General MacArthur? Certainly not. It was
+the business of the general commanding the district. The water-cure,
+though very painful, was seldom fatal, and when not fatal was almost
+never permanently damaging, and it was about the only way to shake
+the loyalty of the average Filipino and make him give information
+as to hidden insurgent guns, guerrilla bands, etc. It was a part of
+Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+Let us now return to the early battlefields about Manila which we
+left, initially, to analyze the extreme bitterness of the feeling
+between the combatants that very early began to develop.
+
+We left war correspondent John F. Bass among the dead and dying on
+one of these fields, supposedly musing on the White Man's Burden,
+or Land-Grabbing, or Trust-for-Civilization theory, or whatever it
+was that moved the fifty-seven senators whose votes had ratified
+the treaty by a majority of just one more than the constitutionally
+necessary two-thirds.
+
+The reason the writer lays so much stress on Mr. Bass's letters to
+Harper's Weekly on the early fighting in the Philippines, is because
+his remarks come direct from the battlefield, and are, as it were,
+res gestæ. They were made dum fervet opus, to use a law Latin phrase
+which in plain English means "while the iron is hot." They reflect
+more or less accurately the feelings of the men whose deeds he was
+recording. He, and O. K. Davis, now Washington correspondent of the
+New York Times, and John T. McCutcheon, of Chicago, the now famous
+cartoonist (who was with Dewey in the battle of Manila Bay), and
+Robert Collins, now London correspondent of the Associated Press, and
+"Dick" Little of the Chicago Tribune,--a little man about six feet
+three,--and lots of other good men and true, were all through that
+fighting, and we will later come to an issue of personal veracity
+between them and General Otis which culminated in the retirement from
+office of Secretary of War Alger, and ought to have resulted in the
+recall of General Otis, but did not, because to have acknowledged
+what a blunderer General Otis had been and to have relieved him from
+command, as he should have been relieved, would have been to "swap
+horses crossing a stream," as Mr. Lincoln used to put it in declining
+to change generals during a given campaign. The object here is to
+bring out the truth of history as to how the men who bore the brunt of
+the early fighting felt about it. Testimony as to what the officers
+and men of the army said would be of no value, because a complaining
+soldier's complaints are too often only a proof of "cold feet." [216]
+
+These newspaper men, not under military orders, were daily risking
+their lives voluntarily, just to keep the American public informed,
+and the American public were kept in darkness and only vouchsafed
+bulletins giving them the progressive lists of their dead and wounded,
+and this last only on demand made upon Secretary Alger by the people
+of Minnesota, the Dakotas, etc., through their senators. The War
+Department did not want the people to know, did not want to admit
+itself, how plucky, vigorous, and patriotic the resistance was. The
+period of the fighting done by the State Volunteers from February
+until fall, when public opinion finally forced the Administration
+to send General Otis an adequate force, is slurred by Secretary of
+War Root in his report for 1899. I do not mean that it was slurred
+intentionally. But the Philippines were a long way off, and Mr. Root
+and Mr. McKinley naturally relied for their information on their
+commanding general on the spot. There were gallant deeds done in the
+Philippines by those Western fellows of the State regiments which
+volunteered for the war with Spain, that would have made the little
+fighting around Santiago look like--well, to borrow from "Chimmie"
+Fadden's fertile vocabulary, "like 30 cents." But General Otis was
+not in a position to get the thrill of such things from his office
+window, so very few of them were given much prominence by him in his
+despatches to the Adjutant-General of the army. This was wise enough
+from a political standpoint, seeing that a presidential campaign
+was to ensue in 1900 predicated on the proposition that American
+sovereignty was "in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the
+great mass of the Filipinos," to use the words of the President's
+message to Congress of December, 1899.
+
+Caloocan was taken by General MacArthur on February 10th. The natural
+line of advance thereafter was of course up the railroad, because
+the insurgents held it, and needed it as much as we would. Throughout
+February there were engagements too numerous to mention. The navy also
+entertained the enemy whenever he came too near the shores of Manila
+Bay. One incident in particular is worthy of note, and worthy of
+the best traditions of the navy. I refer to the conduct of Assistant
+Engineer Emory Winship off Malabon, March 4, 1899. Malabon is five
+miles north of Manila, on the bay, not far from Caloocan. On the day
+named, a landing party of 125 men from the U. S. S. Bennington went
+ashore near Malabon to make photographs, in aid of navy gunnery, of
+certain entrenchments and buildings that had been struck by shells
+from the Monadnock. They foolishly failed to throw out scouts ahead
+of their column, and were suddenly greeted with a withering fire from
+a whole regiment of insurgents who had seen them first and lain in
+wait for them. They retired with considerably more haste than they
+had gone forth. The insurgents advanced, firing, at double quick,
+toward the comparative handful of Americans, and would undoubtedly
+have killed the last man jack of them, but Engineer Winship, who
+had been left in charge of the tug that brought the landing party
+shoreward, to keep up steam, saw the situation and promptly met it. He
+unlimbered a 37mm. Hotchkiss revolving machine gun which stood in
+the bow of the tug, and opened up with accurate aim on the advancing
+regiment of Filipinos. Naturally he at once became a more important
+target than the retreating body. Nevertheless, he kept pumping lead
+into that long howling murderous advancing brown line until, when
+within two hundred yards of where the tug lay, the line recoiled and
+retreated, and the landing party got safely back to the ship. It was,
+literally, a case of saving the lives of more than a hundred men,
+by fearless promptness and dogged tenacity in the intelligent and
+skilful performance of duty. The awnings of the tug were torn in
+shreds by the enemy's rain of bullets, and her woodwork was much
+peppered. Winship was hit five times, and still carries the bullets
+in his body, having been retired on account of disability resulting
+therefrom, after being promoted in recognition of his work.
+
+Soon after March 25th, General MacArthur, commanding the Second
+Division of the Eighth Army Corps, advanced from Caloocan up the
+railroad to Malolos, the insurgent capital, some twenty miles
+away. Malolos was taken March 31st. Our February killed were six
+officers and seventy-one enlisted men, total seventy-seven, and a total
+of 378 wounded. By the end of March the list swelled to twelve officers
+and 127 enlisted men killed, total 139, and a total of 881 wounded,
+making our total casualties, as reported April 1st, 1020. Also 15%
+of the command, or about 2500, were on sick report on that date from
+heat prostrations and the like. [217] For these and other reasons,
+farther advance up the railroad was halted for a while.
+
+Meantime, General Lawton, with his staff, consisting of Colonel
+Edwards, Major Starr, and Captains King and Sewall, "the big four" they
+were called, had come out from New York City by way of the Suez Canal,
+bringing most welcome reinforcements, the 4th and 17th Infantry. These
+people arrived between the 10th and the 22d of March. What happened
+soon after, as a result of their arrival, must now become for a brief
+moment, a part of the panorama, the lay of the land General Lawton
+first swept over being first indicated.
+
+Luzon is practically bisected, east and west, by the Pasig River
+and a lake out of which it flows almost due west into Manila Bay,
+Manila being at the mouth of the river. Under the Spaniards,
+all Luzon north of the Pasig had been one military district and
+all Luzon south of the Pasig another. The Eighth Army Corps always
+spoke of northern Luzon as "the north line," and of southern Luzon as
+"the south line." The lake above mentioned is called the Laguna de
+Bay. It is nearly as big as Manila Bay, which last is called twenty
+odd miles wide by thirty long. On the map, the Laguna de Bay roughly
+resembles a half-moon, the man in which looks north, the western
+horn being near Manila, and the eastern near the Pacific coast of
+Luzon. General Otis had learned that at a place called Santa Cruz,
+toward the eastern end of the Laguna de Bay, there were a lot of steam
+launches and a Spanish gun-boat, which, if captured, would prove
+invaluable for river fighting and transportation of supplies along
+the Rio Grande de Pampanga and the other streams that watered the
+great central plain through which the railroad ran and which would
+have to be occupied later. So as soon as possible after General
+Lawton arrived and the necessary men could be spared, he was sent
+with 1500 troops to seize and bring back the boats in question. Of
+course the country he should overrun would have to be overrun again,
+because there were not troops enough to spare to garrison and hold
+it. But for the present, the launches would help. This expedition was
+successful, leaving the head of the lake nearest Manila on April 9th,
+and returning April 17th. It met with some good hard fighting on the
+way, sweeping everything before it of course, inflicting considerable
+loss, and suffering some. General Lawton's report mentions, among
+other officers whose conspicuous gallantry and efficiency in action
+attracted his attention, Colonel Clarence R. Edwards, now Chief of
+the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, of whose conduct
+in the capture of Santa Cruz on the morning of April 10th, he says:
+"No line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently
+led." [218] The resistance was pretty real to Colonel Edwards then,
+i.e., the Benevolent Assimilation was quite strenuous, and it continued
+to be so until his great commander was shot through the breast in the
+forefront of battle in the hour of victory in December thereafter,
+and the colonel came home with the general's body. Since then the
+colonel has soldiered no more, but has remained on duty at Washington,
+the birthplace of the original theory that the Filipinos welcomed our
+rule, charged with the duty of yearning over the erring Filipino who
+thinks he can govern himself but is mistaken, and also with the still
+more difficult task of trying to live up to the original theory as
+far as circumstances will permit. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos
+would probably have gotten along much better than the Cubans if we
+had let General Lawton do there what he and General Wood were set to
+work doing in Cuba shortly after Santiago fell. Public opinion is a
+very dangerous thing to trifle with, and when, in September, 1899,
+there was a story going the rounds of the American newspapers that
+Lawton, the hero of El Caney, the man who had reflected more glory
+on American arms in striking the shackles of Spain from Cuba than any
+other one soldier in the army, had called the war in the Philippines
+"this accursed war," the War Department got busy over the cable to
+General Otis and obtained from him a denial that General Lawton had
+made such a remark. But the public knew its Lawton and what he had done
+in Cuba, and had a suspicion there might be some truth in the rumor. So
+the War Department cabled out saying "Newspapers say Lawton's denial
+insufficient," and then repeating the words attributed to him. So
+General Otis sent another denial that filled the bill. [219] Of course
+General Lawton made no such remark. He was too good a soldier. It would
+have demoralized his whole command. But I served under him in both
+hemispheres, and I will always believe that he had a certain amount
+of regret at having to fight the Filipinos to keep them from having
+independence, when they were a so much likelier lot, take it all in
+all, than the Cubans we saw about Santiago. Moreover, I believe that
+had it not been then too late to ask him, he would have subscribed
+to the opinion Admiral Dewey had cabled home the previous summer:
+"These people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable
+of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with
+both races."
+
+After the expedition down the lake, General Lawton went on "The North
+Line." So let us now turn thither also. For wherever Lawton was,
+there was fighting.
+
+In the latter half of April, General MacArthur advanced north along the
+railroad, and took Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio Grande,
+on April 28th. This was the place where under cover of "the accurate
+concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light Artillery commanded by
+Major Young" [220] a few Kansas men with ropes tied to their bodies
+swam the river in the face of a heavy fire from the enemy, fastened
+the ropes to some boats on the enemy's side, and were pulled back
+in the boats, by their comrades, to the side they had come from; the
+Kansans then crossing the river under the lead of the gallant Funston,
+and driving the enemy from his trenches. The desperate bravery of
+the performance, like so many other things General Funston did in the
+Philippines, was so superb that one forgets how contrary it was to all
+known rules of the game of war. If it was Providence that saved Funston
+and his Kansans from annihilation, certainly Providence was ably
+assisted on that occasion by Major Young and his Utah Battery. [221]
+
+Shortly after this General MacArthur entered San Fernando, the second
+insurgent capital, which is forty miles or so up the railroad from
+Manila.
+
+During the month of May General Lawton kept the insurgents busy to
+the east of the railroad, between it and the Pacific coast range,
+taking San Isidro, whither the third insurgent capital was moved after
+Malolos fell, on May 17th. Here he made his headquarters for a time,
+as did General MacArthur at San Fernando.
+
+It had been supposed that practically the whole body of the insurgent
+army was concentrated in the country to the north of Manila, but this
+proved a mistake. They now began to threaten Manila from the country
+south of the Pasig. Says General Otis:
+
+
+    The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the South and
+    it became necessary to throw him back once more. [222]
+
+
+General Lawton was directed to concentrate his troops in the country
+about San Isidro, turn them over to the command of some one else,
+and come to Manila to organize for a campaign on the south line. The
+details of this expedition belong to a military history, which this
+is not. The expedition left its initial point of concentration near
+Manila on June 9th. Its great event was the battle of Zapote River on
+June 13th. Along this river in 1896 the insurgents had gained a great
+victory over the Spaniards. They had trenches on the farther side of
+the river which they deemed impregnable. General Lawton attacked them
+in these intrenchments June 13th. At three o'clock that afternoon
+he wired General Otis at Manila giving him an idea of the battle
+and stating that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with
+determination. At 3:30 o'clock he wired:
+
+
+    We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition; we will
+    need it;
+
+
+and at 4 o'clock:
+
+
+    We have the bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not yet over. It
+    is a battle however. [223]
+
+
+It was in this battle of Zapote River that Lieutenant William L. Kenly,
+of the regular artillery, did what was perhaps the finest single bit
+of soldier work of the whole war, [224] in recognition of which his
+conduct in the battle was characterized as "magnificent" by so thorough
+a soldier as General Lawton, who recommended him to be brevetted for
+distinguished gallantry in the presence of the enemy, with this remark:
+
+
+    As General Ovenshine says, speaking of Lieutenant Kenly and
+    his battery, "This is probably the first time in history that a
+    battery has been advanced and fought without cover within thirty
+    yards of strongly manned trenches." [225]
+
+
+For what he did on that occasion, Kenly ought to have had a medal
+of honor, which, except life insurance and a good education, is the
+finest legacy any government can enable a soldier to bequeath to his
+children. If the war had been backed by the sentiment of the whole
+country, as the Spanish War was, he would have gotten it. As it was,
+the only thing he ever got for it, so far as the writer is advised,
+was to have his name spelt wrong in an account of the incident in
+the only book wherein there has yet been attempted a record of the
+many deeds of splendid daring that marked the only war into which
+this nation ever blundered. [226]
+
+While there were divers and sundry movements of our troops hither
+and thither, and much sacrifice of life, after General Lawton's
+Zapote River campaign in June, no substantial progress was made in
+conquering and occupying the Islands until the fall following the
+Zapote River campaign above mentioned, when the twenty-five regiments
+of volunteers were organized and sent out. All that was done until
+then, after the capture of San Fernando, may be summed up broadly,
+by saying that we protected Manila and held the railroad, as far as
+we had fought our way up it. It is true that the city of Iloilo had
+been occupied on February 11th, the city of Cebu shortly afterward,
+the island of Negros, an oasis of comparative quiet in a great desert
+of hostility, a little later; also that a small Spanish garrison at
+the little port of Jolo in the Mohammedan country near Borneo had
+also been relieved by a small American force on the 19th of May. But
+these irresolute movements accomplished nothing except to deprive
+our force at the front of about 4000 men and to awaken the Visayan
+Islands to active and thorough organization against us.
+
+Preparatory to an understanding of the fall campaign, in which
+patchwork and piecemeal warfare was superseded by the real thing, it
+will now be necessary to consider the political--or let us call it,
+the politico-military--aspect of the first half year of the war.
+
+General Otis's folly had led him to advise Washington as early as
+November, 1898, that he could get along with 25,000 troops, [227]
+and the Otis under-estimate of the resistance we would meet if we
+took the Islands had undoubtedly influenced Mr. McKinley in deciding
+to take them. Twenty-five thousand troops was only 5000 more than
+General Otis had with him at the time he made the recommendation, and
+signified that he was not expecting trouble. The Treaty of Paris was
+signed on December 10, 1898, and on December 16th, President McKinley's
+Secretary of War informed Congress that 25,000 troops would be enough
+for the Philippines. [228] When the treaty was ratified February 6,
+1899, the war in the Philippines had already broken out. On March 2,
+1899, two days before the 55th Congress expired, in fact on the very
+day that Congress appropriated the $20,000,000 to pay Spain for the
+Islands, an act was passed authorizing the President to enlist 35,000
+volunteers to put down the insurrection in the Islands. The term
+of enlistment of these volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901. As
+the New Thought people would say "Hold the Thought!" June 30, 1901,
+is the end of our government's fiscal year. That date, the date of
+expiration of the enlistment of the volunteer army raised under the
+act of March 2, 1899, is a convenient key to the whole history of the
+American occupation of the Philippines since the outbreak of our war
+with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899, including the titanic efforts of
+the McKinley Administration in the latter half of 1899 and the first
+half of 1900 to retrieve the Otis blunders; the premature resumption
+by Judge Taft, during and in aid of Mr. McKinley's campaign for the
+Presidency in 1900, of the original McKinley Benevolent Assimilation
+programme, on the theory, already wholly exploded by a long and bitter
+war, that the great majority of the people welcomed American rule and
+had only been coerced into opposing us; and the premature setting up
+of the Civil Government on July 4, 1901. No candid mind seeking only
+the truth of history can fail to see that when President McKinley
+sent the Taft Commission to the Philippines in the spring of 1900,
+part of their problem was to facilitate Mr. McKinley in avoiding later
+on any further call for volunteers to take the place of those whose
+terms would expire June 30, 1901. The amount of force that has been
+needed to saddle our government firmly on the Filipino people is the
+only honest test by which to examine the claim that it is unto them
+as Castoria unto children. In February, 1899, the dogs of war being
+already let loose, President McKinley had resumed his now wholly
+impossible Benevolent Assimilation programme, by sending out the
+Schurman Commission, which was the prototype of the Taft Commission,
+to yearningly explain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make
+clear to them how unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The
+scheme was like trying to put salt on a bird's tail after you have
+flushed him. This commission was headed by President Schurman, of
+Cornell University. It arrived in March, armed with instructions
+as benevolent in their rhetoric as any the Filipinos had ever read
+in the days of our predecessors in sovereignty, the Spaniards. And
+the commission were of course duly astounded that their publication
+had no effect. The Filipinos in Manila tore them down as soon as
+they were put up. The instructions clothed the commission with
+authority to yield every point in issue except the only one in
+dispute--Independence. On this alone they were firm. But so were
+the people who had already submitted the issue to the arbitrament
+of war. Of course the Schurman Commission, therefore, accomplished
+nothing. It held frequent communication with the enemy in the field
+and came near an open rupture with General Otis, who was nominally a
+member of it. But even that unwise man knew war when he saw it, and
+knew the futility of trying to mix peace with war. War being hell,
+the sooner 'tis over the better for all concerned. After Professor
+Schurman had been quite optimistically explaining our intentions for
+about three months, under the tragically mistaken notion Mr. McKinley
+had originally derived from General Otis that the insurrection had
+been brought about by "the sinister ambition of a few leaders,"
+[229] General Otis wired Washington, on June 4th, "Negotiations and
+conferences with insurgent leaders cost soldiers' lives and prolong our
+difficulties," [230] adding with regard to the Schurman Commission:
+"Ostensibly it will be supported * * * here, and to the outside
+world gentle peace shall prevail," but intimating that he would be
+very much gratified if the Department would allow him to handle the
+enemy, and stop Dr. Schurman from having their leaders come in under
+flags of truce to parley. After that Dr. Schurman's activities seem
+to have been confined to the less mischievous business of gathering
+statistics. His mistake was simply the one he had brought with him,
+derived from President McKinley. He came back home, however, thoroughly
+satisfied that the Filipinos did of a verity want the independence
+they were fighting for, and quite as sure that republics should not
+have colonies as General Anderson's experience had previously made
+him. It has long been known throughout the length and breadth of the
+United States that Dr. Schurman is in favor of Philippine independence.
+
+On June 26th, just thirteen days after the Zapote River fight had
+stopped the insurgents on the south line from threatening almost the
+very gates of the city of Manila itself, General Otis had another
+attack of optimism. On that date he wired Washington: "Insurgent cause
+may collapse at any time." [231] Finally, the war correspondents at
+Manila, wearied with the military press censorship whereby General
+Otis had so long kept the situation from the people at home, with his
+eternal "situation-well-in-hand" telegrams, got together, inspired no
+doubt by the example of the Roosevelt round robin that had rescued the
+Fifth Army Corps from Cuba after the fighting down there, and prepared
+a round robin of their own--a protest against further misrepresentation
+of the facts. This they of course knew General Otis would not let
+them cable home. However, they asked his permission to do so, the
+committee appointed to beard the lion in his den being O. K. Davis,
+John T. McCutcheon, Robert Collins, and John F. Bass. General Otis
+threatened to "put them off the island." This did not bother them in
+the least. General Otis told the War Department afterwards that he
+did not punish them because they were "courting martyrdom," or words
+to that effect. As a matter of fact, they were merely determined that
+the American people should know the facts. That of "putting them off
+the island" was just a fussy phrase of "Mother" Otis, long familiar to
+them. They were under his jurisdiction. But they were Americans, and
+reputable gentlemen, and he knew he was responsible for their right
+treatment. After General Otis had duly put the expected veto on the
+proposed cablegram of protest, the newspaper men sent their protest
+over to Hong Kong by mail, and had it cabled to the United States from
+there. It was published in the newspapers of this country July 17,
+1899. A copy of it may be found in any public library which keeps
+the bound copies of the great magazines, in the Review of Reviews
+for August, 1899, pp. 137-8. It read as follows:
+
+
+    The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American
+    newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following statement:
+
+    We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made
+    public in Washington, the people of the United States have not
+    received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines,
+    but that those despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view
+    that is not shared by the general officers in the field.
+
+    We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing
+    conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension
+    and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to
+    the brigand character of their army.
+
+    We believe the despatches err in the declaration that "the
+    situation is well in hand," and in the assumption that the
+    insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased
+    force.
+
+    We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been
+    under-estimated, and that the statements are unfounded that
+    volunteers are willing to engage in further service.
+
+    The censorship has compelled us to participate in this
+    misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements
+    of facts on the plea that "they would alarm the people at home,"
+    or "have the people of the United States by the ears."
+
+
+The men of the pen had been so long under military rule and had seen
+so much of courts-martial that their document savored of military
+jurisprudence. After making the above charges, it set forth what it
+called "specifications." These were:
+
+
+    Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports
+    of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat
+    prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval
+    operations; and suppression of complete reports of the situation.
+
+
+The paper was signed by John T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong,
+representing the Chicago Record; O. K. Davis and P. G. MacDonnell,
+representing the New York Sun; Robert M. Collins, John P. Dunning,
+and L. Jones, representing the Associated Press; John F. Bass and
+William Dinwiddie, representing the New York Herald; E. D. Skeene,
+representing the Scripps-McRae Association; and Richard Little,
+representing the Chicago Tribune. Mr. Collins, the Associated Press
+representative, wrote his people an account of this whole episode,
+which was also given wide publicity. After describing the committee's
+interview with the General down to a certain point, he says:
+
+
+    But when General Otis came down to the frank admission that it
+    was his purpose to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the
+    public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in
+    ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "My instructions
+    are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration," we
+    concluded that protest was justifiable.
+
+
+Collins had written what he considered a conservative review of
+the situation in June, saying reinforcements were needed. Of the
+suppression of this he says:
+
+
+    The censor's comment (I made a note of it) was: "Of course we all
+    know that we are in a terrible mess out here, but we don't want the
+    people to get excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet
+    now we will pull through in time [232] without any fuss at home!"
+
+
+Mr. Collins's letter proceeds: "When I went to see him [Otis] he
+repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to pieces."
+
+As to the charge of suppressing the real condition of our sick in
+the hospitals, Mr. Collins says that General Otis remarked that the
+"hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and should
+be turned out." On June 2, 1899, according to General Otis's report
+(p. 121), sixty per cent. of one of the State volunteer regiments
+were in hospital sick or wounded and there were in its ranks an
+average of but eight men to a company fit for duty. The report of
+the regimental surgeon stating this was forwarded by General Otis
+to Washington with the comment that there were few cases of serious
+illness; that the then "present station of these troops"--the place
+where the fighting was hottest, San Fernando--"is considered by the
+Filipinos as a health resort," and that "when orders to take passage
+to the United States are issued, both the Montana and South Dakota
+troops will recover with astonishing rapidity." [233]
+
+This round robin of course produced a profound sensation in the United
+States. It was just what the American public had long suspected was
+the case. Shortly afterward Secretary of War Alger resigned. Coming
+as it did on the heels of the scandal about "embalmed beef" having
+been furnished to the army in Cuba, it made him too much of a load
+for the Administration to carry. He was succeeded by Mr. Root,
+an eminent member of the New York Bar, whose masterful mind soon
+saw the essentials of the situation and proceeded to get a volunteer
+army recruited, equipped, and sent to the Philippines without further
+unnecessary delay.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+OTIS AND THE WAR (Continued)
+
+              And now, a man of head being at the centre of it,
+              the whole matter gets vital.--Carlyle's French Revolution.
+
+
+There can surely be little doubt in any quarter that Mr. Root is, in
+intellectual endowment and equipment at least, one of the greatest,
+if he is not the greatest, of living American statesmen. Mankind will
+always yield due acclaim to men who, in great emergencies, see the
+essentials of a given situation, and at once proceed to get the thing
+done that ought to be done. Whether the war in the Philippines was
+regrettable or not, it had become, by midsummer of 1899, supremely
+important, from any rational and patriotic standpoint, to end it as
+soon as possible.
+
+Mr. Root had not been in office as Secretary of War very long before
+fleets of troop-ships, carrying some twenty-five well-equipped
+volunteer regiments, [234] were swarming out of New York harbor
+bound for Manila by way of the Suez Canal, and out of the Golden
+Gate for the same destination via Honolulu. Nor was there any
+confusion as in the Cuban helter-skelter. Everything went as if by
+clockwork. Moreover, along with the new and ample force, went a clear,
+masterly, comprehensive plan of campaign, prepared, not by General
+Otis at Manila, but in the War Department at Washington, by officers
+already familiar with the islands.
+
+It was the purpose of this government at last to demonstrate
+conclusively to the Filipino people that the representative of the
+United States at Manila was "the boss of the show," and that Aguinaldo
+was not--a demonstration then sorely needed by the exigencies of
+American prestige. The purpose can readily be appreciated, but to
+understand the plan of campaign, and the method of its execution,
+somewhat of the geography of Luzon must now be considered. Before
+we approach the shores of Luzon and the city of Manila, however,
+let us consider from a distance, in a bird's-eye view, as it were,
+the relation of Luzon to the rest of the archipelago, so as to know,
+in a comprehensive way, what we are "going out for to see." We may as
+well pause at this point, long enough to learn all we will ever need to
+know, for the purposes of the scope of this narrative, concerning the
+general geography of the Philippine archipelago, and the governmental
+problems it presents. (See folding map at end of volume.)
+
+It is a common saying that Paris is France. In the same sense Manila
+is the Philippines. In fact, the latter expression is more accurate
+than the former, for Manila, besides being the capital city of the
+country, and its chief port, is a city of over 200,000 people, while
+no one of the two or three cities next to it in rank in population
+had more than 20,000. [235] By parity of reasoning it may be said that
+Luzon was the Philippines, so far as the problem which confronted us
+when we went there was concerned, relatively both to the original
+conception in 1898 of the struggle for independence, its birth in
+1899, its life, and its slow, lingering obstinate death in 1900-1902,
+in which last year the insurrection was finally correctly stated
+to be practically ended. To know just how and why this was true,
+is necessary to a clear understanding of that struggle, including
+not only its genesis and its exodus, but also its gospels, its acts,
+its revelations, and the multitudinous subsequent commentaries thereon.
+
+The total land area of the Philippine archipelago, according to the
+American Census of 1903, is 115,000 square miles. [236] The area of
+Luzon, the principal island, on which Manila is situated, is 41,000
+square miles, and that of Mindanao, the only other large island, is
+36,000. [237] Between these two large islands, Luzon on the north,
+and Mindanao on the south, there are a number of smaller ones,
+but acquaintance with only six of these is essential to a clear
+understanding of the American occupation. Many Americans, too busy
+to have paid much attention to the Philippine Islands, which are,
+and must ever remain, a thing wholly apart from American life, have a
+vague notion that there are several thousand of them. This is true, in
+a way. American energy has made, for the first time in their history,
+an actual count of them, "including everything which at high tide
+appeared as a separate island." [238] The work was done for our Census
+of 1903 by Mr. George R. Putnam, now head of the Lighthouse Board of
+the United States. Mr. Putnam, counted 3141 of them. [239] Of these,
+of course, many--many hundred perhaps--are merely rocks fit only for a
+resting place for birds. 2775, have an area of less than a square mile
+each, 262 have an area of between 1 and 10 square miles, 73 between 10
+and 100 square miles, and 20 between 100 and 1000 square miles. This
+accounts for, and may dismiss at once from consideration 3130--all but
+11. Most of these 3130 that are large enough to demand even so much
+as a single word here are poorly adapted to human habitation, being
+in most instances, without good harbors or other landing places, and
+usually covered either with dense jungle or inhospitable mountains, or
+both. Their total area is only about 8500 square miles, of the 115,500
+square miles of land in the archipelago. None of them have ever had
+any political significance, either in Spain's time, or our own, and
+therefore, the whole 3130 may at once be eliminated from consideration,
+leaving 11 only requiring any special notice at all--the 11 largest
+islands. Of these, Luzon and Mindanao have already been mentioned. The
+remaining 9, with their respective areas and populations, are:
+
+
+    Island                Area [240]        Population [241]
+                          in Square Miles
+
+    Panay                 4,611               743,646
+    Negros                4,881               560,776
+    Cebu                  1,762               592,247
+    Bohol                 1,411               243,148
+    Samar                 5,031               222,690
+    Leyte                 2,722 [242]         357,641
+    Mindoro               3,851                28,361
+    Masbate               1,236                29,451
+    Paragua               4,027 [243]          10,918
+                         ------             ---------
+         Total           29,532             2,788,878
+
+
+The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141
+islands to eleven, the last three of the nine contained in the above
+table may also be eliminated as follows: (See map at end of volume.)
+
+Paragua, the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of any
+map of the archipelago, extending northeast southwest at an angle
+of about 45°, is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much
+except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used.
+
+Masbate--easily located on the map at a glance, because the twelfth
+parallel of north latitude intersects the 124th meridian of longitude
+east of Greenwich in its southeast corner--though noted for cattle
+and other quadrupeds, is not essential to a clear understanding of
+the human problem in its broader governmental aspects.
+
+Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzon,
+pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is
+thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part
+of its area, has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious),
+is also very sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever,
+cut any figure politically, as a disturbing factor. [244]
+
+Eliminating Paragua, Masbate, and Mindoro as not essential to a
+substantially correct general idea of the strategic and governmental
+problems presented by the Philippine Islands, we have left, besides
+Luzon and Mindanao, nothing but the half-dozen islands which appear
+in large type in the above table: Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar,
+Leyte, with a total area of 20,500 square miles. Add these to Luzon's
+41,000 square miles and Mindanao's 36,000, and you have the Philippine
+archipelago as we are to consider it in this book, that is to say,
+two big islands with a half dozen little ones in between, the eight
+having a total area of 97,500 square miles, of which the two big
+islands represent nearly four-fifths.
+
+While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with
+its 36,000 square miles [245] of area, requires that the Philippine
+archipelago be described as stretching over more than 1000 miles
+from north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains
+about 500,000 people all told, [246] half of them semi-civilized,
+[247] the governmental problem it presents has no more to do with
+the main problem of whether, if ever, we are to grant independence
+to the 7,000,000 Christians of the other islands, than the questions
+that have to be passed on by our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have
+to do with the tariff.
+
+Mindanao's 36,000 square miles constitute nearly a third of
+the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that
+fraction of the 97,500 square miles of territory to a consideration
+of which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination
+above indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan,
+semi-civilized Moros would indeed be "like granting self-government
+to an Apache reservation under some local chief," as Mr. Roosevelt,
+in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to grant
+self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo. [248] Furthermore, the Moros,
+so far as they can think, would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be
+entitled to recognition as subjects of, some great nation. [249]
+Again, because, the Filipinos have no moral right to control
+the Moros, and could not if they would, the latter being fierce
+fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate
+domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate of
+the consent-of-the-governed principle has not a leg to stand on
+with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it,
+we have a distinct and separate problem, which cannot be solved
+in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which
+need not in the least delay the advent of independence for the
+other fourteen-fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago
+[250]--all Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is
+true that there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in
+policing the Moros, our government would of course protect them from
+the Moros. If they did not like our government, they could move to
+such parts of the island as we might permit to be incorporated in an
+ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of
+the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo
+(the "Sulu Archipelago," so called, "reigned over" by the Sultan of
+comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always present,
+a distinct and separate problem, and never did have anything more
+to do with the Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins
+and co-religionists over in nearby Borneo, the task which confronted
+Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine
+insurrection, meant, practically, the subjugation of one big island,
+Luzon, containing half the population and one-third the total area of
+the archipelago, and six neighboring smaller ones, the Visayan Islands.
+
+And now let us concentrate our attention upon Luzon as Mr. Root
+no doubt did, with infinite pains, in the fall of 1899. Of the
+7,600,000 people of the Philippines [251] almost exactly one-half,
+i.e., 3,800,000, [252] live on Luzon, and these are practically all
+civilized. [253] It so happens that the State of our Union which is
+nearer the size of Luzon than any other is the one which furnished
+the first American Civil Governor for the Philippine Islands, Governor
+Taft. President Taft's native State of Ohio is 41,061 square miles in
+area, and Luzon is 40,969. [254] Roughly speaking, Luzon may also be
+said to be about the size of Cuba, [255] though it is about twice as
+thickly populated as the latter, Cuba, having something over 2,000,000
+people to Luzon's nearly 4,000,000. [256]
+
+By all Americans in the Philippines since our occupation, the island
+of Luzon is always contemplated as consisting of two parts, to wit,
+northern Luzon, or that part north of Manila, and southern Luzon,
+the part south of Manila. The great central plain of Luzon, lying
+just north of Manila, is nearly as large as the republic of Salvador,
+or the State of New Jersey, i.e., in the neighborhood of 7000 square
+miles area [257]--and, like Salvador, it contains a population of
+something over 1,000,000 inhabitants. The area and population of the
+five provinces of this plain are, according to the Philippine Census
+of 1903, as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area [258] (sq. m.)    Population [259]
+
+    Pangasinan            1,193                      397,902
+    Pampanga                868                      223,754
+    Bulacan               1,173                      223,742
+    Tarlac                1,205                      135,107
+    Nueva Ecija           1,950                      134,147
+                          -----                    ---------
+                          6,389                    1,114,652
+
+
+Roughly speaking, the central plain comprising the above five provinces
+is bounded as follows: On the north by mountains and Lingayen Gulf, on
+the east by a coast range of mountains separating it from the Pacific
+Ocean, on the west by a similar range separating it from the China
+Sea, and on the south by Manila Bay and mountains. The Rio Grande de
+Pampanga flows obliquely across it in a southwesterly direction into
+Manila Bay, and near its western edge runs the railroad from Manila
+to Dagupan on Lingayen gulf. Dagupan is 120 miles from Manila. This
+plain, held by a well-equipped insurgent army backed by the moral
+support of the whole population, became the theatre of war as soon
+as the volunteers of 1899 began to arrive at Manila, the insurgent
+capital being then at Tarlac, a place about two-thirds of the way up
+the railroad from Manila to Dagupan.
+
+Of course the first essential thing to do was to break the backbone
+of the insurgent army, and scatter it, and the next thing to do was
+to capture Aguinaldo, the head and front of the whole business, the
+incarnation of the aspirations of the Filipino people. The operations
+to this end commenced in October, and involved three movements of
+three separate forces:
+
+(1) A column under General Lawton, proceeding up the Rio Grande
+and along the northeastern borders of the plain, and bending around
+westward along its northern boundary toward the gulf of Lingayen,
+garrisoning the towns en route, and occupying the mountain passes
+on the northeast which give exit over the divide into the great
+valleys beyond.
+
+(2) An expedition under General Wheaton, some 2500 in all, proceeding
+by transports to the gulf of Lingayen, the chief port of which,
+Dagupan, was the northern terminus of the railroad; the objective
+being to land on the shore of that gulf at the northwest corner of
+the plain, occupy the great coast road which runs from that point to
+the northern extremity of the island, and also to proceed eastward
+and effect a junction with the Lawton column.
+
+(3) A third column under General MacArthur, proceeding up the railroad
+to the capture of Tarlac, the third insurgent capital, and thence
+still up the railroad to its end at Dagupan, driving the enemy's
+forces before it toward the line held by the first two columns.
+
+On October 12th, General Lawton moved up the Rio Grande from a place
+called Aryat, a few miles up stream from where the railroad crosses the
+river at Calumpit, driving the insurgents before him to the northward
+and westward. His command was made up mainly from the 3d Cavalry and
+the 22d Infantry, together with several hundred scouts, American and
+Maccabebee. On the 20th San Isidro was again captured. That was the
+place Lawton had evacuated in May previous. Arriving in the Islands
+with Colonel E. E. Hardin's regiment, the 29th U. S. Volunteer
+Infantry, on November 3, 1899, the writer was immediately detailed
+to the Maccabebee scouts, to take the place of Lieutenant Boutelle,
+of the regular artillery, a young West Pointer from Oregon, who had
+been killed a day or two previous, and reported to Major C. G. Starr,
+General Lawton's Adjutant-General in the field (whom he had known at
+Santiago de Cuba the previous year) at San Isidro on or about November
+8th. Major Starr said: "We took this town last spring," stating how
+much our loss had been in so doing, "but, partly as a result of the
+Schurman Commission parleying with the insurgents General Otis had
+us fall back. We have just had to take it again." General Lawton
+garrisoned San Isidro this time once for all, and pressed on north,
+capturing the successive towns en route. Meantime, General Young's
+cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts under Major Batson, a lieutenant
+of the regular army, and a medal-of-honor graduate of the Santiago
+campaign, were operating to the west of the general line of advance,
+striking insurgent detachments wherever found and driving them toward
+the line of the railroad. By November 13th, Lawton's advance had
+turned to the westward, according to the concerted plan of campaign
+above described, garrisoning, as fast as they were taken, such of the
+towns of the country over which he swept as there were troops to spare
+for. We knew that Aguinaldo had been at Tarlac when the advance began,
+and every officer and enlisted man of the command was on the qui vive
+to catch him. By November 18th, General Lawton's forces held a line of
+posts extending up the eastern side of the plain, and curving around
+across the northern end to within a few miles of the gulf of Lingayen.
+
+On November 6th, General Wheaton set sail from Manila for Lingayen
+Gulf, with 2500 men of the 13th Regular and 33d Volunteer Infantry,
+and a platoon of the 6th Artillery, convoyed by the ships of the
+navy, and next day the expedition was successfully landed at San
+Fabian, "with effective assistance from the naval convoy against
+spirited resistance," says Secretary of War Root, in his annual
+report for 1899. The navy's assistance on that occasion was indeed
+"effective," but such passing mention hardly covers the case. In
+the first place, they selected the landing point, their patrols
+being already familiar with the coasts. As soon as the transports
+were sighted, about eleven o'clock on the morning of November
+7th, Commander Knox, the senior officer present, who commanded the
+Princeton, and Commander Moore, of the Helena, went out to meet and
+confer with General Wheaton. This done, the landing was effected
+under protection of the navy's guns. Besides the naval vessels
+above named, there were also present the Bennington under Commander
+Arnold, the Manila under Lieutenant-Commander Nazro, and two captured
+Spanish gun-boats small enough to get close in shore, the Callao,
+and the Samar. The troops were disembarked in two columns of small
+boats towed by launches. Lieutenant-Commander Tappan in charge of
+the Callao, and Ensign Mustin, commanding the Samar, were especially
+commended in the despatches of Admiral Watson, commander-in-chief
+of the Asiatic squadron. Both bombarded the insurgent trenches
+at close range during the landing, and Mustin actually steamed in
+between the insurgents and the head of the column of troop-boats,
+so as to intercept and receive the brunt of their fire himself, and,
+selecting a point about seventy-five yards from the enemy's trenches
+whence he could effectually pepper them, ran his ship aground so she
+would stick, and commenced rapid firing at point blank range, driving
+the enemy from his trenches, and enabling Colonel Hare of the 33d,
+and those who followed, to land without being subjected to further
+fire while on the water. [260]
+
+On the 11th of November, Colonel Hare with the 33d Volunteer Infantry
+and one Gatling gun under Captain Charles R. Howland of the 28th
+Volunteer Infantry, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a member of
+General Wheaton's staff, proceeded southeastward to San Jacinto, and
+attacked and routed some 1200 to 1600 intrenched insurgents, Major John
+A. Logan being among our killed. The enemy left eighty-one dead in the
+trenches, and suffered a total loss estimated at three hundred. While
+space does not permit dwelling on the details of engagements, it may be
+remarked here, once for all, that the 33d Volunteer Infantry, Colonel
+Luther R. Hare commanding, made more reputation than any other of the
+twenty-five regiments of the volunteer army of 1899, except, possibly,
+Colonel J. Franklin Bell's regiment, the 36th. This is no reflection on
+the rest. These two were lucky enough to have more opportunities. In
+meeting his opportunities, however, Colonel Hare, like Colonel Bell,
+proved himself a superb soldier; his field-officers, especially Major
+March, [261] were particularly indefatigable; and his men were mostly
+Texans, accustomed to handling a rifle with effect. Space also forbids
+following Captain Howland and his Gatling gun into the engagement of
+November 11th, but from the uniformity with which General Wheaton's
+official reports commend his young aide's bravery and efficiency
+on numerous occasions in 1899-1900, it may be safely assumed that
+those qualities were behind that Gatling gun at San Jacinto. There
+was a vicious rumor started after the San Jacinto fight and given wide
+circulation in the United States, that Major Logan was shot in the back
+by his own men. I saw a major surgeon a few days later who had been
+an eye-witness to his death. He said an insurgent sharpshooter shot
+Major Logan from a tree, and that the said sharpshooter was promptly
+thereafter dropped from his perch full of 33d Infantry bullets. Says
+General Wheaton's despatch of November 12th: "Major Logan fell while
+gallantly leading his battalion." [262]
+
+On November 5th, General MacArthur, with a strong column, composed
+mainly of the 9th, 17th, and 36th Regiments of Infantry, two troops of
+the 4th Cavalry, two platoons of the 1st Artillery, and a detachment
+of scouts, advanced up the railroad from Angeles, in execution of his
+part of the programme. [263] Angeles is some distance up the railroad
+from Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio Grande. [264]
+General MacArthur's column encountered and overwhelmed the enemy
+at every point, entering Tarlac on November 12th, and effecting a
+junction with General Wheaton at Dagupan, the northern terminus of
+the Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 120 miles from Manila, on November 20th.
+
+After General Lawton had finished his part of the round-up, he had
+a final conference with General Young on November 18th at Pozorubio,
+which is near the northeastern border of the plain, bade him good-bye,
+and soon afterward went south to dispose of a body of insurgents who
+were giving trouble near Manila. It was in this last expedition that
+he lost his life at San Mateo about twelve miles out of Manila on
+December 19, 1899.
+
+The first of the two purposes of the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur
+northern advance, viz., the dispersion of the insurgent army of
+northern Luzon had been duly accomplished. The other purpose had
+failed of realization. Aguinaldo had not been captured. He escaped
+through our lines.
+
+Such is in brief the story of the destruction of the Aguinaldo
+government in 1899 by General Otis, or rather by Mr. Root. But the
+trouble about it was that it would not stay destroyed. It "played
+possum" for a while, the honorable President retiring to permanent
+headquarters in the mountains "with his government concealed about
+his person," as Senator Lodge put it later in a summary of the case
+for the Administration, before the Senate, in the spring of 1900. If
+the distinguished and accomplished senator from Massachusetts, in
+adding at that time to the gaiety of nations, had had access to a
+certain diary kept by one of Aguinaldo's personal staff throughout
+that period, subsequently submitted, in 1902, to the Senate Committee
+of that year, he could have swelled the innocuous merriment with such
+cheery entries as "Here we tightened our belts and went to bed on
+the ground"--the time alluded to being midnight after a hard day's
+march without food, the place, some chilly mountain top up which the
+"Honorable Presidente" and party had that day been guided by the
+ever-present and ever-willing paisano (fellow countryman) of the
+immediate neighborhood--whatever the neighborhood--to facilitate them
+in eluding General Young's hard riding cavalry and scouts. The writer
+has no quarrel with Senator Lodge's witticism above quoted, having
+derived on reading it, in full measure, the suggestive amusement it
+was intended to afford. It is true that about all then left of the
+"Honorable Presidente's" government, for the nonce, was in fact
+concealed about his person. It was of a nature easily portable. It
+needed neither bull trains, pack ponies, nor coolies to carry it. It
+consisted solely of the loyal support of the whole people, who looked
+to him as the incarnation of their aspirations. Said General MacArthur
+to the Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo: "He was the
+incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos." "Senator Culberson:
+'And represented the Filipino people?' General MacArthur: 'I think so;
+yes'." [265] We of the 8th Army Corps did not know what a complete
+structure the Philippine republic of 1898-9 was until, having shot
+it to pieces, we had abundant leisure to examine the ruins. To admit,
+in the same breath, participation in that war and profound regret that
+it ever had occurred, is not an incriminating admission. In this case
+as in any other where you have done another a wrong, by thrashing him
+or otherwise, under a mistake of fact, the first step toward righting
+the wrong is to frankly acknowledge it. As soon as Aguinaldo's flight
+and wanderings terminated in the finding of permanent headquarters,
+he began sending messages to his various generals all over Luzon and
+the other islands, and wherever those orders were not intercepted they
+were delivered and loyally obeyed. This kept up until General Funston
+captured him in 1901. One traitor among all those teeming millions
+might have betrayed his whereabouts, but none appeared. The obstinate
+character and long continuance of the warfare in northern Luzon after
+the great round-up which terminated with the final junction of the
+Lawton, Wheaton, and MacArthur columns near Dagupan, as elsewhere
+later throughout the archipelago, was at first very surprising to our
+generals. It had been supposed that to disperse the insurgent army
+would end the insurrection. As events turned out, it only made the
+resistance more effective. So long as the insurgents kept together
+in large bodies they could not hide. And as they were poor marksmen,
+while the men behind our guns, like most other young Americans,
+knew something about shooting, the ratio of their casualties to ours
+was about 16 to 1. [266] When General MacArthur began his advance
+on Tarlac, General Lawton his great march up the valley of the Rio
+Grande, and General Wheaton his closing in from Dagupan, Aguinaldo
+with his cabinet, generals, and headquarters troops abandoned Tarlac,
+their capital, and went up the railroad to Bayambang. Here they held
+a council of war, which General MacArthur describes in his report
+for 1900 (from information obtained later on) as follows:
+
+
+    At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, about November
+    12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the
+    Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the effect
+    that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance
+    in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the
+    army, the generals and the men to return to their own provinces,
+    with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by
+    means of guerrilla warfare. [267]
+
+
+This had been the plan from the beginning, the council of war
+simply determining that the time to put the plan into effect had
+arrived. Accordingly, the uniformed insurgent battalions and regiments
+broke up into small bands which maintained a most persistent guerrilla
+warfare for years thereafter. During those years they seldom wore
+uniforms, disappearing and hiding their guns when hotly pursued,
+and reappearing as non-combatant peasants interrupted in agricultural
+pursuits, with invariable protestations of friendship. Hence all such
+came to be known as amigos (friends), and the word amigo, or friend,
+became a bitter by-word, meaning to all American soldiers throughout
+the archipelago an enemy falsely claiming to be a friend. And every
+Filipino was an "amigo."
+
+Still, the volunteers had arrived in time to enable Mr. Root to make
+a very nice showing to Congress, and through it to the people, in his
+annual report to the President for 1899, dated November 29th. This
+report is full of cheerful chirps from General Otis to the effect
+that the resistance was practically ended, and the substance of the
+information it conveyed duly found its way into the President's message
+of December of that year and through it to the general public. One
+of the Otis despatches said: "Claim to government by insurgents can
+be made no longer." [268] This message went on to state that nothing
+was now left but "banditti," and that the people are all friendly
+to our troops. Thus misled, Mr. Root repeated to the President and
+through him to Congress and the country the following nonsense:
+
+
+    It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away from the
+    immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the country
+    exceedingly friendly * * *. This was doubtless due in some measure
+    to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces of
+    Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan,
+    as well as the other more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the
+    Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of
+    that tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved.
+
+
+In characterizing this as nonsense no disrespect is intended to
+Mr. Root. He did not know any better. He was relying on General
+Otis. But it is sorely difficult to convey in written words what
+utter nonsense those expressions about "the Pampangos" and "the
+Pangasinanes" are to any one who was in that northern advance in the
+fall of 1899. Imagine a British cabinet minister making a report to
+Parliament in 1776 couched in the following words, to wit:
+
+
+    The Massachusetts-ites, who inhabit Massachusetts, and the
+    Virginia-ites who inhabit Virginia, as well as most of the other
+    inhabitants are unfriendly to the New York-ites, and have simply
+    submitted to the military domination of the last named,
+
+
+and you have a faint idea of the accuracy of Mr. Root's report. It is
+quite true that the Tagalos were the prime movers in the insurrection
+against us, as they had been in all previous insurrections against
+Spain. But the "Tagalo tribe" was no more alone among the Filipino
+people in their wishes and views than the "unterrified" Tammany tribe
+who inhabit the wilds of Manhattan Island, at the mouth of the Hudson
+River, are alone in their views among our people.
+
+On page 70 of this report, Secretary Root reproduces a telegram from
+General Otis dated November 18, 1899, stating that on the road from
+San Nicolas to San Manuel, a day or so previous, General Lawton was
+"cordially received by the inhabitants." He announces in the same
+telegram the drowning of Captain Luna, a volunteer officer from New
+Mexico, who was one of General Lawton's aides, and had been a captain
+in Colonel Roosevelt's regiment of Rough Riders before Santiago. The
+writer happens to have been on that ride with General Lawton from San
+Nicolas to San Manuel, and was within a dozen feet of Captain Luna
+when the angry current of the Agno River caught him and his pony
+in its grip and swept both out of sight forever, along with divers
+troopers of the 4th Cavalry, horses and riders writhing to their
+death in one awful, tangled, struggling mass. He can never forget
+the magnificent dash back into the wide, ugly, swollen stream made
+by Captain Edward L. King of General Lawton's staff, as he spurred
+his horse in, followed by several troopers who had responded to his
+call for mounted volunteers to accompany him in an effort to save the
+lives of the men who went down. Their generous work proved futile. But
+it was inspired partly by common dread of what they knew would happen
+to any half-drowned soldier who might be washed ashore far away from
+the column and captured. If an army was ever "in enemy's country" it
+was then and there. When we reached San Manuel that night, Captains
+King and Sewall, the two surviving personal aides of General Lawton's
+staff, and the writer, stopped, along with the general, in a little
+nipa shack on the roadside. General Lawton, was in an upper room busy
+with couriers and the like, but downstairs King, Sewall, and myself
+set to work to buscar [269] something to eat. I got hold of an hombre
+(literally, a man; colloquially a native peasant man), who went to work
+with apparent alacrity, and managed to provide three ravenously hungry
+young men with a good meal of chicken, eggs, and rice. After supper,
+being new in the country, the writer remarked to the general on the
+alacrity of the hombre. I had brought out from the United States the
+notions there current about the nature of the resistance. General
+Lawton said, with a humorous twinkle in those fine eyes of his:
+"Humph! If you expected to be killed the next minute if you didn't
+find a chicken, you'd probably find one too." It is true that in the
+course of the campaign General Young sent a telegram to General Otis
+at Manila characterizing his reception at the hands of the natives as
+friendly. This was prompted by our column being met as it would come
+into a town by the town band. It did not take long to see through
+this, and other like hypocrisy entirely justifiable in war, though
+such tactics deceived us for a little while at first into thinking
+the people were genuine amigos (friends). General Otis, not being near
+the scene, remained under our original brief illusion. Let us return,
+however, from Mr. Root's "patient and unconsenting millions dominated
+by the Tagalo tribe," of 1899, to the facts, and follow the course
+of events succeeding Lawton's junction with Wheaton and MacArthur
+and his farewell to Young.
+
+General Young, with his cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts, continued
+in pursuit of Aguinaldo through the passes of the mountains, the
+latter having managed to run the gauntlet of our lines successfully
+by a very close shave. How narrowly he escaped is illustrated by
+the fact that after a fight we had at the Aringay River on November
+19th, in which Major Batson was wounded while gallantly directing
+the crossing of the river, we remained that night in the town of
+Aringay, and at the very time we were "hustling for chow" in Aringay,
+Aguinaldo was in the village of Naguilian an hour or so distant,
+as was authoritatively ascertained long afterward from a captured
+diary of one of his staff officers. [270]
+
+General Young proceeded up the coast road, in hot haste, taking
+one town, San Fernando de Union, after a brief engagement led by
+the general in person--imagine a brigadier-general leading a charge
+at the head of thirty-seven men!--but Aguinaldo had turned off to
+the right and taken to the mountains. General Lawton wired General
+Otis about that time, in effect, in announcing Aguinaldo's escape
+through our lines and his own tireless brigade-commander's bold dash
+in pursuit of him with an inadequate force of cavalry hampered by
+lack of horseshoes and nails for the same, "If Young does not catch
+Aguinaldo, he will at least make him very unhappy." The Young column
+garrisoned the towns along the route over which it went, occupying
+all the western part of Northern Luzon, hereafter described, and also
+later on rescued Lieutenant Gilmore of the navy, Mr. Albert Sonnichsen,
+previously an enlisted man and since a writer of some note, and other
+American prisoners who had been in the hands of the insurgents for
+many months. General Young finally made his headquarters at Vigan,
+in the province of Ilocos Sur, a fine town in a fine country. The
+Ilocanos are called "the Yankees of the Philippines," on account of
+their energy and industry. Vigan is on the China sea coast of Luzon
+(the west coast), about one hundred miles up the old Spanish coast
+road, or "King's Highway" (Camino Real), from Lingayen Gulf (where
+the hundred-and-twenty mile railroad from Manila to Dagupan ends)
+and about eighty miles from the extreme northern end of the island
+of Luzon. [271]
+
+As subsequent policies and their effect on one's attitude toward
+a great historic panorama do not interfere in the least with a
+proper appreciation of the bravery and efficiency of the army of
+one's country, it is with much regret that this narrative cannot
+properly chronicle in detail what the War Department reports record
+of the stirring deeds of General Young, and the officers and men
+of his command, Colonels Hare and Howze, Captains Chase and Dodd,
+and the rest, [272] performed during the long course of the work now
+under consideration. One incident, however, is appropriate in this
+connection, not only to a collection of genre pictures of the war
+itself, but also to a place among the lights and shadows of the general
+picture of the American occupation. On December 2, 1899, Major March
+of the 33d Infantry had his famous fight at Tila pass, in which young
+Gregorio del Pilar, one of the ablest and bravest of the insurgent
+generals, was killed. The locality mentioned is a wild pass in the
+mountains of the west coast of Luzon, that overlook the China Sea, some
+4500 feet above sea level. It was strongly fortified, and was believed
+by the insurgents to be impregnable. The trail winds up the mountains
+in a sharp zigzag, and was commanded by stone barricades loop-holed
+for infantry fire. The advance of our people was checked at first by
+a heavy fire from these barricades. The approach being precipitous,
+it looked for a while as if the position would indeed be impregnable,
+and the idea of taking it by a frontal attack was abandoned. But a
+hill to the left front of the barricade was seized by some of our
+sharpshooters--those Texans of the 33d were indeed sharpshooters--and
+after that, under cover of their fire, our troops managed to get in
+a fire simultaneously both on the flank and rear of the occupants of
+the barricades, climbing the precipitous slope up the mountain side
+by means of twigs and the like, and finally killing some fifty-two of
+the enemy, General Pilar among the number. After the fight was over,
+Lieutenant Quinlan, heretofore mentioned, moved by certain indignities
+in the nature of looting perpetrated upon the remains of General Pilar,
+buried them with such military honors as could be hastily provided,
+after first taking from a pocket of the dead general's uniform a
+souvenir in the shape of an unfinished poem written in Spanish by
+him the night before, addressed to his sweetheart; and, the burial
+finished, the American officer placed on the rude headstone left to
+mark the spot this generous inscription:
+
+
+    General Gregorio Pilar, killed at the battle of Tila Pass, December
+    2d, 1899, commanding Aguinaldo's rear-guard. An officer and a
+    gentleman. (Signed) D. P. Quinlan, 2d Lieutenant, 11th Cavalry.
+
+
+The brief incident over, Quinlan hurried on, rejoined the column,
+and resumed the work of Benevolent Assimilation and the war
+against Home Rule with all the dauntless ardor of his impetuous
+Irish nature. Whatever the ultimate analysis of the ethics of this
+scene--Quinlan at the grave of Pilar--clearly the Second Lieutenant
+Quinlan of 1899 would hardly have agreed with the vice-presidential
+candidate of 1900, Colonel Roosevelt, that granting self-government
+to the Filipinos would be like granting self-government to an Apache
+reservation under some local chief.
+
+The territory occupied and finally "pacified" by General Young,
+with the effective assistance of the officers heretofore mentioned,
+and many other good men and true, was ultimately organized into
+a military district, which was called the First District of the
+Department of Northern Luzon. As territory was fought over, occupied,
+and finally reduced to submission, that territory would be organized
+into a military district by the commanding general or colonel of the
+invading column, under the direction of the division commander. The
+military "Division of the Philippines," which was succeeded by the
+Civil Government of the Philippines under Governor Taft in 1901,
+of course covered all the territory ceded by the Treaty of Paris. It
+was divided into four "Departments," the Department of Northern Luzon,
+the Department of Southern Luzon, the Department of the Visayas, [273]
+and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo. General Young commanded the
+First District of the Department of Northern Luzon--which included
+the three west coast provinces north of Lingayen Gulf, and the three
+adjacent mountain provinces--from the time he led his brigade into
+that region in pursuit of Aguinaldo until shortly before Governor
+Taft's inauguration in the summer of 1901. Many were the combats,
+great and small, of General Young's brigade, in compassing the task
+of crushing the resistance in that part of Luzon into which he led
+the first American troops in the winter of 1899-1900. The resistance
+was obstinate, desperate, and long drawn out, but when he finally
+reported the territory under his command "pacified," it was pacified.
+A soldier's task had been performed in a soldierly manner. The work
+had been done thoroughly. General Young gave the Ilocano country a
+lesson it never forgot, before politics had time to interfere. We
+have never had any trouble in that region from that day to this.
+
+Before the army of occupation had had time to do in southern Luzon what
+General Young did in northern Luzon and thereby secure like permanent
+results in that region, a "peace-at-any-price" policy was inaugurated
+to meet the exigencies of Mr. McKinley's campaign for the Presidency
+in 1900. Our last martyred President clung all through that campaign
+to his original assumption that Benevolent Assimilation would work,
+and that the single burning need of the hour was to make clear to
+the Filipinos what our intentions were--as if powder and lead did
+not spell denial of independence plain enough, as if that were
+not the sole issue, and as if that issue had not been submitted,
+with deadly finality, to the stern arbitrament of war. However,
+neither Lord Roberts in India, nor Lord Kitchener in Egypt ever more
+effectively convinced the people of those countries that his flag
+must be respected as an emblem of sovereignty, than General Young did
+the Ilocanos. Take the month of April, 1900 for instance. Several
+days after the expiration of said month (on May 5th) General Otis
+was relieved and went home. During the month of April, General Young
+killed five hundred insurgents in his district. [274] But this did
+not prevent General Otis, arriving as he did in the United States
+in the month of June, when the national political conventions meet,
+from "repeating the same old story about the insurrection going to
+pieces" [275]--only, not "going" now, but "gone." Nor did it, and like
+sputterings of insurrection all over the place, prevent Judge Taft--the
+"Mark Tapley of this Philippine business" as he humorously told the
+Senate Committee of 1902 he had been called--from cabling home, during
+the presidential campaign of 1900, a series of superlatively optimistic
+bulletins, [276] based on the testimony of Filipinos who had abandoned
+the cause of their country as soon as patriotism meant personal peril,
+all such testimony being eagerly accepted, as testimony of the kind one
+wants and needs badly usually is, in total disregard of information
+directly to the contrary furnished by General MacArthur and other
+distinguished soldiers who had been then on the ground for two years.
+
+The area and population of the territory occupied by General Young,
+the "First District of the Department of Northern Luzon," was,
+according to the Census of 1903, as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area (sq. m.) [277]      Population [278]
+
+    Ilocos Norte          1,330                       178,995
+    Ilocos Sur              471                       187,411
+    Union                   634                       137,839
+    Abra                  1,171                        51,860
+    Lepanto-Bontoc [279]  2,005                        72,750
+    Benguet                 822                        22,745
+                          -----                       -------
+                          6,433                       651,600
+
+
+As this narrative purposes so to present the geography of the
+Philippine Islands as to facilitate an easy remembrance of the
+essentials only of the governmental problem there presented,
+we will hereafter speak of the First District as containing,
+roughly, 6500 square miles, and 650,000 people. Whenever, if ever,
+a Philippine republic is set up, these six provinces are very likely,
+for geographical and other reasons, to become one of the original
+states comprising that republic, just as the states of Mexico are
+made up of groups of provinces. [280]
+
+The rest of the story of the northern campaign of 1899-1900 immediately
+following Aguinaldo's escape into the mountains through General Young's
+and General Lawton's lines, being a necessary part of the American
+occupation of the Philippines, may also serve as a text for further
+acquainting the reader with the geography of Luzon. War is the best
+possible teacher of geography, and it may be well to communicate
+in broken doses, as we received them, the lessons on the subject
+which the 8th Army Corps learned in 1899 and the subsequent years
+so thoroughly that we could all pronounce with astonishing glibness,
+the most unpronounceable names imaginable.
+
+When the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur "Round-up" reached the
+mountains on the northeast of the great central plain, in the
+latter part of November 1899, Captain Joseph B. Batchelor, with
+one battalion of the 24th (negro) Infantry, and some scouts under
+Lieutenant Castner, a very intrepid and tireless officer, boldly cut
+loose from the column of which he was a part, and, pressing on over the
+Caranglan pass, overran the province of Nueva Vizcaya, which is part
+of the watershed of north central Luzon, proceeding from Bayombong,
+the capital of Nueva Vizcaya, down the valley of the Magat River,
+by the same route Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent of the navy had made
+their pleasant junket in the fall of 1898 as described in Chapter VI
+(ante). Following this route Captain Batchelor finally came into
+Isabela province, where the Magat empties into the Cagayan River,
+reaching Iligan, the capital of Isabela, ninety miles northeast of
+Bayombong, about December 8th. From Iligan Batchelor went on, promptly
+overcoming all resistance offered, down the great Cagayan valley, some
+110 miles due north, to the sea at Aparri, the northernmost town of
+Luzon and of the archipelago, where he met two vessels of our navy,
+the Newark and the Helena, under Captain McCalla, and found, to his
+inexpressible (but partially and rather fervently expressed) chagrin,
+that the insurgents who had fled before him, and also the garrison
+at Aparri, had already surrendered to the navy. The territory thus
+covered by Batchelor's bold, brilliant, and memorable march over two
+hundred miles of hostile country from the mountains of central Luzon
+down the Cagayan valley to the northern end of the island, at Aparri,
+[281] consisted of the three provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva
+Vizcaya. The area and population of these three, according to the
+census tables of 1903, are as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.) [282]   Population [283]
+
+    Cagayan               5,052                156,239
+    Isabela               5,018                 76,431
+    Nueva Vizcaya         1,950                 62,541
+                         ------                -------
+    Total                12,020                295,211
+
+
+The troops of Captain Batchelor's command were later on relieved by
+the 16th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hood, under whom the above
+group of three provinces finally became the "Second District of the
+Department of Northern Luzon." As part of the plan to provide the
+reader with a fair general idea of Luzon conveniently portable in
+memory, he is requested to note, at this point, that hereinafter the
+Cagayan valley, with its three provinces, [284] will be alluded to as
+a district containing 12,000 square miles and 300,000 people. As was
+remarked concerning the original military district commanded by General
+Young, to wit, the First District, so of Colonel Hood's district,
+the Second--that is to say, as the Ilocano country may some day become
+the state of Ilocos, so, for like geographical and other governmental
+reasons, the three provinces of the Cagayan valley may some day become
+the state of Cagayan in the possible Philippine republic of the future.
+
+Having now followed the "far-flung battle line" of the volunteers of
+'99 and their comrades in arms, the regulars, from Manila northward
+across the rice paddies of central Luzon and over the mountains to the
+northern extremity of the island, let us return to the central plain,
+for reasons which will be stated in so doing. Between the China Sea
+and the coast range which forms the western boundary of the central
+plain of Luzon, there is a long strip of territory--a west wing of
+the plain, as it were--about 125 miles long, with an average width
+of not more than twenty miles, stretching from Manila Bay to Lingayen
+Gulf. This is divided, for governmental purposes into two provinces,
+Bataan on the south, whose southern extremity lay on Admiral Dewey's
+port side as he entered Manila Bay the night before the naval battle
+of May 1, 1898, and Zambales on the north. The area and population
+of this territory are as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Bataan                 537                    46,787
+    Zambales             2,125                   104,549
+                         -----                   -------
+                         2,662                   151,336
+
+
+Also, between the Pacific Ocean and the coast range which forms the
+eastern boundary of the plain is a longer, narrower, and very sparsely
+populated strip, or east wing, divided also into two provinces,
+Principe on the north and Infanta on the south, each supposed to
+contain about fifteen thousand people. Principe and Infanta are wholly
+unimportant, except that, to avoid confusion, we must account for
+all the provinces visible on the maps of Luzon. These two provinces
+never gave any trouble and no one ever bothered about them. [285]
+In the mountains of Zambales and Bataan, however, as in most of the
+other provinces of the archipelago, the struggle was long kept up,
+just as the Boers kept up their war for independence against Great
+Britain about the same time, by guerrilla warfare.
+
+The central plain with five provinces has already been fully
+described. If to this plain you add its two wings, above mentioned,
+you have the nine provinces of central Luzon you see on the map. And
+if to them you add the six provinces of the Ilocos country and the
+three of the Cagayan valley, you have clearly before you the political
+make-up of northern Luzon--eighteen provinces in all. When central
+Luzon was arranged by districts under the military occupation,
+it was divided into three parts, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
+districts of the Department of Northern Luzon, the Third District
+being under General Jacob H. Smith of Samar fame, [286] the Fourth
+under General Funston, and the Fifth under General Grant. The Sixth
+and last district of northern Luzon was made up of the city of Manila
+and adjacent territory.
+
+General Smith's district, the Third, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Zambales           2,125                    104,549
+    Pangasinan         1,193                    397,902
+    Tarlac             1,205                    135,107
+                       -----                    -------
+                       4,523                    637,558
+
+
+Pangasinan with its near 400,000 people is the largest, in point
+of population, of the twenty-five provinces of Luzon, and the third
+largest of the archipelago.
+
+General Funston's district, the Fourth, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Nueva Ecija        2,169                    134,147
+    Principe [287]       331                     15,853
+                       -----                    -------
+                       2,500                    150,000
+
+
+General Grant's district, the Fifth, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Bataan               537                     46,787
+    Pampanga             868                    223,754
+    Bulacan            1,173                    223,742
+                       -----                    -------
+                       2,578                    494,283
+
+                       2,500                    150,000
+                       =====                    =======
+    Totals, 4th and
+    5th Districts:     5,078                    644,283
+
+
+It will be seen from the foregoing that the Third District was nearly
+equal in area to the Fourth and Fifth added together, and that the
+same was true as to its population figure.
+
+Just as the six provinces of the Ilocano country, first occupied by
+General Young and organized as "The First District of the Department of
+Northern Luzon," should some day evolve into a State of Ilocos, and the
+three provinces of the Cagayan valley, occupied by Colonel Hood as the
+Second District, into an ultimate State of Cagayan, so the provinces
+of General Smith's old district, the Third, should finally become a
+State of Pangasinan. [288] This Third District may be conveniently
+recollected as accounting for, roughly speaking, 4500 square miles
+of territory and 625,000 people. The total combined area of General
+Funston's old district, the Fourth, [289] and the adjacent one,
+the Fifth, General Grant's district, is--roughly--5000 square miles,
+and its total population 650,000. No reason is apparent why these two
+districts, the Fourth and Fifth, should not ultimately evolve into a
+State of Pampanga. The five original military districts, [290] which
+in 1900 constituted all of the Department of Northern Luzon except
+the city of Manila and vicinity, might make four ultimate states,
+with names, areas, and populations as follows:
+
+
+    State            Area (sq. m.)         Population
+
+    Ilocos            6,500                   650,000
+    Cagayan          12,000                   300,000
+    Pangasinan        4,500                   625,000
+    Pampanga          5,000                   650,000
+                     ------                 ---------
+                     28,000                 2,225,000
+
+
+It may surprise the reader after all the blood and thunder to which
+his attention has hereinabove been subjected, apropos of northern
+Luzon and the winter of 1899-1900, to know that the insurgents were
+still bearding the lion in his den, i. e., General Otis in Manila,
+by operating in very considerable force in the village-dotted country
+within cannon-shot of the road from Manila to Cavite in January,
+1900. Nevertheless such was the case.
+
+On the 4th of January, 1900, General J. C. Bates was assigned to
+the command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps, General
+Lawton's old division, and an active campaign was commenced in southern
+Luzon. The plan adopted was that General Wheaton with a strong force
+should engage and hold the enemy in the neighborhood of Cavite, while
+General Schwan, starting at the western horn of the half moon to which
+the great lake called Laguna de Bay has already been likened, should
+move rapidly down the west shore of the lake, and around its south
+shore to Santa Cruz near its eastern end, or horn, garrisoning the
+towns en route, as taken, instead of leaving them to be re-occupied by
+the insurgents. Santa Cruz is the same place where General Lawton had
+"touched second base," as it were, with a flying column in April, 1899.
+
+This plan was duly carried out. The Schwan column started from San
+Pedro Macati, the initial rendezvous, a few miles out of Manila,
+on January 4, 1900, now garrisoning the towns en route, instead of
+leaving them to be fought over and captured again as heretofore. The
+first stiff fight we had in that campaign was at Biņan, on January 6,
+1900, one of the places General Lawton's expedition had taken when
+he fought his way over the same country the year before. O. K. Davis
+and John T. McCutcheon, who were in that fight and campaign--in fact
+one of them had the ice-cold nerve to photograph the Biņan fight while
+it was going on, as I learned when we all went down to the creek near
+the town, after we took it, to freshen up--can testify that we did not
+then hear any nonsense about a "Tagal" insurrection, such as Secretary
+of War Root's Report for 1899, published shortly before, is full of,
+and that on the contrary the whole country was as much a unit against
+us and as loyal to the Aguinaldo government as northern Luzon had
+been. And inasmuch as I am doing some "testifying" along here myself,
+and assuming to brush aside without the slightest hesitation, as wholly
+erroneous, information conveyed to the American public at the time
+in the state papers of President McKinley and Secretary of War Root,
+it is only due the reader, whose attention is being seriously asked,
+that "the witness" should "qualify" as to the opportunities he may
+have had, if any, to know whereof he speaks, concerning the character
+of the opposition. To that end, the following document, which General
+Schwan was kind enough to send me afterwards, is submitted as sent:
+
+
+    EXTRACT COPY.
+
+    Headquarters Detachment Macabebe Scouts.
+    The Adjutant General, Schwan's Expeditionary Brigade:
+
+
+    Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
+    operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts, under my command,
+    while forming a part of your Brigade.
+
+    The Detachment, consisting of five (5) officers and one hundred
+    and forty (140) men, was divided into two companies, commanded
+    by 1st Lt. J. Lee Hall, 33rd Inf., and 1st Lt. Blount, 29th Inf.,
+    left San Pedro Macati the afternoon of Jan. 4th, 1900 * * *.
+
+                * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+
+    I wish to invite your attention, especially, to the good work
+    done in the fight at Biņan by Lieut. Blount, 29th Inf., who led
+    the line by at least twenty-five yards * * *.
+
+
+        Very Respectfully,
+        Wm. C. Geiger, 1st Lt. 14th Inf., Com'd'g Det.
+
+
+    I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of extracts from
+    the report of the operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts
+    forming part of an Expeditionary Brigade under my command, in
+    the months of January and February, 1900.
+
+
+        Theo. Schwan,
+        Brig. General, U. S. Vols.
+        Aug. 16, 1900.
+
+
+The activities of Generals Bates and Wheaton, and the Schwan Expedition
+of January-February, 1900, extended the American occupation, so far
+as there were troops enough immediately available to go around, over
+the lake-shore portions and the principal towns of the two great
+provinces of southern Luzon bordering on the Laguna de Bay, viz.,
+Cavite and Laguna; and over parts of the two adjacent provinces of
+Batangas and Tayabas.
+
+Batangas bounds Cavite on the south, and is itself bounded on the
+south by the sea, where a fairly good port offered a fine gateway
+for smuggling arms into the interior from abroad. Tayabas province
+adjoins Laguna on the southeast. Cavite province has always been,
+since the opening of the Suez Canal, about 1869, and the agitations
+for political reform in Spain which culminated in the Spanish republic
+of 1873, quickened the thought of Spain's East Indies, the home of
+insurrection, the breeding place of political agitation. Aguinaldo
+himself was born within its limits in 1869. Laguna province comprehends
+most of the country lying between the southern and eastern lake-shore
+of the Laguna de Bay and the mountains which skirt that body of water
+in the blue distance, all parts of it being thus in easy and safe
+touch by water transportation by night with Cavite, the home and
+headquarters of insurgency.
+
+Just as northern Luzon had been gradually organized into military
+districts as conquered, so was southern Luzon. The territory, over-run,
+as above described, by Generals Bates, Wheaton, and Schwan, was divided
+into two districts. [291] Colonel Hare commanded the First District,
+Cavite province and vicinity. General Hall commanded the Second
+District, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The area and population of
+these four provinces, according to the Census of 1903, were as follows:
+
+
+    Province            Area (sq. m.)             Population
+
+    Cavite                619                      134,779
+    Batangas            1,201                      257,715
+    Laguna                629                      148,606
+    Tayabas             5,993                      153,065
+                        -----                      -------
+                        8,442                      694,165
+
+
+For convenience of subsequent allusion, this group of provinces may
+be treated as representing roughly 8500 square miles of territory
+and 700,000 people. These four provinces group themselves together
+naturally from a military standpoint. As physical force is the
+final basis of all government, these four provinces constitute a
+logical administrative governmental unit, as shown by the action
+of our military authorities in their extension of the American
+occupation. It would seem therefore that if there should ever be
+a Philippine republic, they would probably constitute one of its
+states--the State, let us say, of Cavite.
+
+The rest of southern Luzon below that part above described consists of
+a peninsula which, owing to its odd formation, is easy to remember. The
+mainland of Luzon, that is to-say, that part of the island which our
+narrative has already covered, remotely suggests, in shape, the State
+of Illinois. At least it resembles Illinois more than it does any other
+State of our Union, in that its length runs north and south, and its
+average length and width are nearer that of Illinois than any other. At
+the southeast corner of this mainland, the observer of the map will
+see, jutting off to the southeast from the mainland, the peninsula in
+question. It is about a hundred and fifty miles long, with an average
+width of possibly thirty miles--a minimum width of, say, ten miles, and
+a maximum of fifty,--and is separated from Samar by the narrow, swift,
+and treacherous San Bernardino Strait, which connects the Pacific
+Ocean with the China Sea. This peninsula is frequently called "the
+Hemp Peninsula." The importance of controlling the hemp ports prompted
+General Otis to send General Bates with an expedition to those ports on
+February 15, 1900. [292] This expedition did little more than occupy
+those ports. The great interior continued under insurgent control
+some time afterward. The report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Root,
+for 1900, goes on to describe an engagement, or two, sustained by
+the Bates Expedition shortly after it landed, and concludes, with
+a complacency almost Otis-like, by stating that shortly thereafter
+"the normal conditions of industry and trade relations with Manila
+were resumed by the inhabitants." Of course Mr. Root believed this,
+and so did Mr. McKinley. More the pity, as we shall later see. General
+Otis was now getting anxious to go home, and hastened to "occupy"
+and organize the rest of the archipelago, on paper, at least, the
+hemp peninsula becoming, on March 20, 1900, the Third District of
+the Department of Southern Luzon, Brigadier-General James M. Bell
+commanding. The provinces comprised in this district, with their
+areas and populations as given by the Census of 1903, were as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area (sq. m.)         Population
+
+    Camarines [293]       3,279                  239,405
+    Albay                 1,783                  240,326
+    Sorsogon                755                  120,495
+                          -----                  -------
+                          5,817                  600,226
+
+
+For convenience of subsequent allusion, these three provinces of
+the hemp peninsula which constituted the Third Military District of
+the Military Department of Southern Luzon in 1900, may be regarded
+as comprising, roughly, 6000 square miles of territory and 600,000
+people. If the Philippine republic of the future which is the dream
+of the Filipino people, prove other than an idle dream, the hemp
+peninsula will probably some day constitute a state of that republic,
+an appropriate and probable name for which would be the State of
+Camarines.
+
+The Fourth District of southern Luzon--there were but four--was
+occupied by the 29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Colonel
+E. E. Hardin, one of the best executive officers General Otis had in
+his whole command. The Fourth District comprised a lot of islands
+unnecessary to be considered at length in this bird's-eye view of
+the panorama, but necessary to be mentioned in outlining the military
+occupation. The 29th, like the other twenty-four volunteer regiments,
+settled down with equanimity to the business of policing a hostile
+country, sang with zest, like the rest of the twenty-five volunteer
+regiments, that old familiar song, "Damn, Damn, Damn the Filipino,"
+etc., and waited with the uniquely admirable stoicism of the American
+soldier for the season of their home-going to roll round, which, under
+the Act of Congress, [294] would be the spring of the following year.
+
+In volume i., part 5, War Department Report, 1899, at pages 5 et seq.,
+may be found a journal illustrating the nature of the "police" work
+done by the volunteers of 1899, in 1900, and at pages 5 et seq. of
+the same report for 1900 (volume i., part 4) may be found a similar
+diary carried up to June 30, 1901. Throughout the period covered by
+those reports, scarcely a day passed without what the military folk
+coolly call "contacts" with the enemy.
+
+The Visayan Islands were in course of time duly organized, as Luzon had
+previously been, departmentally and by military districts. The Visayan
+Islands became the Department of Visayas, divided into districts
+commanded either by regimental commanders having a regiment or more
+with them, or by general officers. For a long time no attempt to make
+military occupation effective in these various islands, save in the
+coast towns, was attempted. However, the indicated disposition of
+troops completed, technically at least, the American occupation of
+the Visayan Islands.
+
+Pursuant to the plan followed, as we have hitherto followed the
+army in our narrative, first throughout northern Luzon and later
+through southern Luzon, some data are now in order concerning the
+Visayan Islands.
+
+As already made clear, there are but six of the Visayan Islands with
+which any one interested in the Philippines merely as a student of
+world politics or of history need bother. The area and population of
+these are as follows: [295]
+
+
+    Island                Area (sq. m.)       Population
+
+    Panay                 4,611                743,646
+    Negros                4,881                460,776
+    Cebu                  1,762                592,247
+    Leyte                 2,722                356,641
+    Samar                 5,031                222,090
+    Bohol                 1,441                243,148
+
+
+Whenever, if ever, an independent republic is established in
+the Philippines, the six islands above mentioned could and should
+constitute self-governing commonwealths similar to the several States
+of the American Union. The rest of the islands lying between Luzon
+and Mindanao could easily be disposed of governmentally by being
+attached to the jurisdiction of one of the said six islands.
+
+Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo were organized as
+the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, under General Kobbe, with
+the 31st Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Pettit's regiment, the 40th
+Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Godwin's regiment, and the 23rd Regular
+Infantry. Thus the archipelago was completely accounted for, for
+the time being, just as all the territory of the United States was
+long accounted for by our military authorities at home, with the
+Department of the East, headquarters Governor's Island, New York; the
+Department of the Lakes, headquarters Chicago; the Department of the
+Gulf, headquarters Atlanta, etc. In this state of the case, General
+Otis re-embraced his early pet delusion--if it was a delusion, which
+charity and the probabilities suggest it should be called--about the
+insurrection having gone to pieces; and decided to come home. Possibly,
+also, he was homesick. General Otis was a very positive character,
+a strong man. But even strong men get homesick after long exile. When
+you hear the call of the homeland after long residence "east of Suez,"
+you must answer the call, duty not forbidding. General Otis had stood
+by his ink wells and the Administration with unswerving devotion
+for twenty months, and was entitled to come back home and tell the
+public all about the fighting in the Philippines, and how entirely
+over it was, and how wholly right Mr. McKinley was in his theory
+that the visible opposition to our rule and the seeming desire to
+be free and independent did not represent the wishes of the Filipino
+people at all, but only the "sinister ambitions of a few unscrupulous
+Tagalo leaders." Accordingly on May 5, 1900, he was relieved at his
+own request, and departed for the United States. He was succeeded
+in command by a very different type of man, Major-General Arthur
+MacArthur, upon whom now devolved the problem of holding down the
+situation and of actually getting it stably "well in hand" by June
+30, 1901, the date of expiration of the term of enlistment of the
+twenty-five volunteer regiments organized under the Act of March
+2, 1899.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+MACARTHUR AND THE WAR
+
+                        Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,
+                        Pock-marked khakiac ladrone; [296]
+                        Underneath the starry flag
+                        Civilize him with a Krag,
+                        And return us to our own beloved home.
+
+                     Army Song of the Philippines under MacArthur. [297]
+
+
+Some one has said, "Let me write the songs of a people and I care
+not who makes their laws." Give me the campaign songs of a war, and
+I will so write the history of that war that he who runs may read,
+and, reading, know the truth. The volunteers of 1899 had, most of
+them, been in the Spanish War of '98. That struggle had been so
+brief that, to borrow a phrase of the principal beneficiary of it,
+Colonel Roosevelt, there had not been "war enough to go 'round." The
+Philippine insurrection had already broken out when the Spanish War
+volunteers returned from Cuba in the first half of 1899. Few of them
+knew exactly where the Philippines were on the map. They simply knew
+that we had bought the islands, that disturbances of public order
+were in progress there, and that the Government desired to suppress
+them. The President had called for volunteers. That was enough. When
+they reached the islands, instead of finding a lot of outlaws,
+brigands, etc., such as that pestiferous, ill-conditioned outfit of
+horse-thieves and cane-field burning patriots we volunteers of '98
+had to comb out of the eastern end of Cuba under General Wood in the
+winter of 1898-9, they found Manila, on their arrival, practically
+almost a besieged city. They knew that the erroneous impression
+they had brought with them was the result of misrepresentation. Who
+was responsible for that misrepresentation they did not attempt to
+analyze. They simply set to work with American energy to put down the
+insurrection. Nobody questioned the unanimity of the opposition. There
+it was, a fact--denied at home, but a fact. In the course of the fight
+against the organized insurgent army they lost a great many of their
+comrades, and in that way the unanimity of the resistance was quite
+forcibly impressed upon them. By kindred psychologic processes equally
+free from mystery, their determination to overcome the resistance
+early became very set--a state of mind which boded no good to the
+Filipinos. The army song given at the beginning of Chapter XI (ante),
+in which General Otis is made to sing, after the fashion of some of
+the characters in Pinafore, that pensive query to himself
+
+
+    Am I the boss, or am I a tool?
+
+
+the first stanza of which closes
+
+
+    Now I'd like to know who's the boss of the show,
+    Is it me or Emilio Aguinaldo?
+
+
+was a point of departure, in the matter of information, which
+served to acquaint them with all that had gone before. They resented
+the loss of prestige to American arms and desired to restore that
+prestige. While engaged in so doing, they became aware, during the
+Presidential year 1900, that the campaign of that year in the United
+States was based largely upon the pretence that the majority of the
+Filipinos welcomed our rule. Naturally, their experience led them to
+a very general and very cordial detestation of this pretence. For one
+thing, it was an unfair belittling of the actual military service
+they were rendering. People hate a lie whether they are able to
+trace its devious windings to its source or sources, or to analyze
+all its causes, or calculate all its possible effects, or not. The
+real rock-bottom falsehood, not as fully understood then as it became
+later, consisted in the impression sought to be produced at home, in
+order to get votes, that the great body of the Filipino people were
+not really in sympathy with their country's struggle for freedom,
+and would be really glad tamely to accept the alien domination so
+benevolently offered by a superior people, but were being coerced into
+fighting through intimidation by a few selfish leaders acting for their
+own selfish ends. While our fighting generals in the field,--General
+MacArthur, for instance, whose interview with a newspaper man just
+after the fall of Malolos, in March, 1899, subsequently verified by
+him before the Senate Committee of 1902, has already been noticed--at
+first believed that it was only a faction that we had to contend with,
+they soon discovered that the whole people were loyal to Aguinaldo and
+the cause he represented. But, while the point as to how unanimous
+the resistance was remained a disputed matter for some little time
+among those of our people who did not have to "go up against it,"
+the most curious fact of that whole historic situation, to my mind,
+is the absolute identity of the disputed suggestion with that which
+had previously been used in like cases in all ages by the powerful
+against people struggling to be free, and the cotemporaneous absence
+of any notation of the coincidence by any conspicuous spectator of
+the drama, to say nothing of us smaller fry who bore the brunt of
+the war or any portion of it.
+
+Those men of '99 in the Philippines realized in 1900, vaguely
+it may be, but actually, that they were waging a war of conquest
+after the manner of the British as sung by Kipling, but under the
+hypocritical pretence that they were doing missionary work to improve
+the Filipino. They did not know whether the Filipinos could or could
+not run a decent government if permitted. It was too early to form
+any judgment. And even then there was no unanimous feeling that they
+could not. Brigadier-General Charles King, the famous novelist,
+who was in the fighting out there during the first half of 1899,
+was quoted in the Catholic Citizen, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in June,
+1899, as having said in an interview given at Milwaukee:
+
+
+    There is no reason in the world why the people should not have
+    the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far as
+    their ability to carry it on goes.
+
+
+The real reason why the war was being waged was stated with the honesty
+which heated public discussion always brings forth, by Hon. Charles
+Denby, a member of the Schurman Commission of 1899, in an article
+which appeared in the Forum for February, 1899, entitled "Why the
+Treaty Should be Ratified:" [298]
+
+
+    The cold, hard, practical question alone remains: "Will the
+    possession of the islands benefit us as a nation?" If it will not,
+    set them free to-morrow.
+
+
+But in the same magazine, the Forum, for June, 1900, in other words
+to the very same audience, in an article whose title is a protest,
+"Do we Owe the Filipinos Independence?" we find this same distinguished
+diplomat sagaciously deferring to that not inconsiderable element of
+the American public which is opposed to wars for conquest, with the
+rank hypocrisy which must ever characterize a republic warring for
+gain against the ideals that made it great, thus:
+
+
+    A little time ought to be conceded to the Administration to
+    ascertain what the wish of the people [meaning the people of the
+    Philippine Islands] really is; [299]
+
+
+adding some of the stale but ever-welcome salve originally invented
+by General Otis for use by Mr. McKinley on the public conscience
+of America, about the war having been "fomented by professional
+politicians," and not having the moral support of the whole people. "A
+majority of the Filipinos are friendly to us," he says. Even as early
+as January 4, 1900, in the New York Independent, we find Mr. Denby
+abandoning all his previous honesty of 1899 about "the cold, hard,
+practical question," and rubbing his hands with invisible soap to
+the tune of the following hypocrisy:
+
+
+    Let us find out how many of the people want independence, and
+    how many are willing to remain loyal to our government. It is
+    believed a large majority [etc.]. [300]
+
+
+The same article even assumed an air of injured innocence and urged
+that as soon as the insurgent army laid down its arms [301] "the
+intentions of our government will be made known by Congress." That
+was just thirteen years ago, and "the intentions of our government"
+have never yet been "made known by Congress," despite the fact
+that the omission has all these years been like a buzzing insect,
+lighting intermittently on the sores of race prejudice and political
+difference in the Philippines, to say nothing of the circumstance
+that such omission leaves everybody guessing, including ourselves. The
+omission has been due to the fact that both the McKinley Administration
+which committed the original blunder of taking the islands, and
+the succeeding Administrations which have been the legatees of that
+blunder, have always needed in their Philippine business the support
+both of those whose votes are caught by the Denby honesty of 1899
+and those whose votes are caught by the Denby hypocrisy of 1900.
+
+War is a great silencer of hypocrisy. In the presence of real sorrow
+and genuine anger, it slinks away and is seen no more until more
+piping times. The lists of casualties had been duly bulletined to
+the United States from time to time between February, 1899, and June,
+1900, so that by the date last named it had become "good politics" to
+throw off the mask. Hence, at the Republican National Convention held
+in Philadelphia June 19-21, 1900, we find that astute past-master of
+the science of government by parties, Senator Lodge, boldly throwing
+off the mask thus:
+
+
+    We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the
+    Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade
+    expansion.
+
+
+Now the words of a United States Senator are much listened to by an
+army in the field. When a war breaks out, it is usually your Senator
+who gets your commission for you originally, and has you promoted
+and made captain, colonel, or general, as the case may be, if you do
+anything to deserve it, or lifted from the ranks to a commission, if
+you do anything to deserve it, or sees that something fitting is done
+if you die in any specially decent way. An army in the field thinks
+a United States Senator is about one of the biggest institutions
+going--which, seriously, is not far from the truth, with all due
+respect to the blasé pessimists of the press gallery. Consider then how
+wholly uninspiring, as a sentiment to die by and kill by, the above
+senatorial utterance was to the men in the field in the Philippines,
+who did not even then believe the islands would pay. The "cold, hard,
+practical" fact was, if the Senator was to be believed, that we were
+fighting for what is generically called "Wall Street;" that it was
+primarily a Wall Street war: an expedition fitted out to kill enough
+Filipinos to make the survivors good future customers--"Ultimate
+Consumers"--and only incidentally a war to make people follow your
+way of being happy in lieu of their own. Yet we had most of us, but
+shortly previously to that, gone trooping headlong to Cuba, in the wake
+of the most inspiring single personality of this age--Senator Lodge's
+friend, Colonel Roosevelt--some of our American thoraxes inflated with
+sentiments thus nobly expressed by the same distinguished Senator in
+his speech on the resolution which declared war against Spain:
+
+"We are there" (meaning in the then Cuban situation), Senator Lodge
+had said in the Senate, in the matchless outburst of eloquence with
+which he set the keynote to the war with Spain--
+
+
+    We are there because we represent the spirit of liberty and the
+    new time. * * * We have grasped no man's territory, we have taken
+    no man's property, we have invaded no man's rights. We do not
+    ask their lands. [302]
+
+
+What difference, however, did it make to men under military orders,
+and that far away from home, where American public opinion could not
+and never can affect any given situation in time to help it, whether
+they were serving God or the devil? Everything disappeared but the
+primal fighting instinct. So the slaughter proceeded right merrily,
+at a ratio of about sixteen to one, and many a Filipino died with the
+word "Independence" on his lips, [303] while many an obscure American
+life went out, fighting under the Denby-Lodge dollar-mark flag of
+pseudo-trade expansion. Can you imagine a more thankless job? Do
+you wonder at the song that heads the chapter? Still, war is war,
+once you are in it. All through 1900 the volunteers of 1899 kept on,
+cheerfully doing their country's work, not in the least hampered by
+whys or wherefores, so far as the quality of their work went. They knew
+that the Filipinos were not heathen, and they were not perfectly clear
+that they themselves were doing the Lord's work, unless "putting the
+fear of God into the heart of the insurrecto"--one of their campaign
+expressions--was the Lord's work. However, if any of them gave any
+special thought to the ethics of the situation, this did not in the
+least affect their efficiency in action, nor their determination to
+lick the Filipino into submission. When the brief organized resistance
+of the insurgent armies in the field (February to November, 1899)
+underwent its transition to the far more formidable guerrilla tactics,
+they realized that they were "up against" a long and tedious task,
+in which would be no special glamour, as there had been in Cuba,
+because the war was not much more popular at home than it was with
+them. The rank net hypocrisy of the whole situation, as they viewed
+it, is expressed in the song which heads this chapter. It is an
+answer to the Taft nonsense of 1900 about "the people long for peace
+and are willing to accept government under United States." [304]
+That is why the Caribao Society do not sing it to Mr. Taft when he
+attends their annual banquet, notwithstanding that it is the star
+song of their repertoire. [305] This statement of Judge Taft's, as
+well as other like statements of his which followed it during the
+presidential campaign of 1900, would have been perfectly harmless in
+home politics. It was made in the same spirit of optimism in which
+a Taft man will tell you to-day, "The people are willing to see the
+Taft Administration endorsed." But at that time in the Philippines
+there was no possible way to prove or disprove the statement to the
+satisfaction of anybody at home--or elsewhere, for that matter. And,
+under the circumstances, it was at once a libel on Filipino patriotism
+and an ungracious belittling of the work of the American army. It was
+a libel on Filipino patriotism because it denied the loyal (even if
+ill-advised) unanimity of the Filipino people in their struggle for
+independence, and was a statement made recklessly, without knowledge,
+in aid of a presidential candidate in the United States. That it was
+highly inaccurate was well known to some 70,000 American soldiers then
+in the field, who were daily getting insurrecto lead pumped into them,
+and also well known to their gallant commander, General MacArthur, who
+told Judge Taft just that thing. That it was an ungracious belittling
+of the work of the army is certainly obvious enough, and it was
+so considered by the army, and its commanding general aforesaid,
+who practically told Judge Taft just that thing. But Mr. Root,
+then Secretary of War, was as much interested in Mr. McKinley's
+re-election as Judge Taft was. So he spread the Taft cablegrams
+broadcast throughout the United States during the presidential
+campaign, and pigeonholed the MacArthur messages and reports on the
+situation in the dusty and innocuous desuetude of the War Department
+archives. Four years later at the Republican National Convention of
+1904, Mr. Root told the naked truth, thus:
+
+
+    When the last national convention met, over 70,000 soldiers from
+    more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in check. [306]
+
+
+The foregoing is all a record made and unalterable. It is a fair sample
+of the initial stages of one more of the experiments in colonization
+by a republic which are scattered through history and teach but
+one lesson. All the gentlemen concerned were personally men of high
+type. But look at the net result of their work. The impression it
+produced in the United States, at a tremendously critical period in the
+country's history, when the men at the helm of state were bending every
+energy to railroad the republic into a career of overseas conquest,
+and using the army for that purpose, can be called by a short and ugly
+word. The splendor of Mr. Root's intellect is positively alluring,
+but he is a dangerous man to republican institutions. Mr. Taft's part
+in that conspiracy for the suppression of the facts of the Philippine
+situation in 1900 was really due to kindliness of heart, regret
+at the war, and earnest hope that it would soon end. Mr. Denby's
+part was that of the out-and-out imperialist who has frank doubts
+in his own mind as to whether it is axiomatic, after all, that the
+form of government bequeathed us by our fathers is the best form of
+government yet devised. But the conspiracy was really a sin against
+the progress of the world, because it deceived the American people as
+to the genuineness and unanimity of the desire of the Filipino people
+to imitate the example set by us in 1776, which has since served as
+a beacon-light of hope to so many people in so many lands in their
+several struggles to be free.
+
+By the spring of 1900, when General MacArthur relieved General Otis,
+the volunteers of 1899 had gotten thoroughly warmed up to the work
+of showing the Filipinos who was in fact "the boss of the show,"
+and by June, 1900, when Judge Taft arrived, they had gotten still
+warmer [307]; and in General Otis's successor they had a commander
+who understood his men thoroughly, and was determined to carry out
+honestly, with firmness, and without playing, as his predecessor had
+done, the rôle of political henchman, the purpose for which the army
+he commanded had been sent to the Islands to accomplish. In this
+state of the case, the Taft Commission came out.
+
+This would seem rather an odd point at which to terminate a chapter on
+"MacArthur and the War," seeing that General MacArthur continued to
+command the American forces in the Philippines and to direct their
+strenuous field operations until July, 1901, more than a year later,
+when he was relieved by General Chaffee, on whom thereafter devolved
+the subsequent conduct of the war. But we must follow the inexorable
+thread of chronological order, and so yield the centre of the stage
+from June, 1900, on, to Mr. Taft, else the resultant net confusion of
+ideas about the American occupation of the Philippines might remain
+as great as that which this narrative is an attempt in some degree
+to correct.
+
+All through the official correspondence of 1899 and 1900 between the
+Adjutant-General of the Army, General Corbin, and General Otis at
+Manila, one sees Mr. McKinley's sensitiveness to public opinion. "In
+view of the impatience of the people" you will do thus and so,
+is a typical sample of this feature of that correspondence. [308]
+Troubled, possibly, with misgivings, as to whether, after all, in view
+of the vigorous and undeniably obstinate struggle for independence
+the Filipinos were putting up, it would not have been wiser to have
+done with them as we had done in the case of Cuba, and troubled,
+beyond the peradventure of a doubt, about the effect of the possible
+Philippine situation on the fortunes of his party and himself in the
+approaching campaign for the presidency, Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taft
+out, in the spring preceding the election of 1900, to help General
+MacArthur run the war. We must now, therefore, turn our attention to
+Mr. Taft, not forgetting General MacArthur in so doing.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+THE TAFT COMMISSION
+
+                                    The papers 'id it 'andsome,
+                                    But you bet the army knows.
+
+                                        Kipling, Ballad of the Boer War.
+
+
+The essentials of the situation which confronted the Taft Commission
+on its arrival in the islands in June, 1900, and the mental attitude
+in which they approached that situation, may now be briefly summarized,
+with entire confidence that such summary will commend itself as fairly
+accurate to the impartial judgment both of the historian of the future
+and of any candid contemporary mind.
+
+It is not necessary to "vex the dull ear" of a mighty people much
+engrossed with their own affairs, by repetition of any further
+details concerning the original de facto alliance between Admiral
+Dewey and Aguinaldo. Suffice it to remind a people whose saving
+grace is a love of fair play, that, after the battle of Manila Bay,
+when Admiral Dewey brought Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong to Cavite,
+both the Admiral and his Filipino allies were keenly cognizant of the
+national purpose set forth in the declaration of war against Spain,
+and that the Filipinos could not have been expected to make any
+substantial distinction between the casual remarks of a victorious
+admiral on the quarter-deck of his flagship in May, remarks concurrent
+and consistent with actual treatment of the Filipinos as allies, and
+the imperious commands of a general ashore in December thereafter,
+acting under specific orders pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. The
+one great fact of the situation, "as huge as high Olympus," they did
+grasp, viz., that both were representatives of America on the ground
+at the time of their respective utterances, and that one in December
+in effect repudiated without a word of explanation what the other
+had done from May to August. They had helped us to take the city of
+Manila in August, and, to use the current phrase of the passing hour,
+coined in this period of awakening of the national conscience to
+a proper attitude toward double-dealing in general, they felt that
+they had been "given the double cross." In other words they believed
+that the American Government had been guilty of a duplicity rankly
+Machiavellian. And that was the cause of the war.
+
+We have seen in the chapters on "The Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation" and "The Iloilo Fiasco" that, in the Philippines at
+any rate, no matter how mellifluously pacific it may have sounded at
+home--no matter how soothing to the troubled doubts of the national
+conscience--the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation of December 21,
+1898, was recognized both by the Eighth Army Corps and by Aguinaldo's
+people as a call to arms--a signal to the former to get ready for the
+work of "civilizing with a Krag"; a signal to the latter to gird up
+their loins for the fight to the death for government of their people,
+by their people, for their people; and that the yearning benevolence
+of said proclamation was calculated strikingly to remind the Filipinos
+of Spain's previous traditional yearnings for the welfare of Cuba,
+indignantly cut short by us--yearnings "to spare the great island
+from the danger of premature independence" [309] which that decadent
+monarchy could not even help repeating in the swan-song wherein
+she sued to President McKinley for peace. We did not realize the
+absoluteness of the analogy then. It is all clear enough now. We can
+now understand how and why Mr. McKinley's programme of Annexation and
+Benevolent Assimilation of 1898-9, blindly earnest as was his belief
+that it would make the Filipino people at once cheerfully forego the
+"legitimate aspirations" to which we ourselves had originally given
+a momentum so generous that nothing but bullets could then possibly
+have stopped it, was in fact received by them in a manner compared
+with which Canada's response in 1911 to Speaker Champ Clark's equally
+benevolent suggestion of United States willingness to accord to Canada
+also, gradual Benevolent Assimilation and Ultimate Annexation, was
+one great sisterly sob of sheer joy as at the finding of a long lost
+brother. From the arrival of the American troops on June 30, 1898,
+until the outbreak of February 4, 1899, there had been two armies
+camped not far from each other, one born of the idea of independence
+and bent upon it, the other at first groping in the dark without
+instructions, and finally instructed to deny independence. There
+was never any faltering or evasion on the part of Aguinaldo and his
+people. They knew what they wanted and said so on all occasions. At
+all times and in all places they made it clear, by proclamation, by
+letter, by conversation, and otherwise, that independence was the one
+thing to which, whether they were fit for it or not, they had pledged
+"their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor."
+
+We have seen how easily the war itself could have been averted by the
+Bacon Resolution of January, 1899, or some similar resolution frankly
+declaring the purpose of our government; how here was Senator Bacon
+at this end of the line pleading with his colleagues to be frank,
+and to make a declaration in keeping with "the high purpose" for
+which we had gone to war with Spain, instead of holding on to the
+Philippines on the idea that they might prove a second Klondike,
+while justifying such retention by arbitrarily assuming, without any
+knowledge whatever on the subject, that the Filipinos were incapable
+of self-government; how, there, at the other end of the line, at
+Manila, Aguinaldo's Commissioners, familiar with our Constitution
+and the history and traditions of our government, were making,
+substantially, though in more diplomatic language, precisely the
+same plea, and imploring General Otis's Commissioners to give them
+some assurance which would quiet the apprehensions of their people,
+and calm the fear that the original assurance, "We are going to lick
+the Spaniards and set you free," was now about to be ignored because
+the islands might be profitable to the United States.
+
+We have seen the war itself, as far as it had progressed by June,
+1900, one of the bitterest wars in history, punctuated by frequent
+barbarities avenged in kind, and how, if the Taft Commission had
+not come out with McKinley spectacles on, they would have seen the
+picture of a bleeding, prostrate, and deeply hostile people, still
+bent on fighting to the last ditch, not only animated by a feeling
+against annexation by us similar to that the Canadians would have
+to-day if we should also try the Benevolent Assimilation game on
+them--first with proclamations breathing benevolence and then with
+cannon belching grape-shot--but further animated by the instinctive
+as well as inherited knowledge common to all colored peoples,
+whether red, yellow brown, or black, that wheresoever white men
+and colored live in the same country together, there the white man
+will rule. Understand, this was before Judge Taft had had a chance to
+assure them, with the kindly Taft smile and the hearty Taft hand-shake,
+that their benevolent new masters were going to reverse the verdict
+of the ages, and treat them with a fraternal love wholly free from
+race prejudice. If Judge Taft could only have arrived in January,
+1899, and told them that the Bacon Resolution really represented the
+spirit of the attitude of the American people toward them, then the
+finely commanding bearing of Mr. Taft, and the noble genuineness of
+his desire to see peace on earth and goodwill toward men, might even
+have prevented the war. But this is merely what might have been. What
+actually was, when he did arrive, in June, 1900, was that the milk of
+human kindness had long since been spilled, and his task was to gather
+it up and put it back in the pail. When I, a Southern man who have
+taken part in the only two wars this nation has had in my lifetime,
+reflect that in this year of grace, 1912, Mr. Underwood's otherwise
+matchless availability as the candidate of his party for President is
+questioned on the idea that it might be a tactical blunder, because of
+"the late war," which broke out before either Mr. Underwood or myself
+were born, I cannot share the Taft optimism as to the rapidity with
+which the scars of "the late war" in the Philippines will heal, and
+as to the affectionate gratitude toward the United States with which
+the McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation will presently
+be regarded by the people of the Philippine Islands.
+
+We have seen the futile efforts of the Schurman Commission of 1899,
+sent out that spring, in deference to American public opinion,
+with definite instructions to try and patch up a peace, by talking
+to the leading spirits of a war for independence, now in full swing,
+about the desirability of benevolent leading-strings. "They [meaning
+the Schurman Commission] had come," says Mr. McKinley, in his annual
+message to Congress of December 5, 1899, [310] "with the hope of
+co-operating with Admiral Dewey and General Otis in establishing
+peace and order." They came, they saw, they went, recognizing the
+futility of the errand on which they had been sent. And now came the
+Taft Commission a year later, on precisely the same errand, after the
+Filipinos had sunk all their original petty differences and jealousies
+in a very reasonable instinctive common fear of economic exploitation,
+and a very unreasonable but, to them, very real common fear of race
+elimination, amounting to terror, and been welded into absolute
+oneness--if that were somewhat lacking before--in the fierce crucible
+of sixteen months of bloody fighting against a foreign foe for the
+independence of their common country. President McKinley's message to
+Congress of December, 1899, is full of the old insufferable drivel,
+so grossly, though unwittingly, ungenerous to our army then in the
+field in the Philippines, about the triviality of the resistance
+we were "up against." The message in one place blandly speaks of
+"the peaceable and loyal majority who ask nothing better than to
+accept our authority," in another of "the sinister ambitions of a
+few selfish Filipinos." Thus was outlined, in the message announcing
+the purpose to send out the Taft Commission, the view that no real
+fundamental resistance existed in the islands. Basing contemplated
+action on this sort of stuff, the presidential message outlines the
+presidential purpose as follows--this in December, 1899, mind you:
+
+
+    There is no reason why steps should not be taken from time to
+    time to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form
+    as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops.
+
+
+Then follows the genesis of the idea which resulted in the Taft
+Commission:
+
+
+    To this end I am considering the advisability of the return
+    [to the islands] of the commission [the Schurman Commission]
+    or such of the members thereof as can be secured.
+
+
+In Cuba, General Wood began the work of reconstruction at Havana with
+a central government and the best men he could get hold of, and acted
+through them, letting his plans and purposes percolate downward to
+the masses of the people. Not so in the Philippines. Reconstruction
+there was to begin by establishing municipal governments, to be
+later followed by provincial governments, and finally by a central
+one; in other words, by placing the waters of self-government at
+the bottom of the social fabric among the most ignorant people,
+and letting them percolate up, according to some mysterious law of
+gravitation apparently deemed applicable to political physics. Of
+course, these poor people simply always took their cue from their
+leaders, knowing nothing themselves that could affect the success of
+this project except that we were their enemies and that they might get
+knocked in the head if they did not play the game. "I have believed,"
+says Mr. McKinley, in his message to Congress of December, 1899,
+"that reconstruction should not begin by the establishment of one
+central civil government for all the islands, with its seat at Manila,
+but rather that the work should be commenced by building up from the
+bottom." Whereat, the young giant America bowed, in puzzled hope,
+and worldly-wise old Europe smiled, in silent but amused contempt.
+
+If at the time he formulated this scheme for their government
+Mr. McKinley had known anything about the Philippines, or the
+Filipinos, he would have known that what he so suavely called "building
+from the bottom" was like trying to make water run up hill, i.e.,
+like starting out to have ideas percolate upward, so that through "the
+masses" the more intelligent people might be redeemed. The "nigger
+in the woodpile" lay in the words "essentially popular in form." Of
+course no government by us "essentially popular" was possible at the
+time. But a government "popular in form" would sound well to the
+American people, and, if they could be kept quiet until after the
+presidential election of 1900, maybe the supposed misunderstanding
+on the part of the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions
+might be corrected by kindness. Accordingly, the following spring,
+cotemporaneously with General Otis's final departure from Manila to
+the United States, in which free country he might say the war was over
+as much as he pleased without being molested with round-robins by Bob
+Collins, O. K. Davis, John McCutcheon, and the rest of those banes of
+his insular career, who so pestiferously insisted that the American
+public ought to know the facts, the Taft Commission was sent out,
+to "aid" General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had "aided"
+General Otis. [311]
+
+It would seem fairly beyond any reasonable doubt that the official
+information the Taft Commission were given by President McKinley
+concerning the state of public order they would find in the islands
+on arrival was in keeping with the information solemnly imparted
+to Congress by him in December thereafter, which was as follows:
+"By the spring of this year (1900) the effective opposition of the
+dissatisfied Tagals"--always the same minimization of the task of the
+army as a sop to the American conscience--"was virtually ended." Then
+follows a glowing picture of how the Filipinos are going to love us
+after we rescue them from the hated Tagal, but with this circumspect
+reservation: "He would be rash who, with the teachings of contemporary
+history, would fix a limit" as to how long it will take to produce
+such a state of affairs. Looking at that mighty panorama of events
+from the dispassionate standpoint now possible, it seems to me that
+Mr. McKinley's whole Philippine policy of 1899-1900 was animated by
+the belief that the more the Philippine situation should resemble the
+really identical Cuban one in the estimation of the American people,
+the more likely his Philippine policy was to be repudiated at the
+polls in the fall of 1900. The Taft Commission left Washington for
+Manila in the spring of 1900, after their final conference with the
+President who had appointed them and was a candidate for re-election in
+the coming fall, as completely committed as circumstances can commit
+any man or set of men to the programme of occupation which was to
+follow the subjugation of the inhabitants, and to the proposition
+of present incapacity for self-government, its corner-stone;
+to say nothing of the embarrassment felt at Washington by reason
+of having stumbled into a bloody war with people whom we honestly
+wanted to help, had never seen, and had nothing but the kindliest
+feelings for. While the serene and capacious intellect of William
+H. Taft was still pursuing the even tenor of its way in the halls of
+justice (as United States Circuit Judge for the 8th Circuit), the
+Philippine programme was formulated at Washington. Judge Taft went
+to Manila to make the best of a situation which he had not created,
+to write the lines of the Deus ex machina for a Tragedy of Errors
+up to that point composed wholly by others. It has been frequently
+stated and generally believed that when Mr. McKinley sent for him and
+proposed the Philippine mission, Judge Taft replied, substantially:
+"Mr. President, I am not the man for the place. I don't want the
+Philippines." To which Mr. McKinley is supposed to have replied:
+"You are the man for the place, Judge. I had rather have a man out
+there who doesn't want them." The point of the original story lay in
+what Mr. McKinley said. The point of the repetition of it here lies
+in what Mr. Taft said, the inference therefrom being that he did not
+think the true interests of his country "wanted" them, and that had
+he been called into President McKinley's council sooner he would have
+so advised; an inference warranted by his subsequent admission that
+"we blundered into colonization." [312]
+
+It is utterly fatal to clear thinking on this great subject, which
+concerns the liberties of a whole people, to treat Judge Taft's reports
+as Commissioner to, and later Governor of, the Philippines as in the
+nature of a judicial decision on the capacity of the Filipinos for
+self-government. When he consented to go out there, he went, not to
+review the findings of the Paris Peace Commission, but at the urgent
+solicitation of an Administration whose fortunes were irrevocably
+committed to those findings, including the express finding that they
+were unfit for self-government, and the implied one that we must remain
+to improve the condition of the inhabitants. He was thus not a judge
+come out to decide on the fitness of the people for self-government,
+but an advocate to make the best possible case for their unfitness, and
+its corollary, the necessity to remain indefinitely, just as England
+has remained in Egypt. The war itself convinced the whole army of the
+United States that Aguinaldo would have been the "Boss of the Show"
+had Dewey sailed away from Manila after sinking the Spanish fleet. The
+war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have been a small edition
+of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipino republic-that-might-have-been
+would have been, very decidedly, "a going concern," although Aguinaldo
+probably would have been able to say with a degree of accuracy, as
+Diaz might have said in Mexico for so many years, "The Republic? I
+am the Republic." The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D.,
+that the Filipinos are "capable of self-government," unless the kind
+which happens to suit the genius of the American people is the only
+kind of government on earth that is respectable, and the one panacea
+for all the ills of government among men without regard to their
+temperament or historical antecedents. The educated patriotic Filipinos
+can control the masses of the people in their several districts as
+completely as a captain ever controlled a company. [313] While the
+municipal officials of the McKinley-Taft municipal kindergarten were
+stumbling along with the strange new town government system imported
+from America, and atoning to their benignant masters for mistakes by
+writing them letters about how benignant they--the teachers--were,
+they--the pupils,--according to the contemporaneous description by the
+commanding general of the United States forces in the islands, were
+running a superbly efficient municipal system throughout the whole
+archipelago, "simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American
+governments, and in many instances through the same personnel,"
+[314] in aid of the insurrection. General MacArthur humorously adds
+that the town officials "acted openly in behalf of the Americans
+and secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, with considerable
+apparent solicitude for the interest of both." In short, the war
+at once demonstrated their "capacity for self-government" and made
+granting it to them for the time being unthinkable. For the war was
+fought not on the issue of the capacity, but on the issue of the
+granting. The Treaty of Paris settled the "capacity" part. The army
+in 1898, 1899, and 1900 can hardly be said to have had any much more
+decided opinion on the capacity branch of the subject, than Perry did
+about the Japanese in 1854. The Paris Peace Commission having solemnly
+decided the "capacity part" adversely to the Filipinos and the war
+having followed, thereafter Mr. Taft went out to make out the best case
+possible in support of the action of the Peace Commission and, ex vi
+termini, in support of everything made necessary by the fact of the
+purchase. Unless some one goes out to present to the American people
+the other side of the case, they will never arrive at a just verdict.
+
+Committed, a priori, to the task of squaring the McKinley
+Administration with its course as to Cuba, the only course possible
+for the Taft Commission was to set up a benevolent government based
+upon the incompetency of the governed, which, being a standing affront
+to the intelligence of the people, earns their hatred, however it may
+crave their love. By the very bitterness of the opposition it permits
+yet disregards, it binds itself ever more irrevocably to remain a
+benevolent engenderer of malevolence. Government and governed thus get
+wider apart as the years go by, and, the raison d'ętre of the former
+being the mental deficiencies of the latter, it must, in self-defence,
+assert those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently
+they are denied. What hope therefore can there be that the light
+that shone upon Saul on the road to Damascus will ever break upon
+the President? What hope that he will ever re-attune his ears to the
+voice of the Declaration of Independence, calling down from where
+the Signers (we hope without untoward exception) have gone, crying:
+"William, William, why persecutest thou me? it is hard for thee to
+kick against the right of a people to pursue happiness in their own
+way"? The difference between the President and the writer is that
+both went out to scoff and the latter remained--much longer--to pray.
+
+The Taft Commission arrived at Manila on June 3, 1900, loaded to the
+guards with kindly belief in the stale falsehood wherewith General
+Otis, ably assisted by his press censor, had been systematically
+soothing Mr. McKinley's and the general American conscience during
+the whole twenty months he had commanded the Eighth Army Corps, [315]
+viz., that the insurrection was due solely to "the sinister ambitions
+of a few selfish leaders," and did not represent the wishes of the
+whole people. It is true that the insurrection originally started
+under Admiral Dewey's auspices and under the initial protection of
+his puissant guns was headed by a group of men most of whom, including
+Aguinaldo, were Tagalos. But all Filipinos look alike, the whole seven
+or eight millions of them. They differ from one another not one whit
+more than one Japanese differs from another. And they all feel alike on
+most things, [316] because they all have the same customs, tastes, and
+habits of thought. Said Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in 1902:
+
+
+    While it is true that there are a number of Christian "tribes,"
+    so-called,--I do not know the number, possibly eight or ten, or
+    twelve,--that speak different languages, there is a homogeneity
+    in the people in appearance, in habits, and in many avenues of
+    thought. To begin with, they are Catholics." [317]
+
+
+Certainly this should forever crucify the stale slander, still
+ignorantly repeated in the United States at intervals, which seeks
+to make the American people think the great body of the Filipino
+people are still in a tribal state, ethnologically. [318] A Tagalo
+leader is about as much a "tribal" leader as is a Tammany "brave"
+of Irish antecedents. In fact there is much in common between the
+two. Both are clannish. Both have a genius for organization that
+is simply superb. Both are irrepressible about Home Rule. Countless
+generations ago the Filipinos were lifted by the Spanish priests out
+of the tribal state, and the educated people all speak Spanish. But
+the original tribal dialects, which the Spanish priests patiently
+mastered and finally reduced for them to a written language, still
+survive in the several localities of their origin. So that every
+Filipino of a well-to-do family is brought up speaking two languages,
+Spanish, and the local dialect of his native place, which is the only
+language known to the poorer natives of the same neighborhood. Surely
+even the valor of ignorance can see that we are presumptuously
+seeking to reverse the order of God and nature in assuming that
+an alien race can lead a people out of the wilderness better than
+could a government by the leading men of their own race to whom the
+less favored look with an ardent pride that would be a guarantee of
+loyal and inspiring co-operation. You can beat a balking horse to
+death but you cannot make him wag his tail, or otherwise indicate
+contentment or a disposition to cordial co-operation which will
+make for progress. Mr. Bryan has visited the Philippines, and his
+evidence is simply cumulative of mine, as mine, based on six years'
+acquaintance with the Filipinos, is simply cumulative of Admiral
+Dewey's testimony of 1898, so often cited hereinbefore, and of the
+opinion of Hon. George Curry, a Republican member of Congress from
+New Mexico who served eight years in the Philippines, and believes
+they can safely be given their independence by 1921. Mr. Bryan says:
+
+
+    So far as their own internal affairs are concerned, they do not
+    need to be subject to any alien government.
+
+
+He further says:
+
+
+    There is a wide difference, it is true, between the general
+    intelligence of the educated Filipino and the laborer on
+    the street and in the field, but this is not a barrier to
+    self-government. Intelligence controls in every government,
+    except where it is suppressed by military force. Nine tenths of
+    the Japanese have no part in the law-making. In Mexico, the gap
+    between the educated classes and the peons is fully as great as,
+    if not greater than, the gap between the extremes of Filipino
+    society. Those who question the capacity of the Filipinos for
+    self-government forget that patriotism raises up persons fitted
+    for the work that needs to be done." [319]
+
+
+It is because I believe that in the Philippines we are doing ourselves
+an injustice and keeping back the progress of the world by depreciating
+and scoffing at the value of patriotism as a factor in self-government
+and in the maintenance of free institutions, that I have written this
+book. There is no more patriotic people in the world than the Filipino
+people. I base this opinion upon an intimate knowledge of them, and
+in the light of considerable observation throughout most of Europe,
+and in Asia from the Golden Horn to the mouth of the Yang-tse. Woe
+to the nonsense, sometimes ignorant, sometimes vicious, wherewith
+we are regaled from time to time by Americans who go to Manila,
+smoke a cigar or two in some American club there, and then come back
+home and depreciate the Filipino people without at least correcting
+Col. Roosevelt's wholly uninformed and cruel random assertions of
+1900 about the Filipinos being a "jumble of savage tribes," and about
+Aguinaldo being "the Osceola of the Filipinos," or their "Sitting
+Bull!" It is wonderfully inspiring to turn from such stale slander to
+Mr. Bryan's above statement of the case for our Oriental subjects,
+a statement framed in his own infinitely sympathetic and inimitable
+way, which says for me just what I had long wanted to express, but
+could not, so well. And in the midst of the recurring slander that the
+Filipino people are "a heterogeneous lot," it is refreshing to find in
+a preface to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, by the
+Director thereof, a passage where, in comparing the tables of that
+census with those of the Twelfth Census of the United States, he says:
+
+
+   "Those of the Philippine Census are somewhat simpler, the
+    differences being due mainly to the more homogeneous character
+    of the population of the Philippine Islands." [320]
+
+
+When we consider the above in the light of the past and present
+operation of our own immigration laws, it is not flattering, but it
+may and should tend to awaken some realization of the manifold nature
+and blinding effects of current misapprehensions in the United States
+concerning the inhabitants of the Philippines. One Filipino does not
+differ from another any more than one American does from another
+American--in fact they differ less, considering immigration. The
+Filipino people are not rendered a heterogeneous lot by having three
+different languages, Ilocano, Tagalo, and Visayan, [321] which are
+respectively the languages spoken in the northern, the central,
+and the southern part of their country, any more than the people
+of Switzerland are rendered heterogeneous by the circumstance that
+in northern Switzerland you find German spoken for the most part,
+while farther south you find French, and near the southernmost
+extremities some Italian. At this late date no credible person
+acquainted with the facts will be so poor in spirit as to deny that
+the motives of the men who originally started the insurrection were
+patriotic. Nor will any one who served under General Otis's command
+in the Philippines deny that that eminent desk soldier continued to
+cling to his early theory that it was a purely Tagalo insurrection
+long after the deadly unanimity of the opposition had seeped, with
+all-pervading thoroughness, into the general mind of the army of
+occupation. The white flag or rag of truce, alias treachery, used
+to be hoisted to put us off our guard in pretence of welcome to our
+columns approaching their towns and barrios. Such use of such a flag,
+followed by treachery, the ultimate weapon of the weak, had been in
+turn followed, with relentless impartiality in countless instances,
+by due unloosening of the vials of American wrath, until every nipa
+shack [322] in the Philippine Islands that remained unburned had
+had its lesson, written in the blood of its occupants or their kin,
+to the tune of the Krag-Jorgensen or the Gatling. Yet General Otis's
+reports are always bland, and always convey the idea of an insurrection
+exclusively Tagalo.
+
+In the summer of 1900, the newly arrived civilians, the Taft
+Commission, had no special interest in the soldiers who, for better,
+for worse, were "doing their country's work," as Kipling calls his
+own country's countless wars against its refractory subjects in the
+far East; and no especial sympathy with that work. Two years later we
+find President Roosevelt, in connection with the general amnesty of
+July 4, 1902, congratulating his "bowld lads," as Mr. Dooley would
+call them--meaning General Chaffee and the Eighth Army Corps--on a
+total of "two thousand combats, great and small" up to that time,
+but you never find in any of Governor Taft's Philippine state
+papers any more affirmative recognition of continued resistance to
+American rule than some mild allusion to "small but hard knocks"
+being administered here and there by the army. From the beginning
+there was a systematic belittling, on the part of the Taft Commission,
+of the work of the army, incidentally to belittling the reality and
+unanimity of the opposition which was daily calling it forth. [323]
+This was not vicious. It was essentially benevolent. It was part of
+the initial fermentation of their preconceived theory. But the trouble
+about their theory was that it was only a theory. It would not square
+with the facts. They were trying to square the subjugation of the
+Philippines with the freeing of Cuba, a task quite as soluble as the
+squaring of a circle. They hoped, with all the kindly benevolence
+of Mr. McKinley himself, that the opposition to our rule was not
+as great as some people seemed to think. They had come out to the
+islands earnestly wishing to find conditions not as bad as they
+had been asserted to be. And the wish became father to the thought
+and the thought soon found expression in words--cablegrams to the
+United States presenting an optimistic view as to the prospects of
+necessity for further shedding of blood in the interest of Benevolent
+Assimilation, alias Trade Expansion. Some flippant person will say,
+"That is a polite way of charging insincerity." This book is not
+addressed to flippant persons. It is a serious attempt to deal with
+a problem involving the liberties of a whole people, and will be,
+as far as the writer can make it, straightforward, dignified, and
+candid. Judge Taft's fearful mistake of 1900-1901 in the matter of his
+premature planting of the civil government--a mistake because based
+on the idea that "the great majority of the people" welcomed American
+rule, and a fearful mistake because fraught with so much subsequent
+sacrifice of life due to too early withdrawal of the police protection
+of the army--was not the first instance in American history where an
+ordinarily level-headed public man has, with egregious folly, mistaken
+the mood and temper of a whole people. The key to his mistake lay in
+the fact that, coming into a strange country in the midst of a war,
+he ignored the advice of the commanding general of the army of his
+country concerning the military situation, and took the advice of a
+few native Tories, or Copperheads, of wealth, who had never really
+been in sympathy with the insurrection and who, flocking about him
+as soon as he arrived, told him what he so longed to be told, viz.,
+that the war did not represent the wishes of the people but was kept
+up by "a conspiracy of assassination" of all who did not contribute
+to it either in service or money. He thereupon decided that the men
+who told him this really represented the voice of the people, and
+that the men in the field who had then been keeping up the struggle
+for independence for sixteen months, in season and out of season,
+were simply "a Mafia on a very large scale." Consequently the Taft
+Commission had been in the islands less than three months when
+Secretary of War Root at Washington was giving the widest possible
+publicity to cablegrams from them, such as that dated August 21,
+1900, mentioned in the preceding chapter, conveying the glad tidings
+that "large number of people long for peace and are willing to accept
+government under United States" [324]; and by November next thereafter,
+the "large number" had grown to "a great majority," and the "willing"
+to "entirely willing." The November statement was:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States. [325]
+
+
+Yet, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the real situation in the
+Philippines at this very time was described four years later at the
+Republican National Convention of 1904 by Mr. Root thus:
+
+
+    When the last national convention met, over 70,000 American
+    soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy
+    in check.
+
+
+Between the date of their arrival in the Islands on June 3d, and the
+date of this August 21st telegram, the Taft Commission did little
+junketing, but remained in Manila imbibing the welcome views of the
+"Tories" or "Copperheads," and seeking very little information from
+the army. But it so happens that the Adjutant-General at Manila used
+to keep a record of the daily engagements during that period, which
+record was later published in the annual War Department Report, [326]
+and it shows a total of about five hundred killings (of Filipinos)
+between June 3d, and August 21st, to say nothing of probably many times
+that number hit but not killed, and therefore able to get away. (You
+could not include any Filipino in your returns of your killings except
+dead you had actually counted.) It also happens that on June 4th,
+the day after Judge Taft's arrival, General MacArthur, in response to
+an order from Washington sent some time previous at the instance of
+Congress, had all the Filipino casualties our military records showed
+up to that time (i. e., during the sixteen months from the day of the
+outbreak, February 4, 1899, to June 3, 1900), tabulated and totalled,
+and the total Filipino killed accordingly reported by cablegram to
+the War Department on June 4, 1900, was 10,780. [327]
+
+Ten thousand in sixteen months is 625 per month. So that by the
+time Judge Taft arrived, the Filipinos had been sufficiently
+beaten into submission to decrease the death-rate due to the
+Independence Bug from something over six hundred per month to about
+two hundred per month. Judge Taft called this enthusiasm. I call it
+exhaustion. Whereupon, exclaims a Boston Anti-Imperialist, "Why don't
+you issue Mr. Taft a certificate as a member of the Ananias Club at
+once, and be done with it?" My answer is that I do not believe the
+Taft Commission in 1900 either knew these figures or wanted to know
+them. They came out preaching a Gospel of Hope to the exclusion of
+all else, a species of mental healing. They said, soothingly to Dame
+Filipina, "Be not afraid; you are well; you are well"--of the desire
+for independence she had conceived, when what that lady needed was the
+surgical operation indispensable for the removal of a still-born child.
+
+The will of the American people is ascertainable, and quadrennially
+announced, through certain prescribed methods. And (nearly)
+everybody takes the result good-humoredly, God bless our country,
+whatever the result. But just how Mr. Taft and his colleagues could
+assume to speak for the "great majority" of the Filipino people at
+the tremendous juncture in their destinies now under consideration
+during the Presidential election of 1900, does not clearly appear,
+except that in their first report they say:
+
+
+    Many witnesses were examined as to the form of government best
+    adapted to these islands and satisfactory to the people, [328]
+
+
+a statement which obviously takes for granted the only point
+involved in the war, viz., whether any kind of alien government
+would be "satisfactory to the people." And in their various other
+communications to Washington they describe themselves, with no small
+degree of benevolent satisfaction, as enthusiastically received by
+natives not under arms at the moment of such reception. As a matter of
+fact, a carpet-bag governor of Georgia might just as well have reported
+to Andrew Johnson an enthusiastic reception at the hands of the people
+whose homes had lately been put to the torch, and their kith and kin to
+the sword, while the whole fair face of nature from Atlanta to the sea
+lay bruised and bleeding under the iron heel of Sherman's army. Let no
+advocate of Indefinite Tutelage whet his scalping-knife for me because
+of the use of that word "carpet-bag." It was as free from ill-will
+as the explosion incident to flash-light photography. We are trying
+to develop a picture of those times. Two at least of the Commission,
+Messrs. Taft and Wright, were the kind of men who in all the personal
+relations of life, meet the ultimate test of human confidence and
+friendship--you would make either, if he would consent to act,
+executor of your will, or testamentary guardian of your child. But
+they came out with the preconceived notion that kindness would win
+the people over, whereas what those people wanted was not foreign
+kindness but home rule, not silken political swaddling clothes,
+but freedom. And as the acquisition of the Philippines has placed
+us under the necessity of getting up a new definition of freedom,
+one consistent with tariff taxation without representation--through
+legislation by a Congress on the other side of the world in which
+"our new possessions" have no vote--it should be added that one of
+the things Freedom meant with us before 1898, was freedom to frame
+the laws--tariff and other--which largely determine the selling
+price of crops and the purchase price of the necessities of life,
+freedom to see the intelligent and educated men of your own race in
+charge of your common destiny, freedom to have a flag as an emblem
+of your common interests, in a word, just Freedom. And that was what
+the war was about. They wanted to be free and independent. Whether
+they were fit for such freedom is wholly foreign to the reality and
+unanimity of their desire for it. General Otis used to be very fond
+of taking the wind out of the sails of their commissioners and other
+officials before the outbreak by saying that their people had not
+the slightest notion of what the word independence meant. It is true
+that they knew nothing about it by experience, but equally true that
+whatever it was, they wanted it. Of the ten thousand men we had already
+killed when Judge Taft arrived, there can be no question, as already
+heretofore suggested, that many of them may have been hit just as
+they were hurrahing for independence, in other words, died with the
+word "Independence" on their lips. When men have been thus fighting
+against overwhelming odds for some sixteen months for government of
+their people by their people for their people--however inarticulate
+the emotions of the rank and file on going into battle--it is idle
+to claim that they do not know what they want, whether the great
+majority of the rank and file can read and write or not. But pursuant
+to the idea that kindness would cure the desire for independence,
+Judge Taft ignored, in the outset, all advice from the military
+department, because that was not the kindness department, accepting
+as truly representative of the temper of the whole people the views
+of a few ultra-conservatives of large means who had always been part
+and parcel of the Spanish Administration.
+
+On the other hand, General MacArthur and the whole Eighth Army Corps
+had seen a great insurrection drag on from month to month and from one
+year to another, under General Otis, when short shrift would have been
+made of it in the outset, and far less life sacrificed, if Mr. McKinley
+had not needed, in aid of his Philippine policy, the support of both
+of those who believed it was right and of those who believed it would
+pay. The one central thought which had seemed to animate General
+Otis from the beginning, a thought which we have already traced
+through all its humiliating manifestations, was that he must neither
+do or permit anything that might hurt the Administration. When the
+"impatience of the people" at home, which figures so prominently in
+the correspondence already cited between the Adjutant General of the
+army, General Corbin, and General Otis at Manila, had begun to cast its
+shadows on the presidential year, 1900, the master mind of Mr. Root had
+interrupted the fatal Otis treatment of the insurrection, indicated by
+General Otis's long failure to call for volunteers, his stupid stream
+of "situation well in hand" and "insurrection about to collapse"
+telegrams, and his utterly unpardonable persistence in calling it a
+purely "Tagalo insurrection," by sending him a competent force, and
+a plan of campaign, and directing him to carry out the plan. General
+Otis did this, because he was told to, and then began again to sing
+the same old song. MacArthur, Wheaton, Lawton, Bates, Young, Funston,
+and the rest of the fighting generals, had submitted to all the Otis
+follies without a murmur, because insubordination degrades an army
+into a rabble. But they [329] believed the army was there to put down
+that insurrection, not to have a symposium with its leaders on the
+rights of man. They had taken up "The White Man's Burden," after the
+manner of Lords Kitchener and Roberts, and they had no qualms. Above
+all, they wanted peace, no matter how much fighting it took to get
+it. Mindful of the attempts of the Schurman Commission of the year
+before to mix peace with war, and of the immense encouragement thus
+given the insurgents, they had not looked forward with enthusiasm to
+the coming of the Taft Commission, and to the highly probable renewal
+of negotiations with the insurgent leaders in the field, pursuant to
+a presidential policy of patching up a peace at any price, suggested
+by the exigencies of political expediency, to give the government a
+semblance of having more or less of the consent of the governed. That
+the anticipations of the military authorities in this regard did not
+receive a pleasant disappointment, has already been suggested by the
+nature of the views adopted by the commission soon after its arrival.
+
+The military view of the situation, as it stood when Judge Taft and his
+colleagues arrived at Manila in June, 1900, is set forth in the annual
+report of the commanding general, General MacArthur, rendered shortly
+thereafter; rendered, not in aid of any political candidate at home,
+nor of a sudden, but at the usual and customary annual season for the
+making of such reports; and rendered by a soldier of no mean experience
+and ability, who was a man of great kindliness of heart as well, to
+the war department of his government, to acquaint it with the facts
+of a military situation he had been dealing with for two years prior
+to the arrival of the Taft Commission. General MacArthur's views,
+as expressed in his report, must now be contrasted with the Taft
+view, not to show that MacArthur is a bigger man than Taft, nor for
+any other idle or petty purpose, but because, if, in 1900, General
+MacArthur was right, and Judge Taft was wrong, about the unanimity
+of the whole Filipino people against us, then the institution of the
+Civil Government of the Philippines on July 4, 1901, was premature;
+and, therefore, by reason of the withdrawal of the strong arm of the
+military at a critical period of public order, it was not calculated
+to give adequate protection to the lives and property of those who
+were willing to abandon the struggle for independence and submit
+to our rule. And if, as we shall see later, it did in fact grossly
+fail to afford such adequate protection for life and property, it was
+derelict in the most sacred duty enjoined upon it by Mr. McKinley's
+instructions to the Taft Commission. But first let me introduce you
+to General MacArthur.
+
+General MacArthur is not only a soldier of a high order of
+ability, but a statesman as well. Moreover, he was a thoroughgoing
+"expansionist." He believed in keeping the Philippines permanently,
+just as England does her colonies. But he was perfectly honest about
+it. He recognized the fact that they were against our rule. But
+he did not attach any more weight to that circumstance than Lord
+Kitchener would have done. Also, he had come out to the islands with
+the first expedition, in 1898, had been in the field continuously
+for fifteen months prior to assuming supreme military command, and
+knew the Filipinos thoroughly. As soon as he took command, on May 5,
+1900, of the 70,000 troops then in the Islands, he set himself with
+patience and firmness to the great task of ending the insurrection,
+which at that time promised to continue indefinitely, the far more
+formidable guerrilla warfare that had followed the brief period of
+serried resistance having now settled down to a chronic stage, aided
+and abetted by the whole population. I have said General MacArthur was
+a "thoroughgoing" expansionist. This needs a slight qualification. At
+first he appears to have had a few qualms. Shortly after the outbreak
+of the war with the Filipinos, when he took the first insurgent capital
+Malolos, in March, 1899, he had said at Malolos, as we have seen,
+to a newspaper man who accompanied the expedition:
+
+
+    When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that
+    Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I did not believe
+    that the whole population of Luzon was opposed to us; but I have
+    been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipinos are
+    loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he represents. [330]
+
+
+General MacArthur's reports concerning the war in the Philippines
+during the period of his command are succinct and luminous. He
+makes it perfectly clear that the original resistance offered by the
+insurgent armies in the field after the arrival of the overwhelmingly
+ample reinforcements sent out from this country in the fall of 1899,
+was little more than a mere flash in the pan, compared with the
+well-planned scheme of resistance which followed the dispersion of
+those armies to the several provinces which had furnished them to
+the cause, and Aguinaldo's simultaneous flight into the mountains
+"with his government concealed about his person," as Senator Lodge
+exultantly described that incident in his speech of April, 1900,
+in defence of the Administration's Philippine policy. Speaking of
+this period, General MacArthur says:
+
+
+    It has since been ascertained that the expediency of adopting
+    guerrilla warfare from the inception of hostilities was seriously
+    discussed by the native leaders, and advocated with much emphasis
+    as the system best adapted to the peculiar conditions of the
+    struggle. It was finally determined, however, that a concentrated
+    field army, conducting regular operations, would, in the event
+    of success, attract the favorable attention of the world, and be
+    accepted as a practical demonstration of capacity for organization
+    and self-government. The disbandment of the field army, therefore,
+    having been a subject of contemplation from the start, the actual
+    event, in pursuance of the deliberate action of the council of
+    war in Bayambang about November 12, 1899 (already hereinbefore
+    noticed), was not regarded by Filipinos in the light of a calamity,
+    but simply as a transition from one form of action to another;
+    a change which by many was regarded as a positive advantage,
+    and was relied upon to accomplish more effectively the end in
+    view. The Filipino idea behind the dissolution of their field
+    army was not at the time of the occurrence well understood in
+    the American camp. As a consequence, misleading conclusions
+    were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had been
+    destroyed, and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of
+    the rebel army by a system of police administration not likely
+    to be either onerous or dangerous. [331]
+
+
+In his report covering the period from May 5th, to October 1, 1900,
+General MacArthur says of the policy of resistance above outlined:
+
+
+    The country affords great advantages for the practical
+    development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the
+    uniform enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at
+    their convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers,
+    and immediately thereafter are within the American lines in
+    the attitude of peaceful natives, absorbed in a dense mass of
+    sympathetic people. [332]
+
+
+In this same connection the report includes a copy of the original
+order of the insurgent government which was the corner stone of the
+guerrilla policy, and states that "systemized regulations" for its
+effective prosecution throughout the archipelago had been compiled
+and published by the Filipino junta, or revolutionary committee at
+Madrid, and distributed among the insurgent forces. The report also
+appends a copy of the "Army Regulations" under which the insurgent
+forces were to conduct the guerrilla warfare. It also describes in
+detail the system of warfare prescribed under these regulations, and
+states that as a result of the measures which he, General MacArthur,
+took to combat that warfare "the 53 stations of American troops
+occupied in the archipelago on November 1, 1899, had on September 1,
+1900, expanded to 413," and that during this period, the casualties
+to our troops were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55 captured, and to the
+insurgents, so far as our records showed, 3227 killed, 694 wounded,
+and 2864 captured. Says he:
+
+
+    The extensive distribution of troops has strained the soldiers
+    of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little command
+    has had to provide its own service of security and information
+    by never ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and
+    regular guards. An idea seems to have been established in the
+    public mind [he meant the public mind at home, of course] that the
+    field work of the army is in the nature of police, in regulating a
+    few bands of guerrillas, and involving none of the vicissitudes of
+    war. [Here he is meeting the Otis theory, then being industriously
+    circulated in the United States.] Such a narrow statement of the
+    case is unfair to the service. In all things requiring endurance,
+    fortitude, and patient diligence, the guerrilla period has been
+    pre-eminent. It is difficult for the non-professional observer
+    [he means Judge Taft] to understand that apparently desultory
+    work, such as has prevailed in the Philippines during the past
+    ten months, [333] has demanded more of discipline and as much
+    of valor as was required during the period of regular operations
+    against the concentrated field forces of the insurrection. It is,
+    therefore, a great privilege to speak warmly in respect of the
+    importance of the service rendered day by day, with unremitting
+    vigilance, by the splendid men who," etc. [334]
+
+
+It was not until July 4, 1902, that President Roosevelt officially
+declared, by his amnesty proclamation of that date that the
+insurrection in the Philippines was at last ended. It was by no
+means beaten to a frazzle, as we shall later see. But of course,
+knowing the impatience of a large portion of the American people with a
+situation about which there was a wide-spread notion that much remained
+undisclosed, Mr. Roosevelt would have issued such a proclamation
+earlier, had the facts seemed to him to so authorize. General
+MacArthur's relentless "never ceasing patrols, explorations," etc.,
+continued straight on through the presidential campaign of 1900 side
+by side in point of time with the roseate Taft cablegrams of the same
+period, and long thereafter--how long will be later indicated. Says
+General MacArthur, in his report for 1901:
+
+
+    It had been suggested that some of the Filipino leaders were
+    willing to submit the issue to the judgment of the American people,
+    which was soon to be expressed at the polls, and to abide by
+    the result of the presidential election of November, 1900. [335]
+    But subsequent events demonstrated that the hope of ending the
+    war without further effusion of blood was not well founded,
+    and that as a matter of fact the Filipinos were organizing for
+    further desperate resistance by means of a general banding of
+    the people in support of the guerrillas in the field. [336]
+
+
+General MacArthur then goes on to tell how, as part of this programme,
+the insurgent authorities,
+
+
+    announced a primal and inflexible principle, to the effect that
+    every native, without any exception, residing within the limits
+    of the archipelago, owed active allegiance to the insurgent
+    cause. This jurisdiction was enjoined under severe penalties,
+    which were systematically enforced.
+
+
+This is what Judge Taft afterwards described as "a conspiracy of
+murder, a Mafia on a very large scale", [337] the characterization
+being made in support of his theory that "the great majority of the
+people" with whom we were then at war would welcome our rule if allowed
+to follow their real preferences, and that they were being cruelly
+coerced to fight for the independence of their country. General
+MacArthur's view, however, did not support this theory. His report
+deals with this branch of the subject thus:
+
+
+    The cohesion of Filipino society in behalf of insurgent
+    interests is most emphatically illustrated by the fact that
+    assassination, which was extensively employed, was generally
+    accepted as a legitimate expression of insurgent governmental
+    authority. The individuals marked for death would not appeal to
+    American protection, although condemned exclusively on account
+    of supposed pro-Americanism.
+
+
+Later on, when we came to understand the Filipinos better, this
+summary method of dealing with the faint-hearted lost much of its
+initial horrifying force, and the failure of such to appeal to us for
+protection lost much of its strangeness. In the first place, nobody
+loves a traitor. Even those to whom he claims to have betrayed his
+countrymen do not trust him implicitly. Again, Latin countries never
+assume that before a man is punished for alleged crime he has been
+confronted with the witnesses against him. Such testimony is, under
+their jurisprudence, frequently received in his absence. The legal
+department of General MacArthur's office once got hold of a captured
+insurgent paper subscribed with the autograph of Juan Cailles, one
+of their best generals. It directed that a named Filipino residing
+in a certain town garrisoned by American troops be executed--we
+of course, would call it "assassinated"--at a certain hour on a
+certain day in a public street of the town, and that the soldier or
+soldiers performing the "execution" should declare to the bystanders,
+if any, in so doing, that it was done because the man was a traitor,
+a friend of the Americans. We kept this paper, intending to hang Juan
+whenever he should be captured. He held out a long time, and finally
+surrendered unconditionally--but he proved such an elegant fellow,
+game as a pebble, courteous as Chesterfield, and immensely popular
+with his people, that it was decided he could be of more service
+as a live governor of a province than he could as a dead general,
+[338] so he was appointed a provincial governor by Governor Taft,
+and made a splendid official.
+
+Another reason why Filipinos suspected, during the insurrection, by
+the more obstinate and stout-hearted of their compatriots who held
+out longer in the struggle for independence, of weakening toward the
+cause of their country, in other words, suspected of what might be
+called "Copperhead" or "Tory" tendencies, would not appeal to us for
+protection, is strikingly presented in General MacArthur's report for
+1901. He says they naturally had "grave doubt as to the wisdom" of
+siding with us, "as the United States had made no formal announcement
+of an inflexible purpose to hold the archipelago and afford protection
+to pro-Americans." [339]
+
+The one great thing that has crippled progress in the Philippines
+from the beginning of the American occupation down to date is the
+uncertainty as to what our policy for the future is to be, the lack of
+some, "formal announcement of an inflexible purpose." And of course
+I mean, as General MacArthur meant, by "formal" announcement, an
+authoritative declaration by the law-making power of the government. If
+Congress should formally declare that it is the purpose of this
+government to hold the Philippines permanently, American and other
+capital would at once go there in abundance and the place would
+"blossom like a rose." If, on the other hand, Congress should formally
+declare that it is the purpose of this government to give the Filipinos
+their independence as soon as a stable native government can be set up,
+thus holding out to the present generation the prospect of living to
+see the independence of their country, the place would also quickly
+blossom as aforesaid, through the generous ardor of native love of
+country. In either event, everybody out there would know where he is
+"at." At present all is uncertainty, both with the resident members
+of the dominant alien race, and with those over whom we are ruling.
+
+It took over 120,000 American troops, first and last, to put down
+the struggle of the Filipinos for independence. [340] The war began
+February 4, 1899, and the last public official announcement that it
+was ended was on July 4, 1902. [341] Of course this does not imply
+that every province was at all times during that period a theatre
+of actual war. Putting down the insurrection was something like
+putting out a fire in a field of dry grass. At first the trouble was
+general. Gradually it diminished toward the end. But for a while,
+no sooner was it quenched in one province than it would break out
+in another. How the Filipinos were able to prolong the struggle
+as long as they did against such apparently overwhelming odds is
+most interestingly explained by General MacArthur in his report
+for 1900. After describing the method he followed of establishing
+native municipal governments in territory as conquered, he says,
+with a patient stateliness that is almost humorous:
+
+
+    The institution of municipal government under American auspices,
+    of course, carried the idea of exclusive fidelity to the sovereign
+    power of the United States. All the necessary moral obligations
+    to that end were readily assumed by municipal bodies, and all
+    outward forms of loyalty and decorum carefully preserved. But
+    precisely at this point the psychologic conditions referred to
+    above [meaning the unity against us], [342] began to work with
+    great energy, in assistance of insurgent field operations. For this
+    purpose most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent
+    municipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the
+    same sphere as the American governments and in many instances
+    through the same personnel--that is to say, the presidentes
+    and town officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and
+    secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may
+    seem, with considerable apparent solicitude for the interests
+    of both. In all matters touching the peace of the town, the
+    regulation of markets, the primitive work possible on roads,
+    streets, and bridges, and the institution of schools, their open
+    activity was commendable; at the same time they were exacting and
+    collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the
+    Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable military information
+    to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the archipelago,
+    there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond
+    dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance
+    thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of
+    American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases
+    for all insurgent military activities; and not only so in the
+    sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of
+    guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it
+    is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband
+    when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio;
+    a manoeuvre quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance
+    of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is
+    transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native. [343]
+
+
+To contrast a cold, hard military fact involving the lives of American
+soldiers with a lot of political nonsense intended for consumption in
+the United States during a presidential election, the next paragraph is
+particularly interesting in the light of the cotemporaneous Taft view:
+[344]
+
+
+    The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost
+    complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such
+    unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion. Intimidation
+    has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the
+    only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and
+    apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. [345]
+    One traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex
+    organization.
+
+
+Then follows this bit of grim humor:
+
+
+    It is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from
+    ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a time
+    to the appeals of consanguineous leadership--
+
+
+in other words, to stick to their own kith and kin. He had in a
+previous paragraph used that very expression thus: "The people seem to
+be actuated by the idea that in politics or war men are never nearer
+right then when going with their own kith and kin."
+
+In all the foregoing, General MacArthur was not simply trying to score
+a point against Judge Taft, though his resentment of the effort of the
+Taft Commission of 1900 to mix politics with war in the presidential
+year was quite as decided, and quite as well known in the islands at
+the time, as was General Otis's similar attitude toward the Schurman
+Commission of the previous year. [346] He is simply laying before
+the War Department, as a soldier, the familiar facts of a situation
+which he had been dealing with for two years past, as well known to
+the 70,000 officers and men under his command as to himself. And as
+the details into which he goes are simply prefatory to an account of
+the remedy he applied to the situation, that remedy must now claim
+our attention. The remedy General MacArthur finally applied was
+a proclamation, explaining to the Filipino people--"to all classes
+throughout the archipelago," it read, and especially to the leaders in
+the field, many of whose captured comrades-in-arms he had now become
+thoroughly acquainted with--the severities sanctioned by the laws of
+civilized nations under such circumstances, and the reasons therefor;
+and, further, serving them with notice that thenceforward he proposed
+to enforce those laws with full rigor. [347]
+
+The eminent lawyers of the Taft Commission were too busy about that
+time acquainting themselves with the situation through natives not in
+arms, to attach much importance to General MacArthur's proclamation,
+but the Eighth Army Corps always believed that that proclamation,
+and the army's work under it, was the main factor in making the
+civil government at all possible by the date it was set up, July 4,
+1901. The issuance of this document was not only a wise military move,
+but a subtle stroke of statesmanship as well. It assumed that the
+Filipino people were a civilized people, an assumption never indulged
+by Spain during the whole of her rule, but always freely admitted by
+General MacArthur in all his dealings with their leading men to be a
+fact. It therefore appealed to their amour propre, and to the noblesse
+oblige of many of the most obstinate and trusted fighting leaders. The
+writer was, at the date of the proclamation under consideration,
+on duty at General MacArthur's headquarters, as assistant to Colonel
+Crowder, his judge advocate, now Judge Advocate General of the United
+States Army, and prepared the first rough, tentative suggestions
+for the final draft of it, accompanying such suggestions with a
+memorandum showing the course taken by Wellington in France in 1815,
+and by Bismarck's generals at the close of the Franco-Prussian War,
+as well as that followed under General Order No. 100, 1863, for the
+government of the armies of the United States in the field. Having then
+entertained the opinion that that proclamation, though drastic, was
+wise and right under the facts of the situation which confronted us,
+and having nowise changed that opinion since, it may be well for the
+writer of this book to explain his reasons for that opinion. This must
+be done wholly without reference to "the authorities," for neither at
+the bar of public opinion, nor at the bar of final judgment, do "the
+authorities" count for much. In so doing, however, we must start with
+the assumption that it was a case of American military occupation of
+hostile territory, notwithstanding that Judge Taft began soon after
+his arrival in the islands in the June previous to the December now
+referred to, to cable home impressions which, if correct, amounted
+to a denial that the great body of the people were hostile. Military
+occupation is a fact which admits of no debate, and the necessity
+of making your country's flag respected is always fully and keenly
+recognized as the one supreme consideration by every good American
+except one who, obsessed with the idea that kindness will cure the
+desire of a people for independence, proceeds to act on that idea in
+the midst of a war for independence.
+
+Under the laws of war the commanding general of the occupying force
+owes protection, both of life and property, to all persons residing
+within the territory occupied. The object of General MacArthur's
+proclamation was to put a stop to such "executions," or assassinations,
+as that perpetrated by Juan Cailles, mentioned above, and to separate
+the insurgents in the field from their main reliance, the towns. The
+latter end of a bloody war is no time for a discussion of the causes
+of the war between victor and vanquished. Nor is it any time to
+believe the representative of the enemy who tells you that most of
+him is really in sympathy with you and merely coerced. Your duty is to
+stop the war. You and your enemy having had a difference, and having
+referred it to the arbitrament of war, which is, unfortunately, at
+present the only human jurisdiction having power to enforce decisions
+concerning such differences, if you win, and your enemy refuses to
+abide the decision, he is simply, as it were in contempt of court, and,
+in the scheme of things, as at present ordered, deserves punishment
+as an enemy to the general peace. To state the ethics of the matter
+juridically, "there should be an end of litigation"--somewhere.
+
+I do not believe in the doctrine that might makes right, and I cherish
+the high hope that this human family of ours will survive to see war
+superseded, as the ultimate arbiter, by something more like heaven and
+less like hell. But in the Philippines in 1900 it was a situation,
+not a theory, that confronted us, and, as far as my consciously
+fallible thinking apparatus lights the way which then lay before us,
+that way led to a shrine whereon was written "A life for a life." This
+is no mere academic discussion. With me it is a tremendously practical
+one. In the gravest possible acceptation of the term it is awe-fully
+so. If I am wrong, every execution I approved by memorandum review
+furnished Colonel Crowder and General MacArthur, of military commission
+findings out there was wrong, and so were a number of the executions I
+ordered as a judge appointed by Governor Taft under a government which,
+though nominally a civil government, was no more "civil" in so far as
+that term implies absence of necessity for the presence of military
+force, than other governments immediately following conquest usually
+are. The propriety of the imposition of capital punishment by the
+constituted authorities of a nation as part of a set policy to make its
+sovereignty respected, is wholly independent of whether you call your
+colonial government a civil or a military one. So that in justifying
+General MacArthur I am also justifying Governor Taft, and as it was
+on the recommendation of the former that the latter appointed me to
+the Bench, we are certainly all three in the same boat in the matter
+of the capital punishments under consideration. And while the company
+you were in on earth in a given transaction, however distinguished
+that company, is not going to help you with the Recording Angel,
+[348] still, it is some comfort to know that wiser and abler men than
+yourself approved a course of imposing capital punishments to which
+you were a party, such punishments having been inflicted as part of a
+policy whose subsequent evolution revealed it to you as fundamentally
+wrong. And this reflection is quite relevant in the present connection
+to the question whether the government of Benevolent Assimilation we
+have maintained over the Filipinos for the last fourteen years is one
+which was originally imposed by force against their will, or whether
+it was ever welcomed by them or any considerable fraction of them.
+
+That the MacArthur proclamation of December 20, 1900, concerning the
+laws of war, was at the time a military necessity, is as perfectly
+clear to me now as it was then. And yet it may well give the thoughtful
+and patriotic American pause. It is sometimes difficult to understand
+why men are so often entirely willing to go on fighting and dying in
+a cause they must know to be hopeless. The famous passage of Edmund
+Burke's speech on "Conciliation with America,"
+
+
+    If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, so long as foreign
+    troops remained on my native soil, I never would lay down my arms,
+    no, never, never, never!
+
+
+sounds well to us, but from the standpoint of a conqueror, there is
+a good deal of wind-jamming to it, after all. It was the language of
+a man who knew nothing of the horrors of war by actual experience,
+or of what hell it slowly becomes to everybody concerned after most
+of the high officials of the vanquished government have been captured
+and are sleeping on dry, warm beds, eating good wholesome food, and
+smoking good cigars, in comfortable custody, while the vanquished
+army, no longer strong enough to come out in the open and fight, is
+relegated to ambuscades and other tactics equally akin to the methods
+of the assassin. The law of nations in this regard is an expression
+of the views of successive generations of civilized and enlightened
+men of all nations whose profession was war--men familiar with the
+horrors inevitably incident to it and anxious to mitigate them as far
+as possible. That law represents the common consensus of Christendom
+resulting from that experience. It recognizes that after resistance
+becomes utterly hopeless, it becomes a crime against society and
+the general peace, and this is wholly independent of the merits
+or demerits of the questions involved in the war. In other words,
+the greatest good of the greatest number cries aloud that the war
+must stop. The cold, hard fact is that the great majority of the men
+who hold out longest are, usually, either single men having no one
+dependent on them, or nothing to lose, or both, or else they are men
+more or less indifferent to the ties of family affection, and callous
+to the suffering fruitlessly entailed upon innocent noncombatants
+by the various and sundry horrors of war, such as decimation of
+the plough animals of the country due to their running at large
+without caretakers or forage; resultant untilled fields and scant
+food; pestilence and famine consequent upon insufficient nourishment;
+arson, robbery, rape, and murder inevitably committed in such times
+by sorry scamps and ruffians claiming to be patriots but yielding no
+allegiance to any responsible head; and so on, ad infinitum.
+
+General MacArthur's proclamation of December 20, 1900, served
+notice on the leaders of a hopeless cause that assassinations, such
+as that ordered by Juan Cailles, above mentioned, must stop; that
+the universal practice of the townfolk, of sending money, supplies,
+and information concerning our movements to the enemy in the field,
+must stop; that participating in hostilities intermittently, in
+citizen garb, followed by return to home and avocation when too
+hard pressed, must stop; in short that the war must stop. Yet the
+proclamation explained in so firm and kindly a way why the penalties
+it promised were only reasonable under the circumstances, that "as an
+educational document the effect was immediate and far-reaching," [349]
+to quote from an opinion expressed by its author in the body of it,
+an opinion entirely consistent with modesty and fully justified by
+the facts. General MacArthur also goes on to say of his unrelenting
+and rigid enforcement of the terms of this proclamation that the
+results "preclude all possibility of doubt * * * that the effective
+pacification of the archipelago commenced December 20, 1900"--its
+date. It is a part of the history of those times, familiar to all who
+are familiar with them, that the Taft Civil Commission thought its
+assurances of the benevolent intentions of our government were what
+made the civil government possible by midsummer, 1901. But whatever
+the Filipinos may think of us at present, now that they understand us
+better, certainly in 1900-01, in view of the events of the preceding
+two or three years, which formed the basis of the only acquaintance
+they then had with us, and in view of the fact that their experience
+for the preceding two or three hundred years had made force the only
+effective governmental argument with them, and governmental promises a
+mere mockery, and in view of the fact that the "never-ceasing patrols,
+explorations, escorts, outposts," etc., of General MacArthur's 70,000
+men were relentlessly kept up during the six months immediately
+following the proclamation and in aid of it, it at once becomes
+obvious how infinitesimal a fraction of the final partial pacification
+which made the civil government possible, the Taft assurances to the
+Filipinos as to our intentions must have been. These matters are of
+prime importance to any honest effort toward a clear understanding of
+present conditions, because far and away the greatest wrong which we,
+in our genuinely benevolent misinformation, have done the Filipinos,
+not even excepting the tariff legislation perpetrated upon them by
+Congress, lies in the insufferably hypocritical pretence that they
+ever consented to our rule, or that they consent to it now--a pretence
+conceived in 1898 by Trade Expansion, to beguile a nation the breath of
+whose own life is political liberty based on consent of the governed,
+into a career of conquest, but not even countenanced since by those
+who believe the Government should go into the politico-missionary
+business, after the manner of Spain in the sixteenth century.
+
+Having now exhaustively examined the differences of opinion between
+Judge Taft and General MacArthur, when the former set to work,
+in the summer of 1900, to get a civil government started by the
+date of expiration of the term of enlistment of the volunteer army
+(June 30, 1901), let us follow the facts of the situation up to the
+date last named, or, which is practically the same thing, up to the
+inauguration of Judge Taft as Civil Governor of the islands on July 4,
+1901, pausing, in passing, for such reflections as may force themselves
+upon us as pertinent to the Philippine problem of to-day.
+
+On September 19, 1900, General MacArthur wired Secretary of War
+Root--General Corbin, the Adjutant-General of the Army, to be exact,
+but it is the same thing--describing what he calls "considerable
+activity" throughout Luzon, ominously stating that General Young (up
+in the Ilocano country, into which we followed him and his cavalry
+in Chapter XII, ante) "has called so emphatically for more force,"
+that he, MacArthur, feels grave concern; adding that Luzon north of
+the Pasig is "very much disturbed," and that south of the Pasig the
+same conditions prevail. [350]
+
+October 26th, General MacArthur cables outlining a plan for a great
+campaign on comprehensive lines, stating that "Full development of this
+scheme requires about four months and all troops now in the islands,"
+and deprecating any move on Mr. Root's part to reduce his force of
+70,000 men by starting any of the volunteers homeward before it should
+be absolutely necessary. [351] October 28th, General MacArthur wires,
+"Shall push everything with great vigor," adding "Expect to have
+everything in full operation November 15th." [352] November 5th, as
+if to reassure General MacArthur that he and the General understand
+each other and that the Taft cotemporaneous nonsense is not going to
+be allowed to interfere with more serious business, Secretary Root,
+through the Adjutant-General, sends this cable message:
+
+
+    Secretary of War directs no instructions from here be allowed
+    interfere or impede progress your military operations which he
+    expects you force to successful conclusion. [353]
+
+
+So that while the American people were being pacified with the Taft
+cablegrams to Secretary Root that the Filipino people wanted peace,
+General MacArthur, under Mr. Root's direction, was simultaneously
+proceeding to make them want it with the customary argument used
+to settle irreconcilable differences between nations--powder and
+lead. Mr. Root was all the time in constant communication with both,
+but he gave out only the Taft optimism to the public, and withheld the
+actual facts within his knowledge. December 25th, General MacArthur
+wires Secretary Root, "Expectations based on result of election have
+not been realized." "Progress," he says, is "very slow." [354]
+
+And now I come to one of the most important things that all my
+researches into the official records of our government concerning
+the Philippine Islands have developed. On December 28, 1900, General
+MacArthur reports by cable the contents of some important insurgent
+papers captured in Cavite Province about that time. The Filipinos have
+a great way of reducing to writing, or making minutes of, whatever
+occurs at any important conference. This habit they did not abandon
+in the field. The papers in question belonged to General Trias, the
+Lieutenant-General commanding all the insurgent armies in the field,
+and, next to Aguinaldo, the highest official connected with the
+revolutionary government. One of these papers, according to General
+MacArthur's despatch of December 28th, purported to be the minutes of
+a certain meeting had October 11th previous, between General Trias
+and the Japanese Consul at Manila. As to whether or not the paper
+was really authentic, General MacArthur says: "I accept it as such
+without hesitation." Communicating the contents of the paper he says:
+
+
+    Consul advised that Trias visit Japan. Filipinos represented that
+    concessions which they might be forced to make to Washington would
+    be more agreeable if made to Japan, which as a nation of kindred
+    blood would not be likely to assert superiority. Consul said Japan
+    desired coaling station, freedom to trade and build railways. [355]
+
+
+I consider these negotiations of the Japanese Government with the
+Philippine insurgents important to be related here because they have
+never been generally known, for the good reason, of course, that
+the President of the United States cannot take the public into his
+confidence about such grave and delicate matters when they occur. The
+incident is not "ancient history" relatively to present-day problems,
+for the following reasons:
+
+(1) Because it is credibly reported and currently believed in the
+United States that in Japan, during the cruise of our battleship
+fleet around the world in 1907, one of the reception committee of
+Japanese officers who welcomed our officers was recognized by one of
+the latter as having been, not a great while before that, a servant
+aboard an American battleship.
+
+(2) Because of the following incident, related to me, in 1911,
+without the slightest injunction of secrecy, by the Director of
+Public Health of the Philippine Islands, then on a visit to the United
+States. Shortly before the Director's said visit home, while he was out
+in one of the provinces, there was brought to his attention a Filipino
+with a broken arm. There was a Japanese doctor in the town, at least
+a Japanese who had a sign out as a doctor. The Director carried the
+sufferer to the "doctor," not being a surgeon himself. The "doctor"
+turned out to be a civil engineer, who had been making maps and plans
+of fortifications. The plans were found in his possession.
+
+(3) Because from one of the islands through which the northern line of
+the Treaty of Paris runs, situated only a pleasant morning's journey
+in a launch due north of Aparri, the northernmost town of Luzon, you
+can see, on a clear day, with a good field-glass, the southern end of
+Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. Japan can land an army on American
+soil at Aparri any time she wants to, overnight--an army several
+times that of the total American force now in the Philippines, [356]
+or likely ever to be there. From Aparri it is 70 miles up the river to
+Tueguegarao, 40 more to Iligan, and 90 more, all fairly good marching,
+to Bayombong, in Nueva Viscaya (total distance, Aparri to Bayombong,
+200 miles) the province which lies in the heart of the watershed of
+Central Luzon. I know what I am talking about, because that region
+was the first judicial district I presided over, and many a hard
+journey I have had over it, circuit riding, on a scrubby pony. Part
+of it I have been through in the company of President Taft. It thus
+appears that from Aparri to Bayombong there would be but a week or
+ten days of unresisted marching to reach the watershed region, Nueva
+Viscaya. The Japanese soldier's ration is mainly rice, so that he can
+carry more days' travel rations than almost any other soldier in the
+world. Never fear about their making the journey inside of a week or
+ten days, once they start. To descend from the watershed aforesaid,
+over the Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the Rio Grande de
+Pampanga to Manila, another three or four days would be all that would
+be needed. It would be a Japanese picnic. Fortifying Corregidor Island,
+at the entrance to Manila Bay, which is about all the serious scheme
+of defence against a foreign foe we have out there, is quite like
+the reliance of the Spaniards on Morro Castle, at the mouth of the
+harbor of Santiago de Cuba, against our landing at Guantanamo. Our
+garrison in the Philippines, all told, is but a handful. Aparri is an
+absolutely unfortified seaport, at which the Japanese could land an
+army overnight from the southern end of Formosa. There are no military
+fortifications whatsoever to stay the advance of an invading army
+from Aparri down the Cagayan Valley, and thence over the watershed
+of Nueva Viscaya Province, through the Caranglan Pass, and down the
+valley of the Pampanga River to Manila. So that to-day Japan can
+take Manila inside of two weeks any time she wants to. That is why
+I object to the President's "jollying" the situation along as best
+he can, without taking the American people into his confidence. Any
+army officer at our War College will inform any member of the House
+or Senate on inquiry, that Japan can take the Philippines any time
+she wants to. President Taft and the Mikado may keep on exchanging the
+most cordial cablegrams imaginable, but the map-making goes on just the
+same. And, earnest and sincere as both the President and the Emperor
+undoubtedly are in their desire to preserve the general peace, who
+is going to restrain Hobson and Hearst, and several of Japan's public
+men equally distinguished and equally inflammatory? Heads of nations
+cannot restrain gusts of popular passion. The Pacific Coast is not so
+friendly to Japan as the rest of our country, and as between Japan and
+the Pacific Coast, we are pretty apt to stand by the latter without
+inquiring with meticulous nicety into any differences that may arise.
+
+The reason I said in the chapter before this one that Mr. Root is
+a dangerous man to Republican institutions was because he is of the
+type who are constantly finding situations which they consider it best
+for the people not to know about. After the McKinley election of 1900
+was safely "put over," Mr. Root, as Secretary of War, let Judge Taft
+go ahead and ride his dove-of-peace hobby-horse in the Philippines,
+duly repeating to the American people all the cheery Taft cluckings
+to said horse, at a time when the real situation is indicated by such
+grim correspondence as the following cablegram dated January 29, 1901:
+
+
+    Wood, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can
+    give your consent to the immediate withdrawal Tenth Infantry
+    from Cuba. Imperative that we have immediate use of every
+    available company we can lay our hands on for service in the
+    Philippines. (Signed) Corbin. [357]
+
+
+But let us turn from this sorry spectacle of Mr. Root pulling the wool
+over the eyes of his countrymen to make them believe the Filipinos
+were not quite so unconsenting as they seemed to be, and again look
+at the sheer splendor of American military ability to get anything
+done the Government wants done. I refer to the capture of Aguinaldo.
+
+One of the most eminent lawyers in this country once said to me, "I
+would not let that man Funston enter my house." I tried to enlighten
+him, but as I happened to be a guest in his house at the time,
+which entitled him to exemption from light if he insisted--which he
+did--General Funston and he have continued to miss what might have been
+a real pleasure to them both. The following is, as briefly as I can
+dispose of it, the story of the capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901.
+
+Ever since Aguinaldo had escaped through our lines in November,
+1899, his capture had been the one great consummation most devoutly
+wished. It has already been shown how busy with the war the army
+was all the time Judge Taft was gayly jogging away astride of his
+peace hobby about the insurrection being really quite regretted
+and over. However, in the favorite remark with which he used to
+wave the insurrection into thin air, to the effect that it was
+now merely "a Mafia on a large scale," there was one element
+of truth. The general feeling of the people, both educated and
+uneducated, was such as to countenance the attitude of the leaders
+that pro-American tendencies were treason. Any leader who surrendered
+of course was thereafter an object of at least some suspicion to his
+fellow-countrymen, however assiduous his subsequent double-dealing. As
+long as Aguinaldo remained out, this state of affairs was sure to
+continue indefinitely, possibly for years to come. If captured, he
+would probably himself give up the struggle, and use his influence
+with the rest to do likewise. Therefore, in the spring of 1901,
+each and every one of General MacArthur's 70,000 men was, and had
+been since 1899, on the qui vive to make his own personal fortunes
+secure for life, and gain lasting military distinction, by taking
+any sort of chances to capture Aguinaldo. On February 8, 1901, an
+officer of General Funston's district, the Fourth, in central Luzon,
+intercepted a messenger bearing despatches from Aguinaldo to one of
+his generals of that region, directing the general (Lacuna) to send
+some reinforcements to him, Aguinaldo. General Funston's headquarters
+were then at San Fernando, in the province of Pampanga--organized as a
+"civil" government province by act of the Taft Commission just five
+days later. [358] Through these despatches and their bearer, General
+Funston ascertained the hiding-place of the insurgent chieftain to
+be at a place called Palanan, in the mountains of Isabela Province,
+in northeastern Luzon, near the Pacific Coast. Early in the war we had
+availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes,
+who look nowise different from all other Filipinos, but who had, under
+the Spanish government, by reason of long-standing feuds with their
+more rebellious neighbors, come to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish
+authorities. When we came they had transferred that loyalty to us, and
+had now become a recognized and valuable part of our military force. So
+it occurred to General Funston; "Why not personate the reinforcements
+called for, the American officers to command the expedition assuming
+the rôle of captured American prisoners?" The plan was submitted to
+General MacArthur and adopted. A picked company of Maccabebes was
+selected, consisting of about eighty men, and General Funston decided
+to go himself, taking with him on the perilous expedition four young
+officers of proven mettle: Captain Harry W. Newton, 34th Infantry,
+U. S. Volunteers, now a captain of the Coast Artillery; Captain
+R. T. Hazzard, 11th Volunteer Cavalry; Lieutenant O. P. M. Hazzard,
+his brother, of the same regiment, the latter now an officer of
+the regular army, and Lieutenant Mitchell, "my efficient aid." [359]
+March 6, 1901, the U.S.S. Vicksburg slipped quietly out of Manila Bay,
+bearing the participants in the desperate enterprise--as desperate
+an undertaking as the heart and brain of a soldier ever carried to a
+successful conclusion. General Thomas H. Barry wrote Secretary of War
+Root, after they left, telling of their departure, and stating that
+he did not much expect ever to see them again. The chances were ten
+to one that the eighty men would meet five or ten times their number,
+and, as they were to masquerade as troops of the enemy, they could
+not complain, under the recognized laws of war as to spies, at being
+summarily shot if captured alive. And the whole Filipino people were a
+secret service ready to warn Aguinaldo, should the carefully concocted
+ruse be discovered anywhere along the journey. They went down to the
+southern end of Luzon, and through the San Bernardino Straits into
+the Pacific Ocean, and thence up the east coast of Luzon to Casiguran
+Bay, about 100 miles south of Palanan, landing at Casiguran Bay, March
+14th. The "little Macks," as General Funston calls the Maccabebes, were
+made to discard their dapper American uniforms after they got aboard
+the ship, and don instead a lot of nondescript clothing gathered by
+the military authorities at Manila before the Vicksburg sailed, so
+as to resemble the average insurgent command. Not a man of them had
+been told of the nature of the expedition before sailing. This was
+not for fear of treachery, but lest some one of the faithful "Macks"
+should get his tongue loosed by hospitality before departing. Also,
+their Krag-Jorgensen regulation rifles were taken from them, and a
+miscellaneous assortment of old Springfields, Mausers, etc., given them
+instead, to complete the deception. An ex-insurgent officer, well known
+to Aguinaldo, but now in General Funston's employ, was to play the
+rôle of commanding officer of the "reinforcements." To read General
+Funston's account of this expedition is a more convincing rebuttal
+of the contemporaneous Taft denials of Filipino hostility and of the
+unanimity of the feeling of the people against us, than a thousand
+quotations from official documents could ever be. It was necessary
+to land more than 100 miles south of Aguinaldo's hiding-place, lest
+the smoke of the approaching vessel should be sighted from a distance,
+and some peasant or lookout give the alarm. Accordingly, they landed at
+Casiguran Bay by night, with the ship's lights screened, the Vicksburg
+at once departing out of sight of land, and agreeing to meet them off
+Palanan, their destination, on March 25th, eleven days later. From the
+beginning they vigilantly and consummately played the rôle planned,
+the "Macks" having been drilled on the way up, each and all, in the
+story they were to tell at the first village near Casiguran Bay, and
+everywhere thereafter, to the effect that they had come across country,
+and en route had met ten American soldiers out map-making, and had
+killed two, wounded three, and captured five. They were to point to
+General Funston and the four other Americans in corroboration of their
+story. Speaking of himself and his four fellow "prisoners," General
+Funston says, "We were a pretty scrubby looking lot of privates." The
+villagers received the patriot forces, thus flushed with triumph,
+in an appropriate manner, and supplied them with rations and guides
+for the rest of their 100-mile journey to the headquarters of the
+"dictator." General Funston is even at pains to say for the village
+officials that they were very humane and courteous to himself and
+the other four American "prisoners." They reached Palanan Bay,
+eight miles from Palanan, on March 22d. Here Hilario Tal Placido,
+the ex-insurgent officer whose rôle in the present thrilling drama
+was that of "commanding officer" of the expedition, sent a note to
+Aguinaldo, stating that he had halted his command for a rest at the
+beach preparatory to marching inland and reporting to the Honorable
+Presidente, that they were very much exhausted, and much in need of
+food, and please to send him some. Of course that was the natural card
+to play to put Aguinaldo off his guard. The food came, and the bearers
+returned and casually reported to the Honorable Presidente that his
+honorable reinforcements would soon be along, much to the honorable
+joy--to make the thing a little Japanesque--of the president of the
+honorable republic. This incident has been since made the occasion of
+some criticism--that it was contrary to decency to accept Aguinaldo's
+food and then attack him afterwards. General Funston very properly
+replies in effect that the case would have been very different had he
+thrown himself on Aguinaldo's mercy, taken his food, and used treachery
+afterwards, but that his conduct was entirely correct, under the code
+of war, for the reason that should he and his command be captured
+while personating enemy's forces, Aguinaldo would have had a perfect
+right, under the rules of the game, to shoot them all as spies. He
+adds rather savagely, concerning "certain ladylike persons in the
+United States" who have censured his course in the matter, that he
+"would be very much interested in seeing the results of a surgical
+operation performed on the skull of a man who cannot readily see the
+radical difference between the two propositions," and that he doubts
+if a good quality of calf brains would be revealed by the operation.
+
+At all events, the expedition was very much refreshed by the food
+and highly delighted at the proof, contained in the sending of it,
+that Aguinaldo did not suspect a ruse. But now came one of the many
+emergencies which had to be met by quick wit in the course of that
+memorable adventure. Aguinaldo sent word to leave the "prisoners"
+under a guard in one of the huts by the sea-shore, where there was one
+of the Aguinaldo retainers in charge, an old Tagalo. After a hurried,
+whispered conversation, "prisoner" Funston instructed "Commanding
+Officer" Placido to go ahead with his main column and then a little
+later send back a forged written order purporting to be from Aguinaldo,
+for the "prisoners" to come on also. This was shown to the old Tagalo,
+thus disarming suspicion on his part. But now came the "closest shave"
+they had. The column met a detachment from Aguinaldo's headquarters
+sent down with instructions to relieve the necessarily worn-out
+guard of the newly arrived "re-inforcements" that were supposed to
+be guarding the five prisoners at the beach, and let said guard come
+on up to headquarters with the rest of the "re-inforcements," the
+idea being to still leave the prisoners at the beach so they would
+not learn definitely as to the Aguinaldo whereabouts. Detaining the
+officer commanding this detachment for a moment or so on some pretext,
+the "Commanding Officer" of the "re-inforcements" whispered to a
+Maccabebe corporal to run back and tell General Funston and the rest
+of the "prisoners" to jump in the bushes and hide. This they did,
+lying within thirty feet of the detachment, as it passed them en
+route for the beach. Of course a fight would have meant considerable
+firing, and the quarry might hear it, take fright, and escape. Finally
+they reached Palanan, the "prisoners" quite far in the rear. Placido
+got safely into Aguinaldo's presence, followed at a short distance
+by the main body of his Maccabebes. Aguinaldo's life-guard of some
+fifty men, neatly uniformed, presented arms as Placido entered the
+insurgent headquarters building, and thereafter waited at attention
+outside. Then the worthy Placido entertained the honorable Presidente
+with a few cock-and-bull stories about the march across country,
+etc., made obediently to the President's order, keeping a weather
+eye out of the window all the time. As soon as the Maccabebes had
+come up and formed facing the Aguinaldo life-guard, Placido went to
+the window and ordered them to open fire. This they did, killing
+two of the insurgents and wounding their commanding officer. The
+rest fled, panic-stricken, by reason of the surprise. Then Placido,
+a very stout individual, grabbed Aguinaldo, who only weighs about
+115 pounds, threw him down, and sat on him, until General Funston,
+the Hazzards, Mitchell, and Newton arrived. The orders were iron-clad
+that under no circumstances, if it could be avoided, was Aguinaldo
+to be killed. His signature to proclamations telling the people to
+quit the war was going to be needed too much. The party rested two
+days and then set out for the coast again, on March 25th, the day the
+Vicksburg had agreed to meet them. "At noon" says General Funston,
+"we again saw the Pacific, and far out on it a wisp of smoke--the
+Vicksburg coming in!" In due course they reached Manila Bay. The
+old palace of the Spanish captains-general, then occupied by our
+commanding general, is up the Pasig River, accessible from the bay
+by launch. By that method General Funston took his precious prisoner
+to the palace without the knowledge of a soul in the great city of
+Manila. He arrived before General MacArthur had gotten up. In a few
+minutes the General came out. "Where is Aguinaldo?" said he, dryly. He
+supposed General Funston simply had some details to tell, like the
+commanding officers of hundreds of other expeditions that had gone out
+before that on false scents in search of the illustrious but elusive
+Presidente. "Right here in this house," said General Funston. General
+MacArthur could hardly believe his ears. A few days later, General
+Funston walked into General MacArthur's office. The latter said;
+"Well, Funston, they do not seem to have thought much in Washington
+of your performance. I am afraid you have got into trouble." "At the
+same time he handed me," says General Funston in the Scribner Magazine
+article above mentioned, "a cablegram announcing my appointment as
+a brigadier-general in the regular army."
+
+In his annual report for 1901, [360] General MacArthur describes
+the capture of Aguinaldo as "the most momentous single event of
+the year," stating also that "Aguinaldo was the incarnation of the
+insurrection." This last statement explains why he was so anxious to
+capture him alive. If dead, he would be sure to get re-incarnated in
+the person of some able assistant of his entourage, thus insuring
+undisturbed continuance of the war. He was most graciously treated
+by General MacArthur during his stay as that distinguished soldier's
+"guest" at the Malacaņan palace, from March 28th until April 20th. The
+word "guest" is placed in quotations because the host thought so
+much of him that he considered him worth many hundred times his
+weight in gold, and had him watched night and day by a commissioned
+officer. Everything that had been done by the Americans since November,
+1899, was explained to him, and he was made to see that our purposes
+with regard to his people were not only benevolent but also inflexible;
+in other words that there was no altering our determination to make
+his people happy whether they were willing or not. Seeing this,
+Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. The programme explained to
+Aguinaldo is wittily described by a very bright Englishwoman as a
+plan "to have lots of American school teachers at once set to work
+to teach the Filipino English and at the same time keep plenty of
+American soldiers around to knock him on the head should he get a
+notion that he is ready for self-government before the Americans
+think he is"--a quaint scheme, she adds, "and one characteristic of
+the dauntlessness of American energy." To be brief, on April 19th,
+Aguinaldo took the oath of allegiance to the American Government,
+which all agree he has faithfully observed ever since, and issued
+a proclamation recommending abandonment of further resistance. This
+proclamation was at once published by General MacArthur and signalized
+by the immediate liberation of one thousand prisoners of war, on
+their likewise taking the oath of allegiance.  In his proclamation
+Aguinaldo said, among other things:
+
+
+    The time has come, however, when they [the Filipino people] find
+    their advance along this path [the path of their aspirations]
+    impeded by an irresistible force. * * * Enough of blood, enough
+    of tears and desolation.
+
+
+He concludes by announcing his final unconditional submission to
+American sovereignty and advises others to do likewise. [361]
+
+Soon after this General Tiņo surrendered in General Young's district,
+and in another part of northern Luzon, General Mascardo, commanding
+the insurgent forces in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales,
+heretofore described as "the west wing of the great central plain,"
+also surrendered. In the latter part of June, General Cailles, with
+whom we have already had occasion to become acquainted, in connection
+with Judge Taft's "Mafia on a large scale," also surrendered in
+Laguna Province. After that, there was never any more trouble in
+northern Luzon. But during the spring of 1901, the Commission had
+been very busy organizing the provinces of southern Luzon under
+civil government, thus cutting short the process of licking it into
+submission and substituting a process of loving it into that state
+through good salaries and otherwise--a policy which postponed the
+final permanent pacification of that ill-fated region for several
+years, as hereinafter more fully set forth.
+
+The unconditional absoluteness with which Judge Taft acted from the
+beginning on the assumption that the Filipinos would make a distinction
+between civil and military rule, and that their objection to us was
+because we had first sent soldiers to rule them and not civilians,
+and that these objections would vanish before the benignant sunlight
+of a government by civilians, is one of the great tragedies of all
+history, considering the countless lives it eventually cost. As a
+matter of fact, the Filipino objection had little or no relation
+to the kind of clothes we wore, whether they were white duck or
+khaki. Their objection was to us, i.e., to an alien yoke. However,
+to heal the bleeding wounds of war, the Filipinos were benevolently
+told to forget it, and a civil government was set up on July 4, 1901,
+pursuant to the amiable delusion indicated. That it has never yet
+proved a panacea, and why, will be developed in the next and subsequent
+chapters, but only in-so-far as such development throws light on the
+present situation--which it is the whole object of this book to do.
+
+And now a few words by way of concluding the present chapter, as
+preliminary to the inauguration of a civil government, cannot be
+misconstrued, though they come from one who held office under it. I
+have certainly made clear that Judge Taft and his colleagues were as
+honest in their delusion about how popular they were with the Filipinos
+as many other public men who have been known to have hobbies, and my
+remarks must be understood as based on the comprehensive bird's-eye
+view which we have had of the whole situation from the outbreak of
+the war with Spain in 1898 to the end of June, 1901, as a summation
+of that situation. It is quite true that all contemporary history is
+as much affected by its environment as the writer of it is by his
+own limitations. But it certainly seems clear now that, in regard
+to the Philippine problem presented in 1898 by the decision to keep
+the islands, the American people were played upon by the politicians
+for the next few years thereafter, sometimes on the idea that the
+Filipino people were not a people but only a jumble of semi-civilized
+tribes incapable of any intelligent notion of what independence meant,
+and sometimes on the idea that while there was no denying that they
+were indeed a civilized, homogeneous, Christian people, yet the great
+majority of them did not want independence, and would prefer to be
+under a strong alien government. But the key-note to the McKinley
+policy from the beginning, his answer to the eager question of his
+own people, was that there was no real absence of the consent of the
+governed. In Senator Lodge's history of the war with Spain, written in
+1899, there is a description of the long struggle for independence in
+Cuba, whose existence Spain denied year after year until we decided
+that patience had ceased to be a virtue, which description is so
+strikingly applicable to the situation in the Philippines during
+the first years of American rule that I cannot refrain from quoting
+it here:
+
+
+    And we were to go on pretending that the war was not there,
+    and that we had answered the unsettled question, when we really
+    had simply turned our heads aside and refused to look. And then
+    when the troublesome matter had been so nicely laid to sleep,
+    the result followed which is usual when Congressmen and Presidents
+    and nations are trying to make shams pass for realities." [362]
+
+
+By the same high token the Philippine question will always remain
+"the unsettled question" until it is settled right. In other words,
+the American occupation of the Philippines, having been originally
+predicated on the idea that the Filipino people did not really
+want independence, a fiction which political expediency incident
+to government by parties inexorably compelled it to try to live up
+to thereafter, took the form, in 1901, of a civil government founded
+upon a benevolent lie, which expressed a hope, not a fact, a hopeless
+hope that can never be a fact. And that is what has been the matter
+with it ever since.
+
+
+                    The papers 'id it 'andsome,
+                    But you bet the army knows.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT--1901-2
+
+                For they have healed the hurt of the daughter of
+                my people slightly, saying--Peace, peace; when there
+                is no peace. Jeremiah viii., 11.
+
+
+On February 22, 1898, the American Consul at Manila, Mr. Williams,
+after he had been at that post for about a month, wrote the State
+Department, describing the Spanish methods of keeping from the world
+the outward and visible manifestations of the desire of the Filipino
+people to be free from their yoke thus:
+
+
+    Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities therefor
+    were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for two years.
+
+
+He adds:
+
+
+    Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists,
+    battles are of almost daily occurrence, etc. [363]
+
+
+As will hereinafter appear, this is not far from a correct description
+of the conditions which prevailed successively in various provinces
+of the Philippines in gradually lessening degree for the six years
+next ensuing after the report of the Taft Commission of November 30,
+1900, wherein they said:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States. [364]
+
+
+We have seen how from the date of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to
+the date of his final departure from the islands for the United States
+on May 5, 1900, General Otis had diligently supplied the eager ear of
+Mr. McKinley with his "situation well in hand" and "insurrection about
+to collapse" telegrams, Secretary of War Alger having meantime been
+forced out of the cabinet--in part, at least--by a public opinion which
+indignantly believed that the real situation was being withheld. We
+have seen how, from soon after the arrival of the Taft Commission at
+Manila on June 3, 1900, until after the November elections of that
+year, the same eager presidential ear aforesaid was supplied with
+like material through the presumably innocent but opportunely deluded
+optimism of the Commission, as manifested in the above sample message;
+how the actual military situation as described by General MacArthur,
+the military commander at the time, was one of "desperate resistance by
+means of a general banding of the people in support of the guerrillas
+in the field," [365] he having wired the War Department on January 4,
+1901, "Troops throughout the archipelago more active than at any time
+since November, 1899"; [366] and how this had been followed on July
+4, 1901, by a civil government, the inauguration of which could by
+no possibility be construed as affirming to the people of the United
+States anything other than the existence of a state of peace.
+
+We are to trace in this and subsequent chapters how, a short time after
+the civil government was instituted, the insurrection got its second
+wind; how a year later came another public declaration of peace, on
+July 4, 1902; and how this was followed by a long series of public
+disorders, combated by prosecutions for sedition and brigandage,
+until toward the end of 1906. The drama is quite an allegory--Uncle
+Sam wrestling with his guardian angel Consent-of-the-governed. He
+finally gets both the angel's shoulders on the mat, however, and so
+the two have lived at loggerheads in the Philippines ever since.
+
+As soon as we had once blundered into the colonial business, the
+rock-bottom frankness with which we so dearly love to deal with one
+another, let carping Europe deny it as she will, was superseded
+by a systematic effort on the part of the statesmen responsible
+for the blunder to conceal it. It soon became clear to those on the
+inside that the sovereign American people had "bought a gold brick,"
+that is to say, had made a grievous mistake and had done wrong. But
+as it is not expedient for courtiers to tell the sovereign he has
+done wrong, because "The king can do no wrong," thereafter all the
+courtiers,--i. e. persons desiring to control the "sovereign" while
+seeming to obey him--instead of risking loss of the "royal" favor
+by boldly telling the people they had done wrong and ought to mend
+the error of their ways, began to fill their ears and salve their
+conscience with mediæval doctrines about salvation of the heathen
+through governmental missions maintained by the joint agencies of Cross
+and Sword. For the foregoing and cognate reasons, Senator Lodge's
+description of Spain's last thirty years in Cuba fits our first six
+or seven in the Philippines, beginning in 1899 with the original
+Otis press censorship policy of "not letting anything go that will
+hurt the Administration," and coming on down to a certificate made
+in 1907 by the Philippine Commission for consumption in the United
+States, to the effect that a state of general and complete peace had
+prevailed throughout the islands for a stated period preceding the
+certificate, when, as a matter of fact, during the period covered by
+the certificate, an executive proclamation formally declaring a state
+of insurrection had issued, and the Supreme Court of the islands had
+upheld certain drastic executive action as legal because of the state
+of insurrection recognized by the proclamation.
+
+The Taft civil government of the Philippines set up in 1901 was an
+attempt to answer the question which, during the crucial period of
+our country's history following the Spanish War, rang so persistently
+through the public utterances of both Grover Cleveland and Benjamin
+Harrison: "Mr. President, how are you going to square the subjugation
+of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba?" Mr. McKinley's
+answer had been, in effect: "Never mind about that, Grover; you and
+Benjamin are back numbers. I will show you 'the latest thing' in the
+consent-of-the-governed line, a government not 'essentially popular,'
+it is true, nor indeed at all 'popular,' in fact very unpopular,
+but 'essentially popular in form.' You lads are not experts on the
+political trapeze." Accordingly, as Senator Lodge said concerning
+the dreary years of continuous public disorders in Cuba under Spain,
+which we finally put a stop to in 1898:
+
+
+    We were to go on pretending that the war was not there, etc.
+
+
+Lack of frankness is usually due to weakness of one sort or
+another. The weakness of the Spanish colonial system lay in the
+impotent poverty of the home government and the graft tendencies
+of the colonial officials. The weakness of the American colonial
+system has always lain in the fundamental unfitness of republican
+governmental machinery for boldly advocating and honestly enforcing
+doctrines which deny frankly and as a matter of course that governments
+derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. There
+are so many people in a republic like ours who will always stand by
+this last proposition as righteous, and as being the chief bulwark
+of their own liberties, and so many who will always regard denial
+of that proposition as an insidious practice calculated ultimately
+to react on their own institutions, that no colonial government of
+conquered subject provinces eager for independence can ever have the
+sympathy and backing of all our people. Thus it is that to get home
+support for the policy, the supreme need of the colonial government
+is constant apology for its own existence, and constant effort to
+show that the subject people do not really want freedom to pursue
+happiness in their own way as badly as their orators say they do;
+that the oratory is mere "hot air"; and that the people really like
+alien domination better than they seem to.
+
+Always in a mental attitude of self-defence against home criticism,
+in its official reports there is ever present with the Philippine
+insular government the tendency and temptation not to volunteer to
+the American people evidence within its possession calculated to
+awaken discussion as to the wisdom of its continuance. It thus usurps
+a legitimate function never intended to be delegated to the Executive,
+but reserved to the people. It thus makes itself the judge of how much
+the people at home shall know. The law of self-preservation prompts
+it not to take the American people into its confidence, at least
+not that portion of them who are opposed on principle to holding
+remote colonies impossible to defend in the event of war without a
+large standing army maintained for the purpose. There is always the
+apprehension that the value of apparently unfavorable evidence will
+not be wisely weighed by the people at home, because of unfamiliarity
+with insular conditions. This is by no means altogether vicious. It
+is a perfectly natural attitude and a good deal can be said in favor
+of it. But the real vice of it lies in the fact that your colonial
+government thus becomes not unlike the president of a certain naval
+board before which a case involving the commission of an officer of
+the navy was once tried. They had no competent official stenographer to
+take down all that transpired. The Navy Department was asked for one,
+but they referred it to the board. The president of the board knew very
+well that "the defence" wanted to show bias on his part. He exuded
+conscious rectitude and plainly resented any suggestion of bias. So
+a stenographer was refused and the case proceeded, the proceedings
+being recorded in long hand by a regular permanent employee of the
+board. Under such circumstances, there is so much which transpires that
+is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial, that the proceedings would
+be interminable if every little thing were recorded. Consequently,
+much that was material, including casual remarks of the president of
+the board clearly indicative of bias sufficient to disqualify any
+judge or juror on earth, failed of entry in the record. However,
+enough was gotten into the record to satisfy the President of the
+United States that the president of the board was not only not
+impartial, but very much prejudiced, and he reversed the action of
+the board. The case of that board is very much like the case of the
+Philippine Government. The case of the latter is, as it were, a case
+involving a question as to how long a guardianship ought to continue,
+and they simply fail and omit to have recorded in a form where it may
+be available to the reviewing authority, the American people, much that
+is material (on the idea of saving the reviewing authority labor and
+trouble), which they think the record ought not to be cumbered with,
+or the reviewing authority bothered with. This practice is due to a
+confident belief that the American people, being so far away, and being
+necessarily so wholly unacquainted with all the ins and outs of the
+situation in the Philippines, are not fitted to pass intelligently on
+the questions which continually confront the colonial government. This
+is not a mental attitude of insult to the intelligence of the people
+of the United States. It is simply a belief that they, the colonial
+officials, know much better than the American people can ever know,
+what is wisest, in each case, to be done in the premises. And there
+is much to be said in favor of this view, so far as details go. The
+fundamental error of it, however, lies in the assumption that the
+American people are forever committed to permanent retention of the
+Philippines, i. e., permanent so far as any living human being is
+concerned--an assumption wholly unauthorized by any declaration of
+the law-making power of this government, and countenanced only by
+the oft-expressed hope of President Taft that that will be the policy
+some day declared, if any definite policy is ever declared. Thus it
+is that throughout the last twelve years those particular facts and
+events which (to me) seem most vitally relevant to the fundamental
+question in the case, viz., whether or not we should continue to
+persist in the original blunder of inaugurating and maintaining a--to
+all intents and purposes--permanent over-seas colonial government,
+have been withheld from the knowledge of the American public. The
+present policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention
+is a mere makeshift to avoid a frank avowal of intention to retain
+the islands for all future time with which anybody living has any
+practical concern. Until it is substituted by a definite declaration
+by Congress similar to the one we made in the case of Cuba, and the
+present American Governor-General and his associates are substituted
+by men sent out to report back how soon they think the Filipinos
+may safely be trusted to attend to their own domestic concerns, all
+crucial facts and situations that might jeopardize the continuance
+of the present American régime in the Philippines will continue,
+as heretofore, to remain unmentioned in the official reports of the
+American authorities now out there. Until that is done, you will never
+hear the Filipino side of the case from anybody whose opinion you are
+willing to make the basis of governmental action. These remarks will,
+obviously from the nature of the case, be quite as true long after
+President Taft, the reader, and I are dead as they are now.
+
+Mr. Taft would be very glad to have Congress declare frankly that it
+is the purpose of this Government to hold the Philippines permanently,
+i. e., permanently so far as the word means continuance of the "uplift"
+treatment long after everybody now on the earth is beneath it. But
+because public opinion in the United States is so much divided as
+to the wisdom of a policy of frankly avowed intention permanently
+to retain the islands, he prefers to leave the whole matter open
+and undetermined, so as to get the support both of those who think
+a definite programme of permanent retention righteous and those who
+think such a programme vicious. He wishes to please both sides of
+a moral issue, on the idea that, as the present policy is in his
+individual judgment best for all concerned, the end justifies the
+means. Yet, as the issue is a moral one, which concerns the cause of
+representative government throughout the world, and a strategic one
+which concerns the national defence, it should, in my judgment, no
+longer be dodged, but squarely met. You constantly hear President Taft
+talking quite out loud here at home, in his public utterances, about
+the great politico-missionary work we are doing in the Philippines
+by furnishing them with the most approved up-to-date methods for
+the pursuit of happiness, the avoidance of graft in government, the
+elimination of crimes of violence, in short the ideal way to minimize
+the ills that human governments are heir to, while every day and every
+dollar spent out there by Americans induced by him to go there, are
+time and money tensely arrayed against the ultimate independence he
+purports to favor. Give the Americans out there a square deal. Let
+them know whether we are going to keep the islands or whether we
+are not. Honesty is a far better policy than the present policy. The
+Americans in the islands, Mr. Taft's agents in the Philippines, talk no
+uncandid and misleading stuff about the Philippines being exclusively
+for the Filipinos. And they do considerable talking. They need looking
+after, if the present pious fiction is to be kept up at this end of the
+line. Nobody in the Philippines to-day, among the Americans, considers
+talk about independence as anything other than political buncombe very
+hampering to their work. Listen to this high official of the insular
+government, who writes in the North American Review for February, 1912:
+
+
+    The somewhat blatant note with which we at the beginning
+    proclaimed our altruistic purposes in the Philippines has died
+    away into a whisper. To say much about it is to incur a charge
+    of hypocrisy. [367]
+
+
+The most important problem which confronted Mr. McKinley when he
+sent Judge Taft to the Philippines was how to so handle the supreme
+question of public order as to avoid any necessity of having to
+ask Congress later for more volunteers to replace those whose terms
+of enlistment would expire June 30, 1901. We have already reviewed
+the strenuous efforts of General MacArthur during the twelve months
+immediately following the arrival of the Taft Commission in June,
+1900, to get rid of the shadow of this necessity by the date named,
+the regular army having been reorganized meantime and considerably
+increased by the Act of February 2, 1901. On March 22, 1901, while
+the Taft Commission was going around the islands with their Federal
+party folk, holding out the prospect of office to those who would
+quit insurging and come in and be good, General MacArthur reported
+progress to Secretary of War Root by cable as follows: "Hope report
+cessation of hostilities before June 30." [368] His idea was to get
+a good military grip on the situation, if possible, by that time,
+and, as a corollary, of course, that the grip thus obtained should
+be diligently retained for a long time, not loosened, so that the
+disturbed conditions incident to many years of war might have a few
+years, at least, in which to settle. In his annual report dated July 4,
+1901, the date of the inauguration of Judge Taft as "Civil Governor,"
+he says, in regard to the imperative necessity for continuing the
+military grip by keeping on hand sufficient forces:
+
+
+    Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede the activity
+    or reduce the efficiency of these instruments will not only be a
+    menace to the present, but put in jeopardy the entire future of
+    American possibilities in the archipelago. [369]
+
+
+General MacArthur believed in keeping the islands permanently. His
+views were frankly imperialistic. He had no salve to offer to the
+conscience of pious thrift at home anxious to believe that the
+Filipinos were not bitterly opposed to our rule, and very much in
+favor of what was supposed to be a glittering opening for Trade
+Expansion. He was thoroughly imbued with the British colonial idea
+known as The White Man's Burden. On the other hand, Governor Taft
+firmly believed that kindness would cure the desire of the people for
+independence. The difference between these two gentlemen was fully
+ventilated afterward before the Senate Committee of 1902. A statement
+of General MacArthur's embodying the crux of this difference was read
+to Governor Taft by Senator Carmack, and the Governor's reply was:
+
+
+    We did not then agree with that statement, and we do not now
+    agree with it. [370]
+
+
+A little later, in the same connection, he said to the same Senate
+Committee, with the cheery tolerance of conflicting views which comes
+only from entire confidence in the soundness of one's own:
+
+
+    I have been called the Mark Tapley of this Philippine business.
+
+
+There is no doubt about the fact that President Taft is an
+optimist. But while optimism is a very blessed thing in a sick-room or
+a financial panic, it is a very poor substitute for powder and lead
+in putting down an insurrection, or in weaning people from a desire
+for independence accentuated by a long war waged for that purpose,
+especially when your kindness must be accompanied by assurances to
+the objects of it that on account of a lack of sufficient intelligence
+they are not fit for the thing they want. It was upon a programme of
+this sort that Governor Taft entered upon the task of reconciling the
+Filipinos to American rule more than ten years ago. The impossibility
+of the task is of course obvious enough from the mere statement of
+it. The subsequent bitterness between him and the military authorities
+was quite carefully and very properly kept from the American public
+because it might get back to the Filipino public. The military folk
+knew that to go around the country setting up provincial and municipal
+governments, carrying a liberal pay-roll, with diligent contemporaneous
+circulation of the knowledge that anybody who would quit fighting
+would stand a good chance to get an office, would seem to many of the
+Filipinos a confession of weakness and fear, sure to cause trouble
+later. Many of them--of course it would be inappropriate to mention
+names--simply did not believe that Mr. Taft was honest in his absurd
+notion. They simply damned "politics" for meddling with war, and let
+it go at that. But the real epic pathos of the whole thing was that
+Mr. Taft was actually sincere. He believed that the majority of the
+Philippine people were for him and his policies. As late as 1905,
+he seems to have clung to this idea, according to various accounts
+by Senators Newlands, Dubois, and others, in magazine articles
+written after their return from a trip to the Philippines in that
+year in company with Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War. In fact so
+impressed were they with the general discontent out there, and yet so
+considerate of their good friend Mr. Taft's feelings in the matter and
+his confidence that the Filipinos loved benevolent alien domination,
+that one of them simply contented himself with the remark:
+
+
+    When we left the islands I do not believe there was a single
+    member of our party who was not sorry we own them, except Secretary
+    Taft himself.
+
+
+Indeed it is not until 1907 that, we find Mr. Taft's paternal
+solicitude for his step-daughter, Miss Filipina, finally reconciling
+itself to the idea that while this generation seems to want Home
+Rule as irreconcilably as Ireland herself and "wont be happy 'til
+it gets it," yet inasmuch as Home Rule is not, in his judgment, good
+for every people, this generation is therefore a wicked and perverse
+generation, and hence the Filipinos must simply resign themselves to
+the idea of being happy in some other generation. This attitude was
+freely stated before the Millers' convention at St. Louis, May 30,
+1907, the speech being reported in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat the
+next day. Said Mr. Taft on that occasion, after admitting that the
+Islands had been a tremendous financial drain on us:
+
+
+    If, then, we have not had material recompense, have we had it in
+    the continuing gratitude of the people whom we have aided?
+
+
+Answering this, in effect, though not in so many words, "Alas, no,"
+he adds, with a sigh which is audible between the lines:
+
+
+    He who would measure his altruism by the thankfulness of those
+    whom he aids, will not persist in good works.
+
+
+Thus we see the Mark Tapley optimism of 1902 become in 1907 a species
+of solicitude which Dickens describes in Bleak House as "Telescopic
+Philanthropy," in the chapter by that title in which he introduces
+the famous Mrs. Jellyby, mother of a large and interesting family,
+"a lady of very remarkable strength of character, who devotes
+herself entirely to the public," who "has devoted herself to an
+extensive variety of public subjects, at various times, and is at
+present devoted to the subject of Africa, with a general view to the
+cultivation of the coffee berry--and the natives,"--to the woeful
+neglect of her own domestic concerns and her large and expensive
+family of children. Since 1907, Mr. Taft has frankly abandoned his
+early delusion about the consent-of-the-governed, and boldly takes
+the position, up to that time more or less evaded, that the consent
+of the governed is not at all essential to just government.
+
+The apotheosis of Uncle Sam as Mrs. Jellyby is to be found in one of
+Mr. Taft's speeches wherein he declared that the present Philippine
+policy was "a plan for the spread of Christian civilization in the
+Orient."
+
+Thus has it been that, under the reactionary influence of a colonial
+policy, this republic has followed its frank abandonment of the idea
+that all just government must derive its origin in the consent of
+the governed by a further abandonment of the idea that Church and
+State should be kept separate. I do not wish to make President Taft
+ridiculous, and could not if I would. Nor do I seek to belittle him
+in the eyes of his people,--for we are "his people," for the time
+being. No one can belittle him. He is too big a man to be belittled
+by anybody. Besides, he is, in many respects beyond all question, a
+truly great man. But he is not the only great man in history who has
+made egregious blunders. And there is no question that we are running
+there on the confines of Asia, in the Philippines, a superfluous
+governmental kindergarten whose sessions should be concluded, not
+suddenly, but without unnecessary delay. The two principal reasons
+for retaining the Filipinos as subjects, or "wards," or by whatever
+euphemism any one may prefer to designate the relation, are, first,
+that a Filipino government would not properly protect life and
+property, and second, that although they complain much at taxation
+without representation through tariff and other legislation placed or
+kept on the statute books of Congress through the influence and for
+the benefit of special interests in the United States, yet that such
+taxation without representation is not so grievous as to justify them
+in feeling as we did in 1776. Whether these reasons for retaining the
+Filipinos as subjects indefinitely are justified by the facts, must
+depend upon the facts. If they are not, the question will then arise,
+"Would a Filipino government be any worse for the Filipinos than the
+one we are keeping saddled on them over their protest?"
+
+In his letter of instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft Commission,
+Mr. McKinley first quoted the noble concluding language with which
+the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila gave an immediate
+and supremely comforting sense of security to a city of some three
+hundred thousand people who had then been continuously in terror of
+their lives for three and one half months, thus:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants, * * * and its private property of
+    all description * * * are placed under the special safeguard of
+    the faith and honor of the American army;
+
+
+and then added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life * * *
+    to all the people of the Philippine Islands. * * * I charge this
+    commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation,
+    which concerns the honor and conscience of their country.
+
+
+How the premature setting up of the civil government of the Philippines
+in 1901 under pressure of political expediency, and the consequent
+withdrawal of the police protection of the army, was followed by a
+long series of disorders combated by prosecutions for sedition and
+brigandage, toward the end of which the writer broke down and left the
+Islands exclaiming inwardly, "I do not know the method of drawing an
+indictment against a whole people," will now be traced, not so much
+to show that the Philippine insular government has failed properly and
+competently to meet the most sacred obligations that can rest upon any
+government, but to show the inherent unfitness of a government based
+on the consent of the governed to run any other kind of a government.
+
+There were five officers of the Philippine volunteer army of 1899-1901
+appointed to the bench by Governor Taft in 1901. Their names and the
+method of their transition from the military to the civil régime
+are indicated by the following communication, a copy of which was
+furnished to each, as indicated in the endorsement which follows the
+signature of Judge Taft:
+
+
+    UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION
+
+    President's Office, Manila, June 17, 1901.
+
+    Major-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. A.,
+
+    Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.
+
+
+    Sir:
+
+    I am directed by the commission to inform you that it has made
+    the following appointments under the recent Judicial Act passed
+    June 11, 1901:
+
+    You will observe that among our appointees are five army officers:
+    Brigadier General James F. Smith, Lieutenant James H. Blount,
+    Jr., 29th Infantry, Captain Adam C. Carson, 28th Infantry; Captain
+    Warren H. Ickis, 36th Infantry; and Lieutenant George P. Whitsett,
+    32d Infantry.
+
+    It is suggested that it would be well for these officers to resign
+    their positions in the United States military service to the end
+    that they may accept the civil positions, take the oath of office,
+    and immediately begin their new duties.
+
+    I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
+
+
+        Your obedient servant,
+
+        (Signed) Wm. H. Taft,
+        President.
+
+
+    Official extract copy respectfully furnished Lieutenant James
+    H. Blount, Jr., 29th Infantry, U. S. Vols., Manila, P. I. Your
+    resignation, if offered in compliance with above letter, will be
+    accepted upon the date preferred.
+
+    By command of Major-General MacArthur:
+
+
+        (Signed) E. H. Crowder
+        Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. Secretary.
+        Military Secretary's Office,
+        June 18, 1901.
+
+
+General Smith had come out as colonel of the 1st Californias, and had
+won his stars on the field of battle, as has already been described in
+an earlier chapter. He went from the army to the Supreme Bench--at
+Manila. The archipelago had been divided by the Taft Commission
+into fifteen judicial districts, containing three or four provinces
+each,--each district court to be a nisi prius or trial court. Judge
+Carson (Va.) went to the Hemp Peninsula District in the extreme south
+of Luzon, already described, and four years later to the Supreme Bench,
+where he still is. Judge Ickis (Ia.) went to Mindanao, and later died
+of the cholera down there. Judge Whitsett (Mo.) went to Jolo (the
+little group of islets near British North Borneo), but his wife died
+soon afterward, and he resigned and came home. The writer (Ga.) went
+to northern Luzon, to the First District hereinafter noticed.
+
+Just here it may be remarked that the reader will need no long
+complicated description of the details of the organization of the new
+government, interspersed with unpronounceable names, if he will simply
+assume the view-point Governor Taft had in the beginning. Governor
+Taft simply analogized his situation to that of a governor of a State
+or Territory at home. His fifty provinces were to him fifty counties,
+twenty-five of them in the main island of Luzon, which, as heretofore
+stated, is about the size of Ohio or Cuba (forty odd thousand square
+miles), and contains half the population and over one-third the total
+land area of the archipelago. However, each of his provincial governors
+was liberally paid, and the authority of a governor of a province
+was, on a small scale, more like that of one of our own state chief
+executives than like the authority and functions of the chairman of
+the Board of County Commissioners of a county with us. For instance,
+the governorship of Cebu, with its 2000 square miles of territory
+and 650,000 inhabitants, was quite as big a job as the governorship
+of New Mexico, or some other one of our newer States.
+
+So that the task on which Governor Taft entered July 4, 1901, was
+the governing of a potential ultimate federal union in miniature,
+containing nearly eight millions of people. One slight mistake I
+think he made was in providing that the governors of the provinces
+should be ex-officio sheriffs of the Courts of First Instance
+(of the fifteen several judicial districts aforesaid). This was to
+enable the Judges of First Instance to keep a weather eye on the
+provincial governors, the judiciary at first being largely American,
+and it being the programme to have native governors, some of them
+recently surrendered insurgent generals, as rapidly as practicable
+and advisable. The scheme was good business, but not tactful. It
+subtracted some wind from the gubernatorial sails to be a sheriff,
+a provincial governor under the Spanish régime having been quite a
+vice-regal potentate. But the judges were as careful to treat their
+native governors with the consideration the authority vested in them
+called for as Governor Taft himself would have been. So no substantial
+harm was done, and the real power in the provinces of questionable
+loyalty remained where it belonged, in American hands.
+
+Just after Governor Taft's inauguration, the four newly appointed
+district judges just out of the army called on the governor. Judge
+Carson was the spokesman, though without pre-arrangement. He said:
+"Governor, we have called to pay our respects and say goodbye before
+going to the provinces. We have been acting under military orders so
+long, that while we are not here to get orders, we would like to have
+any parting suggestions that may occur to you." Governor Taft said:
+"Well, Gentlemen, all I can think of is to remind you that if what
+we have all heard is true the Spanish courts usually operated to the
+delay of justice, rather than to the dispensing of it. So just go
+ahead to your respective districts, and get to work, remembering that
+you are Americans." So we did. Of course none of us loaned ourselves
+for a moment to the amiable Taft fiction that "the great majority of
+the people are entirely willing to government under the supremacy
+of the United States." We had all had a share in the subjugation
+of the Islands as far as it had progressed at that time, and had
+seen the Filipinos fight--unskilfully and ineffectively, it is true
+(because they none of them understood the use of two sights on a rifle,
+and simply could not hit us much), but pluckily enough. We knew the
+Filipinos well, and our attitude was simply that of "Pharaoh and the
+Sergeant," in Kipling's ballad of the conquest of Egypt. However,
+we knew nothing of the Egyptians, except what we had learned in the
+Bible, gave no thought to whether our occupation was to be "temporary"
+like the British occupation of Egypt since 1882, or temporary like
+the American occupation of Cuba in 1898. That was a matter for the
+people of the United States to determine later. But somebody had to
+govern the Islands, and there we were, and there were the Islands. In
+the scheme of things some one had to do that part of the world's work,
+and, as the salaries were liberal, we went to the work, not concerning
+ourselves with amiable fictions of any kind. I think our attitude
+was really one of more intimately sympathetic understanding of the
+Filipinos than that of Governor Taft himself, because we had all known
+them longer, and all spoke their language, i. e., the language of
+the educated and representative men (Spanish), and knew their ways,
+their foibles, and their many indisputably noble traits. But we did
+not start out to play the part of political wet-nurses. Our attitude
+was, if Mr. Filipino does not behave, we will make him.
+
+Judge Carson and myself had one peculiar qualification for fidelity
+to the Taft policies for which we were entitled to no credit. We
+instinctively resented any suggestion comparing the Filipinos to
+negroes. We had many warm friends among the Filipinos, had shared
+their generous hospitality often, and in turn had extended them
+ours. Any such suggestion as that indicated implied that we had been
+doing something equivalent to eating, drinking, dancing, and chumming
+with negroes. And we resented such suggestions with an anger quite as
+cordial and intense as the canons of good taste and loyal friendship
+demanded. I really believe that the southern men in the Philippines
+have always gotten along better with the Filipinos than any other
+Americans out there, and for the reasons just suggested. Not only
+is the universal American willingness to treat the educated Asiatic
+as a human being endowed with certain unalienable rights going to
+redeem him from the down-trodden condition into which British and
+other European contempt for him has kept him, but the American from
+the South out there is a guarantee that he shall never be treated as
+if he were an African. The African is æons of time behind the Asiatic
+in development; the latter is æons ahead of us in the mere duration
+of his civilization. The Filipino has many of the virtues both of the
+European and the Asiatic. Christianity has made him the superior in
+many respects, of his neighbor and racial cousin, the Japanese. And
+Spanish civilization has produced among them many educated gentlemen
+whom it is an honor to call friend.
+
+The five lawyers, who on ceasing to be volunteer officers became
+judges, had other incentives also to make the Taft Government a
+success. The possession of power is always pleasant. We knew the
+military folk were going to stand by and watch the civil government,
+and prophesy failure. This of course put us on our metal to impress
+upon the dictatorial gentry of the military profession, with didactic
+firmness, the fundamental importance to all American ideals that the
+military should be subordinate to the civil authority.
+
+The First Judicial District to which the writer was first assigned
+comprised four provinces, Ilocos Norte, in the Ilocano country, the
+province situated at the extreme northwestern corner of Luzon, in the
+military district the conquest of which by General Young has already
+been fully described; and the three provinces of the Cagayan valley,
+[371] overrun by Captain Batchelor on his remarkable march from the
+mountains to the sea in November, 1899, also already described. Here
+I remained for a year, and then came home on leave, desperately
+ill; being given, on returning to the Islands after my recovery,
+an assignment in one of the southern islands, hereinafter dealt with.
+
+We volunteers were all commissioned as judges as of the 15th of June,
+though none of us I believe were mustered out until June 30th. The
+day after I was notified of my appointment as judge, as above set
+forth, desiring to enter upon my judicial emoluments, which were
+several times those I was receiving as a soldier, I removed the
+shoulder-straps and collar ornaments from my white duck suit, and
+went over and took the oath of office before the Chief Justice of
+the Islands. We had not yet been mustered out of the army, but as
+above stated, Governor Taft had suggested to General MacArthur that
+we resign without waiting for the day of muster out, so we could
+get to work that much sooner, and General MacArthur had notified us
+that if we cared to resign at once as suggested, he would cable our
+resignations to Washington. Immediately after qualifying before the
+Chief Justice, I left his office and on emerging from the court-house
+hailed a carromata, [372] but the driver said No, he would not carry
+me. I suggested in a very rudimental way, in rather rudimental Spanish
+suited to him, that he was a common carrier, and as such under a
+duty to transport me. He said his horse was tired. His horse did
+not look tired. He would not have thus casually toyed with veracity
+if I had had my shoulder-straps on. An autoridad (a representative
+of constituted authority) is to the masses of the Filipino people
+something which instinctively challenges their respect and obedience,
+more especially where the "authority" is firm and just. Respect for
+authority is their most conspicuous civic trait, and it is on this
+element in the lower ninety, on the intelligence and capacity to
+guide them of the upper ten, and on the ardent patriotism of both,
+that I predicate my difference with President Taft as to the capacity
+of the Filipino people for self-government. However, as I was to all
+appearances not an "authority," this ignorant man treated me as merely
+one of the Americans who, having invaded his country, apparently were
+not sure whether they were afraid of his people or not. Again I tried
+diplomacy, offering him an exorbitant fare. "Nothing doing." It was
+about siesta time, and he would not budge. Here then was the civil
+government proposition in a nutshell, to take the ignorant people and
+teach them their rights under theoretically free institutions, instead
+of letting their own people do it in their own way; to reason directly
+with such people as this cochero (hackman), to begin at the bottom of
+the social scale right on the jump, the idea being to fit them, the
+sacred (?) majority, to know their rights and "knowing dare maintain"
+them against the educated minority, as if the latter did not have
+a greater natural interest in their welfare than any stranger could
+possibly have. That I indulged all these reflections at the time I
+of course do not mean to say. The significance of the incident has
+of course deepened in the light of the subsequent years. At any rate,
+I did not succeed in budging that cochero. I walked home, forego the
+difference between the military and the judicial salary for the two
+weeks remaining before muster-out day, put my shoulder-straps back on,
+and kept them on until June 30, 1901. [373]
+
+When I first landed on the China seacoast of the district I was to
+preside over, I was met by quite a reception committee of the leading
+men, who conducted me with great courtesy to the provincial capital. A
+little later the justices of the peace paid their respects. One
+of them came thirty miles to do so. The court-room was very long,
+and when I first spied this last man, he was at the other end of
+the room bowing very low. He would bow, then advance a few steps,
+then bow again, then resume the forward march toward me. I reminded
+myself of some ancient king, so profound were his obeisances. At
+first I thought to myself, "He bows too low, he must have been up to
+some devilment lately!" Experience showed me later that it was simply
+one of the ever-present manifestations of the respect of the Filipino
+for constituted authority. They positively love to show their respect
+for authority, just as a good soldier loves to show his respect for
+an officer. Here some American remarks: "Ah, but that is not good
+proof of capacity for self-government. They would not 'cuss out' the
+party in power enough." I answer: Who made you the judge to say that
+our particular form of government and our particular way of doing
+things is better for each and every other people under the sun than
+any they can devise for themselves? But there was of course another
+possible reason for the profundity of the obeisances of my judicial
+subordinate above mentioned. When I reached that province of Ilocos
+Norte in July, 1901, the people were in a state of submission that was
+simply abject. They had at first worked the amigo business on General
+Young, and treachery of that kind had been so inexorably followed by
+dire punishment, that every home in the country had its lesson. Yet
+that was the only way. The poor devils did not seem to know when they
+were licked. This is not maudlin sentiment. It is a protest against the
+cotemporary libel on Filipino patriotism about "the great majority"
+being "entirely willing" to accept our rule, and the cotemporary
+belittling of the work the army had to do to make them accept it.
+
+I remained in charge of the First Judicial District for more
+than a year, and during that period tried few or no crimes of a
+political character, that is to say, indictments for sedition or the
+like--attempts to subvert the government. The district comprised a
+total population of about a half million people, more than one-eighth
+of the population of Luzon, and a total area of over 13,000 square
+miles, nearly one-third of all Luzon. But remember, this was in
+northern Luzon, where the work of pacification was lucidly completed
+by the army before the "peace-at-any-price" policy began. We will see
+what happened in my friend Judge Carson's district, and in the rest of
+southern Luzon later. The principal broad general fact I now recall,
+in connection with the administration of justice in the First Judicial
+District during the year or more I had it, is that the main volume of
+business on the court calendars was crimes of violence of a strictly
+non-political character due to lack of efficient police protection
+in the several communities, consequent on withdrawal of military
+garrisons. The country was in an unsettled state. The aftermath
+of war, lawless violence, was virulently present, and the presence
+of troops scattered through a province, under such circumstances,
+is a wonderful moral force to restrain lawlessness. However high
+the purpose, however kindly the motive, the setting up of a civil
+government in the Philippines at the time it was set up, when the
+country was far from ready for it, was a terrible mistake. Of course
+no one man in a given province or judicial district had a bird's-eye
+view of the whole situation and the whole panorama at the time,
+such as we can get at this distance, in retrospect. Of course it did
+not lie in human nature for the men responsible for the mistake to
+see it at first, and, the die once cast, they had to keep on, with
+intermittent resort to military help, the extent of which help was
+always minimized thereafter. To show how little the general state of
+the archipelago was understood by American provincial officials busy in
+a given part of it, and getting little or no news of the outside world,
+I remained in the First Judicial District from July, 1901, to August,
+1902, and heard nothing of the great insurrection in southern Luzon,
+in Batangas, and the adjacent provinces, which raged during the winter
+of 1901-02, except a vague rumor that there was trouble down there. The
+Filipinos did, however. Of course for Mr. Root to be able to furnish
+in December, 1901, a report, as Secretary of War, to the President,
+for consumption by Congress and the people of this country, to the
+effect that his volunteer army had been mustered out on schedule time,
+June 30, 1901, and a "civil" government set up and in due operation,
+was a nice showing, calculated to sooth latent public discontent with
+wading through slaughter to over-seas dominion. Reports thereafter of
+disturbances could always be waived aside as merely local in character,
+and not serious. If it were stoutly asserted that everything was
+quiet all over the archipelago except in certain parts of certain
+localities, naming them, that sounded well, and as the public at home
+simply skipped the unpronounceable names, not caring much whether they
+represented molecules or hemispheres, all went well. For instance,
+most of the provinces of the archipelago were organized under "civil"
+government prior to the inauguration of Governor Taft, which occurred,
+July 4, 1901, and on July 17th, thereafter, Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol
+were restored to military control. [374] I suppose the fact that
+Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol had been so restored was duly announced
+at the time in the Associated Press despatches from Manila. But
+what light did it throw on the situation? Who knew whether any one
+of these names represented a mountain lair, a country village, a
+remote islet, or a large and populous province? As a matter of fact,
+each was a province, and the total population of the three provinces
+was 1,180,655, [375] and their total area 4651 square miles. [376]
+The eminent gentlemen charged with the government of the Islands,
+once they committed themselves to their "civil" government, persisted
+always in treating the insurrection, as General Hancock's campaign
+speeches used to treat the tariff--as "a local issue." The true
+analogy, that of a house on fire, with the fire partly but not wholly
+under control, and momentarily subject to gusts of wind, never seems
+to have occurred to them. Here were provinces aggregating nearly
+twelve hundred thousand people, officially admitted to be still in
+insurrection within less than two weeks after the announcement of
+the inauguration of a civil government, which included them, with
+its implied assertion of a state of peace as to them.
+
+If to the three provinces above named you add the province of Samar,
+later of dark and bloody fame, you have a fourth province as to which
+not only had there been no "civil" government organized on paper, but
+no claim yet made by any one that we had ever conquered it. We had been
+so busy in Luzon and elsewhere that we had not yet had time to bother
+very much with Samar. The area of Samar is 5276 square miles, and its
+population 266,237. (See the census tables already cited.) In their
+report dated October 15, 1901, [377] you find the Commission admitting
+that "the insurrection still continues in Batangas, Samar, Cebu" and
+"parts of" Laguna and Tayabas provinces. Now the euphemistic limitation
+implied in the words "parts of" is quite negligible, for any serious
+purpose, since our troops kept the insurgents rather constantly on the
+move, and the population in all the "parts of" any province that was
+still holding out backed up the combatants morally and materially,
+with information as to our movements, supplies, etc., whenever
+the insurgent detachments, in the course of their peregrinations,
+happened to pass through those "parts." So, to make a recapitulation
+presenting the political situation admitted by the Commission to exist
+a little over three months after the inauguration of civil government,
+we have the insurrection still in progress as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.)          Population
+
+    Batangas              1,201                   257,715
+    Cebu                  1,939                   653,727
+    Bohol                 1,511                   269,223
+    Laguna                  629                   148,606
+    Tayabas               5,993                   153,065
+    Samar                 5,276                   266,237
+                         ------                 ---------
+        Total            16,549                 1,748,573
+
+
+According to his own official statements, it thus appears that on
+October 15th, after Governor Taft set up his "civil" government on
+the Fourth of July, throughout one-fifth of the territory and among
+one-fourth of the population insurrection was rampant. The total
+area of the archipelago, if Mohammedan Mindanao be excepted (for the
+reason that the Moros never had anything to do with the Filipinos
+and their insurrection against us), is about 80,000 square miles,
+having a total population of 7,000,000. So that, to restate the
+case, one-fifth of the house was still on fire, and one-fourth of
+the inmates were trying their best to keep the fire from being put out.
+
+Just here I owe it to President Taft, under whose administration
+as governor I served as a judge, as well as to myself, to explain
+why I have so frequently put the word "civil" in quotations in
+referring to the civil government of the Philippines. Broadly
+speaking, if "civil" does not imply consent of the governed, it
+at least distinctly negatives the idea of a bleeding, prostrate,
+and deeply hostile people. And, in that the civil government of the
+Philippines founded in 1901 did so negative the actual conditions it
+was a kindly humbug. When you go around the country sending people
+to the penitentiary by scores for political crimes, and then get
+criticised afterwards for "subserviency" to the government you are
+thus serving, you get a trifle sensitive about such criticism. Now
+the core of the charges made in this country against the Philippine
+judiciary in the early days was that they were parties to a humbug,
+pliable servants of a government which was trying to produce at home
+an incorrect impression of substantial absence of unwillingness on
+the part of the governed. I am very sure that the five ex-officers of
+the volunteer army above named, who went from the army to the bench,
+never did, by act or word, lend themselves to the idea that there was
+any "consent" on the part of the governed. Those of us who had been
+in Cuba with General Wood had but a little while previously observed
+there a civil régime under a military name. We were now, in the
+Philippines, serving a military régime under a civil name. We had all
+of us doubtless--if there was an exception it is immaterial--served
+on military commissions. We therefore felt, without immodesty,
+that we could deal out to insurrectos and their political cousins,
+the brigands, more even-handed justice, as a military commission
+of one, than a board of several officers, booted, spurred, and
+travel-stained from some recent man-hunt. Turning, however, from
+the more inconspicuous objects of Professor Willis's attacks, [378]
+the American trial judges in the Philippines in the pioneer days, to
+the now wide-looming historic personage who was his real objective,
+I was asked at a public meeting in Boston, rather significantly,
+by one of the most eminent lawyers in this country, Mr. Moorfield
+Storey, formerly president of the American Bar Association, whether
+or not there had been attempts in the Philippines, while I was there,
+to make the judiciary subservient to the executive. My answer was, "No,
+the lawyers who have been in charge of the Philippine Government have
+never been guilty of any unprofessional conduct." But the distinguished
+Boston barrister above referred to has a nephew who is now and has been
+since 1909, Governor of the Philippines--and who, before he went out
+there was a representative of Big Business in Boston--Governor Forbes,
+and I have no idea that any judge who during that time has rendered
+any decision of importance he did not like has been promoted to the
+Supreme Bench of the Islands, though I know that under Governor Taft,
+Judge Carson unhesitatingly declared a certain act of the Commission
+null and void as being in conflict with an Act of Congress, and
+before the time-servers had gotten through wondering at his rashness,
+Mr. Taft had him put on the Supreme Bench of the Philippines [379]
+because he liked that kind of a judge.
+
+Having sown the wind by setting up his civil government too soon,
+let us now observe the whirlwind Governor Taft reaped within six
+months thereafter. Of course the civil and military folk were at
+daggers' points. That goes without saying. But their differences
+were decorously suppressed so that the Filipinos did not get hold
+of them. To that end, the situation was also diligently concealed
+in the United States. In his proclamation of July 4, 1902, you find
+President Roosevelt publicly smoothing the ruffled feathers of that
+rugged hero of many battles in two hemispheres, General Chaffee, and
+also commending Governor Taft, and telling them how harmoniously they
+had gotten along together to the credit of their common country. But
+in 1901, shortly after General Chaffee had relieved General MacArthur,
+you find the following cablegram:
+
+
+                                          Executive Mansion, Washington,
+                                                        October 8, 1901.
+
+    Chaffee, Manila: I am deeply chagrined, to use the mildest possible
+    term, over the trouble between yourself and Taft. I wish you
+    to see him personally, and spare no effort to secure prompt and
+    friendly agreement in regard to the differences between you. Have
+    cabled him also. It is most unfortunate to have any action which
+    produces friction and which may have a serious effect both in
+    the Philippines and here at home. I trust implicitly that you
+    and Taft will come to agreement.
+
+        Theodore Roosevelt. [380]
+
+
+The most important words of the above telegram are "and here at
+home." The "serious effect here at home" so earnestly deprecated was
+that the real issue between General Chaffee and Governor Taft might
+be ventilated by some Congressional Committee, and thus bring out
+the prematurity with which, to meet political exigencies, the civil
+government had been set up. The issue was that General Chaffee was
+recognizing the hostility of the people, and deprecating the withdrawal
+of the police protection of the army from districts in which there
+were many people who, though tired of keeping up the struggle, and
+willing to quit, were being harried by the die-in-the-last-ditch
+contingent. This would mean, ultimately, an examination, such as has
+already been made in this volume, of the evidence on which Governor
+Taft based his half-baked opinion of 1900 that "the great majority"
+were "entirely willing" to American sovereignty. It would also show
+up Mr. Root's nonsense about "the patient and unconsenting millions,"
+so shamelessly flouted in the presidential campaign of 1900, and his
+pious Philippics against delivering said millions "into the hands of
+the assassin, Aguinaldo," [381] and would reveal the truth confessed
+by Secretary Root in a speech made to the cadets at West Point in July,
+1902, after the trouble had blown over, in which, apropos of the valor
+and services of the army, he referred proudly to its having then just
+completed the suppression of "an insurrection of 7,000,000 people."
+
+On September 28, 1901, just prior to President Roosevelt's above
+cablegram pouring oil on the troubled politico-military insular
+waters, a company of General Chaffee's command, Company C, of the
+9th Infantry, had been taken off their guard and massacred at a place
+called Balangiga, in the island of Samar. [382] This had made General
+Chaffee somewhat angry, and explains the subsequent dark and bloody
+drama of which General "Jake" Smith was the central figure, whereby
+Samar was made "a howling wilderness." But Governor Taft was filled
+with much more solicitude about the success of his civil government
+than he was about the obscure lives lost at Balangiga. Apropos
+of the Balangiga affair he was wearing the patience of the doughty
+Chaffee with remarks like this: "The people are friendly to the civil
+government," and suavely speaking of "the evidence which accumulates
+on every hand of the desire of the people at large for peace and
+protection by the civil government." [383] The same Taft report goes
+on to deprecate "rigor in the treatment" of the situation and the
+"consequent revulsion in those feelings of friendship toward the
+Americans which have been growing stronger each day with the spread
+and development of the civil government."
+
+General "Jake" Smith was sent to Samar shortly after the Balangiga
+massacre, and did indeed make the place a howling wilderness, with his
+famous "kill-and-burn" orders, instructions to "kill everything over
+ten years old" and so forth, and the army was in sympathy generally
+with most of what he did,--except, of course, the unspeakable "10 year
+old" part--piously exclaiming, as fallible human nature often will in
+such circumstances, "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord." Now the civil
+government could have put a stop to all this if it had wanted to. It
+had the backing of President Roosevelt. But it quietly accepted the
+benefit of such "fear of God"--to use the army's rather sacrilegious
+expression about that Samar campaign--as the military arm put into
+the heart of the Filipino, and went on the even tenor of its way,
+still maintaining that the Filipinos must like us because the civil
+government was so benevolent,--as if the Filipinos drew any nice
+distinctions between Governor Taft and General Chaffee, or supposed
+the two did not represent one and the same government, the government
+of the United States. There was much investigation about that awful
+Samar campaign afterward. General Smith was court-martialed and partly
+whitewashed, at least not dismissed. At General Smith's court-martial,
+there was some dispute about the alleged orders to "kill and burn,"
+to "kill everything over ten years old," etc. But the nature of the
+campaign may be inferred from General Smith's famous circular No. 6,
+which, issued on Christmas eve, 1901, advised his command, in effect,
+that he did not take much stock in the civil commission's confidence
+that the people really wanted peace; that he was "thoroughly convinced"
+that the wealthy people in the towns of his district were aiding the
+insurgents while pretending to be friendly and that he proposed to
+
+
+    adopt a policy that will create in all the minds of all the
+    people a burning desire for the war to cease; a desire or longing
+    so intense, so personal, and so real that it will impel them to
+    devote themselves in real earnest to bringing about a real state
+    of peace. [384]
+
+
+During all his trial troubles, General Smith "took what was coming
+to him" without a murmur, and General Chaffee stuck to him as far as
+he could without assuming the primary responsibility for the fearful
+orders above alluded to. If, when General Smith went to Samar, his
+superior officer, General Chaffee, was in just the direly vengeful
+frame of mind he, General Smith, afterwards displayed, and prompted
+him to do, substantially, what he afterward did, which is by no
+means unlikely, General Smith never whimpered or put the blame on his
+chief. But a fearful lesson was given the Filipinos, and the civil
+government profited by it. General Chaffee was never really pressed
+on whether he did or did not prompt General Smith to do what he did;
+Governor Taft was never even criticised for not protesting; but with
+a flourish of presidential trumpets, General Smith was finally made
+"the goat," by being summarily placed on the retired list, and that
+closed the bloody Samar episode of 1901-02. I wonder General Smith
+has not gone and wept on General Miles's shoulder and like him become
+a member of the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston. Some of the best
+fighting men in the army say that as a soldier in battle General
+Smith is superb. At any rate he may find spiritual consolation in the
+following passage of the Scriptures which fits and describes his case:
+
+
+    But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall be
+    presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him,
+    and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. [385]
+
+
+In his Report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four principal
+provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble shortly after the
+civil government was set up in that year, and had to be returned
+to military control, were organized under civil rule "on the
+recommendation" of the then commanding general (MacArthur) [386]: It
+certainly seems unlikely that the haste to change from military rule
+to civil rule came on the motion of the military. If the Commission
+ever got, in writing, from General MacArthur, a "recommendation" that
+any provinces be placed under civil rule while still in insurrection,
+the text of the writing will show a mere soldiery acquiescence in the
+will of Mr. McKinley, the commander-in-chief. Parol contemporaneous
+evidence will show that General MacArthur told them, substantially,
+that they were "riding for a fall." In fact, whenever an insurrection
+would break out in a province after Governor Taft's inauguration as
+governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, from
+the commanding general down, was "I told you so." They did not say
+this where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common knowledge
+that they were much addicted to damning "politics" as the cause of
+all the trouble.
+
+Governor Taft's statement in his report for 1901, that the four
+principal provinces, above named, Batangas and the rest, were organized
+under civil rule "on the recommendation of General MacArthur,"
+is fully explained in his testimony before the Senate Committee of
+1902. From the various passages hereinbefore quoted from President
+McKinley's state papers concerning the Philippines, especially
+his messages to Congress, the political pressure Mr. McKinley was
+under from the beginning to make a show of "civil" government, thus
+emphasizing the alleged absence of any real substantial opposition
+to our rule by a seeming absence of necessity for the use of force,
+so as to palliate American repugnance to forcing a government upon an
+unwilling people, has been made clear. There were to be no "dark days
+of reconstruction." The Civil War in the United States from 1861 to
+1865 was a love feast compared with our war in the Philippines. Yet the
+work of reconstruction in the Philippines was to be predicated on the
+theory of consent, so persistently urged by President McKinley before
+the American people from the beginning, viz., that the insurrection
+represented only a small faction of the people. We have seen how
+General MacArthur also had originally, in 1898, entertained this
+notion, and how by the time he took Malolos in March, 1899, he had
+gotten over this notion, and had--regretfully--recognized that "the
+whole people are loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he represents." And
+now came Governor Taft, after fifteen months more of continuous
+fighting, to tell General MacArthur, on behalf of Mr. McKinley,
+that he, MacArthur, did not know what he was talking about, and that
+"the great majority" were for American rule. The representative
+men of my own State of Georgia welcomed the return of the State to
+military control in 1870. Most of them had been officers of the
+Confederate army. The Federal commander simply told them that if
+they could not restrain the lawless element of their own people, he
+would. By premature setting up of the Philippine civil government,
+the lawless element was allowed full swing. General MacArthur had
+been in the Civil War. He knew something about reconstruction. But
+here were the Taft Commission, with instructions from Mr. McKinley to
+the effect that civil government, government "essentially popular in
+form," was to be set up as fast as territory was conquered. It didn't
+make any difference about the government being "essentially popular"
+just so it was "essentially popular in form." To the Senate Committee
+of 1902, Governor Taft said:
+
+
+    General MacArthur and the Commission did differ as to where the
+    power lay with respect to the organization of civil governments,
+    as to who should say what civil governments should be organized,
+    the Commission contending that, under the instructions, it was
+    left to them, and General MacArthur thinking that everything was
+    subject to military control ultimately, in view of the fact that
+    the islands were in a state of war. [387]
+
+
+Governor Taft then added that he and General MacArthur reached a
+modus vivendi. When a good soldier once finds out just what his
+commander-in-chief wants done, he will endeavor, in loyal good
+faith, to carry out the spirit of instructions, no matter how
+unwise they may seem to him. As soon as General MacArthur saw what
+President McKinley wanted done, he proceeded to co-operate loyally
+with Governor Taft to carry out the plan. He well knew the country
+was not ready for civil government, but if Mr. McKinley was bent on
+crowding civil government forward as fast as territory was conquered,
+he would make his recommendations on that basis. In the matter of
+the utter folly of the prematurity with which the civil government
+was set up in the Philippines in 1901, and the terrible consequences
+to the hapless Filipinos, hereinafter described, which followed,
+by reason of the premature withdrawal of the police protection of
+the army and the sense of security its several garrisons radiated,
+from a country just recovering from some six years of war, General
+MacArthur's exemption from responsibility is shown by his reports
+for 1900 and 1901. [388] The former has already been fully examined,
+and the original sharp differences between him and Governor Taft
+made clear. In the latter report dated July 4, 1901, the date of
+the Taft inauguration as Governor, and also, if I mistake not, the
+day of General MacArthur's final departure for the United States,
+the latter washes his hands of the kindly McKinley-Taft nonsense,
+born of political expediency, about there having never been any real
+fundamental or unanimous resistance, in no uncertain terms thus:
+
+
+    Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede the
+    activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments [our
+    military forces,] will not only be a menace to the present, but
+    put in jeopardy the entire future of American possibilities in
+    the archipelago. [389]
+
+
+No, President Taft can never make General MacArthur "the goat" for
+what General Bell had to do in Batangas Province in 1901-02 to make
+our "willing" subjects behave. Nor can the ultimate responsibility
+before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the
+United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of
+1899, the population of Batangas Province was 312,192, and according
+to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903 it was 257,715,
+[390] rest entirely on military shoulders. An attempt to place the
+responsibility for the prematurity of the civil government on General
+MacArthur was made by Honorable Henry C. Ide, who was of the Taft
+Commission of 1900, and later Governor General of the Islands, and
+is now Minister to Spain, in the North American Review for December,
+1907. But Mr. Taft, a man of nobler mould, has at least maintained a
+decorous silence on the subject except when interrogated by Congress,
+and when so interrogated, his testimony, above quoted, if analyzed,
+places the responsibility where it honestly belongs. In 1900 the Taft
+Commission were not taking much military advice.
+
+Batangas province was first taken under the wing of the
+peace-at-any-price policy by the Act of the Taft Commission of May 2,
+1901, entitled "An Act Extending the Provisions of 'the Provincial
+Government Act' [391] to the Province of Batangas." By the Act of
+the Commission of July 17, 1901, the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and
+Bohol, were restored to military control. When the civil authorities
+turned those provinces back to military control, they well knew the
+frame of mind the military were in, and there is no escape from the
+proposition that they, in effect, said to the military: "Take them
+and chasten them; go as far as you like. After you are done with them,
+it will be time enough to pet them again. But for the present we mean
+business." General Bell was scathingly criticised on the floor of the
+United States Senate for what he did in Batangas in 1901-02, but by
+the time he took hold there it had become a case of "spare the rod
+and spoil the child." The substitution by the Commission of kindness,
+and a disposition to forget what the Filipinos could not forget, for
+firmness and the policy of making them submit unreservedly to the
+inevitable,--viz., abandonment of their dream of independence--had
+created among them a well-nigh ineradicable impression that, for some
+reason or other, whether due to disapproval in the United States
+of the so-called "imperial" policy or what not, we were afraid of
+them. General Bell's task in Batangas, therefore, was to eradicate
+this impression all over the archipelago by making an example of the
+Batangas people.
+
+In General Chaffee's report for 1902, [392] he prefaces his account
+of General Bell's operations in Batangas as follows:
+
+
+    The long-continued resistance in the province of Batangas and
+    in certain parts of the bordering provinces of Tayabas, Laguna,
+    and Cavite, had made it apparent to me and to others that the
+    insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist
+    and maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge
+    of practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active
+    support of many who professed friendship for United States
+    authority, etc.
+
+
+This last was a thrust at Governor Taft's new-found Filipino friends
+and advisers, in whose lack of sympathy with the cause of their
+country the Governor so profoundly believed, but in whose continuing
+co-operation in the killing of his soldiers General Chaffee believed
+still more profoundly.
+
+General Bell's famous operations on a large scale in Batangas began
+January 1, 1902. The great mistake of the Civil Commission, to which
+they adhered so long, was in supposing that when the respectable
+military element of the insurgents was pursued to capture or surrender,
+these last could and would thereafter control the situation. As a
+matter of fact, whether they could or not, they did not.
+
+In his celebrated circular order dated Batangas, December 9, 1901,
+General Bell announced:
+
+
+    To all Station Commanders:
+
+    A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares,
+    appears to exist, that the insurrection in this brigade continues
+    because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy
+    ones, pretend to desire, but do not in reality want peace; that
+    when all really want peace, we can have it promptly. Under such
+    circumstances, it is clearly indicated that a policy should be
+    adopted that will, as soon as possible, make the people want
+    peace and want it badly.
+
+    The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments
+    of either individuals or town councils should be such acts
+    publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to
+    the side of Americans by arousing the animosity of the insurgent
+    element. * * * No person should be given credit for loyalty simply
+    because he takes the oath of allegiance, or secretly conveys to
+    Americans worthless information and idle rumors which result in
+    nothing. Those who publicly guide our troops to the camps of the
+    enemy, who publicly identify insurgents, who accompany troops in
+    operations against the enemy, who denounce and assist in arresting
+    the secret enemies of the Government, who publicly obtain and
+    bring reliable and valuable information to commanding officers,
+    those in fact who publicly array themselves against the insurgents,
+    and for Americans, should be trusted and given credit for loyalty,
+    but no others. No person should be given credit for loyalty solely
+    on account of having done nothing for or against us so far as
+    known. Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of
+    this brigade should be either active friend or be classed as enemy.
+
+
+In his Circular Order No. 5, dated Batangas, December 13, 1901, [393]
+General Bell announced that General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's
+Office, 1863, approved and published by order of President Lincoln,
+for the government of the armies of the United States in the field,
+would thereafter be regarded as the guide of his subordinates in the
+conduct of the war. This order is familiar to all who have ever made
+any study of military law. Ordinarily, of course, a captured enemy
+is entitled to "the honors of war," i. e., he must be held, housed,
+and fed, unless exchanged, until the close of the war. But where an
+enemy places himself by his conduct without the pale of the laws of
+war, i. e., where he does not "play the game according to the rules,"
+he may be killed on sight, like other outlaws.
+
+Under General Orders No. 100, 1863, men and squads of men who,
+without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly
+organized hostile army, fight occasionally only, and with intermittent
+returns to their homes and avocations, and frequent assumption of the
+semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character
+and appearance of soldiers; armed prowlers seeking to cut telegraph
+wires, destroy bridges and the like, etc., are not entitled to the
+protection of the laws of war and may be shot on sight. In other
+words, the game being one of life and death, you must take even
+chances with your opponent. General Bell's defenders on the floor of
+the Senate simply relied on General Orders No. 100. However, there is
+nothing about reconcentration in that order. We learned that from the
+Spaniards. In fact we never did succeed in bringing to terms the far
+Eastern colonies we bought from Spain, until we adopted her methods
+with regard to them. Another of the expedients adopted by General Bell
+in Batangas seems harsh, but it was used by Wellington in the latter
+end of the Napoleonic wars, and by the Germans in the latter end of
+the Franco-Prussian War. It was to promise the inhabitants of a given
+territory that whenever a telegraph wire or pole was cut the country
+within a stated radius thereof, including all human habitations,
+would be devastated. It is in General Bell's Circular Order No. 7
+of December 15, 1901, [394] that we find the genesis of the idea of
+basing tactics used by Weyler in Cuba on Mr. Lincoln's General Order
+100. He there says:
+
+
+    Though Section 17, General Orders 100, authorizes the starving
+    of unarmed hostile belligerents as well as armed ones, provided
+    it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is considered
+    neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any person to starve
+    who has come into towns under our control seeking protection.
+
+
+This order goes on to direct that all food supplies encountered
+be brought to the towns. Of course this does not mean supplies
+captured from the enemy's forces, which may lawfully be destroyed
+at once. To those not familiar with reconcentration tactics it
+should be explained that reconcentration means this: You notify,
+by proclamation and otherwise, all persons within a given area, that
+on and after a certain day they must all leave their homes and come
+within a certain prescribed zone or radius of which a named town is
+usually the centre, there to remain until further orders, and that
+all persons found outside that zone after the date named will be
+treated as public enemies. General Bell's order of December 20th,
+provided that rice found in the possession of families outside the
+protected zone should, if practicable, be moved with them to the town
+which was the centre of the zone, that that found apparently cached
+for enemy's use should be confiscated, and also destroyed if necessary.
+
+
+    Whenever it is found absolutely impossible to transport it [any
+    food supply] to a point within the protected zone, it will be
+    burned or otherwise destroyed. These rules will apply to all
+    food products.
+
+
+No person within the reconcentration zones was permitted to go
+outside thereof--cross the dead line--without a written pass. The
+Circular Order of December 23d, apparently solicitous lest subordinate
+commanders might become infected with the Taft belief in Filipino
+affection, directs that after January 1, 1902, all the municipal
+officials, members of the police force, etc., "who have not fully
+complied with their duty by actively aiding the Americans and rendering
+them valuable service," shall be summarily thrown into prison. [395]
+Circular Order No. 19, issued on Christmas Eve, 1901, provided that,
+
+
+    in order to make the existing state oĢ war and martial law
+    so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they will
+    earnestly desire and work for the re-establishment of peace and
+    civil government,
+
+
+subordinate commanders might, under certain prescribed restrictions,
+put everybody they chose to work on the roads. [396] This was an
+ingenious blow at the wealthy and soft-handed, intended to superinduce
+submission by humbling their pride. Note also the seeds of affection
+thus sown for the civil government under the reconstruction period
+which was to follow. In one of Dickens novels there occurs a law
+firm by the name of Spenlow and Jorkins. Mr. Spenlow was quite
+fond of considering himself, and of being considered by others, as
+tender-hearted. Mr. Jorkins did not mind. When the widow and the orphan
+would plead with Mr. Spenlow to stay the foreclosure of a mortgage,
+that benevolent soul would tell them, with a pained expression of
+infinite sympathy, that he would do all he could for them, but that
+they would have to see Mr. Jorkins, "who is a very exacting man,"
+he would say. In the dual American politico-military régime in the
+Philippines of 1901-02, Governor Taft was the Mr. Spenlow, General
+Chaffee the Mr. Jorkins. But the former always seemed to harbor the
+amiable delusion that the Filipinos did not at all consider the firm as
+the movants in each proceeding against them, and that on the contrary
+they were sure to make a favorable contrast in their hearts between
+the kindness of Mr. Spenlow and the harshness of Mr. Jorkins. He
+seemed blind to the fact that the Filipinos, in considering what was
+done by any of us, spelled us--U. S.
+
+General Bell's Circular Order No. 22, also a Christmas Eve product,
+re-iterates the usual purpose to make the people yearn for civil
+government, and the usual warning that none of them really and truly
+want the blessings of American domination and Benevolent Assimilation
+as they truly should, and adds:
+
+
+    To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of
+    war as insupportable as possible; and there is no more efficacious
+    way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people
+    in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such
+    conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The
+    less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey intentions. [397]
+
+
+Under date of December 26, 1901, General Bell reports:
+
+
+    I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2500 men, who will be
+    used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the command.
+    * * * I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly
+    searching each ravine, valley, and mountain peak for insurgents
+    and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of
+    town. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured.
+
+
+Such was the central idea animating the Bell Brigade that overran
+Batangas in 1902. The American soldier in officially sanctioned
+wrath is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling
+to describe him. I have seen him in that mood, but to describe it is
+beyond me. Side by side with innumerable ambuscades incident to the
+nature of the field service as it then was, in which little affairs
+the soldier above mentioned had lost many a "bunkie," there had gone
+on for some time, under the McKinley-Taft peace-at-any-price policy,
+whose keynote was that no American should have a job a Filipino could
+fill, much appointing to municipal and other offices of Filipinos,
+many of whom had at once set to work to make their new offices useful
+to the cause of their country by systematic aid to the ambuscade
+business. With this and the Balangiga massacre ever in mind, the
+men of General Bell's brigade began their work in Batangas in a mood
+which quite made for fidelity in performance of orders to "make living
+unbearable" for the Filipino "by acts, not words." Also, the American
+soldier can sing, sometimes very badly, but often rather irrepressibly,
+until stopped by his officer. Also, whether justly or unjustly is
+beside the question, he considers a politician who pets the enemy
+in the midst of a war a hypocrite. So General Bell's 2500 men began
+that Batangas campaign on New Year's Day, 1902, giving preference,
+out of their repertoire, to a campaign song whose ominous chorus ran:
+
+
+            "He may be a brother of William H. Taft
+            But he ain't no friend of mine,"
+
+
+and between songs they would say purringly to one another, "Remember
+Balangiga." And their commanding officer was the very incarnation of
+this feeling. So listen to the stride of his seven-league boots and
+the ring of his iron heel:
+
+
+    I expect to first clean out the wide Looboo Peninsula. I shall then
+    move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the country
+    westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning through
+    Lipa. I shall scour and clean up the Lipa mountains. Swinging
+    northward, the country in the vicinity of [here follows a long
+    list of towns] will be scoured, ending at [a named mountain],
+    which will then be thoroughly searched and devastated. Swinging
+    back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the
+    country of which [two named mountains] are the main peaks.
+
+
+And so on ad libitum. General Bell's course in Batangas was commended
+in the annual report of his immediate superior, a very humane, as
+well as gallant, soldier, General Wheaton, as "a model in suppressing
+insurrections under like circumstances." [398] The Batangas programme
+was approved by General Chaffee, the commanding general. In 1902 the
+United States Senate rang with indiscriminate denunciation of the
+Batangas severities and the Samar "kill and burn" orders. I tried
+in 1903, without success, to satisfy my distinguished and beloved
+fellow-townsman, Senator Bacon, that at the time it was adopted it
+had become a military necessity, which it had. The fact was that the
+McKinley-Taft policy of conciliation, intended to gild the rivets of
+alien domination and cure the desire for independence by coddling,
+had loaned aid and comfort to the enemy, by creating, among a people
+used theretofore solely to force as a governmental agency for making
+sovereignty respected, the pathetic notion that we were afraid of them,
+and might be weakening in respect to our declared programme of denying
+them independence. The Bell opinion of the Commission's confidence in
+Filipino gladness at its advent among them is sufficiently apparent in
+his orders to his troops. On May 23, 1902, Senator Bacon read in the
+Senate a letter from an officer of the army, a West Point graduate and
+a personal friend of the Senator's, whose name he withheld, but for
+whose veracity he vouched, which letter alluded to "a reconcentrado,
+pen with a dead line outside, beyond which everything living is
+shot"; spoke of "this corpse-carcass stench wafted in" (to where the
+letter-writer sat writing) as making it "slightly unpleasant here,"
+and made your flesh crawl thus:
+
+
+    At nightfall clouds of vampire bats softly swirl out on their
+    orgies over the dead.
+
+
+This does not sound to me like Batangas and Bell. It sounds like
+Smith and Samar. There were about 100,000 people, all told, gathered
+in the reconcentrado camps in Batangas under General Bell, [399]
+and they were handled as efficiently as General Funston handled
+matters after the San Francisco fire. There was no starvation in
+those camps. All the reconcentrados had to do was not to cross the
+dead line of the reconcentration zone, and to draw their rations,
+which were provided as religiously as any ordinary American who is
+not a fiend and has plenty of rice on hand for the purpose will give
+it to the hungry. The reconcentrado camps and the people in them were
+daily looked after by medical officers of the American army. General
+Bell's active campaigning began in Batangas January 1, 1902, Malvar
+surrendered April 16 thereafter, and Batangas was thoroughly purged
+of insurrectos and the like by July. During this period the total of
+insurgents killed was only 163, and wounded 209; and 3626 insurgents
+surrendered. [400]
+
+The truth is General Bell's "bark" was much worse than his
+"bite." The inestimable value of what he did in Batangas in 1901-02
+lay in convincing the Filipinos once and for all that we were not
+as impotent as the civil-government coddling had led them quite
+naturally, but very foolishly, to think we were. Reference was
+made above to the fact that the population of Batangas in 1899 was
+312,192, and in 1903, 257,715. Those figures were inserted at the
+outset to make General Bell's "bark" sound louder, but now that we
+are considering his "bite"--how many lives his Batangas lesson to
+the Filipino people cost--another bit of testimony is tremendously
+relevant. On December 18, 1901, the Provincial Secretary of Batangas
+Province reported to Governor Taft that the mortality in Batangas due
+to war, pestilence, and famine "has reduced to a little over 200,000
+the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province
+had." [401] Considering that General Bell's 1901-'02 campaign in that
+ill-fated province cost outright but 163 killed,--how many of the 209
+wounded recovered does not appear; they may have all recovered--the
+Bell programme in Batangas was indeed a very tender model, from
+the humanitarian stand-point, of civilizing with a Krag, a model of
+"suppressing insurrection under like circumstances." But it was never
+again followed. It had made too much noise at home. Senator Bacon's
+"corpse-carcass stench" from supposed reconcentrado pens and his
+"clouds of vampire bats softly swirling on their orgies over the
+dead," so vividly reminded our people of why they had driven Spain
+out of Cuba, that the Administration became apprehensive. Until the
+noise about the Batangas business, our people had been led by Governor
+Taft and President Roosevelt to believe that the Filipinos were most
+sobbingly in love with "a benign civil government" and had forgotten
+all about independence. It was obvious that a repetition of such a
+campaign in any other province might create in the public mind at home
+a disgust with the whole Philippine policy which would be heard at
+the polls in the next presidential election. So the Batangas affair
+made it certain that the army was not going to be ordered out again
+in the Philippines before said next presidential election, at least;
+whatever castigation might be deemed advisable thereafter.
+
+It was intimated above that Senator Bacon's army friend's "clouds of
+vampire bats softly swirling" over the corpses of reconcentrados, were
+doing said swirling not over Batangas at all, but over Samar. Any man
+familiar with the lay of the land in the two provinces can see from
+the letter that it was written from Samar. Moreover, Colonel Wagner
+afterwards testified before the Senate Committee of 1902 [402] that
+if there had been any great mortality in the reconcentration camps
+in Batangas, he would have known of it. He inspected practically
+all those Batangas camps. Nobody who was in the islands at the time
+doubts but what such conditions may have obtained in some places
+under General Smith in Samar, or believes for a moment that any such
+conditions would have been tolerated under General Bell. General Bell
+has that aversion to either causing or witnessing needless suffering,
+which you almost invariably find in men who are both constitutionally
+brave and temperamentally generous and considerate of others. But the
+moral sought to be pointed here is not that the Bell reconcentration
+in Batangas was as merciful as the Smith performances in Samar were
+hellish, but that, in all matters concerning the Philippines, the army,
+as in the case of Senator Bacon's friend, is gagged by operation of
+law, and its enforced silence is peculiarly an asset in the hands of
+the party in power seeking to continue in power, in a distant colonial
+enterprise. Senator Bacon withheld his friend's name, because for an
+army officer to tell the truth about the Philippines would be likely
+to get him into trouble with the President of the United States. The
+President, be it remembered, is also the leader of the political party
+to which he belongs. That is why the country has never been able to
+get any light from those who know the most about the Philippines and
+the wisdom or unwisdom of keeping them, viz., the army. In 1898 this
+republic was beguiled into abandonment of the faiths of the founders
+and started after a gold brick, thinking it was a Klondyke. Then and
+ever since, the most important and material witnesses concerning the
+wisdom or unwisdom of keeping the brick, viz., the army,--which best
+of all knows the rank folly of it--have been gagged by operation
+of law. All republics that have heretofore become monarchies, have
+become so through manipulation of the army by men in power seeking
+to continue in power. We should either resign our expensive kingship
+over the Philippines or get a king for the whole business, and be
+done with it. We have some ready-made coronet initials in T. R. [403]
+
+"On June 23, 1902," says General Chaffee, in his report for that year,
+[404] "by Act No. 421 of the Philippine Commission, so much of Act
+No. 173, of July 17, 1901, as transferred the province of Batangas
+to military control was revoked. Civil government was re-established
+in the province at 12 o'clock noon, July 4, 1902." The rest of the
+1,748,573 people herein above mentioned as constituting the population
+of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar, were also in
+turn made to "want peace and want it badly," and on July 4, 1902,
+President Roosevelt issued his proclamation declaring that a state of
+general and complete peace existed. This is the famous proclamation
+in which he congratulated General Chaffee and the officers and men of
+his command on "a total of more than 2000 combats, great and small,"
+most of them subsequent to the Taft roseate cablegrams of 1900,
+and the still more roseate reports of 1901 from the same source. The
+proclamation appeared in the Philippines as General Orders No. 66,
+Adjutant General's Office, Washington, dated July 4, 1902. [405]
+It directed, in the body of it, that it be "read aloud at parade in
+every military post." It thanked the officers and enlisted men of the
+army in the Philippines, in the name of the President of the United
+States, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal
+devotion with which they had been fighting up to that time, alluded
+to the impliedly lamb-like or turn-the-other-cheek way in which they
+had been behaving (no special reference is made either to Batangas,
+Samar, or the water-cure), and closes with a bully Rooseveltian
+war-whoop about the "more than 2000 combats, great and small," above
+mentioned. It also referred to how, "with admirable good temper and
+loyalty to American ideals its (the army's) commanding generals have
+joined with the civilian agents of the government" in the work of
+superinducing allegiance to American sovereignty. This document is
+one of the most remarkable state papers of that most remarkable of
+men, ex-President Roosevelt, in its evidences of ability to mould
+powerful discordant elements to his will. It put everybody in a good
+humor. And yet, read at every military post, it served notice on the
+military that if they knew which side their bread was buttered on,
+they had better forget everything they knew tending to show the
+prematurity of the setting-up of the civil government, sheath all
+tomahawks and scalping knives they might have whetted and waiting
+for Governor Taft's exit from office, abstain from chatty letters to
+United States Senators telling tales out of school, such as the one
+Senator Bacon had read on the floor of the Senate (already noticed),
+and dutifully perceive, in the future, that the war was ended, as
+officially announced in the proclamation itself.
+
+The report of the Philippine Commission for 1902, declares that the
+insurrection "as an organized attempt to subvert the authority of
+the United States" is over (p. 3). They then proceed, with evident
+sincerity, to describe the popularity of themselves and their
+policies with the same curious blindness you sometimes find in
+your Congressional district, in the type of man who thinks he could
+be elected to Congress "in a walk" if he should only announce his
+candidacy, when as a matter of fact, the great majority of the people
+of his district are, for some notorious reason connected with his
+past history among them,--say his war record--very much prejudiced
+against him. They repeat one of their favorite sentiments about the
+whole country--always except "as hereinafter excepted"--being now
+engaged in enjoying civil government. But they casually admit also that
+"much remains to be done" in suppressing lawlessness and disturbances,
+so as to perfect and accentuate said "enjoyment."
+
+Let us see just what the state of the country was in this regard
+according to their own showing. They say:
+
+
+    The six years of war to which these islands have been subjected
+    have naturally created a class of restless men utterly lacking
+    in habits of industry, taught to live and prey upon the country
+    for their support by the confiscation of food supplies as a
+    war measure, and regarding the duties of a laborer as dull and
+    impossible for one who has tasted the excitement of a guerrilla
+    life. Even to the man anxious to return to agricultural pursuits,
+    the conditions existing present no temptation. By the war
+    and by the rinderpest, chiefly the latter, the carabaos, or
+    water-buffaloes, have been reduced to ten per cent. of their
+    former number.
+
+
+Think of the condition of a country, any country, but especially one
+whose wealth is almost wholly agricultural, which has just had nine
+tenths of its plow animals absolutely swept off the face of the earth
+by war and its immediate consequences. The report proceeds:
+
+
+    The chief food of the common people of these islands is rice,
+    and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people in
+    the cultivation of rice,
+
+
+adding also that the carabao is the chief means of transportation
+of the tobacco, hemp, and other crops to market, and that the few
+remaining carabaos, the ordinary price of which in normal Spanish
+times had been $10 was now $100. Then, after completing a faithful
+picture of supremely thorough desolation such as the Islands had never
+seen since they first rose out of the sea, certainly not during the
+sleepy, easy-going Spanish rule, they say: "The Filipino people of
+the better class have received the passage of the Philippine Act with
+great satisfaction"--meaning the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the
+Philippine Government Act. Gott im Himmel! What did the people care
+about paper constitutions concerning benevolent assimilation? What they
+were interested in was food and safety, not politics; food, raiment,
+shelter, and efficient police protection from the brigandage which
+immediately follows in the wake of all war, not details as to what we
+were going to do with the bleeding and prostrate body politic. But
+the Commission had started out to govern the Filipino people on a
+definite theory,--apparently on the idea that if Americans wore white
+duck and no brass buttons, in lieu of khaki and brass buttons, the
+Filipinos would at once forget the war and be happy with an exceeding
+great happiness. Now the real situation was this. The Islands had not
+yet been thoroughly beaten into submission. Northern Luzon had been
+conquered. The lake region of Southern Luzon had been conquered. The
+most important of the Visayan Islands had been conquered. But the
+extreme southern portion of Luzon, the enormously rich hemp peninsula
+already described in a former chapter, and the adjoining hemp island of
+Samar, were still seething with sedition which later broke out. All
+through the winter of 1900-01 General MacArthur had tried to get
+Mr. Root to let him close the hemp ports. But some powerful influence
+at Washington had prevented the grant of this permission. On January 9,
+1901, General MacArthur had wired Mr. Root:
+
+
+    Hemp in southern Luzon in same relation to present struggle as
+    cotton during rebellion. [406]
+
+
+Nothing doing. General MacArthur must worry along with the
+"blockade-runners" as best he could, no matter how much hemp money
+might be poured into the insurgent coffers. So that in the latter
+part of 1902, although the more respectable of the insurgent leaders
+had then surrendered, even in the hemp country, the flames of public
+disorder, which had flickered for a spell after the Batangas lesson,
+broke out anew in the province of Albay, and in parts of Sorsogon,
+the two provinces of the hemp peninsula having the best sea-ports. The
+man at the head of this Albay insurrection was a sorry scamp of some
+shrewdness by the name of Simeon Ola, with whom I afterwards had an
+interesting and in some respects most amusing acquaintance. But that
+is another story. I have simply brought the whole archipelago abreast
+of the close of 1902, relatively to public order. In this way only
+may the insurrections in Albay and elsewhere in 1902-03, described
+in the chapter which follows, be understood in their relation to a
+comprehensive view of the American occupation from the beginning,
+and not be regarded as "a local issue" like General Hancock's tariff,
+having no general political significance. In this way only may those
+insurrections be understood in their true relation to the history of
+public order in the Islands. The Commission always represented all
+disturbances after 1902 as matters of mere banditti, such as have
+been chronic for generations in Calabria or the Transcaucasus, wholly
+distinct from, instead of being an inevitable political sequel of,
+the years of continuous warfare which had preceded. Their benevolent
+obsession was that the desire of the Philippine people for independence
+was wholly and happily eradicated.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT, 1903
+
+                            Me miserable! Which way shall I fly?
+
+                                                          Paradise Lost.
+
+
+Throughout the last year of Governor Taft's administration in the
+Philippines, 1903, both he, and the peaceably inclined Filipinos in
+the disturbed districts, were between the devil and the deep sea. The
+military handling of the Batangas and Samar disorders of 1901-2 had
+precipitated in the United States Senate a storm of criticism, at
+the hands of Senator Bacon and others, which had reminded a public,
+already satiated with slaughtering a weaker Christian people they had
+never seen in the interest of supposed trade expansion, of "the days
+when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when,
+before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus
+thundered against the oppressor of Africa." [407] He did not want to
+order out the military again if he could help it, and this relegated
+him to his native municipal police and constabulary, experimental
+outfits of doubtful loyalty, [408] and, at best, wholly inadequate, as
+it afterwards turned out, [409] for the maintenance of public order and
+for affording to the peaceably inclined people that sort of security
+for life and property, and that protection against semi-political as
+well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comport with the dignity
+of this nation. The better class of Filipinos, though not so enamored
+of American rule as Governor Taft fondly believed, had by 1903 about
+resigned themselves to the inevitable, and would have liked to see
+brigandage masquerading under the name of patriotism stopped by that
+sort of adequate police protection which was so obviously necessary in
+the disturbed and unsettled conditions naturally consequent upon many
+years of war, and which they of course realized could only be afforded
+by the strong arm of the American army. But they knew that if the army
+were ordered out, the burden of proof as to their own loyalty would
+at once be shifted to them, by the strenuous agents of that strenuous
+institution. The result was a sort of reign of terror for nearly a
+year, in 1902-3, in the richest province of the whole archipelago,
+the hemp-producing province of Albay, at the southern end of Luzon,
+and also in portions of the province of Misamis. These conditions had
+begun in those provinces in 1902, and, not being promptly checked,
+because the army was held in leash and the constabulary were crude and
+inadequate, by 1903 brigandage therein was thriving like a garden of
+weeds. Super-solicitude concerning the possible effect of adequately
+vigorous governmental action in the Philippines on the fortunes of the
+Administration in charge of the Federal Government at Washington, an
+attitude not surprising in the colonial agents of that Administration,
+but which, as we have seen, had been from the beginning, as it must
+ever be, the curse of our colonial system, had rendered American
+sovereignty in the disturbed districts as humiliatingly impotent as
+senile decadence ever rendered Spain.
+
+The average American citizen will admit that the average American
+statesman, even if he be not far-sighted, looks at least a year
+ahead, in matters where both his personal fortunes and those of the
+political party to which he belongs are intimately related to what he
+may be doing at the time. If in 1903 Governor Taft's administration
+of affairs in the Philippines was wholly uninfluenced by any possible
+effect it might have on President Roosevelt's chances for becoming an
+elected President in 1904, then he was a false friend and a very poor
+party man as well. Assuming that he was neither, let us examine his
+course regarding the disturbances of public order in the Philippines
+in that year, as related to the first and most sacred duty of every
+government, adequate protection for life and property.
+
+In President McKinley's original instructions of April 7, 1900,
+to the Taft Commission, after quoting the final paragraph of the
+articles of capitulation of the city of Manila:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants * * * and its private property of all
+    descriptions * * * are hereby placed under the special safeguard
+    of the faith and honor of the American army;
+
+
+the President had added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life
+    * * * to all the people of the Philippine Islands.
+
+    * * * I charge this Commission to labor for the full performance
+    of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of
+    their country.
+
+
+We will probably never again have a better man at the head of the
+Philippine Government than William H. Taft. We have no higher type of
+citizen in the republic to-day than the man now [410] at the head of
+it. In the Outlook of September 21, 1901, there appeared an article
+on the Philippines written in the summer previous by Vice-President
+Roosevelt, entitled "The First Civil Governor," which began as follows:
+
+
+    A year ago a man of wide acquaintance both with American public
+    life and American public men [411] remarked that the first Governor
+    of the Philippines ought to combine the qualities which would make
+    a first-class President of the United States with the qualities
+    which would make a first-class Chief Justice of the United States,
+    and that the only man he knew who possessed all these qualities was
+    Judge William H. Taft, of Ohio. The statement was entirely correct.
+
+
+The writer subscribed then, and still subscribes, to the foregoing
+estimate of Mr. Taft, whether Colonel Roosevelt still does or
+not. Though I dissent most vigorously from more than one of President
+Taft's policies, and though this book is one long dissent from his
+chief pet policy, still it is to me an especial pleasure to do him
+honor where I may, not merely because he has greatly honored me in
+the past, but because my judgment approves the above estimate. Though
+as a party leader he is a very poor general, as Chief Magistrate of
+the nation he has certainly deserved and commanded the cordial esteem
+of the whole country, and the respectful regard of all mankind. With
+this admission freely made, if after reading what follows in this and
+the next chapter, and weighing the same in the light of all that has
+preceded, the reader does not decide that the writer, far from being
+animated by any intelligent high purpose, is merely a foolish person
+of the sounding-brass-and-tinkling-cymbal variety full of sound and
+fury signifying nothing, then he can reach but one other conclusion,
+viz., that colonization by a republic like ours, such as that we
+blundered into by purchasing the Philippines, is a case of a house
+divided against itself, a case of the soul of a nation at war with
+the better angels of its nature, a case where considerations of what
+may be demanded by home considerations of political expediency will
+always operate to the detriment of the Filipino people, and be the
+controlling factor in our government of them. And if I show that
+in the Philippines in 1903 Governor Taft failed properly to protect
+the lives and property of peaceably inclined people, as so sacredly
+enjoined in the language above quoted from President McKinley's
+original instructions to him, lest "the full performance of this
+obligation" might prejudice the presidential prospects of his friend,
+Mr. Roosevelt, and the success of the party to which they belonged,
+then I will have shown that for this republic to be in the colonizing
+business is an absolutely evil thing, and that any man who proposes
+any honorable way out of the conceded blunder of 1898, is entitled to
+a hearing at the hands of the American people, because it "concerns
+the honor and conscience of their country."
+
+Having tried most of the cases which arose out of the public disorders
+in the Philippines in 1903, and knowing from what I thus learned,
+together with what I subsequently learned which Mr. Taft knew then,
+that the most serious of those disorders were very inadequately handled
+by native police, and constabulary, with much wholly unnecessary
+incidental sacrifice of life, in order to preserve the appearance of
+"civil" government and convey the impression of the state of peace
+the name implied, at a time when a reign of terror due to brigandage
+prevailed throughout wide and populous regions in whose soil lay the
+riches of agricultural plenty, while the United States Army looked
+on with a silent disgust which understood the reason, and a becoming
+subordination which regretfully bowed to that reason as one which
+must ever be the curse of colonization by a republic like ours, I
+know whereof I shall speak, and will therefore speak neither lightly
+nor unadvisedly, but soberly, charitably, and in the fear of God.
+
+The insurrection in the Philippines against American authority which
+began with the outbreak of February 4, 1899, and whose last dying
+embers were not finally stamped out until 1906, systematic denials
+by optimist officialdom to the contrary notwithstanding, had three
+distinct stages:
+
+(1) The original fighting in company, battalion, and regimental
+formation, with the ordinary wide-flung battle line; this having
+terminated pursuant to a preconcerted plan early in November, 1899.
+
+(2) A period of guerrilla warfare maintained by the educated,
+patriotic, fighting generals, in a gradually decreasing number of
+provinces, until the summer of 1902.
+
+(3) The final long drawn-out sputterings, which began to get serious
+in the fall of 1902, in provinces prematurely taken under the civil
+government, and stripped of adequate military protection before things
+had been given time to settle down in them to normal.
+
+These last are the "gardens of weeds"--brigandage weeds--above
+mentioned. While the horticultural metaphor will help some, to really
+understand the case nothing so fits it as the more common illustration
+applied to grave public disorders having a common cause which likens
+such matters to a conflagration. The third and last stage through
+which the Philippine insurrection degenerated to final extinction
+is adequately and accurately described in the following extract from
+one of the military reports of 1902:
+
+
+    The surrender or capture of the respectable military element left
+    the control of affairs and the remainder of the arms in the hands
+    of a lot of persons, most of them ignorant, some criminal, and
+    nearly all pertaining to a restless, irresponsible, unscrupulous
+    class of people, whose principal ambition seems to be to live
+    without work, and who have found it possible to so do under the
+    guise of patriotism. [412]
+
+
+Such was the problem which confronted Governor Taft in 1903 as to
+public order and protection of the peaceably inclined people, in the
+two main provinces hereinafter dealt with.
+
+It is a great pity that in 1903 President Roosevelt could not have
+called in Secretary of War Root and sent for Senator Bacon, and those
+of the latter's colleagues whose philippics in the Senate of the year
+previous against Generals Jake Smith and J. Franklin Bell had reminded
+an aroused nation of the days of Cicero and Verres, Tacitus and Africa,
+etc., and had a frank talk with them somewhat after this fashion:
+
+
+    Gentlemen, Governor Taft has a hard job out there in the
+    Philippines. There is a big insurrection going on in the province
+    of Albay, which is the very richest province in the whole
+    archipelago, a province as big as the State of Delaware, [413]
+    having a population of about a quarter of a million people, and he
+    has, for police purposes, a crude outfit of native constabulary,
+    officered mostly by ex-enlisted men of the mustered-out American
+    volunteer regiments. The personnel of the officers may be weeded
+    out later and made a fine body of men, but just at present there
+    are a good many rather tough citizens among them. Moreover, as
+    soon as the constabulary was gotten together they were at once set
+    to work chasing little remnants of the insurgent army all over
+    the archipelago. So as yet they are as undisciplined an outfit
+    as you can well imagine, and have never had any opportunity to
+    act together in any considerable command. Moreover, hardly any
+    Filipinos have yet had a chance to learn much about how to shoot
+    a rifle. Also, they know practically nothing about the interior
+    economy of large commands, such as handling and distributing
+    rations systematically for troops and for prisoners, or doing the
+    same as to clothing, and nothing at all about medical care of
+    the wounded, or the sick, or prisoners. So you can see that to
+    handle this insurrection with such an outfit as this is sure to
+    mean trouble of one sort or another. Wholly unauthorized overtures
+    through officious natives, to the insurgent brigand chiefs, may,
+    possibly, be made, promising them immunity, when they ought to be
+    made an example of; and that will embarrass us in punishing them
+    when we do finally get them, and be an encouragement to other
+    cut-throats to do likewise in the future. Worst of all, you can
+    see that if some five hundred or a thousand of these brigands,
+    or insurgents, or whatever they are, suddenly surrender, the
+    ordinary police accommodations for housing and feeding prisoners
+    will be wholly inadequate; yet we will have to detain them all
+    until our courts can sift them and see which are the mere dumb
+    driven cattle and which are the mischievous fellows. Therefore,
+    in case of such a surrender, the nature of this constabulary
+    force, as I have already described it to you, makes it plain
+    that its inadequacy to meet the serious conditions we are now
+    confronted with may result in our having on our hands a series
+    of little Andersonville prisons that will smell to heaven. The
+    majority of the people of the province are really sick of the
+    war. Their best men have all surrendered and come in. But there
+    is an ignorant creature calling himself a general, by the name of
+    Ola, who seems to have a great deal of influence with the lawless
+    element that do not want to work. Ola has gathered together
+    nearly a thousand malcontents, who obey him implicitly. He is
+    terrorizing Albay province and the regions adjacent thereto,
+    and as the constabulary are not adequate to patrol the whole
+    province, the people do not know whether self-interest demands
+    that they should side with Ola or with us. Clearly, therefore,
+    this is a case for vigorous measures, if we all have a common
+    concern for the national honor, for the maintenance of law and
+    order in a territory we are supposed to be governing, and for
+    the proper protection of life and property there. General Bell
+    or somebody else ought to be sent there to comb that province
+    just as Bell did Batangas. But we don't want any howl about it.
+
+
+At this point of the supposed colloquy,--I say "colloquy," though
+tradition has it that most of President Roosevelt's "colloquys" with
+Senators were what Henry E. Davis, the Sidney Smith of Washington,
+calls "unilateral conversation"--one can imagine the senatorial
+Ciceros exchanging glances expressive of the unspoken thought: "The
+man certainly has his nerve with him. Does he think the Senate is an
+annex of the White House?" Then we can imagine President Roosevelt
+bending strenuously to his task with infinite tactfulness thus:
+
+
+    I put Jake Smith out of business, as you gentlemen all know, for
+    his inhuman methods of avenging the Balangiga massacre in Samar,
+    and I am just as much opposed to cruelty as any of you Senators can
+    be. But Bell in Batangas is an altogether different case from Smith
+    in Samar. All this about the odor of decomposing bodies wafted from
+    reconcentration camps, and "clouds of vampire bats swirling out
+    on their orgies over the dead," that Senator Bacon's army friend,
+    whoever he may be, wrote the Senator, relates to Samar, and never
+    did have any application to Bell's methods in Batangas. Bell did
+    a clean job in a minimum of time and with a minimum sacrifice
+    of life, and, while he did have those reconcentration camps in
+    Batangas, he saw to it religiously that nobody starved, and that
+    all those people received daily medical treatment.
+
+
+For the correctness of the picture of conditions presented in the
+above hypothetical talk, I of course intend to be understood as
+vouching. If such a talk could have been had in 1903 by President
+Roosevelt with Senator Bacon and those of his colleagues who shared his
+views, the Albay situation might have been handled creditably. But the
+Administration was in no position to be frank with the Opposition. No
+Administration has ever yet during the last fourteen years been in a
+position to be frank with the Senate and the country concerning the
+situation at any given time in the Philippines, because at any given
+time there was always so much that it could not afford to re-open
+and explain. Mr. Root, for instance, might have been questioned too
+closely as to why, when Secretary of War, he had gone around the
+country in the fall of 1900 speaking for Mr. McKinley, and talking
+about "the patient and unconsenting millions" so anxious to be rid
+of "Aguinaldo and his band of assassins," when at that very time his
+(Mr. Root's) generals in the Philippines were engaged in activities,
+the magnitude of which may be inferred from a telegram sent from
+Washington to General Wood at Havana, asking if he could possibly
+spare the 10th Infantry, and adding:
+
+
+    Imperative that we have immediate use of every available company
+    that we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines, [414]
+
+
+although at West Point in 1902 he told the cadets how nobly the army
+had labored in putting down "an insurrection of 7,000,000 people." No,
+the Administration in 1903 simply could not afford to be frank
+concerning the situation in the Philippines. I need not recapitulate
+here any more of the long train of reasons why, because they have all
+been fully explained in the preceding chapters. Of course President
+Roosevelt had no such guilty knowledge of the facts as Mr. Root. He
+was not in constant daily contact with army officers at the War
+Department, familiar with the actual situation in the Philippines,
+as Mr. Root was. He was simply "sticking to Taft." Somewhere along
+about the time the military folk in the Philippines were scoffing at
+the unnecessary sacrifice of life incident to the lack of a strong
+government, President Roosevelt had written his warm personal friend,
+Hon. George Curry, now a member of Congress from New Mexico, who had
+been a captain in his regiment before Santiago, was then an official
+of the civil government of the Philippines, and later Governor of
+New Mexico, by appointment of Mr. Roosevelt: "Stick to Taft, George"
+or words to that effect. Mr. Roosevelt's attitude was simply that
+of an intensely loyal friend of Mr. Taft who simply assumed that the
+Philippine Government was not going to tolerate impotence in the matter
+of protecting life and property. But everybody at both ends of the line
+was too deep in the mire of all the long and systematic withholding
+of facts from the American public which had been occurring ever since
+1898, and which it has been the aim of the preceding chapters to
+illuminate by the light since becoming available in the published
+official records of the Government. Hence, in the hypothetical
+conference above supposed, President Roosevelt was in no position
+to take any high ground. He would have had to admit that the civil
+government of 1901 was set up too soon in order to stand by half-baked
+notions dished out in 1900 by the Taft Commission in aid of his own
+and Mr. McKinley's campaign for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency,
+respectively. In other words the truth about the Philippines from
+the beginning might, and probably would, have seriously jeopardized
+the Roosevelt presidential chances in 1904. So Governor Taft was left
+to his own resources in struggling with the problem of law and order
+in the Islands, intimately understanding the obvious bearing, just
+suggested, of what he might do out there, on the election of 1904. What
+then did Governor Taft do to meet the situation in 1903? Chronological
+order, as well as other considerations making for clearness, would
+suggest that I begin by telling what he did not do.
+
+In May, 1903, I was sent to the province of Surigao to try some cases
+arising out of what has ever since been known in that out-of-the-way
+region as "the affair of March 23d" (1903). In his annual report for
+1903, pages 29 and 30, in describing the Surigao affair, Governor
+Taft correctly states that a band of outlaws came into the town of
+Surigao on the day above named, killed Captain Clark, the officer
+in charge of the constabulary, took the constabulary's guns, while
+they were all away at their mid-day meal, scattered about the town,
+and departed. But Mr. Taft's report disposes of the whole incident
+in a most casual way. As a matter of fact the gist of it was that
+a heroic little band of Americans under Mr. Luther S. Kelly, the
+provincial treasurer, an old Indian scout of the Yellowstone country,
+hastily gathered the seven American women then in the town, one of
+them in a delicate condition, into the stone government house, and
+stood off those semi-civilized sensual brigands until reinforcements
+arrived. Governor Taft's failure adequately to present the gravity of
+the episode in his account of it does not argue well for the subsequent
+solicitude he might feel about other American women in other remote
+provinces which he was anxious to keep on his "pacified list," to
+say nothing of politically negligible native life therein. [415]
+Nor does this report include any of the material facts showing the
+ineffectiveness of the rank and file of the constabulary to cope
+with the situation, or the general feeling of insecurity I found in
+the province as to how far the whole population might be in sympathy
+with the brigands. As a matter of fact, after that Surigao affair,
+Governor Taft had to turn the army loose in the province to go and
+get back and restore to his constabulary the seventy-five to one
+hundred stand-of-arms the brigands had so rudely and impolitely taken
+away from them, and I held court there for a month trying the people
+who were captured and brought in, with Colonel Meyer, of the 11th
+Infantry, one of the most thorough and able soldiers of the United
+States Army, and seven hundred soldiers of his regiment acting as
+deputy sheriffs, and yet all the time the province was under "civil"
+government, nominally. Colonel Meyer got the men who killed Clark,
+and, upon due and ample proof, I hung them, but Surigao was never
+taken for a day from the list of provinces enjoying "the peace and
+protection of a benign civil government." The writ of habeas corpus
+was never suspended for a moment.
+
+In the report above quoted from, Governor Taft remarks that if
+the prompt steps he did take (he had already described the prompt
+sending of the military to the scene) had not been taken, "the trouble
+might have spread." But the Surigao affair seemed to teach the civil
+government nothing in the matter of subsequent protection of life,
+nor did it lessen their persistence in relying on their constabulary
+for due extension of such protection in time of need.
+
+By June, 1903, another scheme was invented for avoiding calling on the
+military. When you are in a foreign country building a new government
+on the ruins of an old one, you naturally find out as much as you
+can about how the old one met its problems. The Spaniards had had
+the same problem in their day about not ordering out the military,
+because they did not have any military to order out. They were too poor
+to garrison the various provinces. They had long followed the plan,
+from time to time, of reconcentrating in the main towns of disturbed
+districts all the country population they could get to come in, and
+then acting on the assumption that all who did not come in were public
+enemies. This meant that when the country people came in, they simply
+looked out for themselves, while away from their homes, and farms,
+as best they could. Of course nobody at all looked after the farms,
+and nobody provided medical attention for the reconcentrados, or
+sanitary attention for the reconcentration camps. This general plan
+was formally sanctioned by the Commission, in so far as the following
+law sanctioned it. The law was enacted, June 1, 1903. It is section
+6, of Act 781, which was an act dealing with all the constabulary
+problems, of which this was one. It read:
+
+
+    In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
+    outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
+    barrios [416] are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory
+    raids--
+
+
+think of permitting a country to get into any such condition when you
+have an abundance of American troops on hand available to prevent it--
+
+
+    and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws
+    their sources of food supply, and it is not possible with the
+    available police forces constantly to provide protection to
+    such barrios--
+
+
+there being all the time "available police forces," in the shape
+of regular troops, amply able to handle these unsettled conditions,
+which were the inevitable aftermath of lawlessness consequent on five
+or six years of guerrilla warfare--
+
+
+    it shall be within the power of the Governor-General, upon
+    resolution of the Philippine Commission, to authorize the
+    provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying
+    barrios be temporarily brought--
+
+
+observe the length of time this may last is not limited--
+
+
+    within stated proximity to the poblacion, or larger barrios, of
+    the municipality, there to remain until the necessity for such
+    order ceases to exist.
+
+
+To house and ration the reconcentrados, the following provision is
+made by the statute we are considering:
+
+
+    During such temporary residence, it shall be the duty of the
+    provincial board, out of provincial funds, to furnish such
+    sustenance and shelter as may be needed to prevent suffering
+    among the residents of the barrios thus withdrawn.
+
+
+The act also provides that during the course of the reconcentration,
+where the province does not happen to have the necessary ready
+cash, it may apply to the Commission, in distant Manila, for an
+appropriation to meet the emergency. What is to be done with those
+who starve during the temporary deficit, it does not say. If you
+must have reconcentration, to leave it to such agencies as the above,
+with the native police and constabulary as understudies, in lieu of
+availing yourself of the superb equipment of the American army, with
+all its facilities for handling great masses of people, as they did,
+for instance, after the San Francisco fire, is like preferring the
+Mulligan Guards to the Cold-stream Guards. Furthermore, there is no
+escape from the logic of the fact that reconcentration is essentially
+a war measure. The difference between what is lawful in war and what
+is lawful in peace is not a technical one. In war the innocent must
+often suffer with the guilty. In peace the theory at least is that
+only the guilty suffer. Hence it is that our Constitution is so
+jealous that in time of peace no man's life, liberty, or property,
+shall be taken from him without "due process of law," a provision
+which becomes inoperative in war times, being superseded by martial
+law. I know that the early question, "Does the Constitution follow
+the flag?" was answered by the Supreme Court of the United States in
+the negative as to the Philippines. But the Act of Congress of July
+1, 1902, under which we were governing the Philippines in 1903,
+and still govern them, known as the Philippine Government Act,
+extended to the Islands all the provisions of the Bill of Rights of
+our Constitution except the right of jury trial and the individual
+right to go armed--"bear arms." It specifically said in section 5:
+
+
+    No law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
+    person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
+
+
+It hardly needs argument to show that to bundle the rural population
+of a whole district out of house and home, and make them come to town
+to live indefinitely on such public charity as may drain through the
+itching fingers of impecunious town officials, abandoning meantime
+their growing crops, and the household effects they cannot bring with
+them, is depriving people of their property, and restraining them
+of their liberty, without due process of law. In fact, in 1905, in
+the case of Barcelon vs. Baker, vol. v., Philippine Report, page 116,
+during an insurrection in Batangas, to control which, the presidential
+election of 1904 being then safely over, the writ of habeas corpus
+had been suspended and martial law declared, the Supreme Court of the
+Philippines held that detention of people as reconcentrados under
+such circumstances "for the purpose of protecting them" was not an
+illegal restraint of their liberty, because the ordinary law had been
+suspended. This decision held it to be both the prerogative and the
+duty of the Governor-General to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
+when the public safety so required.
+
+I refuse to believe for a moment that President Taft, the former
+wise and just judge, in whom is now vested by law the mighty power
+of filling vacancies on the highest court in this great country of
+ours, will seriously contend that that reconcentration law is not in
+direct violation of the above quoted section of the Act of Congress
+of July 1, 1902, for the government of the Philippines, and therefore
+null and void. The truth is, it was a piece of careless legislation,
+dealing with conditions that were essentially war conditions, under
+a government which was forever vowing that peace conditions existed,
+and determined not to admit the contrary. The civil government was
+like Lot's wife. It could not look back.
+
+The Act of Congress of 1902 had made the usual provision permitting
+the governor to declare martial law in a given locality in his
+discretion. But the reconcentration law passed by the Philippine
+Commission was a way of avoiding the exercise of that authority,
+so as to keep up the appearance of peace in the provinces to which
+it might be applied, regardless of how many lives it might cost. In
+its last analysis the reconcentration law was at once an admission
+of a duty to order out the military and a declaration of intention
+to neglect that duty. I suppose the eminent gentlemen who enacted
+it justified it on the idea of teaching the natives how to maintain
+order themselves by letting them stew in the dregs of their own
+insurrection. Yet no one can read the Commission's own description
+of the widespread lawlessness which so long ran riot after the
+guerrilla warfare degenerated into brigandage, without seeing,
+from their own showing, how obvious was their duty to have waited,
+originally, until law and order were restored, by not interfering
+with the war itself until it was over, and by keeping the country
+properly garrisoned for a decorous and sufficient period after it
+was over, until something like real peace conditions should exist,
+on which to begin the work of post-bellum reconstruction. After all,
+it all gets us back to the original pernicious programme outlined in
+President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December, 1899,
+wherein was announced the intention to send out the Taft Commission,
+which message also announced, in effect, that it was Mr. McKinley's
+purpose to begin the work of reconstruction as fast as the patient
+and unconsenting millions "loyal to our rule" should be rescued from
+the clutch of the hated Tagals.
+
+Recurring again to the reconcentration law itself, the moral quality
+of executive action putting it in operation was not unlike that which
+would attach should the Governor of Massachusetts, in lieu of ordering
+the state troops to the scene of great strike riots in half a dozen
+towns around Boston, issue a proclamation something like this:
+
+
+    The situation has grown so serious that your local police force,
+    as you see, is wholly inadequate to cope with the situation. You
+    will all, therefore, thrust your tooth-brushes, night-gowns,
+    and a change of clothing, into the family grip, and assemble
+    on the Boston Common and in the public gardens, there to remain
+    until the necessity for this order ceases to exist, and we will
+    there take the best care of you we can, as was done in the case
+    of the San Francisco fire. As governor I am unwilling to order
+    out the military.
+
+
+If any lawyer on the Commission gave any thought at the time to the
+validity of the reconcentration law, in its relation to the "due
+process of law" clause of the Philippine Government Act, which none
+of them probably did, he must simply have justified the means by the
+benevolence of the end, on the idea that he knew so much better than
+Congress possibly could, the needs of the local situation. But if you
+read this law in the light of a knowledge of its practical operation,
+there is more suggestion between its lines of Senator Bacon's friend's
+"corpse-carcass stench" and "clouds of vampire bats softly swirling
+out on their orgies over the dead" than there is of benevolence. It
+really was unsportsmanlike for the Commission to have entrusted
+reconcentration to the native police and constabulary the native
+governors had, and it was wholly indefensible for them to take the
+liberty of violating an act of Congress in order to live up to their
+pet fiction about the war being "entirely over."
+
+After the term of court at Surigao in the month of May, 1903, I was
+sent to Misamis province, where I remained until September, handling an
+insurrection down there. This province also was nominally in a state of
+peace, i.e., there was no formal recognition of the existence of the
+insurrection by suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Curiously
+enough, as I wrote Governor Taft afterwards, the Misamis crowd of
+disturbers of the peace were genuine insurrectos. Their movement
+was not so formidable as the Ola insurrection in Albay I dealt with
+later, but they were by no means unmitigated cut-throats. I have often
+wondered how they managed to be so respectable at that late date. They
+did not steal, as did most of the outlaws of 1903. Their avowed
+purpose was to subvert the existing government. The use of this word
+"insurrection" in connection with these various disturbances recalls
+a pertinent incident. In 1904 there was a vacancy on the Supreme Bench
+of the Islands. Some of my friends, members of the bar of my district,
+got up a petition to the then Governor-General setting forth in most
+partial terms my alleged qualifications for the place. Now in the
+Philippines, in the candor of informal social intercourse, all of
+us always called a spade a spade, i.e., we called an insurrection an
+insurrection, instead of referring to the disturbance in the guarded
+and euphemistic terms which you find in all the official reports
+intended for home consumption. So in their petition, these gentlemen
+recited, among my other supposed qualifications, that I had held
+court in three different provinces "during insurrections in the same."
+
+The Albay insurrection was the worst one I had to deal with during
+Governor Taft's administration as Governor of the Philippines. This
+was the insurrection headed by Simeon Ola. The first appearance of
+this man Ola in the official reports of the Philippine Government in
+connection with the Albay disturbances of 1902-3 is in the report
+of the colonel commanding the constabulary for the district which
+included Albay, Col. H. H. Bandholtz, dated June 30, 1903. [417] This
+report contains a sort of diary of events for the year preceding the
+date of it. An entry for October 28, 1902, begins:
+
+
+    Early this month negotiations were opened with Simeon Ola, chief
+    of the ladrones in this province, with a view of inducing him
+    to surrender.
+
+
+Think of this great government negotiating with the leader of a band
+of thieves who were openly and flagrantly defying its authority! The
+entry proceeds:
+
+
+    After many promises and conferences extending over a period of
+    forty days, during which hostilities were suspended, Ola broke
+    off negotiations and withdrew his entire force and a large number
+    of additional recruits that he had secured during the armistice.
+
+
+Before Ola finally surrendered he is supposed to have had a total
+command ranging at various times from a thousand to 1500 men. And I
+think Colonel Bandholtz must have had in the field opposed to him,
+first and last, at least an equal number of native forces. Ola also
+makes an official reappearance in the report of the Governor of Albay
+Province for 1904. [418] It there appears that reconcentration was
+begun in Albay as part of the campaign against Ola and his forces, in
+March, 1903, and continued until the end of October of that year. Says
+this report of the Governor of Albay concerning reconcentration:
+
+
+    Naturally, the effect of this unusual volume of persons in a
+    limited area was disease and suffering for want of food and
+    ordinary living accommodations.
+
+
+The Governor does not say how large the "unusual volume of persons"
+was that was herded into the reconcentration zones, nor does he
+furnish any mortality statistics. Nobody kept any. How much there was
+of the awful mortality and "clouds of vampire bats softly swirling
+out on their orgies over the dead," that Senator Bacon's army friend
+correspondent encountered in Samar does not affirmatively appear. The
+number of people affected by reconcentration in Albay and an adjacent
+province that caught the contagion of unrest and had to be given
+similar treatment, was about 300,000. [419]
+
+In his report for 1903, in describing the Ola insurrection of 1902-3,
+Governor Taft says: "A reign of terror was inaugurated throughout
+the province." He then goes on to state that to meet it he applied
+the reconcentration tactics. In the same report he describes what
+is to my mind the most humiliating incident connected with the
+whole history of the American Government in the Philippines, viz.,
+Vice-Governor Wright's visit to Albay in 1903, apparently in pursuance
+of the peace-at-any-price policy that the Manila Government was
+bent on. Governor Taft says of the civil government's dealings with
+His Excellency, the Honorable Simeon Ola, the chief of the brigands,
+that General Wright and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino member of the
+Commission, went down to Albay and "talked to the people," the idea
+apparently being that those poor unarmed or ill-armed creatures should
+go after the brigands. This was to avoid ordering out the military,
+and summarily putting a stop to the reign of terror as became the
+dignity of this nation. I think these talks had something to do with
+the origin of the charge afterwards made that immunity was promised
+Ola and the men who finally did surrender with him. Of course General
+Wright made no such promises. But the idea got out in the province
+that the word was, "Get the guns," the inference being that if Ola
+and his people would come in and surrender their guns they would be
+lightly dealt with. In his book Our Philippine Problem, Professor
+Willis, at page 140, gives what purports to be an agreement signed
+by Colonel Bandholtz, dated September 22, 1903, whereby Bandholtz
+promises Ola immunity, and also promises a number of other things
+which are on their face rankly preposterous. Ola was much on the
+witness stand before me during that term of court, and, everything
+"came out in the wash." He was represented by competent, intelligent,
+and fearless Filipino counsel, and they did not suggest the existence
+of any such document. No proof of any offer of immunity was adduced
+before me. I think Ola simply finally decided to throw himself on
+the mercy of the government, on the idea that there would be more joy
+over the one sinner that repenteth than over the ninety and nine that
+are already saved. He was probably as much afraid that Governor Taft
+would order out the military as the wretched pacificos were that he
+would not. He immediately turned state's evidence against all the men
+under him of whose individual actings and doings he had any knowledge,
+the prosecuting attorney making, with my full approval, a promise
+to ask executive clemency as a reward. This was in keeping with the
+practice in like cases customary in all jurisdictions throughout the
+English-speaking world.
+
+The magnitude of the Ola insurrection may be somewhat appreciated
+from the financial loss it occasioned. Says Governor Taft, in his
+report for 1903:
+
+
+    The Governor [of Albay] estimates that hemp production and sale
+    have been interfered with to the extent of some ten to twelve
+    millions of dollars Mexican [which is equivalent to five or six
+    million dollars American money]. [420]
+
+
+As the population of the province was about 250,000, [421] a loss
+of $5,000,000 meant a loss of $20 per capita for the six months or
+so of reconcentration during which the farms were neglected. This
+would be equivalent to a loss of $1,800,000,000, in the same length
+of time to a country having a population of 90,000,000, which is the
+total population figure for the United States according to the Census
+of 1910.
+
+It was in the latter part of October, 1903, I believe, that Ola finally
+surrendered with some five hundred or six hundred men. I was sent to
+Albay about the middle of November, to assist the regular judge of
+the district, Hon. Adam C. Carson, now one of the justices of the
+Supreme Court of the Philippines, in disposing of the case arising
+out of the Ola performances. Conditions at the time were also very
+much perturbed in various neighboring and other provinces, and the
+courts and constabulary were kept very busy.
+
+An incident recurs to memory just here which illustrates the state of
+public order. But before relating it a decent respect to the opinions
+of the reader requires me to state my own attitude toward that whole
+situation at the time. I am perfectly clear in my own mind that as
+society stands at present, capital punishment is a necessary part of
+any sensible scheme for its protection. I have no compunction about
+hanging any man for the lawless taking of the life of another. We owe
+it to the community as a measure of protection to your life and mine
+and all others. So far as public order was concerned in the country
+now under consideration in 1903, the "civil" government was simply a
+well-meaning sham, a military government with a civil name to it. When
+the constabulary would get in the various brigands, cut-throats, etc.,
+who might be terrorizing a given district, some of them masquerading as
+patriots, others not even doing that, the courts would try them. None
+of the judges cared anything about any particular brigand in any
+given case except to find out how many, if any, murders, rapes,
+arsons, etc., he had committed during the particular reign of terror
+of which he had been a part. Wherever specific murders were proven,
+the punishment would always be "a life for a life." And you have no
+idea how absolutely wanton some of the murders were, and how cruelly
+some of the young women, daughters of the farmers, were maltreated
+after they were carried off to the mountains. I would hate to try to
+guess how much more of this sort of thing would have had to occur in
+Albay in 1903 than did occur, to have moved Governor Taft to deprive
+Albay of "the protection of a benign civil government"--one of the pet
+expressions of contemporaneous official literature--and say the word
+to the army to take hold of the situation and give the people decent
+protection. But to come to the incident above broached. Shortly after I
+reached Albay, and set to work to hold Part II. of the district court,
+while my colleague, Judge Carson, held Part I. we had a call from a
+third judge, Judge Linebarger, of Chicago, who was on his way to some
+other perturbed region. I think that by that time, late in November,
+1903, Governor Taft must have known he was soon to leave the Islands to
+become Secretary of War, and therefore was anxious to be able to make
+the best showing possible, in his farewell annual report as Governor,
+as to the "tranquillity" conditions. At any rate Judge Linebarger
+came to see us, for a few hours, his ship having touched en route at
+the port near the provincial capital of Albay. Judge Carson had had a
+gallows erected near the public square of the town, for the execution
+of some brigand he had convicted, whether it was for maltreating some
+poor farmer's daughter until she died, or burying an American alive,
+or what, I do not now recollect. But in going around the town some
+one suggested, as we passed this gallows, that we go up on it to
+get the view. So we went--the three of us. Then each looked at the
+other and all thought of the work ahead. Then Judge Carson smiled
+and dispelled the momentary sombreness by repeating with grim humor,
+an old Latin quotation he happened to remember from his college days
+at the University of Virginia: Hæc olim meminisse juvabit ("It will
+be pleasant to remember these things hereafter").
+
+The Ola insurrection had continued from October, 1902, to October,
+1903, without suspension of civil government. During that period the
+jail had been filled far beyond its reasonable capacity most of the
+time. It sometimes had contained many hundreds. As to the sanitary
+conditions, in passing the jail building one day in company with
+one of the provincial officials, he remarked to me, nonchalantly:
+"It's equivalent to a death sentence to put a man in that jail." I
+afterwards found out that this was no joke. During most of my visit
+to the province I was too busy holding court and separating the sheep
+from the goats, to think much of anything else. But toward the close of
+the term, after Christmas, after Governor Taft had left the Islands
+and gone home to be Secretary of War, an incident happened that
+produced a profound impression on me, suggested a new view-point,
+and started troubled doubts as to whether the whole Benevolent
+Assimilation business was not a mistake born of a union of avarice
+and piety in which avarice predominated--doubts which certain events
+of the following year, hereinafter related, converted in conviction
+that any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos would
+be better for all concerned than any government we could give them,
+hampered as we always will be by the ever-present necessity to argue
+that government against the consent of the governed is not altogether
+wrong, and that taxation without representation may be a blessing in
+disguise. The Yule-tide incident above alluded to was this. Most of
+the docket having been disposed of, and there being a lull between
+Christmas and New Year's day which afforded time for matters more or
+less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting attorney brought in
+rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court to sign. One was
+headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other with a list of
+sixty-three names. Both orders recited that "the foregoing" persons
+had died in the jail--all but one between May 20 and Dec. 3. 1903
+(roughly six and one-half months) as will appear from an examination
+of the dates of death--and concluded by directing that the indictments
+be quashed. The writer was only holding an extraordinary term of court
+there in Albay, and was about to leave the province to take charge
+of another district to which Governor Taft had assigned him before
+leaving the Islands. The newly appointed regular judge of the district,
+Judge Trent, now of the Philippine Supreme Court, was scheduled soon
+to arrive. Therefore the writer did not sign the proposed orders
+but kept them as legal curios. A correct translation of one of them
+appears below, followed by the list of names which headed the other
+(identical) order:
+
+
+    THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, EIGHTH
+    JUDICIAL DISTRICT
+
+    In the Court of First Instance of Albay
+
+    The United States against
+
+    Cornelio Rigorosa              died December    3, 1903
+    Fabian Basques                 died September  25, 1903
+    Julian Nacion                  died October    14, 1903
+    Francisco Rigorosa             died October    18, 1903
+    Anacleto Solano                died November   25, 1903
+    Valentin Cesillano             died November    6, 1903
+    Felix Sasutona                 died September  26, 1903
+    Marcelo de los Santos          died June        3, 1903
+    Marcelo Patingo                died November   15, 1903
+    Julian Raynante                died September   7, 1903
+    Dionisio Carifiaga             died October     4, 1903
+    Felipe Navor                   died September  17, 1903
+    Luis Nicol                     died November   23, 1903
+    Balbino Nicol                  died September  23, 1903
+    Damiano Nicol                  died November   23, 1903
+    Leoncio Salbaburo              died November   20, 1903
+    Catalino Sideria               died July       25, 1903
+    Marcelo Ariola                 died October    26, 1903
+    Francisco Cao                  died November   26, 1903
+    Martin Olaguer                 died November   13, 1903
+    Juan Neric                     died November   16, 1903
+    Eufemio Bere                   died November   21, 1903
+    Julian Sotero                  died October    30, 1902
+    Juan Payadan                   died September  10, 1903
+    Benedicto Milla                died July       30, 1903
+    Placido Porlage                died June       13, 1903
+    Gaudencio Oguita               died October    11, 1903
+    Alberto Cabrera                died September   8, 1903
+    Julian Payadan                 died August      4, 1903
+    Eusebio Payadan                died August     10, 1903
+    Leonardo Rebusi                died November    2, 1903
+    Julian Riobaldis               died October     2, 1903
+    Victor Riobaldis               died October    23, 1903
+    Mauricio Balbin                died September  27, 1903
+    Tomas Rigador                  died July       23, 1903
+    Miguel de los Santos           died July       28, 1903
+    Eustaquio Mapula               died November   18, 1903
+    Eugenio Lomibao                died November    1, 1903
+    Francisco Luna                 died August      7, 1903
+    Gregorio Sierte                died October    31, 1903
+    Teodoro Patingo                died November   21, 1903
+    Teodorico Tua                  died September  23, 1903
+    Ceferino Octia                 died November   10, 1903
+    Graciona Pamplona              died September  12, 1903
+    Felipe Bonifacio               died November   26, 1903
+    Baltazer Bundi                 died October    12, 1903
+    Julian Locot                   died October    13, 1903
+    Francisco de Punta             died August     20, 1903
+    Pedro Madrid                   died August     24, 1903
+    Felipe Pusiquit                died July       17, 1903
+    Rufo Mansalan                  died July       14, 1903
+    Ignacio Titano                 died June       20, 1903
+    Alfonso Locot                  died June       29, 1903
+    Gil Locot                      died May        23, 1903
+    Regino Bitarra                 died September   7, 1903
+    Bonifacio Bo                   died August      2, 1903
+    Francisco de Belen             died September  29, 1903
+
+
+    DECREE
+
+    The defendants above named, charged with divers crimes, having
+    died in the provincial jail by reason of various ailments, upon
+    various dates, according to official report of the jailer, it is
+
+    ORDERED BY THIS COURT, That the cases pending against the said
+    deceased persons be, and the same are hereby, quashed, the costs
+    to be charged against the government.
+
+
+    Judge of the Twelfth District acting in the Eighth.
+
+    Albay, December 28, 1903.
+
+
+The foregoing order contains fifty-seven names. As already indicated,
+the second order was like the first. It contained the names of
+sixty-three other deceased prisoners, as follows, to wit:
+
+
+    Anacleto Avila                 died September  2, 1903
+    Gregorio Saquedo               died July      21, 1903
+    Francisco Almonte              died October   11, 1903
+    Faustino Sallao                died October    9, 1903
+    Leocadio Pena                  died October   16, 1903
+    Juan Ranuco                    died October   16, 1903
+    Esteban de Lima                died February   4, 1903
+    Estanislao Jacoba              died October    7, 1903
+    Macario Ordiales               died October   19, 1903
+    Laureano Ordiales              died October   27, 1903
+    Reimundo Narito                died October    4, 1903
+    Antonio Polvorido              died September 12, 1903
+    Norverto Melgar                died June      14, 1903
+    Bartolome Rico                 died November   8, 1903
+    Simon Ordiales                 died September 13, 1903
+    Candido Rosari                 died September 29, 1903
+    Saturnino Vuelvo               died October   18, 1903
+    Vicente Belsaida               died May       26, 1903
+    Felix Canaria                  died June      12, 1903
+    Pedro Cuya                     died July      26, 1903
+    Evaristo Dias                  died July      24, 1903
+    Felix Padre                    died July       8, 1903
+    Alberto Mantes                 died August     7, 1903
+    Joaquin Maamot                 died September  5, 1903
+    Santiago Cacero                died May       28, 1903
+    Hilario Zalazar                died July      26, 1903
+    Tomas Odsinada                 died October    1, 1903
+    Julian Oco                     died October    4, 1903
+    Julian Lontac                  died August    27, 1903
+    Ambrosio Rabosa                died September 19, 1903
+    Mariano Garcia                 died September 12, 1903
+    Ramon Madrigalejo              died August    19, 1903
+    Albino Oyardo                  died October    1, 1903
+    Felipe Rotarla                 died September 29, 1903
+    Urbano Saralde                 died October    5, 1903
+    Gil Mediavillo                 died June      13, 1903
+    Egidio Mediavillo              died June      16, 1903
+    Mauricio Losano                died October    5, 1903
+    Bernabe Carenan                died September 27, 1903
+    Pedro Sagaysay                 died September 29, 1903
+    Laureano Ibo                   died August     5, 1903
+    Vicente Sanosing               died July      17, 1903
+    Francisco Morante              died June      10, 1903
+    Anatollo Sadullo               died September 16, 1903
+    Lucio Rebeza                   died August    27, 1903
+    Eugenio Sanbuena               died August    13, 1903
+    Nicolas Oberos                 died August    26, 1903
+    Eusebio Rambillo               died September 13, 1903
+    Tomas Rempillo                 died August    19, 1903
+    Daniel Patasin                 died August    19, 1903
+    Ignacio Bundi                  died September  7, 1903
+    Juan Locot                     died May       23, 1903
+    Zacarias David Padilla         died August     7, 1903
+    Juan Almazar                   died September 12, 1903
+    Rufino Quipi                   died June      13, 1903
+    Antonio Brio                   died June      13, 1903
+    Timoteo Enciso                 died September 12, 1903
+    Hilario Palaad                 died August    28, 1903
+    Ventura Prades                 died May       24, 1903
+    Alejandro Alevanto             died May       22, 1903
+    Rufino Pelicia                 died May       20, 1903
+    Alejo Bruqueza                 died July      19, 1903
+    Prudencio Estrada              died September 15, 1903
+
+
+These lists were printed in an article by the author which appeared
+in the North American Review for January 18, 1907, which article was
+reprinted by Hon. James L. Slayden, of Texas, in the Congressional
+Record for February 12, 1907. There can be little doubt that President
+Taft saw the article, and that if it had contained any inaccuracies
+they would long since have been noticed. So that in the Albay jail in
+1903 we had a sort of Andersonville prison, or Black Hole of Calcutta,
+on a small scale.
+
+If the military authorities had had charge of the Albay insurrection
+and of the prisoners in the Albay jail in 1903, it is safe to say
+that the great majority of those who died would have lived. But to
+have ordered out the troops would have been to abandon the official
+fiction that there was peace.
+
+Of Ola's five or six hundred men, Judge Carson and I, assisted by
+the chief prosecuting attorney of the government, Hon. James Ross,
+turned several hundred loose. Another large batch were disposed of
+under a vagrancy law, which allowed us to put them to work on the
+roads of the provinces for not exceeding two years, usually six to
+twelve months. Most of the remainder, a few score, we tried under the
+sedition law, and sent to Bilibid, the central penitentary at Manila,
+for terms commensurate with their individual conduct and deeds. The
+more serious cases were sent up for longer terms under the brigandage
+law. We indulged in no more maudlin sentiment about those precious
+scamps who had been degrading Filipino patriotism by occasionally
+invoking its name in the course of a long season of preying upon
+their respectable fellow-countrymen than Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles
+would have indulged. I am quite sure that either Aguinaldo or Juan
+Cailles would have made much shorter shrift of the whole bunch than
+Judge Carson and I did. It was only the men shown to have committed
+crimes usually punished capitally in this country that we sentenced
+to death--a dozen or more, all told. Ola was the star witness for the
+state. He held back nothing that would aid the prosecuting attorney
+to convict the men who had followed him for a year. He was given a
+sentence of thirty years (by Judge Carson), as a sort of expression
+of opinion of the most Christian attitude possible concerning his
+real deserts, but his services as state's evidence entitled him to
+immunity, and for that very good and sufficient reason Judge Carson,
+Prosecuting Attorney Ross, and myself so recommended to the Governor.
+
+Ola could read and write after a fashion, though he was quite an
+ignorant man. But to show what his control must have been over the
+rank and file of his men, let one incident suffice. On the boat going
+up to Manila from Albay, after the term of court was over, Ola was
+aboard, en route for the penitentiary. But, as he was a prospective
+recipient of executive clemency, though the guards kept an eye on him,
+he was allowed the freedom of the ship. One night on the voyage up,
+the weather being extremely warm, I left my stateroom sometime after
+midnight, carrying blanket and pillow, and went back to the storm
+steering-gear at the stern of the ship, to spend the rest of the night
+more comfortably. Waking sometime afterward for some unassignable
+cause, I realized that the crown of another head was tangent to the
+crown of my own, and occupying part of my pillow. It was Ola, the
+chief of the brigands. I raised up, shook the intruder, and said:
+"Hello, Ola, what are you doing here?" He wakened slowly. He had no
+idea of any first-class passenger being back there, and had taken
+it for granted that I was one of the ship's crew, when he decided to
+share my pillow. As soon as he realized who I was, he sprang to his
+feet with profound and effusive apologies, and paced the deck until
+morning, perhaps thinking over the possible effect of the incident
+on my recommendation concerning himself.
+
+After I had recovered the use of all my pillow I went back to
+sleep for a spell. About dawn I was wakened by some of the guards
+chattering. But I heard Ola, who had apparently been keeping watch
+over my august slumbers in the meantime, say in an imperious tone to
+the guards, his keepers, "Hush, the judge is sleeping." They looked
+at the brigand chief, and cowed, obeyed.
+
+Ola was pardoned.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT, 1903 (Continued)
+
+                            The Philippines for the Filipinos.
+
+                                                Speech of Governor Taft.
+
+
+Just before Governor Taft left the Islands in 1903, he made a speech
+which made him immensely popular with the Filipinos and immensely
+unpopular with the Americans. The key-note of the speech was "The
+Philippines for the Filipinos." The Filipinos interpreted it to
+mean for them that ultimate independence was not so far in the dim
+distance of what is to happen after all the living are dead as to
+be a purely academic matter. And there was absolutely nothing in
+the speech to negative that idea, although he must have known how
+the great majority of the Filipinos would interpret the speech. On
+the other hand, the Americans in the Islands, popularity with whom
+was then and there a negligible factor, interpreted the speech,
+not inaccurately, to mean for them: "If you white men out here, not
+connected with the Government, you Americans, British, Germans and
+Spaniards, and the rest of you, do not like the way I am running this
+country, why, the boats have not quit running between here and your
+respective homes." [422] Then he came back to the United States and
+has ever since been urging American capital to go to the Philippines,
+all the time opposing any declaration by the law-making power of the
+Government which will let the American who goes out there know "where
+he is at," i.e., whether we are or are not going to keep the Islands
+permanently, and how to formulate his earthly plans accordingly, though
+the educated Filipinos are concurrently permitted to clamor against
+American "exploitation," American rule, and Americans generally,
+and to keep alive among the masses of their people what they call
+"the spirit of liberty," and what the insular government calls the
+spirit of "irreconcilableness." Clearly, a policy which makes for race
+friction and race hatred is essentially soft-headed, not soft-hearted,
+and ought not to be permitted to continue. Yet it has been true for
+twelve years, as one of President Taft's admiring friends proudly
+boasted concerning him some time since:
+
+
+    One man virtually holds in his keeping the American conscience
+    with the regard to the Philippines. [423]
+
+
+This is true, and it is not as it should be. We should either stop
+the clamor, or stop the American capital and energy from going to
+the Islands. After an American goes out to the Islands, invests his
+money there, and casts his fortunes there, unless he is a renegade,
+he sticks to his own people out there. Then the Taft policy steps in
+and bullyrags him into what he calls "knuckling to the Filipinos,"
+every time he shows any contumacious dissent from the Taft decision
+reversing the verdict of all racial history--which has been up to
+date, that wheresoever white men dwell in any considerable numbers
+in the same country with Asiatics or Africans, the white man will
+rule. Yet the American in the Philippines, once he is beguiled into
+going there, must bow to the Taft policies. He has taken his family to
+the Islands, and all his worldly interests are there. Yet he is living
+under a despotism, a benevolent despotism, it is true, so long as the
+non-office-holding American does not openly oppose the government's
+policies, but one which, however benevolent, is, so far as regards any
+brooking of opposition from any one outside the government hierarchy,
+as absolute as any of the other despotic governments of Asia. Though
+the Governor of the Philippines does not wear as much gilt braid
+as some of his fellow potentates on the mainland of Asia, still,
+in all executive matters he wields a power quite as immediate and
+substantial, in its operation on his subjects, as any of his royal
+colleagues. It never for a moment occurs either to the American
+Government official in the Philippines, or to the American citizen
+engaged in private business there who is in entire accord with the
+policies of the insular government and on terms of friendship with
+the officials, that the government under which he is living is any
+more of a despotism than the Government of the United States. The
+shoe never pinches the American citizen engaged in private business
+until he begins, for one reason or another, to be "at outs" with the
+insular government, and to have "opinions" which--American-like--he
+at once wants to express. If he permits himself to get thoroughly
+out of accord with the powers that be, the sooner he gets out of the
+Islands the better for him. This is the most notorious single fact
+in the present situation. There is no public opinion to help such a
+person, in any case where he differs with any specific act or policy
+of the insular government. The American colony is comparatively small,
+say between ten and twenty thousand all told, outside the army (which
+consists of ten or twelve thousand individuals living wholly apart
+from the rest of the community). The doctor who is known to have
+the patronage of high government officials is sure of professional
+success, and his wife is sure to receive the social recognition her
+husband's position in the community naturally commands; and this
+permits her to make auspicious entrance into the game of playing at
+precedence with her next neighbor called "society," so dear to the
+hearts of many otherwise sensible and estimable women--to say nothing
+of carpet knights, callow youths, cads, and aging gourmands. Also
+if the doctor and his lady have adult children, their opportunities
+to marry well are multiplied by the sunlight from the seats of the
+mighty. Thus the doctor and his wife are a standing lesson to the man
+"with convictions" that yearn for utterance, but who is also blessed
+with a discreet helpmate, more concerned in the general welfare and
+happiness of all the family than in seeing her husband's name in
+the paper. What is true of the doctor is also true of the lawyer
+known to be persona grata to the government. Again, the newspaper
+man in favor with the government is sure to get his share of the
+government advertising, according to a very liberal construction,
+and that insures his being able to command reportorial and editorial
+talent such as will sell his paper, and the consequent circulation is
+sure to get him the advertising patronage of the mercantile community,
+thus placing success for him on a solid, comfortable basis. Also, a
+contrary course will, slowly, maybe, but surely, freeze out any rash
+competitor. Consequently, the American in the Philippines is deprived
+of one of his most precious home pleasures, viz., letting off steam,
+in some opposition paper, about the real or imagined shortcomings of
+the men in charge of the government. For the reasonable expectancy
+of life of an opposition paper in Manila is pathetically brief. The
+hapless editor on the prosperous paper, whatever his talents,
+who happens to become afflicted with "views" which he airs in his
+editorial columns, is soon upbraided by his friends at his club as
+"getting cranky," and is told by the orthodox old-timers among them,
+"John, you've been out here too long. You better go home." If he does
+not change his tone, the receipts of the advertising department of his
+paper soon fall off, and his friend, the more tactful proprietor, who
+"knows how to get along with people," is not long in agreeing with
+the rest of his friends that he has "been out here too long." Again
+the successful merchant has too many interests at stake in which he
+needs the cordial friendship of the government to be able to afford
+to antagonize it. And so on, through every walk of life, the influence
+of the government permeates every nook and corner of the situation.
+
+The average public man in the United States would not feel "nat'ral"
+unless intermittently bedewed with steam from the exhaust valve of
+the soul of some "outraged citizen," through the medium of the public
+press. But in the Philippines a public man occupying a conspicuous
+position with the government may be very generally detested and
+actually not know it. [424] The American in the Philippines, with
+all his home connections severed, might as well send his family to
+the poor-house at once as to come out in a paper with an interview or
+speech,--even supposing any paper would publish it--which, copied by
+the papers back in the United States, would embarrass the National
+Administration's Philippine policy in any way. The same applies to
+talking too freely for the newspapers when home on a visit.
+
+I think the foregoing makes sufficiently obvious the inherent
+impossibility of the American people ever knowing anything about
+current governmental mistakes in the Philippines, of which there
+must be some, in time for their judgment to have anything to do with
+shaping the course of the government out there for which they are
+responsible. And therefore it shows the inherent unfitness of their
+governmental machinery to govern the Filipinos so long as they do not
+change the home form of government to meet the needs of the colonial
+situation, by providing a method of invoking the public judgment on
+a single issue, as in the case of monarchical ministries, instead of
+lumping issues as we now do. It is certainly a shame that the fate and
+future of the Philippines are to-day dependent upon issues as wholly
+foreign to anything Philippine as is the price of cheese in Kamchatka
+or the price of wool in the United States. Whether the Filipinos are
+fit for self-government or not, under our present form of government
+we are certainly wholly unfit to govern them. In our government of
+the Filipinos, the nature of the case eliminates our most valuable
+governmental asset, to wit, that saving grace of public opinion
+which stops public men, none of whom are infallible, before they can
+accomplish irreparable mischief, through uncorrected faith in plans of
+questionable wisdom and righteousness to which their minds are made up.
+
+To show how absolute was the executive and legislative power over
+8,000,000 of people entrusted by the sole authority of President
+McKinley to Governor Taft--without consulting Congress, though
+afterwards the authority so conferred was ratified by Congress and
+descended from Governor Taft to his successor--an incident related
+to me in the freedom of social intercourse, and not in the least
+in confidence, by my late beloved friend Arthur W. Fergusson,
+long Executive Secretary to Governor Taft, will suffice. In 1901
+the Commission had passed a law providing for the constitution of
+the Philippine judiciary, [425] according to which law an American,
+in order to be eligible to appointment as a Judge of First Instance
+(the ordinary trial court, or nisi prius court, of Anglo-Saxon
+jurisprudence) must be more than thirty years old, and must have
+practised law in the United States for a period of five years before
+appointed. In 1903 President Roosevelt wanted to make Hon. Beekman
+Winthrop (then under thirty years of age) now (1912), Assistant
+Secretary of the Navy, a Judge of First Instance. Governor Taft called
+Fergusson in and said: "Fergy, make me out a commission for Beekman
+Winthrop as a Judge of First Instance." Fergusson said: "You can't do
+it, Governor. It's against the law. He's not old enough." Winthrop was
+a graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor Taft said humorously,
+"I can't eh? I'll show you. Send me a stenographer." A law was dictated
+[426] striking out thirty years and inserting twenty-five, and adding
+after the words "must have practised law for a period of five years"
+the words "or be a graduate of a reputable law school." Fergusson
+was then called in, and told to go down the hall, see the other
+commissioners, [427] and get them together, which he did, and
+the law was passed in a few minutes. Then Fergusson was sent for,
+and the Governor said, handing him the new "law"; "Now make out
+that commission." Even if Fergusson colored the incident up a bit,
+in the exercise of his inimitable artistic capacity to make anything
+interesting, his story was certainly substantially correct relatively
+to the absoluteness of the authority of the Governor, as will appear
+by reference to the two laws cited.
+
+It is only fair to say that Winthrop made a very good judge. There
+used to be current in the Philippines a story that Governor Taft
+had said, in more or less humorous vein: "Gentlemen, I'm somewhat
+of an expert on judges. What you need in a judge is"--counting with
+the index finger of one hand on the fingers of the other--"firstly,
+integrity; secondly, courage; thirdly, common sense; and fourthly,
+he must know a little law." Winthrop's integrity, courage, and common
+sense were beyond all question. It could hardly have been otherwise. He
+came of a long line of sturdy and distinguished men, the first of whom
+had come over in the Mayflower days to the Massachusetts coast. And,
+he did know a little law. But the manner of his appointment is none
+the less illustrative of how much quicker, Governor Taft could make
+and publish a law than any of his fellow despots [428] over on the
+mainland of Asia, considering how slow-moving all their various grand
+viziers were, compared with Fergy, and his corps of stenographers.
+
+Having now given, I hope, a more or less sympathetic insight into
+what absolute rulers our governors in the Philippines have been, in
+the very nature of the case, from the beginning, let us observe the
+change of tone of the government, after the reign of the first ended,
+and the reign of the second began.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+GOVERNOR WRIGHT--1904
+
+                                The blame of those ye better
+                                The hate of those ye guard.
+
+                                           Kipling's White Man's Burden.
+
+
+Governor Taft left the Philippines on or about December 23, 1903,
+to become Secretary of War in President Roosevelt's Cabinet, and
+shortly afterward Vice-Governor Luke E. Wright succeeded to the
+governorship. After the accession of Governor Wright, there was
+no more hammering it into the American business men having money
+invested in the Islands that the Filipino was their "little brown
+brother," for whom no sacrifice, however sublime, would be more
+than was expected. Governor Wright was quite unpopular with the
+Filipinos and immensely popular with the Americans and Europeans,
+because, soon after he came into power, he "let the cat out of the
+bag," by letting the Filipinos know plainly that they might just as
+well shut up talking about independence for the present, so far as
+he was advised and believed; in other words, that Governor Taft's
+"Philippines for the Filipinos" need not cause any specially billowy
+sighs of joy just yet, because it had no reference to any Filipinos
+now able to sigh, but only to unborn Filipinos who might sigh in
+some remote future generation; and that the slogan which had caused
+them all to want to sob simultaneously for joy on the broad chest
+of Governor Taft was merely a case of an amiable unwillingness to
+tell them an unpleasant truth, viz., that in his opinion they were
+wholly unfit for self-government--all of which, in effect, meant
+that Governor Taft had been merely "Keeping the word of promise to
+the ear and breaking it to the hope."
+
+The Wright plain talk made the Filipinos one and all feel:
+"Alackaday! Our true friend has departed." But as Secretary of War
+Taft, after four years more of trying to please both sides, at home, at
+last frankly told the Filipinos when he went out to attend the opening
+of the first Philippine legislature, in 1907, practically just what
+Governor Wright had begun to tell them from the moment his predecessor
+had exchanged the parting tear with them on the water-front at Manila
+in 1903, the net result of the Wright policy of uncompromising honesty
+on the present political situation, may easily be guessed.
+
+Governor Wright's method of repudiating the Taft straddle took for its
+key-note, in lieu of "The Philippines for the Filipinos," the slogan
+"An Equal Chance for All." What Governor Wright meant was merely that
+there would be no more browbeating of Americans to make them love
+their little brown brother as much as Governor Taft was supposed
+to love him, but that everybody would be treated absolutely alike
+and nobody coddled. However, the Filipinos of course knew that they
+could not compete with American wealth and energy, and so did the
+Americans in the islands. So what the Wright slogan, unquestionably
+fair as was its intent, inexorably meant to everybody concerned except
+the dignified, straightforward and candid propounder of it, was, in
+effect, the British "White Man's Burden" or Trust-for-Civilization
+theory, a theory whereunder the white man who wants some one else's
+land goes and takes it on the idea that he can put it to better
+use than the owner. Thus early did the original "jollying" Mr. Taft
+had given them become transparent to his little brown brother. Thus
+early did it become clear to the Filipinos that behind the mask of
+executive protestations that they shall some day have independence
+when fit for it, lurks a set determination industriously to earn for
+an indeterminate number of generations yet to come
+
+
+                The blame of those ye better
+                The hate of those ye guard.
+
+
+This book has been written, up to this point, in vain, if the
+preceding chapters have not made clear how much political expediency,
+looking to the welfare of a party in power naturally seeking to
+continue in power, necessarily dominates Philippine affairs under
+American rule. We have observed under the microscope of history,
+made available by the official documents now accessible, the long
+battle between the political expediency germ and the independence
+bug which began in General Anderson's dealings with Aguinaldo and
+continued through General Merritt's and General Otis's régimes. We
+have seen General MacArthur's attempt at a wise surgical operation
+to excise the independence bug from the Philippine body politic--so
+that the expediency germ might die a natural death from having nothing
+to feed on. We have seen that operation interfered with by the Taft
+Commission during the presidential campaign of 1900, because the men
+in control of the republic could not ignore considerations of political
+expediency; and we saw the consequent premature setting up of the civil
+government in 1901, with all its dire consequences in the then as yet
+unconquered parts of the archipelago, southern Luzon, and some of the
+Visayan Islands. We have observed the effective though heroic local
+treatment administered to the Philippine body politic by General Bell
+in Batangas in 1901-2, with a view of killing off the independence
+bug there. We have seen the fierce struggle between some of the bug's
+belated spawn and the expediency germ's now more emboldened forces
+in Albay in the off year, 1903. We are now to take our fifth year's
+course in the colonial department of politico-entomological research,
+the presidential year 1904.
+
+It was the way the Samar insurrection of 1904-5-6 was handled which
+finally convinced me that the Filipinos would not kill any more of
+each other in a hundred years than we have killed, or permitted to
+be killed, of them, in the fell process of Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+American imperialism is not honest, like the British variety. American
+imperialism knows that Avarice was its father, and Piety its
+mother, and that it takes after its father more than it does
+after its mother. British imperialism frankly aims mostly to make
+the survivors of its policies happy, not the people it immediately
+operates on. American imperialism pretends to be ministering to the
+happiness of the living, and, though it realizes that it is not a
+success in that line, it resents identification with its British
+cousin, by sanctimonious reference to the alleged net good it is
+doing. Yet in its moments of frankness it says, with an air of infinite
+patience under base ingratitude, "Well, they will be happy in some
+other generation," and that therefore the number of people we have
+had or may have, to kill, or permit to be killed, in the process of
+Benevolent Assimilation, is wholly negligible. This is simply the old,
+old argument that the end justifies the means, the argument that has
+wrought more misery in the world than any other since time began.
+
+When Judge Taft, General Wright, and their colleagues of the Taft
+Commission, came out to the Philippines in 1900, they came full of the
+McKinley convictions about a people whom neither they or Mr. McKinley
+had ever seen, bound hand and foot by political necessity to square the
+freeing of Cuba with the subjugation of the Philippines. A perfectly
+natural evolution of this attitude resulted in the position they
+at once took on arriving in the Islands, viz., that to do for the
+Filipinos what we have done for the Cubans would mean a bloody welter
+of anarchy and chaos. And the presidential contest of 1900 was fought
+and won largely on that issue. After 1900, for all the gentlemen above
+referred to, the proposition was always res adjudicata. All protests
+by Filipinos to the contrary caused only resentment, and welded the
+authorities more and more hermetically to the correctness of the
+original proposition. Loyalty to the original ill-considered decision
+became impregnated, in their case, with a fervor not entirely unlike
+religious fanaticism, and belief in it became a matter of principle,
+justifying all they had done, and guiding all they might thereafter
+do. So that when General Wright "came to the throne" in our colonial
+empire, as Governor, and legatee of the McKinley-Taft Benevolent
+Assimilation policies, his attitude in all he did was thoroughly
+honest, and also thoroughly British. He honestly believed in the
+"bloody welter of anarchy and chaos" proposition, and was prepared,
+in any emergency that might arise, to follow his convictions in that
+regard whithersoever they might lead, without variableness or shadow
+of turning. Take him all in all, Governor Wright was about the best
+man occupying exalted station I ever knew personally, President Taft
+himself not excepted; although I still adhere to Colonel Roosevelt's
+opinion of 1901 concerning Mr. Taft, quoted in the chapter preceding
+this, from the Outlook of September 21, 1901, notwithstanding that in
+the contest for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1912,
+the Colonel "recalled" that opinion. Seriously, a man may "combine the
+qualities which would make a first class President of the United States
+with the qualities which would make a first class Chief Justice of the
+United States" and still cut a sorry figure trying to fit a square peg
+into a round hole, or a scheme of government, the breath of whose life
+is public opinion, into the running of a remote colonial government,
+the breath of whose life is exemption from being interfered with by
+public opinion.
+
+After the Albay insurrection of 1903 had been cleaned up, I took charge
+of the Twelfth Judicial District, having been appointed thereto by
+Governor Taft just before he left the islands to become Secretary of
+War. In those trying pioneer days they always seemed to give me the
+insurrections to sift out, but it was purely fortuitous. Whenever you
+ceased to be busy, prompt arrangements were made for you to get busy
+again. Judge Ide, the Minister of Justice, wasted no government money.
+
+The Twelfth District consisted of the two island provinces of Samar and
+Leyte, two of the six Visayan Islands heretofore noticed as the only
+ones worth considering in a general view of the archipelago such as
+the student of world politics wants or needs. Leyte had a population
+of 388,922, [429] and an area of 3008 square miles. [430] Samar's
+population was 266,237, and its area, 5276 square miles, makes it the
+third largest island of the Philippine Archipelago. So that as Judge
+of the Twelfth District, consisting of two provinces, the Governor of
+each of which was ex-officio sheriff of the court for his province,
+I was, in a sense, a sort of shepherd of a political flock of some
+650,000 people, whom I always thought of as a whole as "my" people.
+
+Samar and Leyte are separated, where nearest together, by a most
+picturesque winding strait bordered with densely wooded hills. San
+Juanico Strait is much narrower than the inland sea of Japan at its
+narrowest point, and almost as beautiful. In fact, at its narrowest
+point it seems little more than a stone's throw in width. It is as
+pretty as the prettiest part of the Golden Horn. Leyte had been put
+under the Civil Government in 1901, and this premature interference
+with the military authorities in the midst of their efforts to pacify
+the island had had the usual result of postponing pacification, by
+filling local politicians, wholly unable to comprehend a government
+which entreated or reasoned with people to do things, with the notion
+that we were resorting to diplomacy in lieu of force because of fear
+of them. Leyte and Samar were strategically one for the insurgents,
+just as the provinces of the Lake district of Luzon, described in
+an earlier chapter, were, because they could flee by night from
+one province to another in small boats without detection, when hard
+pressed by the Americano. The main insurgent general in Samar, Lucban,
+had surrendered to General Grant in 1902, but the cheaper fellows
+stayed out much longer, preying upon those who preferred daily toil
+to cattle-stealing and throat-cutting as a means of livelihood,
+and continuing the political unrest intermittently in gradually
+diminishing degree, through 1903. By the spring of 1904, however,
+there still remained in Samar riffraff enough, the jetsam and flotsam
+of the insurrection--professional outlaws--to get up some trouble,
+so that, as brigand chiefs, they might resume the rôles of Robin
+Hood, Jesse James, et al. During the first half of that year the
+opportunity these worthies had been waiting for, while resting on
+their oars, developed. The crop of municipal officials resulting from
+the original McKinley plan of beginning the work of reconstruction
+during, instead of after, the war, and among the potential village
+Hampdens, instead of among the Cromwells, had resulted in some very
+rascally municipal officials who oppressed the poor, getting the hemp
+of the small farmer, when they would bring it to town, at their own
+prices--hemp being to Samar what cotton is to the South. From the
+lowland and upland farmers the ever-widening discontent spread to
+the hills, where dwelt a type of people constituting only a small
+fraction of the total population of the Islands--"half savage and
+half child"--but loving their hills, and wholly indisposed, of their
+own initiative, to start trouble, unless manipulated. Obviously,
+then, "the public mind" of Samar--those who know Samar will smile
+with me at the phrase, but it will do, for lack of a better--was
+likely soon to be in a generally inflammable condition. By July,
+1904, the Robin Hoods, Jesse Jameses, et al., touched the match to
+the material and a political conflagration started, apparently as
+unguided--save by the winds of impulse--and certainly as persistent,
+as a forest fire. Every native of the Philippine Islands, whether
+he be of the 7,000,000 Christians or of the 500,000 non-Christian
+tribes, is born with a highly developed social instinct either to
+command or to obey. The latter tendency is quite as common in the
+Philippines as the former is in the United States. Hence the Samar
+disturbances of 1904-5-6, though made up at the outset of raids and
+depredations by various roving bands of outlaws yielding allegiance
+only to their immediate chief, soon took on a very formidable military
+and political aspect. [431] The roving bands would ask the peaceably
+inclined people our flag was supposed to be protecting, "Are you for
+us or for the Americans?" promptly chopping their heads off if they
+showed any lack of zeal in denouncing American municipal institutions
+and things American in general. Pursuant to Mr. McKinley's original
+scheme--concocted for a people he had never seen, under pressure of
+political necessity--to rig up in short order a government "essentially
+popular in form," a lot of most pitiable municipal governments had
+been let loose on the people, a part of our series of kindergarten
+lessons. The plan was as wise as it will be for the Japanese--some
+one please hold Captain Hobson while I finish the analogy--when
+they conquer the United States, to go to the Bowery and the Ghetto
+for mayors of all our cities. Thus by our pluperfect benevolence,
+we had contrived in Samar by 1904 to rouse the highland folk, or hill
+people, whom the Spaniards had always let alone, against the pacific
+agricultural lowland people and the dwellers in the coast villages. The
+latter, or such of them as did not join the hill folk for protection,
+we permitted to be mercilessly butchered by wholesale, from August to
+November, 1904, as hereinafter more fully set forth, because ordering
+out the army to protect them might have been construed at home to mean
+disturbances more serious and widespread than actually existed, and
+might therefore affect the presidential election in the United States
+by renewing the notion that the Administration had never been frank
+with the American people concerning conditions in the Philippines.
+
+The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 is dated
+November 1st, which was just a week before the presidential election
+day of that year. Their annual report for 1905 is dated November 1,
+1905. In their report for 1904, the Commission deal with the general
+state of public order in the same roseate manner which, as we have
+seen, had made its first appearance during the political exigencies
+of 1900 in the language about "the great majority of the people"
+being "entirely willing" to benevolent alien domination in lieu
+of independence. When Rip Van Winkle was trying to quit drinking,
+he used to say after each drink: "Oh, we'll just let that pass." In
+their report for 1904, the Commission swallow the conditions in Samar
+with equal nonchalance. After stating that some (impliedly negligible)
+disturbances had occurred in Samar "two months since," they add that
+"the constabulary of the province took the field" against the bands
+of Pulajans, or outlaws, and that "as a result, they were soon broken
+up, and are being pursued and killed or captured" (p. 3). In their
+report dated November 1, 1905, by way of preface to an account of
+the extensive military operations inaugurated in Samar shortly after
+the presidential election of 1904, which operations had not only
+been in progress for nearly a year on the date of the 1905 report,
+but continued for more than a year thereafter, the Commission explain
+their 1904 nonchalance about Samar thus: "It was then believed that
+the constabulary forces had succeeded in checking the further progress
+of the outbreak" (p. 47).
+
+Let us examine the facts on which they based this statement, since it
+meant that they believed that a duly reported epidemic of massacres
+of peaceably inclined people, over whom the American flag was floating
+as a symbol of protection to life and property, had stood effectually
+checked by November 1, 1904, the date of their report. And first,
+of the massacres themselves, their nature and extent.
+
+The Samar massacres of 1904 began with what we all called down there
+"the outbreak of July 10th." In August, 1904, I went to Samar to
+handle the cases arising out of the disturbances there, assisted by
+the (native) Governor of the province, who, under the law already
+alluded to, was ex-officio sheriff of the court, and an army of
+deputy sheriffs, as it were, the constabulary, numbering several
+hundred. The outbreak of July 10th was always known afterwards as
+"the Tauiran affair." This Tauiran affair was a raid by an outlaw
+band on the barrio of Tauiran, one of the hamlets of the municipal
+jurisdiction of the township called Gandara, in the valley of the
+Gandara River, in north central Samar, wherein one hundred houses,
+the whole settlement, were burned, and twenty-one people killed. The
+term of court lasted from early in August until early in November. The
+day after the Tauiran affair, over on the other fork of the Gandara
+River, occurred what was called "the Cantaguic affair." Cantaguic was
+a hamlet or barrio about the size of Tauiran. The brigands killed the
+lieutenant of police of Cantaguic and some others, but they did not
+kill everybody in the place. Instead, after killing a few people,
+they went to the tribunal (town hall), seized the local teniente,
+or municipal representative of American authority, tied the American
+flag they found at the tribunal about the head of the teniente, turban
+fashion, poured kerosene oil on it, and took the teniente down stairs
+and out into the public square, where they lighted and burned the
+flag on his head, the chief of the band, one Juliano Caducoy by name,
+remarking to the onlookers that the act was intended as a lesson to
+those serving that flag. They then cut off the lips of the teniente
+so he could not eat (he of course died a little later), burned the
+barrio and carried off fifty of the inhabitants. Caducoy was captured
+some time afterward, and I sentenced him to be hanged. There was
+practically no dispute about the facts. After the Cantaguic affair,
+during the term of court mentioned, the provincial doctor, Dr. Cullen,
+an American who had been a captain doctor of volunteers, had occasion
+to run up to Manila. The doctor was a most accomplished gentleman,
+but he had a fondness for the grewsome in description equal to Edgar
+Allan Poe himself. After he came back he told me about having told the
+Governor-General of the Cantaguic affair, and repeated with an evident
+pleased consciousness of his ability to make his hearer's blood curdle,
+how the Governor had said to him slowly, "Doctor, that--is--awful!"
+
+Blood seemed to whet the appetite for slaughter. The records of the
+August-November, 1904 term of the court of first instance of Samar show
+all the various barrios of the Gandara Valley in flames on successive
+days, after the affairs of July 10th and 11th. I do not speak from
+memory, but from documents contained in a large bundle of papers
+kept ever since, in memory of that incarnadined epoch. You find one
+barrio burned one day and another another day, until all the people
+of the Gandara Valley were made homeless. One of the constabulary
+officers, Lieutenant Bowers, a very gallant fellow, testified before
+me that from July 10th to the date of his testimony, which was on or
+about September 28th, some 50,000 people had been made homeless in
+Samar by the operations of the outlaws. I deem Lieutenant Bowers's
+estimate quite reasonable. His figures include only one-fifth of the
+population of an island which was in the throes of an all-pervading
+brigand uprising. The conservative nature of Lieutenant Bowers's
+estimate concerning the mischief that had already been wrought
+by the end of September, 1904, and was then gathering destructive
+potentiality like a forest or prairie fire, may be inferred from the
+contents of a memorandum appearing below, furnished me by a Spanish
+officer of the constabulary, a Lieutenant Calderon, who had been an
+officer of the Rural Guard in the Spanish days. It contains a list
+of fifty-three towns, villages, and hamlets (a barrio may be quite a
+village, sometimes even quite a town, though usually it is a hamlet)
+burned up to the date the memorandum was furnished me.
+
+In order to a clear understanding of these Samar massacres and
+town-burnings of 1904, as well as for general geographical purposes,
+a few preliminary words of explanation will be appropriate just here.
+A province in the Philippines has heretofore been likened to a county
+with us. But in the largest provinces, the subdivisions of provinces
+called municipalities are more like counties; and each municipality
+is in turn subdivided into sections called barrios. A municipality
+(Spanish, pueblo) in the Philippines is not primarily a city or town,
+as we understand it, i.e., a more or less continuous settlement
+of houses and lots more or less adjacent, but a specific area of
+territory, a township, as it were. This area or territory may be 5 Ũ
+10 square miles, or 10 Ũ 20, or more, or less. For example, Samar's
+area is 5276 square miles. Yet it contained in 1904, and probably still
+contains, only twenty-five townships or municipalities all told, each
+municipality being subdivided in turn into barrios. Municipalities
+in the Philippines vary in size as much as counties do with us, and
+their total area accounts for and represents the total area of the
+province, just as the total area of the counties of a State represents
+with us the total area of the State. The seat of government of the
+municipality always bears the same name as the municipality itself,
+just as the county seat of a county usually, or frequently, bears
+the same name as the county, with us. Take for instance, the name of
+the first municipality or township in the list which appears below,
+Gandara. The municipality of Gandara might be described by analogy
+as the "county" of Gandara, the list of barrios burned as a list of
+towns and villages of the "county" of Gandara.
+
+The municipality of Gandara included a watershed in north central Samar
+from which the Gandara River flowed in a southwesterly direction to
+the sea. Within this watershed, parallel 12 1/2 north of the equator
+intersects the 125th meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. Northern
+Samar is a very rich hemp country, Catarman hemp being usually quoted
+higher than any hemp listed on the London market. If you stand at the
+highest point of the Gandara watershed you can see four streams flowing
+off north, northwest, northeast, and southwest to the sea. There are
+some half dozen streams having their source there. Brigands making
+their headquarters there could always, when hard pressed, get away
+in canoes toward the sea in almost any direction they wished. The
+following is Lieutenant Calderon's list:
+
+
+    RELACION POR MUNICIPIOS DE LOS BARRIOS QUEMADOS.
+
+    (List by Municipalities of the Barrios Burned.)
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF GANDARA
+
+    Tauiran                    July 10
+    Cantaguic                  July 12
+    Cauilan                    July 13
+    Erenas                     July 16
+    Blanca Aurora              July 19
+    Bulao [432]                July 21
+    Pizarro                  August  8
+    Cagibabago               August  8
+    Nueva                    August 10
+    Hernandez                August 10
+    San Miguel               August 10
+    Buao                     August 15
+    El Cano                  August 17
+    San Enrique              August 20
+    San Luis                 August 25
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Malino                   July   31
+    Silanga                  August  9
+    Ginga                    August 13
+    San Fernando             August 15
+    Maragadin                August 20
+    Talinga                  August 21
+    Santa Cruz               August 22
+    Dap-dap                  August 29
+    Palencia                 August 31
+    Albalate           (date not given)
+    Villa Hermosa      (date not given)
+
+
+The above list of villages burned in the township of Catbalogan
+shows how bold the Pulajans had then grown. By that time they were
+committing depredations, robbery, murder, and town-burning, in all the
+various villages within the municipal jurisdiction of the township
+of Catbalogan, coming often within a few miles of the town proper
+of Catbalogan itself, the seat of the provincial government. In the
+attack on Silanga, which occurred August 9th, a number of people
+were killed. Silanga was but little more than an hour's walk from
+the court-house at Catbalogan. The Governor at once wired Manila
+as follows:
+
+
+                                        Catbalogan, Samar, Aug. 9, 1904.
+
+    Executive Secretary, Manila:
+
+    The peaceably inclined people of the barrios near here are
+    collecting here in large numbers, terrorized by Pulajans who are
+    boldly roaming the country, burning barrios within seven or eight
+    miles from Catbalogan. They kill men, women, and children without
+    distinction. These Pulajans have fled from Gandara where they are
+    being actively pursued by constabulary. All forces that could be
+    spared have gone out. We have about thirty available fighting
+    men here. Pulajans liable at any time to enter Catbalogan. We
+    are in danger of some occurrence quite as serious as the Surigao
+    affair. [433] There are buildings here which I must protect at all
+    hazards--Treasury, Provincial Jail with ninety-five prisoners, and
+    commissary and ordnance stores of constabulary. We need at once at
+    least three hundred men, scouts if possible, to handle situation,
+    between here and Gandara. Pulajans undoubtedly have friends in
+    Catbalogan. I suspect certain of the municipal authorities here. I
+    estimate number of Pulajans now operating at about five hundred.
+
+        (Signed) Feito, Governor.
+
+
+On September 2d, the Provincial Governor of Samar sent to Manila the
+following telegram:
+
+
+                                              Catbalogan, Sept. 2, 1904.
+
+    Carpenter, Actg. Ex. Secy., Palace, Manila:
+
+    Seven-thirty this evening simultaneous reports from north
+    and south sides of town Pulajans approaching. They have not
+    entered yet and may not, but have gathered Americans with wives
+    and children in my house. Arms supplied. Treasury twenty-five
+    thousand Conant. [434] One hundred forty prisoners in jail. Only
+    forty-seven constabulary here. If Pulajans enter much needless
+    sacrifice life pacific citizens here. Feel sure Pulajans have
+    friends in Catbalogan. Request company either scouts or soldiers
+    from Calbayog stationed here, preferably former. Their presence
+    guarantee stability.
+
+        (Signed) Feito, Governor.
+
+
+Of course Governor Feito did not call for the regular army of the
+United States. His job, poor devil, was to demonstrate as best he
+could that the military were not needed. He would at once have been
+suspected of trying to scuttle the ship of "benign civil government"
+if he had admitted that the regular army was needed. But to return
+to Calderon's list:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CALBAYOG [435]
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+
+    Ylo                       August 17
+    Napuro                    August 17
+    Balud                     August 17
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF WRIGHT
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Guinica-an                  July 25
+    Calapi                      July 28
+    Bonga                      August 4
+    Tutubigan                 August 19
+    Motiong                 September 1
+    Lau-an                   October 10
+    Sao Jose           (date not given)
+
+
+A sample of the distressing communications I was getting as these
+massacres progressed is the notification of the Motiong affair
+of September 1st set forth below, which I give as a type of the
+methodical stoicism of those bloody times. Motiong was seven miles
+down the coast road from Catbalogan:
+
+
+    In the district of Motiong, municipality of Wright, province of
+    Samar, Philippine Islands, September 1, 1904.
+
+    In the presence of the undersigned Peregrin Albano, member of
+    the village council, there being also present the president of
+    the Municipal Board of Health, Mr. Tomas San Pablo, and the
+    principal men of the place, there has this day occurred the
+    burial of the corpses, victims of the Pulajans, in the cemetery
+    of this place, to wit: The officer of volunteers, Rafael Rosales,
+    and the following volunteers, viz., Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle,
+    Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo; also the two women,
+    Eustaquia Sapiten and Apolinaria N., also one unknown Pulajan. This
+    in fulfilment of the official letter of instructions No. 136,
+    from the office of the presidente of the town of Wright dated
+    to-day. Said burial ceremonies were conducted by the Reverend
+    Father Marcos Gomez, and were attended by the whole volunteer
+    force of this place because of the death of their officer Rosales.
+
+
+    Tomas San Pablo,
+    President of the Board of Health.
+
+    Peregrin Albano,
+    Councillor.
+
+    (Illegible)----Moro, Captain of Volunteers. [436]
+
+
+Fancy having documents like the foregoing handed you with
+ever-increasing regularity as you sauntered, morning after morning,
+from your bath to your coffee and rolls, preparatory to the daily
+sifting of incidents such as that which included the burning of
+the American flag on the head of the municipal representative of
+American authority already mentioned, and other like acts of poor
+misguided peasants stirred up by trifling scamps representing the
+dregs of insurrection. Motiong was not only within seven miles of
+the court-house at Catbalogan, but it was so near to Camp Bumpus,
+over in Leyte, where the 18th Infantry lay, that an order to them
+to move in the morning would have made life and property in all that
+brigand-harried region safe that night and continuously thereafter.
+
+General Wm. H. Carter, Major-General U. S. A., well known to the
+American public as the able officer who, in 1911, commanded the United
+States forces mobilized on the Mexican border during the Mexican
+revolution of that year, that ousted President Diaz and seated
+President Madero, was in command at the time--the fall of 1904--of
+the military district of the Philippines which included Samar and
+Leyte. A word of request to him would have made life definitely safe
+in all the coast towns and their vicinity within two or three days
+after receipt of such a request.
+
+Besides Gandara, Catbalogan, Calbayog, and Wright, Lieutenant
+Calderon's list included the trio of ill-fated municipalities set
+forth below, concluding with the illustrious name of Taft:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG
+
+    Poblacion              September  5
+    Tagabiran                 August 11
+    San Vicente               August --
+
+
+Catubig was toward the north end of Samar. On the day of the burning
+and sacking of the poblacion of Catubig, September 5th, which was done
+by a force of several hundred Pulajans, the scouts and constabulary,
+so it was afterward reported, killed a hundred of the Catubig Pulajans
+in an engagement. If this report were correct, as is likely, it was
+the biggest single killing of natives since the early days of the
+insurrection. [437] But it did not in the least check the Pulajan
+insurrection, which simply swerved its fury from the Catubig region
+toward the coast (the Pacific coast), descending upon the towns,
+villages, and hamlets of the townships of Borongan and Taft, thus:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Sepa                     Sept. 23
+    Lucsohong                Sept. 23
+    Maybocog                 Sept. 23
+    Maydolong                Sept. 23
+    Soribao                  Sept. 23
+    Bugas                     Oct. 10
+    Punta Maria               Oct. 10
+    Canjauay                  Oct. 11
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF TAFT
+
+    (Calderon's List continued)
+
+    Del Remedio              Sept. 22
+    San Julian               Sept. 22
+    Nena                     Sept. 22
+    Libas                    Sept. 22
+    Pagbabangnan             Sept. 22
+    San Vicente              Sept. 21
+    Jinolaso                 Oct.   3
+
+
+Of the twenty-five pueblos or townships of Samar, the Calderon
+list only pretended to throw light on events in nine of them,
+those being the only ones from which definite news had then reached
+headquarters. But as a reign of terror prevailed all over Samar at the
+time, the rest may be imagined, though it can never be ascertained. Of
+these nine, the last two were:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF LLORENTE
+
+    Pagbabalancayan          Sept. 23
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF ORAS
+
+    Concepcion               Sept. 23
+    Jipapad                     --
+
+
+Now it feels just as uncomfortable to be boloed in Pagbabalancayan
+as it would in a place with a more pronounceable name, and the same
+is true of the comparatively mellifluous Jipapad. True, some of
+these places were mere hamlets of twenty to forty houses, but you
+may be sure there were five or six people, on an average, to each
+house. On the other hand, glance back again at the list of towns of
+the township of Taft that were sacked and burned, and consider that
+San Julian was about the size of the provincial capital, Catbalogan,
+and that Catbalogan, the town proper, contained a population of
+four thousand, though looked at from the amphitheatre of hills which
+surround it, Catbalogan does not look like such a very large group
+of houses. Filipino houses are usually full of people. It is easier
+to live that way than to build more houses.
+
+After the Pulajan descent on Llorente, the people of Llorente all went
+off to the hills to the Pulajans for safety. They were not allowed
+to have firearms. This was forbidden by law, except on condition of
+making formal application for permission, getting it finally approved,
+and giving a bond, conditions which, in practical operation, made
+the prohibition all but absolute. The law was general for the whole
+archipelago. The theory of the law was that the inhabitants were under
+"the peace and protection of a benign civil government." The real
+reason of the law was that if the people were allowed to bear arms it
+was very uncertain which side they would use them on, our side or the
+other. But, by 1904, the lowland and coast people of Samar would have
+been glad enough to have stuck to us and gone out after the mountain
+robber bands had we armed them. Left unprotected, a feeling seemed
+to spread in many places that about the only thing to do to be safe
+was to depart from under the "protection" of the American flag and
+take to the hills and join, or seem to join, the uprising.
+
+Toward the last of September, the provincial treasurer of Samar, an
+American, a Mr. Whittier, visited the east coast of Samar, including
+Taft. On October 5th, he stated before me as follows:
+
+
+    All the presidentes that I have talked with, and this man Hill,
+    [438] said that they wanted some protection for their towns. Except
+    at Borongan there are no guns in the hands of the municipal
+    police. [439] This band near Taft was said to have nineteen
+    guns, and they felt they could not defend their towns with spears
+    against these guns. There were reported to be between 200 and 600
+    in operation on the coast at that time, and they felt that they
+    could not defend their towns with the means at hand. I found at
+    Taft that they had taken all the records of the municipality,
+    and the money, and taken it over to an island away from the
+    main coast, in order to protect their money and their records,
+    and I understand the same thing was done at Llorente. At Oras
+    they had practically decided to take the same step if it became
+    necessary. All of the commercial houses on the east coast and
+    a large number of people congregated at Borongan, which was
+    safe on account of the protection of the constabulary; and the
+    constabulary there were doing very good work, doing everything
+    they could with their small force, and they (the presidentes)
+    felt that if they had guns in the hands of the municipal police
+    or if they had the constabulary to guard their towns, they could
+    go out after these people themselves.
+
+
+The importance of all this testimony, relatively to its forever
+sickening any one acquainted with it with colonization by a republic,
+is that a transcript of Mr. Whittier's statement of October 5th
+was placed in the hands of the Governor-General a few days later by
+Mr. Harvey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and yet this situation
+continued until shortly after the presidential election. Several
+years afterwards, in the North American Review, Judge Ide, who
+was Vice-Governor in 1904, after admitting that he was in constant
+consultation with the Governor-General all through that period (by
+way of showing his opportunities for knowing whereof he spoke),
+denied that the failure to order out the military to protect the
+people from massacre had any relation whatever to the presidential
+election then going on in the United States.
+
+Mr. Whittier also stated before me that the total population of the
+municipality of Taft was 18,000, and that twenty-five men armed with
+guns in each of the four principal villages thereof that were burned
+would have prevented the destruction of those villages. So we did not
+protect the people, and we would not let them protect themselves. I
+do not select the pueblo of Taft on account of its distinguished
+name. "What's in a name?" The fate of Taft and its inhabitants was
+simply typical of the fate which descended upon scores of other places
+in "dark and bloody" Samar between the outbreak of July 10, 1904, and
+the presidential election of November 8th, of that year, and between
+those two dates the shadow of such a fate was over all the towns of
+the island on which it did not in fact descend. Mr. Whittier stated to
+me informally that at the time he was speaking of in the above formal
+statement, there were pending and had been pending for a long time
+(he seemed to think they must have been pigeon-holed) applications
+for permission to bear arms from fifteen different pueblos. After
+Mr. Whittier had finished his statement the Presidente of Taft made
+a like statement on the same day, October 5th. My retained copy
+shows that this official bore the ponderous name of Angel Custodio
+Crisologo. He declared a willingness to lead his people against
+the Pulajans if given guns, though the fervent soul did qualify
+this martial remark by adding, "If I am well enough," explaining
+that the presidential body was subject to rheumatism. Mr. Crisologo
+stated among other things that there had been eight hundred houses
+burned in the jurisdiction of Taft before he left the east coast
+for Catbalogan--about a week before. Like Mr. Whittier's, a copy
+of Mr. Crisologo's statement was delivered a few days later to
+the Governor-General in person by the Assistant Attorney-General,
+Mr. Harvey, who had been present when it was made and taken down.
+
+This Mr. Harvey need not be, to the western hemisphere reader, a
+mere nebulous antipodal entity, as the Hon. Angel Custodio Crisologo
+might. He is a very live American, a very high-toned gentleman, and
+an excellent lawyer, and was at last accounts still with the insular
+government of the Philippine Islands, though in a higher capacity
+(Solicitor General) than he was at the date of the events herein
+narrated. There was very little congenial society in Catbalogan when
+Mr. Harvey came there to help dispose of the criminal docket, and his
+advent was to me a very welcome oasis in a desert of "the solitude
+of my own originality"--or lack of originality. On September 19th I
+had wired Vice-Governor Ide that there were 172 prisoners in the jail
+awaiting trial and "many more coming." Of course no justice of the
+peace would be trusted to pass on whether an alleged outlaw should
+or should not be held for trial. If he were secretly in sympathy
+with the discomfiture American authority in Samar was having, he
+might let the man go, no matter what the proof. Also he might seek to
+clear himself of all suspicion in each case by committing men against
+whom there was no proof, thus unnecessarily crowding an already fast
+filling provincial jail of limited dimensions, wherein beriberi [440]
+was already making its dread appearance.
+
+So the writ of habeas corpus remained unsuspended, thus making it
+possible to so state in later official certificates covering that
+period. But habeas corpus cut no more figure in the situation than
+it did at the battle of Gettysburg, or at the crossing of the Red
+Sea by the chosen people, or at the sinking of the Titanic. The
+constabulary would worry along with such force as they had in the
+island of Samar, only a few hundred, certainly nearer five hundred
+than one thousand. And, whenever they had a battle with the outlaws,
+if they themselves were not annihilated, which happened more than
+once, they would bring back prisoners in droves and put them in
+the jail, and I was expected to sift out how much proof they had,
+or claimed to have, of overt acts by persons not actually captured
+in action. Of course a race then began, a race against death, to see
+whether death or I would get to John Doe or Richard Roe first. And
+though I held court every day except Sunday from August to November
+8th, sometimes getting in sixteen hours per day by supplementing a
+day's work with a night session, death would often beat me to some
+one man on the jail list whom I happened to have picked out to get to
+the next day. Men so picked out were men as to whom something I might
+have heard held out the hope of being able to dispose of their cases
+quickly by letting them loose, [441] thus getting that much farther
+from the danger limit of crowding in the jail. Some of these would be
+specially picked out because reported sick. I kept track of the sick
+by visiting them myself when practicable, and talking to them. Of
+course many of them were brigands---Pulajans--but some of them were
+the saddest looking, most abject little brigands that anybody ever
+saw. Of course you might catch some nasty disease from them, but
+nobody, somehow, ever seemed to have any apprehension on that score
+in the Philippines. This does not argue bravery at all. It is merely
+the listless stoicism that lurks in the climate. I recollect going
+to walk one afternoon, after adjourning court at 5 o'clock, saying to
+the prosecuting attorney before adjourning, "We will take up the case
+of Capence Coral in the morning; there does not seem, from what I can
+understand, to be enough proof to convict him of anything." Of course
+when you were dealing with hundreds of people, you did not have any
+nerve-racking hysterics about any one man. Leaving the court-house I
+passed by the hospital, where Capence had been transferred, pending
+the arrival of witnesses against him and the rest of the crowd captured
+with him. I asked the hospital steward how Capence was. The answer was
+he had died at 4:45--some twenty minutes before. Death had beat me to
+Capence. When I meet Capence he will know I did the best I could. I
+was under a great strain, a sort of writ of habeas corpus incarnate,
+the only thing remotely suggesting relief from unwarranted [442]
+detention on the whole horizon of the situation. I was trying to do
+the best I could by the Constitution, in so far as the spirit of it
+had reached the Philippines. I broke down totally under the strain
+about November 8th, came home in the spring of the following year
+and remained an invalid for several years thereafter; and as a noted
+corporation lawyer once said after recovery from a similar illness,
+"I haven't had much constitution since, but have been living mostly
+under the by-laws."
+
+American office-holding in the Philippines is not so popular with
+the Filipinos as to have moved them to any outburst of gratitude in
+the shape of an effort to create a pension system for Americans who
+lose their health in the government service out there. When they
+leave the Islands they become as one dead so far as the Philippine
+insular government is concerned. And the men whose health is more or
+less permanently impaired by disability incurred in line of duty in
+the Philippines are not and will never be numerous or powerful enough
+back home to create any sentiment in favor of a pension system for
+former Philippine employees, since the Philippine business is not a
+subject of much popular enthusiasm at best. So if I had not had private
+resources, the results of the Samar insurrection of 1904 would have
+left me also in the pitiable plight in which I have beheld so many
+of my repatriated former comrades of the Philippine service in the
+last seven years, to whom the heart of the more fortunate ex-Filipino
+indeed goes out in sympathy. But to return to the race to beat death
+to prisoners in that grim and memorable fall of 1904.
+
+In September the crowded condition of the jail had begun to tell on
+the inmates. The constabulary force at Catbalogan was quite inadequate
+for the varied emergencies of the situation, there being, besides
+the town itself to protect, the provincial treasury to guard, the
+governor's office, the court-house, and the jail. Consequently the jail
+guard was too small. The jail buildings were in an enclosure a little
+larger than a baseball diamond, surrounded by high stone walls. But
+it was not safe to let the inmates sleep out in the enclosure at
+night. They had to be kept at night in the buildings. Any American
+who has visited the central penitentiary at Manila called Bilibid
+has seen a place almost as clean as a battleship. This is American
+work. But the Filipinos are not trained in sanitary matters, and all
+they know about handling large crowds of prisoners they learned from
+the Spaniards. The Governor was a native half-caste, a very excellent
+man, but free from that horror, which I think is an almost universal
+American trait, of seeing unnecessary and preventable sacrifice of
+human life, no matter whose the life. I inspected the jail as often
+as was practicable, and managed to keep down the death-rate below
+what it might have been, the prisoners being allowed to go out in
+the open court during the day. They also had such medical attention
+as was available. However, during the last five or six weeks of that
+term of court I would be pretty sure to find on my desk every two or
+three days, on opening court in the morning, a notice like this:
+
+
+    Carcel Provincial de Samar, I. F.
+    Oficina del Alcaide
+
+    Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.,
+    22 de Septiembre de 1904.
+
+    Hon. Sr. Juez de Ia Instancia de esta provincia,
+    Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.
+
+    Seņor:
+
+    Tengo el honor de poner en conocimiento de ese juzgado, que
+    anoche entre 12 y 1 de ella, fallecio el procesado, Ramon Boroce,
+    a consecuencia de la enfermedad de beriberi, que venia padeciendo.
+
+    Lo que tengo el honor de communicar a ese Juzgado para su superior
+    conocimiento.
+
+    De U. muy respetuosamente,
+    Gonzalo Lucero,
+
+    Alcaide de la Carcel Provincial.
+
+
+which being interpreted means:
+
+
+    Provincial Jail of Samar, P. I.
+
+    Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.,
+    September 22, 1904.
+
+    His honor, the Judge of First Instance of this province,
+    Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.
+
+    Sir:
+
+    I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of the court that last
+    night between 12 and 1 o'clock, the accused person Ramon Boroce
+    died in consequence of the disease of beriberi from which he has
+    been suffering; which fact I have the honor to communicate to
+    the court for its superior knowledge.
+
+    Very respectfully,
+    Gonzalo Lucero,
+
+    Warden of the Provincial Jail.
+
+
+Now a jail death-rate of only ten or twelve a month was not at all a
+bad record for an insurrection in a Philippine province. It would be
+rank demagoguery at this late date to be a party to anybody's getting
+excited about it. I was rather proud of it by comparison with the jail
+death-rate of the Albay insurrection of the year before, where 120
+men had died in the jail in about six months. But it began to get on
+one's nerves to have to expect a billet-doux like the above on your
+desk at the opening of court each day, when the accused person had
+had no commitment trial and may have been wholly innocent. It all
+came back to the difference between war and peace, viz., that in war
+it is to be expected that many innocent persons will suffer, but that
+in peace only the guilty should suffer. Moreover, in war that admits
+it is war, your agents, your army, are better able to handle crowds
+of prisoners than native police and constabulary, and the percentage
+of innocent who suffer with the guilty in such war will be far less;
+whereas the contrary is true of war--waged by constabulary checked
+by courts--which pretends that a state of peace exists, i.e., which
+pretends there is no need for declaring martial law and calling on
+your army.
+
+It was this Samar insurrection which convinced me that waging war
+with courts and constabulary in lieu of the recognized method was,
+in its net results, the cruelest kind of war, and that the civil
+government of the Philippines was a failure, in so far as regarded
+Mr. McKinley's original injunction to the Taft Commission; where,
+after alluding to the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila
+to our forces, which concluded with the words:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants * * * and its private property of all
+    descriptions * * * are placed under the special safeguard of the
+    faith and honor of the American Army,
+
+
+he added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life * * *
+    to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this
+    commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation,
+    which concerns the honor and conscience of their country.
+
+
+Commenting on this in his inaugural address as Governor of the
+Philippines, Governor Taft had said:
+
+
+    May we not be recreant to the charge, which he truly says,
+    concerns the honor and conscience of our country.
+
+
+No matter who was to blame, here we were in Samar, with the
+14th Infantry three hours away in one direction at Calbayog,
+doing nothing, and the 18th Infantry five hours away in another
+direction, at Tacloban, doing nothing, and a reign of terror going
+on in Samar, with the peaceably inclined people of the lowlands
+and coast towns appealing to us for protection and not getting it,
+sometimes crouching in abject terror without knowing which way to fly,
+sometimes taking to the hills and joining the outlaws as a measure
+of self-preservation. 'Twas pitiful, wondrous pitiful! I then and
+there decided that we ought to get out of the Philippines as soon
+as any decent sort of a native government could be set up, and that
+our republic was not adapted to colonization. In his North American
+Review article above cited, in denying that the unwillingness of
+the Manila government to order out the army in Samar in the fall
+of 1904 had anything to do with the possible effect so doing might
+have had on the presidential election, then in progress in the United
+States, Governor Ide rebuked me with patronizing self-righteousness
+thus: "Was Judge Blount opposed to kindness?" He means in giving
+the Filipinos, under such circumstances, the "protection of civil
+government," instead of ordering out the army. No, but I was opposed
+to using a saw, in lieu of a lancet, in excising the ulcers of that
+body politic at that time. In protesting that there was "nothing
+sinister" about the failure to use the troops, Judge Ide cunningly
+wonders whether my attitude was subsequently assumed after I left
+the Islands because of "proclivities as a Democrat," or whether it
+was merely due to "predilections in favor of military rule." Read
+Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Taft Commission, above quoted,
+that to protect life and property concerned the honor and conscience
+of their country, and consider if the Ide suggestion does not seem to
+hide its head and slink away in shame before the strong clear light
+of what was then a plain duty. As a matter of fact Judge Charles
+S. Lobinger, who is still with the Philippine judiciary, visited me
+en route to another point, during that Samar term of court, and he
+will recall, should he ever chance upon this book and this chapter,
+with what vehemence I said to him at the time, in effect, "Judge,
+we belong in the Western Hemisphere. We have no business out here
+permanently." If proclivities and predilections in favor of affording
+decent protection to the lives and property of defenceless people
+by properly garrisoning their towns constitutes lack of kindness,
+then the Ide rebuke was well taken.
+
+These details are not related with Pickwickian gravity in order to
+acquaint the reader with my utterances as being important per se. But
+it is important to make clear to the reader, and he is entitled,
+in all frankness, to have it made clear by one who has now so long
+detained his attention on this great subject, to know just when "the
+light from heaven on the road to Damascus" broke upon this witness,
+and how and why he came to be in favor of Philippine independence,
+because the reasons which convinced him may seem good in the sight
+of the reader also. If the man who reads this book shall see that
+the man who wrote it was, in Samar in 1904, neither a Republican nor
+a Democrat, but simply an American in a far distant land, jealous
+of the honor of his country's flag in its capacity as a symbol of
+protection to those over whom it floated, then the work will not have
+been written in vain.
+
+The presidentes or mayors of the various pueblos were in session
+at Catbalogan in semi-annual convention during the first few days
+of October, 1904, when the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey,
+visited Catbalogan. Mr. Harvey and the writer had taken a number of
+long walks together in the suburbs of Catbalogan, though Major Dade,
+commanding the Samar constabulary, an officer of the regular army,
+had warned us it was not safe outside of town. We had talked over
+the situation fully. Besides all its other aspects, there were a
+number of American women in Catbalogan, an American lawyer's wife,
+the wife of the superintendent of schools, her sister, and others. It
+was not at all likely that the Pulajans would enter Catbalogan, but
+there was always the possibility, not to be wholly ignored, that some
+such episode as that of March 23d, of the preceding year, at Surigao,
+already described, might be repeated. As hereinbefore noted, on August
+9th, the Pulajans had done some killing and burning at Silanga, less
+than ten miles north of Catbalogan and likewise at Motiong, less than
+ten miles south of Catbalogan, on September 1st, and on the evening
+of September 2d, about 7:30, there had been a false alarm caused
+by some native of Catbalogan running down the main street yelling,
+"Pulajans! Pulajans!" All of which did not tend to make you feel
+that your American women were quite as entirely safe from harm as
+they ought to be.
+
+In the course of one of our walks Mr. Harvey and I had stopped on the
+mountain side overlooking Catbalogan, to catch our breath and take in
+the view of the town below and the sea beyond. I said to him, because
+I knew his mind also was on the one great need of the hour: "Yes sir,
+if President Roosevelt were here, and could see this situation as we
+do, he would order out the army and protect these defenceless people,
+no matter which way the chips might fly." Mr. Harvey agreed with
+me. He promised to go back to Manila and tell the authorities there
+so. After we came back to town, we were advised that the convention of
+presidentes desired to have Mr. Harvey favor them with an address. He
+said, "What shall I tell them?" I said, "Tell them that if they will
+do their duty by the American Government, the American Government will
+do its duty by them." He spoke Spanish fluently, made a good speech,
+and told them in effect just that thing. Then he went back to Manila,
+and shortly afterward wrote me the two letters which follow:
+
+
+    Department of Justice, Philippine Islands,
+    Office of the Assistant Attorney-General
+    for the Constabulary,
+
+                                        Manila, P. I., October 15, 1904.
+
+
+    My dear Judge: We arrived in Manila on Tuesday morning,
+    the 11th instant, and I prepared my report and submitted it
+    to the attorney-general on the 12th, in the meantime making a
+    transcript of your summary and delivering a copy of same with other
+    information to the attorney-general along with my report. After
+    dictating the report and before delivering it I had a conversation
+    with General Allen on the situation in Samar and told him what
+    my recommendations would be. He agreed that rewards should be
+    offered for the capture of Pablo Bulan, Antonio Anogar, and Pedro
+    de la Cruz, but took issue on the other recommendations, and to my
+    mind he takes a very extreme view; but I thought at the time and
+    still think that he wanted to tone me down in my feelings in the
+    matter. I think the real cause for his opposition is the effect
+    that he fears an aggressive attitude might have on the presidential
+    election. In other words, whatever they do aggressively might be
+    misconstrued and made use of as political capital.
+
+    At Governor Wright's request I got the report from the
+    attorney-general before it was sent up and went over to the
+    Malacaņan, and the governor read the report and read most of the
+    data that I submitted with the report, including your summary, and
+    while he did not say much what he did say convinced me that there
+    would be something doing if it were not on the eve of election,
+    and in my opinion there will be things doing in Samar within
+    thirty days.
+
+    I inclose herewith a copy of your summary, and also a copy of my
+    report to the attorney-general. On the 18th instant I received
+    your telegram to hold the completion of your summary until receipt
+    of a letter mailed by you that day. I telegraphed you in reply
+    that my report and your summary were placed in the hands of the
+    attorney-general on the 12th instant. If there is any additional
+    data in your letter mailed on the 13th I will submit it to the
+    proper authorities.
+
+    For the lack of time, I will close, and write more next time.
+
+
+        Very truly yours,
+        (Signed) Geo. R. Harvey,
+        Assistant Attorney-General.
+
+
+
+
+    Department of Justice, Philippine Islands,
+    Office of the Assistant Attorney-General,
+    for the Constabulary,
+
+                                        Manila, P. I., October 19, 1904.
+
+
+    My dear Judge Blount: Since mailing my letter to you of last
+    Saturday I have found the copies of your summary on the situation
+    in Samar and inclose two herewith, in accordance with my promise.
+
+    This week we have received some good news from Samar with
+    reference to important captures and killings of Pulajans. I
+    am not in touch with what is going on with reference to Samar,
+    and can give you no information along that line. As I remember,
+    the governor told me the other day when I was talking with him
+    that one more company of scouts will be sent down right away.
+
+    I sincerely hope the situation is improving, and that you are
+    getting along rapidly in disposing of the large docket before
+    you. If there is not a very great improvement in the situation
+    by the 9th of November, I think there will be a considerable
+    movement of troops in Samar within thirty days. For the good of the
+    government, I hope the situation will improve materially before
+    that time. I would like to see them put the troops there right
+    now. I am of the opinion that it would not affect the election a
+    half-dozen votes, and it might save two or three or a half-dozen
+    massacres and the destruction of much property.
+
+    With best wishes for your success in your work, and with regards
+    to Mr. Block, I am,
+
+
+        Very truly yours,
+
+        Geo. R. Harvey,
+
+        Assistant Attorney-General, Philippines Constabulary.
+        To Hon. James H. Blount,
+        Judge of First Instance, Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.
+
+
+These two letters may be found at p. 2532, Congressional Record,
+February 25, 1908, where they were the subject of remark in the House
+of Representatives by Hon. Thomas W. Hardwick of Georgia, apropos of
+Governor Ide's North American Review article of December, 1907.
+
+A few weeks after the presidential election I saw Mr. Harvey
+in Manila. We naturally talked about Samar and his two letters
+to me. The troops had then been ordered out. He referred to his
+conference with the Governor-General and stated, "Yes, he told me
+that was the reason," meaning that the reason for not ordering out
+the troops was the one assigned in his (Harvey's) letter to me, viz.,
+"Whatever we do aggressively might be misconstrued and made use of
+as political capital."
+
+On October 18, 1904, there was received at Manila the following
+cablegram concerning the presidential campaign in the United States:
+
+
+    New York, 16th. Judge Parker, in addressing campaign clubs at
+    Esopus the past week returned to the subject of the Philippines
+    in the evident hope of making it a paramount issue of the
+    campaign. He repeated his former declaration that the retention
+    of the Philippines and the carrying out of the policy of the
+    Republican Administration have cost six hundred and fifty millions
+    of dollars and two hundred thousand lives. Secretary of War Taft,
+    in addressing a mass meeting held in Baltimore, Saturday night,
+    ridiculed Judge Parker's statement and characterized his figures
+    as alarmist.
+
+
+Of course Judge Parker's figures were rather high--of which more
+anon. He was not going to miss anything in the way of a chance of
+"getting a rise" out of the Administration, by understatement. But some
+statement from the Philippines at once became a supremely important
+desideratum, to counterbalance Judge Parker's over-statement, some
+optimism to meet the Parker pessimism. Encouraged by the public
+interest aroused by the figures furnished him, and the consequent
+apparent uneasiness it created in "the enemy's camp," Judge Parker
+soon had the whole Philippine group of islands going to "the demnition
+bow-wows." On October 20th, Secretary of War Taft cabled Governor
+Wright, then Governor-General of the Islands, a long telegram, quoting
+Judge Parker as having used, among other language descriptive of the
+beatitudes we had conferred on our little brown brother, the following:
+"The towns in many places in ruins, whole districts in the hands of
+ladrones." [443]
+
+At that time the whole archipelago was absolutely quiet for the nonce,
+except Samar. Samar was the only island where Judge Parker's statement
+was true, and as to Samar, it was absolutely true. On October 23d
+Governor Wright wired Secretary of War Taft as follows:
+
+
+    There is nothing warranting the statement that towns are in
+    ruins. It is not true that there are whole districts in the hands
+    of ladrones. Life and property are as safe here as in the United
+    States. [444]
+
+
+This was followed by a perfectly true and correct picture of the
+peace and quiet which then prevailed for the time being everywhere
+throughout the archipelago, except in Samar, which dark and bloody
+isle was specifically excepted. Then followed a statement as to
+Samar, full of allusions as elaborately optimistic as any of the Taft
+cablegrams of 1900, to impliedly inconsiderable "prowling bands" of
+outlaws in Samar. Of course nobody at home knew the answer to this,
+so it silenced the Parker batteries, and the Samar massacres proceeded
+unchecked. Meanwhile the 14th Infantry at Calbayog, Samar, and the 18th
+Infantry, at Tacloban, Leyte, smiled with astute, if contemptuous,
+tolerance, at the self-inflicted impotence of a republic trying to
+make conquered subjects behave without colliding too violently with
+home sentiment against having conquered subjects; sang their favorite
+barrack room song,
+
+
+            He may be a brother of Wm. H. Taft,
+            But he ain't no friend of mine;
+
+
+and continued to enjoy enforced leisure. They did chafe under the
+restraint, but it at least relieved them from the not altogether
+inspiring task of chasing Pulajans through jungles and along the
+slippery mire of precipitous mountain trails, and at the same time
+permitted the secondest second lieutenant among them to swear fierce
+blasé oaths, not wholly unjustified, about how much better he could
+run the Islands than they were being run.
+
+On October 26th, I wired Governor Wright at Manila as follows:
+
+
+    Since my letter of October 6th, situation appears worse. Additional
+    depredations both on east and west coast. Smith-Bell closing
+    out. [445] Reliable American residing in Wright says that during
+    week ending last Sunday thirteen families living along river
+    Nacbac, barrio of Tutubigan, said pueblo, kidnapped by brigands
+    and carried off to hills. This means some sixty people having
+    farms along river, rice ready to be harvested. Seven of the eleven
+    barrios of Wright have been burned.
+
+            Blount.
+
+
+When I sent that telegram of October 26th, the situation in the pueblo
+of Wright was typical of the reign of terror throughout the island.
+Wright could have been reached by the 18th Infantry (then over at
+Tacloban, in Leyte), and garrisoned on eight hours' notice. But I had
+little hope that the telegram would stir the 18th. The best man I had
+ever personally known well in high station was at the head of the
+government of the Islands, and as he was my friend, I sat down to
+think the situation out, determined, with the prejudice which is the
+privilege of friendship, to analyze his apparent apathy, and to
+conjecture how many times thirteen families "having farms along river,
+rice ready to be harvested" would have to be carried off to the hills
+by the brigands in order to move the 18th Infantry before the
+presidential election. Then I wondered just how many seconds it
+would have taken a British governor-general, backed by unanimous
+home sentiment concerning the wisdom of having colonies, to have
+acted, had a great British colonial mercantile house like Smith,
+Bell & Co. appealed to him for protection of its interests. And that
+brought me, there on "the tie-ribs of earth," as Kipling would phrase
+it, to the fundamentals of the problem. The British imperial idea of
+which Kipling is the voice and Benjamin Kidd the accompanist is based,
+superficially, upon a supposed necessity for the control of the tropics
+by non-tropical peoples, though fundamentally, it is an assertion of
+the right of any people to assume control of the land and destinies
+of another when they feel sure they can govern that other better than
+that other can govern itself. Is this proposition tenable, and if so,
+within what limits? Is it tenable to the point of total elimination of
+the people sought to be improved? If not, then how far? How far is
+incidental sacrifice of human life negligible in the working out of
+the broader problem of "the greatest good of the greatest number?" In
+his article in the North American Review for December, 1907, Governor
+Ide makes exhaustive answer to "the doctors who for some months past,
+in the columns of the North American Review and elsewhere, have
+published prescriptions for curing the ills of the Filipino people,"
+including Senator Francis G. Newlands, Hon. William J. Bryan, and the
+writer. In the course of disposing of the quack last mentioned,
+Governor Ide gets on rather a high horse, asking, with much dignified
+indignation, "How many people in the United States would have known or
+cared whether the army was or was not ordered out in Samar in 1904?"
+I concede that the solicitude was a super-solicitude, as do the Harvey
+letters, but like them, I must recognize its reality. However, when
+Governor Ide reaches this rhapsody of conscious virtue: "It is
+inconceivable that the Commission could have been animated by the
+base and ignoble partisan prejudices thus charged against them,"
+capping his climax by triumphantly pointing out that "Governor-General
+Wright was a life-long Democrat," he doth protest too much. For the
+angelic pinions he thus attaches to himself are at once rudely snapped
+by the reflection that a very short while after his article came out
+in the North American Review Governor Wright became Secretary of War
+in President Roosevelt's Cabinet, and a little later took the stump
+for Taft and Sherman, in 1908. Governor Wright did not stoop to deny
+or extenuate his share in the matter, and I honor him for it. [446]
+But to stick to your own crowd and then deny afterwards that you did
+so--that is another story. However, let us brush aside such petty
+attempts to cloud the real issue, which is: How many people would
+Governor Wright and Vice-Governor Ide have permitted to be massacred
+by the Pulajans in Samar in 1904 before they would have ordered out
+the military prior to the presidential election? Let us consider the
+case, not with a view of clouding the issue, but of clearing it. The
+truth is, Governor Wright was very gravely concerned about the Samar
+situation from August to November, 1904. Of course it is due to him
+to make perfectly clear that he did not realize the gravity of that
+situation as vividly as those of us who were on the ground in Samar,
+four or five hundred miles away. But the information hereinbefore
+reviewed, conveyed to him by the Provincial Governor, by Mr. Harvey,
+the Assistant Attorney General sent to Samar for the express purpose
+of getting the Manila government in possession of the exact situation,
+and by myself, was certainly sufficient to make him "chargeable with
+notice" of all that happened thereafter, certainly chargeable with
+knowledge of all that had happened theretofore. Of course there
+was General Allen, the commander-in-chief of the constabulary, at
+Manila, presumably speaking well of his command--the right arm of
+the civil government--presumably giving industrious and tactful aid
+and comfort to the idea that the authorities could afford to worry
+along with the constabulary alone until after the presidential
+election. But that could not discount the actual facts reported
+from the afflicted province by the officials on the ground. General
+Allen, it should be noted, remained in Manila all this time. So that
+any Otis-like "situation-well-in-hand" bouquets he may have thrown
+at his subordinates in Samar, and the situation there generally,
+were mere political hothouse products, surer to be recognized as
+such by the shrewd kindliness of the truly considerable man at the
+head of the government than by most any one else he could hand them
+out to. That man knew, to all intents and purposes, in the great and
+noble heart of him, what was really going on in Samar. He knew that
+massacres had been occurring, and that they were likely to keep on
+occurring. In other words, he knew that preventable sacrifice of life
+of defenceless people was going on, and that he could put a stop to it
+any time he saw fit. The question he had to wrestle with was, should he
+stop it, knowing the "Hell fer Sartin" the Democratic orators in the
+United States would at once luridly describe as "broke loose" in the
+Philippines? I insist that there is no use for any holier-than-thou
+gentleman to become suffused with any glow of indignant conscious
+rectitude based on the premises we are considering. Better to look
+a little deeper, on the idea that you are observing your republic in
+flagrante colonizatione, with as good a man as you ever have had, or
+ever will have, among you, as the principal actor. Governor Wright's
+course was entirely right, if the Philippine policy was right. If his
+course was not right, it was not right because the Philippine policy
+is fundamentally wrong. Governor Wright of course believed that the
+Philippine policy was right. I myself did not come finally to believe
+it was wrong until it was revealed in all its rawness by the period now
+under discussion. Of course the Governor did not vividly realize that
+the American women in Catbalogan were not entirely safe. If he had,
+he would have rushed the troops there, politics or no politics. But
+native life was politically negligible. What difference would a few
+score, or even a few hundred, natives of Samar make, compared with
+that pandemonium of anarchy and bloodshed all over the archipelago
+which Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide had long been insisting would
+follow Philippine independence? Was the whole future of 8,000,000 of
+people to be jeopardized to save a few people in Samar? That was the
+moral question before the insular government, in its last analysis. And
+the government faced the proposition squarely, and answered it "No."
+
+I will go farther than this. If I had believed, with Messrs. Taft,
+Wright, and Ide, that Philippine independence meant anarchy in the
+Islands, and the orthodox "bloody welter of chaos," I too might have
+hesitated to order out the troops on the eve of the election, and
+my hesitation, like theirs, might have continued until the election
+was safely over. So might yours, reader. Don't be so certain you
+would not. Practically absolute power, sure of its own benevolence,
+has temptations to withhold its confidence from the people that you
+wot not of. Don't condemn Governor Wright. Condemn the policy, and
+change your republic back to the course set by its founders. Give
+the Philippine people the independence they of right ought to have,
+instead of secretly hoping to unload them on somebody else, through
+the medium of your next great war.
+
+The question of whether the troops should have been ordered out
+or not at the time above dealt with is by no means without two
+sides. On the "bloody welter" side, you have the well-known opinions
+of Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide. On the other side you have before
+you--for the moment--only my little opinion. So instead of having in
+Governor Wright a Bluebeard, you simply have a man of great personal
+probity and unflinching moral courage, following his convictions to
+their ultimate logical conclusion without shadow of turning, in the
+act of colonization. In other words, Mr. American, you see yourself,
+as others see you. So face the music and look at yourself. In your
+colony business, you are a house divided against itself, which
+cannot stand. On the other hand, I knew the Filipino people far more
+intimately than either Mr. Taft, Governor Wright, or Judge Ide. I spoke
+their language--which they did not. I had met them both in peace and
+in war--which they had not. I had held court for months at a time in
+various provinces of the archipelago from extreme northern Luzon to
+Mindanao--which they had not. I had met the Filipinos in their homes
+for years on terms of free and informal intercourse impracticable
+for any governor-general. It was therefore perfectly natural that I
+should know them better than any of these eminent gentlemen. I was
+not prepared to be in a hurry about recommending myself out of office
+by assenting that our guardianship over the Filipinos should at once
+be terminated, but I knew there was nothing to the "bloody welter"
+proposition. The home life of the Filipino is too altogether a model
+of freedom from discord, pervaded as it is by parental, filial, and
+fraternal love, and their patriotism is too universal and genuine,
+to give the "bloody welter" bugaboo any standing in court.
+
+But whosoever questions for one moment Governor Wright's high personal
+character, simply does not know the man. To do so, moreover, would
+fatally cloud the issue I have sought to make clear between his
+view of the duty of our government and my own. In his moods that
+reminded one of Lincoln, Governor Wright used to say: "Don't shoot
+the organist, he's doing the best he can." It is true that his
+answer to Judge Parker was not a full and frank statement of the
+case. But did it lie in American human nature, when your antagonist
+was recklessly over-stating the case in the heat of debate on the
+eve of a presidential election, to take him into your confidence
+and tell him all you knew, in simple trusting faith that he would
+thereafter quit exaggerating? To permit the dispute to boil down to
+the real issue, viz., how many lives it was permissible to abandon on
+the "greatest good to the greatest number" theory, would obviously
+jeopardize the existence of a government which the Governor of the
+Philippines naturally believed to be better for all concerned than
+any other. And there is your cul-de-sac. Hinc illæ lachrymæ.
+
+We can point with pride to many things we have done in the
+Philippines, the public improvements, [447] the school system, the
+better sanitation, and a long list of other benefits conferred. But in
+the greatest thing we have done for them, we have builded wiser than
+we knew. "God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform." In
+fourteen years we have welded the Filipinos into one homogeneous
+political unit. In a most charming book, entitled An Englishwoman in
+the Philippines, [448] we can see our attempts to fit government by
+two political parties into over-seas colonization caricatured without
+sting until we really remind ourselves of a hippopotamus caressing a
+squirrel. In one passage the British sister describes our programme
+as one "to educate the Filipino for all he is worth, so that he may,
+in the course of time, be fit to govern himself according to American
+methods; but at the same time they have plenty of soldiers to knock
+him on the head if he shows signs of wanting his liberty before the
+Americans think he is fit for it"--"A quaint scheme," she naïvely adds,
+"and one full of the go-ahead originality of America."
+
+The more we teach the Filipinos, the more intimately they will become
+acquainted, in their own way, with the history of the relations
+between our country and theirs from the beginning, including the
+taxation without representation, through Congressional legislation
+(hereinafter noticed) placed or kept on our statute-books by the hemp
+trust and other special interests in the United States. And they will
+learn all these things in the midst of a "growing gulf between the
+two peoples." [449]
+
+In fourteen years we have made these unwilling subjects, whom we
+neither want nor need any more than they want or need us, a unit; a
+unit for Home Rule in preference to alien domination, it is true; but,
+nevertheless, a patriotic unit--one people--a potential body politic
+which can take a modest, but self-respecting place in the concert of
+free nations, with only a little more additional help from us.
+
+In the handling of an insurrection in any given province with
+courts and constabulary during the first four or five years after
+the Taft government of the Philippines was founded, the function of
+a representative of the office of the Attorney-General, coming from
+Manila to help the local prosecuting attorney handle a large docket
+and a crowded jail, was by no means remotely analogous to that of a
+grand jury. He originated prosecutions, found "No Bill," etc. When
+Mr. Harvey came to Samar, he came direct to the court room, and I
+suspended the trial of the pending case, and, after greeting him,
+began an informal talk which was akin to the nature of a charge to
+a grand jury, putting him in possession of the general aspects of
+the uprising. He was a very just and kindly man, and entered into
+the spirit of the task. I elaborated on the class of cases where
+the defendant claimed, as most of them did, "Yes, I joined the band
+of brigands, but I was made to do so." It was also indictable to
+furnish supplies to the public enemy. This presented the class of
+cases where the brigands would swoop down on a town and demand rice,
+and not getting it, would sometimes kill the persons refusing it,
+and so intimidate the rest into finding rice for them. Also there was
+the class of cases where a man would claim to have been one of the
+inhabitants of an unprotected town who had gone off to the hills in a
+body, for safety, to propitiate the mountain people by becoming part of
+them. This sort of thing at one time threatened to become epidemic with
+all the coast towns. It did not, however. A modus vivendi of some sort,
+sometimes express, sometimes merely tacit, would be arranged between
+the coast people and the hill people. These modus vivendi arrangements
+enabled the coast people to obtain a certain degree of safety, in
+lieu of that we should have secured them but did not, by making the
+hill folk believe that the coast men were against us and for them. At
+one time the prosecuting attorney got hold of evidence sufficient to
+authorize the issuance of a warrant for the Presidente of Balangiga,
+the man supposed to have engineered the massacre of the 9th Infantry
+in September 1901. I authorized the issuance of the warrant for his
+arrest. But the native governor of the province, and also Major Dade,
+the American regular officer commanding the constabulary, satisfied me
+that we did not have force sufficient to protect Balangiga from the
+Pulajans, if we arrested the presidente, who, being persona grata to
+the Pulajans, was able to keep them from descending on his town. To
+arrest him would therefore mean, in their opinion, that the people
+of Balangiga would take to the hills for protection, and join the
+hill folk, or Pulajans, and if a town as large as Balangiga set any
+such example all the coast towns might follow it. So the supposed
+perpetrator of the 9th Infantry massacre was allowed to remain
+unmolested. The American court was impotent to enforce its processes.
+
+In my mass of Philippine papers there is one containing a copy of my
+remarks to the Assistant Attorney-General on his arrival at Catbalogan,
+above referred to as analogous to a charge to a grand jury at home. It
+is dated Catbalogan, Samar, September 28, 1904, and is headed:
+"Remarks by the court upon the occasion of the arrival of Assistant
+Attorney-General Harvey, with regard to the recent disturbances in
+Samar, and the cases for brigandage and sedition growing out of the
+same." Certain parts of this contemporary document will doubtless
+give the reader a more vivid apprehension of the then situation than
+he can get from mere subsequent description. Of course the visiting
+representative of the Attorney-General's office was familiar in a
+general way with the manner of the handling of the Albay insurrection
+in the previous year, described in the chapter preceding this. In
+discussing the Samar situation the "remarks" of the court contain,
+among other things, this passage:
+
+
+    In the cases growing out of the Albay disturbances there were
+    a great many people who strayed out to the mountains just like
+    cattle. They did not know why or whither they went. As to those
+    persons, Judge Carson, Mr. Ross, and myself were unanimous in the
+    opinion that some of them could be indicted under the vagrancy
+    law. There were others of a greater degree of guilt, but who did
+    not appear to have been what you might call ordinary thieves,
+    and we were all agreed to indict those under the sedition law,
+    the limit of which is ten years and ten thousand dollars. Thus you
+    do not force upon a Judge of First Instance the responsibility of
+    sentencing a man to twenty years of his life for a connection with
+    bandits which may be but little more than technical. Besides those
+    two classes, there were in Albay of course the bandits proper,
+    to whom the bandolerismo [brigandage] law was specially intended
+    to apply. There cannot be any doubt about the fact that this
+    bandolerismo law is one of the most stringent statutes that ever
+    was on the statute-books of any country. It is very far from the
+    purpose of this court to attempt to say what would be the wisest
+    legislation, or to say that this is not the very best legislation,
+    under the circumstances. How we administer the several laws
+    alluded to governing public order, will settle whether or not
+    substantial justice is done.
+
+
+The men in the United States who in those days were slinging mud at
+the Philippine trial judges as being "subservient," wholly missed
+the core of the whole matter. In the provinces where so many heavy
+sentences were imposed, the real situation was that a state of war
+existed, and the judges believed, and I think correctly, that they were
+practically a military commission of one, and much more able to give
+a prisoner a square deal, tempering justice with mercy, than officers
+briefly gathered from the scenes of the fighting to act as a military
+commission. We tried those men with as little prejudice as if they had
+just come from the moon. Moreover, from the italicized concluding words
+of the above excerpt from my talk to the Assistant Attorney-General,
+it will be seen that the court had practically unlimited discretion
+in the matter of punishment, and was, in fact, about the only court
+of criminal equity in the annals of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
+
+In the last analysis, the righteousness or unrighteousness of a civil
+government in a country not yet entirely subjugated, depends on whether
+more innocent people suffer through completing the work of subjugation
+with constabulary whose "prisoners of war" are tried, to see what
+they may have done, if anything, by one-man courts, or whether more
+innocent people suffer through completing the work of subjugation as
+any other great power on earth but ourselves would have completed it,
+with an army, trying the prisoners by military commission. Unless you
+yourself were a traitor to your country, you considered as criminal
+attempts to subvert your government by cut-throats that no one of
+the respectable Filipinos, from Aguinaldo and Juan Cailles down,
+would have hesitated to have shot summarily. But you sought to
+make the punishment in each case fit the crime, by ascertaining
+as dispassionately as if the defendant were fresh from the moon,
+just what each accused man had himself done. Either Aguinaldo, or
+an American military commission would have had such people shot in
+bunches, as not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. The trouble
+with the civil government did not lie in its judiciary, but in its
+constabulary. It was the physical handling of the crowds of prisoners
+by the constabulary, and their failure, because not numerous enough,
+to protect peaceably inclined people, which made it a fact that turning
+the situation over to the military would have meant less sacrifice of
+the innocent along with the guilty. It is much more merciful to kill
+a few hundred people, as a lesson to the rest, and let the rest go,
+with the clear understanding that if they insurrect again you will
+promptly kill a few hundred more, than to permit a reign of terror
+from one month to another and from one year to another, with all the
+untilled fields, famine, pestilence, and other disease this involves,
+merely in order to be able to invoke the blessing of the Doctor Lyman
+Abbots of the world on a supposedly benign "civil" government.
+
+In all my sentences, and in all his indictments, Mr. Harvey and the
+writer sailed close to the wind, by holding only those responsible
+who had taken active parts in the sacking and burning of villages and
+the massacre of their inhabitants. I knew that sooner or later some
+officious prosecuting attorney of less noble mould than Harvey would
+ask me to convict some poor creature of brigandage for giving a little
+rice to the brigands, and my mind was made up to refuse to do so,
+and in so refusing to commit heresy once and for all by expressing my
+sentiments, in the decision, concerning the failure to give adequate
+protection to defenceless people, along the lines indicated in this
+chapter. No such case was in fact presented. I broke down under the
+strain of graver cases early in November and left Samar forever,
+bound for Manila.
+
+Before I left, the whole island was seething with sedition. I was
+told by a credible American that the chief deputy sheriff of the
+court, an ex-insurgent officer, one of the "peace-at-any-price"
+policy appointees, had remarked among some of his own people where he
+did not expect the remark to be repeated: "I see no use persecuting
+our brethren in the hills." The municipal officials of the provincial
+capital, Catbalogan, were suspected by the native provincial governor,
+and the latter in turn was suspected by the Manila government. In
+fact the whole political atmosphere of the island had become full of
+rumor and suspicion as to who was for the government, and who was
+against the government. I left Samar, November 8th, which was the
+day of the presidential election of 1904, determined to try no more
+insurrections. By that time nearly everybody in the island was more
+or less guilty of sedition, and I did not know the method of drawing
+an indictment against a whole people.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+GOVERNOR WRIGHT--1905
+
+        My heart is heavy with the fate of that unhappy people.
+
+                       Speech of Hon. A. O. Bacon in U. S. Senate. [450]
+
+
+Because the especially cordial relations which existed to the last
+between Governor Wright and myself [451] are familiar to a number of
+very dear mutual friends, I deem it due both to them and to myself,
+in view of the contents of the preceding chapter, to state that I
+see no reason why, in writing a history of the American Occupation
+of the Philippines, I should omit or slur the facts which convinced
+me that that occupation ought to terminate as soon as practicable,
+and that any decent kind of a government of Filipinos by Filipinos
+would be better for all concerned than the McKinley-Taft programme of
+Benevolent Assimilation whereof Governor Wright was the legatee. By the
+thousand and one uncandid threads of that programme, slowly woven from
+1898 to 1904, as indicated in the first sixteen chapters of this book,
+Governor Wright had found himself as hopelessly bound to concealment
+from the American people of the real situation in Samar in the fall
+of 1904, as a Gulliver in Lilliput.
+
+When I finally left Samar and came to Manila, in November, 1904, I
+was not prepared to figure out how or how soon, the blunder we made
+by the purchase of the Philippine archipelago could be corrected. But
+my mental attitude toward the whole Philippine problem had undergone
+a complete change. In 1901 Governor Wright, then Vice-Governor, had
+written me: "You younger men out here, who have cast your fortunes with
+this country, are to be, in all likelihood, in the natural course of
+events, its future rulers." Up to 1903 I had clung to that idea with
+the devotion of what was really high and earnest purpose, untroubled
+with misgivings of any kind. In November, 1903, in Albay, Judge Carson
+and myself had talked over the long struggle of the civil government
+to walk without leaning on the military, and, with the readiness of one
+vested with authority to believe such authority wisely vested, and the
+readiness of a civilian lawyer to jealously guard the American home
+idea that the military should be subordinate to the civil authority,
+I had cordially agreed with a sentiment one day expressed by Judge
+Carson concerning Governor Taft about "the splendid moral fibre of
+the man," meaning in keeping the military from prancing out of the
+traces. After Governor Taft left the Islands to be Secretary of War
+(December 23, 1903), and while I was still in Albay, I had learned of
+the 120 men who had died in the Albay jail while awaiting trial, and
+thereafter something of the magnitude of the Ola insurrection there,
+and that had given me pause as to the practical benevolence of the
+operation of "a benign civil government." Then the Samar massacres
+of 1904, and the gory panorama I had there witnessed, had finally
+convinced me that a republic like ours is wholly unfitted to govern
+people against their consent. But I did not tell anybody in Manila
+all these things. I simply pondered them. Grover Cleveland was the
+only man in the world I would have liked to talk to just then freely
+and fully. And he was not about. "My heart was heavy with the fate
+of that unhappy people" as Senator Bacon had said in the Senate in
+1902, after visiting the Islands in 1901. I did not condemn Governor
+Wright. I quite realized that I was "up against" about the largest
+ethical problem of world politics, one on which the nations are much
+divided, and that I was not infallible. I did not say to the Governor:
+"Governor, let's resign and go home and tell our people that this whole
+business is a mistake." Nor did I ever lose faith in Governor Wright
+personally. If I had, I might just as well have said: "After this,
+the deluge." I would simply have lost faith in human nature. I had not
+then, nor have I since, known a man of higher personal character. I
+had simply lost faith in Benevolent Assimilation, and begun to take
+the Filipino people seriously as a potential nation, probably better
+able to handle their own domestic problems than we will ever be able
+to handle them for them.
+
+The day after I resigned, Mr. Justice Carson, of the Supreme Court,
+and Mr. Wilfley, the Attorney-General, came to call on me. My friends
+knew I was very much troubled over the Samar business. I was doing
+some grumbling, but without specifying, because to specify would mean
+that we all of us ought to give up the life careers we had planned for
+ourselves in the Islands. I knew the old familiar answer a grumbler
+was sure to get in the Philippines, viz., "Old man, you've been out
+here too long. You better go home." But I did a little more grumbling
+to my friends Judge Carson and Mr. Wilfley, during the course of their
+visit. They could both pretty well guess what was the matter. But Judge
+Carson and I had come out in 1899, and had served through the war
+together. He knew all about the Albay business, and somewhat of the
+Samar business. Wilfley had not come out until the civil government
+was founded in 1901. Mr. Wilfley said cheerily: "Oh, Blount, you are
+too conscientious." I shall never forget what happened then. Judge
+Carson said, with a ring of something like anger in his tone: "No,
+Wilfley, I'll be d--d if he is." Is it any wonder that ever since I
+have worn that man, as Hamlet would say, "in my heart's core"? Here was
+as brave and true an Irishman as ever gained distinction on battlefield
+or bench. And he understood. He did not say--which was the implication
+of Wilfley's tone--"Old man, you've been out here too long, and illness
+has made you peevish." He knew what was the matter. He knew that as
+trial judges he and I had not been small editions of Lord Jeffries,
+as some of our American critics had implied, BUT HE ALSO KNEW THAT
+THERE WAS NO METHOD OF DRAWING AN INDICTMENT AGAINST A WHOLE PEOPLE.
+
+Possibly the intensity of my feelings on this great subject, then
+and ever since, hampers the power of clear expression. Therefore,
+a word more in attempt at elucidation. In 1898, Judge Carson and I,
+with many thousands of other young Americans, had trooped down to
+Cuba, in the wake of the impetuous Roosevelt, to free the inhabitants
+of that ill-fated island from Spanish rule, drive the Spaniards from
+the Western Hemisphere, and put a stop to Spain's pious efforts "to
+spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence,"
+as she always expressed her attitude toward Cuba. We had many of us
+been fired by the catchy Roosevelt utterance which did so much to
+bring on the Spanish War, viz., "The steps of the White House are
+slippery with the blood of the Cuban reconcentrados." Then in 1899,
+we had gone to the Philippines, and had ever since been engaged there
+in "sparing the Islands from the danger of premature independence,"
+and the Samar massacres of 1904 were, to me, the apotheosis of the
+work. So that after November 8, 1904, I felt "The steps of the White
+House are slippery with the blood of the people of my district." It had
+all been done under the pious pretence that the Filipinos welcomed our
+rule--a pretence which had taken the form for six years of systematic
+asseveration that they did so welcome it. Yet it was not true that
+they, or any appreciable fraction of them, had ever welcomed our
+rule. And it never will be true. Surely no man can see in this book
+any scolding or unkindness. It is an attempt merely to bring home to
+my countrymen a strategic fact, a fact which it is folly to ignore. But
+to return to the thread of our story.
+
+Four days after the presidential election of 1904, to wit, on November
+12th, Governor Wright left Manila and went to Samar, including in
+his itinerary various others of the southern islands. [452] Soon
+after their return, the seven hundred native troops in Samar were
+increased to nearly two thousand, and sixteen companies of regulars
+(say one hundred men to a company) were also thrown into Samar. It
+took until the end of 1906 to end the trouble. You cannot find in the
+reports of the civil authorities anything explaining their three or
+four weeks' stay in the Visayan Islands in November-December, 1904,
+that is not absolutely in accord with the original Taft obsession of
+1900 about the popularity of the proposed alien "civil" government with
+its subjects. Governor Wright's description of the trip says: "The
+warm hospitality of the Filipino people made this trip of inspection
+a most agreeable one." As a matter of fact, on such occasions, the
+more disaffected a leader of the people was, the more he would seek,
+by "warm hospitality," "warm" oratory telling the visiting mighty
+what the visiting mighty longed to hear, parades, fiestas, etc.,
+to divert suspicion of sedition from himself. The poor creatures
+had met General Young's cavalry column in northern Luzon in 1899
+with their town bands, doing the only thing they knew of to do to
+"temper the wind to the shorn lamb"--i.e., to temper it to their
+several communities--many of them doubtless expecting to be put
+to the sword by General Young's troopers, as the Cossacks did the
+Persians during the brief and sensational sojourn of that brilliant
+young administrator, Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, in Persia in 1911-12. I
+have no doubt that high on the list of those extending some of the
+"warm hospitality" above mentioned appeared the name of Don Jaime de
+Veyra. Yet in the summer of 1904 Don Jaime had gotten out of a sick
+bed to attend a convention called to send delegates to the Democratic
+National Convention in the United States that year, [453] and also,
+in that same year, had run for Governor of Leyte on a platform
+the principal plank of which was Carthago est delenda--"Carthago"
+being us, the American régime. De Veyra was defeated that time,
+but ran again the next time and was elected. While the writer is not
+one of those who seek to show their "breadth of view" by gossiping
+with outsiders regarding what is peculiarly our own affair, still,
+the British view-point of the situation in the Visayan Islands, as
+conveyed by an Englishwoman whose husband was engaged in mercantile
+business there in 1904-5, and who therefore was certainly in a position
+to know the opinion of the little circle of British people at Cebu and
+Iloilo, may not be superfluous here. This lady, living then at Iloilo,
+wrote a series of letters to friends back home in England which she
+afterwards published in book form. [454] In a letter dated Iloilo,
+January 22, 1905 (page 86), she says:
+
+
+    The Americans give out and write in their papers that the
+    Philippine Islands are completely pacified, and that the Filipinos
+    love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives,
+    is complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed
+    with insurrection and plots; the fighting has never ceased; and
+    the natives loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so
+    openly in their native press and showing their dislike in every
+    possible fashion. Their one idea is to be rid of the U. S. A.
+    * * * and to be free of a burden of taxation which is heavier than
+    any the Spaniards laid on them.
+
+
+Also an Englishman who was in Samar in 1904-5, a Mr. Hyatt, who,
+with his brother, served with the American troops there in the bloody
+Pulajan uprising, afterwards wrote a book called the Little Brown
+Brother, wherein he fully corroborates Mrs. Dauncey's appreciation
+of the situation during that period.
+
+In its blindness to the unanimity of Visayan discontent, as manifested
+in its report now under consideration, the civil government of
+the Philippines was not trying wilfully to deceive anybody. It was
+deceiving itself. It was obeying the law of its life, its existence
+having been originally predicated on the consent of a great free
+people to keep in subjection a weaker people eager to be also free,
+such consent having been obtained through diligent nursing of the
+original idea that the subject people were not in fact so eager, but
+were, on the contrary, in a mental attitude of tearful welcome toward
+the proffered protection of a strong power. In his report for 1905
+[455] General William H. Carter, commanding the Department of the
+Philippines which included Samar and the rest of the Visayan Islands,
+gives the key to the Commission's twenty-six-day stay in his district
+in the following part of said report:
+
+
+    Within a few days after the rendition of the annual report for
+    last year [456] a serious outbreak occurred in the Gandara valley,
+    Samar. This was followed by disorders in all the other large
+    islands of the department, Negros, Panay, Cebu, and Leyte.
+
+
+Nowhere in the civil government reports do you find the slightest
+recognition that these disorders had any relation to each other, or to
+the fundamental problem of public order, or any political significance
+whatsoever, each being treated as a purely local issue, the idea that
+the circumstance of Samar's having been thrown into pandemonium by
+the successes of the enemies of the American Government might have
+encouraged its enemies in the neighboring islands, never seeming to
+occur to the authors of the said reports. General Carter's report goes
+on to state that within five months after the Samar outbreak of July,
+1904, seven hundred native troops had been put in the field in that
+turbulent island. In December, 1904, troops began to be poured into
+Samar, so that it was not long before the seven hundred native troops
+had become seventeen hundred or eighteen hundred, and, says General
+Carter, "in order to free them from garrison work in the towns, sixteen
+companies of the 12th and 14th Infantry were distributed about the
+disaffected coasts to enable the people who so desired to come from
+their hiding places"--whither they had gone because the American flag
+afforded them no protection--"and undertake the rebuilding of their
+burned homes." General Carter avoids touching on the civil government's
+(to him well-known) obsession about its popularity, a state of mind
+which could see no "political" significance in outbreaks of any
+kind. But he does use this very straightforward language about Samar:
+
+
+    Whatever may have been the original cause of the outbreak, it was
+    soon lost sight of when success had drawn a large proportion of
+    the people away from their homes and fields. * * * Except in the
+    largest towns it became simply a question of joining the Pulajans
+    or being harried by them. In the absence of proper protection
+    thousands joined in the movement.
+
+
+Early in 1905, Hon. George Curry, of New Mexico, who was an officer
+of Colonel Roosevelt's regiment in Cuba, and had gone out to the
+Philippines with a volunteer regiment in 1899, remaining with the
+civil Government after 1901, was made Governor of Samar. Governor
+Curry has since been Governor of the Territory of New Mexico,
+and is now (1912) a member of Congress from the recently admitted
+State of New Mexico. Governor Curry has told me since he was
+elected to Congress that it took him all of 1905 and most of
+1906, aided by several thousand troops, native and regular, to
+put down that Samar outbreak. Yet a certificate signed March 28,
+1907, by the Governor-General and his associates of the Philippine
+Commission states that "a condition of general and complete peace"
+had continued in the Islands for two years previous to the date
+of the certificate. [457] We will come to this certificate in its
+chronological order later. How many and what sort of uprisings were
+blanketed in that "forget-it" certificate of 1907 is material to the
+question whether or not the National Administration has ever been or
+is now frank with the country about the universality of the desire of
+the Philippine people for independence and local self-government, and
+pertinent to the insistently recurring query: "Why should we make of
+the Philippines an American Ireland?" But inasmuch as, in addition to
+the Samar uprising which raged all through 1905, another insurrection
+occurred in that year, which was duly "forgotten" by said certificate,
+this last movement must now claim our attention.
+
+The provinces which were the theatre of the outbreak last above
+mentioned were all near Manila. They were: Cavite, a province of
+135,000 people almost at the gates of Manila; Batangas, a province of
+257,000 inhabitants adjoining Cavite; and Laguna, a province of 150,000
+people adjoining both. Some five hundred brigands headed by cut-throats
+claiming to be patriots were terrorizing whole districts. Far be it
+from me to lend any countenance to the idea that the leaders of this
+movement, Sakay, Felizardo, Montalon, and the rest of their gang,
+were entitled to any respect. But they certainly had a hold on
+the whole population akin to that of Robin Hood, Little John, and
+Friar Tuck. In refusing in 1907 to commute Sakay's death sentence
+after he was captured, tried, and convicted, Governor-General James
+P. Smith gives some gruesome details concerning the performance of
+that worthy, and his followers, yet in dealing with the nature and
+extent of the trouble they gave the Manila government he says they
+"assumed the convenient cloak of patriotism, and under the titles of
+'Defenders of the Country' and 'Protectors of the People' proceeded
+to inaugurate a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of
+the most beautiful provinces in the archipelago." [458]
+
+It has already been made clear that, during the time of the
+insurrection against both the Spaniards and Americans, the insurrecto
+forces were maintained by voluntary contributions of the people. Major
+D. C. Shanks, Fourth U. S. Regular Infantry, who was Governor of Cavite
+Province in 1905, after calling attention to this fact, adds [459]:
+
+
+    When the insurrection was over a number of these leaders remained
+    out and refused to surrender. Included among them were Felizardo
+    and Montalon. The system of voluntary contributions, carried on
+    during the insurrecto period, was continued after establishment
+    of civil government.
+
+
+Again Governor Shanks says, with more of frankness than diplomacy,
+considering that he was a provincial governor under the civil
+government:
+
+
+    The establishment of civil government of this province was
+    premature and ill-advised. Records show the capture or surrender
+    since establishment of civil government of nearly 600 hostile
+    firearms.
+
+
+One of the causes contributory to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna
+insurrection is stated in the report of the Governor-General for
+1905 thus:
+
+
+    In the autumn of 1904 it became necessary to withdraw a number
+    of the constabulary from these provinces to assist in suppressing
+    disorder which had broken out in the province of Samar. [460]
+
+
+Another of the contributory causes is thus stated:
+
+
+    There was at the time [the fall of 1904] also considerable activity
+    among the small group of irreconcilables in Manila, who began
+    agitating for immediate independence, doubtless because of the
+    supposed effect it would have on the presidential election in
+    the United States, in which the Philippines was a large topic
+    of discussion. Evidently this was regarded as a favorable time
+    for a demonstration by Felizardo, Montalon, De Vega, Oruga, Sakay
+    [etc]. All these men had been officers of the Filipino army during
+    the insurrection.
+
+
+Consider the benevolent casuistry necessary to include these fellows,
+and the tremendous following they could get up, and did get up, in
+Cavite, "the home of insurrection," and the adjacent provinces, in a
+certificate to "a condition of general and complete peace" alleged
+in the certificate to have prevailed for two years prior to March
+28, 1907. To make a long story short, on January 31, 1905, a state
+of insurrection was declared to exist, the writ of habeas corpus was
+suspended in Cavite and Batangas, the regular army of the United States
+was ordered out, and reconcentration tactics resorted to, as provided
+by Section 6 of Act 781 of the Commission. This is the act already
+examined at length, intended to meet cases of impotency on the part
+of the insular government to protect life and property in any other
+way. Political timidity is conspicuously absent from the resolution of
+the Philippine Commission of January 31, 1905, formally recognizing
+a break in the peerless continuity of the "general and complete
+peace." It is virilely frank, the presidential election being then
+safely over. [461] It concludes by authorizing the Governor-General
+to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law, "the
+public safety requiring it." Then follows a proclamation of the same
+date and tenor, by the Governor-General.
+
+It appears from the case cited in the foot-note that in the spring of
+1905, one, Felix Barcelon, filed in the proper court a petition for the
+writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was one of the reconcentrados
+corralled and "detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of
+Batangas, in the province of Batangas," by one of Colonel Baker's
+constabulary minions down there. The writ was denied by the lower
+court. In one part of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case it
+is stated (p. 116) that the petitioner "has been detained for a long
+time * * * not for the commission of any crime and by due process of
+law, but apparently for the purpose of protecting him." The opinion of
+the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, very properly held that
+the detention was lawful under the war power, basing its decision on
+the authority conferred on the Governor-General of the Philippines
+by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5 of which expressly
+authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus "when in
+cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may
+require it." A long legal battle was fought, the court holding that the
+Executive Department of the Government is the one in which is vested
+the exclusive right to say when "a state of rebellion, insurrection,
+or invasion" exists, and that when it so formally declares, that
+settles the fact that it does exist. At page 98 of the volume above
+cited [462] the court held, as to the above mentioned resolution of
+the Philippine Commission and the above mentioned executive order
+declaring a state of insurrection in Cavite and Batangas:
+
+
+    The conclusion set forth in the said resolution and the said
+    executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the provinces
+    of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the constituted
+    authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of
+    the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after
+    an investigation of the facts.
+
+
+Yet two years later the same "constituted authorities" certified to
+the President of the United States, in effect, as we shall see, that
+no open insurrection against the constituted authorities had occurred
+during the preceding two years. They do not in their certificate
+ignore Cavite and Batangas. They mention them by name, with a lot
+of whereases, explaining that after all they really believe that the
+majority of the people in the provinces aforesaid were not in sympathy
+with the uprising. However, after they get through with their whereases
+they face the music squarely, and certify to "the condition of general
+and complete peace." Of the "nigger in the woodpile" more anon.
+
+Governor Wright was not a party to the certificate of 1907. He
+left the Islands on leave November 4, 1905. A speech made by him
+prior to his departure, as published in a Manila paper, indicates
+an expectation to return. He never did. In 1906 he was demoted to be
+Ambassador to Japan, a place of far less dignity, and far less salary,
+which he resigned after a year or so. Vice-Governor Ide acted as
+Governor-General until April 2, 1906, on which date he was formally
+inaugurated as Governor-General.
+
+Just why Governor Wright did not go back to the Philippines as
+Governor, after his visit to the United States in 1905-6, does
+not appear. It would seem almost certain that if Secretary of War
+Taft had wanted President Roosevelt to send him back, he would have
+gone. Mr. Taft never did frankly tell the Filipinos until 1907 that
+they might just as well shut up talking about any independence that
+anybody living might hope to see. Governor Wright began to talk that
+way soon after Mr. Taft left the Islands. Possibly Governor Wright
+undeceived them too soon, and thereby made the Philippines more of
+a troublesome issue in the presidential campaign of 1904. President
+Roosevelt recognized the sterling worth of the man, by inviting
+him to succeed Mr. Taft as Secretary of War in 1908. But President
+Taft did not invite him to continue in that capacity after March 4,
+1909. Gossip has it that when the incoming President Taft's letter
+to the outgoing President Roosevelt's last Secretary of War, Governor
+Wright, was handed to the addressee, and its conventional "hope to be
+able to avail myself of your services later in some other capacity"
+was read by him, the outgoing official quietly remarked: "Well, that
+is a little more round-about than the one Jimmie Garfield [463] got,
+but it's a dismissal just the same."
+
+I have always thought that the reason Governor Wright did not go back
+to the Philippines as Governor after 1905 was that he did not continue
+to "jolly" the Filipinos, and abstain from ruthlessly crushing their
+hopes of seeing independence during their lifetime, as Mr. Taft did
+continuously during his stay out there. The inevitable tendency of
+the Wright frank talk was from the beginning to discredit the Taft
+pleasing and evasive nothings. Also, it was followed, as we have seen,
+by quite a crop of serious disturbances of public order, and somebody
+had to be "the goat."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX
+
+GOVERNOR IDE--1906
+
+                                The Tariff is a local issue.
+
+                                                  General W. S. Hancock.
+
+
+After Governor Wright left the Islands finally on November 4, 1905,
+Vice-Governor Henry C. Ide acted as Governor-General until April 2,
+1906, when he was duly inaugurated as such. He resigned and left the
+Islands finally in September thereafter.
+
+All through 1905, Governor Curry, as Governor of Samar, which is the
+third largest island of the archipelago, wrestled with the Pulajan
+uprising there, aided, as has been stated in the previous chapter,
+by the native troops, scouts, and constabulary, and also by the
+regular army. But at the end of 1905 "the situation" was not yet
+"well in hand." Since his election to Congress in 1912, Governor
+Curry has told me that in 1905 many thousands of people of Samar
+participated actively as part of the enemy's force in the field during
+that period. By the spring of 1906 Governor Curry was getting a grip
+on the situation, and in the latter part of March of that year, some
+of the main outlaw chiefs agreed to surrender to him. The report of
+Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, commanding the constabulary of the Third
+District, which included Samar states [464]: "After several weeks of
+negotiating, during which time the camp of the Pulahanes was visited
+by Governor Curry, and the Pulahan officers visited the settlement
+at Magtaon"--a settlement in south central Samar--"an understanding
+was arrived at by which the Pulahanes were to surrender, March 24,
+1906. Instead of surrendering as agreed, the Pulahanes, commanded by
+Nasario Aguilar, made a treacherous attack on the constabulary garrison
+on the day and hour appointed for the surrender." The constabulary
+numbered some fifty men, the pulajans about 130. After the pulajans
+opened fire they made a rush on the constabulary and a hand-to-hand
+fight ensued. Colonel Taylor's report continues:
+
+
+    After the first rush the fighting continued fiercely, and when
+    the last of the pulahanes disappeared there remained but seven
+    enlisted men of the constabulary able to fight. Seven more were
+    lying about more or less seriously wounded and twenty-two were
+    dead. Captain Jones received a bad spear thrust in the chest early
+    in the fight, but fought on, regardless. Lieutenant Bowers received
+    a gunshot wound through the left arm, which, however, did not put
+    him out of the fight. Thirty-five dead pulahanes were found on the
+    field and eight more have since been found some distance off. The
+    number of wounded who escaped cannot be determined. The unarmed
+    Americans present with Governor Curry escaped to the river and
+    afterwards rejoined Captain Jones who armed them.
+
+
+The explanation of this treachery, as given by Governor Curry, is
+curious and interesting. The outlaws had intended in good faith to
+surrender as a result of his negotiation with them, but at the last
+moment there arrived to witness the surrender certain native officials
+and other natives bitterly hated by the Pulajans and wholly mistrusted
+by them. Their arrival caused the outlaws to suspect treachery
+themselves and that was the cause of their change of plans. It was not
+until the end of the year 1906 that the various energetic campaigns
+which followed the Magtaon incident finally began to work more or
+less complete restoration of public order by gradual elimination of
+the enemy through killings, captures, and surrenders. An idea of the
+seriousness and magnitude of these operations may be gathered without
+going into the details, from the annual report for 1906 of General
+Henry T. Allen commanding the Philippines Constabulary. This report,
+dated August 31, 1906 [465], states:
+
+
+    At present seventeen companies of scouts and four companies of
+    American troops under Colonel Smith, 8th U. S. Infantry, are
+    operating against the pulahanes, but with success that will be
+    largely dependent upon time and attrition.
+
+
+General Allen adds: "The entire 21st Regiment [of Infantry] is also in
+Samar." These facts are here given because they relate to the period
+covered by the certificate of the Philippine Commission of March 28,
+1907, heretofore alluded to, and which will be more fully dealt with
+hereinafter, which stated that "a condition of general and complete
+peace" had prevailed throughout the archipelago for two years prior
+to March 28, 1907. Without a brief exposition of all these matters,
+it would be impossible to enable the reader to feel the pulse of
+the Filipino people as it stood at the time of the election of their
+assembly in 1907. The fact of our having been unable to discontinue
+Filipino-killing altogether for any considerable period from 1899 to
+the end of 1906 is too obviously relevant to the state of the public
+mind in 1907 to need elaboration.
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 [466] deals at some
+length with disturbances which occurred in the island of Leyte (area
+3000 square miles, population nearly 400,000), beginning in the middle
+of June. It describes among other things a visit of Governor-General
+Ide to Tacloban, the capital of Leyte, made in consequence of said
+disturbances, and conferences held by him there with Major-General
+Wood, commanding all the United States forces in the Philippines,
+Brigadier-General Lee, commanding the Department of the Visayas (which
+included Leyte, headquarters, Iloilo), Colonel Borden, commanding
+the United States forces in the island of Leyte, Colonel Taylor, the
+chief of the constabulary of the District, etc. Certainly from this
+formidable gathering of notables, it is clear that there was about to
+take place in Leyte what our friends of the Lambs' Club in New York
+would call "An all star performance." Leyte was four to five hundred
+miles from Manila. Yet so serious was the disturbance that the highest
+military and civil representatives of the American Government in the
+archipelago deemed it necessary to meet in the island which was the
+scene of the trouble with a view of handling it. Yet in the Report of
+the Philippine Commission for 1906 one finds the usual rotund rhetoric
+treating the disturbances as of no "political" significance--which
+was only another way of claiming that they were not serious. It
+is difficult to handle this aspect of the matter without imputing
+to the civil authorities intent to deceive, but to leave such an
+imputation unremoved would be to miss the whole significance of the
+matter. As has already been made clear, when Judge Taft, Judge Ide,
+and their colleagues of the Philippine Commission had left Washington
+for Manila in 1900 Mr. McKinley had assured them he had no doubt that
+the better element of the Philippine people, once they understood us,
+would welcome our rule. As soon as they set foot in the Philippine
+Islands they had at once begun to act upon the theory that there was
+no real fundamental opposition to us on the part of the people of
+the Philippines and had continued obstinately to act upon that theory
+ever since. Certainly the attitude of the civil government toward the
+disturbances in Leyte in 1906 is not surprising when the mind adverts
+for a moment to the panorama of the five more or less sanguinary years
+already fully described hereinbefore and then takes the following
+bird's-eye glance at the official reports for those years.
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1900, (page 17) had said:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1901 (page 7) had said:
+
+
+    The collapse of the insurrection came in May.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1902 (page 3) had said:
+
+
+    The insurrection as an organized attempt to subvert the authority
+    of the United States in these islands is entirely at an end,
+
+
+referring farther on to "the whole Christian Philippine population"
+as "enjoying civil government." If the "enjoyment" thus described had
+been genuine, continued, profound, and sincere, it would have been
+another story. But the net attitude of the civil government toward
+the general health of the body politic, relatively to public order,
+reminds one of the cheerful gentleman who remarked of his invalid
+friend, "He seems to be 'enjoying' poor health."
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1903 (page 25) says:
+
+
+    The conditions with respect to tranquillity in the islands have
+    greatly improved during the last year.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 (page 1) says:
+
+
+    The great mass of the people, however, were domestic and peaceable.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905 (part 1, page 59)
+says:
+
+
+    On the whole life and property have been as safe as in other
+    civilized countries.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 (page 40) says:
+
+
+    Viewing the entire situation the islands are in a peaceable and
+    orderly condition aside from----
+
+
+various disorders which fill some ten pages of the report.
+
+The inflexible attitude of the Commission from the beginning, of
+treating each successive disturbance of public order as a purely
+"local issue," after General Hancock's method with the tariff,
+is thus sufficiently apparent. They always refuse to see in
+successive outbreaks in various parts of the Islands any evidence
+of general and unanimous lack of appreciation for a benign alien
+civil government. Therefore it was of course clearly a foregone
+conclusion, in 1906, that Governor Ide, who had been in the Islands
+all these years, was going to be wholly unable to see anything in the
+disturbances in Leyte in the least tending to show that American rule
+was unpopular. And yet it was a matter of common knowledge all over
+the Visayan Islands that Jaime Veyra, then Governor of Leyte, elected
+by the people, was one of the most obnoxious anti-Americans in the
+archipelago. Both the army and constabulary were ordered out in Leyte
+and a good deal of fighting occurred before order was restored. The
+report of General Allen, commanding the constabulary for that year
+[467] shows one engagement with the outlaws in Leyte participated
+in by the constabulary and the 21st Regular Infantry, in which the
+enemy numbered 450 and left forty-nine dead upon the field. All
+this period is covered by the certificate of general and complete
+peace of 1907, in the fall of which year a Philippine legislature
+was elected. And those of the membership of that body not in favor
+of Philippine independence were almost as few as the Socialist party
+in the American House of Representatives, which, I believe, consists
+of Representative Berger. True, the peace certificate does not ignore
+the Leyte outbreak. It "forgets and forgives it," so to speak, as we
+shall see.
+
+Governor Ide left the Islands finally on September 20, 1906, having
+resigned. Why he should have resigned, it is difficult to say. Take
+it all in all, he made a splendid Governor-General, and ought to
+have been allowed to remain. He knew the Islands from Alpha to Omega
+and had been there six years. His going out of office to make way
+for still another Governor-General was wholly uncalled for. So far
+as the writer is informed, he was, when he left, still blessed with
+good health. He had filled a very considerable place in the history
+of his country most creditably. He had drawn up a fine code of laws
+for the Islands known as the Ide code. He had made a great minister of
+finance, successfully performing the perilous task of transferring the
+currency of the country from a silver basis to a gold basis, and in so
+doing had proven himself fully a match, in protecting the interests
+of the Government, for the wiley local financiers representing the
+Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the chartered bank of India, Australia,
+and China, and other institutions run by experienced men of more or
+less piratical tendencies. As Governor-General of the Islands, his
+justice, firmness, and courtliness of manner combined to produce an
+administration in keeping with the dignity of his great office. After
+returning to the United States, he remained in private life for a time,
+and was finally given a comparatively unimportant post as minister to
+a second-class country, Spain, which post he still occupies (in 1912).
+
+When, fresh from the memory of the Samar massacres of 1904, I landed
+at Seattle, at the end of my last homeward-bound journey across the
+Pacific, in April, 1905, one of the "natives" of Seattle asked me:
+"Have those people over there ever got quiet yet?" The question itself
+seemed an answer to the orthodox official attitude at Manila, which had
+so long been elaborately denying, as to each successive local outbreak,
+that such outbreak bore any relation to the original insurrection,
+or was any wise illustrative of the general state of public feeling
+in the Islands. At the time the question was asked, the answer was,
+"Not entirely." Not until toward the end of 1906 did "Yes" become
+a correct answer to the question. In other words, there were no
+more serious outbreaks after 1906, nor was a state of general and
+complete peace ever finally established until then. Since 1906 there
+have been occasional despatches from Manila recounting small episodes
+of bloodshed, several of which have had quite a martial ring. These
+have related merely to the country of the Mohammedan Moros, who are
+as wholly apart from the main problem as the American Indian to-day
+is from our tariff and other like questions. The Moros are indeed
+what Kipling calls "half savage and half child." They never did have
+anything more to do with the Filipino insurrection against us than
+the American Indian had to do with the Civil War.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI
+
+GOVERNOR SMITH--1907-9
+
+        Oh, but Honey, dis rabbit dess 'bleeged ter climb dis tree.
+
+                                                            Uncle Remus.
+
+
+"On September 20, 1906," says the Report of the Philippine Commission
+for 1907, [468] "the resignation of the Hon. Henry Clay Ide as
+Governor-General became effective, and on that date the Hon. James
+F. Smith was inaugurated as Governor-General of the Philippine
+Islands."
+
+The year 1907 will be known most prominently to the future history of
+our Far Eastern possession as the year of the opening of the Philippine
+Assembly, which momentous event occurred on October 16th. But in the
+departments both of Politics and Psychology it should be known as the
+year of the Great Certificate. The Great Certificate was a certificate
+signed by certain eminent gentlemen on March 28, 1907, which made the
+preposterous affirmation that a condition of general and complete
+peace had prevailed throughout the archipelago, except among the
+non-Christian tribes, for the two years immediately preceding. Taken
+in its historic setting, that certificate can by no possibility escape
+responsibility, as "accessory after the fact" at least, to the pretence
+that a similar condition had prevailed ever since President Roosevelt's
+final war-whoop of July 4, 1902, published to the American troops in
+the Islands on the day named. That war-whoop, it will be remembered,
+was in the form of a presidential proclamation congratulating General
+Chaffee and "the gallant officers and men under his command" on some
+"two thousand combats, great and small," and declaring, in effect,
+that Benevolent Assimilation was at last triumphantly vindicated,
+and that opposition to American rule was at an end. The certificate of
+March 28, 1907, appears at pages 47-8 of the Report of the Philippine
+Commission for 1907, part 1. If we consider what is now going on in
+the Islands as "modern" history, and the days of the early fighting as
+"ancient" history, this certificate will serve as the connecting link
+between the two. It furnishes the key-note to all that had happened
+during the American occupation prior to 1907, and the key-note of
+all that has happened since. Therefore, though somewhat long, it is
+deemed indispensable to clearness to submit here in full the text of
+
+
+    THE GREAT CERTIFICATE OF 1907
+
+    Whereas the census of the Philippine Islands was completed and
+    published on the twenty-seventh day of March, nineteen hundred and
+    five, which said completion and publication of said census was,
+    on the twenty-eighth day of March, nineteen hundred and five, duly
+    published and proclaimed to the people by the governor-general of
+    the Philippine Islands with the announcement that the President
+    of the United States would direct the Philippine Commission to
+    call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular
+    assembly, provided that a condition of general and complete peace
+    with recognition of the authority of the United States should be
+    certified by the Philippine Commission to have continued in the
+    territory of the Philippine Islands for a period of two years
+    after said completion and publication of said census; and
+
+    Whereas since the completion and publication of said census there
+    have been no serious disturbances of the public order save and
+    except those caused by the noted outlaws and bandit chieftains,
+    Felizardo and Montalon, and their followers in the provinces of
+    Cavite and Batangas, and those caused in the provinces of Samar
+    and Leyte by the non-Christian and fanatical pulahanes resident
+    in the mountain districts of the said provinces and the barrios
+    contiguous thereto; and
+
+    Whereas the overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces
+    of Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte have not taken part in said
+    disturbances and have not aided or abetted the lawless acts of
+    said bandits and pulahanes; and
+
+    Whereas the great mass and body of the Filipino people have,
+    during said period of two years, continued to be law-abiding,
+    peaceful, and loyal to the United States, and have continued to
+    recognize and do now recognize the authority and sovereignty of
+    the United States in the territory of said Philippine Islands:
+    Now, therefore, be it
+
+    Resolved by the Philippine Commission in formal session duly
+    assembled, That it, said Philippine Commission, do certify, and it
+    does hereby certify, to the President of the United States that for
+    a period of two years after the completion and publication of the
+    census a condition of general and complete peace, with recognition
+    of the authority of the United States, has continued to exist
+    and now exists in the territory of said Philippine Islands not
+    inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes; and be it further
+
+    Resolved by said Philippine Commission, That the President of the
+    United States be requested, and is hereby requested, to direct
+    said Philippine Commission to call a general election for the
+    choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said
+    territory in the Philippine Islands, which assembly shall be
+    known as the Philippine Assembly.
+
+
+Let us examine these amiable liberties thus taken with the facts of
+history by men of irreproachable private character, briefly analyzing
+their action. Such an examination and analysis are indispensable to
+a clear understanding by a great free people whose proudest boast is
+love of fair play, of whether the Filipino people, or any appreciable
+fraction of them, have ever in the least consented, or do now in the
+least consent, to our rule, as the small minority among us interested
+in keeping the Islands, have systematically sought, all these years,
+to have this nation believe. As the above certificate of 1907 was
+the last hurdle that Benevolent Assimilation had to leap on the
+Benevolent Hypocrisy course over which we had to gallop in order to
+get from the freeing of Cuba to the subjugation of the Philippines,
+let us glance back for a moment at the first hurdle or two, leapt
+when Mr. Taft was in the Philippine saddle.
+
+Judge Taft had said on November 30, 1900:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States [469];
+
+
+and, pursuant to that idea, he had set up his civil government on July
+4, 1901. He never did thereafter admit that he was mistaken in his
+original theory, but kept on trying to fit the facts to his theory,
+hoping that after a while they would fit. He "clung to his policy
+of disinterested benevolence with a tenacity born of conviction,"
+to borrow a phrase from Governor-General Smith's inaugural address of
+1907. But in this same inaugural address of Governor Smith of 1907,
+you find, for the first time in all the Philippine state papers,
+a frank admission of the actual conditions under which the civil
+government of 1901 was in fact set up. Says he:
+
+
+    While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills and valleys
+    of the Philippines and every town and barrio in the islands was
+    smoking hot with rebellion, she [the United States] replaced the
+    military with a civil regime and on the smouldering embers of
+    insurrection planted civil government. [470]
+
+
+That confession, made with the bluntness of a most gallant soldier,
+is as refreshing in its honesty as the Roosevelt war-whoop of
+1902. There shall be no tiresome repetition here concerning the
+original withholding of the facts from the American people in 1898-9,
+but to place in juxtaposition Secretary of War Root's representations
+to the American public in the year last named, and the actual facts
+as stated earlier in the same year by General MacArthur, one of
+our best fighting generals, during the thick of the early fighting,
+in an interview already noticed in its proper chronological place,
+will forever fix the genesis of the original lack of frankness as to
+conditions in the Philippines which has naturally and inexorably made
+frankness as to those conditions impossible ever since. As late as
+October 7, 1899, Mr. Root--who had not then and has not since been
+in the Philippines--had said in Chicago, in a speech at a dinner of
+the Marquette Club:
+
+
+    Well, against whom are we fighting? Are we fighting the
+    Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds of
+    islands, inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more than
+    sixty different languages, and all but one are ready to accept
+    American sovereignty.
+
+
+As early as the beginning of April, 1899, just after the taking on
+March 31st of the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur,
+who commanded our troops in the assault on that place, had said, in
+an interview with a newspaper man afterwards verified by the General
+before the Senate Committee of 1902 as substantially correct:
+
+
+    When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that
+    Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. * * * I did not like
+    to believe that the whole population of Luzon * * * was opposed to
+    us * * *. But after having come thus far, and having been brought
+    much in contact with both insurrectos and amigos, [471] I have
+    been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses
+    are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads. [472]
+
+
+The presidential election of 1900 had been fought out, in the midst of
+considerable bitterness, on the idea that the Root view was correct
+and the MacArthur view was altogether mistaken. So that after 1900,
+the McKinley Administration was irrevocably committed to the Root
+view. [473] The Philippine Government had, after 1900, diligently set
+to work to live up to the Root view, and to fit the facts to the Root
+view by prayer and hope, accompanied by asseveration. Hence in 1901 the
+alleged joyous sobs of welcome with which the Filipino people are, in
+effect, described in the report of the Philippine Commission for that
+year as having received the "benign" civil government, said sobs or
+other manifestations having spread, if the Commission's report is to
+be taken at its face value, "like wild-fire." Hence also the attempt
+of 1902 to minimize the insurrection of 1901-2, in Batangas and other
+provinces of southern Luzon, conducted by what Governor Luke E. Wright,
+in a speech delivered at Memphis in the latter part of 1902, called
+"the die-in-the-last-ditch contingent." Hence the quiet placing of
+the province of Surigao in the hands of the military in 1903 without
+suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the failure to order
+out the army in Albay in 1903 and in Samar in 1904. Hence also the
+prompt use of the army in Samar, Batangas, and Cavite in 1905, after
+the presidential election was safely over. Hence also the seething
+state of sedition which smouldered in the Visayan Islands in 1906,
+punctuated by the outbreak in Leyte of that year.
+
+The psychologic processes by which the distinguished gentlemen
+who signed the Great Certificate of March 28, 1907, got their
+own consent to sign it make the most profoundly interesting study,
+relatively to the general welfare of the world, in all our Philippine
+experiments so far. They are the final flowering of the plant Political
+Expediency. They are the weeds of benevolent casuistry that become from
+time to time unavoidable in a colonial garden tended by a republic
+based on the consent of the governed and therefore by the law of its
+own life unfitted to run any other kind of a government frankly. These
+processes find their origin in the provisions of the Act of Congress
+of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Government Act. Three days
+after President Roosevelt approved the Act, he issued his proclamation
+of July 4, 1902, above noticed, declaring the insurrection at an
+end. Section 6 of that Act provided:
+
+
+    Whenever the existing insurrection in the Philippine Islands shall
+    have ceased, and a condition of general and complete peace shall
+    have been established therein, and the fact shall be certified to
+    the President by the Philippine Commission, the President, upon
+    being satisfied thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine
+    Islands to be taken by said Philippine Commission.
+
+
+This census was intended to be preliminary to granting the Filipinos
+a legislature of their own, but as a legislature full of insurrectos
+would of course stultify its American sponsors before all mankind,
+it was announced in effect, in publishing the census programme, that
+no legislature would be forthcoming if the Filipinos did not quit
+insurrecting, and remain "good" for two years. If they did remain good
+for two years after the census was finished, then they should have
+their legislature. During the lull of "general and complete" peace
+which, in the fall of 1902, followed the suppression of the Batangas
+insurrection of 1901-2, and preceded the Ola insurrection of 1902-3 in
+the hemp provinces of southern Luzon, the Commission made, on September
+25, 1902, the certificate contemplated by the above Act of Congress,
+and the taking of the census was accordingly ordered by the President
+of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, by a proclamation issued the
+same day. [474] Section 7 of the aforesaid Act of Congress provided:
+
+
+    Two years after the completion and publication of the census, in
+    case such condition of general and complete peace with recognition
+    of the authority of the United States shall have continued in
+    the territory of said islands not inhabited by Moros or other
+    non-Christian tribes, and such facts shall have been certified
+    to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President
+    upon being satisfied thereof shall direct said Commission to
+    call, and the Commission shall call, a general election for the
+    choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said
+    territory in the Philippine Islands, which shall be known as the
+    Philippine Assembly.
+
+
+On March 27, 1905, the President of the United States was duly
+advised that the census had been completed, and on March 28th,
+the presidential proclamation promising the Filipinos a legislature
+two years later if in the meantime they did not insurrect any, was
+duly published at Manila. It is true that there is no Philippine
+state paper signed by anybody, either by the President of the United
+States, or the Governor-General of the Philippines, or any one else,
+certifying to a condition of "general and complete peace" between
+the certificate to that effect made by the Philippine Commission on
+September 25, 1902, above mentioned, which authorized commencing the
+census (and was justified by the facts), and the presidential promise
+of March 28, 1905, that if they would "be good" for two years more,
+they should have a legislature. But the whole manifest implication
+of the representations of fact sought to be conveyed by the action
+both of the Washington and the Manila authorities at the date of the
+presidential promise of March 28, 1905, is that a condition of general
+and complete peace had obtained ever since the last certificate to that
+effect, the certificate of September 25, 1902. Yet, as we saw in the
+chapter covering the last year of Governor Wright's administration,
+besides the Samar disturbances that lasted all through 1905, a big
+insurrection was actually in full swing in Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna
+provinces, on March 28, 1905, had then been in progress since before
+the first of the year, and continued until the latter part of 1905,
+the then Governor-General, Governor Wright, having, by proclamation
+issued January 31, 1905, declared Cavite and Batangas to be in a
+state of insurrection, ordered the military into those provinces, and
+suspended the writ of habeas corpus. President Roosevelt's proclamation
+of March 28, 1905, can by no possibility be construed as saying to
+the Filipinos anything other than substantially this: "You have not
+insurrected any since my proclamation of July 4, 1902. If you will be
+good two years more, you shall have a legislature." What then was the
+Philippine Commission to do at the end of those two years, peppered,
+as they had been, with most annoying outbreaks in various provinces
+not inhabited by "Moros or other non-Christian tribes." During the
+presidential campaign of 1904 the Commission had committed themselves,
+as we have seen, to the proposition that nothing serious was going
+on at that time in Samar. So how could they take frank official
+cognizance on paper of the reign of terror let loose there by their
+delay in ordering out the army until after the presidential election,
+a delay which, like a delay of fire-engines to arrive at the scene of
+a fire, had permitted the Samar outbreak to gain such headway that it
+took two years to finally put it down? Then there was the outbreak
+of 1906 in Leyte, described in the last chapter, as to which even
+the Commission had admitted in their annual report for that year [475]:
+
+
+    Possibly its [Leyte's] immediate vicinity to Samar has had to do
+    with the disturbed conditions.
+
+
+In other words, possibly, a fire may spread from one field of dry
+grass to another near by.
+
+As to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection of 1905, in an executive
+order dated September 28, 1907, [476]--noticed in a previous chapter,
+but too pertinent to be entirely omitted here--wherein are set forth
+the reasons for withholding executive clemency from the condemned
+leaders of that movement, Governor-General Smith describes in harrowing
+terms "a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of the most
+beautiful provinces in the archipelago," wrought by the condemned
+men, who he says "assumed the cloak of patriotism, and under the
+titles of 'Defenders of the Country,' and 'Protectors of the People'
+proceeded to inaugurate" said reign of terror. These men were most
+of them former insurgent officers who had remained out after the
+respectable generals had all surrendered. This Cavite-Batangas-Laguna
+insurrection was the very sort of thing which the conditional promise
+of a legislature made by Congress to the Filipino people in Sections 6
+and 7 of the Act of July 1, 1902--the Philippine Government Act--had
+stipulated should not happen. This is no mere dictum of my own. In
+the case of Barcelon against Baker, 5 Philippine Reports, pp. 87 et
+seq., already very briefly noticed in a previous chapter, the Supreme
+Court of the Islands had, in effect, so held. Section 5 of the Act of
+Congress of July 1, 1902, had provided that if any state of affairs
+serious enough should arise, the Governor of the Philippines should
+have authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases
+of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require
+it." Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act had provided, on the other hand,
+that if a condition of general and complete peace should prevail for
+a stated period the Filipinos should have a legislature. In the case
+of Barcelon against Baker the Supreme Court held that the situation
+contemplated by Section 5 of the Act of Congress had arisen in the
+provinces of Cavite and Batangas. That, of course, automatically, so
+to speak, made the postponement of the Philippine Assembly a necessary
+logical sequence, under the provisions of Sections 6 and 7. These
+Sections 6 and 7 promised the Filipinos a legislature in the event
+the conditions contemplated by Section 5 should not arise. Barcelon,
+who was one of the (non-combatant) reconcentrados restrained of his
+liberty at Batangas, claimed that his detention as such reconcentrado
+by the defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding, the constabulary
+officer, Colonel Baker, was unlawful, in that, he being charged with
+no crime, such detention deprived him of his liberty without due
+process of law. The Philippine Commission, however, had declared,
+by virtue of the authority vested in it by Section 5 of the Act of
+Congress aforesaid, that a state of insurrection existed in Cavite and
+Batangas, and accordingly the Governor-General had suspended the writ
+of habeas corpus and declared martial law in those provinces. The
+Attorney-General representing the Philippine Commission before
+the court rested the Government's case on the proposition that the
+petitioner was not entitled to claim the ordinary "due process of
+law" because "open insurrection against the constituted authorities"
+existed in the provinces named. And the Supreme Court upheld his
+contention. In so holding, they say, among other things (page 93),
+in construing Section 5 of the Act of Congress we are considering:
+
+
+    Inasmuch as the President, or Governor-General with the approval
+    of the Philippine Commission, can suspend the privilege of the
+    writ of habeas corpus only under the conditions mentioned in the
+    said statute, it becomes their duty to make an investigation of
+    the existing conditions in the archipelago, or any part thereof,
+    to ascertain whether there actually exists a state of rebellion,
+    insurrection, or invasion, and that the public safety requires the
+    suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. When
+    this investigation is concluded, and the President, or the
+    Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Commission,
+    declares that there exists these conditions, and that the public
+    safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
+    habeas corpus, can the judicial department of the Government
+    investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions
+    exist?
+
+
+They answer "No!" The head note of the decision is as follows:
+
+
+    The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in
+    the Philippine Islands in the case of rebellion, insurrection,
+    and invasion, when the public safety requires it, by the President
+    of the United States, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine
+    Islands with the approval of the Philippine Commission.
+
+
+Thus the Supreme Court of the Islands squarely held that on the
+fourth day of August, 1905 (the day the writ of habeas corpus
+was made returnable), open insurrection existed against the
+constituted authorities in the Islands, in the provinces named,
+and had existed since the Executive Proclamation of January 31st,
+previous, declaring a state of insurrection, and on that ground denied
+the writ. Yet the Commission certified on March 28, 1907, that a state
+of general and complete peace as contemplated by the Act of Congress
+conditionally promising a legislature, had prevailed for the two
+years preceding. In other words the Philippine Commission declared
+a state of insurrection to exist in certain populous provinces, and
+was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Islands in so doing, and later
+certified to the continuance of a state of general and complete peace
+covering the same period.
+
+All the uncandid things--uncandid in failure to take the American
+people into their confidence--that have been done by all the good men
+we have sent to the Philippines from the beginning, have been justified
+by those good men to their own consciences on the idea that, because
+the end in view was truly benevolent, therefore the end justified the
+means. As a matter of fact, American Benevolent Assimilation in the
+Philippines has, in its practical operation, worked more of misery and
+havoc, first through war, and since through legislation put or kept on
+the statute books by the influence of special interests in the United
+States with Congress, "than any which has darkened their unhappy past"
+to use one of Mr. McKinley's early expressions deprecating doing for
+the Philippines what we did for Cuba. [477]
+
+But let us see just how much the Philippine Commission that signed the
+peace certificate of March 28, 1907, swallowed, and how they swallowed
+it. It will be observed that they sugar-coated their certificate with
+a lot of whereases. The first of these recites President Roosevelt's
+promise of March 28, 1905, that the Filipinos should have a legislature
+two years thereafter "provided that a condition of general and
+complete peace with recognition of the authority of the United States
+should be certified by the Philippine Commission to have continued in
+the territory of the Philippine Islands for a period of two years"
+after the proclamation. Whereas number two, it will be noted, goes
+on to state that there have been "no serious disturbances of public
+order save and except" those in Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte,
+[478] the magnitude of which has been fully described in previous
+chapters. Of the Cavite-Batangas insurrection, the only one they had
+previously formally admitted to be an insurrection, they say it was
+"caused by certain noted outlaws and bandit chieftains [naming them],
+and their followers." Obviously this was hardly sufficient to show
+that an insurrection they had once officially recognized as such
+was not in fact such at all. So in order to justify a statement
+that "a condition of general and complete peace" had continued in
+these two great provinces of Cavite and Batangas, which they had
+but shortly previously declared to be in a state of insurrection,
+and been upheld by the Supreme Court in so doing, they resort to the
+old Otis expedient of 1898-9, worked on the American people through
+Mr. McKinley to show absence of lack of consent-of-the-governed. This
+expedient, as we have seen in the earlier chapters of this book,
+consisted in vague use of the word "majority." It had stood Judge
+Taft in good stead in the campaign of 1900, because when he then
+said that "the great majority of the people" were "entirely willing"
+to accept American rule, there was no earthly way to disprove it
+in time for the verdict of the American people to be influenced by
+the unanimity of the Filipinos against a change of masters in lieu
+of independence. It was the only possible expedient for an American
+conscience, because every American naturally feels that unless he
+can, by some sort of sophistry, persuade himself that "the majority"
+of the people want a given thing, then the thing is a wrong thing to
+force upon them. So the ethical hurdle the Commission had to leap in
+order to sign the certificate of 1907 was cleared thus:
+
+
+    The overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces have
+    not taken part in said disturbances and have not aided and abetted
+    the lawless acts of said bandits.
+
+
+As a matter of fact, the report of the American Governor of Cavite--and
+conditions were conceded to be identical in the two provinces of
+Cavite and Batangas--shows that the reason it was so hard to suppress
+the Cavite-Batangas troubles of 1905 was that the people would not
+help the authorities to apprehend the outlaws. No doubt the King of
+England would have signed a similar certificate as to the people of
+the shires and counties in which Robin Hood, Little John, and Friar
+Tuck, held high carnival. Of course I do not mean to libel the fair
+fame of that fine freebooter Robin Hood and his companions by placing
+the rascally leaders of the bands of outlaws now under consideration
+in the same jolly and respectable class with those beloved friends of
+the childhood of us all. But the Cavite-Batangas "patriots" of 1905
+could never have given the authorities as much trouble as they did if
+the people had not at least taken secret joy in discomfiture of the
+American authorities. Until finally suppressed, all such movements
+as these always grew exactly as a snow-ball does if you roll it on
+snow. Says Governor Shanks, a Major of the 4th United States Infantry,
+who was Governor of Cavite, in 1905 in his report for that year, [479]
+in explaining the uprising under consideration, and the way it grew:
+"The Filipino likes to be on the winning side." Certainly this is
+not peculiar to the Filipino. Governor Shanks proceeds:
+
+
+    The prestige acquired (by the uprising) at San Pedro Tunasan,
+    Paranaque, Taal, and San Francisco de Malabon had great weight in
+    creating active sympathy for ladrone bands and leaders. Something
+    was needed to counterbalance the effect of their combined
+    successes, and the appearance of regular troops was just the
+    thing needed.
+
+
+This explains how "the overwhelming majority" of which the certificate
+of 1907 speaks was obtained in Cavite. It took six months to obtain
+said "majority" at that. I suppose the campaigning of the American
+regulars might be credited with obtaining the "majority," and the
+reconcentration of brother Baker of the constabulary might be accorded
+the additional credit of making the majority "overwhelming." If you
+have, as election tellers, so to speak, a soldier with a bayonet on
+one side, and a constabulary officer with a reconcentration camp
+back of him on the other, you can get an "overwhelming majority"
+for the continuance of American rule even in Cavite province.
+
+Through men I commanded during the early campaigning, I have killed my
+share of Filipinos in the time of war; and after the civil government
+was set up I had occasion to hang a good many of them, under what
+seemed to me a necessary application of the old Mosaic law, "An eye
+for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life." But I thank
+God I have never been a party to the insufferable pretence that they,
+or any appreciable fraction of them, ever consented to our rule. This,
+however, is the whole theory of the Philippine Commission's certificate
+of March 28, 1907. It is curious how generously and supremely frank a
+brave soldier will get when he forgets to be a politician. In one of
+his state papers of 1907 Governor-General Smith [480] speaks of General
+Trias, who had been Lieutenant-General of the insurgent army in the
+days of the insurrection, and next in rank to Aguinaldo himself, as one
+"whose love of country had been tested on many a well fought field
+of honorable conflict." Contrast this tribute to the respectability
+of the original Philippine war for independence against us with the
+long list of stale falsehoods already reviewed in this volume, on the
+faith of which, in the presidential campaign of 1900, the American
+people were persuaded that to deny to the Filipinos what they had
+accorded to Cuba was righteous! The leaders of the Cavite-Batangas
+uprising of 1905 had been officers of the insurgent army, and that
+was the secret of their hold upon the people of those provinces. It
+is true that they must have been pretty sorry officers, and that they
+were ladrones (brigands). They were cruel and unmitigated scoundrels
+working for purely selfish and vainglorious ends. But it was the
+cloak of patriotism, however, infamously misused, that gained them
+such success as they attained in 1905. Says the American Governor of
+Cavite province in his annual report for 1906 [481]:
+
+
+    The province should be most carefully watched. I am convinced
+    that ladrone leaders do not produce conditions, but that the
+    conditions and attitude of the public produce ladrones.
+
+
+So much for the Cavite-Batangas hurdle. And now as to the Samar and
+Leyte hurdle.
+
+The signers of the certificate of 1907 justify their certificate as to
+Samar and Leyte on a very ingenious theory. The Act of Congress of July
+1, 1902, already cited, which had provided for the taking of a census
+preliminary to the call of an election for delegates to a legislature,
+had recognized the crude ethnological status of the Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes. These had never had anything whatever to do
+with the insurrection against us. Therefore in making the continuance
+of a state of general and complete peace for a prescribed period a
+condition precedent to granting the Filipinos a legislature, the Act
+of 1902 had limited that condition precedent to "the territory of said
+Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes." In fact
+President Roosevelt's proclamation of September 25, 1902, already
+noticed, ordering the taking of the census on the theory that a
+state of general and complete peace then existed, explains that this
+theory is entirely consistent with trouble among the Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes because they, it says, quoting from a statement
+of the Philippine Commission previously made to the President,
+"never have taken any part in the insurrection." The Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes were, so to speak, in no sense assets of the
+Philippine insurrection. All the rest of the population was--that is,
+if there was anything in the veteran General MacArthur's grim jest of
+1900, prompted by Governor Taft's half-baked opinion to the contrary,
+that "ethnological homogeneity" was the secret of the unanimity of the
+opposition we met, and that somehow people "will stick to their own
+kith and kin." When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drawn
+nobody pretended for a moment that there were any non-Christian tribes
+either in Samar or Leyte. The whole population of those Islands were
+valuable assets of the insurrection. If any one doubts it, let him
+ask the 9th Infantry. You will find in the Census of 1903 that there
+are no non-Christian tribes credited either to Samar or Leyte. [482]
+When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drafted, the exception
+about Moros and other non-Christian tribes was intended to except
+merely certain types of people as distinct from the great mass of the
+Philippine population as islands are from the sea. The fact is, no
+person connected with the Philippine Government either before or after
+the certificate under consideration, ever thought of classifying the
+ignorant country people of the uplands and hills of Samar or Leyte,
+as "non-Christian tribes." The Philippine Census of 1903 does not
+so classify them. The very volume of the Report of the Philippine
+Commission for 1907 in which the certificate aforesaid appears,
+does not. In that volume, [483] the report of the Executive Secretary
+deals elaborately with the subject of non-Christian tribes. Professor
+Worcester of the Philippine Commission has for the last twelve years
+been the grand official digger-up of non-Christian tribes. He takes
+as much delight at the discovery of a new non-Christian tribe in
+some remote, newly penetrated mountain fastness, as the butterfly
+catcher with the proverbial blue goggles does in the capture of a
+new kind of butterfly. The Executive Secretary's report, out of
+deference to the professor, omits no single achievement of his
+with reference to his anthropological hobby. It treats, with an
+enthusiasm that would delight Mrs. Jellyby herself, of "the progress
+that was made during the fiscal year in the work of civilizing
+non-Christian tribes scattered throughout the archipelago." It
+gives an alphabetical list of all the provinces where there are
+non-Christian tribes, and, under the name of each province it gives
+notes as to the progress during the year with those tribes. Neither
+Samar nor Leyte appear in that list of provinces. So that the Samar
+"Pulajans," or "Red Breeches" fellows,--"fanatical" Pulajans, they
+are called in the certificate--were "non-Christian tribes" for peace
+certificate purposes only. One thing which makes it most difficult
+of all for me to understand how these gentlemen got their consent
+to sign that certificate is that each non-Christian tribe in the
+Philippines has a language of its own, whereas the country people
+of the uplands and mountains of Samar and Leyte who are labelled--or
+libelled--"non-Christian tribes" in the certificate of 1907, were no
+more different from the rest of the population of those islands than,
+for instance, the ignorant mountain people of Virginia or Kentucky
+are different, ethnologically, from the inhabitants of Richmond or
+Louisville. In his report for 1908, [484] Governor-General Smith
+himself makes this perfectly clear, where he describes the Samar
+Pulajan, or mountaineer, thus:
+
+
+    The Pulajan is not a robber or a thief by nature--quite the
+    contrary. He is hard working, industrious, and even frugal. He
+    had his little late [485] of hemp on the side of the mountain,
+    and breaking out his picul [486] of hemp, he carried it hank by
+    hank for miles and miles over almost impassable mountain trails
+    to the nearest town or barrio. There he offered it for sale,
+    and if he refused the price tendered, which was generally not
+    more than half the value, he soon found himself arrested on a
+    trumped-up charge, and unless he compromised by parting with his
+    hemp he found himself, after paying his fine and lawyer's fees,
+    without either hemp or money.
+
+
+The non-Christian tribes, on the other hand, never have anything to
+do with the civilized people. The Act of Congress of 1902, therefore,
+had no sort of reference to the simple, ignorant, and ordinarily
+docile mountain folk who tilled the soil, revered the priests, paid
+their cedula or head tax like all the rest of the population of the
+Islands, and carried their agricultural products from season to season,
+their hemp and the like, to the coast towns to market. In other words,
+inclusion of the Samar "Pulajans," or "Red Breeches" brigade, and the
+Leyte bandits, in the peace certificate of 1907, as "non-Christian
+tribes" was an afterthought, having no foundation either in logic
+or fact. It was a part of Benevolent Assimilation. This is clearly
+apparent from President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December,
+1905. [487] You do not find any buncombe about "non-Christian
+tribes" in that message. In there reviewing the Samar and other
+insurrections of 1905 in the Philippines, you find him dealing with
+the real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting the
+view that the Filipino people were to blame therefor, because we
+had placed too much power in the hands of an ignorant electorate,
+which had elected rascally officials. "Cavite and Samar," he says,
+"are instances of reposing too much confidence in the self-governing
+power of a people." If we had let the Filipinos go ahead with their
+little republic in 1898, instead of destroying it as we did, they
+knew and would have utilized the true elements of strength they had,
+viz., a very considerable body of educated, patriotic men having
+the loyal confidence of the masses of the people. But we proceeded
+to ram down their throats a preconceived theory that the only road
+to self-government was for an alien people to step in and make the
+ignorant masses the sine qua non. Yet if there was one point on which
+Mr. McKinley had laid more stress than on any other, in his original
+instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft Commission, that point was
+the one consecrated in the following language of those instructions:
+
+
+    In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which
+    they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in
+    mind that the government which they are establishing is designed
+    not for * * * the expression of our theoretical views, etc.
+
+
+Of course the ignorant electorate we perpetrated on Samar as an
+"expression of our theoretical views" proved that we had "gone too
+fast" in conferring self-government, or, to quote Mr. Roosevelt,
+had been "reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power
+of a people," if to begin with the rankest material for constructing
+a government that there was at hand was to offer a fair test of
+capacity for self-government. But President Roosevelt's message,
+above quoted, shows you that the "ignorant electorate" was merely an
+ignorant electorate, and not a non-Christian tribe, as the Philippine
+Commission later had the temerity to certify they were. Now the plain,
+unvarnished, benevolent truth is just this: The Commission knew that
+nobody in the United States, whether they were for retaining the
+Islands or against retaining them, had any desire to postpone granting
+a legislature to the Philippine people. So in their certificate they
+simply included everybody who had given trouble in Samar and Leyte
+as "non-Christian tribes." The only justification for this was that
+they had in fact acted in a most un-Christianlike manner,--i.e., for
+people who devotedly murmur prayers to patron saints in good standing
+in the church calendar. In making their certificate, the Commission
+simply ignored the various uprisings of the preceding two years. They
+simply said, generously, "Oh, forget it." They knew nobody in the
+United States begrudged the Filipinos their conditionally promised
+legislature, or cared to postpone it. The leading Filipinos begged the
+authorities to "forget" the various disturbances that had occurred
+since the publication of the census, and there was a very general
+desire in the Islands to let bygones be bygones, wipe the slate, and
+begin again. Any other attitude would have meant that the legislature
+would have to be postponed. Then the opposition in the United States
+would want to know why, and by 1908 Philippine independence might
+become an issue again. In the eyes of the Commission, the end, being
+benevolent, justified stretching the language of the Act of 1902
+as if it had been the blessed veil of charity itself--i.e., the end
+justified the means. In fact it did--almost--justify the means. But not
+quite. The moral quality of the Great Certificate of 1907 was not as
+reprehensible as General Anderson's dealings with Aguinaldo, already
+described, which, like the certificate, were a necessary part of the
+benevolent hypocrisy of Benevolent Assimilation of an unconsenting
+people. Yet General Anderson is an honorable man. It was not as bad
+as General Greene's juggling Aguinaldo out of his trenches before
+Manila in a friendly way, and failing to give him a receipt for said
+trenches, as he had promised to do, because such a receipt would show
+co-operation and "might look too much like an alliance." This also was
+done on the idea that the end justified the means. Yet General Greene
+is an honorable man. The signers of the great peace certificate of
+1907 are all honorable men. But they signed that certificate, just the
+same. "Judge not that ye be not judged." All I have to say is, I would
+not have signed that certificate. I would have said: "No, gentlemen,
+the end does not justify the means. The Philippine Assembly must be
+postponed, if we are going to deal frankly with Congress and the folks
+at home. The conditions Congress made precedent to the grant of an
+assembly have not been met, and we each and all of us know it. We owe
+more to our own country and to truth than we do to the Filipinos. The
+Act of Congress of 1902 did not vest in the Philippine Commission
+authority to pardon disturbances of public order. It imposed upon
+the Commission an implied duty to report such disturbances, fully
+and frankly. It is not true that there has been a continuing state of
+general and complete peace in these Islands for the last two years,
+and I for one will not certify that there has been."
+
+The truth is, the attitude of the signers of the certificate was like
+that of Uncle Remus, when interrupted by the little boy in one of his
+stories. When Uncle Remus gets to the point in the rabbit story where
+the rabbit thrillingly escapes from the jaws of death, i.e., from the
+jaws of the dogs, by climbing a tree, the rapt listener interrupts:
+"Why, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can't climb a tree." To which Uncle
+Remus replies, with a reassuring wave of the hand, "Oh, but Honey,
+dis rabbit dess 'bleeged ter climb dis tree."
+
+Should any of my good friends still in the Philippines feel disposed to
+censure such levity as the above, I can only say, as Kipling writes
+from England to his Anglo-Indian friends in a foreword to one of
+his books:
+
+
+            I have told these tales of our life
+              For a sheltered people's mirth,
+            In jesting guise,--but ye are wise,
+              And ye know what the jest is worth.
+
+
+Moreover, my authority to speak frankly about these matters is also
+aptly stated by the same great poet thus:
+
+
+            I have eaten your bread and salt,
+              I have drunk your water and wine,
+            The deaths ye died I have watched beside
+              And the lives that ye led were mine.
+
+            Was there aught that I did not share
+              In vigil or toil or ease,
+            One joy or woe that I did not know,
+              Dear friends across the seas?
+
+
+The above reflections are not placed before the reader to show him
+what a pity it is that the writer was not a member of the Philippine
+Commission at the time of their certificate of 1907, or to show what
+a fine thing for our common country it would be if he were made a
+member of that Commission now. He is, personally, as disinterested
+as if Manila were in the moon, for he cannot live in the tropics
+any more. The effect of a year or so of residence there upon white
+men invalided home for tropical dysentery and then returning to the
+Islands is like the effect of water upon a starched shirt. However,
+it is believed that the facts of official record collected in this
+chapter up to this point are a demonstration of this proposition,
+to wit: What the Philippine Government needs more than anything else
+is that the minority party in the United States should be represented
+on the Commission. By this I do not mean representation by what are
+called, under Republican Administrations, "White House" Democrats,
+nor what under a Democratic Administration, if one should ever occur,
+would probably be called "Copperhead Republicans." I mean the genuine
+article. A Democrat who has cast his fortunes with the Philippines
+is no longer a Democrat relatively to the Philippines, because the
+Democratic party wants to get rid of the Philippines and the Democrat
+in the Philippines of course does not. How absurd it is to talk about
+former Governors Wright and Smith, as "life-long Democrats," by way
+of preliminary to using their opinions as "admissions." In the law
+of evidence, an "admission" is a statement made against the interest
+of the party making it.
+
+The first election for representatives in the Philippine Assembly was
+held on July 30, 1907, and on October 16th thereafter the Assembly
+was formally opened by Secretary of War, William H. Taft. The various
+"whereases" hereinabove reviewed, importing complete acquiescence in
+American rule since President Roosevelt's Proclamation of July 4, 1902,
+were first duly read, and then the Assembly was opened. Of course,
+no man could have been elected to the Assembly without at least
+pretending to be in favor of independence, and all but a corporal's
+guard of them were outspoken in favor of the proposition. As the
+present Governor-General Mr. Forbes, said, while Vice-Governor,
+in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909:
+
+
+    To deny the capacity of one's country for * * * self-government
+    is essentially unpopular.
+
+
+When he visited the Philippines to open their Assembly in 1907,
+Mr. Taft had said nothing definite and final on the question of
+promising independence since his departure from the Islands in
+1903. His then benevolent unwillingness to tell them frankly he did not
+think they had sense enough to run a government of their own, and that
+they were unfit for self-government, has already been reviewed. For
+two years after 1903 Governor Wright had made them pine for the return
+of Mr. Taft. They longed to hear again some of the siren notes of
+the celebrated speech "the Philippines for the Filipinos." They had
+gotten very excited and very happy over that speech. Of course they
+would not have gotten very excited over independence supposed to be
+coming long after they should be dead and buried. During the two dark
+frank years of Governor Wright's régime, they had frequently been
+told that they were not fit for independence. So that when Secretary
+of War Taft had visited the Islands in 1905 they all had been on the
+qui vive for more statements vaguely implying an independence they
+might hope to live to see. During the visit of 1905 the time of the
+visiting Congressional party was consumed principally with tariff
+hearings, and comparatively little was said on the subject uppermost
+in the minds of all Filipinos. It is true that Mr. Taft said then he
+was of the opinion that it would take a generation or longer to get
+the country ready for self-government, but he said it in a tactful,
+kindly way, and did not forever crush their hopes. So when he went
+out to the Islands to open the assembly in 1907, the attitude of the
+whole people in expectation of some definite utterances on the question
+of a definite promise of independence at some future time, was just
+the attitude of an audience in a theatre as to which one affirms
+"you could hear a pin fall." In this regard Mr. Taft's utterances
+were as follows [488]:
+
+
+    I am aware that in view of the issues discussed at the election of
+    this assembly I am expected to say something regarding the policy
+    of the United States toward these islands. I cannot speak with
+    the authority of one who may control that policy. The Philippine
+    Islands are territory belonging to the United States, and by the
+    Constitution, the branch of that government vested with the power
+    and charged with the duty of making rules and regulations for their
+    government is Congress. The policy to be pursued with respect
+    to them is therefore ultimately for Congress to determine. * * *
+    I have no authority to speak for Congress in respect to the
+    ultimate disposition of the Islands.
+
+
+After that there was some talk about "mutually beneficial trade
+relations" and "improvement of the people both industrially and in
+self-governing capacity." But with regard to the "process of political
+preparation of the Filipino people" for self-government the Secretary
+said that was a question no one could certainly answer; and so far as
+he was concerned he thought it would take "considerable longer than a
+generation." Somewhere in the early Philippine State papers there is
+a quotation used by Mr. Taft from Shakespeare about "Keeping the word
+of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope." The Filipinos have
+eagerly read for the last twelve years every utterance of Mr. Taft's
+that they could get hold of. If any of those embryonic statesmen of the
+first Philippine Assembly, familiar with the various Taft utterances,
+had looked up the context of the Shakespearian quotation above alluded
+to, he would have found it to be as follows:
+
+
+            And be these juggling fiends no more believ'd,
+            That palter with us in a double sense:
+            That keep the word of promise to our ear
+            And break it to our hope. [489]
+
+
+Since the announcement by Secretary of War Taft at the opening
+of the Philippine Assembly in October, 1907, of the policy of
+indefinite retention of the Islands with undeclared intention,
+the Filipinos have of course clearly understood that if they were
+ever to have independence they must look to Congress for it. But
+they know Congress is not interested in them and that they have no
+influence with it, and that the Hemp Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the
+Sugar Trust, have. So that since 1907, both the American authorities
+in the Philippines and the Filipinos have settled down, the former
+suffused with benevolence--hardened however by paternalistic firmness,
+the latter stoically, to the programme of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention. No conceivable programme could be devised more
+ingeniously calculated to engender race hatred. The Filipino newspapers
+call the present policy one of "permanent administration for inferior
+and incapable races." The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
+Philippine Government Act, which is the "Constitution," so to speak,
+we have given the Filipinos, accords "liberty of the press" in the
+exact language of our own Constitution. The native press does not
+fail to use this liberty to the limit. Naturally the American press
+does not remain silent. So here are a pair of bellows ever fanning
+the charcoals of discontent. And the masses of the Filipino people
+read the Filipino papers. If they cannot read, their children can. In
+one of the reports of one of the American constabulary officials in
+the Philippines, there is an account of the influence of the native
+press too graphic to be otherwise than accurate. He says one can often
+see, in the country districts, a group of natives gathered about some
+village Hampden, listening to his reading the latest diatribe against
+the American Occupation. Never was there such folly in the annals of
+statesmanship. In their native papers, the race situation of course
+comes in for much comment. Now the most notorious and inflexible
+fact of that race situation is that the colonial Anglo-Saxon does
+not intermarry with "the yellow and brown" subject people, as the
+Latin colonizing races do. It would be an over-statement of the case
+to say that the Filipinos to-day had rather have the Spaniards back
+as their overlords instead of us. In 1898, they "tasted the sweets
+of liberty," to use an expression of one of their leaders, and I
+am perfectly sure that to-day the desire of all those people for a
+government of their own is so genuine and universal as that it amounts
+to a very hopeful positive factor in the equation of their capacity for
+self-government. But there is no doubt that many of the Filipinos after
+all have a very warm place in their hearts for the Spanish people. How
+could it be otherwise when so many of the Filipinos are sons and
+grandsons of Spaniards? Much of like and dislike in life's journey is
+determined pre-natally. On the other hand, the American women in the
+Philippines maintain an attitude toward the natives quite like that of
+their British sisters in Hong Kong toward the Chinese, and in Calcutta
+toward the natives there. The social status of an American woman who
+marries a native,--I myself have never heard of but one case--is like
+that of a Pacific coast girl who marries a Jap. This is merely the
+instinct of self-defence with which Nature provides the weaker sex,
+just as she provides the porcupine with quills. But look at the other
+side of the picture. When an American man marries a native woman,
+he thereafter finds himself more in touch with his native "in-laws"
+it is true, but correspondingly, and ever increasingly, out of touch
+with his former associations. This is not as it should be. But it is
+a most unpleasant and inexorable fact of the present situation. In
+an address delivered at the Quill Club in Manila on January 25,
+1909, Governor Smith, after reciting the various beneficent designs
+contemplated by the government and the various public works consummated
+(at the expense of the people of the Islands) deplored, in spite of
+it all, what he termed "the growing gulf between the races." Said he:
+
+
+    An era of ill feeling has started between Americans and Filipinos,
+    and, I hesitate to say it, race hatred.
+
+
+Cherchez la femme! You find her, on the one hand, in the American woman
+whose attitude has been indicated, and you find her, on the other,
+in the refined and virtuous native woman, who finds her American
+husband's relations to his compatriots altered--queered--since his
+marriage to her, no matter how faithful a wife and mother she may
+be. This is the unspeakably cruel situation we have forced upon the
+Filipino people--whom I really learned to respect, and became much
+attached to, before I left the Islands--and President Taft knows it
+as well as I do. Yet he does not take the American people into his
+confidence. He simply worries along with the situation, wishing it
+would get better, but knowing it will get worse. That this situation
+is a permanent one is clearly shown by all the previous teachings
+of racial history. In his Winning of the West, written in 1889,
+speaking of the French settlers in the Ohio valley before 1776,
+and the cordial social relations of the dominant race with the
+natives--relations which have always obtained with all Latin races
+under like circumstances--Mr. Roosevelt says (vol. i., page 41):
+
+
+    They were not trammelled by the queer pride which makes a man
+    of English stock unwilling to make a red-skinned woman his wife,
+    though anxious enough to make her his concubine.
+
+
+Men of English stock have changed but little in the matter of race
+instinct since 1776. If we had a definite policy, declared by Congress,
+promising independence, the American attitude in the Philippines toward
+the Filipinos would at once change, from the present impossible one,
+to our ordinary natural attitude of courtesy toward all foreigners,
+regardless of their color.
+
+On May 7, 1909, the Honorable James F. Smith took his departure from
+the Philippine Islands forever and turned over the duties of his
+office to the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, as Acting President of the
+Commission and Governor-General. As in the case of Governors Wright
+and Ide, so in that of Governor Smith, no reason is apparent why the
+Washington Government should have been willing to dispense with the
+services of the incumbent. This was peculiarly true in the case of
+General Smith. He was but fifty years of age when he left the Islands
+in 1909. He has rendered more different kinds of distinguished public
+service than any American who has ever been in the Philippine Islands
+from the time Dewey's guns first thundered out over Manila Bay down to
+this good hour. Going out with the first expedition in 1898 as Colonel
+of the 1st California Regiment, he distinguished himself on more
+than one battlefield in the early fighting and in recognition thereof
+was made a brigadier-general. Subsequent to this he became Military
+Governor of the island of Negros, that one of the six principal
+Visayan Islands which gave less trouble during the insurrection and
+after than any other--a circumstance doubtless not wholly unrelated
+to General Smith's wise and tactful administration there. Later on
+during the military régime he became Collector of Customs of the
+archipelago. The revenues from customs are the principal source of
+revenue of the Philippine Government and the sums of money handled
+are enormous. The customs service, moreover, in most countries, and
+especially in the Philippines, is more subject to the creeping in of
+graft than any other. General Smith's administration of this post was
+in keeping with everything else he did in the Islands. When the civil
+government was founded by Judge Taft in 1901, he was appointed one of
+the Justices of the Supreme Court and filled the duties of that office
+most creditably. Thence he was promoted to the Philippine Commission,
+which is, virtually, the cabinet of the Governor-General. Still later
+he became Vice-Governor, and finally Governor, serving as such from
+September, 1906, to May, 1909. Any other government on earth that has
+over-seas colonies and recognizes the supreme importance of a maximum
+of continuity of policy, would have kept Governor Smith as long
+as it could have possibly induced him to stay, just as the British
+kept Lord Cromer in Egypt. Governor Smith was succeeded by a young
+man from Boston, who had come out to the Islands four years before,
+and who, prior to that time, had never had any public service in the
+United States of any kind, had never been in the Philippine Islands,
+and probably had never seen a Filipino until he landed at Manila.
+
+General Smith is now (1912) one of the Judges of the Court of Customs
+Appeals at Washington.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII
+
+GOVERNOR FORBES--1909-1912
+
+            The trouble with this country to-day is that,
+            under long domination by the protected interests,
+            a partnership has grown up between them and the
+            Government which the best men in the Republican
+            party could not break up if they would.--Woodrow Wilson.
+
+
+When Governor Forbes assumed the duties of Governor-General of the
+Philippines, some ten years after the ratification of the Treaty
+of Paris whereby we bought the Islands, he was the ninth supreme
+representative of American authority we had had there since the
+American occupation began. The following is the list:
+
+
+    (1) Gen. Thomas M. Anderson       June  30, 1898-July 25, 1898
+    (2) Gen. Wesley Merritt           July  25, 1898-Aug. 29, 1898
+    (3) Gen. Elwell S. Otis           Aug.  29, 1898-May 5, 1900
+    (4) Gen. Arthur MacArthur         May    5, 1900-July 4, 1901
+    (5) Hon. William H. Taft          July   4, 1901-Dec. 23, 1903
+    (6) Hon. Luke E. Wright           Dec.  23, 1903-Nov. 4, 1905
+    (7) Hon. Henry C. Ide             Nov.   4, 1905-Sept. 20, 1906
+    (8) Hon. James F. Smith           Sept. 20, 1906-May 7, 1909
+    (9) Hon. W. Cameron Forbes        May    7, 1909- [490]
+
+
+No one of these distinguished gentlemen has ever had any authority to
+tell the Filipinos what we expect ultimately to do with them. They
+have not known themselves. Is not this distinctly unfair both to
+governors and governed?
+
+Before Governor Forbes went to the Philippines he had been a largely
+successful business man. He is a man of the very highest personal
+character, and an indefatigable worker. He has done as well as the
+conditions of the problem permit. But he is always between Scylla
+and Charybdis. American capital in or contemplating investment in the
+Islands is continually pressing to be permitted to go ahead and develop
+the resources of the Islands. To keep the Islands from being exploited
+Congress early limited grants of land to a maximum too small to attract
+capital. So those who desire to build up the country, knowing they
+cannot get the law changed, are forever seeking to invent ways to get
+around the law. And, being firm in the orthodox Administration belief
+that discussion of ultimate independence is purely academic, i.e.,
+a matter of no concern to anybody now living, Governor Forbes is of
+course in sympathy with Americans who wish to develop the resources of
+the Islands. On the other hand, he knows that such a course will daily
+and hourly make ultimate independence more certain never to come. So
+do the Filipinos know this. Therefore they clamor ever louder and
+louder against all American attempts to repeal the anti-exploiting
+Acts of Congress by "liberal" interpretation. Many an American just
+here is sure to ask himself, "Why all this 'clamor'? Do we not give
+them good government? What just ground have they for complaint?" Yes,
+we do give them very good government, so far as the Manila end of
+the business is concerned, except that it is a far more expensive
+government than any people on the earth would be willing to impose
+on themselves. But their main staples are hemp, sugar, and tobacco,
+and we raise the last two in this country. Their sugar and tobacco
+were allowed free entry into the United States by the Paine Law of
+1909 up to amounts limited in the law, but the Philippine people know
+very well that American sugar and tobacco interests will either dwarf
+the growth of their sugar and tobacco industries by refusing to allow
+the limit raised--the limit of amounts admitted free of duty--or else
+that our Sugar Trust and our Tobacco Trust will simply ultimately
+eliminate them by absorption, just as the Standard Oil Company used
+to do with small competitors. In this sort of prospect certainly even
+the dullest intellect must recognize just ground for fearing--nay for
+plainly foreseeing--practical industrial slavery through control by
+foreign [491] corporations of economic conditions. So much for the
+two staples in which the Philippines may some day become competitors
+of ours. It took Mr. Taft nine years to persuade American sugar and
+tobacco that they would not be in any immediate danger by letting
+in a little Philippine sugar and tobacco free of duty. Then they
+consented. Not until then did they promise not to shout "Down with
+cheap Asiatic labor. We will not consent to compete with it." Their
+mental reservation was, of course, and is, "if the Philippine sugar
+and tobacco industries get too prosperous, we will either buy them,
+or cripple them by defeating their next attempt to get legislation
+increasing the amounts of Philippine sugar and tobacco admitted into
+the United States free of duty." And the Filipinos know that this is
+the fate that awaits two out of the three main sources of the wealth
+of their country. Their third source of wealth, their main staple, is
+the world-famous Manila hemp. This represents more than half the value
+of their total annual exports. And as to it, "practical industrial
+slavery through control by foreign corporations of economic conditions"
+is to-day not a fear, but a fact. The International Harvester Company
+has its agents at Manila. The said company or allied interests,
+or both, are large importers of Manila hemp. The reports of all the
+governors-general of the Philippines who have preceded Governor Forbes
+tell, year after year, of the millions "handed over" to American hemp
+importers through "the hemp joker" of the Act of Congress of 1902,
+hereinafter explained, in the chapter on Congressional Legislation
+(Chapter XXVI.). Why did these complaints--made with annual
+regularity up to Governor Forbes's accession--cease thereafter? You
+will find these complaints of his predecessors transcribed in the
+chapter mentioned, because if I had re-stated them you might suspect
+exaggeration. The "rake-off" of the American importers of Manila hemp
+for 1910 was nearly $750,000, as fully explained in Chapter XXVI.
+
+Governor Forbes will be in this country when this book is issued. I
+think he owes it to the American people to explain why he does not
+continue the efforts of his predecessors to halt the depredations
+of the Hemp Trust. Why does he content himself in his last annual
+report with a mild allusion to the fact that the condition of
+the hemp industry is "not satisfactory"? I have said that Governor
+Forbes is a man of high character, and take pleasure in repeating that
+statement in this connection. The truth is we are running a political
+kindergarten for adults in the Philippines, and those responsible
+for the original blunder of taking them, and all their political
+heirs and assigns since, have sought to evade admitting and setting
+to work to rectify the blunder. Unmasked, this is what the policy of
+Benevolent Assimilation now is. They allege an end, and so justify
+all the ways and means. Benevolent Assimilation needs the support
+of the International Harvester Company and of all other Big Business
+interested directly or indirectly in Manila hemp. The end justifies
+the means. Hence the silence. Philippine gubernatorial reticence is
+always most reticent about that particular subject on which at the time
+the American people are most peculiarly entitled to information. As
+long as public order was the most pressing question, Philippine
+gubernatorial reticence selected that branch of our colonial problem
+either for especial silence or for superlatively casual allusion, as
+we have already seen. So now with the economic distresses. Frankness
+would obviously furnish too much good argument for winding up this
+Oriental receivership of ours. The Philippine Government will never
+tell its main current troubles until after they are over. But as
+the present trouble--the economic depredations of powerful special
+interests--must necessarily be fruitful of discontent which will
+crop out some day to remind us that as we sow so shall we reap,
+any one who helps expose the root of the trouble is doing a public
+service. No Congressman who in silence would permit Big Business to
+prey upon his constituents as Governor Forbes has, could long remain in
+office. Taxation without representation may amount to depredation, and
+yet never be corrected, when the powers that prey have the ear of the
+court, and the victims cannot get the ear of the American people. So
+the Hemp Trust continues to rob the Filipinos under the forms of law,
+and the Mohonk Conference continues to kiss Benevolent Assimilation
+on both cheeks. And Dr. Lyman Abbott periodically says Amen. I am not
+speaking disrespectfully of Dr. Abbott. I am deploring the lack of
+information of our people at home as to conditions in the Philippines.
+
+It is a relief to turn from such matters to some of the real
+substantial good we have done out there to which Governor Forbes
+has heretofore publicly pointed with just pride. In an article
+in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909, Governor Forbes (then
+Vice-Governor) said, among other things:
+
+
+    We have completed the separation of Church and State, buying out
+    from the religious orders their large agricultural properties,
+    which are now administered by the government for the benefit of
+    the tenants.
+
+
+This statement I cannot too cordially endorse. It would be grossly
+unfair not to accord full measure of acclaim to Governor Taft for the
+way he worked out the problem of the Friar Lands. He has been attacked
+in some quarters in this regard, and most unjustly. Not being a
+Catholic, and all my people being Protestants, I have no fear of being
+suspected of special pleading in the matter. The working out of the
+Friar Land problem by Governor Taft in the Philippines was a splendid
+piece of constructive statesmanship. He was at his greatest and best
+in that very transaction. The Treaty of Paris had guaranteed that all
+vested rights should be respected, including those of ecclesiastical
+bodies. The friars had long owned the lands in question. There can be
+no particle of doubt on this point. The tenants on the land had all
+long ago attorned to them, father and son, from time out of mind,
+paying rent regularly. But by claiming jurisdiction over their
+tenants' souls also, and getting that jurisdiction effectively
+recognized, the thrifty friars used to raise the rent regularly,
+quieting incipient protest with threats of eternal punishment,
+or protracted stay in purgatory. The advent of our government let
+loose a revolt against the authority of the friars generally, and,
+their spiritual hold once loosened, this led the tenants to dispute
+the land titles of their spiritual shepherds, who were also their
+temporal landlords. Of course the titles had all been long recorded,
+and looked after by the best legal talent the country afforded. As
+long as you control the future of your tenant's soul, you can make him
+pay his last copeck for rent. But as soon as that control is lost,
+the man on whom the governing of the country thereafter devolves
+has a certain prospect of a great agrarian revolution on his hands,
+having in it many elements of substantial righteousness. Governor
+Taft's capacious mind, prompted by his strongest instinct, love of
+justice, conceived the idea of having the Philippine Government raise
+the money to buy the Friar Lands, by issuing bonds, and then buying
+the Friars out and re-selling the land to the tenants on long time,
+on the instalment plan, the instalments to be so graduated as to be
+equal to a moderate rental. Each tenant stayed right where he had
+been all the time, in possession of the tract he had always tilled,
+he and his father before him. To arrange all this it took an Act of
+Congress authorizing the bond issue, and a visit to Rome to arrange
+the bargain with the Pope. Some say His Holiness drove a hard bargain
+with Governor Taft, or to put it another way, that Governor Taft paid
+the Church people too much for the land. He did not. He may not have
+counted pennies with them, but the lands were worth what he paid for
+them. And the purchase protected the faith and honor of our government,
+as pledged by the Treaty of Paris, and at the same time prevented an
+agrarian revolution--which would have had a lot of elemental justice
+on its side.
+
+Another of the good works we have done in the Philippines, to which
+Governor Forbes points in his magazine article above mentioned,
+is thus noted by him:
+
+
+    We have put the finances on a sound and sensible basis.
+
+
+To this also I say Amen. The Forbes article then goes on to say
+that the government of the Islands is self-supporting. This is
+true, except the $14,000,000 a year it costs us to keep out there a
+garrison of 12,000 American troops (supplemented by certain native
+scouts--see chapter on "Cost of the Philippines," hereafter). This
+garrison is conceded to be a mere handful, sufficient merely,
+and intended merely--as a witty English woman has put it in a book
+on the Philippines--"to knock the Filipino on the head in case he
+wants his liberty before the Americans think he is fit for it." In
+other words, we only attempt to keep force enough there to quell any
+outbreak that might occur. So far as possible invasion by any foreign
+power is concerned, our $14,000,000 per annum is an absolutely dead
+loss. Brigadier-General Clarence Edwards, U. S. A., commanding the
+Bureau of Insular Affairs, said recently [492] before the Finance
+Committee of the Senate:
+
+
+    I would never think of the Philippines as a military problem for
+    defence. If any nation wants them, it is merely a declaration
+    of war.
+
+
+What a shameful admission for a great nation to subscribe to,
+relatively to people it pretends to be protecting! The programme of
+the War Department is to abandon the Islands to their fate, for the
+time being at least, in our next war, letting them remain a football
+until the end of such war, when, as an independent republic they
+could, and would, rally as one man to the defence of their country
+against invasion, and would, with a little help from us, make life
+unbearable for an invading force. As things stand, we are just as
+impotent as Spain was out there in 1898, and it is utter folly to
+forget what happened then.
+
+But to return to Governor Forbes's article and to a pleasanter feature
+of the situation. He says:
+
+
+    We have established schools throughout the archipelago, teaching
+    upward of half a million children.
+
+
+This also is true, and greatly to our credit. But as the American
+hemp trust mulcts the Philippine hemp output about a half million
+dollars a year (as above suggested, and later, in another chapter,
+more fully explained), it follows that each Filipino child pays the
+hemp trust a dollar a year for the privilege of going to school.
+
+And now let us consider the most supremely important part of Governor
+Forbes's magazine article above quoted. The burden of the song of
+the adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill (looking to
+Philippine independence in 1921) [493] is that because there are
+certain "wild tribes" scattered throughout the archipelago, in the
+mountain fastnesses, therefore we should cling to the present policy of
+indefinite retention with undeclared intention until the wild tribes
+get civilized. Governor Forbes's article is an absolute, complete,
+and final answer to the misinformed nonsense of the minority report
+aforesaid. He says, apropos of public order:
+
+
+    It is now safe to travel everywhere throughout the Islands without
+    carrying a weapon, excepting only in some of the remote parts of
+    the mountains, where lurk bands of wild tribes who might possibly
+    mistake the object of a visit, and in the southern part of the
+    great island of Mindanao which is inhabited by intractable Moros.
+
+
+The foregoing unmasks, in all its contemptible falsehood, the pretence
+that the presence of a few wild tribes in the Philippines is a reason
+for withholding independence from 7,000,000 of Christian people in
+order that a greedy little set of American importers of Manila hemp may
+fatten thereon. True, hemp is not edible, but it is convertible into
+edibles--and also into campaign funds. That the existence of these wild
+tribes--the dog-eating Igorrotes and other savages you saw exhibited at
+the St. Louis Exposition of 1903-4--constitute infinitely less reason
+for withholding independence from the Filipinos than the American
+Indian constituted in 1776 for withholding independence from us, will
+be sufficiently apparent from a glance at the following table, taken
+from the American Census of the Islands of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123):
+[494]
+
+
+        Island      Civilized       Wild        Total
+
+        Luzon       3,575,001    223,506    3,798,507
+        Panay         728,713     14,933      743,646
+        Cebu          592,247                 592,247
+        Bohol         243,148                 243,148
+        Negros        439,559     21,217      460,776
+        Leyte         357,641                 357,641
+        Samar         222,002        688      222,690
+        Mindanao      246,694    252,940      499,634
+
+
+I think the above table makes clear the enormity of the injustice I am
+now trying to crucify. Without stopping to use your pencil, you can
+see that Mindanao, the island where the "intractable Moros" Governor
+Forbes speaks of live, contains about a half million people. Half
+of these are civilized Christians, and the other half are the wild,
+crudely Mohammedan Moro tribes. Above Mindanao on the above list,
+you behold what practically is the Philippine archipelago (except
+Mindanao), viz., Luzon and the six main Visayan Islands. If you will
+turn back to pages 225 et seq., especially to page 228, where the
+student of world politics was furnished with all he needs or will
+ever care to know about the geography of the Philippine Islands,
+you will there find all the rocks sticking out of the water and all
+the little daubs you see on the map eliminated from the equation
+as wholly unessential to a clear understanding of the problem of
+governing the Islands. That process of elimination left us Luzon and
+the six main Visayan Islands above, as constituting, for all practical
+governmental purposes all the Philippine archipelago except the Moro
+country, Mindanao (i.e., parts of it), and its adjacent islets;
+Luzon and the Visayan Islands contain nearly 7,000,000 of people,
+and of these the wild tribes, as you can see by a glance at the above
+table, constitute less than 300,000, sprinkled in the pockets of their
+various mountain regions. Nearly all these 300,000 are quite tame,
+peaceable, and tractable, except, as Governor Forbes suggests, they
+"might possibly mistake the object of a visit." The half million
+"intractable Moros" of Mindanao, plus those in the adjacent islets,
+make up another 300,000. These last, it is true, will need policing
+for some time to come, but whether we do that policing by retaining
+Mindanao, or whether we let the Filipinos do it, is a detail that has
+no standing in court as a reason for continuing to deny independence
+to the 7,000,000 of people of Luzon and the Visayan Islands because
+they have some 300,000 backward people in the backwoods of their
+mountains. Yet see how the ingenuity of inspired ignorance states the
+case, by adding the 300,000 tame tribes of Luzon and the Visayas to
+the 300,000 fierce Moro savages away down in Mindanao, near Borneo,
+so as to get 600,000 "wild" people, and then alluding to the fact
+that so far only 200,000 Filipinos are qualified to vote. Says the
+report of the minority of the Committee on Insular Affairs on the
+pending Jones bill (proposing independence in 1921):
+
+
+    The wild and uncivilized inhabitants of the islands outnumber, 3
+    to 1, those who would be qualified to vote under the pending bill
+    [the Jones bill].
+
+
+You see the minority report is counting women and children,
+when it talks about the wild tribes, but not when it talks about
+voters. According to universally accepted general averages, among
+7,500,000 people you should find 1,500,000 adult males. No one doubts
+that of these, by 1921, 500,000 will have become qualified voters. No
+one can deny that any such country having 500,000 qualified voters, the
+bulk of whom are good farmers, and the cream of whom are high-minded
+educated gentlemen, and all of whom are intensely patriotic, will be in
+good shape for promotion to independence. What wearies me about this
+whole matter is that the minority report above mentioned is permitted
+to get off such "rot," and the New York Times, the Army and Navy
+Journal, and others, to applaud it, while the Administration sits by,
+silent, and reaps the benefit of such stale, though not intentional,
+falsehoods, without attempting to correct them, so that our people
+may get at the real merits of the question. You see this silence
+inures to the benefit of the interests that have cornered the Manila
+hemp industry.
+
+In the campaign of 1912 for the Republican nomination for the
+Presidency, there was much mutual recrimination between Colonel
+Roosevelt and Mr. Taft about which of them had been kindest to
+the International Harvester Company. It seems to me it is "up to"
+Governor Forbes, who in the Philippines has served under the present
+President and his predecessor also, to explain why he has abandoned
+the fight, so long waged by previous governors-general, to get what
+former Governor-General James F. Smith calls "the [hemp] joker" of
+the Act of Congress of 1902 concerning the Philippines, wiped from
+the statute books of this country.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII
+
+"NON-CHRISTIAN" WORCESTER
+
+            The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.
+
+                          Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
+
+
+In the year 1911, the editor of one of the great metropolitan
+papers told me that President Taft told him that the Honorable
+Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine
+Government, was "the most valuable man we have on the Philippine
+Commission." Certainly, reproduction of such an indorsement from
+so exalted a source shows a wish to be fair, in one who considers
+Professor Worcester the direst calamity that has befallen the
+Filipinos since the American occupation, neither war, pestilence,
+famine, reconcentration, nor tariff-wrought poverty excepted. During
+all my stay in the Philippines I never did have any official relations
+of any sort with the Professor, and only met him, casually, once,
+in 1901. The personal impression left from the meeting was distinctly
+that of an overbearing bully of the beggar-on-horseback type. Conscious
+of liability to error, and preferring that the reader should judge for
+himself, I give the main circumstances upon which this impression is
+based. Soon after the central insular government was set up, in 1901,
+Judge Taft and certain other members of the Philippine Commission,
+the Professor among the number, came into my judicial district to
+organize provincial governments. Their coming to each town where they
+stopped was telegraphed in advance, and before they reached the town
+where I then was holding court each one of the American colony of
+the town was designated by common consent to look after a fraction
+of the Taft party during their stay. The Professor fell to my lot. I
+always was unlucky. However, their stay was only a few hours. While
+they were there, I had occasion to observe that the Professor spoke
+Spanish quite well and so remarked to him. The well-bred reply was:
+"You'll find that I know a great many things you might not think I
+knew." Whether this was merely "The insolence of office" cropping
+out in a previously obscure young man suddenly elevated to high
+station, or whether it was an evidence of the Commissioner's idea
+of the relation of the Executive Department of a government to its
+Judiciary, is a question. [495] At all events I think the incident
+gives an insight into the man not irrelevant to what is hereinafter
+submitted. I have met a number of other Americans since who had
+received impressions similar to my own. And the Professor's whole
+subsequent course in the Islands corroborates those impressions. I
+have never talked to any American in the Philippines who had a good
+word for him. Of course, Power, like Property, will always have
+friends. So that even Professor Worcester may have some friends,
+among his fellow-countrymen in those far-away Islands. But it has
+already been made clear in a former chapter how entirely possible it
+is for a man occupying high position in the government out there to
+be very generally and cordially disliked by his own countrymen there
+and actually not know it. Whether this is true of Professor Worcester,
+or not, as a general proposition it is quite possible. One thing is
+certain, namely, that he is very generally and very cordially detested
+by the Filipinos. That this detestation is perfectly natural under
+the circumstances, and entirely justifiable, and that it is a cruel
+injustice to those people, as well as a monumental piece of folly,
+to keep the Professor saddled upon them, it is now in order to show.
+
+In Chapter VI (ante), we made the acquaintance of two young naval
+officers. Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, who,
+in the fall of 1898, while the fate of the Philippines hung in the
+balance at Paris, and peace still reigned in the Islands between us
+and the Filipinos, made a trip through the interior of Luzon, covering
+some six hundred miles, and afterwards furnished Admiral Dewey with
+a written report of their trip, which was later published as a Senate
+document. Professor Worcester's greatest value to President Taft, and
+also the thing out of which has grown, most unfortunately, what seems
+to be a very cordial mutual hatred between him and the Filipinos,
+is his activities in the matter of discovering, getting acquainted
+with, classifying, tabulating, enumerating, and otherwise preparing
+for salvation, the various non-Christian tribes. These tribes have
+already been briefly dealt with in Chapter XXI. (ante), apropos of
+that part of the Great Peace Certificate of 1907 which related to the
+"Moros and other non-Christian tribes"--uncivilized tribes which,
+being as distinct from the great mass of the Filipino people as
+islets from the sea, had had no more to do with the insurrection
+against us, than the Pawnees, Apaches, and Sioux Indians had to do
+with our Civil War of 1861-5. They were also dealt with, somewhat,
+in the chapter preceding this. Long before Professor Worcester was
+permanently inflicted upon the Filipino people, one of the young
+naval officers above mentioned, Mr. Sargent, published an article in
+the Outlook for September 2, 1899, [496] based on this trip through
+the interior of Luzon, made by authority of Admiral Dewey the year
+before. In the course of his article Mr. Sargent says:
+
+
+    Some years ago, at an exposition held at Barcelona, Spain,
+    a man and woman were exhibited as representative types of the
+    inhabitants of Luzon. The man wore a loin cloth, and the woman
+    a scanty skirt. It was evident that they belonged to the lowest
+    plane of savagery.
+
+
+He adds:
+
+
+    I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the pride of the
+    real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition, the
+    knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the island. The
+    man and woman, while actually natives of Luzon, were captives of
+    a wild tribe of Igorrotes of the hills.
+
+
+Professor Worcester was originally a professor of zoölogy, or something
+of that sort, in a western university. In the early nineties he had
+made a trip to the Philippines, confining himself then mostly to
+creeping things and quadrupeds--lizards, alligators, pythons, unusual
+wild beasts, and other forms of animal life of the kind much coveted as
+specimens by museums and universities. In 1899, just after the Spanish
+War, he got out a book on the Philippines, and as an American who had
+been in the Philippines was then a rara avis, it came to pass that
+the reptile-finder ultimately became a statesman. He was brought,
+possibly by conscious worth, to the notice of President McKinley,
+accompanied the Schurman Commission to the Islands, in 1899, and
+the Taft Commission in 1900, and finally evolved into his present
+eminence as Secretary of the Interior and official chief finder of
+non-Christian tribes for the Philippine Government.
+
+The best known of the wild tribes in the Philippines are the Igorrotes,
+the dog-eating savages you saw at the St. Louis Exposition in 1903-4,
+the same Mr. Sargent speaks of in his article in the Outlook. Of
+course it was not a desire to misrepresent the situation, but only the
+enthusiasm of a zoölogist, anthropologically inclined, and accustomed
+to carry a kodak, which started the Professor to photographing the
+dog-eating Igorrotes and specimens of other non-Christian tribes
+soon after the Taft Commission reached the Philippines. But you
+cannot get far in the earlier reports of the Taft Commission, which
+was supposed to have been sent out to report back on the capacity of
+the Filipinos for self-government, without crossing the trail of the
+Professor's kodak--pictures of naked Igorrotes and the like. This,
+however innocent, must have been of distinct political value in
+1900 and 1904 in causing the heart of the missionary vote in the
+United States to bleed for those "sixty different tribes having sixty
+different languages" of which Secretary Root's campaign speeches made
+so much. It must also have greatly awakened the philanthropic interest
+of exporters of cotton goods to learn of those poor "savage millions"
+wearing only a loin cloth, when they could be wearing yards of cotton
+cloth. By the time the St. Louis Exposition came off, in 1903-4,
+it was decided to have the various tribes represented there. So
+specimens were sent of the Igorrote tribe, the Tagalos, the Visayans,
+the Negrito tribe, and various other tribes. The Tagalos, the Visayans,
+etc., being ordinary Filipinos, did not prove money-makers. But it was
+great sport to watch the Igorrotes preparing their morning dog. So it
+was the "non-Christian tribes" that paid. It was they that were most
+advertised. It was the recollection of them that lingered longest
+with the visitor to the Exposition, and there was always in his mind
+thereafter an association of ideas between the Igorrotes and Filipino
+capacity for self-government generally. Many representative Filipinos
+visited the St. Louis Exposition, saw all this, and came home and told
+about it. One very excellent Filipino gentleman, a friend of mine,
+who was Governor of Samar during my administration of the district
+which included that island, sent me one day in October, 1904, a
+satirical note, enclosing a pamphlet he had just received called
+Catalogue of Philippine Views at the St. Louis Exposition. He knew I
+would understand, so he said in the note, that the pamphlet was sent
+"in order that you may learn something of certain tribes still extant
+in this country." Concerning all this, I can say of my own knowledge
+exactly what Naval Cadet Sargent said concerning the lesser like
+indignity of the one Igorrote couple exhibited at Barcelona while
+the Filipinos were asking representation in the Spanish Cortes, viz.:
+
+
+    I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the pride of
+    the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition,
+    the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the islands.
+
+
+You see our Census of 1903 gave the population of the Philippines
+at about 7,600,000 of which 7,000,000 are put down as civilized
+Christians; and of the remaining 600,000, about half are the
+savage, or semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros, in Mindanao,
+and the adjacent islets down near Borneo. The other 300,000 or so
+uncivilized people scattered throughout the rest of the archipelago,
+the "non-Christian tribes," which dwell in the mountain fastnesses,
+remote from "the madding crowd," cut little more figure, if any,
+in the general political equation, than the American Indian does
+with us to-day. Take for instance the province of Nueva Vizcaya,
+in the heart of north central Luzon. That was one of the provinces
+of the First Judicial District I presided over in the Islands. I
+think Nueva Vizcaya is Professor Worcester's "brag" province, in the
+matter of non-Christian anthropological specimens, both regarding
+their number and their variety. Yet while I was there, though we knew
+those people were up in the hills, and that there were a good many
+of them, the civilized people all told us that the hill-tribes never
+bothered them. And on their advice I have ridden in safety, unarmed,
+at night, accompanied only by the court stenographer, over the main
+high-road running through the central plateau that constitutes the
+bulk of Nueva Vizcaya province, said plateau being surrounded by a
+great amphitheatre of hills, the habitat of the Worcester pets.
+
+The non-Christian tribes in the Philippines have been more
+widely advertised in America than anything else connected with
+the Islands. That advertisement has done more harm to the cause
+of Philippine independence by depreciating American conceptions
+concerning Filipino capacity for self-government, than anything that
+could be devised even by the cruel ingenuity of studied mendacity. And
+Professor Worcester is the P. T. Barnum of the "non-Christian tribe"
+industry. The Filipinos, though unacquainted with the career of
+the famous menagerie proprietor last named, and his famous remark:
+"The American people love to be humbugged," understand the malign
+and far-reaching influence upon their future destiny of the work
+of Professor Worcester, and his services to the present Philippine
+policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, through
+humbugging the American people into the belief that the Islands must be
+retained until the three hundred thousand or so Negritos, Igorrotes,
+and other primitive wild peoples sprinkled throughout the archipelago
+are "reconstructed." Is it any wonder that the Filipinos do not love
+the Professor? To keep him saddled upon them as one of their rulers
+is as tactful as it would be to send Senator Tillman on a diplomatic
+mission to Liberia or Haiti.
+
+Not long ago the famous magazine publisher Mr. S. S. McClure, who, I
+think, is trying to make his life one of large and genuine usefulness
+for good, said to me that if we gave the Filipinos self-government
+we would shortly have another Haiti or Santo Domingo on our hands. He
+must have seen some of Professor Worcester's pictures of Igorrotes and
+Negritos scattered through public documents related to the question
+of Filipino capacity for self-government. Mr. McClure has never,
+I believe, been in the Islands; and the cruelly unjust impression he
+had innocently received was precisely the impression systematically
+developed all these years through the Worcester kodak.
+
+In February, 1911, there appeared an article in the Sunset magazine for
+that month entitled "The Philippines as I Saw them." The contributor
+of the article is no less a personage than the Honorable James
+F. Smith, former Governor-General of the Islands. At the top of the
+article one reads the legend "Illustrated by Photographs through
+the Courtesy of the Bureau of Insular Affairs." If you read this
+legend understandingly, you can, in so doing, hear the click of the
+Worcester kodak. General Smith's article is smeared all over with
+such pictures. One is merrily entitled "Eighteen Igorrot Fledglings
+Hatched by the American Bird of Freedom." Another is entitled "Subano
+Man and woman, Mindanao." Another is a picture of an Ifugao home
+in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, hereinabove mentioned. Ifugao is
+the name of one of the wild tribes, one of the results of Professor
+Worcester's anthropological excavations of the last few years. In
+front of the Ifugao home stands the master of the house, clothed in a
+breech-clout. Next in the menagerie in the article under consideration
+you find a group of Ifugao children, then a Bagobo of Mindanao, then
+some other specimen with a curious name, in which there is a woman
+naked from the waist up and a man in a loin-cloth. Then follows a
+picture of a Tingyan girl from Abra province. And, to cap the climax,
+among the last of these pictures you find a Filipino couple pounding
+rice. The rice pounders are ordinary Filipinos. The woman is decently
+dressed; the man is clothed only from the waist down, having divested
+himself of his upper garment, as is customary in order to work at hard
+labor more comfortably in hot weather. I do not so much blame General
+Smith for this libellous panorama of pictures, scattered though they
+are through an article by him on "The Philippines as I Saw them." He
+probably illustrated his article with what the Bureau of Insular
+Affairs sent him, without giving much thought to the matter. But the
+Bureau of Insular Affairs appears to neglect no occasion to parade the
+Philippine archipelago's sprinkling of non-Christian tribes before
+the American public, fully knowing that the hopes of the Filipinos
+for independence must depend upon impressions received by the American
+people concerning the degree of civilization they have reached.
+
+For all these wanton indignities offered their pride and self-respect,
+the Filipinos well know they are primarily indebted to Professor
+Worcester and his non-Christian tribe bureau. The feud between the
+Professor and the Filipino people--the bad blood has been growing so
+long that the incident hereinafter related justifies its being called
+a feud--has been peculiarly embittered by the missionary aspect of
+the non-Christian industry. The great body of the Filipino people,
+the whole six or seven millions of them, are Catholics--most of them
+devout Catholics. Presumably, their desire for salvation by the method
+handed down by their forefathers would not be affected by a change
+from American political supervision to independence. Yet the darkest
+thing ahead of Philippine independence prospects is the Protestant
+missionary vote in the United States. Bishop Brent, Episcopal Bishop
+of the Philippines, one of the noblest and most saintly characters
+that ever lived, has devoted his life apparently to missionary work
+in the Philippines, having twice declined a nomination as Bishop of
+Washington (D.C.). The only field of endeavor open to Bishop Brent and
+his devoted little band of co-workers is the non-Christian tribes. It
+seems that the Catholic and Protestant ecclesiastical authorities in
+the Islands get along harmoniously, a kind of modus vivendi having
+been arranged between them, by which the Protestants are not to do
+any proselyting among the seven millions of Catholic Christians. So
+this field of endeavor is the one Professor Worcester has been
+industriously preparing during the last twelve years. Obviously,
+every time Professor Worcester digs up a new non-Christian tribe
+he increases the prospective harvest of the Protestants, thus
+corralling more missionary vote at home for permanent retention of
+the Philippines. Professor Worcester is quoted in a Manila paper as
+saying, "I am under no delusion as to what may be accomplished for
+the primitive wild people. It takes time to reconstruct them." This
+remark is supposed to have been made in a speech before the Young Men's
+Christian Association of Manila. Neither is Mr. Taft under any delusion
+as to how valuable is religious support for the idea of retaining the
+Philippines as a missionary field. The nature of the above allusion to
+Bishop Brent should certainly be sufficient to show that the writer
+yields to no one in affectionate reverence and respect for that rare
+and noble character. But neither Bishop Brent nor any one else can
+persuade him that it is wise to abandon the principle that Church
+and State should be separate, in order that our government may go
+into the missionary business. Since it has become apparent that the
+Philippines will not pay, the Administration has relied solely on
+missionary sentiment. In one of his public utterances Mr. Taft has
+said in effect, "The programme of the Republican party with regard
+to the Philippines is one which will make greatly for the spread of
+Christian civilization throughout the Orient."
+
+The foregoing reflections are not intended to raise an issue as to the
+wisdom of foreign missions. They are simply intended to illustrate
+how it is possible and natural for President Taft to consider
+Professor Worcester "the most valuable man we have on the Philippine
+Commission." The Professor's menagerie is a vote-getter. Also,
+President Taft's whole Philippine policy being founded upon the theory
+that "the great majority" of the Filipino people are in favor of
+alien thraldom in lieu of independence, he tolerantly permits their
+editors to "let off steam" through clamor for independence. This
+privilege they do not fail to exercise to the limit. The attitude
+of the Insular Government permits the native press much latitude of
+"sauciness," in deference to the American idea about liberty of the
+press. In the exercise of this privilege during the last few years
+the native press has gone the limit. However, there was no way to
+stop them, on the principle to which we had committed ourselves. The
+thing was very mischievous, and became utterly intolerable. There was
+a native paper called Renacimiento (Renaissance). This paper was long
+permitted to say things more or less seditious in character which
+no self-respecting government should have tolerated. This was done
+pursuant to the original theory, obstinately adhered to up to date,
+that there was no real substantial unwillingness to American rule. Of
+course, if this were true, newspaper noise could do no harm. Therefore
+it was permitted to continue. Finally, however, like a boy "taking a
+dare," the Renacimiento published an article on Professor Worcester
+which intimately and sympathetically voiced the general yearning of
+the Filipino people to be rid of the Professor. In so doing, however,
+the hapless editor overstepped the limits of American license, and
+got into the toils of the law, by saying things about the Professor
+that rendered the editor liable to prosecution for criminal libel. The
+Professor promptly took advantage of this misstep, to the great joy of
+the authorities, who had been previously much goaded by independence
+clamor. The result was that the paper was put out of business and the
+editor was put in jail. No doubt the editor ought to have been put in
+jail, but his incarceration incidentally served to tone down Filipino
+clamor for independence. Subsequent to this coup d'état, the Professor
+did a little venting of feelings in his turn. He made a speech at
+the Y. M. C. A. on October 10, 1910, which was a highly unchristian
+speech to be gotten off in an edifice dedicated to the service
+of Christ. The Manila papers give only extracts from the speech,
+and I have never seen a copy of it. From the newspaper accounts,
+it seems that the Professor was determined to, and did, relieve his
+feelings about the Filipinos. The Manila Cable-News of October 11,
+1910, quotes the Professor as referring to his pets, the non-Christian
+tribes, as "ancestral enemies of the Christians." Thus for the first
+time is developed an attitude of being champion of the uncivilized
+pagan remnant, left from prehistoric times, against the Christians
+of the Islands. The Cable-News also says that Professor Worcester
+"laughed at the idea that the Islands belonged to the so-called
+civilized people and held that if the archipelago belonged to any
+one it certainly belonged to its original owners the Negritos." This
+remark about the "so-called civilized people" was as tactful as
+if President Taft should address a meeting of colored people in a
+doubtful state and call them "niggers." Another of the Manila papers
+gives an account of the speech from which it appears that the burly
+Professor succeeded in amusing himself at least, if not his audience,
+by suggestions as to the superior fighting qualities of the Moros over
+the Filipinos, which suggestions were on the idea that the Moros would
+lick the Filipinos if we should leave the country. (The Moros number
+300,000, the Filipinos nearly 7,000,000.) The Professor's remarks
+in this regard, according to the paper, were a distinct reflection
+upon the courage of the Filipinos generally as a people. The effect
+of Professor Worcester's speech before the Y. M. C. A. may be well
+imagined. However the facts of history do not leave the imagination
+unaided. The Philippine Assembly, representing the whole Filipino
+people, and desiring to express the unanimous feeling of those people
+with regard to the Worcester speech, unanimously passed, soon after
+the speech was delivered, a set of resolutions whereof the following
+is a translation:
+
+
+    Resolved that the regret of the Assembly be recorded for the
+    language attributed to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary
+    of the Interior of the Philippine Government in a discourse
+    before the Young Men's Christian Association, October 10,
+    1910. It is improper and censurable in a man who holds a public
+    office and who has the confidence of the government. And as the
+    statements made as facts are false, slanderous, and offensive to
+    the Philippine people, their publication is a grave violation of
+    the instructions given by President McKinley which required that
+    public functionaries should respect the sensibilities, beliefs,
+    and sentiments of the Philippine people, and should show them
+    consideration. The words and the conduct of Mr. Worcester tend
+    to sow distrust between the Americans and the Filipinos, whose
+    aspirations and duties should not separate them but unite them
+    in the pathway which leads to the progress and emancipation of
+    the Philippine people. The influence of Mr. Worcester has caused
+    injury to the feelings of the Filipinos, encouraged race hatred,
+    and tended to frustrate the task undertaken by men of real good
+    will to win the esteem, confidence, and respect of the Philippine
+    people for the Americans.
+
+    Resolved further that this House desires that these facts should
+    be communicated to the President of the United States through
+    the Governor of the Philippines and the Secretary of War.
+
+
+Presumably these resolutions were forwarded "to the President
+of the United States through the Governor of the Philippines and
+the Secretary of War." But apparently they were pigeonholed when
+they reached Washington. I stumbled on them in the Insular Affairs
+Committee of the House of Representatives whither they had landed
+through Mr. Slayden of Texas. The distinguished veteran Congressman
+from Texas, being known as an enemy of all wrong things, was appealed
+to by certain persons in the United States to bring the matter to
+the attention of Congress. He did so by presenting to the House of
+Representatives an American petition which embodied a copy of the
+resolutions of the Philippine Assembly.
+
+It thus becomes apparent that one of Professor Worcester's principal
+elements of value is in bullying the Filipinos, and thereby smothering
+manifestations of a desire for independence, the existence of which
+desire is denied by President Taft's Administration. The more the
+Filipinos cry for independence the greater seems the sin of holding
+them in subjection. So that Professor Worcester is very valuable in
+silencing independence clamor and thereby creating an appearance of
+consent of the governed, when there is no consent of the governed
+whatsoever.
+
+In describing the discontent in distant provinces under brutal
+pro-consuls, which contributed largely to the final disintegration
+of the Roman Empire, Gibbon says:
+
+
+    The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.
+
+
+The total failure of the above temperate, dignified, and vibrant
+protest of the Philippine Assembly to reach the ears of the American
+people is but another reminder that history repeats itself.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV
+
+THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL SERVICE
+
+        Is our Occupation of the Philippines to be temporary,
+        like our occupation of Cuba after the Spanish War, or
+        "temporary" like the British Occupation of Egypt since
+        1882? The Unsettled Question.
+
+        The policy to be pursued is for Congress to determine.
+        I have no authority to speak for Congress in respect
+        to the ultimate disposition of the Islands.
+
+              Secretary of War Wm. H. Taft to Philippine Assembly, 1907.
+
+
+The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Government
+Act, is entitled "An Act temporarily to provide" a government for the
+Philippine Islands. The young American who goes out to the Philippines
+to take a position with the Insular Government there has usually
+read his share of Kipling, and his imagination likes to analogize
+his prospective employment to the British Indian Civil Service. The
+latter, however, offers a career. But what does the former offer? Take
+the prospects of the rank and file, as set forth by Mr. J. R. Arnold,
+of the Executive Bureau of the Philippine Government, in an article
+published in the North American Review for February, 1912. Suppose a
+young man goes out to the Philippines at a salary of $1200. Mr. Arnold
+discusses fully and frankly the cost of living in the Islands, and
+how much higher board, lodging, etc., are out there than in the United
+States. He states that board and lodging will cost $15 to $20 a month
+more than here. So that, so far, a salary of $1200 in the Philippines
+would seem equivalent to a salary of say approximately $950 in the
+United States--say in Washington. Also he calls attention to the
+fact that the government will pay your way out, but you must get
+back the best way you can. He does not say so, but the walking is not
+good all the way from Manila to Washington. Seriously, according to
+the authority from whom we are quoting, it costs $225 to $300 to get
+back. So if you come back at the end of a three years' stay--you must
+contract to stay at least that long--you must have laid by, taking
+his maximum return fare as the more prudent figure to reckon on, one
+hundred dollars a year to buy your return ticket. Mr. Arnold does not
+say so, but it is a fact, that various little expenses will creep in
+that are sure to amount, even with the most rigidly frugal, to $50
+per annum that you would never have spent in the United States. You
+are hardly respectable in the Philippines if you do not have a
+muchacho. Muchacho, in Spanish, means the same as garįon in French,
+or valet in English. But muchachos are as thick as cigarettes in the
+Philippines. And you can hire one for about $5 a month. To resolve not
+to have a muchacho in the Philippines would be like resolving at home
+never to have your shoes shined, or your clothes pressed. It would be
+contrary to the universal custom of the country, and would therefore be
+"impossible." You have not been long in the Philippines before you get
+tired of telling applicants for the position of muchacho that you do
+not want one, and, benumbed by the universal custom, you accept the
+last applicant. You must figure on a muchacho as one of your "fixed
+charges." Count then an extra $50 annual necessary expense that you
+would not have at home. If you do not succumb to the muchacho custom,
+you will get rid of the $50 in other ways fairly classifiable as
+necessary current expenses. Thus, if you take from your $1200, worth
+$950 in Manila, as above stated, the $100 per annum necessary to be
+laid by against your home-coming, and the other $50 last suggested,
+your salary of $1200 per annum in Manila becomes equivalent to one of
+$800 at home, so far as regards what you are likely to save by strict
+habits of economy. In other words, to figure how you are going to come
+out in the long run, if you go out as a $1200 man, while your social
+position will be precisely that of a man commanding the same salary
+in a government position in Washington, you must knock off a third of
+the $1200. This is not the way Mr. Arnold states the case exactly. I
+am simply taking his facts, supplemented by what little I have added,
+and stating them in a way which will perhaps illustrate the case
+better to some people. Mr. Arnold says you are apt to get up as high
+as $1500 and finally even to $1800 in three to five years. Suppose
+you do have that luck. Still, if, as has been made plain above, you
+must consider $1200 in Manila as equal to only $800 in Washington
+(so far as regards what you are going to be able to save each year),
+by the same token you must consider $1500 in Manila as being equal
+to only $1000 in Washington, and $1800 as only $1200.
+
+The utmost limit of achievement in the Philippine Government service,
+the only one of the higher positions not subject to political caprice,
+the only one regarded out there as a "life position"--and this excepts
+neither the Governorship of the Islands nor the Commissionerships--is
+the position of Justice of the Supreme Court. The salary is $10,000
+per annum, American money. But there is not an American judge on that
+bench who would not be glad at any moment to accept a $5000 position
+as a United States District Judge at home. All of them whom I know
+are most happily married. But I believe their wives would quit them
+if they refused such an offer from the President of the United States,
+or else get so unhappy about it that they would accept and come home.
+
+While we have now considered the case from bottom to top, we did not
+originally figure on the young American going out to the Philippines
+otherwise than single. In this behalf Mr. Arnold himself says:
+
+
+    I do not think it can be fairly called other than risky for
+    an American to attempt to practise love in a cottage in the
+    Philippines.
+
+
+Says the late Arthur W. Fergusson--who gave his life to the Philippine
+Civil Service--in his annual report for 1905, as Executive Secretary:
+
+
+    The one great stumbling-block, and which no legislative body
+    can eradicate, is the fact that very few Americans intend to
+    make the Philippines their permanent home, or even stay here
+    for any extended period. This is doubtless due to the location
+    of the islands, their isolation from centres of civilization
+    and culture, the enervating climate, lack of entertainment and
+    desirable companionship, and distance from the homeland. Every
+    clerk, no matter what his ideals or aspirations, realizes after
+    coming here that he must at some time in the future return to
+    the United States and begin all over again. After spending a
+    year or more in the islands, the realization that the sooner the
+    change is made the better, becomes more acute. This condition
+    causes, doubtless, the class of men who are not adventurous or
+    fond of visiting strange climes to think twice before accepting
+    an appointment for service in these islands, and generally to
+    remain away, and a great majority of those who do come here to
+    leave the service again after a very short period of duty. [497]
+
+
+Then Mr. Fergusson comes to the obvious but apparently unattainable
+remedy, which he says is
+
+
+    to make a Philippine appointment a permanent means of livelihood
+    by providing an effective system of transfers to the Federal
+    service after a reasonable period of service here. * * * Under
+    the present regulations influence must be brought to bear at
+    Washington in order that requisition may be made by the Chief of
+    some bureau there for the services of a clerk desiring to transfer.
+
+
+You see, if a Washington Bureau, say the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
+or the Geological Survey, sends a man out to the Islands, he is never
+for a moment separated from the Federal Civil Service or the Federal
+Government's pay-roll. The same is true of civilian employees of the
+army. But the man in the Insular Service, when he wants to get back
+home, is little better off than if he were in the employ of the Cuban
+Government, or the British Indian Government, or that of the Dutch
+East Indies. Mr. Fergusson also says:
+
+
+    It is believed to be useless to try to influence men to come out
+    here unless there is something permanent offered to them at the
+    expiration of a reasonable term of service. * * * The average
+    European is content to live and die "east of Suez"; the average
+    American is not. * * * I am firmly convinced that a permanent
+    service under present conditions is entirely out of the question.
+
+
+How can you have "a permanent service" unless you have a definite
+declared policy? Why not declare the purpose of our Government with
+the regard to the Islands?
+
+In his annual report for 1906 [498] Mr. Fergusson says:
+
+
+    Our relations to the islands are such that the education and
+    specialization of a distinct body of high class men purposely
+    for this service as is done in England for the Indian service,
+    will probably be always a practical impossibility.
+
+
+He then goes on to reiterate his annual plea for a law providing for
+transfer as a matter of right, not of influence, from the Philippine
+Civil Service to the Federal Civil Service in the United States,
+and tells of a very capable official of his bureau who got a chance
+during the year just closed to transfer from the Philippines to a
+$1400 government position in the United States, and was glad to get
+it, although $1400 was "considerably less than half what he received
+here." Mr. Fergusson quickly gives the key to all this in what he calls
+"the haunting fear of having to return to the States in debilitated
+health and out of touch with existent conditions, only to face the
+necessity of seeking a new position." He adds:
+
+
+    That this is not a mere theory is proven by the number of army
+    (civilian) employees who contentedly remain year after year.
+
+
+In 1907, Mr. Fergusson reports on the same subject [499]: "Matters
+do not seem to be improving," and that the Director of the Insular
+Civil Service informs him that "during the fiscal year there were five
+hundred voluntary separations from the service by Americans, of whom
+one hundred were college graduates." He adds: "When the expense of
+getting and bringing out new men, and of training them to their new
+work is considered, the wastefulness of the present system is evident."
+
+You do not find any quotations from any of the Fergusson disclosures
+in Mr. Arnold's North American Review article. He would probably have
+lost his job, if he had quoted them. Yet the evils pointed out by
+Mr. Fergusson come from one permanent source, the uncertainty of the
+future of every American out there, due to the failure of Congress
+to declare the purpose of the Government.
+
+On January 30, 1908, Arthur W. Fergusson died in the service of the
+Philippine Government. No general law putting that service on the basis
+he pleaded for to the day of his death has ever yet been passed. Since
+his death, his tactful successor appears to have abandoned further
+pleading, and concluded to worry along with the permanently lame
+conditions inherent in the uncertainty as to whether we are to keep
+the Islands permanently or not, rather than embarrass President Taft
+by discouraging young Americans from going to the Islands.
+
+The report of the Governor-General of the Philippines for 1907,
+Governor Smith, says [500]:
+
+
+    American officials and employees have rarely made up their minds
+    to cast their fortunes definitely with the Philippines or to make
+    governmental service in the tropics a career. Many of those who
+    in the beginning were so minded, due to ill health or the longing
+    to return to friends or relatives, changed front and preferred to
+    return to the home land, there to enjoy life at half the salary
+    in the environment to which they were accustomed. * * * That
+    which operates probably more than anything else to induce good men
+    drawing good salaries to abandon the service * * * is the knowledge
+    that they have nothing to look forward to when broken health or
+    old age shall have rendered them valueless to the government.
+
+
+If Congress should ever care to do anything to improve the Philippine
+Civil Service and the status of Americans entering the same, certainly
+the one supremely obvious thing to do is to make transfer back to
+the civil service in the United States after a term of duty in the
+Islands a matter of right.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV
+
+COST OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+                If 't were well to do right, 't were better still
+                if 't were more profitable.
+
+                                                           Cynic Maxims.
+
+
+General Otis's annual report for 1899, [501] dated August 31st, gives
+the number of Americans killed in battle in the Philippines, from
+the beginning of the American occupation to that date, as 380. This
+includes those wounded who afterwards died of such wounds. His report
+for 1900, [502] covering the period from his 1899 report to May 5,
+1900, gives the number of Americans killed in battle from August 31,
+1899, to May 1, 1900, as 258. General MacArthur succeeded General
+Otis in command of the American forces in the Philippines on May 5,
+1900. General MacArthur's annual report for 1901, [503] gives the
+number of Americans killed in battle between May 5, 1900, and June 30,
+1901, as 245. Thus the total number of Americans killed in battle up
+to the time the Civil Government was set up in 1901, was 883. The
+military reports do not always give the insurgents killed during
+the periods they cover. But on June 4, 1900, as we saw in a previous
+chapter, General MacArthur reported the number of Filipinos killed
+up to that time, so far as our records showed, to be something over
+10,000. General MacArthur's report, above quoted, giving our killed
+for the period it covers (May 5, 1900, to June 30, 1901), at 245,
+gives the insurgent killed for the same period as 3854. If we add this
+3854 to the 10,000 killed up to about where May merged into June in
+1900, we have 13,854 Filipinos killed up to the time Judge Taft was
+inaugurated as Governor, in 1901. There was no record, of course,
+obtainable or attempted, by the Eighth Army Corps, of Filipinos who
+were wounded and not captured and who subsequently died. It is quite
+safe to assume that such fatalities must have swelled the enemy's list
+up to the time of the setting up of the Civil Government far above
+16,000 killed. Thus, as has heretofore been stated, the ratio of the
+enemy's loss to our loss was, literally, at least 16 to 1, up to the
+time the civil government was set up. General MacArthur's report for
+1900 [504] would seem to bear out the above ratio. He there gives the
+number of our killed, from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900,
+including the wounded who afterwards died of such wounds, at 268, and
+the Filipinos killed, "as far as of record," 3227. While these last
+figures make our killed for the period they relate to, considerably
+over 200, and the enemy's killed but a very small figure over 3200,
+still, making allowances for the enemy's wounded that died afterwards,
+of which of course we have no record, the 16 to 1 ratio would seem to
+give a fairly accurate probable estimate of the relative loss of life.
+
+These figures are explained by the facts, already noticed hereinbefore,
+that most of our people knew how to shoot and the Filipinos did
+not. The great part of their army were raw recruits who did not
+understand the use of two sights on a rifle, and frequently relied
+solely on the one at the muzzle, not even lifting up the sight near
+the lock which when not in use lies flat along the gun-barrel, with
+the result that they almost invariably got the range too high and
+shot over our heads.
+
+Because the military reports overlap each other in many instances,
+it is not possible to state accurately how many men the Eighth Army
+Corps lost by disease, but our loss chargeable to this account was
+not far from our fatalities on the battlefield. [505]
+
+It is not possible to even approximate the enemy's loss other than
+on the battlefield. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey
+Philippine Atlas gives the table estimating the population of the
+various provinces of the Philippine archipelago prior to the American
+occupation. This estimate gives the population of Batangas province
+at 312,192. The American Census of the Philippines of 1903 gives
+the population of Batangas province at 257,715. [506] This would
+present a difference in the population of Batangas prior to 1898 and
+its population after the war of 54,477. The provincial secretary of
+Batangas province made a report to Governor Taft on December 18, 1901
+[507] on the condition of the province generally. This report, as it
+appears in the Senate Document, is a translation from the Spanish. The
+portion which relates to the reduction of the population of Batangas
+province reads as follows:
+
+
+    The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease,
+    such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
+    200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years
+    the province had.
+
+
+Of course these appalling figures [508] must be taken with a grain
+of salt. In the first place, the man who furnished them was merely
+reproducing the general impression of his neighbors as to the
+diminution of the population of the province. He does not pretend
+to be dealing with official statistics. On the other hand, all of
+the yearly reports of the various native provincial officers are,
+as a general rule, pathetically optimistic. They all seem to think
+it their duty to present a hopeful view of the situation. In fact if
+you read these reports one after the other, the various signers seem
+to vie with one another in optimism as if their tenure of office
+depended upon it. So that, balancing probabilities, it would seem
+unlikely that the provincial secretary of Batangas would have stated
+more than what he at least believed to represent actual conditions,
+and the results of the war. A comparison of the Atlas population
+tables above mentioned with the census tables of 1903 shows no very
+startling difference in the population of any of the other provinces
+of the archipelago before and after the war except Batangas. It is
+also notorious that Batangas suffered by the war more than any other
+province in the Philippine Islands. However, a glance at the table
+of population of the various provinces of the Census of 1903 [509]
+shows you fifty provinces with a total of 7,635,426 people. While
+we will never know whether Batangas did or did not lose one hundred
+thousand as a result of the war and its consequences, still, if it did,
+the other forty-nine provinces above mentioned must have lost as many
+more, that is to say, must have lost another hundred thousand. So that
+while it is all a matter of surmise, with nothing more certain to go on
+than the foregoing, it would really seem by no means absurd to assume
+the Filipino loss of life, other than on the battlefield, caused by the
+war, and the famine, pestilence, and other disease consequent thereon,
+at not far from 200,000 people. In more than one province, the people
+died like flies, especially the women and children, as a result of
+conditions incident to and consequent upon the war. This will not
+seem an over-statement to men who have lived much among people that
+do not know much about how to take care of themselves in the midst
+of great calamities, people who will eat meat of animals carried off
+by disease, in time of famine; who will drink water contaminated by
+what may for euphony be called sewage; and who are unprovided with
+any save traditional home remedies against cholera, small-pox, etc.
+
+As to the cost of the Philippines in money, it used to be said
+in the early days that we paid $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000
+insurrection. Just what the Islands have cost us up to date in money
+it is utterly impossible to figure out with any degree of certainty,
+except that a safe minimum may be arrived at. Said the distinguished
+Congressman from Texas, Honorable James L. Slayden, in a speech which
+appears in the Congressional Record of February 25, 1908 (pp. 2532
+et seq.):
+
+
+    On this point, and in reply to a resolution of the Senate in
+    1902, the Secretary of War reported that the cost of the army
+    in the Philippines from June 30, 1898, to July 1, 1902, had been
+    $169,853,512.00. To this let us add $114,515,643.00, the admitted
+    cost of the army in the Philippines from May 1, 1902, to June 30,
+    1907, and we will have a grand total of $284,369,155.00. That
+    does not take into account the additional cost of the navy.
+
+
+Nor, be it noted, does it count the $20,000,000 we paid Spain for
+the Islands, which item, is, however included in another part of
+Mr. Slayden's speech.
+
+The only other estimate of what the Islands have cost, made in the
+last few years, which seems to be specially worthy of consideration,
+is one which appeared in the New York Evening Post of March 6,
+1907. This estimate was prepared by one of the best trained and
+most conservative newspaper men in the United States, Mr. Edward
+G. Lowry, then Washington correspondent of the Evening Post, and
+since 1911, its managing editor. The total which Mr. Lowry arrives
+at is $308,369,155, up to that time. There have been various absurd
+estimates made recklessly without knowledge, but Mr. Lowry's estimate
+is very carefully studied out, and presented in detail in the newspaper
+referred to. From the testimony of Mr. Slayden and Mr. Lowry, given
+as a result of their inquiries into the matter, it would thus seem
+that the Islands must have cost us by the end of 1907 something like
+$300,000,000. The Insular Government is now self-sustaining, except
+as to military affairs.
+
+The cost per annum of the Philippine (native) scouts, of which there
+are 4000, is paid out of the United States Treasury, and amounts
+to $2,000,000 per annum. [510] The number of American troops in the
+islands for the last few years has been about 12,000. Those who are
+wedded to the present Philippine policy of indefinite retention
+with undeclared intention, insist that our military expenses in
+the Philippines, in respect to the regular army out there, are not
+fairly chargeable as a part of the current expenses of the Philippine
+occupation. This argument must be admitted to have some force as far
+as the navy is concerned, but as to the army it is clearly without
+merit. Under the Act of Congress reorganizing the army of the United
+States after the Spanish War, provision was made for a skeleton army
+of about 60,000 men capable of expansion to something like 100,000
+in time of war. The method of expansion thus contemplated was to have
+companies of, say, for illustration, sixty men, in time of peace, which
+companies could be recruited up to a war footing of one hundred men,
+in time of war. The suggestion that the cost of the part of the regular
+army which we have to keep in the Philippines is not chargeable to
+the Philippines because those same troops would have to be somewhere
+in the United States if they were not where they are, is not well
+taken. If we did not need 12,000 men continually in the Philippines,
+the army could be at once reduced by that much without affecting its
+present organization. If we had no troops in the Philippines this would
+not mean the absolute elimination from the army of enough regiments
+to represent twelve thousand men. It would not eliminate any existing
+organization. It would simply mean contraction of the number of men in
+the several companies of the several regiments of the army toward a
+peace basis to the extent of a total of twelve thousand men, more or
+less. The War Department has long figured on the cost of an American
+soldier in the Philippines per annum including his pay, allowances,
+and transportation out and back, at $1000 per annum. The cost of
+12,000 soldiers at $1000 per annum is $12,000,000, per annum. The
+conclusion would, therefore, seem inevitable that the extra military
+current expense chargeable to our occupation of the Philippines is
+$12,000,000, per annum, outside the Philippine scouts, or, a total
+of $14,000,000. Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000,
+that is no reason why we should continue to run a kindergarten for
+adults out there, and let the Monroe Doctrine run to seed. "Something"
+is not "bound to turn up." The Philippine Islands will not prove a
+blessing in disguise. In every war with a nation having discontented
+colonial subjects, the enemy will always strike the colony first,
+and hope for aid from the inhabitants thereof.
+
+Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000, we are a nation
+of nearly 100,000,000 people. So they have cost us, all told, in
+the neighborhood of only about $3 a piece. And we subjugated them by
+mistake, after freeing a less capable people, the Cubans.
+
+The Panama Canal is to be finished in 1913. This means a splendid,
+but free-for-all contest, for the trade of South America. In South
+America we will meet a tremendous pro-German sentiment, and a by no
+means inconsiderable anti-"Yankee" sentiment. The bigger Germany's
+army and navy grows, the more she will loom up as the one great
+menace to the peace of the world, and the one avowed enemy of the
+Monroe Doctrine. We need to build up a Pan-American esprit de corps,
+based on the instinct of self-defence. We must win the good will of
+South America, and we cannot do it so long as we insist, in another
+part of the world, upon the righteousness of the principle of one
+Christian people policing a weaker Christian people, ostensibly to
+keep them from having revolutions, and really in the hope of ultimate
+profit. To free the Filipinos should be the first step we take after
+the Panama Canal is completed toward getting ourselves foot-loose
+entirely, with a view of getting everything from the Canadian border
+to the Argentine wheat fields and beyond, solidly and sincerely
+for the Monroe Doctrine. In that direction lies our only sensible
+and reasonable hope that the canal will get for us the trade and
+friendship of South America. With such tremendous issues at stake,
+what does it matter to the richest nation on earth what the Philippines
+cost? What does it matter, anyhow, how much it costs to do right?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI
+
+CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
+
+        Taxation without representation is good cause for revolt.
+
+                                                American Speech of 1776.
+
+
+As a colony of Spain the Philippines enjoyed certain special
+privileges in the way of trade with the "mother country." When at the
+beginning of our military occupation in 1898 General Otis detailed
+an army officer to take charge of the Customs House, he continued
+for the time being the Spanish tariff laws concerning imports and
+exports. On September 17, 1901, the Philippine Commission passed
+a tariff act [511] fixing the duties on imports into the Islands
+and also continuing to a considerable extent the system of duties
+on Philippine exports inherited from the Spanish régime. Among the
+products of the Philippine Islands on which the Act of September 17,
+1901, imposed an export tax were the following:
+
+
+    Hemp, 75c. per 100 kilos [512]; sugar, 5c. per 100 kilos;
+    manufactured tobacco, $1.50 per 100 kilos; raw tobacco, $1.50
+    down to 75c. per 100 kilos. [513]
+
+
+On March 8, 1902, the United States Congress passed an Act,
+"temporarily to provide revenue for the Philippine Islands and for
+other purposes." The Act of 1902 re-enacted the Commission's tariff
+law for the Philippines of September 17, 1901, with one change,
+hereinafter to be discussed, as to its export tax features. As
+to the tariffs to be collected at our custom-houses on Philippine
+products shipped to the United States, the Act of 1902 reduced the
+rates fixed by the Dingley tariff to seventy-five per cent. of said
+rates. That was all Congress did in the way of lowering our tariff
+wall to Philippine products until 1909, when the Payne-Aldrich tariff
+bill became a law. This twenty-five per cent. reduction was no better
+than no reduction whatever would have been.
+
+Governor Taft pleaded very earnestly with Congress, at the time
+of the passage of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, for a
+substantial reduction of the Dingley tariff rate on sugar and tobacco,
+so as to give his "constituents"--his Filipinos--something in lieu
+of the markets they had had under Spain. But our sugar and tobacco
+interests defeated his efforts, because they feared what they termed
+"competition with cheap Asiatic labor."
+
+The Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, repealed the export duties
+imposed by the Act of the Philippine Commission of September 17,
+1901, as to exports to the United States, leaving unrepealed,
+however, the export duty on Philippine products shipped to foreign
+countries. Section 2 of said Act of 1902 provided, as to exports
+from the Philippines to the United States, that the rates of duty
+upon products of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United
+States, should be less any duty or tax levied, collected, and paid
+thereon (under the Act of the Philippine Commission of September
+17, 1901, aforesaid) upon the shipment thereof from the Philippine
+Archipelago. This sounds liberal enough. It is, as far as it goes. But
+what those familiar with the hemp infamy of the Act of 1902 call
+"the joker" in it, is as follows:
+
+
+    All articles, the growth and product of the Philippine Islands,
+    admitted into the ports of the United States free of duty
+    under the provisions of this act, and coming directly from said
+    islands to the United States, for use and consumption therein,
+    shall be hereafter exempt from any export duties imposed in the
+    Philippine Islands.
+
+
+This also sounds liberal, on first reading, but its object was, and
+its effect has been, to enable the American Hemp Trust to corner
+and control the Manila hemp industry. There is but one article of
+Philippine export which any one in the United States is interested
+in, that was admitted into the United States free of duty under the
+Dingley Act. [514] That article is hemp. The object of the law was
+to favor Americans interested in exporting hemp from Manila to the
+United States as against Europeans exporting it to England and other
+foreign countries. This does not look, on its face, either unpatriotic
+or un-Christian. It is not unpatriotic or un-Christian, ordinarily,
+to favor your own people, as against their foreign competitors. The
+moral quality of such favoritism, however, must depend on who is to
+pay for it. Under the Act of 1902, the Manila authorities have always
+collected an export tax on hemp coming to the United States, just as
+they do on hemp going from Manila to foreign countries, exactly as
+if the law abolishing the export tax on hemp coming to the United
+States had never been passed. Later, on proof that the hemp was in
+fact carried to the United States and used and consumed therein, they
+refund the export tax. This is on the idea that they cannot tell where
+the hemp is going to until they know where it went to, nor where it
+is going to be "used and consumed" until they know where it was in
+fact finally "used and consumed." Of course the small farmer is in
+no position to follow his bale of hemp into the markets of the world
+and show, if it happens to go to the United States, that it did in
+fact go there and that it was there "used and consumed," and, finally
+obtaining the proof of this, submit it to the Manila Government and
+get his little export tax on his bale of hemp refunded. Only the big
+buyer's agents at Manila are in a position to do this. So the hemp
+crop is bought and moved under conditions which are the same as if
+all hemp were subject to an export tax. And only the big fish get
+the benefit. For instance, the International Harvester Company has
+its hemp buyers at Manila. And as to the part of the Philippine hemp
+crop it handles, it can, of course, follow the hemp to its ultimate
+consumption in the United States, make the proof, and get the refund.
+
+The wealth of the Philippines is practically entirely
+agricultural. Neither mining nor manufactures cut any appreciable
+figure. Hemp, sugar, tobacco, and copra [515] are the chief staples
+and main exports, and of the first of these Secretary of War Taft
+says in one of his reports: [516]
+
+
+    The chief export in value and quantity from the Philippines is
+    Manila hemp, it amounting to between 60 and 65 per cent. of the
+    total exports.
+
+
+Let us see just how far, according to the annual reports of our
+own agents in the Philippines--those charged by us with governing
+them,--this piece of legislation gotten through by "special privilege"
+has depressed the Manila hemp industry, the chief source of wealth of
+the Islands. And before we even get to the main trouble, let us permit
+the Insular Government to "place on the screen," as a preliminary
+"view," a glance at what the instinct of self-preservation of American
+sugar and tobacco interests, fearing competition from "cheap Asiatic
+labor," have deemed it necessary to do to the Philippine sugar and
+tobacco industries, through the Dingley tariff. The annual report of
+the Philippine Commission for 1904, before it gets to the subject of
+hemp, draws a most gloomy picture of how we killed the markets for
+sugar and tobacco the Islands had under Spain, and gave them none
+instead. They speak of "the languishing state of these industries"
+(p. 26), and describe a state of affairs that sounds more like Egypt
+under Pharaoh than anything else, including a cattle disease that
+carried off ninety per cent. of the beasts of burden of the country,
+and wholesale destruction of crops by locusts. [517] What they have to
+say of the annual tribute levied by the American Hemp Trust, through
+Congress, on the Manila hemp industry, should not be re-stated,
+but quoted. They say: [518]
+
+
+    We desire to call attention to the injustice effected upon the
+    revenues of the islands by section 2 of the Act of Congress
+    approved March 8, 1902, which provides that the Philippine
+    Government shall refund all export duties imposed upon articles
+    exported from the islands into and consumed in the United
+    States. Under the provisions of this section there has been
+    collected in the Philippine Islands, since its enactment down to
+    the close of the fiscal year 1904, the sum of $1,060,460.20 United
+    States currency, which is refundable. These refundable duties
+    are principally upon hemp exportations to the United States,
+    and are in effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of
+    the United States who use hemp in their operations.
+
+
+They add:
+
+
+    It is manifestly a discrimination in favor of our manufacturers
+    as against those of foreign countries. No good reason is perceived
+    why this bounty to American manufacturers should be extracted from
+    the treasury of the Philippine Islands, and it is respectfully
+    submitted that the law authorizing it should be repealed.
+
+
+The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1905, after the
+usual complaint about being made a political football by Benevolent
+Assimilation on the one side, and Louisiana and our sugar-beet
+States on the other, and the usual annual and true description of
+the consequent poverty, says concerning hemp:
+
+
+    We have several times in our reports called attention to the
+    practical workings of that portion of the Act of Congress approved
+    March 8, 1902, which provides for the refund of duties paid
+    on articles exported from the Philippine Islands to the United
+    States and consumed therein, and have as repeatedly recommended
+    its repeal. It is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine
+    Islands, because it takes from the insular treasury export duties
+    collected from the people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp
+    products in the United States. These manufacturers were already
+    prosperous before this bounty was given them and it seems hardly
+    consistent with our expressions of purpose to build up and develop
+    the Philippine Islands when we are thus enriching a few of our
+    own people at their expense. [519]
+
+
+By the end of the fiscal year 1905 (June 30), the American importers of
+Manila hemp--of whom the International Harvester Company and its allied
+interests are the most influential--had, under the operation of the
+rebate system based on the Act of 1902, milked the Philippine people to
+the tune of about $1,000,000. Says the Philippine Commission's annual
+report for 1905, immediately after the passage last above quoted:
+
+
+    The amount of duties refunded under this act to manufacturers in
+    the United States during the three years ending June 30, 1905,
+    is $1,057,251.12. Many of the departments of the government are
+    much hampered in their operations because of the lack of funds,
+    notably the bureau of education, and were the sum thus taken
+    available for educational purposes, to say nothing of any other,
+    the government would be enabled to give instruction to thousands
+    of Filipino children whom they are now unable to reach and who
+    must remain steeped in ignorance because of the lack of funds to
+    provide such instruction.
+
+
+Said the Manila Chamber of Commerce to the Taft Congressional party in
+August, 1905: "The country is in a state of financial collapse." [520]
+
+Says the Philippine Commission's report for 1906 (pt. 1, p. 68):
+
+
+    The Commission has repeatedly called attention in its reports
+    to the action of Congress providing for a refund of duties paid
+    on articles exported from the Islands to the United States and
+    consumed therein. The reasons that led the Commission heretofore to
+    recommend the repeal of that provision are still operative. Since
+    the passage of that act on March 8, 1902, the amount of duties
+    collected and paid into the Philippine treasury and handed over
+    to manufacturers in the United States down to June 30, 1906,
+    is $1,471,208.47. This money has been taken out of the poverty
+    of the insular treasury to be delivered directly into the hands
+    of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Philippine hemp in
+    the United States for their enrichment. The cordage interests are
+    prosperous and do not need this help; the Philippine Islands are
+    poor. Legislation which takes money directly from the Philippine
+    treasury and passes it over to a particular industry in the United
+    States is not founded on sound principles of political economy
+    or of justice to the Filipinos. We renew our recommendation for
+    the repeal of this provision.
+
+
+You also find in the Commission's report for 1906 the usual
+annual protests against the Dingley tariff on Philippine sugar and
+tobacco. Said the Honorable Henry C. Ide in an article in the New York
+Independent for November 22, 1906, written shortly after he retired
+from the office of Governor-General of the Philippines and returned
+to the United States: "By annexation we killed the Spanish market for
+Philippine sugar and tobacco, and our tariff shuts these products
+from the United States market, and to-day both these [industries]
+are practically prostrated." In their annual report for 1907,
+the Philippine Commission say with regard to the American corner on
+Philippine hemp: [521] "The price of hemp has fallen from an average of
+twenty pesos ($10 American money) per picul [522] to thirteen pesos
+per picul." It thus appears that by judicious manipulation of the
+hemp market at Manila, through the leverage of the refund system,
+based on collection and subsequent refunding of the export tax on
+hemp coming to the United States, the Manila agents of the American
+hemp manufacturers had, as early as 1907, beat the price of hemp down
+to not far above half of what it had been formerly. To-day (1912)
+the Filipino hemp farmer gets for his hemp just one half what he got
+just ten years ago. During all this period of economic depression,
+the public utterances and State papers both of President Roosevelt
+and Mr. Taft are full of such preposterous stuff as the following:
+
+
+    No great civilized power has ever managed with such wisdom and
+    disinterestedness the affairs of a people committed by the accident
+    of war to its hands. [523]
+
+
+This is what Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft were publicly pretending to
+believe. But at practically the same time, during as dark a year,
+economically, as the American occupation has seen, 1907, let us see
+what they were privately admitting to their intimate friends.
+
+In the North American Review for January 18, 1907, in an article
+contributed to that Review by the author of this volume, our
+treatment of the Philippine people, through our Congress, was briefly
+discussed. The article chanced to attract the attention of Mr. Andrew
+Carnegie, who gave a considerable sum of money to have it reprinted and
+distributed. Some correspondence followed between us, in the course
+of which Mr. Carnegie stated that he had been at the White House
+shortly before writing me, and described what happened as follows:
+
+
+    When at supper with the President [Mr. Roosevelt] recently,
+    pointing to Judge Taft [then Secretary of War], who sat opposite,
+    he [President Roosevelt] said: "Here are the two men in all the
+    world most anxious to get out of the Philippines."
+
+
+In another letter Mr. Carnegie described this same incident, this other
+letter's version of President Roosevelt's supper-table remark being:
+
+
+    Here are the two men in America most anxious to get rid of them
+    [the Philippines]. [524]
+
+
+Now why all this public boasting about our "disinterestedness,"
+when, if he had been a Filipino, Colonel Roosevelt would probably
+have hunted up all the American speeches of 1776 about taxation
+without representation, and played hide-and-seek with the public
+prosecutor at Manila, to see how far he could violate the sedition
+statute without getting in jail? And why this private admission
+to his friend Mr. Carnegie, which neither he nor Mr. Taft has ever
+publicly made? Why did he not send a message to Congress showing up
+the hemp rebate system? Simply because to do so would lose support
+for the Administration, would alienate powerful interests from the
+fatuous policy of Benevolent Assimilation bequeathed to Mr. Roosevelt
+by Mr. McKinley. His party was irrevocably committed to indefinite
+retention of the Islands. It was like Lot's wife. It could not turn
+back. So the protected and subsidized interests were permitted to
+continue to prey upon the Philippine people. Tariff evils were never
+President Roosevelt's specialty. Nor has war against intrenched
+privilege of any sort ever been Mr. Taft's specialty. Mr. Taft went
+out to the Philippines in 1907 to open the Philippine Assembly. In
+1908 he came back and made a report to President Roosevelt which is
+as bland as his Winona declaration that the Payne-Aldrich bill is
+"the best tariff bill the Republican party ever passed." It makes
+the American reader's heart swell with pious pride at what he is
+doing for his "little brown brother," in the matter of vaccination,
+sewers, school-books, and the like. President Roosevelt sent this
+report to Congress, accompanied by a message, from which we have
+already quoted. In that same message he said:
+
+
+    I question whether there is a brighter page in the annals of
+    international dealing between the strong and the weak than the
+    page which tells of our doings in the Philippines.
+
+
+Apparently, Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft thought, in 1907, that granting
+the Filipinos a little debating society solemnly called a legislative
+body, but wholly without any real power, was ample compensation for
+deserted tobacco and cane plantations and for the price of hemp being
+beat down below the cost of production by manipulation through an Act
+of Congress passed for the benefit of American hemp manufacturers. If
+we had had a Cleveland in the White House about that time, he would
+have written an essay on taxation without representation, with the
+hemp infamy of this Philippine Tariff Act of 1902 as a text, and sent
+it to Congress as a message demanding the repeal of the Act. But the
+good-will of the Hemp Trust is an asset for the policy of Benevolent
+Assimilation. The Filipino cannot vote, and the cordage manufacturer in
+the United States can. No conceivable state of economic desolation to
+which we might reduce the people of the Philippine Islands being other
+than a blessing in disguise compared with permitting them to attend
+to their own affairs after their own quaint and mutually considerate
+fashion, the Hemp Trust's rope, tied into a slip-knot by the Act of
+1902, must not be removed from their throats. By judicious manipulation
+of sufficient hemp rope, you can corral much support for Benevolent
+Assimilation. Therefore, to this good hour, the substance of the hemp
+part of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, remains upon the
+statute books of the United States, to the shame of the nation.
+
+At last, under the Payne tariff law of 1909, Mr. Taft's long and
+patient quiet work with Congressional committees prevailed upon
+Congress and the interests to admit Philippine sugar and tobacco to
+this country free of duty, up to amounts limited in the Act. [525]
+Since then you find the reports of our American officials in the
+Philippines palpitating with gratitude to Congress. As a matter
+of fact all Congress had said to the Filipinos by its action may be
+summed up about thus: "The sugar and tobacco interests of this country
+have at last realized that such little of the sugar and tobacco you
+raise as may stray over to this side of the world will not be in the
+least likely to hurt them. Therefore they have graciously decided,
+in their benignity, to permit you to live, provided you do not get
+too prosperous." But this very same Payne bill continued the export
+tax features of the Act of 1902. Section 13 of the Payne bill is
+as follows:
+
+
+    Section 13. That upon the exportation to any foreign country from
+    the Philippine Islands, or the shipment thereof to the United
+    States or any of its possessions, of the following articles
+    there shall be levied, collected, and paid thereon the following
+    export duties: Provided, however, that all articles the growth
+    and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from said
+    islands, to the United States or any of its possessions for use
+    and consumption therein shall be exempt from any export duties
+    imposed in the Philippine Islands:
+
+    352. Abaca (hemp), gross weight, 100 kilos, 75 cents.
+    353. Sugar, gross weight, 100 kilos, 5 cents.
+    354. Copra, gross weight, 100 kilos, 10 cents.
+    355. Tobacco, gross weight:
+
+    (a) Manufactured or unmanufactured, except as otherwise provided,
+    100 kilos, $1.30.
+
+    (b) Stems, clippings, and other wastes of tobacco, 100 kilos,
+    50 cents.
+
+
+Let us briefly glance at the net results of this law, and its
+predecessor, the Act of 1902, the export features of which it
+re-enacted. It is important that every fair-minded American who can
+possibly spare the time should take such a glance at what Congress has
+done to the Philippine hemp industry, because of the obvious bearing
+that such taxation without representation will probably have on the
+attitude of the Philippine people whenever we get into a war with a
+foreign power. Certainly the legislation Congress has perpetrated upon
+them, at the behest of special interests in the United States, has not
+soothed the original desire of those people to be free and independent.
+
+At page 27 of the report of the Philippine Collector of Customs for
+1910, a table is given showing the export duties subject to refund
+collected under the Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, and deposited
+in the Philippine treasury to the credit of the Insular Government
+at the end of each fiscal year (June 30), as follows:
+
+
+                    1902        $  71,064.69
+                    1903          527,228.10
+                    1904          462,433.83
+                    1905          486,475.56
+                    1906          433,991.79
+                    1907          433,458.58
+                    1908          370,513.36
+                    1909          598,917.69
+                               -------------
+                               $3,384,083.60
+
+
+The following table, taken from this same annual report of the
+Collector of Customs of the Philippines for 1910 (p. 22) shows the
+size (weight in kilograms), and value, of the annual Philippine hemp
+crop from 1899 to 1910, both inclusive. It gives in one set of columns
+the total exported to all countries, and in the other the part which
+comes to the United States:
+
+
+              To All Countries.         To United States.
+                 Kilos        Value       Kilos        Value
+
+        1899   59,840,368  $ 6,185,293  23,066,248  $ 2,436,169
+        1900   76,708,936   11,393,883  25,763,728    3,446,141
+        1901  112,215,168   14,453,110  18,157,952    2,402,867
+        1902  109,968,792   15,841,316  45,526,960    7,261,459
+        1903  132,241,594   21,701,575  71,654,416   12,314,312
+        1904  131,817,872   21,794,960  61,886,592   10,631,591
+        1905  130,621,024   22,146,241  73,351,136   12,954,515
+        1906  112,165,384   19,446,769  62,045,088   11,168,226
+        1907  114,701,320   21,085,081  58,388,504   11,326,864
+        1908  115,829,080   17,311,808  48,813,720    7,684,000
+        1909  149,991,866   15,883,577  79,210,362    8,534,288
+        1910  170,788,629   17,404,922  99,305,102   10,399,397
+
+
+If you have the time and inclination, you can easily figure out the
+annual "rake-off" of the American hemp importers from the above
+table. For instance, take the last year, 1910: 99,305,102 kilos
+at 75 cents per 100 kilos is $744,788.26, which is more than 4%
+of $17,404,922, the total value of the hemp crop of the archipelago
+for that year. Add this $744,788.26 to the $3,384,183.60 shown by the
+above table of refundable duties collected from 1902 to 1909 inclusive,
+and you have over $4,000,000 rebates accruing to American importers
+of Manila hemp from 1902 to 1910 inclusive.
+
+In his remarks on Section 13 of the Payne Law of 1909 (above set
+forth), in the House of Representatives, May 13, 1909, [526] Hon. Oscar
+W. Underwood said, in part:
+
+
+    When you put a tax on your people for engaging in export trade,
+    to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully meet
+    their foreign competitor and reduce the territory in which they
+    can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. Our
+    forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
+    recognizing the false principle on which an export tax was based,
+    put it in the fundamental law of our land that the United States
+    Government should not lay export taxes. If we enact this law,
+    we write into the statute book for the Philippine Islands,
+    legislation which is little short of barbarous, legislation that
+    no government in the civilized world except Turkey, and Persia,
+    and other second-class nations countenance to-day.
+
+
+But the hemp interests won out and the section was adopted. In an
+argument for the repeal of the export tax, delivered in the House of
+Representatives August 19, 1911, the Philippine delegate, Hon. Manuel
+L. Quezon, said:
+
+
+    There is one section in the Philippine tariff law, approved
+    August 5, 1909, which is seriously injuring the proper commercial
+    development of the islands.
+
+
+Of course the earnestness with which Mr. Quezon pleaded his cause may
+be imagined from the circumstance that, as he says, he is continually
+advised by letters from his people, and verily believes that if the
+export tax is not taken off soon the Philippine hemp industry will be
+entirely destroyed, and the hemp farmers will have to take to raising
+something else in lieu of hemp, because the present prices hardly
+permit them to live. In the course of his speech Mr. Quezon offered
+the following truly eloquent and absolutely unanswerable argument:
+
+
+    Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
+    States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in force in
+    the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said decision
+    also meant that this Government has the power to enact laws for
+    the islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution
+    in the United States.
+
+
+It is through the courtesy of Mr. Quezon that such light as I may
+have been able to throw on the subject has been obtained. He has
+shown me letters from the Philippine Chamber of Commerce at Manila
+and other commercial organizations prophesying ruin to the Manila
+hemp industry in the event the export tax should continue. One of
+these letters is addressed to the two Philippine Commissioners in
+Congress, Mr. Legarda and Mr. Quezon. It informs them of the hopes of
+the Filipinos at Manila that they, Messrs. Legarda and Quezon, may be
+successful in their campaign to get the law repealed and that many
+of them (the Filipinos at Manila) feel hopeful of results in that
+regard. Speaking for their fellow countrymen at Manila, they say,
+"The optimists are of the opinion that the matter being in such good
+hands as yours will be carried to a successful conclusion." Then they
+give the darker side of the picture thus:
+
+
+    But the representatives at this capital of the famous syndicate,
+    the International Harvester Company, are of the opinion that we
+    will be able to accomplish nothing, and theirs is an opinion to
+    which great weight should be attached, because the vast interests
+    which that concern represents can set in motion powerful influences
+    to keep the present law as it is, since it concerns their interest
+    to do so.
+
+
+Mr. Quezon has also shown me a letter written to him, March 30, 1911,
+by his and my warm personal friend, Hon. James F. Smith, formerly
+Governor-General of the Philippines, now (1912) Judge of the Court of
+Customs Appeals at Washington, D. C., in which letter General Smith
+says, concerning the operation of that part of the export tax act of
+March 8, 1902 (continued by the Payne Tariff Law of 1909) by which
+American manufacturers are relieved from the payment of the export
+tax on Manila hemp:
+
+
+    In effect this really and truly amounts to the payment by the
+    Philippine Government and the Filipino people of a large subsidy
+    to American manufacturers of hemp. More than that, this concession
+    to the American manufacturer, by enabling him to undersell his
+    British competitor, gives him an undue control of the situation
+    and has put him in a position, to some extent, to control prices
+    for the raw product.
+
+
+It seems to me that the American people had better look to their
+own liberties, when they remember that in the campaign for the
+Republican nomination in 1912, the Roosevelt Headquarters gave out
+that pending the Roosevelt dictation of Mr. Taft's nomination in
+1908, the International Harvester Company furnished a floor of its
+Chicago building to the Taft people, this interesting fact being
+part of the leakage from the Roosevelt-Taft quarrel caused by the
+Roosevelt charge that Mr. Taft was unfit for re-election because he
+"meant well feebly"; and when it is recalled, on the other hand, that
+in the Roosevelt campaign of 1912 for the presidential nomination for
+a third term, Mr. George W. Perkins, [527] the very personification
+of undue corporation influence with the Government, assumed the rôle
+of Warwick for an ex-President who, when President, had repudiated
+the advice of his counsel, Governor Harmon, that a railroad company
+[528] be prosecuted for taking rebates because the vice-president of
+the company was his personal friend. [529] But let us return to the
+Philippine rebates, and their corner-stone, the export tax, Section
+13 of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.
+
+In the case of Fairbanks vs. United States, 181 U. S. Supreme Court
+Reports, page 290, a case in which the court was asked to declare a
+certain Act of Congress unconstitutional and void, because it imposed
+what was virtually an export tax, the opinion of the court cites
+the absolute inhibition against such a tax imposed by our Federal
+Constitution, and says concerning the wise theory on which this
+fundamental tenet of our government rests:
+
+
+    The requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be
+    free from any governmental burden.
+
+
+The decision then goes on to elaborate on what it terms "that freedom
+from governmental burden in the matter of exports which it was the
+intention of our Constitution to protect and preserve." Finally,
+the court uses an expression which is certainly a stinging rebuke to
+any law-making power that permits the selfish greed of a little set
+of importers to get a law passed imposing for their special benefit
+a paralyzing export tax on the chief staple of a helpless colony:
+
+
+    The power to tax is the power to destroy.
+
+
+But Mr. Quezon has no vote in Congress and his voice was not heard,
+at least not heeded.
+
+The summation of the whole matter is this: Both the Philippine
+people and the American people are, and long have been, suffering
+from unjust taxation through laws for which special selfish financial
+interests in the United States, exercising grossly undue influence on
+governmental action, are responsible. Neither will ever get relief
+until the government of this nation is wrested from the control
+of the money-hogs and restored to the people. Until that is done,
+selfish greed will continue to sow sedition in the Philippines,
+and socialism in the United States.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVII
+
+THE RIGHTS OF MAN
+
+                        The rights of man cannot be changed. It is
+                        the government which attempts to change them
+                        that must change.--Webster.
+
+
+It was the homely common sense of Mr. Lincoln that first reminded
+us most vividly how like to the sins of an individual are those of a
+nation. To the Southern man who admires Mr. Lincoln as one of the great
+figures of all time, he seems like a great physician, who, with malice
+toward none and with charity for all, kept vigil for four years at the
+bedside of a sick nation through all the long agony of its efforts to
+throw off from its system the inherited curse of slavery. Of course,
+human slavery was a relic of barbarism. But in fixing the Rights of
+Man, the founders of the Republic actually overlooked the fact that a
+negro was a human being. So that, vast property rights having accrued
+pursuant to that mistake, the march of progress had to wipe them out,
+no matter whom it hurt financially. The enormity of the iniquity of
+human slavery did not dawn suddenly and exclusively upon William Lloyd
+Garrison. He is not the sole, original inventor and patentee of the
+idea. Lord Macaulay's father was doing the same sort of agitating in
+England about the same time. Westminster Abbey has its monument to
+the elder Macaulay, just as Commonwealth Avenue has its monument to
+the elder Garrison. Simultaneous like stirrings occurred elsewhere
+throughout Christendom. But, of course, in America, arguments for
+the emancipation of the slave first took root most readily in a
+thrifty section of our liberty-loving country which had nothing to
+lose by abolition.
+
+John Quincy Adams once said that our government was "an experiment
+upon the heart of man." It is because this government of the people
+by the people for the people was a deliberate and thoughtful attempt
+upon the part of its founders to apply the Golden Rule as a doctrine
+of international and inter-individual law, that we believe our form
+of government is the last hope of mankind. It is, as we conceive
+it, the voice of humanity raised in protest against the proposition
+that might makes right. It is, as we conceive it, a government which
+entered the lists of the nations as the champion of the human mind,
+in the great struggle of Mind for the mastery over Matter, the
+world-old struggle between Good and Evil, Light and Darkness. Our
+government, like everything else, must follow the law of its being,
+or die. Its first great sin in violation of the Rights of Man was due
+to heredity. We inherited the institution of slavery, the governmental
+exception to the rule that all men are created with equal right to
+life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This was a sin against
+human liberty, one of the "unalienable" Rights of Man, upon which
+the Republic purported to be builded. The consequences of that sin
+are still with us; but, except for the occasional bloody-shirt waver,
+whose intellectual resources are not sufficient to provide him with a
+live issue, we are meeting those consequences, as a nation, bravely,
+and with the mutual forbearance born of the fact that none are wholly
+free from responsibility for present difficulties.
+
+Our second great national sin was a yielding to the temptation of
+the environment which arose, unforeseen, after a splendid war waged
+for the Rights of Man against Spain in Cuba. The Philippine war was
+waged to subjugate the Filipino people, because Mr. McKinley believed
+it would be financially profitable to us to own the islands, and in
+the face of the fact that the only thing he knew officially about
+the Filipino people was that Admiral Dewey thought them superior
+to the Cubans and more capable of self-government. The war in the
+Philippines was, therefore, a war against the Rights of Man. Nowhere
+in any state paper has any American statesman, soldier, or sailor,
+had the temerity to invoke the name of God in connection with the
+retention of the Philippine Islands. Nowhere in any American state
+paper connected with the Philippines is there any reference to "a
+decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The sin of our Philippine
+policy is that it is a denial of the right of a people to pursue
+happiness in their own way instead of in somebody else's way. It is a
+denial of the very principles in maintenance of which we went to war
+against Spain to free Cuba, as we had previously gone to war against
+England to free ourselves.
+
+Now the reason the nation blundered into taking the Philippines was
+that it believed the Filipinos to be, not a people, but a jumble
+of savage tribes. But the reason the men who controlled the action
+of the government at the time took the Philippines was because they
+believed they would pay. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient number
+of our fellow-citizens--controlled, some by altruistic motives and
+some by sordid motives--to cause the nation to follow the lead of
+those then in control. If the men then in control had taken the people
+into their confidence, the blunder would never have been made. If the
+correspondence between Mr. McKinley and the Paris Peace Commission
+in the fall of 1898, from which the injunction of secrecy was not
+removed until 1901, had been given out at the time, the treaty would
+never have been ratified except after some such declaration as to
+the Philippines as was made concerning Cuba, some reaffirmance of
+allegiance to faith in our cardinal tenet--the right of every people
+to pursue happiness in their own way, free from alien domination. The
+Bacon resolution of 1899, which was along this line, was defeated only
+by the deciding vote of the presiding officer, the Vice-President of
+the United States. The passage of that resolution would have prevented
+the Philippine Insurrection. Had it passed, the Filipinos would no more
+have had occasion to think of insurrection than the Cubans did. It was
+Mr. McKinley alone who decided to take the Philippines. Congress was
+not called together in extra session. The people were not consulted,
+except from the rear-end of an observation car.
+
+Most people, whether they be lawyers or not, are more or less
+acquainted with the doctrine of what is called in law a "bona
+fide purchaser without notice." No man can claim to be a bona fide
+purchaser without notice, when he knows enough about the subject
+matter of his purchase to put him on reasonable notice of the
+existence of facts which, had he taken the trouble to verify them,
+would have caused him to halt and not purchase. The correspondence
+in 1898, made public in 1901, withheld by Mr. McKinley until after
+his second election in 1900, is sufficient to have made any honest
+man ask himself some such question as this: "After all, is it not
+quite possible that those people can run a decent government of
+their own? Admiral Dewey says they are superior to the Cubans." But
+Mr. McKinley did not pursue this inquiry, as it was his duty to
+do. He took the islands because he believed they would pay, knowing
+nothing in particular about the Filipinos, except what he had learned
+from Admiral Dewey's brief comment, yet hoping in spite of it that
+they would turn out sufficiently unfit for self-government for the
+event to vindicate the purchase. To demonstrate that the Filipinos
+were wholly unfit for the treatment accorded the Cubans was the only
+possible justification of the initial departure from the traditions of
+the Republic and from the principles which were its corner-stone. And
+he made the departure because the business "interests" of the country
+then believed--erroneously they all now admit--that it would pay. He
+decided to treat eternal principles as "worn-out formulæ." Senator Hoar
+once declined an invitation extended by his own city of Worcester,
+to deliver a eulogy on Mr. McKinley, because of his Philippine
+policy. True, he tempers the asperity of this action thus: "It was
+not because I was behind any other man in admiration or personal
+affection for that lofty and beautiful character. But * * * if a great
+Catholic prelate were to die, his eulogy should not be pronounced
+by a Protestant." [530] But all Senator Hoar's speeches against the
+McKinley Philippine policy were as emphatic as Luther's ninety-five
+theses. He was in possession at the time, along with the rest of the
+Senate, of the correspondence with the Paris Peace Commission made
+public after the presidential election of 1900.
+
+Ever since Mr. McKinley took the Philippines, it has been the awkward
+but inexorable duty of the defenders of that good man's fame to
+deprecate Filipino capacity for self-government. President Taft's
+chief life-work since this century began has been to take care
+of his martyred predecessor's fame, by proving that Mr. McKinley
+guessed right in 1898 when he bought the Philippines and trusted
+to luck to be able to make out, in spite of what Admiral Dewey had
+said, a case sufficiently derogatory to Filipino intelligence to
+justify the purchase and subjugation of the islands at the very
+time we were freeing Cuba. Obviously, then, the more utterly unfit
+for self-government in the present or the near future Mr. Taft can
+make the Filipinos out, the nearer he gets to vindicating the memory
+of Mr. McKinley, that is, with men of his own, (Mr. Taft's) high
+character. He insists on treating as children a people who got up a
+well-armed army of thirty-odd thousand men in three or four months
+and held at bay, for two years and a half, some 125,000 husky American
+soldiers, over five times as many as it took to drive Spain from the
+Western hemisphere. Physical force is the basis of all government
+among men. If President Taft had anything of the soldier instinct
+of his immediate predecessor, he would not sniff demagoguery in the
+proposition that military efficiency is a better guaranty of capacity
+for self-government than all the school-books in the world, and that
+proven passionate willingness to die for freedom from alien domination
+is the best guaranty conceivable against internecine strife. It was
+a tremendous struggle with his own conscience that Mr. McKinley went
+through with before he decided to repudiate the principles on which we
+took Cuba in order, for a money consideration euphemistically called
+"trade expansion," to take the Philippines. He had advices before him
+at the time making it reasonably certain that this meant trouble with
+the Filipinos, i.e., bloodshed in the Philippines, the extent of which
+none could foresee, and about which he was of course apprehensive. In
+the matter of instructing our Paris Peace Commissioners to insist on
+Spain's ceding us the Philippines, Mr. McKinley took no moral ground
+tenable like a rock, such as truly great men take in great crises of
+their country's history. He did not attempt to lead the people. He
+simply decided that it would be a popular thing to do to take the
+islands. Fresh from a war entered upon to emancipate the Cubans from
+alien domination, he took a step which both Admiral Dewey and General
+Merritt warned him beforehand would probably mean war--to subjugate,
+against their will, a people superior to the Cubans. And in taking
+this step, he took into his confidence, neither the people who paid
+for the war, nor the soldiers who fought it. To deny that his motives
+were benevolent would be simply stupid. But he followed the mob which
+shouted from the rear-end of his observation car and repeated by cable
+to the Paris Peace Commission, what the mob yelled. Ever since the
+supposed Philippine Klondyke whispered in President McKinley's ear
+"Eat of the imperial fruits of a colonial policy," the archives of
+this government--the reports of the State, War, and Navy Departments,
+and the Congressional Documents--have reeked with the inevitable
+consequences of our fall from our high estate. No man can serve two
+masters. Philanthropy for pecuniary profit is a paradox. Duplicity
+ever follows deviation from principle. In our dealings in 1898 with
+Aguinaldo you find vacillation on the part of military commanders who
+personally did not know what fear was, and embarrassed hypocrisy in
+dealing with him on the part of men wearing the shoulder-straps of the
+American army, athwart the frankness of whose gaze no such shadow had
+ever fallen before. You find systematic concealment of our intentions
+in dealing with the insurgents, for fear they would insurge before the
+Treaty was signed, and thus cause such a revulsion of feeling in our
+country against the purchase of theirs as to defeat the ratification
+of the treaty. After that, you find a systematic minimizing of
+the opposition to our rule, reinforced by subtle depreciation of
+Filipino intelligence, and backed up by a "peace-at-any-price" policy,
+periodically punctuated by the horrors of war without its dignity. The
+denial of Filipino opposition to our rule, which opposition means
+merely a natural longing for freedom from alien rule, has gradually
+been abandoned. Nobody now clings to that stale fiction. Also, a long
+course of chastening, through reconcentration and kindred severities
+subsequent to the official announcement of a state of general peace,
+has at last gotten the situation as to public order well in hand. The
+only question for those who affect that "decent respect to the opinions
+of mankind" which the men of 1776 had in mind is, "Are the Filipinos
+a people?" President Taft was originally with Senator Hoar on the
+Philippine question. At least he was an "anti-expansionist." In all
+the heat of subsequent controversy he has never made bold to deny
+the general proposition of the unalienable right of every people to
+liberty and the pursuit of happiness in their own way. His position
+is that the Filipino people must be made an exception to the rule
+because they are not a people. This is the strongest I can state his
+proposition for him. It is very difficult to state even with apparent
+plausibility, anything which denies the right of every community of
+people to immunity from alien domination. The case must be an extreme
+one. The issue which the writer raises with the President's policy
+is that the Filipinos are a people.
+
+I know of no graver responsibility that an American statesman can
+take upon himself before the bar of history than to deny the right
+of any given people to self-government. Certainly any man who denies
+that right at least assumes the burden of proof that they are unfit
+to attend to their own affairs. Mr. McKinley assumed it without
+pretending to know anything much about the Filipinos, the motive being
+that the Islands would be profitable to us. When Mr. Taft went to the
+Philippines in 1900, he went, not to investigate the correctness of
+Mr. McKinley's assumption, which was implied in the purchase, but to
+champion it; not to give advice concerning the righteousness of having
+taken over the Philippines, but to bolster up the policy. He assumed
+the burden of proof before he knew anything about the facts. The
+burden has been on him ever since. Any subordinate who helps him
+to bear that burden, finds favor in his eyes. But the burden is
+greater than he can bear. The proof fails. The proof shows that the
+Filipino people ought to be allowed to pursue happiness in their
+own way instead of being made to pursue it in Mr. Taft's way. Once
+you pretend that our true object in the Philippines is the "pursuit
+of happiness" for them, The Taft policy is condemned by the facts;
+and that is why I am opposed to it. The record shows this. He admits
+it. But he insists, with a sigh, that in some other generation they
+will be happy. Meantime, we are drifting toward our next war carrying
+in tow 8,000,000 of human beings who, if neutralized and let alone
+would not be disturbed by our next war, but whose destinies now must
+be dependent upon the outcome of such war, however little they may
+be concerned in the issues which bring it about.
+
+The shifty opportunism which once actually held out to the Filipinos
+the hope of some day becoming a State of the United States of America,
+has long since lapsed into the silence of shame, because no American
+ever honestly believed that the American people would ever countenance
+any such preposterous proposition. And so a free republic based on
+representative government is face to face with the proposition of
+having a "crown colony" on its hands which wishes to be, and could
+soon be made fit to be, a free republic also.
+
+If a federal republic cannot live half slave and half free, can it
+live with millions of the governed denied a voice in the federal
+government confessedly forever?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVIII
+
+THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY
+
+                                Oh be ye not dismayed
+                                Though ye stumbled and ye strayed.
+
+                                         Kipling--A Song of the English.
+
+
+He who points out a wrong without being prepared to suggest a remedy
+presumes upon the patience of his neighbor without good and sufficient
+cause. Up to this point the wrong has been unfolded, with such ability
+as was vouchsafed the narrator, "from Genesis to Revelations," so to
+speak; also his own attitude as an eye-witness, and its evolution from
+the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,
+to the more Christian doctrines of the New Testament. Let us now
+consider the remedy.
+
+In the course of our travels with the army in the earlier chapters of
+this book, we first followed its northern advance, from Manila over
+the great central plain drained by the Rio Grande and crossed by the
+railroad connecting Manila Bay with Lingayen Gulf; its further advance
+from the northern borders of the plain over the mountains of Central
+Luzon; and its march from the central mountains to the northern sea,
+at the extreme northern end of the archipelago. We thus saw in detail
+the military conquest and occupation of that part of Luzon lying
+north of the Pasig River. Before leaving that part of the subject, the
+way the provinces thus occupied were grouped into military districts
+was indicated. Following the lines of the military occupation, it was
+shown that Northern Luzon was naturally and conveniently susceptible of
+division into four groups of provinces, which groups might ultimately
+be evolved into self-governing commonwealths--States of a Philippine
+Federal Union, as follows:
+
+
+    Name of State     Area (sq. m.)    Population
+
+    Ilocos [531]          6,500           650,000
+    Cagayan [532]        12,000           300,000
+    Pangasinan [533]      4,500           625,000
+    Pampamga [534]        5,000           650,000
+                         ------         ---------
+    Total                28,000         2,225,000
+
+
+It will be remembered that after our narrative had followed the
+occupation of Northern Luzon by the American forces to practical
+completion, we turned to that part of Luzon lying south of Manila,
+and followed the military occupation as it was gradually extended
+from the Pasig River to the extreme point of Southern Luzon. Before
+closing the review of that military panorama, suggestions were made
+for an ultimate grouping of the provinces of Southern Luzon into two
+governmental units intended to be ultimately evolved into states. Those
+suggestions contemplated grouping the provinces of the lake region
+bordering on the Laguna de Bay and the adjacent provinces, into a
+territory designated for convenience as Cavite. [535] This territory
+was to include all of Southern Luzon except the hemp peninsula,
+which lies to the south of the Lake country. It was also suggested
+in the same connection that the three provinces of the hemp peninsula
+might form a convenient ultimate State of Camarines. In other words,
+two states can be made out of Southern Luzon as follows:
+
+
+    Name of State    Area (sq. m.)      Population
+
+    Cavite              8,500              700,000
+    Camarines           7,000              600,000
+                       ------            ---------
+    Total              15,500            1,300,000
+
+
+To recapitulate: All of Luzon except Manila and the vicinity
+can at once be divided into the six groups of provinces above
+mentioned--"territories," having what we are accustomed in the United
+States to call a "territorial form of government," and intended to
+be made states later. Luzon is about the size of Cuba (a little over
+40,000 sq. miles), is twice as thickly populated (nearly 4,000,000 to
+Cuba's 2,000,000), and is not cursed with a negro question, as Cuba is.
+
+The above totals, be it remembered, are only round numbers, but
+they get us "out of the woods" so to speak, and away from a lot of
+unpronounceable names. They show you how to handle Luzon as if it were
+about the size of Ohio--which it is. And, as has already been made
+clear in the earlier part of this volume, Luzon "is" the Philippines,
+in a very suggestive sense of the phrase, since it contains half the
+land area of the archipelago (outside of the Mohammedan island of
+Mindanao), and half the total population of the whole archipelago,
+besides being eight or ten times as large as any other island of the
+group except Mindanao; and it also contains the city which is the
+capital and chief port of the archipelago, and has been the seat of
+government for over three hundred years--Manila. And Manila is eight
+or ten times as large as any other town in the archipelago.
+
+After the occupation of Luzon, General Otis's extension of our
+occupation to the Visayan islands was reviewed, and in that connection
+it was pointed out that each of the six largest of those islands to
+wit, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, might be ultimately
+evolved into six states. [536]
+
+The smaller islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao could easily be
+disposed of governmentally by being attached to the jurisdiction of
+one of the said six islands.
+
+There is to-day no reason why a dozen Americans could not be at
+once appointed governors of the twelve prospective autonomous
+commonwealths above indicated, just as the President of the United
+States has in the past appointed governors for New Mexico, Arizona,
+and other territories of the United States which have subsequently
+been admitted to the Union. If the Congress of the United States should
+promise the Filipinos independence, to be granted as soon as American
+authority in the Islands should so recommend, the dozen territorial
+governments intended to be evolved into states of an ultimate federal
+union could soon be whipped into shape where they could take care of
+themselves to the extent that our state governments to-day take care
+of themselves. American representatives of American authority in the
+Islands, sent out to work out such a programme, might be instructed
+to watch these twelve territorial governments, granting to each the
+right to elect a governor in lieu of the appointed governor as soon
+as in their judgment a given territory was worthy of it. I have no
+doubt that such recommendations would follow successively as to all
+of said prospective states inside of four or five years. Whether this
+plan is wise or not, it certainly is not, as far as I am concerned,
+"half baked." Some five years ago, in the North American Review,
+[537] I suggested that Luzon could be so organized within less than
+ten years by American territorial governors selected for the work,
+naming the Honorable George Curry of New Mexico, formerly Governor of
+the territory of New Mexico, and now a member of Congress therefrom,
+as an ideal man to organize one such territory. It is true that there
+are not eleven other men as well qualified for the work as Governor
+Curry. In fact he is probably better qualified for the work than
+any man living. The language used as to Governor Curry in the North
+American Review article referred to was as follows:
+
+
+    If the inhabitants of these regions were told by a man whom they
+    liked and would believe, as they would Curry, that they were to
+    have autonomous governments like one of the Western Territories
+    of the United States, at the very earliest possible moment,
+    and urged to get ready for it, they could and would, under his
+    guidance. We would get a co-operation from those people we do not
+    now get and never will get, so long as we keep them in uncertainty
+    as to what we are going to do with them. If next year we should
+    formally disclaim intention to retain the islands permanently, and
+    set to work to create autonomous Territories destined ultimately
+    to be States of a Federated Philippine Republic, whenever fit,
+    we would soon see the way out of this tangle, and behold the
+    beginning of the end of it.
+
+
+Whenever the twelve territorial governments should be gotten into
+smooth working order under elected native governors, the Philippine
+archipelago would then be nearly ready for independence, so far as
+its internal affairs are concerned. The danger of their being annexed
+on the first pretext by some one of the great land-grabbing powers
+should be met by our guaranteeing them their independence, as we
+do Cuba, until they could be protected by neutralization treaties,
+such as protect Belgium and Switzerland to-day, as explained in
+the chapter which follows this. Powers not specifically granted
+to the several states-in-embryo should of course, until the final
+grant of independence, be reserved to the central government at
+Manila. Manila and Rizal province would be available at almost any
+time as a thirteenth state. So that when the twelve states above
+suggested had shown themselves capable of local self-government,
+Manila and Rizal province might be added to make the final one of
+thirteen original states of a Philippine Republic.
+
+Any American who has seen a Filipino pueblo transformed, as if by
+magic, from listless apathy to a state of buzzing and busy enthusiasm
+suggestive of a bee-hive, by preparations for some church fiesta,
+or for the coming of some dignitary from Manila, has seen something
+analogous to what would happen if the Filipino body politic should
+suddenly be electrified by a promise of independence under some such
+programme as the above. A generous rivalry would at once ensue all
+over the archipelago in each of the twelve prospective states. Each
+would seek to be the first to be recommended by American authority as
+ready for statehood. I do not believe the annals of national experience
+contain any analogy where every member of a given community has rallied
+to a common cause more completely than the whole Filipino people would
+rally to such a prospective programme of independence. The unanimity
+would be as absolute as the kind we saw among the American people at
+the outbreak of the Spanish War, when Congress one fine morning placed
+fifty millions of dollars at the disposal of President McKinley by
+a unanimous vote.
+
+I especially invite attention to the fact that the above programme
+throws away nothing that has been done by us in the Islands in the
+last twelve years in the way of organization. It simply takes it and
+builds upon it. Congress should not attempt to work out the details
+from this end of the line. We should send men out there from here to
+work them out, with local co-operation from the leading Filipinos. Men
+animated by the idea of working out a programme under which the living
+may hope to see the independence of their country, should be sent out
+to take the place of the men now there who are irrevocably committed
+to the programme of indefinite retention with undeclared intention,
+which holds out no hope to the living. It is not wise to arrange
+the details of the programme by act of Congress without a year or
+two of study of the situation by such men on the ground. An act of
+Congress which goes into details before getting the recommendations
+of such men will inevitably set up a lot of straw men easy for the
+other side to knock down. All you need is a program, sanctioned by
+Congress, containing a promise of independence, and men sent out to
+the islands to work out the program. They would report back from time
+to time, and the Congress by whose authority they went out would have
+no hesitation in being guided by their recommendations. If unpatriotic
+greed for office among the Filipinos, or other opposition animated by
+evil motives, should block the game, your Americans so sent out would
+have to recommend the calling of a halt. This ever-present shadow
+in the background would in turn throw the shadow of ostracism over
+all demagogues.
+
+Meantime the Filipinos should be given a Senate, or upper house,
+in which, the thirteen prospective "states" should be represented by
+two men, the bill therefor to be framed out there, and sent back here
+to Congress for approval. This would give them under the plan here
+suggested, as soon as the Americans sent out should so recommend,
+a Senate of twenty-six members. At present, if the native Assembly,
+or lower house, does not pass the annual appropriations necessary
+to run the government, the appropriation act of the preceding year
+again becomes law. At present, the upper house is the Philippine
+Commission. By withholding its consent, it can prevent any legislation
+whatsoever. So, at present, the Assembly is little more than a debating
+society. All questions as to appropriations, veto of legislation, and
+other details, in the event the Filipinos are given a Senate also,
+should be left to be fixed in the bill recommended by the men sent
+out to work out the program of promise.
+
+On March 20, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, the distinguished veteran
+Congressman from Virginia, who is Chairman of the Committee on Insular
+Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill entitled
+"A bill to establish a qualified independence for the Philippines, and
+to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute
+and complete." The greater part of what precedes this paragraph of
+this chapter was written prior to March 20, 1912. Mr. Jones's bill
+works out the details of the independence problem in a manner somewhat
+different from the plan I suggest, but that does not make me any the
+less heartily in favor of the principle which his bill embodies. The
+supreme virtue of the Jones bill is that it promises Independence at
+a fixed date, July 4, 1921. It ends the cruel uncertainty, so unjust
+to both the Filipinos and to the Americans in the Philippines, that
+is contained in the present program of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention. Five years ago, in the North American Review
+for January 18, and June 21, 1907, the writer hereof expressed the
+belief that an earlier date was feasible, thus:
+
+
+    If three strong and able men, familiar with insular conditions,
+    and still young enough to undertake the task [538] were told by
+    a President of the United States, by authority of the Congress,
+    "Go out there and set up a respectable native government in
+    ten years, and then come away," they could and would do it,
+    and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest
+    moral victories in the annals of free government would have
+    been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their
+    country's history.
+
+
+As Mr. Jones's bill allows four years more of time, I believe it to
+be absolutely safe.
+
+Governor Curry, the Congressman from New Mexico hereinabove mentioned,
+who spent eight years in the Philippines, agrees with the fundamental
+principle of the Jones bill, that as to making a definite promise of
+Independence within a few years, and does not consider 1921 too early.
+
+Under the present law, the Philippine Assembly has some eighty
+members, each supposed to represent 90,000 people, more or less. This
+tallies, roughly, with the census total of population, which is
+7,600,000. [539] Under the existing law in the Philippines, the
+qualifications for voting are really of two kinds, though nominally
+of three kinds. There is a property qualification, and there is
+an educational qualification. In any case, in order to vote, the
+individual must be twenty-one years old, and must have lived for six
+months in the place where he offers to vote. The property qualification
+requires that the would-be voter own at least $250 worth of property,
+or pay a tax to the amount of $15. The explanation of how a man may
+not own $250 worth of property and yet pay $15 taxes is that under the
+old Spanish system, which we partially adopted, a man might pay such
+cedula or poll-tax as he preferred, according to a graduated scale,
+certain civic rights being accorded to those voluntarily paying the
+higher poll-tax which were denied to those paying less. The educational
+qualification requires the would-be voter to speak, read, and write
+either English or Spanish, or else to have held certain enumerated
+small municipal offices under the Spaniards--before the American
+occupation. Mr. Jones's bill proposes to add the speaking, reading,
+and writing of the native dialect of a given locality [540] to the
+educational qualification. This would double, or perhaps triple,
+the electorate, and would, in my judgment, be wise. Thousands upon
+thousands of natives who only speak a little Spanish can both speak,
+read, and write their native Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan, as the
+case may be. The total of those qualified to vote for members of the
+Assembly in 1907 was only about 100,000. At a later election, that
+number was doubled. If there are 7,500,000 people in the archipelago,
+one fifth of these should represent the adult male population, say
+1,500,000. Under Mr. Jones's bill, the electorate would probably
+increase to half a million long before the date he proposes for
+independence, July 4, 1921. But all such details as qualification for
+voting might, it seems to me, be left to people on the ground, their
+recommendations controlling. Under a promise of independence by 1921,
+a very fair electorate of at least one third, possibly one half, of
+the adult male population, could be built up. As the majority report
+on the Jones Bill, dated April 26, 1912, says:
+
+
+    For nearly ten years the average public-school enrolment has not
+    been less than 500,000. [541]
+
+
+I believe that the Moros should be left as they are for the
+present. The time for solving that problem has not yet been
+reached. Mr. Jones himself evidently bases his idea of allowing the
+Moro country representation in the Philippine Congress, or legislature
+provided by his bill, on the probability that enough Christian people
+will vote, down there, to make up an electorate that would not be
+"impossible," i.e., absurd. For instance, he tells me that a great
+many people have moved into Mindanao from the northern islands for
+commercial reasons, and, if I recollect correctly, that Zamboanga,
+the most beautiful little port in Mindanao, which hardly had 10,000
+people when I was there, now has possibly 50,000. But the Moro
+question need not stand in the way of setting up an independent
+government in the Philippines in 1921, as proposed by his bill. You
+have material for thirteen original states, representing a population
+of nearly seven million Christian people, in Luzon and the six main
+Visayan Islands. Why delay the creation of this republic on account
+of 250,000 semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros in Mindanao--a
+separate island lying off to the south of the proposed republic? [542]
+A happy solution of the matter would be to send Mr. Jones out there as
+Governor-General and let him work out the problem on the ground. He
+has had a long and distinguished career in the public service,
+twenty-two years in Congress. His public record and speeches on the
+Philippine question from the beginning would make him to the Filipinos
+the very incarnation of a bona fide intention on our part to give
+them their independence at the earliest practical moment, that is,
+at some time which the living might hope to see. When Governor Taft
+and Mr. Root drew the Philippine Government Act of 1902, the former
+had already been president of the Philippine Commission for two
+years, had been all over the archipelago, and knew it well. Suppose
+the Taft policy should be substituted by the more progressive Jones
+policy. Mr. Jones, or whoever is to change the policy, ought to have
+as much acquaintance with the subject, acquired on the ground, as
+Mr. Taft had when he formulated his policy of indefinite retention
+with undeclared intention. The nucleus of the Taft policy was stated
+by Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in 1902, as follows [543]:
+
+
+    My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy is to be
+    declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United States
+    to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show
+    themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing
+    popular government, when their relation to the United States,
+    either of statehood, or of quasi-independence, like the colony
+    of Australia or Canada, can be declared after mutual conference.
+
+
+The policy which Mr. Jones has favored for the last twelve years is
+almost as well known to the Filipinos as are the views of Mr. Taft
+himself.
+
+In conclusion, the writer desires to say, with especial emphasis,
+that the suggestions outlining the plan which forms the bulk of this
+chapter are presented in a spirit of entire deference to the views
+of any one else who may have considered this great subject carefully,
+especially to the views of Mr. Jones, whose bill is so entirely right
+in principle. The one supreme need of the situation is a definite
+legislative declaration which shall make clear to all concerned--to the
+Filipino demagogue and the American grafter, as well as to the great
+body of the good people of both races out there--that the governing
+of a remote and alien people is to have no permanent place in the
+purposes of our national life; and that we do bona fide intend to
+give the Filipinos their independence at a date in the future which
+will interest the living, by extending to the living the hope to see
+the independence of their country. And the Jones Bill does that.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIX
+
+THE WAY OUT
+
+                Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland
+                has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of
+                Europe that its violation would inevitably provoke
+                a storm of indignation.
+
+                             M. de Martens in the Revue des Deux Mondes.
+
+
+On March 25, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, of Virginia, Chairman of the
+House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a resolution (H. J. 278)
+proposing the neutralization of the Philippines, to accompany his
+Philippine Independence Bill discussed in the preceding chapter. Such
+a resolution, accompanying such a bill, both introduced by one of the
+majority leaders in the House of Representatives, lifts the question
+of Philippine neutralization out of the region of the "academic,"
+and brings it forward as a thing which must, sooner or later, command
+the serious consideration both of Congress and the country. There
+have been many such resolutions before that of Mr. Jones. But they
+are all the same in principle. All contemplate our guaranteeing the
+Filipinos their independence until the treaties they propose shall
+be consummated. In 1911, there were at least nine such resolutions
+proposing neutralization of the Philippines, introduced by the
+following named gentlemen, the first a Republican, the rest Democrats:
+
+Mr. McCall, of Massachusetts; Mr. Cline, of Indiana; Mr. Sabath,
+of Illinois; Mr. Garner, of Texas; Mr. Peters, of Massachusetts;
+Mr. Martin, of Colorado; Mr. Burgess, of Texas; Mr. Oldfield, of
+Arkansas; and Mr. Ferris, of Oklahoma.
+
+Because the neutralization plan to provide against the Philippines
+being annexed by some other Power in case we ever give them their
+independence would, if successfully worked out, reduce by that much
+the possible area of war, and be a distinct step in the direction of
+universal peace, it is certainly worthy of careful consideration by
+the enlightened judgment of the Congress and the world.
+
+Mr. McCall is the father of the neutralization idea, so far as
+the House of Representatives is concerned, application of it to
+the Philippines having been first suggested at the Universal Peace
+Conference of 1904, by Mr. Erving Winslow, of Boston. Mr. McCall has
+been introducing his neutralization resolution at every Congress for
+a number of Congresses past.
+
+The McCall Resolution (H. J. Res. 107) is the oldest, and perhaps the
+simplest, of the various pending resolutions for the neutralization
+of the Philippines, and is typical of all. It reads:
+
+
+    JOINT RESOLUTION
+
+    Declaring the purpose of the United States to recognize
+    the independence of the Filipino people as soon as a stable
+    government can be established, and requesting the President to
+    open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
+
+    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
+    States of America in Congress assembled:
+
+    That in accordance with the principles upon which its government
+    is founded and which were again asserted by it at the outbreak of
+    the war with Spain, the United States declares that the Filipino
+    people of right ought to be free and independent, and announces
+    its purpose to recognize their independence as soon as a stable
+    government, republican in form, can be established by them, and
+    thereupon to transfer to such government all its rights in the
+    Philippine Islands upon terms which shall be reasonable and just,
+    and to leave the sovereignty and control of their country to the
+    Filipino people.
+
+    Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby
+    is, requested to open negotiations with such foreign Powers as in
+    his opinion should be parties to the compact for the neutralization
+    of the Philippine Islands by international agreement.
+
+
+If the McCall Resolution, or any one of the kindred resolutions,
+were passed, and complied with by the President of the United States,
+and accepted by the other Powers, and the Filipinos were helped to
+organize territorial governments such as Arizona and New Mexico were
+before they became States, several such territories could form the
+nucleus about which to begin to build at once, as indicated in the
+chapter on "The Road to Autonomy." A number of such territories could
+be made at once as completely autonomous as the governments of the
+territories of Arizona and New Mexico were before their admission to
+our Union. With those examples to emulate, together with the tingling
+of the general blood that would follow a promise of independence and
+a national life of their own, similar territorial governments could
+be successively organized, as indicated in the preceding chapter,
+throughout the archipelago. These could, in less than ten years, be
+fitted for admission to a federal union of autonomous territories,
+with the string of our sovereignty still tied to it, and an American
+Governor-General still over the whole, as now. And when the last island
+knocked for admission and was admitted, the string could be cut, and
+the Federal Union of Territories admitted, through our good offices, to
+the sisterhood of nations, as an independent Philippine republic. They
+would not bother the rest of the world any more than Belgium and
+Switzerland do, which are likewise protected by neutralization.
+
+The idea of international neutralization is not without pride of
+ancestry or hope of posterity. It was born out of the downfall of
+Napoleon I. The Treaty of Paris of 1815 declared that
+
+
+    the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as well as its
+    independence of outside influences, are in conformity with the
+    true interests of European politics.
+
+
+The Congress of Vienna, held afterwards in the same year, at
+which there were present, besides the various monarchs, such men as
+Wellington, Talleyrand, and Metternich, solemnly and finally reiterated
+that declaration. Would not "the neutrality and inviolability" of
+the Philippines be gladly acceded to by the great Powers as being
+"in conformity with the true interests of European politics," and
+Asiatic politics as well?
+
+Says M. De Martens, in an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes for
+November 15, 1903:
+
+
+    Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland has now taken
+    such lodgment in the conscience of the civilized nations of Europe
+    that its violation would inevitably provoke a storm of indignation.
+
+
+At present, the Philippines are a potential apple of discord thrown
+into the Balance of Power in the Pacific. The present policy of
+indefinite retention by us, with undeclared intention, leaves everybody
+guessing, including ourselves. Now is the accepted time, while the
+horizon of the future is absolutely cloudless, to ask Japan to sign
+a treaty agreeing not to annex the Philippine Islands after we give
+them their independence. By her answer she will show her hand. The
+overcrowded monarchies do not pretend any special scruples about
+annexing anything annexable. Germany very frankly insists that she
+became a great Power too late to get her rightful share of the earth's
+surface, and that she must expand somewhither. And only the virile
+menace of the Monroe Doctrine has so far stayed her heavy hand from
+seizing some portion of South America. But probably none of the Powers
+would object to converting the Philippines into permanently neutral
+territory, by the same kind of an agreement that protects Switzerland.
+
+The Treaty of London of 1831, relative to Belgium and Holland,
+declares:
+
+
+    Within the limits indicated, Belgium shall form an independent
+    and perpetually neutral state. She shall be required to observe
+    this same neutrality toward all the other states.
+
+
+The signatories to this treaty were Great Britain, France, Austria,
+Prussia, and Russia. Forty years after it was made, during the
+Franco-Prussian war, when Belgium's neutrality was threatened by
+manifestations of intention on the part both of France and of Prussia
+to occupy some of her territory, England served notice on both parties
+to the conflict that if either violated the territorial integrity of
+Belgium, she, England, would join forces with the other. And the treaty
+was observed. The specific way in which observance of it was compassed
+was this: Great Britain made representations to both France and Germany
+which resulted in two identical conventions, signed in August, 1870,
+at Paris and Berlin, whereby any act of aggression by either against
+Belgium was to be followed by England's joining forces with the other
+against the aggressor. So long as human nature does not change very
+materially, "the green-eyed monster" will remain a powerful factor in
+human affairs. The mutual jealousy of the Powers will always be the
+saving grace, in troubled times, of neutralization treaties signed in
+time of profound peace. If "Balance of Power" considerations in Europe
+have protected the Turkish Empire from annexation or dismemberment all
+these years, without a neutralization treaty, why will not the mutual
+jealousy of the Powers insure the signing and faithful observance of
+a treaty tending to preserve the Balance of Power in the Pacific? Who
+would object?
+
+The Panama Canal is to be opened in 1913. We want South America to
+be a real friend to the Monroe Doctrine, which she certainly is not
+enthusiastic about now, and will never be while we remain wedded
+to the McKinley Doctrine of Benevolent Assimilation of unconsenting
+people--people anxious to develop, under God, along their own lines. In
+1906, while Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Root made
+a tour of South America. He told those people down there, at Rio
+Janeiro, by way of quieting their fears lest we may some day be moved
+to "improve" their condition also, through benevolent assimilation
+and vigorous application of the "uplift" treatment:
+
+
+    We wish for * * * no territory except our own. We deem the
+    independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member
+    of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of
+    the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the
+    chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong.
+
+
+That Rio Janeiro speech of Mr. Root's is as noble a masterpiece of
+real eloquence, its setting and all considered, as any utterance of
+any statesman of modern times. Among other things, he said:
+
+
+    No student of our times can fail to see that not America alone
+    but the whole civilized world is swinging away from its old
+    governmental moorings and intrusting the fate of its civilization
+    to the capacity of the popular mass to govern. By this pathway
+    mankind is to travel, whithersoever it leads. Upon the success
+    of this, our great undertaking, the hope of humanity depends.
+
+
+As Secretary of War, "civilizing with a Krag," Mr. Root reminds one
+of Cortez and Pizarro. As Secretary of State, he permits us to believe
+that all the great men are not dead yet.
+
+If, in making that Rio Janeiro speech, Mr. Root laid to his soul
+the flattering unction that the minds of his hearers did not revert
+dubiously to his previous grim missionary work in the Philippines,
+where the percentage of literacy is superior to that of more than one
+Latin-American republic, he is very much mistaken. If he is laboring
+under any such delusion, let him read a book written since then by
+a distinguished South American publicist, called El Porvenir de La
+Americana Latina ("The Future of Latin America"). If he does not read
+Spanish, he can divine the contents of the book from the cartoon which
+adorns the title-page. The cartoon represents the American eagle,
+flag in claw, standing on the map of North America, looking toward
+South America as if ready for flight, its beak bent over Panama,
+the shadow of its wings already darkening the northern portions of
+the sister continent to the south of us. To get the trade of South
+America, in the mighty struggle for commercial supremacy which is to
+follow the opening of the Panama Canal, we must win the confidence of
+South America. We will never do it until we do the right thing by the
+Filipinos. Concerning the Philippines, South America reflects that
+we annexed the first supposedly rich non-contiguous Spanish country
+we ever had a chance to annex that we had not previously solemnly
+vowed we would not annex. We must choose between the Monroe Doctrine
+of mutually respectful Fraternal Relation, which contemplates some
+twenty-one mutually trustful republics in the Western Hemisphere, all
+a unit against alien colonization here, and the McKinley Doctrine of
+grossly patronizing Benevolent Assimilation, which contemplates some
+8,000,000 of people in the Eastern Hemisphere, all a unit against
+alien colonization there--a people, moreover, whose friendship we
+have cultivated with the Gatling gun and the gallows, and watered
+with tariff and other legislation enacted without knowledge and used
+without shame.
+
+We should stop running a kindergarten for adults in Asia, and get back
+to the Monroe Doctrine. There are only two hemispheres to a sphere,
+and our manifest destiny lies in the Western one. We do not want the
+earth. Our mission as a nation is to conserve the republican form
+of government, and the consent-of-the-governed principle, and to
+promote the general peace of mankind by insuring it in our half of
+the earth. The first thing to do to set this country right again is
+to get rid of the Philippines, and give them a square deal, pursuant
+to the spirit of the neutralization resolutions now pending before
+Congress. All these resolutions contain the one supreme need of the
+hour, an honest declaration of intention. The longer we fight shy
+of that, the less likely we are ever to give the Filipinos their
+independence, and the deeper we get into the mire of mistaken
+philanthropy and covert exploitation.
+
+We should resume our original programme of blazing out the path and
+making clear the way up which any nation of the earth may follow when
+it will. That path lies along the line of actually attempting as a
+nation a practical demonstration of the Power of Righteousness, or,
+in other words, the existence of an Omnipotent Omniscient Benevolent
+Good (whether you spell it with one o or with two is not important)
+shaping, guiding, and directing human affairs, such demonstration
+to be made through the concerted action of a self-governing people
+under a written Constitution based on equality of opportunity and
+the Golden Rule.
+
+As a people we are very young yet. It is not yet written in the Book
+of Time how long this nation will survive. So far, our government is
+only an experiment. But, as John Quincy Adams once said, it and its
+Constitution are "an experiment upon the human heart," to see whether
+or not the Golden Rule will work in government among men.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+NOTES
+
+
+[1] The date contemplated by the pending Philippine Independence
+Bill, introduced in the House of Representatives in March, 1912,
+by Hon. W. A. Jones, Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs.
+
+[2] Congressional Record, December 6, 1897, p. 3.
+
+[3] Split Rock.
+
+[4] Senate Document 62, p. 381.
+
+[5] See pages 341 et seq., Senate Document 62, part 1, 55th Cong.,
+3d Sess., 1898-9.
+
+[6] Senate Document 62, p. 346.
+
+[7] Ib., 349.
+
+[8] The natives in and about Singapore are Mohammedans, forbidden by
+their religion to use alcoholic beverages.
+
+[9] Senate Document 62, p. 354.
+
+[10] Senate Document 62, p. 356.
+
+[11] Hearings on Philippine affairs, Senate Document 331, part 3,
+57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1901-2, proceedings of June 26-8, 1902.
+
+[12] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2927.
+
+[13] The Senate Document has it backwards "left Mirs Bay for Hong
+Kong," clearly an error.
+
+[14] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2932.
+
+[15] Cong. Record, April 17, 1900, p. 4287.
+
+[16] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2928.
+
+[17] Ib.
+
+[18] S. D. 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.
+
+[19] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2937.
+
+[20] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2934.
+
+[21] Ib., p. 2967.
+
+[22] See pp. 2928 and 2956, S. D. 331, part 3.
+
+[23] S. D. 331, pt.3, p. 2965.
+
+[24] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
+
+[25] Ib., p. 2936.
+
+[26] Ib., p. 2940.
+
+[27] See letter of H. Irving Hancock, American war correspondent in
+the field, dated Manila, May 3, 1899, published New York Criterion,
+June 17, 1899. This Hancock interview with General MacArthur was
+quoted in debate on the floor of the Senate on April 17, 1900 (see
+Cong. Rec. of that date), and was corroborated by General MacArthur
+himself as substantially correct in that officer's testimony before
+the Senate in 1902, S. D. 331, pt. 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session,
+p. 1942, in answer to questions put by Senator Culberson.
+
+[28] Rev. Clay Macaulay, who afterwards made that statement in a
+letter to the Boston Transcript.
+
+[29] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
+
+[30] S. D. 208, part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 7, 8.
+
+[31] Cong. Record, December, 1897.
+
+[32] See Cong. Record, April 11, 1898, pp. 3699 et seq.
+
+[33] Cong. Record, April 13, 1898, pp. 3701 et seq.
+
+[34] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.
+
+[35] S. D. 62, p. 327.
+
+[36] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, App., p. 100. Dispatch May 20, 1898.
+
+[37] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 13.
+
+[38] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2930.
+
+[39] Report Schurman Commission, vol. i., p. 172.
+
+[40] S. D. 62, p. 337.
+
+[41] S. D. 331, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2951.
+
+[42] S. D. 331, p. 2955.
+
+[43] Ib., p. 2954.
+
+[44] S. D. 62, pp. 328-9.
+
+[45] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.
+
+[46] Ib., p. 102.
+
+[47] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 102.
+
+[48] S. D. 62, p. 362.
+
+[49] Ib., pp. 360-1.
+
+[50] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 106.
+
+[51] S. D. 62, p. 354.
+
+[52] S. D. 62, p. 329.
+
+[53] Ib., p. 432.
+
+[54] Alas, that rare man, Frank Millet, perished in the Titanic
+disaster of April, 1912, since the above was written.
+
+[55] Expedition to the Philippines.
+
+[56] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 111.
+
+[57] See p. 2934, S. D. 331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[58] See p. 2934, S. D. 331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[59] S. D. 62, p. 383.
+
+[60] See Admiral Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902,
+S. D. 331, pp. 2942, 2957.
+
+[61] See National Geographic Magazine, August, 1905.
+
+[62] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898.
+
+[63] See p. 2938, S. D. 331 (1902).
+
+[64] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898, p. 5.
+
+[65] Senate Document 169, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1898).
+
+[66] Ib.
+
+[67] Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, August, 1898 Century Magazine.
+
+[68] See p. 85, S. D. 208, 1900.
+
+[69] See General Orders No. 101, series 1898, Adjutant-General's
+Office, Washington, July 18, 1898, a copy of which accompanied the
+President's message to Congress of December, 1898, and may be seen
+at p. 783, House Document No. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9.
+
+[70] For a copy of this proclamation, see p. 86, S. D. 208, 56th Cong.,
+1st Sess.
+
+[71] S. D. 208, p. 8.
+
+[72] S. D. 331, p. 2976, Hearings before Senate Committee, 1902.
+
+[73] S. D. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 16.
+
+[74] Correspondence, War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 720.
+
+[75] For Admiral Dewey's cable report of this, see Navy Dept. Report,
+1898, Appendix, p. 110. For particulars, given by him subsequently,
+see S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2942.
+
+[76] S. D. 331, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2942, and thereabouts.
+
+[77] S. D. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 4.
+
+[78] S. D. 208, p. 4.
+
+[79] Anderson only had about 2500 troops then.
+
+[80] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 110; S. D. 331, 1902,
+p. 2942.
+
+[81] Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 8.
+
+[82] Ib., pp. 12-13.
+
+[83] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 9.
+
+[84] Ib., p. 8.
+
+[85] See page 40 of General Merritt's Report, War Dept. Report, 1898,
+vol. i., part 2.
+
+[86] S. D. 208, 1900, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.
+
+[87] Ib., p. 10.
+
+[88] The writer is certainly one of these, and while calling in
+question the wisdom and righteousness of our Philippine policy,
+he cannot refrain from avowing just here a feeling of individual
+obligation to Mr. Root for his exquisite tribute to the personal
+equation of Mr. McKinley, delivered at the National Republican
+Convention of 1904, which was, in part, as follows: "How wise and
+skilful he was. How modest and self-effacing. How deep his insight
+into the human heart. How swift the intuitions of his sympathy. How
+compelling the charm of his gracious presence. He was so unselfish,
+so genuine a lover of his kind. And he was the kindest and tenderest
+friend who ever grasped another's hand. Alas, that his virtues did
+plead in vain against his cruel fate."
+
+[89] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 117.
+
+[90] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 13.
+
+[91] For the Merritt proclamation, see S. D. 208, p. 86.
+
+[92] In 1906.
+
+[93] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 13.
+
+[94] Ib., p. 40.
+
+[95] Report First Philippine Commission, vol. i., p. 172.
+
+[96] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4. Otis report, p. 13.
+
+[97] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2941.
+
+[98] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 788.
+
+[99] May 19th-July 9th; see General Anderson's report to the
+Adjutant-General of the army of July 9, 1898, S. D. 208, p. 6.
+
+[100] See Major J. F. Bell's report to Merritt of August 29, 1898,
+S. D. 62, p. 379.
+
+[101] Clerks.
+
+[102] See S. D. 208, pp. 101-2.
+
+[103] Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 34.
+
+[104] S. D. 208, p. 99.
+
+[105] Admiral Dewey to Senate Committee, 1902, S. D. 331, 1902,
+p. 2940.
+
+[106] 7,635,426. See Philippine Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15.
+
+[107] 3,798,507. See Philippine Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 125.
+
+[108] See Senate Document 62, 1898, p. 379.
+
+[109] Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon.
+
+[110] Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Cagayan.
+
+[111] S. D. 62, p. 380.
+
+[112] Diary of Major Simeon Villa, p. 1898, Senate Document 331,
+pt. 3, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1902.
+
+[113] See Merritt's Report for 1898, War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i.,
+pt. 2, p. 40.
+
+[114] Expedition to the Philippines, p. 61.
+
+[115] "With 10,000 men, we would have had to guard 13,300 Spanish
+prisoners, and to fight 14,000 Filipinos," says General Anderson,
+North American Review for February, 1900.
+
+[116] Senate Document 208, p. 86.
+
+[117] Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Peace Commissioners, Senate
+Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.
+
+[118] See General Greene's Report, W. D. R., 1898, vol. i., pt. 2,
+p. 72, where Mr. Millet's conduct in the assault on the city receives
+special mention.
+
+[119] War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 73.
+
+[120] See War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 58.
+
+[121] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898, p. 5.
+
+[122] War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 57.
+
+[123] Ib., vol. i., pt. 4, p. 190.
+
+[124] See his Report, War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 3.
+
+[125] On August 20th. War Dept. Report,1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 345.
+
+[126] Ib., p. 5.
+
+[127] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. 1., pt. 4, pp. 346-7.
+
+[128] Ib. p. 335.
+
+[129] Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34.
+
+[130] S. D. 208, pt. ii., pp. 7, 8.
+
+[131] Otis's Report, p. 10.
+
+[132] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 101.
+
+[133] To say nothing of the "chariot and four, and a band of a hundred
+pieces, and everything in the grandest style," of which Admiral Dewey
+told the Senate Committee in 1902 (S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2972).
+
+[134] See p. 7, S. D. 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess.
+
+[135] Expedition to the Philippines, p. 255.
+
+[136] "Putting the road and accessories into the same state as they
+were on February 4, 1899," was the language in which Mr. Higgins
+formulated his demand in a letter to General Otis on Jan. 25, 1900. See
+War Dept. Record, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 516.
+
+[137] North American Review, January 18, 1907, p. 140.
+
+[138] The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always
+dealt with in this book as a separate and distinct problem.
+
+[139] Senate Document 196, 56th Cong., 1st. Sess., p. 14.
+
+[140] Here the author's commanding officer, Major Batson, was shot
+a year and a day later while directing with his usual clear-headed
+intrepidity the fire of a part of his battalion to protect the crossing
+of the rest of it over the Aringay River, we being at the time in hot
+pursuit of Aguinaldo, whose rear-guard made a stand in the trenches
+on the other side of the river.
+
+[141] Senate Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9, p. 283.
+
+[142] Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the
+Treasury, now (1912) President of the National City Bank, New York,
+in the Century Magazine, August, 1898.
+
+[143] S. D. 148, p. 15.
+
+[144] Navy Department Report for 1898, Appendix, p. 122.
+
+[145] Senate Document 148, p. 19.
+
+[146] Chairman of the Spanish Commission.
+
+[147] Meaning evidently payment of some of Spain's debts with money
+she could probably get from us for the asking, as a matter of sympathy
+for the fellow who is "down and out."
+
+[148] Mr. McKinley had before that sent word significantly that he
+was not unmindful of the distressing financial embarrassments of Spain.
+
+[149] Otis's Report for 1899, p. 43.
+
+[150] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 3.
+
+[151] Ib., pt. 2, p. 75.
+
+[152] Senate Document 62, p. 379.
+
+[153] Published at page 7 of Senate Document 208, pt. 2, 56th Congress,
+1st Session (1900).
+
+[154] Called in Spanish "Visayas," or Bisayas. Visayas is an
+adjective derived from the name of the Bay of Biscay, "b" and "v"
+being interchangeable in Spanish.
+
+[155] For a fuller description of the archipelago, see Chapter XII.
+
+[156] Vol. ii., p. 315.
+
+[157] This proclamation has been printed many times, in various
+government publications, e.g., War Department Report, 1899, vol. i.,
+pt. 4, pp. 355-6; Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session
+(1900), pp. 82-3, etc.
+
+[158] Senate Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, p. 272.
+
+[159] The "self-doubting" lay in the doubt of the Administration as
+to whether its programme of conquest would or would not be ratified
+by the Senate. The "pusillanimity" lay, wholly unbeknown to Washington
+of course, in the estimate of us it produced among the Filipinos.
+
+[160] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 62.
+
+[161] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 64.
+
+[162] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 79.
+
+[163] Ib., p. 67.
+
+[164] "I sent you the President's proclamation, not for publication,
+but for your information," wrote Otis to Miller after the latter had
+let the cat out of the bag. Senate Document 208, p. 58.
+
+[165] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54.
+
+[166] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.
+
+[167] Ibid.
+
+[168] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 59.
+
+[169] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), pp. 54-5.
+
+[170] Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, General Otis's Judge Advocate, was
+"the brains of" the Otis government. But the difference between General
+Otis and Aguinaldo was that Aguinaldo always had the good sense to
+follow Mabini's advice, while Otis did not always follow Crowder's.
+
+[171] Senate Document 208, p. 56.
+
+[172] S. D. 208, p. 58.
+
+[173] See Congressional Record, January 18, 1899, p. 734.
+
+[174] Senate Document 208, p. 59.
+
+[175] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.
+
+[176] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 58, letter
+to General Miller.
+
+[177] A campaign synonym for forced marching. It has no known
+etymology, but to the initiated it suggests torrential downpouring
+of rain and bedraggled mud-spattered columns of troops.
+
+[178] Senate Document 208, pt. 2, p. 7.
+
+[179] Otis Report, p. 80.
+
+[180] The American "Tommy Atkins."
+
+[181] Otis Report, 1899 War Dept. Rpt., 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 81.
+
+[182] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 2709 et seq.
+
+[183] Congressional Record, January 11, 1899, p. 735.
+
+[184] Ib., January 18, 1899, p. 733.
+
+[185] The vote on the Bacon resolution was a tie, 29 to 29, and
+the Vice-President of the United States then cast the deciding vote
+against it. Cong. Rec., Feby. 14, 1899, p. 1845.
+
+[186] See Present-Day Problems, by Wm. H. Taft, p. 9; Dodd, Mead, &
+Co., N. Y., 1908.
+
+[187] Congressional Record, February 14, 1899, p. 1846 (55th Cong.,
+3d Sess.).
+
+[188] See General Hughes's testimony before Senate Committee, 1902,
+Senate Document 331, p. 508.
+
+[189] See Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President for
+1899, pp. 7 et seq.
+
+[190] This is no mere attempt at rhetorical decoration. Said General
+MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo:
+"He was the incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos." Senate
+Document 331, 1902, p. 1926.
+
+[191] Senate Document 331, 1902, pp. 2927 et seq.
+
+[192] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23.
+
+[193] Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9, p. 383.
+
+[194] See end of Chapter IV. ante.
+
+[195] Otis Report for 1899, p. 66.
+
+[196] Report, p. 99.
+
+[197] Ib., p. 100.
+
+[198] Ib., p. 150.
+
+[199] Raw recruits.
+
+[200] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 375.
+
+[201] There were thirteen States represented by at least one
+organization. These were the First Californias, Second Oregons, First
+Colorados, First Nebraskas, Tenth Pennsylvanias, Major Young's Utah
+Battery, the First Idahos, Thirteenth Minnesotas, the North Dakota
+Artillery, the Twentieth Kansas, and the Tennessees, Montanas,
+and Wyomings.
+
+[202] The regular regiments represented were the 14th, 8th, and
+23d Infantry and 4th Cavalry. There were also some batteries of the
+Third Regular Artillery, and a number of Engineers, Hospital Corps,
+and Signal Corps people.
+
+[203] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 440.
+
+[204] Hearings on affairs in Philippine Islands, 1902.
+
+[205] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 109.
+
+[206] Senate Document 331, p. 1890.
+
+[207] Senate Document 331, pp. 1890 et seq.
+
+[208] Ib., p. 1436.
+
+[209] Senate Document 331, p. 1448.
+
+[210] Ib., pt. 2, p. 1447.
+
+[211] The "water cure" (a cure for reticence) consisted in placing
+a bamboo reed in the victim's mouth and pouring water down his
+throat thus painfully distending his stomach and crowding all his
+viscera. Allowed to void this after a time, he would, under threat
+of repetition, give the desired information.
+
+[212] Since the above was written, the officer in question has joined
+the Great Majority. It was that fearless, faithful, and kindly man,
+General Fred. D. Grant, who died in April, 1912.
+
+[213] The lieutenant is no longer in the army, but he resigned
+voluntarily long after the incident related in the text, and for
+reasons wholly foreign to said incident.
+
+[214] Of course my host's name was not Jones, but Jones will do.
+
+[215] Spanish for man.
+
+[216] A Philippine campaign expression for losing one's nerve and
+wanting to quit.
+
+[217] Otis's Report, p. 133.
+
+[218] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 35. In this handsome
+commendation General Lawton also included Maj. Charles G. Starr,
+one of the best all-round soldiers I ever knew.
+
+[219] See Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+pp. 1068 et seq.
+
+[220] Otis's Report, p. 115.
+
+[221] An interesting account of this experience is given by General
+Funston himself in the October, 1911, number of Scribner's Magazine,
+in an article entitled "From Malolos to San Fernando."
+
+[222] Otis's Report, p. 136.
+
+[223] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 138.
+
+[224] Except, of course, the capture of Aguinaldo by General Funston
+nearly two years later.
+
+[225] See General Lawton's Report on the Zapote River fight, War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 282.
+
+[226] See Harper's History of the War in the Philippines, p. 214,
+where the name of the gentleman is spelled "Kanly."
+
+[227] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Otis Despatches
+of November 27th, vol. ii., p. 846.
+
+[228] House Document 85, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.
+
+[229] The words quoted are from President McKinley's message to
+Congress of December, 1899.
+
+[230] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1002.
+
+[231] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1020.
+
+[232] Meaning, of course, in time not to embarrass President McKinley's
+prospective candidacy for re-election in 1900, in a campaign in
+which all knew the acquisition of the Philippines was sure to be the
+paramount issue.
+
+[233] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., part 4, p. 122.
+
+[234] Strictly speaking, only twenty-three regiments were sent out
+from the United States. Under the Act of March 2, 1899, providing the
+volunteer army of 35,000 men for the Philippines, twenty-four regiments
+of infantry and one of cavalry were organized. The infantry regiments
+were numbered Twenty-six to Forty-nine, both inclusive, the numbering
+taking up where the numbering of the regular infantry regiments then
+ended, with the Twenty-fifth. The cavalry regiment was called the
+Eleventh Cavalry, the regular cavalry regimental enumeration ending at
+that time with the Tenth. The Eleventh Cavalry and the Thirty-sixth
+Infantry were organized, officered, and largely recruited from men
+of the State Volunteers sent out in '98, who, in consideration of
+liberal inducements offered by the Government, consented to remain.
+
+[235] The population of the city of Manila according to the Philippine
+Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 16; was 219,928. The three next largest
+towns are: Laoag, in the province of Ilocos Norte, about 270 miles
+north of Manila, near the northwest corner of Luzon, population 19,699;
+Iloilo, capital of the island of Panay and chief city and port of the
+Visayan Islands, some 300 miles south of Manila, population 19,054;
+and Cebu, capital and chief port of the island of Cebu, a day's
+voyage from Iloilo, population 18,330. See Philippine Census of 1903,
+vol. ii., p. 38.
+
+[236] 115,026 is the exact figure. See Philippine Census, vol. i.,
+p. 57.
+
+[237] The exact figure for Luzon is 40,969, and that for Mindanao,
+36,292. Ib.
+
+[238] Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 56.
+
+[239] Ibid.
+
+[240] Table of Areas, Census, 1903, vol. i., p. 263.
+
+[241] Table of Populations, ib., vol. ii., p. 126.
+
+[242] Total of these six in large type 20,418 square miles, say
+roughly 20,500.
+
+[243] Total of these last three in smaller type 9114 square miles.
+
+[244] There is a large sugar estate on Mindoro, supposed to contain
+over 60,000 acres or, say, ninety odd square miles, which in 1911
+figured in a congressional investigation of certain charges against
+Professor Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, but this
+is wholly separate from the original problem of public order.
+
+[245] The exact figure is 36,292. Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 263.
+
+[246] 499,634, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 126.
+
+[247] The semi-civilized Moros of Mindanao live mostly in the interior,
+and have a crude form of Mohammedanism. The civilized Christian
+Filipinos of Mindanao live mostly on the littoral.
+
+[248] This was said in no mere speech. Speeches are often
+misquoted. It was a letter signed by the foremost man of this age,
+Mr. Roosevelt, written September 15, 1900, accepting the nomination
+for the Vice-Presidency. (See Proceedings of the Republican National
+Committee, 1900, p. 86.) Yet it represented then one of the many
+current misapprehensions about the Filipinos which moved this great
+nation to destroy a young republic set up in a spirit of intelligent
+and generous emulation of our own.
+
+[249] One of the sultans, or head-men, was believed in 1899, to have
+tried on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca made before we took
+the Philippines, by some dickering at Singapore or near there in
+the Straits Settlements, to sell out for a consideration to Great
+Britain, so as to be under the protection and in the pay of British
+North Borneo.
+
+[250] The fraction used is based on 500,000 (the population of
+Mindanao), being that fraction of 7,500,000 (which last is, roughly
+speaking, the total population of the archipelago). The census figures
+being 499,634 and 7,635,426 respectively, as heretofore stated.
+
+[251] 7,635,426. Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 15.
+
+[252] 3,798,507. Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 125.
+
+[253] 223,506 is the total of the uncivilized tribes still extant
+in Luzon, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 125, but they live in the
+mountains and you might live in the Philippines a long lifetime
+without ever seeing a sample of them, unless you happen to be an
+energetic ethnologist fond of mountain climbing.
+
+[254] Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 57.
+
+[255] The area of Cuba is about 44,000 square miles.
+
+[256] Except Ohio, the States of Pennsylvania and Tennessee are nearer
+the size of Luzon than any others of the Union, the former containing
+about 45,000 square miles and the latter about 42,000.
+
+[257] This comparison does not pretend to be mathematically exact. New
+Jersey's area is nearer 8000 than 7000 square miles. For further
+illustration by comparison, it may be noted in this connection that
+the area of Massachusetts is over 8000 square miles (8315) and that of
+Vermont between 9000 and 10,000 (9565). As Costa Rica has only 368,780
+inhabitants (Statesman's Year Book), the province of Pangasinan alone
+contains more people than the republic of Costa Rica. The average of
+intelligence and industry of the masses in both is doubtless about
+the same, with the probabilities in favor of Pangasinan.
+
+[258] Table of Areas, Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[259] Table of Populations, ib., vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[260] In alluding, in complimentary terms, to this officer's
+gallant conduct on that occasion, Harper's History of the War in the
+Philippines spells the name "Hustin," as it had previously misspelled
+the name of the star actor among the younger officers who participated
+in the Zapote River fight "Kanly." "Such is fame." The gentleman's
+right name is Mustin. He is now a lieutenant-commander, well known
+in the navy to-day, as the inventor of the "Mustin gun-sight."
+
+[261] There is a notable unanimity, among the men in the army of about
+Major March's age and rank, in the opinion that he is a man of very
+extraordinary ability. This unanimity is so generous and genuine that
+I deem it a duty as well as a pleasure to emphasize it here.
+
+[262] See Otis's Report covering September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900,
+War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 261.
+
+[263] The 12th, part of the 25th, and the 32d Infantry being used to
+guard the railroad and for other purposes.
+
+[264] Calumpit will be remembered as the place where in the previous
+spring Colonel Funston and his Kansans performed the daring and
+successful manoeuvre of crossing the Bagbag River under fire.
+
+[265] Senate Document 331, pt. 2 (1902), p. 1926.
+
+[266] This ratio is no jest. It is a statistical fact, figured out
+from one of the War Department Reports.
+
+[267] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59.
+
+[268] Report of Secretary of War, 1899, p. 12.
+
+[269] Campaign Spanish for "look for." Generals Lawton and Young had
+cut loose from their base of supplies and their command was trusting
+for subsistence to living upon the country.
+
+[270] See translation of diary of Major Simeon Villa, Senate Document
+331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), p. 1988. It was in this
+Aringay fight that one of the narrowest escapes from death in battle
+ever officially authenticated occurred. Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan,
+now a captain of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, was struck just over the heart
+by an insurgent bullet (probably more or less spent) while crossing the
+river in the face of a hot fire, the bullet being deflected by a plug
+of tobacco carried in the breast pocket of the regulation campaign
+blue shirt he was wearing, which pocket, any one acquainted with
+that shirt will remember, is at the left breast just over the heart
+(War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 6, pp. 166, 279). He was
+knocked over, but soon recovered and went on. The flesh of the left
+breast over the heart was bruised black and blue. He was recommended
+for a medal of honor on account of the incident (War Department Report,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 7, p. 136).
+
+[271] If these figures are not exact, they are approximately
+correct. We always called it three hundred miles from Manila to the
+northern end of Luzon via Vigan and the lighthouse at Cape Bojeador.
+
+[272] For instance, there was what used to be known to the 8th Corps
+as "Col. Jim Parker's night attack at Vigan," which occurred early in
+December, 1899, soon after that place was occupied, the insurgents
+coming into the town in large numbers, at night under command of
+General Tiņio, through a tunnel so it was said, and being driven
+out only after desperate close quarters' fighting from about two
+o'clock in the morning until after broad daylight, leaving the streets
+and plaza of Vigan much cumbered with their dead. Again, later on,
+there was the sudden order, swiftly executed, in obedience to which
+Lieutenant Grayson V. Heidt with a part of a troop of the 3d Cavalry,
+rode from Laoag to Batac to the rescue of a besieged garrison at the
+latter place, arriving in time to prevent a small Custer massacre,
+the garrison having gotten short of ammunition, and having just managed
+to telegraph for reinforcements a few moments before the enemy cut the
+telegraph wire. Then, there was Lieutenant Hannay, of the 22d Infantry,
+who being at the front, received an order from General Lawton to come
+back to build a bridge. The order made him sick, the surgeon reported
+him sick, the messenger returned with that message, and then Hannay
+promptly got well, and stayed at the front. And so on, ad infinitum.
+
+[273] The Visayan Islands--the half-dozen islands between Luzon and
+Mindanao already mentioned, as the only ones worth mentioning for
+our purposes, together with the various smaller islands, islets,
+and rocks "visible at high water."
+
+[274] "During April, in the First District, comprising the provinces
+of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Union, Abra, Lepanto, Benguet, and Bontoc,
+Brigadier General S. B. M. Young, commanding, the insurgents manifested
+considerable activity and endeavored to take the offensive against
+the scattered detachments in the district. The insurgents were in
+every instance defeated, and lost more than 500 men killed." War
+Dept. Report 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 196.
+
+[275] The language quoted is that employed by Robert Collins,
+Associated Press Correspondent, in connection with the Round Robin
+incident of nine months previous, described in the concluding part
+of the chapter preceding this.
+
+[276] Hereinafter more fully set forth.
+
+[277] For the Table of Areas, see Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[278] For the Table of Populations, see Philippine Census, vol. ii.,
+p. 123.
+
+[279] Under the Spaniards, these were two provinces. They were combined
+by us.
+
+[280] A province in Latin countries corresponds more nearly to what
+we call a county than to anything else familiar to our system of
+political divisions.
+
+[281] For the details of this march, see War Department Report, 1900,
+vol. i., pt. 4, p. 309. Captain Batchelor had neither orders nor
+permission to do what he did. When he cut loose from the command he
+belonged to, he took very long chances on finding subsistence for
+his men in the unknown country he had set out to conquer, to say
+nothing of the highly probable chances of annihilation of his whole
+command. When an officer commanding troops does this in time of war,
+he does so at his peril, and signal success is his only salvation.
+
+[282] Area tables, Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[283] Population tables, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[284] Though Nueva Vizcaya is not in the Cagayan valley, but on a
+plateau of the great divide, still, its streams all flow into the
+Cagayan valley, and that term will be used in this book, as it is
+colloquially in the Philippines, to include not only the Cagayan valley
+proper, but also the adjoining tributary province of Nueva Vizcaya.
+
+[285] The only thing of interest to the American people that ever
+happened over there was the capture of Lieutenant Gilmore of the Navy,
+and his men, at Baler, on the Pacific coast, in Principe, a capture
+which, it will be recollected, was followed by long captivity, and
+ultimately terminated in rescue. The interested student will see
+these two provinces on the American maps of the islands, but they
+were each attached by the Taft government for administration purposes
+to another province, and do not appear in the American census list
+of provinces. Therefore, they cut no figure in the census totals,
+either of area or population.
+
+[286] The officer on whom public attention in the United States was
+later focussed by an alleged order, charged to have been issued by him
+in a campaign in Samar to "kill everything over ten years old." This
+alleged order was called by the American newspapers of the period
+"Jake Smith's Kill and Burn Order."
+
+[287] The figures as to Principe are mere arbitrary guesses, the exact
+figures used being fixed on merely to get convenient round numbers,
+there being no statistics as to Principe.
+
+[288] Of course the Filipinos should be consulted as to what provinces
+should constitute each state, but I am simply sketching a tentative
+governmental scheme based upon the way our army perfected its original
+grip on public order and the general administrative situation.
+
+[289] All along here we, of course, deal in round numbers only.
+
+[290] See War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 45 et
+seq. The city of Manila and vicinity constituted the Sixth District
+of the Department of Northern Luzon.
+
+[291] War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 47-8.
+
+[292] War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., part 1, p. 9.
+
+[293] The Spanish word camarin means a warehouse. The province of
+Camarines was originally two provinces, and is still referred to as
+two, though governmentally but one.
+
+[294] Of March 2, 1899. Under it the term of enlistment of the
+volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901.
+
+[295] Table of Areas, Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 263. Table
+of Population, ib., vol. ii., pp. 123 et seq.
+
+[296] Copper-colored thief.
+
+[297] Sung to the tune of "Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching."
+
+[298] See Forum, vol. xxvi., p. 647.
+
+[299] See Forum, vol. xxix., p. 403.
+
+[300] These quotations are not taken from a scrap-book. Many
+readers forget that the bound volumes of all the great magazines are
+permanently available in the great libraries of the country.
+
+[301] Hostilities had not yet broken out when the article now being
+considered appeared on January 4th, and did not break out until thirty
+days later, to wit, on February 4th.
+
+[302] Congressional Record, April 13, 1898, p. 3701.
+
+[303] In the early days of the fighting they used to hurrah a good
+deal, and shout "Viva la Independencia" (Live Independence).
+
+[304] See Judge Taft's cablegram to Secretary of War Root of August
+21, 1900, War Department Report, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[305] The Caribao Society is an organization composed mainly of
+officers of the regular army, but to which any one who served as an
+officer, volunteer or regular, in the Philippine Insurrection, is
+eligible. Their principal function, like that of the famous Gridiron
+Club, is to give an annual dinner.
+
+[306] Addresses at Republican National Convention (1904), p. 62,
+published by Isaac H. Blanchard & Co., New York, 1904. The Republican
+National Convention of 1900 met June 19th, just sixteen days after
+the Taft Commission arrived at Manila.
+
+[307] General MacArthur relieved General Otis May 5, 1900, and the
+Taft Commission arrived at Manila June 3d thereafter.
+
+[308] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1051.
+
+[309] Letter of July 22, 1898, by Duc d'Almodovar del Rio, Prime
+Minister of Spain, to President McKinley, suing for peace. Senate
+Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 272-3.
+
+[310] See Congressional Record of that date, p. 33.
+
+[311] General Otis's appreciation of such "aid" was thus expressed
+in his cablegram to Washington of June 4, 1899: "Negotiations
+and conferences with insurgents cost soldiers' lives and prolong
+our difficulties." Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain,
+vol. ii., p. 1002.
+
+[312] Address by Secretary of War Taft before the National Geographic
+Society at Washington, published in the official organ of that Society,
+National Geographic Magazine for August, 1905.
+
+[313] Says General Chaffee in his annual report for 1902: "The
+intelligent element controlled the ignorant masses as perfectly as
+ever a captain controlled the men of his company." War Department
+Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.
+
+[314] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.
+
+[315] August 29, 1898, to May 5, 1900.
+
+[316] Especially independence.
+
+[317] Senate Document 331 (1902), pt. 1, page 50.
+
+[318] A slander ignorantly repeated by the adverse report of the
+minority of the Insular Affairs Committee of the House, on the Jones
+Bill, introduced in March, 1912, proposing ultimate independence
+in 1921.
+
+[319] See The Commoner, April 27, 1906.
+
+[320] Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 9.
+
+[321] These are the three main lines of cleavage, linguistically
+speaking. Nearly all the minor dialects are kin to some one of the
+principal three.
+
+[322] Peasant's hut, usually of bamboo, thatched with stout straw
+(nipa). It is the log cabin of the Philippines.
+
+[323] By way of protest against this kind of belittling of the army's
+work, General MacArthur says in his annual report (War Dept. Rept.,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60), "Such a narrow statement of the case is
+unfair to the service," adding a handsome tribute, which might have
+come very graciously from the Commission had it felt so disposed, to
+"the endurance, fortitude, and valor" of his 70,000 men during the
+precise period while the Commission was filling the American papers
+with politically opportune nonsense about "Peace, peace," when there
+was no peace.
+
+[324] See Report of Secretary of War Root for 1900. War Department
+Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[325] See Report of Taft Philippine Commission of 1900, p. 17.
+
+[326] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 34-42.
+
+[327] S. D. 435, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.
+
+[328] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, November, 1900, p. 15.
+
+[329] General Lawton was killed in battle in the hour of victory at a
+point only about twelve miles out of Manila, in the winter preceding
+the spring of 1900 in which the Taft Commission left the United States
+for Manila.
+
+[330] This interview was indorsed as substantially correct by General
+MacArthur before the Senate Committee of 1902, Senator Culberson first
+reading it to him and then asking him if it quoted him correctly. See
+hearing on Philippine affairs, 1902, Senate Document 331, pt. 2,
+p. 1942.
+
+[331] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88.
+
+[332] Ibid., 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[333] November, 1899, to September, 1900, both inclusive.
+
+[334] W. D. R., 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[335] Judge Taft had cabled Secretary of War Root on August 21, 1900,
+after his arrival in June: "Defining of political issues in United
+States reported here in full, gave hope to insurgent officers still
+in arms, * * * and stayed surrenders to await result of election." See
+War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 80.
+
+[336] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 89.
+
+[337] See Report of Taft Commission to Secretary of War, dated November
+30, 1900.
+
+[338] A sample of one of these death sentences that Cailles and all
+the rest of the insurgent generals were accustomed to issue against
+their "Copperheads" may be seen in General MacArthur's report for
+1900. War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 63.
+
+[339] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.
+
+[340] See Report of Secretary Root for 1902, p. 13.
+
+[341] Just how correct this was will be examined later.
+
+[342] "The people seem to be actuated by the idea that men are
+never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin." War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.
+
+[343] General MacArthur's Annual Report dated October 1, 1900. War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 61-2.
+
+[344] General MacArthur's report which we are now quoting from,
+dated October 1, 1900, was forwarded by the ordinary course of mail,
+and even if it arrived before the day of the November election, the
+Secretary of War certainly did not at once place it before the public.
+
+[345] Compare this MacArthur, October 1, 1900, statement with the Taft
+statements of the same situation between June and November, 1900, as
+expressed for instance in his November, 1900, report to the Secretary
+of War thus: "A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under
+the supremacy of the United States. They are, however, restrained
+by fear. * * * Without this, armed resistance to the United States
+authority would have long ago ceased. It is a Mafia on a very large
+scale." Report, Taft Commission, November 30, 1900, p. 17. This was
+before Judge Taft met Juan Cailles above mentioned and liked him well
+enough to make him governor of a province, in spite of his being an
+"assassin," in other words a Filipino general who had a few weak-kneed
+fellows shot for being too friendly with the Americans.
+
+[346] Chapter XI., ante.
+
+[347] See War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 65-6.
+
+[348] As for my share as a soldier in that Philippine Insurrection,
+admitting, as I now do, that it was a tragedy of errors, the President
+of the United States would indeed be a very impotent Chief Executive
+if it were every American's duty to deliberate as a judge on the
+Bench before he decided to answer a president's call for volunteers
+in an emergency. I am not yet so highly educated as to find no
+inward response to the sentiment, "Right or wrong, my country." If
+this sentiment is not right, no republic can long survive, for the
+ultimate safety of republics must lie in volunteer soldiery.
+
+[349] Page 93.
+
+[350] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1211.
+
+[351] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1222.
+
+[352] Ibid., vol. ii., p. 1223.
+
+[353] Ibid., p. 1226.
+
+[354] Ibid., p. 1237.
+
+[355] See Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1239.
+
+[356] Ten or twelve thousand.
+
+[357] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1249.
+
+[358] See Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission Division of Insular
+Affairs, War Department, Washington, 1901, p. 181.
+
+[359] See General Funston's article on "The Capture of Aguinaldo,"
+which appeared in Scribner's Magazine for November, 1911.
+
+[360] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i. pt. 4, p. 99.
+
+[361] For a copy of this proclamation see War Department Report,
+1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 100.
+
+[362] The War with Spain, by H. C. Lodge, p. 20.
+
+[363] Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler, Senate Document 62 (1898), p. 319.
+
+[364] See First Report of Taft Philippine Commission to the Secretary
+of War, p. 17.
+
+[365] General MacArthur's report for 1901, War Department Report,
+1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.
+
+[366] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1241.
+
+[367] J. R. Arnold, of the Philippine Civil Service Board, in North
+American Review, for February, 1912.
+
+[368] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1261.
+
+[369] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.
+
+[370] Senate Document 331, pt. 1, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902,
+p. 136.
+
+[371] Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya.
+
+[372] A kind of two-wheeled buggy, the principal public vehicle
+of Manila.
+
+[373] As it turned out, I lost nothing in the end, because my
+resignation of my military commission was not acted on at Washington,
+and I only ceased to be an officer of the army by operation of law
+at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1901, as had been provided
+by the Act of Congress of March 2, 1899, organizing the twenty-five
+regiments for Philippine service.
+
+[374] See the Act of the U. S. Philippine Commission of July 17,
+1901, entitled, "An act restoring the provinces of Batangas, Cebu,
+and Bohol, to the executive control of the military governor," in
+Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission, Division of Insular Affairs,
+War Department.
+
+[375] See American Census of the Philippines, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[376] Ib., vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[377] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 7.
+
+[378] See pages 102 et seq. of Our Philippine Problem by H. Parker
+Willis, Professor of Economics and Politics in Washington and Lee
+University. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1905.
+
+[379] Where he still is.
+
+[380] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1297.
+
+[381] The words quoted were used by Mr. Root in a speech delivered
+at Youngstown, Ohio, October 25, 1900.
+
+[382] Sixty-six men and three officers were surprised at breakfast
+and cut off from their guns by several hundred bolo men who had come
+into town as unarmed natives under pretence of attending a church
+fiesta. Forty-five men and officers were killed after a desperate
+resistance. Twenty-four only were able to escape. War Department
+Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.
+
+[383] Governor Taft's Report for 1901, War Department Report, 1901,
+vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.
+
+[384] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 208.
+
+[385] Leviticus xvi., 10.
+
+[386] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 12.
+
+[387] Senate Document 331, pt. 1, p. 86, 57th Congress, 1st Session
+(1902).
+
+[388] War Department Report for 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59 et
+seq. Ibid., 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88 et seq.
+
+[389] Report for 1901, p. 98.
+
+[390] See Philippine Census, vol. ii, p. 123.
+
+[391] The Provincial Government Act was an act passed February 6,
+1901, outlining the general scheme of government for the several
+provinces, and indicating the various tempting official positions
+attaching thereto.
+
+[392] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.
+
+[393] Senate Document 331, p. 1612 et seq.
+
+[394] Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1614.
+
+[395] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 1622.
+
+[396] Ibid., p. 1623.
+
+[397] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 1628.
+
+[398] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 221.
+
+[399] Colonel Wagner's testimony before Senate Committee of
+1902. Senate Document 331, pt. 3, p. 2873.
+
+[400] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 284.
+
+[401] Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 887.
+
+[402] Senate Document 331, pt. 3, p. 2878.
+
+[403] Theodore Rex.
+
+[404] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 192.
+
+[405] Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+pp. 1352-3.
+
+[406] Military Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+p. 1244.
+
+[407] Macaulay's Trial of Hastings.
+
+[408] Says Gen. Henry T. Allen, commanding the Philippines
+constabulary, in his report for 1903 (Report U. S. Philippine
+Commission, 1903, pt. 3, p. 49), "For some time to come the number of
+troops (meaning American) to be kept here should be a direct function
+of the number of guns put into the hands of natives." He adds, "It
+is unwise to ignore the great moral effect of a strong armed force
+above suspicion."
+
+[409] The constabulary force was about 5000. When disturbances in one
+province would become formidable, constabulary from provinces would
+be hurried thither, thus denuding the latter provinces of proper
+police protection.
+
+[410] 1912.
+
+[411] The reference is supposed to be to Mr. McKinley.
+
+[412] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 264.
+
+[413] Delaware has 2050 square miles, Albay 1783.
+
+[414] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1249.
+
+[415] President Roosevelt cabled Kelly, whom he had known in the West
+many years before, congratulating him on the results of his cool
+and determined fearlessness and presence of mind on that occasion,
+but elaboration on the Surigao affair was not part of the insular
+programme, which was one of irrepressible optimism as to the state
+of public order.
+
+[416] Every province in the Philippines is divided into so many
+pueblos. Pueblo, in Spanish, means town. But the Spanish pueblo is more
+like a township. It does not mean a continuous stretch of residences
+and other buildings, but a given municipal area. Each pueblo is
+likewise subdivided into barrios, dotted usually with hamlets, and
+groups of houses.
+
+[417] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 3, p. 92.
+
+[418] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 1, p. 366.
+
+[419] Senate Document 170, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.
+
+[420] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 1, p. 32.
+
+[421] 240, 326, Philippine Census, 1903, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[422] The speech referred to in the text was made at Manila in
+December, 1903, but the same "Philippines for the Filipinos" policy had
+already been proclaimed much earlier. The Manila American of February
+28, 1903, reprints from the Iloilo Times of February 21, 1903, an
+account of Governor Taft's celebrated Iloilo speech of February 19,
+1903, which was received with such profound chagrin by the American
+business community in the Islands. There had been much bad blood
+between the American colony at and about Iloilo and the native
+Americano-phobes. The following is from the Iloilo paper's account
+of Governor Taft's speech: "The Governor then gave some advice to
+foreigners and Americans, remarking that if they found fault with the
+way the government was being run here, they could leave the islands;
+that the government was being run for the Filipinos."
+
+[423] James LeRoy in The World's Work for December, 1903.
+
+[424] A familiar instance of this will occur to any one acquainted
+with the situation in the Islands for any considerable part of the
+last ten years.
+
+[425] Act No. 136, U. S. Philippine Commission, passed June 11, 1901.
+
+[426] Act 1024, Philippine Commission, passed Oct. 10, 1903.
+
+[427] There were five members of the original Taft Commission,
+including President Taft.
+
+[428] I neither forget nor gainsay the generally benevolent character
+of his despotism; and having been a beneficiary of it myself I am
+therefore disposed to see much of wisdom in the way it was exercised.
+
+[429] Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[430] Ib., vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[431] Says Brigadier-General Wm. H. Carter, in his annual report for
+1905 covering the Samar outbreak of 1904-5: "Whatever may have been
+the original cause of the outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when
+success had drawn a large proportion of the people away from their
+homes and fields. Except in the largest towns it became simply a
+question of joining the pulajans or being harried by them. In the
+absence of proper protection thousands joined in the movement." See
+War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 286.
+
+[432] Bulao was situated on a high bluff on the left bank of a river
+called the Bangahon. The Pulajans entered before daybreak, on July
+21st. There was a stiff fight at Bulao, also, between our native
+troops and the enemy on August 21st, but Calderon seems to have
+left it out of his list. See Gen. Wm. H. Carter's Report for 1905,
+War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290. Capt. Cary Crockett,
+a descendant of David Crockett, commanded the constabulary, and though
+badly wounded himself, as were also half his command, he defeated
+a force of Pulajans greatly outnumbering his, killing forty-one of
+them. Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 3, p. 90, Report
+of Col. Wallace C. Taylor. I think he was awarded a medal of honor
+for his work. He certainly earned it.
+
+"Pulajan" means "red breeches," the uniform of the mountain clans,
+worn whenever they set out to give trouble.
+
+[433] Of March 23d of the previous year, already described in a
+previous chapter, where Luther S. Kelly--"Yellowstone" Kelly--saved
+the American women by gathering them and a few men in the Government
+House and bluffing the brigands off.
+
+[434] The "Conant" peso, named for the noted fiscal expert,
+Mr. Conant. It was worth fifty cents American money.
+
+[435] The Fourteenth U. S. Infantry was stationed in garrison just
+outside the town proper of Calbayog, which was three hours by steam
+launch from the provincial capital, Catbalogan. But the depredations
+might have been carried to just outside the line of the military
+reservation, and the military folk would not have dared to make a
+move save on request first made by the Civil Government at Manila. In
+other words the above three villages were burned under their noses.
+
+[436] One seems to get the stoicism better in the original, somehow,
+so I give the body of the original Spanish, as it came to me:
+
+
+    En el distrito de Motiong, municipio de Wright, provincia de
+    Samar, Islas Filipinas, a primero de septiembre de mil novecientos
+    quatro. Ante mi Peregrin Albano, consejal del mismo, y presente el
+    Presidente de Sanidad Municipal, D. Tomas San Pablo y principales
+    del mismo se procedio al enterramiento de los cadaveres victimas
+    de los Pulajans en el sementerio de esta localidad el oficial de
+    voluntarios, Rafael Rosales y otros voluntarios, Gualberto Gabane,
+    Juan Pacle, Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo, y
+    particulares Eustaquia Sapiten y Apolinaria N: con otro tanto
+    Pulajan desconocido; en conformidad de la carta oficial de la
+    presidencia municipal de Wright de fecha de hoy registrada con
+    el numero 136.
+
+    Del citado enteramiento ha sido asistido por el Reverendo Padre
+    Marcos Gomez y acompanado por toda la fuerza voluntaria del mismo
+    por la muerte del oficial Rosales.
+
+
+[437] See War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290.
+
+[438] Hill was Whittier's deputy at Llorente.
+
+[439] Even if the municipal police had been like Cæsar's wife, they
+were like chaff before the wind in a Pulajan foray, though they were
+somewhat better if well led by some prominent and forceful man of
+the community in an expedition after Pulajans.
+
+[440] A disease of a dropsical variety, usually attacking the legs
+first, which easily becomes epidemic. It had been the cause of many
+of the 120 deaths in the Albay jail during the Ola insurrection. Ideal
+conditions for it are a steady diet of poor rice and lack of exercise.
+
+[441] It was not well to be too hasty. You might have the head of the
+whole uprising in custody, or one of his most important lieutenants,
+and find it out by the merest accident in the course of hearing a
+case against some apparently abject "private of the rear rank."
+
+[442] By unwarranted I mean without warrant. Nobody bothered much
+with warrants. The times were too strenuous.
+
+[443] See New York Tribune, Oct. 25, 1904.
+
+[444] Ibid.
+
+[445] Smith, Bell & Co. are an old British mercantile house, well
+known in Manila and Hong Kong.
+
+[446] The North American Review article by the writer, to which Judge
+Ide was replying, appeared in the issue of that magazine for January
+18, 1907, and could hardly have escaped the attention of anybody
+concerned, having been given wide circulation; (1) by Mr. Andrew
+Carnegie through pamphlet reprints; (2) by Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, in his
+paper, the Commoner; (3) by Hon. James L. Slayden, M. C. of Texas,
+through reprinting in the Congressional Record.
+
+[447] Such as the breakwater at Manila, the road-building in various
+provinces, etc.--all, however, be it remembered, being paid for by
+the Filipino people, out of the insular revenues and assets.
+
+[448] By Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.
+
+[449] Words used by Governor-General James F. Smith, in an address
+at the Quill Club, Manila, January 25, 1909.
+
+[450] Delivered in 1902, after the Senator visited the Islands in 1901.
+
+[451] The following is a copy of the letter accepting my resignation:
+
+             Office of the Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands,
+                                                   January 25, 1905.
+
+    My dear Judge Blount:
+
+    I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
+    yesterday in which you tender your resignation as Judge of First
+    Instance at large. I regret extremely that your ill-health has made
+    this course imperative. Under all the circumstances, however, I am
+    satisfied that you have acted wisely, as I have feared for some
+    time that you would be unable to perform the duties pertaining
+    to your office because of your physical condition. I, therefore,
+    though with much regret accept your resignation.
+
+    At the same time I beg to express my appreciation of the faithful
+    and efficient services you have rendered in the past. I hope very
+    much that a rest and change of climate may have the effect of
+    restoring you again to vigorous health, and I assure you that
+    you carry with you my best wishes for your future prosperity
+    and happiness.
+
+        Sincerely yours,
+        Luke E. Wright,
+        Civil Governor.
+
+    To the Honorable James H. Blount, Judge of First Instance at large,
+    Manila, P. I.
+
+[452] See annual report of the Governor-General for 1905, in Report
+of the Philippine Commission for 1905, pt. 1, p. 85.
+
+[453] Which delegates were denied admission to the Convention on the
+ground that no American living in the Philippines could be in sympathy
+with the Democratic programme as to them.
+
+[454] An Englishwoman in the Philippines, by Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.
+
+[455] War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 285.
+
+[456] Army reports are usually made right after the expiration of
+the American governmental fiscal year, June 30th.
+
+[457] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 47.
+
+[458] See Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38. He
+means Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna.
+
+[459] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 212.
+
+[460] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 52.
+
+[461] For a copy of it, see the case of Barcelon vs. Baker, Philippine
+Supreme Court Reports, vol. v., p. 89.
+
+[462] Volume v., Philippine Reports.
+
+[463] Mr. Garfield was President Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior.
+
+[464] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2, p. 255.
+
+[465] See page 227, Report of Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2.
+
+[466] Report, Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 1, p. 37.
+
+[467] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2, p. 228.
+
+[468] Pt. 1, p. 36.
+
+[469] Report of Taft Philippine Commission for 1900, p. 17.
+
+[470] See Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.
+
+[471] Amigo, in Spanish, means friend. Every non-combatant Filipino
+with whom our people came in contact in the early days always claimed
+to be an "amigo," and never was, in any single instance.
+
+[472] See testimony of General MacArthur before the Senate Committee
+of 1902, Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1942.
+
+[473] The adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill, which
+bill proposes ultimate Philippine independence in 1921, is full of
+the old insufferable drivel about "tribes," and of the rest of the
+Root views of 1900.
+
+[474] See Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 211.
+
+[475] Part 1, p. 38.
+
+[476] Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 37.
+
+[477] See President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December,
+1899, Congressional Record, December 5, 1899, p. 34.
+
+[478] Provinces totalling about a million people.
+
+[479] Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 211.
+
+[480] Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38.
+
+[481] Ibid., 1906; pt. 1, p. 225.
+
+[482] To be absolutely accurate, there are 688 people classified as
+"wild" in the Census figures as to Samar, and 265,549 are put down
+as civilized; the total of population being 266,237. All the 388,922
+people of Leyte are put down as civilized. See Philippine Census,
+Table of Population, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[483] Report of Philippine Commission for 1907, pt. 1, p. 195.
+
+[484] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1908, pt. 1, p. 62.
+
+[485] Tract. You speak of the small farmer's "late of hemp" in the
+Philippines as you do of his "patch of cotton" in the United States.
+
+[486] A picul is a bale of a given quantity--weight. "Breaking out
+a picul of hemp" is analogous, colloquially, to "picking a bale
+of cotton."
+
+[487] See Congressional Record, December 5, 1905, p. 103.
+
+[488] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 215.
+
+[489] Macbeth, Act V., Sc. 8.
+
+[490] In June, 1912, Governor Forbes was still Governor-General.
+
+[491] By "foreign" I mean, of course, American, i.e., non-resident.
+
+[492] Hearings on Sugar, April 5, 1912.
+
+[493] Introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. W. A. Jones,
+of Va., Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House,
+in March, 1912.
+
+[494] See also, in connection with this table, the folding map of
+the archipelago at the end of the book.
+
+[495] The greatest defect of the Philippine Government was in the
+beginning, and still is, that the Philippine Commission, which is
+the executive authority, controls the appointment and assignment of
+the trial judges, and also, largely, their chances for promotion
+to the Supreme Bench of the Islands. The Justices of the Supreme
+Court are appointed by the President of the United States, often on
+recommendation of the Commission, but thereafter they are absolutely
+independent. The trial judges ought also to be appointed by the
+President of the United States.
+
+[496] Republished, Congressional Record, January 9, 1900, p. 715.
+
+[497] See Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 89
+et seq.
+
+[498] Report Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 1, p. 99.
+
+[499] U. S. Philippine Commission Report, 1907, pt. 1, p. 149.
+
+[500] See Report Philippine Commission for 1907, pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[501] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 142.
+
+[502] Ibid., pp. 559-560.
+
+[503] See War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.
+
+[504] War Department Report, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[505] From July 31, 1898, to May 24, 1900, we lost 1138 men by
+disease. See special report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, Senate
+Document 426, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. By the middle of 1900 our soldiers
+had pretty well learned how to take care of themselves in the tropics.
+
+[506] See vol. ii., p. 102.
+
+[507] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 887.
+
+[508] Appalling, because there are forty-nine other provinces besides
+Batangas.
+
+[509] Vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[510] See page 78 of the special report of the Secretary of War
+Taft on the Philippines, January 23, 1908, transmitted by President
+Roosevelt to Congress, January 27, 1908, Senate Document 200, 60th
+Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[511] Act 230, U. S. Philippine Commission.
+
+[512] For the convenience of readers who do not constantly use the
+metric system: A kilo is about 2.25 lbs.
+
+[513] According to what part of archipelago grown.
+
+[514] The Payne law of 1909 continued the export tax, etc.
+
+[515] Dried cocoa-nut meat, used to make soaps and oils. I do not
+deal with copra because it nearly all goes to Europe, principally
+to Marseilles.
+
+[516] Senate Document 200, 1908, Sixtieth Congress, First Session.
+
+[517] I have myself seen a cloud of locusts three miles long.
+
+[518] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1904, pt. 1, pp. 26-7.
+
+[519] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, pp. 72-3.
+
+[520] Senator Newlands, North American Review, December, 1905. Senator
+Newlands was one of the party.
+
+[521] Part 1, p. 99.
+
+[522] 137 1/2 lbs.
+
+[523] President Roosevelt's message to Congress of January 27, 1908,
+transmitting report of Secretary of War Taft on the Philippines.
+
+[524] Before assuming to use these letters in this book, I sent them
+to Mr. Carnegie and asked his permission to so use them. He returned
+them to me with his consent entered on the back of one of them.
+
+[525] 300,000 tons of sugar, 150,000,000 cigars, etc.
+
+[526] Congressional Record, May 13, 1909, p. 2009.
+
+[527] Mr. Perkins is chairman of the Finance Committee of the
+International Harvester Company, a hundred million dollar corporation
+owning divers subsidiary companies which make twine and cordage. See
+Moody's Manual.
+
+[528] The Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe.
+
+[529] Paul Morton.
+
+[530] Autobiography of Seventy Years, vol. ii., p. 317.
+
+[531] P. 252, ante.
+
+[532] P. 255.
+
+[533] P. 258.
+
+[534] Pp. 258-9.
+
+[535] The name is immaterial, but the grouping is convenient and
+practicable, though not the only grouping practicable.
+
+[536] See p. 267, ante.
+
+[537] For June 21, 1907.
+
+[538] In the article quoted from I named three men, adding "or
+any three men of like calibre." One of the three was Justice Adam
+C. Carson, of the Philippine Supreme Court, who has been a member
+of the Philippine Judiciary since the Taft Civil Government was
+founded in 1901. If this book has gained for me any character in
+the estimation of any reader who is or may hereafter be clothed with
+authority, I desire to say here, on the very highest public grounds,
+that, in my judgment, Judge Carson is the most considerable man we
+have out there now (1912)--a good man to have in an emergency. Though
+not as learned in the law as his colleague, Justice Johnson--who is
+quite the equal, as a jurist, of most of the Federal judges I know
+in the United States, Judge Carson is a man of great breadth of view,
+and is peculiarly endowed with capacity to handle men and situations
+effectively and patriotically.
+
+[539] Says the census of the Philippines of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15:
+"The total population of the Philippine Archipelago on March 2,
+1903, was 7,635,426. Of this number, 6,987,686 enjoyed a considerable
+degree of civilization, while the remainder, 647,740, consisted of wild
+people." By this same Census, the Moros are classified as uncivilized,
+and the population of the island on which they live, Mindanao, is
+given at about 500,000 (499,634, vol. ii., p. 126), of which about
+half only (252,940) are Moros, the rest being civilized. The total of
+the uncivilized people of the archipelago, according to the Census, is
+647,740 (vol. ii., p. 123), less than 400,000, leaving out the Moros.
+
+[540] Tagalo, Ilocano, and Visayan are the three main dialects
+that have been evolved into written language by the patience of the
+Spanish priests in the last couple of hundred years or so. Probably
+five sixths of the people of the archipelago speak some one of these
+three dialects. In fact they can hardly be called "dialects," for there
+are plenty of books--novels, plays, grammars, histories, dictionaries,
+etc.--written in Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan. Every educated Filipino
+of the well-to-do classes grows up speaking Spanish and the dialect
+of his native province, while the latter is the only language spoken
+by the less fortunate people of his neighborhood, the poorer classes.
+
+[541] This report is numbered Report 606, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., and
+accompanies H. R. 22143 (the Jones Bill).
+
+[542] According to the American Census of the Philippines, of 1903,
+the total population of Mindanao is 499,634 (see vol. ii., p. 126),
+of which 252,940 are Moros, and the rest civilized. In addition to
+said 252,940 Moros on Mindanao, the adjacent islets contain some
+25,000 Moros.
+
+[543] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 339.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the
+Philippines 1898-1912, by James H. Blount
+
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the Philippines
+1898-1912, by James H. Blount
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
+
+Author: James H. Blount
+
+Release Date: June 28, 2011 [EBook #36542]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by the
+Digital & Multimedia Center, Michigan State University
+Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+<div class="front">
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first"></p>
+<div class="figure xd20e112width" id="frontispiece"><img src=
+"images/frontispiece.jpg" alt=
+"The capture of Aguinaldo, March 22, 1901. The central fact of the American military occupation."
+width="720" height="466">
+<p class="figureHead">The capture of Aguinaldo, March 22, 1901. The
+central fact of the American military occupation.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first"></p>
+<div class="figure xd20e119width"><img src="images/titlepage.jpg" alt=
+"Original Title Page." width="425" height="720"></div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="titlePage">
+<div class="docTitle">
+<div class="mainTitle">The American Occupation of the Philippines</div>
+<div class="subTitle">1898&ndash;1912</div>
+</div>
+<div class="byline">By<br>
+<span class="docAuthor">James H. Blount</span><br>
+Officer of United States Volunteers in the Philippines,
+1899&ndash;1901<br>
+United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901&ndash;1905</div>
+<div class="docImprint"><i>With a Map</i><br>
+G. P. Putnam&rsquo;s Sons<br>
+New York and London<br>
+<i>The Knickerbocker Press</i><br>
+<span class="docDate">1912</span></div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first xd20e159"><span class="sc">Copyright</span>, 1912<br>
+By<br>
+James H. Blount</p>
+<p class="xd20e159"><i>The Knickerbocker Press, New York</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first xd20e159"><i>To</i><br>
+<span class="xd20e178">JOHN DOWNEY WORKS</span><br>
+OF CALIFORNIA<br>
+AS FINE A TYPE OF CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN<br>
+AS EVER<br>
+GRACED A SEAT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES<br>
+WHO<br>
+BELIEVING, WITH THE WRITER, AS TO THE PHILIPPINES, THAT<br>
+INDEFINITE RETENTION WITH UNDECLARED INTENTION<br>
+IS<br>
+INDEFINITE DRIFTING<br>
+HAS READ THE MANUSCRIPT OF THIS WORK<br>
+AS IT PROGRESSED<br>
+LENDING TO ITS PREPARATION THE AID AND COUNSEL OF<br>
+AN OLDER AND A WISER MAN<br>
+AND<br>
+THE CONTAGIOUS SERENITY OF<br>
+CONFIDENCE THAT RIGHT WILL PREVAIL<br>
+THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED BY<br>
+<span class="sc">The Author</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"xd20e222" href="#xd20e222" name="xd20e222">v</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="main">Preface</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line xd20e228">Pardon, gentles all,</p>
+<p class="line">The flat unraised spirit that hath dared</p>
+<p class="line">On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth</p>
+<p class="line">So great an object.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Henry V.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">To have gone out to the other side of the world with
+an army of invasion, and had a part, however small, in the subjugation
+of a strange people, and then to see a new government set up, and, as
+an official of that government, watch it work out through a number of
+years, is an unusual and interesting experience, especially to a
+lawyer. What seem to me the most valuable things I learned in the
+course of that experience are herein submitted to my fellow-countrymen,
+in connection with a narrative covering the whole of the American
+occupation of the Philippines to date.</p>
+<p>This book is an attempt, by one whose intimate acquaintance with two
+remotely separated peoples will be denied in no quarter, to interpret
+each to the other. How intelligent that acquaintance is, is of course
+altogether another matter, which the reader will determine for
+himself.</p>
+<p>The task here undertaken is to make audible to a great free nation
+the voice of a weaker subject people who passionately and rightly long
+to be also free, but whose longings have been systematically denied for
+the last fourteen years, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes viciously, and
+always cruelly, on the wholly erroneous <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"xd20e246" href="#xd20e246" name="xd20e246">vi</a>]</span>idea that
+where the <i>end</i> is benevolent, it justifies the <i>means</i>,
+regardless of the means necessary to the end.</p>
+<p>At a time when all our military and fiscal experts agree that having
+the Philippines on our hands is a grave strategic and economic mistake,
+fraught with peril to the nation&rsquo;s prestige in the early stages
+of our next great war, we are keeping the Filipinos in industrial
+bondage through unrighteous Congressional legislation for which special
+interests in America are responsible, in bald repudiation of the Open
+Door policy, and against their helpless but universal protest, a wholly
+unprotected and easy prey to the first first-class Power with which we
+become involved in war. Yet all the while the very highest
+considerations of national honor require us to choose between making
+the Filipino people free and independent without unnecessary delay, as
+they of right ought to be, or else imperilling the perpetuity of our
+own institutions by the creation and maintenance of a great standing
+army, sufficient properly to guard overseas possessions.</p>
+<p>A cheerful blindness to the inevitable worthy of Mark Tapley
+himself, the stale Micawberism that &ldquo;something is bound to turn
+up,&rdquo; and a Mrs. Jellyby philanthropy hopelessly callous to
+domestic duties, expenses, and distresses, have hitherto successfully
+united to prevent the one simple and supreme need of the
+situation&mdash;a frank, formal, and definite declaration, by <i>the
+law-making power</i> of the government, of the nation&rsquo;s purpose
+in the premises. What is needed is a formal legislative announcement
+that the governing of a remote and alien people is to have no permanent
+place in the purposes of our national life, and that we do <i>bona
+fide</i> intend, just as soon as a stable government, republican in
+form, can be established by the people of the Philippine Islands, to
+turn over, upon terms which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e264"
+href="#xd20e264" name="xd20e264">vii</a>]</span>shall be reasonable and
+just, the government and control of the islands to the people
+thereof.</p>
+<p>The essentials of the problem, being at least as immutable as human
+nature and geography, will not change much with time. And whenever the
+American people are ready to abandon the strange gods whose guidance
+has necessitated a new definition of Liberty consistent with taxation
+without representation and unanimous protest by the governed, they will
+at once set about to secure to a people who have proven themselves
+brave and self-sacrificing in war, and gentle, generous, and tractable
+in peace, the right to pursue happiness in <i>their own</i> way, in
+lieu of somebody else&rsquo;s way, as the spirit of our Constitution,
+and the teachings of our God, Who is also theirs, alike demand.</p>
+<p>After seven years spent at the storm-centre of so-called
+&ldquo;Expansion,&rdquo; the first of the seven as a volunteer officer
+in Cuba during and after the Spanish War, the next two in a like
+capacity in the Philippines, and the remainder as a United States judge
+in the last-named country, the writer was finally invalided home in
+1905, sustained in spirit, at parting, by cordial farewells, oral and
+written, personal and official, but convinced that foreign kindness
+will not cure the desire of a people, once awakened, for what used to
+be known as Freedom before we freed Cuba and then subjugated the
+Philippines; and that to permanently eradicate sedition from the
+Philippine Islands, the American courts there must be given
+jurisdiction over thought as well as over overt act, and must learn the
+method of drawing an indictment against a whole people.</p>
+<p>Seven other years of interested observation from the Western
+Hemisphere end of the line have confirmed and fortified the convictions
+above set forth.</p>
+<p>If we give the Filipinos this independence they so <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e277" href="#xd20e277" name=
+"xd20e277">viii</a>]</span>ardently desire and ever clamor for until
+made to shut up, &ldquo;the holy cause,&rdquo; as their brilliant young
+representative in the American House of Representatives, Mr. Quezon,
+always calls it, will <i>not</i> be at once spoiled, as the American
+hemp and other special interests so contemptuously insist, by the
+gentleman named, and his compatriot, Se&ntilde;or Osme&ntilde;a, the
+Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and the rest of the leaders of the
+patriot cause, in a general mutual throat-cutting incidental to a
+scramble for the offices. This sort of contention is merely the hiss of
+the same old serpent of tyranny which has always beset the pathway of
+man&rsquo;s struggle for free institutions.</p>
+<p>When first the talk in America, after the battle of Manila Bay,
+about keeping the Philippines, reached the islands, one of the Filipino
+leaders wrote to another during the negotiations between their
+commanding general and our own looking to preservation of the peace
+until the results of the Paris Peace Conference which settled the fate
+of the islands should be known, in effect, thus: &ldquo;The Filipinos
+will not be fit for independence in ten, twenty, or a hundred years if
+it be left to American colonial office-holders drawing good salaries to
+determine the question.&rdquo; Is there not some human nature in that
+remark? Suppose, reader, you were in the enjoyment of a salary of five,
+ten, or twenty thousand dollars a year as a government official in the
+Philippines, how precipitately would you hasten to recommend yourself
+out of office, and evict yourself into this cold Western world with
+which you had meantime lost all touch?</p>
+<p>The Filipinos can run a far better government than the Cubans. In
+1898, when Admiral Dewey read in the papers that we were going to give
+Cuba independence, he wired home from Manila: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e287" href="#xd20e287" name=
+"xd20e287">ix</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">These people are far superior in their intelligence,
+and more capable of self-government than the people of Cuba, and I am
+familiar with both races.</p>
+</div>
+<p>After a year in Cuba and nearly six in the Philippines, two as an
+officer of the army that subjugated the Filipinos, and the remainder as
+a judge over them, I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral Dewey,
+but with this addition, viz., that the people of those islands,
+whatever of conscious political unity they may have lacked in 1898,
+were welded into absolute oneness as a people by their original
+struggle for independence against us, and will remain forever so welded
+by their incurable aspirations for a national life of their own under a
+republic framed in imitation of ours. Furthermore, the one great
+difference between Cuba and the Philippines is that the latter country
+has no race cancer forever menacing its peace, and sapping its
+self-reliance. The Philippine people are absolutely one people, as to
+race, color, and previous condition. Again, American sugar and tobacco
+interests will never permit the competitive Philippine sugar and
+tobacco industries to grow as Nature and Nature&rsquo;s God intended;
+and the American importers of Manila hemp&mdash;which is to the
+Philippines what cotton is to the South&mdash;have, through special
+Congressional legislation still standing on our statute books&mdash;to
+the shame of the nation&mdash;so depressed the hemp industry of the
+islands that the market price it brings to-day is just one half what it
+brought ten years ago.</p>
+<p>If three strong and able Americans, familiar with insular conditions
+and still young enough to undertake the task, were told by a President
+of the United States, by authority of Congress, &ldquo;Go out there and
+set up a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e296" href="#xd20e296" name=
+"xd20e296">x</a>]</span>stable native government by July 4,
+1921,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e298src" href="#xd20e298" name=
+"xd20e298src">1</a> and then come away,&rdquo; they could and would do
+it; and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest
+moral victories in the annals of free government would have been
+written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their
+country&rsquo;s history.</p>
+<p>We ought to give the Filipinos their independence, even if we have
+to guarantee it to them. But, by neutralization treaties with the other
+great Powers similar to those which safeguard the integrity and
+independence of Switzerland to-day, whereby the other Powers would
+agree not to seize the islands after we give them their independence,
+the Philippines can be made as permanently neutral territory in Asiatic
+politics as Switzerland is to-day in European politics.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">James H. Blount.</span></p>
+<p class="dateline">1406 G Street, N. W.,<br>
+<span class="sc">Washington, D. C.</span>,<br>
+July 4, 1912.</p>
+<p>P.S.&mdash;The preparation of this book has entailed examination of
+a vast mass of official documents, as will appear from the foot-note
+citations to the page and volume from which quotations have been made.
+The object has been to place all material statements of fact beyond
+question. For the purpose of this research work, Mr. Herbert Putnam,
+Librarian of Congress, was kind enough to extend me the privileges of
+the national library, and it would be most ungracious to fail to
+acknowledge the obligation I am under, in this regard, to one whom the
+country is indeed fortunate <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e318"
+href="#xd20e318" name="xd20e318">xi</a>]</span>in having at the head of
+that great institution. I should also make acknowledgment of the
+obligation I am under to Mr. W. W. Bishop, the able superintendent of
+the reading-room, for aid rendered whenever asked, and to my life-long
+friends, John and Hugh Morrison, the most valuable men, to the general
+public, except the two gentlemen above named, on the whole great roll
+of employees of the Library of Congress.</p>
+<p class="signed">J. H. B. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e322"
+href="#xd20e322" name="xd20e322">xiii</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e298" href="#xd20e298src" name="xd20e298">1</a></span> The date
+contemplated by the pending Philippine Independence Bill, introduced in
+the House of Representatives in March, 1912, by Hon. W. A. Jones,
+Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="toc" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="main">Contents</h2>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">Pages</span></p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter I</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch1">Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s
+Serenade</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">1&ndash;15</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United
+States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements, finding
+Aguinaldo a political refugee at that place at the outbreak of our war
+with Spain, April 21, 1898, arranges by cable with Admiral Dewey, then
+at Hong Kong with his squadron, for Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong and
+thence to Manila, to co-operate by land with Admiral Dewey against the
+Spaniards, Pratt promising Aguinaldo independence, without authority.
+Mr. Pratt is later quietly separated from the consular service.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter II</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch2">Dewey and
+Aguinaldo</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">16&ndash;45</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">After the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898,
+Admiral Dewey brings Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong, whither he had
+proceeded from Singapore, lands him at Cavite, and chaperones his
+insurrection against the Spaniards until the American troops arrive,
+June 30th.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter III</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch3">Anderson and
+Aguinaldo</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">46&ndash;66</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">General Anderson&rsquo;s official dealings with
+Aguinaldo from June 30, 1898, until General Merritt&rsquo;s arrival,
+July 25th,</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter IV</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch4">Merritt and
+Aguinaldo</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">67&ndash;87</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">General Merritt&rsquo;s five weeks&rsquo;
+sojourn in the Islands, from July 25, 1898, to the end of August,
+including fall of Manila, August 13th, and our relations with Aguinaldo
+during period indicated. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e379" href=
+"#xd20e379" name="xd20e379">xiv</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter V</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch5">Otis and
+Aguinaldo</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">88&ndash;106</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Dealings and relations between,
+September&ndash;December, 1898.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VI</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch6">The
+Wilcox-Sargent Trip</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">107&ndash;120</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Two American naval officers make an extended
+tour through the interior of Luzon by permission of Admiral Dewey and
+with Aguinaldo&rsquo;s consent, in October&ndash;November, 1898, while
+the Paris peace negotiations were in progress. What they saw and
+learned.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch7">The Treaty of
+Paris</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">121&ndash;138</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">An account of the negotiations,
+October-December, 1898. How we came to pay Spain $20,000,000 for a
+$200,000,000 insurrection. Treaty signed December 10, 1898.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter VIII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch8">The Benevolent
+Assimilation Proclamation</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">139&ndash;151</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">President McKinley&rsquo;s celebrated
+proclamation of December 21, 1898, cabled out to the Islands, December
+27, 1898, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on the 10th, and
+intended as a fire-extinguisher, in fact acted merely as a firebrand,
+the Filipinos perceiving that Benevolent Assimilation meant such
+measure of slaughter as might be necessary to &ldquo;spare them from
+the dangers of&rdquo; the independence on which they were bent.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter IX</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch9">The Iloilo
+Fiasco</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">152&ndash;163</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">By order of President McKinley, General Otis
+abstains from hostilities to await Senate action on Treaty of
+Paris.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter X</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch10">Otis and
+Aguinaldo</a></span> (<i>Continued</i>) &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">164&ndash;185</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Still waiting for the Senate to act.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e456" href="#xd20e456" name=
+"xd20e456">xv</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XI</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch11">Otis and the
+War</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">186&ndash;223</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Covering the period from the outbreak of
+February 4, 1899, until the fall of that year.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch12">Otis and the
+War</a></span> (<i>Continued</i>) &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">224&ndash;269</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">From the fall of 1899 to the spring of 1900.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch13">Macarthur and
+the War</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">270&ndash;281</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Carries the story up to the date of the arrival
+of the Taft Commission, sent out in the spring of 1900, to help General
+MacArthur run the war.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIV</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch14">The Taft
+Commission</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">282&ndash;344</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows how the Taft Commission, born of the
+McKinley Benevolent Assimilation theory that there was no real
+fundamental opposition to American rule, lived up to that theory, in
+their telegrams sent home during the presidential campaign of 1900, and
+in 1901 set up a civil government predicated upon their obstinate but
+opportune delusions of the previous year.</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">&ldquo;The papers &rsquo;id it &rsquo;andsome</p>
+<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first tocChapter">Chapter XV</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch15">Governor
+Taft</a></span>&mdash;1901&ndash;2 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">345&ndash;402</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows the prematurity of a civil government set
+up under pressure of political expediency, and the disorders which
+followed.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVI</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch16">Governor
+Taft</a></span>&mdash;1903 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">403&ndash;436</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows divers serious insurrections in various
+provinces amounting to what the Commission itself termed, in one
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e539" href="#xd20e539" name=
+"xd20e539">xvi</a>]</span>instance, &ldquo;a reign of
+terror&rdquo;&mdash;situations so endangering the public safety that to
+fail to order out the army to quell the disturbances was neglect of
+plain duty, such neglect being due to a set policy of preserving the
+official fiction that peace prevailed, and that Benevolent Assimilation
+was a success.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch17">Governor
+Taft</a></span>&mdash;1903 (<i>Continued</i>) &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">437&ndash;445</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows the essentially despotic, though
+theoretically benevolent, character of the Taft civil government of the
+Philippines, and its attitude toward the American business community in
+the Islands.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XVIII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch18">Governor
+Wright</a></span>&mdash;1904 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">446&ndash;498</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows the change of the tone of the government
+under Governor Taft&rsquo;s successor, his consequent popularity with
+his fellow-country men in the Islands, and his corresponding
+unpopularity with the Filipinos. Shows also a long series of massacres
+of <i>pacificos</i> by enemies of the American government between July
+and November, 1904, permitted out of super-solicitude lest ordering out
+the army and summarily putting a stop to said massacres might affect
+the presidential election in the United States unfavorably to Mr.
+Roosevelt, by reviving the notion that neither the Roosevelt
+Administration nor its predecessor had ever been frank with the country
+concerning the state of public order in the Islands.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XIX</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch19">Governor
+Wright</a></span>&mdash;1905 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">499&ndash;514</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows the prompt ordering of the army to the
+scene of the disturbances after the presidential election of 1904 was
+safely over, and the nature and extent of the insurrections of
+1905.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XX</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch20">Governor
+Ide</a></span>&mdash;1906 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">515&ndash;523</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Describes the last outbreak prior to the final
+establishment of a state of general and complete peace. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e596" href="#xd20e596" name=
+"xd20e596">xvii</a>]</span></p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXI</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch21">Governor
+Smith</a></span>&mdash;1907&ndash;9 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">524&ndash;557</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Describes divers matters, including a
+certificate made March 28, 1907, declaring that a state of general and
+complete peace had prevailed for the two years immediately the
+preceding. Describes also the formal opening of First Philippine
+Assembly by Secretary of War Taft in October, 1907, and his final
+announcement to them that he had no authority to end the uncertainty
+concerning their future which is the corner-stone of the Taft policy of
+Indefinite Tutelage, and that Congress only could end that
+uncertainty.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch22">Governor
+Forbes</a></span>&mdash;1909&ndash;12 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">558&ndash;570</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Suggests the hypocrisy of boasting about
+&ldquo;the good we are doing&rdquo; the Filipinos when predatory
+special interests are all the while preying upon the Philippine people
+even more shamelessly than they do upon the American people, and by the
+same methods, viz.: legislation placed or kept on the statute-books of
+the United States for their special benefit, the difference being that
+the American people can help themselves if they will, but the
+Philippine people cannot.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href=
+"#ch23">&ldquo;Non-Christian&rdquo; Worcester</a></span>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">571&ndash;586</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Professor Worcester, the P. T. Barnum of the
+&ldquo;non-Christian tribe&rdquo; industry, and his menagerie of
+certain rare and interesting wild tribes still extant in the Islands,
+specimens of which you saw at the St. Louis Exposition of 1903&ndash;4;
+by which device the American people have been led to believe the
+Igorrotes, Negritos, etc., to be samples of the Filipino people.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIV</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch24">The Philippine
+Civil Service</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">587&ndash;594</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Showing how imperatively simple justice demands
+that Americans, who go out to enter the Philippine Civil Service
+should, after a tour of duty out there, be entitled, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="xd20e646" href="#xd20e646" name=
+"xd20e646">xviii</a>]</span>as matter of right, to be transferred back
+to the Civil Service in the United States, instead of being left wholly
+dependent on political influence to &ldquo;place&rdquo; them after
+their final return home.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXV</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch25">Cost of the
+Philippines</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">595&ndash;603</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">In life, and money, together with certain
+consolatory reflections thereon.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVI</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch26">Congressional
+Legislation</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">604&ndash;622</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Showing how a small group of American importers
+of Manila hemp&mdash;hemp being to the Philippines what cotton is to
+the South&mdash;have so manipulated the Philippine hemp industry as to
+depress the market price of the main source of wealth of the Islands
+below the cost of production; also other evils of taxation without
+representation.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch27">The Rights of
+Man</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">623&ndash;632</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Industrial slavery to predatory interests and
+physical slavery compared.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXVIII</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch28">The Road to
+Autonomy</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">633&ndash;646</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows how entirely easy would be the task of
+evolving the American Ireland we have laid up for ourselves in the
+Philippines into complete Home Rule by 1921, the date proposed for
+Philippine independence in the pending Jones bill, introduced in the
+House of Representatives in March, 1912.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter">Chapter XXIX</p>
+<p class="tocSection"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch29">The Way
+Out</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">647&ndash;655</span></p>
+<p class="tocArgument">Shows how, by neutralization treaties with the
+other powers, as proposed in many different resolutions, of both
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e710" href="#xd20e710" name=
+"xd20e710">xix</a>]</span>Republican and Democratic origin, now pending
+in Congress, whereby the other powers should agree not to annex the
+Islands after we give them their independence, the Philippines can be
+made <i>permanently neutral territory in Asiatic politics</i> exactly
+as both Switzerland and Belgium have been for nearly a hundred years in
+European politics.</p>
+<p class="tocChapter"><span class="sc"><a href=
+"#index">Index</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">657</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="xd20e723" href=
+"#xd20e723" name="xd20e723">xxi</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="main">Illustrations</h2>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">Page</span></p>
+<p><span class="sc"><a href="#frontispiece">The Capture of Aguinaldo,
+March 23, 1901&mdash;The Central Fact of the American Military
+Occupation</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum"><i>Frontispiece</i></span><br>
+From the Drawing by F. C. Yohn<br>
+Copyright by Charles Scribner&rsquo;s Sons</p>
+<p><span class="sc"><a href="#p228">Bird&rsquo;s-eye View of the
+Philippine Archipelago, Showing Preponderating Importance of
+Luzon</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum">228</span></p>
+<p><span class="sc"><a href="#p232">Outline Sketch of the Theatre of
+Operations in Luzon, 1899</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
+<span class="tocPagenum">232</span></p>
+<p><span class="sc"><a href="#map">Sketch Map of the
+Philippines</a></span> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class=
+"tocPagenum"><i>At End</i></span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb1"
+href="#pb1" name="pb1">1</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="body">
+<div id="ch1" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="super">The American Occupations of the Philippines</h2>
+<h2 class="label">Chapter I</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s Serenade</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Had I but served my God with half the zeal</p>
+<p class="line">I served my king, he would not in mine age</p>
+<p class="line">Have left me naked to mine enemies.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>King Henry VIII.</i>, Act III., Sc. 2.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Any narrative covering our acquisition of the
+Philippine Islands must, of course, centre in the outset about Admiral
+Dewey, and the destruction by him of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on
+Sunday morning, May 1, 1898. But as the Admiral had brought Aguinaldo
+down from Hong Kong to Manila after the battle, and landed him on May
+19th to start an auxiliary insurrection, which insurrection kept the
+Spaniards bottled up in Manila on the land side for three and a half
+months while Dewey did the same by sea, until ten thousand American
+troops arrived, and easily completed the reduction and capture of the
+beleaguered and famished city on August 13th, it is necessary to a
+clear understanding of the <i>de facto</i> alliance between the
+Americans and Aguinaldo thus created, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb2" href="#pb2" name="pb2">2</a>]</span>know who brought the Admiral
+and Aguinaldo together and how, and why.</p>
+<p>The United States declared war against Spain, April 21, 1898, to
+free Cuba, and at once arranged an understanding with the Cuban
+revolutionists looking to co-operation between their forces and ours to
+that end. For some years prior to this, political conditions in the
+Philippines had been quite similar to those in Cuba, so that when, two
+days after war broke out, the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General
+of the United States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements,
+found Aguinaldo, who had headed the last organized outbreak against
+Spain in the Philippines, temporarily sojourning as a political refugee
+at Singapore, in the Filipino colony there, he naturally sought to
+arrange for his co-operating with us against Spain, as Gomez and Garcia
+were doing in Cuba. Thereby hangs the story of &ldquo;Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s
+Serenade.&rdquo; However, before we listen to the band whose strains
+spoke the gratitude of the Filipinos to Mr. Pratt for having introduced
+Aguinaldo to Dewey, let us learn somewhat of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+antecedents, as related to the purposes of the introduction.</p>
+<p>The first low rumbling of official thunder premonitory to the war
+with Spain was heard in Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s annual message to Congress
+of December, 1897,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e804src" href="#xd20e804"
+name="xd20e804src">1</a> wherein he said, among other things:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The most important problem with which this government
+is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns
+its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In that very month of December, 1897, Aguinaldo was heading a
+formidable insurrection against Spanish <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb3" href="#pb3" name="pb3">3</a>]</span>tyranny in the Philippines,
+and the Filipinos and their revolutionary committees everywhere were
+watching with eager interest the course of &ldquo;The Great North
+American Republic,&rdquo; as they were wont to term our government.</p>
+<p>The Report of the First Philippine Commission sent out to the
+Islands by President McKinley in February, 1899, of which President
+Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, contains a succinct
+memorandum concerning the Filipino revolutionary movement of
+1896&ndash;7, which had been begun by Aguinaldo in 1896, and had
+culminated in what is known as the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e819src" href="#xd20e819" name="xd20e819src">2</a>
+signed December 14, 1897. This treaty had promised certain reforms,
+such as representation in the Spanish Cortez, sending the Friars away,
+etc., and had also promised the leaders $400,000 if Aguinaldo and his
+Cabinet would leave the country and go to Hong Kong. &ldquo;No definite
+time was fixed,&rdquo; says President Schurman (vol. I., p. 171),
+&ldquo;during which these men were to remain away from the Philippines;
+and if the promises made by Spain were not fulfilled, they had the
+right to return.&rdquo; Of course, &ldquo;the promises made by
+Spain&rdquo; were <i>not</i> fulfilled. Spain thought she had bought
+Aguinaldo and his crowd off. &ldquo;Two hundred thousand
+dollars,&rdquo; says Prof. Schurman, &ldquo;was paid to Aguinaldo when
+he arrived in Hong Kong.&rdquo; But instead of using this money in
+riotous living, the little group of exiles began to take notice of the
+struggles of their brothers in wretchedness in Cuba, and the
+ever-increasing probability of intervention by the United States in
+that unhappy Spanish colony, which, of course, would be <i>their</i>
+opportunity to strike for Independence. They had only been in Hong Kong
+about two months when the <i>Maine</i> blew up <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb4" href="#pb4" name="pb4">4</a>]</span>February 15,
+1898, Then they knew there would be &ldquo;something doing.&rdquo; Hong
+Kong being the cross-roads of the Far East and the gateway to Asia, and
+being only sixty hours across the choppy China Sea from Manila, was the
+best place in that part of the world to brew another insurrection
+against Spain. But Singapore is also a good place for a branch office
+for such an enterprise, being on the main-travelled route between the
+Philippines and Spain by way of the Suez Canal, about four or five days
+out of Hong Kong by a good liner, and but little farther from Manila,
+as the crow flies, than Hong Kong itself. Owing to political unrest in
+the Philippines in 1896&ndash;7&ndash;8, there was quite a colony of
+Filipino political refugees living at Singapore during that period.
+Aguinaldo had gone over from Hong Kong to Singapore in the latter half
+of April, 1898, arriving there, it so chanced, the day we declared war
+against Spain, April 21st. He was immediately sought out by Mr. Pratt,
+who had learned of his presence in the community through an Englishman
+of Singapore, a former resident of Manila, a Mr. Bray, who seems to
+have been a kind of striker for the Filipino general. Aguinaldo had
+come <i>incognito</i>. Out of Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s interview with the
+insurgent chief thus obtained, and its results, grew the episode which
+is the subject of this chapter.</p>
+<p>A word just here, preliminary to this interview, concerning the
+personal equation of Aguinaldo, would seem to be advisable.</p>
+<p>While I personally chased him and his outfit a good deal in the
+latter part of 1899, in the northern advance of a column of General
+Lawton&rsquo;s Division from San Isidro across the Rio Grande de
+Pampanga, over the boggy passes of the Caraballa Mountains to the China
+Sea, and up the Luzon West Coast road, we never did <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb5" href="#pb5" name="pb5">5</a>]</span>catch him,
+and I never personally met him but once, and that was after he was
+captured in 1901. He was as insignificant looking physically as a
+Japanese diplomat. But his presence suggested, equally with that of his
+wonderful racial cousins who represent the great empire of the Mikado
+abroad, both a high order of intelligence and baffling reserve. And
+Major-General J. Franklin Bell, recently Chief of Staff, United States
+Army, who was a Major on General Merritt&rsquo;s staff in 1898, having
+charge of the &ldquo;Office of Military Information,&rdquo; in a
+confidential report prepared for his chief dated August 29, 1898,
+&ldquo;sizing up&rdquo; the various insurgent leaders, in view of the
+then apparent probability of trouble with them, gives these notes on
+Aguinaldo, the head and front of the revolution: &ldquo;Aguinaldo:
+Honest, sincere, and *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* a natural leader of
+men.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e843src" href="#xd20e843" name=
+"xd20e843src">3</a></p>
+<p>Any one acquainted with General Bell knows that he knows what he is
+talking about when he speaks of &ldquo;a natural leader of men,&rdquo;
+for he is one himself. Our ablest men in the early days were the first
+to cease considering the little brown soldiers a joke, and their
+government an <i>opera-bouffe</i> affair. General Bell also says in the
+same report that he, Aguinaldo, is undoubtedly endowed in a wonderful
+degree with &ldquo;the power of creating among the people confidence in
+himself.&rdquo; He was, indeed, the very incarnation of &ldquo;the
+legitimate aspirations of&rdquo; his people, to use one of the favorite
+phrases of his early state papers, and the faithful interpreter
+thereof. That was the secret of his power, that and a most remarkable
+talent for surrounding himself with an atmosphere of impenetrable
+reserve. This last used to make our young army officers suspect him of
+being what they called a &ldquo;four-flusher,&rdquo; which being
+interpreted means a man who is partially successful <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb6" href="#pb6" name="pb6">6</a>]</span>in making
+people think him far more important than he really is. But we have seen
+General Bell&rsquo;s estimate. And the day Aguinaldo took the oath of
+allegiance to the United States, in 1901, General MacArthur, then
+commanding the American forces in the Philippines, signalized the event
+by liberating 1000 Filipino prisoners of war. General Funston, the man
+who captured him in 1901, says in <i>Scribner&rsquo;s Magazine</i> for
+November, 1911, &ldquo;He is a man of many excellent qualities and
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* far and away the best Filipino I was ever brought in
+contact with.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Aguinaldo was born in 1869. To-day, 1912, he is farming about twenty
+miles out of Manila in his native province of Cavite; has always
+scrupulously observed his oath of allegiance aforesaid; occasionally
+comes to town and plays chess with Governor-General Forbes; and in all
+respects has played for the last ten years with really fine dignity the
+r&ocirc;le of Chieftain of a Lost Cause on which his all had been
+staked. He was a school-teacher at Cavite at one time, but is not a
+college graduate, and so far as mere book education is concerned, he is
+not a highly educated man. Whether or not he can give the principal
+parts of the principal irregular Greek verbs I do not know, but his
+place in the history of his country, and in the annals of wars for
+independence, cannot, and for the honor of human nature should not, be
+a small one. Dr. Rizal, the Filipino patriot whose picture we print on
+the Philippine postage stamps, and who was shot for sedition by the
+Spaniards before our time out there, was what Colonel Roosevelt would
+jocularly call &ldquo;one of these darned literary fellows.&rdquo; He
+was a sort of &ldquo;Sweetness and Light&rdquo; proposition, who only
+<i>wrote</i> about &ldquo;The Rights of Man,&rdquo; and finally
+<i>let</i> the Spaniards shoot him&mdash;stuck his head in the
+lion&rsquo;s mouth, so to speak. Aguinaldo was a born <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb7" href="#pb7" name="pb7">7</a>]</span>leader of
+men, who knew how to put the fear of God into the hearts of the ancient
+oppressors of his people. Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s own story of how he earned
+his serenade is preserved to future ages in the published records of
+the State Department.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e869src" href=
+"#xd20e869" name="xd20e869src">4</a> We will now attempt to summarize,
+not so eloquently as Mr. Pratt, but more briefly, the manner of its
+earning, the serenade itself, and its resultant effects both upon the
+personal fortunes of Mr. Pratt and upon Filipino confidence in American
+official assurances.</p>
+<p>It was on the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1898, that Mr. Pratt
+was confidentially informed of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s arrival at Singapore,
+<i>incognito</i>. &ldquo;Being aware,&rdquo; says Mr. Pratt, &ldquo;of
+the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that
+no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same
+influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see
+him.&rdquo; Accordingly, he did see him the following Sunday morning,
+the 24th.</p>
+<p>At this interview, it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then at
+Hong Kong with his squadron awaiting orders, should so desire,
+Aguinaldo should proceed to Hong Kong to arrange for co-operation of
+the insurgents at Manila with our naval forces in the prospective
+operations against the Spaniards.</p>
+<p>Accordingly, that Sunday, Mr. Pratt telegraphed Dewey through our
+consul at Hong Kong:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong
+arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if
+desired. Telegraph.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Admiral Dewey (then Commodore) replied:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb8" href="#pb8" name=
+"pb8">8</a>]</span></p>
+<p>This message was received late Sunday night, April 24th, and was at
+once communicated to Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt then did considerable
+bustling around for the benefit of his new-found ally, whom, with his
+aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names he
+&ldquo;succeeded in getting off,&rdquo; to use his phrase, by the
+British steamer <i>Malacca</i>, which left Singapore for Hong Kong,
+April 26th. In the letter reporting all this to the State Department,
+Mr. Pratt adds that he trusts this action &ldquo;in arranging for his
+[Aguinaldo&rsquo;s] direct co-operation with the commander of our
+forces&rdquo; will meet with the Government&rsquo;s approval. A little
+later Mr. Pratt sends the State Department a copy of the <i>Singapore
+Free Press</i> of May 4, 1898, containing an impressive account of the
+above transaction and the negotiations leading up to it. This account
+describes the political conditions among the population of the
+Philippine archipelago, &ldquo;which,&rdquo; it goes on to say,
+&ldquo;merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise <i>en
+masse</i>.&rdquo; Speaking of Pratt&rsquo;s interview with Aguinaldo,
+it says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">General Aguinaldo&rsquo;s policy embraces the
+independence of the Philippines. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* American protection
+would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might
+be instituted hereafter in Cuba.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Mr. Pratt also forwards a proclamation gotten up by the Filipino
+insurgent leaders at Hong Kong and sent over to the Philippines in
+advance of Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s coming, calling upon the Filipinos not
+to heed any appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to
+rally to the support of the latter. This manifesto of the Filipinos is
+headed, prominently&mdash;for all we know it may have had a heading as
+big as a Hearst newspaper <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb9" href=
+"#pb9" name="pb9">9</a>]</span>box-car type announcement of the latest
+violation of the Seventh Commandment&mdash;: &ldquo;America&rsquo;s
+Allies.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>It begins thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place
+independence within our reach. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The Americans, not from
+mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of
+so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an
+American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines.
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any
+reinforcements coming from Spain; *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* we insurgents must
+attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms,
+because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us.
+<i>There where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers;
+they are our redeemers!</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e924src" href=
+"#xd20e924" name="xd20e924src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>For twelve days after his letter to the State Department enclosing
+the above proclamation, Mr. Pratt, so far as the record discloses,
+contemplated his <i lang="fr">coup <span class="corr" id="xd20e933"
+title="Source: d&rsquo; &eacute;tat">d&rsquo;&eacute;tat</span></i> in
+silent satisfaction. Since its successful pulling off, Admiral Dewey
+had smashed the Spanish fleet, and Aguinaldo had started his auxiliary
+insurrection. The former was patting the latter on the back, as it
+were, and saying, &ldquo;Go it little man.&rdquo; But nobody was
+patting Pratt on the back, yet. Therefore, on June 2d, Mr. Pratt writes
+the State Department, purring for patting thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo
+has been received by the natives and the confidence with which he
+already appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I
+think, that I did not over-rate his importance and <i>that I have
+materially assisted</i> the cause of the United States in the
+Philippines in securing his co-operation.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e942src" href="#xd20e942" name="xd20e942src">6</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb10" href="#pb10" name=
+"pb10">10</a>]</span></p>
+<p>A glow of conscious superiority, in value to the Government, over
+his consular colleague and neighbor, Mr. Wildman, at Hong Kong, next
+suffuses Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s diction, being manifested thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Why this co-operation should not have been secured to
+us during the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hong
+Kong, and that he was allowed to leave there without having been
+approached in the interest of our Government, I cannot understand.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Considering that in his letter accepting the nomination for the
+Vice-Presidency two years after this Mr. Roosevelt compared Aguinaldo
+and his people to that squalid old Apache medicine man, Sitting Bull,
+and his band of dirty paint-streaked cut-throats, Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s
+next Pickwickian sigh of complacent, if neglected, worth is
+particularly interesting:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No <i>close observer</i> of what had transpired in the
+Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize
+that General Aguinaldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the
+Filipino insurgents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners
+in the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and
+honor.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In other words, knowing the proverbial ingratitude of republics, Mr.
+Pratt is determined to impress upon his Government and on the
+discerning historian of the future that he was &ldquo;the original
+Aguinaldo man.&rdquo; A week later (June 9th) Mr. Pratt writes the
+Department enclosing copies of the Singapore papers of that date,
+giving an account of a generous outburst of Filipino enthusiasm at
+Singapore in honor of America, Admiral Dewey, and, last, if not least,
+Mr. Pratt. He encloses duplicate copies of these newspaper notices
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb11" href="#pb11" name=
+"pb11">11</a>]</span>&ldquo;for the press, should you consider their
+publication desirable.&rdquo; His letter begins:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the
+occasion of the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo&rsquo;s recent
+successes near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in
+Singapore and presented an address. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*</p>
+</div>
+<p>He then proceeds with further details of the event, without
+self-laudation. The Singapore papers which he encloses, however, not
+handicapped by the inexorable modesty of official correspondence, give
+a glowing account of the presentation of the &ldquo;address,&rdquo; and
+of the serenade and toasts which followed. Says one of them, the
+<i>Straits Times:</i></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday
+afternoon in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to
+Raffles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an outlying part. From a
+period shortly prior to 5 o&rsquo;clock, afternoon, the natives of the
+Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate.
+Their object was to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United
+States Consul-General, and, partly, to serenade him, for which purpose
+some twenty-five or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical
+instruments.</p>
+</div>
+<p>First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading
+and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the
+Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the &ldquo;eternal
+gratitude&rdquo; of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the
+honored addressee, alluded to the glories of independence, and to how
+Aguinaldo had been enabled by the arrangement so happily effected with
+Admiral Dewey by Consul Pratt to arouse 8,000,000 of Filipinos to take
+up <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb12" href="#pb12" name=
+"pb12">12</a>]</span>arms &ldquo;in defence of those principles of
+justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost
+champion&rdquo; and trusted &ldquo;that the United States
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* will efficaciously second the programme arranged
+between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and
+secure to us our independence under the protection of the United
+States.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Mr. Pratt arose and &ldquo;proceeded speaking in French,&rdquo; says
+the newspaper&mdash;it does not say Alabama French, but that is
+doubtless what it was&mdash;&ldquo;to state his belief that the
+Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for
+self-government.&rdquo; The gentleman from Alabama then went on to
+review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six weeks,
+Dewey&rsquo;s victory of May 1st,</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished
+leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, <i>co-operating on land with the
+Americans at sea</i>, etc. You have just reason to be proud of what has
+been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your
+fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned
+that General Aguinaldo had arrived <i>incognito</i> in Singapore, I
+immediately <i>sought him out</i>. An hour&rsquo;s interview convinced
+me that he was <i>the man for the occasion</i>; and, having
+communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join
+the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration:
+&ldquo;At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s speech refreshments were
+served, and as the Filipinos, <i>being Christians, drink
+alcohol</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1008src" href="#xd20e1008"
+name="xd20e1008src">7</a> there was no difficulty in arranging as to
+refreshments.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Then followed a general drinking of toasts to America, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb13" href="#pb13" name="pb13">13</a>]</span>Dewey,
+Pratt, and Aguinaldo. Then the band played. Then the meeting broke up.
+Then the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States,
+retired to the seclusion of his apartments in Raffles Hotel, and, under
+the soothing swish of his <i>plunkah</i>, forgot the accursed heat of
+that stepping-off place, Singapore, and dreamed of future
+greatness.</p>
+<p>A few days later the even tenor of Mr. Pratt&rsquo;s meditations was
+disturbed by a letter from the State Department saying, in effect, that
+it was all right to get Aguinaldo&rsquo;s assistance &ldquo;<i>if</i>
+in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be
+practicable to gratify.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1023src"
+href="#xd20e1023" name="xd20e1023src">8</a> But it did <i>not</i> tell
+him to tell the Filipinos so. For Aguinaldo was keeping the Spaniards
+bottled up in the old walled city of Manila on short and ever
+shortening rations, and American troops were on the way to join him,
+and the shorter the food supply grew in Manila the readier the garrison
+would be to surrender when they did arrive, and the fewer American
+soldiers&rsquo; lives would have to be sacrificed in the final capture
+of the town. Every day of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s service under the
+Dewey-Pratt arrangement was worth an American life, perhaps many. It
+was too valuable to repudiate, just yet. July 20th, the State
+Department wrote Mr. Pratt a letter acknowledging receipt of his of
+June 9th &ldquo;enclosing printed copies of a report from the
+<i>Straits Times</i> of the same day, entitled &lsquo;Mr. Spencer
+Pratt&rsquo;s Serenade,&rsquo; with a view to its communication to the
+press,&rdquo; and not only not felicitating him <i>on</i> his serenade,
+but making him sorry he had ever <i>had</i> a serenade. It said, among
+other things:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;The extract now communicated by you from the <i>Straits
+Times</i> of the 9th of June has occasioned <i>a feeling of disquietude
+and a doubt as to whether some of your acts <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb14" href="#pb14" name="pb14">14</a>]</span>may not
+have borne a significance and produced an impression which this
+government would feel compelled to regret</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e1051src" href="#xd20e1051" name="xd20e1051src">9</a> Hapless
+Pratt! &ldquo;Feel compelled to regret&rdquo; is State Department for
+&ldquo;You are liable to be fired.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The letter of reprimand proceeds:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;The address *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* discloses an understanding on
+their part that *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the ultimate object of our action is
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the independence of the Philippines *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*.
+Your address does not repel this implication
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;*&rdquo;.</p>
+<p>The letter then scores Pratt for having called Aguinaldo &ldquo;the
+man for the occasion,&rdquo; and for having said that the
+&ldquo;arrangement&rdquo; between Aguinaldo and Dewey had
+&ldquo;resulted so happily,&rdquo; and after a few further
+animadversions, concludes with this great blow to the reading public of
+Alabama:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;For these reasons the Department has not caused the article
+to be given to the press lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction
+to views the expression of which it had not authorized.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>&ldquo;The Department&rdquo; was very scrupulous about even the
+appearance, at the American end of the line, of &ldquo;lending a
+sanction&rdquo; to Pratt&rsquo;s arrangement with Aguinaldo, while all
+the time it was knowingly permitting the latter to daily risk his own
+life and the lives of his countrymen on the faith of that very
+&ldquo;arrangement,&rdquo; and it was so permitting this to be done
+because the &ldquo;arrangement&rdquo; was daily operating to reduce the
+number of American lives which it would be necessary to sacrifice in
+the final taking of Manila. The day the letter of reprimand was written
+our troop-ships were on the ocean, speeding toward the Philippines. And
+Aguinaldo and his people were fighting the Spaniards with the pent-up
+feeling of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb15" href="#pb15" name=
+"pb15">15</a>]</span>centuries impelling their little steel-jacketed
+messengers of death, thinking of &ldquo;Cuba Libre,&rdquo; and dreaming
+of a Star of Philippine Independence risen in the Far East.</p>
+<p>Such are the circumstances from which the Filipino people derived
+their first impressions concerning the faith and honor of a strange
+people they had never theretofore seen, who succeeded the Spaniards as
+their overlords. Mr. Pratt was subsequently quietly separated from the
+consular service, and doubtless lived to regret that he had ever
+unloosed the fountains of his Alabama French on the Filipino colony of
+Singapore. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb16" href="#pb16" name=
+"pb16">16</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e804" href="#xd20e804src" name="xd20e804">1</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 6, 1897, p. 3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e819" href="#xd20e819src" name="xd20e819">2</a></span> Split
+Rock.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e843" href="#xd20e843src" name="xd20e843">3</a></span> <i>Senate
+Document 62</i>, p. 381.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e869" href="#xd20e869src" name="xd20e869">4</a></span> See pages
+341 <i>et seq.</i>, <i>Senate Document 62</i>, part 1, 55th Cong., 3d
+Sess., 1898&ndash;9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e924" href="#xd20e924src" name="xd20e924">5</a></span> <i>Senate
+Document 62</i>, p. 346.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e942" href="#xd20e942src" name="xd20e942">6</a></span> <i>Ib.</i>,
+349.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1008" href="#xd20e1008src" name="xd20e1008">7</a></span> The
+natives in and about Singapore are Mohammedans, forbidden by their
+religion to use alcoholic beverages.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1023" href="#xd20e1023src" name="xd20e1023">8</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 354.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1051" href="#xd20e1051src" name="xd20e1051">9</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 356.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch2" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter II</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Dewey and Aguinaldo</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Armaments that thunderstrike the walls</p>
+<p class="line">Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake</p>
+<p class="line">And monarchs tremble in their capitals.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Childe Harold.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">The battle of Manila Bay was fought May 1, 1898. Until
+the thunder of Dewey&rsquo;s guns reverberated around the world, there
+was perhaps no part of it the American people knew less about than the
+Philippine Islands.</p>
+<p>We have all heard much of what happened after the battle, but
+comparatively few, probably, have ever had a glimpse at our great
+sailor while he was there in Hong Kong harbor, getting ready to go to
+sea to destroy the Spanish armada. Such a glimpse is modestly afforded
+by the Admiral in his testimony before the Senate Committee in
+1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1092src" href="#xd20e1092" name=
+"xd20e1092src">1</a></p>
+<p>Asked by the Committee when he first heard from Aguinaldo and his
+people in 1898, Admiral Dewey said<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1100src"
+href="#xd20e1100" name="xd20e1100src">2</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I should think about a month before leaving Hong Kong,
+that is, about the first of April, when it became pretty certain that
+there was to be war with Spain, I heard that <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb17" href="#pb17" name="pb17">17</a>]</span>there
+were a number of Filipinos in the city of Hong Kong who were anxious to
+accompany the squadron to Manila in case we went over. I saw these men
+two or three times myself. They seemed to be all very young earnest
+boys. I did not attach much importance to what they said or to
+themselves. Finally, before we left Hong Kong for Mirs Bay<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1110src" href="#xd20e1110" name="xd20e1110src">3</a>
+I received a telegram from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore saying
+that Aguinaldo was there and anxious to see me. I said to him
+&ldquo;All right; tell him to come on,&rdquo; but I attached so little
+importance to Aguinaldo that I did not wait for him. He did not arrive,
+and we sailed from Mirs Bay without any Filipinos.</p>
+</div>
+<p>From his testimony before the Committee it is clear that Admiral
+Dewey&rsquo;s first impressions of the Filipinos, like those of most
+Americans after him, were not very favorable, that is to say, he did
+not in the outset take them very seriously. It will be interesting to
+consider these impressions, and then to compare them with those he
+gathered on better acquaintance from observing their early struggles
+for independence. The more intimate acquaintance, as has been the case
+with all his fellow countrymen since, caused him to revise his first
+verdict. Answering a question put by Senator Carmack concerning what
+transpired between him and the Philippine Revolutionists at Hong Kong
+before he sailed in search of the Spanish fleet, the Admiral
+said<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1119src" href="#xd20e1119" name=
+"xd20e1119src">4</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">They were bothering me. I was getting my squadron
+ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at
+Hong Kong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the
+slightest importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing;
+that is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had
+been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb18" href="#pb18" name=
+"pb18">18</a>]</span>go. <i>One of them didn&rsquo;t go because he
+didn&rsquo;t have any tooth-brush.</i></p>
+<p><span class="sc">Senator Burrows</span>: &ldquo;Did he give that as
+his reason?&rdquo;</p>
+<p><span class="sc">Admiral Dewey</span>: &ldquo;Yes, he said &lsquo;I
+have no tooth-brush.&rsquo;&rdquo;</p>
+<p>They used to come aboard my ship and take my time, and finally I
+would not see them at all, but turned them over to my staff.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Now the lack of a tooth-brush is hardly a valid excuse for not going
+into battle, however great a convenience it may be in campaign. But the
+absence of orders from your commanding officer stands on a very
+different footing. Aguinaldo had not yet arrived. Three hundred years
+of Spanish misgovernment and cruelty is not conducive to aversion to
+fictitious excuses by the lowly in the presence of supreme authority.
+The answer was amusingly uncandid, but disproved neither patriotism nor
+intelligence.</p>
+<p>Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong from Singapore a day or so after
+Admiral Dewey had sailed for Manila. Of the battle of May 1st, no
+detailed mention is essential here. Every schoolboy is familiar with
+it. It will remain, as long as the republic lasts, a part of the
+heritage of the nation. But the true glory of that battle, to my mind,
+rests, not upon the circumstance that we have the Philippines, but upon
+the tremendous fact that before it occurred the attitude of our State
+Department toward an American citizen sojourning in distant lands and
+becoming involved in difficulties there had long been, &ldquo;Why
+didn&rsquo;t he stay at home? Let him stew in his own juice&rdquo;;
+whereas, since then, to be an American has been more like it was in the
+days of St. Paul to be a Roman citizen.</p>
+<p>May 16th, our consul at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, succeeded in getting
+the insurgent leader and his staff <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb19"
+href="#pb19" name="pb19">19</a>]</span>off for Manila on board the U.
+S. S. <i>McCulloch</i> by authority of Admiral Dewey. Like his
+colleague over at Singapore, Consul Wildman was bent on the r&ocirc;le
+of Warwick. Admiral Dewey was quite busy there in Manila Bay the first
+two or three weeks after the battle, but yielding to the letters of
+Wildman, who meantime had constituted himself a kind of fiscal agent at
+Hong Kong for the prospective revolution in the matter of the purchase
+of guns and otherwise, the Admiral told the commanding officer of the
+<i>McCulloch</i> that on his next trip to Hong Kong he might bring down
+a dozen or so of the Filipinos there. The frame of mind they were in on
+reaching Manila, as a result of the assurances of Pratt and Wildman, is
+well illustrated by a letter the latter wrote Aguinaldo a little later
+(June 25th) which is undoubtedly in keeping with what he had been
+telling him earlier:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Do not forget that the United States undertook this
+war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties
+under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or
+the hope of gain. <i>They are actuated by precisely the same feelings
+for the Filipinos.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1162src" href=
+"#xd20e1162" name="xd20e1162src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><i>And at the time, they were.</i></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Every American citizen who came in contact with the Filipinos
+at the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months
+after hostilities began,&rdquo; said General Anderson in an interview
+published in the <i>Chicago Record</i> of February 24, 1900,
+&ldquo;probably told those he talked with *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* that we
+intended to free them from Spanish oppression. The general expression,
+was &lsquo;We intend to whip the Spaniards and set you
+free.&rsquo;&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The <i>McCulloch</i> arrived in Manila Bay with Aguinaldo
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb20" href="#pb20" name=
+"pb20">20</a>]</span>and his outfit, May 19th. Let Admiral Dewey tell
+what happened then<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1184src" href=
+"#xd20e1184" name="xd20e1184src">6</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Aguinaldo came to see me. I said, &ldquo;Well now, go
+ashore there; we have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavite, go
+ashore and start your army.&rdquo; He came back in the course of a few
+hours and said, &ldquo;I want to leave here; I want to go to
+Japan.&rdquo; I said, &ldquo;Don&rsquo;t give it up, Don Emilio.&rdquo;
+<i>I wanted his help, you know.</i> He did not sleep ashore that night;
+he slept on board the ship. The next morning he went on shore, <i>still
+inside my lines</i>, and began recruiting men.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Enterprises of great pith and moment have often turned awry and lost
+the name of action for lack of a word spoken in season by a stout
+heart. Admiral Dewey spoke the word, and Aguinaldo, his
+prot&eacute;g&eacute;, did the rest. &ldquo;Then he began operations
+toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards
+battle after battle *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"n48.2src" href="#n48.2" name="n48.2src">7</a> In fact, the desperate
+bravery of those little brown men after they got warmed up reminds one
+of the Japs at the walls of Peking, in the advance of the Allied Armies
+to the relief of the foreign legations during the Boxer troubles of
+1900. Admiral Dewey told the Senate Committee in 1902 that Aguinaldo
+actually wanted to put one of the old smooth-bore Spanish guns he found
+at Cavite <i>on a barge</i> and have him (Dewey) <i>tow it</i> up in
+front of Manila so he could attack the city with it. &ldquo;I said,
+&lsquo;Oh no, no; we can do nothing until our troops
+come.&rsquo;&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Otherwise he was constantly advising and encouraging him. Why? Let
+the Admiral answer: &ldquo;I knew that what he was doing&mdash;driving
+the Spaniards in&mdash;was <i>saving our troops</i>.&rdquo;<a class=
+"pseudonoteref" href="#n48.2">7</a> In other words they were daily
+dying that American soldiers might live, on the faith of the reasons
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb21" href="#pb21" name=
+"pb21">21</a>]</span>for which we had declared war, and trusting,
+because of the words of our consuls and the acts of our admiral, in the
+sentiment subsequently so nobly expressed by Mr. McKinley in his
+instructions to the Paris peace Commissioners:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The United States in making peace should follow the
+same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1224src" href="#xd20e1224" name=
+"xd20e1224src">8</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>&ldquo;I did not know what the action of our Government would
+be,&rdquo; said the Admiral to the Committee,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1231src" href="#xd20e1231" name="xd20e1231src">9</a> adding that
+he simply used his best judgment on the spot at the time; presumably
+supposing that his Government would do the decent thing by these people
+who considered us their liberators. &ldquo;They looked on us as their
+liberators,&rdquo; said he.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1236src" href=
+"#xd20e1236" name="xd20e1236src">10</a> &ldquo;Up to the time the army
+came he (Aguinaldo) did everything I requested. He was most obedient;
+whatever I told him to do he did. I saw him almost daily.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1241src" href="#xd20e1241" name=
+"xd20e1241src">11</a> I had not much to do with him after the army
+came.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1246src" href="#xd20e1246"
+name="xd20e1246src">12</a></p>
+<p>That was no ordinary occasion, that midsummer session of the Senate
+Committee in 1902. It was a case of the powerful of the earth
+discussing a question of ethics, even as they do in Boston. The nation
+had been intoxicated in 1898 with the pride of power&mdash;power
+revealed to it by the Spanish War; and in a spirit thus mellowed had
+taken the Philippines as a sort of political foreign mission,
+forgetting the injunction of the Fathers to keep Church and State
+separate, but not forgetting the possible profits of trade with the
+saved. A long war with the prospective saved had followed, developing
+many barbarities avenged in kind, and the breezes from the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb22" href="#pb22" name="pb22">22</a>]</span>South
+Seas were suggesting the aroma of shambles. &ldquo;How did we get into
+all this mess, anyhow?&rdquo; said the people. &ldquo;Let us pause, and
+consider.&rdquo; Hear the still small voice of a nation&rsquo;s
+conscience mingling with demagogic nonsense perpetrated by potent,
+grave, and reverend Senators:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Admiral Dewey: &ldquo;I do not think it makes any
+difference what my opinion is on these things.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Senator Patterson: &ldquo;There is no man whose opinion goes farther
+with the country than yours does, Admiral, and therefore I think you
+ought to be very prudent in expressing your views.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Senator Beveridge (Acting Chairman): &ldquo;The Chairman will not
+permit any member to lecture Admiral Dewey on his prudence or
+imprudence.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>This of course would read well to &ldquo;Mary of the Vine-clad
+Cottage&rdquo; out in Indiana, whose four-year-old boy was named George
+Dewey&mdash;, or to her counterpart up in Vermont who might name her
+next boy after the brilliant and distinguished Acting Chairman, in
+token of her choice for the Presidency.</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Senator Patterson: &ldquo;I was not lecturing
+him.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Senator Beveridge: &ldquo;Yes; you said he ought to be
+prudent.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Senator Patterson: &ldquo;And I think it was well enough to suggest
+those things.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1273src" href=
+"#xd20e1273" name="xd20e1273src">13</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Thawed into theorizing by these indubitably genuine evidences of a
+nation&rsquo;s high regard, the man of action tried to help the nation
+out. He said he had used the Filipinos as the Federal troops used the
+negroes in the Civil War. Senator Patterson struck this suggestion
+amidships and sunk it with the remark that the negroes <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb23" href="#pb23" name="pb23">23</a>]</span>were
+expecting freedom. Admiral Dewey had said &ldquo;The Filipinos were
+slaves too&rdquo; and considered him their liberator.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e1282src" href="#xd20e1282" name="xd20e1282src">14</a> But he
+never did elaborate on the new definition of freedom which had followed
+in the wake of his ships to Manila, viz., that Freedom does not
+necessarily mean freedom from alien domination, but only a change of
+masters deemed by the new master beneficial to the
+&ldquo;slave.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Apropos of why he accepted Aguinaldo&rsquo;s help, the Admiral also
+said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure
+the Filipinos could not take Manila, and I thought that <i>the closer
+they invested the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived
+to march in</i>. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they
+were doing our work.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1295src" href=
+"#xd20e1295" name="xd20e1295src">15</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Asked as to how big a force Aguinaldo had under arms then and
+afterwards, the Admiral said maybe 25,000, adding, by way of
+illustration of the pluck, vim, and patriotism of his valuable new-made
+friends, &ldquo;They could have had any number of <i>men</i>; it was
+just a question of <i>arming</i> them. <i>They could have had the whole
+population.</i>&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1311src" href=
+"#xd20e1311" name="xd20e1311src">16</a> Eleven months after that, when
+we captured the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur,
+the ablest and one of the bravest generals we ever set to slaughtering
+Filipinos, said to a newspaper man just after a bloody and of course
+victorious fight: &ldquo;When I first started in against these rebels,
+I believed that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s troops represented only a
+faction.&rdquo; &ldquo;<i>I did not like</i>,&rdquo; said this veteran
+of three wars, who was always &ldquo;on the job&rdquo; in action out
+there as elsewhere, &ldquo;<i>I did not like to believe that the
+whole</i> population of Luzon *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* was opposed to us
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* but after having come thus far, and having been brought
+much in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb24" href="#pb24" name=
+"pb24">24</a>]</span>contact with both <i>insurrectos</i> and
+<i>amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the
+Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he
+heads</i>&rdquo;.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1331src" href="#xd20e1331"
+name="xd20e1331src">17</a></p>
+<p>Is it at all unlikely that Admiral Dewey did in fact say of his
+prot&eacute;g&eacute;s, the Filipinos, to an American visiting Manila
+in January, 1899, three or four weeks before the war broke out,
+&ldquo;Rather than make a war of conquest upon the Filipino people, I
+would up anchor and sail out of the harbor.&rdquo;<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e1345src" href="#xd20e1345" name="xd20e1345src">18</a></p>
+<p>If Dewey and MacArthur were right, then, about the situation around
+Manila in 1898, it was a case of an entire people united in an
+aspiration, and looking to us for its fulfilment.</p>
+<p>When the American troops reached the Philippines and perfected their
+battle formations about Manila, and the order to advance was given,
+they did &ldquo;march in,&rdquo; to use Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s
+expression above quoted. But they did not let the Filipinos have a
+finger in the pie. The conquest and retention of the islands had then
+been determined upon. The Admiral&rsquo;s reasons for saddling his
+prot&eacute;g&eacute; with a series of bloody battles and a long and
+arduous campaign are certainly stated with the proverbial frankness of
+the sailorman: &ldquo;I wanted his help, you know.&rdquo; But what was
+Aguinaldo to get out of the transaction, from the Dewey point of view?
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb25" href="#pb25" name=
+"pb25">25</a>]</span></p>
+<p>&ldquo;They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards. I do not think they
+looked much beyond that,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1359src"
+href="#xd20e1359" name="xd20e1359src">19</a> said the Admiral to the
+Senate Committee. Let us see whether they did or not. Aguinaldo had
+been shipped by the Honorable E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the
+United States at Singapore, from that point to Hong Kong on April 26th,
+consigned to his fellow Warwick, the Honorable Rounseville Wildman,
+Consul-General of the United States at the last-named place, and had
+been received in due course by the consignee. May 5th, at Hong Kong,
+the Filipino Revolutionary Committee had a meeting, the minutes of
+which we subsequently came into possession of, along with other
+captured insurgent papers. The following is an extract from those
+minutes:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Once the President [Aguinaldo] is in the Philippines
+with his prestige, he will be able to arouse the masses to combat the
+demands of the United States, if they should colonize that country, and
+will drive them, the Filipinos, if circumstances render it necessary,
+to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if later they should
+succumb to the weight of the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington
+proposes to carry out the fundamental principles of its Constitution,
+<i>it is most improbable that an attempt will be made to colonize the
+Philippines or annex them. It is probable then that independence will
+be guaranteed.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1369src" href=
+"#xd20e1369" name="xd20e1369src">20</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The truth is that instead of leaving everything to the chance of our
+continuing in the same unselfish frame of mind we were really in when
+the Spanish-American War started, Aguinaldo and his people, not sure
+but what in the wind-up they might even be thrown back upon the tender
+mercies of Spain, played their cards <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb26" href="#pb26" name="pb26">26</a>]</span>boldly and consistently
+from the beginning with a view of organizing a <i>de facto</i>
+government and getting it recognized by the Powers as such at the very
+earliest practicable moment. They believed that the Lord helps those
+who help themselves. They had anticipated our change of heart and
+already had it discounted before we were aware of it ourselves. They
+were already acting on the idea that eternal vigilance is the price of
+liberty while public opinion in the United States concerning them was
+in a chrysalis state, and trying to develop a new definition of Liberty
+which should comport with the subjugation of distant island subjects by
+a continental commonwealth on the other side of the world based on
+representative government. The prospective subjects did not believe
+that a legislature ten thousand miles away in which they had no vote
+would ever give them a square deal about tariff and other laws dictated
+by special interests. They had had three hundred years of just that
+very sort of thing under Spain and instinctively dreaded continuance of
+it. That their instincts did not deceive them, our later study of
+Congressional legislation will show. The Filipinos had greatly pondered
+their future in their hearts during the last twelve months of
+Spain&rsquo;s colonial empire, watching her Cuban embarrassments with
+eager eye.</p>
+<p>Having seen the frame of mind in which they approached the contract
+implied in Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s cheery words, &ldquo;Well now, go
+ashore there and start your army,&rdquo; what were the facts of recent
+history within the knowledge of both parties at the time? What had been
+the screams of the American eagle, if any, concerning his moral
+leadership of the family of unfeathered bipeds?</p>
+<p>President McKinley&rsquo;s annual message to Congress <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb27" href="#pb27" name="pb27">27</a>]</span>of
+December, 1897,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1387src" href="#xd20e1387"
+name="xd20e1387src">21</a> calling attention to conditions in Cuba as
+intolerable, had declared that if we should intervene to put a stop to
+them, we certainly would not make it the occasion of a land-grab. The
+other nations said: &ldquo;We are from Missouri.&rdquo; But Mr.
+McKinley said, &ldquo;forcible annexation&rdquo; was not to be thought
+of by us. &ldquo;That by <i>our</i> code of morality would be
+criminal,&rdquo; etc. So the world said, &ldquo;We shall see what we
+shall see.&rdquo; Then had come the war message of April 11,
+1898,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1395src" href="#xd20e1395" name=
+"xd20e1395src">22</a> reiterating the declaration of the Cuban message
+of December previous, that &ldquo;forcible annexation by <i>our</i>
+code of morality would be criminal aggression.&rdquo; In other words we
+announced to the overcrowded monarchies of the old world, whose
+land-lust is ever tempted by the broad acres of South America, and ever
+cooled by the virile menace of the Monroe doctrine, that we not only
+were against the <i>principle</i> of land-grabbing, but would not
+indulge in the <i>practice</i>. Immediately upon the conclusion of the
+reading of the war message, Senator Stewart was recognized, and said,
+among other things: &ldquo;Under the law of nations, intervention for
+conquest is condemned, and is opposed to the universal sentiment of
+mankind. It is unjust, it is robbery, to intervene for conquest.&rdquo;
+Then Mr. Lodge stood up, &ldquo;in the Senate House a Senator,&rdquo;
+and said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We are there [meaning in this present Cuban situation]
+because we represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new
+time, and Spain is over against us because she is medi&aelig;val,
+cruel, dying. We have grasped no man&rsquo;s territory, we have taken
+no man&rsquo;s property, we have invaded no man&rsquo;s rights. <i>We
+do not ask their lands.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1418src" href=
+"#xd20e1418" name="xd20e1418src">23</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb28" href="#pb28" name=
+"pb28">28</a>]</span></p>
+<p>These speeches went forth to the world almost like a part of the
+message itself. And Admiral Dewey, like every other American, in his
+early dealings with Aguinaldo, after war broke out, must have assumed a
+mental attitude in harmony with these announcements. But the world
+said, &ldquo;All this is merely what you Americans yourselves call
+&lsquo;hot air.&rsquo; We repeat, &lsquo;We are from
+Missouri.&rsquo;&rdquo; Then we said: &ldquo;Oh very well, we will show
+you.&rdquo; So in the declaration of war against Spain we inserted the
+following:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Fourth: That the United States hereby disclaims any
+disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
+control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
+asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the
+government and control of the island to its people.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This meant, &ldquo;It is true we do love the Almighty Dollar very
+dearly, oh, Sisters of the Family of Nations, but there are some
+axiomatic principles of human liberty that we love better, and one of
+them is the &lsquo;unalienable right&rsquo; of every people to pursue
+happiness in their own way, free from alien domination.&rdquo; All
+these things were well known to both the contracting parties when
+Admiral Dewey set Aguinaldo ashore at Cavite, May 20, 1898, and got him
+to start his insurrection &ldquo;under the protection of our
+guns,&rdquo; as he expressed it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1434src"
+href="#xd20e1434" name="xd20e1434src">24</a> Accordingly, when the
+insurgent leader went ashore, the declaration of war was his major
+premise, the assurances of our consuls and the acts of our Admiral
+pursuant thereto were his minor premise, and Independence was his
+conclusion. Trusting to the faith and honor of the American people, he
+took his life in his hands, left the panoplied safety of our mighty
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb29" href="#pb29" name=
+"pb29">29</a>]</span>squadron, and plunged, single-handed, into the
+struggle for Freedom.</p>
+<p>What was the state of the public mind on shore, and how was it
+prepared to receive his assurances of American aid? Consider the
+following picture in the light of its sombre sequel.</p>
+<p>Just as the war broke out, Consul Williams had left Manila and gone
+over to Hong Kong, where he joined Admiral Dewey, and accompanied him
+back to Manila, and was thus privileged to be present at the battle of
+Manila Bay, May 1st. Under date of May 12th, from his consular
+headquarters aboard the U. S. S. <i>Baltimore</i>, he reports<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1448src" href="#xd20e1448" name=
+"xd20e1448src">25</a> going ashore at Cavite and being received with
+enthusiastic greetings by vast crowds of Filipinos. &ldquo;They crowded
+around me,&rdquo; says Brother Williams, &ldquo;hats off, shouting
+&lsquo;<i lang="es">Viva los Americanos</i>,&rsquo; thronged about me
+by hundreds to shake either hand, even several at a time, men, women,
+and children, striving to get even a finger to shake. So I moved
+<i>half a mile</i>, shaking continuously with both hands.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Tut! tut! says the casual reader. What did the Government at
+Washington know of all these goings on, that it should be charged later
+with having violated as binding a moral obligation as ever a nation
+assumed? It is true that the news of the Williams ovation, as in the
+case of the Pratt serenade, reached Washington only by the slow
+channels of the mail. But Washington did in fact receive the said news
+by due course of mail. When it came, however, Washington was nursing
+visions of savages in blankets smoking the pipe of peace with the
+agents of the Great White Father in the White House&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>,
+thought, or hoped, the Filipinos were savages&mdash;and remained as
+deaf to the sounds <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb30" href="#pb30"
+name="pb30">30</a>]</span>of the Williams ovation as it had been to the
+strains of the Pratt serenade.</p>
+<p>However, hardly had Admiral Dewey taken his binoculars from the gig
+that carried Aguinaldo ashore to raise his auxiliary insurrection, when
+he called his Flag Secretary, or the equivalent, and dictated the
+following cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought
+down by the <i>McCulloch</i>. Organizing forces near Cavite, and <i>may
+render assistance that will be valuable</i>.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1478src" href="#xd20e1478" name="xd20e1478src">26</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This sounds a little more serious than &ldquo;earnest boys&rdquo;
+alleging the lack of a toothbrush as an excuse for declining mortal
+combat, does it not? <i>How</i> valuable did this assistance prove?
+Admiral Dewey had to wait three and one half months for the army to
+arrive, and this is how the commanding general of the American forces
+describes conditions as he found them in the latter part of August:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">For three and one half months Admiral Dewey with his
+squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled.
+All commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food
+supplies were nearly exhausted.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1491src"
+href="#xd20e1491" name="xd20e1491src">27</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>And, he might have added, the taking of the city was thus made
+perfectly easy. Otherwise, as Aguinaldo put it in one of his letters to
+General Otis, we would not have taken a city, but only <i>the ruins</i>
+of a city. Admiral Dewey said to the Senate Committee in 1902:
+&ldquo;They [the Spaniards] surrendered on August 13th, and they had
+not gotten a thing in after the 1st of May.&rdquo;<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e1501src" href="#xd20e1501" name="xd20e1501src">28</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb31" href="#pb31" name=
+"pb31">31</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In the early part of the next year, 1899, President McKinley sent
+out a kind of olive-branch commission, of which President Schurman of
+Cornell University was Chairman. The olive branch got withered in the
+sulphur of exploding gun-powder, so the Commission contented itself
+with making a report. And this is what they said concerning what
+followed the Dewey-Aguinaldo <i>entente</i>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Shortly afterwards, the Filipinos began to attack the
+Spanish. Their number was rapidly augmented by the militia who had been
+given arms by Spain, all of whom revolted and joined the insurgents.
+Great Filipino successes followed, many Spaniards were taken prisoners,
+and while the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the
+Filipino forces made themselves masters of <i>the entire island</i> [of
+Luzon] except that city.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1518src" href=
+"#xd20e1518" name="xd20e1518src">29</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Of conditions in July, sixty days after Admiral Dewey had on May
+20th said to Aguinaldo in effect, &ldquo;Go it, little man, we need you
+in our business,&rdquo; Mr. Wildman, our Consul at Hong Kong, writing
+to the State Department, said, in defending himself for his share in
+the business of getting Aguinaldo&rsquo;s help under promises, both
+express and implied, which were subsequently repudiated, that after he,
+Wildman, put the insurgent chief aboard the <i>McCulloch</i>, May 16th,
+bound for Manila to co-operate by land with our navy: &ldquo;He
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* organized a government *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and from that
+day to this he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and
+dignified and just as the head of his government,&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1528src" href="#xd20e1528" name=
+"xd20e1528src">30</a> a statement which Admiral Dewey subsequently
+endorsed.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1533src" href="#xd20e1533" name=
+"xd20e1533src">31</a></p>
+<p>We have seen the preliminaries of this &ldquo;government&rdquo;
+started under the auspices of our Admiral and under <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb32" href="#pb32" name="pb32">32</a>]</span>what he
+himself called &ldquo;the protection of our guns&rdquo; (<i>ante</i>).
+Let us note its progress. If you turn the leaves of the contemporaneous
+official reports, you see quite a moving picture show, and the action
+is rapid. On May 24th, still &ldquo;under the protection of our
+guns,&rdquo; Aguinaldo proclaimed his revolutionary government and
+summoned the people to his standard for the purpose of driving the
+Spaniards out forever. The situation was an exact counterpart of the
+cotemporary Cuban one as regards identity of purpose between
+&ldquo;liberator&rdquo; and &ldquo;oppressed.&rdquo; His proclamation
+promised a constitutional convention to be called later (and which
+<i>was</i> duly called later) to elect a President and Cabinet, in
+whose favor he would resign the emergency authority now assumed;
+referred to the United States as &ldquo;undoubtedly
+disinterested&rdquo; and as considering the Filipinos &ldquo;capable of
+governing for ourselves our unfortunate country&rdquo;; and formally
+announced the temporary assumption of supreme authority as dictator.
+Copies of these proclamations were duly furnished Admiral Dewey. The
+latter was too busy looking after the men behind his guns and watching
+the progress of his plucky little ally to study Spanish, so he
+forwarded them to the Navy Department without
+comment&mdash;&ldquo;without reading them,&rdquo; said he to the Senate
+Committee in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1548src" href=
+"#xd20e1548" name="xd20e1548src">32</a> When his attention was called
+to them before the Committee by one of the members reading them, his
+comment was, &ldquo;Nothing about independence there, is
+there?&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1553src" href="#xd20e1553"
+name="xd20e1553src">33</a> It seems to me it did not take an
+international lawyer to see <i>a good deal</i> &ldquo;there,&rdquo;
+about independence. In a proclamation published at Tarlac in the latter
+part of 1899, which appears to have been a sort of swan-song of the
+Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo had said, in effect, &ldquo;Certainly
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb33" href="#pb33" name=
+"pb33">33</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey did not bring me from Hong Kong to
+Manila to fight the Spaniards for the benefit of American Trade
+Expansion,&rdquo; and in this proclamation he claimed that Admiral
+Dewey promised him independence. It is true, that in a letter to
+Senator Lodge, which that distinguished gentleman read on the floor of
+the Senate on January 31, 1900, Admiral Dewey denounced this last
+statement as false. It is also true that those Americans are few and
+far between who will take Aguinaldo&rsquo;s word in preference to
+Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s. Certainly the writer is not one of them. But
+Aguinaldo is no Spanish scholar, being more of a leader of men than a
+master of language, and what sort of an interpreter acted between him
+and the Admiral does not appear. Certainly he never did get anything in
+writing from Admiral Dewey. But after the latter brought him to Manila,
+set him to fighting the common enemy, and helped him with guns and
+otherwise in quickly organizing an army for the purpose, the Admiral
+was at least put on inquiry as to just what Aguinaldo supposed he
+<i>was</i> fighting for. What did the Admiral probably suppose? He told
+the Senate Committee that the idea that they wanted independence
+&ldquo;never entered his head.&rdquo; The roar of mighty guns seems to
+have made it difficult for him to hear the prattlings of what
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s proclamations of the time called &ldquo;the
+legitimate aspirations of a people.&rdquo; The milk in the cocoanut is
+this: How could it ever occur to a great naval commander, such as
+Admiral Dewey, familiar with the four quarters of the globe, that a
+coterie of politicians at home would be so foolish as to buy a vast
+straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the South Seas which
+had been a nuisance to every government that ever owned them? But let
+us turn from the Senate Committee&rsquo;s studies of <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb34" href="#pb34" name="pb34">34</a>]</span>1902 to
+the progress of the infant republic of 1898 at Cavite.</p>
+<p>The same day the above proclamations of May 24th were issued, we
+find Consul Williams, now become a sort of amphibious civilian aide to
+Dewey, having his consular headquarters afloat, on the U. S. S.
+<i>Baltimore</i>, of the squadron, writing the State Department,
+describing the great successes of the insurgents, his various
+conferences with Aguinaldo and the other leaders, and his own
+activities in arranging the execution of a power of attorney whereby
+Aguinaldo released to certain parties in Hong Kong $400,000 then on
+deposit to his credit in a Hong Kong bank, for the purpose of enabling
+them to pay for 3000 stand of arms bought there and expected to arrive
+at Cavite on the morrow, and for other needed expenses of the
+revolutionary movement. He says, in part: &ldquo;Officers have visited
+me during the darkness of the night to inform <i>the fleet and me</i>
+of their operations, and to report increase of strength. When General
+Merritt arrives he will find large auxiliary land forces adapted to his
+service and used to the climate.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1577src" href="#xd20e1577" name="xd20e1577src">34</a> Throughout
+this period Admiral Dewey reports various cordial conferences with
+Aguinaldo, though he is not so literary as to vivify his accounts with
+allusions to the weather. In one despatch he states that he has
+&ldquo;refrained from assisting him *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* with the forces
+under my command&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1582src" href=
+"#xd20e1582" name="xd20e1582src">35</a>&mdash;explaining to him that
+&ldquo;the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United
+States troops.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Six days after the issuance of the Dictatorship proclamations above
+mentioned, viz., on May 30th, Admiral Dewey cables the Navy
+Department<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1589src" href="#xd20e1589" name=
+"xd20e1589src">36</a>: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb35" href="#pb35"
+name="pb35">35</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited
+<i>Olympia</i> yesterday. He expects to make general attack May
+31st.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He did not succeed entirely, but there was hard fighting, and the
+cordon around the doomed Spaniards in Manila and its suburbs was drawn
+ever closer and closer.</p>
+<p>The remarkable feat of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s raising a right formidable
+fighting force in twelve days after his little &ldquo;Return from
+Elba,&rdquo; which force kept growing like a snowball, is difficult,
+for one who does not know the Filipinos, and the conditions then, to
+credit. It is explained by the fact that Admiral Dewey let him have the
+captured guns in the Cavite arsenal, that Cavite was a populous hotbed
+of insurrection, and that many native regiments, or parts of regiments,
+quite suited to be the nucleus of an army, having lots of veteran
+non-commissioned officers, deserted the Spaniards and went over to the
+insurgents, their countrymen, as soon as Aguinaldo arrived.</p>
+<p>On June 6th, we have another bulletin sent to the Navy Department by
+Admiral Dewey, transmitting with perceptible satisfaction further
+information as to the progress of his indefatigable
+prot&eacute;g&eacute;:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Insurgents have been engaged actively within the
+province of Cavite during the last week; they have had several small
+victories, taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish
+troops, not native.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1611src" href=
+"#xd20e1611" name="xd20e1611src">37</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Along about this period Aguinaldo happens to get hold of a belated
+copy of the <i>London Times</i> of May 5, 1898. It contains
+considerable speculation on the future of the Philippines which casts a
+shadow over the soul of the president of the incipient republic.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb36" href="#pb36" name=
+"pb36">36</a>]</span>Having read President McKinley&rsquo;s immortal
+State papers about the moral obliquity of &ldquo;forcible
+annexation,&rdquo; he is moved to write direct to the source of those
+noble sentiments. The letter is dated June 10, 1898. It is addressed,
+with a quaintness now pathetic, &ldquo;To the President of the Republic
+of the Great North American Nation.&rdquo; It greets the addressee with
+&ldquo;the most tender effusion of&rdquo; the writer&rsquo;s soul,
+expresses his &ldquo;deep and sincere gratitude,&rdquo; in the name of
+his people, &ldquo;for the efficient and <i>disinterested</i>
+protection which you have decided to give it to shake off the yoke of
+the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the
+equally unfortunate Cuba&rdquo; and then proceeds to tell of &ldquo;the
+great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the
+<i>Times</i> the astounding statement that you, sir, will retain these
+islands,&rdquo; etc. He proceeds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Philippine people *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* have seen in
+your nation, ever since your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish
+fleet which was here *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>the angel who is the harbinger
+of their liberty</i>; and they <i>rose like a single wave</i>
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* as soon as I trod these shores; and captured in ten
+days nearly the whole garrison of this Province of Cavite <i>in whose
+port I have my government&mdash;by the consent of the Admiral of your
+triumphant fleet</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1642src" href=
+"#xd20e1642" name="xd20e1642src">38</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The writer closes his letter with an impassioned protest against the
+occurrence of what is suggested in the <i>Times</i>, and speaks of his
+fellow-countrymen as &ldquo;a people which trusts blindly in you not to
+abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and
+independent,&rdquo; and adds his &ldquo;fervent prayers for the
+ever-increasing prosperity of your powerful nation.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1652src" href="#xd20e1652" name=
+"xd20e1652src">39</a></p>
+<p>But the signer of the foregoing letter did not spend <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb37" href="#pb37" name="pb37">37</a>]</span>all his
+time <i>praying</i> for us, as may be observed in this bulletin from
+Admiral Dewey concerning the way he was lambasting the common enemy,
+sent the Navy Department, June 12th:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically
+surrounded Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they
+treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the
+arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1667src" href="#xd20e1667" name=
+"xd20e1667src">40</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Four days later Washington chided the hapless Pratt at Singapore
+about having talked to Aguinaldo of &ldquo;direct co-operation&rdquo;
+with Admiral Dewey, saying: &ldquo;To obtain the unconditional personal
+assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper,
+if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be
+practicable to gratify.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1674src"
+href="#xd20e1674" name="xd20e1674src">41</a> This communication goes on
+to advise Mr. Pratt that the Department cannot approve anything he may
+have said to Aguinaldo on behalf of the United States which would
+concede that in accepting his co-operation we would owe him anything.
+Yet it did not tell Admiral Dewey to quit coaching him, because <i>the
+service he was rendering was too valuable</i>. There is no
+communication to Admiral Dewey about &ldquo;hopes which it might not be
+practicable to gratify&rdquo; in the official archives of those times.
+There was Admiral Dewey coaching Aguinaldo and telling him to wait for
+the main attack until General Merritt should arrive with our troops.
+Why? Because he expected Merritt to co-operate with Aguinaldo, and of
+course Aguinaldo expected exactly what Dewey expected.</p>
+<p>In reviewing the history of those times the writer has not been so
+careless as to have overlooked Senator <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb38" href="#pb38" name="pb38">38</a>]</span>Lodge&rsquo;s elaborate
+speech in the Senate on March 7, 1900, wherein attention is called to
+the circumstance that a few days after Aguinaldo landed at Cavite, the
+Navy Department cabled cautioning Dewey to have no alliance with him
+that might complicate us, and that the Admiral answered he had made no
+alliance and would make none. But if actions speak louder than words,
+the Senator&rsquo;s point does not rise above the dignity of a
+technicality.</p>
+<p>The same day the State Department reprimanded Pratt, as above
+indicated, viz., June 16th, Consul Williams at Manila wrote them a
+glowing communication<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1688src" href=
+"#xd20e1688" name="xd20e1688src">42</a> about how &ldquo;active and
+almost uniformly successful&rdquo; Aguinaldo was continuing to be. But
+no resultant enthusiasm is of record. Two days later, on June 18th,
+Aguinaldo issued his first formal Declaration of Independence. The
+infant republic was now less than a month old, but it already had a
+fine set of teeth. The Spaniards had seen them. The proclamation was of
+course addressed to the Filipino people, and called on them to rally to
+the cause, but he was also driving at recognition by the Powers. It
+read in part: &ldquo;In the face of the whole world I have proclaimed
+that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my wishes
+and efforts, is your independence, because I have the inner conviction
+that it is also your constant longing.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1693src" href="#xd20e1693" name="xd20e1693src">43</a> Many
+Americans insist that this is mere &ldquo;hot air&rdquo; and that the
+average Filipino peasant does not think much more than his plough
+animal, the scoffer himself being stupidly unaware that this has been
+precisely the argument of tyranny in all ages. But the pride a people
+will have in seeing the best educated and most able men of their own
+race in charge of their affairs seems to me too obvious to need
+elaboration. It was <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb39" href="#pb39"
+name="pb39">39</a>]</span>always accepted by us as axiomatic until we
+took the Philippines. It is a cruel species of wickedness for an
+American to tell his countrymen that the Filipino people <i>do not
+want</i> independence, for some of them may believe it.</p>
+<p>The Declaration of Independence of June 18th is known to students of
+Philippine political arch&aelig;ology as the Proclamation establishing
+the &ldquo;dictatorial&rdquo; government. The principal thing it did
+was to supplement the absolute dictatorship proclaimed May 24th by
+provisions for organizing in detail. It also declared independence. A
+more elaborate Declaration followed on June 23d, known as the
+proclamation establishing the &ldquo;revolutionary&rdquo; government.
+This made provision for a Congress, a Cabinet, and courts. Of course it
+was only a paper government the day the ink dried on it. But we will
+follow it through its teething, and adolescence, to the attainment of
+its majority at an inauguration where the president was driven to the
+place of the taking of the oath of office in a coach and four, through
+a short and very self-respecting heyday, and a longer peripatetic
+existence, to final dissolution. The document of June 23d reminds us of
+a fact which in reading it at this late date we are apt to forget,
+viz., that the Filipinos did not know at what moment their powerful
+ally, the American squadron, might up anchor and sail away to the high
+seas, to meet another Spanish fleet; thus leaving them to the tender
+mercies of the Spaniards, possibly forever. So they were losing no
+time. In fact, they had set to work from the very beginning with a
+determination to try and secure recognition from the Powers at the
+earliest moment. In appealing to the public opinion of the world with a
+view of paving the way to recognition by the Powers&mdash;which
+recognition would mean getting arms for war <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb40" href="#pb40" name="pb40">40</a>]</span>with
+Spain or any other power without the inconveniences of
+filibustering&mdash;Aguinaldo says on behalf of his people in the
+proclamation of June 23d, above mentioned, that they &ldquo;now no
+longer limit themselves to asking for assimilation with the political
+constitution of Spain, but ask for a complete separation (and) strive
+for independence, completely assured that the time has come when they
+can and ought to govern themselves.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Mr. Frank D. Millet, who reached Manila soon enough (in July) to see
+the ripples of this proclamation, describes the effect on the people.
+While Mr. Millet is one of the best men that anybody ever knew, a
+proposition as to which I am quite sure the President of the United
+States and many people great and small in many lands would affirm my
+judgment,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1709src" href="#xd20e1709" name=
+"xd20e1709src">44</a> still, he writes from a frankly White Man&rsquo;s
+Burden or land-grabbing standpoint&mdash;is in harmony with his
+environment. At page 50 of his book,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1715src" href="#xd20e1715" name="xd20e1715src">45</a> he
+reproduces the proclamation last above quoted from, and adds the
+following satirical comment: &ldquo;This flowery production was widely
+circulated and had a great effect on the imagination of the people,
+who, in the elation of their present success in investing the town and
+<i>in their belief that the United States was beginning a campaign in
+the Philippines to free them from Spanish oppression</i> (italics mine)
+shortly came to think that they were already a nation.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Copies of these June proclamations also, as in the case of those of
+May 24th, were duly forwarded by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1724src" href="#xd20e1724" name=
+"xd20e1724src">46</a> and by him forwarded to Washington without
+comment. In his letter transmitting <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb41"
+href="#pb41" name="pb41">41</a>]</span>them to Dewey, Aguinaldo
+announces that his government has &ldquo;<i>taken possession of the
+various provinces of the archipelago</i>.&rdquo; Just exactly how many
+provinces he had control of on June 23d will be examined later. <i>The
+very same day the proclamation of June 23d declaring independence was
+issued</i>, Admiral Dewey cabled the Navy Department<a class="noteref"
+id="n69.1src" href="#n69.1" name="n69.1src">47</a>: &ldquo;Aguinaldo
+has acted independently of the squadron, but <i>has kept me advised of
+his progress which has been wonderful</i>. I have allowed him to take
+from the arsenal such Spanish arms and ammunition as he needed.&rdquo;
+After adding that &ldquo;Aguinaldo expects to capture Manila without
+any assistance,&rdquo; the Admiral, evidently divining the temptation
+that was then luring the political St. Anthonies at Washington,
+volunteers this timely suggestion:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In my opinion these people are superior in
+intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of
+Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.<a class="pseudonoteref" href=
+"#n69.1">47</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>That there may be no doubt about the motive behind that suggestion,
+it may be noted here that the Admiral told the Senate Committee in
+1902: &ldquo;<i>I</i> wrote that <i>because I saw in the newspapers
+that Congress contemplated giving the Cubans
+independence</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1761src" href=
+"#xd20e1761" name="xd20e1761src">48</a></p>
+<p>But this is not all. On August 13th, the day after the Peace
+Protocol was signed, Mr. McKinley wired Admiral Dewey asking about
+&ldquo;the desirability of the several islands,&rdquo; the &ldquo;coal
+<i>and mineral</i> deposits,&rdquo; and in reply on August 29th, the
+Admiral wrote:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In a telegram sent the Department on June 23d, I
+expressed the opinion that &ldquo;these people are far superior in
+their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb42" href="#pb42" name=
+"pb42">42</a>]</span>natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both
+races.&rdquo; <i>Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this
+opinion.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e1779src" href="#xd20e1779"
+name="xd20e1779src">49</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>As a result of one year&rsquo;s stay in Cuba, and six in the
+Philippines&mdash;two in the army that subjugated the Filipinos and
+four as a judge over them&mdash;I heartily concur in the above opinion
+of Admiral Dewey, but with this addition: Whatever of solidarity for
+governmental purposes the Filipinos may have lacked at the date of the
+Admiral&rsquo;s communications, they were certainly welded into
+conscious political unity, <i>as one people</i>, in their war for
+independence against us.</p>
+<p>In the 1609 or Douay (pronounce Dewey) version of the Bible, the
+Latin Vulgate, Luke&rsquo;s version of the Lord&rsquo;s Prayer only
+says &ldquo;Lead us not into temptation,&rdquo; while Matthew adds
+&ldquo;but deliver us from evil.&rdquo; The Dewey suggestions to the
+Washington Government in 1898 remind a regretful nation of both the
+evangelical versions mentioned, for the first seems to say what Luke
+says, and the second seems to add what Matthew adds.</p>
+<p>There is not an American who has known the Filipinos since the
+beginning of the American occupation who doubts for a moment that but
+for our intervention a Republic would have been established out there
+under the lead of Aguinaldo, Mabini, and their associates, which would
+have compared well with the republican governments between the United
+States and Cape Horn. The writer doubts very much if President Taft is
+of a contrary opinion. The real issue is, now that we have them, should
+we keep them in spite of the tariff iniquities which the Trusts
+perpetrate on them through Congress, until they have received the best
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb43" href="#pb43" name=
+"pb43">43</a>]</span>possible tuition we can give them, or be content
+to give them their independence when they are already at least as fit
+for it as the Republics to the South of us, guaranteeing them
+independence by international agreement like that which protects
+Belgium and Switzerland?</p>
+<p>Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and
+emphasize on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the
+capacity of the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made
+in lucid language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek.
+General Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first
+American troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May
+1st, and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat
+as a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United
+States of retaining the Philippines. &ldquo;I was the first to tell
+Admiral Dewey,&rdquo; says General Anderson in the <i>North American
+Review</i> for February, 1900, &ldquo;that there was any disposition on
+the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were
+captured.&rdquo; He adds: &ldquo;Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls
+Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances
+that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly
+thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words.
+Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at
+his request.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured
+prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the
+Filipinos&mdash;1300 at one clip in the month of June at
+Olongapo.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1803src" href="#xd20e1803" name=
+"xd20e1803src">50</a> These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb44" href="#pb44" name=
+"pb44">44</a>]</span>the Filipinos from taking until Aguinaldo reported
+the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon, he promptly sent Captain
+Coghlan with the <i>Raleigh</i> and another of his ships to the scene
+of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the German
+&ldquo;<span lang="de">Hoch der Kaiser</span>&rdquo; etc. or words to
+that effect, and made him go about his business and let our ally alone.
+Then Captain Coghlan took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them
+over to Aguinaldo by direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as
+well as the test of, an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring
+into the partnership something you lack. The navy had no way to keep
+prisoners of war. There can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s
+original notions about meeting the problems presented by his great
+victory of May 1, 1898, had been followed, we never would have had any
+trouble with the Filipinos; nor can there be any doubt that he made
+them his allies and used them as such. They were very obedient allies
+at that, until they saw the Washington Government was going to
+repudiate the &ldquo;alliance,&rdquo; and withhold from them what they
+had a right to consider the object and meaning of the alliance, if it
+meant anything.</p>
+<p>The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the
+National Geographic Society in Washington, &ldquo;We blundered into
+colonization.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1819src" href=
+"#xd20e1819" name="xd20e1819src">51</a> As we have seen, Admiral Dewey
+repeatedly expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the
+Filipinos were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more
+capable of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when
+he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for
+self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a
+coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part of
+the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb45" href="#pb45" name=
+"pb45">45</a>]</span>mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong
+as the gateway to the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the
+carrying trade of the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at
+Manila by way of rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that
+the taking of the islands was a dubious step from a financial
+standpoint, and a still more dubious one from the strategic standpoint
+of defending them by land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or
+any other first-class power. At this late date, when the passions and
+controversies of that period have long since subsided, is it not
+perfectly clear that after he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral
+Dewey not only dealt with the Filipinos, until the army came out,
+substantially as Admiral Sampson and General Shatter did with the
+Cubans, but also that he did all he properly could to save President
+McKinley from the one great blunder of our history, the taking of the
+Philippine Islands? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb46" href="#pb46"
+name="pb46">46</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1092" href="#xd20e1092src" name="xd20e1092">1</a></span> Hearings
+on Philippine affairs, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, part 3, 57th Cong.,
+1st Sess., 1901&ndash;2, proceedings of June 26&ndash;8, 1902.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1100" href="#xd20e1100src" name="xd20e1100">2</a></span> <i>S. D.
+331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2927.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1110" href="#xd20e1110src" name="xd20e1110">3</a></span> The
+<i>Senate Document</i> has it backwards &ldquo;left Mirs Bay for Hong
+Kong,&rdquo; clearly an error.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1119" href="#xd20e1119src" name="xd20e1119">4</a></span> <i>S. D.
+331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2932.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1162" href="#xd20e1162src" name="xd20e1162">5</a></span> <i>Cong.
+Record</i>, April 17, 1900, p. 4287.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1184" href="#xd20e1184src" name="xd20e1184">6</a></span> <i>S. D.
+331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2928.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n48.2"
+href="#n48.2src" name="n48.2">7</a></span> <i>Ib.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1224" href="#xd20e1224src" name="xd20e1224">8</a></span> <i>S. D.
+148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1231" href="#xd20e1231src" name="xd20e1231">9</a></span> <i>S. D.
+331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2937.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1236" href="#xd20e1236src" name="xd20e1236">10</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2934.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1241" href="#xd20e1241src" name="xd20e1241">11</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2967.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1246" href="#xd20e1246src" name="xd20e1246">12</a></span> See pp.
+2928 and 2956, <i>S. D. 331</i>, part 3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1273" href="#xd20e1273src" name="xd20e1273">13</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt.3, p. 2965.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1282" href="#xd20e1282src" name="xd20e1282">14</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2939.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1295" href="#xd20e1295src" name="xd20e1295">15</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2936.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1311" href="#xd20e1311src" name="xd20e1311">16</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2940.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1331" href="#xd20e1331src" name="xd20e1331">17</a></span> See
+letter of H. Irving Hancock, American war correspondent in the field,
+dated Manila, May 3, 1899, published <i>New York Criterion</i>, June
+17, 1899. This Hancock interview with General MacArthur was quoted in
+debate on the floor of the Senate on April 17, 1900 (see <i>Cong.
+Rec.</i> of that date), and was corroborated by General MacArthur
+himself as substantially correct in that officer&rsquo;s testimony
+before the Senate in 1902, <i>S. D. 331</i>, pt. 2, 57th Congress, 1st
+Session, p. 1942, in answer to questions put by Senator Culberson.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1345" href="#xd20e1345src" name="xd20e1345">18</a></span> Rev.
+Clay Macaulay, who afterwards made that statement in a letter to the
+<i>Boston Transcript</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1359" href="#xd20e1359src" name="xd20e1359">19</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2939.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1369" href="#xd20e1369src" name="xd20e1369">20</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 7, 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1387" href="#xd20e1387src" name="xd20e1387">21</a></span>
+<i>Cong. Record</i>, December, 1897.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1395" href="#xd20e1395src" name="xd20e1395">22</a></span> See
+<i>Cong. Record</i>, April 11, 1898, pp. 3699 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1418" href="#xd20e1418src" name="xd20e1418">23</a></span>
+<i>Cong. Record</i>, April 13, 1898, pp. 3701 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1434" href="#xd20e1434src" name="xd20e1434">24</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1448" href="#xd20e1448src" name="xd20e1448">25</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 327.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1478" href="#xd20e1478src" name="xd20e1478">26</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, App., p. 100. Dispatch May 20, 1898.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1491" href="#xd20e1491src" name="xd20e1491">27</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1501" href="#xd20e1501src" name="xd20e1501">28</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2930.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1518" href="#xd20e1518src" name="xd20e1518">29</a></span>
+<i>Report Schurman Commission</i>, vol. i., p. 172.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1528" href="#xd20e1528src" name="xd20e1528">30</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 337.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1533" href="#xd20e1533src" name="xd20e1533">31</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2951.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1548" href="#xd20e1548src" name="xd20e1548">32</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, p. 2955.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1553" href="#xd20e1553src" name="xd20e1553">33</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 2954.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1577" href="#xd20e1577src" name="xd20e1577">34</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, pp. 328&ndash;9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1582" href="#xd20e1582src" name="xd20e1582">35</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1589" href="#xd20e1589src" name="xd20e1589">36</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 102.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1611" href="#xd20e1611src" name="xd20e1611">37</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 102.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1642" href="#xd20e1642src" name="xd20e1642">38</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 362.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1652" href="#xd20e1652src" name="xd20e1652">39</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, pp. 360&ndash;1.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1667" href="#xd20e1667src" name="xd20e1667">40</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 106.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1674" href="#xd20e1674src" name="xd20e1674">41</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 354.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1688" href="#xd20e1688src" name="xd20e1688">42</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 329.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1693" href="#xd20e1693src" name="xd20e1693">43</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 432.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1709" href="#xd20e1709src" name="xd20e1709">44</a></span> Alas,
+that rare man, Frank Millet, perished in the <i>Titanic</i> disaster of
+April, 1912, since the above was written.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1715" href="#xd20e1715src" name="xd20e1715">45</a></span>
+<i>Expedition to the Philippines.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1724" href="#xd20e1724src" name="xd20e1724">46</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 111.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n69.1"
+href="#n69.1src" name="n69.1">47</a></span> See p. 2934, <i>S. D.
+331</i>, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1761" href="#xd20e1761src" name="xd20e1761">48</a></span> See p.
+2934, <i>S. D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1779" href="#xd20e1779src" name="xd20e1779">49</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 383.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1803" href="#xd20e1803src" name="xd20e1803">50</a></span> See
+Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902,
+<i>S. D. 331</i>, pp. 2942, 2957.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1819" href="#xd20e1819src" name="xd20e1819">51</a></span> See
+<i>National Geographic Magazine</i>, August, 1905.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch3" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter III</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Anderson and Aguinaldo</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Well, honor is the subject of my story.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Julius C&aelig;sar</i>, Act. I, Sc. 2.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on
+May 1, 1898, ten days after the outbreak of the war with Spain, having
+necessitated sending troops to the Philippines to complete the
+reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, Major-General Wesley
+Merritt was on May 16th selected to organize and command such an
+expedition.</p>
+<p>&ldquo;The First Expedition,&rdquo; as it was always distinguished,
+by the officers and men of the Eighth Army Corps, there having been
+many subsequent expeditions sent out before our war with the Filipinos
+was over, was itself subdivided into a number of different expeditions,
+troops being hurried to Manila as fast as they could be assembled and
+properly equipped in sufficient numbers. The first batch that were
+whipped into shape left San Francisco under command of
+Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, on May 25th, and arrived off
+Manila, June 30th. General Merritt did not arrive until July 25th. It
+was General Anderson, therefore, who broke the ice of the American
+occupation of the Philippines.</p>
+<p>In his annual message to Congress of December, following,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e1847src" href="#xd20e1847" name="xd20e1847src">1</a>
+summing up the War with Spain and its <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb47" href="#pb47" name="pb47">47</a>]</span>results, Mr. McKinley
+gives a brief account of the First Expedition. After recounting Admiral
+Dewey&rsquo;s victory of May 1st previous, he states that &ldquo;on the
+seventh day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory
+at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of the fleet what
+troops would be required.&rdquo; President McKinley does not give the
+Admiral&rsquo;s answer, though he does state that it was received on
+the 15th day of May. The Admiral&rsquo;s answer appears, however, in
+the <i>Report of the Navy Department</i> for 1898, Appendix, page 98.
+It was: &ldquo;In my best judgment, a well-equipped force of 5000
+men.&rdquo; But the President&rsquo;s message does state that he at
+once sent a &ldquo;total force consisting of 641 officers and 15,058
+enlisted men.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The difference of view-point of the Admiral and the President is
+clear from the language of both. In recommending 5000 troops, the
+Admiral had said they would be necessary &ldquo;to retain possession
+[of Manila] and thus control Philippine Islands.&rdquo; This counted,
+of course, on the friendship of the people, as in Cuba. &ldquo;I had in
+view simply taking possession of the city.&rdquo; said Admiral Dewey to
+the Senate Committee in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1859src" href=
+"#xd20e1859" name="xd20e1859src">2</a></p>
+<p>The purpose of the President in sending three times as many troops
+as were needed for the purpose Admiral Dewey had in mind is indicated
+in his account of what happened. After describing the taking of Manila
+by our troops on August 13th, the presidential message says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">By this <i>the conquest of the Philippine Islands</i>,
+virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was
+destroyed by Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s victory of May 1st, <i>was formally
+sealed</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1876src" href="#xd20e1876" name=
+"xd20e1876src">3</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb48" href="#pb48" name=
+"pb48">48</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Admiral Dewey contemplated that we should merely remain masters of
+the situation out where he was until the end of the war. President
+McKinley set about to effect &ldquo;the conquest of the Philippine
+Islands.&rdquo; The naval victory of Manila Bay having made it certain
+that at the conclusion of our war against a decadent monarchy we would
+at last have an adequate coaling station and naval base in the Far
+East, the sending of troops to the Philippines, in appropriate
+prosecution of the war, to reduce and capture Manila, the capital and
+chief port, raised the question at once &ldquo;And then
+what?&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The genesis of the idea of taking over the archipelago is traceable
+to within a few days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet.</p>
+<p>Within a few days after the official news of the battle of Manila
+Bay reached Washington, the Treasury Department set a man to work
+making a &ldquo;Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions of the
+Philippine Islands.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1888src" href=
+"#xd20e1888" name="xd20e1888src">4</a> The Interior Department also
+awoke, about the same time to possibilities of an El Dorado in the new
+overseas conquest. &ldquo;In May, 1898,&rdquo; says Secretary of the
+Interior, C. N. Bliss, in a letter intended for the Peace Commissioners
+who met at Paris that fall, &ldquo;by arrangement between the Secretary
+of War with this Department&rdquo;&mdash;Mr. Bliss&rsquo;s grammar is
+bad, but his meaning is plain&mdash;&ldquo;a geologist of the United
+States Geological Survey accompanied the military expedition to the
+Philippines for the purpose of procuring information touching the
+geological <i>and mineral</i> resources of said
+islands.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1896src" href="#xd20e1896"
+name="xd20e1896src">5</a> This report, which accompanies the Bliss
+letter, reads like a mining stock prospectus. That summer an Assistant
+Secretary of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb49" href="#pb49" name=
+"pb49">49</a>]</span>Treasury, presumably echoing the sentiments of the
+Administration, came out in one of the great magazines of the period,
+the <i>Century</i>, with an article in which he said: &ldquo;We see
+with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political
+maxims have outlived their force. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* A new mainspring
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* has become the directing force *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the
+mainspring of commercialism.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1906src"
+href="#xd20e1906" name="xd20e1906src">6</a> Of course, the writer did
+not mention that Manila is an out-of-the-way place, so far as regards
+the main-travelled routes across the Pacific Ocean, and also forgot
+that, as has been suggested once before, the carrying trade of the
+world, and the shippers on which it depends, in the contest of the
+nations for the markets of Asia, would never take to the practice of
+unloading at Manila by way of rehearsal, before finally discharging
+cargo on the mainland of Asia, where the name of the Ultimate Consumer
+is legion. Nevertheless &ldquo;Expansion&rdquo;&mdash;of Trade,
+mainly&mdash;was the slogan of the hour, and any one who did not catch
+the contagion of exuberant allusion to &ldquo;Our New
+Possessions&rdquo; was considered crusty and out of date. People who
+referred back to the political maxims of Washington&rsquo;s Farewell
+Address, and the cognate set represented by the Monroe Doctrine, were
+regarded merely as not knowing a good thing when they saw it. So on
+rode the country, on the crest of the wave of war. When President
+McKinley sent the troops to the Philippines, their job was to hurry up
+and effect what his subsequent message to Congress describing their
+work called &ldquo;the conquest of the Philippine Islands.&rdquo; That
+is, they were to effect a <i>constructive</i> conquest of the
+archipelago before Spain should sue for peace. It never seemed to occur
+to anybody at home that the Filipinos would object. If the country had,
+through some divine interposition, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb50"
+href="#pb50" name="pb50">50</a>]</span>gotten it into its head that the
+Filipinos were quite a decent lot and really did object very bitterly,
+it would have risen in its wrath and smitten down any suggestion of
+forcing a government on them against their will. But nobody knew
+anything about them. They were a wholly new proposition.</p>
+<p>General Anderson was of course furnished with a copy of the
+President&rsquo;s instructions to his chief, General Merritt. They are
+quite long, and go into details about a number of administrative
+matters that would necessarily come up after the city should surrender,
+such as the raising of revenue, the military commander&rsquo;s duty
+under the law of nations with regard to the seizure of transportation
+lines by land or sea, the protection of places of worship from
+desecration or destruction, and the like. The only portion of them that
+is essential to a clear understanding of subsequent events is now
+submitted: They are dated Executive Mansion, May 18, 1898, and read in
+part<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1920src" href="#xd20e1920" name=
+"xd20e1920src">7</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">PRESIDENT McKINLEY&rsquo;S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL
+MERRITT</p>
+<p>The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the
+taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the garrisons,
+and acquisition of control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in
+the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for
+the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with
+Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for <i>the
+twofold purpose</i> of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in
+that quarter, and of <i>giving order and security</i> to the islands
+while in the possession of the United States.</p>
+<p>For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General
+Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions as to
+the manner in which the movements shall be conducted. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb51" href="#pb51" name="pb51">51</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy&rsquo;s
+territory is the severance of the former political relations of the
+inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this
+changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform
+their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property
+and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the
+people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the
+United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in
+this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the
+expedition, <i>immediately upon his arrival</i> in the islands, to
+publish a proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the
+people of the Philippines nor upon any party or <i>faction</i> among
+them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in
+their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active
+aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its
+efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the
+reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free
+from severity as possible. Though <i>the powers of the military
+occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the
+political condition of the inhabitants</i>, the municipal laws of the
+conquered territory, such as affect private rights of persons and
+property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered
+as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
+order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
+occupying belligerents; and in practice they are not usually abrogated,
+but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
+ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
+This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on
+the present occasion. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The freedom of the people to
+pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may
+be necessary to do so.</p>
+<p>While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be
+such as has just been defined, it will be his <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb52" href="#pb52" name="pb52">52</a>]</span>duty to
+adopt measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the
+people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of
+law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the
+native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his
+own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such
+supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these
+high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and experience
+and a high sense of justice.</p>
+</div>
+<p>While this document declares the purpose of our government to be a
+&ldquo;two fold purpose,&rdquo; viz., first, to make an appropriate
+move in the game of war, and, second, to police the Islands
+&ldquo;while in the possession of the United States,&rdquo; it is
+wholly free from inherent evidence of any intention out of harmony with
+the policy as to Cuba. In fact when the city of Santiago de Cuba
+surrendered to our forces in July thereafter, and it became necessary
+to issue instructions for the guidance of the military commander there,
+exactly the same instructions were given him,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1958src" href="#xd20e1958" name="xd20e1958src">8</a> <i lang=
+"la">verbatim et literatim</i>. But in respect of the Cuban
+instructions there was never any concealment practised or necessary
+because the Cubans had been assured by the Teller amendment to the
+resolutions declaring war against Spain that we had no ulterior designs
+on their country, and that, as soon as peace and public order were
+restored, we intended &ldquo;to leave the government and control of the
+island to its people.&rdquo; The Cuban instructions were therefore
+frankly and promptly published in General Orders No. 101 by the War
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb53" href="#pb53" name=
+"pb53">53</a>]</span>Department, July 18, 1898, five days after they
+were received from the President, and were then translated into Spanish
+and spread broadcast over Santiago province without unnecessary delay.
+I remember poring over a Spanish copy of General Orders 101, at
+Santiago de Cuba, shortly after the fall of that city, which copy was
+one of many already posted about that city by direction of General
+Wood. The words &ldquo;the powers of the military occupant are
+<i>absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the political
+condition of the inhabitants</i>&rdquo; never disturbed the Cuban
+leaders in the least, because they were read in the light of the
+disclaimer contained in the declaration of war. On the other hand, the
+proclamation which the military commander in the Philippines was
+enjoined by his instructions to publish &ldquo;immediately upon his
+arrival in the islands,&rdquo; which arrival occurred July 25th, was
+not so published until after we had taken Manila, August 13th, and then
+it copied only the glittering generalities of the instructions
+themselves, such as the part assuring the people that we had not come
+to make war on them and that vested rights would be respected, but it
+carefully omitted the words about the powers of the military occupant
+being absolute and supreme, because when the army arrived it found a
+native government that had already issued its declaration of
+independence, was making wonderful progress against the common enemy,
+and was able to put up a right good fight against us also, in case we
+should deny them independence.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e1972src"
+href="#xd20e1972" name="xd20e1972src">9</a></p>
+<p>General Anderson arrived in Manila Bay, June 30, 1898, with about
+2500 men, and when General Merritt arrived, July 25th, we had about
+10,000 all told, while the Filipinos had half again that many, and
+there were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb54" href="#pb54" name=
+"pb54">54</a>]</span>12,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila. General
+Anderson had not been long camped on the bayshore, under cover of the
+Navy&rsquo;s guns and in the neighborhood of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+headquarters, before he understood the whole situation clearly and
+wrote the War Department as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Since reading the President&rsquo;s instructions to
+General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment
+of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in
+conflict with insurgents.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This letter is dated July 18, 1898.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1988src" href="#xd20e1988" name="xd20e1988src">10</a></p>
+<p>When General Anderson arrived in the islands on June 30th, the
+Washington Government was still wrestling with the angel of its
+announced creed about &ldquo;Forcible Annexation&rdquo; being
+&ldquo;criminal aggression,&rdquo; and Mr. McKinley had to get both
+that angel&rsquo;s shoulders on the mat and put him out of business
+before he could get his own consent to giving any instructions to his
+generals which might sanction their killing people for objecting to
+forcible annexation. Hence his early anxiety to avoid a rupture with
+the Filipino leaders. The first stage of this wrestling coincides in
+point of time with General Anderson&rsquo;s tenure as the ranking
+military officer commanding our forces in the Philippines, which was
+from June 30th until the date of General Merritt&rsquo;s arrival, July
+25th. As already made plain, the President&rsquo;s instructions for the
+guidance of the military commander were entirely free from any
+land-grabbing suggestion. On the other hand, when General Anderson left
+San Francisco for Manila, May 25th, there was already talk in the
+United States about retaining the Islands, if they were captured, for
+he so informed <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb55" href="#pb55" name=
+"pb55">55</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey in the first interview they had
+after the transports which brought his command cast anchor near our
+squadron in Manila Bay on the last day of June. &ldquo;I was the first
+to tell Admiral Dewey,&rdquo; says he, in the <i>North American
+Review</i> for February, 1900, &ldquo;that there was any disposition on
+the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were
+captured. The current opinion was setting that way when the
+expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no
+reason to surmise.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Relegated by the circumstances to his own discretion as to how he
+should act until Washington knew its mind, General Anderson&rsquo;s
+attitude in the outset represented a &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo;
+policy, suffused with benevolent pride at championing the cause of the
+oppressed, but secretly knowing from the beginning that it might become
+necessary later to slaughter said &ldquo;oppressed,&rdquo; should they
+seriously object to a change of masters.</p>
+<p>&ldquo;On July 1st,&rdquo; says General Anderson, in the <i>North
+American Review</i> article above quoted, &ldquo;I called on Aguinaldo
+with Admiral Dewey.&rdquo; Of the Admiral&rsquo;s dealings with the
+insurgent chief prior to this time, the General says in this same
+article:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and
+Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino
+government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so,
+probably <span class="corr" id="xd20e2009" title=
+"Source: infering">inferring</span> this from their acts rather than
+from their statements.&rdquo; This last quoted passage was read to
+Admiral Dewey by a member of the Senate Committee in 1902, along with
+other parts of the magazine article cited, and he was asked to comment
+on the same. He said:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;These are General Anderson&rsquo;s statements. They
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb56" href="#pb56" name=
+"pb56">56</a>]</span>are very interesting, indeed; I am here to make my
+own statements.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>He had stated that he never did specifically promise Aguinaldo
+independence, and the questioner was trying to show that his
+<i>acts</i> had amounted to assurances and therefore had committed the
+Government to giving the Filipinos their independence. Then Senator
+Patterson began another question, and had gotten as far as &ldquo;I
+want to know whether your views&mdash;&rdquo; when out came this, as of
+a sailor-man clearing decks for action:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them
+yesterday and I do not like them to-day.&rdquo; So the Admiral&rsquo;s
+feelings were respected and the question was not pressed. There is no
+doubt at all that in the Philippines in the summer of 1898 the army
+turned the back of its hand to Aguinaldo as soon as it got there and
+baldly repudiated what the navy had done in the way of befriending the
+Filipinos. But both had acted under the authority of the
+Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy&mdash;the President. The
+Admiral&rsquo;s sensitiveness on the subject <i>ought</i> to have been
+respected. And it was.</p>
+<p>By the time Admiral Dewey and General Anderson decided to call on
+&ldquo;Don Emilio,&rdquo; the day after the General&rsquo;s arrival,
+the unexpected intimations which the latter brought, as to the
+Washington programme for the Philippine revolutionists being different
+from that as to Cuba, had begun to get in its work on the former. Not
+being a politician, the gallant Admiral was there ready and able to
+carry out any orders his government might send him, whenever the
+politicians should decide what they wanted to do. But in the absence of
+orders, he began to trim his sails a bit, so as to be prepared for
+whatever might be the policy. Accordingly, before he <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb57" href="#pb57" name="pb57">57</a>]</span>and the
+General started out to pay their call on &ldquo;Don Emilio Aguinaldo y
+Famy, President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and
+General in Chief of its Army&rdquo;&mdash;as he had styled himself in
+his proclamation of June 23d,&mdash;the Admiral said, &ldquo;Do not
+take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do
+not go with any ceremony.&rdquo; And says he, in telling this,
+&ldquo;We went in that way.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2031src"
+href="#xd20e2031" name="xd20e2031src">11</a> The reason of thus
+avoiding too much ceremony toward our &ldquo;ally&rdquo; claiming to
+represent an existing government which had lately declared its
+independence, is explained by an expression of the Admiral&rsquo;s
+concerning said Declaration of Independence itself: &ldquo;That was my
+idea, not taking it seriously.&rdquo; At that same hearing the Admiral
+explained with much genuine feeling that from the day of the naval
+battle of May 1st until the arrival of the army &ldquo;these great
+questions&rdquo; were coming up constantly and he simply met them as
+they arose by acting on his best judgment on the spot at the time. But
+what a terrible mistake it was not to take that Declaration of
+Independence of June 23d, seriously, backed as it was by an army of
+15,000 men flushed with victory, and under the absolute control of the
+author of the Declaration! Of course the Declaration had been published
+to the army. Could its author have checked them by repudiating it even
+if he had wanted to? As Aguinaldo himself expressed what would happen
+in such a contingency, &ldquo;They would fail to recognize me as <i>the
+interpreter of their aspirations</i> and would punish me as a traitor,
+replacing me by another more careful of his own honor and
+dignity.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2039src" href="#xd20e2039"
+name="xd20e2039src">12</a></p>
+<p>This Dewey-Anderson call on Aguinaldo was on July 1st. Admiral Dewey
+now began to foresee that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb58" href=
+"#pb58" name="pb58">58</a>]</span>the Washington programme was going to
+put him in an awkward position. So he began to take Aguinaldo more
+seriously. On July 4th, he wired Washington: &ldquo;Aguinaldo
+proclaimed himself President of the Revolutionary Republic on July
+1st.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2048src" href="#xd20e2048" name=
+"xd20e2048src">13</a> It was on July 7th that Admiral Dewey captured
+1300 armed Spanish prisoners, the garrison of Isla la Grande, off
+Olongapo, and turned them over to the forces of the Aguinaldo
+government because he had no way to keep them.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2053src" href="#xd20e2053" name="xd20e2053src">14</a> Was not
+that taking that government a bit seriously? How wholly unauthorized by
+the facts was this of &ldquo;not taking it seriously,&rdquo; on the
+part of &ldquo;The Liberator of the Filipinos,&rdquo;<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e2062src" href="#xd20e2062" name="xd20e2062src">15</a> the
+immortal victor of Manila Bay, who two months before had taught the
+nation the magnitude of its power for good, in a cause as righteous as
+the crusades of old, and more sensible!</p>
+<p>But to return to General Anderson&rsquo;s account in the <i>North
+American Review</i> of his call, with Admiral Dewey, on the insurgent
+chief: &ldquo;He asked me at once whether the &lsquo;United States of
+the North&rsquo; either had, or would recognize his government. I am
+not quite sure as to the form of the question, whether it was
+&lsquo;had&rsquo; or &lsquo;would&rsquo;? <i>In either form it was
+embarrassing.</i>&rdquo; General Anderson then tells of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s returning his call: &ldquo;A few days thereafter he
+made an official call, coming with cabinet, staff, and band. He asked
+if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the
+Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that
+in 122 years we had established no colonies. He then made this
+remarkable statement: &lsquo;<i>I have studied attentively the
+Constitution of the United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb59" href=
+"#pb59" name="pb59">59</a>]</span>States, and I find in it no authority
+for colonies, and I have no fear.</i>&rsquo;&rdquo; General Anderson
+adds: &ldquo;It may seem that my answer was evasive, but I was at the
+time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, fuel, and
+forage.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>While this history must not lapse into an almanac, it may not be
+amiss to follow these early stages of this matter through a few more
+successive dates, because the history of that period was all indelibly
+branded into Filipino memory shortly afterward with the red-hot iron of
+war.</p>
+<p>July 4th, General Anderson writes the Filipino candidate for
+Independence inviting him to &ldquo;co-operate with us in military
+operations against the Spanish forces.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2084src" href="#xd20e2084" name="xd20e2084src">16</a> This was
+written not to arrange any <i>plan</i> of co-operation but in order to
+get room about Cavite as a military base without a row. In his <i>North
+American Review</i> article General Anderson says that on that same
+day, the Fourth of July, Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and
+review &ldquo;in honor of our national holiday.&rdquo; &ldquo;He did
+not come,&rdquo; says the article, &ldquo;because he was not invited as
+President but as General Aguinaldo.&rdquo; An odd situation, was it
+not? Here was a man claiming to be President of a newly established
+republic based on the principles set forth in our Declaration of
+Independence, which republic had just issued a like Declaration, and he
+was invited to come and hear <i>our</i> declaration read, and declined
+<i>because we would not <span class="corr" id="xd20e2100" title=
+"Source: recognise">recognize</span> his right to assert the same
+truths</i>. On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
+it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our Declaration
+before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.</p>
+<p>July 6th, General Anderson writes telling Aguinaldo <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb60" href="#pb60" name="pb60">60</a>]</span>that he
+is expecting more troops soon and therefore &ldquo;<i>I would like to
+have your excellency&rsquo;s advice and
+co-operation.</i>&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2111src" href=
+"#xd20e2111" name="xd20e2111src">17</a></p>
+<p>July 9th, General Anderson writes the War Department that Aguinaldo
+tells him he has about 15,000 fighting men, 11,000 armed with guns, and
+some 4000 prisoners,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2118src" href=
+"#xd20e2118" name="xd20e2118src">18</a> and adds: &ldquo;When we first
+landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly but I have
+now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more
+friendly and seems <i>willing to co-operate</i>.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>July 13th, we find Admiral Dewey also still in a co-operative mood.
+On that day he cables the Navy Department of the capture of the 1,300
+prisoners on July 7th, mentioned above, which capture was made, it
+appears, because Aguinaldo complained to him that a German war-ship was
+interfering with his operations,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2126src"
+href="#xd20e2126" name="xd20e2126src">19</a> the prisoners being at
+once turned over to Aguinaldo, as stated above.</p>
+<p>July 18th, is the date of the letter to the War Department in which
+General Anderson states that the establishment of a provisional
+government by us will probably mean a conflict with the insurgents.
+This was equivalent to saying that they will probably be ready to fight
+whenever we assert the &ldquo;absolute and supreme&rdquo; authority
+that the President&rsquo;s instructions had directed to be asserted by
+the army as soon as it should arrive in the Philippines. Yet in the
+fall of 1899, President McKinley said he &ldquo;never dreamed&rdquo;
+that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s &ldquo;little band&rdquo; would oppose our rule
+to the extent of war against it. It would have been more accurate if
+the martyred Christian gentleman who used those words had said he
+&ldquo;always hoped&rdquo; they would not, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb61" href="#pb61" name="pb61">61</a>]</span>instead
+of &ldquo;never dreamed&rdquo; they would. This letter of July 18th,
+informs the Department:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Aguinaldo has declared himself dictator and
+self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a
+minute method of procedure under it.</p>
+</div>
+<p>July 19th, General Anderson sends Major (now Major-General) J. F.
+Bell, to Aguinaldo, and asks of him a number of favors, such as any
+soldier may properly ask of an ally, for example, permission to see his
+military maps, etc., and that Aguinaldo &ldquo;place at his
+[Bell&rsquo;s] disposal any <i>information you may have</i> on the
+above subjects, and also give him [Bell] a letter or pass addressed to
+your subordinates which will <i>authorize them to furnish him any
+information they can</i> *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and to facilitate his passage
+along the lines, upon a reconnaissance around Manila, on which I
+propose to send him.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2151src" href=
+"#xd20e2151" name="xd20e2151src">20</a> All of which Aguinaldo did.</p>
+<p>Military training is very keen on honor. Talk about what the French
+call <i lang="fr">foi d&rsquo;officier</i>,&mdash;the &ldquo;word of an
+officer&rdquo;! Did ever a letter from one soldier to another more
+completely commit the faith and honor of his government, to recognition
+of the existence of an alliance? &ldquo;In 122 years we have
+established no colonies,&rdquo; he had told Aguinaldo. &ldquo;It looks
+like we are about to go into the colonizing business,&rdquo; he had, in
+effect, said to Admiral Dewey, about the same time.</p>
+<p>July 21st, General Anderson writes the Adjutant-General of the army
+as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Since I last wrote, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
+elaborate system of military government. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* It may seem
+strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as
+dictator, his declaration of martial law, etc. I wrote such a protest
+but did not publish it at Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s request.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2167src" href="#xd20e2167" name=
+"xd20e2167src">21</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb62" href="#pb62" name=
+"pb62">62</a>]</span></p>
+<p>When he wrote this letter, General Anderson was evidently beginning
+to have some compunctions about the trouble he now saw ahead. He was a
+veteran of the Civil War, whose gallantry had then been proven on many
+a field against an enemy compared with whom these people would be a
+picnic. But things did not look to the grim old hero like there was
+going to be a square deal. So he put this in the letter:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore
+underrated the natives. They are <i>not</i> ignorant savage tribes, but
+have a civilization of their own, and although insignificant in
+appearance are fierce fighters and for a tropical people they are
+industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work than a
+regiment of volunteers.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course, this slam at &ldquo;volunteers&rdquo; <i>was</i> a bit
+rough. But the battle-scarred veteran&rsquo;s sense of fair play was
+getting on his nerves. He foresaw the coming conflict, and though he
+did not shirk it, he did not relish it. He understood the
+&ldquo;game,&rdquo; and it seemed to him the cards were stacked, to
+meet the necessity of demonstrating that forcible annexation, instead
+of being criminal aggression, was merely Trade Expansion, and that his
+government was right then irrevocably committing itself, without any
+knowledge of, or acquaintance with, the Filipinos, to the assumption
+that they were incapable of running a government of their own.</p>
+<p>The next day, July 22d, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo a letter
+advising him that he was without orders as yet concerning the question
+of recognizing his government. But that this letter was neither a
+protest nor in the nature of a protest, is evident from its text:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I observe that Your Excellency has announced yourself
+dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb63" href="#pb63" name="pb63">63</a>]</span>simply
+in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an
+assumption. <i>I have no orders from my government on the
+subject.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2196src" href="#xd20e2196"
+name="xd20e2196src">22</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Yet General Anderson&rsquo;s letter to the Adjutant-General of the
+army of July 18th<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2203src" href="#xd20e2203"
+name="xd20e2203src">23</a> uses the words &ldquo;since reading the
+President&rsquo;s instructions to General Merritt,&rdquo; etc., showing
+that he had a copy of them; and those instructions order and direct
+(see <i>ante</i>) that as soon as the commanding general of the
+American troops arrives he is to let the Filipinos know that &ldquo;the
+powers of the military occupant are <i>absolute and supreme and
+immediately operate</i> upon the political condition of the
+inhabitants.&rdquo; A charitable view of the matter would be that,
+technically, those were Merritt&rsquo;s orders, not Anderson&rsquo;s.
+But the whole scheme was to conceal the intention to assume supreme
+authority and keep Aguinaldo quiet &ldquo;until,&rdquo; as General
+Merritt afterwards expressed it in his report, &ldquo;I should be in
+possession of the city of Manila, *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* as I would not until
+then be in a position to *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* enforce my authority, in the
+event that his [Aguinaldo&rsquo;s] pretensions should clash with my
+designs.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2214src" href="#xd20e2214"
+name="xd20e2214src">24</a></p>
+<p>The same day that General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo his <i>billet
+doux</i> about the dictatorship, viz., July 22d, he cabled Washington a
+much franker and more serious message; which read: &ldquo;Aguinaldo
+declares dictatorship and martial law over all islands. <span class=
+"sc">The people expect independence.</span>&rdquo; The very next day,
+July 23d, he wrote Aguinaldo asking his assistance in getting five
+hundred horses, and fifty oxen and ox-carts, and manifesting
+considerable impatience that he had not already complied with a
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e2228" title=
+"Source: similiar">similar</span> request previously <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb64" href="#pb64" name="pb64">64</a>]</span>made
+&ldquo;<i>as it was to fight in the cause of your
+people</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2237src" href=
+"#xd20e2237" name="xd20e2237src">25</a> The following day, July 24th,
+replying to General Anderson&rsquo;s letter of the 22d wherein General
+Anderson had advised him that he was as yet without orders concerning
+the question of recognizing his government, Aguinaldo wrote:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is true that my government has not been
+acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the
+great North American nation, which had struggled first for its
+independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, <i>and is
+now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba</i>, would look
+upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2248src" href="#xd20e2248" name=
+"xd20e2248src">26</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>That cablegram of July 22d, above quoted, in which the commanding
+general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington
+government, &ldquo;The people expect independence,&rdquo; is the
+hardest thing in the published archives of our government covering that
+momentous period for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get
+around.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2255src" href="#xd20e2255" name=
+"xd20e2255src">27</a> After the war with the Filipinos broke out Mr.
+McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, &ldquo;I never dreamed
+they would turn against us.&rdquo; You do not find the Anderson
+cablegram of July 22d in the published report of the War Department
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb65" href="#pb65" name=
+"pb65">65</a>]</span>covering the period under consideration. General
+Anderson addressed it to the Secretary of War and signed it, and,
+probably for lack of army cable facilities, got Admiral Dewey to send
+it to the Secretary of the Navy for transmission to the Secretary of
+War.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2266src" href="#xd20e2266" name=
+"xd20e2266src">28</a> Certain it must be that at some Cabinet meeting
+on or after July 22, 1898, either the Secretary of the Navy or the
+Secretary of War read in the hearing of the President and the rest of
+his advisers that message from General Anderson, &ldquo;<span class=
+"sc">The people expect independence.</span>&rdquo; The object here is
+<i>not</i> to inveigh against Mr. McKinley. It is to show that, as
+Gibbon told us long ago, in speaking of the discontent of far distant
+possessions and the lack of hold of the possessor on the affections of
+the inhabitants thereof, &ldquo;the cry of remote distress is ever
+faintly heard.&rdquo; The average American to-day, if told the
+Filipinos want independence, will give the statement about the same
+consideration Mr. McKinley did then, and if told that the desire among
+them for a government <i>of</i> their people <i>by their</i> people
+<i>for</i> their people has not been diminished since the late war by
+tariff taxation without representation, and the steady development of
+race prejudice between the dominant alien race and the subject one, he
+will begin to realize by personal experience how faintly the uttered
+longings of a whole people may fall on distant ears.</p>
+<p>We saw above that in a letter written July 21st, the day before the
+telegram about the &ldquo;people expect independence,&rdquo; which
+letter must have reached Washington within thirty days, General
+Anderson not only notified Washington all about Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+government and its pretensions, but stated that at the request of
+Admiral Dewey he had made no protest against it.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2290src" href="#xd20e2290" name="xd20e2290src">29</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb66" href="#pb66" name=
+"pb66">66</a>]</span>Yet straight on through the period of General
+Merritt&rsquo;s sojourn in the Islands, which began July 25th, and
+terminated August 29th, we find no protest ordered by Washington, and
+we further find the purpose of the President as announced in the
+instructions to Merritt, &ldquo;The powers of the military occupant are
+<i>absolute and supreme</i>&rdquo; throughout the Islands, not only
+<i>not</i> communicated to the Filipino people, but deliberately
+suppressed from the proclamation published by General Merritt pursuant
+to those instructions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2303src" href=
+"#xd20e2303" name="xd20e2303src">30</a></p>
+<p>Comments and conclusions are usually impertinent and unwelcome save
+as mere addenda to <i>facts</i>, but in the light of the facts
+derivable from our own official records, is it any wonder that General
+Anderson, a gallant veteran of the Civil War, and perhaps the most
+conspicuous figure of the early fighting in the Philippines, delivered
+an address some time after he came back home before the Oregon
+Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e2314src" href="#xd20e2314" name="xd20e2314src">31</a> on the
+subject, &ldquo;Should republics have colonies?&rdquo; and answered the
+question emphatically &ldquo;No!&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb67" href="#pb67" name="pb67">67</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1847" href="#xd20e1847src" name="xd20e1847">1</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1859" href="#xd20e1859src" name="xd20e1859">2</a></span> See p.
+2938, <i>S. D. 331</i> (1902).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1876" href="#xd20e1876src" name="xd20e1876">3</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898, p. 5.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1888" href="#xd20e1888src" name="xd20e1888">4</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 169</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1898).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1896" href="#xd20e1896src" name="xd20e1896">5</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1906" href="#xd20e1906src" name="xd20e1906">6</a></span> Hon.
+Frank A. Vanderlip, August, 1898 <i>Century Magazine</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1920" href="#xd20e1920src" name="xd20e1920">7</a></span> See p.
+85, <i>S. D. 208</i>, 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1958" href="#xd20e1958src" name="xd20e1958">8</a></span> See
+General Orders No. 101, series 1898, Adjutant-General&rsquo;s Office,
+Washington, July 18, 1898, a copy of which accompanied the
+President&rsquo;s message to Congress of December, 1898, and may be
+seen at p. 783, <i>House Document No. 1</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.,
+1898&ndash;9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1972" href="#xd20e1972src" name="xd20e1972">9</a></span> For a
+copy of this proclamation, see p. 86, <i>S. D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st
+Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e1988" href="#xd20e1988src" name="xd20e1988">10</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, p. 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2031" href="#xd20e2031src" name="xd20e2031">11</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, p. 2976, Hearings before Senate Committee, 1902.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2039" href="#xd20e2039src" name="xd20e2039">12</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 16.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2048" href="#xd20e2048src" name="xd20e2048">13</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence, War with Spain,</i> vol. ii., p. 720.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2053" href="#xd20e2053src" name="xd20e2053">14</a></span> For
+Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s cable report of this, see <i>Navy Dept.
+Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 110. For particulars, given by him
+subsequently, see <i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 2942.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2062" href="#xd20e2062src" name="xd20e2062">15</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2942, and thereabouts.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2084" href="#xd20e2084src" name="xd20e2084">16</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 4.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2111" href="#xd20e2111src" name="xd20e2111">17</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, p. 4.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2118" href="#xd20e2118src" name="xd20e2118">18</a></span>
+Anderson only had about 2500 troops then.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2126" href="#xd20e2126src" name="xd20e2126">19</a></span> See
+<i>Navy Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 110; <i>S. D. 331</i>,
+1902, p. 2942.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2151" href="#xd20e2151src" name="xd20e2151">20</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 1900, p. 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2167" href="#xd20e2167src" name="xd20e2167">21</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, pp. 12&ndash;13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2196" href="#xd20e2196src" name="xd20e2196">22</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, 1900, p. 9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2203" href="#xd20e2203src" name="xd20e2203">23</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2214" href="#xd20e2214src" name="xd20e2214">24</a></span> See
+page 40 of General Merritt&rsquo;s Report, <i>War Dept. Report</i>,
+1898, vol. i., part 2.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2237" href="#xd20e2237src" name="xd20e2237">25</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, 1900, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2248" href="#xd20e2248src" name="xd20e2248">26</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 10.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2255" href="#xd20e2255src" name="xd20e2255">27</a></span> The
+writer is certainly one of these, and while calling in question the
+wisdom and righteousness of our Philippine policy, he cannot refrain
+from avowing just here a feeling of individual obligation to Mr. Root
+for his exquisite tribute to the <i>personal</i> equation of Mr.
+McKinley, delivered at the National Republican Convention of 1904,
+which was, in part, as follows: &ldquo;How wise and skilful he was. How
+modest and self-effacing. How deep his insight into the human heart.
+<i>How swift the intuitions of his sympathy. How compelling the charm
+of his gracious presence.</i> He was so unselfish, so genuine a lover
+of his kind. And he was the kindest and tenderest friend who ever
+grasped another&rsquo;s hand. Alas, that his virtues did plead in vain
+against his cruel fate.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2266" href="#xd20e2266src" name="xd20e2266">28</a></span> See
+<i>Navy Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 117.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2290" href="#xd20e2290src" name="xd20e2290">29</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, 1900, p. 13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2303" href="#xd20e2303src" name="xd20e2303">30</a></span> For the
+Merritt proclamation, see <i>S. D. 208</i>, p. 86.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2314" href="#xd20e2314src" name="xd20e2314">31</a></span> In
+1906.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch4" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter IV</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Merritt and Aguinaldo</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">There are no tricks in plain and simple faith.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Julius C&aelig;sar</i>, Act IV., Sc.
+2.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Major-General Wesley Merritt&rsquo;s account of the
+operations of the troops under his command in the First Expedition to
+the Philippines may be found in volume i., part 2, <i>War Department
+Report</i> for 1898. He left San Francisco accompanied by his staff,
+June 29, 1898, arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th, received the
+surrender of the city of Manila August 13th, and sailed thence August
+30th, in obedience to orders from Washington to proceed without
+unnecessary delay to Paris, France, for conference with the Peace
+Commissioners. According to General Merritt&rsquo;s report, about the
+time he arrived Aguinaldo had some 12,000 men under arms, with plenty
+of ammunition, and a number of field-pieces. The late lamented Frank D.
+Millet has preserved for us, in his <i>Expedition to the
+Philippines</i>, some valuable and intimate studies of this army of
+Filipino besiegers whom our troops found busily at work when they
+arrived in the Islands:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It was an interesting sight at Camp Dewey to see the
+insurgents strolling to and from the front. Pretty much all day long
+they were coming and going, never in military formation, but singly,
+and in small groups, perfectly clean <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb68" href="#pb68" name="pb68">68</a>]</span>and tidy in dress, often
+accompanied by their wives and children, and all chatting as merrily as
+if they were going off on a pigeon shoot. The men who sold fish and
+vegetables in camp in the morning would be seen every day or two
+dressed in holiday garments, with rifle and cartridge boxes, strolling
+off to take their turn at the Spaniards.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The reader will readily understand that there were many times as
+many volunteers as guns. Mr. Millet continues:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When they had been at the front twenty-four hours they
+were relieved and returned home for a rest. They generally passed their
+rifles and equipments on to another man and thus a limited number of
+weapons served to arm a great many besiegers. They had no distinctive
+uniform, the only badge of service being a red and blue cockade with a
+white triangle bearing the Malay symbol of the sun and three stars, and
+sometimes a red and blue band pinned diagonally across the lower part
+of the left sleeve. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Many of them *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* had
+belonged to the native volunteer force. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The recruits
+were soon hammered into shape by the veterans of the rank and file.
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Their men were perfectly obedient to orders
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and they made the most devoted soldiers. There was no
+visible Commissary or Quartermaster&rsquo;s Departments, but the
+insurgent force was always supplied with food and ammunition and there
+was no lack of transportation. The food issued at the front was mostly
+rice <i>brought up in carromatas to within a few hundred yards of the
+trenches, when it was cooked by the women</i>. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Each man
+had a double handful of rice, sometimes enriched by a small proportion
+of meat and fish, which was served him in a square of plantain leaf.
+Thus he was unencumbered with a plate or knife or fork and threw away
+his primitive but excellent dish when he had &ldquo;licked the platter
+clean.&rdquo; It was noticeable that the insurgents carried no water
+bottles nor haversacks, and no <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb69"
+href="#pb69" name="pb69">69</a>]</span>equipments indeed, but cartridge
+boxes. They did not seem to be worried by thirst like our men.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&ldquo;Although insignificant in appearance, they are fierce
+fighters,&rdquo; wrote General Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the
+army in July.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2358src" href="#xd20e2358"
+name="xd20e2358src">1</a></p>
+<p>General Merritt states in his report that Aguinaldo had
+&ldquo;proclaimed an independent government, republican in form, with
+himself as President, and at the time of my arrival in the Islands the
+entire edifice of executive and legislative departments had been
+accomplished, at least <i>on paper</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2368src" href="#xd20e2368" name="xd20e2368src">2</a> Of course at
+that time we were still officially declining to take Filipino
+aspirations for independence seriously, and preferred to treat
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s government as purely a matter of stationery. As a
+matter of fact, an exhaustive examination of the official documents of
+that period, made with a view of ascertaining just how much of that
+Aguinaldo government of 1898 was stationery fiction and how much was
+stable fact, has absolutely surprised one man who was out there from
+1899 to 1905 (the writer), and I have no doubt will be interesting, as
+mere matter of political necrology, to any American who was there
+&ldquo;in the days of the empire&rdquo; as the
+&ldquo;ninety-niners&rdquo; called it.</p>
+<p>Early in the spring of 1899, Mr. McKinley sent out the Commission of
+which President Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, to try to
+stop the war. They bent themselves to the task in a spirit as kindly as
+that in which we know Mr. McKinley himself would have acted. They
+failed because the war was already on and the Filipinos were bent on
+fighting for independence to the bitter end. But they learned a good
+deal about the facts of the earlier situation. Speaking of these in
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb70" href="#pb70" name=
+"pb70">70</a>]</span>their report to the President<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e2377src" href="#xd20e2377" name="xd20e2377src">3</a> with
+especial reference to the period beginning with Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+landing at Cavite in May, after describing how the Filipino successes
+in battle with the Spaniards finally resulted in all of them being
+driven into Manila, where they remained hemmed in, they say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in
+Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves <i>masters of the entire
+island except that city</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&ldquo;For three and one half months,&rdquo; says General Otis in
+describing the facts of this same situation a year later, &ldquo;the
+insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled [meaning while
+Admiral Dewey had been blockading the place by water] *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+and food supplies were exhausted.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2391src" href="#xd20e2391" name="xd20e2391src">4</a> &ldquo;We
+had Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held <i>not</i> by
+the Spanish but by the Filipinos,&rdquo; said General Anderson, in the
+<i>North American Review</i> for February, 1900. &ldquo;It is a fact
+that they were in possession, they had gotten pretty much the whole
+thing except Manila,&rdquo; said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee
+in 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2402src" href="#xd20e2402" name=
+"xd20e2402src">5</a></p>
+<p>General Merritt took Manila August 13th, and sailed away for Paris
+August 31st, and only a week after that General Otis wired Washington
+(under date of September 7th) from Manila: &ldquo;Insurgents have
+captured all Spanish garrisons in island [of Luzon] and control affairs
+outside of Cavite and this city.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2409src" href="#xd20e2409" name="xd20e2409src">6</a></p>
+<p>The recruiting by Aguinaldo of an army of 40,000 men with guns
+within one hundred days after his little &ldquo;Return from
+Elba&rdquo;&mdash;&ldquo;15,000 fighting men, 11,000 <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb71" href="#pb71" name="pb71">71</a>]</span>of them
+armed with guns,&rdquo; in fifty days,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2418src" href="#xd20e2418" name="xd20e2418src">7</a> which number
+had swelled to nearly 40,000 men with guns in another fifty days (by
+August 29th)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2424src" href="#xd20e2424"
+name="xd20e2424src">8</a>&mdash;is no more remarkable than his progress
+in organizing his government and making its grip on the whole island of
+Luzon effective in a short space of time.</p>
+<p>As all Americans who know the Filipinos know how fond they are of
+what government offices call &ldquo;paper work,&rdquo; and how their
+<i lang="es">escribientes</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2435src" href=
+"#xd20e2435" name="xd20e2435src">9</a> can work like bees in drafting
+documents, it might be easy to ignore Aguinaldo&rsquo;s various
+proclamations, already hereinbefore noticed in Chapter II., as
+representing merely &ldquo;a government on paper,&rdquo; were there no
+other proof. But among the insurgent captured papers we found long
+afterward, there is a document containing the minutes of a convention
+of the <i lang="es">insurrecto</i> presidentes from all the pueblos of
+fifteen different provinces, on August 6, 1898, which throws a flood of
+light on the subject now under consideration.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2441src" href="#xd20e2441" name="xd20e2441src">10</a> This
+convention was held at Bacoor, then Aguinaldo&rsquo;s headquarters, a
+little town on the bay shore between Manila and Cavite. The minutes of
+the convention recite that its members had been previously chosen as
+presidentes of their respective pueblos in the manner prescribed by
+previous decrees issued by Aguinaldo (already noticed), and that
+thereafter they had taken the oath of office before Aguinaldo as
+President of the government, etc. They then declare that the Filipino
+people whom they speak for are &ldquo;not ambitious for power, nor
+honors, nor riches, aside from the rational aspirations for a free and
+independent life,&rdquo; and &ldquo;proclaim solemnly, in the face of
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb72" href="#pb72" name=
+"pb72">72</a>]</span>the whole world, the Independence of the
+Philippines.&rdquo; They also re-affirm allegiance to Aguinaldo as
+President of the government and request him to seek recognition of it
+at the hands of the Powers, &ldquo;because,&rdquo; says the paper,
+&ldquo;to no one is it permitted to *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* stifle the
+legitimate aspirations of a people&rdquo;&mdash;as if Europe cared a
+rap what <i>we</i> did to them except in the way of regret that
+<i>it</i> did not have a finger in the pie. However, they were not only
+apprehensive, on the one hand, lest we might be tempted to take their
+country away from Spain for ourselves, but also, on the other hand,
+lest we might in the wind-up decide to leave them to Spain at the end
+of the war. That this last was not an idle fear is shown by the fact
+that during the deliberations of the Paris Peace Commission, Judge Gray
+urged, in behalf of his contention against taking the islands at all,
+that if Dewey had sunk the Spanish fleet off Cadiz, instead of in
+Manila Bay, and the Carlists had incidentally helped us about that
+time, we would have been under no resulting obligation &ldquo;to stay
+by them at the conclusion of the war.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2456src" href="#xd20e2456" name="xd20e2456src">11</a> When the
+presidentes in convention assembled as aforesaid got through with their
+<span class="sc">whereases</span> and <span class=
+"sc">resolutions</span> they presented them to His Excellency the
+President of the Republic, Aguinaldo, who then issued a proclamation
+which recited, among other things: &ldquo;In these provinces [the
+fifteen represented in the convention] complete order and perfect
+tranquillity reign, administered by the authorities
+elected&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2467src" href="#xd20e2467"
+name="xd20e2467src">12</a> according to his previous decrees as
+Dictator, which decrees have already been placed before the reader. The
+proclamation claims that the new government has 9,000 prisoners of war
+and 30,000 combatants. The former claim no one <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb73" href="#pb73" name="pb73">73</a>]</span>having
+any acquaintance with those times and conditions will question for a
+moment. As to the 30,000 combatants, if he had 11,000 men armed with
+guns on July 9th and 40,000 on August 29th, why not 30,000 on August
+6th? Of course, men without guns, bolo men, do not count for much in a
+serious connection like this now being considered. In November, 1899,
+at San Jos&eacute;, in Nueva Ecija province, I heard General Lawton
+tell Colonel Jack Hayes to disarm and turn loose 175 bolo men the
+colonel had just captured and was lining up on the public square as we
+rode into the town. But we are considering how much of a government the
+Filipinos had in 1898, because the answer is pertinent to what sort of
+a government they could run if permitted <i>now</i> or at any time in
+the future; and, physical force being the ultimate basis of stability
+in all government, when we come to estimate how much of an army they
+had when their government was claiming recognition as a legitimate
+living thing, we must remember that &ldquo;It was just a question of
+arming them. They could have had the whole population.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2478src" href="#xd20e2478" name=
+"xd20e2478src">13</a></p>
+<p>Now the great significant fact about this Bacoor convention of
+presidentes of August 6th&mdash;a week before Manila surrendered to our
+forces&mdash;is that in it more than half the population of the island
+of Luzon was represented. The total population of the Philippines is
+about 7,600,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2486src" href="#xd20e2486"
+name="xd20e2486src">14</a> and, of these, one-half, or
+3,800,000<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2492src" href="#xd20e2492" name=
+"xd20e2492src">15</a> live on Luzon. The other islands may be said to
+dangle from Luzon like the tail of a kite. Taking the tables of the
+American census of the Philippines of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123), as a
+basis on which to judge what Aguinaldo&rsquo;s claims of August 6th
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb74" href="#pb74" name=
+"pb74">74</a>]</span>amounted to if true, the population of the
+provinces thus duly incorporated into the new government and in working
+order on that date, was, in round numbers, about as follows: South of
+Manila:&mdash;Cavite, 135,000; Batangas, 260,000; Laguna, 150,000;
+Tayabas, 150,000; North of Manila:&mdash;Bulacan, 225,000; Pampamga,
+225,000; Nueva Ecija, 135,000; Tarlac, 135,000; Pangasinan, 400,000;
+Union, 140,000; Bataan, 45,000; Zambales, 105,000. This represents a
+total of more than 2,000,000 of people.</p>
+<p>But Aguinaldo&rsquo;s claims of August 6th are not the only evidence
+as to the political status of the provinces of Luzon in August, 1898.
+Toward the end of that month, Maj. J. F. Bell, Chief of General
+Merritt&rsquo;s Bureau of Military Information, made a report on the
+situation as it stood August 29th, the report being made after most
+careful investigation, and intended as a summary of the then situation
+according to the most reliable information obtainable, in order that
+General Merritt might know, as far as practicable, what he would be
+&ldquo;up against&rdquo; in the event of trouble with the
+insurgents.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2502src" href="#xd20e2502" name=
+"xd20e2502src">16</a></p>
+<p>This report not only corroborates Aguinaldo&rsquo;s claims of August
+6th, but it also concedes to the Aguinaldo people eight other important
+provinces&mdash;four south of the Pasig River with a total population
+of about 630,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2510src" href="#xd20e2510"
+name="xd20e2510src">17</a> the only four of southern Luzon not included
+in Aguinaldo&rsquo;s claim of August 6th, thus conceding him
+practically all of Luzon south of the Pasig; and it furthermore
+concedes him four great provinces of northern Luzon with a total
+population of nearly 600,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2513src" href=
+"#xd20e2513" name="xd20e2513src">18</a> General Bell states that these
+last <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb75" href="#pb75" name=
+"pb75">75</a>]</span>are &ldquo;still in the possession of the
+Spanish,&rdquo; but practically certain to be with the insurgents in
+the very near future. &ldquo;Insurgents have been dispatched to attack
+the Spanish in these provinces,&rdquo; says the Bell report.</p>
+<p>In this same report Major Bell said: &ldquo;There is not a particle
+of doubt but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt
+<i>of any government</i> to reorganize a colonial government
+here.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2523src" href="#xd20e2523"
+name="xd20e2523src">19</a> When the insurgent government was finally
+dislodged from its last capital and Aguinaldo became a fugitive hotly
+pursued by our troops, he started for the mountains of northern Luzon,
+passing through provinces he had never visited before. The diary of one
+of his staff officers, Major Villa, in describing a brief stop they
+made in a town <i>en route</i> (Aringay, in Union province) says:
+&ldquo;After the honorable President had urged them [the townspeople]
+to be patriotic, we continued the march.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2531src" href="#xd20e2531" name="xd20e2531src">20</a> They
+certainly did &ldquo;continue the march.&rdquo; The Maccabebe scouts,
+of which the writer commanded a company at the time, took the town a
+few hours later, Aguinaldo&rsquo;s rear-guard retiring after a brief
+resistance, following which we found, among the dead in the trenches, a
+major other than Villa. Certainly, to read this little extract from the
+diary of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s retreat is to feel the pulse of northern
+Luzon as to its loyalty to the revolution at that time, and is
+corroborative of these claims of Aguinaldo made in August, 1898,
+supplemented, as we have seen them, by General Bell&rsquo;s
+appraisal.</p>
+<p>As to the political conditions which prevailed in southern Luzon,
+particularly in the Camarines, in August and the fall of 1898,
+information derived from one who was there then would seem appropriate
+here. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb76" href="#pb76" name=
+"pb76">76</a>]</span>Major Blanton Winship, Judge Advocate&rsquo;s
+Corps, U. S. A., Major Archibald W. Butt, the late lamented military
+aide to President Taft, and the writer, lived together in Manila, in
+1900, at the house of a Spanish physician, a Dr. Lopez, who had been a
+&ldquo;prisoner&rdquo; at Nueva Caceres, a town situated in one of the
+provinces of southern Luzon (Camarines) in the fall of 1898. Dr. Lopez
+had a large family. They had also been &ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; down
+there. No evil befell them at the hands of their &ldquo;captors.&rdquo;
+They had the freedom of the town they were in. They had good reason to
+be pretty well scared as to what the insurgents might do to them. But
+they were never maltreated. The main impression we got from Dr. Lopez
+and his family was that the political grip of the Aguinaldo government
+on southern Luzon was complete during the time they were
+&ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; there. If anybody doubts the absoluteness of
+the grip of the Revolutionary government on the situation in the
+provinces which were represented at the Bacoor convention of August 6,
+1898, above mentioned, when the Filipino Declaration of Independence
+was signed and proclaimed, let him ask any American who had a part in
+putting down the Philippine insurrection what a presidente, an
+<i>insurrecto</i> presidente, in a Filipino town, was in 1899 and 1900.
+He was &ldquo;the whole thing.&rdquo; Even to-day the presidente of a
+pueblo is as absolute boss of his town as Charles F. Murphy is of
+Tammany Hall. And a <i>town</i> or <i>pueblo</i> in the Philippines is
+more than an area covered by more or less contiguous buildings and
+grounds. It is more like a township in Massachusetts. So that when you
+account governmentally for the pueblos of a given province, you account
+for every square foot of that province and for every man in it. For
+several years before our war with Spain, nearly every Filipino of any
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb77" href="#pb77" name=
+"pb77">77</a>]</span>education and spirit in the archipelago belonged
+to the secret revolutionary society known as the Katipunan. This had
+its organization in every town when Dewey sank the Spanish fleet and
+landed Aguinaldo at Cavite. The rest may be imagined.</p>
+<p>By September, 1898, Aguinaldo was absolute master of the whole of
+Luzon. Before the Treaty of Paris was signed (December 10, 1898), in
+fact while Judge Gray of the Peace Commission was cabling President
+McKinley that not to leave the government of the Philippines to the
+people thereof &ldquo;would be to make a mockery of
+instructions,&rdquo; Aguinaldo had become equally absolute master of
+the situation throughout the rest of the archipelago outside of
+Manila.</p>
+<p>Toward the end of July, 1898, our Manila Consul, Mr. Williams, who
+was one of our consular triumvirate of would-be Warwicks, or
+&ldquo;original Aguinaldo men,&rdquo; of 1898, used to have nice talks
+with Aguinaldo about the lion and the lamb lying down together without
+the lion eating the lamb, and in one instance, at least, he goes so far
+as to represent Aguinaldo as willing to some such
+arrangement&mdash;<i>e. g.</i>, annexation, or some vague scheme of
+dependence. But whenever we hear from Aguinaldo over his own signature,
+we hear him saying whatever means in Tagalo &ldquo;Timeo Danaos et dona
+ferentes.&rdquo; For instance, at page 15, of <i>Senate Document
+208</i>, he writes Williams, under date of August 1st, with fine
+courtesy:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness
+and ingenuity which you have displayed in painting in an admirable
+manner the benefits which, <i>especially for me and my leaders</i>, and
+in general for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of
+these islands with the United States of America. Ah! that picture, so
+happy and so finished *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* This is not saying that I am not
+of your opinion <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb78" href="#pb78" name=
+"pb78">78</a>]</span>*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* You say all this and yet more will
+result from annexing ourselves to your people *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* You are
+my friend and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But why
+should we say it? Will my people believe it? *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I have
+done what they desire, establishing a government *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* not
+only because it was my duty, but also because had I acted in any other
+manner they would fail to recognize me as <i>the interpreter of their
+aspirations</i>, and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by
+another <i>more careful of his own honor and dignity</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Now that we know what was in the Filipino mind when General Merritt
+arrived in the Philippines, let us see what was in the American
+military mind out there at the same time. Says General Merritt:
+&ldquo;General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his
+services as a subordinate leader.&rdquo; We trust the reason of this at
+once suggests itself from what has preceded, including General
+Anderson&rsquo;s dealings with the insurgent chief. The latter wanted
+some understanding as to what <i>the intentions of our government
+were</i>, and what was to be the programme afterward, should he and his
+countrymen assist in the little fighting that now remained necessary to
+complete the taking of Manila. <i>Those intentions were precisely what
+Merritt was determined to conceal.</i> &ldquo;As my instructions from
+the President fully contemplated the occupation of <i>the Islands</i>
+by the American land forces, and stated that &lsquo;the powers of the
+military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon
+the political condition of the inhabitants,&rsquo; I did not consider
+it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader
+until I should be in possession of the city of Manila.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2588src" href="#xd20e2588" name=
+"xd20e2588src">21</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb79" href="#pb79"
+name="pb79">79</a>]</span></p>
+<p>On one occasion General Merritt passed through the village of Bacoor
+where Aguinaldo had his headquarters, but, says Mr. Millet<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2597src" href="#xd20e2597" name=
+"xd20e2597src">22</a> in mentioning this, &ldquo;They never met.&rdquo;
+After the taking of the city, General Merritt remembered that with some
+13,000 Spanish prisoners to guard, and a city of 300,000 people, all
+but a sprinkling of whom were in sympathy with the insurgent cause, on
+his hands, and an army of at least 14,000 insurgents&mdash;probably far
+more than that&mdash;clamoring without the gates of that city, and only
+10,000 men of his own with whom to handle such a situation, frankness
+was out of the question, in view of his orders from the
+President.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2602src" href="#xd20e2602" name=
+"xd20e2602src">23</a> Therefore, on the day after the city surrendered,
+General Merritt issued a proclamation, copying<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2608src" href="#xd20e2608" name="xd20e2608src">24</a>
+<i>verbatim</i> from Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s instructions (<i>ante</i>)
+such innocuous milk-and-water passages as the one which assured the
+people that our government &ldquo;has not come to wage war upon them
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* but to protect them in their homes, in their
+employments, and in their personal and religious rights; all persons
+who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United
+States *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* will receive the reward of its support and
+protection.&rdquo; But he carefully omitted the words quoted above
+about the powers of the military occupant being absolute and supreme,
+&ldquo;lest his [Aguinaldo&rsquo;s] pretensions,&rdquo; to use General
+Merritt&rsquo;s expression, &ldquo;should clash with my designs.&rdquo;
+&ldquo;For these reasons,&rdquo; says General Merritt (p. 40),
+&ldquo;the preparations for the attack on the city were *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent
+forces.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Here General Merritt is speaking frankly but not <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb80" href="#pb80" name=
+"pb80">80</a>]</span>accurately. He means he made his preparations
+without any more reference to the situation of the insurgent forces
+than he could help. As a matter of fact, their situation bothered him a
+good deal. They were in the way. For instance, there was a whole
+brigade of them at one point between our people and Manila.
+&ldquo;This,&rdquo; says General Merritt (p. 41), &ldquo;was overcome
+by instructions to General Greene to <i>arrange if possible</i> with
+the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to
+the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the
+roads in their immediate front. No objection was made,&rdquo; etc. That
+reads very well&mdash;that about &ldquo;arrange if possible,&rdquo;
+&ldquo;no objection was made,&rdquo; etc.,&mdash;does it not? Nothing
+there through which &ldquo;the lustre and the moral strength&rdquo; of
+the motives that prompted the Spanish war might be &ldquo;dimmed by
+ulterior designs which might tempt us,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2626src" href="#xd20e2626" name="xd20e2626src">25</a> is there?
+It was stated above that General Merritt was speaking frankly in this
+report. He was. He probably did not know how General Greene carried out
+the order to &ldquo;arrange if possible with the insurgent
+brigadier-commander.&rdquo; But it so happened that there was a
+newspaper correspondent along with General Greene who has since told
+us. This gentleman was Mr. Frank D. Millet, from whom we have already
+above quoted, the correspondent of the <i>London Times</i> and of
+<i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>. General Greene had known him years before
+in the campaigns of the Turco-Russian war. Mr. Millet had been a war
+correspondent in those campaigns also, and General Greene was there
+taking observations. So that in the operations against Manila, Mr.
+Millet, being an old friend of General Greene&rsquo;s, known to be a
+handy man to have around in a close place, was acting <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb81" href="#pb81" name="pb81">81</a>]</span>as a
+civilian volunteer aide to the general.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2641src" href="#xd20e2641" name="xd20e2641src">26</a> Here is Mr.
+Millet&rsquo;s account of what happened, taken from his book, <i>The
+Expedition to the Philippines</i>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">On the afternoon of the 28th [of July, 1898], General
+Greene received a verbal message from General Merritt suggesting that
+he <i>juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines</i>, always on
+his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the
+commanding general to any recognition of the native leaders or opening
+up the prospect of an alliance. This General Greene accomplished very
+cleverly.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Mr. Millet then goes on to tell how General Greene persuaded one of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s generals (Noriel) to evacuate certain trenches so he
+(Greene) could occupy them, &ldquo;with a condition attached that
+General Greene must give a written receipt for the
+entrenchments.&rdquo; This condition, Mr. Millet says, was imposed by
+&ldquo;the astute leader&rdquo; (Aguinaldo). General Greene&rsquo;s
+&ldquo;cleverness&rdquo; consisted in purposely failing and omitting to
+give the receipt, which Mr. Millet says &ldquo;looked very much like a
+bargain concluded over a signature, and was a little more formal than
+General Greene thought advisable.&rdquo; The key to this sorry business
+may be found in the first paragraph of General Merritt&rsquo;s
+instructions to all his generals at the time:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. <i>Can
+ask</i> insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for <i>permission</i> to occupy
+trenches, but if refused not to use force.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2669src" href="#xd20e2669" name="xd20e2669src">27</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>&ldquo;I am quite unable to explain,&rdquo; says Mr. Millet (p. 61),
+&ldquo;why we did not in the very beginning make them understand that
+we were masters of the situation, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb82"
+href="#pb82" name="pb82">82</a>]</span>and that they must come strictly
+under our authority.&rdquo; The obvious reason was that a war of
+conquest to subjugate a remote people struggling to be free from the
+yoke of alien domination was sure to be more or less unpopular with
+many of the sovereign voters of a republic, and more or less dangerous
+therefore, like all unpopular wars, to the tenure of office of the
+party in power. So that in entering upon a war for conquest, a republic
+<i>must</i> &ldquo;play politics,&rdquo; using the military arm of the
+government for the twofold purpose of crushing opposition and proving
+that there is none.</p>
+<p>The maxim which makes all fair in war often covers a multitude of
+sins. But let us turn for a moment from strategy to principle, and see
+what two other distinguished American war correspondents were thinking
+and saying about the same time. Writing to <i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>
+from Cavite, under date of July 16th, concerning the work of the
+Filipinos during the eight weeks before that, Mr. O. K. Davis said:
+&ldquo;The insurgents have driven them [the Spaniards] back over twenty
+miles of country practically impassable for our men. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+Aguinaldo has saved our troops a lot of desperately hard campaigning
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. The insurgent works extend clear around Manila, and
+the Spaniards are completely hemmed in. There is no hope for them but
+surrender.&rdquo; Writing to the same paper under date of August 6th,
+Mr. John F. Bass says: &ldquo;We forget that they drove the Spaniards
+from Cavite to their present intrenched position, thus saving us a
+long-continued fight through the jungle.&rdquo; This gentleman did not
+tackle the question of inventing a new definition of liberty consistent
+with alien domination. He simply says: &ldquo;Give them their liberty
+and guarantee it to them.&rdquo; In the face of such plucky patriotism
+as he had witnessed, political casuistry about <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb83" href="#pb83" name=
+"pb83">83</a>]</span>&ldquo;capacity for self-government&rdquo; would
+have hung its head. Yet Mr. Bass was by no means a novice. He had
+served with the British army in Egypt in 1895, through the Armenian
+massacres of 1896, and in the Cretan rebellion and Greek War of 1897.
+His sentiments were simply precisely what those of the average American
+not under military orders would have been at the time. After the fall
+of Manila he wrote (August 17th): &ldquo;I am inclined to think that
+the insurgents intend to fight <i>us</i> if we stay and <i>Spain</i> if
+we go.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>There were 8500 American troops in the taking of the city of Manila,
+on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos were ignored by them, although they
+afterwards claimed to have helped. As a matter of fact, the Spanish
+officers in command were very anxious to surrender and get back to
+Spain. The Filipinos had already made them &ldquo;long for
+peace,&rdquo; to use a famous expression of General J. F. Bell. The
+garrison only put up a very slight resistance, &ldquo;to save their
+face,&rdquo; as the Chinese say, <i>i. e.</i>, to save themselves from
+being court-martialed under some quixotic article of the Spanish army
+regulations. The assault was begun about 9.30 <span class=
+"sc">A.M.</span>, and early that afternoon the Spanish flag had been
+lowered from the flag-staff in the main square and the Stars and
+Stripes run up in its stead, amid the convulsive sobs of dark-eyed
+se&ntilde;oritas and the muttered curses of melodramatic Spanish
+cavaliers. Thanks to the Filipinos&rsquo; three and one half
+months&rsquo; work, the performance only cost us five men killed out of
+the 8500. The list of wounded totalled 43. Our antecedent loss in the
+trenches prior to the day of the assault had been fourteen killed and
+sixty wounded. So the job was completed, so far as the records show, at
+a cost of less than a score of American lives.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2702src" href="#xd20e2702" name="xd20e2702src">28</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb84" href="#pb84" name=
+"pb84">84</a>]</span></p>
+<p>As Aguinaldo&rsquo;s troops surged forward in the wake of the
+American advance they were stopped by orders from the American
+commander, and prevented from following the retreating Spaniards into
+Manila. They were not even allowed what is known to the modern small
+boy as &ldquo;a look-in.&rdquo; They were not permitted to come into
+the city to <i>see</i> the surrender. President McKinley&rsquo;s
+message to Congress of December, 1898, describes &ldquo;the last scene
+of the war&rdquo; as having been &ldquo;enacted at Manila its starting
+place.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2714src" href="#xd20e2714"
+name="xd20e2714src">29</a> It says: &ldquo;On August 13th, after a
+brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in which the squadron
+assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally.&rdquo; In this
+connection, by way of explaining Aguinaldo&rsquo;s treatment at the
+hands of our generals from the beginning, the message says,
+&ldquo;Divided victory was not permissible.&rdquo; &ldquo;It was
+fitting that whatever was to be done *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* should be
+accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone.&rdquo; But
+what takes much of the virtue out of the &ldquo;strong arm&rdquo;
+proposition is that Generals Merritt and Anderson were carrying out
+President McKinley&rsquo;s orders all the time they were juggling
+Aguinaldo out of his positions before Manila, and giving him evasive
+answers, until the city could be taken by the said &ldquo;strong
+arm&rdquo; <i>alone</i>. For, as the message puts it, in speaking of
+the taking of the city, &ldquo;By this the conquest of the Philippine
+Islands *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* was formally sealed.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>When General Merritt left Manila on August 30th, he proceeded to
+Paris to appear before the Peace Commission there. His views doubtless
+had great weight with them on the momentous questions they had to
+decide. But his views were wholly erroneous, and that they were so is
+not surprising. As above stated, he did <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb85" href="#pb85" name="pb85">85</a>]</span>not even meet Aguinaldo,
+purposely holding himself aloof from him and his leaders. He never did
+know how deeply they were incensed at being shut out of Manila when the
+city surrendered. In his report prepared aboard the steamship
+<i>China</i>, en route for Paris, he says: &ldquo;Doubtless much
+dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents, but
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I am of the opinion that the leaders will be <i>able to
+prevent</i> serious disturbances,&rdquo; etc. (p. 40). If General
+Merritt had caught the temper of the trenches he would have known
+better, but he saw nothing of the fighting prior to the final scene,
+nor did he take the field in person on the day of the combined assault
+on the city, August 13th, and therefore missed the supreme opportunity
+to understand how the Filipinos felt. Says General Anderson in his
+report:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I understood from the general commanding that he would
+be personally present on the day of battle. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* On the
+morning of the 13th, General Babcock came to my headquarters and
+informed me that the major-general commanding would remain on a
+despatch boat.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2735src" href="#xd20e2735"
+name="xd20e2735src">30</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Indeed, so reduced was Manila, by reason of the long siege conducted
+by the insurgents, that the assault of August 13th, not only was, but
+was expected to be, little more than a sham battle. Says
+Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, chief quartermaster, &ldquo;On the evening of
+August 12th an order was sent me to report with two battalions of the
+Second Oregon Volunteers, under Colonel Summers the next day on the
+<i>Kwong Hoi</i> to the commanding general on the <i>Newport</i>, as an
+escort on his entrance into Manila. At the hour named, I reported
+etc.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2748src" href="#xd20e2748" name=
+"xd20e2748src">31</a> As soon as Spanish &ldquo;honor&rdquo; was
+satisfied, up <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb86" href="#pb86" name=
+"pb86">86</a>]</span>went the white flag and General Merritt was duly
+escorted ashore and into the city, where he received the surrender of
+the Spanish general.</p>
+<p>In the Civil War, General Merritt had received six successive
+promotions for gallantry, at Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, Five Forks,
+etc., and had been with Sheridan at Winchester. So the way he
+&ldquo;commanded&rdquo; the assault on Manila is proof only of the
+obligations we then owed the Filipinos. They had left very little to be
+done.</p>
+<p>In his account of General Merritt&rsquo;s original personal
+disembarkation at Cavite, Mr. Frank Millet acquaints his readers with a
+Philippine custom we afterwards grew quite familiar with and found
+quite useful, of keeping your shoes dry in landing from a rowboat on a
+beach by riding astride the shoulders of some husky native boatman. The
+boatmen make it a point of special pride not to let their passengers
+get their feet wet. Mr. Millet tells us that a general in uniform looks
+neither dignified nor picturesque under such circumstances, and that
+therefore he will not elaborate on the picture, but that it is
+suggestive &ldquo;more of the hilarious than of the heroic.&rdquo;
+Presumably when General Merritt went ashore on August 13th, from the
+despatch boat from which he had been watching the assault on Manila, to
+receive the surrender of the Spanish general, he followed the same
+custom of the country he had used on the occasion of his original
+disembarkation. So that in the taking of Manila, we were probably
+literally, as well as ethically, like General Mahone of Virginia as he
+is pictured in a familiar <i>post-bellum</i> negro story, according to
+which the general met a negro on a steep part of the road to heaven,
+told him that St. Peter would only admit mounted parties, mounted the
+negro with the latter&rsquo;s consent, rode on his <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb87" href="#pb87" name="pb87">87</a>]</span>back the
+rest of the toilsome journey to the heavenly gate, dismounted, knocked,
+and was cordially welcomed by the saint at the sacred portal thus:
+&ldquo;Why how d&rsquo; ye do, General Mahone; jess tie yoh hoss and
+come in.&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb88" href="#pb88" name=
+"pb88">88</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2358" href="#xd20e2358src" name="xd20e2358">1</a></span> <i>S. D.
+208</i>, 1900, p. 13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2368" href="#xd20e2368src" name="xd20e2368">2</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 40.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2377" href="#xd20e2377src" name="xd20e2377">3</a></span>
+<i>Report First Philippine Commission</i>, vol. i., p. 172.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2391" href="#xd20e2391src" name="xd20e2391">4</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4. Otis report, p. 13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2402" href="#xd20e2402src" name="xd20e2402">5</a></span> <i>S. D.
+331</i>, 1902, p. 2941.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2409" href="#xd20e2409src" name="xd20e2409">6</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+788.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2418" href="#xd20e2418src" name="xd20e2418">7</a></span> May
+19th&ndash;July 9th; see General Anderson&rsquo;s report to the
+Adjutant-General of the army of July 9, 1898, <i>S. D. 208</i>, p.
+6.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2424" href="#xd20e2424src" name="xd20e2424">8</a></span> See
+Major J. F. Bell&rsquo;s report to Merritt of August 29, 1898, <i>S. D.
+62</i>, p. 379.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2435" href="#xd20e2435src" name="xd20e2435">9</a></span>
+Clerks.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2441" href="#xd20e2441src" name="xd20e2441">10</a></span> See
+<i>S. D. 208</i>, pp. 101&ndash;2.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2456" href="#xd20e2456src" name="xd20e2456">11</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 34.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2467" href="#xd20e2467src" name="xd20e2467">12</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, p. 99.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2478" href="#xd20e2478src" name="xd20e2478">13</a></span> Admiral
+Dewey to Senate Committee, 1902, <i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 2940.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2486" href="#xd20e2486src" name="xd20e2486">14</a></span>
+7,635,426. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 15.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2492" href="#xd20e2492src" name="xd20e2492">15</a></span>
+3,798,507. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 125.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2502" href="#xd20e2502src" name="xd20e2502">16</a></span> See
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, 1898, p. 379.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2510" href="#xd20e2510src" name="xd20e2510">17</a></span> Albay,
+Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2513" href="#xd20e2513src" name="xd20e2513">18</a></span> Ilocos
+Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Cagayan.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2523" href="#xd20e2523src" name="xd20e2523">19</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 62</i>, p. 380.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2531" href="#xd20e2531src" name="xd20e2531">20</a></span> Diary
+of Major Simeon Villa, p. 1898, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 3, 56th
+Congress, 1st Session, 1902.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2588" href="#xd20e2588src" name="xd20e2588">21</a></span> See
+Merritt&rsquo;s Report for 1898, <i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol.
+i., pt. 2, p. 40.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2597" href="#xd20e2597src" name="xd20e2597">22</a></span>
+<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 61.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2602" href="#xd20e2602src" name="xd20e2602">23</a></span>
+&ldquo;With 10,000 men, we would have had to guard 13,300 Spanish
+prisoners, and to fight 14,000 Filipinos,&rdquo; says General Anderson,
+<i>North American Review</i> for February, 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2608" href="#xd20e2608src" name="xd20e2608">24</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 86.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2626" href="#xd20e2626src" name="xd20e2626">25</a></span> Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s instructions to the Peace Commissioners, <i>Senate
+Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2641" href="#xd20e2641src" name="xd20e2641">26</a></span> See
+General Greene&rsquo;s Report, <i>W. D. R.</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2,
+p. 72, where Mr. Millet&rsquo;s conduct in the assault on the city
+receives special mention.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2669" href="#xd20e2669src" name="xd20e2669">27</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 73.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2702" href="#xd20e2702src" name="xd20e2702">28</a></span> See
+<i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2714" href="#xd20e2714src" name="xd20e2714">29</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1898, p. 5.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2735" href="#xd20e2735src" name="xd20e2735">30</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 57.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2748" href="#xd20e2748src" name="xd20e2748">31</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 190.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch5" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter V</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Otis and Aguinaldo</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Where people and leaders are agreed,</p>
+<p class="line">What can the archon do?</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Athenian Maxims.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Major-general Elwell S. Otis and staff arrived at
+Manila August 21, 1898.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2781src" href=
+"#xd20e2781" name="xd20e2781src">1</a> He relieved General Merritt and
+succeeded to the command of the American troops in the Philippines,
+August 29th. Archbishop Chapelle, who was papal delegate to the
+Philippines in 1900, once said to the writer at Manila, in that year,
+that General Otis was &ldquo;of about the right mental calibre to
+command a one-company post in Arizona.&rdquo; The impatience manifested
+in the remark was due to differences between him and the
+commanding-general about the Friar question. The remark itself was of
+course intended, and understood, as hyperbole. But the selection of
+General Otis to handle the Philippine situation <i>was</i> a serious
+mistake. He was past sixty when he took command. He continued in
+command from August 29, 1898, to May 5, 1900, a period of some twenty
+months. The insurrection was held in abeyance for some five months
+after he took hold, the leaders hoping against hope that the Treaty of
+Paris would leave their country to them as it did Cuba to the Cubans;
+and during all that time General Otis <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb89" href="#pb89" name="pb89">89</a>]</span>was apparently unable to
+see that war would be inevitable in the event the decision at Paris was
+adverse to Filipino hopes. A member of General Otis&rsquo;s staff once
+told me in speaking of the insurrection period that his chief
+pooh-poohed the likelihood of an outbreak right along up to the very
+day before the outbreak of February 4, 1899, occurred. <i>Before</i>
+the insurrection came he <i>would</i> not see it, and <i>after</i> it
+came he&mdash;literally&mdash;<i>did not</i> see it; that is to say,
+during fifteen months of fighting he commanded the Eighth Army Corps
+from a desk in Manila and never once took the field. His Civil War
+record was all right, but he was now getting well along in years. He
+was also a graduate of the Harvard Law School of the Class of 1861,
+rather prided himself on being &ldquo;a pretty fair jack-leg
+lawyer,&rdquo; and had a most absorbing passion for the details of
+administrative work. They used to say that the only occasion on which
+General Otis ever went out of Manila the whole time he was there was
+when he went up the railroad once to Angeles to see that a proper
+valuation was put on a then recently deceased Quartermaster&rsquo;s
+Department mule. When he left the Islands he remarked to a newspaper
+man that he had had but one &ldquo;day off&rdquo; since he had been
+there. Unswerving devotion to a desk in time of war, on the part of the
+commanding general of the army in the field, seemed to him an
+appropriate subject for just pride. This showed his limitations. He was
+a man wholly unable to see the essentials of an important situation, or
+to take in the whole horizon. He was known to the Eighth Corps, his
+command, as a sort of &ldquo;Fussy Grandpa,&rdquo; his personality and
+general management of things always suggesting the picture of a
+painfully near-sighted be-spectacled old gentleman busily nosing over
+papers you had submitted, and finding fault to show he knew a thing or
+two. However, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb90" href="#pb90" name=
+"pb90">90</a>]</span>he had many eminently respectable traits, and did
+the best he knew how, though wholly devoid of that noble serenity of
+vision which used to enable Mr. Lincoln, amid the darkest and most
+tremendous of his problems, to say with a smile to Horace Greeley:
+&ldquo;Don&rsquo;t shoot the organist, he&rsquo;s doing the best he
+can.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Before General Otis relieved General Merritt, the latter had written
+Aguinaldo politely requesting him to move his troops beyond certain
+specified lines about the city,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2809src"
+href="#xd20e2809" name="xd20e2809src">2</a> and Aguinaldo had replied
+August 27th, agreeing to do so, but asking that the Americans promise
+to restore to him the positions thus vacated in the event under the
+treaty the United States should leave the Philippines to
+Spain.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2815src" href="#xd20e2815" name=
+"xd20e2815src">3</a> August 31st, Otis notified Aguinaldo, then still
+at Bacoor, his first capital, that General Merritt had been
+unexpectedly called away, and that he, Otis, being unacquainted with
+the situation must take time before answering the Aguinaldo letter to
+Merritt of the 27th. On September 8th, he did answer, in a
+preposterously long communication of about 3000 words, which says,
+among other things: &ldquo;I have not been instructed as to what policy
+the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate
+holdings here&rdquo;; and therefore declines to promise anything about
+restoring the insurgent positions in the event we should leave the
+Islands to Spain under the treaty. Commenting on this in the <i>North
+American Review</i> for February, 1900, General Anderson says: &ldquo;I
+believe we came to the parting of the ways when we refused this
+request.&rdquo; General Anderson was right. General Merritt had on
+August 21st sent Aguinaldo a memorandum by the hand of Major J.
+Franklin Bell which promised: &ldquo;Care will be taken to leave him
+[Aguinaldo] <i>in as good condition <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb91"
+href="#pb91" name="pb91">91</a>]</span>as he was found by the forces of
+the government.</i>&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2828src" href=
+"#xd20e2828" name="xd20e2828src">4</a> In the r&ocirc;le of political
+henchman for President McKinley, which General Otis seems to have
+conceived it his duty to play from the very beginning in the
+Philippines, it thus appears that he was not troubled about keeping
+unsullied the faith and honor of the government as pledged by his
+predecessor. His 3000-word letter to Aguinaldo of September 8th ignores
+Merritt&rsquo;s promise as coolly as if it had never been made. His
+only concern appears to have been to leave the government free to throw
+the Filipinos overboard if it should wish to. He peevishly implies
+later on that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s requests in this regard were merely a
+cloak for designs against us (p. 40). But his real reason is given in a
+sort of stage &ldquo;aside&rdquo;&mdash;a letter to the
+Adjutant-General of the army dated September 12, 1898, wherein he
+explains: &ldquo;Should I promise them that in case of the return of
+the city to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be
+placed by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe
+that they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the
+international obligations resting upon us *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* no such
+promise can be given.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2834src" href=
+"#xd20e2834" name="xd20e2834src">5</a> In the sacred name of National
+Honor what of the Merritt promise? You only have to turn a few pages in
+the <i>War Department Report</i> for 1899 from the Merritt promise to
+the Otis repudiation of it. Yes, General Anderson was right. It was
+when General Otis practically repudiated in writing the written promise
+of his predecessor, General Merritt, that we &ldquo;came to the parting
+of the ways&rdquo; in our relations with the Filipinos. Let no American
+suppose for a moment that the author of this volume is engaged in the
+ungracious, and frequently deservedly thankless task of mere
+muck-raking. He never met <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb92" href=
+"#pb92" name="pb92">92</a>]</span>General Otis but once, and then for a
+very brief official interview of an agreeable nature. He is only
+attempting to make a small contribution to the righting of a great
+wrong unwittingly done by a great, free, and generous people to another
+people then struggling to be free&mdash;a wrong which he doubts not
+will one day be righted, whether he lives to see it so righted or not.
+General Otis&rsquo;s letter to the Adjutant-General of the army of
+September 12th, above quoted, shows that he was holding himself in
+readiness to carry out in the Philippines any political programme the
+Administration might determine upon, which would mean that he would
+afterwards come home and tell how entirely righteous that programme had
+been. Had the Administration hearkened back to Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s
+suggestion that the Filipinos were far superior to the Cubans, and
+decided to set before General Otis in the Philippines the same task it
+had set before General Wood in Cuba, we would have heard nothing about
+Filipino &ldquo;incapacity for self-government.&rdquo; General Otis
+would have taken his cue from the President, his commander-in chief,
+and said: &ldquo;I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral
+Dewey.&rdquo; Then he would have gone to work in a spirit of generous
+rivalry to do in the Philippines just what Wood did in Cuba. And the
+task would have been easier. Had the Administration taken the view
+urged by Judge Gray, as a member of the Paris Peace Commission, that
+&ldquo;if we had captured Cadiz and the Carlists had helped us [we]
+would not owe duty to stay by them at the conclusion of the
+war,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2844src" href="#xd20e2844" name=
+"xd20e2844src">6</a> and therefore we were not bound to see the
+Filipinos through their struggle, General Otis would have adopted that
+view with equal loyalty and in the presidential campaign of 1900, he
+would have furnished the Administration <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb93" href="#pb93" name="pb93">93</a>]</span>with arguments to justify
+that course. This would have been an easy task, also, for two of
+Spain&rsquo;s fleets had been destroyed by us, leaving her but one to
+guard her home coast cities, and making the sending of reinforcements
+to the besieged and demoralized garrison of Manila impossible. The
+native army she relied on throughout the archipelago had gone over
+bodily to the patriot cause, and there was no hope of successful
+resistance to it. But General Otis did not have the boundless prestige
+of Admiral Dewey and so volunteered no advice. As soon as the
+Administration chose its course, he set to work to prove the
+correctness of it. From him, of course, came all the McKinley
+Administration&rsquo;s original arguments against doing for the
+Filipinos as we did in the case of Cuba. He was the only legitimate
+source the American people could look to at that time to help them in
+their dilemma. They were standing with reluctant feet where democracy
+and its antithesis meet, and Otis was their sole guide. But the guide
+was of the kind who wait until you point and ask &ldquo;Is that the
+right direction?&rdquo; and then answer &ldquo;Yes.&rdquo; Four days
+after General Otis sent his above quoted letter of September 12th, to
+Adjutant-General Corbin, Mr. McKinley signed his instructions to the
+Paris Peace Commissioners, directing them to insist on the cession of
+Luzon at least, the instructions being full of eloquent but specious
+argument about the necessity of establishing a guardianship over people
+of whom we then knew nothing. From that day forward General Otis bent
+himself to the task of showing the righteousness of that course.
+&ldquo;I will let nothing go that will hurt the Administration,&rdquo;
+was his favorite expression to the newspaper correspondents when they
+used to complain about his press censorship. Hypocrisy is defined to be
+&ldquo;a false assumption of piety or virtue.&rdquo; <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb94" href="#pb94" name="pb94">94</a>]</span>The
+false assumption of piety or virtue which has handicapped the American
+occupation of the Philippines from the beginning, and which will always
+handicap it, until we throw off the mask and honestly set to work to
+give the Filipinos a square deal on the question of whether they can or
+cannot run a decent government of their own if permitted, is traceable
+back to the Otis letter to the Adjutant-General of September 12, 1898,
+ignoring General Merritt&rsquo;s promise to leave Aguinaldo &ldquo;in
+as good condition as he was found by the forces of the
+government&rdquo; in case we should, under the terms of the treaty of
+peace, leave the Islands to Spain.</p>
+<p>General Otis&rsquo;s letter of September 8th to Aguinaldo is
+apparently intended to convince him that he ought to consider
+everything the Americans had done up to date as exactly the correct
+thing, according to the standards of up-to-date, philanthropic,
+liberty-loving nations which pity double-dealing as medi&aelig;val; and
+that he should cheer up, and feel grateful and happy, instead of
+sulking, Achilles-like, in his tents; and furthermore&mdash;which was
+the crux&mdash;that he must move said tents. General Otis does not
+forget &ldquo;that the revolutionary forces under your command have
+made many sacrifices in the interest of <i>civil liberty</i> (observe,
+he does not call it independence) and for the welfare of your
+people&rdquo;; admits that they have &ldquo;endured great hardships,
+and have rendered aid&rdquo;; and avers, as a reason for
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s evacuating that part of the environs of Manila
+occupied by his troops: &ldquo;It [the war with Spain] was undertaken
+by the United States for humanity&rsquo;s sake *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* not for
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* aggrandizement or for any national profit.&rdquo; After
+stating, as above indicated, that he does not yet know what the policy
+of the United States is to be &ldquo;in regard to its legitimate
+holdings here,&rdquo; General Otis proceeds to declare that in any
+event he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb95" href="#pb95" name=
+"pb95">95</a>]</span>will not be a party to any joint occupation of any
+part of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila&mdash;the territory covered
+by the Peace Protocol of August 13th&mdash;and that Aguinaldo must
+effect the evacuation demanded in the letter of General Merritt
+&ldquo;before Tuesday the 15th&rdquo; (of September), <i>i.e.</i>,
+within a week. Aguinaldo finally withdrew his troops, after much
+useless parleying and much waste of ink.</p>
+<p>There was some of the parleying and ink, however, that was not
+wholly wasted. But to properly appreciate it as illustrative of the
+fortitude and tact which the early Filipino leaders seem to have
+combined in a remarkable degree, some prefatory data are essential.</p>
+<p>Aguinaldo&rsquo;s capital was then at Bacoor, one of the small coast
+villages you pass through in going by land from Manila to Cavite. From
+Manila over to Cavite by water is about seven miles, and by land about
+three or four times that. The coast line from Manila to Cavite makes a
+loop, so that a straight line over the water from Manila to Cavite
+subtends a curve, near the Cavite end of which lies Bacoor. Thus,
+Bacoor, being at the mercy of the big guns at Cavite, and also easily
+accessible by a land force from Manila, to say nothing of Dewey&rsquo;s
+mighty armada riding at anchor in the offing, was a good place to move
+away from. There it lay, right in the lion&rsquo;s jaws, should the
+lion happen to get hungry. Aguinaldo had reflected on all this, and had
+determined to get himself a capital away from &ldquo;the city, bay, and
+harbor of Manila,&rdquo; that is to say, to take his head out of the
+lion&rsquo;s jaws. General Otis&rsquo;s demand of September 8th that he
+move his troops out of the suburbs of Manila determined him to move his
+capital as well. He moved it to a place called Malolos, in Bulacan
+province. Bulacan lies over on the north shore of Manila Bay, opposite
+Cavite province <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb96" href="#pb96" name=
+"pb96">96</a>]</span>on the south shore. Malolos is situated some
+distance inland, out of sight and range of a fleet&rsquo;s guns, and
+about twenty-odd miles by railroad northwest of Manila. Malolos was
+also desirable because it was in the heart of an insurgent province
+having a population of nearly a quarter of a million people, a province
+which, by reason of being on the north side of the bay, was sure to be
+in touch, strategically and politically, with all Luzon north of the
+Pasig River, just as Cavite province, the birthplace of Aguinaldo, and
+also of the revolutionary government, had been with all Luzon south of
+the Pasig. Should the worst come to the worst&mdash;and as has already
+been indicated, the insurgents played a sweepstake game from the
+beginning for independence, with only war as the limit&mdash;northern
+Luzon had more inaccessible mountains from which to conduct such a
+struggle for an indefinite period than southern Luzon. But while the
+Otis demand of September 8th decided the matter of the change of
+capital, Aguinaldo could not afford to tell his troops that he was
+moving them from the environs of Manila because made to. He was going
+to accept war cheerfully when it should become necessary to fight for
+independence, but he still had some hopes of the Paris Peace Conference
+deciding to do with the Philippines as with Cuba, and wished to await
+patiently the outcome of that conference. Besides, he was getting in
+shipments of guns all the time, as fast as the revenues of his
+government would permit, and thus his ability to protract an ultimate
+war for independence was constantly enlarging by accretion. The Hong
+Kong conference of the Filipino revolutionary leaders held in the city
+named on May 4, 1898, at which Aguinaldo presided, and which mapped out
+a programme covering every possible contingency, has already been
+mentioned. Its minutes say: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb97" href=
+"#pb97" name="pb97">97</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental
+principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt
+will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2873src" href="#xd20e2873" name=
+"xd20e2873src">7</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>On the other hand, the minutes of this same meeting as we saw
+recognized that America might be tempted into entering upon a career of
+colonization, once she should get a foothold in the islands. The
+programme of Aguinaldo and his people was thus, from the beginning, not
+to precipitate hostilities until it should become clear that, in the
+matter of land-grabbing, the gleam of hope held out by the American
+programme for Cuba was illusive. According to the minutes of the
+meeting alluded to, such a contingency would, of course, &ldquo;drive
+them, the Filipinos *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to a struggle for their
+independence, even if they should succumb to the weight of the
+yoke,&rdquo; etc. Such a struggle, as all the world knows, did
+ultimately ensue. That part of the parleying following Otis&rsquo;s
+demand of September 8th (that Aguinaldo move his troops) which was
+<i>not</i> useless was this: In order to &ldquo;save their face,&rdquo;
+with the rank and file of their army, the Filipino Commissioners asked
+General Otis &ldquo;if I [Otis,] would express in writing a simple
+<i>request</i> to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I
+designated&mdash;something which he could show to the
+troops.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2886src" href="#xd20e2886"
+name="xd20e2886src">8</a> So, on September 13th, General Otis wrote
+such a &ldquo;request,&rdquo; and Aguinaldo moved his troops as
+demanded, but no farther than demanded. He wanted to be in the best
+position possible in case the United States should finally leave the
+Philippines to Spain, and always so insisted. Long afterward General
+Otis insinuated in his report that this <span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e2892" title="Source: insistance">insistence</span>, which was
+uniformly pressed until after the Treaty was signed, was mere dishonest
+pretence, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb98" href="#pb98" name=
+"pb98">98</a>]</span>cloak warlike intentions against the United
+States. Yet, as we have seen above, one of our Peace Commissioners at
+Paris, Judge Gray, just about the same time, was taking that
+contingency quite as seriously as did Aguinaldo. And early in May,
+1898, our Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, had cabled Admiral Dewey
+&ldquo;not to have political alliances with the insurgents
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* that would incur liability to maintain their cause in
+the future.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2898src" href=
+"#xd20e2898" name="xd20e2898src">9</a> Before moving his troops
+pursuant to the Otis demand of September 8th, the Otis
+&ldquo;request&rdquo; was duly published to the insurgent army, and as
+the insurgents withdrew, the American troops presented arms in most
+friendly fashion. &ldquo;They certainly made a brave show,&rdquo; says
+Mr. Millet (<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 255), &ldquo;for
+they were neatly uniformed, had excellent rifles, marched well, and
+looked very soldierly and intelligent.&rdquo; &ldquo;The
+withdrawal,&rdquo; says General Otis (p. 10), &ldquo;was effected
+adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering
+the American forces.&rdquo; Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila
+at this time, with complete machinery of government in each province
+for all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000
+men at his beck, and his whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo
+formally inaugurated his permanent government&mdash;permanent as
+opposed to the previous provisional government&mdash;with a
+Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after our own,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e2906src" href="#xd20e2906" name=
+"xd20e2906src">10</a> just as the South American republics had done
+before him when <i>they</i> were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new
+capital, on September 15, 1898. <i>The next day, September 16th, at
+Washington, President <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb99" href="#pb99"
+name="pb99">99</a>]</span>McKinley delivered to his Peace
+Commissioners, then getting ready to start for the Paris Peace
+Conference, their letter of instructions, directing them to insist on
+the cession by Spain to the United States of the island of Luzon
+&ldquo;at least.&rdquo;</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e2919src" href=
+"#xd20e2919" name="xd20e2919src">11</a> In other words, the day after
+the little Filipino republic, gay with banners and glad with music,
+started forth on its journey, Mr. McKinley signed its death-warrant.
+The political student of 1912 may say just here, &ldquo;Oh, I read all
+that in the papers at the time, or at least it was all ventilated in
+the Presidential campaign of 1900.&rdquo; Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+instructions to the Paris Peace Commission were not made public until
+after the Presidential election of 1900. To be specific, they were
+first printed and given out to the public in 1901, in <i>Senate
+Document 148</i>, having been extracted from the jealous custody of the
+Executive by a Senate resolution. It was not until then that the veil
+was lifted. By that time, no American who was not transcendental enough
+to have lost his love for the old maxim, &ldquo;Right or wrong, my
+country,&rdquo; cared to hear the details of the story. The Filipinos
+and &ldquo;our boys&rdquo; had been diligently engaged in killing each
+other for a couple of years, and the American people said, &ldquo;A
+truce to scolding; let us finish this war, now we are in it.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>But to return from the death-warrant of the Philippine republic
+signed by Mr. McKinley on September 16th, to its christening, or
+inauguration, the day before. Mr. Millet gives an intensely interesting
+account of the inaugural ceremonies of September 15th, which as Manila
+correspondent of the <i>London Times</i> and <i>Harper&rsquo;s
+Weekly</i> he had the good fortune to witness. Says he:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The date was at last *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* fixed for
+September 15th. A few days before Aguinaldo had made a triumphant entry
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb100" href="#pb100" name=
+"pb100">100</a>]</span>into Malolos in a carriage drawn by white
+horses, and there had been a general celebration of his arrival, with
+speeches, a gala dinner, open air concerts, and a military parade. Mr.
+Higgins (an Englishman), the manager of the Railway, kindly offered to
+take me up to Malolos to witness the ceremony of the inauguration of
+the new government. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The only other passenger was to be
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s secretary *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* a small boyish-looking
+young man. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2942src" href=
+"#xd20e2942" name="xd20e2942src">12</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>It seems there had been a strike of the native employees of the
+railway up the road.</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Mr. Higgins calmly remarked to the secretary that, in
+his opinion, if the affairs of the Filipino government were managed in
+the future as they were at present, the proposed republic would be
+nothing but a cheap farce. The secretary timidly asked what there was
+to complain about.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Then came a tirade from Higgins, ending with, &ldquo;I am going to
+lay this *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* before Aguinaldo to-day, and I shall expect
+you to arrange an interview for my friend and myself.&rdquo; Then,
+turning to the astonished Millet, he said in English: &ldquo;It does
+these chaps good to be talked to straight from the shoulder. Since they
+came to Malolos, the earth isn&rsquo;t big enough to hold
+them.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>This scene on the train is, decidedly, as Thomas Carlyle would say,
+&ldquo;of real interest to universal history.&rdquo; Mr. Millet&rsquo;s
+Government was a lion about to eat a lamb, but the head of his nation,
+Mr. McKinley, clothed with absolute authority in the premises for the
+nonce, was balking at the diet. Now, Mr. Millet rather admired the
+British boldness, just as a Northern man likes to hear a Southerner
+talk straight from the shoulder to a &ldquo;darkey.&rdquo; As soon as
+the era of good feeling was over, our people quit treating the
+Filipinos as Perry <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb101" href="#pb101"
+name="pb101">101</a>]</span>did the Japanese in 1854, and began calling
+them &ldquo;niggers.&rdquo; In fact the commanding general found it
+necessary a little later to put a stop to this pernicious practice
+among the soldiers by issuing a General Order prohibiting it. But Mr.
+Millet&rsquo;s admiration would have been somewhat toned down had he
+known what we found out later. The real secret of Higgins&rsquo;s
+personal arrogance was this. The Filipino government needed his
+railroad in its business. During the war which followed, the insurgents
+long controlled a large part of this railway, from Manila to Dagupan,
+which was the only railway in the Philippines. The railway properties
+suffered much damage incident to the war, and&mdash;just how willingly
+is beside the question&mdash;the company rendered material aid to the
+insurgent cause. So much did they render, that when Higgins had the
+assurance later to want our Government to pay the damages his
+properties had suffered at the hands of the insurgents, our government
+at Manila promptly turned his claim down. Subsequently the London
+office of his company actually inveigled the British Foreign Office
+into making representation to our State Department about the
+matter&mdash;obviously a very grave step, in international law. The
+claim was promptly turned down by Washington also, and, happily, that
+&ldquo;closed the incident.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e2960src"
+href="#xd20e2960" name="xd20e2960src">13</a></p>
+<p>Having exploded Mr. Millet&rsquo;s bubble, let us resume the thread
+of his story:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We reached the station [at Malolos] in about an hour
+and a half. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The town numbers perhaps thirty or forty
+thousand people. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* From the first humble <i>nipa</i>
+shack to the great square where the convent stands, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb102" href="#pb102" name=
+"pb102">102</a>]</span>thousands of insurgent flags fluttered from
+every window and every post. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Every man had an insurgent
+tri-color cockade in his hat.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Then follows a detailed account of being introduced, after some
+ceremony, to Aguinaldo, who is described as &ldquo;a small individual,
+in full evening black suit, and flowing black tie.&rdquo; Higgins made
+his complaint about the strikers, and Aguinaldo said, &ldquo;I will
+attend to this matter of the strikers,&rdquo; and then changed the
+topic, asking if the visitors did not wish to attend the opening of the
+Congress&mdash;which they did.</p>
+<p>From Mr. Millet&rsquo;s account, it is evident that, like Admiral
+Dewey and most of the Americans who first dealt with the Filipinos
+except Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and J. F. Bell, he failed to take
+the Filipinos as seriously as the facts demanded. At that time the
+Japanese had not yet taught the world that national aspirations are not
+necessarily to be treated with contumely because a people are small of
+stature and not white of skin. Consul Wildman at Hong Kong at first
+wrote the State Department quite peevishly that Aguinaldo seemed much
+more concerned about the kind of cane he should wear than about the
+figure he might make in history. Wildman did not then know, apparently,
+that canes, with all Spanish-Filipino colonial officialdom, were badges
+of official rank, like shoulder-straps are with us. The reader will
+also remember the toothbrush incident hereinbefore reproduced, told by
+Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee, in 1902. That incident,
+naturally enough, amused the Committee not a little. But we who know
+the Filipino know it was merely an awkward and embarrassed answer due
+to diffidence, and made on the spur of the moment to cloak some real
+reason which if disclosed would not seem so childish. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb103" href="#pb103" name="pb103">103</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Misunderstanding is the principal cause of hate in this world. When
+you understand people, hatred disappears in a way strikingly analogous
+to the disappearance of darkness on the arrival of light. The more you
+know of the educated patriotic Filipino, the more certain you become
+that the government we destroyed in 1898 would have worked quite as
+well as most any of the republics now in operation between the Rio
+Grande and Patagonia. The masses of the people down there, the peons,
+are probably quite as ignorant and docile as the Filipino <i>tao</i>
+(peasant), and I question if the educated men of Latin America, the
+class of men who, after all, control in every country, could, after
+meeting and knowing the corresponding class in the Philippines, get
+their own consent to declare the latter their inferiors either in
+intelligence, character, or patriotism.</p>
+<p>But to return to the inauguration. Mr. Millet saw the inaugural
+ceremonies in the church, and heard Aguinaldo&rsquo;s address to the
+Congress. Of the audience he says &ldquo;few among them would have
+escaped notice in a crowd for they were exceptionally alert, keen, and
+intelligent in appearance.&rdquo; Of this same Congress and government,
+Mr. John Barrett, who was American Minister to Siam about that time,
+and is now (1912) head of the Bureau of American Republics at
+Washington&mdash;an institution organized and run for the purpose of
+persuading Latin-America that we do <i>not</i> belong to the Imperial
+International Society for the Partition of the Earth and that we are
+<i>not</i> in the business of gobbling up little countries on pretext
+of &ldquo;policing&rdquo; them&mdash;said in an address before the
+Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on January 12, 1899:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">He [Aguinaldo] has organized a government which has
+practically been administering the affairs of that great <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb104" href="#pb104" name=
+"pb104">104</a>]</span>island [Luzon] since the American occupation of
+Manila, which is certainly better than the former administration; he
+has a properly constituted Cabinet and Congress, the members of which
+compare favorably with Japanese statesmen.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The present Philippine Assembly had not had its first meeting when I
+left the Islands in the spring of 1905. It was organized in 1907. In
+the summer of 1911, I had the pleasure of renewing an old and very
+cordial acquaintance with Dr. Heiser, Director of Public Health of the
+Philippine Islands, who is one of the most considerable men connected
+with our government out there, and is also thoroughly in sympathy with
+its indefinite continuance in its present form. The Doctor is a
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e3003" title=
+"Source: broad-guaged">broad-gauged</span> man likely to be worth to
+any government, in matters of Public Health, whatever such government
+could reasonably afford to pay in the way of salary, and is doubtless
+well-paid by the Philippine Insular Government. He can hardly be
+blamed, therefore, for being in sympathy with its indefinite
+continuance in its present form. Doctor Heiser is a man of too much
+genuine dignity to be very much addicted to slang, but when I asked him
+about the Philippine Assembly, I think he said it was &ldquo;a
+cracker-jack.&rdquo; At any rate, I have never heard any legislative
+body spoken of in more genuinely complimentary terms than those in
+which he described the Philippine Assembly. I learned from him
+incidentally that their &ldquo;capacity for self-government&rdquo; is
+so crude, however, as yet, that the members have not yet learned to
+read newspapers while a colleague whose seat is next to theirs is
+addressing the house and trying to get the attention of his fellows,
+nor do they keep up such a buzz of conversation that the man who has
+the floor cannot hear himself <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb105"
+href="#pb105" name="pb105">105</a>]</span>talk. They listen to the
+programme of the public business.</p>
+<p>Some five years ago in an article written for the <i>North American
+Review</i> concerning the Philippine problem, the author of the present
+volume said, among other things: &ldquo;During nearly four years of
+service on the bench in the Philippines the writer heard as much
+genuine, impassioned, and effective eloquence from Filipino lawyers,
+saw exhibited in the trial of causes as much industrious preparation,
+and zealous, loyal advocacy of the rights of clients, as any ordinary
+<i>nisi prius</i> judge at home is likely to meet with in the same
+length of time.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3016src" href=
+"#xd20e3016" name="xd20e3016src">14</a> Any country that has plenty of
+good lawyers and plenty of good soldiers, backed by plenty of good
+farmers, is capable of self-government. As President Schurman of
+Cornell University, who headed the first Philippine Commission, the one
+that went out in 1899, said in closing his Founder&rsquo;s Day Address
+at that institution on January 11, 1902: &ldquo;Any decent kind of
+government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible
+government of Filipinos by Americans.&rdquo; The Malolos government
+which Mr. Millet saw inaugurated on September 15, 1898, would probably
+have filled this bill. Had the Filipino people then possessed the
+consciousness of racial and political unity <i>as a</i> people which
+was developed by their subsequent long struggle against us for
+independence, and which has been steadily developing more and more
+under the mild sway of a <i>quasi</i>-freedom whose princely
+prodigality in spreading education is marred only by its declared
+programme that no living beneficiary thereof may hope to see the
+independence of his country, and that the present generation must
+resign itself to tariff schedules &ldquo;fixed&rdquo; at Washington,
+there is no reasonable <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb106" href=
+"#pb106" name="pb106">106</a>]</span>doubt that the original Malolos
+government of 1898 would have been a very &ldquo;decent kind of
+government.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>All through the last four months of 1898, the two hostile armies
+faced each other in a mood which it needed but a spark to ignite,
+awaiting the outcome of the peace negotiations arranged for in
+September, commenced in October, and concluded in December. While they
+are thus engaged about Manila, let us turn to a happier picture, the
+situation in the provinces under the Aguinaldo government. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb107" href="#pb107" name="pb107">107</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2781" href="#xd20e2781src" name="xd20e2781">1</a></span> See his
+Report, <i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2809" href="#xd20e2809src" name="xd20e2809">2</a></span> On
+August 20th. <i>War Dept. Report</i>,1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 345.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2815" href="#xd20e2815src" name="xd20e2815">3</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 5.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2828" href="#xd20e2828src" name="xd20e2828">4</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. 1., pt. 4, pp. 346&ndash;7.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2834" href="#xd20e2834src" name="xd20e2834">5</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i> p. 335.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2844" href="#xd20e2844src" name="xd20e2844">6</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2873" href="#xd20e2873src" name="xd20e2873">7</a></span> <i>S. D.
+208</i>, pt. ii., pp. 7, 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2886" href="#xd20e2886src" name="xd20e2886">8</a></span>
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report</i>, p. 10.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2898" href="#xd20e2898src" name="xd20e2898">9</a></span> <i>Navy
+Dept. Report</i>, 1898, Appendix, p. 101.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2906" href="#xd20e2906src" name="xd20e2906">10</a></span> To say
+nothing of the &ldquo;chariot and four, and a band of a hundred pieces,
+and everything in the grandest style,&rdquo; of which Admiral Dewey
+told the Senate Committee in 1902 (<i>S. D. 331</i>, 1902, p.
+2972).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2919" href="#xd20e2919src" name="xd20e2919">11</a></span> See p.
+7, <i>S. D. 148</i>, 56th Cong., 2d Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2942" href="#xd20e2942src" name="xd20e2942">12</a></span>
+<i>Expedition to the Philippines</i>, p. 255.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e2960" href="#xd20e2960src" name="xd20e2960">13</a></span>
+&ldquo;Putting the road and accessories into the same state as they
+were on February 4, 1899,&rdquo; was the language in which Mr. Higgins
+formulated his demand in a letter to General Otis on Jan. 25, 1900. See
+<i>War Dept. Record</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 516.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3016" href="#xd20e3016src" name="xd20e3016">14</a></span>
+<i>North American Review</i>, January 18, 1907, p. 140.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch6" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter VI</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Wilcox-Sargent Trip</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">A smiling, peaceful, and plenteous land</p>
+<p class="line">As yet unblighted by the scourge of war;</p>
+<p class="line">Where happiness and hospitality walk hand in hand</p>
+<p class="line">And new-born Freedom bows to Law.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Anonymous.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">In the last chapter, we saw Aguinaldo&rsquo;s republic
+formally established at Malolos, September 15th, claiming jurisdiction
+over all Luzon. In <a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>., entitled
+&ldquo;Merritt and Aguinaldo,&rdquo; we saw the political condition of
+southern Luzon in August, 1898, and the following months, and verified
+the correctness of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s claims as to complete mastery
+there then. Let us now examine the state of affairs in northern Luzon
+in the fall of 1898.</p>
+<p>In <i>Senate Document 196</i>, 56th Congress, 1st Session, dated
+February 26, 1900, transmitted by Secretary of the Navy Long, in
+response to a Senate resolution, may be found a report of a tour of
+observation through the half of Luzon Island which lies north of Manila
+and the Pasig River, made between October 8 and November 20,
+1898,&mdash;note the dates, for the Paris Peace Conference began
+October 1st and ended December 10th,&mdash;by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox
+and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent. This report was submitted by them to
+Admiral Dewey under <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb108" href="#pb108"
+name="pb108">108</a>]</span>date of November 23, 1898, and by him
+forwarded to the Navy Department for its information, with the comment
+that it &ldquo;in my opinion contains the most complete and reliable
+information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern
+part of Luzon Island.&rdquo; The Admiral&rsquo;s endorsement was not
+sent to the Senate along with the report. It appears in a book
+afterwards published by Paymaster Wilcox in 1901, entitled <i>Through
+Luzon on Highways and Byways</i>. The book is merely an elaboration of
+the report, and reproduces most of the report, if not all of it,
+<i>verbatim</i>. The book of Paymaster Wilcox may be treated as,
+practically, official, for historical purposes. The preface recites
+that in October, 1898, American control was effective only in Manila
+and Cavite, that the insurgents, under Aguinaldo, who had proclaimed
+himself President of the whole Archipelago, immediately after
+Dewey&rsquo;s victory, were in supposedly complete possession of every
+part of the Island outside of these two cities, that their lines were
+so close to the outposts of our army that their people could at times
+converse with our soldiers, and that General Otis&rsquo;s authority did
+not extend much beyond a three-mile radius from the centre of Manila,
+while Admiral Dewey held and operated the navy-yard at Cavite.
+&ldquo;Even the country between Manila and Cavite was in the hands of
+Aguinaldo, so much so that our officers had been refused permission to
+land at any intermediate point by water, and were prohibited from
+traversing the distance by road.&rdquo; Wilcox and Sargent procured
+leave of absence from Admiral Dewey to make their trip. They went first
+to Malolos, but failed to get anything in the way of safe-conduct from
+Aguinaldo. He is described, however, as of &ldquo;great force of
+character *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and he dominates all around him with a
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb109" href="#pb109" name=
+"pb109">109</a>]</span>power that seems peculiar to himself.&rdquo;
+Wilcox had seen him before at Cavite. &ldquo;He adroitly read between
+the lines that the Government of the United States did not then, nor
+would it at any future time, recognize his authority,&rdquo; says the
+writer.</p>
+<p>Our travellers left Manila, October 8, 1898, on the Manila-Dagupan
+Railway, for a place called Bayambang, which is the capital of
+Pangasinan province, about one hundred miles north of Manila. In
+Pangasinan &ldquo;the people were all very respectful and polite and
+offered the hospitality of their homes.&rdquo; From Bayambang they
+struck off from the railroad and proceeded eastward comfortably and
+unmolested a day&rsquo;s journey, to a town in the adjoining province
+of Nueva Ecija (Rosales) where they received a cordial reception at the
+hands of the Presidente (Mayor)&mdash;Aguinaldo&rsquo;s Presidente of
+course, not the Presidente left over from the Spanish r&eacute;gime.
+&ldquo;At this time all the local government of the different towns was
+in the hands of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s adherents,&rdquo; says the
+descriptive itinerary we are following. The tourists were provided at
+Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort, &ldquo;which was
+continued by relays all the way to Aparri&rdquo; (the northernmost town
+of Luzon, at the mouth of the Cagayan River). Paymaster Wilcox says he
+carried five hundred Mexican dollars in his saddle-bags, but used only
+a trifling portion of this amount, &ldquo;for in every town my
+entertainment was given without pay.&rdquo; They went from Rosales to
+Humingan, in Nueva Ecija. At Humingan they were again entertained by
+the Presidente at dinner, with music following, and comfortably housed.
+The Presidente made many inquiries about &ldquo;the War with Spain and
+their own future.&rdquo; Their future, as revealed by the raised
+curtain of a year later, was that their country was being overrun by
+Lawton&rsquo;s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb110" href="#pb110" name=
+"pb110">110</a>]</span>Division of the Eighth Army Corps, the author of
+this volume having passed through this same town of Humingan in
+November, 1899, as an officer of the scouts used to develop fire for
+General Lawton&rsquo;s column. They journeyed eastward through the
+province of Nueva Ecija from Humingan to a little village (Puncan) in
+the foothills of the mountains they planned to cross. Of this place and
+the hospitality there, our traveller remarks: &ldquo;I shall never
+forget the welcome of the local official&rdquo; the Presidente. Thence
+they proceeded a few more stages and parasangs, northward over the
+Caranglan pass, into Nueva Vizcaya province, the watershed of north
+central Luzon, and thence down the valley of the Cagayan River via
+Iligan and Tuguegarao to Aparri, being always hospitably entertained in
+every town through which they passed by the Presidente or Mayor of the
+town, the local representative of the Philippine republic. In the
+<i>New York Independent</i> of September 14, 1899, Cadet Sargent, in an
+article about this trip, gives the words of the new Filipino national
+Hymn, which he describes as sung with great enthusiasm everywhere he
+and Wilcox were entertained in the various towns. I desire to preserve
+a sample verse of it here. The music it is set to is much like the
+<i>Marseillaise</i>&mdash;quite as stirring:</p>
+<div lang="es" class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Del sue&ntilde;o de tres siglos</p>
+<p class="line">Hermanos Despertad!</p>
+<p class="line">Gritando &ldquo;Fuera Espa&ntilde;a!</p>
+<p class="line">Viva La Libertad!&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">which, being interpreted, means:</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">From the sleep of three centuries</p>
+<p class="line">Brothers, awake!</p>
+<p class="line">Crying &ldquo;Out with Spain!</p>
+<p class="line">Live Liberty!&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb111" href="#pb111" name=
+"pb111">111</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through
+the provinces of southern Luzon about this same time, under similar
+friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and
+misery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now
+know, have found similar conditions.</p>
+<p>Some suspicions were aroused on one or two occasions, but once the
+local authorities became convinced that the trip was being made by
+consent of &ldquo;The Illustrious Presidente&rdquo;
+(Aguinaldo&mdash;&ldquo;El Egregio Presidente&rdquo; is the Spanish of
+it) all was sunshine again. The Mayor of each town&mdash;the
+Presidente&mdash;would receive from the escort coming with them from
+the last town they had stopped at, a letter from the Mayor, or
+Presidente, of said last town; the old escort would return to
+<i>their</i> town, and a new one would be provided to give them
+safe-conduct to the next town. This was no new-fangled scheme of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s. It was an ancient custom of the Spanish Government,
+and was an ideal nucleus of administration for the new government.
+Curiously enough, the army knew practically nothing of this trip in the
+days of the early fighting. All that country was to us a <i>terra
+incognita</i>, until overrun by Captain Bacthelor, with a part of the
+25th Infantry in the fall of 1899, the following year. So was the rest
+of the archipelago a like <i>terra incognita</i>, until likewise slowly
+conquered by hard fighting. That is why we so utterly failed to
+understand what a wonderfully complete &ldquo;going concern&rdquo;
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s government had become throughout the Philippine
+archipelago before the Treaty of Paris was signed. Descending from the
+watershed of north central Luzon in the province of Nueva Viscaya
+already mentioned, our travellers reached the town of Carig, in the
+foothills which fringe that side of the watershed. There they
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb112" href="#pb112" name=
+"pb112">112</a>]</span>were met by Simeon Villa, military commander of
+Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldo
+afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with Aguinaldo in
+the spring of 1901. Villa&rsquo;s immediate superior was Colonel
+Tirona, at Aparri, the colonel commanding all the insurgent forces of
+the Cagayan valley. Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant
+Ventura Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the author of the
+present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for playing a minor
+part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish army committed under
+Villa&rsquo;s orders just prior to, or about the time of, the
+Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and sentenced, but later
+liberated under President Roosevelt&rsquo;s amnesty of 1902. He
+<i>was</i> guilty, but the deceased, so the people in the Cagayan
+valley used to say, in being tortured to death, got only the same sort
+of medicine he had often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that
+was the broad theory of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases.
+Villa was a Tagal and had come up from Manila with <span class="corr"
+id="xd20e3122" title="Source: she">the</span> expedition commanded by
+Colonel Tirona, which expedition was fitted out with guns furnished
+Aguinaldo by Admiral Dewey, or, if not furnished, permitted to be
+furnished. But Guzman was a member of one of the wealthiest and most
+influential native families of that province (Isabela). General
+Otis&rsquo;s reports are full of the most inexcusable blunders about
+how &ldquo;the Tagals&rdquo; took possession of the various provinces
+and <i>made</i> the people do this or that. Villa&rsquo;s relations
+with Guzman were just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent
+up to Vermont in the days of the American Revolution to help organize
+the resistance there, in conjunction with one of the local leaders of
+the patriot cause in the Green Mountain State. Both <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb113" href="#pb113" name="pb113">113</a>]</span>were
+members of the Katipunan, the Filipino Revolutionary Secret Society, an
+organization patterned after Masonry, membership in which was always
+treated by the Spaniards as sedition, and usually visited with capital
+punishment. Nearly every Filipino of any spirit belonged to it on May
+1, 1898, the date of the naval battle of Manila Bay. It is the
+all-pervading completeness of this organization at that time&mdash;it
+could give old Tammany Hall cards and spades&mdash;which explains the
+astonishing rapidity of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s political success,
+<i>i.e.</i>, the astonishing rapidity with which the Malolos Government
+acquired control of Luzon between May and October, 1898. Their
+cabalistic watchword was &ldquo;Paisano&rdquo; (fellow-countryman),
+their battle cry &ldquo;Independence.&rdquo; In the fall of 1898, at
+the time of this Wilcox-Sargent trip through Luzon, the Filipinos
+really &ldquo;had tasted the sweets of Independence,&rdquo; to use the
+phrase of the people of Iloilo in declining <i>on that ground</i> to
+surrender to General Miller in December thereafter and electing the
+arbitrament of war. The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history
+of that Cagayan valley as almost any other American. It is true there
+were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the Spaniards. But they
+were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries of tyranny. They do not
+prove unfitness for self-government. I for one prefer to follow the
+example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over
+all those matters. With the Spaniards it was a case of <i lang=
+"fr">Sauve qui peut</i>. With the Filipinos, it was a case, as old man
+Dimas Guzman, father to this Lieutenant Ventura we have just met, used
+to put it, of <i lang="es">Me las vais a pagar</i>, which, liberally
+interpreted, means, &ldquo;The bad quarter of an hour has arrived for
+the Spaniards. The day of reckoning has come.&rdquo; I sentenced both
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb114" href="#pb114" name=
+"pb114">114</a>]</span>Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for being
+accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above named, Lieutenant
+Piera. Villa officiated as archfiend of the gruesome occasion. I am
+quite sure I would have hung Villa without any compunction at that
+time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of him,
+but Governor Taft&rsquo;s Attorney-General, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me that
+Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British territory,
+and extradition would involve application to the London Foreign Office.
+The intimation was that we had trouble enough of our own without
+borrowing any from feuds that had existed under our predecessors in
+sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now practising medicine in
+Manila. More than one officer of the American army that I know,
+afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to
+that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think
+President Roosevelt acted wisely and humanely in wiping the slate. We
+had new problems to deal with, and were not bound to handicap ourselves
+with the old ones left over from the Spanish r&eacute;gime.</p>
+<p>It appears that Villa became a little suspicious of the travellers.
+He detained them at Carig seven days. Finally there came a telegram
+from his chief at Aparri, Colonel Tirona, to our two travellers, which
+read: &ldquo;I salute you affectionately, and authorize Villa to
+accompany you to Iligan.&rdquo; At Iligan, the capital of Isabela
+province, the travellers were lavishly entertained. They were given a
+grand <i>baile</i> (ball) and <i>fiesta</i> (feast), a kind of
+dinner-dance, we would call it. To the light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox
+throw on the then universal acknowledgment of the authority of the
+Aguinaldo government, and the perfect tranquillity <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb115" href="#pb115" name="pb115">115</a>]</span>and
+public order maintained under it, in the Cagayan valley, I may add that
+as judge of that district in 1901&ndash;2 there came before me a number
+of cases in the trial of which the fact would be brought out of this or
+that difference among the local authorities having been referred to the
+Malolos Government for settlement. <i>And they always waited until they
+heard from it.</i> The doubting Thomas will attribute this to the
+partiality of the Filipinos to procrastination in general. I know it
+was due to the hearty co-operation of the people with, and their
+loyalty to, the then existing government, and to their pride in it. Mr.
+Sargent tells a characteristic story of Villa, whose vengeful feeling
+toward the Spaniards showed on all occasions. The former Spanish
+governor of the province was of course a prisoner in Villa&rsquo;s
+custody. Villa had the ex-governor brought in, for the travellers to
+see him, and remarked, in his presence to them, &ldquo;This is the man
+who robbed this province of $25,000 during the last year of his
+office.&rdquo; From Iligan our travellers proceeded to Aparri,
+cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in fact, as
+Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period seeking
+recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of profound
+peace and tranquillity&mdash;free from brigandage and the like. At
+Aparri the visitors were cordially welcomed by Colonel Tirona, and much
+f&ecirc;ted. While they were there, Tirona transferred his authority to
+a civil r&eacute;gime. Says Paymaster Wilcox:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The steamer <i>Saturnus</i>, which had left the harbor
+the day before our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the
+Senators from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the
+independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel
+Tirona considered the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb116" href=
+"#pb116" name="pb116">116</a>]</span>information of sufficient
+reliability to justify him in regarding Philippine Independence as
+assured, and warfare in the Islands at an end.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He then goes on to describe the inauguration of civil government in
+Cagayan province. I hope all this will not weary the American reader.
+It was vividly interesting to me when I read it for the first time
+thirteen years afterward, in 1911, because it was such unexpected
+information, so surprising. It will be equally interesting to all other
+Americans who participated in putting down the subsequent insurrection
+and in setting up the Taft civil government in that same valley three
+years later. I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor
+Taft in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not have
+occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then
+existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Of
+course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzon goes, so
+go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail to the Luzon
+kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out there, and
+Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French and to
+France. Luzon is about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that
+really matter,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3169src" href="#xd20e3169"
+name="xd20e3169src">1</a> are in size mere little Connecticuts and
+Rhode Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos.
+Describing the ceremonies of the inauguration of civil government in
+Cagayan, the Wilcox-Sargent report to Admiral Dewey says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Presidentes of all the towns in the province were
+present at the ceremony. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Colonel Tirona made a short
+speech. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* He then handed the staff of office to
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb117" href="#pb117" name=
+"pb117">117</a>]</span>the man who had been elected &ldquo;Jefe
+Provincial&rdquo; [Governor of the Province]. This officer also made a
+speech in which he thanked the military forces *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and
+assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated by the
+people, where <i>every man, woman, and child stood ready to take up
+arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with the last drop
+of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever to bring them back to
+their former state of dependence</i>. He then knelt, placed his hand on
+an open Bible, and took the oath of office.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3180src" href="#xd20e3180" name="xd20e3180src">2</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Does not such language in an official report made by officers of the
+navy to Admiral Dewey in November, 1898, show an undercurrent of deep
+feeling at the position the Administration had put Admiral Dewey in
+with Aguinaldo, when it decided to take the Philippines, and
+accordingly sent out an army whose generals ignored his
+prot&eacute;g&eacute;?</p>
+<p>The speech of the provincial governor was followed, says the
+Wilcox-Sargent report (same page) by speeches from &ldquo;the other
+officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of the
+three departments&mdash;justice, police, and internal revenue. Every
+town in this province has the same organization.&rdquo; Article III. of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s decree of June 18th, previous, providing an organic
+law or constitution for his provisional government (see Chapter II.,
+<i>ante</i>) had provided precisely the organization which Wilcox and
+Sargent thus saw working at Aparri and throughout the Cagayan valley in
+October, 1898. The importance of all this to the question of how the
+Filipinos feel toward us to-day, in this year of grace, 1912, and to
+the element of righteousness there is in that feeling, is too obvious
+to need comment. Americans interested in business in the Philippines
+come back to this country from time <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb118" href="#pb118" name="pb118">118</a>]</span>to time and give out
+interviews in the papers declaring that the Filipinos do not want
+independence. What they really mean is that it makes no difference
+whether they want it or not, they are not going to get it. And it is
+precisely these Americans, and their business associates in the United
+States, who have gotten through Congress the legislation which enables
+them to give the Filipino just half of what he got ten years ago for
+his hemp, and other like legislation, and the Filipinos know it. The
+gulf in the Philippines between the dominant and the subject race will
+continue to widen as the years go by, so long as indirect taxation
+without representation continues to be perpetrated at Washington for
+the benefit of special interests having a powerful lobby. If the
+American people themselves are groaning under this very sort of thing,
+and apparently unable to help themselves, what is the <i>a priori</i>
+probability as to our voteless and therefore defenceless little brown
+brother. Like the sheep before the shearer, he is dumb. But to return
+to our travellers and their journey.</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A Norwegian steamer came into port [meaning the harbor
+of Aparri] that afternoon, and this seemed our only hope. She was
+chartered by two Chinamen *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. At first they refused us
+permission to embark, and declined to put in at any port on the west
+coast. No sooner was this related to Colonel Tirona than he sent notice
+that the ship could not clear without taking us and making a landing
+where we desired. This argument was convincing.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Colonel Tirona provided them with a letter addressed to Colonel
+Ti&ntilde;o at Vigan, the chief town of the west coast of Luzon and the
+capital of the province of Ilocos Sur, which province fronts the China
+Sea. Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent proceeded aboard the Norwegian
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb119" href="#pb119" name=
+"pb119">119</a>]</span>steamer from Aparri westward, doubling the
+northwest corner of Luzon, and steaming thence due south to the nearest
+port. Vigan was the Filipino military headquarters of the western half
+of northern Luzon, just as Aparri was at the same time of the eastern
+half. On the west coast the travellers were treated always courteously,
+but with considerable suspicion. The explanation is easy. That region
+is in closer touch with Manila, and with what is going on and may be
+learned at the capital, than is the Cagayan valley which our tourists
+had just left. They bade the commanding officer at Vigan good-bye,
+November 13, 1898. Passing south through Namacpacan (which the command
+I was with took a year or so later), they came to San Fernando de
+Union, some twenty miles farther south along the coast road. Here they
+met Colonel Ti&ntilde;o and presented their letter from Tirona. He gave
+them a dinner, of course. How a Filipino does love to entertain, and
+make you enjoy yourself! Talk about your &ldquo;true Southern
+hospitality&rdquo;! You get it there. &ldquo;Speeches were made, and
+great things promised by the Philippine republic in the near
+future&rdquo; says Mr. Wilcox. After the dinner and speech-making came
+the inevitable dance. After that Colonel Ti&ntilde;o started them off
+on their journey southward toward Manila duly provided with carriages.
+Passing Aringay on November 18, 1898<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3205src" href="#xd20e3205" name="xd20e3205src">3</a> our
+travellers finally reached Dagupan, the northern terminus of the
+Manila-Dagupan Railway, and there took a train for Manila, 120 miles
+away.</p>
+<p>In his report covering the fall of 1898, General Otis <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb120" href="#pb120" name=
+"pb120">120</a>]</span>always scoldingly says of the Filipinos that in
+all the parleyings of his commissioners with Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+commissioners before the outbreak, the latter never did know what they
+really wanted. The truth was they believed the Americans were going to
+do with them exactly as every other white race they knew of had done
+with every other brown race they knew of, but they did not tell General
+Otis so. Mr. Wilcox, a more friendly witness of that same period states
+their position thus at page twenty of the report to Admiral Dewey:
+&ldquo;They desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear
+any interference on land.&rdquo; &ldquo;On one point they seemed
+united, viz., that whatever our government may have done for them, it
+had not gained the right to annex them,&rdquo; adding, in relation to
+the physical preparations to make good this contention, in the event of
+war, &ldquo;The Philippine Government has an organized force in every
+province we visited.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The whole tone of the Wilcox-Sargent report and the subsequent
+Wilcox book is an implied reiteration, after intimate, extended, and
+friendly contact with the people of all Luzon north of the Pasig River,
+of Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s telegram sent to the Navy Department, June 23,
+1898: &ldquo;The people are far superior in intelligence and capacity
+for self-government to the people of Cuba and I am familiar with both
+races.&rdquo; In fact Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent do not raise the
+question of &ldquo;capacity for self-government&rdquo; at all, any more
+than Commodore Perry did when similarly welcomed in 1854 by the
+Japanese. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb121" href="#pb121" name=
+"pb121">121</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3169" href="#xd20e3169src" name="xd20e3169">1</a></span> The six
+main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealt with in this
+book as a separate and distinct problem.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3180" href="#xd20e3180src" name="xd20e3180">2</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 196</i>, 56th Cong., 1st. Sess., p. 14.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3205" href="#xd20e3205src" name="xd20e3205">3</a></span> Here the
+author&rsquo;s commanding officer, Major Batson, was shot a year and a
+day later while directing with his usual clear-headed intrepidity the
+fire of a part of his battalion to protect the crossing of the rest of
+it over the Aringay River, we being at the time in hot pursuit of
+Aguinaldo, whose rear-guard made a stand in the trenches on the other
+side of the river.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch7" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter VII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Treaty of Paris</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">No man can serve two masters.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Matthew</span> vi., 24.</p>
+<p>Confine the Empire within those limits which nature seems to have
+fixed as its natural bulwarks and boundaries.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Augustus C&aelig;sar&rsquo;s
+Will.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">This is a tale of three cities, Paris, Washington, and
+Manila.</p>
+<p>Article III. of the Peace Protocol signed at Washington, August 12,
+1898, provided:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay,
+and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace which
+shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the
+Philippines.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3242src" href="#xd20e3242"
+name="xd20e3242src">1</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The &ldquo;Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain&rdquo; including
+the telegraphic correspondence between President McKinley and our Peace
+Commissioners pending the negotiations, were sent to the Senate,
+January 30, 1899, just one week before the final vote on the treaty,
+but the injunction of secrecy was not removed until January 31,
+1901&mdash;<i>after</i> the presidential election of 1900. They then
+were published as <i>Senate Document 148</i>, 56th Congress, 2d
+Session. It was not until then <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb122"
+href="#pb122" name="pb122">122</a>]</span>that the veil was lifted. The
+instructions to the Peace Commissioners were dated September 16, 1898.
+The Commissioners were: William R. Day, of Ohio, Republican, just
+previously Secretary of State, now (1912) Associate Justice of the
+Supreme Court of the United States; Whitelaw Reid, Republican, then
+editor of the <i>New York Tribune</i>, now Ambassador to Great Britain,
+and three members of the United States Senate, Cushman K. Davis, of
+Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, Republicans, and George Gray, of
+Delaware, Democrat. Senator Davis died in 1900, and Senator Frye in
+1911. Senator Gray has been, since 1899, and is now, United States
+Circuit Judge for the 3d Judicial District. Among other things, the
+President&rsquo;s instructions to the Commissioners said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is my earnest wish that <i>the United States in
+making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided
+it in facing war</i>. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>The lustre and the moral
+strength</i> attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon
+the considerate judgment of the world <i>should not under any illusion
+of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us</i>
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>into an adventurous departure on untried
+paths</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get
+down to this:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the
+commercial opportunity. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The United States cannot accept
+less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of
+Luzon.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to
+recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in
+the councils of the Administration<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3284src"
+href="#xd20e3284" name="xd20e3284src">2</a> <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb123" href="#pb123" name=
+"pb123">123</a>]</span>declared in one of the great reviews of the
+period: &ldquo;We see with sudden clearness that some of the most
+revered of our political maxims have outlived their force.&rdquo; Among
+these &ldquo;revered maxims&rdquo; thus suddenly fossilized by his
+<i lang="la">ipse dixit</i>, Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the
+teachings of &ldquo;Washington&rsquo;s Farewell Address and the later
+crystallization of its main thought by President
+Monroe&rdquo;&mdash;the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of these
+&ldquo;A new mainspring *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* has become the directing force
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the mainspring of commercialism.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which
+renominated Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900,
+Senator Lodge, speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris,
+said: &ldquo;We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in
+the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade
+Expansion.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand,&rdquo; said
+Mr. Vanderlip&rsquo;s Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage,
+about the same time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty
+was made.</p>
+<p>The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at
+Paris, October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move
+of the Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent
+events, especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter
+described (<a href="#ch9">Chapter IX</a>.).</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Spanish communication represents,&rdquo; says Judge
+Day&rsquo;s cablegram to the President,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3307src" href="#xd20e3307" name="xd20e3307src">3</a> &ldquo;that
+<i>status quo</i> has been altered and continues to be altered to the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb124" href="#pb124" name=
+"pb124">124</a>]</span>prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it
+describes as <i>an auxiliary force</i> to the regular American
+troops.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the
+obvious, called the Filipinos our allies.</p>
+<p>The Spanish initial move was more immediately prompted by the fact
+that in point of absolute astronomical time Manila, though captured
+when it was morning of August 13th <i>there</i>, was captured when it
+was evening of August 12th, at Washington, and the protocol was signed
+at Washington in the evening of August 12th. While this point was
+material, because we had captured $900,000 in cash in the Spanish
+treasury at Manila and much other property, the title to which, under
+the laws of war between civilized nations, depended on just <i>what
+time</i> it was captured, the matter was finally swallowed up and lost
+sight of in the agreement to give Spain a lump $20,000,000 for the
+archipelago. But the initial move had other aspects. In the event we
+should take the Philippines off her hands, Spain was going to insist
+that we should get back from the Filipinos, our &ldquo;allies,&rdquo;
+and restore to her all the Spaniards they captured after August 12th.
+She knew that in all probability if we bought the Islands we would be
+buying an insurrection, and she was &ldquo;taking care of her
+own&rdquo; at our expense.</p>
+<p>The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a
+bird&rsquo;s-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we
+should take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley
+cabled Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was
+signed, asking as to &ldquo;the desirability of the several
+islands,&rdquo; &ldquo;coal <i>and other mineral deposits</i>,&rdquo;
+and &ldquo;in a naval and commercial sense which (of the several
+islands) would be most advantageous.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3335src" href="#xd20e3335" name="xd20e3335src">4</a> Admiral
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb125" href="#pb125" name=
+"pb125">125</a>]</span>Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was
+&ldquo;the most desirable,&rdquo; but volunteered no advice. He
+<i>did</i> state, &ldquo;No coal of good quality can be procured in the
+Philippine Islands,&rdquo; which is still true. Allusion is made to
+this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is there set forth.
+On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President McKinley suggesting
+that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him &ldquo;whether it would be
+better *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to retain Luzon *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* or the whole
+group.&rdquo; Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey
+before General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in
+writing &ldquo;on general question of Philippines,&rdquo; and that
+&ldquo;his report is in your hands in response to both
+questions.&rdquo; But the commission replied that Admiral Dewey had
+sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene&rsquo;s and
+nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion from
+Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis&rsquo;s Report
+(p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently,
+been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898,
+suggesting that we &ldquo;interfere as little as possible in the
+internal affairs of the Islands.&rdquo; No; Admiral Dewey must be
+acquitted of having ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy
+the Philippines.</p>
+<p>On October 7th the Commission telegraphed Washington that General
+Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian Consul at
+Manila, M. Andr&eacute;, and that &ldquo;Consul says United States must
+take all or nothing&rdquo;; that &ldquo;if southern islands remained
+with Spain they would be in constant revolt, and United States would
+have a second Cuba&rdquo;; that &ldquo;Spanish government would not
+improve,&rdquo; and &ldquo;would still protect monks in their
+extortion.&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb126" href="#pb126"
+name="pb126">126</a>]</span></p>
+<p>To this advice there was absolutely no answer. It <i>was</i> a case
+of &ldquo;all or nothing,&rdquo; and it had already become a case of
+&ldquo;all&rdquo; when on September 16th previous Mr. McKinley signed
+his original instructions to the Commission stating &ldquo;The United
+States cannot accept less than Luzon.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The Commission&rsquo;s telegram of October 7th goes on to quote from
+the Belgian Consul&rsquo;s opinion that &ldquo;Present rebellion
+represents only one half of one per cent. of the inhabitants.&rdquo;
+The Consul was not before them in person. They were quoting from a
+memorandum submitted by him to General Merritt at Merritt&rsquo;s
+request, made at Manila and dated August 29th, the day General Merritt
+sailed away from Manila bound for Paris via the Suez Canal. He had
+brought the memorandum along with him. From the previous chapters the
+reader will, of course, understand that Americans and Europeans at
+Manila in August, 1898, were paying very little attention to Aguinaldo
+and his claims as to the extent of his authority in the provinces. It
+is therefore not surprising that M. Andr&eacute;&rsquo;s memorandum of
+August 29th should have made the foolish statement, &ldquo;Present
+rebellion represents only one half of one per cent. of
+inhabitants.&rdquo; But it is eternally regrettable that his statement
+on this point had any weight with the Commissioners, for it was, or by
+that time at least (October 7th) had become, just about 99&frac12; per
+cent. wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, by October 7th it would
+have been more accurate to have said, in lieu of the above,
+&ldquo;Present rebellion represents practically whole people.&rdquo;
+You see, we started an insurrection in May, in October it had become a
+full grown affair, and in December we bought it. The telegram of
+October 7th also quoted General Merritt as saying, &ldquo;Insurgents
+would be victorious unless Spaniards did <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb127" href="#pb127" name="pb127">127</a>]</span>better in future than
+in past,&rdquo; and as considering it &ldquo;feasible for United States
+to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as
+England does her colonies.&rdquo; These are about the only two sound
+suggestions General Merritt made to that Commission. In the next breath
+they quote him as saying, &ldquo;Natives could not resist 5000
+troops.&rdquo; The fact that they did resist more than 120,000 troops,
+that it took more than that, all told, to put down the insurrection, is
+sufficient to show how much General Merritt&rsquo;s advice was worth.
+He was right on two points, as indicated. Both Spanish fleets had been
+destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her home coast cities.
+The death knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit
+as she was, she could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the
+Philippines. Besides the Filipinos would have &ldquo;eaten them
+up.&rdquo; General Merritt&rsquo;s suggestion to &ldquo;hold them as
+England does her colonies&rdquo; was also sensible. In fact that was
+the only thoroughly honest thing to have done, if we were going to take
+them at all. England never acts the hypocrite with her colonies. <i>She
+makes them behave.</i> She does not let native people preach sedition
+in native newspapers, because of &ldquo;sentimental bosh&rdquo; about
+freedom of the press, until the whole country becomes a smouldering
+hot-bed of sedition. She <i>has</i> blown offending natives from the
+cannon&rsquo;s mouth, when deemed necessary to cure them and their
+country of the desire for independence. If we are going to have
+colonies at all, we ought to govern them with the upright downright
+ruthless honesty of the British. <i>It is more merciful in the long
+run.</i> But we ought not to have colonies at all. For if there is one
+thing this republic stands for, above all other things, it is the
+righteousness of aversion to a foreign yoke. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb128" href="#pb128" name="pb128">128</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In their telegram of October 7th,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3369src" href="#xd20e3369" name="xd20e3369src">5</a> the Peace
+Commissioners, now squarely confronted with the question of forcible
+annexation, begin to let the Administration down easy. They say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">General Anderson in correspondence with Aguinaldo in
+June and July seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native
+authorities, <i>but subsequently changed his tone</i>. Merritt and
+Dewey both kept clear of any <i>compromising</i> communications.</p>
+</div>
+<p>A despatch sent by Judge Day certainly comes from high authority.
+The word &ldquo;compromising&rdquo; is therefore important. To say that
+Admiral Dewey did not treat Aguinaldo as an ally is to raise a mere
+technical point. But Aguinaldo never did get anything from him in
+writing. What he got consisted more of deeds than words. And actions
+speak louder than words. We <i>had</i> an alliance with Aguinaldo, a
+most &ldquo;compromising&rdquo; alliance and afterwards repudiated it.
+Admiral Dewey made it and General Merritt repudiated it. Dewey did,
+without the President&rsquo;s knowledge, exactly what the President and
+the American people would have had him do at the time. And Merritt did
+exactly what the President ordered him to do. But between the making of
+the alliance, and the repudiation of it, the President and the American
+people changed their minds. I say the American people, because they
+afterwards ratified all that Mr. McKinley did. You see the bitterness
+that lies away down in the secret recesses of the hearts of the
+Filipino people to-day has its source at this point. They had &ldquo;a
+gentleman&rsquo;s agreement,&rdquo; as it were, with us, not in
+writing, made at a time when the thought of a colony had never entered
+our minds. They fought in a common cause with us <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb129" href="#pb129" name="pb129">129</a>]</span>on
+the faith of that agreement&mdash;drove the Spaniards into Manila in
+numerous victorious engagements involving much loss of life, on their
+part, keeping the Dons thereafter bottled up in Manila on the land side
+while their &ldquo;ally&rdquo; Admiral Dewey was doing the same on the
+sea side. The said Dons were living on horses and rats, and famine was
+imminent when our troops arrived and began to finish the work of taking
+the beleaguered city. And then, having changed our minds and decided to
+annex the islands, we repudiated our &ldquo;gentleman&rsquo;s
+agreement,&rdquo; on the idea that the end justified the means. And the
+end, as it has turned out, did not even justify the means, seeing that
+the islands have proved a heavy financial liability instead of a
+profitable asset. Judge Day&rsquo;s telegram to Secretary Hay of
+October 12th (p. 27) contains this curious and surprising passage as to
+Cuba:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Senator Gray in favor of accepting sovereignty
+unconditionally *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* that we may thereby avoid future
+complications with Cubans, claiming sovereignty while we are in process
+of pacifying island *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* We desire instructions on this
+point.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The future of Cuba, however, trembled in the balance but for a
+moment. Before &ldquo;the shell-burred cables&rdquo; had had time to
+quit vibrating with the question thus propounded, there came back this
+splendidly clean-cut answer from the President:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We must carry out the spirit and letter of the
+resolution of Congress [declaring war].</p>
+</div>
+<p>In characterizing Judge Gray&rsquo;s position, above indicated, as
+&ldquo;surprising,&rdquo; no reflection upon him is intended. On the
+contrary, such a position, assumed by a <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb130" href="#pb130" name="pb130">130</a>]</span>man of such conceded
+intellectual probity, is illuminating as to the attitude subsequently
+taken concerning the Philippines by the Democratic Senators who voted
+for the treaty. This attitude is stated by Senator Lodge, in his
+<i>History of the War with Spain</i>, with all the incisive
+forcefulness to which the country has so long been accustomed in the
+public utterances of that distinguished man, and, seeing that no
+promise had been made, as in the case of Cuba, Senator Lodge&rsquo;s
+statement of the position of those who voted for the treaty should
+forever set at rest the stale injustice, still occasionally repeated,
+that Mr. Bryan, &ldquo;played politics&rdquo; in 1898&ndash;9 in urging
+his friends in the Senate to vote for its ratification. Says Senator
+Lodge (<i>History of the War with Spain</i>, p. 231):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The friends of ratification took the very simple
+ground that the treaty committed the United States to no policy, but
+left them free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands; that
+the American people could be safely entrusted with this grave
+responsibility, and that patriotism and common sense alike demanded the
+end of the war and the re-establishment of peace, which could only be
+effected by the adoption of the treaty.</p>
+</div>
+<p>October 14th, Washington wires the commission that Admiral Dewey has
+just cabled:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is important that the disposition of the Philippine
+Islands should be decided as soon as possible. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* General
+anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila.
+Natives appear unable to govern.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true
+some wild rumors then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans
+at Manila which of course were impossible of verification. I say
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb131" href="#pb131" name=
+"pb131">131</a>]</span>&ldquo;unfortunately&rdquo; with some
+earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his message that
+they <i>were</i> mere rumors. And, that they were wholly erroneous, in
+point of fact, has already been cleared up in previous chapters,
+wherein the real state of peace, order and tranquillity which prevailed
+throughout Luzon at that time has been, it is believed, put beyond all
+doubt. But what manna in the wilderness to the McKinley Administration,
+now that it was bent on taking the islands, was that Dewey message of
+October 14th, &ldquo;The natives appear unable to govern&rdquo;!</p>
+<p>On October 17th, Mr. Day wires Mr. Hay that the Peace Commissioners
+feel the importance of preserving, so far as possible, the condition of
+things existing at the time of signing the protocol, to prevent any
+change in the <i>status quo</i>. He says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Might not our government *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* take more
+active and positive measures than heretofore for preservation of order
+and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands?</p>
+</div>
+<p>How could we, when Aguinaldo and his people were in the saddle all
+over Luzon, had taken the <i>status quo</i> between their teeth and run
+away with it, and were prepared to fight if bidden to halt and
+dismount; and, which is more, were preserving order perfectly
+themselves?</p>
+<p>On October 19th, Mr. Hay repeated by wire to Mr. Day a cablegram
+from General Otis which said: &ldquo;Do not anticipate trouble with
+insurgents *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Affairs progressing favorably.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>General Otis was making a desperate effort to humor Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s &ldquo;consent-of-the-governed&rdquo; theory and
+programme. But it was a situation, not a theory, which confronted him.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb132" href="#pb132" name=
+"pb132">132</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The date of the high-water mark of the Paris peace negotiations is
+October 25th. On that day, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning
+Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted (by cable
+also) herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
+instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint
+commission almost immediately.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, sent a joint signed statement. They
+urged taking over the whole archipelago, saying that, as their
+instructions provided for the retention at least of Luzon, &ldquo;we do
+not consider the question of remaining in the Philippine Islands as at
+all now properly before us.&rdquo; They also urged that as Spain
+governed and defended the islands from Manila, we became, with the
+destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army, &ldquo;as
+complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing
+needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the <i>ample</i>
+forces we had at hand to take <i>unopposed</i> possession.&rdquo; The
+vice of this proposition, from the strategic as well as the ethical
+point of view, is of course clear enough <i>now</i>.</p>
+<p>Spain&rsquo;s government was already tottering in the Philippines
+when the Spanish-American war broke out. To be &ldquo;as complete
+masters as she had been&rdquo; was like becoming the recipient of a
+quit-claim deed. Also, ours was not a case of taking &ldquo;unopposed
+possession.&rdquo; An adverse claimant, relying on immemorial
+prescription, was in full possession; all the tenants on the land had
+attorned to him, and he and they were ready to defend their claim
+against all comers with their lives. They reminded one of the recurrent
+small farmer whom <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb133" href="#pb133"
+name="pb133">133</a>]</span>some great timber or other corporation
+seeks to oust, patrolling his land lines rifle in hand, on the lookout
+for the corporation&rsquo;s agent and the sheriff with the
+dispossessory warrant.</p>
+<p>Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid go on to say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be
+practically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Hardly any one can fail to read with interest the following accurate
+and vivid picture which they give of the physical strategic unity of
+the Philippine Islands:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is hardly a single island in the group from
+which you cannot shoot across to one or more of the
+others&mdash;scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the
+islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This explains also why the Filipino people are <i>a people</i>.
+Whenever the American people understand that, they will give them their
+independence, unless they get an idea that government <i>of</i> their
+people <i>by</i> their people <i>for</i> their people would be
+distasteful to them.</p>
+<p>In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Washington on
+October 25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid also say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Public opinion in Europe, <i>including that of
+Rome</i>, expects us to retain whole of Philippine Islands.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Archbishop Chapelle was in Paris at the time of these negotiations.
+He afterwards told the writer in Manila that he got that $20,000,000
+put in the Treaty of Paris. The Church preferred that our title should
+be a title by purchase rather than a title by conquest, and Mr.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb134" href="#pb134" name=
+"pb134">134</a>]</span>McKinley was vigorously urging the latter.
+Between the legal effects of the two, there is a world of difference.
+The Church outgeneralled the President&mdash;checkmated him with a
+bishop. Look at that part of the treaty which affects church
+property:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Article VIII. The *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* cession
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* cannot in any respect impair the property or rights
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* of *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* ecclesiastical *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+bodies.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Church of Rome, or at least some of the ecclesiastical bodies
+pertaining to it in the Philippines, owned the cream of the
+agricultural estates. By the treaty they have not lost a dollar. It
+might have been otherwise, had not Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s original claim
+of title by conquest been overcome at Paris.</p>
+<p>Judge Day&rsquo;s memorandum of his own views, telegraphed on
+October 25th along with those of his colleagues, stated that he was
+unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire
+Philippine group; that</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>In the spirit of our instructions</i>, and bearing
+in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom
+from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, <i>we
+should be consistent</i> in demands in making peace *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+with due regard to our responsibility because of <i>the conduct of our
+military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Again, he says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a
+government [he of course did not know what a complete government they
+had already formed] or to battle against a foe which *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+might readily overcome them.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards
+then in the Philippines were to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb135"
+href="#pb135" name="pb135">135</a>]</span>get away, and how completely
+they were at the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces.
+&ldquo;On all hands&rdquo; says Judge Day, &ldquo;it is agreed that the
+inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government.&rdquo; Of
+course we knew absolutely nothing worth mentioning about the Filipinos
+at that time. Judge Day then proposes, for the reasons indicated, to
+accept Luzon and some adjacent islands, as being of &ldquo;strategic
+advantage,&rdquo; and to leave Spain the rest, with a &ldquo;treaty
+stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the United
+States.&rdquo; It seems to me that Judge Day&rsquo;s scheme was the
+least desirable of all.</p>
+<p>Senator Gray&rsquo;s memorandum of the same date is a red-hot
+argument against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins
+thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take
+Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
+accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon
+through our history. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* It will make necessary
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* immense sums for fortifications and harbors
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Climate and social conditions demoralizing to character
+of American youth *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. On whole, instead of indemnity,
+injury *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. Cannot agree that any obligation incurred to
+insurgents *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had
+helped us, would not be our duty to stay by them at the conclusion of
+war *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. No place for *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* government of subject
+people in American system *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. Even conceding all benefits
+claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the moral
+grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of
+the world *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* for doubtful material advantages and
+<i>shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully
+assumed</i>. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Now that we have achieved all and more
+than our object, <i>let us simply keep our word</i> *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*.
+<i>Above all let us not make a mockery of the</i> [President&rsquo;s]
+<i>instructions</i>, where, after stating that we took <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb136" href="#pb136" name="pb136">136</a>]</span>up
+arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and
+that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for conquest,
+the President *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* eloquently says: &ldquo;It is my earnest
+wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high
+rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none.
+The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is
+sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the
+matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On
+October 27th, the Commission wired Washington:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr.
+Reid.</p>
+</div>
+<p>It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying
+to find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in
+sudden disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made
+plain the inflexible determination of the American people not to assume
+the Cuban debt. The Ambassador said: &ldquo;Montero Rios<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e3573src" href="#xd20e3573" name="xd20e3573src">6</a>
+<i>could not return to Madrid</i> now if known to have accepted entire
+Cuban indebtedness,&rdquo; and asked delay to see &ldquo;if some
+concessions elsewhere might not be found which would save Spanish
+Commissioners from utter repudiation at home.&rdquo; There is no doubt
+that the talk we are now considering was a &ldquo;heart-to-heart&rdquo;
+affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of the most important
+talks that have <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb137" href="#pb137"
+name="pb137">137</a>]</span>occurred between any two men in this world
+in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint to the
+effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment seemed
+rather inclined to retain the Philippines, &ldquo;It was
+possible,&rdquo; he said, &ldquo;but not probable that out of these
+conditions the Spanish Commissioners might find something <i>either in
+territory or debt</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e3583src" href=
+"#xd20e3583" name="xd20e3583src">7</a> which might <i>seem to their
+people at least like a concession</i>.!&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3590src" href="#xd20e3590" name="xd20e3590src">8</a></p>
+<p>It was the leaven of this hint that leavened the whole loaf. There
+was doubtless much informal parleying after that, but finally, the
+American Commissioners, having become satisfied that Spanish honor
+would not be offended by an offer having the substance, if not the
+form, of charity, and being very tired of Spain&rsquo;s sparring for
+wind in the hope of a European coalition against us should war be
+resumed, submitted the following proposal:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Government of the United States is unable to
+modify the proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire
+archipelago of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners
+are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed
+to, the sum of $20,000,000.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement
+that</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Upon the acceptance *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* of the proposals
+herein made *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>but not otherwise</i>, it will be
+possible *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to proceed to the consideration
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* of other matters.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Also, our Commissioners wired Washington: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb138" href="#pb138" name="pb138">138</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* nothing remains except to close the negotiations.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This was very American and very final. Washington answered:
+&ldquo;Your proposed action approved.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>November 29th, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Spanish Commissioners at to-day&rsquo;s conference
+presented a definite and final acceptance of our last proposition.</p>
+</div>
+<p>And that is how that twenty millions found its way into the
+treaty&mdash;not forgetting the prayers and other contemporaneous
+activities of Archbishop Chapelle.</p>
+<p>After the tremendous eight weeks&rsquo; tension had relaxed, and
+before the final reduction to writing of all the details, we see this
+dear little telegram, from Secretary of State Hay, himself a writer of
+note, come bravely paddling into port, where it was cordially received
+by both sides, taken in out of the wet, and put under the shelter of
+the treaty:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Mr. Hay to Mr. Day: In renewing conventional
+arrangements do not lose sight of copyright agreement.</p>
+</div>
+<p>And here is the last act of the drama:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Mr. Day to Mr. Hay, Paris, December 10, 1898: Treaty
+signed at 8.50 this evening.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb139" href="#pb139" name=
+"pb139">139</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3242" href="#xd20e3242src" name="xd20e3242">1</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898&ndash;9,
+p. 283.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3284" href="#xd20e3284src" name="xd20e3284">2</a></span> Hon.
+Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, now
+(1912) President of the National City Bank, New York, in the <i>Century
+Magazine</i>, August, 1898.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3307" href="#xd20e3307src" name="xd20e3307">3</a></span> <i>S. D.
+148</i>, p. 15.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3335" href="#xd20e3335src" name="xd20e3335">4</a></span> <i>Navy
+Department Report</i> for 1898, Appendix, p. 122.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3369" href="#xd20e3369src" name="xd20e3369">5</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 148</i>, p. 19.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3573" href="#xd20e3573src" name="xd20e3573">6</a></span> Chairman
+of the Spanish Commission.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3583" href="#xd20e3583src" name="xd20e3583">7</a></span> Meaning
+evidently payment of some of Spain&rsquo;s debts with money she could
+probably get from us for the asking, as a matter of sympathy for the
+fellow who is &ldquo;down and out.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3590" href="#xd20e3590src" name="xd20e3590">8</a></span> Mr.
+McKinley had before that sent word significantly that he was not
+unmindful of the distressing financial embarrassments of Spain.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch8" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter VIII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">Prometheus stole the heavenly fire from the altar of
+Jupiter to benefit mankind, and Jupiter thereupon punished both
+Prometheus and the rest of mankind by creating and giving to them the
+woman Pandora, a supposed blessing but a real curse. Pandora brought
+along a box of blessings, and when she opened it, everything flew out
+and away but Hope.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><i>Tales from &AElig;schylus.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">The ever-memorable Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation, the Pandora box of Philippine woes, was signed December
+21, 1898, and its contents were let loose in the Philippines on January
+1, 1899.</p>
+<p>Let us consider for a moment the total misapprehension of conditions
+in the islands under which Mr. McKinley drafted and signed that famous
+document&mdash;a misapprehension due to General Otis&rsquo;s curious
+blindness to the great vital fact of the situation, viz., that the
+Filipinos were bent on independence from the first, and preparing to
+fight for it to the last. Take the following Otis utterance, for
+example, concerning a date when practically everybody in the Eighth
+Army Corps, and every newspaper correspondent in the Philippines,
+recognized that war would be certain in the event the Paris Peace
+negotiations should result, as common rumor then said they would
+result, in our taking over the islands:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory
+solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb140" href="#pb140" name=
+"pb140">140</a>]</span>from a despatch sent to Washington on December
+7th, wherein I stated that conditions were improving, and that there
+were signs of revolutionary disintegration.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3659src" href="#xd20e3659" name="xd20e3659src">1</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>There can be no doubt that, at the date of that despatch, General
+Otis had been given to understand that under the Treaty of Paris we
+were going to keep the islands <i>if</i> the treaty should be ratified,
+and also that the <i>if</i> might give the Administration trouble,
+should trouble arise with the Filipinos before the <i>if</i> was
+disposed of at home. As heretofore intimated, in addition to his
+preference for legal and administrative work to the work of his
+profession, in the Philippines General Otis constituted himself from
+the beginning a political henchman. Ample evidence will be introduced
+later on to show beyond all doubt that all through the early
+difficulties, when the American people should have been frankly dealt
+with and given the facts, General Otis would, in the exercise of his
+military powers as press censor, always say to the war correspondents,
+&ldquo;I will let nothing go that will hurt the
+Administration.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Let us see what the real facts of the Philippine situation were at
+the date of the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, or, which is the same
+thing, when General Otis sent his despatch of December 7th. When the
+Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of Manila
+and Cavite, with less than 20,000 men under his command, and Aguinaldo
+was in possession of practically all the rest of the archipelago, with
+between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, and
+the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the army of their
+country. We have already seen the conditions in the various provinces
+at that time and also the inauguration of the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb141" href="#pb141" name=
+"pb141">141</a>]</span>native central government. Let us now examine
+the military figures.</p>
+<p>Ten thousand American soldiers were on hand when Manila was
+captured, August 13th, and 5000 more had arrived under command of
+Major-General Elwell S. Otis a week or so after the fall of the
+city.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3682src" href="#xd20e3682" name=
+"xd20e3682src">2</a> They had 13,000 Spanish soldiers to guard. In
+addition to this, by the terms of the capitulation, the city
+(population say 300,000), its inhabitants, its churches and educational
+establishments, and its private property of all descriptions had been
+placed &ldquo;under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the
+American army.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="n169.2src" href="#n169.2"
+name="n169.2src">3</a> Some 4500 to 5000 more troops began to swarm out
+of San Francisco bound for Manila in the latter part of October, 1898,
+the last of them reaching Manila December 11th, the day after the
+Treaty of Paris was signed. After that there were no further additions
+to General Otis&rsquo;s command prior to the outbreak of war with the
+Filipinos, February 4, 1899.<a class="pseudonoteref" href=
+"#n169.2">3</a> Of these (approximately) 20,000 men, only 1500 to 2000
+were regulars, having the Krag-Jorgensen smokeless gun. The rest were
+State volunteers, armed with the antiquated Springfield rifles, the
+same the 71st New York and the 2d Massachusetts had been permitted to
+carry into the Santiago campaign the summer before. Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+people were equipped entirely with Mausers captured from the Spaniards,
+and other rifles, bought in Hong Kong mostly, using smokeless
+ammunition. Major (now Major-General) J. F. Bell, who is, in the
+judgment of many, one of the best all-round soldiers in the American
+army to-day, was in charge of the &ldquo;Division of Military
+Information&rdquo; at Manila both before and after the taking of the
+city. General Bell <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb142" href="#pb142"
+name="pb142">142</a>]</span>has done many fine things, in the way of
+reckless bravery in battle at the critical moment and of bold
+reconnoitring in campaign, and what he fails to find out about an
+enemy, or a prospective enemy, is not apt to be ascertainable. In a
+report bearing date August 29, 1898,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3697src" href="#xd20e3697" name="xd20e3697src">4</a> prepared in
+anticipation of possible trouble with the Filipinos, he estimated the
+number of men under arms that Aguinaldo had at between 35,000 and
+40,000. This estimate is based by General Bell in his report on the
+number of guns out in the hands of the Filipinos, which he figures
+thus:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Captured from Spanish militia</td>
+<td>12,500</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>From Cavite arsenal</td>
+<td>2,500</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>From Jackson &amp; Evans (American merchants trading with Hong
+Kong)</td>
+<td>2,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>From Spanish (captured in battle)</td>
+<td>8,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>In hands of Filipinos previous to May 1, 1898</td>
+<td>15,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">40,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>From this number General Bell deducts several thousands as having
+been recaptured by the Spaniards, or bought in. I at once hear some
+former comrade-in-arms of the Philippine insurrection say: &ldquo;Oh,
+no. They couldn&rsquo;t have had as many as 40,000 guns, or near
+that.&rdquo; I thought the same thing when I first read General
+Bell&rsquo;s report on the matter. But he removes the doubt thus:
+&ldquo;They are being continually sent away to other
+provinces.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>We did not understand Aguinaldo&rsquo;s movements then. All his
+troops were not around Manila. From what I learned from General Lawton
+and his staff in 1899, my belief is that Aguinaldo had perhaps 30,000
+men with guns around Manila, and out along the railroad, at
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb143" href="#pb143" name=
+"pb143">143</a>]</span>the time of the outbreak of February 4th. It is
+idle, of course, at this late date, to claim that the Filipinos were
+not bent on independence from the first. The matured plans of their
+leaders, formulated at Hong Kong May 4, 1898, before they ever started
+the insurrection, preserved in the captured minutes of the meeting
+already noticed,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3741src" href="#xd20e3741"
+name="xd20e3741src">5</a> provide the programme to be adopted in the
+event we should be tempted to keep the islands. In that event, they
+were prepared against surprise, or any necessity for making new plans,
+and were agreed to accept war as inevitable. From the first, they made
+ready for it.</p>
+<p>Governmentally and strategically, the Philippine Islands, except
+Mohammedan Mindanao, which is a separate and distinct problem, may be
+described very simply and sufficiently as consisting of the great
+island of Luzon, on which Manila is situated, and the Visayan
+group.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3749src" href="#xd20e3749" name=
+"xd20e3749src">6</a> We are already familiar with the conditions in
+Luzon in December, 1898. You hear a great deal about the Philippine
+archipelago consisting of a thousand and one islands, but there are
+only eight that are, broadly speaking, worth considering here. The
+moment a jagged submarine ledge peeps out of the water it becomes an
+island. And even before that it may wreck a ship. But we are talking
+about islands that need to be charted on the sea of world politics. The
+Visayan Islands that really count at all in a great problem such as
+that we are now considering, are but six in number: Panay, capital
+Iloilo; Cebu, capital Cebu; Bohol, Negros, Samar, and Leyte.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e3753src" href="#xd20e3753" name="xd20e3753src">7</a>
+Iloilo is <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb144" href="#pb144" name=
+"pb144">144</a>]</span>some three hundred and odd miles south of
+Manila, and, besides being the capital of Panay, is the chief port of
+the Visayas and the second city of the archipelago, Cebu being the
+third. Under the Spaniards, as now under us, a vessel might clear from
+either of these places for any part of the world. As we saw in the
+chapter preceding this, as early as November 18th, Admiral Dewey had
+cabled Washington that the entire island of Panay was in possession of
+insurgents, except Iloilo. By the end of December, all the Spanish
+garrisons in the Visayan Islands had surrendered to the insurgents.
+(<i>Otis&rsquo;s Report</i>, p. 61.) Iloilo did not surrender to the
+insurgents until the day before Christmas. But let us not
+anticipate.</p>
+<p>December 13th, General Otis received a petition for protection
+signed by the business men and firms of Iloilo (p. 54), sent of course
+with the approval of the general commanding the imperilled Spanish
+garrison. December 14th, he wired Washington for instructions as to
+what action he should take on this petition, saying, among other
+things, &ldquo;Spanish authorities are still holding out, but <i>will
+receive</i> American troops&rdquo;; and adding one of his inevitable
+notes of optimism as to the tameness of Filipino aspirations (at
+Iloilo) for independence: &ldquo;Insurgents reported favorable to
+American annexation.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>General Otis knew the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the
+insurgents down at Iloilo, and eagerly awaited a reply. President
+McKinley was then away from Washington, on a southern trip, to Atlanta
+and Macon, Georgia, and other points, and nobody at home was giving any
+thought to the Filipinos, while they were knocking successively at the
+gates of the various Visayan capitals, and receiving the surrender of
+their Spanish defenders. It was getting toward the yuletide
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb145" href="#pb145" name=
+"pb145">145</a>]</span>season. President McKinley was engaged, quite
+seasonably, in putting the finishing touches to the great work of his
+life, which was welding the North and the South together forever by
+wise and kindly manipulation of the countless opportunities to do so
+presented by the latest war. It was a season of general peace and
+rejoicing in a thrice-blessed land, and nobody in the United States was
+looking for trouble with the Filipinos. With our people it was a case
+of ignorance being bliss, so far as the Philippine Islands and their
+inhabitants were concerned. In his <i>Autobiography of Seventy
+Years</i>, Senator Hoar tells of an interview with President McKinley
+concerning his (the Senator&rsquo;s) attitude toward the Treaty of
+Paris, early in December, 1898.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3777src"
+href="#xd20e3777" name="xd20e3777src">8</a> &ldquo;He greeted me with
+the delightful and affectionate cordiality which I always found in him.
+He took me by the hand, and said: &lsquo;How are you feeling this
+winter, Mr. Senator?&rsquo; I was determined there should be no
+misunderstanding. I replied at once: &lsquo;Pretty pugnacious, I
+confess, Mr. President.&rsquo; The tears came into his eyes and he
+said, grasping my hand again: &lsquo;I shall always love you whatever
+you do.&rsquo;&rdquo;</p>
+<p>It behooves this nation, and all nations, to consider those tears.
+They explain all the subsequent history of the Philippines to date. Mr.
+McKinley had proved himself a gallant soldier in his youth, and he knew
+something of the horrors of war. He was also one of the most amiable
+gentlemen that ever lived. But it is no disrespect to his memory to say
+that while Mr. McKinley was a good man, Senator Hoar was his superior
+in moral fibre, and he knew it, and he knew the country knew it. He
+knew that Senator Hoar was going to fight the ratification of the
+treaty to the last ditch, speaking for the Rights of Man and such old
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb146" href="#pb146" name=
+"pb146">146</a>]</span>&ldquo;worn out formul&aelig;,&rdquo; and that
+his only defence before the bar of history would have to rest on
+&ldquo;Trade Expansion,&rdquo; alias the &ldquo;Almighty Dollar.&rdquo;
+Those tears were harbingers of the coming strife in the Philippines.
+They were shed for such lives as that strife might cost. They were an
+assumption of responsibility for such shedding of blood as the treaty
+might entail. The President returned to Washington from his southern
+trip on December 21st, and on December 23d (p. 55) cabled General Otis
+the following reply to his request of December 14th for
+instructions:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Send necessary troops to Iloilo, to <i>preserve the
+peace</i> and protect life and property. <i>It is most important that
+there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory but
+firm.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>Senator Hoar had put Mr. McKinley on notice that he was going to
+present the ethics of the case in the debate on the treaty. Congress
+had gone home for the holidays, and after it re-assembled in January
+the treaty would come up. The vote was sure to be close, and a too
+vigorous manifestation of belief on the part of the Filipinos that this
+nation was <i>not</i> closing the war with Spain animated by &ldquo;the
+same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war&rdquo; (Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s instructions to the Peace Commissioners) might defeat
+the ratification of the treaty. Indeed, the final vote of February 6th,
+was so close that the Administration had but one vote to spare. The
+final vote was fifty-seven to twenty-seven&mdash;just one over the
+necessary two-thirds. The smoke of a battle to subjugate the Filipinos
+might &ldquo;dim the lustre and the moral strength,&rdquo; as Mr.
+McKinley had expressed it in his instructions to the Peace
+Commissioners, of a war to free the Cubans. Therefore there must be no
+trouble, at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb147" href="#pb147" name=
+"pb147">147</a>]</span>least until after the ratification of the
+treaty. President McKinley had invented in the case of Cuba a very
+catchy phrase, &ldquo;Forcible annexation would be criminal
+aggression,&rdquo; and every time anybody now quoted it on him it
+tended to take the wind out of his sails. So benevolently eager was
+that truly kind-hearted and Christian gentleman to avoid the appearance
+of &ldquo;criminal aggression&rdquo; that he evidently got to thinking
+about that telegram of December 23d in which he had authorized General
+Otis to send troops to the relief of the beleaguered Spanish garrison
+at Iloilo, and also about the message from Admiral Dewey received
+November 18th previous, to the effect that the entire island of Panay
+except Iloilo was then already in the hands of the insurgents. The
+result was that he decided not to let his conciliatory proclamation of
+December 21st await the slow process of the mails, and therefore,
+though it consisted of something like one thousand words, he had it
+cabled out to General Otis in full on December 27th. It is now here
+reproduced in full because it precipitated the war in the Philippines,
+and is the key to all our subsequent dealings with them<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e3800src" href="#xd20e3800" name=
+"xd20e3800src">9</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Executive Mansion,
+Washington</span>, December 21, 1898.</p>
+<p>The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the
+United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed
+by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces,
+practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb148" href="#pb148" name=
+"pb148">148</a>]</span>suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With
+the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and
+Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th
+instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, <i>the
+future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands
+are ceded to the United States</i>. In the fulfilment of the <i>rights
+of sovereignty</i> thus acquired and the responsible obligations of
+government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of
+the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately
+necessary, and the <i>military government</i> heretofore maintained by
+the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila <i>is to be
+extended</i> with all possible despatch <i>to the whole of the ceded
+territory</i>. In performing this duty the military commander of the
+United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the
+Philippine Islands that in <i>succeeding to the sovereignty of
+Spain</i>, in severing the former political relations, and in
+establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States
+is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the
+people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private
+rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the
+forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner
+that <i>we come</i> not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends,
+<i>to protect</i> the natives in their homes, in their employments, and
+in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by
+active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the Government of
+the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will
+receive the reward of its support and <i>protection</i>. All others
+will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness
+if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. Within the
+absolute domain of <i>military authority</i>, which necessarily is and
+<i>must remain supreme</i> in the ceded territory until the legislation
+of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the
+territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression
+of crime are to be considered as continuing <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb149" href="#pb149" name="pb149">149</a>]</span>in
+force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as
+practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be
+performed by such officers as may accept <i>the supremacy of the United
+States</i> by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as
+far as practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands. While the
+control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes
+with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means
+of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the
+United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or
+corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The
+taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late
+government become payable to the authorities of the United States
+unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or
+modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or
+local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid
+for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in
+cash is not practicable, receipts are to be given. All ports and places
+in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and
+naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all
+friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military
+reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted
+upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at
+the time of their importation. Finally, it should be the earnest wish
+and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence,
+respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by
+assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual
+rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by
+proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of</p>
+<p>BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION</p>
+<p>substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.
+In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb150" href="#pb150" name="pb150">150</a>]</span>the
+temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the
+governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of
+authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the
+bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people
+of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">William McKinley.</span></p>
+</div>
+<p>The words used in the foregoing proclamation which were regarded by
+the Filipinos as &ldquo;fighting words,&rdquo; <i>i. e.</i>, as making
+certain the long anticipated probability of a war for independence, are
+those which appear in italics. The rest of the proclamation counted for
+nothing with them. They had been used to the hollow rhetoric and
+flowery promises of equally eloquent Spanish proclamations all their
+lives, they and their fathers before them.</p>
+<p>In suing to President McKinley for peace on July 22d, previous, the
+Prime Minister of Spain had justified all the atrocities committed and
+permitted by his government in Cuba during the thirty years&rsquo;
+struggle for independence there which preceded the Spanish-American War
+by saying that what Spain had done had been prompted only by a
+&ldquo;desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature
+independence.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3880src" href=
+"#xd20e3880" name="xd20e3880src">10</a></p>
+<p>Clearly, from the Filipino point of view, the United States was now
+determined &ldquo;to spare them from the dangers of premature
+independence,&rdquo; using such force as might be necessary for the
+accomplishment of that pious purpose.</p>
+<p>The truth is that, Prometheus-like, we stole the sacred fire from
+the altar of Freedom whereupon the flames of the Spanish War were
+kindled, and gave it to the Filipinos, justifying the means by the end;
+and &ldquo;the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb151" href="#pb151" name=
+"pb151">151</a>]</span>links of the lame Lemnian&rdquo; have been
+festering in our flesh ever since. The Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation was a kind of Pandora Box, supposed to contain all the
+blessings of Liberty, but when the lid was taken off, woes innumerable
+befell the intended beneficiaries, and left them only the Hope of
+Freedom&mdash;from us. Verily there is nothing new under the sun. It is
+written: &ldquo;Thou shalt not steal&rdquo; anything&mdash;not even
+&ldquo;sacred fire.&rdquo; There is no such thing as nimble morality.
+The lesson of the old Greek poet fits our case. So also, indeed, do
+those of the modern sage, Maeterlinck, for the Filipinos could have
+found their own Bluebird for happiness. The record of our experience in
+the Philippines is full of reminders, which will multiply as the years
+go by, that, after all, every people have an &ldquo;unalienable
+right&rdquo; to pursue happiness <i>in their own way</i> as opposed to
+<i>somebody else&rsquo;s way</i>. That is the law of God, as God gives
+me to see the right. Conceived during the Christmas holiday season and
+in the spirit of that blessed season and presented to the Filipino
+people on New Year&rsquo;s Day, received by them practically as a
+declaration of war and baptized in the blood of thousands of them in
+the battle of February 4th thereafter, the manner of the reception of
+this famous document, the initial reversal and subsequent evolution of
+its policies, and all the lights and shadows of Benevolent Assimilation
+will be traced in the chapters which follow. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb152" href="#pb152" name="pb152">152</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3659" href="#xd20e3659src" name="xd20e3659">1</a></span>
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report for 1899</i>, p. 43.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3682" href="#xd20e3682src" name="xd20e3682">2</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n169.2"
+href="#n169.2src" name="n169.2">3</a></span> <i>Ib.</i>, pt. 2, p.
+75.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3697" href="#xd20e3697src" name="xd20e3697">4</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, p. 379.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3741" href="#xd20e3741src" name="xd20e3741">5</a></span>
+Published at page 7 of <i>Senate Document 208</i>, pt. 2, 56th
+Congress, 1st Session (1900).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3749" href="#xd20e3749src" name="xd20e3749">6</a></span> Called
+in Spanish &ldquo;Visayas,&rdquo; or Bisayas. Visayas is an adjective
+derived from the name of the Bay of Biscay, &ldquo;b&rdquo; and
+&ldquo;v&rdquo; being interchangeable in Spanish.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3753" href="#xd20e3753src" name="xd20e3753">7</a></span> For a
+fuller description of the archipelago, see <a href="#ch12">Chapter
+XII</a>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3777" href="#xd20e3777src" name="xd20e3777">8</a></span> Vol.
+ii., p. 315.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3800" href="#xd20e3800src" name="xd20e3800">9</a></span> This
+proclamation has been printed many times, in various government
+publications, <i>e.g.</i>, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i.,
+pt. 4, pp. 355&ndash;6; <i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Congress, 1st
+Session (1900), pp. 82&ndash;3, etc.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3880" href="#xd20e3880src" name="xd20e3880">10</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, p.
+272.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch9" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter IX</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Iloilo Fiasco</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The King of France with forty thousand men</p>
+<p class="line">Marched up the hill and then marched down again.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Old English Ballad.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">We have already seen how busily Aguinaldo occupied
+himself during the protracted peace negotiations at Paris in getting
+his government and people ready for the struggle for independence which
+he early and shrewdly guessed would be ultimately forthcoming. General
+Otis was in no position to preserve the <i>status quo</i>. The
+<i>status quo</i> was a worm in hot ashes that would not stay still.
+The revolution was a snow-ball that <i>would</i> roll. The day after
+Christmas, General Otis at last sent an expedition under General Marcus
+P. Miller to the relief of Iloilo, but when it arrived, December 28th,
+the Spaniards had already turned the town over to the insurgent
+authorities, and sailed away. When General Miller arrived, being under
+imperative orders from Washington to be conciliatory, and under no
+circumstances to have a clash with the insurgents, the
+Administration&rsquo;s most earnest solicitude being to avoid a clash,
+at least until the treaty of peace with Spain should be ratified by the
+United States Senate, he courteously <i>asked permission</i> to land,
+several times, being refused each time. With a request of this sort
+sent ashore January 1, 1899, he transmitted <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb153" href="#pb153" name="pb153">153</a>]</span>a
+copy of the proclamation set forth in the preceding chapter. The
+insurgent reply defiantly forbade him to land. Therefore he did not
+land&mdash;because Washington was pulling the strings&mdash;until after
+the treaty was ratified. &ldquo;So here we are at Iloilo, an exploded
+bluff,&rdquo; wrote war correspondent J. F. Bass to his paper,
+<i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>.</p>
+<p>By the time the treaty was ratified the battle of Manila of February
+4th had occurred, and the pusillanimity of self-doubting diplomacy had
+given way to the red honesty of war.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3935src" href="#xd20e3935" name="xd20e3935src">1</a></p>
+<p>As was noticed in the chapter preceding this, by the end of
+December, 1898, all military stations outside Luzon, with the exception
+of Zamboanga, in the extreme south of the great Mohammedan island of
+Mindanao near Borneo, had been turned over by the Spaniards to the
+insurgents. When General Miller, commanding the expedition to Iloilo,
+arrived in the harbor of that city with his teeming troop-ships and
+naval escorts on December 28th, an aide of the Filipino commanding
+general came aboard the boat he was on and &ldquo;desired to
+know,&rdquo; says General Miller&rsquo;s report,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3940src" href="#xd20e3940" name="xd20e3940src">2</a> &ldquo;if we
+had anything against them&mdash;were we going to interfere with
+them.&rdquo; General Miller then sent some of his own aides ashore with
+a letter to the insurgent authorities, explaining the peaceful nature
+of his errand. They at once asked if our people had brought down any
+instructions from Aguinaldo. Answering in the negative, General
+Miller&rsquo;s aides handed them his olive-branch letter. They read it
+and said they could do nothing without orders from Aguinaldo &ldquo;in
+cases <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb154" href="#pb154" name=
+"pb154">154</a>]</span>affecting their Federal Government.&rdquo; The
+grim veteran commanding the American troops smoked on this for a day or
+so, and then asked a delegation of insurgents that were visiting his
+ship by his invitation&mdash;they would not let him land, you
+see&mdash;whether if he landed they would meet him with armed
+resistance. The Malay reverence for the relation of host and guest
+resulted in an evasive reply. They could not answer. But after they
+went back to the city they did answer. And this is what they wrote:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Upon the return of your commissioners last night, we
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* discussed the situation and attitude of this region of
+Bisayas in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central
+government of Luzon (the Aguinaldo government, of course); and
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction
+with the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our
+pretension <i>not to consent *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to any foreign
+interference without express orders from the central government of
+Luzon *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* with which we are one in ideas, as we have been
+until now in sacrifices</i>. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* If you insist
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* upon disembarking your forces, this is our final
+attitude. <i>May God forgive you, etc.</i>&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="dateline">Iloilo, December 30, 1898.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3958src" href="#xd20e3958" name="xd20e3958src">3</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This letter is recited in General Miller&rsquo;s report to be from
+&ldquo;President Lopez, of the Federal Government of Visayas.&rdquo;
+General Miller then wrote Otis begging permission to attack on the
+ground that upon the success of the expedition he was in charge of
+&ldquo;depends the future speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements
+in the islands.&rdquo; War correspondent Bass, who was on the ground at
+the time, also wrote his paper: &ldquo;The effect on the natives will
+be incalculable all over the islands.&rdquo; But General Otis was
+trying to help <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb155" href="#pb155" name=
+"pb155">155</a>]</span>Mr. McKinley nurse the treaty through the Senate
+on the idea that there weren&rsquo;t going to be any
+&ldquo;insurrectionary movements in the islands,&rdquo; that all dark
+and misguided conspiracies of selfishly ambitious leaders looking to
+such impious ends would fade before the sunlight of Benevolent
+Assimilation.</p>
+<p>Cautioning Otis against any clash at Iloilo, Mr. McKinley wired
+January 9th: &ldquo;Conflict would be most unfortunate, considering the
+present. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Time given the insurgents cannot injure us,
+and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent
+purpose, etc.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3969src" href=
+"#xd20e3969" name="xd20e3969src">4</a></p>
+<p>The Iloilo fiasco did indeed furnish to the insurgent cause aid and
+comfort at the psychologic moment when it most needed encouragement to
+bring things to a head. It presented a spectacle of vacillation and
+seeming cowardice which heartened the timid among the insurgents and
+started among them a general eagerness for war which had been lacking
+before. In one of his bulletins<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3976src"
+href="#xd20e3976" name="xd20e3976src">5</a> to Otis, General Miller
+tells of two boats&rsquo; crews of the 51st Iowa landing on January
+5th, and being met by a force of armed natives who &ldquo;asked them
+their business and warned them off,&rdquo; whereupon they heeded the
+warning and returned to their transport. This regiment had then been
+cooped up on their transport continuously since leaving San Francisco
+November 3d, previous, sixty-three days. They were kept lying off
+Iloilo until January 29th, and then brought back to Manila and landed,
+after eighty-nine days aboard ship, all idea of taking Iloilo before
+the Senate should act having been abandoned.</p>
+<p>The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was received by cable in
+cipher, at Manila, December 29th, and as soon as it had been written
+out in long hand <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb156" href="#pb156"
+name="pb156">156</a>]</span>General Otis hurried a copy down to General
+Miller at Iloilo by a ship sailing that day, so that General Miller
+might &ldquo;understand the position and policy of our
+government.&rdquo; But he forgot to tell Miller to conceal the policy
+for the present.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3985src" href="#xd20e3985"
+name="xd20e3985src">6</a> So the latter, on January 1st, not only sent
+a copy of it to the &ldquo;President of the Federal Government of
+Visayas,&rdquo; Mr. Lopez,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e3991src" href=
+"#xd20e3991" name="xd20e3991src">7</a> but <i>in the note of
+transmittal</i> he &ldquo;asked,&rdquo; says his report, &ldquo;that
+they <i>permit</i> the entry of my troops.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4003src" href="#xd20e4003" name="xd20e4003src">8</a> What a fatal
+mistake! Here was a proclamation representing all the &ldquo;majesty,
+dominion, and power&rdquo; of the American Government, signed by the
+President of the United States, in terms asserting immediate, absolute,
+and supreme authority, and the natives were &ldquo;asked&rdquo; if they
+would &ldquo;permit&rdquo; its enforcement. General Miller&rsquo;s
+report says that he also had the proclamation &ldquo;translated into
+Spanish and distributed to the people.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4008src" href="#xd20e4008" name="xd20e4008src">9</a> &ldquo;The
+people laugh at it,&rdquo; he says. &ldquo;The insurgents call us
+cowards and are fortifying at the point of the peninsula, and are
+mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are
+intrenching everywhere, are bent on having one fight, and are confident
+of victory. <i>The longer we wait before the attack the harder it will
+be to put down the insurrection.</i>&rdquo; This is especially
+interesting in the light of President McKinley&rsquo;s justification of
+the wisdom of temporizing&mdash;on the idea that delay would weaken the
+insurgents and could not hurt us. &ldquo;<i>Let no one convince
+you</i>,&rdquo; writes Miller to Otis on January 5th, &ldquo;that
+peaceful means can settle the difficulty here.&rdquo; <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb157" href="#pb157" name="pb157">157</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The appeal to Otis to permit commencement of operations was without
+avail. Otis was the Manila agent of the Aldrich Old Guard in the
+Senate, in charge of the pending treaty. He would simply send the
+disgusted Miller messages not to be hasty, assuring him that the firing
+of a shot at Iloilo would mean the precipitation of general conflict
+about Manila and all over the place, and that this would be &ldquo;most
+disappointing to the President of the United States, who continually
+urges extreme caution and no conflict.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4022src" href="#xd20e4022" name="xd20e4022src">10</a></p>
+<p>The Administration was counting senatorial noses at the time, and
+that its anxiety was justified is apparent from the fact already noted,
+that on the final vote whereby the treaty was ratified it had but one
+vote to spare. So General Miller sat sunning himself on the deck of his
+transport, and watching the insurgents working like ants at their
+fortifications, and vainly wishing his 2500 men could get ashore at
+least long enough to stretch themselves a bit. John F. Bass,
+correspondent for <i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>, left Iloilo, returned
+to Manila, and wrote his paper on January 23d: &ldquo;I returned to
+Manila well knowing that there was nothing more to be done in Iloilo
+until the Senate voted on the Treaty of Peace.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>On the eighth day after General Miller had asked permission of the
+Iloilo village Hampdens to enforce the orders of the President of the
+United States, the &ldquo;Federal Government of the Visayas,&rdquo;
+through its President, Se&ntilde;or Lopez, finally deigned to notice
+Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s proclamation. It said under date of January
+9th:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">General: We have the high honor of having received
+your message, dated January 1st, of this year, enclosing <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb158" href="#pb158" name=
+"pb158">158</a>]</span>letter of President McKinley. You say in one
+clause of your message: &ldquo;As indicated in the President&rsquo;s
+cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants of the island of
+Panay ought to obey the political authority of the United States, and
+they will incur a grave responsibility if, after deliberating, they
+decide to resist said authority.&rdquo; So the council of state of this
+region of Visayas are, at this present moment, between the authority of
+the United States, that you try to impose on us, and the authority of
+the central government of Malolos.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Then follows this remarkable statement of the case for the
+Filipinos:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The supposed authority of the United States began with
+the Treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. <i>The authority of
+the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural
+bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, (and)
+sacrifices.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e4047src" href="#xd20e4047"
+name="xd20e4047src">11</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>General Otis was fond of throwing cold water on any particularly
+eloquent Filipino <i>insurrecto</i> document he had occasion to put in
+his reports by saying that Mabini was &ldquo;the brains of&rdquo; the
+Malolos Government&mdash;meaning the only brains it had<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e4057src" href="#xd20e4057" name=
+"xd20e4057src">12</a>&mdash;and that he probably wrote such document,
+whatever it might be. But here is a piece of real eloquence,
+originating away down in the Visayan Islands, as far away from Malolos
+as Colonel Stark and his &ldquo;Green Mountain Boys&rdquo; were from
+Washington and Hamilton in 1776 and after. What then is the explanation
+of composition so forceful in its <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb159"
+href="#pb159" name="pb159">159</a>]</span>impassioned simplicity, and
+in the light of subsequent events, so pathetic? There is but one
+explanation. It came from the heart. It was the cry of the Soul of
+Humanity seeking its natural affiliations. It was the language of what
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s early state papers always used to call the
+&ldquo;legitimate aspirations of&rdquo; his people&mdash;legitimate
+aspirations which we later strangled. The reason of the writer&rsquo;s
+earnestness is that a few months later he helped do some of the
+strangling. Thirteen years afterwards, a thorough acquaintance with the
+Filipino side of the matter, derived from an examination of the
+information which has been gradually accumulated and published by our
+government during that time, causes him to say, &ldquo;Father forgive
+me, for I knew not what I did.&rdquo; The 35,000 volunteers of 1899
+knew nothing about the Filipinos or their side of the case. We were
+like the deputy sheriff who goes out with a warrant duly issued to
+arrest a man charged with unlawful breach of the peace. It is not his
+business to inquire whether the man is guilty or not. If the man
+resists arrest, he takes the consequences.</p>
+<p>On the second day after the above defiance of the President of the
+United States was served up to General Miller, that gallant officer
+having dutifully swallowed it, sent an officer ashore on a diplomatic
+mission. The name and rank of this military ambassador were Acting
+Assistant Surgeon Henry DuR. Phelan, who clearly appears to have been a
+man of keen insight and considerable ability. His written report to
+General Miller of what transpired is a document of permanent interest
+and importance to the annals of men&rsquo;s struggles for free
+institutions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4064src" href="#xd20e4064"
+name="xd20e4064src">13</a> It states that at the meeting the spokesman
+of the Filipinos, Attorney Raimundo Melliza, began by saying that
+&ldquo;all the Americans <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb160" href=
+"#pb160" name="pb160">160</a>]</span>owned was Manila.&rdquo; That was
+unquestionably true, so our ambassador, it seems, did not gainsay it.
+Dr. Phelan suggested that the Americans had sacrificed lives and money
+in destroying the power of Spain. The spokesman, Attorney Melliza,
+replied that &ldquo;<i>they also</i> had made great sacrifice in lives,
+<i>and that they had a right to their country</i> which they had fought
+for, and that we are here now to take from them what they had won by
+fighting; <i>that they had been our allies, and we had used them as
+such</i>.&rdquo; Dr. Phelan&rsquo;s report goes on to say: &ldquo;I
+replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time,
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and that as soon as order was assured it would be
+withdrawn *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. <i>They smiled at this.</i>&rdquo; Well they
+might. Fourteen years have elapsed since then, and the law-making power
+of the United States has never yet declared whether the American
+occupation of the Philippine Islands is to be temporary, like our
+occupation of Cuba was, or permanent, like the British occupation of
+Egypt is. True, Dr. Phelan said &ldquo;military&rdquo; occupation, but
+the smile was provoked by the suggestion of <i>temporariness</i>. After
+the committee smiled, they remarked:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have fought for independence and feel that we have
+the power of governing and need no assistance. <i>We are showing it
+now. You might inquire of the foreigners if it is not so.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>Dr. Phelan&rsquo;s report proceeds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">They stated that their orders were not to allow us to
+disembark, and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without
+express orders from their government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In regard to the Treaty of Paris, the spokesman, Lawyer Melliza,
+said: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb161" href="#pb161" name=
+"pb161">161</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">International law forbids a nation to make a contract
+in regard to taking the liberties of its colonies.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Lawyer Melliza was wrong. If he had said &ldquo;the law of
+righteousness,&rdquo; instead of &ldquo;international law,&rdquo; his
+proposition, thus amended, would have been incontrovertible. On
+September 19, 1911, one of the great newspapers of this country, the
+<i>Denver Post</i>, sent out to the members of the Congress of the
+United States, and to &ldquo;The Fourth Estate&rdquo; also, the
+newspaper editors, a circular letter proposing that we sell the
+Philippine Islands to Japan. A member of the United States Senate sent
+this answer:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I do not favor your proposition. Selling the Islands
+means selling the inhabitants. The question of traffic in human beings,
+whether by wholesale or retail, was forever settled by the Civil
+War.</p>
+</div>
+<p>About the same time a leading daily paper of Georgia had an
+editorial on the <i>Denver Post&rsquo;s</i> proposition, the most
+conspicuous feature of which was that <i>Japan was too poor to pay us
+well</i>, should we contemplate selling the Filipinos to her, so it was
+no use to discuss the matter at length.</p>
+<p>No; Lawyer Melliza&rsquo;s proposition has no standing in
+international law <i>yet</i>. But it has with what Mr. Lincoln&rsquo;s
+First Inaugural called &ldquo;the better angels of our nature,&rdquo;
+if we stop to reflect.</p>
+<p>Another interesting feature of the Phelan report to General Miller
+is the following:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could
+occupy the city would they agree to it. He replied most emphatically
+that they would.</p>
+</div>
+<p>At that time, in January, 1899, while the debate on the treaty was
+in progress in the United States Senate, <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb162" href="#pb162" name="pb162">162</a>]</span>there was hardly a
+province in that archipelago where you would not have encountered the
+same inflexible adherence to the Aguinaldo government.</p>
+<p>Dr. Phelan&rsquo;s report closes thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that as
+this question <i>involved the integrity of the entire republic</i>, it
+could not be further discussed here, but must be referred to the
+Malolos Government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>There is one other statement made by the spokesman of the Filipinos,
+at their meeting with Dr. Phelan, which arrested and gripped my
+attention. That it may interest the reader as it did me, it will need
+but a word or so as preface. In the fall of that same year, 1899, when
+my regiment, the 29th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reached the Islands,
+it was supposed that the insurrection had about played out,
+<i>i.e.</i>, that it had been &ldquo;beaten to a frazzle,&rdquo;
+because the Filipinos no longer offered to do battle in force in the
+open. Yet all that fall, and all through 1900 and after, a most
+obstinate guerrilla warfare was kept up. Anywhere in the archipelago
+you were liable to be fired on from ambush. At first we could not
+understand this. Later we found out it was the result of an order of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s, faithfully carried out, not to assemble in large
+commands, but to conduct a systematic guerrilla warfare indefinitely.
+We learned this by capturing a copy of the order, which was quite
+elaborate. Dr. Phelan&rsquo;s report says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I told him [Melliza] that the city was in our power,
+and that we could destroy it at any time *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. Lawyer
+Melliza replied that he cared nothing about the city; that we could
+destroy it if we wished *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. &ldquo;<i>We will withdraw to
+the mountains and repeat the North American Indian warfare. You must
+not forget that.</i>&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb163" href="#pb163" name=
+"pb163">163</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Later, they did.</p>
+<p>On January 15th, General Otis wrote General Miller<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e4165src" href="#xd20e4165" name="xd20e4165src">14</a> again
+cautioning him against any clash at Iloilo, and saying of conditions at
+Manila and Malolos: &ldquo;The revolutionary government is <i>very
+anxious</i> for peaceful relations.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Three days later Senator Bacon saw the situation with clearer vision
+from the other side of the world than General Otis could see it under
+his nose, and said on the floor of the Senate on January 18th
+concerning the conditions at Manila and Malolos:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">While there is no declaration of war, while there is
+no avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other
+with such divers intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to
+ignite the magazines which is to explode.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4178src" href="#xd20e4178" name="xd20e4178src">15</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The spark was ignited on February 4, 1899, by a sentinel of the
+Nebraska regiment firing on some Filipino soldiers who disregarded his
+challenge to halt, and killing one of them. War once on, General Miller
+was directed on February 10th, after he had lain in Iloilo harbor for
+forty-four days, to take the city. So at last he gave written notice to
+the insurgents in Iloilo demanding the surrender of the city and
+garrison &ldquo;before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant&rdquo; and
+requesting them to give warning to all non-combatants.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e4186src" href="#xd20e4186" name=
+"xd20e4186src">16</a> Thereupon the insurgents set fire to the city and
+departed. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb164" href="#pb164" name=
+"pb164">164</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3935" href="#xd20e3935src" name="xd20e3935">1</a></span> The
+&ldquo;self-doubting&rdquo; lay in the doubt of the Administration as
+to whether its programme of conquest would or would not be ratified by
+the Senate. The &ldquo;pusillanimity&rdquo; lay, wholly unbeknown to
+Washington of course, in the estimate of us it produced among the
+Filipinos.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3940" href="#xd20e3940src" name="xd20e3940">2</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 62.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3958" href="#xd20e3958src" name="xd20e3958">3</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 64.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3969" href="#xd20e3969src" name="xd20e3969">4</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 79.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3976" href="#xd20e3976src" name="xd20e3976">5</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 67.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3985" href="#xd20e3985src" name="xd20e3985">6</a></span> &ldquo;I
+sent you the President&rsquo;s proclamation, not for publication, but
+for your information,&rdquo; wrote Otis to Miller after the latter had
+let the cat out of the bag. <i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e3991" href="#xd20e3991src" name="xd20e3991">7</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4003" href="#xd20e4003src" name="xd20e4003">8</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4008" href="#xd20e4008src" name="xd20e4008">9</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4022" href="#xd20e4022src" name="xd20e4022">10</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 59.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4047" href="#xd20e4047src" name="xd20e4047">11</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), pp.
+54&ndash;5.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4057" href="#xd20e4057src" name="xd20e4057">12</a></span> Colonel
+Enoch H. Crowder, General Otis&rsquo;s Judge Advocate, was &ldquo;the
+brains of&rdquo; the Otis government. But the difference between
+General Otis and Aguinaldo was that Aguinaldo always had the good sense
+to follow Mabini&rsquo;s advice, while Otis did not always follow
+Crowder&rsquo;s.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4064" href="#xd20e4064src" name="xd20e4064">13</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 56.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4165" href="#xd20e4165src" name="xd20e4165">14</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 208</i>, p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4178" href="#xd20e4178src" name="xd20e4178">15</a></span> See
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, January 18, 1899, p. 734.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4186" href="#xd20e4186src" name="xd20e4186">16</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, p. 59.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch10" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter X</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Otis and Aguinaldo (<i>Continued</i>)</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">A word spoken in due season, how good is it!</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Proverbs</span> xv., 23.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">In the last chapter we saw the d&eacute;but of the
+Benevolent Assimilation programme at Iloilo. We are now to observe it
+at Manila. General Otis says in his report for 1899<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e4212src" href="#xd20e4212" name="xd20e4212src">1</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">After fully considering the President&rsquo;s
+proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily
+discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United
+States Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain
+words and expressions therein, such as &ldquo;sovereignty,&rdquo;
+&ldquo;right of cession,&rdquo; and those which directed immediate
+occupation, etc., *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* which might be advantageously used by
+the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the
+natives. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be
+justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the
+United States Government would be clearly brought within the
+comprehension of the people.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Accordingly, he published a proclamation as indicated, on January
+4th, at Manila. In a less formal communication concerning this
+proclamation, viz., a letter <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb165" href=
+"#pb165" name="pb165">165</a>]</span>to General Miller at Iloilo,
+General Otis comes to the point more quickly thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">After some deliberation we put out one of our own
+which it was believed would suit the temper of the people.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e4228src" href="#xd20e4228" name=
+"xd20e4228src">2</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The only thing in the Otis proclamation specifically directed toward
+soothing &ldquo;the temper of the people&rdquo; was a hint that the
+United States would, under the government it was going to impose,
+&ldquo;appoint the representative men now forming the controlling
+element of the Filipinos to civil positions of responsibility and
+trust&rdquo; (p. 69). And this, far from soothing Filipino temper, was
+interpreted as an offer of a bribe if they would desert the cause of
+their country. The <i>bona fides</i> of the offer they did not doubt
+for a moment. In fact it caught a number of the more timid prominent
+men, especially the elderly ones of the ultraconservative element
+preferring submission to strife. But the younger and bolder spirits
+were faithful, many of them unto death, and all of them unto many
+battles and much &ldquo;hiking.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4238src" href="#xd20e4238" name="xd20e4238src">3</a></p>
+<p>General Otis&rsquo;s report goes on to tell how, about the middle of
+January, after he had published his sugar-coated edition of the
+presidential proclamation at Manila, it then at last occurred to him
+that General Miller might have published the original text of it in
+full at Iloilo, and, &ldquo;fearing that,&rdquo; says he, &ldquo;I
+again despatched Lieut. Col. Potter to Iloilo&rdquo;&mdash;evidently
+post-haste. But it appears that when the breathless Potter arrived, the
+lid was already off. The horse had left <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb166" href="#pb166" name="pb166">166</a>]</span>the stable and the
+door was open, as we saw in the preceding chapter. However, as the Otis
+report indicates in this connection (p. 67), copies of the original
+McKinley proclamation, as published in full at Iloilo by General
+Miller, were of course promptly forwarded by the insurgents at Iloilo
+to the insurgent government at Malolos. So all that General Otis got
+for his pains was detection in the attempt to conceal the <i>crucial
+words</i> asserting American sovereignty in plain English. He tells us
+himself that as soon as the Malolos people discovered the trick,
+&ldquo;it [the proclamation] became&rdquo;&mdash;in the light of the
+Otis doctoring&mdash;&ldquo;the object of venomous attack.&rdquo; His
+report was of course written long after all these matters occurred, but
+its language shows a total failure on the part of its author, even
+then, to understand the cause of the bitterness he denominates
+&ldquo;venom.&rdquo; This bitterness grew naturally out of what seemed
+to the Filipinos an evident purpose of the United States to take and
+keep the Islands and an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that
+purpose, as shown by the conspicuous discrepancies between the original
+text of the proclamation as published at Iloilo by General Miller, on
+January 1st, and the modified version of it given out by General Otis
+at Manila on January 4th. &ldquo;The ablest of the insurgent
+newspapers,&rdquo; says he (p. 69), &ldquo;which was now issued at
+Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* attacked
+the policy *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* as declared in the proclamation, and its
+assumption of sovereignty *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* with all the vigor of which
+he was capable.&rdquo; The nature of Editor Luna&rsquo;s philippics is
+not described by General Otis in detail, the only specific notion we
+get of them being from General Otis&rsquo;s echo of their tone, which,
+he tells us, was to the effect that &ldquo;everything tended simply to
+a change of masters.&rdquo; But in another part of the Otis
+<i>Report</i> (p. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb167" href="#pb167"
+name="pb167">167</a>]</span>163) we find an epistle written about that
+time by one partisan of the revolution to another, whose key-note,
+given in the following extracts, was doubtless in harmony with the Luna
+editorials:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We shall not have them (Filipinos enough to conduct a
+decent government) in 10, 20, or a 100 years, because the Yankees will
+never acknowledge the aptitude of an &ldquo;inferior&rdquo; race to
+govern the country. Do not dream that when American sovereignty is
+implanted in the country the American office-holders will give up.
+Never! If *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* it depends upon them to say whether the
+Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* they will never say it.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>Is not the American who pretends that he would have done anything
+but just what the Filipinos did, had he been in their place,
+<i>i.e.</i>, fought to the last ditch for the independence of his
+country, the rankest sort of a hypocrite? General Otis was a soldier,
+and his views may have been honestly colored by his environment. But
+how at this late date can any fair-minded man read the above extracts
+illustrative of the temper in which the Filipinos went to war with us
+without acknowledging the righteousness of the motives which impelled
+them?</p>
+<p>Aguinaldo promptly met General Otis&rsquo;s proclamation of January
+4th by a counter-proclamation put out the very next day, in which he
+indignantly protested against the United States assuming
+<i>sovereignty</i> over the Islands. &ldquo;Even the women,&rdquo; says
+General Otis (p. 70), &ldquo;in a document numerously signed by them,
+gave me to understand that after the men were all killed off they were
+prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence
+of their country.&rdquo; General Otis actually intended this last as a
+sly touch <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb168" href="#pb168" name=
+"pb168">168</a>]</span>of humor. But when we recollect Mr.
+Millet&rsquo;s description (<a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>. <i>ante</i>)
+of the women coming to the trenches and cooking rice for the men while
+the Filipinos were slowly drawing their cordon ever closer about the
+doomed Spanish garrison of Manila in July and August previous, fighting
+their way over the ground between them and the besieged main body of
+their ancient enemies inch by inch, while Admiral Dewey blockaded them
+by sea, General Otis&rsquo;s sly touch of humor loses some of its
+slyness. &ldquo;The insurgent army also,&rdquo; he says (p. 70),
+&ldquo;was especially affected *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and only awaited an
+opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United
+States troops *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* whom it had commenced to insult and
+charge with cowardice.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The benighted condition of the insurgents in this regard was
+directly traceable to the Iloilo fiasco. It was that, principally,
+which made the insurgents so foolishly over-confident and the
+subsequent slaughter of them so tremendous. Further on in his report
+General Otis says, with perceptible petulance, in summing up his case
+against the Filipinos:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The pretext that the United States was about to
+substitute itself for Spain *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* was resorted to and had its
+effect on the ignorant masses.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Speaking of his own modified version of the Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation, General Otis says (p. 76):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No sooner was it published than it brought out a
+virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the
+wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5th, issued the
+following</p>
+</div>
+<p>&mdash;giving the reply proclamation in full. No man can read the
+Otis report itself without feeling that if he, the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb169" href="#pb169" name=
+"pb169">169</a>]</span>reader, had been playing Aguinaldo&rsquo;s hand
+he would have played it exactly as Aguinaldo did. To General Otis the
+government at Malolos&mdash;&ldquo;their Malolos arrangement,&rdquo; he
+used to call it&mdash;seemed quite an impudent little
+<i>opera-bouffe</i> affair, &ldquo;a tin-horn government,&rdquo; as
+Senator Spooner suggested in the same debate on the treaty, in which he
+called his rugged and fiery friend from South Carolina, Senator
+Tillman, &ldquo;the Senator from Aguinaldo,&rdquo; and immediately
+thereafter, with that engaging frankness that always so endeared him to
+his colleagues on both sides of the Chamber, removed the sting from the
+jest by admitting that neither he (Spooner), nor Tillman, nor anybody
+else in the United States, knew anything about Aguinaldo or his
+government. But in the calmer retrospect of many years after, we have
+seen, through the official documents which have become available in the
+interval, that said government was in complete and effective control of
+practically the whole archipelago, and had the moral support of the
+whole population at a time when our troops controlled absolutely
+nothing but the two towns of Manila and Cavite. Therefore, when we read
+in the Aguinaldo proclamation such phrases as, &ldquo;In view of this,
+I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet,
+and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I&rdquo; did so and
+so; &ldquo;My government cannot remain indifferent to&rdquo; this or
+that act of the Americans assuming sovereignty over the islands;
+&ldquo;Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities
+if&rdquo; etc.; they do not sound to us so irritatingly bombastic as
+they did to General Otis, distributed under his nose as the
+proclamation containing them at once was, by thousands, throughout a
+city of which he was nominally in possession, but nine-tenths of whose
+300,000 <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb170" href="#pb170" name=
+"pb170">170</a>]</span>inhabitants he was obliged to believe in
+sympathy with the insurgents.</p>
+<p>&ldquo;My government,&rdquo; says the Aguinaldo proclamation,
+&ldquo;rules the whole of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of
+Mindanao.&rdquo; Except as to Mindanao, which cut absolutely no figure
+in the insurrection until well toward the end of the guerrilla part of
+it, we have already examined this claim and found by careful analysis
+that it was absolutely true by the end of December, 1898.</p>
+<p>After a rapid review of how he had been aided and encouraged in
+starting the revolution against the Spaniards by Admiral Dewey, and
+then given the cold shoulder by the army when it came,
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s manifesto says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It was also taken for granted that the American forces
+would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed
+to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships;
+and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and
+traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the
+abolition of slavery, and which <i>posed as the champion and liberator
+of oppressed peoples</i>. <i>We felt ourselves under the safeguard of a
+free people.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>That this statement also was authorized by the facts is evident from
+the minutes of the Hong Kong meeting of May 4th, already noticed,
+presided over by Aguinaldo, and called to formulate the programme for
+the insurrection he was about to sail for the Philippines to
+inaugurate, in which, after much discussion among the revolutionary
+leaders it was agreed that while they must be prepared for all possible
+contingencies, yet,</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">if Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental
+principles of its constitution, it is most improbable that an
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb171" href="#pb171" name=
+"pb171">171</a>]</span>attempt will be made to colonize the Filipinos
+or annex them.<a class="noteref" id="n199.1src" href="#n199.1" name=
+"n199.1src">4</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>In short, the Aguinaldo proclamation of January 5th suggests with a
+briefness which Filipino familiarity with the great mass of facts
+already laid before the reader in the preceding chapters made
+appropriate, all the causes for which the Malolos Government was ready,
+if need be, to declare war, and winds up by boldly serving General Otis
+with notice that if the Americans try to take Iloilo and the Visayan
+Islands &ldquo;my government is disposed to open
+hostilities.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>On January 9th President McKinley cabled out to General Otis asking
+if it would help matters to send a commission out to explain to the
+Filipinos our benevolent intentions. This idea thus suggested
+materialized, a few weeks later, in the Schurman Commission, of which
+more anon. The next day, January 10th, General Otis answered endorsing
+the sending of &ldquo;commissioners of tact and discretion,&rdquo; and
+adding:<a class="pseudonoteref" href="#n199.1">4</a></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control
+ignorant classes.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4332src" href="#xd20e4332"
+name="xd20e4332src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>As a matter of fact the leaders were leading. They were not
+<i>arguing</i> with the tide. They were merely <i>riding the crest</i>
+of it. Actually, General Otis would have stopped &ldquo;The Six Hundred
+Marseillaise Who Knew How to Die&rdquo;&mdash;the ones whose march to
+Paris, according to Thomas Carlyle, inspired the composition of the
+French national air, &ldquo;The Marseillaise&rdquo;&mdash;and tried to
+parley with the head of the column on the idea of getting them to
+abandon their enterprise and disperse to their several homes. He also
+says, in the cablegram under consideration: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb172" href="#pb172" name="pb172">172</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If peace kept for several days more immediate danger
+will have passed.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In other words, he was holding off the calf as best he could pending
+the ratification of the treaty. From the text itself, however, of
+General Otis&rsquo;s report, it is clear enough, that even he was
+getting anxious to give the Filipinos a drubbing as soon as the treaty
+should be safely passed. Referring to a message from the President
+enjoining avoidance of a clash with the Filipinos he says (p. 80):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The injunction of his Excellency the President of the
+United States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent
+effect upon the command. Officers and men *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>were</i>
+restless under the restraints *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* imposed, and
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* eager to avenge the insults received. <i>Now</i> they
+submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of the
+insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business
+portion of the city.</p>
+</div>
+<p>See the lamb kick the lion viciously in the face, and observe the
+lion as he first lifts his eyes heavenward and says meekly: &ldquo;Thy
+will be done. This is Benevolent Assimilation&rdquo;; and then turns
+them Senate-ward and murmurs: &ldquo;I cannot stand this much longer,
+kind sirs. Say when!&rdquo; The way war correspondent John F. Bass puts
+the situation about this time in a letter to his paper,
+<i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>, was this:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Jimmie Green<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4370src" href=
+"#xd20e4370" name="xd20e4370src">6</a> bites his lip, hangs on to
+himself, and finds comfort in the idea that his time will come.</p>
+</div>
+<p>After Aguinaldo&rsquo;s ultimatum of January 5th about fighting if
+we took Iloilo, General Otis refrained from taking Iloilo, and
+continued to communicate with the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb173"
+href="#pb173" name="pb173">173</a>]</span>insurgent chieftain,
+appointing commissioners to meet commissioners appointed by him. These
+held divers and sundry sessions, whose only result was to kill time, or
+at least to mark time, while the Administration was getting the treaty
+through the Senate. The object of these meetings is thus set forth in
+the military order of January 9, 1899, appointing the Otis portion of
+the Joint High Parleying Board:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">To meet a commission of like number appointed by
+General Aguinaldo, and to confer with regard to the situation of
+affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent,
+purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the
+United States, that peace and harmonious relations between these
+respective peoples may be continued.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4381src" href="#xd20e4381" name="xd20e4381src">7</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The minutes of the first meeting of this board, prepared by the
+Spanish-speaking clerk or recorder, recite the above declared purpose
+<i>verbatim</i>, in all its verbosity, and then go on to say that our
+side asked</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">That the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo
+give their opinion as to what <i>were</i> the purposes, aspirations,
+aims, and desires of the people of the archipelago.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The next paragraph is almost Pickwickian in its unconscious
+terseness:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">To this request the commissioners appointed by General
+Aguinaldo made response that in their opinion the aspirations,
+purposes, and desires of the Philippine people might be summed up in
+<i>two words</i> &ldquo;Absolute Independence.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course even General Otis does not reproduce this laconic answer
+as part of his petulant summing up of how little the Filipinos knew,
+before the outbreak of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb174" href=
+"#pb174" name="pb174">174</a>]</span>February 4th, as to what they
+really wanted. He merely alludes to it as being of record elsewhere. It
+is one o&pound; the various pieces of jetsam and flotsam that have
+floated from the sea of those great events to the shores of government
+publications since. The minutes of these meetings may be found among
+the hearings before the Senate Committee of 1902.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4415src" href="#xd20e4415" name="xd20e4415src">8</a></p>
+<p>General Otis&rsquo;s report complains that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+commissioners did not know what they wanted, &ldquo;could not give any
+satisfactory explanation&rdquo; of the &ldquo;measure of
+protection&rdquo; they wanted, they having declared that they would
+greatly prefer the United States to establish a protectorate over them
+to keep them from being annexed by some other power. But he fails to
+state, which is a fact shown by the minutes of the meeting of January
+14 (p. 2721), that the Filipino commissioners did say that this was a
+question which would only be reached between their government and ours
+when the latter should agree to officially recognize the former. To
+quote their exact language, which is rather clumsily translated, they
+said: &ldquo;The aspiration of the Filipino people is the independence
+with the restrictions resulting from the conditions which its
+government may agree with the American, <i>when the latter agree to
+officially recognize the former</i>.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>It is perfectly clear from the voluminous minutes of the proceedings
+that the Filipinos were only seeking <i>some declaration of the purpose
+of our government</i> which would satisfy their people that the
+programme was something more than a mere change of masters. &ldquo;They
+begged,&rdquo; says General Otis (p. 82), &ldquo;for <i>some tangible
+concession</i> from the United States Government&mdash;one <i>which
+they could present to the people</i> and which might serve to allay
+excitement.&rdquo; General Otis of course <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb175" href="#pb175" name="pb175">175</a>]</span>had no authority to
+bind the government and so could make no promise. But the day this
+Otis-Aguinaldo parleying board had its second meeting, January 11th,
+and probably with no more knowledge of its existence than the reader
+has of what is going on in the Fiji Islands at the moment he reads
+these lines, Senator Bacon introduced in the United States Senate some
+resolutions which were precisely the medicine the case required and
+precisely the thing the Filipinos were pleading for. These resolutions
+concluded thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition
+or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
+said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their
+determination when an independent government shall have been duly
+erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said
+government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights
+secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the
+government and control of the islands to their people.</p>
+</div>
+<p>They were a twin brother to the Teller Cuban resolution which was
+incorporated into the resolution declaring war against Spain, being
+<i>verbatim</i> the same, except with the necessary changes of name, of
+&ldquo;islands&rdquo; for &ldquo;island,&rdquo; etc.</p>
+<p>On January 18th, while the futile parleying board aforesaid was
+still futilely parleying at Manila, Senator Bacon made an argument in
+the Senate in support of his resolution, whose far-sighted
+statesmanship, considered in relation to the analogies of its historic
+setting, most strikingly reminds us of Burke&rsquo;s great speech on
+conciliation with America delivered under similar circumstances nearly
+a century and a quarter earlier. After alluding to the naturalness of
+the apprehension of the Filipinos &ldquo;that it is the purpose of the
+United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb176" href="#pb176" name=
+"pb176">176</a>]</span>States Government to maintain permanent dominion
+over them,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4454src" href="#xd20e4454"
+name="xd20e4454src">9</a> Senator Bacon urged:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The fundamental requirement in these resolutions is
+that the Government of the United States will not undertake to exercise
+<i>permanent dominion</i> over the Philippine Islands. The resolutions
+are intentionally made broad, so that <i>those who agree on that
+fundamental proposition may stand upon them</i> even though they may
+differ materially as to a great many other things relative to the
+future course of the government in connection with the Philippine
+Islands.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Senator Bacon then quoted the following from some remarks Senator
+Foraker had previously made in the course of the great debate on the
+treaty:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I do not understand anybody to be proposing to take
+the Philippine Islands with the idea and view of permanently holding
+them. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* The President of the United States does not, I
+know, and no Senator in this chamber has made any such statement;</p>
+</div>
+<p>and added:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If the views expressed by the learned Senator from
+Ohio in his speech *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* are those upon which we are to act,
+there is very little difference between us; and there will be no future
+contention between us *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* if we can have an authoritative
+expression from <span class="sc">The Law-Making Power</span> of the
+United States in a joint resolution that such is the purpose of the
+future.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4483src" href="#xd20e4483" name=
+"xd20e4483src">10</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Says the Holy Scripture: &ldquo;A word spoken in season, how good is
+it!&rdquo; Had the Bacon resolutions passed the United States Senate in
+January, 1899, we never would have had any war with the
+Filipinos.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4490src" href="#xd20e4490" name=
+"xd20e4490src">11</a> They <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb177" href=
+"#pb177" name="pb177">177</a>]</span>would have presented at the
+psychologic moment the very thing the best and bravest of the Filipino
+leaders were then pleading with General Otis for, something
+&ldquo;tangible,&rdquo; something &ldquo;which they could present to
+their people and which would allay excitement,&rdquo; by allaying the
+universal fear that we were going to do with them exactly as all other
+white men they had ever heard of had done with all other brown men they
+had ever heard of under like circumstances, viz., keep them under
+permanent dominion with a view of profit.</p>
+<p>In his letter accepting the nomination for the Presidency in 1900,
+Mr. McKinley sought to show the Filipinos to have been the aggressors
+in the war by a reference to the fact that the outbreak occurred
+<i>while the Bacon resolution was under discussion</i> in the Senate.
+This hardly came with good grace from an Administration whose friends
+in the Senate had all along opposed not only the Bacon resolution but
+also all other resolutions frankly declaratory of the purpose of our
+government. The supreme need of the hour then was, and the supreme need
+of every hour of every day we have been in the Philippines since has
+been, &ldquo;an authoritative expression from the law-making power of
+the United States&rdquo;&mdash;not mere surmises of a President,
+confessedly devoid of binding force, but an <i>authoritative expression
+from the law-making power</i>, declaratory of the purpose of our
+government with regard to the Philippine Islands. Secretary of War Taft
+visited Manila in 1907 to be present at the opening of the Philippine
+Assembly. In view of the universal longing which he knew existed for
+some definite authoritative declaration as to whether our government
+intends to keep the Islands permanently or not, he said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I cannot speak with authority *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. The
+policy to be pursued with respect to them is, therefore, ultimately for
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb178" href="#pb178" name=
+"pb178">178</a>]</span>Congress to determine. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I have no
+authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate disposition
+of the Islands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4511src" href="#xd20e4511"
+name="xd20e4511src">12</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This bitter disappointment of the public expectation and hope of
+something definite, certainly did not lessen the belief of the
+Filipinos that we have no notion of ever giving them their
+independence. Had the Senate known what the Filipino commissioners were
+so earnestly asking of the Otis commissioners in January, 1899, the
+Bacon resolution would probably have passed. In fact it is demonstrable
+almost mathematically that, had the Administration&rsquo;s friends in
+the Senate allowed that resolution to come to a vote before the
+outbreak of February 4th, instead of filibustering against it until
+after that event, it would have passed. As stated in the foot-note, the
+roll-call on the final vote on it, which was not taken until February
+14th, showed a tie&mdash;29 to 29, the Vice-President of the United
+States casting the deciding vote which defeated it. Much dealing with
+real life and real death has blunted my artistic sensibilities to
+thrills from the mere pantomime of the stage. But as here was a vote
+where, had a single Senator who voted No voted Aye, some 300,000,000 of
+dollars, over a thousand lives of American soldiers killed in battle,
+some 16,000 lives of Filipino soldiers killed in battle, and possibly
+100,000 Filipino lives snuffed out through famine, pestilence, and
+other ills consequent on the war, would have been saved, I can not
+refrain from reproducing the vote&mdash;perhaps the most uniquely
+momentous single roll-call in the parliamentary history of
+Christendom<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4519src" href="#xd20e4519" name=
+"xd20e4519src">13</a>: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb179" href=
+"#pb179" name="pb179">179</a>]</span></p>
+<p><i>Ayes</i></p>
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>
+<ul>
+<li>Bacon</li>
+<li>Bate</li>
+<li>Berry</li>
+<li>Caffery</li>
+<li>Chilton</li>
+<li>Clay</li>
+<li>Cockrell</li>
+<li>Faulkner</li>
+<li>Gorman</li>
+<li>Gray</li>
+<li>Hale</li>
+<li>Harris</li>
+<li>Heitfield</li>
+<li>Hoar</li>
+<li>Jones of Arkansas</li>
+</ul>
+</td>
+<td>
+<ul>
+<li>Jones of Nevada</li>
+<li>Lindsay</li>
+<li>McLaurin</li>
+<li>Martin</li>
+<li>Money</li>
+<li>Murphy</li>
+<li>Perkins</li>
+<li>Pettigrew</li>
+<li>Pettus</li>
+<li>Quay</li>
+<li>Rawlins</li>
+<li>Smith</li>
+<li>Tillman</li>
+<li>Turner</li>
+</ul>
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+<p><i>Nays</i></p>
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>
+<ul>
+<li>Allison</li>
+<li>Burrows</li>
+<li>Carter</li>
+<li>Chandler</li>
+<li>Deboe</li>
+<li>Fairbanks</li>
+<li>Frye</li>
+<li>Gear</li>
+<li>Hanna</li>
+<li>Hawley</li>
+<li>Kyle</li>
+<li>Lodge</li>
+<li>McBride</li>
+<li>McEnery</li>
+<li>McMillan</li>
+</ul>
+</td>
+<td>
+<ul>
+<li>Mantle</li>
+<li>Morgan</li>
+<li>Nelson</li>
+<li>Penrose</li>
+<li>Platt of Connecticut</li>
+<li>Platt of New York</li>
+<li>Pritchard</li>
+<li>Ross</li>
+<li>Shoup</li>
+<li>Simon</li>
+<li>Stewart</li>
+<li>Teller</li>
+<li>Warren</li>
+<li>Wolcott</li>
+</ul>
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+<p>In January, 1899, the out-and-out land-grabbers had not yet made
+bold to show their hand, the friends of the treaty confining themselves
+to the alleged shame of doing as we had done with Cuba, on account of
+the supposed semi-barbarous condition of &ldquo;the various tribes out
+there,&rdquo; leaving the possibility of profit to quietly suggest
+<i>itself</i> amid the noisy exhortations of altruism. It was not until
+after the milk of human kindness had been spilled in war that Senator
+Lodge said at the Philadelphia National Republican Convention of
+1900:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested
+in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade
+Expansion.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Speaking (p. 82) of the meetings of what for lack of a better term I
+have above called the Otis-Aguinaldo Joint High Parleying Board,
+General Otis says in his report: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb180"
+href="#pb180" name="pb180">180</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Finally, the conferences became the object of
+insurgent suspicion, *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* amusement.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Filipino newspapers called attention to the fact that large
+reinforcements of American troops were on the way to Manila, and very
+plausibly inferred that the parleying was for delay only. By January
+26th the politeness of both the American and the Filipino commissioners
+had been worn to a frazzle, and they adjourned, each recognizing that
+the differences between them could ultimately be settled only on the
+field of battle, in the event of the ratification of the treaty.</p>
+<p>January 27th, General Otis cabled to Washington a letter from
+Aguinaldo, of which he says in his report: &ldquo;I was surprised
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* because of the boldness with which he therein indicated
+his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness
+by the arbitrament of war&rdquo; (p. 84). General Otis was
+&ldquo;surprised&rdquo; to the last. Aguinaldo&rsquo;s letter is not at
+all surprising, though extremely interesting. It sends General Otis a
+proclamation issued January 21st, announcing the publication of a
+constitution modelled substantially after that of the United States,
+even beginning with the familiar words about &ldquo;securing the
+blessings of liberty, promoting the general welfare,&rdquo; etc., and
+concludes with an expression of confident hope that the United States
+will recognize his government, and a bold implication of determination
+to fight if it does not. On the evening of February 4th an insurgent
+soldier approaching an American picket failed to halt or answer when
+challenged, and was shot and killed. Nearly six months of nervous
+tension thereupon pressed for liberation in a general engagement which
+continued throughout the night and until toward sundown of the next
+day, thus finally unleashing the dogs of war. In <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb181" href="#pb181" name="pb181">181</a>]</span>the
+<i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, Senator Bacon is quoted as
+saying:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be
+necessary to carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain
+that we could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate
+adopted my resolution, or a similar resolution <i>announcing our honest
+intentions with regard to the Philippines</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Said the <i>New York Criterion</i> of February 11, 1899:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Whether we like it or not, we must go on slaughtering
+the natives in the English fashion, and taking what muddy glory lies in
+this wholesale killing until they have learned to respect our arms.
+<i>The more difficult task of getting them to respect our intentions
+will follow.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>The <i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, may not have quoted
+Senator Bacon with exactitude. But what the Senator <i>did</i> say on
+the floor of the Senate <i>is</i> important, historically. Under date
+of February 22, 1912, Senator Bacon writes me, in answer to an
+inquiry:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I enclose a speech made by me upon the subject in the
+Senate February 27, 1899, and upon pages 6, 7, and 8 of which you will
+find a statement of my position, and the reasons given by me therefor.
+Of course you cannot go at length into that question in your narration
+of the events of that day, but my position was that, while I did not
+approve of the war, and did not approve of the enslavement of the
+Filipinos, and while if I had my way I would immediately set them free,
+at the same time, as war was then flagrant, and there were then some
+twenty odd thousand American troops in the Philippine Islands, we must
+either support them or leave them to defeat and death. I do not know
+how far you can use anything then said by me, but if you make allusion
+to the fact that I was willing to supply money <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb182" href="#pb182" name="pb182">182</a>]</span>and
+troops to carry on the war in the Philippines, I would be glad for it
+to be accompanied by a very brief statement of the ground upon which I
+based such action.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The above makes it unnecessary to quote at length from the speech
+referred to, which may be found at pp. 2456 <i>et seq</i> of the
+<i>Congressional Record</i> for February 27, 1899. However, there is
+one passage in the speech to which I especially say Amen, and invite
+all whose creed of patriotism is not too sublimated for such a common
+feeling to join me in so doing. Senator Bacon will now state the
+creed:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The oft-repeated expression &ldquo;our country, right
+or wrong&rdquo; has a vital principle in it, and upon that principle I
+stand.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Senator immediately follows his creed with these
+commentaries:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In this annexation of the Philippine Islands through
+the ratification of the treaty, and in waging war to subjugate the
+Filipinos, I think the country, acting through constitutional
+authorities, is wrong. But it is not for me to say because the country
+has been committed to a policy that I do not favor and have opposed, in
+consequence of which there is war, that I will not support the
+government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Under the civilizing influence of Krag-Jorgensen rifles and the
+moral uplift of high explosive projectiles, what our soldiers used to
+call, with questionable piety, &ldquo;the fear of God,&rdquo; was
+finally put into the hearts of the Filipinos, after much carnage by
+wholesale in battle formation and later by retail in a species of
+guerrilla warfare as irritating as it was obstinate. But they have
+never yet learned to respect our intentions, because under the guidance
+of three successive Presidents we <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb183"
+href="#pb183" name="pb183">183</a>]</span>have studiously refrained
+from any authoritative declaration as to what those intentions are. We
+are loth to hark back to the only right course, a course similar to our
+action in Cuba, because of the expense we have been to in the
+Philippines. But we also know that the islands are and are likely to
+continue, a costly burden, a nuisance, and a distinct strategic
+disadvantage in the event of war; and that Mr. Cleveland was right when
+he said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The government of remote and alien people should have
+no permanent place in the purposes of our national life.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The mistaken policy which involved us in a war to subjugate the
+Filipinos, following our war to free the Cubans, will never stand
+atoned for before the bar of history, nor can the Filipinos ever in
+reason be expected to respect our intentions, until the law-making
+power of the government shall have authoritatively declared what those
+intentions are&mdash;<i>i. e.</i>, what we intend ultimately to do with
+the islands. Senator Bacon&rsquo;s resolutions of 1899 were, are, and
+always will be the last word on the first act needed to rectify the
+original Philippine blunder, &ldquo;announcing&rdquo; as they would, to
+use the language attributed to their distinguished author by the
+<i>Washington Post</i> of February 6, 1899, above-quoted, &ldquo;our
+honest intentions with regard to the Philippines.&rdquo; So eager is
+the exploiter to exploit the islands, and so apprehensive is the
+Filipino that the exploiter will have more influence at Washington than
+himself and therefore be able ultimately to bring about a practical
+industrial slavery, that common honesty demands such a declaration. To
+doctor present Filipino discontent with Benevolent Uncertainty is a
+mere makeshift. The remedy the situation needs is simple, but as yet
+untried&mdash;Frankness. The chief of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb184" href="#pb184" name="pb184">184</a>]</span>causes of the present
+discontent among the Filipinos with American rule is precisely the same
+old serpent that precipitated the war thirteen years ago, to wit, lack
+of a frank and honest declaration of our purpose. The trouble then lay,
+and still lies, and, in the absence of some such declaration as that
+proposed by the Bacon resolution, will always lie in what seemed then,
+and still seems, to the Filipinos &ldquo;an evident purpose to keep the
+islands and an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that
+purpose.&rdquo; Some may object that one Congress cannot bind another.
+The same argument would have killed the Teller amendment to the
+declaration of war with Spain avowing our purpose as to Cuba. Such an
+argument assumes that this nation has no sense of honor, and that it
+should cling for a while longer to the stale Micawberism that the
+Islands may yet pay, before it decides whether it will do right or not,
+and signalizes such decision by formal announcement through Congress.
+To men capable of such an assumption as the one just indicated, this
+book is not addressed. Three successive Presidents, Messrs. McKinley,
+Roosevelt, and Taft, have with earnest asseveration of benevolent
+intention tried without success all these years to win the affections
+of the Filipino people, and to make them feel that &ldquo;our flag had
+not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their
+shores,&rdquo; as Mr. McKinley used to say. But the corner-stone of the
+policy was laid before we knew anything about how the land lay, and on
+the assumption, made practically without any knowledge whatever on the
+subject, that the Filipino people were incapable of self-government.
+The corner-stone of our Philippine policy has been from the beginning
+precisely that urged by Spain for not freeing Cuba, viz., &ldquo;to
+spare the people from the dangers of premature independence.&rdquo;
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb185" href="#pb185" name=
+"pb185">185</a>]</span>The three Presidents named above have always
+been willing to imply independence, but never to promise it. And the
+unwillingness to declare a purpose ultimately to give the Filipinos
+their independence has always been due to the desire to catch the vote
+of those who are determined they shall never have it. In this
+inexorable and unchangeable political necessity lies the essential
+contemptibleness of republican imperialism, and the secret of why the
+Filipinos, notwithstanding our good intentions, do not like us, and
+never will under the present policy. How can you blame them?</p>
+<p>Yet the more you know of the Filipinos, the better you like them.
+Self-sacrificing, brave, and faithful unto death in war, they are
+gentle, generous, and tractable in peace. Moreover, respect for
+constituted authority, as such, is innate in practically every
+Filipino, which I am not sure can be predicated concerning each and
+every citizen of my beloved native land. And we can win the grateful
+and lasting affection of the whole seven or eight millions of them any
+day we wish to. How? Have done with vague, vote-catching Presidential
+<i>obiter</i>, and through your Congress declare your purpose!
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb186" href="#pb186" name=
+"pb186">186</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4212" href="#xd20e4212src" name="xd20e4212">1</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4228" href="#xd20e4228src" name="xd20e4228">2</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 58, letter
+to General Miller.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4238" href="#xd20e4238src" name="xd20e4238">3</a></span> A
+campaign synonym for forced marching. It has no known etymology, but to
+the initiated it suggests torrential downpouring of rain and bedraggled
+mud-spattered columns of troops.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id="n199.1"
+href="#n199.1src" name="n199.1">4</a></span> <i>Senate Document
+208</i>, pt. 2, p. 7.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4332" href="#xd20e4332src" name="xd20e4332">5</a></span> <i>Otis
+Report</i>, p. 80.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4370" href="#xd20e4370src" name="xd20e4370">6</a></span> The
+American &ldquo;Tommy Atkins.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4381" href="#xd20e4381src" name="xd20e4381">7</a></span> <i>Otis
+Report</i>, 1899 <i>War Dept. Rpt.</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p.
+81.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4415" href="#xd20e4415src" name="xd20e4415">8</a></span> See
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 2709 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4454" href="#xd20e4454src" name="xd20e4454">9</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, January 11, 1899, p. 735.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4483" href="#xd20e4483src" name="xd20e4483">10</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, January 18, 1899, p. 733.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4490" href="#xd20e4490src" name="xd20e4490">11</a></span> The
+vote on the Bacon resolution was a tie, 29 to 29, and the
+Vice-President of the United States then cast the deciding vote against
+it. <i>Cong. Rec.</i>, Feby. 14, 1899, p. 1845.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4511" href="#xd20e4511src" name="xd20e4511">12</a></span> See
+<i>Present-Day Problems</i>, by Wm. H. Taft, p. 9; Dodd, Mead, &amp;
+Co., N. Y., 1908.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4519" href="#xd20e4519src" name="xd20e4519">13</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, February 14, 1899, p. 1846 (55th Cong., 3d
+Sess.).</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch11" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XI</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Otis and the War</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Am I the boss, or am I a tool,</p>
+<p class="line">Am I Governor-General or a hobo&mdash;hobo;</p>
+<p class="line">Now I&rsquo;d like to know who&rsquo;s the boss of the
+show,</p>
+<p class="line">Is it me, or Emilio Aguinaldo?</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Army Song of the Philippines under
+Otis.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&ldquo;The thing is on,&rdquo; said General Hughes,
+Provost Marshal of Manila, to General Otis, at Malaca&ntilde;an palace,
+on the night of February 4, 1899, about half past eight o&rsquo;clock,
+as soon as the firing started.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4783src"
+href="#xd20e4783" name="xd20e4783src">1</a> He was talking about
+something which every American in Manila except General Otis had for
+months frankly recognized as inevitable&mdash;the war.</p>
+<p>On the day of the outbreak of February 4th, General Otis had under
+his command 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men, say in round numbers
+a total of 21,000. Of these some 15,500 were State volunteers mostly
+from the Western States, and the rest were regulars. All the volunteers
+and 1650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to
+their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of
+ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. The
+total force which he was thus entitled to command for any considerable
+period consisted of less than 4000. Of the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb187" href="#pb187" name=
+"pb187">187</a>]</span>21,000 men on hand as aforesaid, on February
+4th, deducting those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those
+serving in civil departments, and in the staff organizations, the
+effective fighting force was 14,000, and of these 3000 constituted the
+Provost Guard in the great and hostile city of Manila.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e4793src" href="#xd20e4793" name="xd20e4793src">2</a>
+Thus there were only 11,000 men, including those entitled to discharge,
+available to engage the insurgent army, &ldquo;which,&rdquo; says
+Secretary of War Root, &ldquo;was two or three times that number, well
+armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly
+comprised in the Spanish army.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Such was the predicament into which General Otis&rsquo;s supremely
+zealous efforts to help the Administration get the treaty through the
+Senate by withholding from the American people the knowledge of facts
+which might have put them on notice that they were paying $20,000,000
+for a $200,000,000 insurrection, had brought us. This is not a tale of
+woe. It is a tale of the disgust&mdash;good-humored, because
+stoical&mdash;which finally found expression at the time in the army
+song that heads this chapter, disgust at unnecessary sacrifice of
+American life which could so easily have been prevented had General
+Otis only revealed the real situation in time to have had plenty of
+troops on hand. It is a requiem over those brave men of the Eighth Army
+Corps from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States that bore
+the brunt of the early fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed
+in 1899 as the result of an unpreparedness for war due to anxiety not
+to embarrass Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the
+Senate, an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in
+order to conceal from the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb188" href=
+"#pb188" name="pb188">188</a>]</span>people of the United States the
+unanimity of the desire of the Filipinos for Independence.</p>
+<p>It is quite true that none of our people then in the Islands
+realized this unanimity in all its pathos at the outset, but it soon
+became clear to everybody except the commanding general. It naturally
+dawned on him last of all, because he did not visit the most reliable
+sources of information, to wit, the battlefields during the fighting,
+and therefore did not see how tenaciously the Filipinos fought for the
+independence of their country. Moreover, General Otis tried to think
+till the last along lines in harmony with the original theory of
+Benevolent Assimilation. Hence Mr. Root&rsquo;s nonsense of 1899 and
+1900 about &ldquo;the patient and unconsenting millions&rdquo;
+dominated by &ldquo;the Tagalo tribe,&rdquo; which nonsense was
+immensely serviceable in a campaign for the presidency wherein
+antidotes for sympathy with a people struggling to be free were of
+supreme practical political value. General Otis actually had Mr.
+McKinley believing as late as December, 1899, at least, that the
+opposition to a change of masters in lieu of Freedom was confined to a
+little coterie of self-seeking politicians who were in the business for
+what they could get out of it, and that the great majority would prefer
+him, Otis, to Aguinaldo, as governor-general. It <i>is</i> difficult on
+first blush to accept this statement as dispassionately correct, but
+there is no escape from the record. Mr. McKinley said in his annual
+message to Congress in December, 1899, in reviewing the direction he
+gave to the Paris peace negotiations which ended in the purchase of the
+islands, and the war with the Filipinos which had followed, and had
+then been raging since February 4th previous, &ldquo;I had every reason
+to believe, and <i>still believe</i> that the transfer of sovereignty
+was in accordance with the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb189" href=
+"#pb189" name="pb189">189</a>]</span>wishes and aspirations of the
+great mass of the Filipino people.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Yet every American soldier who served in the Philippines at the time
+knows that Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand,
+because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their
+aspirations.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4817src" href="#xd20e4817"
+name="xd20e4817src">3</a></p>
+<p>During the presidential campaign of 1900, while the war with the
+Filipinos was still raging, partisan rancour bitterly called in
+question the sincerity of President McKinley&rsquo;s statement in his
+annual message to Congress of December, 1899, that he then still
+believed &ldquo;the transfer of sovereignty was in accord with the
+wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people,&rdquo;
+on the ground that he must by the time he made that statement have
+understood how grossly&mdash;however honestly&mdash;General Otis had
+misled him as to the unanimity and tenacity of the Filipino purpose.
+But it is only necessary to read Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s testimony before
+the Senate Committee of 1902 to understand Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+allusion in this same message to Congress of 1899 to &ldquo;the
+sinister ambition of a few leaders,&rdquo; and this, once understood,
+explains the other statement of the message. Admiral Dewey came home in
+the fall of 1899 and undoubtedly filled Mr. McKinley with the estimate
+of Aguinaldo which makes such painful reading in the Admiral&rsquo;s
+testimony of 1902 before the Senate Committee, where he abused
+Aguinaldo like a pick-pocket, so to speak, saying his original motive
+was principally loot.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4825src" href=
+"#xd20e4825" name="xd20e4825src">4</a> In the fall of 1899 Aguinaldo
+had issued a proclamation claiming that Admiral Dewey originally
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb190" href="#pb190" name=
+"pb190">190</a>]</span>promised him independence, and Admiral Dewey had
+bitterly denounced this as a falsehood, so that the Admiral always
+cherished a very real resentment against the insurgent chief
+thereafter. His estimate of the Filipino leader as being in the
+insurrection merely for what he could get out of it was wholly
+erroneous, and has long since been exploded, all our generals of the
+early fighting and all Americans who have known him since being
+unanimous that Aguinaldo was and is a sincere patriot; but it
+undoubtedly explains Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s still clinging, in 1899, to
+the notion derived from General Otis that the insurrection did not have
+the moral and material backing of the whole Filipino people. The
+Filipino leaders were familiar with the spirit of our institutions. The
+men who controlled their counsels were high-minded, educated, patriotic
+men. &ldquo;For myself and the officers and men under my
+command,&rdquo; wrote General Merritt to Aguinaldo in August, 1898,
+just after the fall of Manila, &ldquo;I can say that we have conceived
+a high respect for the abilities and qualities of the Filipinos, and if
+called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that
+effect.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4834src" href="#xd20e4834"
+name="xd20e4834src">5</a></p>
+<p>The leaders believed that the American people did not fully
+understand the identity of the Philippine situation with that in Cuba,
+and that if they had, the treaty would not have been ratified. They
+also knew the supreme futility of trying to get the facts before the
+American people by peaceful means. And it was really with the abandon
+of genuine patriotism that they plunged their country into war. We did
+not know it then, but we do know it now. It would be simply
+wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war
+with us. Of course some of the <i lang="fr">jeunesse dor&eacute;e</i>,
+as General Bell calls them in one of <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb191" href="#pb191" name="pb191">191</a>]</span>his early
+reports,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4846src" href="#xd20e4846" name=
+"xd20e4846src">6</a> grew very aggressive and insulting toward the
+last. But the thinking men went into the war for independence in a
+spirit of &ldquo;decent respect to the opinions of mankind,&rdquo; to
+correct the impression General Otis had communicated to Mr. McKinley,
+and through him to our people, in the hope that the more lives they
+sacrificed in such a war (they risked&mdash;and many of them
+lost&mdash;their own also), the nearer they would come to refuting the
+idea that they did not know what they wanted. It was the only way they
+had to appeal to C&aelig;sar, <i>i.e.</i>, to the great heart of the
+American people. As the war grew more and more unpopular in the United
+States, the impression was more and more nursed here at home that the
+people did not really want independence, but were being coerced; and
+that they were like dumb driven cattle. The striking similarity of
+these suggestions to those by which tyranny has always met the
+struggles of men to be free, did not seem to occur to the American
+public. They were accepted as authoritative, being convenient also as
+an antidote to sympathy. General Otis had suppressed such words as
+&ldquo;sovereignty,&rdquo; &ldquo;protection,&rdquo; and the like from
+his original sugar-coated edition of the Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation, offering an elaborate cock-and-bull explanation of why he
+did so. The Filipino answer to this took the form of a very clever
+newspaper cartoon, representing an American in a carromata&mdash;a kind
+of two-wheeled buggy&mdash;with a Filipino between the shafts pulling
+it; which cartoon of course, never reached the United States. The
+Filipinos had never heard the story on General Mahone about &ldquo;tie
+yoh hoss an&rsquo; come in,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4854src"
+href="#xd20e4854" name="xd20e4854src">7</a> but they had heard of the
+jinrickshaws of Japan, and they had read in Holy <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb192" href="#pb192" name="pb192">192</a>]</span>Writ
+and elsewhere of conquered people becoming hewers of wood and drawers
+of water to invading conquerors. And they are <i>not</i> without a
+sense of humor. It is a common mistake with many Americans&mdash;for
+quite a few among us suffer intellectually from
+over-sophistication&mdash;to suppose we monopolize all the sense of
+humor there is, and that that alone is proof of a due sense of
+proportion. At any rate, the Filipinos, with all due respect to General
+Otis&rsquo;s good intentions, understood that &ldquo;sovereignty&rdquo;
+and &ldquo;protection&rdquo; meant alien domination, so there was
+nothing in the Otis notion that for them those words had a
+&ldquo;<i>peculiar</i> meaning which might be advantageously used by
+the Tagalo war party to incite,&rdquo; etc.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4871src" href="#xd20e4871" name="xd20e4871src">8</a></p>
+<p>Having now gotten into a war on the theory that only a small
+fraction of the Filipino people were opposed to a new and unknown yoke
+in lieu of the old one, General Otis still continued to try to square
+his theory with the facts. For many months he sat at his desk in Manila
+cheerily waging war with an inadequate force, and retaining in the
+service and on the firing line after their terms of enlistment expired,
+under pretence that they consented to it willingly, a lot of fellows
+from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States, who had
+volunteered for the war with Spain, with intent to kill Spaniards in
+order to free Cubans, and not with intent to kill Filipinos for also
+wanting to be free. Seeing nothing of the fighting himself, he of
+course failed to get a correct estimate of the tenacity of the Filipino
+purpose. No purpose is here entertained to suggest that any of those
+early volunteers went around preaching mutiny, or feeling mutinous.
+They did not originally like the Filipinos especially; furthermore,
+they liked the Philippines less than they did the Filipinos,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb193" href="#pb193" name=
+"pb193">193</a>]</span>and they had a vague notion that some one had
+blundered. But it was not theirs to ask the reason why. Besides, the
+orders from Washington being not to clash with the Filipinos at least
+until the treaty was ratified, the Filipino soldiers and subaltern
+officers had been calling them cowards for some time with impunity. So
+that as soon as the treaty was safely &ldquo;put over,&rdquo; they were
+very glad to let off steam by killing a few hundred of them. But their
+hearts were not in the fight, in the sense of clear and profound
+conviction of the righteousness of the war. However, war is war, and
+they were soldiers, and &ldquo;orders is orders,&rdquo; as Tommy Atkins
+says. So let us turn to an honester, if grimmer, side of the
+picture.</p>
+<p>The first battle of the war began about 8:30 o&rsquo;clock on the
+night of February 4th, and lasted all through that night and until
+about 5 o&rsquo;clock in the afternoon of the next day. Our casualties
+numbered about 250 killed and wounded. The insurgent loss was estimated
+at 3000. &ldquo;Those of the insurgents will never be known,&rdquo;
+says General Otis.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4883src" href=
+"#xd20e4883" name="xd20e4883src">9</a> &ldquo;We buried 700 of
+them.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4888src" href="#xd20e4888"
+name="xd20e4888src">10</a> There was fighting pretty much all around
+Manila, for the insurgents had the city almost hemmed in. An arc of a
+circle, broken in places possibly, but several miles long, drawn about
+the city, would probably suggest the general idea of the enemy&rsquo;s
+lines. They had been allowed to dig trenches without interference while
+the debate in the Senate on the treaty was in progress, pursuant to the
+temporary &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo; programme. The arc was
+broken into smithereens by 5 <span class="sc">P.M.</span> of February
+5th. When the morning of February 6th came Col. James F. Smith,
+commanding the First Californias, was <i lang="la">non est
+inventus</i>, and so was a large part of his regiment. &ldquo;No one
+seemed to know definitely his location,&rdquo; says the Otis
+<i>Report</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4903src" href="#xd20e4903"
+name="xd20e4903src">11</a> As a matter of fact <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb194" href="#pb194" name="pb194">194</a>]</span>he
+had taken two battalions of his regiment and waded clean through the
+enemy&rsquo;s lines, and had to be sent for to come back to form again
+with the line of battle needed to protect the city. So the Californias
+probably carried off the pick of the laurels of the first day&rsquo;s
+fighting. General Anderson, commanding the First Division of the Eighth
+Corps, threw them some very handsome well earned bouquets in his
+report, stating also that their colonel had shown &ldquo;the very best
+qualities of a volunteer officer&rdquo;&mdash;why he limited it to
+&ldquo;volunteer&rdquo; does not appear, but is inferable from the
+well-known disposition of all regulars to consider all volunteers
+&ldquo;rookies&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4910src" href=
+"#xd20e4910" name="xd20e4910src">12</a>&mdash;and recommended that he
+be made a brigadier general, which shortly afterward was done.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e4913src" href="#xd20e4913" name=
+"xd20e4913src">13</a></p>
+<p>It would be invidious to follow the various phases of the subsequent
+early fighting, and single out one or more States<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4920src" href="#xd20e4920" name="xd20e4920src">14</a> and tell of
+the hard earned and well deserved honors they won, because space
+forbids a proper tribute to the heroism of all of them. As for the
+regulars,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e4923src" href="#xd20e4923" name=
+"xd20e4923src">15</a> they were the same they were at Santiago de Cuba,
+the same they always are anywhere you put them. When a newspaper man
+would come around a regular regiment during the fighting before
+Santiago he would be told that they had no news to give him, &ldquo;We
+ain&rsquo;t heroes, we&rsquo;re regulars,&rdquo; they would say. After
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb195" href="#pb195" name=
+"pb195">195</a>]</span>the outbreak of February 4th, all our people did
+well, acted nobly, &ldquo;Angels could no more.&rdquo; Neither could
+devils, as shown by the losses inflicted on the enemy.</p>
+<p>There was more fighting outside Manila during the next two or three
+days, and when that was done the somewhat shattered insurgent legions
+had recoiled to the distantly visible foot-hills, convinced that their
+notion they could take Manila was very foolish and very rash.</p>
+<p>At the town of Caloocan, some three or four miles out to the north
+of Manila, were located the shops and round houses of the Manila and
+Dagupan Railway, which runs from Manila in a northwesterly direction
+about 120 miles to Dagupan, and was then the only railroad in the
+archipelago. It was fed by a vast rich farming country, the great plain
+of central Luzon. Naturally, the central plain which fed the railroad
+that traversed it and kept its teeming myriads of small farmers in
+touch with the great outside world was to be sooner or later, the
+theatre of war. To seize transportation is instinctively the first
+tactical move of a military man. Lieutenant-General Luna,
+commander-in-chief, next to Aguinaldo, of the revolutionary forces, the
+man whom later Aguinaldo had shot, was just then at Caloocan with 4000
+men. So it fell to General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of
+the Eighth Corps, to move on Caloocan, which he did on February
+10th.</p>
+<p>John F. Bass, correspondent for <i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i>,
+writing from Manila a short time after this, describes this movement.
+It was our first move away from the city of Manila. With a few masterly
+strokes of the pen, which I regret there is not space to reproduce here
+in full, Mr. Bass gives a vivid picture of the various engagements, and
+of &ldquo;a background of burning villages, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb196" href="#pb196" name=
+"pb196">196</a>]</span>smoke, fire, shot, and shell, the ceaseless
+tramp of tired and often bleeding feet,&rdquo; etc.
+&ldquo;Heroism,&rdquo; he says, &ldquo;became a matter of course and
+death an incident.&rdquo; Finally his story pauses for a moment thus:
+&ldquo;The natural comment is that all this is merely war&mdash;the
+<i>business</i> of the soldier. True, nor do I think Jimmie Green [Mr.
+Bass&rsquo;s name for our &ldquo;Tommy Atkins&rdquo;] is troubled with
+heroics. He accepts the situation without excitement or hysterics.
+<i>He has little feeling in this matter for his heart is not in this
+fight.</i>&rdquo; Here brother Bass&rsquo;s moralizing ceases abruptly,
+and the contagious excitement of the hour catches him, just as it
+always does the average man under such circumstances:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">From La Loma church you may get the full view of our
+long line crossing the open field, evenly, steadily, irresistibly, like
+an inrolling wave on the beach *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. Watch the regiments go
+forward, and form under fire, and move on and on, and you will exclaim:
+&ldquo;Magnificent,&rdquo; and you will gulp a little and feel proud
+<i>without exactly knowing why</i>. Then gradually the <i>power</i> of
+that line will force itself upon you, and you will feel that you must
+follow, that wherever that line goes you must go also. By and by you
+will be sorry, but for the present the might of an American regiment
+has got possession of you.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Anybody who has ever been with an American regiment in action knows
+exactly how the man who wrote that felt. The American who has never had
+the experience Mr. Bass describes above has missed one way of realizing
+the majesty of the power of the republic whereof he is privileged to be
+a citizen. For if there is one national trait which more than any other
+explains the greatness of our country, it is the instinct for
+organization, the fondness for self-multiplication to the
+<i>n</i><sup>th</sup> power by intelligent co-operation with
+one&rsquo;s fellows to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb197" href=
+"#pb197" name="pb197">197</a>]</span>a common end. Especially is the
+experience in question inspiring where the example of the field
+officers is particularly appropriate to the occasion. Take for instance
+the following, concerning the conduct of Major J. Franklin Bell in this
+advance on Caloocan, from the report of Major Kobbe, Commanding the
+Artillery:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">As the right cleared the head of the ravine, I could
+see Maj. J. F. Bell *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* leading a company of Montana troops
+in front of the right *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* advancing, firing, toward
+intrenchments *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. He was on a black horse to the last
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* leading and cheering the men. His work was most gallant
+and *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* especially cheering to me.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4967src" href="#xd20e4967" name="xd20e4967src">16</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>No mere scribe can magnify General Bell&rsquo;s matchless efficiency
+in action, but it is certainly inspiring to contemplate. There are no
+&ldquo;fuss and feathers&rdquo; about him. Yet his power, proven on
+many a field in the Philippines, to kindle martial ardor by example,
+suggests the ubiquitous &ldquo;Helmet of Navarre&rdquo; of Lord
+Macaulay&rsquo;s poem.</p>
+<p>A little later correspondent Bass develops what he meant by
+&ldquo;by and by you will be sorry.&rdquo; You see it is not
+comfortable business, this of hustling about among the dead and dying.
+In the excitement, you are so liable to step on the face of some poor
+devil you knew well, maybe a once warm friend. In this connection Mr.
+Bass says: &ldquo;There is this difference between the manner in which
+American and Filipino soldiers die. The American falls in a heap and
+dies hard; the Filipino stretches himself out, and when dead is always
+found in some easy attitude, generally with his head on his arms. They
+die the way a wild animal dies&mdash;in just such a position as one
+finds a deer or an antelope which one has shot in the woods.&rdquo;
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb198" href="#pb198" name=
+"pb198">198</a>]</span></p>
+<p>So far as the writer is advised and believes, nobody who knows John
+F. Bass ever suspected him of being a quitter. He must have been
+reading the <i>London Standard</i>, which said about that time:
+&ldquo;It <i>is</i> a little startling to find the liberators of Cuba
+engaged in suppressing a youthful republic which claims the sacred
+right of self-government.&rdquo; Bass had written his newspaper in
+August previous, after observing how pluckily the Filipinos had fought
+and licked the Spaniards: &ldquo;Give them their independence and
+guarantee it to them.&rdquo; The overwhelming sentiment of the Eighth
+Army Corps when we took the Philippines was against taking them; and
+those who had kept informed knew that the Senate had ratified the
+treaty by a majority only one more than enough to squeeze it through,
+the vote having been 57 to 27, at least 56 being thus indispensable to
+make the necessary constitutional two-thirds of the 84 votes cast; and
+that Wall Street and the White Man&rsquo;s Burden or land-grabbing
+contingent&mdash;&ldquo;Philanthropy and Five per cent,&rdquo; as
+Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage put it at the time&mdash;were
+responsible for these shambles Mr. Bass describes.</p>
+<p>At this juncture some soft-headed gentleman asks: &ldquo;What is
+this man who writes this book driving at? Is he trying to show that the
+American soldiers in the Philippines in February, 1899, all wanted to
+quit as soon as the war broke out?&rdquo; Not at all. In the first
+place it hardly lay in American soldier nature to want to quit when
+Aguinaldo was telling us &ldquo;if you don&rsquo;t take your flag down
+and out of these islands at once and promptly get out yourselves along
+with it, I will proceed to kick <i>you</i> out and throw <i>it</i>
+out.&rdquo; And in the next place, in the war with the Filipinos, as in
+all other wars, fuel was added to the flame as soon as the war broke
+out. Among the Americans, charges soon came into general <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb199" href="#pb199" name=
+"pb199">199</a>]</span>circulation and acceptance that the Filipinos
+had planned (but been frustrated in) a plot looking to a general
+massacre of all foreigners in Manila. This alleged plot was supposed to
+have been scheduled to be carried out on a certain night shortly after
+February 15, 1899. Among the Filipinos, on the other hand,
+counter-charges soon followed, and met with general credence, that the
+Americans made a practise of killing prisoners taken in battle,
+including the wounded. Neither charge was ever proven, but both served
+the purpose, at the psychologic moment, of possessing each side with
+the desire to kill, which is the business of war. Let us glance briefly
+at these recriminations.</p>
+<p>Between pages 1916 and 1917 of <i>Senate Document 331</i>, part
+2<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5000src" href="#xd20e5000" name=
+"xd20e5000src">17</a> may be found a photo-lithograph of the celebrated
+alleged order of the Filipino Revolutionary Government of February 15,
+1899, to massacre all foreign residents of Manila. In his report for
+1899<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5003src" href="#xd20e5003" name=
+"xd20e5003src">18</a> General Otis himself describes this order as one
+&ldquo;which for barbarous intent is unequalled in these modern times
+in civilized warfare,&rdquo; and speaks of it as &ldquo;issued by the
+Malolos Government through the responsible officer who had raised and
+organized the hostile inhabitants within the city.&rdquo; After
+Aguinaldo was captured in 1901, according to an account given by
+General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902, of a conversation
+with the insurgent leader, the latter was shown a copy of this document
+purporting to have been signed by General Luna, one of his generals. He
+disclaimed having in any way sanctioned it, in fact disclaimed any
+prior knowledge of it whatsoever,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5008src"
+href="#xd20e5008" name="xd20e5008src">19</a> a disclaimer which General
+MacArthur appears to have <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb200" href=
+"#pb200" name="pb200">200</a>]</span>accepted as true, frankly and
+entirely. At page 1890 of the same volume, Captain J. R. M. Taylor,
+14th U. S. Infantry, a gallant soldier and an accomplished scholar, who
+was in charge in 1901 of the captured insurgent records at Manila,
+states that he was &ldquo;informed&rdquo; that the document was
+originally &ldquo;signed by Sandico, then Secretary of the
+Interior&rdquo; of the revolutionary government. Captain Taylor made an
+attempt to run the matter down, but obtained no evidence convincing to
+him. A like investigation by General MacArthur in 1901 had a like
+result.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5016src" href="#xd20e5016" name=
+"xd20e5016src">20</a></p>
+<p>On the other hand, Major Wm. H. Bishop, of the 20th Kansas, was
+credited in a soldier&rsquo;s letter written home, which first came to
+light in this country, with killing unarmed prisoners during the
+advance on Caloocan. The charges originated with a private of that
+regiment. Major Bishop denied the charges.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5026src" href="#xd20e5026" name="xd20e5026src">21</a> An
+investigation followed, in the course of which somebody made an
+innuendo, or charge&mdash;it is not important which&mdash;that other
+officers used their influence to prevent a full ventilation of the
+matter, specifically, General Funston, then Colonel of the 20th Kansas,
+and Major Metcalf, of the same regiment. These last two also made a
+most vigorous general denial, and nothing whatever was established
+against them. The whole matter was finally disposed of by being
+forwarded to the War Department at Washington by General Otis on July
+13, 1899, some six months after the occurrences alleged, with the
+remark that he (General Otis) &ldquo;doubted the wisdom of a
+court-martial&rdquo; of the soldier who had made the charge against
+Major Bishop, &ldquo;as it would give the insurgent authorities a
+knowledge of what was taking place, and they would assert positively
+that our troops practised inhumanities, whether the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb201" href="#pb201" name=
+"pb201">201</a>]</span>charges could be proven or not&rdquo; and that
+they would use the incident &ldquo;as an excuse to defend their own
+barbarities.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5033src" href=
+"#xd20e5033" name="xd20e5033src">22</a> The last endorsement on the
+papers preceding General Otis&rsquo;s final endorsement was one by
+Colonel Crowder, now (1912) Judge Advocate General of the United States
+Army, in which he said: &ldquo;I am not convinced from a careful
+reading of this report, that Private Brenner has made a false charge
+against Captain Bishop&rdquo;; adding that &ldquo;considerations of
+public policy, sufficiently grave to silence every other demand,
+require that no further action be taken in this case.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5038src" href="#xd20e5038" name=
+"xd20e5038src">23</a> The &ldquo;considerations of public policy&rdquo;
+were of course those indicated in General Otis&rsquo;s final
+endorsement on the papers, already quoted. They were compellingly
+controlling, in my judgment, independently of the merits. Washing
+one&rsquo;s soiled linen in public is never advisable, and placing a
+weapon in your enemy&rsquo;s hand in time of war is at least equally
+unwise. Some shreds of this once much mooted matter doubtless still
+linger in the public memory. It has been thus briefly ventilated here
+solely to trace the genesis of the bitterness of that war, and of
+numerous later barbarities avenged in kind. The bitterness thus early
+begun grew as the war went on, until every time a hapless Filipino
+peasant soldier speaking only two or three words of Spanish would
+falsely explain, when captured, that he was a non-combatant, an
+<i>amigo</i> (friend), it usually at once filled the captor with vivid
+recollections of slain comrades, and of rumored or sometimes proven
+mutilation of their bodies after death, and these reflections would at
+once fill him with a yearning desire to blow the top of the
+<i>amigo&rsquo;s</i> head off, whether he yielded to the desire or not.
+Of no instance where he did so yield am I aware. But I do know that the
+invariable statement of all <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb202" href=
+"#pb202" name="pb202">202</a>]</span>Filipinos unarmed and un-uniformed
+when captured, to the effect that they were <i>amigos</i>, became to
+the American soldier not remotely dissimilar to the waving of a red rag
+at a bull. Of course this was also due, largely, to the guerrilla
+practice of hiding guns when hard-pressed and actually plunging at once
+into some make-believe agricultural pursuit. As for Major Bishop, it is
+inconceivable to me that he gave any order to kill unarmed prisoners.
+Even admitting for the sake of the argument that he is a fiend, he is
+not a fool. As a matter of fact, he was a brave soldier, as all the
+reports show, and is a reputable lawyer, having many warm friends whose
+opinion of any man would command respect anywhere. The truth of the
+whole matter probably is that just before going into battle, when our
+troops were in an ugly temper by reason of the rumors of barbarities
+alleged to have been perpetrated by the enemy, or contemplated by him,
+the word was passed along the line to &ldquo;Take no more prisoners
+than we have to,&rdquo; and that that thought originated with some
+irresponsible private soldier of the line inflamed by stories of
+mutilation of our dead or of maltreatment of our wounded. Such a
+&ldquo;word,&rdquo; so passed from man to man, can, in the heat of
+conflict, very soon evolve into something having for practical purposes
+all the force and effect of an order.</p>
+<p>Through the foregoing, and like causes, including the &ldquo;water
+cure,&rdquo; later invented to persuade <i>amigos</i> to discover the
+whereabouts of hidden insurgent guns or give information as to the
+movements of the enemy,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5060src" href=
+"#xd20e5060" name="xd20e5060src">24</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb203" href="#pb203" name="pb203">203</a>]</span>our war with the
+Filipinos became, before it was over, a rather &ldquo;dark and
+bloody&rdquo; affair, accentuated as it was, from time to time, by
+occasional Filipino success in surprising detachments from ambush, or
+by taking them unawares and off their guard in their quarters, and
+eliminating them, the most notable instance of the first being the
+crumpling of a large command of the 15th Infantry by General Juan
+Cailles, in southern Luzon, and the most indelibly remembered and
+important example of the second being the massacre of the 9th Infantry
+people at Balangiga, in Samar, in the fall of 1901. Certainly more than
+one American in that long-drawn-out war did things unworthy of any
+civilized man, things he would have believed it impossible, before he
+went out there, ever to come to. Personally, I have heard, so far as I
+now recollect, of comparatively few barbarities perpetrated by
+Filipinos on captured American soldiers. Barbarities on their side
+seemed to have been reserved for those of their own race whom they
+found disloyal to the cause of their country. Personally I have never
+seen the water-cure administered. But I once went on a confidential
+mission by direction of General MacArthur, in the course of which I
+reported first, on arriving in the neighborhood of the contemplated
+destination, to a general officer of the regular army who is still such
+to-day.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5065src" href="#xd20e5065" name=
+"xd20e5065src">25</a> That night the general was good enough to extend
+the usual courtesy of a cot to sleep on, in the headquarters building.
+Toward dusk I went to dine with a certain lieutenant, also of the
+regular army.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5068src" href="#xd20e5068"
+name="xd20e5068src">26</a> As we approached <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb204" href="#pb204" name="pb204">204</a>]</span>the
+lieutenant&rsquo;s quarters a sergeant came up with a prisoner, and
+asked instructions as to what to do with him. The lieutenant said:
+&ldquo;Take him out and find out what he knows. <i>Do you
+understand</i>, Sergeant?&rdquo; The sergeant saluted, answered in the
+affirmative, and moved away with his prisoner. We went in to the
+lieutenant&rsquo;s quarters, and while at dinner heard groans outside.
+I said &ldquo;What is that, Jones?&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5077src" href="#xd20e5077" name="xd20e5077src">27</a> Jones said:
+&ldquo;That&rsquo;s the water-cure he&rsquo;s giving that <i lang=
+"es">hombre</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5083src" href="#xd20e5083"
+name="xd20e5083src">28</a> Want to see it?&rdquo; I replied that I
+certainly did not. Returning that night to the general&rsquo;s
+headquarters, after breakfast the next morning I met my friend Jones
+coming out of the general&rsquo;s office. I said: &ldquo;What&rsquo;s
+the matter, what are you doing here,&rdquo; he having mentioned the
+evening before an expedition planned for the morrow. He said:
+&ldquo;Well, I&rsquo;ve just had a talk with the general to see if I
+could get my resignation from the army accepted?&rdquo;
+&ldquo;Why?&rdquo; said I. &ldquo;Well,&rdquo; was the reply,
+&ldquo;that &mdash;&mdash;&rdquo; (designating the prisoner of the
+night before by a double barrelled epithet) &ldquo;died on me last
+night.&rdquo; Just how the matter was hushed up I have never known, but
+Jones was never punished. More than one general officer of the United
+States Army in the Philippines during our war with the Filipinos at
+least winked at the water-cure as a means of getting information, and
+quite a number of subalterns made a custom of applying it for that
+purpose. It was practically the only way you could get them to betray
+their countrymen. Did I report the incident to General MacArthur?
+Certainly not. It was the business of the general commanding the
+district. The water-cure, though very painful, was seldom fatal, and
+when not fatal was almost never <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb205"
+href="#pb205" name="pb205">205</a>]</span>permanently damaging, and it
+was about the only way to shake the loyalty of the average Filipino and
+make him give information as to hidden insurgent guns, guerrilla bands,
+etc. It was a part of Benevolent Assimilation.</p>
+<p>Let us now return to the early battlefields about Manila which we
+left, initially, to analyze the extreme bitterness of the feeling
+between the combatants that very early began to develop.</p>
+<p>We left war correspondent John F. Bass among the dead and dying on
+one of these fields, supposedly musing on the White Man&rsquo;s Burden,
+or Land-Grabbing, or Trust-for-Civilization theory, or whatever it was
+that moved the fifty-seven senators whose votes had ratified the treaty
+by a majority of just one more than the constitutionally necessary
+two-thirds.</p>
+<p>The reason the writer lays so much stress on Mr. Bass&rsquo;s
+letters to <i>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly</i> on the early fighting in the
+Philippines, is because his remarks come direct from the battlefield,
+and are, as it were, <i>res gest&aelig;</i>. They were made <i>dum
+fervet opus</i>, to use a law Latin phrase which in plain English means
+&ldquo;while the iron is hot.&rdquo; They reflect more or less
+accurately the feelings of the men whose deeds he was recording. He,
+and O. K. Davis, now Washington correspondent of the <i>New York
+Times</i>, and John T. McCutcheon, of Chicago, the now famous
+cartoonist (who was with Dewey in the battle of Manila Bay), and Robert
+Collins, now London correspondent of the Associated Press, and
+&ldquo;Dick&rdquo; Little of the <i>Chicago Tribune</i>,&mdash;a little
+man about six feet three,&mdash;and lots of other good men and true,
+were all through that fighting, and we will later come to an issue of
+personal veracity between them and General Otis which culminated in the
+retirement from office of Secretary of War Alger, and ought to have
+resulted in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb206" href="#pb206" name=
+"pb206">206</a>]</span>the recall of General Otis, but did not, because
+to have acknowledged what a blunderer General Otis had been and to have
+relieved him from command, as he should have been relieved, would have
+been to &ldquo;swap horses crossing a stream,&rdquo; as Mr. Lincoln
+used to put it in declining to change generals during a given campaign.
+The object here is to bring out the truth of history as to how the men
+who bore the brunt of the early fighting felt about it. Testimony as to
+what the officers and men of the army said would be of no value,
+because a complaining soldier&rsquo;s complaints are too often only a
+proof of &ldquo;cold feet.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5112src"
+href="#xd20e5112" name="xd20e5112src">29</a></p>
+<p>These newspaper men, not under military orders, were daily risking
+their lives voluntarily, just to keep the American public informed, and
+the American public were kept in darkness and only vouchsafed bulletins
+giving them the progressive lists of their dead and wounded, and this
+last only on demand made upon Secretary Alger by the people of
+Minnesota, the Dakotas, etc., through their senators. The War
+Department did not want the people to know, did not want to admit
+itself, how plucky, vigorous, and patriotic the resistance was. The
+period of the fighting done by the State Volunteers from February until
+fall, when public opinion finally forced the Administration to send
+General Otis an adequate force, is slurred by Secretary of War Root in
+his report for 1899. I do not mean that it was slurred intentionally.
+But the Philippines were a long way off, and Mr. Root and Mr. McKinley
+naturally relied for their information on their commanding general on
+the spot. There were gallant deeds done in the Philippines by those
+Western fellows of the State regiments which volunteered for the war
+with Spain, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb207" href="#pb207" name=
+"pb207">207</a>]</span>that would have made the little fighting around
+Santiago look like&mdash;well, to borrow from &ldquo;Chimmie&rdquo;
+Fadden&rsquo;s fertile vocabulary, &ldquo;like 30 cents.&rdquo; But
+General Otis was not in a position to get the thrill of such things
+from his office window, so very few of them were given much prominence
+by him in his despatches to the Adjutant-General of the army. This was
+wise enough from a political standpoint, seeing that a presidential
+campaign was to ensue in 1900 predicated on the proposition that
+American sovereignty was &ldquo;in accord with the wishes and
+aspirations of the great mass of the Filipinos,&rdquo; to use the words
+of the President&rsquo;s message to Congress of December, 1899.</p>
+<p>Caloocan was taken by General MacArthur on February 10th. The
+natural line of advance thereafter was of course up the railroad,
+because the insurgents held it, and needed it as much as we would.
+Throughout February there were engagements too numerous to mention. The
+navy also entertained the enemy whenever he came too near the shores of
+Manila Bay. One incident in particular is worthy of note, and worthy of
+the best traditions of the navy. I refer to the conduct of Assistant
+Engineer Emory Winship off Malabon, March 4, 1899. Malabon is five
+miles north of Manila, on the bay, not far from Caloocan. On the day
+named, a landing party of 125 men from the U. S. S. <i>Bennington</i>
+went ashore near Malabon to make photographs, in aid of navy gunnery,
+of certain entrenchments and buildings that had been struck by shells
+from the <i>Monadnock</i>. They foolishly failed to throw out scouts
+ahead of their column, and were suddenly greeted with a withering fire
+from a whole regiment of insurgents who had seen them first and lain in
+wait for them. They retired with considerably more haste than they had
+gone forth. The insurgents advanced, firing, at <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb208" href="#pb208" name=
+"pb208">208</a>]</span>double quick, toward the comparative handful of
+Americans, and would undoubtedly have killed the last man jack of them,
+but Engineer Winship, who had been left in charge of the tug that
+brought the landing party shoreward, to keep up steam, saw the
+situation and promptly met it. He unlimbered a 37<i>mm.</i> Hotchkiss
+revolving machine gun which stood in the bow of the tug, and opened up
+with accurate aim on the advancing regiment of Filipinos. Naturally he
+at once became a more important target than the retreating body.
+Nevertheless, he kept pumping lead into that long howling murderous
+advancing brown line until, when within two hundred yards of where the
+tug lay, the line recoiled and retreated, and the landing party got
+safely back to the ship. It was, literally, a case of saving the lives
+of more than a hundred men, by fearless promptness and dogged tenacity
+in the intelligent and skilful performance of duty. The awnings of the
+tug were torn in shreds by the enemy&rsquo;s rain of bullets, and her
+woodwork was much peppered. Winship was hit five times, and still
+carries the bullets in his body, having been retired on account of
+disability resulting therefrom, after being promoted in recognition of
+his work.</p>
+<p>Soon after March 25th, General MacArthur, commanding the Second
+Division of the Eighth Army Corps, advanced from Caloocan up the
+railroad to Malolos, the insurgent capital, some twenty miles away.
+Malolos was taken March 31st. Our February killed were six officers and
+seventy-one enlisted men, total seventy-seven, and a total of 378
+wounded. By the end of March the list swelled to twelve officers and
+127 enlisted men killed, total 139, and a total of 881 wounded, making
+our total casualties, as reported April 1st, 1020. Also 15% of the
+command, or about <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb209" href="#pb209"
+name="pb209">209</a>]</span>2500, were on sick report on that date from
+heat prostrations and the like.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5136src"
+href="#xd20e5136" name="xd20e5136src">30</a> For these and other
+reasons, farther advance up the railroad was halted for a while.</p>
+<p>Meantime, General Lawton, with his staff, consisting of Colonel
+Edwards, Major Starr, and Captains King and Sewall, &ldquo;the big
+four&rdquo; they were called, had come out from New York City by way of
+the Suez Canal, bringing most welcome reinforcements, the 4th and 17th
+Infantry. These people arrived between the 10th and the 22d of March.
+What happened soon after, as a result of their arrival, must now become
+for a brief moment, a part of the panorama, the lay of the land General
+Lawton first swept over being first indicated.</p>
+<p>Luzon is practically bisected, east and west, by the Pasig River and
+a lake out of which it flows almost due west into Manila Bay, Manila
+being at the mouth of the river. Under the Spaniards, all Luzon north
+of the Pasig had been one military district and all Luzon south of the
+Pasig another. The Eighth Army Corps always spoke of northern Luzon as
+&ldquo;the north line,&rdquo; and of southern Luzon as &ldquo;the south
+line.&rdquo; The lake above mentioned is called the Laguna de Bay. It
+is nearly as big as Manila Bay, which last is called twenty odd miles
+wide by thirty long. On the map, the Laguna de Bay roughly resembles a
+half-moon, the man in which looks north, the western horn being near
+Manila, and the eastern near the Pacific coast of Luzon. General Otis
+had learned that at a place called Santa Cruz, toward the eastern end
+of the Laguna de Bay, there were a lot of steam launches and a Spanish
+gun-boat, which, if captured, would prove invaluable for river fighting
+and transportation of supplies along the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb210" href="#pb210" name="pb210">210</a>]</span>Rio Grande de
+Pampanga and the other streams that watered the great central plain
+through which the railroad ran and which would have to be occupied
+later. So as soon as possible after General Lawton arrived and the
+necessary men could be spared, he was sent with 1500 troops to seize
+and bring back the boats in question. Of course the country he should
+overrun would have to be overrun again, because there were not troops
+enough to spare to garrison and hold it. But for the present, the
+launches would help. This expedition was successful, leaving the head
+of the lake nearest Manila on April 9th, and returning April 17th. It
+met with some good hard fighting on the way, sweeping everything before
+it of course, inflicting considerable loss, and suffering some. General
+Lawton&rsquo;s report mentions, among other officers whose conspicuous
+gallantry and efficiency in action attracted his attention, Colonel
+Clarence R. Edwards, now Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the
+War Department, of whose conduct in the capture of Santa Cruz on the
+morning of April 10th, he says: &ldquo;No line of battle could have
+been more courageously or intelligently led.&rdquo;<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e5148src" href="#xd20e5148" name="xd20e5148src">31</a> The
+resistance was pretty real to Colonel Edwards then, <i>i.e.</i>, the
+Benevolent Assimilation was quite strenuous, and it continued to be so
+until his great commander was shot through the breast in the forefront
+of battle in the hour of victory in December thereafter, and the
+colonel came home with the general&rsquo;s body. Since then the colonel
+has soldiered no more, but has remained on duty at Washington, the
+birthplace of the original theory that the Filipinos welcomed our rule,
+charged with the duty of yearning <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb211"
+href="#pb211" name="pb211">211</a>]</span>over the erring Filipino who
+thinks he can govern himself but is mistaken, and also with the still
+more difficult task of trying to live up to the original theory as far
+as circumstances will permit. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos would
+probably have gotten along much better than the Cubans if we had let
+General Lawton do there what he and General Wood were set to work doing
+in Cuba shortly after Santiago fell. Public opinion is a very dangerous
+thing to trifle with, and when, in September, 1899, there was a story
+going the rounds of the American newspapers that Lawton, the hero of El
+Caney, the man who had reflected more glory on American arms in
+striking the shackles of Spain from Cuba than any other one soldier in
+the army, had called the war in the Philippines &ldquo;this accursed
+war,&rdquo; the War Department got busy over the cable to General Otis
+and obtained from him a denial that General Lawton had made such a
+remark. But the public knew its Lawton and what he had done in Cuba,
+and had a suspicion there might be some truth in the rumor. So the War
+Department cabled out saying &ldquo;Newspapers say Lawton&rsquo;s
+denial insufficient,&rdquo; and then repeating the words attributed to
+him. So General Otis sent another denial that filled the bill.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5158src" href="#xd20e5158" name=
+"xd20e5158src">32</a> Of course General Lawton made no such remark. He
+was too good a soldier. It would have demoralized his whole command.
+But I served under him in both hemispheres, and I will always believe
+that he had a certain amount of regret at having to fight the Filipinos
+to keep them from having independence, when they were a so much
+likelier lot, take it all in all, than the Cubans we saw about
+Santiago. Moreover, I believe that had it not been then too late to ask
+him, he would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb212" href="#pb212" name=
+"pb212">212</a>]</span>have subscribed to the opinion Admiral Dewey had
+cabled home the previous summer: &ldquo;These people are far superior
+in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the
+natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>After the expedition down the lake, General Lawton went on
+&ldquo;The North Line.&rdquo; So let us now turn thither also. For
+wherever Lawton was, there was fighting.</p>
+<p>In the latter half of April, General MacArthur advanced north along
+the railroad, and took Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio
+Grande, on April 28th. This was the place where under cover of
+&ldquo;the accurate concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light
+Artillery commanded by Major Young&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5174src" href="#xd20e5174" name="xd20e5174src">33</a> a few
+Kansas men with ropes tied to their bodies swam the river in the face
+of a heavy fire from the enemy, fastened the ropes to some boats on the
+enemy&rsquo;s side, and were pulled back in the boats, by their
+comrades, to the side they had come from; the Kansans then crossing the
+river under the lead of the gallant Funston, and driving the enemy from
+his trenches. The desperate bravery of the performance, like so many
+other things General Funston did in the Philippines, was so superb that
+one forgets how contrary it was to all known rules of the game of war.
+If it was Providence that saved Funston and his Kansans from
+annihilation, certainly Providence was ably assisted on that occasion
+by Major Young and his Utah Battery.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5180src" href="#xd20e5180" name="xd20e5180src">34</a></p>
+<p>Shortly after this General MacArthur entered San <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb213" href="#pb213" name=
+"pb213">213</a>]</span>Fernando, the second insurgent capital, which is
+forty miles or so up the railroad from Manila.</p>
+<p>During the month of May General Lawton kept the insurgents busy to
+the east of the railroad, between it and the Pacific coast range,
+taking San Isidro, whither the third insurgent capital was moved after
+Malolos fell, on May 17th. Here he made his headquarters for a time, as
+did General MacArthur at San Fernando.</p>
+<p>It had been supposed that practically the whole body of the
+insurgent army was concentrated in the country to the north of Manila,
+but this proved a mistake. They now began to threaten Manila from the
+country south of the Pasig. Says General Otis:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the
+South and it became necessary to throw him back once more.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5197src" href="#xd20e5197" name=
+"xd20e5197src">35</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>General Lawton was directed to concentrate his troops in the country
+about San Isidro, turn them over to the command of some one else, and
+come to Manila to organize for a campaign on the south line. The
+<i>details</i> of this expedition belong to a military history, which
+this is not. The expedition left its initial point of concentration
+near Manila on June 9th. Its great event was the battle of Zapote River
+on June 13th. Along this river in 1896 the insurgents had gained a
+great victory over the Spaniards. They had trenches on the farther side
+of the river which they deemed impregnable. General Lawton attacked
+them in these intrenchments June 13th. At three o&rsquo;clock that
+afternoon he wired General Otis at Manila giving him an idea of the
+battle and stating that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with
+determination. At 3:30 o&rsquo;clock he wired: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb214" href="#pb214" name="pb214">214</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition;
+we will need it;</p>
+</div>
+<p>and at 4 o&rsquo;clock:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have the bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not
+yet over. It is a battle however.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5218src"
+href="#xd20e5218" name="xd20e5218src">36</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>It was in this battle of Zapote River that Lieutenant William L.
+Kenly, of the regular artillery, did what was perhaps the finest single
+bit of soldier work of the whole war,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5225src" href="#xd20e5225" name="xd20e5225src">37</a> in
+recognition of which his conduct in the battle was characterized as
+&ldquo;magnificent&rdquo; by so thorough a soldier as General Lawton,
+who recommended him to be brevetted for distinguished gallantry in the
+presence of the enemy, with this remark:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">As General Ovenshine says, speaking of Lieutenant
+Kenly and his battery, &ldquo;This is probably <i>the first time in
+history</i> that a battery has been advanced and <i>fought without
+cover within thirty yards of</i> strongly manned
+trenches.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5237src" href="#xd20e5237"
+name="xd20e5237src">38</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>For what he did on that occasion, Kenly ought to have had a medal of
+honor, which, except life insurance and a good education, is the finest
+legacy any government can enable a soldier to bequeath to his children.
+If the war had been backed by the sentiment of the whole country, as
+the Spanish War was, he would have gotten it. As it was, the only thing
+he ever got for it, so far as the writer is advised, was to have his
+name spelt wrong in an account of the incident in the only book
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb215" href="#pb215" name=
+"pb215">215</a>]</span>wherein there has yet been attempted a record of
+the many deeds of splendid daring that marked the only war into which
+this nation ever blundered.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5247src" href=
+"#xd20e5247" name="xd20e5247src">39</a></p>
+<p>While there were divers and sundry movements of our troops hither
+and thither, and much sacrifice of life, after General Lawton&rsquo;s
+Zapote River campaign in June, no substantial progress was made in
+conquering and occupying the Islands until the fall following the
+Zapote River campaign above mentioned, when the twenty-five regiments
+of volunteers were organized and sent out. All that was done until
+then, after the capture of San Fernando, may be summed up broadly, by
+saying that we protected Manila and held the railroad, as far as we had
+fought our way up it. It is true that the city of Iloilo had been
+occupied on February 11th, the city of Cebu shortly afterward, the
+island of Negros, an oasis of comparative quiet in a great desert of
+hostility, a little later; also that a small Spanish garrison at the
+little port of Jolo in the Mohammedan country near Borneo had also been
+relieved by a small American force on the 19th of May. But these
+irresolute movements accomplished nothing except to deprive our force
+at the front of about 4000 men and to awaken the Visayan Islands to
+active and thorough organization against us.</p>
+<p>Preparatory to an understanding of the fall campaign, in which
+patchwork and piecemeal warfare was superseded by the real thing, it
+will now be necessary to consider the political&mdash;or let us call
+it, the politico-military&mdash;aspect of the first half year of the
+war.</p>
+<p>General Otis&rsquo;s folly had led him to advise Washington as early
+as November, 1898, that he could get along with <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb216" href="#pb216" name=
+"pb216">216</a>]</span>25,000 troops,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5261src" href="#xd20e5261" name="xd20e5261src">40</a> and the
+Otis under-estimate of the resistance we would meet if we took the
+Islands had undoubtedly influenced Mr. McKinley in deciding to take
+them. Twenty-five thousand troops was only 5000 more than General Otis
+had with him at the time he made the recommendation, and signified that
+he was not expecting trouble. The Treaty of Paris was signed on
+December 10, 1898, and on December 16th, President McKinley&rsquo;s
+Secretary of War informed Congress that 25,000 troops would be enough
+for the Philippines.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5266src" href=
+"#xd20e5266" name="xd20e5266src">41</a> When the treaty was ratified
+February 6, 1899, the war in the Philippines had already broken out. On
+March 2, 1899, two days before the 55th Congress expired, in fact on
+the very day that Congress appropriated the $20,000,000 to pay Spain
+for the Islands, an act was passed authorizing the President to enlist
+35,000 volunteers to put down the insurrection in the Islands. The term
+of enlistment of these volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901. As the
+New Thought people would say &ldquo;Hold the Thought!&rdquo; June 30,
+1901, is the end of our government&rsquo;s fiscal year. That date, the
+date of expiration of the enlistment of the volunteer army raised under
+the act of March 2, 1899, is a convenient key to the whole history of
+the American occupation of the Philippines since the outbreak of our
+war with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899, including the titanic efforts
+of the McKinley Administration in the latter half of 1899 and the first
+half of 1900 to retrieve the Otis blunders; the premature resumption by
+Judge Taft, during and in aid of Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s campaign for the
+Presidency in 1900, of the original McKinley Benevolent Assimilation
+programme, on the theory, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb217" href=
+"#pb217" name="pb217">217</a>]</span>already wholly exploded by a long
+and bitter war, that the great majority of the people welcomed American
+rule and had only been coerced into opposing us; and the premature
+setting up of the Civil Government on July 4, 1901. No candid mind
+seeking only the truth of history can fail to see that when President
+McKinley sent the Taft Commission to the Philippines in the spring of
+1900, part of their problem was to facilitate Mr. McKinley in avoiding
+later on any further call for volunteers to take the place of those
+whose terms would expire June 30, 1901. The amount of force that has
+been needed to saddle our government firmly on the Filipino people is
+the only honest test by which to examine the claim that it is unto them
+as Castoria unto children. In February, 1899, the dogs of war being
+already let loose, President McKinley had resumed his now wholly
+impossible Benevolent Assimilation programme, by sending out the
+Schurman Commission, which was the prototype of the Taft Commission, to
+yearningly explain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make clear
+to them how unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme
+was like trying to put salt on a bird&rsquo;s tail after you have
+flushed him. This commission was headed by President Schurman, of
+Cornell University. It arrived in March, armed with instructions as
+benevolent in their rhetoric as any the Filipinos had ever read in the
+days of our predecessors in sovereignty, the Spaniards. And the
+commission were of course duly astounded that their publication had no
+effect. The Filipinos in Manila tore them down as soon as they were put
+up. The instructions clothed the commission with authority to yield
+every point in issue except the only one in dispute&mdash;Independence.
+On this alone they were firm. But so were the people who had already
+submitted the issue to the arbitrament <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb218" href="#pb218" name="pb218">218</a>]</span>of war. Of course the
+Schurman Commission, therefore, accomplished nothing. It held frequent
+communication with the enemy in the field and came near an open rupture
+with General Otis, who was nominally a member of it. But even that
+unwise man knew war when he saw it, and knew the futility of trying to
+mix peace with war. War being hell, the sooner &rsquo;tis over the
+better for all concerned. After Professor Schurman had been quite
+optimistically explaining our intentions for about three months, under
+the tragically mistaken notion Mr. McKinley had originally derived from
+General Otis that the insurrection had been brought about by &ldquo;the
+sinister ambition of a few leaders,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5276src" href="#xd20e5276" name="xd20e5276src">42</a> General
+Otis wired Washington, on June 4th, &ldquo;Negotiations and conferences
+with insurgent leaders cost soldiers&rsquo; lives and prolong our
+difficulties,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5279src" href=
+"#xd20e5279" name="xd20e5279src">43</a> adding with regard to the
+Schurman Commission: &ldquo;Ostensibly it will be supported
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* here, and to the outside world gentle peace shall
+prevail,&rdquo; but intimating that he would be very much gratified if
+the Department would allow him to handle the enemy, and stop Dr.
+Schurman from having their leaders come in under flags of truce to
+parley. After that Dr. Schurman&rsquo;s activities seem to have been
+confined to the less mischievous business of gathering statistics. His
+mistake was simply the one he had brought with him, derived from
+President McKinley. He came back home, however, thoroughly satisfied
+that the Filipinos did of a verity want the independence they were
+fighting for, and quite as sure that republics should not have colonies
+as General Anderson&rsquo;s experience had previously made him. It has
+long been known throughout the length and breadth <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb219" href="#pb219" name="pb219">219</a>]</span>of
+the United States that Dr. Schurman is in favor of Philippine
+independence.</p>
+<p>On June 26th, just thirteen days after the Zapote River fight had
+stopped the insurgents on the south line from threatening almost the
+very gates of the city of Manila itself, General Otis had another
+attack of optimism. On that date he wired Washington: &ldquo;Insurgent
+cause may collapse at any time.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5289src" href="#xd20e5289" name="xd20e5289src">44</a> Finally,
+the war correspondents at Manila, wearied with the military press
+censorship whereby General Otis had so long kept the situation from the
+people at home, with his eternal &ldquo;situation-well-in-hand&rdquo;
+telegrams, got together, inspired no doubt by the example of the
+Roosevelt round robin that had rescued the Fifth Army Corps from Cuba
+after the fighting down there, and prepared a round robin of their
+own&mdash;a protest against further misrepresentation of the facts.
+This they of course knew General Otis would not let them cable home.
+However, they asked his permission to do so, the committee appointed to
+beard the lion in his den being O. K. Davis, John T. McCutcheon, Robert
+Collins, and John F. Bass. General Otis threatened to &ldquo;put them
+off the island.&rdquo; This did not bother them in the least. General
+Otis told the War Department afterwards that he did not punish them
+because they were &ldquo;courting martyrdom,&rdquo; or words to that
+effect. As a matter of fact, they were merely determined that the
+American people should know the facts. That of &ldquo;putting them off
+the island&rdquo; was just a fussy phrase of &ldquo;Mother&rdquo; Otis,
+long familiar to them. They were under his jurisdiction. But they were
+Americans, and reputable gentlemen, and he knew he was responsible for
+their right treatment. After General Otis had duly put the expected
+veto on the proposed <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb220" href="#pb220"
+name="pb220">220</a>]</span>cablegram of protest, the newspaper men
+sent their protest over to Hong Kong by mail, and had it cabled to the
+United States from there. It was published in the newspapers of this
+country July 17, 1899. A copy of it may be found in any public library
+which keeps the bound copies of the great magazines, in the <i>Review
+of Reviews</i> for August, 1899, pp. 137&ndash;8. It read as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of
+American newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following
+statement:</p>
+<p>We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made
+public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received
+a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that
+those despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not
+shared by the general officers in the field.</p>
+<p>We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing
+conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension and
+demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand
+character of their army.</p>
+<p>We believe the despatches err in the declaration that &ldquo;the
+situation is well in hand,&rdquo; and in the assumption that the
+insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased
+force.</p>
+<p>We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been
+under-estimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers
+are willing to engage in further service.</p>
+<p>The censorship has compelled us to participate in this
+misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of
+facts on the plea that &ldquo;they would alarm the people at
+home,&rdquo; or &ldquo;have the people of the United States by the
+ears.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>The men of the pen had been so long under military rule and had seen
+so much of courts-martial that their <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb221" href="#pb221" name="pb221">221</a>]</span>document savored of
+military jurisprudence. After making the above charges, it set forth
+what it called &ldquo;specifications.&rdquo; These were:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full
+reports of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat
+prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval operations;
+and suppression of complete reports of the situation.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The paper was signed by John T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong,
+representing the Chicago <i>Record</i>; O. K. Davis and P. G.
+MacDonnell, representing the New York <i>Sun</i>; Robert M. Collins,
+John P. Dunning, and L. Jones, representing the Associated Press; John
+F. Bass and William Dinwiddie, representing the New York <i>Herald</i>;
+E. D. Skeene, representing the Scripps-McRae Association; and Richard
+Little, representing the Chicago <i>Tribune</i>. Mr. Collins, the
+Associated Press representative, wrote his people an account of this
+whole episode, which was also given wide publicity. After describing
+the committee&rsquo;s interview with the General down to a certain
+point, he says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">But when General Otis came down to the frank admission
+that it was his purpose to keep the knowledge of conditions here from
+the public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in
+ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, &ldquo;My instructions
+are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration,&rdquo; we
+concluded that protest was justifiable.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Collins had written what he considered a conservative review of the
+situation in June, saying reinforcements were needed. Of the
+suppression of this he says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The censor&rsquo;s comment (I made a note of it) was:
+&ldquo;Of course we all know that we are in a terrible mess out here,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb222" href="#pb222" name=
+"pb222">222</a>]</span>but we don&rsquo;t want the people to get
+excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet now we will pull
+through <i>in time</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5348src" href=
+"#xd20e5348" name="xd20e5348src">45</a> without any fuss at
+home!&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p>Mr. Collins&rsquo;s letter proceeds: &ldquo;When I went to see him
+[Otis] he repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to
+pieces.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>As to the charge of suppressing the real condition of our sick in
+the hospitals, Mr. Collins says that General Otis remarked that the
+&ldquo;hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and
+should be turned out.&rdquo; On June 2, 1899, according to General
+Otis&rsquo;s report (p. 121), sixty per cent. of one of the State
+volunteer regiments were in hospital sick or wounded and there were in
+its ranks an average of but eight men to a company fit for duty. The
+report of the regimental surgeon stating this was forwarded by General
+Otis to Washington with the comment that there were few cases of
+serious illness; that the then &ldquo;present station of these
+troops&rdquo;&mdash;the place where the fighting was hottest, San
+Fernando&mdash;&ldquo;is considered by the Filipinos as a health
+resort,&rdquo; and that &ldquo;when orders to take passage to the
+United States are issued, both the Montana and South Dakota troops will
+recover <i>with astonishing rapidity</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5359src" href="#xd20e5359" name="xd20e5359src">46</a></p>
+<p>This round robin of course produced a profound sensation in the
+United States. It was just what the American public had long suspected
+was the case. Shortly afterward Secretary of War Alger resigned. Coming
+as it did on the heels of the scandal about &ldquo;embalmed beef&rdquo;
+having been furnished to the army <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb223"
+href="#pb223" name="pb223">223</a>]</span>in Cuba, it made him too much
+of a load for the Administration to carry. He was succeeded by Mr.
+Root, an eminent member of the New York Bar, whose masterful mind soon
+saw the essentials of the situation and proceeded to get a volunteer
+army recruited, equipped, and sent to the Philippines without further
+unnecessary delay. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb224" href="#pb224"
+name="pb224">224</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4783" href="#xd20e4783src" name="xd20e4783">1</a></span> See
+General Hughes&rsquo;s testimony before Senate Committee, 1902,
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 508.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4793" href="#xd20e4793src" name="xd20e4793">2</a></span> See
+<i>Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President for 1899</i>,
+pp. 7 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4817" href="#xd20e4817src" name="xd20e4817">3</a></span> This is
+no mere attempt at rhetorical decoration. Said General MacArthur to the
+Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo: &ldquo;He was the
+incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos.&rdquo; <i>Senate Document
+331</i>, 1902, p. 1926.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4825" href="#xd20e4825src" name="xd20e4825">4</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, pp. 2927 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4834" href="#xd20e4834src" name="xd20e4834">5</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 208</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4846" href="#xd20e4846src" name="xd20e4846">6</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 62</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898&ndash;9, p.
+383.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4854" href="#xd20e4854src" name="xd20e4854">7</a></span> See end
+of <a href="#ch4">Chapter IV</a>. <i>ante.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4871" href="#xd20e4871src" name="xd20e4871">8</a></span> <i>Otis
+Report for 1899</i>, p. 66.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4883" href="#xd20e4883src" name="xd20e4883">9</a></span>
+<i>Report</i>, p. 99.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4888" href="#xd20e4888src" name="xd20e4888">10</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 100.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4903" href="#xd20e4903src" name="xd20e4903">11</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 150.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4910" href="#xd20e4910src" name="xd20e4910">12</a></span> Raw
+recruits.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4913" href="#xd20e4913src" name="xd20e4913">13</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 375.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4920" href="#xd20e4920src" name="xd20e4920">14</a></span> There
+were thirteen States represented by at least one organization. These
+were the First Californias, Second Oregons, First Colorados, First
+Nebraskas, Tenth Pennsylvanias, Major Young&rsquo;s Utah Battery, the
+First Idahos, Thirteenth Minnesotas, the North Dakota Artillery, the
+Twentieth Kansas, and the Tennessees, Montanas, and Wyomings.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4923" href="#xd20e4923src" name="xd20e4923">15</a></span> The
+regular regiments represented were the 14th, 8th, and 23d Infantry and
+4th Cavalry. There were also some batteries of the Third Regular
+Artillery, and a number of Engineers, Hospital Corps, and Signal Corps
+people.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e4967" href="#xd20e4967src" name="xd20e4967">16</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 440.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5000" href="#xd20e5000src" name="xd20e5000">17</a></span>
+Hearings on affairs in Philippine Islands, 1902.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5003" href="#xd20e5003src" name="xd20e5003">18</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 109.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5008" href="#xd20e5008src" name="xd20e5008">19</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1890.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5016" href="#xd20e5016src" name="xd20e5016">20</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pp. 1890 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5026" href="#xd20e5026src" name="xd20e5026">21</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, p. 1436.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5033" href="#xd20e5033src" name="xd20e5033">22</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1448.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5038" href="#xd20e5038src" name="xd20e5038">23</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, pt. 2, p. 1447.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5060" href="#xd20e5060src" name="xd20e5060">24</a></span> The
+&ldquo;water cure&rdquo; (a cure for reticence) consisted in placing a
+bamboo reed in the victim&rsquo;s mouth and pouring water down his
+throat thus painfully distending his stomach and crowding all his
+viscera. Allowed to void this after a time, he would, under threat of
+repetition, give the desired information.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5065" href="#xd20e5065src" name="xd20e5065">25</a></span> Since
+the above was written, the officer in question has joined the Great
+Majority. It was that fearless, faithful, and kindly man, General Fred.
+D. Grant, who died in April, 1912.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5068" href="#xd20e5068src" name="xd20e5068">26</a></span> The
+lieutenant is no longer in the army, but he resigned voluntarily long
+after the incident related in the text, and for reasons wholly foreign
+to said incident.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5077" href="#xd20e5077src" name="xd20e5077">27</a></span> Of
+course my host&rsquo;s name was not Jones, but Jones will do.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5083" href="#xd20e5083src" name="xd20e5083">28</a></span> Spanish
+for man.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5112" href="#xd20e5112src" name="xd20e5112">29</a></span> A
+Philippine campaign expression for losing one&rsquo;s nerve and wanting
+to quit.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5136" href="#xd20e5136src" name="xd20e5136">30</a></span>
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report</i>, p. 133.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5148" href="#xd20e5148src" name="xd20e5148">31</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 35. In this handsome
+commendation General Lawton also included Maj. Charles G. Starr, one of
+the best all-round soldiers I ever knew.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5158" href="#xd20e5158src" name="xd20e5158">32</a></span> See
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., pp.
+1068 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5174" href="#xd20e5174src" name="xd20e5174">33</a></span>
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report</i>, p. 115.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5180" href="#xd20e5180src" name="xd20e5180">34</a></span> An
+interesting account of this experience is given by General Funston
+himself in the October, 1911, number of <i>Scribner&rsquo;s
+Magazine</i>, in an article entitled &ldquo;From Malolos to San
+Fernando.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5197" href="#xd20e5197src" name="xd20e5197">35</a></span>
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report</i>, p. 136.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5218" href="#xd20e5218src" name="xd20e5218">36</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 138.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5225" href="#xd20e5225src" name="xd20e5225">37</a></span> Except,
+of course, the capture of Aguinaldo by General Funston nearly two years
+later.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5237" href="#xd20e5237src" name="xd20e5237">38</a></span> See
+General Lawton&rsquo;s Report on the Zapote River fight, <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 282.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5247" href="#xd20e5247src" name="xd20e5247">39</a></span> See
+Harper&rsquo;s <i>History of the War in the Philippines</i>, p. 214,
+where the name of the gentleman is spelled &ldquo;Kanly.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5261" href="#xd20e5261src" name="xd20e5261">40</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, Otis Despatches
+of November 27th, vol. ii., p. 846.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5266" href="#xd20e5266src" name="xd20e5266">41</a></span>
+<i>House Document 85</i>, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5276" href="#xd20e5276src" name="xd20e5276">42</a></span> The
+words quoted are from President McKinley&rsquo;s message to Congress of
+December, 1899.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5279" href="#xd20e5279src" name="xd20e5279">43</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1002.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5289" href="#xd20e5289src" name="xd20e5289">44</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1020.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5348" href="#xd20e5348src" name="xd20e5348">45</a></span>
+Meaning, of course, in time not to embarrass President McKinley&rsquo;s
+prospective candidacy for re-election in 1900, in a campaign in which
+all knew the acquisition of the Philippines was sure to be the
+paramount issue.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5359" href="#xd20e5359src" name="xd20e5359">46</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., part 4, p. 122.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch12" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Otis and the War (<i>Continued</i>)</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">And now, a man of head being at the centre of it, the
+whole matter gets vital.&mdash;Carlyle&rsquo;s <i>French
+Revolution</i>.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">There can surely be little doubt in any quarter that
+Mr. Root is, in intellectual endowment and equipment at least, one of
+the greatest, if he is not <i>the</i> greatest, of living American
+statesmen. Mankind will always yield due acclaim to men who, in great
+emergencies, see the essentials of a given situation, and at once
+proceed to get the thing done that ought to be done. Whether the war in
+the Philippines was regrettable or not, it had become, by midsummer of
+1899, supremely important, from any rational and patriotic standpoint,
+to end it as soon as possible.</p>
+<p>Mr. Root had not been in office as Secretary of War very long before
+fleets of troop-ships, carrying some twenty-five well-equipped
+volunteer regiments,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5391src" href=
+"#xd20e5391" name="xd20e5391src">1</a> were <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb225" href="#pb225" name=
+"pb225">225</a>]</span>swarming out of New York harbor bound for Manila
+by way of the Suez Canal, and out of the Golden Gate for the same
+destination <i>via</i> Honolulu. Nor was there any confusion as in the
+Cuban helter-skelter. Everything went as if by clockwork. Moreover,
+along with the new and ample force, went a clear, masterly,
+comprehensive plan of campaign, prepared, not by General Otis at
+Manila, but in the War Department at Washington, by officers already
+familiar with the islands.</p>
+<p>It was the purpose of this government at last to demonstrate
+conclusively to the Filipino people that the representative of the
+United States at Manila was &ldquo;the boss of the show,&rdquo; and
+that Aguinaldo was <i>not</i>&mdash;a demonstration then sorely needed
+by the exigencies of American prestige. The purpose can readily be
+appreciated, but to understand the plan of campaign, and the method of
+its execution, somewhat of the geography of Luzon must now be
+considered. Before we approach the shores of Luzon and the city of
+Manila, however, let us consider from a distance, in a bird&rsquo;s-eye
+view, as it were, the relation of Luzon to the rest of the archipelago,
+so as to know, in a comprehensive way, what we are &ldquo;going out for
+to see.&rdquo; We may as well pause at this point, long enough to learn
+all we will ever need to know, for the purposes of the scope of this
+narrative, concerning the general geography of the Philippine
+archipelago, and the governmental problems it presents. (<i>See folding
+map at end of volume.</i>)</p>
+<p>It is a common saying that Paris is France. In the same sense Manila
+<i>is</i> the Philippines. In fact, the latter expression is more
+accurate than the former, for Manila, besides being the capital city of
+the country, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb226" href="#pb226" name=
+"pb226">226</a>]</span><i>and</i> its chief port, is a city of over
+200,000 people, while no one of the two or three cities next to it in
+rank in population had more than 20,000.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5418src" href="#xd20e5418" name="xd20e5418src">2</a> By parity of
+reasoning it may be said that Luzon <i>was</i> the Philippines, so far
+as the problem which confronted us when we went there was concerned,
+relatively both to the original conception in 1898 of the struggle for
+independence, its birth in 1899, its life, and its slow, lingering
+obstinate death in 1900&ndash;1902, in which last year the insurrection
+was finally correctly stated to be practically ended. To know just how
+and why this was true, is necessary to a clear understanding of that
+struggle, including not only its genesis and its exodus, but also its
+gospels, its acts, its revelations, and the multitudinous subsequent
+commentaries thereon.</p>
+<p>The total land area of the Philippine archipelago, according to the
+American Census of 1903, is 115,000 square miles.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5432src" href="#xd20e5432" name="xd20e5432src">3</a> The area of
+Luzon, the principal island, on which Manila is situated, is 41,000
+square miles, and that of Mindanao, the only other large island, is
+36,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5438src" href="#xd20e5438" name=
+"xd20e5438src">4</a> Between these two large islands, Luzon on the
+north, and Mindanao on the south, there are a number of smaller ones,
+but acquaintance with only six of these is essential to a clear
+understanding of the American occupation. Many Americans, too busy to
+have paid <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb227" href="#pb227" name=
+"pb227">227</a>]</span>much attention to the Philippine Islands, which
+are, and must ever remain, a thing wholly apart from American life,
+have a vague notion that there are several thousand of them. This is
+true, in a way. American energy has made, for the first time in their
+history, an actual count of them, &ldquo;including everything which at
+high tide appeared as a separate island.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5445src" href="#xd20e5445" name="xd20e5445src">5</a> The work was
+done for our Census of 1903 by Mr. George R. Putnam, now head of the
+Lighthouse Board of the United States. Mr. Putnam, counted 3141 of
+them.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5450src" href="#xd20e5450" name=
+"xd20e5450src">6</a> Of these, of course, many&mdash;many hundred
+perhaps&mdash;are merely rocks fit only for a resting place for birds.
+2775, have an area of less than a square mile each, 262 have an area of
+between 1 and 10 square miles, 73 between 10 and 100 square miles, and
+20 between 100 and 1000 square miles. This accounts for, and may
+dismiss at once from consideration 3130&mdash;all but 11. Most of these
+3130 that are large enough to demand even so much as a single word here
+are poorly adapted to human habitation, being in most instances,
+without good harbors or other landing places, and usually covered
+either with dense jungle or inhospitable mountains, or both. Their
+total area is only about 8500 square miles, of the 115,500 square miles
+of land in the archipelago. None of them have ever had any political
+significance, either in Spain&rsquo;s time, or our own, and therefore,
+the whole 3130 may at once be eliminated from consideration, leaving 11
+only requiring any special notice at all&mdash;the 11 largest islands.
+Of these, Luzon and Mindanao have already been mentioned. The remaining
+9, with their respective areas and populations, are: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb228" href="#pb228" name="pb228">228</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Island</i></td>
+<td><i>Area<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5465src" href="#xd20e5465" name=
+"xd20e5465src">7</a> in Square Miles</i></td>
+<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5474src" href=
+"#xd20e5474" name="xd20e5474src">8</a></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Panay</td>
+<td>4,611</td>
+<td>743,646</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Negros</td>
+<td>4,881</td>
+<td>560,776</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cebu</td>
+<td>1,762</td>
+<td>592,247</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bohol</td>
+<td>1,411</td>
+<td>243,148</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Samar</td>
+<td>5,031</td>
+<td>222,690</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leyte</td>
+<td>2,722<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5520src" href="#xd20e5520" name=
+"xd20e5520src">9</a></td>
+<td>357,641</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Mindoro</td>
+<td>3,851</td>
+<td>28,361</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Masbate</td>
+<td>1,236</td>
+<td>29,451</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Paragua</td>
+<td>4,027<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5544src" href="#xd20e5544" name=
+"xd20e5544src">10</a></td>
+<td>10,918</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">29,532</td>
+<td class="sum">2,788,878</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141
+islands to eleven, the last three of the nine contained in the above
+table may also be eliminated as follows: (<i><a href="#map">See map at
+end of volume</a>.</i>)</p>
+<p>Paragua, the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of
+any map of the archipelago, extending northeast southwest at an angle
+of about 45&deg;, is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much
+except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used.</p>
+<p>Masbate&mdash;easily located on the map at a glance, because the
+twelfth parallel of north latitude intersects the 124th meridian of
+longitude east of Greenwich in its southeast corner&mdash;though noted
+for cattle and other quadrupeds, is not essential to a clear
+understanding of the human problem in its broader governmental
+aspects.</p>
+<div class="figure xd20e5571width" id="p228"><img src="images/p228.jpg"
+alt=
+"Bird&rsquo;s-eye view of the Philippine Archipelago, showing the preponderating importance of Luzon."
+width="539" height="720">
+<p class="figureHead">Bird&rsquo;s-eye view of the Philippine
+Archipelago, showing the preponderating importance of Luzon.</p>
+<p class="first">For greater details, see <a href="#map">folding
+map</a> at end of volume.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb229" href="#pb229" name=
+"pb229">229</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzon,
+pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is thick
+with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part of its area,
+has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious), is also very
+sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure
+politically, as a disturbing factor.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5583src" href="#xd20e5583" name="xd20e5583src">11</a></p>
+<p>Eliminating Paragua, Masbate, and Mindoro as not essential to a
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e5588" title=
+"Source: substanially">substantially</span> correct general idea of the
+strategic and governmental problems presented by the Philippine
+Islands, we have left, besides Luzon and Mindanao, nothing but the
+half-dozen islands which appear in large type in the above table:
+Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, with a total area of 20,500
+square miles. Add these to Luzon&rsquo;s 41,000 square miles and
+Mindanao&rsquo;s 36,000, and you have the Philippine archipelago as we
+are to consider it in this book, that is to say, two big islands with a
+half dozen little ones in between, the eight having a total area of
+97,500 square miles, of which the two big islands represent nearly
+four-fifths.</p>
+<p>While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its
+36,000 square miles<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5593src" href=
+"#xd20e5593" name="xd20e5593src">12</a> of area, requires that the
+Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more than 1000
+miles from north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains
+about 500,000 people all told,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5599src"
+href="#xd20e5599" name="xd20e5599src">13</a> half of them
+semi-civilized,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5605src" href="#xd20e5605"
+name="xd20e5605src">14</a> the governmental problem it presents has
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb230" href="#pb230" name=
+"pb230">230</a>]</span>no more to do with the main problem of whether,
+if ever, we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of
+the other islands, than the questions that have to be passed on by our
+Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff.</p>
+<p>Mindanao&rsquo;s 36,000 square miles constitute nearly a third of
+the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that
+fraction of the 97,500 square miles of territory to a consideration of
+which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination above
+indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan,
+semi-civilized Moros would indeed be &ldquo;like granting
+self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief,&rdquo;
+as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would
+be to grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e5612src" href="#xd20e5612" name="xd20e5612src">15</a>
+Furthermore, the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe
+allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects of, some
+great nation.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5618src" href="#xd20e5618"
+name="xd20e5618src">16</a> Again, because, the Filipinos have no moral
+right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, the latter
+being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible
+ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate
+of the consent-of-the-governed principle has <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb231" href="#pb231" name="pb231">231</a>]</span>not
+a leg to stand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm
+that as to it, we have a distinct and separate problem, which cannot be
+solved in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which
+need not in the least delay the advent of independence for the other
+fourteen-fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5623src" href="#xd20e5623" name=
+"xd20e5623src">17</a>&mdash;all Christians living on islands north of
+Mindanao. It is true that there are some Christian Filipinos on
+Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our government would of course
+protect them from the Moros. If they did not like our government, they
+could move to such parts of the island as we might permit to be
+incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the
+300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and the
+adjacent islets called Jolo (the &ldquo;Sulu Archipelago,&rdquo; so
+called, &ldquo;reigned over&rdquo; by the Sultan of comic opera fame)
+originally presented, as they will always present, a distinct and
+separate problem, and never did have anything more to do with the
+Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins and
+co-religionists over in nearby Borneo, the task which confronted Mr.
+Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine
+insurrection, meant, practically, the subjugation of one big island,
+Luzon, containing half the population and one-third the total area of
+the archipelago, and six neighboring smaller ones, the Visayan
+Islands.</p>
+<p>And now let us concentrate our attention upon Luzon as Mr. Root no
+doubt did, with infinite pains, in the fall of 1899. Of the 7,600,000
+people of the Philippines<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5628src" href=
+"#xd20e5628" name="xd20e5628src">18</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb232" href="#pb232" name="pb232">232</a>]</span>almost exactly
+one-half, <i>i.e.</i>, 3,800,000,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5639src"
+href="#xd20e5639" name="xd20e5639src">19</a> live on Luzon, and these
+are practically all civilized.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5645src"
+href="#xd20e5645" name="xd20e5645src">20</a> It so happens that the
+State of our Union which is nearer the size of Luzon than any other is
+the one which furnished the first American Civil Governor for the
+Philippine Islands, Governor Taft. President Taft&rsquo;s native State
+of Ohio is 41,061 square miles in area, and Luzon is 40,969.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5652src" href="#xd20e5652" name=
+"xd20e5652src">21</a> Roughly speaking, Luzon may also be said to be
+about the size of Cuba,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5657src" href=
+"#xd20e5657" name="xd20e5657src">22</a> though it is about twice as
+thickly populated as the latter, Cuba, having something over 2,000,000
+people to Luzon&rsquo;s nearly 4,000,000.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5660src" href="#xd20e5660" name="xd20e5660src">23</a></p>
+<div class="figure xd20e5663width" id="p232"><img src="images/p232.jpg"
+alt="Outline sketch of the theatre of operations in Luzon, 1899."
+width="440" height="720">
+<p class="figureHead">Outline sketch of the theatre of operations in
+Luzon, 1899.</p>
+</div>
+<p>By all Americans in the Philippines since our occupation, the island
+of Luzon is always contemplated as consisting of two parts, to wit,
+northern Luzon, or that part north of Manila, and southern Luzon, the
+part south of Manila. The great central plain of Luzon, lying just
+north of Manila, is nearly as large as the republic of Salvador, or the
+State of New Jersey, <i>i.e.</i>, in the neighborhood of 7000 square
+miles area<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5672src" href="#xd20e5672" name=
+"xd20e5672src">24</a>&mdash;and, like Salvador, it contains a
+population of something over 1,000,000 inhabitants. The area and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb233" href="#pb233" name=
+"pb233">233</a>]</span>population of the five provinces of this plain
+are, according to the <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5693src" href="#xd20e5693"
+name="xd20e5693src">25</a> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5702src" href=
+"#xd20e5702" name="xd20e5702src">26</a></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pangasinan</td>
+<td>1,193</td>
+<td>397,902</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pampanga</td>
+<td>868</td>
+<td>223,754</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bulacan</td>
+<td>1,173</td>
+<td>223,742</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tarlac</td>
+<td>1,205</td>
+<td>135,107</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
+<td>1,950</td>
+<td>134,147</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">6,389</td>
+<td class="sum">1,114,652</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Roughly speaking, the central plain comprising the above five
+provinces is bounded as follows: On the north by mountains and Lingayen
+Gulf, on the east by a coast range of mountains separating it from the
+Pacific Ocean, on the west by a similar range separating it from the
+China Sea, and on the south by Manila Bay and mountains. The Rio Grande
+de Pampanga flows obliquely across it in a southwesterly direction into
+Manila Bay, and near its western edge runs the railroad from Manila to
+Dagupan on Lingayen gulf. Dagupan is 120 miles from Manila. This plain,
+held by a well-equipped insurgent army backed by the moral support of
+the whole population, became the theatre of war as soon as the
+volunteers of 1899 began to arrive at Manila, the insurgent capital
+being then at Tarlac, a place about two-thirds of the way up the
+railroad from Manila to Dagupan.</p>
+<p>Of course the first essential thing to do was to break <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb234" href="#pb234" name="pb234">234</a>]</span>the
+backbone of the insurgent army, and scatter it, and the next thing to
+do was to capture Aguinaldo, the head and front of the whole business,
+the incarnation of the aspirations of the Filipino people. The
+operations to this end commenced in October, and involved three
+movements of three separate forces:</p>
+<p>(1) A column under General Lawton, proceeding up the Rio Grande and
+along the northeastern borders of the plain, and bending around
+westward along its northern boundary toward the gulf of Lingayen,
+garrisoning the towns en route, and occupying the mountain passes on
+the northeast which give exit over the divide into the great valleys
+beyond.</p>
+<p>(2) An expedition under General Wheaton, some 2500 in all,
+proceeding by transports to the gulf of Lingayen, the chief port of
+which, Dagupan, was the northern terminus of the railroad; the
+objective being to land on the shore of that gulf at the northwest
+corner of the plain, occupy the great coast road which runs from that
+point to the northern extremity of the island, and also to proceed
+eastward and effect a junction with the Lawton column.</p>
+<p>(3) A third column under General MacArthur, proceeding up the
+railroad to the capture of Tarlac, the third insurgent capital, and
+thence still up the railroad to its end at Dagupan, driving the
+enemy&rsquo;s forces before it toward the line held by the first two
+columns.</p>
+<p>On October 12th, General Lawton moved up the Rio Grande from a place
+called Aryat, a few miles up stream from where the railroad crosses the
+river at Calumpit, driving the insurgents before him to the northward
+and westward. His command was made up mainly from the 3d Cavalry and
+the 22d Infantry, together with several hundred scouts, American and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb235" href="#pb235" name=
+"pb235">235</a>]</span>Maccabebee. On the 20th San Isidro was again
+captured. That was the place Lawton had evacuated in May previous.
+Arriving in the Islands with Colonel E. E. Hardin&rsquo;s regiment, the
+29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, on November 3, 1899, the writer was
+immediately detailed to the Maccabebee scouts, to take the place of
+Lieutenant Boutelle, of the regular artillery, a young West Pointer
+from Oregon, who had been killed a day or two previous, and reported to
+Major C. G. Starr, General Lawton&rsquo;s Adjutant-General in the field
+(whom he had known at Santiago de Cuba the previous year) at San Isidro
+on or about November 8th. Major Starr said: &ldquo;We took this town
+last spring,&rdquo; stating how much our loss had been in so doing,
+&ldquo;but, partly as a result of the Schurman Commission parleying
+with the insurgents General Otis had us fall back. We have just had to
+take it again.&rdquo; General Lawton garrisoned San Isidro this time
+once for all, and pressed on north, capturing the successive towns en
+route. Meantime, General Young&rsquo;s cavalry, and the Maccabebee
+scouts under Major Batson, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a
+medal-of-honor graduate of the Santiago campaign, were operating to the
+west of the general line of advance, striking insurgent detachments
+wherever found and driving them toward the line of the railroad. By
+November 13th, Lawton&rsquo;s advance had turned to the westward,
+according to the concerted plan of campaign above described,
+garrisoning, as fast as they were taken, such of the towns of the
+country over which he swept as there were troops to spare for. We knew
+that Aguinaldo had been at Tarlac when the advance began, and every
+officer and enlisted man of the command was on the <i>qui vive</i> to
+catch him. By November 18th, General Lawton&rsquo;s forces held a line
+of posts extending up the eastern <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb236"
+href="#pb236" name="pb236">236</a>]</span>side of the plain, and
+curving around across the northern end to within a few miles of the
+gulf of Lingayen.</p>
+<p>On November 6th, General Wheaton set sail from Manila for Lingayen
+Gulf, with 2500 men of the 13th Regular and 33d Volunteer Infantry, and
+a platoon of the 6th Artillery, convoyed by the ships of the navy, and
+next day the expedition was successfully landed at San Fabian,
+&ldquo;with effective assistance from the naval convoy against spirited
+resistance,&rdquo; says Secretary of War Root, in his annual report for
+1899. The navy&rsquo;s assistance on that occasion was indeed
+&ldquo;effective,&rdquo; but such passing mention hardly covers the
+case. In the first place, they selected the landing point, their
+patrols being already familiar with the coasts. As soon as the
+transports were sighted, about eleven o&rsquo;clock on the morning of
+November 7th, Commander Knox, the senior officer present, who commanded
+the <i>Princeton</i>, and Commander Moore, of the <i>Helena</i>, went
+out to meet and confer with General Wheaton. This done, the landing was
+effected under protection of the navy&rsquo;s guns. Besides the naval
+vessels above named, there were also present the <i>Bennington</i>
+under Commander Arnold, the <i>Manila</i> under Lieutenant-Commander
+Nazro, and two captured Spanish gun-boats small enough to get close in
+shore, the <i>Callao</i>, and the <i>Samar</i>. The troops were
+disembarked in two columns of small boats towed by launches.
+Lieutenant-Commander Tappan in charge of the <i>Callao</i>, and Ensign
+Mustin, commanding the <i>Samar</i>, were especially commended in the
+despatches of Admiral Watson, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic
+squadron. Both bombarded the insurgent trenches at close range during
+the landing, and Mustin actually steamed in between the insurgents and
+the head of the column of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb237" href=
+"#pb237" name="pb237">237</a>]</span>troop-boats, so as to intercept
+and receive the brunt of their fire himself, and, selecting a point
+about seventy-five yards from the enemy&rsquo;s trenches whence he
+could effectually pepper them, ran his ship aground so she would stick,
+and commenced rapid firing at point blank range, driving the enemy from
+his trenches, and enabling Colonel Hare of the 33d, and those who
+followed, to land without being subjected to further fire while on the
+water.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5802src" href="#xd20e5802" name=
+"xd20e5802src">27</a></p>
+<p>On the 11th of November, Colonel Hare with the 33d Volunteer
+Infantry and one Gatling gun under Captain Charles R. Howland of the
+28th Volunteer Infantry, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a member
+of General Wheaton&rsquo;s staff, proceeded southeastward to San
+Jacinto, and attacked and routed some 1200 to 1600 intrenched
+insurgents, Major John A. Logan being among our killed. The enemy left
+eighty-one dead in the trenches, and suffered a total loss estimated at
+three hundred. While space does not permit dwelling on the details of
+engagements, it may be remarked here, once for all, that the 33d
+Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Luther R. Hare commanding, made more
+reputation than any other of the twenty-five regiments of the volunteer
+army of 1899, except, possibly, Colonel J. Franklin Bell&rsquo;s
+regiment, the 36th. This is no reflection on the rest. These two were
+lucky enough to have more opportunities. In meeting his opportunities,
+however, Colonel Hare, like Colonel Bell, proved himself a superb
+soldier; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb238" href="#pb238" name=
+"pb238">238</a>]</span>his field-officers, especially Major
+March,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5812src" href="#xd20e5812" name=
+"xd20e5812src">28</a> were particularly indefatigable; and his men were
+mostly Texans, accustomed to handling a rifle with effect. Space also
+forbids following Captain Howland and his Gatling gun into the
+engagement of November 11th, but from the uniformity with which General
+Wheaton&rsquo;s official reports commend his young aide&rsquo;s bravery
+and efficiency on numerous occasions in 1899&ndash;1900, it may be
+safely assumed that those qualities were behind that Gatling gun at San
+Jacinto. There was a vicious rumor started after the San Jacinto fight
+and given wide circulation in the United States, that Major Logan was
+shot in the back by his own men. I saw a major surgeon a few days later
+who had been an eye-witness to his death. He said an insurgent
+sharpshooter shot Major Logan from a tree, and that the said
+sharpshooter was promptly thereafter dropped from his perch full of 33d
+Infantry bullets. Says General Wheaton&rsquo;s despatch of November
+12th: &ldquo;Major Logan fell while gallantly leading his
+battalion.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5815src" href="#xd20e5815"
+name="xd20e5815src">29</a></p>
+<p>On November 5th, General MacArthur, with a strong column, composed
+mainly of the 9th, 17th, and 36th Regiments of Infantry, two troops of
+the 4th Cavalry, two platoons of the 1st Artillery, and a detachment of
+scouts, advanced up the railroad from Angeles, in execution of his part
+of the programme.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5826src" href="#xd20e5826"
+name="xd20e5826src">30</a> Angeles is some distance up the railroad
+from Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb239" href="#pb239" name="pb239">239</a>]</span>Rio
+Grande.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5831src" href="#xd20e5831" name=
+"xd20e5831src">31</a> General MacArthur&rsquo;s column encountered and
+overwhelmed the enemy at every point, entering Tarlac on November 12th,
+and effecting a junction with General Wheaton at Dagupan, the northern
+terminus of the Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 120 miles from Manila, on
+November 20th.</p>
+<p>After General Lawton had finished his part of the round-up, he had a
+final conference with General Young on November 18th at Pozorubio,
+which is near the northeastern border of the plain, bade him good-bye,
+and soon afterward went south to dispose of a body of insurgents who
+were giving trouble near Manila. It was in this last expedition that he
+lost his life at San Mateo about twelve miles out of Manila on December
+19, 1899.</p>
+<p>The first of the two purposes of the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur
+northern advance, viz., the dispersion of the insurgent army of
+northern Luzon had been duly accomplished. The other purpose had failed
+of realization. Aguinaldo had not been captured. He escaped through our
+lines.</p>
+<p>Such is in brief the story of the destruction of the Aguinaldo
+government in 1899 by General Otis, or rather by Mr. Root. But the
+trouble about it was that it would not stay destroyed. It &ldquo;played
+possum&rdquo; for a while, the honorable President retiring to
+permanent headquarters in the mountains &ldquo;with his government
+concealed about his person,&rdquo; as Senator Lodge put it later in a
+summary of the case for the Administration, before the Senate, in the
+spring of 1900. If the distinguished and accomplished senator from
+Massachusetts, in adding at that time to the gaiety of nations,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb240" href="#pb240" name=
+"pb240">240</a>]</span>had had access to a certain diary kept by one of
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s personal staff throughout that period, subsequently
+submitted, in 1902, to the Senate Committee of that year, he could have
+swelled the innocuous merriment with such cheery entries as &ldquo;Here
+we tightened our belts and went to bed on the ground&rdquo;&mdash;the
+time alluded to being midnight after a hard day&rsquo;s march without
+food, the place, some chilly mountain top up which the &ldquo;Honorable
+Presidente&rdquo; and party had that day been guided by the
+ever-present and ever-willing <i>paisano</i> (fellow countryman) of the
+immediate neighborhood&mdash;whatever the neighborhood&mdash;to
+facilitate them in eluding General Young&rsquo;s hard riding cavalry
+and scouts. The writer has no quarrel with Senator Lodge&rsquo;s
+witticism above quoted, having derived on reading it, in full measure,
+the suggestive amusement it was intended to afford. It is true that
+about all then left of the &ldquo;Honorable Presidente&rsquo;s&rdquo;
+government, for the nonce, was in fact concealed about his person. It
+was of a nature easily portable. It needed neither bull trains, pack
+ponies, nor coolies to carry it. It consisted solely of the loyal
+support of the whole people, who looked to him as the incarnation of
+their aspirations. Said General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in
+1902 concerning Aguinaldo: &ldquo;He was the incarnation of the
+feelings of the Filipinos.&rdquo; &ldquo;Senator Culberson: &lsquo;And
+represented the Filipino people?&rsquo; General MacArthur: &lsquo;I
+think so; yes&rsquo;.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5845src" href=
+"#xd20e5845" name="xd20e5845src">32</a> We of the 8th Army Corps did
+not know what a complete structure the Philippine republic of
+1898&ndash;9 was until, having shot it to pieces, we had abundant
+leisure to examine the ruins. To admit, in the same breath,
+participation in that war and profound regret that it ever had
+occurred, is not an incriminating <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb241"
+href="#pb241" name="pb241">241</a>]</span>admission. In this case as in
+any other where you have done another a wrong, by thrashing him or
+otherwise, under a mistake of fact, the first step toward righting the
+wrong is to frankly acknowledge it. As soon as Aguinaldo&rsquo;s flight
+and wanderings terminated in the finding of permanent headquarters, he
+began sending messages to his various generals all over Luzon and the
+other islands, and wherever those orders were not intercepted they were
+delivered and loyally obeyed. This kept up until General Funston
+captured him in 1901. One traitor among all those teeming millions
+might have betrayed his whereabouts, but none appeared. The obstinate
+character and long continuance of the warfare in northern Luzon after
+the great round-up which terminated with the final junction of the
+Lawton, Wheaton, and MacArthur columns near Dagupan, as elsewhere later
+throughout the archipelago, was at first very surprising to our
+generals. It had been supposed that to disperse the insurgent army
+would end the insurrection. As events turned out, it only made the
+resistance more effective. So long as the insurgents kept together in
+large bodies they could not hide. And as they were poor marksmen, while
+the men behind our guns, like most other young Americans, knew
+something about shooting, the ratio of their casualties to ours was
+about 16 to 1.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5852src" href="#xd20e5852"
+name="xd20e5852src">33</a> When General MacArthur began his advance on
+Tarlac, General Lawton his great march up the valley of the Rio Grande,
+and General Wheaton his closing in from Dagupan, Aguinaldo with his
+cabinet, generals, and headquarters troops abandoned Tarlac, their
+capital, and went up the railroad to Bayambang. Here they held a
+council of war, which General MacArthur <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb242" href="#pb242" name="pb242">242</a>]</span>describes in his
+report for 1900 (from information obtained later on) as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan,
+about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and
+many of the Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the
+effect that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance
+in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the army,
+the generals and the men to return to their own provinces, with a view
+to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla
+warfare.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5861src" href="#xd20e5861" name=
+"xd20e5861src">34</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This had been the plan from the beginning, the council of war simply
+determining that the time to put the plan into effect had arrived.
+Accordingly, the uniformed insurgent battalions and regiments broke up
+into small bands which maintained a most persistent guerrilla warfare
+for years thereafter. During those years they seldom wore uniforms,
+disappearing and hiding their guns when hotly pursued, and reappearing
+as non-combatant peasants interrupted in agricultural pursuits, with
+invariable protestations of friendship. Hence all such came to be known
+as <i>amigos</i> (friends), and the word <i>amigo</i>, or friend,
+became a bitter by-word, meaning to all American soldiers throughout
+the archipelago an enemy falsely claiming to be a friend. <i>And every
+Filipino was an &ldquo;amigo.&rdquo;</i></p>
+<p>Still, the volunteers had arrived in time to enable Mr. Root to make
+a very nice showing to Congress, and through it to the people, in his
+annual report to the President for 1899, dated November 29th. This
+report is full of cheerful chirps from General Otis to the effect that
+the resistance was practically ended, and the substance of the
+information it conveyed duly <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb243" href=
+"#pb243" name="pb243">243</a>]</span>found its way into the
+President&rsquo;s message of December of that year and through it to
+the general public. One of the Otis despatches said: &ldquo;Claim to
+government by insurgents can be made no longer.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5881src" href="#xd20e5881" name=
+"xd20e5881src">35</a> This message went on to state that nothing was
+now left but &ldquo;banditti,&rdquo; and that the people are all
+friendly to our troops. Thus misled, Mr. Root repeated to the President
+and through him to Congress and the country the following nonsense:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away
+from the immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the
+country exceedingly friendly *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. This was doubtless due in
+some measure to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces
+of Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan,
+as well as the other more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the
+Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of that
+tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In characterizing this as nonsense no disrespect is intended to Mr.
+Root. He did not know any better. He was relying on General Otis. But
+it is sorely difficult to convey in written words what utter nonsense
+those expressions about &ldquo;the Pampangos&rdquo; and &ldquo;the
+Pangasinanes&rdquo; are to any one who was in that northern advance in
+the fall of 1899. Imagine a British cabinet minister making a report to
+Parliament in 1776 couched in the following words, to wit:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Massachusetts-ites, who inhabit Massachusetts, and
+the Virginia-ites who inhabit Virginia, as well as most of the other
+inhabitants are unfriendly to the New York-ites, and have simply
+submitted to the military domination of the last named,</p>
+</div>
+<p>and you have a faint idea of the accuracy of Mr. Root&rsquo;s
+report. It is quite true that the Tagalos were <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb244" href="#pb244" name="pb244">244</a>]</span>the
+prime movers in the insurrection against us, as they had been in all
+previous insurrections against Spain. But the &ldquo;Tagalo
+tribe&rdquo; was no more alone among the Filipino people in their
+wishes and views than the &ldquo;unterrified&rdquo; Tammany tribe who
+inhabit the wilds of Manhattan Island, at the mouth of the Hudson
+River, are alone in their views among our people.</p>
+<p>On page 70 of this report, Secretary Root reproduces a telegram from
+General Otis dated November 18, 1899, stating that on the road from San
+Nicolas to San Manuel, a day or so previous, General Lawton was
+&ldquo;cordially received by the inhabitants.&rdquo; He announces in
+the same telegram the drowning of Captain Luna, a volunteer officer
+from New Mexico, who was one of General Lawton&rsquo;s aides, and had
+been a captain in Colonel Roosevelt&rsquo;s regiment of Rough Riders
+before Santiago. The writer happens to have been on that ride with
+General Lawton from San Nicolas to San Manuel, and was within a dozen
+feet of Captain Luna when the angry current of the Agno River caught
+him and his pony in its grip and swept both out of sight forever, along
+with divers troopers of the 4th Cavalry, horses and riders writhing to
+their death in one awful, tangled, struggling mass. He can never forget
+the magnificent dash back into the wide, ugly, swollen stream made by
+Captain Edward L. King of General Lawton&rsquo;s staff, as he spurred
+his horse in, followed by several troopers who had responded to his
+call for mounted volunteers to accompany him in an effort to save the
+lives of the men who went down. Their generous work proved futile. But
+it was inspired partly by common dread of what they knew would happen
+to any half-drowned soldier who might be washed ashore far away from
+the column and captured. If an army was ever &ldquo;in enemy&rsquo;s
+country&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb245" href="#pb245" name=
+"pb245">245</a>]</span>it was then and there. When we reached San
+Manuel that night, Captains King and Sewall, the two surviving personal
+aides of General Lawton&rsquo;s staff, and the writer, stopped, along
+with the general, in a little <i>nipa</i> shack on the roadside.
+General Lawton, was in an upper room busy with couriers and the like,
+but downstairs King, Sewall, and myself set to work to
+<i>buscar</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e5910src" href="#xd20e5910"
+name="xd20e5910src">36</a> something to eat. I got hold of an
+<i>hombre</i> (literally, a man; colloquially a native peasant man),
+who went to work with apparent alacrity, and managed to provide three
+ravenously hungry young men with a good meal of chicken, eggs, and
+rice. After supper, being new in the country, the writer remarked to
+the general on the alacrity of the <i>hombre</i>. I had brought out
+from the United States the notions there current about the nature of
+the resistance. General Lawton said, with a humorous twinkle in those
+fine eyes of his: &ldquo;Humph! If you expected to be killed the next
+minute if you didn&rsquo;t find a chicken, <i>you&rsquo;d</i> probably
+find one too.&rdquo; It is true that in the course of the campaign
+General Young sent a telegram to General Otis at Manila characterizing
+his reception at the hands of the natives as friendly. This was
+prompted by our column being met as it would come into a town by the
+town band. It did not take long to see through this, and other like
+hypocrisy entirely justifiable in war, though such tactics deceived us
+for a little while at first into thinking the people were genuine
+<i>amigos</i> (friends). General Otis, not being near the scene,
+remained under our original brief illusion. Let us return, however,
+from Mr. Root&rsquo;s &ldquo;patient and unconsenting millions
+dominated by the Tagalo tribe,&rdquo; of <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb246" href="#pb246" name="pb246">246</a>]</span>1899, to the facts,
+and follow the course of events succeeding Lawton&rsquo;s junction with
+Wheaton and MacArthur and his farewell to Young.</p>
+<p>General Young, with his cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts,
+continued in pursuit of Aguinaldo through the passes of the mountains,
+the latter having managed to run the gauntlet of our lines successfully
+by a very close shave. How narrowly he escaped is illustrated by the
+fact that after a fight we had at the Aringay River on November 19th,
+in which Major Batson was wounded while gallantly directing the
+crossing of the river, we remained that night in the town of Aringay,
+and at the very time we were &ldquo;hustling for chow&rdquo; in
+Aringay, Aguinaldo was in the village of Naguilian an hour or so
+distant, as was authoritatively ascertained long afterward from a
+captured diary of one of his staff officers.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5930src" href="#xd20e5930" name="xd20e5930src">37</a></p>
+<p>General Young proceeded up the coast road, in hot haste, taking one
+town, San Fernando de Union, after a brief engagement led by the
+general in person&mdash;imagine a brigadier-general leading a charge at
+the head of thirty-seven men!&mdash;but Aguinaldo had turned off to the
+right and taken to the mountains. General Lawton wired General Otis
+about that time, in effect, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb247" href=
+"#pb247" name="pb247">247</a>]</span>in announcing Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+escape through our lines and his own tireless brigade-commander&rsquo;s
+bold dash in pursuit of him with an inadequate force of cavalry
+hampered by lack of horseshoes and nails for the same, &ldquo;If Young
+does not catch Aguinaldo, he will at least make him very
+unhappy.&rdquo; The Young column garrisoned the towns along the route
+over which it went, occupying all the western part of Northern Luzon,
+hereafter described, and also later on rescued Lieutenant Gilmore of
+the navy, Mr. Albert Sonnichsen, previously an enlisted man and since a
+writer of some note, and other American prisoners who had been in the
+hands of the insurgents for many months. General Young finally made his
+headquarters at Vigan, in the province of Ilocos Sur, a fine town in a
+fine country. The Ilocanos are called &ldquo;the Yankees of the
+Philippines,&rdquo; on account of their energy and industry. Vigan is
+on the China sea coast of Luzon (the west coast), about one hundred
+miles up the old Spanish coast road, or &ldquo;King&rsquo;s
+Highway&rdquo; (Camino Real), from Lingayen Gulf (where the
+hundred-and-twenty mile railroad from Manila to Dagupan ends) and about
+eighty miles from the extreme northern end of the island of
+Luzon.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5949src" href="#xd20e5949" name=
+"xd20e5949src">38</a></p>
+<p>As subsequent policies and their effect on one&rsquo;s attitude
+toward a great historic panorama do not interfere in the least with a
+proper appreciation of the bravery and efficiency of the army of
+one&rsquo;s country, it is with much regret that this narrative cannot
+properly chronicle in detail what the War Department reports record of
+the stirring deeds of General Young, and the officers and men of his
+command, Colonels Hare and Howze, Captains Chase and Dodd, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb248" href="#pb248" name="pb248">248</a>]</span>and
+the rest,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e5956src" href="#xd20e5956" name=
+"xd20e5956src">39</a> performed during the long course of the work now
+under consideration. One incident, however, is appropriate in this
+connection, not only to a collection of <i>genre</i> pictures of the
+war itself, but also to a place among the lights and shadows of the
+general picture of the American occupation. On December 2, 1899, Major
+March of the 33d Infantry had his famous fight at Tila pass, in which
+young Gregorio del Pilar, one of the ablest and bravest of the
+insurgent generals, was killed. The locality mentioned is a wild pass
+in the mountains of the west coast of Luzon, that overlook the China
+Sea, some 4500 feet above sea level. It was strongly fortified, and was
+believed by the insurgents to be impregnable. The trail winds up the
+mountains in a sharp zigzag, and was commanded by stone barricades
+loop-holed for infantry fire. The advance of our people was checked at
+first by a heavy fire from these barricades. The approach being
+precipitous, it looked for a while as if the position would indeed be
+impregnable, and the idea of taking it by a frontal attack was
+abandoned. But a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb249" href="#pb249"
+name="pb249">249</a>]</span>hill to the left front of the barricade was
+seized by some of our sharpshooters&mdash;those Texans of the 33d were
+indeed <i>sharpshooters</i>&mdash;and after that, under cover of their
+fire, our troops managed to get in a fire simultaneously both on the
+flank and rear of the occupants of the barricades, climbing the
+precipitous slope up the mountain side by means of twigs and the like,
+and finally killing some fifty-two of the enemy, General Pilar among
+the number. After the fight was over, Lieutenant Quinlan, heretofore
+mentioned, moved by certain indignities in the nature of looting
+perpetrated upon the remains of General Pilar, buried them with such
+military honors as could be hastily provided, after first taking from a
+pocket of the dead general&rsquo;s uniform a souvenir in the shape of
+an unfinished poem written in Spanish by him the night before,
+addressed to his sweetheart; and, the burial finished, the American
+officer placed on the rude headstone left to mark the spot this
+generous inscription:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">General Gregorio Pilar, killed at the battle of Tila
+Pass, December 2d, 1899, commanding Aguinaldo&rsquo;s rear-guard. <i>An
+officer and a gentleman.</i> (Signed) D. P. Quinlan, 2d Lieutenant,
+11th Cavalry.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The brief incident over, Quinlan hurried on, rejoined the column,
+and resumed the work of Benevolent Assimilation and the war against
+Home Rule with all the dauntless ardor of his impetuous Irish nature.
+Whatever the ultimate analysis of the ethics of this
+scene&mdash;Quinlan at the grave of Pilar&mdash;clearly the Second
+Lieutenant Quinlan of 1899 would hardly have agreed with the
+vice-presidential candidate of 1900, Colonel Roosevelt, that granting
+self-government to the Filipinos would be like granting self-government
+to an Apache reservation under some local chief.</p>
+<p>The territory occupied and finally &ldquo;pacified&rdquo; by
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb250" href="#pb250" name=
+"pb250">250</a>]</span>General Young, with the effective assistance of
+the officers heretofore mentioned, and many other good men and true,
+was ultimately organized into a military district, which was called the
+First District of the Department of Northern Luzon. As territory was
+fought over, occupied, and finally reduced to submission, that
+territory would be organized into a military district by the commanding
+general or colonel of the invading column, under the direction of the
+division commander. The military &ldquo;Division of the
+Philippines,&rdquo; which was succeeded by the Civil Government of the
+Philippines under Governor Taft in 1901, of course covered all the
+territory ceded by the Treaty of Paris. It was divided into four
+&ldquo;Departments,&rdquo; the Department of Northern Luzon, the
+Department of Southern Luzon, the Department of the Visayas,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e5984src" href="#xd20e5984" name=
+"xd20e5984src">40</a> and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo. General
+Young commanded the First District of the Department of Northern
+Luzon&mdash;which included the three west coast provinces north of
+Lingayen Gulf, and the three adjacent mountain provinces&mdash;from the
+time he led his brigade into that region in pursuit of Aguinaldo until
+shortly before Governor Taft&rsquo;s inauguration in the summer of
+1901. Many were the combats, great and small, of General Young&rsquo;s
+brigade, in compassing the task of crushing the resistance in that part
+of Luzon into which he led the first American troops in the winter of
+1899&ndash;1900. The resistance was obstinate, desperate, and long
+drawn out, but when he finally reported the territory under his command
+&ldquo;pacified,&rdquo; it <i>was</i> pacified. A soldier&rsquo;s task
+had been performed in a soldierly manner. The work had been done
+thoroughly. General <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb251" href="#pb251"
+name="pb251">251</a>]</span>Young gave the Ilocano country a lesson it
+never forgot, before politics had time to interfere. We have never had
+any trouble in that region from that day to this.</p>
+<p>Before the army of occupation had had time to do in southern Luzon
+what General Young did in northern Luzon and thereby secure like
+permanent results in that region, a &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo;
+policy was inaugurated to meet the exigencies of Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+campaign for the Presidency in 1900. Our last martyred President clung
+all through that campaign to his original assumption that Benevolent
+Assimilation would work, and that the single burning need of the hour
+was to make clear to the Filipinos what our intentions were&mdash;as if
+powder and lead did not spell denial of independence plain enough, as
+if that were not the sole issue, and as if that issue had not been
+submitted, with deadly finality, to the stern arbitrament of war.
+However, neither Lord Roberts in India, nor Lord Kitchener in Egypt
+ever more effectively convinced the people of those countries that his
+flag must be respected as an emblem of sovereignty, than General Young
+did the Ilocanos. Take the month of April, 1900 for instance. Several
+days after the expiration of said month (on May 5th) General Otis was
+relieved and went home. During the month of April, General Young killed
+five hundred insurgents in his district.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5994src" href="#xd20e5994" name="xd20e5994src">41</a> But this
+did not prevent General Otis, arriving as he did in the United States
+in the month of June, when the national political conventions meet,
+from &ldquo;repeating <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb252" href=
+"#pb252" name="pb252">252</a>]</span>the same old story about the
+insurrection going to pieces&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6002src"
+href="#xd20e6002" name="xd20e6002src">42</a>&mdash;<i>only</i>, not
+&ldquo;going&rdquo; now, but &ldquo;gone.&rdquo; Nor did it, and like
+sputterings of insurrection all over the place, prevent Judge
+Taft&mdash;the &ldquo;Mark Tapley of this Philippine business&rdquo; as
+he humorously told the Senate Committee of 1902 he had been
+called&mdash;from cabling home, during the presidential campaign of
+1900, a series of superlatively optimistic bulletins,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e6008src" href="#xd20e6008" name="xd20e6008src">43</a> based on
+the testimony of Filipinos who had abandoned the cause of their country
+as soon as patriotism meant personal peril, all such testimony being
+eagerly accepted, as testimony of the kind one wants and needs badly
+usually is, in total disregard of information directly to the contrary
+furnished by General MacArthur and other distinguished soldiers who had
+been then on the ground for two years.</p>
+<p>The area and population of the territory occupied by General Young,
+the &ldquo;First District of the Department of Northern Luzon,&rdquo;
+was, according to the Census of 1903, as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6022src" href=
+"#xd20e6022" name="xd20e6022src">44</a></td>
+<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6030src" href=
+"#xd20e6030" name="xd20e6030src">45</a></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ilocos Norte</td>
+<td>1,330</td>
+<td>178,995</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ilocos Sur</td>
+<td>471</td>
+<td>187,411</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Union</td>
+<td>634</td>
+<td>137,839</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Abra</td>
+<td>1,171</td>
+<td>51,860</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Lepanto-Bontoc<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6067src" href=
+"#xd20e6067" name="xd20e6067src">46</a></td>
+<td>2,005</td>
+<td>72,750</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Benguet</td>
+<td>822</td>
+<td>22,745</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">6,433</td>
+<td class="sum">651,600</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb253" href="#pb253" name=
+"pb253">253</a>]</span></p>
+<p>As this narrative purposes so to present the geography of the
+Philippine Islands as to facilitate an easy remembrance of <i>the
+essentials only</i> of the governmental problem there presented, we
+will hereafter speak of the First District as containing, roughly, 6500
+square miles, and 650,000 people. Whenever, if ever, a Philippine
+republic is set up, these six provinces are very likely, for
+geographical and other reasons, to become one of the original states
+comprising that republic, just as the states of Mexico are made up of
+groups of provinces.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6095src" href=
+"#xd20e6095" name="xd20e6095src">47</a></p>
+<p>The rest of the story of the northern campaign of 1899&ndash;1900
+immediately following Aguinaldo&rsquo;s escape into the mountains
+through General Young&rsquo;s and General Lawton&rsquo;s lines, being a
+necessary part of the American occupation of the Philippines, may also
+serve as a text for further acquainting the reader with the geography
+of Luzon. War is the best possible teacher of geography, and it may be
+well to communicate in broken doses, as we received them, the lessons
+on the subject which the 8th Army Corps learned in 1899 and the
+subsequent years so thoroughly that we could all pronounce with
+astonishing glibness, the most unpronounceable names imaginable.</p>
+<p>When the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur &ldquo;Round-up&rdquo;
+reached the mountains on the northeast of the great central plain, in
+the latter part of November 1899, Captain Joseph B. Batchelor, with one
+battalion of the 24th (negro) Infantry, and some scouts under
+Lieutenant Castner, a very intrepid and tireless officer, boldly cut
+loose from the column of which he was <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb254" href="#pb254" name="pb254">254</a>]</span>a part, and, pressing
+on over the Caranglan pass, overran the province of Nueva Vizcaya,
+which is part of the watershed of north central Luzon, proceeding from
+Bayombong, the capital of Nueva Vizcaya, down the valley of the Magat
+River, by the same route Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent of the navy had
+made their pleasant junket in the fall of 1898 as described in <a href=
+"#ch6">Chapter VI</a> (<i>ante</i>). Following this route Captain
+Batchelor finally came into Isabela province, where the Magat empties
+into the Cagayan River, reaching Iligan, the capital of Isabela, ninety
+miles northeast of Bayombong, about December 8th. From Iligan Batchelor
+went on, promptly overcoming all resistance offered, down the great
+Cagayan valley, some 110 miles due north, to the sea at Aparri, the
+northernmost town of Luzon and of the archipelago, where he met two
+vessels of our navy, the <i>Newark</i> and the <i>Helena</i>, under
+Captain McCalla, and found, to his inexpressible (but partially and
+rather fervently expressed) chagrin, that the insurgents who had fled
+before him, and also the garrison at Aparri, had already surrendered to
+the navy. The territory thus covered by Batchelor&rsquo;s bold,
+brilliant, and memorable march over two hundred miles of hostile
+country from the mountains of central Luzon down the Cagayan valley to
+the northern end of the island, at Aparri,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6118src" href="#xd20e6118" name="xd20e6118src">48</a> consisted
+of the three provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The area
+and population of these three, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb255"
+href="#pb255" name="pb255">255</a>]</span>according to the census
+tables of 1903, are as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6135src" href=
+"#xd20e6135" name="xd20e6135src">49</a></td>
+<td><i>Population</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6143src" href=
+"#xd20e6143" name="xd20e6143src">50</a></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cagayan</td>
+<td>5,052</td>
+<td>156,239</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Isabela</td>
+<td>5,018</td>
+<td>76,431</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td>
+<td>1,950</td>
+<td>62,541</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">12,020</td>
+<td class="sum">295,211</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>The troops of Captain Batchelor&rsquo;s command were later on
+relieved by the 16th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hood, under whom
+the above group of three provinces finally became the &ldquo;Second
+District of the Department of Northern Luzon.&rdquo; As part of the
+plan to provide the reader with a fair general idea of Luzon
+conveniently portable in memory, he is requested to note, at this
+point, that hereinafter the Cagayan valley, with its three
+provinces,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6180src" href="#xd20e6180" name=
+"xd20e6180src">51</a> will be alluded to as a district containing
+12,000 square miles and 300,000 people. As was remarked concerning the
+original military district commanded by General Young, to wit, the
+First District, so of Colonel Hood&rsquo;s district, the
+Second&mdash;that is to say, as the Ilocano country may some day become
+the state of Ilocos, so, for like geographical and other governmental
+reasons, the three provinces of the Cagayan valley may some day become
+the state of Cagayan in the possible Philippine republic of the future.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb256" href="#pb256" name=
+"pb256">256</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Having now followed the &ldquo;far-flung battle line&rdquo; of the
+volunteers of &rsquo;99 and their comrades in arms, the regulars, from
+Manila northward across the rice paddies of central Luzon and over the
+mountains to the northern extremity of the island, let us return to the
+central plain, for reasons which will be stated in so doing. Between
+the China Sea and the coast range which forms the western boundary of
+the central plain of Luzon, there is a long strip of territory&mdash;a
+west wing of the plain, as it were&mdash;about 125 miles long, with an
+average width of not more than twenty miles, stretching from Manila Bay
+to Lingayen Gulf. This is divided, for governmental purposes into two
+provinces, Bataan on the south, whose southern extremity lay on Admiral
+Dewey&rsquo;s port side as he entered Manila Bay the night before the
+naval battle of May 1, 1898, and Zambales on the north. The area and
+population of this territory are as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bataan</td>
+<td>537</td>
+<td>46,787</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Zambales</td>
+<td>2,125</td>
+<td>104,549</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td>2,662</td>
+<td>151,336</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Also, between the Pacific Ocean and the coast range which forms the
+eastern boundary of the plain is a longer, narrower, and very sparsely
+populated strip, or east wing, divided also into two provinces,
+Principe on the north and Infanta on the south, each supposed to
+contain about fifteen thousand people. Principe and Infanta are wholly
+unimportant, except that, to avoid confusion, we must account for all
+the provinces visible on the maps of Luzon. These two provinces
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb257" href="#pb257" name=
+"pb257">257</a>]</span>never gave any trouble and no one ever bothered
+about them.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6229src" href="#xd20e6229" name=
+"xd20e6229src">52</a> In the mountains of Zambales and Bataan, however,
+as in most of the other provinces of the archipelago, the struggle was
+long kept up, just as the Boers kept up their war for independence
+against Great Britain about the same time, by guerrilla warfare.</p>
+<p>The central plain with five provinces has already been fully
+described. If to this plain you add its two wings, above mentioned, you
+have the nine provinces of central Luzon you see on the map. And if to
+them you add the six provinces of the Ilocos country and the three of
+the Cagayan valley, you have clearly before you the political make-up
+of northern Luzon&mdash;eighteen provinces in all. When central Luzon
+was arranged by districts under the military occupation, it was divided
+into three parts, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth districts of the
+Department of Northern Luzon, the Third District being under General
+Jacob H. Smith of Samar fame,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6234src" href=
+"#xd20e6234" name="xd20e6234src">53</a> the Fourth under General
+Funston, and the Fifth under General Grant. The Sixth and last district
+of northern Luzon was made up of the city of Manila and adjacent
+territory. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb258" href="#pb258" name=
+"pb258">258</a>]</span></p>
+<p>General Smith&rsquo;s district, the Third, comprised the provinces
+of</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Zambales</td>
+<td>2,125</td>
+<td>104,549</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pangasinan</td>
+<td>1,193</td>
+<td>397,902</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tarlac</td>
+<td>1,205</td>
+<td>135,107</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">4,523</td>
+<td class="sum">637,558</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Pangasinan with its near 400,000 people is the largest, in point of
+population, of the twenty-five provinces of Luzon, and the third
+largest of the archipelago.</p>
+<p>General Funston&rsquo;s district, the Fourth, comprised the
+provinces of</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
+<td>2,169</td>
+<td>134,147</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Principe<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6311src" href="#xd20e6311"
+name="xd20e6311src">54</a></td>
+<td>331</td>
+<td>15,853</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">2,500</td>
+<td class="sum">150,000</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>General Grant&rsquo;s district, the Fifth, comprised the provinces
+of</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bataan</td>
+<td>537</td>
+<td>46,787</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pampanga</td>
+<td>868</td>
+<td>223,754</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bulacan</td>
+<td>1,173</td>
+<td>223,742</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">2,578</td>
+<td class="sum">494,283</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td>2,500</td>
+<td>150,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Totals, 4th and 5th Districts:</td>
+<td class="sum">5,078</td>
+<td class="sum">644,283</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb259" href="#pb259" name=
+"pb259">259</a>]</span></p>
+<p>It will be seen from the foregoing that the Third District was
+nearly equal in area to the Fourth and Fifth added together, and that
+the same was true as to its population figure.</p>
+<p>Just as the six provinces of the Ilocano country, first occupied by
+General Young and organized as &ldquo;The First District of the
+Department of Northern Luzon,&rdquo; should some day evolve into a
+State of Ilocos, and the three provinces of the Cagayan valley,
+occupied by Colonel Hood as the Second District, into an ultimate State
+of Cagayan, so the provinces of General Smith&rsquo;s old district, the
+Third, should finally become a State of Pangasinan.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e6390src" href="#xd20e6390" name="xd20e6390src">55</a> This
+Third District may be conveniently recollected as accounting for,
+roughly speaking, 4500 square miles of territory and 625,000 people.
+The total combined area of General Funston&rsquo;s old district, the
+Fourth,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6393src" href="#xd20e6393" name=
+"xd20e6393src">56</a> and the adjacent one, the Fifth, General
+Grant&rsquo;s district, is&mdash;roughly&mdash;5000 square miles, and
+its total population 650,000. No reason is apparent why these two
+districts, the Fourth and Fifth, should not ultimately evolve into a
+State of Pampanga. The five original military districts,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e6396src" href="#xd20e6396" name=
+"xd20e6396src">57</a> which in 1900 constituted all of the Department
+of Northern Luzon except the city of Manila and vicinity, might make
+four ultimate states, with names, areas, and populations as follows:
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb260" href="#pb260" name=
+"pb260">260</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>State</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ilocos</td>
+<td>6,500</td>
+<td>650,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cagayan</td>
+<td>12,000</td>
+<td>300,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pangasinan</td>
+<td>4,500</td>
+<td>625,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pampanga</td>
+<td>5,000</td>
+<td>650,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td>28,000</td>
+<td>2,225,000</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>It may surprise the reader after all the blood and thunder to which
+his attention has hereinabove been subjected, apropos of northern Luzon
+and the winter of 1899&ndash;1900, to know that the insurgents were
+still bearding the lion in his den, <i>i. e.</i>, General Otis in
+Manila, by operating in very considerable force in the village-dotted
+country within cannon-shot of the road from Manila to Cavite in
+January, 1900. Nevertheless such was the case.</p>
+<p>On the 4th of January, 1900, General J. C. Bates was assigned to the
+command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps, General
+Lawton&rsquo;s old division, and an active campaign was commenced in
+southern Luzon. The plan adopted was that General Wheaton with a strong
+force should engage and hold the enemy in the neighborhood of Cavite,
+while General Schwan, starting at the western horn of the half moon to
+which the great lake called Laguna de Bay has already been likened,
+should move rapidly down the west shore of the lake, and around its
+south shore to Santa Cruz near its eastern end, or horn, garrisoning
+the towns en route, as taken, instead of leaving them to be re-occupied
+by the insurgents. Santa Cruz is the same place where General Lawton
+had &ldquo;touched second base,&rdquo; as it were, with a flying column
+in April, 1899.</p>
+<p>This plan was duly carried out. The Schwan column started from San
+Pedro Macati, the initial rendezvous, <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb261" href="#pb261" name="pb261">261</a>]</span>a few miles out of
+Manila, on January 4, 1900, now garrisoning the towns en route, instead
+of leaving them to be fought over and captured again as heretofore. The
+first stiff fight we had in that campaign was at Bi&ntilde;an, on
+January 6, 1900, one of the places General Lawton&rsquo;s expedition
+had taken when he fought his way over the same country the year before.
+O. K. Davis and John T. McCutcheon, who were in that fight and
+campaign&mdash;in fact one of them had the ice-cold nerve to photograph
+the Bi&ntilde;an fight while it was going on, as I learned when we all
+went down to the creek near the town, after we took it, to freshen
+up&mdash;can testify that we did not then hear any nonsense about a
+&ldquo;Tagal&rdquo; insurrection, such as Secretary of War Root&rsquo;s
+<i>Report for 1899</i>, published shortly before, is full of, and that
+on the contrary the whole country was as much a unit against us and as
+loyal to the Aguinaldo government as northern Luzon had been. And
+inasmuch as I am doing some &ldquo;testifying&rdquo; along here myself,
+and assuming to brush aside without the slightest hesitation, as wholly
+erroneous, information conveyed to the American public at the time in
+the state papers of President McKinley and Secretary of War Root, it is
+only due the reader, whose attention is being seriously asked, that
+&ldquo;the witness&rdquo; should &ldquo;qualify&rdquo; as to the
+opportunities he may have had, if any, to know whereof he speaks,
+concerning the character of the opposition. To that end, the following
+document, which General Schwan was kind enough to send me afterwards,
+is submitted as sent:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">EXTRACT COPY.</p>
+<p>Headquarters Detachment Macabebe Scouts.<br>
+The Adjutant General, Schwan&rsquo;s Expeditionary Brigade:</p>
+<p>Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
+operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb262" href="#pb262" name=
+"pb262">262</a>]</span>under my command, while forming a part of your
+Brigade.</p>
+<p>The Detachment, consisting of five (5) officers and one hundred and
+forty (140) men, was divided into two companies, commanded by 1st Lt.
+J. Lee Hall, 33rd Inf., and 1st Lt. Blount, 29th Inf., left San Pedro
+Macati the afternoon of Jan. 4th, 1900 *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*.</p>
+<hr class="tb">
+<p>I wish to invite your attention, especially, to the good work done
+in the fight at Bi&ntilde;an by Lieut. Blount, 29th Inf., who led the
+line by at least twenty-five yards *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*.</p>
+<p>Very Respectfully,<br>
+<span class="sc">Wm. C. Geiger</span>, 1st Lt. 14th Inf.,
+Com&rsquo;d&rsquo;g Det.</p>
+<p>I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of extracts from the
+report of the operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts forming
+part of an Expeditionary Brigade under my command, in the months of
+January and February, 1900.</p>
+<p><span class="sc">Theo. Schwan</span>,<br>
+Brig. General, U. S. Vols.<br>
+Aug. 16, 1900.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The activities of Generals Bates and Wheaton, and the Schwan
+Expedition of January-February, 1900, extended the American occupation,
+so far as there were troops enough immediately available to go around,
+over the lake-shore portions and the principal towns of the two great
+provinces of southern Luzon bordering on the Laguna de Bay, viz.,
+Cavite and Laguna; and over parts of the two adjacent provinces of
+Batangas and Tayabas.</p>
+<p>Batangas bounds Cavite on the south, and is itself bounded on the
+south by the sea, where a fairly good port offered a fine gateway for
+smuggling arms into the interior from abroad. Tayabas province adjoins
+Laguna on the southeast. Cavite province has always been, since the
+opening of the Suez Canal, about 1869, <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb263" href="#pb263" name="pb263">263</a>]</span>and the agitations
+for political reform in Spain which culminated in the Spanish republic
+of 1873, quickened the thought of Spain&rsquo;s East Indies, the home
+of insurrection, the breeding place of political agitation. Aguinaldo
+himself was born within its limits in 1869. Laguna province comprehends
+most of the country lying between the southern and eastern lake-shore
+of the Laguna de Bay and the mountains which skirt that body of water
+in the blue distance, all parts of it being thus in easy and safe touch
+by water transportation by night with Cavite, the home and headquarters
+of insurgency.</p>
+<p>Just as northern Luzon had been gradually organized into military
+districts as conquered, so was southern Luzon. The territory, over-run,
+as above described, by Generals Bates, Wheaton, and Schwan, was divided
+into two districts.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6514src" href=
+"#xd20e6514" name="xd20e6514src">58</a> Colonel Hare commanded the
+First District, Cavite province and vicinity. General Hall commanded
+the Second District, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The area and
+population of these four provinces, according to the Census of 1903,
+were as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cavite</td>
+<td>619</td>
+<td>134,779</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Batangas</td>
+<td>1,201</td>
+<td>257,715</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Laguna</td>
+<td>629</td>
+<td>148,606</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tayabas</td>
+<td>5,993</td>
+<td>153,065</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">8,442</td>
+<td class="sum">694,165</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>For convenience of subsequent allusion, this group of provinces may
+be treated as representing roughly 8500 square miles of territory and
+700,000 people. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb264" href="#pb264"
+name="pb264">264</a>]</span>These four provinces group themselves
+together naturally from a military standpoint. As physical force is the
+final basis of all government, these four provinces constitute a
+logical administrative governmental unit, as shown by the action of our
+military authorities in their extension of the American occupation. It
+would seem therefore that if there should ever be a Philippine
+republic, they would probably constitute one of its states&mdash;the
+State, let us say, of Cavite.</p>
+<p>The rest of southern Luzon below that part above described consists
+of a peninsula which, owing to its odd formation, is easy to remember.
+The mainland of Luzon, that is to-say, that part of the island which
+our narrative has already covered, remotely suggests, in shape, the
+State of Illinois. At least it resembles Illinois more than it does any
+other State of our Union, in that its length runs north and south, and
+its average length and width are nearer that of Illinois than any
+other. At the southeast corner of this mainland, the observer of the
+map will see, jutting off to the southeast from the mainland, the
+peninsula in question. It is about a hundred and fifty miles long, with
+an average width of possibly thirty miles&mdash;a minimum width of,
+say, ten miles, and a maximum of fifty,&mdash;and is separated from
+Samar by the narrow, swift, and treacherous San Bernardino Strait,
+which connects the Pacific Ocean with the China Sea. This peninsula is
+frequently called &ldquo;the Hemp Peninsula.&rdquo; The importance of
+controlling the hemp ports prompted General Otis to send General Bates
+with an expedition to those ports on February 15, 1900.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e6575src" href="#xd20e6575" name=
+"xd20e6575src">59</a> This expedition did little more than occupy those
+ports. The great interior continued under insurgent control some time
+afterward. The report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, for 1900, goes
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb265" href="#pb265" name=
+"pb265">265</a>]</span>on to describe an engagement, or two, sustained
+by the Bates Expedition shortly after it landed, and concludes, with a
+complacency almost Otis-like, by stating that shortly thereafter
+&ldquo;the normal conditions of industry and trade relations with
+Manila were resumed by the inhabitants.&rdquo; Of course Mr. Root
+believed this, and so did Mr. McKinley. More the pity, as we shall
+later see. General Otis was now getting anxious to go home, and
+hastened to &ldquo;occupy&rdquo; and organize the rest of the
+archipelago, on paper, at least, the hemp peninsula becoming, on March
+20, 1900, the Third District of the Department of Southern Luzon,
+Brigadier-General James M. Bell commanding. The provinces comprised in
+this district, with their areas and populations as given by the Census
+of 1903, were as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Camarines<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6599src" href="#xd20e6599"
+name="xd20e6599src">60</a></td>
+<td>3,279</td>
+<td>239,405</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Albay</td>
+<td>1,783</td>
+<td>240,326</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Sorsogon</td>
+<td>755</td>
+<td>120,495</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">5,817</td>
+<td class="sum">600,226</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>For convenience of subsequent allusion, these three provinces of the
+hemp peninsula which constituted the Third Military District of the
+Military Department of Southern Luzon in 1900, may be regarded as
+comprising, roughly, 6000 square miles of territory and 600,000 people.
+If the Philippine republic of the future which is the dream of the
+Filipino people, prove other than an idle dream, the hemp peninsula
+will probably some day constitute a state of that republic, an
+appropriate <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb266" href="#pb266" name=
+"pb266">266</a>]</span>and probable name for which would be the State
+of Camarines.</p>
+<p>The Fourth District of southern Luzon&mdash;there were but
+four&mdash;was occupied by the 29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, commanded
+by Colonel E. E. Hardin, one of the best executive officers General
+Otis had in his whole command. The Fourth District comprised a lot of
+islands unnecessary to be considered at length in this bird&rsquo;s-eye
+view of the panorama, but necessary to be mentioned in outlining the
+military occupation. The 29th, like the other twenty-four volunteer
+regiments, settled down with equanimity to the business of policing a
+hostile country, sang with zest, like the rest of the twenty-five
+volunteer regiments, that old familiar song, &ldquo;Damn, Damn, Damn
+the Filipino,&rdquo; etc., and waited with the uniquely admirable
+stoicism of the American soldier for the season of their home-going to
+roll round, which, under the Act of Congress,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6637src" href="#xd20e6637" name="xd20e6637src">61</a> would be
+the spring of the following year.</p>
+<p>In volume i., part 5, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, at pages 5
+<i>et seq.</i>, may be found a journal illustrating the nature of the
+&ldquo;police&rdquo; work done by the volunteers of 1899, in 1900, and
+at pages 5 <i>et seq.</i> of the same report for 1900 (volume i., part
+4) may be found a similar diary carried up to June 30, 1901. Throughout
+the period covered by those reports, scarcely a day passed without what
+the military folk coolly call &ldquo;contacts&rdquo; with the
+enemy.</p>
+<p>The Visayan Islands were in course of time duly organized, as Luzon
+had previously been, departmentally and by military districts. The
+Visayan Islands became the Department of Visayas, divided into
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb267" href="#pb267" name=
+"pb267">267</a>]</span>districts commanded either by regimental
+commanders having a regiment or more with them, or by general officers.
+For a long time no attempt to make military occupation effective in
+these various islands, save in the coast towns, was attempted. However,
+the indicated disposition of troops completed, technically at least,
+the American occupation of the Visayan Islands.</p>
+<p>Pursuant to the plan followed, as we have hitherto followed the army
+in our narrative, first throughout northern Luzon and later through
+southern Luzon, some data are now in order concerning the Visayan
+Islands.</p>
+<p>As already made clear, there are but six of the Visayan Islands with
+which any one interested in the Philippines merely as a student of
+world politics or of history need bother. The area and population of
+these are as follows:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6660src" href=
+"#xd20e6660" name="xd20e6660src">62</a></p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Island</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Panay</td>
+<td>4,611</td>
+<td>743,646</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Negros</td>
+<td>4,881</td>
+<td>460,776</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cebu</td>
+<td>1,762</td>
+<td>592,247</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leyte</td>
+<td>2,722</td>
+<td>356,641</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Samar</td>
+<td>5,031</td>
+<td>222,090</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bohol</td>
+<td>1,441</td>
+<td>243,148</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Whenever, if ever, an independent republic is established in the
+Philippines, the six islands above mentioned could and should
+constitute self-governing commonwealths similar to the several States
+of the American Union. The rest of the islands lying between Luzon and
+Mindanao could easily be disposed of governmentally by being attached
+to the <span class="corr" id="xd20e6730" title=
+"Source: jursidiction">jurisdiction</span> of one of the said six
+islands. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb268" href="#pb268" name=
+"pb268">268</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo were organized as the
+Department of Mindanao and Jolo, under General Kobbe, with the 31st
+Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Pettit&rsquo;s regiment, the 40th Volunteer
+Infantry, Colonel Godwin&rsquo;s regiment, and the 23rd Regular
+Infantry. Thus the archipelago was completely accounted for, for the
+time being, just as all the territory of the United States was long
+accounted for by our military authorities at home, with the Department
+of the East, headquarters Governor&rsquo;s Island, New York; the
+Department of the Lakes, headquarters Chicago; the Department of the
+Gulf, headquarters Atlanta, etc. In this state of the case, General
+Otis re-embraced his early pet delusion&mdash;if it was a delusion,
+which charity and the probabilities suggest it should be
+called&mdash;about the insurrection having gone to pieces; and decided
+to come home. Possibly, also, he was homesick. General Otis was a very
+positive character, a strong man. But even strong men get homesick
+after long exile. When you hear the call of the homeland after long
+residence &ldquo;east of Suez,&rdquo; you must answer the call, duty
+not forbidding. General Otis had stood by his ink wells and the
+Administration with unswerving devotion for twenty months, and was
+entitled to come back home and tell the public all about the fighting
+in the Philippines, and how entirely over it was, and how wholly right
+Mr. McKinley was in his theory that the visible opposition to our rule
+and the seeming desire to be free and independent did not represent the
+wishes of the Filipino people at all, but only the &ldquo;sinister
+ambitions of a few unscrupulous Tagalo leaders.&rdquo; Accordingly on
+May 5, 1900, he was relieved at his own request, and departed for the
+United States. He was succeeded in command by a very different type of
+man, Major-General Arthur <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb269" href=
+"#pb269" name="pb269">269</a>]</span>MacArthur, upon whom now devolved
+the problem of holding down the situation and of actually getting it
+stably &ldquo;well in hand&rdquo; by June 30, 1901, the date of
+expiration of the term of enlistment of the twenty-five volunteer
+regiments organized under the Act of March 2, 1899. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb270" href="#pb270" name="pb270">270</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5391" href="#xd20e5391src" name="xd20e5391">1</a></span> Strictly
+speaking, only twenty-three regiments were sent out from the United
+States. Under the Act of March 2, 1899, providing the volunteer army of
+35,000 men for the Philippines, twenty-four regiments of infantry and
+one of cavalry were organized. The infantry regiments were numbered
+Twenty-six to Forty-nine, both inclusive, the numbering taking up where
+the numbering of the regular infantry regiments then ended, with the
+Twenty-fifth. The cavalry regiment was called the Eleventh Cavalry, the
+regular cavalry regimental enumeration ending at that time with the
+Tenth. The Eleventh Cavalry and the Thirty-sixth Infantry were
+organized, officered, and largely recruited from men of the State
+Volunteers sent out in &rsquo;98, who, in consideration of liberal
+inducements offered by the Government, consented to remain.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5418" href="#xd20e5418src" name="xd20e5418">2</a></span> The
+population of the city of Manila according to the <i>Philippine Census
+of 1903</i>, vol. ii., p. 16; was 219,928. The three next largest towns
+are: Laoag, in the province of Ilocos Norte, about 270 miles north of
+Manila, near the northwest corner of Luzon, population 19,699; Iloilo,
+capital of the island of Panay and chief city and port of the Visayan
+Islands, some 300 miles south of Manila, population 19,054; and Cebu,
+capital and chief port of the island of Cebu, a day&rsquo;s voyage from
+Iloilo, population 18,330. See <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol.
+ii., p. 38.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5432" href="#xd20e5432src" name="xd20e5432">3</a></span> 115,026
+is the exact figure. See <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 57.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5438" href="#xd20e5438src" name="xd20e5438">4</a></span> The
+exact figure for Luzon is 40,969, and that for Mindanao, 36,292.
+<i>Ib.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5445" href="#xd20e5445src" name="xd20e5445">5</a></span>
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 56.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5450" href="#xd20e5450src" name="xd20e5450">6</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5465" href="#xd20e5465src" name="xd20e5465">7</a></span> Table of
+Areas, <i>Census</i>, 1903, vol. i., p. 263.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5474" href="#xd20e5474src" name="xd20e5474">8</a></span> Table of
+Populations, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., p. 126.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5520" href="#xd20e5520src" name="xd20e5520">9</a></span> Total of
+these six in large type 20,418 square miles, say roughly 20,500.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5544" href="#xd20e5544src" name="xd20e5544">10</a></span> Total
+of these last three in smaller type 9114 square miles.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5583" href="#xd20e5583src" name="xd20e5583">11</a></span> There
+is a large sugar estate on Mindoro, supposed to contain over 60,000
+acres or, say, ninety odd square miles, which in 1911 figured in a
+congressional investigation of certain charges against Professor
+Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, but this is wholly
+separate from the original problem of public order.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5593" href="#xd20e5593src" name="xd20e5593">12</a></span> The
+exact figure is 36,292. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 263.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5599" href="#xd20e5599src" name="xd20e5599">13</a></span>
+499,634, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 126.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5605" href="#xd20e5605src" name="xd20e5605">14</a></span> The
+semi-civilized Moros of Mindanao live mostly in the interior, and have
+a crude form of Mohammedanism. The civilized Christian Filipinos of
+Mindanao live mostly on the littoral.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5612" href="#xd20e5612src" name="xd20e5612">15</a></span> This
+was said in no mere speech. Speeches are often misquoted. It was a
+letter signed by the foremost man of this age, Mr. Roosevelt, written
+September 15, 1900, accepting the nomination for the Vice-Presidency.
+(See <i>Proceedings of the Republican National Committee</i>, 1900, p.
+86.) Yet it represented then one of the many current misapprehensions
+about the Filipinos which moved this great nation to destroy a young
+republic set up in a spirit of intelligent and generous emulation of
+our own.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5618" href="#xd20e5618src" name="xd20e5618">16</a></span> One of
+the sultans, or head-men, was believed in 1899, to have tried on his
+return from a pilgrimage to Mecca made before we took the Philippines,
+by some dickering at Singapore or near there in the Straits
+Settlements, to sell out for a consideration to Great Britain, so as to
+be under the protection and in the pay of British North Borneo.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5623" href="#xd20e5623src" name="xd20e5623">17</a></span> The
+fraction used is based on 500,000 (the population of Mindanao), being
+that fraction of 7,500,000 (which last is, roughly speaking, the total
+population of the archipelago). The census figures being 499,634 and
+7,635,426 respectively, as heretofore stated.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5628" href="#xd20e5628src" name="xd20e5628">18</a></span>
+7,635,426. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 15.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5639" href="#xd20e5639src" name="xd20e5639">19</a></span>
+3,798,507. <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 125.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5645" href="#xd20e5645src" name="xd20e5645">20</a></span> 223,506
+is the total of the uncivilized tribes still extant in Luzon,
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 125, but they live in the
+mountains and you might live in the Philippines a long lifetime without
+ever seeing a sample of them, unless you happen to be an energetic
+ethnologist fond of mountain climbing.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5652" href="#xd20e5652src" name="xd20e5652">21</a></span>
+<i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 57.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5657" href="#xd20e5657src" name="xd20e5657">22</a></span> The
+area of Cuba is about 44,000 square miles.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5660" href="#xd20e5660src" name="xd20e5660">23</a></span> Except
+Ohio, the States of Pennsylvania and Tennessee are nearer the size of
+Luzon than any others of the Union, the former containing about 45,000
+square miles and the latter about 42,000.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5672" href="#xd20e5672src" name="xd20e5672">24</a></span> This
+comparison does not pretend to be mathematically exact. New
+Jersey&rsquo;s area is nearer 8000 than 7000 square miles. For further
+illustration by comparison, it may be noted in this connection that the
+area of Massachusetts is over 8000 square miles (8315) and that of
+Vermont between 9000 and 10,000 (9565). As Costa Rica has only 368,780
+inhabitants (<i>Statesman&rsquo;s Year Book</i>), the province of
+Pangasinan alone contains more people than the republic of Costa Rica.
+The average of intelligence and industry of the masses in both is
+doubtless about the same, with the probabilities in favor of
+Pangasinan.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5693" href="#xd20e5693src" name="xd20e5693">25</a></span> Table
+of Areas, <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5702" href="#xd20e5702src" name="xd20e5702">26</a></span> Table
+of Populations, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5802" href="#xd20e5802src" name="xd20e5802">27</a></span> In
+alluding, in complimentary terms, to this officer&rsquo;s gallant
+conduct on that occasion, Harper&rsquo;s <i>History of the War in the
+Philippines</i> spells the name &ldquo;Hustin,&rdquo; as it had
+previously misspelled the name of the star actor among the younger
+officers who participated in the Zapote River fight
+&ldquo;Kanly.&rdquo; &ldquo;Such is fame.&rdquo; The gentleman&rsquo;s
+right name is Mustin. He is now a lieutenant-commander, well known in
+the navy to-day, as the inventor of the &ldquo;Mustin
+gun-sight.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5812" href="#xd20e5812src" name="xd20e5812">28</a></span> There
+is a notable unanimity, among the men in the army of about Major
+March&rsquo;s age and rank, in the opinion that he is a man of very
+extraordinary ability. This unanimity is so generous and genuine that I
+deem it a duty as well as a pleasure to emphasize it here.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5815" href="#xd20e5815src" name="xd20e5815">29</a></span> See
+Otis&rsquo;s <i>Report</i> covering September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900,
+<i>War Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 261.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5826" href="#xd20e5826src" name="xd20e5826">30</a></span> The
+12th, part of the 25th, and the 32d Infantry being used to guard the
+railroad and for other purposes.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5831" href="#xd20e5831src" name="xd20e5831">31</a></span>
+Calumpit will be remembered as the place where in the previous spring
+Colonel Funston and his Kansans performed the daring and successful
+man&oelig;uvre of crossing the Bagbag River under fire.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5845" href="#xd20e5845src" name="xd20e5845">32</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 2 (1902), p. 1926.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5852" href="#xd20e5852src" name="xd20e5852">33</a></span> This
+ratio is no jest. It is a statistical fact, figured out from one of the
+War Department Reports.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5861" href="#xd20e5861src" name="xd20e5861">34</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5881" href="#xd20e5881src" name="xd20e5881">35</a></span>
+<i>Report of Secretary of War</i>, 1899, p. 12.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5910" href="#xd20e5910src" name="xd20e5910">36</a></span>
+Campaign Spanish for &ldquo;look for.&rdquo; Generals Lawton and Young
+had cut loose from their base of supplies and their command was
+trusting for subsistence to living upon the country.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5930" href="#xd20e5930src" name="xd20e5930">37</a></span> See
+translation of diary of Major Simeon Villa, <i>Senate Document 331</i>,
+pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), p. 1988. It was in this Aringay
+fight that one of the narrowest escapes from death in battle ever
+officially authenticated occurred. Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan, now a
+captain of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, was struck just over the heart by an
+insurgent bullet (probably more or less spent) while crossing the river
+in the face of a hot fire, the bullet being deflected by a plug of
+tobacco carried in the breast pocket of the regulation campaign blue
+shirt he was wearing, which pocket, any one acquainted with that shirt
+will remember, is at the left breast just over the heart (<i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 6, <span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e5938" title="Source: pt.">pp.</span> 166, 279). He was knocked
+over, but soon recovered and went on. The flesh of the left breast over
+the heart was bruised black and blue. He was recommended for a medal of
+honor on account of the incident (<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900,
+vol. i., pt. 7, p. 136).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5949" href="#xd20e5949src" name="xd20e5949">38</a></span> If
+these figures are not exact, they are approximately correct. We always
+called it three hundred miles from Manila to the northern end of Luzon
+via Vigan and the lighthouse at Cape Bojeador.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5956" href="#xd20e5956src" name="xd20e5956">39</a></span> For
+instance, there was what used to be known to the 8th Corps as
+&ldquo;Col. Jim Parker&rsquo;s night attack at Vigan,&rdquo; which
+occurred early in December, 1899, soon after that place was occupied,
+the insurgents coming into the town in large numbers, at night under
+command of General Ti&ntilde;io, through a tunnel so it was said, and
+being driven out only after desperate close quarters&rsquo; fighting
+from about two o&rsquo;clock in the morning until after broad daylight,
+leaving the streets and plaza of Vigan much cumbered with their dead.
+Again, later on, there was the sudden order, swiftly executed, in
+obedience to which Lieutenant Grayson V. Heidt with a part of a troop
+of the 3d Cavalry, rode from Laoag to Batac to the rescue of a besieged
+garrison at the latter place, arriving in time to prevent a small
+Custer massacre, the garrison having gotten short of ammunition, and
+having just managed to telegraph for reinforcements a few moments
+before the enemy cut the telegraph wire. Then, there was Lieutenant
+Hannay, of the 22d Infantry, who being at the front, received an order
+from General Lawton to come back to build a bridge. The order made him
+sick, the surgeon reported him sick, the messenger returned with that
+message, and then Hannay promptly got well, and stayed at the front.
+And so on, <i lang="la">ad infinitum</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5984" href="#xd20e5984src" name="xd20e5984">40</a></span> The
+Visayan Islands&mdash;the half-dozen islands between Luzon and Mindanao
+already mentioned, as the only ones worth mentioning for our purposes,
+together with the various smaller islands, islets, and rocks
+&ldquo;visible at high water.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e5994" href="#xd20e5994src" name="xd20e5994">41</a></span>
+&ldquo;During April, in the First District, comprising the provinces of
+Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Union, Abra, Lepanto, Benguet, and Bontoc,
+Brigadier General S. B. M. Young, commanding, the insurgents manifested
+considerable activity and endeavored to take the offensive against the
+scattered detachments in the district. The insurgents were in every
+instance defeated, and lost more than 500 men killed.&rdquo; <i>War
+Dept. Report</i> 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 196.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6002" href="#xd20e6002src" name="xd20e6002">42</a></span> The
+language quoted is that employed by Robert Collins, Associated Press
+Correspondent, in connection with the Round Robin incident of nine
+months previous, described in the concluding part of the chapter
+preceding this.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6008" href="#xd20e6008src" name="xd20e6008">43</a></span>
+Hereinafter more fully set forth.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6022" href="#xd20e6022src" name="xd20e6022">44</a></span> For the
+Table of Areas, see <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6030" href="#xd20e6030src" name="xd20e6030">45</a></span> For the
+Table of Populations, see <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p.
+123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6067" href="#xd20e6067src" name="xd20e6067">46</a></span> Under
+the Spaniards, these were two provinces. They were combined by us.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6095" href="#xd20e6095src" name="xd20e6095">47</a></span> A
+province in Latin countries corresponds more nearly to what we call a
+county than to anything else familiar to our system of political
+divisions.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6118" href="#xd20e6118src" name="xd20e6118">48</a></span> For the
+details of this march, see <i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i.,
+pt. 4, p. 309. Captain Batchelor had neither orders nor permission to
+do what he did. When he cut loose from the command he belonged to, he
+took very long chances on finding subsistence for his men in the
+unknown country he had set out to conquer, to say nothing of the highly
+probable chances of annihilation of his whole command. When an officer
+commanding troops does this in time of war, he does so at his peril,
+and signal success is his only salvation.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6135" href="#xd20e6135src" name="xd20e6135">49</a></span> Area
+tables, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6143" href="#xd20e6143src" name="xd20e6143">50</a></span>
+Population tables, <i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6180" href="#xd20e6180src" name="xd20e6180">51</a></span> Though
+Nueva Vizcaya is not <i>in</i> the Cagayan valley, but on a plateau of
+the great divide, still, its streams all flow into the Cagayan valley,
+and that term will be used in this book, as it is colloquially in the
+Philippines, to include not only the Cagayan valley proper, but also
+the adjoining tributary province of Nueva Vizcaya.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6229" href="#xd20e6229src" name="xd20e6229">52</a></span> The
+only thing of interest to the American people that ever happened over
+there was the capture of Lieutenant Gilmore of the Navy, and his men,
+at Baler, on the Pacific coast, in Principe, a capture which, it will
+be recollected, was followed by long captivity, and ultimately
+terminated in rescue. The interested student will see these two
+provinces on the American maps of the islands, but they were each
+attached by the Taft government for administration purposes to another
+province, and do not appear in the American census list of provinces.
+Therefore, they cut no figure in the census totals, either of area or
+population.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6234" href="#xd20e6234src" name="xd20e6234">53</a></span> The
+officer on whom public attention in the United States was later
+focussed by an alleged order, charged to have been issued by him in a
+campaign in Samar to &ldquo;kill everything over ten years old.&rdquo;
+This alleged order was called by the American newspapers of the period
+&ldquo;Jake Smith&rsquo;s Kill and Burn Order.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6311" href="#xd20e6311src" name="xd20e6311">54</a></span> The
+figures as to Principe are mere arbitrary guesses, the exact figures
+used being fixed on merely to get convenient round numbers, there being
+no statistics as to Principe.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6390" href="#xd20e6390src" name="xd20e6390">55</a></span> Of
+course the Filipinos should be consulted as to what provinces should
+constitute each state, but I am simply sketching a tentative
+governmental scheme based upon the way our army perfected its original
+grip on public order and the general administrative situation.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6393" href="#xd20e6393src" name="xd20e6393">56</a></span> All
+along here we, of course, deal in round numbers only.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6396" href="#xd20e6396src" name="xd20e6396">57</a></span> See
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 45 <i>et
+seq.</i> The city of Manila and vicinity constituted the Sixth District
+of the Department of Northern Luzon.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6514" href="#xd20e6514src" name="xd20e6514">58</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 47&ndash;8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6575" href="#xd20e6575src" name="xd20e6575">59</a></span> <i>War
+Dept. Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., part 1, p. 9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6599" href="#xd20e6599src" name="xd20e6599">60</a></span> The
+Spanish word <i>camarin</i> means a warehouse. The province of
+Camarines was originally two provinces, and is still referred to as
+two, though governmentally but one.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6637" href="#xd20e6637src" name="xd20e6637">61</a></span> Of
+March 2, 1899. Under it the term of enlistment of the volunteers was to
+expire June 30, 1901.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6660" href="#xd20e6660src" name="xd20e6660">62</a></span> Table
+of Areas, <i>Philippine Census of 1903</i>, vol. i., p. 263. Table of
+Population, <i>ib.</i>, vol. ii., pp. 123 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch13" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XIII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">MacArthur and the War</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,</p>
+<p class="line">Pock-marked khakiac ladrone;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6750src" href="#xd20e6750" name="xd20e6750src">1</a></p>
+<p class="line">Underneath the starry flag</p>
+<p class="line">Civilize him with a Krag,</p>
+<p class="line">And return us to our own beloved home.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Army Song of the Philippines under
+MacArthur.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6762src" href="#xd20e6762"
+name="xd20e6762src">2</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Some one has said, &ldquo;Let me write the songs of a
+people and I care not who makes their laws.&rdquo; Give me the campaign
+songs of a war, and I will so write the history of that war that he who
+runs may read, and, reading, <i>know</i> the truth. The volunteers of
+1899 had, most of them, been in the Spanish War of &rsquo;98. That
+struggle had been so brief that, to borrow a phrase of the principal
+beneficiary of it, Colonel Roosevelt, there had not been &ldquo;war
+enough to go &rsquo;round.&rdquo; The Philippine insurrection had
+already broken out when the Spanish War volunteers returned from Cuba
+in the first half of 1899. Few of them knew exactly where the
+Philippines were on the map. They simply knew that we had bought the
+islands, that disturbances of public order were in progress there, and
+that the Government desired to suppress them. The President had called
+for volunteers. That was enough. When they reached the islands, instead
+of finding a lot of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb271" href="#pb271"
+name="pb271">271</a>]</span>outlaws, brigands, etc., such as that
+pestiferous, ill-conditioned outfit of horse-thieves and cane-field
+burning patriots we volunteers of &rsquo;98 had to comb out of the
+eastern end of Cuba under General Wood in the winter of 1898&ndash;9,
+they found Manila, on their arrival, practically almost a besieged
+city. They knew that the erroneous impression they had brought with
+them was the result of misrepresentation. Who was responsible for that
+misrepresentation they did not attempt to analyze. They simply set to
+work with American energy to put down the insurrection. Nobody
+questioned the unanimity of the opposition. There it was, a
+<i>fact</i>&mdash;denied at home, but a fact. In the course of the
+fight against the organized insurgent army they lost a great many of
+their comrades, and in that way the unanimity of the resistance was
+quite forcibly impressed upon them. By kindred psychologic processes
+equally free from mystery, their determination to overcome the
+resistance early became very set&mdash;a state of mind which boded no
+good to the Filipinos. The army song given at the beginning of <a href=
+"#ch11">Chapter XI</a> (<i>ante</i>), in which General Otis is made to
+sing, after the fashion of some of the characters in <i>Pinafore</i>,
+that pensive query to himself</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Am I the boss, or am I a tool?</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">the first stanza of which closes</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Now I&rsquo;d like to know who&rsquo;s the boss of the
+show,</p>
+<p class="line">Is it me or Emilio Aguinaldo?</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">was a point of departure, in the matter of
+information, which served to acquaint them with all that had gone
+before. They resented the loss of prestige to American arms and desired
+to restore that prestige. While engaged in so doing, they became aware,
+during the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb272" href="#pb272" name=
+"pb272">272</a>]</span>Presidential year 1900, that the campaign of
+that year in the United States was based largely upon the pretence that
+the majority of the Filipinos welcomed our rule. Naturally, their
+experience led them to a very general and very cordial detestation of
+this pretence. For one thing, it was an unfair belittling of the actual
+military service they were rendering. People hate a lie whether they
+are able to trace its devious windings to its source or sources, or to
+analyze all its causes, or calculate all its possible effects, or not.
+The real rock-bottom falsehood, not as fully understood then as it
+became later, consisted in the impression sought to be produced at
+home, in order to get votes, that the great body of the Filipino people
+were not really in sympathy with their country&rsquo;s struggle for
+freedom, and would be really glad tamely to accept the alien domination
+so benevolently offered by a superior people, but were being coerced
+into fighting through intimidation by a few selfish leaders acting for
+their own selfish ends. While our fighting generals in the
+field,&mdash;General MacArthur, for instance, whose interview with a
+newspaper man just after the fall of Malolos, in March, 1899,
+subsequently verified by him before the Senate Committee of 1902, has
+already been noticed&mdash;at first believed that it was only a faction
+that we had to contend with, they soon discovered that the whole people
+were loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he represented. But, while the
+point as to how unanimous the resistance was remained a disputed matter
+for some little time among those of our people who did not have to
+&ldquo;go up against it,&rdquo; the most curious fact of that whole
+historic situation, to my mind, is the absolute identity of the
+disputed suggestion with that which had previously been used in like
+cases in all ages by the powerful against people struggling to be free,
+and the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb273" href="#pb273" name=
+"pb273">273</a>]</span>cotemporaneous absence of any notation of the
+coincidence by any conspicuous spectator of the drama, to say nothing
+of us smaller fry who bore the brunt of the war or any portion of
+it.</p>
+<p>Those men of &rsquo;99 in the Philippines realized in 1900, vaguely
+it may be, but actually, that they were waging a war of conquest after
+the manner of the British as sung by Kipling, but under the
+hypocritical pretence that they were doing missionary work to improve
+the Filipino. They did not know whether the Filipinos could or could
+not run a decent government if permitted. It was too early to form any
+judgment. And even then there was no unanimous feeling that they could
+not. Brigadier-General Charles King, the famous novelist, who was in
+the fighting out there during the first half of 1899, was quoted in the
+<i>Catholic Citizen</i>, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in June, 1899, as
+having said in an interview given at Milwaukee:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is no reason in the world why the people should
+not have the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far
+as their ability to carry it on goes.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The real reason why the war was being waged was stated with the
+honesty which heated public discussion always brings forth, by Hon.
+Charles Denby, a member of the Schurman Commission of 1899, in an
+article which appeared in the <i>Forum</i> for February, 1899, entitled
+&ldquo;Why the Treaty Should be Ratified:&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6814src" href="#xd20e6814" name="xd20e6814src">3</a></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The cold, hard, practical question alone remains:
+&ldquo;Will the possession of the islands benefit us as a
+nation?&rdquo; If it will not, set them free to-morrow.</p>
+</div>
+<p>But in the same magazine, the <i>Forum</i>, for June, 1900, in other
+words to the very same audience, in an article <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb274" href="#pb274" name=
+"pb274">274</a>]</span>whose title is a protest, &ldquo;Do we Owe the
+Filipinos Independence?&rdquo; we find this same distinguished diplomat
+sagaciously deferring to that not inconsiderable element of the
+American public which is opposed to wars for conquest, with the rank
+hypocrisy which must ever characterize a republic warring for gain
+against the ideals that made it great, thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A little time ought to be conceded to the
+Administration to ascertain what the wish of the people [meaning the
+people of the Philippine Islands] really is;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6834src" href="#xd20e6834" name="xd20e6834src">4</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>adding some of the stale but ever-welcome salve originally invented
+by General Otis for use by Mr. McKinley on the public conscience of
+America, about the war having been &ldquo;fomented by professional
+politicians,&rdquo; and not having the moral support of the whole
+people. &ldquo;A majority of the Filipinos are friendly to us,&rdquo;
+he says. Even as early as January 4, 1900, in the New York
+<i>Independent</i>, we find Mr. Denby abandoning all his previous
+honesty of 1899 about &ldquo;the cold, hard, practical question,&rdquo;
+and rubbing his hands with invisible soap to the tune of the following
+hypocrisy:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Let us find out how many of the people want
+independence, and how many are willing to remain loyal to our
+government. It is believed a large majority [etc.].<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e6849src" href="#xd20e6849" name="xd20e6849src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The same article even assumed an air of injured innocence and urged
+that as soon as the insurgent army laid down its arms<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e6854src" href="#xd20e6854" name="xd20e6854src">6</a>
+&ldquo;the intentions of our government <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb275" href="#pb275" name="pb275">275</a>]</span>will be made known by
+Congress.&rdquo; That was just thirteen years ago, and &ldquo;the
+intentions of our government&rdquo; have never yet been &ldquo;made
+known by Congress,&rdquo; despite the fact that the omission has all
+these years been like a buzzing insect, lighting intermittently on the
+sores of race prejudice and political difference in the Philippines, to
+say nothing of the circumstance that such omission leaves everybody
+guessing, including ourselves. The omission has been due to the fact
+that both the McKinley Administration which committed the original
+blunder of taking the islands, and the succeeding Administrations which
+have been the legatees of that blunder, have always needed in their
+Philippine business the support both of those whose votes are caught by
+the Denby honesty of 1899 and those whose votes are caught by the Denby
+hypocrisy of 1900.</p>
+<p>War is a great silencer of hypocrisy. In the presence of real sorrow
+and genuine anger, it slinks away and is seen no more until more piping
+times. The lists of casualties had been duly bulletined to the United
+States from time to time between February, 1899, and June, 1900, so
+that by the date last named it had become &ldquo;good politics&rdquo;
+to throw off the mask. Hence, at the Republican National Convention
+held in Philadelphia June 19&ndash;21, 1900, we find that astute
+past-master of the science of government by parties, Senator Lodge,
+boldly throwing off the mask thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested
+in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade
+expansion.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Now the words of a United States Senator are much listened to by an
+army in the field. When a war breaks out, it is usually your Senator
+who gets your commission <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb276" href=
+"#pb276" name="pb276">276</a>]</span>for you originally, and has you
+promoted and made captain, colonel, or general, as the case may be, if
+you do anything to deserve it, or lifted from the ranks to a
+commission, if you do anything to deserve it, or sees that something
+fitting is done if you die in any specially decent way. An army in the
+field thinks a United States Senator is about one of the biggest
+institutions going&mdash;which, seriously, is not far from the truth,
+with all due respect to the blas&eacute; pessimists of the press
+gallery. Consider then how wholly uninspiring, as a sentiment to die by
+and kill by, the above senatorial utterance was to the men in the field
+in the Philippines, who did not even then believe the islands would
+pay. The &ldquo;cold, hard, practical&rdquo; fact was, if the Senator
+was to be believed, that we were fighting for what is generically
+called &ldquo;Wall Street;&rdquo; that it was primarily a Wall Street
+war: an expedition fitted out to kill enough Filipinos to make the
+survivors good future customers&mdash;&ldquo;Ultimate
+Consumers&rdquo;&mdash;and only incidentally a war to make people
+follow your way of being happy in lieu of their own. Yet we had most of
+us, but shortly previously to that, gone trooping headlong to Cuba, in
+the wake of the most inspiring single personality of this
+age&mdash;Senator Lodge&rsquo;s friend, Colonel Roosevelt&mdash;some of
+our American thoraxes inflated with sentiments thus nobly expressed by
+the same distinguished Senator in his speech on the resolution which
+declared war against Spain:</p>
+<p>&ldquo;We are there&rdquo; (meaning in the then Cuban situation),
+Senator Lodge had said in the Senate, in the matchless outburst of
+eloquence with which he set the keynote to the war with
+Spain&mdash;</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We are there because we represent the spirit of
+liberty and the new time. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* We have grasped no
+man&rsquo;s territory, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb277" href=
+"#pb277" name="pb277">277</a>]</span>we have taken no man&rsquo;s
+property, we have invaded no man&rsquo;s rights. <i>We do not ask their
+lands.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e6878src" href="#xd20e6878" name=
+"xd20e6878src">7</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>What difference, however, did it make to men under military orders,
+and that far away from home, where American public opinion could not
+and never can affect any given situation in time to help it, whether
+they were serving God or the devil? Everything disappeared but the
+primal fighting instinct. So the slaughter proceeded right merrily, at
+a ratio of about sixteen to one, and many a Filipino died with the word
+&ldquo;Independence&rdquo; on his lips,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6885src" href="#xd20e6885" name="xd20e6885src">8</a> while many
+an obscure American life went out, fighting under the Denby-Lodge
+dollar-mark flag of pseudo-trade expansion. Can you imagine a more
+thankless job? Do you wonder at the song that heads the chapter? Still,
+war is war, once you are in it. All through 1900 the volunteers of 1899
+kept on, cheerfully doing their country&rsquo;s work, not in the least
+hampered by whys or wherefores, so far as the quality of their work
+went. They knew that the Filipinos were not heathen, and they were not
+perfectly clear that they themselves were doing the Lord&rsquo;s work,
+unless &ldquo;putting the fear of God into the heart of the <i lang=
+"es">insurrecto</i>&rdquo;&mdash;one of their campaign
+expressions&mdash;was the Lord&rsquo;s work. However, if any of them
+gave any special thought to the ethics of the situation, this did not
+in the least affect their efficiency in action, nor their determination
+to lick the Filipino into submission. When the brief organized
+resistance of the insurgent armies in the field (February to November,
+1899) underwent its transition to the far more formidable guerrilla
+tactics, they realized that they were &ldquo;up <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb278" href="#pb278" name=
+"pb278">278</a>]</span>against&rdquo; a long and tedious task, in which
+would be no special glamour, as there had been in Cuba, because the war
+was not much more popular at home than it was with them. The rank net
+hypocrisy of the whole situation, as they viewed it, is expressed in
+the song which heads this chapter. It is an answer to the Taft nonsense
+of 1900 about &ldquo;the people long for peace and are willing to
+accept government under United States.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6896src" href="#xd20e6896" name="xd20e6896src">9</a> That is why
+the Caribao Society do not sing it to Mr. Taft when he attends their
+annual banquet, notwithstanding that it is the star song of their
+repertoire.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6902src" href="#xd20e6902" name=
+"xd20e6902src">10</a> This statement of Judge Taft&rsquo;s, as well as
+other like statements of his which followed it during the presidential
+campaign of 1900, would have been perfectly harmless in home politics.
+It was made in the same spirit of optimism in which a Taft man will
+tell you to-day, &ldquo;The people are willing to see the Taft
+Administration endorsed.&rdquo; But at that time in the Philippines
+there was no possible way to prove or disprove the statement to the
+satisfaction of anybody at home&mdash;or elsewhere, for that matter.
+And, under the circumstances, it was at once a libel on Filipino
+patriotism and an ungracious belittling of the work of the American
+army. It was a libel on Filipino patriotism because it denied the loyal
+(even if ill-advised) unanimity of the Filipino people in their
+struggle for independence, and was a statement made recklessly, without
+knowledge, in aid of a presidential candidate in the United States.
+That it was highly inaccurate was well known to some <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb279" href="#pb279" name=
+"pb279">279</a>]</span>70,000 American soldiers then in the field, who
+were daily getting <i>insurrecto</i> lead pumped into them, and also
+well known to their gallant commander, General MacArthur, who told
+Judge Taft just that thing. That it was an ungracious belittling of the
+work of the army is certainly obvious enough, and it was so considered
+by the army, and its commanding general aforesaid, who practically told
+Judge Taft just that thing. But Mr. Root, then Secretary of War, was as
+much interested in Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s re-election as Judge Taft was.
+So he spread the Taft cablegrams broadcast throughout the United States
+during the presidential campaign, and pigeonholed the MacArthur
+messages and reports on the situation in the dusty and innocuous
+desuetude of the War Department archives. Four years later at the
+Republican National Convention of 1904, Mr. Root told the naked truth,
+thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When the last national convention met, over 70,000
+soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in
+check.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6914src" href="#xd20e6914" name=
+"xd20e6914src">11</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The foregoing is all a record made and unalterable. It is a fair
+sample of the initial stages of one more of the experiments in
+colonization by a republic which are scattered through history and
+teach but one lesson. All the gentlemen concerned were personally men
+of high type. But look at the net result of their work. The impression
+it produced in the United States, at a tremendously critical period in
+the country&rsquo;s history, when the men at the helm of state were
+bending every energy to railroad the republic into a career of overseas
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb280" href="#pb280" name=
+"pb280">280</a>]</span>conquest, and using the army for that purpose,
+can be called by a short and ugly word. The splendor of Mr.
+Root&rsquo;s intellect is positively alluring, but he is a dangerous
+man to republican institutions. Mr. Taft&rsquo;s part in that
+conspiracy for the suppression of the facts of the Philippine situation
+in 1900 was really due to kindliness of heart, regret at the war, and
+earnest hope that it would soon end. Mr. Denby&rsquo;s part was that of
+the out-and-out imperialist who has frank doubts in his own mind as to
+whether it is axiomatic, after all, that the form of government
+bequeathed us by our fathers is the best form of government yet
+devised. But the conspiracy was really a sin against the progress of
+the world, because it deceived the American people as to the
+genuineness and unanimity of the desire of the Filipino people to
+imitate the example set by us in 1776, which has since served as a
+beacon-light of hope to so many people in so many lands in their
+several struggles to be free.</p>
+<p>By the spring of 1900, when General MacArthur relieved General Otis,
+the volunteers of 1899 had gotten thoroughly warmed up to the work of
+showing the Filipinos who was in fact &ldquo;the boss of the
+show,&rdquo; and by June, 1900, when Judge Taft arrived, they had
+gotten still warmer<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6925src" href=
+"#xd20e6925" name="xd20e6925src">12</a>; and in General Otis&rsquo;s
+successor they had a commander who understood his men thoroughly, and
+was determined to carry out honestly, with firmness, and without
+playing, as his predecessor had done, the r&ocirc;le of political
+henchman, the purpose for which the army he commanded had been sent to
+the Islands to accomplish. In this state of the case, the Taft
+Commission came out.</p>
+<p>This would seem rather an odd point at which to <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb281" href="#pb281" name=
+"pb281">281</a>]</span>terminate a chapter on &ldquo;MacArthur and the
+War,&rdquo; seeing that General MacArthur continued to command the
+American forces in the Philippines and to direct their strenuous field
+operations until July, 1901, more than a year later, when he was
+relieved by General Chaffee, on whom thereafter devolved the subsequent
+conduct of the war. But we must follow the inexorable thread of
+chronological order, and so yield the centre of the stage from June,
+1900, on, to Mr. Taft, else the resultant net confusion of ideas about
+the American occupation of the Philippines might remain as great as
+that which this narrative is an attempt in some degree to correct.</p>
+<p>All through the official correspondence of 1899 and 1900 between the
+Adjutant-General of the Army, General Corbin, and General Otis at
+Manila, one sees Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s sensitiveness to public opinion.
+&ldquo;In view of the impatience of the people&rdquo; you will do thus
+and so, is a typical sample of this feature of that
+correspondence.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e6934src" href="#xd20e6934"
+name="xd20e6934src">13</a> Troubled, possibly, with misgivings, as to
+whether, after all, in view of the vigorous and undeniably obstinate
+struggle for independence the Filipinos were putting up, it would not
+have been wiser to have done with them as we had done in the case of
+Cuba, and troubled, beyond the peradventure of a doubt, about the
+effect of the possible Philippine situation on the fortunes of his
+party and himself in the approaching campaign for the presidency, Mr.
+McKinley sent Mr. Taft out, in the spring preceding the election of
+1900, to help General MacArthur run the war. We must now, therefore,
+turn our attention to Mr. Taft, not forgetting General MacArthur in so
+doing. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb282" href="#pb282" name=
+"pb282">282</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6750" href="#xd20e6750src" name="xd20e6750">1</a></span>
+Copper-colored thief.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6762" href="#xd20e6762src" name="xd20e6762">2</a></span> Sung to
+the tune of &ldquo;Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are
+marching.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6814" href="#xd20e6814src" name="xd20e6814">3</a></span> See
+<i>Forum</i>, vol. xxvi., p. 647.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6834" href="#xd20e6834src" name="xd20e6834">4</a></span> See
+<i>Forum</i>, vol. xxix., p. 403.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6849" href="#xd20e6849src" name="xd20e6849">5</a></span> These
+quotations are not taken from a scrap-book. Many readers forget that
+the bound volumes of all the great magazines are permanently available
+in the great libraries of the country.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6854" href="#xd20e6854src" name="xd20e6854">6</a></span>
+Hostilities had not yet broken out when the article now being
+considered appeared on January 4th, and did not break out until thirty
+days later, to wit, on February 4th.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6878" href="#xd20e6878src" name="xd20e6878">7</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, April 13, 1898, p. 3701.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6885" href="#xd20e6885src" name="xd20e6885">8</a></span> In the
+early days of the fighting they used to hurrah a good deal, and shout
+&ldquo;<span lang="es">Viva la Independencia</span>&rdquo; (Live
+Independence).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6896" href="#xd20e6896src" name="xd20e6896">9</a></span> See
+Judge Taft&rsquo;s cablegram to Secretary of War Root of August 21,
+1900, <i>War Department Report</i>, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6902" href="#xd20e6902src" name="xd20e6902">10</a></span> The
+Caribao Society is an organization composed mainly of officers of the
+regular army, but to which any one who served as an officer, volunteer
+or regular, in the Philippine Insurrection, is eligible. Their
+principal function, like that of the famous Gridiron Club, is to give
+an annual dinner.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6914" href="#xd20e6914src" name="xd20e6914">11</a></span>
+<i>Addresses at Republican National Convention</i> (1904), p. 62,
+published by Isaac H. Blanchard &amp; Co., New York, 1904. The
+Republican National Convention of 1900 met June 19th, just sixteen days
+after the Taft Commission arrived at Manila.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6925" href="#xd20e6925src" name="xd20e6925">12</a></span> General
+MacArthur relieved General Otis May 5, 1900, and the Taft Commission
+arrived at Manila June 3d thereafter.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6934" href="#xd20e6934src" name="xd20e6934">13</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1051.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch14" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XIV</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Taft Commission</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The papers &rsquo;id it &rsquo;andsome,</p>
+<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236">Kipling, <i>Ballad of the Boer War</i>.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">The essentials of the situation which confronted the
+Taft Commission on its arrival in the islands in June, 1900, and the
+mental attitude in which they approached that situation, may now be
+briefly summarized, with entire confidence that such summary will
+commend itself as fairly accurate to the impartial judgment both of the
+historian of the future and of any candid contemporary mind.</p>
+<p>It is not necessary to &ldquo;vex the dull ear&rdquo; of a mighty
+people much engrossed with their own affairs, by repetition of any
+further details concerning the original <i>de facto</i> alliance
+between Admiral Dewey and Aguinaldo. Suffice it to remind a people
+whose saving grace is a love of fair play, that, after the battle of
+Manila Bay, when Admiral Dewey brought Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong to
+Cavite, both the Admiral and his Filipino allies were keenly cognizant
+of the national purpose set forth in the declaration of war against
+Spain, and that the Filipinos could not have been expected to make any
+substantial distinction between the casual remarks of a victorious
+admiral on the quarter-deck of his flagship in May, remarks concurrent
+and consistent <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb283" href="#pb283" name=
+"pb283">283</a>]</span>with actual treatment of the Filipinos as
+allies, and the imperious commands of a general ashore in December
+thereafter, acting under specific orders pursuant to the Treaty of
+Paris. The one great fact of the situation, &ldquo;as huge as high
+Olympus,&rdquo; they <i>did</i> grasp, <i>viz.</i>, that both were
+representatives of America on the ground at the time of their
+respective utterances, and that one in December in effect repudiated
+without a word of explanation what the other had done from May to
+August. They had helped us to take the city of Manila in August, and,
+to use the current phrase of the passing hour, coined in this period of
+awakening of the national conscience to a proper attitude toward
+double-dealing in general, they felt that they had been &ldquo;given
+the double cross.&rdquo; In other words they believed that the American
+Government had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian. And
+that was the cause of the war.</p>
+<p>We have seen in the chapters on &ldquo;The Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation&rdquo; and &ldquo;The Iloilo Fiasco&rdquo; that, in the
+Philippines at any rate, no matter how mellifluously pacific it may
+have sounded at home&mdash;no matter how soothing to the troubled
+doubts of the national conscience&mdash;the Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation of December 21, 1898, was recognized both by the Eighth
+Army Corps and by Aguinaldo&rsquo;s people as a call to arms&mdash;a
+signal to the former to get ready for the work of &ldquo;civilizing
+with a Krag&rdquo;; a signal to the latter to gird up their loins for
+the fight to the death for government of their people, by their people,
+for their people; and that the yearning benevolence of said
+proclamation was calculated strikingly to remind the Filipinos of
+Spain&rsquo;s previous traditional yearnings for the welfare of Cuba,
+indignantly cut short by us&mdash;yearnings &ldquo;to spare the great
+island from the danger of premature <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb284" href="#pb284" name=
+"pb284">284</a>]</span>independence&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6975src" href="#xd20e6975" name="xd20e6975src">1</a> which that
+decadent monarchy could not even help repeating in the swan-song
+wherein she sued to President McKinley for peace. We did not realize
+the absoluteness of the analogy then. It is all clear enough now. We
+can now understand how and why Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s programme of
+Annexation and Benevolent Assimilation of 1898&ndash;9, blindly earnest
+as was his belief that it would make the Filipino people at once
+cheerfully forego the &ldquo;legitimate aspirations&rdquo; to which we
+ourselves had originally given a momentum so generous that nothing but
+bullets could then possibly have stopped it, was in fact received by
+them in a manner compared with which Canada&rsquo;s response in 1911 to
+Speaker Champ Clark&rsquo;s equally benevolent suggestion of United
+States willingness to accord to Canada <i>also</i>, gradual Benevolent
+Assimilation and Ultimate Annexation, was one great sisterly sob of
+sheer joy as at the finding of a long lost brother. From the arrival of
+the American troops on June 30, 1898, until the outbreak of February 4,
+1899, there had been two armies camped not far from each other, one
+born of the idea of independence and bent upon it, the other at first
+groping in the dark without instructions, and finally instructed to
+deny independence. There was never any faltering or evasion on the part
+of Aguinaldo and his people. They knew what they wanted and said so on
+all occasions. At all times and in all places they made it clear, by
+proclamation, by letter, by conversation, and otherwise, that
+independence was the one thing to which, whether they were fit for it
+or not, they had pledged &ldquo;their lives, their fortunes, and their
+sacred honor.&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb285" href="#pb285"
+name="pb285">285</a>]</span></p>
+<p>We have seen how easily the war itself could have been averted by
+the Bacon Resolution of January, 1899, or some similar resolution
+frankly declaring the purpose of our government; how here was Senator
+Bacon at this end of the line pleading with his colleagues to be frank,
+and to make a declaration in keeping with &ldquo;the high
+purpose&rdquo; for which we had gone to war with Spain, instead of
+holding on to the Philippines on the idea that they might prove a
+second Klondike, while justifying such retention by arbitrarily
+assuming, without any knowledge whatever on the subject, that the
+Filipinos were incapable of self-government; how, there, at the other
+end of the line, at Manila, Aguinaldo&rsquo;s Commissioners, familiar
+with our Constitution and the history and traditions of our government,
+were making, substantially, though in more diplomatic language,
+precisely the same plea, and imploring General Otis&rsquo;s
+Commissioners to give them some assurance which would quiet the
+apprehensions of their people, and calm the fear that the original
+assurance, &ldquo;We are going to lick the Spaniards and set you
+free,&rdquo; was now about to be ignored because the islands might be
+profitable to the United States.</p>
+<p>We have seen the war itself, as far as it had progressed by June,
+1900, one of the bitterest wars in history, punctuated by frequent
+barbarities avenged in kind, and how, if the Taft Commission had not
+come out with McKinley spectacles on, they would have seen the picture
+of a bleeding, prostrate, and deeply hostile people, still bent on
+fighting to the last ditch, not only animated by a feeling against
+annexation by us similar to that the Canadians would have to-day if we
+should also try the Benevolent Assimilation game on them&mdash;first
+with proclamations breathing benevolence and then with cannon belching
+grape-shot&mdash;but further <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb286" href=
+"#pb286" name="pb286">286</a>]</span>animated by the instinctive as
+well as inherited knowledge common to all colored peoples, whether red,
+yellow brown, or black, that wheresoever white men and colored live in
+the same country together, <i>there the white man will rule</i>.
+Understand, this was before Judge Taft had had a chance to assure them,
+with the kindly Taft smile and the hearty Taft hand-shake, that their
+benevolent new masters were going to reverse the verdict of the ages,
+and treat them with a fraternal love wholly free from race prejudice.
+If Judge Taft could only have arrived in January, 1899, and told them
+that the Bacon Resolution really represented the spirit of the attitude
+of the American people toward them, then the finely commanding bearing
+of Mr. Taft, and the noble genuineness of his desire to see peace on
+earth and goodwill toward men, might even have prevented the war. But
+this is merely what <i>might</i> have been. What actually <i>was</i>,
+when he <i>did</i> arrive, in June, 1900, was that the milk of human
+kindness had long since been spilled, and his task was to gather it up
+and put it back in the pail. When I, a Southern man who have taken part
+in the only two wars this nation has had in my lifetime, reflect that
+in this year of grace, 1912, Mr. Underwood&rsquo;s otherwise matchless
+availability as the candidate of his party for President is questioned
+on the idea that it might be a tactical blunder, because of &ldquo;the
+late war,&rdquo; which broke out before either Mr. Underwood or myself
+were born, I cannot share the Taft optimism as to the rapidity with
+which the scars of &ldquo;the late war&rdquo; in the Philippines will
+heal, and as to the affectionate gratitude toward the United States
+with which the McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation will
+presently be regarded by the people of the Philippine Islands.</p>
+<p>We have seen the futile efforts of the Schurman <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb287" href="#pb287" name=
+"pb287">287</a>]</span>Commission of 1899, sent out that spring, in
+deference to American public opinion, with definite instructions to try
+and patch up a peace, by talking to the leading spirits of a war for
+independence, <i>now in full swing</i>, about the desirability of
+benevolent leading-strings. &ldquo;They [meaning the Schurman
+Commission] had come,&rdquo; says Mr. McKinley, in his annual message
+to Congress of December 5, 1899,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7010src"
+href="#xd20e7010" name="xd20e7010src">2</a> &ldquo;with the hope of
+co-operating with Admiral Dewey and General Otis in establishing peace
+and order.&rdquo; They came, they saw, they went, recognizing the
+futility of the errand on which they had been sent. And now came the
+Taft Commission a year later, on precisely the same errand, after the
+Filipinos had sunk all their original petty differences and jealousies
+in a very reasonable instinctive common fear of economic exploitation,
+and a very unreasonable but, to them, very real common fear of race
+elimination, amounting to terror, and been welded into absolute
+oneness&mdash;if that were somewhat lacking before&mdash;in the fierce
+crucible of sixteen months of bloody fighting against a foreign foe for
+the independence of their common country. President McKinley&rsquo;s
+message to Congress of December, 1899, is full of the old insufferable
+drivel, so grossly, though unwittingly, ungenerous to our army then in
+the field in the Philippines, about the triviality of the resistance we
+were &ldquo;up against.&rdquo; The message in one place blandly speaks
+of &ldquo;the peaceable and loyal majority who ask nothing better than
+to accept our authority,&rdquo; in another of &ldquo;the sinister
+ambitions of a few selfish Filipinos.&rdquo; Thus was outlined, in the
+message announcing the purpose to send out the Taft Commission, the
+view that no real fundamental resistance existed in the islands. Basing
+contemplated action on this sort of stuff, the presidential
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb288" href="#pb288" name=
+"pb288">288</a>]</span>message outlines the presidential purpose as
+follows&mdash;this in December, 1899, mind you:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is no reason why steps should not be taken from
+time to time to inaugurate governments <i>essentially popular in their
+form</i> as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Then follows the genesis of the idea which resulted in the Taft
+Commission:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">To this end I am considering the advisability of the
+return [to the islands] of the commission [the Schurman Commission] or
+such of the members thereof as can be secured.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In Cuba, General Wood began the work of reconstruction at Havana
+with a central government and the best men he could get hold of, and
+acted through them, letting his plans and purposes percolate
+<i>downward</i> to the masses of the people. Not so in the Philippines.
+Reconstruction there was to begin by establishing municipal
+governments, to be later followed by provincial governments, and
+finally by a central one; in other words, by placing the waters of
+self-government at the bottom of the social fabric among the most
+ignorant people, and letting them percolate <i>up</i>, according to
+some mysterious law of gravitation apparently deemed applicable to
+political physics. Of course, these poor people simply always took
+their cue from their leaders, knowing nothing themselves that could
+affect the success of this project except that we were their enemies
+and that they might get knocked in the head if they did not play the
+game. &ldquo;I have believed,&rdquo; says Mr. McKinley, in his message
+to Congress of December, 1899, &ldquo;that reconstruction should not
+begin by the establishment of one central civil government for all the
+islands, with its seat at Manila, but rather <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb289" href="#pb289" name="pb289">289</a>]</span>that
+the work should be commenced by <i>building up from the
+bottom</i>.&rdquo; Whereat, the young giant America bowed, in puzzled
+hope, and worldly-wise old Europe smiled, in silent but amused
+contempt.</p>
+<p>If at the time he formulated this scheme for their government Mr.
+McKinley had known anything about the Philippines, or the Filipinos, he
+would have known that what he so suavely called &ldquo;building from
+the bottom&rdquo; was like trying to make water run up hill,
+<i>i.e.</i>, like starting out to have ideas percolate upward, so that
+through &ldquo;the masses&rdquo; the more intelligent people might be
+redeemed. The &ldquo;nigger in the woodpile&rdquo; lay in the words
+&ldquo;essentially popular in form.&rdquo; Of course no government by
+us &ldquo;essentially popular&rdquo; was possible at the time. But a
+government &ldquo;popular in form&rdquo; would sound well to the
+American people, and, if they could be kept quiet until after the
+presidential election of 1900, maybe the supposed misunderstanding on
+the part of the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions might be
+corrected by kindness. Accordingly, the following spring,
+cotemporaneously with General Otis&rsquo;s final departure from Manila
+to the United States, in which free country he might say the war was
+over as much as he pleased without being molested with round-robins by
+Bob Collins, O. K. Davis, John McCutcheon, and the rest of those banes
+of his insular career, who so pestiferously insisted that the American
+public ought to know the facts, the Taft Commission was sent out, to
+&ldquo;aid&rdquo; General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had
+&ldquo;aided&rdquo; General Otis.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7050src"
+href="#xd20e7050" name="xd20e7050src">3</a></p>
+<p>It would seem fairly beyond any reasonable doubt <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb290" href="#pb290" name="pb290">290</a>]</span>that
+the official information the Taft Commission were given by President
+McKinley concerning the state of public order they would find in the
+islands on arrival was in keeping with the information solemnly
+imparted to Congress by him in December thereafter, which was as
+follows: &ldquo;By the spring of this year (1900) the effective
+opposition of <i>the dissatisfied Tagals</i>&rdquo;&mdash;always the
+same minimization of the task of the army as a sop to the American
+conscience&mdash;&ldquo;was virtually ended.&rdquo; Then follows a
+glowing picture of how the Filipinos are going to love us after we
+rescue them from the hated Tagal, but with this circumspect
+reservation: &ldquo;He would be rash who, with the teachings of
+contemporary history, would fix a limit&rdquo; as to how long it will
+take to produce such a state of affairs. Looking at that mighty
+panorama of events from the dispassionate standpoint now possible, it
+seems to me that Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s whole Philippine policy of
+1899&ndash;1900 was animated by the belief that the more the Philippine
+situation should resemble the really identical Cuban one in the
+estimation of the American people, the more likely his Philippine
+policy was to be repudiated at the polls in the fall of 1900. The Taft
+Commission left Washington for Manila in the spring of 1900, after
+their final conference with the President who had appointed them and
+was a candidate for re-election in the coming fall, as completely
+committed as circumstances can commit any man or set of men to the
+programme of occupation which was to follow the subjugation of the
+inhabitants, and to the proposition of present incapacity for
+self-government, its corner-stone; to say nothing of the embarrassment
+felt at Washington by reason of having stumbled into a bloody war with
+people whom we honestly wanted to help, had never seen, and had nothing
+but the kindliest feelings for. While the serene <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb291" href="#pb291" name="pb291">291</a>]</span>and
+capacious intellect of William H. Taft was still pursuing the even
+tenor of its way in the halls of justice (as United States Circuit
+Judge for the 8th Circuit), the Philippine programme was formulated at
+Washington. Judge Taft went to Manila to make the best of a situation
+which he had not created, to write the lines of the <i>Deus ex
+machina</i> for a Tragedy of Errors up to that point composed wholly by
+others. It has been frequently stated and generally believed that when
+Mr. McKinley sent for him and proposed the Philippine mission, Judge
+Taft replied, substantially: &ldquo;Mr. President, I am not the man for
+the place. <i>I don&rsquo;t want the Philippines</i>.&rdquo; To which
+Mr. McKinley is supposed to have replied: &ldquo;You <i>are</i> the man
+for the place, Judge. I had rather <i>have</i> a man out there who
+doesn&rsquo;t want them.&rdquo; The point of the original story lay in
+what Mr. McKinley said. The point of the repetition of it here lies in
+what Mr. Taft said, the inference therefrom being that he did not think
+the true interests of his country &ldquo;wanted&rdquo; them, and that
+had he been called into President McKinley&rsquo;s council sooner he
+would have so advised; an inference warranted by his subsequent
+admission that &ldquo;we blundered into colonization.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e7078src" href="#xd20e7078" name=
+"xd20e7078src">4</a></p>
+<p>It is utterly fatal to clear thinking on this great subject, which
+concerns the liberties of a whole people, to treat Judge Taft&rsquo;s
+reports as Commissioner to, and later Governor of, the Philippines as
+in the nature of a judicial decision on the capacity of the Filipinos
+for self-government. When he consented to go out there, he went, not to
+review the findings of the Paris Peace Commission, but at the urgent
+solicitation of an Administration <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb292"
+href="#pb292" name="pb292">292</a>]</span>whose fortunes were
+irrevocably committed to those findings, including the express finding
+that they were unfit for self-government, and the implied one that we
+must remain to improve the condition of the inhabitants. He was thus
+not a judge come out to decide on the fitness of the people for
+self-government, but an advocate to make the best possible case for
+their unfitness, and its corollary, the necessity to remain
+indefinitely, just as England has remained in Egypt. The war itself
+convinced the whole army of the United States that Aguinaldo would have
+been the &ldquo;Boss of the Show&rdquo; had Dewey sailed away from
+Manila after sinking the Spanish fleet. The war satisfied us all that
+Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that
+the Filipino republic-that-might-have-been would have been, very
+decidedly, &ldquo;a going concern,&rdquo; although Aguinaldo probably
+would have been able to say with a degree of accuracy, as Diaz might
+have said in Mexico for so many years, &ldquo;The Republic? <i>I</i> am
+the Republic.&rdquo; The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D.,
+that the Filipinos are &ldquo;capable of self-government,&rdquo; unless
+the kind which happens to suit the genius of the American people is the
+only kind of government on earth that is respectable, and the one
+panacea for all the ills of government among men without regard to
+their temperament or historical antecedents. The educated patriotic
+Filipinos can control the masses of the people in their several
+districts as completely as a captain ever controlled a
+company.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7091src" href="#xd20e7091" name=
+"xd20e7091src">5</a> While the municipal officials of the McKinley-Taft
+municipal kindergarten were stumbling along with the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb293" href="#pb293" name=
+"pb293">293</a>]</span>strange new town government system imported from
+America, and atoning to their benignant masters for mistakes by writing
+them letters about how benignant they&mdash;the teachers&mdash;were,
+they&mdash;the pupils,&mdash;according to the contemporaneous
+description by the commanding general of the United States forces in
+the islands, were running a superbly efficient municipal system
+throughout the whole archipelago, &ldquo;simultaneously and in the same
+sphere as the American governments, and in many instances through the
+same personnel,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7099src" href=
+"#xd20e7099" name="xd20e7099src">6</a> in aid of the insurrection.
+General MacArthur humorously adds that the town officials &ldquo;acted
+openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in behalf of the
+insurgents, and, <i>with considerable apparent solicitude for the
+interest of both</i>.&rdquo; In short, the war at once demonstrated
+their &ldquo;capacity for self-government&rdquo; and made granting it
+to them for the time being unthinkable. For the war was fought not on
+the issue of the <i>capacity</i>, but on the issue of the
+<i>granting</i>. The Treaty of Paris settled the &ldquo;capacity&rdquo;
+part. The army in 1898, 1899, and 1900 can hardly be said to have had
+any much more decided opinion on the <i>capacity</i> branch of the
+subject, than Perry did about the Japanese in 1854. The Paris Peace
+Commission having solemnly decided the &ldquo;capacity part&rdquo;
+adversely to the Filipinos and the war having followed, thereafter Mr.
+Taft went out to make out the best case possible in support of the
+action of the Peace Commission and, <i lang="la">ex vi termini</i>, in
+support of everything made necessary by the fact of the purchase.
+Unless some one goes out to present to the American people the other
+side of the case, they will never arrive at a just verdict.</p>
+<p>Committed, <i>a priori</i>, to the task of squaring the McKinley
+Administration with its course as to Cuba, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb294" href="#pb294" name="pb294">294</a>]</span>the
+only course possible for the Taft Commission was to set up a benevolent
+government based upon the incompetency of the governed, which, being a
+standing affront to the intelligence of the people, earns their hatred,
+however it may crave their love. By the very bitterness of the
+opposition it permits yet disregards, it binds itself ever more
+irrevocably to remain a benevolent engenderer of malevolence.
+Government and governed thus get wider apart as the years go by, and,
+the <i lang="fr">raison d&rsquo;&ecirc;tre</i> of the former being the
+mental deficiencies of the latter, it must, in self-defence, assert
+those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently they are
+denied. What hope therefore can there be that the light that shone upon
+Saul on the road to Damascus will ever break upon the President? What
+hope that he will ever re-attune his ears to the voice of the
+Declaration of Independence, calling down from where the Signers (we
+hope without untoward exception) have gone, crying: &ldquo;William,
+William, why persecutest thou me? it is hard for thee to kick against
+the right of a people to pursue happiness in <i>their own
+way</i>&rdquo;? The difference between the President and the writer is
+that both went out to scoff and the latter remained&mdash;much
+longer&mdash;to pray.</p>
+<p>The Taft Commission arrived at Manila on June 3, 1900, loaded to the
+guards with kindly belief in the stale falsehood wherewith General
+Otis, ably assisted by his press censor, had been systematically
+soothing Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s and the general American conscience
+during the whole twenty months he had commanded the Eighth Army
+Corps,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7135src" href="#xd20e7135" name=
+"xd20e7135src">7</a> viz., that the insurrection was due solely to
+&ldquo;the sinister ambitions of a few selfish leaders,&rdquo; and did
+<i>not</i> represent the wishes of the whole people. It is true that
+the insurrection originally started under <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb295" href="#pb295" name="pb295">295</a>]</span>Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s
+auspices and under the initial protection of his puissant guns was
+headed by a group of men most of whom, including Aguinaldo, were
+Tagalos. But all Filipinos look alike, the whole seven or eight
+millions of them. They differ from one another not one whit more than
+one Japanese differs from another. And they all feel alike on most
+things,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7143src" href="#xd20e7143" name=
+"xd20e7143src">8</a> because they all have the same customs, tastes,
+and habits of thought. Said Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in
+1902:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">While it is true that there are a number of Christian
+&ldquo;tribes,&rdquo; so-called,&mdash;I do not know the number,
+possibly eight or ten, or twelve,&mdash;that speak different languages,
+there is a homogeneity in the people in appearance, in habits, and in
+many avenues of thought. To begin with, <i>they are
+Catholics</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7152src" href=
+"#xd20e7152" name="xd20e7152src">9</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Certainly this should forever crucify the stale slander, still
+ignorantly repeated in the United States at intervals, which seeks to
+make the American people think the great body of the Filipino people
+are still in a tribal state, ethnologically.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7161src" href="#xd20e7161" name="xd20e7161src">10</a> A Tagalo
+leader is about as much a &ldquo;tribal&rdquo; leader as is a Tammany
+&ldquo;brave&rdquo; of Irish antecedents. In fact there is much in
+common between the two. Both are clannish. Both have a genius for
+organization that is simply superb. Both are irrepressible about Home
+Rule. Countless generations ago the Filipinos were lifted by the
+Spanish priests out of the tribal state, and the educated people all
+speak Spanish. But the original tribal dialects, which the Spanish
+priests patiently mastered and finally reduced for them to a written
+language, still survive in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb296" href=
+"#pb296" name="pb296">296</a>]</span>the several localities of their
+origin. So that every Filipino of a well-to-do family is brought up
+speaking two languages, Spanish, and the local dialect of his native
+place, which is the only language known to the poorer natives of the
+same neighborhood. Surely even the valor of ignorance can see that we
+are presumptuously seeking to reverse the order of God and nature in
+assuming that an alien race can lead a people out of the wilderness
+better than could a government by the leading men of their own race to
+whom the less favored look with an ardent pride that would be a
+guarantee of loyal and inspiring co-operation. You can beat a balking
+horse to death but you <i>cannot</i> make him wag his tail, or
+otherwise indicate contentment or a disposition to cordial co-operation
+which will make for progress. Mr. Bryan has visited the Philippines,
+and his evidence is simply cumulative of mine, as mine, based on six
+years&rsquo; acquaintance with the Filipinos, is simply cumulative of
+Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s testimony of 1898, so often cited hereinbefore,
+and of the opinion of Hon. George Curry, a Republican member of
+Congress from New Mexico who served eight years in the Philippines, and
+believes they can safely be given their independence by 1921. Mr. Bryan
+says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">So far as their own internal affairs are concerned,
+they do not need to be subject to any alien government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He further says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is a wide difference, it is true, between the
+general intelligence of the educated Filipino and the laborer on the
+street and in the field, but this is not a barrier to self-government.
+Intelligence controls in every government, except where it is
+suppressed by military force. Nine tenths of the Japanese have no part
+in the law-making. In Mexico, the gap between the educated classes and
+the peons is fully as <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb297" href=
+"#pb297" name="pb297">297</a>]</span>great as, if not greater than, the
+gap between the extremes of Filipino society. Those who question the
+capacity of the Filipinos for self-government forget that <i>patriotism
+raises up persons fitted for the work that needs to be
+done</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7183src" href="#xd20e7183"
+name="xd20e7183src">11</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>It is because I believe that in the Philippines we are doing
+ourselves an injustice and keeping back the progress of the world by
+depreciating and scoffing at the value of patriotism as a factor in
+self-government and in the maintenance of free institutions, that I
+have written this book. There is no more patriotic people in the world
+than the Filipino people. I base this opinion upon an intimate
+knowledge of them, and in the light of considerable observation
+throughout most of Europe, and in Asia from the Golden Horn to the
+mouth of the Yang-tse. Woe to the nonsense, sometimes ignorant,
+sometimes vicious, wherewith we are regaled from time to time by
+Americans who go to Manila, smoke a cigar or two in some American club
+there, and then come back home and depreciate the Filipino people
+without at least correcting Col. Roosevelt&rsquo;s wholly uninformed
+and cruel random assertions of 1900 about the Filipinos being a
+&ldquo;jumble of savage tribes,&rdquo; and about Aguinaldo being
+&ldquo;the Osceola of the Filipinos,&rdquo; or their &ldquo;Sitting
+Bull!&rdquo; It is wonderfully inspiring to turn from such stale
+slander to Mr. Bryan&rsquo;s above statement of the case for our
+Oriental subjects, a statement framed in his own infinitely sympathetic
+and inimitable way, which says for me just what I had long wanted to
+express, but could not, so well. And in the midst of the recurring
+slander that the Filipino people are &ldquo;a heterogeneous lot,&rdquo;
+it is refreshing to find in a preface to the American Census of the
+Philippines of 1903, by the Director thereof, a passage where, in
+comparing the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb298" href="#pb298" name=
+"pb298">298</a>]</span>tables of that census with those of the Twelfth
+Census of the United States, he says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">&ldquo;Those of the Philippine Census are somewhat
+simpler, the differences being due mainly to <i>the more homogeneous
+character of the population of the Philippine
+Islands</i>.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7199src" href=
+"#xd20e7199" name="xd20e7199src">12</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>When we consider the above in the light of the past and present
+operation of our own immigration laws, it is not flattering, but it may
+and should tend to awaken some realization of the manifold nature and
+blinding effects of current misapprehensions in the United States
+concerning the inhabitants of the Philippines. One Filipino does not
+differ from another any more than one American does from another
+American&mdash;in fact they differ less, considering immigration. The
+Filipino people are not rendered a heterogeneous lot by having three
+different languages, Ilocano, Tagalo, and Visayan,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7206src" href="#xd20e7206" name="xd20e7206src">13</a> which
+are respectively the languages spoken in the northern, the central, and
+the southern part of their country, any more than the people of
+Switzerland are rendered heterogeneous by the circumstance that in
+northern Switzerland you find German spoken for the most part, while
+farther south you find French, and near the southernmost extremities
+some Italian. At this late date no credible person acquainted with the
+facts will be so poor in spirit as to deny that the motives of the men
+who originally started the insurrection were patriotic. Nor will any
+one who served under General Otis&rsquo;s command in the Philippines
+deny that that eminent desk soldier continued to cling to his early
+theory that it was a purely Tagalo insurrection long after the deadly
+unanimity of the opposition had seeped, with <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb299" href="#pb299" name=
+"pb299">299</a>]</span>all-pervading thoroughness, into the general
+mind of the army of occupation. The white flag or rag of truce,
+<i>alias</i> treachery, used to be hoisted to put us off our guard in
+pretence of welcome to our columns approaching their towns and barrios.
+Such use of such a flag, followed by treachery, the ultimate weapon of
+the weak, had been in turn followed, with relentless impartiality in
+countless instances, by due unloosening of the vials of American wrath,
+until every <i>nipa</i> shack<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7217src" href=
+"#xd20e7217" name="xd20e7217src">14</a> in the Philippine Islands that
+remained unburned had had its lesson, written in the blood of its
+occupants or their kin, to the tune of the Krag-Jorgensen or the
+Gatling. Yet General Otis&rsquo;s reports are always bland, and always
+convey the idea of an insurrection exclusively Tagalo.</p>
+<p>In the summer of 1900, the newly arrived civilians, the Taft
+Commission, had no special interest in the soldiers who, for better,
+for worse, were &ldquo;doing their country&rsquo;s work,&rdquo; as
+Kipling calls his own country&rsquo;s countless wars against its
+refractory subjects in the far East; and no especial sympathy with that
+work. Two years later we find President Roosevelt, in connection with
+the general amnesty of July 4, 1902, congratulating his &ldquo;bowld
+lads,&rdquo; as Mr. Dooley would call them&mdash;meaning General
+Chaffee and the Eighth Army Corps&mdash;on a total of &ldquo;two
+thousand combats, great and small&rdquo; up to that time, but you never
+find in any of Governor Taft&rsquo;s Philippine state papers any more
+affirmative recognition of continued resistance to American rule than
+some mild allusion to &ldquo;small but hard knocks&rdquo; being
+administered here and there by the army. From the beginning there was a
+systematic belittling, on the part of the Taft Commission, of the work
+of the army, incidentally to belittling the reality and unanimity
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb300" href="#pb300" name=
+"pb300">300</a>]</span>of the opposition which was daily calling it
+forth.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7227src" href="#xd20e7227" name=
+"xd20e7227src">15</a> This was not vicious. It was essentially
+benevolent. It was part of the initial fermentation of their
+preconceived theory. But the trouble about their theory was that it was
+only a theory. It would not square with the facts. They were trying to
+square the subjugation of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba, a
+task quite as soluble as the squaring of a circle. They hoped, with all
+the kindly benevolence of Mr. McKinley himself, that the opposition to
+our rule was not as great as some people seemed to think. They had come
+out to the islands earnestly wishing to find conditions not as bad as
+they had been asserted to be. And the wish became father to the thought
+and the thought soon found expression in words&mdash;cablegrams to the
+United States presenting an optimistic view as to the prospects of
+necessity for further shedding of blood in the interest of Benevolent
+Assimilation, alias Trade Expansion. Some flippant person will say,
+&ldquo;That is a polite way of charging insincerity.&rdquo; This book
+is not addressed to flippant persons. It is a serious attempt to deal
+with a problem involving the liberties of a whole people, and will be,
+as far as the writer can make it, straightforward, dignified, and
+candid. Judge Taft&rsquo;s fearful mistake of 1900&ndash;1901 in the
+matter of his premature planting of the civil government&mdash;a
+mistake because based on the idea that &ldquo;the great majority of the
+people&rdquo; welcomed American rule, and a fearful mistake because
+fraught <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb301" href="#pb301" name=
+"pb301">301</a>]</span>with so much subsequent sacrifice of life due to
+too early withdrawal of the police protection of the army&mdash;was not
+the first instance in American history where an ordinarily level-headed
+public man has, with egregious folly, mistaken the mood and temper of a
+whole people. The key to his mistake lay in the fact that, coming into
+a strange country in the midst of a war, he ignored the advice of the
+commanding general of the army of his country concerning the military
+situation, and took the advice of a few native Tories, or Copperheads,
+of wealth, who had never really been in sympathy with the insurrection
+and who, flocking about him as soon as he arrived, told him what he so
+longed to be told, viz., that the war did not represent the wishes of
+the people but was kept up by &ldquo;a conspiracy of
+assassination&rdquo; of all who did not contribute to it either in
+service or money. He thereupon decided that the men who told him this
+really represented the voice of the people, and that the men in the
+field who had then been keeping up the struggle for independence for
+sixteen months, in season and out of season, were simply &ldquo;a Mafia
+on a very large scale.&rdquo; Consequently the Taft Commission had been
+in the islands less than three months when Secretary of War Root at
+Washington was giving the widest possible publicity to cablegrams from
+them, such as that dated August 21, 1900, mentioned in the preceding
+chapter, conveying the glad tidings that &ldquo;large number of people
+long for peace and are willing to accept government under United
+States&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7235src" href="#xd20e7235"
+name="xd20e7235src">16</a>; and by November next thereafter, the
+&ldquo;large number&rdquo; had grown to &ldquo;a great majority,&rdquo;
+and the &ldquo;willing&rdquo; to &ldquo;entirely willing.&rdquo; The
+November statement was: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb302" href=
+"#pb302" name="pb302">302</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>A great majority</i> of the people long for peace
+and are <i>entirely</i> willing to accept the establishment of a
+government under the supremacy of the United States.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7250src" href="#xd20e7250" name="xd20e7250src">17</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Yet, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the real situation in the
+Philippines at this very time was described four years later at the
+Republican National Convention of 1904 by Mr. Root thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When the last national convention met, over 70,000
+American soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous
+enemy in check.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Between the date of their arrival in the Islands on June 3d, and the
+date of this August 21st telegram, the Taft Commission did little
+junketing, but remained in Manila imbibing the welcome views of the
+&ldquo;Tories&rdquo; or &ldquo;Copperheads,&rdquo; and seeking very
+little information from the army. But it so happens that the
+Adjutant-General at Manila used to keep a record of the daily
+engagements during that period, which record was later published in the
+annual <i>War Department Report</i>,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7268src" href="#xd20e7268" name="xd20e7268src">18</a> and it
+shows a total of about five hundred killings (of Filipinos) between
+June 3d, and August 21st, to say nothing of probably many times that
+number hit but not killed, and therefore able to get away. (You could
+not include any Filipino in your returns of your killings except dead
+you had actually counted.) It also happens that on June 4th, the day
+after Judge Taft&rsquo;s arrival, General MacArthur, in response to an
+order from Washington sent some time previous at the instance of
+Congress, had all the Filipino casualties our military records showed
+up to that time (<i>i. e.</i>, during the sixteen months from the day
+of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to June 3, 1900), tabulated and
+totalled, and the total Filipino <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb303"
+href="#pb303" name="pb303">303</a>]</span>killed accordingly reported
+by cablegram to the War Department on June 4, 1900, was
+10,780.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7278src" href="#xd20e7278" name=
+"xd20e7278src">19</a></p>
+<p>Ten thousand in sixteen months is 625 per month. So that by the time
+Judge Taft arrived, the Filipinos had been sufficiently beaten into
+submission to decrease the death-rate due to the Independence Bug from
+something over six hundred per month to about two hundred per month.
+Judge Taft called this enthusiasm. I call it exhaustion. Whereupon,
+exclaims a Boston Anti-Imperialist, &ldquo;Why don&rsquo;t you issue
+Mr. Taft a certificate as a member of the Ananias Club at once, and be
+done with it?&rdquo; My answer is that I do not believe the Taft
+Commission in 1900 either knew these figures or wanted to know them.
+They came out preaching a Gospel of Hope to the exclusion of all else,
+a species of mental healing. They said, soothingly to Dame Filipina,
+&ldquo;Be not afraid; you are well; you are well&rdquo;&mdash;of the
+desire for independence she had conceived, when what that lady needed
+was the surgical operation indispensable for the removal of a
+still-born child.</p>
+<p>The will of the American people is ascertainable, and quadrennially
+announced, through certain prescribed methods. And (nearly) everybody
+takes the result good-humoredly, God bless our country, whatever the
+result. But just how Mr. Taft and his colleagues could assume to speak
+for the &ldquo;great majority&rdquo; of the Filipino people at the
+tremendous juncture in their destinies now under consideration during
+the Presidential election of 1900, does not clearly appear, except that
+in their first report they say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Many witnesses were examined as to the form of
+government best adapted to these islands and <i>satisfactory to the
+people</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7293src" href="#xd20e7293" name=
+"xd20e7293src">20</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb304" href="#pb304" name=
+"pb304">304</a>]</span></p>
+<p>a statement which obviously takes for granted the only point
+involved in the war, viz., whether <i>any kind</i> of alien government
+would be &ldquo;satisfactory to the people.&rdquo; And in their various
+other communications to Washington they describe themselves, with no
+small degree of benevolent satisfaction, as enthusiastically received
+by natives not under arms at the moment of such reception. As a matter
+of fact, a carpet-bag governor of Georgia might just as well have
+reported to Andrew Johnson an enthusiastic reception at the hands of
+the people whose homes had lately been put to the torch, and their kith
+and kin to the sword, while the whole fair face of nature from Atlanta
+to the sea lay bruised and bleeding under the iron heel of
+Sherman&rsquo;s army. Let no advocate of Indefinite Tutelage whet his
+scalping-knife for me because of the use of that word
+&ldquo;carpet-bag.&rdquo; It was as free from ill-will as the explosion
+incident to flash-light photography. We are trying to develop a picture
+of those times. Two at least of the Commission, Messrs. Taft and
+Wright, were the kind of men who in all the personal relations of life,
+meet the ultimate test of human confidence and friendship&mdash;you
+would make either, if he would consent to act, executor of your will,
+or testamentary guardian of your child. But they came out with the
+preconceived notion that kindness would win the people over, whereas
+what those people wanted was not foreign kindness but home rule, not
+silken political swaddling clothes, but freedom. And as the acquisition
+of the Philippines has placed us under the necessity of getting up a
+new definition of freedom, one consistent with tariff taxation without
+representation&mdash;through legislation by a Congress on the other
+side of the world in which &ldquo;our new possessions&rdquo; have no
+vote&mdash;it should be added that one of the things Freedom meant with
+us before 1898, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb305" href="#pb305"
+name="pb305">305</a>]</span>was freedom to frame the laws&mdash;tariff
+and other&mdash;which largely determine the selling price of crops and
+the purchase price of the necessities of life, freedom to see the
+intelligent and educated men of your own race in charge of your common
+destiny, freedom to have a flag as an emblem of your common interests,
+in a word, just Freedom. And that was what the war was about. They
+wanted to be free and independent. Whether they were fit for such
+freedom is wholly foreign to the reality and unanimity of their desire
+for it. General Otis used to be very fond of taking the wind out of the
+sails of their commissioners and other officials before the outbreak by
+saying that their people had not the slightest notion of what the word
+independence meant. It is true that they knew nothing about it by
+experience, but equally true that whatever it was, they wanted it. Of
+the ten thousand men we had already killed when Judge Taft arrived,
+there can be no question, as already heretofore suggested, that many of
+them may have been hit just as they were hurrahing for independence, in
+other words, died with the word &ldquo;Independence&rdquo; on their
+lips. When men have been thus fighting against overwhelming odds for
+some sixteen months for government <i>of their</i> people <i>by</i>
+their people <i>for</i> their people&mdash;however inarticulate the
+emotions of the rank and file on going into battle&mdash;it is idle to
+claim that they do not know what they want, whether the great majority
+of the rank and file can read and write or not. But pursuant to the
+idea that kindness would cure the desire for independence, Judge Taft
+ignored, in the outset, all advice from the military department,
+because that was not the kindness department, accepting as truly
+representative of the temper of the whole people the views of a few
+ultra-conservatives of large means who had always been part and parcel
+of the Spanish Administration. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb306"
+href="#pb306" name="pb306">306</a>]</span></p>
+<p>On the other hand, General MacArthur and the whole Eighth Army Corps
+had seen a great insurrection drag on from month to month and from one
+year to another, under General Otis, when short shrift would have been
+made of it in the outset, and far less life sacrificed, if Mr. McKinley
+had not needed, in aid of his Philippine policy, the support of both of
+those who believed it was right <i>and</i> of those who believed it
+would pay. The one central thought which had seemed to animate General
+Otis from the beginning, a thought which we have already traced through
+all its humiliating manifestations, was that he must neither do or
+permit anything that might hurt the Administration. When the
+&ldquo;impatience of the people&rdquo; at home, which figures so
+prominently in the correspondence already cited between the Adjutant
+General of the army, General Corbin, and General Otis at Manila, had
+begun to cast its shadows on the presidential year, 1900, the master
+mind of Mr. Root had interrupted the fatal Otis treatment of the
+insurrection, indicated by General Otis&rsquo;s long failure to call
+for volunteers, his stupid stream of &ldquo;situation well in
+hand&rdquo; and &ldquo;insurrection about to collapse&rdquo; telegrams,
+and his utterly unpardonable persistence in calling it a purely
+&ldquo;Tagalo insurrection,&rdquo; by sending him a competent force,
+and a plan of campaign, and directing him to carry out the plan.
+General Otis did this, because he was told to, and then began again to
+sing the same old song. MacArthur, Wheaton, Lawton, Bates, Young,
+Funston, and the rest of the fighting generals, had submitted to all
+the Otis follies without a murmur, because insubordination degrades an
+army into a rabble. But they<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7322src" href=
+"#xd20e7322" name="xd20e7322src">21</a> believed the army <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb307" href="#pb307" name="pb307">307</a>]</span>was
+there to put down that insurrection, not to have a symposium with its
+leaders on the rights of man. They had taken up &ldquo;The White
+Man&rsquo;s Burden,&rdquo; after the manner of Lords Kitchener and
+Roberts, and they had no qualms. Above all, they wanted <i>peace</i>,
+no matter how much fighting it took to get it. Mindful of the attempts
+of the Schurman Commission of the year before to mix peace with war,
+and of the immense encouragement thus given the insurgents, they had
+not looked forward with enthusiasm to the coming of the Taft
+Commission, and to the highly probable renewal of negotiations with the
+insurgent leaders in the field, pursuant to a presidential policy of
+patching up a peace at any price, suggested by the exigencies of
+political expediency, to give the government a semblance of having more
+or less of the consent of the governed. That the anticipations of the
+military authorities in this regard did not receive a pleasant
+disappointment, has already been suggested by the nature of the views
+adopted by the commission soon after its arrival.</p>
+<p>The military view of the situation, as it stood when Judge Taft and
+his colleagues arrived at Manila in June, 1900, is set forth in the
+annual report of the commanding general, General MacArthur, rendered
+shortly thereafter; rendered, not in aid of any political candidate at
+home, nor of a sudden, but at the usual and customary annual season for
+the making of such reports; and rendered by a soldier of no mean
+experience and ability, who was a man of great kindliness of heart as
+well, to the war department of his government, to acquaint it with the
+facts of a military situation he had been dealing with for two years
+prior to the arrival of the Taft Commission. General MacArthur&rsquo;s
+views, as expressed in his report, must now be contrasted with the Taft
+view, not to show that MacArthur is a bigger <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb308" href="#pb308" name="pb308">308</a>]</span>man
+than Taft, nor for any other idle or petty purpose, but because, if, in
+1900, General MacArthur was right, and Judge Taft was wrong, about the
+unanimity of the whole Filipino people against us, then the institution
+of the Civil Government of the Philippines on July 4, 1901, was
+premature; and, therefore, by reason of the withdrawal of the strong
+arm of the military at a critical period of public order, it was not
+calculated to give adequate protection to the lives and property of
+those who were willing to abandon the struggle for independence and
+submit to our rule. And if, as we shall see later, it did in fact
+grossly fail to afford such adequate protection for life and property,
+it was derelict in the most sacred duty enjoined upon it by Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s instructions to the Taft Commission. But first let me
+introduce you to General MacArthur.</p>
+<p>General MacArthur is not only a soldier of a high order of ability,
+but a statesman as well. Moreover, he was a thoroughgoing
+&ldquo;expansionist.&rdquo; He believed in keeping the Philippines
+permanently, just as England does her colonies. But he was perfectly
+honest about it. He recognized the fact that they were against our
+rule. But he did not attach any more weight to that circumstance than
+Lord Kitchener would have done. Also, he had come out to the islands
+with the first expedition, in 1898, had been in the field continuously
+for fifteen months prior to assuming supreme military command, and knew
+the Filipinos thoroughly. As soon as he took command, on May 5, 1900,
+of the 70,000 troops then in the Islands, he set himself with patience
+and firmness to the great task of ending the insurrection, which at
+that time promised to continue indefinitely, the far more formidable
+guerrilla warfare that had followed the brief period of serried
+resistance having now settled down to a chronic stage, aided and
+abetted <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb309" href="#pb309" name=
+"pb309">309</a>]</span>by the whole population. I have said General
+MacArthur was a &ldquo;thoroughgoing&rdquo; expansionist. This needs a
+slight qualification. At first he appears to have had a few qualms.
+Shortly after the outbreak of the war with the Filipinos, when he took
+the first insurgent capital Malolos, in March, 1899, he had said at
+Malolos, as we have seen, to a newspaper man who accompanied the
+expedition:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When I first started in against these rebels, I
+believed that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s troops represented only a faction. I
+did not believe that the whole population of Luzon was opposed to us;
+but I have been <i>reluctantly</i> compelled to believe that the
+Filipinos are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he
+represents.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7344src" href="#xd20e7344" name=
+"xd20e7344src">22</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>General MacArthur&rsquo;s reports concerning the war in the
+Philippines during the period of his command are succinct and luminous.
+He makes it perfectly clear that the original resistance offered by the
+insurgent armies in the field after the arrival of the overwhelmingly
+ample reinforcements sent out from this country in the fall of 1899,
+was little more than a mere flash in the pan, compared with the
+well-planned scheme of resistance which followed the dispersion of
+those armies to the several provinces which had furnished them to the
+cause, and Aguinaldo&rsquo;s simultaneous flight into the mountains
+&ldquo;with his government concealed about his person,&rdquo; as
+Senator Lodge exultantly described that incident in his speech of
+April, 1900, in defence of the Administration&rsquo;s Philippine
+policy. Speaking of this period, General MacArthur says: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb310" href="#pb310" name="pb310">310</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It has since been ascertained that the expediency of
+adopting guerrilla warfare from the inception of hostilities was
+seriously discussed by the native leaders, and advocated with much
+emphasis as the system best adapted to the peculiar conditions of the
+struggle. It was finally determined, however, that a concentrated field
+army, conducting regular operations, would, in the event of success,
+attract the favorable attention of the world, and be accepted as a
+practical demonstration of capacity for organization and
+self-government. The disbandment of the field army, therefore, having
+been a subject of contemplation from the start, the actual event, in
+pursuance of the deliberate action of the council of war in Bayambang
+about November 12, 1899 (already hereinbefore noticed), <i>was not
+regarded by Filipinos in the light of a calamity, but simply as a
+transition from one form of action to another</i>; a change which by
+many was regarded as a positive advantage, and was relied upon to
+accomplish more effectively the end in view. The Filipino idea behind
+the dissolution of their field army was not at the time of the
+occurrence well understood in the American camp. As a consequence,
+misleading conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection
+itself had been destroyed, and that it only remained to sweep up the
+fag ends of the rebel army by a system of police administration not
+likely to be either onerous or dangerous.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7359src" href="#xd20e7359" name="xd20e7359src">23</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>In his report covering the period from May 5th, to October 1, 1900,
+General MacArthur says of the policy of resistance above outlined:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The country affords great advantages for the practical
+development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the uniform
+enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at their
+convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers, and
+immediately thereafter are within the American lines in the attitude of
+peaceful natives, absorbed in <i>a dense mass of sympathetic
+people</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7372src" href="#xd20e7372" name=
+"xd20e7372src">24</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb311" href="#pb311" name=
+"pb311">311</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In this same connection the report includes a copy of the original
+order of the insurgent government which was the corner stone of the
+guerrilla policy, and states that &ldquo;systemized regulations&rdquo;
+for its effective prosecution throughout the archipelago had been
+compiled and published by the Filipino junta, or revolutionary
+committee at Madrid, and distributed among the insurgent forces. The
+report also appends a copy of the &ldquo;Army Regulations&rdquo; under
+which the insurgent forces were to conduct the guerrilla warfare. It
+also describes in detail the system of warfare prescribed under these
+regulations, and states that as a result of the measures which he,
+General MacArthur, took to combat that warfare &ldquo;the 53 stations
+of American troops occupied in the archipelago on November 1, 1899, had
+on September 1, 1900, expanded to 413,&rdquo; and that during this
+period, the casualties to our troops were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55
+captured, and to the insurgents, so far as our records showed, 3227
+killed, 694 wounded, and 2864 captured. Says he:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The extensive distribution of troops has strained the
+soldiers of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little
+command has had to provide its own service of security and information
+by never ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and regular
+guards. An idea seems to have been established in the public mind [he
+meant the public mind at home, of course] that the field work of the
+army is in the nature of police, in regulating a few bands of
+guerrillas, and involving none of the vicissitudes of war. [Here he is
+meeting the Otis theory, then being industriously circulated in the
+United States.] <i>Such a narrow statement of the case is unfair to the
+service.</i> In all things requiring endurance, fortitude, and patient
+diligence, the guerrilla period has been pre-eminent. It is difficult
+for the non-professional observer [he means Judge Taft] to understand
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb312" href="#pb312" name=
+"pb312">312</a>]</span>that apparently desultory work, such as has
+prevailed in the Philippines during the past ten months,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e7388src" href="#xd20e7388" name=
+"xd20e7388src">25</a> has demanded <i>more of discipline and as much of
+valor</i> as was required during the period of regular operations
+against the concentrated field forces of the insurrection. It is,
+therefore, a great privilege to speak warmly in respect of the
+importance of the service rendered day by day, with unremitting
+vigilance, by the splendid men who,&rdquo; etc.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7394src" href="#xd20e7394" name="xd20e7394src">26</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>It was not until July 4, 1902, that President Roosevelt officially
+declared, by his amnesty proclamation of that date that the
+insurrection in the Philippines was at last ended. It was by no means
+beaten to a frazzle, as we shall later see. But of course, knowing the
+impatience of a large portion of the American people with a situation
+about which there was a wide-spread notion that much remained
+undisclosed, Mr. Roosevelt would have issued such a proclamation
+earlier, had the facts seemed to him to so authorize. General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s relentless &ldquo;never ceasing patrols,
+explorations,&rdquo; etc., continued straight on through the
+presidential campaign of 1900 side by side in point of time with the
+roseate Taft cablegrams of the same period, and long
+thereafter&mdash;how long will be later indicated. Says General
+MacArthur, in his report for 1901:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It had been suggested that some of the Filipino
+leaders were willing to submit the issue to the judgment of the
+American people, which was soon to be expressed at the polls, and to
+abide by the result of the presidential election of November,
+1900.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7404src" href="#xd20e7404" name=
+"xd20e7404src">27</a> But subsequent events demonstrated <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb313" href="#pb313" name="pb313">313</a>]</span>that
+the hope of ending the war without further effusion of blood was not
+well founded, and that as a matter of fact the Filipinos were
+<i>organizing for further desperate resistance</i> by means of a
+general banding of the people in support of the guerrillas in the
+field.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7418src" href="#xd20e7418" name=
+"xd20e7418src">28</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>General MacArthur then goes on to tell how, as part of this
+programme, the insurgent authorities,</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">announced a primal and inflexible principle, to the
+effect that every native, without any exception, residing within the
+limits of the archipelago, owed active allegiance to the insurgent
+cause. This jurisdiction was enjoined under severe penalties, which
+were systematically enforced.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This is what Judge Taft afterwards described as &ldquo;a conspiracy
+of murder, a Mafia on a very large scale&rdquo;,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7432src" href="#xd20e7432" name="xd20e7432src">29</a> the
+characterization being made in support of his theory that &ldquo;the
+great majority of the people&rdquo; with whom we were then at war would
+welcome our rule if allowed to follow their real preferences, and that
+they were being cruelly coerced to fight for the independence of their
+country. General MacArthur&rsquo;s view, however, did not support this
+theory. His report deals with this branch of the subject thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The cohesion of Filipino society in behalf of
+insurgent interests is most emphatically illustrated by the fact that
+assassination, which was extensively employed, was generally accepted
+as a legitimate expression of insurgent governmental authority. <i>The
+individuals marked for death would not appeal to American protection,
+although condemned exclusively on account of supposed
+pro-Americanism.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>Later on, when we came to understand the Filipinos better, this
+summary method of dealing with the faint-hearted <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb314" href="#pb314" name="pb314">314</a>]</span>lost
+much of its initial horrifying force, and the failure of such to appeal
+to us for protection lost much of its strangeness. In the first place,
+nobody loves a traitor. Even those to whom he claims to have betrayed
+his countrymen do not trust him implicitly. Again, Latin countries
+never assume that before a man is punished for alleged crime he has
+been confronted with the witnesses against him. Such testimony is,
+under their jurisprudence, frequently received in his absence. The
+legal department of General MacArthur&rsquo;s office once got hold of a
+captured insurgent paper subscribed with the autograph of Juan Cailles,
+one of their best generals. It directed that a named Filipino residing
+in a certain town garrisoned by American troops be executed&mdash;we of
+course, would call it &ldquo;assassinated&rdquo;&mdash;at a certain
+hour on a certain day in a public street of the town, and that the
+soldier or soldiers performing the &ldquo;execution&rdquo; should
+declare to the bystanders, if any, in so doing, that it was done
+because the man was a traitor, a friend of the Americans. We kept this
+paper, intending to hang Juan whenever he should be captured. He held
+out a long time, and finally surrendered unconditionally&mdash;but he
+proved such an elegant fellow, game as a pebble, courteous as
+Chesterfield, and immensely popular with his people, that it was
+decided he could be of more service as a live governor of a province
+than he could as a dead general,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7448src"
+href="#xd20e7448" name="xd20e7448src">30</a> so he was appointed a
+provincial governor by Governor Taft, and made a splendid official.</p>
+<p>Another reason why Filipinos suspected, during the insurrection, by
+the more obstinate and stout-hearted <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb315" href="#pb315" name="pb315">315</a>]</span>of their compatriots
+who held out longer in the struggle for independence, of weakening
+toward the cause of their country, in other words, suspected of what
+might be called &ldquo;Copperhead&rdquo; or &ldquo;Tory&rdquo;
+tendencies, would not appeal to us for protection, is strikingly
+presented in General MacArthur&rsquo;s report for 1901. He says they
+naturally had &ldquo;grave doubt as to the wisdom&rdquo; of siding with
+us, &ldquo;as the United States had made no formal announcement of an
+inflexible purpose to hold the archipelago and afford protection to
+pro-Americans.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7458src" href=
+"#xd20e7458" name="xd20e7458src">31</a></p>
+<p>The one great thing that has crippled progress in the Philippines
+from the beginning of the American occupation down to date is the
+uncertainty as to what our policy for the future is to be, the lack of
+some, &ldquo;formal announcement of an inflexible purpose.&rdquo; And
+of course I mean, as General MacArthur meant, by
+&ldquo;<i>formal</i>&rdquo; announcement, an authoritative declaration
+by <i>the law-making power</i> of the government. If Congress should
+formally declare that it is the purpose of this government to hold the
+Philippines permanently, American and other capital would at once go
+there in abundance and the place would &ldquo;blossom like a
+rose.&rdquo; If, on the other hand, Congress should formally declare
+that it is the purpose of this government to give the Filipinos their
+independence as soon as a stable native government can be set up, thus
+holding out to the present generation the prospect of living to see the
+independence of their country, the place would also quickly blossom as
+aforesaid, through the generous ardor of native love of country. In
+either event, everybody out there would know where he is
+&ldquo;at.&rdquo; At present all is uncertainty, both with the resident
+members of the dominant alien race, and with those over whom we are
+ruling. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb316" href="#pb316" name=
+"pb316">316</a>]</span></p>
+<p>It took over 120,000 American troops, first and last, to put down
+the struggle of the Filipinos for independence.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7474src" href="#xd20e7474" name="xd20e7474src">32</a> The war
+began February 4, 1899, and the last public official announcement that
+it was ended was on July 4, 1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7477src"
+href="#xd20e7477" name="xd20e7477src">33</a> Of course this does not
+imply that every province was at all times during that period a theatre
+of actual war. Putting down the insurrection was something like putting
+out a fire in a field of dry grass. At first the trouble was general.
+Gradually it diminished toward the end. But for a while, no sooner was
+it quenched in one province than it would break out in another. How the
+Filipinos were able to prolong the struggle as long as they did against
+such apparently overwhelming odds is most interestingly explained by
+General MacArthur in his report for 1900. After describing the method
+he followed of establishing native municipal governments in territory
+as conquered, he says, with a patient stateliness that is almost
+humorous:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The institution of municipal government under American
+auspices, of course, carried the idea of exclusive fidelity to the
+sovereign power of the United States. All the necessary moral
+obligations to that end were readily assumed by municipal bodies, and
+all outward forms of loyalty and decorum carefully preserved. But
+precisely at this point the psychologic conditions referred to above
+[meaning the unity against us],<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7483src"
+href="#xd20e7483" name="xd20e7483src">34</a> began to work with great
+energy, in assistance of insurgent field operations. For this purpose
+most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal
+governments, to proceed <i>simultaneously and in the same sphere as the
+American governments and</i> in many instances <i>through the same
+personnel</i>&mdash;that is to say, the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb317" href="#pb317" name="pb317">317</a>]</span>presidentes and town
+officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in
+behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may seem, with
+considerable apparent solicitude for the interests of both. In all
+matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the
+primitive work possible on roads, streets, and bridges, and the
+institution of schools, their open activity was commendable; at the
+same time they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies
+and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable
+military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the
+archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact
+beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance
+thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American
+occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all
+insurgent military activities; and not only so in the sense of
+furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but
+as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most
+important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and
+seek safety in the nearest <i>barrio</i>; a man&oelig;uvre quickly
+accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease
+with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a
+peaceful native.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7501src" href="#xd20e7501"
+name="xd20e7501src">35</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>To contrast a cold, hard military fact involving the lives of
+American soldiers with a lot of political nonsense intended for
+consumption in the United States during a presidential election, the
+next paragraph is particularly interesting in the light of the
+cotemporaneous Taft view:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7509src" href=
+"#xd20e7509" name="xd20e7509src">36</a></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>The success of this unique system of war depends
+upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population.
+That <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb318" href="#pb318" name=
+"pb318">318</a>]</span>such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of
+discussion.</i> Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this
+end, but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for
+the <i>united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of
+people</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7522src" href="#xd20e7522" name=
+"xd20e7522src">37</a> One traitor in each town would effectually
+destroy such a complex organization.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Then follows this bit of grim humor:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>It is more probable that the adhesive principle
+comes from ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a
+time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership</i>&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+<p>in other words, to stick to <i>their own kith and kin</i>. He had in
+a previous paragraph used that very expression thus: &ldquo;The people
+seem to be actuated by the idea that in politics or war men are never
+nearer right then when going with their own kith and kin.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>In all the foregoing, General MacArthur was not simply trying to
+score a point against Judge Taft, though his resentment of the effort
+of the Taft Commission of 1900 to mix politics with war in the
+presidential year was quite as decided, and quite as well known in the
+islands at the time, as was General Otis&rsquo;s similar attitude
+toward the Schurman Commission of the previous year.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7544src" href="#xd20e7544" name="xd20e7544src">38</a> He is
+simply laying before the War <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb319" href=
+"#pb319" name="pb319">319</a>]</span>Department, as a soldier, the
+familiar facts of a situation which he had been dealing with for two
+years past, as well known to the 70,000 officers and men under his
+command as to himself. And as the details into which he goes are simply
+prefatory to an account of the remedy he applied to the situation, that
+remedy must now claim our attention. The remedy General MacArthur
+finally applied was a proclamation, explaining to the Filipino
+people&mdash;&ldquo;to all classes throughout the archipelago,&rdquo;
+it read, and especially to the leaders in the field, many of whose
+captured comrades-in-arms he had now become thoroughly acquainted
+with&mdash;the severities sanctioned by the laws of civilized nations
+under such circumstances, and the reasons therefor; and, further,
+serving them with notice that thenceforward he proposed to enforce
+those laws with full rigor.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7554src" href=
+"#xd20e7554" name="xd20e7554src">39</a></p>
+<p>The eminent lawyers of the Taft Commission were too busy about that
+time acquainting themselves with the situation through natives not in
+arms, to attach much importance to General MacArthur&rsquo;s
+proclamation, but the Eighth Army Corps always believed that that
+proclamation, and the army&rsquo;s work under it, was the main factor
+in making the civil government at all possible by the date it was set
+up, July 4, 1901. The issuance of this document was not only a wise
+military move, but a subtle stroke of statesmanship as well. It assumed
+that the Filipino people were a <i>civilized people</i>, an assumption
+never indulged by Spain during the whole of her rule, but always freely
+admitted by General MacArthur in all his dealings with their leading
+men to be a fact. It therefore appealed to their <i lang="fr">amour
+propre</i>, and to the <i lang="fr">noblesse oblige</i> of many of the
+most obstinate and trusted fighting leaders. The writer was, at the
+date of the proclamation under consideration, on duty <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb320" href="#pb320" name="pb320">320</a>]</span>at
+General MacArthur&rsquo;s headquarters, as assistant to Colonel
+Crowder, his judge advocate, now Judge Advocate General of the United
+States Army, and prepared the first rough, tentative suggestions for
+the final draft of it, accompanying such suggestions with a memorandum
+showing the course taken by Wellington in France in 1815, and by
+Bismarck&rsquo;s generals at the close of the Franco-Prussian War, as
+well as that followed under General Order No. 100, 1863, for the
+government of the armies of the United States in the field. Having then
+entertained the opinion that that proclamation, though drastic, was
+wise and right under the facts of the situation which confronted us,
+and having nowise changed that opinion since, it may be well for the
+writer of this book to explain his reasons for that opinion. This must
+be done wholly without reference to &ldquo;the authorities,&rdquo; for
+neither at the bar of public opinion, nor at the bar of final judgment,
+do &ldquo;the authorities&rdquo; count for much. In so doing, however,
+we must start with the <i>assumption</i> that it was a case of American
+military occupation of hostile territory, notwithstanding that Judge
+Taft began soon after his arrival in the islands in the June previous
+to the December now referred to, to cable home impressions which, if
+correct, amounted to a denial that the great body of the people were
+hostile. Military occupation is a fact which admits of no debate, and
+the necessity of making your country&rsquo;s flag respected is always
+fully and keenly recognized as the one supreme consideration by every
+good American except one who, obsessed with the idea that kindness will
+cure the desire of a people for independence, proceeds to act on that
+idea in the midst of a war for independence.</p>
+<p>Under the laws of war the commanding general of the occupying force
+owes protection, both of life and property, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb321" href="#pb321" name="pb321">321</a>]</span>to
+all persons residing within the territory occupied. The object of
+General MacArthur&rsquo;s proclamation was to put a stop to such
+&ldquo;executions,&rdquo; or assassinations, as that perpetrated by
+Juan Cailles, mentioned above, and to separate the insurgents in the
+field from their main reliance, the towns. The latter end of a bloody
+war is no time for a discussion of the causes of the war between victor
+and vanquished. Nor is it any time to believe the representative of the
+enemy who tells you that most of him is really in sympathy with you and
+merely coerced. Your duty is to stop the war. You and your enemy having
+had a difference, and having referred it to the arbitrament of war,
+which is, unfortunately, at present the only human jurisdiction having
+power to enforce decisions concerning such differences, if you win, and
+your enemy refuses to abide the decision, he is simply, as it were in
+contempt of court, and, in the scheme of things, as at present ordered,
+deserves punishment as an enemy to the general peace. To state the
+ethics of the matter juridically, &ldquo;there should be an end of
+litigation&rdquo;&mdash;somewhere.</p>
+<p>I do not believe in the doctrine that might makes right, and I
+cherish the high hope that this human family of ours will survive to
+see war superseded, as the ultimate arbiter, by something more like
+heaven and less like hell. But in the Philippines in 1900 it was a
+situation, not a theory, that confronted us, and, as far as my
+consciously fallible thinking apparatus lights the way which then lay
+before us, that way led to a shrine whereon was written &ldquo;A life
+for a life.&rdquo; This is no mere academic discussion. With me it is a
+tremendously practical one. In the gravest possible acceptation of the
+term it is <span class="sc">awe</span>-fully so. If I am wrong, every
+execution I approved by memorandum review furnished <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb322" href="#pb322" name=
+"pb322">322</a>]</span>Colonel Crowder and General MacArthur, of
+military commission findings out there was wrong, and so were a number
+of the executions I ordered as a judge appointed by Governor Taft under
+a government which, though nominally a civil government, was no more
+&ldquo;civil&rdquo; in so far as that term implies absence of necessity
+for the presence of military force, than other governments immediately
+following conquest usually are. The propriety of the imposition of
+capital punishment by the constituted authorities of a nation as part
+of a set policy to make its sovereignty respected, is wholly
+independent of whether you call your colonial government a civil or a
+military one. So that in justifying General MacArthur I am also
+justifying Governor Taft, and as it was on the recommendation of the
+former that the latter appointed me to the Bench, we are certainly all
+three in the same boat in the matter of the capital punishments under
+consideration. And while the company you were in on earth in a given
+transaction, however distinguished that company, is not going to help
+you with the Recording Angel,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7588src" href=
+"#xd20e7588" name="xd20e7588src">40</a> still, it is some comfort to
+know that wiser and abler men than yourself approved a course of
+imposing capital punishments to which you were a party, such
+punishments having been inflicted as part of a policy whose subsequent
+evolution revealed it to you as fundamentally wrong. And this
+reflection is quite relevant in the present connection to the question
+whether the government of Benevolent <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb323" href="#pb323" name="pb323">323</a>]</span>Assimilation we have
+maintained over the Filipinos for the last fourteen years is one which
+was originally imposed by force against their will, or whether it was
+ever welcomed by them or any considerable fraction of them.</p>
+<p>That the MacArthur proclamation of December 20, 1900, concerning the
+laws of war, was at the time a military necessity, is as perfectly
+clear to me now as it was then. And yet it may well give the thoughtful
+and patriotic American pause. It is sometimes difficult to understand
+why men are so often entirely willing to go on fighting and dying in a
+cause they must know to be hopeless. The famous passage of Edmund
+Burke&rsquo;s speech on &ldquo;Conciliation with America,&rdquo;</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, so long
+as foreign troops remained on my native soil, I never would lay down my
+arms, no, never, never, never!</p>
+</div>
+<p>sounds well to us, but from the standpoint of a conqueror, there is
+a good deal of wind-jamming to it, after all. It was the language of a
+man who knew nothing of the horrors of war by actual experience, or of
+what hell it slowly becomes to everybody concerned after most of the
+high officials of the vanquished government have been captured and are
+sleeping on dry, warm beds, eating good wholesome food, and smoking
+good cigars, in comfortable custody, while the vanquished army, no
+longer strong enough to come out in the open and fight, is relegated to
+ambuscades and other tactics equally akin to the methods of the
+assassin. The law of nations in this regard is an expression of the
+views of successive generations of civilized and enlightened men of all
+nations <i>whose profession</i> was war&mdash;men familiar with the
+horrors inevitably incident to it and anxious to mitigate them as far
+as possible. That law represents <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb324"
+href="#pb324" name="pb324">324</a>]</span>the common consensus of
+Christendom resulting from that experience. It recognizes that after
+resistance becomes utterly hopeless, it becomes a crime against society
+and the general peace, and this is wholly independent of the merits or
+demerits of the questions involved in the war. In other words, the
+greatest good of the greatest number cries aloud that the war must
+stop. The cold, hard fact is that the great majority of the men who
+hold out longest are, usually, either single men having no one
+dependent on them, or nothing to lose, or both, or else they are men
+more or less indifferent to the ties of family affection, and callous
+to the suffering fruitlessly entailed upon innocent noncombatants by
+the various and sundry horrors of war, such as decimation of the plough
+animals of the country due to their running at large without caretakers
+or forage; resultant untilled fields and scant food; pestilence and
+famine consequent upon insufficient nourishment; arson, robbery, rape,
+and murder inevitably committed in such times by sorry scamps and
+ruffians claiming to be patriots but yielding no allegiance to any
+responsible head; and so on, <i>ad infinitum</i>.</p>
+<p>General MacArthur&rsquo;s proclamation of December 20, 1900, served
+notice on the leaders of a hopeless cause that assassinations, such as
+that ordered by Juan Cailles, above mentioned, must stop; that the
+universal practice of the townfolk, of sending money, supplies, and
+information concerning our movements to the enemy in the field, must
+stop; that participating in hostilities intermittently, in citizen
+garb, followed by return to home and avocation when too hard pressed,
+must stop; in short that <i>the war must stop</i>. Yet the proclamation
+explained in so firm and kindly a way why the penalties it promised
+were only reasonable under the circumstances, that &ldquo;as an
+educational document <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb325" href="#pb325"
+name="pb325">325</a>]</span>the effect was immediate and
+far-reaching,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7616src" href=
+"#xd20e7616" name="xd20e7616src">41</a> to quote from an opinion
+expressed by its author in the body of it, an opinion entirely
+consistent with modesty and fully justified by the facts. General
+MacArthur also goes on to say of his unrelenting and rigid enforcement
+of the terms of this proclamation that the results &ldquo;preclude all
+possibility of doubt *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* that the effective pacification of
+the archipelago <i>commenced</i> December 20, 1900&rdquo;&mdash;its
+date. It is a part of the history of those times, familiar to all who
+are familiar with them, that the Taft Civil Commission thought its
+assurances of the benevolent intentions of our government were what
+made the civil government possible by midsummer, 1901. But whatever the
+Filipinos may think of us at present, now that they understand us
+better, certainly in 1900&ndash;01, in view of the events of the
+preceding two or three years, which formed the basis of the only
+acquaintance they then had with us, and in view of the fact that their
+experience for the preceding two or three hundred years had made force
+the only effective governmental argument with them, and governmental
+promises a mere mockery, and in view of the fact that the
+&ldquo;never-ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts,&rdquo;
+etc., of General MacArthur&rsquo;s 70,000 men were relentlessly kept up
+during the six months immediately following the proclamation and in aid
+of it, it at once becomes obvious how infinitesimal a fraction of the
+final partial pacification which made the civil government possible,
+the Taft assurances to the Filipinos as to our intentions must have
+been. These matters are of prime importance to any honest effort toward
+a clear understanding of present conditions, because far and away the
+greatest wrong which we, in our genuinely benevolent misinformation,
+have done the Filipinos, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb326" href=
+"#pb326" name="pb326">326</a>]</span>not even excepting the tariff
+legislation perpetrated upon them by Congress, lies in the insufferably
+hypocritical pretence that they ever consented to our rule, or that
+they consent to it now&mdash;a pretence conceived in 1898 by Trade
+Expansion, to beguile a nation the breath of whose own life is
+political liberty based on consent of the governed, into a career of
+conquest, but not even countenanced since by those who believe the
+Government should go into the politico-missionary business, after the
+manner of Spain in the sixteenth century.</p>
+<p>Having now exhaustively examined the differences of opinion between
+Judge Taft and General MacArthur, when the former set to work, in the
+summer of 1900, to get a civil government started by the date of
+expiration of the term of enlistment of the volunteer army (June 30,
+1901), let us follow the facts of the situation up to the date last
+named, or, which is practically the same thing, up to the inauguration
+of Judge Taft as Civil Governor of the islands on July 4, 1901,
+pausing, in passing, for such reflections as may force themselves upon
+us as pertinent to the Philippine problem of to-day.</p>
+<p>On September 19, 1900, General MacArthur wired Secretary of War
+Root&mdash;General Corbin, the Adjutant-General of the Army, to be
+exact, but it is the same thing&mdash;describing what he calls
+&ldquo;considerable activity&rdquo; throughout Luzon, ominously stating
+that General Young (up in the Ilocano country, into which we followed
+him and his cavalry in <a href="#ch12">Chapter XII</a>, <i>ante</i>)
+&ldquo;has called so emphatically for more force,&rdquo; that he,
+MacArthur, feels grave concern; adding that Luzon north of the Pasig is
+&ldquo;very much disturbed,&rdquo; and that south of the Pasig the same
+conditions prevail.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7634src" href=
+"#xd20e7634" name="xd20e7634src">42</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb327" href="#pb327" name="pb327">327</a>]</span></p>
+<p>October 26th, General MacArthur cables outlining a plan for a great
+campaign on comprehensive lines, stating that &ldquo;Full development
+of this scheme requires about four months and all troops now in the
+islands,&rdquo; and deprecating any move on Mr. Root&rsquo;s part to
+reduce his force of 70,000 men by starting any of the volunteers
+homeward before it should be absolutely necessary.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7642src" href="#xd20e7642" name="xd20e7642src">43</a> October
+28th, General MacArthur wires, &ldquo;Shall push everything with great
+vigor,&rdquo; adding &ldquo;Expect to have everything in full operation
+November 15th.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7647src" href=
+"#xd20e7647" name="xd20e7647src">44</a> November 5th, as if to reassure
+General MacArthur that he and the General understand each other and
+that the Taft cotemporaneous nonsense is not going to be allowed to
+interfere with more serious business, Secretary Root, through the
+Adjutant-General, sends this cable message:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Secretary of War directs no instructions from here be
+allowed interfere or impede progress your military operations which he
+expects you force to successful conclusion.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7655src" href="#xd20e7655" name="xd20e7655src">45</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>So that while the American people were being pacified with the Taft
+cablegrams to Secretary Root that the Filipino people wanted peace,
+General MacArthur, under Mr. Root&rsquo;s direction, was simultaneously
+proceeding to <i>make</i> them want it with the customary argument used
+to settle irreconcilable differences between nations&mdash;powder and
+lead. Mr. Root was all the time in constant communication with both,
+but he gave out only the Taft optimism to the public, and withheld the
+actual facts within his knowledge. December 25th, General MacArthur
+wires Secretary Root, &ldquo;Expectations based on result of election
+have not been realized.&rdquo; &ldquo;Progress,&rdquo; he says, is
+&ldquo;very slow.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7665src" href=
+"#xd20e7665" name="xd20e7665src">46</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb328" href="#pb328" name="pb328">328</a>]</span></p>
+<p>And now I come to one of the most important things that all my
+researches into the official records of our government concerning the
+Philippine Islands have developed. On December 28, 1900, General
+MacArthur reports by cable the contents of some important insurgent
+papers captured in Cavite Province about that time. The Filipinos have
+a great way of reducing to writing, or making minutes of, whatever
+occurs at any important conference. This habit they did not abandon in
+the field. The papers in question belonged to General Trias, the
+Lieutenant-General commanding all the insurgent armies in the field,
+and, next to Aguinaldo, the highest official connected with the
+revolutionary government. One of these papers, according to General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s despatch of December 28th, purported to be the
+minutes of a certain meeting had October 11th previous, between General
+Trias and the Japanese Consul at Manila. As to whether or not the paper
+was really authentic, General MacArthur says: &ldquo;I accept it as
+such without hesitation.&rdquo; Communicating the contents of the paper
+he says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Consul advised that Trias visit Japan. Filipinos
+represented that concessions which they might be forced to make to
+Washington would be more agreeable if made to Japan, <i>which as a
+nation of kindred blood would not be likely to assert superiority</i>.
+Consul said Japan desired coaling station, freedom to trade and build
+railways.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7679src" href="#xd20e7679" name=
+"xd20e7679src">47</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>I consider these negotiations of the Japanese Government with the
+Philippine insurgents important to be related here because they have
+never been generally known, for the good reason, of course, that the
+President of the United States cannot take the public into his
+confidence about such grave and delicate matters when <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb329" href="#pb329" name="pb329">329</a>]</span>they
+occur. The incident is not &ldquo;ancient history&rdquo; relatively to
+present-day problems, for the following reasons:</p>
+<p>(1) Because it is credibly reported and currently believed in the
+United States that in Japan, during the cruise of our battleship fleet
+around the world in 1907, one of the reception committee of Japanese
+officers who welcomed our officers was recognized by one of the latter
+as having been, not a great while before that, a servant aboard an
+American battleship.</p>
+<p>(2) Because of the following incident, related to me, in 1911,
+without the slightest injunction of secrecy, by the Director of Public
+Health of the Philippine Islands, then on a visit to the United States.
+Shortly before the Director&rsquo;s said visit home, while he was out
+in one of the provinces, there was brought to his attention a Filipino
+with a broken arm. There was a Japanese doctor in the town, at least a
+Japanese who had a sign out as a doctor. The Director carried the
+sufferer to the &ldquo;doctor,&rdquo; not being a surgeon himself. The
+&ldquo;doctor&rdquo; turned out to be a civil engineer, who had been
+making maps and plans of fortifications. The plans were found in his
+possession.</p>
+<p>(3) Because from one of the islands through which the northern line
+of the Treaty of Paris runs, situated only a pleasant morning&rsquo;s
+journey in a launch due north of Aparri, the northernmost town of
+Luzon, you can see, on a clear day, with a good field-glass, the
+southern end of Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. <i>Japan can land an
+army on American soil at Aparri any time she wants to,
+overnight</i>&mdash;an army several times that of the total American
+force now in the Philippines,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7699src" href=
+"#xd20e7699" name="xd20e7699src">48</a> or likely ever to be there.
+From Aparri it is 70 miles up the river to Tueguegarao, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb330" href="#pb330" name="pb330">330</a>]</span>40
+more to Iligan, and 90 more, all fairly good marching, to Bayombong, in
+Nueva Viscaya (total distance, Aparri to Bayombong, 200 miles) the
+province which lies in the heart of the watershed of Central Luzon. I
+know what I am talking about, because that region was the first
+judicial district I presided over, and many a hard journey I have had
+over it, circuit riding, on a scrubby pony. Part of it I have been
+through in the company of President Taft. It thus appears that from
+Aparri to Bayombong there would be but a week or ten days of unresisted
+marching to reach the watershed region, Nueva Viscaya. The Japanese
+soldier&rsquo;s ration is mainly rice, so that he can carry more
+days&rsquo; travel rations than almost any other soldier in the world.
+Never fear about their making the journey inside of a week or ten days,
+once they start. To descend from the watershed aforesaid, over the
+Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the Rio Grande de Pampanga to
+Manila, another three or four days would be all that would be needed.
+It would be a Japanese picnic. Fortifying Corregidor Island, at the
+entrance to Manila Bay, which is about all the serious scheme of
+defence against a foreign foe we have out there, is quite like the
+reliance of the Spaniards on Morro Castle, at the mouth of the harbor
+of Santiago de Cuba, against our landing at Guantanamo. Our garrison in
+the Philippines, all told, is but a handful. Aparri is an absolutely
+unfortified seaport, at which the Japanese could land an army overnight
+from the southern end of Formosa. There are no military fortifications
+whatsoever to stay the advance of an invading army from Aparri down the
+Cagayan Valley, and thence over the watershed of Nueva Viscaya
+Province, through the Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the
+Pampanga River to Manila. So that to-day Japan can take Manila inside
+of two <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb331" href="#pb331" name=
+"pb331">331</a>]</span>weeks any time she wants to. That is why I
+object to the President&rsquo;s &ldquo;jollying&rdquo; the situation
+along as best he can, without taking the American people into his
+confidence. Any army officer at our War College will inform any member
+of the House or Senate on inquiry, that Japan can take the Philippines
+any time she wants to. President Taft and the Mikado may keep on
+exchanging the most cordial cablegrams imaginable, but the map-making
+goes on just the same. And, earnest and sincere as both the President
+and the Emperor undoubtedly are in their desire to preserve the general
+peace, who is going to restrain Hobson and Hearst, and several of
+Japan&rsquo;s public men equally distinguished and equally
+inflammatory? Heads of nations cannot restrain gusts of popular
+passion. The Pacific Coast is not so friendly to Japan as the rest of
+our country, and as between Japan and the Pacific Coast, we are pretty
+apt to stand by the latter without inquiring with meticulous nicety
+into any differences that may arise.</p>
+<p>The reason I said in the chapter before this one that Mr. Root is a
+dangerous man to Republican institutions was because he is of the type
+who are constantly finding situations which they consider it best for
+the people not to know about. After the McKinley election of 1900 was
+safely &ldquo;put over,&rdquo; Mr. Root, as Secretary of War, let Judge
+Taft go ahead and ride his dove-of-peace hobby-horse in the
+Philippines, duly repeating to the American people all the cheery Taft
+cluckings to said horse, at a time when the real situation is indicated
+by such grim correspondence as the following cablegram dated January
+29, 1901:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Wood, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if
+you can give your consent to the immediate withdrawal <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb332" href="#pb332" name=
+"pb332">332</a>]</span>Tenth Infantry from Cuba. <i>Imperative that we
+have immediate use of every available company we can lay our hands on
+for service in the Philippines.</i> (Signed) Corbin.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7716src" href="#xd20e7716" name="xd20e7716src">49</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>But let us turn from this sorry spectacle of Mr. Root pulling the
+wool over the eyes of his countrymen to make them believe the Filipinos
+were not quite so unconsenting as they seemed to be, and again look at
+the sheer splendor of American military ability to get anything done
+the Government wants done. I refer to the capture of Aguinaldo.</p>
+<p>One of the most eminent lawyers in this country once said to me,
+&ldquo;I would not let that man Funston enter my house.&rdquo; I tried
+to enlighten him, but as I happened to be a guest in his house at the
+time, which entitled him to exemption from light if he
+insisted&mdash;which he did&mdash;General Funston and he have continued
+to miss what might have been a real pleasure to them both. The
+following is, as briefly as I can dispose of it, the story of the
+capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901.</p>
+<p>Ever since Aguinaldo had escaped through our lines in November,
+1899, his capture had been the one great consummation most devoutly
+wished. It has already been shown how busy with the war the army was
+all the time Judge Taft was gayly jogging away astride of his peace
+hobby about the insurrection being really quite regretted and over.
+However, in the favorite remark with which he used to wave the
+insurrection into thin air, to the effect that it was now merely
+&ldquo;a Mafia on a large scale,&rdquo; there was one element of truth.
+The general feeling of the people, both educated and uneducated, was
+such as to countenance the attitude of the leaders that pro-American
+tendencies were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb333" href="#pb333"
+name="pb333">333</a>]</span>treason. Any leader who surrendered of
+course was thereafter an object of at least some suspicion to his
+fellow-countrymen, however assiduous his subsequent double-dealing. As
+long as Aguinaldo remained out, this state of affairs was sure to
+continue indefinitely, possibly for years to come. If captured,
+<i>he</i> would probably himself give up the struggle, and use his
+influence with the rest to do likewise. Therefore, in the spring of
+1901, each and every one of General MacArthur&rsquo;s 70,000 men was,
+and had been since 1899, on the <i>qui vive</i> to make his own
+personal fortunes secure for life, and gain lasting military
+distinction, by taking any sort of chances to capture Aguinaldo. On
+February 8, 1901, an officer of General Funston&rsquo;s district, the
+Fourth, in central Luzon, intercepted a messenger bearing despatches
+from Aguinaldo to one of his generals of that region, directing the
+general (Lacuna) to send some reinforcements to him, Aguinaldo. General
+Funston&rsquo;s headquarters were then at San Fernando, in the province
+of Pampanga&mdash;organized as a &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government
+province by act of the Taft Commission just five days later.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e7735src" href="#xd20e7735" name=
+"xd20e7735src">50</a> Through these despatches and their bearer,
+General Funston ascertained the hiding-place of the insurgent chieftain
+to be at a place called Palanan, in the mountains of Isabela Province,
+in northeastern Luzon, near the Pacific Coast. Early in the war we had
+availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes,
+who look nowise different from all other Filipinos, but who had, under
+the Spanish government, by reason of long-standing feuds with their
+more rebellious neighbors, come to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish
+authorities. When we came they had transferred that loyalty to us, and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb334" href="#pb334" name=
+"pb334">334</a>]</span>had now become a recognized and valuable part of
+our military force. So it occurred to General Funston; &ldquo;Why not
+personate the reinforcements called for, the American officers to
+command the expedition assuming the r&ocirc;le of captured American
+prisoners?&rdquo; The plan was submitted to General MacArthur and
+adopted. A picked company of Maccabebes was selected, consisting of
+about eighty men, and General Funston decided to go himself, taking
+with him on the perilous expedition four young officers of proven
+mettle: Captain Harry W. Newton, 34th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, now a
+captain of the Coast Artillery; Captain R. T. Hazzard, 11th Volunteer
+Cavalry; Lieutenant O. P. M. Hazzard, his brother, of the same
+regiment, the latter now an officer of the regular army, and Lieutenant
+Mitchell, &ldquo;my efficient aid.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7744src" href="#xd20e7744" name="xd20e7744src">51</a> March 6,
+1901, the U.S.S. <i>Vicksburg</i> slipped <span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e7753" title="Source: quitely">quietly</span> out of Manila Bay,
+bearing the participants in the desperate enterprise&mdash;as desperate
+an undertaking as the heart and brain of a soldier ever carried to a
+successful conclusion. General Thomas H. Barry wrote Secretary of War
+Root, after they left, telling of their departure, and stating that he
+did not much expect ever to see them again. The chances were ten to one
+that the eighty men would meet five or ten times their number, and, as
+they were to masquerade as troops of the enemy, they could not
+complain, under the recognized laws of war as to spies, at being
+summarily shot if captured alive. And the whole Filipino people were a
+secret service ready to warn Aguinaldo, should the carefully concocted
+ruse be discovered anywhere along the journey. They went down to the
+southern end of Luzon, and through the San Bernardino Straits into the
+Pacific Ocean, and thence up the east coast of Luzon to <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb335" href="#pb335" name=
+"pb335">335</a>]</span>Casiguran Bay, about 100 miles south of Palanan,
+landing at Casiguran Bay, March 14th. The &ldquo;little Macks,&rdquo;
+as General Funston calls the Maccabebes, were made to discard their
+dapper American uniforms after they got aboard the ship, and don
+instead a lot of nondescript clothing gathered by the military
+authorities at Manila before the <i>Vicksburg</i> sailed, so as to
+resemble the average insurgent command. Not a man of them had been told
+of the nature of the expedition before sailing. This was not for fear
+of treachery, but lest some one of the faithful &ldquo;Macks&rdquo;
+should get his tongue loosed by hospitality before departing. Also,
+their Krag-Jorgensen regulation rifles were taken from them, and a
+miscellaneous assortment of old Springfields, Mausers, etc., given them
+instead, to complete the deception. An ex-insurgent officer, well known
+to Aguinaldo, but now in General Funston&rsquo;s employ, was to play
+the r&ocirc;le of commanding officer of the
+&ldquo;reinforcements.&rdquo; To read General Funston&rsquo;s account
+of this expedition is a more convincing rebuttal of the contemporaneous
+Taft denials of Filipino hostility and of the unanimity of the feeling
+of the people against us, than a thousand quotations from official
+documents could ever be. It was necessary to land more than 100 miles
+south of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s hiding-place, lest the smoke of the
+approaching vessel should be sighted from a distance, and some peasant
+or lookout give the alarm. Accordingly, they landed at Casiguran Bay by
+night, with the ship&rsquo;s lights screened, the <i>Vicksburg</i> at
+once departing out of sight of land, and agreeing to meet them off
+Palanan, their destination, on March 25th, eleven days later. From the
+beginning they vigilantly and consummately played the r&ocirc;le
+planned, the &ldquo;Macks&rdquo; having been drilled on the way up,
+each and all, in the story they were to tell at the first village
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb336" href="#pb336" name=
+"pb336">336</a>]</span>near Casiguran Bay, and everywhere thereafter,
+to the effect that they had come across country, and en route had met
+ten American soldiers out map-making, and had killed two, wounded
+three, and captured five. They were to point to General Funston and the
+four other Americans in corroboration of their story. Speaking of
+himself and his four fellow &ldquo;prisoners,&rdquo; General Funston
+says, &ldquo;We were a pretty scrubby looking lot of privates.&rdquo;
+The villagers received the patriot forces, thus flushed with triumph,
+in an appropriate manner, and supplied them with rations and guides for
+the rest of their 100-mile journey to the headquarters of the
+&ldquo;dictator.&rdquo; General Funston is even at pains to say for the
+village officials that they were very humane and courteous to himself
+and the other four American &ldquo;prisoners.&rdquo; They reached
+Palanan Bay, eight miles from Palanan, on March 22d. Here Hilario Tal
+Placido, the ex-insurgent officer whose r&ocirc;le in the present
+thrilling drama was that of &ldquo;commanding officer&rdquo; of the
+expedition, sent a note to Aguinaldo, stating that he had halted his
+command for a rest at the beach preparatory to marching inland and
+reporting to the Honorable Presidente, that they were very much
+exhausted, and much in need of food, and please to send him some. Of
+course that was the natural card to play to put Aguinaldo off his
+guard. The food came, and the bearers returned and casually reported to
+the Honorable Presidente that his honorable reinforcements would soon
+be along, much to the honorable joy&mdash;to make the thing a little
+Japanesque&mdash;of the president of the honorable republic. This
+incident has been since made the occasion of some criticism&mdash;that
+it was contrary to decency to accept Aguinaldo&rsquo;s food and then
+attack him afterwards. General Funston very properly replies in effect
+that the case would have been <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb337"
+href="#pb337" name="pb337">337</a>]</span>very different had he thrown
+himself on Aguinaldo&rsquo;s mercy, taken his food, and used treachery
+afterwards, but that his conduct was entirely correct, under the code
+of war, for the reason that should he and his command be captured while
+personating enemy&rsquo;s forces, Aguinaldo would have had a perfect
+right, under the rules of the game, to shoot them all as spies. He adds
+rather savagely, concerning &ldquo;certain ladylike persons in the
+United States&rdquo; who have censured his course in the matter, that
+he &ldquo;would be <i>very much interested in seeing</i> the results of
+a surgical operation performed on the skull of a man who cannot readily
+see the radical difference between the two propositions,&rdquo; and
+that he doubts if a good quality of calf brains would be revealed by
+the operation.</p>
+<p>At all events, the expedition was very much refreshed by the food
+and highly delighted at the proof, contained in the sending of it, that
+Aguinaldo did not suspect a ruse. But now came one of the many
+emergencies which had to be met by quick wit in the course of that
+memorable adventure. Aguinaldo sent word to leave the
+&ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; under a guard in one of the huts by the
+sea-shore, where there was one of the Aguinaldo retainers in charge, an
+old Tagalo. After a hurried, whispered conversation,
+&ldquo;prisoner&rdquo; Funston instructed &ldquo;Commanding
+Officer&rdquo; Placido to go ahead with his main column and then a
+little later send back a forged written order purporting to be from
+Aguinaldo, for the &ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; to come on also. This was
+shown to the old Tagalo, thus disarming suspicion on his part. But now
+came the &ldquo;closest shave&rdquo; they had. The column met a
+detachment from Aguinaldo&rsquo;s headquarters sent down with
+instructions to relieve the necessarily worn-out guard of the newly
+arrived &ldquo;re-inforcements&rdquo; that were supposed to be guarding
+the five prisoners at the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb338" href=
+"#pb338" name="pb338">338</a>]</span>beach, and let said guard come on
+up to headquarters with the rest of the &ldquo;re-inforcements,&rdquo;
+the idea being to still leave the prisoners at the beach so they would
+not learn definitely as to the Aguinaldo whereabouts. Detaining the
+officer commanding this detachment for a moment or so on some pretext,
+the &ldquo;Commanding Officer&rdquo; of the
+&ldquo;re-inforcements&rdquo; whispered to a Maccabebe corporal to run
+back and tell General Funston and the rest of the
+&ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; to jump in the bushes and hide. This they did,
+lying within thirty feet of the detachment, as it passed them en route
+for the beach. Of course a fight would have meant considerable firing,
+and the quarry might hear it, take fright, and escape. Finally they
+reached Palanan, the &ldquo;prisoners&rdquo; quite far in the rear.
+Placido got safely into Aguinaldo&rsquo;s presence, followed at a short
+distance by the main body of his Maccabebes. Aguinaldo&rsquo;s
+life-guard of some fifty men, neatly uniformed, presented arms as
+Placido entered the insurgent headquarters building, and thereafter
+waited at attention outside. Then the worthy Placido entertained the
+honorable Presidente with a few cock-and-bull stories about the march
+across country, etc., made obediently to the President&rsquo;s order,
+keeping a weather eye out of the window all the time. As soon as the
+Maccabebes had come up and formed facing the Aguinaldo life-guard,
+Placido went to the window and ordered them to open fire. This they
+did, killing two of the insurgents and wounding their commanding
+officer. The rest fled, panic-stricken, by reason of the surprise. Then
+Placido, a very stout individual, grabbed Aguinaldo, who only weighs
+about 115 pounds, threw him down, and <i>sat on him</i>, until General
+Funston, the Hazzards, Mitchell, and Newton arrived. The orders were
+iron-clad that under no circumstances, if it could be avoided, was
+Aguinaldo to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb339" href="#pb339" name=
+"pb339">339</a>]</span>be killed. His signature to proclamations
+telling the people to quit the war was going to be needed too much. The
+party rested two days and then set out for the coast again, on March
+25th, the day the <i>Vicksburg</i> had agreed to meet them. &ldquo;At
+noon&rdquo; says General Funston, &ldquo;we again saw the Pacific, and
+far out on it a wisp of smoke&mdash;the <i>Vicksburg</i> coming
+in!&rdquo; In due course they reached Manila Bay. The old palace of the
+Spanish captains-general, then occupied by our commanding general, is
+up the Pasig River, accessible from the bay by launch. By that method
+General Funston took his precious prisoner to the palace without the
+knowledge of a soul in the great city of Manila. He arrived before
+General MacArthur had gotten up. In a few minutes the General came out.
+&ldquo;Where is Aguinaldo?&rdquo; said he, dryly. He supposed General
+Funston simply had some details to tell, like the commanding officers
+of hundreds of other expeditions that had gone out before that on false
+scents in search of the illustrious but elusive Presidente.
+&ldquo;Right here in this house,&rdquo; said General Funston. General
+MacArthur could hardly believe his ears. A few days later, General
+Funston walked into General MacArthur&rsquo;s office. The latter said;
+&ldquo;Well, Funston, they do not seem to have thought much in
+Washington of your performance. I am afraid you have got into
+trouble.&rdquo; &ldquo;At the same time he handed me,&rdquo; says
+General Funston in the <i>Scribner Magazine</i> article above
+mentioned, &ldquo;a cablegram announcing my appointment as a
+brigadier-general in the regular army.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>In his annual report for 1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7793src"
+href="#xd20e7793" name="xd20e7793src">52</a> General MacArthur
+describes the capture of Aguinaldo as &ldquo;the most momentous single
+event of the year,&rdquo; stating also that &ldquo;Aguinaldo was the
+incarnation of the insurrection.&rdquo; <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb340" href="#pb340" name="pb340">340</a>]</span>This last statement
+explains why he was so anxious to capture him <i>alive</i>. If dead, he
+would be sure to get <i>re-incarnated</i> in the person of some able
+assistant of his entourage, thus insuring undisturbed continuance of
+the war. He was most graciously treated by General MacArthur during his
+stay as that distinguished soldier&rsquo;s &ldquo;guest&rdquo; at the
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e7808" title=
+"Source: Malacanan">Malaca&ntilde;an</span> palace, from March 28th
+until April 20th. The word &ldquo;guest&rdquo; is placed in quotations
+because the host thought so much of him that he considered him worth
+many hundred times his weight in gold, and had him watched <i>night and
+day by a commissioned officer</i>. Everything that had been done by the
+Americans since November, 1899, was explained to him, and he was made
+to see that our purposes with regard to his people were not only
+benevolent but also inflexible; in other words that there was no
+altering our determination to make his people happy whether they were
+willing or not. Seeing this, Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. The
+programme explained to Aguinaldo is wittily described by a very bright
+Englishwoman as a plan &ldquo;to have lots of American school teachers
+at once set to work to teach the Filipino English and at the same time
+keep plenty of American soldiers around to knock him on the head should
+he get a notion that he is ready for self-government before the
+Americans think he is&rdquo;&mdash;a quaint scheme, she adds,
+&ldquo;and one characteristic of the dauntlessness of American
+energy.&rdquo; To be brief, on April 19th, Aguinaldo took the oath of
+allegiance to the American Government, which all agree he has
+faithfully observed ever since, and issued a proclamation recommending
+abandonment of further resistance. This proclamation was at once
+published by General MacArthur and signalized by the immediate
+liberation of one thousand prisoners of war, on their likewise
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb341" href="#pb341" name=
+"pb341">341</a>]</span>taking the oath of allegiance. In his
+proclamation Aguinaldo said, among other things:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The time has come, however, when they [the Filipino
+people] find their advance along this path [the path of their
+aspirations] impeded by an irresistible force. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Enough
+of blood, enough of tears and desolation.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He concludes by announcing his final unconditional submission to
+American sovereignty and advises others to do likewise.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e7823src" href="#xd20e7823" name=
+"xd20e7823src">53</a></p>
+<p>Soon after this General Ti&ntilde;o surrendered in General
+Young&rsquo;s district, and in another part of northern Luzon, General
+Mascardo, commanding the insurgent forces in the provinces of Bataan
+and Zambales, heretofore described as &ldquo;the west wing of the great
+central plain,&rdquo; also surrendered. In the latter part of June,
+General Cailles, with whom we have already had occasion to become
+acquainted, in connection with Judge Taft&rsquo;s &ldquo;Mafia on a
+large scale,&rdquo; also surrendered in Laguna Province. After that,
+there was never any more trouble in northern Luzon. But during the
+spring of 1901, the Commission had been very busy organizing the
+provinces of southern Luzon under civil government, thus cutting short
+the process of licking it into submission and substituting a process of
+loving it into that state through good salaries and otherwise&mdash;a
+policy which postponed the final permanent pacification of that
+ill-fated region for several years, as hereinafter more fully set
+forth.</p>
+<p>The unconditional absoluteness with which Judge Taft acted from the
+beginning on the assumption that the Filipinos would make a distinction
+between civil and military rule, and that their objection to us was
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb342" href="#pb342" name=
+"pb342">342</a>]</span>because we had first sent soldiers to rule them
+and not civilians, and that these objections would vanish before the
+benignant sunlight of a government by civilians, is one of the great
+tragedies of all history, considering the countless lives it eventually
+cost. As a matter of fact, the Filipino objection had little or no
+relation to the kind of clothes we wore, whether they were white duck
+or khaki. Their objection was to <i>us, i.e.</i>, to an alien yoke.
+However, to heal the bleeding wounds of war, the Filipinos were
+benevolently told to forget it, and a civil government was set up on
+July 4, 1901, pursuant to the amiable delusion indicated. That it has
+never yet proved a panacea, and why, will be developed in the next and
+subsequent chapters, but only in-so-far as such development throws
+light on the present situation&mdash;which it is the whole object of
+this book to do.</p>
+<p>And now a few words by way of concluding the present chapter, as
+preliminary to the inauguration of a civil government, cannot be
+misconstrued, though they come from one who held office under it. I
+have certainly made clear that Judge Taft and his colleagues were as
+honest in their delusion about how popular they were with the Filipinos
+as many other public men who have been known to have hobbies, and my
+remarks must be understood as based on the comprehensive
+bird&rsquo;s-eye view which we have had of the whole situation from the
+outbreak of the war with Spain in 1898 to the end of June, 1901, as a
+summation of that situation. It is quite true that all contemporary
+history is as much affected by its environment as the writer of it is
+by his own limitations. But it certainly seems clear now that, in
+regard to the Philippine problem presented in 1898 by the decision to
+keep the islands, the American people were played upon by the
+politicians <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb343" href="#pb343" name=
+"pb343">343</a>]</span>for the next few years thereafter, sometimes on
+the idea that the Filipino people were <i>not</i> a people but only a
+jumble of semi-civilized tribes incapable of any intelligent notion of
+what independence meant, and sometimes on the idea that while there was
+no denying that they <i>were</i> indeed a civilized, homogeneous,
+Christian people, yet the great majority of them did not want
+independence, and would prefer to be under a strong alien government.
+But the key-note to the McKinley policy from the beginning, his answer
+to the eager question of his own people, was that there was no real
+absence of the consent of the governed. In Senator Lodge&rsquo;s
+history of the war with Spain, written in 1899, there is a description
+of the long struggle for independence in Cuba, whose existence Spain
+denied year after year until we decided that patience had ceased to be
+a virtue, which description is so strikingly applicable to the
+situation in the Philippines during the first years of American rule
+that I cannot refrain from quoting it here:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">And we were to go on pretending that the war was not
+there, and that we had answered the unsettled question, when we really
+had simply turned our heads aside and refused to look. And then when
+the troublesome matter had been so nicely laid to sleep, the result
+followed which is usual <i>when Congressmen and Presidents and nations
+are trying to make shams pass for realities</i>.&rdquo;<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e7855src" href="#xd20e7855" name=
+"xd20e7855src">54</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>By the same high token the Philippine question will always remain
+&ldquo;the unsettled question&rdquo; until it is settled right. In
+other words, the American occupation of the Philippines, having been
+originally predicated on the idea that the Filipino people did not
+really want independence, a fiction which political expediency
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb344" href="#pb344" name=
+"pb344">344</a>]</span>incident to government by parties inexorably
+compelled it to try to live up to thereafter, took the form, in 1901,
+of a civil government founded upon a benevolent lie, which expressed a
+hope, not a fact, a hopeless hope that can never be a fact. And that is
+what has been the matter with it ever since.</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The papers &rsquo;id it &rsquo;andsome,</p>
+<p class="line">But you bet the army knows.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb345" href="#pb345" name=
+"pb345">345</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e6975" href="#xd20e6975src" name="xd20e6975">1</a></span> Letter
+of July 22, 1898, by Duc d&rsquo;Almodovar del Rio, Prime Minister of
+Spain, to President McKinley, suing for peace. <i>Senate Document
+62</i>, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 272&ndash;3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7010" href="#xd20e7010src" name="xd20e7010">2</a></span> See
+<i>Congressional Record</i> of that date, p. 33.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7050" href="#xd20e7050src" name="xd20e7050">3</a></span> General
+Otis&rsquo;s appreciation of such &ldquo;aid&rdquo; was thus expressed
+in his cablegram to Washington of June 4, 1899: &ldquo;Negotiations and
+conferences with insurgents cost soldiers&rsquo; lives and prolong our
+difficulties.&rdquo; <i>Correspondence Relating to the War with
+Spain</i>, vol. ii., p. 1002.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7078" href="#xd20e7078src" name="xd20e7078">4</a></span> Address
+by Secretary of War Taft before the National Geographic Society at
+Washington, published in the official organ of that Society,
+<i>National Geographic Magazine</i> for August, 1905.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7091" href="#xd20e7091src" name="xd20e7091">5</a></span> Says
+General Chaffee in his annual report for 1902: &ldquo;The intelligent
+element controlled the ignorant masses as perfectly as ever a captain
+controlled the men of his company.&rdquo; <i>War Department Report</i>,
+1902, vol. ix., p. 191.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7099" href="#xd20e7099src" name="xd20e7099">6</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7135" href="#xd20e7135src" name="xd20e7135">7</a></span> August
+29, 1898, to May 5, 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7143" href="#xd20e7143src" name="xd20e7143">8</a></span>
+Especially independence.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7152" href="#xd20e7152src" name="xd20e7152">9</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i> (1902), pt. 1, page 50<span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e7156" title="Not in source">.</span></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7161" href="#xd20e7161src" name="xd20e7161">10</a></span> A
+slander ignorantly repeated by the adverse report of the minority of
+the Insular Affairs Committee of the House, on the Jones Bill,
+introduced in March, 1912, proposing ultimate independence in 1921.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7183" href="#xd20e7183src" name="xd20e7183">11</a></span> See
+<i>The Commoner</i>, April 27, 1906.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7199" href="#xd20e7199src" name="xd20e7199">12</a></span>
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7206" href="#xd20e7206src" name="xd20e7206">13</a></span> These
+are the three main lines of cleavage, linguistically speaking. Nearly
+all the minor dialects are kin to some one of the principal three.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7217" href="#xd20e7217src" name="xd20e7217">14</a></span>
+Peasant&rsquo;s hut, usually of bamboo, thatched with stout straw
+(<i>nipa</i>). It is the log cabin of the Philippines.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7227" href="#xd20e7227src" name="xd20e7227">15</a></span> By way
+of protest against this kind of belittling of the army&rsquo;s work,
+General MacArthur says in his annual report (<i>War Dept. Rept.</i>,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60), &ldquo;Such a narrow statement of the
+case is unfair to the service,&rdquo; adding a handsome tribute, which
+might have come very graciously from the Commission had it felt so
+disposed, to &ldquo;the endurance, fortitude, and valor&rdquo; of his
+70,000 men during the precise period while the Commission was filling
+the American papers with politically opportune nonsense about
+&ldquo;Peace, peace,&rdquo; when there was no peace.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7235" href="#xd20e7235src" name="xd20e7235">16</a></span> See
+Report of Secretary of War Root for 1900. <i>War Department Report</i>,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7250" href="#xd20e7250src" name="xd20e7250">17</a></span> See
+<i>Report of Taft Philippine Commission of 1900</i>, p. 17.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7268" href="#xd20e7268src" name="xd20e7268">18</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 34&ndash;42.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7278" href="#xd20e7278src" name="xd20e7278">19</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 435</i>, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7293" href="#xd20e7293src" name="xd20e7293">20</a></span>
+<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, November, 1900, p. 15.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7322" href="#xd20e7322src" name="xd20e7322">21</a></span> General
+Lawton was killed in battle in the hour of victory at a point only
+about twelve miles out of Manila, in the winter preceding the spring of
+1900 in which the Taft Commission left the United States for
+Manila.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7344" href="#xd20e7344src" name="xd20e7344">22</a></span> This
+interview was indorsed as substantially correct by General MacArthur
+before the Senate Committee of 1902, Senator Culberson first reading it
+to him and then asking him if it quoted him correctly. See hearing on
+Philippine affairs, 1902, <i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 2, p.
+1942.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7359" href="#xd20e7359src" name="xd20e7359">23</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7372" href="#xd20e7372src" name="xd20e7372">24</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7388" href="#xd20e7388src" name="xd20e7388">25</a></span>
+November, 1899, to September, 1900, both inclusive.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7394" href="#xd20e7394src" name="xd20e7394">26</a></span> <i>W.
+D. R.</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7404" href="#xd20e7404src" name="xd20e7404">27</a></span> Judge
+Taft had cabled Secretary of War Root on August 21, 1900, after his
+arrival in June: &ldquo;Defining of political issues in United States
+reported here in full, gave hope to insurgent officers still in arms,
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and <i>stayed surrenders</i> to await result of
+election.&rdquo; See <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt.
+4, p. 80.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7418" href="#xd20e7418src" name="xd20e7418">28</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 89.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7432" href="#xd20e7432src" name="xd20e7432">29</a></span> See
+<i>Report of Taft Commission to Secretary of War</i>, dated November
+30, 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7448" href="#xd20e7448src" name="xd20e7448">30</a></span> A
+sample of one of these death sentences that Cailles and all the rest of
+the insurgent generals were accustomed to issue against their
+&ldquo;Copperheads&rdquo; may be seen in General MacArthur&rsquo;s
+report for 1900. <i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p.
+63.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7458" href="#xd20e7458src" name="xd20e7458">31</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7474" href="#xd20e7474src" name="xd20e7474">32</a></span> See
+Report of Secretary Root for 1902, p. 13.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7477" href="#xd20e7477src" name="xd20e7477">33</a></span> Just
+how correct this was will be examined later.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7483" href="#xd20e7483src" name="xd20e7483">34</a></span>
+&ldquo;The people seem to be actuated by the idea that men are never
+nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin.&rdquo; <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7501" href="#xd20e7501src" name="xd20e7501">35</a></span> General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s Annual Report dated October 1, 1900. <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 61&ndash;2.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7509" href="#xd20e7509src" name="xd20e7509">36</a></span> General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s report which we are now quoting from, dated October
+1, 1900, was forwarded by the ordinary course of mail, and even if it
+arrived before the day of the November election, the Secretary of War
+certainly did not at once place it before the public.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7522" href="#xd20e7522src" name="xd20e7522">37</a></span> Compare
+this MacArthur, October 1, 1900, statement with the Taft statements of
+the same situation between June and November, 1900, as expressed for
+instance in his November, 1900, report to the Secretary of War thus:
+&ldquo;<i>A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+supremacy of the United States.</i> They are, however, restrained by
+fear. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* Without this, armed resistance to the United
+States authority would have long ago ceased. It is a Mafia on a very
+large scale.&rdquo; Report, Taft Commission, November 30, 1900, p. 17.
+This was before Judge Taft met Juan Cailles above mentioned and liked
+him well enough to make him governor of a province, in spite of his
+being an &ldquo;assassin,&rdquo; in other words a Filipino general who
+had a few weak-kneed fellows shot for being too friendly with the
+Americans.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7544" href="#xd20e7544src" name="xd20e7544">38</a></span>
+<a href="#ch9">Chapter XI</a>., <i>ante</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7554" href="#xd20e7554src" name="xd20e7554">39</a></span> See
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 65&ndash;6.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7588" href="#xd20e7588src" name="xd20e7588">40</a></span> As for
+my share as a soldier in that Philippine Insurrection, admitting, as I
+now do, that it was a tragedy of errors, the President of the United
+States would indeed be a very impotent Chief Executive if it were every
+American&rsquo;s duty to deliberate as a judge on the Bench before he
+decided to answer a president&rsquo;s call for volunteers in an
+emergency. I am not yet so highly educated as to find no inward
+response to the sentiment, &ldquo;Right or wrong, my country.&rdquo; If
+this sentiment is not right, no republic can long survive, for the
+ultimate safety of republics must lie in volunteer soldiery.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7616" href="#xd20e7616src" name="xd20e7616">41</a></span> Page
+93.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7634" href="#xd20e7634src" name="xd20e7634">42</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1211.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7642" href="#xd20e7642src" name="xd20e7642">43</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1222.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7647" href="#xd20e7647src" name="xd20e7647">44</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, vol. ii., p. 1223.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7655" href="#xd20e7655src" name="xd20e7655">45</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1226.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7665" href="#xd20e7665src" name="xd20e7665">46</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1237.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7679" href="#xd20e7679src" name="xd20e7679">47</a></span> See
+<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1239.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7699" href="#xd20e7699src" name="xd20e7699">48</a></span> Ten or
+twelve thousand.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7716" href="#xd20e7716src" name="xd20e7716">49</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1249.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7735" href="#xd20e7735src" name="xd20e7735">50</a></span> See
+<i>Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission Division of Insular
+Affairs, War Department</i>, Washington, 1901, p. 181.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7744" href="#xd20e7744src" name="xd20e7744">51</a></span> See
+General Funston&rsquo;s article on &ldquo;The Capture of
+Aguinaldo,&rdquo; which appeared in <i>Scribner&rsquo;s Magazine</i>
+for November, 1911.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7793" href="#xd20e7793src" name="xd20e7793">52</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i. pt.<a id="xd20e7797" name=
+"xd20e7797"></a> 4, p. 99.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7823" href="#xd20e7823src" name="xd20e7823">53</a></span> For a
+copy of this proclamation see <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol.
+i., pt. 4, p. 100.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7855" href="#xd20e7855src" name="xd20e7855">54</a></span> <i>The
+War with Spain</i>, by H. C. Lodge, p. 20<span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e7859" title="Not in source">.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch15" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XV</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Taft&mdash;1901&ndash;2</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">For they have healed the hurt of the daughter of my
+people slightly, saying&mdash;Peace, peace; when there is no peace.
+Jeremiah viii., 11.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">On February 22, 1898, the American Consul at Manila,
+Mr. Williams, after he had been at that post for about a month, wrote
+the State Department, describing the Spanish methods of keeping from
+the world the outward and visible manifestations of the desire of the
+Filipino people to be free from their yoke thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities
+therefor were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for two
+years.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He adds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War
+exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, etc.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7893src" href="#xd20e7893" name="xd20e7893src">1</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>As will hereinafter appear, this is not far from a correct
+description of the conditions which prevailed successively in various
+provinces of the Philippines in gradually lessening degree for the six
+years next ensuing after the report of the Taft Commission of November
+30, 1900, wherein they said: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb346" href=
+"#pb346" name="pb346">346</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+supremacy of the United States.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7905src"
+href="#xd20e7905" name="xd20e7905src">2</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>We have seen how from the date of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to
+the date of his final departure from the islands for the United States
+on May 5, 1900, General Otis had diligently supplied the eager ear of
+Mr. McKinley with his &ldquo;situation well in hand&rdquo; and
+&ldquo;insurrection about to collapse&rdquo; telegrams, Secretary of
+War Alger having meantime been forced out of the cabinet&mdash;in part,
+at least&mdash;by a public opinion which indignantly believed that the
+real situation was being withheld. We have seen how, from soon after
+the arrival of the Taft Commission at Manila on June 3, 1900, until
+after the November elections of that year, the same eager presidential
+ear aforesaid was supplied with like material through the presumably
+innocent but opportunely deluded optimism of the Commission, as
+manifested in the above sample message; how the actual military
+situation as described by General MacArthur, the military commander at
+the time, was one of &ldquo;desperate resistance by means of a general
+banding of the people in support of the guerrillas in the
+field,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e7913src" href="#xd20e7913"
+name="xd20e7913src">3</a> he having wired the War Department on January
+4, 1901, &ldquo;Troops throughout the archipelago more active than at
+any time since November, 1899&rdquo;;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7919src" href="#xd20e7919" name="xd20e7919src">4</a> and how this
+had been followed on July 4, 1901, by a civil government, the
+inauguration of which could by no possibility be construed as affirming
+to the people of the United States anything other than the existence of
+a state of peace. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb347" href="#pb347"
+name="pb347">347</a>]</span></p>
+<p>We are to trace in this and subsequent chapters how, a short time
+after the civil government was instituted, the insurrection got its
+second wind; how a year later came another public declaration of peace,
+on July 4, 1902; and how this was followed by a long series of public
+disorders, combated by prosecutions for sedition and brigandage, until
+toward the end of 1906. The drama is quite an allegory&mdash;Uncle Sam
+wrestling with his guardian angel Consent-of-the-governed. He finally
+gets both the angel&rsquo;s shoulders on the mat, however, and so the
+two have lived at loggerheads in the Philippines ever since.</p>
+<p>As soon as we had once blundered into the colonial business, the
+rock-bottom frankness with which we so dearly love to deal with one
+another, let carping Europe deny it as she will, was superseded by a
+systematic effort on the part of the statesmen responsible for the
+blunder to conceal it. It soon became clear to those on the inside that
+the sovereign American people had &ldquo;bought a gold brick,&rdquo;
+that is to say, had made a grievous mistake and had <i>done wrong</i>.
+But as it is not expedient for courtiers to tell the sovereign he has
+done wrong, because &ldquo;The king can do no wrong,&rdquo; thereafter
+all the courtiers,&mdash;<i>i. e.</i> persons desiring to control the
+&ldquo;sovereign&rdquo; while seeming to obey him&mdash;instead of
+risking loss of the &ldquo;royal&rdquo; favor by boldly telling the
+people they had done wrong and ought to mend the error of their ways,
+began to fill their ears and salve their conscience with medi&aelig;val
+doctrines about salvation of the heathen through governmental missions
+maintained by the joint agencies of Cross and Sword. For the foregoing
+and cognate reasons, Senator Lodge&rsquo;s description of Spain&rsquo;s
+last thirty years in Cuba fits our first six or seven in the
+Philippines, beginning in 1899 with the original Otis press censorship
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb348" href="#pb348" name=
+"pb348">348</a>]</span>policy of &ldquo;not letting anything go that
+will hurt the Administration,&rdquo; and coming on down to a
+certificate made in 1907 by the Philippine Commission for consumption
+in the United States, to the effect that a state of general and
+complete peace had prevailed throughout the islands for a stated period
+preceding the certificate, when, as a matter of fact, during the period
+covered by the certificate, an executive proclamation formally
+declaring a state of insurrection had issued, and the Supreme Court of
+the islands had upheld certain drastic executive action as legal
+<i>because</i> of the state of insurrection recognized by the
+proclamation.</p>
+<p>The Taft civil government of the Philippines set up in 1901 was an
+attempt to answer the question which, during the crucial period of our
+country&rsquo;s history following the Spanish War, rang so persistently
+through the public utterances of both Grover Cleveland and Benjamin
+Harrison: &ldquo;Mr. President, how are you going to square the
+subjugation of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba?&rdquo; Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s answer had been, in effect: &ldquo;Never mind about
+that, Grover; you and Benjamin are back numbers. I will show you
+&lsquo;the latest thing&rsquo; in the consent-of-the-governed line, a
+government <i>not</i> &lsquo;essentially popular,&rsquo; it is true,
+nor indeed at all &lsquo;popular,&rsquo; in fact very unpopular, but
+&lsquo;essentially popular <i>in form</i>.&rsquo; You lads are not
+experts on the political trapeze.&rdquo; Accordingly, as Senator Lodge
+said concerning the dreary years of continuous public disorders in Cuba
+under Spain, which we finally put a stop to in 1898:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We were to go on pretending that the war was not
+there, etc.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Lack of frankness is usually due to weakness of one sort or another.
+The weakness of the Spanish colonial <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb349" href="#pb349" name="pb349">349</a>]</span>system lay in the
+impotent poverty of the home government and the graft tendencies of the
+colonial officials. The weakness of the American colonial system has
+always lain in the fundamental unfitness of republican governmental
+machinery for boldly advocating and honestly enforcing doctrines which
+deny frankly and as a matter of course that governments derive their
+just powers from the consent of the governed. There are so many people
+in a republic like ours who will always stand by this last proposition
+as righteous, and as being the chief bulwark of their own liberties,
+and so many who will always regard denial of that proposition as an
+insidious practice calculated ultimately to react on their own
+institutions, that no colonial government of conquered subject
+provinces eager for independence can ever have the sympathy and backing
+of all our people. Thus it is that to get home support for the policy,
+the supreme need of the colonial government is constant apology for its
+own existence, and constant effort to show that the subject people do
+not really want freedom to pursue happiness in their own way as badly
+as their orators say they do; that the oratory is mere &ldquo;hot
+air&rdquo;; and that the people really like alien domination better
+than they seem to.</p>
+<p>Always in a mental attitude of self-defence against home criticism,
+in its official reports there is ever present with the Philippine
+insular government the tendency and temptation not to volunteer to the
+American people evidence within its possession calculated to awaken
+discussion as to the wisdom of its continuance. It thus usurps a
+legitimate function never intended to be delegated to the Executive,
+but reserved to the people. It thus makes itself the judge of how much
+the people at home shall know. The law of self-preservation prompts it
+not to take the American <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb350" href=
+"#pb350" name="pb350">350</a>]</span>people into its confidence, at
+least not that portion of them who are opposed on principle to holding
+remote colonies impossible to defend in the event of war without a
+large standing army maintained for the purpose. There is always the
+apprehension that the value of apparently unfavorable evidence will not
+be wisely weighed by the people at home, because of unfamiliarity with
+insular conditions. This is by no means altogether vicious. It is a
+perfectly natural attitude and a good deal can be said in favor of it.
+But the real vice of it lies in the fact that your colonial government
+thus becomes not unlike the president of a certain naval board before
+which a case involving the commission of an officer of the navy was
+once tried. They had no competent official stenographer to take down
+all that transpired. The Navy Department was asked for one, but they
+referred it to the board. The president of the board knew very well
+that &ldquo;the defence&rdquo; wanted to show bias on his part. He
+exuded conscious rectitude and plainly resented any suggestion of bias.
+So a stenographer was refused and the case proceeded, the proceedings
+being recorded in long hand by a regular permanent employee of the
+board. Under such circumstances, there is so much which transpires that
+is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial, that the proceedings would be
+interminable if every little thing were recorded. Consequently, much
+that <i>was</i> material, including casual remarks of the president of
+the board clearly indicative of bias sufficient to disqualify any judge
+or juror on earth, failed of entry in the record. However, enough was
+gotten into the record to satisfy the President of the United States
+that the president of the board was not only not impartial, but very
+much prejudiced, and he reversed the action of the board. The case of
+that board is very much like the case of the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb351" href="#pb351" name=
+"pb351">351</a>]</span>Philippine Government. The case of the latter
+is, as it were, a case involving a question as to how long a
+guardianship ought to continue, and they simply fail and omit to have
+recorded in a form where it may be available to the reviewing
+authority, the American people, much that is material (on the idea of
+saving the reviewing authority labor and trouble), which they think the
+record ought not to be cumbered with, or the reviewing authority
+bothered with. This practice is due to a confident belief that the
+American people, being so far away, and being necessarily so wholly
+unacquainted with all the ins and outs of the situation in the
+Philippines, are not fitted to pass intelligently on the questions
+which continually confront the colonial government. This is not a
+mental attitude of insult to the intelligence of the people of the
+United States. It is simply a belief that they, the colonial officials,
+know much better than the American people can ever know, what is
+wisest, in each case, to be done in the premises. And there is much to
+be said in favor of this view, so far as details go. The fundamental
+error of it, however, lies in the assumption that the American people
+are forever committed to permanent retention of the Philippines, <i>i.
+e.</i>, permanent so far as any living human being is
+concerned&mdash;an assumption wholly unauthorized by any declaration of
+the law-making power of this government, and countenanced only by the
+oft-expressed hope of President Taft that that will be the policy some
+day declared, if any definite policy is ever declared. Thus it is that
+throughout the last twelve years those particular facts and events
+which (to me) seem most vitally relevant to the fundamental question in
+the case, viz., whether or not we should continue to persist in the
+original blunder of inaugurating and maintaining a&mdash;to all intents
+and purposes&mdash;<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb352" href="#pb352"
+name="pb352">352</a>]</span>permanent over-seas colonial government,
+have been withheld from the knowledge of the American public. The
+present policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention is a
+mere makeshift to avoid a frank avowal of intention to retain the
+islands for all future time with which anybody living has any practical
+concern. Until it is substituted by a definite declaration by Congress
+similar to the one we made in the case of Cuba, and the present
+American Governor-General and his associates are substituted by men
+sent out to report back how soon they think the Filipinos may safely be
+trusted to attend to their own domestic concerns, all crucial facts and
+situations that might jeopardize the continuance of the present
+American r&eacute;gime in the Philippines will continue, as heretofore,
+to remain unmentioned in the official reports of the American
+authorities now out there. Until that is done, you will never hear the
+Filipino side of the case from anybody whose opinion you are willing to
+make the basis of governmental action. These remarks will, obviously
+from the nature of the case, be quite as true long after President
+Taft, the reader, and I are dead as they are now.</p>
+<p>Mr. Taft would be very glad to have Congress declare frankly that it
+is the purpose of this Government to hold the Philippines permanently,
+<i>i. e.</i>, permanently so far as the word means continuance of the
+&ldquo;uplift&rdquo; treatment long after everybody now on the earth is
+beneath it. But because public opinion in the United States is so much
+divided as to the wisdom of a policy of frankly avowed intention
+permanently to retain the islands, he prefers to leave the whole matter
+open and undetermined, so as to get the support both of those who think
+a definite programme of permanent retention righteous and those who
+think such a programme vicious. He wishes to please both sides of a
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb353" href="#pb353" name=
+"pb353">353</a>]</span>moral issue, on the idea that, as the present
+policy is in his individual judgment best for all concerned, the end
+justifies the means. Yet, as the issue <i>is</i> a moral one, which
+concerns the cause of representative government throughout the world,
+and a strategic one which concerns the national defence, it should, in
+my judgment, no longer be dodged, but squarely met. You constantly hear
+President Taft talking quite out loud here at home, in his public
+utterances, about the great politico-missionary work we are doing in
+the Philippines by furnishing them with the most approved up-to-date
+methods for the pursuit of happiness, the avoidance of graft in
+government, the elimination of crimes of violence, in short the ideal
+way to minimize the ills that human governments are heir to, while
+every day and every dollar spent out there by Americans induced by him
+to go there, are time and money tensely arrayed against the ultimate
+independence he purports to favor. Give the Americans out there a
+square deal. Let them know whether we are going to keep the islands or
+whether we are not. Honesty is a far better policy than the present
+policy. The Americans in the islands, Mr. Taft&rsquo;s agents in the
+Philippines, talk no uncandid and misleading stuff about the
+Philippines being exclusively for the Filipinos. And they do
+considerable talking. They need looking after, if the present pious
+fiction is to be kept up at this end of the line. Nobody in the
+Philippines to-day, among the Americans, considers talk about
+independence as anything other than political buncombe very hampering
+to their work. Listen to this high official of the insular government,
+who writes in the <i>North American Review</i> for February, 1912:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The somewhat blatant note with which we at the
+beginning proclaimed our altruistic purposes in the Philippines
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb354" href="#pb354" name=
+"pb354">354</a>]</span>has <i>died away into a whisper</i>. <i>To say
+much about it is to incur a charge of hypocrisy.</i><a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e7994src" href="#xd20e7994" name="xd20e7994src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The most important problem which confronted Mr. McKinley when he
+sent Judge Taft to the Philippines was how to so handle the supreme
+question of public order as to avoid any necessity of having to ask
+Congress later for more volunteers to replace those whose terms of
+enlistment would expire June 30, 1901. We have already reviewed the
+strenuous efforts of General MacArthur during the twelve months
+immediately following the arrival of the Taft Commission in June, 1900,
+to get rid of the shadow of this necessity by the date named, the
+regular army having been reorganized meantime and considerably
+increased by the Act of February 2, 1901. On March 22, 1901, while the
+Taft Commission was going around the islands with their Federal party
+folk, holding out the prospect of office to those who would quit
+insurging and come in and be good, General MacArthur reported progress
+to Secretary of War Root by cable as follows: &ldquo;Hope report
+cessation of hostilities before June 30.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8002src" href="#xd20e8002" name="xd20e8002src">6</a> His idea was
+to get a good military grip on the situation, if possible, by that
+time, and, as a corollary, of course, that the grip thus obtained
+should be diligently retained for a long time, not loosened, so that
+the disturbed conditions incident to many years of war might have a few
+years, at least, in which to settle. In his annual report dated July 4,
+1901, the date of the inauguration of Judge Taft as &ldquo;Civil
+Governor,&rdquo; he says, in regard to the imperative necessity for
+continuing the military grip by keeping on hand sufficient forces:
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb355" href="#pb355" name=
+"pb355">355</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede
+the activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments will not
+only be a menace to the present, but <i>put in jeopardy the entire
+future of American possibilities</i> in the archipelago.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e8014src" href="#xd20e8014" name=
+"xd20e8014src">7</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>General MacArthur believed in keeping the islands permanently. His
+views were frankly imperialistic. He had no salve to offer to the
+conscience of pious thrift at home anxious to believe that the
+Filipinos were not bitterly opposed to our rule, and very much in favor
+of what was supposed to be a glittering opening for Trade Expansion. He
+was thoroughly imbued with the British colonial idea known as The White
+Man&rsquo;s Burden. On the other hand, Governor Taft firmly believed
+that kindness would cure the desire of the people for independence. The
+difference between these two gentlemen was fully ventilated afterward
+before the Senate Committee of 1902. A statement of General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s embodying the crux of this difference was read to
+Governor Taft by Senator Carmack, and the Governor&rsquo;s reply
+was:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We did not then agree with that statement, and we do
+not now agree with it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8024src" href=
+"#xd20e8024" name="xd20e8024src">8</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>A little later, in the same connection, he said to the same Senate
+Committee, with the cheery tolerance of conflicting views which comes
+only from entire confidence in the soundness of one&rsquo;s own:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I have been called the Mark Tapley of this Philippine
+business.</p>
+</div>
+<p>There is no doubt about the fact that President Taft is an optimist.
+But while optimism is a very blessed <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb356" href="#pb356" name="pb356">356</a>]</span>thing in a sick-room
+or a financial panic, it is a very poor substitute for powder and lead
+in putting down an insurrection, or in weaning people from a desire for
+independence accentuated by a long war waged for that purpose,
+especially when your kindness must be accompanied by assurances to the
+objects of it that on account of a lack of sufficient intelligence they
+are not fit for the thing they want. It was upon a programme of this
+sort that Governor Taft entered upon the task of reconciling the
+Filipinos to American rule more than ten years ago. The impossibility
+of the task is of course obvious enough from the mere statement of it.
+The subsequent bitterness between him and the military authorities was
+quite carefully and very properly kept from the American public because
+it might get back to the Filipino public. The military folk knew that
+to go around the country setting up provincial and municipal
+governments, carrying a liberal pay-roll, with diligent contemporaneous
+circulation of the knowledge that anybody who would quit fighting would
+stand a good chance to get an office, would seem to many of the
+Filipinos a confession of weakness and fear, sure to cause trouble
+later. Many of them&mdash;of course it would be inappropriate to
+mention names&mdash;simply did not believe that Mr. Taft was honest in
+his absurd notion. They simply damned &ldquo;politics&rdquo; for
+meddling with war, and let it go at that. But the real epic pathos of
+the whole thing was that Mr. Taft was actually sincere. He believed
+that the majority of the Philippine people were for him and his
+policies. As late as 1905, he seems to have clung to this idea,
+according to various accounts by Senators Newlands, Dubois, and others,
+in magazine articles written after their return from a trip to the
+Philippines in that year in company with Mr. Taft, then Secretary of
+War. In fact so impressed were <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb357"
+href="#pb357" name="pb357">357</a>]</span>they with the general
+discontent out there, and yet so considerate of their good friend Mr.
+Taft&rsquo;s feelings in the matter and his confidence that the
+Filipinos loved benevolent alien domination, that one of them simply
+contented himself with the remark:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When we left the islands I do not believe there was a
+single member of our party who was not sorry we own them, except
+Secretary Taft himself.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Indeed it is not until 1907 that, we find Mr. Taft&rsquo;s paternal
+solicitude for his step-daughter, Miss Filipina, finally reconciling
+itself to the idea that while this generation seems to want Home Rule
+as irreconcilably as Ireland herself and &ldquo;wont be happy
+&rsquo;til it gets it,&rdquo; yet inasmuch as Home Rule is not, in his
+judgment, good for every people, this generation is therefore a wicked
+and perverse generation, and hence the Filipinos must simply resign
+themselves to the idea of being happy in some other generation. This
+attitude was freely stated before the Millers&rsquo; convention at St.
+Louis, May 30, 1907, the speech being reported in the <i>St. Louis
+Globe-Democrat</i> the next day. Said Mr. Taft on that occasion, after
+admitting that the Islands had been a tremendous financial drain on
+us:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If, then, we have not had material recompense, have we
+had it in the continuing gratitude of the people whom we have
+aided?</p>
+</div>
+<p>Answering this, in effect, though not in so many words, &ldquo;Alas,
+no,&rdquo; he adds, with a sigh which is audible between the lines:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">He who would measure his altruism by the thankfulness
+of those whom he aids, will not persist in good works.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb358" href="#pb358" name=
+"pb358">358</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Thus we see the Mark Tapley optimism of 1902 become in 1907 a
+species of solicitude which Dickens describes in <i>Bleak House</i> as
+&ldquo;Telescopic Philanthropy,&rdquo; in the chapter by that title in
+which he introduces the famous Mrs. Jellyby, mother of a large and
+interesting family, &ldquo;a lady of very remarkable strength of
+character, who devotes herself entirely to the public,&rdquo; who
+&ldquo;has devoted herself to an extensive variety of public subjects,
+at various times, and is at present devoted to the subject of Africa,
+with a general view to the cultivation of the coffee
+berry&mdash;<i>and</i> the natives,&rdquo;&mdash;to the woeful neglect
+of her own domestic concerns and her large and expensive family of
+children. Since 1907, Mr. Taft has frankly abandoned his early delusion
+about the consent-of-the-governed, and boldly takes the position, up to
+that time more or less evaded, that the consent of the governed is not
+at all essential to just government.</p>
+<p>The apotheosis of Uncle Sam as Mrs. Jellyby is to be found in one of
+Mr. Taft&rsquo;s speeches wherein he declared that the present
+Philippine policy was &ldquo;a plan for the spread of Christian
+civilization in the Orient.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Thus has it been that, under the reactionary influence of a colonial
+policy, this republic has followed its frank abandonment of the idea
+that all just government must derive its origin in the consent of the
+governed by a further abandonment of the idea that Church and State
+should be kept separate. I do not wish to make President Taft
+ridiculous, and could not if I would. Nor do I seek to belittle him in
+the eyes of his people,&mdash;for we <i>are</i> &ldquo;his
+people,&rdquo; for the time being. No one can belittle him. He is too
+big a man to be belittled by anybody. Besides, he is, in many respects
+beyond all question, a truly great man. But he is not the only great
+man in history who has made egregious blunders. And there is no
+question that we are running there on <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb359" href="#pb359" name="pb359">359</a>]</span>the confines of Asia,
+in the Philippines, a superfluous governmental kindergarten whose
+sessions should be concluded, not suddenly, but without unnecessary
+delay. The two principal reasons for retaining the Filipinos as
+subjects, or &ldquo;wards,&rdquo; or by whatever euphemism any one may
+prefer to designate the relation, are, first, that a Filipino
+government would not properly protect life and property, and second,
+that although they complain much at taxation without representation
+through tariff and other legislation placed or kept on the statute
+books of Congress through the influence and for the benefit of special
+interests in the United States, yet that such taxation without
+representation is not so grievous as to justify them in feeling as we
+did in 1776. Whether these reasons for retaining the Filipinos as
+subjects indefinitely are justified by the facts, must depend upon the
+facts. If they are not, the question will then arise, &ldquo;Would a
+Filipino government be any worse for the Filipinos than the one we are
+keeping saddled on them over their protest?&rdquo;</p>
+<p>In his letter of instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft
+Commission, Mr. McKinley first quoted the noble concluding language
+with which the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila gave an
+immediate and supremely comforting sense of security to a city of some
+three hundred thousand people who had then been continuously in terror
+of their lives for three and one half months, thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants, *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and its
+private property of all description *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* are placed under
+the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army;</p>
+</div>
+<p>and then added:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the
+Government of the United States to give protection for property
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb360" href="#pb360" name=
+"pb360">360</a>]</span>and life *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to all the people of
+the Philippine Islands. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I charge this commission to
+labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the
+honor and conscience of their country.</p>
+</div>
+<p>How the premature setting up of the civil government of the
+Philippines in 1901 under pressure of political expediency, and the
+consequent withdrawal of the police protection of the army, was
+followed by a long series of disorders combated by prosecutions for
+sedition and brigandage, toward the end of which the writer broke down
+and left the Islands exclaiming inwardly, &ldquo;I do not know the
+method of drawing an indictment against a whole people,&rdquo; will now
+be traced, not so much to show that the Philippine insular government
+has failed properly and competently to meet the most sacred obligations
+that can rest upon any government, but to show the inherent unfitness
+of a government based on the consent of the governed to run any other
+kind of a government.</p>
+<p>There were five officers of the Philippine volunteer army of
+1899&ndash;1901 appointed to the bench by Governor Taft in 1901. Their
+names and the method of their transition from the military to the civil
+<i>r&eacute;gime</i> are indicated by the following communication, a
+copy of which was furnished to each, as indicated in the endorsement
+which follows the signature of Judge Taft:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION</p>
+<p><span class="sc">President&rsquo;s Office, Manila</span>, June 17,
+1901.</p>
+<p>Major-General <span class="sc">Arthur MacArthur</span>, U. S.
+A.,</p>
+<p>Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.</p>
+<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Sir:</span></p>
+<p>I am directed by the commission to inform you that it has made the
+following appointments under the recent Judicial Act passed June 11,
+1901: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb361" href="#pb361" name=
+"pb361">361</a>]</span></p>
+<p>You will observe that among our appointees are five army officers:
+Brigadier General James F. Smith, Lieutenant James H. Blount, Jr., 29th
+Infantry, Captain Adam C. Carson, 28th Infantry; Captain Warren H.
+Ickis, 36th Infantry; and Lieutenant George P. Whitsett, 32d
+Infantry.</p>
+<p>It is suggested that it would be well for these officers to resign
+their positions in the United States military service to the end that
+they may accept the civil positions, take the oath of office, and
+immediately begin their new duties.</p>
+<p>I have the honor to be, very respectfully,</p>
+<p class="signed">Your obedient servant,</p>
+<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Wm. H.
+Taft</span>,</p>
+<p class="signed">President.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Official extract copy respectfully furnished
+Lieutenant James H. Blount, Jr., 29th Infantry, U. S. Vols., Manila, P.
+I. Your resignation, if offered in compliance with above letter, will
+be accepted upon the date preferred.</p>
+<p>By command of Major-General MacArthur:</p>
+<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">E. H.
+Crowder</span></p>
+<p>Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. Secretary.</p>
+<p class="dateline">Military Secretary&rsquo;s Office,<br>
+June 18, 1901.</p>
+</div>
+<p>General Smith had come out as colonel of the 1st Californias, and
+had won his stars on the field of battle, as has already been described
+in an earlier chapter. He went from the army to the Supreme
+Bench&mdash;at Manila. The archipelago had been divided by the Taft
+Commission into fifteen judicial districts, containing three or four
+provinces each,&mdash;each district court to be a <i>nisi prius</i> or
+trial court. Judge Carson (Va.) went to the Hemp Peninsula District in
+the extreme south of Luzon, already described, and four years later to
+the Supreme Bench, where he still is. Judge Ickis (Ia.) went to
+Mindanao, and later died of the cholera down there. Judge Whitsett
+(Mo.) went to Jolo (the little group of islets near British North
+Borneo), but his wife died soon afterward, and he resigned and came
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb362" href="#pb362" name=
+"pb362">362</a>]</span>home. The writer (Ga.) went to northern Luzon,
+to the First District hereinafter noticed.</p>
+<p>Just here it may be remarked that the reader will need no long
+complicated description of the details of the organization of the new
+government, interspersed with unpronounceable names, if he will simply
+assume the view-point Governor Taft had in the beginning. Governor Taft
+simply analogized his situation to that of a governor of a State or
+Territory at home. His fifty provinces were to him fifty counties,
+twenty-five of them in the main island of Luzon, which, as heretofore
+stated, is about the size of Ohio or Cuba (forty odd thousand square
+miles), and contains half the population and over one-third the total
+land area of the archipelago. However, each of his provincial governors
+was liberally paid, and the authority of a governor of a province was,
+on a small scale, more like that of one of our own state chief
+executives than like the authority and functions of the chairman of the
+Board of County Commissioners of a county with us. For instance, the
+governorship of Cebu, with its 2000 square miles of territory and
+650,000 inhabitants, was quite as big a job as the governorship of New
+Mexico, or some other one of our newer States.</p>
+<p>So that the task on which Governor Taft entered July 4, 1901, was
+the governing of a potential ultimate federal union in miniature,
+containing nearly eight millions of people. One slight mistake I think
+he made was in providing that the governors of the provinces should be
+ex-officio sheriffs of the Courts of First Instance (of the fifteen
+several judicial districts aforesaid). This was to enable the Judges of
+First Instance to keep a weather eye on the provincial governors, the
+judiciary at first being largely American, and it being the programme
+to have native governors, some of them <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb363" href="#pb363" name="pb363">363</a>]</span>recently surrendered
+insurgent generals, as rapidly as practicable and advisable. The scheme
+was good business, but not tactful. It subtracted some wind from the
+gubernatorial sails to be a sheriff, a provincial governor under the
+Spanish <i>r&eacute;gime</i> having been quite a vice-regal potentate.
+But the judges were as careful to treat their native governors with the
+consideration the authority vested in them called for as Governor Taft
+himself would have been. So no substantial harm was done, and the real
+power in the provinces of questionable loyalty remained where it
+belonged, in American hands.</p>
+<p>Just after Governor Taft&rsquo;s inauguration, the four newly
+appointed district judges just out of the army called on the governor.
+Judge Carson was the spokesman, though without pre-arrangement. He
+said: &ldquo;Governor, we have called to pay our respects and say
+goodbye before going to the provinces. We have been acting under
+military orders so long, that while we are not here to get orders, we
+would like to have any parting suggestions that may occur to
+you.&rdquo; Governor Taft said: &ldquo;Well, Gentlemen, all I can think
+of is to remind you that if what we have all heard is true the Spanish
+courts usually operated to the delay of justice, rather than to the
+dispensing of it. So just go ahead to your respective districts, and
+get to work, remembering that you are Americans.&rdquo; So we did. Of
+course none of us loaned ourselves for a moment to the amiable Taft
+fiction that &ldquo;the great majority of the people are entirely
+willing to government under the supremacy of the United States.&rdquo;
+We had all had a share in the subjugation of the Islands as far as it
+had progressed at that time, and had seen the Filipinos
+fight&mdash;unskilfully and ineffectively, it is true (because they
+none of them understood the use of two sights on a rifle, and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb364" href="#pb364" name=
+"pb364">364</a>]</span>simply could not hit us much), but pluckily
+enough. We knew the Filipinos well, and our attitude was simply that of
+&ldquo;Pharaoh and the Sergeant,&rdquo; in Kipling&rsquo;s ballad of
+the conquest of Egypt. However, we knew nothing of the Egyptians,
+except what we had learned in the Bible, gave no thought to whether our
+occupation was to be &ldquo;temporary&rdquo; like the British
+occupation of Egypt since 1882, or temporary like the American
+occupation of Cuba in 1898. That was a matter for the people of the
+United States to determine later. But somebody had to govern the
+Islands, and there we were, and there were the Islands. In the scheme
+of things some one had to do that part of the world&rsquo;s work, and,
+as the salaries were liberal, we went to the work, not concerning
+ourselves with amiable fictions of any kind. I think our attitude was
+really one of more intimately sympathetic understanding of the
+Filipinos than that of Governor Taft himself, because we had all known
+them longer, and all spoke their language, <i>i. e.</i>, the language
+of the educated and representative men (Spanish), and knew their ways,
+their foibles, and their many indisputably noble traits. But we did not
+start out to play the part of political wet-nurses. Our attitude was,
+if Mr. Filipino does not behave, we will make him.</p>
+<p>Judge Carson and myself had one peculiar qualification for fidelity
+to the Taft policies for which we were entitled to no credit. We
+instinctively resented any suggestion comparing the Filipinos to
+negroes. We had many warm friends among the Filipinos, had shared their
+generous hospitality often, and in turn had extended them ours. Any
+such suggestion as that indicated implied that we had been doing
+something equivalent to eating, drinking, dancing, and chumming with
+negroes. And we resented such suggestions with <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb365" href="#pb365" name="pb365">365</a>]</span>an
+anger quite as cordial and intense as the canons of good taste and
+loyal friendship demanded. I really believe that the southern men in
+the Philippines have always gotten along better with the Filipinos than
+any other Americans out there, and for the reasons just suggested. Not
+only is the universal American willingness to treat the educated
+Asiatic as a human being endowed with certain unalienable rights going
+to redeem him from the down-trodden condition into which British and
+other European contempt for him has kept him, but the American from the
+South out there is a guarantee that he shall never be treated as if he
+were an African. The African is &aelig;ons of time behind the Asiatic
+in development; the latter is &aelig;ons ahead of us in the mere
+duration of his civilization. The Filipino has many of the virtues both
+of the European and the Asiatic. Christianity has made him the superior
+in many respects, of his neighbor and racial cousin, the Japanese. And
+Spanish civilization has produced among them many educated gentlemen
+whom it is an honor to call friend.</p>
+<p>The five lawyers, who on ceasing to be volunteer officers became
+judges, had other incentives also to make the Taft Government a
+success. The possession of power is always pleasant. We knew the
+military folk were going to stand by and watch the civil government,
+and prophesy failure. This of course put us on our metal to impress
+upon the dictatorial gentry of the military profession, with didactic
+firmness, the fundamental importance to all American ideals that the
+military should be subordinate to the civil authority.</p>
+<p>The First Judicial District to which the writer was first assigned
+comprised four provinces, Ilocos Norte, in the Ilocano country, the
+province situated at the extreme northwestern corner of Luzon, in the
+military <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb366" href="#pb366" name=
+"pb366">366</a>]</span>district the conquest of which by General Young
+has already been fully described; and the three provinces of the
+Cagayan valley,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8194src" href="#xd20e8194"
+name="xd20e8194src">9</a> overrun by Captain Batchelor on his
+remarkable march from the mountains to the sea in November, 1899, also
+already described. Here I remained for a year, and then came home on
+leave, desperately ill; being given, on returning to the Islands after
+my recovery, an assignment in one of the southern islands, hereinafter
+dealt with.</p>
+<p>We volunteers were all commissioned as judges as of the 15th of
+June, though none of us I believe were mustered out until June 30th.
+The day after I was notified of my appointment as judge, as above set
+forth, desiring to enter upon my judicial emoluments, which were
+several times those I was receiving as a soldier, I removed the
+shoulder-straps and collar ornaments from my white duck suit, and went
+over and took the oath of office before the Chief Justice of the
+Islands. We had not yet been mustered out of the army, but as above
+stated, Governor Taft had suggested to General MacArthur that we resign
+without waiting for the day of muster out, so we could get to work that
+much sooner, and General MacArthur had notified us that if we cared to
+resign at once as suggested, he would cable our resignations to
+Washington. Immediately after qualifying before the Chief Justice, I
+left his office and on emerging from the court-house hailed a <i lang=
+"es">carromata</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8203src" href=
+"#xd20e8203" name="xd20e8203src">10</a> but the driver said No, he
+would not carry me. I suggested in a very rudimental way, in rather
+rudimental Spanish suited to him, that he was a common carrier, and as
+such under a duty to transport me. He said his horse was tired. His
+horse did not look tired. He would not have thus casually toyed with
+veracity <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb367" href="#pb367" name=
+"pb367">367</a>]</span>if I had had my shoulder-straps on. An <i lang=
+"es">autoridad</i> (a representative of constituted authority) is to
+the masses of the Filipino people something which instinctively
+challenges their respect and obedience, more especially where the
+&ldquo;authority&rdquo; is firm and just. Respect for authority is
+their most conspicuous civic trait, and it is on this element in the
+lower ninety, on the intelligence and capacity to guide them of the
+upper ten, and on the ardent patriotism of both, that I predicate my
+difference with President Taft as to the capacity of the Filipino
+people for self-government. However, as I was to all appearances not an
+&ldquo;authority,&rdquo; this ignorant man treated me as merely one of
+the Americans who, having invaded his country, apparently were not sure
+whether they were afraid of his people or not. Again I tried diplomacy,
+offering him an exorbitant fare. &ldquo;Nothing doing.&rdquo; It was
+about siesta time, and he would not budge. Here then was the civil
+government proposition in a nutshell, to take the ignorant people and
+teach them their rights under theoretically free institutions, instead
+of letting their own people do it <i>in their own way</i>; to reason
+directly with such people as this <i lang="es">cochero</i> (hackman),
+to begin at the bottom of the social scale right on the jump, the idea
+being to fit them, the sacred (?) majority, to know their rights and
+&ldquo;knowing dare maintain&rdquo; them against the educated minority,
+as if the latter did not have a greater natural interest in their
+welfare than any stranger could possibly have. That I indulged all
+these reflections at the time I of course do not mean to say. The
+significance of the incident has of course deepened in the light of the
+subsequent years. At any rate, I did not succeed in budging that
+<i lang="es">cochero</i>. I walked home, forego the difference between
+the military and the judicial salary for the two weeks remaining before
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb368" href="#pb368" name=
+"pb368">368</a>]</span>muster-out day, put my shoulder-straps back on,
+and kept them on until June 30, 1901.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8223src" href="#xd20e8223" name="xd20e8223src">11</a></p>
+<p>When I first landed on the China seacoast of the district I was to
+preside over, I was met by quite a reception committee of the leading
+men, who conducted me with great courtesy to the provincial capital. A
+little later the justices of the peace paid their respects. One of them
+came thirty miles to do so. The court-room was very long, and when I
+first spied this last man, he was at the other end of the room bowing
+very low. He would bow, then advance a few steps, then bow again, then
+resume the forward march toward me. I reminded myself of some ancient
+king, so profound were his obeisances. At first I thought to myself,
+&ldquo;He bows too low, he must have been up to some devilment
+lately!&rdquo; Experience showed me later that it was simply one of the
+ever-present manifestations of the respect of the Filipino for
+constituted authority. They positively love to show their respect for
+authority, just as a good soldier loves to show his respect for an
+officer. Here some American remarks: &ldquo;Ah, but that is not good
+proof of capacity for self-government. They would not &lsquo;cuss
+out&rsquo; the party in power enough.&rdquo; I answer: Who made you the
+judge to say that our particular form of government and our particular
+way of doing things is better for each and every other people under the
+sun than any they can devise for themselves? But there was of course
+another possible reason for the profundity of the obeisances of my
+judicial subordinate above mentioned. When I reached that province
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb369" href="#pb369" name=
+"pb369">369</a>]</span>of Ilocos Norte in July, 1901, the people were
+in a state of submission that was simply abject. They had at first
+worked the <i lang="es">amigo</i> business on General Young, and
+treachery of that kind had been so inexorably followed by dire
+punishment, that every home in the country had its lesson. Yet that was
+the only way. The poor devils did not seem to know when they were
+licked. This is not maudlin sentiment. It is a protest against the
+cotemporary libel on Filipino patriotism about &ldquo;the great
+majority&rdquo; being &ldquo;entirely willing&rdquo; to accept our
+rule, and the cotemporary belittling of the work the army had to do to
+make them accept it.</p>
+<p>I remained in charge of the First Judicial District for more than a
+year, and during that period tried few or no crimes of a political
+character, that is to say, indictments for sedition or the
+like&mdash;attempts to subvert the government. The district comprised a
+total population of about a half million people, more than one-eighth
+of the population of Luzon, and a total area of over 13,000 square
+miles, nearly one-third of all Luzon. But remember, this was in
+northern Luzon, where the work of pacification was lucidly completed by
+the army before the &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo; policy began. We
+will see what happened in my friend Judge Carson&rsquo;s district, and
+in the rest of southern Luzon later. The principal broad general fact I
+now recall, in connection with the administration of justice in the
+First Judicial District during the year or more I had it, is that the
+main volume of business on the court calendars was crimes of violence
+of a strictly non-political character due to lack of efficient police
+protection in the several communities, consequent on withdrawal of
+military garrisons. The country was in an unsettled state. The
+aftermath of war, lawless violence, was virulently <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb370" href="#pb370" name=
+"pb370">370</a>]</span>present, and the presence of troops scattered
+through a province, under such circumstances, is a wonderful moral
+force to restrain lawlessness. However high the purpose, however kindly
+the motive, the setting up of a civil government in the Philippines at
+the time it was set up, when the country was far from ready for it, was
+a terrible mistake. Of course no one man in a given province or
+judicial district had a bird&rsquo;s-eye view of the whole situation
+and the whole panorama at the time, such as we can get at this
+distance, in retrospect. Of course it did not lie in human nature for
+the men responsible for the mistake to see it at first, and, the die
+once cast, they had to keep on, with intermittent resort to military
+help, the extent of which help was always minimized thereafter. To show
+how little the general state of the archipelago was understood by
+American provincial officials busy in a given part of it, and getting
+little or no news of the outside world, I remained in the First
+Judicial District from July, 1901, to August, 1902, and heard nothing
+of the great insurrection in southern Luzon, in Batangas, and the
+adjacent provinces, which raged during the winter of 1901&ndash;02,
+except a vague rumor that there was trouble down there. The Filipinos
+did, however. Of course for Mr. Root to be able to furnish in December,
+1901, a report, as Secretary of War, to the President, for consumption
+by Congress and the people of this country, to the effect that his
+volunteer army had been mustered out on schedule time, June 30, 1901,
+and a &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government set up and in due operation, was a
+nice showing, calculated to sooth latent public discontent with wading
+through slaughter to over-seas dominion. Reports thereafter of
+disturbances could always be waived aside as merely local in character,
+and not <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb371" href="#pb371" name=
+"pb371">371</a>]</span>serious. If it were stoutly asserted that
+everything was quiet all over the archipelago except in certain parts
+of certain localities, naming them, that sounded well, and as the
+public at home simply skipped the unpronounceable names, not caring
+much whether they represented molecules or hemispheres, all went well.
+For instance, most of the provinces of the archipelago were organized
+under &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government prior to the inauguration of
+Governor Taft, which occurred, July 4, 1901, and on July 17th,
+thereafter, Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol were restored to military
+control.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8239src" href="#xd20e8239" name=
+"xd20e8239src">12</a> I suppose the fact that Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol
+had been so restored was duly announced at the time in the Associated
+Press despatches from Manila. But what light did it throw on the
+situation? Who knew whether any one of these names represented a
+mountain lair, a country village, a remote islet, or a large and
+populous province? As a matter of fact, each was a province, and the
+total population of the three provinces was 1,180,655,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e8242src" href="#xd20e8242" name=
+"xd20e8242src">13</a> and their total area 4651 square miles.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e8248src" href="#xd20e8248" name=
+"xd20e8248src">14</a> The eminent gentlemen charged with the government
+of the Islands, once they committed themselves to their
+&ldquo;civil&rdquo; government, persisted always in treating the
+insurrection, as General Hancock&rsquo;s campaign speeches used to
+treat the tariff&mdash;as &ldquo;a local issue.&rdquo; The true
+analogy, that of a house on fire, with the fire partly but not wholly
+under control, and momentarily subject to gusts of wind, never seems to
+have occurred to them. Here were provinces aggregating nearly twelve
+hundred <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb372" href="#pb372" name=
+"pb372">372</a>]</span>thousand people, officially admitted to be still
+in insurrection within less than two weeks after the announcement of
+the inauguration of a civil government, which included them, with its
+implied assertion of a state of peace as to them.</p>
+<p>If to the three provinces above named you add the province of Samar,
+later of dark and bloody fame, you have a fourth province as to which
+not only had there been no &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government organized on
+paper, but no claim yet made by any one that we had ever conquered it.
+We had been so busy in Luzon and elsewhere that we had not yet had time
+to bother very much with Samar. The area of Samar is 5276 square miles,
+and its population 266,237. (See the census tables already cited.) In
+their report dated October 15, 1901,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8258src" href="#xd20e8258" name="xd20e8258src">15</a> you find
+the Commission admitting that &ldquo;the insurrection still continues
+in Batangas, Samar, Cebu&rdquo; and &ldquo;parts of&rdquo; Laguna and
+Tayabas provinces. Now the euphemistic limitation implied in the words
+&ldquo;parts of&rdquo; is quite negligible, for any serious purpose,
+since our troops kept the insurgents rather constantly on the move, and
+the population in all the &ldquo;parts of&rdquo; any province that was
+still holding out backed up the combatants morally and materially, with
+information as to our movements, supplies, etc., whenever the insurgent
+detachments, in the course of their peregrinations, happened to pass
+through those &ldquo;parts.&rdquo; So, to make a recapitulation
+presenting the political situation admitted by the Commission to exist
+a little over three months after the inauguration of civil government,
+we have the insurrection still in progress as follows: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb373" href="#pb373" name="pb373">373</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Province</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Batangas</td>
+<td>1,201</td>
+<td>257,715</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cebu</td>
+<td>1,939</td>
+<td>653,727</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bohol</td>
+<td>1,511</td>
+<td>269,223</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Laguna</td>
+<td>629</td>
+<td>148,606</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tayabas</td>
+<td>5,993</td>
+<td>153,065</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Samar</td>
+<td>5,276</td>
+<td>266,237</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">16,549</td>
+<td class="sum">1,748,573</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>According to his own official statements, it thus appears that on
+October 15th, after Governor Taft set up his &ldquo;civil&rdquo;
+government on the Fourth of July, throughout one-fifth of the territory
+and among one-fourth of the population insurrection was rampant. The
+total area of the archipelago, if Mohammedan Mindanao be excepted (for
+the reason that the Moros never had anything to do with the Filipinos
+and their insurrection against us), is about 80,000 square miles,
+having a total population of 7,000,000. So that, to restate the case,
+one-fifth of the house was still on fire, and one-fourth of the inmates
+were trying their best to keep the fire from being put out.</p>
+<p>Just here I owe it to President Taft, under whose administration as
+governor I served as a judge, as well as to myself, to explain why I
+have so frequently put the word &ldquo;civil&rdquo; in quotations in
+referring to the civil government of the Philippines. Broadly speaking,
+if &ldquo;civil&rdquo; does not imply consent of the governed, it at
+least distinctly negatives the idea of a bleeding, prostrate, and
+deeply hostile people. And, in that the civil government of the
+Philippines founded in 1901 did so negative the actual conditions it
+was a kindly humbug. When you go around the country sending people to
+the penitentiary by scores for political crimes, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb374" href="#pb374" name="pb374">374</a>]</span>and
+then get criticised afterwards for &ldquo;subserviency&rdquo; to the
+government you are thus serving, you get a trifle sensitive about such
+criticism. Now the core of the charges made in this country against the
+Philippine judiciary in the early days was that they were parties to a
+humbug, pliable servants of a government which was trying to produce at
+home an incorrect impression of substantial <i>absence of
+unwillingness</i> on the part of the governed. I am very sure that the
+five ex-officers of the volunteer army above named, who went from the
+army to the bench, never did, by act or word, lend themselves to the
+idea that there was any &ldquo;consent&rdquo; on the part of the
+governed. Those of us who had been in Cuba with General Wood had but a
+little while previously observed there a <i>civil r&eacute;gime</i>
+under a <i>military</i> name. We were now, in the Philippines, serving
+a <i>military r&eacute;gime</i> under a <i>civil</i> name. We had all
+of us doubtless&mdash;if there was an exception it is
+immaterial&mdash;served on military commissions. We therefore felt,
+without immodesty, that we could deal out to insurrectos and their
+political cousins, the brigands, more even-handed justice, as a
+<i>military commission of one</i>, than a board of several officers,
+booted, spurred, and travel-stained from some recent man-hunt. Turning,
+however, from the more inconspicuous objects of Professor
+Willis&rsquo;s attacks,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8354src" href=
+"#xd20e8354" name="xd20e8354src">16</a> the American trial judges in
+the Philippines in the pioneer days, to the now wide-looming historic
+personage who was his real objective, I was asked at a public meeting
+in Boston, rather significantly, by one of the most eminent lawyers in
+this country, Mr. Moorfield Storey, formerly president of the American
+Bar Association, whether or not there had <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb375" href="#pb375" name="pb375">375</a>]</span>been attempts in the
+Philippines, while I was there, to make the judiciary subservient to
+the executive. My answer was, &ldquo;No, the lawyers who have been in
+charge of the Philippine Government have never been guilty of any
+unprofessional conduct.&rdquo; But the distinguished Boston barrister
+above referred to has a nephew who is now and has been since 1909,
+Governor of the Philippines&mdash;and who, before he went out there was
+a representative of Big Business in Boston&mdash;Governor Forbes, and I
+have no idea that any judge who during that time has rendered any
+decision of importance he did not like has been promoted to the Supreme
+Bench of the Islands, though I know that under Governor Taft, Judge
+Carson unhesitatingly declared a certain act of the Commission null and
+void as being in conflict with an Act of Congress, and before the
+time-servers had gotten through wondering at his rashness, Mr. Taft had
+him put on the Supreme Bench of the Philippines<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8365src" href="#xd20e8365" name="xd20e8365src">17</a> because he
+liked that kind of a judge.</p>
+<p>Having sown the wind by setting up his civil government too soon,
+let us now observe the whirlwind Governor Taft reaped within six months
+thereafter. Of course the civil and military folk were at
+daggers&rsquo; points. That goes without saying. But their differences
+were decorously suppressed so that the Filipinos did not get hold of
+them. To that end, the situation was also diligently concealed in the
+United States. In his proclamation of July 4, 1902, you find President
+Roosevelt publicly smoothing the ruffled feathers of that rugged hero
+of many battles in two hemispheres, General Chaffee, and also
+commending Governor Taft, and telling them how harmoniously they had
+gotten along together to the credit of their common country. But in
+1901, shortly after General Chaffee <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb376" href="#pb376" name="pb376">376</a>]</span>had relieved General
+MacArthur, you find the following cablegram:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Executive Mansion,
+Washington</span>,<br>
+October 8, 1901.</p>
+<p><span class="sc">Chaffee, Manila</span>: I am deeply chagrined, to
+use the mildest possible term, over the trouble between yourself and
+Taft. I wish you to see him personally, and spare no effort to secure
+prompt and friendly agreement in regard to the differences between you.
+Have cabled him also. It is most unfortunate to have any action which
+produces friction and which may have a serious effect both in the
+Philippines <i>and here at home</i>. I trust implicitly that you and
+Taft will come to agreement.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Theodore Roosevelt</span>.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e8390src" href="#xd20e8390" name=
+"xd20e8390src">18</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The most important words of the above telegram are &ldquo;and here
+at home.&rdquo; The &ldquo;serious effect here at home&rdquo; so
+earnestly deprecated was that the real issue between General Chaffee
+and Governor Taft might be ventilated by some Congressional Committee,
+and thus bring out the prematurity with which, to meet political
+exigencies, the civil government had been set up. The issue was that
+General Chaffee was recognizing the hostility of the people, and
+deprecating the withdrawal of the police protection of the army from
+districts in which there were many people who, though tired of keeping
+up the struggle, and willing to quit, were being harried by the
+die-in-the-last-ditch contingent. This would mean, ultimately, an
+examination, such as has already been made in this volume, of the
+evidence on which Governor Taft based his half-baked opinion of 1900
+that &ldquo;the great majority&rdquo; were &ldquo;entirely
+willing&rdquo; to American sovereignty. It would also show up Mr.
+Root&rsquo;s nonsense about &ldquo;the patient and unconsenting
+millions,&rdquo; so shamelessly flouted in the presidential
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb377" href="#pb377" name=
+"pb377">377</a>]</span>campaign of 1900, and his pious Philippics
+against delivering said millions &ldquo;into the hands of the assassin,
+Aguinaldo,&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8399src" href="#xd20e8399"
+name="xd20e8399src">19</a> and would reveal the truth confessed by
+Secretary Root in a speech made to the cadets at West Point in July,
+1902, after the trouble had blown over, in which, apropos of the valor
+and services of the army, he referred proudly to its having then just
+completed the suppression of &ldquo;an insurrection of 7,000,000
+people.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>On September 28, 1901, just prior to President Roosevelt&rsquo;s
+above cablegram pouring oil on the troubled politico-military insular
+waters, a company of General Chaffee&rsquo;s command, Company C, of the
+9th Infantry, had been taken off their guard and massacred at a place
+called Balangiga, in the island of Samar.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8404src" href="#xd20e8404" name="xd20e8404src">20</a> This had
+made General Chaffee somewhat angry, and explains the subsequent dark
+and bloody drama of which General &ldquo;Jake&rdquo; Smith was the
+central figure, whereby Samar was made &ldquo;a howling
+wilderness.&rdquo; But Governor Taft was filled with much more
+solicitude about the success of his civil government than he was about
+the obscure lives lost at Balangiga. Apropos of the Balangiga affair he
+was wearing the patience of the doughty Chaffee with remarks like this:
+&ldquo;The people are friendly to the civil government,&rdquo; and
+suavely speaking of &ldquo;the evidence which accumulates on every hand
+of the desire of the people at large for peace and protection by the
+civil government.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8413src" href=
+"#xd20e8413" name="xd20e8413src">21</a> The same Taft <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb378" href="#pb378" name=
+"pb378">378</a>]</span>report goes on to deprecate &ldquo;rigor in the
+treatment&rdquo; of the situation and the &ldquo;consequent revulsion
+in those feelings of friendship toward the Americans which have been
+growing stronger each day with the spread and development of the civil
+government.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>General &ldquo;Jake&rdquo; Smith was sent to Samar shortly after the
+Balangiga massacre, and did indeed make the place a howling wilderness,
+with his famous &ldquo;kill-and-burn&rdquo; orders, instructions to
+&ldquo;kill everything over ten years old&rdquo; and so forth, and the
+army was in sympathy generally with most of what he did,&mdash;except,
+of course, the unspeakable &ldquo;10 year old&rdquo; part&mdash;piously
+exclaiming, as fallible human nature often will in such circumstances,
+&ldquo;Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.&rdquo; Now the civil
+government could have put a stop to all this if it had wanted to. It
+had the backing of President Roosevelt. But it quietly accepted the
+benefit of such &ldquo;fear of God&rdquo;&mdash;to use the army&rsquo;s
+rather sacrilegious expression about that Samar campaign&mdash;as the
+military arm put into the heart of the Filipino, and went on the even
+tenor of its way, still maintaining that the Filipinos must like us
+because the civil government was so benevolent,&mdash;as if the
+Filipinos drew any nice distinctions between Governor Taft and General
+Chaffee, or supposed the two did not represent one and the same
+government, the government of the United States. There was much
+investigation about that awful Samar campaign afterward. General Smith
+was court-martialed and partly whitewashed, at least not dismissed. At
+General Smith&rsquo;s court-martial, there was some dispute about the
+alleged orders to &ldquo;kill and burn,&rdquo; to &ldquo;kill
+everything over ten years old,&rdquo; etc. But the nature of the
+campaign may be inferred from General Smith&rsquo;s famous circular No.
+6, which, issued on Christmas eve, 1901, advised his command, in
+effect, that he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb379" href="#pb379"
+name="pb379">379</a>]</span>did not take much stock in the civil
+commission&rsquo;s confidence that the people really wanted peace; that
+he was &ldquo;thoroughly convinced&rdquo; that the wealthy people in
+the towns of his district were aiding the insurgents while pretending
+to be friendly and that he proposed to</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">adopt a policy that will create <i>in all the minds of
+all the people a burning desire for the war to cease</i>; a desire or
+longing <i>so intense, so personal, and so real</i> that it will
+<i>impel</i> them to devote themselves in real earnest to bringing
+about a <i>real state</i> of peace.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8440src"
+href="#xd20e8440" name="xd20e8440src">22</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>During all his trial troubles, General Smith &ldquo;took what was
+coming to him&rdquo; without a murmur, and General Chaffee stuck to him
+as far as he could without assuming the primary responsibility for the
+fearful orders above alluded to. If, when General Smith went to Samar,
+his superior officer, General Chaffee, was in just the direly vengeful
+frame of mind he, General Smith, afterwards displayed, and prompted him
+to do, substantially, what he afterward did, which is by no means
+unlikely, General Smith never whimpered or put the blame on his chief.
+But a fearful lesson was given the Filipinos, and the civil government
+profited by it. General Chaffee was never really pressed on whether he
+did or did not prompt General Smith to do what he did; Governor Taft
+was never even criticised for not protesting; but with a flourish of
+presidential trumpets, General Smith was finally made &ldquo;the
+goat,&rdquo; by being summarily placed on the retired list, and that
+closed the bloody Samar episode of 1901&ndash;02. I wonder General
+Smith has not gone and wept on General Miles&rsquo;s shoulder and like
+him become a member of the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston. Some of
+the best fighting men in <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb380" href=
+"#pb380" name="pb380">380</a>]</span>the army say that as a soldier in
+battle General Smith is superb. At any rate he may find spiritual
+consolation in the following passage of the Scriptures which fits and
+describes his case:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the
+scapegoat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an
+atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the
+wilderness.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8452src" href="#xd20e8452" name=
+"xd20e8452src">23</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>In his Report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four principal
+provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble shortly after the
+civil government was set up in that year, and had to be returned to
+military control, were organized under civil rule &ldquo;on the
+recommendation&rdquo; of the then commanding general
+(MacArthur)<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8460src" href="#xd20e8460" name=
+"xd20e8460src">24</a>: It certainly seems unlikely that the haste to
+change from military rule to civil rule came on the motion of the
+military. If the Commission ever got, <i>in writing</i>, from General
+MacArthur, a &ldquo;recommendation&rdquo; that any provinces be placed
+under civil rule while still in insurrection, the text of the writing
+will show a mere soldiery acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley, the
+commander-in-chief. Parol contemporaneous evidence will show that
+General MacArthur told them, substantially, that they were
+&ldquo;riding for a fall.&rdquo; In fact, whenever an insurrection
+would break out in a province after Governor Taft&rsquo;s inauguration
+as governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, from
+the commanding general down, was &ldquo;I told you so.&rdquo; They did
+not say this where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common
+knowledge that they were much addicted to damning
+&ldquo;politics&rdquo; as the cause of all the trouble. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb381" href="#pb381" name="pb381">381</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Governor Taft&rsquo;s statement in his report for 1901, that the
+four principal provinces, above named, Batangas and the rest, were
+organized under civil rule &ldquo;on the recommendation of General
+MacArthur,&rdquo; is fully explained in his testimony before the Senate
+Committee of 1902. From the various passages hereinbefore quoted from
+President McKinley&rsquo;s state papers concerning the Philippines,
+especially his messages to Congress, the political pressure Mr.
+McKinley was under from the beginning to make a show of
+&ldquo;civil&rdquo; government, thus emphasizing the alleged absence of
+any real substantial opposition to our rule by a seeming absence of
+necessity for the use of force, so as to palliate American repugnance
+to forcing a government upon an unwilling people, has been made clear.
+There were to be no &ldquo;dark days of reconstruction.&rdquo; The
+Civil War in the United States from 1861 to 1865 was a love feast
+compared with our war in the Philippines. Yet the work of
+reconstruction in the Philippines was to be predicated on the theory of
+consent, so persistently urged by President McKinley before the
+American people from the beginning, viz., that the insurrection
+represented only a small faction of the people. We have seen how
+General MacArthur also had originally, in 1898, entertained this
+notion, and how by the time he took Malolos in March, 1899, he had
+gotten over this notion, and had&mdash;regretfully&mdash;recognized
+that &ldquo;the whole people are loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he
+represents.&rdquo; And now came Governor Taft, after fifteen months
+more of continuous fighting, to tell General MacArthur, on behalf of
+Mr. McKinley, that he, MacArthur, did not know what he was talking
+about, and that &ldquo;the great majority&rdquo; were for American
+rule. The representative men of my own State of Georgia welcomed the
+return of the State to military control in 1870. Most of them
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb382" href="#pb382" name=
+"pb382">382</a>]</span>had been officers of the Confederate army. The
+Federal commander simply told them that if <i>they</i> could not
+restrain the lawless element of their own people, <i>he would</i>. By
+premature setting up of the Philippine civil government, the lawless
+element was allowed full swing. General MacArthur had been in the Civil
+War. He knew something about reconstruction. But here were the Taft
+Commission, with instructions from Mr. McKinley to the effect that
+civil government, government &ldquo;essentially <i>popular</i> in
+form,&rdquo; was to be set up as fast as territory was conquered. It
+didn&rsquo;t make any difference about the government being
+&ldquo;essentially popular&rdquo; just so it was &ldquo;essentially
+popular <i>in form</i>.&rdquo; To the Senate Committee of 1902,
+Governor Taft said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">General MacArthur and the Commission did differ as to
+where the power lay with respect to the organization of civil
+governments, as to <i>who should say what civil governments should be
+organized</i>, the Commission contending that, under the instructions,
+it was left to them, and General MacArthur thinking that everything was
+subject to military control ultimately, in view of the fact that the
+islands were <i>in a state of war</i>.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8495src" href="#xd20e8495" name="xd20e8495src">25</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Governor Taft then added that he and General MacArthur reached a
+<i>modus vivendi</i>. When a good soldier once finds out just what his
+commander-in-chief wants done, he will endeavor, in loyal good faith,
+to carry out the spirit of instructions, no matter how unwise they may
+seem to him. As soon as General MacArthur saw what President McKinley
+wanted done, he proceeded to co-operate loyally with Governor Taft to
+carry out the plan. He well knew the country was not ready for civil
+government, but if Mr. McKinley was bent on crowding civil government
+forward as fast <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb383" href="#pb383"
+name="pb383">383</a>]</span>as territory was conquered, he would make
+his recommendations on that basis. In the matter of the utter folly of
+the prematurity with which the civil government was set up in the
+Philippines in 1901, and the terrible consequences to the hapless
+Filipinos, hereinafter described, which followed, by reason of the
+premature withdrawal of the police protection of the army and the sense
+of security its several garrisons radiated, from a country just
+recovering from some six years of war, General MacArthur&rsquo;s
+exemption from responsibility is shown by his reports for 1900 and
+1901.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8507src" href="#xd20e8507" name=
+"xd20e8507src">26</a> The former has already been fully examined, and
+the original sharp differences between him and Governor Taft made
+clear. In the latter report dated July 4, 1901, the date of the Taft
+inauguration as Governor, and also, if I mistake not, the day of
+General MacArthur&rsquo;s final departure for the United States, the
+latter washes his hands of the kindly McKinley-Taft nonsense, born of
+political expediency, about there having never been any real
+fundamental or unanimous resistance, in no uncertain terms thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede
+the activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments [our
+military forces,] will not only be a menace to the present, but <i>put
+in jeopardy the entire future of American possibilities in the
+archipelago</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8526src" href="#xd20e8526"
+name="xd20e8526src">27</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>No, President Taft can never make General MacArthur &ldquo;the
+goat&rdquo; for what General Bell had to do in Batangas Province in
+1901&ndash;02 to make our &ldquo;willing&rdquo; subjects behave. Nor
+can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful
+fact that, according <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb384" href="#pb384"
+name="pb384">384</a>]</span>to the United States Coast and Geodetic
+Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas
+Province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the
+Philippines of 1903 it was 257,715,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8535src"
+href="#xd20e8535" name="xd20e8535src">28</a> rest entirely on military
+shoulders. An attempt to place the responsibility for the prematurity
+of the civil government on General MacArthur was made by Honorable
+Henry C. Ide, who was of the Taft Commission of 1900, and later
+Governor General of the Islands, and is now Minister to Spain, in the
+<i>North American Review</i> for December, 1907. But Mr. Taft, a man of
+nobler mould, has at least maintained a decorous silence on the subject
+except when interrogated by Congress, and when so interrogated, his
+testimony, above quoted, if analyzed, places the responsibility where
+it honestly belongs. In 1900 the Taft Commission were not taking much
+military advice.</p>
+<p>Batangas province was first taken under the wing of the
+peace-at-any-price policy by the Act of the Taft Commission of May 2,
+1901, entitled &ldquo;An Act Extending the Provisions of &lsquo;the
+Provincial Government Act&rsquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8546src"
+href="#xd20e8546" name="xd20e8546src">29</a> to the Province of
+Batangas.&rdquo; By the Act of the Commission of July 17, 1901, the
+provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol, were restored to military
+control. When the civil authorities turned those provinces back to
+military control, they well knew the frame of mind the military were
+in, and there is no escape from the proposition that they, in effect,
+said to the military: &ldquo;Take them and chasten them; go as far as
+you like. After you are done with them, it will be time enough to
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb385" href="#pb385" name=
+"pb385">385</a>]</span>pet them again. But for the present we mean
+business.&rdquo; General Bell was scathingly criticised on the floor of
+the United States Senate for what he did in Batangas in 1901&ndash;02,
+but by the time he took hold there it had become a case of &ldquo;spare
+the rod and spoil the child.&rdquo; The substitution by the Commission
+of kindness, and a disposition to forget what the Filipinos could not
+forget, for firmness and the policy of making them submit unreservedly
+to the inevitable,&mdash;viz., abandonment of their dream of
+independence&mdash;had created among them a well-nigh ineradicable
+impression that, for some reason or other, whether due to disapproval
+in the United States of the so-called &ldquo;imperial&rdquo; policy or
+what not, we were afraid of them. General Bell&rsquo;s task in
+Batangas, therefore, was to eradicate this impression all over the
+archipelago by making an example of the Batangas people.</p>
+<p>In General Chaffee&rsquo;s report for 1902,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8553src" href="#xd20e8553" name="xd20e8553src">30</a> he prefaces
+his account of General Bell&rsquo;s operations in Batangas as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The long-continued resistance in the province of
+Batangas and in certain parts of the bordering provinces of Tayabas,
+Laguna, and Cavite, had made it apparent to me and to others that the
+insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist and
+maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge of
+practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active support of
+many who professed friendship for United States authority, etc.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This last was a thrust at Governor Taft&rsquo;s new-found Filipino
+friends and advisers, in whose lack of sympathy with the cause of their
+country the Governor so profoundly believed, but in whose continuing
+co-operation <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb386" href="#pb386" name=
+"pb386">386</a>]</span>in the killing of his soldiers General Chaffee
+believed still more profoundly.</p>
+<p>General Bell&rsquo;s famous operations on a large scale in Batangas
+began January 1, 1902. The great mistake of the Civil Commission, to
+which they adhered so long, was in supposing that when the respectable
+military element of the insurgents was pursued to capture or surrender,
+these last <i>could</i> and <i>would</i> thereafter control the
+situation. As a matter of fact, whether they could or not, they did
+not.</p>
+<p>In his celebrated circular order dated Batangas, December 9, 1901,
+General Bell announced:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first salute">To all Station Commanders:</p>
+<p>A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares, appears to
+exist, that the insurrection in this brigade continues because the
+greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, <i>pretend</i>
+to desire, but do not in reality <i>want</i> peace; that when all
+<i>really want</i> peace, we can have it promptly. Under such
+circumstances, it is clearly indicated that a policy should be adopted
+that will, as soon as possible, make the people <i>want peace</i> and
+<i>want it badly</i>.</p>
+<p>The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments
+of either individuals or town councils should be such acts publicly
+performed as must <i>inevitably commit them irrevocably</i> to the side
+of Americans by arousing the animosity of the insurgent element.
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* No person should be given credit for loyalty simply
+because he takes the oath of allegiance, or secretly conveys to
+Americans worthless information and idle rumors which result in
+nothing. Those who <i>publicly</i> guide our troops to the camps of the
+enemy, who <i>publicly</i> identify insurgents, who <i>accompany troops
+in operations</i> against the enemy, who denounce and assist in
+arresting the secret enemies of the Government, who <i>publicly</i>
+obtain and bring <i>reliable</i> and <i>valuable</i> information to
+commanding officers, those in fact who <i>publicly</i> array themselves
+against the insurgents, and for Americans, should be <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb387" href="#pb387" name=
+"pb387">387</a>]</span>trusted and given credit for loyalty, <i>but no
+others</i>. No person should be given credit for loyalty solely on
+account of having done nothing for or against us so far as known.
+Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of this brigade
+should be either active friend or be classed as enemy.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In his Circular Order No. 5, dated Batangas, December 13,
+1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8631src" href="#xd20e8631" name=
+"xd20e8631src">31</a> General Bell announced that General Orders No.
+100, Adjutant General&rsquo;s Office, 1863, approved and published by
+order of President Lincoln, for the government of the armies of the
+United States in the field, would thereafter be regarded as the guide
+of his subordinates in the conduct of the war. This order is familiar
+to all who have ever made any study of military law. Ordinarily, of
+course, a captured enemy is entitled to &ldquo;the honors of
+war,&rdquo; <i>i. e.</i>, he must be held, housed, and fed, unless
+exchanged, until the close of the war. But where an enemy places
+himself by his conduct without the pale of the laws of war, <i>i.
+e.</i>, where he does not &ldquo;play the game according to the
+rules,&rdquo; he may be killed on sight, like other outlaws.</p>
+<p>Under General Orders No. 100, 1863, men and squads of men who,
+without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly
+organized hostile army, fight occasionally only, and with intermittent
+returns to their homes and avocations, and frequent assumption of the
+semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character
+and appearance of soldiers; armed prowlers seeking to cut telegraph
+wires, destroy bridges and the like, etc., are not entitled to the
+protection of the laws of war and may be shot on sight. In other words,
+the game being one of life and death, you must take even chances with
+your opponent. General Bell&rsquo;s defenders on the floor of the
+Senate simply relied <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb388" href="#pb388"
+name="pb388">388</a>]</span>on General Orders No. 100. However, there
+is nothing about reconcentration in that order. We learned that from
+the Spaniards. In fact we never did succeed in bringing to terms the
+far Eastern colonies we bought from Spain, until we adopted her methods
+with regard to them. Another of the expedients adopted by General Bell
+in Batangas seems harsh, but it was used by Wellington in the latter
+end of the Napoleonic wars, and by the Germans in the latter end of the
+Franco-Prussian War. It was to promise the inhabitants of a given
+territory that whenever a telegraph wire or pole was cut the country
+within a stated radius thereof, including all human habitations, would
+be devastated. It is in General Bell&rsquo;s Circular Order No. 7 of
+December 15, 1901,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8648src" href=
+"#xd20e8648" name="xd20e8648src">32</a> that we find the genesis of the
+idea of basing tactics used by Weyler in Cuba on Mr. Lincoln&rsquo;s
+General Order 100. He there says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Though Section 17, General Orders 100, authorizes the
+starving of unarmed hostile belligerents as well as armed ones,
+provided it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is
+considered neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any person to
+starve <i>who has come into towns under our control seeking
+protection</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This order goes on to direct that all food supplies encountered be
+brought to the towns. Of course this does not mean supplies captured
+from the enemy&rsquo;s forces, which may lawfully be destroyed at once.
+To those not familiar with reconcentration tactics it should be
+explained that reconcentration means this: You notify, by proclamation
+and otherwise, all persons within a given area, that on and after a
+certain day they must all leave their homes and come within a certain
+prescribed zone or radius of which a named <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb389" href="#pb389" name="pb389">389</a>]</span>town
+is usually the centre, there to remain until further orders, and that
+all persons found outside that zone after the date named will be
+treated as public enemies. General Bell&rsquo;s order of December 20th,
+provided that rice found in the possession of families outside the
+protected zone should, if practicable, be moved with them to the town
+which was the centre of the zone, that that found apparently
+<i>cached</i> for enemy&rsquo;s use should be confiscated, and also
+destroyed if necessary.</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Whenever it is found absolutely impossible to
+transport it [any food supply] to a point within the protected zone, it
+will be burned or otherwise destroyed. <i>These rules will apply to all
+food products</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>No person within the reconcentration zones was permitted to go
+outside thereof&mdash;cross the dead line&mdash;without a written pass.
+The Circular Order of December 23d, apparently solicitous lest
+subordinate commanders might become infected with the Taft belief in
+Filipino affection, directs that after January 1, 1902, all the
+municipal officials, members of the police force, etc., &ldquo;who have
+not <i>fully complied</i> with their duty by <i>actively</i> aiding the
+Americans and rendering them <i>valuable</i> service,&rdquo; shall be
+<i>summarily thrown into prison</i>.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8689src" href="#xd20e8689" name="xd20e8689src">33</a> Circular
+Order No. 19, issued on Christmas Eve, 1901, provided that,</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">in order to make the existing state o&pound; war and
+martial law <i>so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they
+will earnestly desire and work for</i> the re-establishment of peace
+and <i>civil government</i>,</p>
+</div>
+<p>subordinate commanders might, under certain prescribed restrictions,
+put everybody they chose to work on the roads.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8707src" href="#xd20e8707" name="xd20e8707src">34</a> This was an
+ingenious blow at the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb390" href=
+"#pb390" name="pb390">390</a>]</span>wealthy and soft-handed, intended
+to superinduce submission by humbling their pride. Note also the seeds
+of affection thus sown for the civil government under the
+reconstruction period which was to follow. In one of Dickens novels
+there occurs a law firm by the name of Spenlow and Jorkins. Mr. Spenlow
+was quite fond of considering himself, and of being considered by
+others, as tender-hearted. Mr. Jorkins did not mind. When the widow and
+the orphan would plead with Mr. Spenlow to stay the foreclosure of a
+mortgage, that benevolent soul would tell them, with a pained
+expression of infinite sympathy, that he would do all he could for
+them, but that they would have to see Mr. Jorkins, &ldquo;who is a very
+exacting man,&rdquo; he would say. In the dual American
+politico-military r&eacute;gime in the Philippines of 1901&ndash;02,
+Governor Taft was the Mr. Spenlow, General Chaffee the Mr. Jorkins. But
+the former always seemed to harbor the amiable delusion that the
+Filipinos did not at all consider <i>the firm</i> as the movants in
+each proceeding against them, and that on the contrary they were sure
+to make a favorable contrast in their hearts between the kindness of
+Mr. Spenlow and the harshness of Mr. Jorkins. He seemed blind to the
+fact that the Filipinos, in considering what was done by <i>any</i> of
+us, spelled <i>us</i>&mdash;U. S.</p>
+<p>General Bell&rsquo;s Circular Order No. 22, also a Christmas Eve
+product, re-iterates the usual purpose to make the people yearn for
+civil government, and the usual warning that none of them really and
+truly want the blessings of American domination and Benevolent
+Assimilation as they truly should, and adds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">To combat such a population, it is necessary to make
+the state of war as insupportable as possible; and there is no more
+efficacious way of accomplishing this than by <i>keeping <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb391" href="#pb391" name="pb391">391</a>]</span>the
+minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that
+living under such conditions will soon become unbearable</i>. Little
+should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey
+intentions.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8733src" href="#xd20e8733" name=
+"xd20e8733src">35</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Under date of December 26, 1901, General Bell reports:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2500 men,
+who will be used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the
+command. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I take so large a command for the purpose of
+thoroughly searching <i>each ravine, valley, and mountain peak</i> for
+insurgents and for food, expecting to <i>destroy everything I find
+outside of town</i>. <i>All able-bodied men will be killed or
+captured.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>Such was the central idea animating the Bell Brigade that overran
+Batangas in 1902. The American soldier in officially sanctioned wrath
+is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling to
+describe him. I have seen him in that mood, but to describe it is
+beyond me. Side by side with innumerable ambuscades incident to the
+nature of the field service as it then was, in which little affairs the
+soldier above mentioned had lost many a &ldquo;bunkie,&rdquo; there had
+gone on for some time, under the McKinley-Taft peace-at-any-price
+policy, whose keynote was that no American should have a job a Filipino
+could fill, much appointing to municipal and other offices of
+Filipinos, many of whom had at once set to work to make their new
+offices useful to the cause of their country by systematic aid to the
+ambuscade business. With this and the Balangiga massacre ever in mind,
+the men of General Bell&rsquo;s brigade began their work in Batangas in
+a mood which quite made for fidelity in performance of orders to
+&ldquo;make living unbearable&rdquo; for the Filipino &ldquo;by acts,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb392" href="#pb392" name=
+"pb392">392</a>]</span>not words.&rdquo; Also, the American soldier can
+sing, sometimes very badly, but often rather irrepressibly, until
+stopped by his officer. Also, whether justly or unjustly is beside the
+question, he considers a politician who pets the enemy in the midst of
+a war a hypocrite. So General Bell&rsquo;s 2500 men began that Batangas
+campaign on New Year&rsquo;s Day, 1902, giving preference, out of their
+repertoire, to a campaign song whose ominous chorus ran:</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">&ldquo;He may be a brother of William H. Taft</p>
+<p class="line">But he ain&rsquo;t no friend of mine,&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">and between songs they would say purringly to one
+another, &ldquo;Remember Balangiga.&rdquo; <i>And their commanding
+officer was the very incarnation of this feeling.</i> So listen to the
+stride of his seven-league boots and the ring of his iron heel:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I expect to first clean out the wide Looboo Peninsula.
+I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the
+country westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning through
+Lipa. I shall <i>scour and clean up</i> the Lipa mountains. Swinging
+northward, the country in the vicinity of [here follows a long list of
+towns] will be <i>scoured</i>, ending at [a named mountain], which will
+then be <i>thoroughly searched and devastated</i>. Swinging back to the
+right, the same treatment will be given all the country of which [two
+named mountains] are the main peaks.</p>
+</div>
+<p>And so on <i lang="la">ad libitum</i>. General Bell&rsquo;s course
+in Batangas was commended in the annual report of his immediate
+superior, a very humane, as well as gallant, soldier, General Wheaton,
+as &ldquo;a model in suppressing insurrections under like
+circumstances.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8784src" href=
+"#xd20e8784" name="xd20e8784src">36</a> The Batangas programme was
+approved by General Chaffee, the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb393"
+href="#pb393" name="pb393">393</a>]</span>commanding general. In 1902
+the United States Senate rang with indiscriminate denunciation of the
+Batangas severities and the Samar &ldquo;kill and burn&rdquo; orders. I
+tried in 1903, without success, to satisfy my distinguished and beloved
+fellow-townsman, Senator Bacon, that at the time it was adopted it had
+become a military necessity, which it had. The fact was that the
+McKinley-Taft policy of conciliation, intended to gild the rivets of
+alien domination and cure the desire for independence by coddling, had
+loaned aid and comfort to the enemy, by creating, among a people used
+theretofore solely to force as a governmental agency for making
+sovereignty respected, the pathetic notion that we were afraid of them,
+and might be weakening in respect to our declared programme of denying
+them independence. The Bell opinion of the Commission&rsquo;s
+confidence in Filipino gladness at its advent among them is
+sufficiently apparent in his orders to his troops. On May 23, 1902,
+Senator Bacon read in the Senate a letter from an officer of the army,
+a West Point graduate and a personal friend of the Senator&rsquo;s,
+whose name he withheld, but for whose veracity he vouched, which letter
+alluded to &ldquo;a reconcentrado, pen with a dead line outside, beyond
+which everything living is shot&rdquo;; spoke of &ldquo;this
+corpse-carcass stench wafted in&rdquo; (to where the letter-writer sat
+writing) as making it &ldquo;slightly unpleasant here,&rdquo; and made
+your flesh crawl thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">At nightfall clouds of vampire bats softly swirl out
+on their orgies over the dead.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This does not sound to me like Batangas and Bell. It sounds like
+Smith and Samar. There were about 100,000 people, all told, gathered in
+the reconcentrado <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb394" href="#pb394"
+name="pb394">394</a>]</span>camps in Batangas under General
+Bell,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8799src" href="#xd20e8799" name=
+"xd20e8799src">37</a> and they were handled as efficiently as General
+Funston handled matters after the San Francisco fire. There was no
+starvation in those camps. All the reconcentrados had to do was not to
+cross the dead line of the reconcentration zone, and to draw their
+rations, which were provided as religiously as any ordinary American
+who is not a fiend and has plenty of rice on hand for the purpose will
+give it to the hungry. The reconcentrado camps and the people in them
+were daily looked after by medical officers of the American army.
+General Bell&rsquo;s active campaigning began in Batangas January 1,
+1902, Malvar surrendered April 16 thereafter, and Batangas was
+thoroughly purged of insurrectos and the like by July. During this
+period the total of <span class="corr" id="xd20e8805" title=
+"Source: insurgent">insurgents</span> killed was only 163, and wounded
+209; and 3626 insurgents surrendered.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8808src" href="#xd20e8808" name="xd20e8808src">38</a></p>
+<p>The truth is General Bell&rsquo;s &ldquo;bark&rdquo; was much worse
+than his &ldquo;bite.&rdquo; The inestimable value of what he did in
+Batangas in 1901&ndash;02 lay in convincing the Filipinos once and for
+all that we were not as impotent as the civil-government coddling had
+led them quite naturally, but very foolishly, to think we were.
+Reference was made above to the fact that the population of Batangas in
+1899 was 312,192, and in 1903, 257,715. Those figures were inserted at
+the outset to make General Bell&rsquo;s &ldquo;bark&rdquo; sound
+louder, but now that we are considering his
+&ldquo;bite&rdquo;&mdash;how many lives his Batangas lesson to the
+Filipino people cost&mdash;another bit of testimony is tremendously
+relevant. On December 18, 1901, the Provincial Secretary of Batangas
+Province reported to Governor Taft that the mortality in Batangas
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb395" href="#pb395" name=
+"pb395">395</a>]</span>due to war, pestilence, and famine &ldquo;has
+reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants
+which in former years the province had.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8817src" href="#xd20e8817" name="xd20e8817src">39</a> Considering
+that General Bell&rsquo;s 1901&ndash;&rsquo;02 campaign in that
+ill-fated province cost outright but 163 killed,&mdash;how many of the
+209 wounded recovered does not appear; they may have all
+recovered&mdash;the Bell programme in Batangas was indeed a very tender
+model, from the humanitarian stand-point, of civilizing with a Krag, a
+model of &ldquo;suppressing insurrection under like
+circumstances.&rdquo; But it was never again followed. It had made too
+much noise at home. Senator Bacon&rsquo;s &ldquo;corpse-carcass
+stench&rdquo; from supposed reconcentrado pens and his &ldquo;clouds of
+vampire bats softly swirling on their orgies over the dead,&rdquo; so
+vividly reminded our people of why they had driven Spain out of Cuba,
+that the Administration became apprehensive. Until the noise about the
+Batangas business, our people had been led by Governor Taft and
+President Roosevelt to believe that the Filipinos were most sobbingly
+in love with &ldquo;a benign civil government&rdquo; and had forgotten
+all about independence. It was obvious that a repetition of such a
+campaign in any other province might create in the public mind at home
+a disgust with the whole Philippine policy which would be heard at the
+polls in the next presidential election. So the Batangas affair made it
+certain that the army was not going to be ordered out again in the
+Philippines before said next presidential election, at least; whatever
+castigation might be deemed advisable thereafter.</p>
+<p>It was intimated above that Senator Bacon&rsquo;s army
+friend&rsquo;s &ldquo;clouds of vampire bats softly swirling&rdquo;
+over the corpses of reconcentrados, were doing said swirling <i>not</i>
+over Batangas at all, but over Samar. Any man familiar with the lay of
+the land in the two provinces <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb396"
+href="#pb396" name="pb396">396</a>]</span>can see from the letter that
+it was written from Samar. Moreover, Colonel Wagner afterwards
+testified before the Senate Committee of 1902<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8830src" href="#xd20e8830" name="xd20e8830src">40</a> that if
+there had been any great mortality in the reconcentration camps in
+Batangas, he would have known of it. He inspected practically all those
+Batangas camps. Nobody who was in the islands at the time doubts but
+what such conditions may have obtained in some places under General
+Smith in Samar, or believes for a moment that any such conditions would
+have been tolerated under General Bell. General Bell has that aversion
+to either causing or witnessing needless suffering, which you almost
+invariably find in men who are both constitutionally brave and
+temperamentally generous and considerate of others. But the moral
+sought to be pointed here is not that the Bell reconcentration in
+Batangas was as merciful as the Smith performances in Samar were
+hellish, but that, in all matters concerning the Philippines, the army,
+as in the case of Senator Bacon&rsquo;s friend, is gagged by operation
+of law, and its enforced silence is peculiarly an asset in the hands of
+the party in power seeking to continue in power, in a distant colonial
+enterprise. Senator Bacon withheld his friend&rsquo;s name, because for
+an army officer to tell the truth about the Philippines would be likely
+to get him into trouble with the President of the United States. The
+President, be it remembered, is also the leader of the political party
+to which he belongs. That is why the country has never been able to get
+any light from those who know the most about the Philippines and the
+wisdom or unwisdom of keeping them, viz., the army. In 1898 this
+republic was beguiled into abandonment of the faiths of the founders
+and started after a gold brick, thinking it was a Klondyke. Then and
+ever since, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb397" href="#pb397" name=
+"pb397">397</a>]</span>the most important and material witnesses
+concerning the wisdom or unwisdom of keeping the brick, viz., the
+army,&mdash;which best of all knows the rank folly of it&mdash;have
+been gagged by operation of law. All republics that have heretofore
+become monarchies, have become so through manipulation of the army by
+men in power seeking to continue in power. We should either resign our
+expensive kingship over the Philippines or get a king for the whole
+business, and be done with it. We have some ready-made coronet initials
+in T. R.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8837src" href="#xd20e8837" name=
+"xd20e8837src">41</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;On June 23, 1902,&rdquo; says General Chaffee, in his report
+for that year,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8845src" href="#xd20e8845"
+name="xd20e8845src">42</a> &ldquo;by Act No. 421 of the Philippine
+Commission, so much of Act No. 173, of July 17, 1901, as transferred
+the province of Batangas to military control was revoked. Civil
+government was re-established in the province at 12 o&rsquo;clock noon,
+July 4, 1902.&rdquo; The rest of the 1,748,573 people herein above
+mentioned as constituting the population of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol,
+Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar, were also in turn made to &ldquo;want peace
+and want it badly,&rdquo; and on July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt
+issued his proclamation declaring that a state of general and complete
+peace existed. This is the famous proclamation in which he
+congratulated General Chaffee and the officers and men of his command
+on &ldquo;a total of more than 2000 combats, great and small,&rdquo;
+most of them subsequent to the Taft roseate cablegrams of 1900, and the
+still more roseate reports of 1901 from the same source. The
+proclamation appeared in the Philippines as General Orders No. 66,
+Adjutant General&rsquo;s Office, Washington, dated July 4,
+1902.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8850src" href="#xd20e8850" name=
+"xd20e8850src">43</a> It directed, in the body of it, that it be
+&ldquo;read aloud at parade in every military post.&rdquo; It thanked
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb398" href="#pb398" name=
+"pb398">398</a>]</span>the officers and enlisted men of the army in the
+Philippines, in the name of the President of the United States, for the
+courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with
+which they had been fighting up to that time, alluded to the impliedly
+lamb-like or turn-the-other-cheek way in which they had been behaving
+(no special reference is made either to Batangas, Samar, or the
+water-cure), and closes with a bully Rooseveltian war-whoop about the
+&ldquo;more than 2000 combats, great and small,&rdquo; above mentioned.
+It also referred to how, &ldquo;<i>with admirable good temper</i> and
+loyalty to American ideals its (the army&rsquo;s) commanding generals
+have joined with the civilian agents of the government&rdquo; in the
+work of superinducing allegiance to American sovereignty. This document
+is one of the most remarkable state papers of that most remarkable of
+men, ex-President Roosevelt, in its evidences of ability to mould
+powerful discordant elements to his will. It put everybody in a good
+humor. And yet, read at every military post, it served notice on the
+military that if they knew which side their bread was buttered on, they
+had better forget everything they knew tending to show the prematurity
+of the setting-up of the civil government, sheath all tomahawks and
+scalping knives they might have whetted and waiting for Governor
+Taft&rsquo;s exit from office, abstain from chatty letters to United
+States Senators telling tales out of school, such as the one Senator
+Bacon had read on the floor of the Senate (already noticed), and
+dutifully <i>perceive</i>, in the future, that the war was ended, as
+officially announced in the proclamation itself.</p>
+<p>The report of the Philippine Commission for 1902, declares that the
+insurrection &ldquo;as an organized attempt to subvert the authority of
+the United States&rdquo; is over (p. 3). They then proceed, with
+evident sincerity, to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb399" href=
+"#pb399" name="pb399">399</a>]</span>describe the popularity of
+themselves and their policies with the same curious blindness you
+sometimes find in your Congressional district, in the type of man who
+thinks he could be elected to Congress &ldquo;in a walk&rdquo; if he
+should only announce his candidacy, when as a matter of fact, the great
+majority of the people of his district are, for some notorious reason
+connected with his past history among them,&mdash;say his war
+record&mdash;very much prejudiced against him. They repeat one of their
+favorite sentiments about the whole country&mdash;always except
+&ldquo;as hereinafter excepted&rdquo;&mdash;being now engaged in
+<i>enjoying</i> civil government. But they casually admit also that
+&ldquo;much remains to be done&rdquo; in suppressing lawlessness and
+disturbances, so as to perfect and accentuate said
+&ldquo;enjoyment.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Let us see just what the state of the country was in this regard
+according to their own showing. They say:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The six years of war to which these islands have been
+subjected have naturally created a class of restless men utterly
+lacking in habits of industry, taught to live and prey upon the country
+for their support by the confiscation of food supplies as a war
+measure, and regarding the duties of a laborer as dull and impossible
+for one who has tasted the excitement of a guerrilla life. Even to the
+man anxious to return to agricultural pursuits, the conditions existing
+present no temptation. By the war and by the rinderpest, chiefly the
+latter, the carabaos, or water-buffaloes, <i>have been reduced to ten
+per cent. of their former number</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Think of the condition of a country, <i>any</i> country, but
+especially one whose wealth is almost wholly agricultural, which has
+just had nine tenths of its plow animals absolutely swept off the face
+of the earth by war and its immediate consequences. The report
+proceeds: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb400" href="#pb400" name=
+"pb400">400</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The chief food of the common people of these islands
+is rice, and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people
+in the cultivation of rice,</p>
+</div>
+<p>adding also that the carabao is the chief means of transportation of
+the tobacco, hemp, and other crops to market, and that the few
+remaining carabaos, the ordinary price of which in normal Spanish times
+had been $10 was now $100. Then, after completing a faithful picture of
+supremely thorough desolation such as the Islands had never seen since
+they first rose out of the sea, certainly not during the sleepy,
+easy-going Spanish rule, they say: &ldquo;The Filipino people of <i>the
+better</i> class have received the passage of the Philippine Act with
+great satisfaction&rdquo;&mdash;meaning the Act of Congress of July 1,
+1902, the Philippine Government Act. <i lang="de">Gott im Himmel!</i>
+What did the people care about paper constitutions concerning
+benevolent assimilation? What they were interested in was food and
+safety, not politics; food, raiment, shelter, and efficient police
+protection from the brigandage which immediately follows in the wake of
+all war, not details as to what we were going to do with the bleeding
+and prostrate body politic. But the Commission had started out to
+govern the Filipino people on a definite theory,&mdash;apparently on
+the idea that if Americans wore white duck and no brass buttons, in
+lieu of khaki and brass buttons, the Filipinos would at once forget the
+war and be happy with an exceeding great happiness. Now the real
+situation was this. The Islands had not yet been thoroughly beaten into
+submission. Northern Luzon had been conquered. The lake region of
+Southern Luzon had been conquered. The most important of the Visayan
+Islands had been conquered. But the extreme southern portion of Luzon,
+the enormously rich hemp peninsula already described <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb401" href="#pb401" name="pb401">401</a>]</span>in a
+former chapter, and the adjoining hemp island of Samar, were still
+seething with sedition which later broke out. All through the winter of
+1900&ndash;01 General MacArthur had tried to get Mr. Root to let him
+close the hemp ports. But some powerful influence at Washington had
+prevented the grant of this permission. On January 9, 1901, General
+MacArthur had wired Mr. Root:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Hemp in southern Luzon in same relation to present
+struggle as cotton during rebellion.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8902src" href="#xd20e8902" name="xd20e8902src">44</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Nothing doing. General MacArthur must worry along with the
+&ldquo;blockade-runners&rdquo; as best he could, no matter how much
+hemp money might be poured into the insurgent coffers. So that in the
+latter part of 1902, although the more respectable of the insurgent
+leaders had then surrendered, even in the hemp country, the flames of
+public disorder, which had flickered for a spell after the Batangas
+lesson, broke out anew in the province of Albay, and in parts of
+Sorsogon, the two provinces of the hemp peninsula having the best
+sea-ports. The man at the head of this Albay insurrection was a sorry
+scamp of some shrewdness by the name of Simeon Ola, with whom I
+afterwards had an interesting and in some respects most amusing
+acquaintance. But that is another story. I have simply brought the
+whole archipelago abreast of the close of 1902, relatively to public
+order. In this way only may the insurrections in Albay and elsewhere in
+1902&ndash;03, described in the chapter which follows, be understood in
+their relation to a comprehensive view of the American occupation from
+the beginning, and not be regarded as &ldquo;a local issue&rdquo; like
+General Hancock&rsquo;s tariff, having <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb402" href="#pb402" name="pb402">402</a>]</span>no general political
+significance. In this way only may those insurrections be understood in
+their true relation to the history of public order in the Islands. The
+Commission always represented all disturbances after 1902 as matters of
+mere banditti, such as have been chronic for generations in Calabria or
+the Transcaucasus, wholly distinct from, instead of being an inevitable
+political sequel of, the years of continuous warfare which had
+preceded. Their benevolent obsession was that the desire of the
+Philippine people for independence was wholly and happily eradicated.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb403" href="#pb403" name=
+"pb403">403</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7893" href="#xd20e7893src" name="xd20e7893">1</a></span> Mr.
+Williams to Mr. Cridler, <i>Senate Document 62</i> (1898), p. 319.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7905" href="#xd20e7905src" name="xd20e7905">2</a></span> See
+<i>First Report of Taft Philippine Commission to the Secretary of
+War</i>, p. 17.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7913" href="#xd20e7913src" name="xd20e7913">3</a></span> General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s report for 1901, <i>War Department Report</i>, 1901,
+vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7919" href="#xd20e7919src" name="xd20e7919">4</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1241.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e7994" href="#xd20e7994src" name="xd20e7994">5</a></span> J. R.
+Arnold, of the Philippine Civil Service Board, in <i>North American
+Review</i>, for February, 1912.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8002" href="#xd20e8002src" name="xd20e8002">6</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1261.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8014" href="#xd20e8014src" name="xd20e8014">7</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8024" href="#xd20e8024src" name="xd20e8024">8</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 1, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902, p.
+136.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8194" href="#xd20e8194src" name="xd20e8194">9</a></span> Cagayan,
+Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8203" href="#xd20e8203src" name="xd20e8203">10</a></span> A kind
+of two-wheeled buggy, the principal public vehicle of Manila.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8223" href="#xd20e8223src" name="xd20e8223">11</a></span> As it
+turned out, I lost nothing in the end, because my resignation of my
+military commission was not acted on at Washington, and I only ceased
+to be an officer of the army by operation of law at the end of the
+fiscal year, June 30, 1901, as had been provided by the Act of Congress
+of March 2, 1899, organizing the twenty-five regiments for Philippine
+service.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8239" href="#xd20e8239src" name="xd20e8239">12</a></span> See the
+Act of the U. S. Philippine Commission of July 17, 1901, entitled,
+&ldquo;An act restoring the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol, to
+the executive control of the military governor,&rdquo; in Public Laws,
+U. S. Philippine Commission, Division of Insular Affairs, War
+Department.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8242" href="#xd20e8242src" name="xd20e8242">13</a></span> See
+<i>American Census of the Philippines</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8248" href="#xd20e8248src" name="xd20e8248">14</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8258" href="#xd20e8258src" name="xd20e8258">15</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 7.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8354" href="#xd20e8354src" name="xd20e8354">16</a></span> See
+pages 102 <i>et seq.</i> of <i>Our Philippine Problem</i> by H. Parker
+Willis, Professor of Economics and Politics in Washington and Lee
+University. New York, Henry Holt &amp; Co., 1905.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8365" href="#xd20e8365src" name="xd20e8365">17</a></span> Where
+he still is.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8390" href="#xd20e8390src" name="xd20e8390">18</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1297.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8399" href="#xd20e8399src" name="xd20e8399">19</a></span> The
+words quoted were used by Mr. Root in a speech delivered at Youngstown,
+Ohio, October 25, 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8404" href="#xd20e8404src" name="xd20e8404">20</a></span>
+Sixty-six men and three officers were surprised at breakfast and cut
+off from their guns by several hundred <i>bolo</i> men who had come
+into town as unarmed natives under pretence of attending a church
+fiesta. Forty-five men and officers were killed after a desperate
+resistance. Twenty-four only were able to escape. <i>War Department
+Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8413" href="#xd20e8413src" name="xd20e8413">21</a></span>
+Governor Taft&rsquo;s Report for 1901, <i>War Department Report</i>,
+1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8440" href="#xd20e8440src" name="xd20e8440">22</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 208.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8452" href="#xd20e8452src" name="xd20e8452">23</a></span>
+Leviticus xvi., 10.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8460" href="#xd20e8460src" name="xd20e8460">24</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 12.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8495" href="#xd20e8495src" name="xd20e8495">25</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 1, p. 86, 57th Congress, 1st Session
+(1902).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8507" href="#xd20e8507src" name="xd20e8507">26</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report for 1900</i>, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59 <i>et seq.</i>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8526" href="#xd20e8526src" name="xd20e8526">27</a></span>
+<i>Report for 1901</i>, p. 98.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8535" href="#xd20e8535src" name="xd20e8535">28</a></span> See
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii, p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8546" href="#xd20e8546src" name="xd20e8546">29</a></span> The
+Provincial Government Act was an act passed February 6, 1901, outlining
+the general scheme of government for the several provinces, and
+indicating the various tempting official positions attaching
+thereto.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8553" href="#xd20e8553src" name="xd20e8553">30</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8631" href="#xd20e8631src" name="xd20e8631">31</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, p. 1612 <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8648" href="#xd20e8648src" name="xd20e8648">32</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 1614.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8689" href="#xd20e8689src" name="xd20e8689">33</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 1622.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8707" href="#xd20e8707src" name="xd20e8707">34</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 1623.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8733" href="#xd20e8733src" name="xd20e8733">35</a></span> <i>S.
+D. 331</i>, 1902, p. 1628.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8784" href="#xd20e8784src" name="xd20e8784">36</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 221.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8799" href="#xd20e8799src" name="xd20e8799">37</a></span> Colonel
+Wagner&rsquo;s testimony before Senate Committee of 1902. <i>Senate
+Document 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2873.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8808" href="#xd20e8808src" name="xd20e8808">38</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 284.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8817" href="#xd20e8817src" name="xd20e8817">39</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 887.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8830" href="#xd20e8830src" name="xd20e8830">40</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, pt. 3, p. 2878.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8837" href="#xd20e8837src" name="xd20e8837">41</a></span>
+Theodore <i>Rex</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8845" href="#xd20e8845src" name="xd20e8845">42</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 192.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8850" href="#xd20e8850src" name="xd20e8850">43</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence relating to the War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., pp.
+1352&ndash;3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8902" href="#xd20e8902src" name="xd20e8902">44</a></span>
+<i>Military Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1244.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch16" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XVI</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Taft, 1903</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Me miserable! Which way shall I fly?</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><i>Paradise Lost.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Throughout the last year of Governor Taft&rsquo;s
+administration in the Philippines, 1903, both he, and the peaceably
+inclined Filipinos in the disturbed districts, were between the devil
+and the deep sea. The military handling of the Batangas and Samar
+disorders of 1901&ndash;2 had precipitated in the United States Senate
+a storm of criticism, at the hands of Senator Bacon and others, which
+had reminded a public, already satiated with slaughtering a weaker
+Christian people they had never seen in the interest of supposed trade
+expansion, of &ldquo;the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily
+against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some
+show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of
+Africa.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8926src" href="#xd20e8926"
+name="xd20e8926src">1</a> He did not want to order out the military
+again if he could help it, and this relegated him to his native
+municipal police and constabulary, experimental outfits of doubtful
+loyalty,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8932src" href="#xd20e8932" name=
+"xd20e8932src">2</a> and, at best, wholly inadequate, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb404" href="#pb404" name="pb404">404</a>]</span>as
+it afterwards turned out,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e8946src" href=
+"#xd20e8946" name="xd20e8946src">3</a> for the maintenance of public
+order and for affording to the peaceably inclined people that sort of
+security for life and property, and that protection against
+semi-political as well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comport
+with the dignity of this nation. The better class of Filipinos, though
+not so enamored of American rule as Governor Taft fondly believed, had
+by 1903 about resigned themselves to the inevitable, and would have
+liked to see brigandage masquerading under the name of patriotism
+stopped by that sort of adequate police protection which was so
+obviously necessary in the disturbed and unsettled conditions naturally
+consequent upon many years of war, and which they of course realized
+could only be afforded by the strong arm of the American army. But they
+knew that if the army were ordered out, the burden of proof as to their
+own loyalty would at once be shifted to them, by the strenuous agents
+of that strenuous institution. The result was a sort of reign of terror
+for nearly a year, in 1902&ndash;3, in the richest province of the
+whole archipelago, the hemp-producing province of Albay, at the
+southern end of Luzon, and also in portions of the province of Misamis.
+These conditions had begun in those provinces in 1902, and, not being
+promptly checked, because the army was held in leash and the
+constabulary were crude and inadequate, by 1903 brigandage therein was
+thriving like a garden of weeds. Super-solicitude concerning the
+possible effect of adequately vigorous governmental action in the
+Philippines on the fortunes of the Administration in charge of the
+Federal Government at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb405" href=
+"#pb405" name="pb405">405</a>]</span>Washington, an attitude not
+surprising in the colonial agents of that Administration, but which, as
+we have seen, had been from the beginning, as it must ever be, the
+curse of our colonial system, had rendered American sovereignty in the
+disturbed districts as humiliatingly impotent as senile decadence ever
+rendered Spain.</p>
+<p>The average American citizen will admit that the average American
+statesman, even if he be not far-sighted, looks at least a year ahead,
+in matters where both his personal fortunes and those of the political
+party to which he belongs are intimately related to what he may be
+doing at the time. If in 1903 Governor Taft&rsquo;s administration of
+affairs in the Philippines was wholly uninfluenced by any possible
+effect it might have on President Roosevelt&rsquo;s chances for
+becoming an elected President in 1904, then he was a false friend and a
+very poor party man as well. Assuming that he was neither, let us
+examine his course regarding the disturbances of public order in the
+Philippines in that year, as related to the first and most sacred duty
+of every government, adequate protection for life and property.</p>
+<p>In President McKinley&rsquo;s original instructions of April 7,
+1900, to the Taft Commission, after quoting the final paragraph of the
+articles of capitulation of the city of Manila:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and its
+private property of all descriptions *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* are hereby placed
+under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American
+army;</p>
+</div>
+<p>the President had added:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the
+Government of the United States to give <i>protection for property and
+life</i> *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>to all the people of the Philippine
+Islands</i>. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb406" href="#pb406" name=
+"pb406">406</a>]</span></p>
+<p>*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>I charge this Commission to labor for the full
+performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience
+of their country.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>We will probably never again have a better man at the head of the
+Philippine Government than William H. Taft. We have no higher type of
+citizen in the republic to-day than the man now<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8978src" href="#xd20e8978" name="xd20e8978src">4</a> at the head
+of it. In the <i>Outlook</i> of September 21, 1901, there appeared an
+article on the Philippines written in the summer previous by
+Vice-President Roosevelt, entitled &ldquo;The First Civil
+Governor,&rdquo; which began as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A year ago a man of wide acquaintance both with
+American public life and American public men<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8987src" href="#xd20e8987" name="xd20e8987src">5</a> remarked
+that the first Governor of the Philippines ought to combine the
+qualities which would make a first-class President of the United States
+with the qualities which would make a first-class Chief Justice of the
+United States, and that the only man he knew who possessed all these
+qualities was Judge William H. Taft, of Ohio. The statement was
+entirely correct.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The writer subscribed then, and still subscribes, to the foregoing
+estimate of Mr. Taft, whether Colonel Roosevelt still does or not.
+Though I dissent most vigorously from more than one of President
+Taft&rsquo;s policies, and though this book is one long dissent from
+his chief pet policy, still it is to me an especial pleasure to do him
+honor where I may, not merely because he has greatly honored me in the
+past, but because my judgment approves the above estimate. Though as a
+party leader he is a very poor general, as Chief Magistrate of the
+nation he has certainly deserved and commanded the cordial esteem of
+the whole country, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb407" href="#pb407"
+name="pb407">407</a>]</span>and the respectful regard of all mankind.
+With this admission freely made, if after reading what follows in this
+and the next chapter, and weighing the same in the light of all that
+has preceded, the reader does not decide that the writer, far from
+being animated by any intelligent high purpose, is merely a foolish
+person of the sounding-brass-and-tinkling-cymbal variety full of sound
+and fury signifying nothing, then he can reach but one other
+conclusion, viz., that colonization by a republic like ours, such as
+that we blundered into by purchasing the Philippines, is a case of a
+house divided against itself, a case of the soul of a nation at war
+with the better angels of its nature, a case where considerations of
+what may be demanded by home considerations of political expediency
+will always operate to the detriment of the Filipino people, and be the
+controlling factor in our government of them. And if I show that in the
+Philippines in 1903 Governor Taft failed properly to protect the lives
+and property of peaceably inclined people, as so sacredly enjoined in
+the language above quoted from President McKinley&rsquo;s original
+instructions to him, lest &ldquo;the full performance of this
+obligation&rdquo; might prejudice the presidential prospects of his
+friend, Mr. Roosevelt, and the success of the party to which they
+belonged, then I will have shown that for this republic to be in the
+colonizing business is an absolutely evil thing, and that any man who
+proposes any honorable way out of the conceded blunder of 1898, is
+entitled to a hearing at the hands of the American people, because it
+&ldquo;concerns the honor and conscience of their country.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Having tried most of the cases which arose out of the public
+disorders in the Philippines in 1903, and knowing from what I thus
+learned, together with what I subsequently learned <i>which Mr. Taft
+knew then</i>, that the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb408" href=
+"#pb408" name="pb408">408</a>]</span>most serious of those disorders
+were very inadequately handled by native police, and constabulary, with
+much wholly unnecessary incidental sacrifice of life, in order to
+preserve the appearance of &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government and convey
+the impression of the state of peace the name implied, at a time when a
+reign of terror due to brigandage prevailed throughout wide and
+populous regions in whose soil lay the riches of agricultural plenty,
+while the United States Army looked on with a silent disgust which
+understood the reason, and a becoming subordination which regretfully
+bowed to that reason as one which must ever be the curse of
+colonization by a republic like ours, I know whereof I shall speak, and
+will therefore speak neither lightly nor unadvisedly, but soberly,
+charitably, and in the fear of God.</p>
+<p>The insurrection in the Philippines against American authority which
+began with the outbreak of February 4, 1899, and whose last dying
+embers were not finally stamped out until 1906, systematic denials by
+optimist officialdom to the contrary notwithstanding, had three
+distinct stages:</p>
+<p>(1) The original fighting in company, battalion, and regimental
+formation, with the ordinary wide-flung battle line; this having
+terminated pursuant to a preconcerted plan early in November, 1899.</p>
+<p>(2) A period of guerrilla warfare maintained by the educated,
+patriotic, fighting generals, in a gradually decreasing number of
+provinces, until the summer of 1902.</p>
+<p>(3) The final long drawn-out sputterings, which began to get serious
+in the fall of 1902, in provinces prematurely taken under the civil
+government, and stripped of adequate military protection before things
+had been given time to settle down in them to normal.</p>
+<p>These last are the &ldquo;gardens of weeds&rdquo;&mdash;brigandage
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb409" href="#pb409" name=
+"pb409">409</a>]</span>weeds&mdash;above mentioned. While the
+horticultural metaphor will help some, to really understand the case
+nothing so fits it as the more common illustration applied to grave
+public disorders having a common cause which likens such matters to a
+conflagration. The third and last stage through which the Philippine
+insurrection degenerated to final extinction is adequately and
+accurately described in the following extract from one of the military
+reports of 1902:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The surrender or capture of the respectable military
+element left the control of affairs and the remainder of the arms in
+the hands of a lot of persons, most of them ignorant, some criminal,
+and nearly all pertaining to a restless, irresponsible, unscrupulous
+class of people, whose principal ambition seems to be to live without
+work, and who have found it possible to so do under the guise of
+patriotism.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9018src" href="#xd20e9018" name=
+"xd20e9018src">6</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Such was the problem which confronted Governor Taft in 1903 as to
+public order and protection of the peaceably inclined people, in the
+two main provinces hereinafter dealt with.</p>
+<p>It is a great pity that in 1903 President Roosevelt could not have
+called in Secretary of War Root and sent for Senator Bacon, and those
+of the latter&rsquo;s colleagues whose philippics in the Senate of the
+year previous against Generals Jake Smith and J. Franklin Bell had
+reminded an aroused nation of the days of Cicero and Verres, Tacitus
+and Africa, etc., and had a frank talk with them somewhat after this
+fashion:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Gentlemen, Governor Taft has a hard job out there in
+the Philippines. There is a big insurrection going on in the province
+of Albay, which is the very richest province in the whole archipelago,
+a province as big as the State of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb410"
+href="#pb410" name="pb410">410</a>]</span>Delaware,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e9032src" href="#xd20e9032" name="xd20e9032src">7</a> having a
+population of about a quarter of a million people, and he has, for
+police purposes, a crude outfit of native constabulary, officered
+mostly by ex-enlisted men of the mustered-out American volunteer
+regiments. The personnel of the officers may be weeded out later and
+made a fine body of men, but just at present there are a good many
+rather tough citizens among them. Moreover, as soon as the constabulary
+was gotten together they were at once set to work chasing little
+remnants of the insurgent army all over the archipelago. So as yet they
+are as undisciplined an outfit as you can well imagine, and have never
+had any opportunity to act together in any considerable command.
+Moreover, hardly any Filipinos have yet had a chance to learn much
+about how to shoot a rifle. Also, they know practically nothing about
+the interior economy of large commands, such as handling and
+distributing rations systematically for troops and for prisoners, or
+doing the same as to clothing, and nothing at all about medical care of
+the wounded, or the sick, or prisoners. So you can see that to handle
+this insurrection with such an outfit as this is sure to mean trouble
+of one sort or another. Wholly unauthorized overtures through officious
+natives, to the insurgent brigand chiefs, may, possibly, be made,
+promising them immunity, when they ought to be made an example of; and
+that will embarrass us in punishing them when we do finally get them,
+and be an encouragement to other cut-throats to do likewise in the
+future. Worst of all, you can see that if some five hundred or a
+thousand of these brigands, or insurgents, or whatever they are,
+suddenly surrender, the ordinary police accommodations for housing and
+feeding prisoners will be wholly inadequate; yet we will have to detain
+them all until our courts can sift them and see which are the mere dumb
+driven cattle and which are the mischievous fellows. Therefore, in case
+of such a surrender, the nature of this constabulary force, as I have
+already described it to you, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb411" href=
+"#pb411" name="pb411">411</a>]</span>makes it plain that its inadequacy
+to meet the serious conditions we are now confronted with may result in
+our having on our hands a series of little Andersonville prisons that
+will smell to heaven. The majority of the people of the province are
+really sick of the war. Their best men have all surrendered and come
+in. But there is an ignorant creature calling himself a general, by the
+name of Ola, who seems to have a great deal of influence with the
+lawless element that do not want to work. Ola has gathered together
+nearly a thousand malcontents, who obey him implicitly. He is
+terrorizing Albay province and the regions adjacent thereto, and as the
+constabulary are not adequate to patrol the whole province, the people
+do not know whether self-interest demands that they should side with
+Ola or with us. Clearly, therefore, this is a case for vigorous
+measures, if we all have a common concern for the national honor, for
+the maintenance of law and order in a territory we are supposed to be
+governing, and for the proper protection of life and property there.
+General Bell or somebody else ought to be sent there to comb that
+province just as Bell did Batangas. But we don&rsquo;t want any howl
+about it.</p>
+</div>
+<p>At this point of the supposed colloquy,&mdash;I say
+&ldquo;colloquy,&rdquo; though tradition has it that most of President
+Roosevelt&rsquo;s &ldquo;colloquys&rdquo; with Senators were what Henry
+E. Davis, the Sidney Smith of Washington, calls &ldquo;unilateral
+conversation&rdquo;&mdash;one can imagine the senatorial Ciceros
+exchanging glances expressive of the unspoken thought: &ldquo;The man
+certainly has his nerve with him. Does he think the Senate is an annex
+of the White House?&rdquo; Then we can imagine President Roosevelt
+bending strenuously to his task with infinite tactfulness thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I put Jake Smith out of business, as you gentlemen all
+know, for his inhuman methods of avenging the Balangiga <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb412" href="#pb412" name=
+"pb412">412</a>]</span>massacre in Samar, and I am just as much opposed
+to cruelty as any of you Senators can be. But Bell in Batangas is an
+altogether different case from Smith in Samar. All this about the odor
+of decomposing bodies wafted from reconcentration camps, and
+&ldquo;clouds of vampire bats swirling out on their orgies over the
+dead,&rdquo; that Senator Bacon&rsquo;s army friend, whoever he may be,
+wrote the Senator, relates to Samar, and never did have any application
+to Bell&rsquo;s methods in Batangas. Bell did a clean job in a minimum
+of time and with a minimum sacrifice of life, and, while he did have
+those reconcentration camps in Batangas, he saw to it religiously that
+nobody starved, and that all those people received daily medical
+treatment.</p>
+</div>
+<p>For the correctness of the picture of conditions presented in the
+above hypothetical talk, I of course intend to be understood as
+vouching. If such a talk could have been had in 1903 by President
+Roosevelt with Senator Bacon and those of his colleagues who shared his
+views, the Albay situation might have been handled creditably. But the
+Administration was in no position to be frank with the Opposition. No
+Administration has ever yet during the last fourteen years been in a
+position to be frank with the Senate and the country concerning the
+situation at any given time in the Philippines, because at any given
+time there was always so much that it could not afford to re-open and
+explain. Mr. Root, for instance, might have been questioned too closely
+as to why, when Secretary of War, he had gone around the country in the
+fall of 1900 speaking for Mr. McKinley, and talking about &ldquo;<i>the
+patient and unconsenting millions&rdquo; so anxious to be rid of
+&ldquo;Aguinaldo and his band of assassins</i>,&rdquo; when at that
+very time his (Mr. Root&rsquo;s) generals in the Philippines were
+engaged in activities, the magnitude of which may be inferred from a
+telegram sent from Washington to General <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb413" href="#pb413" name="pb413">413</a>]</span>Wood at Havana,
+asking if he could possibly spare the 10th Infantry, and adding:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>Imperative that we have immediate use of every
+available company that we can lay our hands on for service in the
+Philippines</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9058src" href="#xd20e9058"
+name="xd20e9058src">8</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>although at West Point in 1902 he told the cadets how nobly the army
+had labored in putting down &ldquo;an insurrection of 7,000,000
+people.&rdquo; No, the Administration in 1903 simply could not afford
+to be frank concerning the situation in the Philippines. I need not
+recapitulate here any more of the long train of reasons why, because
+they have all been fully explained in the preceding chapters. Of course
+President Roosevelt had no such guilty knowledge of the facts as Mr.
+Root. He was not in constant daily contact with army officers at the
+War Department, familiar with the actual situation in the Philippines,
+as Mr. Root was. He was simply &ldquo;sticking to Taft.&rdquo;
+Somewhere along about the time the military folk in the Philippines
+were scoffing at the unnecessary sacrifice of life incident to the lack
+of a strong government, President Roosevelt had written his warm
+personal friend, Hon. George Curry, now a member of Congress from New
+Mexico, who had been a captain in his regiment before Santiago, was
+then an official of the civil government of the Philippines, and later
+Governor of New Mexico, by appointment of Mr. Roosevelt: &ldquo;Stick
+to Taft, George&rdquo; or words to that effect. Mr. Roosevelt&rsquo;s
+attitude was simply that of an intensely loyal friend of Mr. Taft who
+simply assumed that the Philippine Government was not going to tolerate
+impotence in the matter of protecting life and property. But everybody
+at both ends of the line was too deep in the mire of all the long and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb414" href="#pb414" name=
+"pb414">414</a>]</span>systematic withholding of facts from the
+American public which had been occurring ever since 1898, and which it
+has been the aim of the preceding chapters to illuminate by the light
+since <span class="corr" id="xd20e9067" title=
+"Source: become">becoming</span> available in the published official
+records of the Government. Hence, in the hypothetical conference above
+supposed, President Roosevelt was in no position to take any high
+ground. He would have had to admit that the civil government of 1901
+was set up too soon in order to stand by half-baked notions dished out
+in 1900 by the Taft Commission in aid of his own and Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s campaign for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency,
+respectively. In other words the truth about the Philippines from the
+beginning might, and probably would, have seriously jeopardized the
+Roosevelt presidential chances in 1904. So Governor Taft was left to
+his own resources in struggling with the problem of law and order in
+the Islands, intimately understanding the obvious bearing, just
+suggested, of what he might do out there, on the election of 1904. What
+then did Governor Taft do to meet the situation in 1903? Chronological
+order, as well as other considerations making for clearness, would
+suggest that I begin by telling what he did not do.</p>
+<p>In May, 1903, I was sent to the province of Surigao to try some
+cases arising out of what has ever since been known in that
+out-of-the-way region as &ldquo;the affair of March 23d&rdquo; (1903).
+In his annual report for 1903, pages 29 and 30, in describing the
+Surigao affair, Governor Taft correctly states that a band of outlaws
+came into the town of Surigao on the day above named, killed Captain
+Clark, the officer in charge of the constabulary, took the
+constabulary&rsquo;s guns, while they were all away at their mid-day
+meal, scattered about the town, and departed. But Mr. Taft&rsquo;s
+report <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb415" href="#pb415" name=
+"pb415">415</a>]</span>disposes of the whole incident in a most casual
+way. As a matter of fact the gist of it was that a heroic little band
+of Americans under Mr. Luther S. Kelly, the provincial treasurer, an
+old Indian scout of the Yellowstone country, hastily gathered the seven
+American women then in the town, one of them in a delicate condition,
+into the stone government house, and stood off those semi-civilized
+sensual brigands until reinforcements arrived. Governor Taft&rsquo;s
+failure adequately to present the gravity of the episode in his account
+of it does not argue well for the subsequent solicitude he might feel
+about other American women in other remote provinces which he was
+anxious to keep on his &ldquo;pacified list,&rdquo; to say nothing of
+politically negligible native life therein.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9074src" href="#xd20e9074" name="xd20e9074src">9</a> Nor does
+this report include any of the material facts showing the
+ineffectiveness of the rank and file of the constabulary to cope with
+the situation, or the general feeling of insecurity I found in the
+province as to how far the whole population might be in sympathy with
+the brigands. As a matter of fact, after that Surigao affair, Governor
+Taft had to turn the army loose in the province to go and get back and
+restore to his constabulary the seventy-five to one hundred
+stand-of-arms the brigands had so rudely and impolitely taken away from
+them, and I held court there for a month trying the people who were
+captured and brought in, with Colonel Meyer, of the 11th Infantry, one
+of the most thorough and able soldiers of the United States Army, and
+seven hundred soldiers of his regiment acting as deputy sheriffs, and
+yet all the time the province was under &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government,
+nominally. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb416" href="#pb416" name=
+"pb416">416</a>]</span>Colonel Meyer got the men who killed Clark, and,
+upon due and ample proof, I hung them, but Surigao was never taken for
+a day from the list of provinces enjoying &ldquo;the peace and
+protection of a benign civil government.&rdquo; <i>The writ of habeas
+corpus was never suspended for a moment.</i></p>
+<p>In the report above quoted from, Governor Taft remarks that if the
+prompt steps he did take (he had already described the prompt sending
+of the military to the scene) had not been taken, &ldquo;the trouble
+might have spread.&rdquo; But the Surigao affair seemed to teach the
+civil government nothing in the matter of subsequent protection of
+life, nor did it lessen their persistence in relying on their
+constabulary for due extension of such protection in time of need.</p>
+<p>By June, 1903, another scheme was invented for avoiding calling on
+the military. When you are in a foreign country building a new
+government on the ruins of an old one, you naturally find out as much
+as you can about how the old one met its problems. The Spaniards had
+had the same problem in their day about not ordering out the military,
+because they did not have any military to order out. They were too poor
+to garrison the various provinces. They had long followed the plan,
+from time to time, of reconcentrating in the main towns of disturbed
+districts all the country population they could get to come in, and
+then acting on the assumption that all who did not come in were public
+enemies. This meant that when the country people came in, they simply
+looked out for themselves, while away from their homes, and farms, as
+best they could. Of course nobody at all looked after the farms, and
+nobody provided medical attention for the reconcentrados, or sanitary
+attention for the reconcentration camps. This general plan was formally
+sanctioned by <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb417" href="#pb417" name=
+"pb417">417</a>]</span>the Commission, in so far as the following law
+sanctioned it. The law was enacted, June 1, 1903. It is section 6, of
+Act 781, which was an act dealing with all the constabulary problems,
+of which this was one. It read:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In provinces which are <i>infested to such an extent
+with ladrones or outlaws that the lives and property of residents in
+the outlying barrios<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9094src" href=
+"#xd20e9094" name="xd20e9094src">10</a> are rendered wholly insecure by
+continued predatory raids</i>&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+<p>think of permitting a country to get into any such condition when
+you have an abundance of American troops on hand available to prevent
+it&mdash;</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones
+or outlaws their sources of food supply, <i>and it is not possible with
+the available police forces constantly to provide protection to such
+barrios</i>&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+<p>there being all the time &ldquo;available police forces,&rdquo; in
+the shape of regular troops, amply able to handle these unsettled
+conditions, which were the inevitable aftermath of lawlessness
+consequent on five or six years of guerrilla warfare&mdash;</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">it shall be within the power of the Governor-General,
+upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, to authorize the
+provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying
+barrios be temporarily brought&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+<p>observe the length of time this may last is not limited&mdash;
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb418" href="#pb418" name=
+"pb418">418</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">within stated proximity to the <i>poblacion</i>, or
+larger barrios, of the municipality, there to remain until the
+necessity for such order ceases to exist.</p>
+</div>
+<p>To house and ration the reconcentrados, the following provision is
+made by the statute we are considering:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">During such <i>temporary</i> residence, it shall be
+the duty of the provincial board, out of provincial funds, to furnish
+such sustenance and shelter as may be needed to prevent suffering among
+the residents of the barrios thus withdrawn.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The act also provides that during the course of the reconcentration,
+where the province does not happen to have the necessary ready cash, it
+may apply to the Commission, in distant Manila, for an appropriation to
+meet the emergency. What is to be done with those who starve during the
+temporary deficit, it does not say. If you must have reconcentration,
+to leave it to such agencies as the above, with the native police and
+constabulary as understudies, in lieu of availing yourself of the
+superb equipment of the American army, with all its facilities for
+handling great masses of people, as they did, for instance, after the
+San Francisco fire, is like preferring the Mulligan Guards to the
+Cold-stream Guards. Furthermore, there is no escape from the logic of
+the fact that reconcentration is essentially a war measure. The
+difference between what is lawful in war and what is lawful in peace is
+not a technical one. In war the innocent must often suffer with the
+guilty. In peace the theory at least is that only the guilty suffer.
+Hence it is that our Constitution is so jealous that in time of peace
+no man&rsquo;s life, liberty, or property, shall be taken from him
+without &ldquo;due process of law,&rdquo; a provision which becomes
+inoperative in war times, being superseded by martial law. I know that
+the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb419" href="#pb419" name=
+"pb419">419</a>]</span>early question, &ldquo;Does the Constitution
+follow the flag?&rdquo; was answered by the Supreme Court of the United
+States in the negative as to the Philippines. But the Act of Congress
+of July 1, 1902, under which we were governing the Philippines in 1903,
+and still govern them, known as the Philippine Government Act, extended
+to the Islands all the provisions of the Bill of Rights of our
+Constitution except the right of jury trial and the individual right to
+go armed&mdash;&ldquo;bear arms.&rdquo; It specifically said in section
+5:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
+deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
+law.</p>
+</div>
+<p>It hardly needs argument to show that to bundle the rural population
+of a whole district out of house and home, and make them come to town
+to live indefinitely on such public charity as may drain through the
+itching fingers of impecunious town officials, abandoning meantime
+their growing crops, and the household effects they cannot bring with
+them, is depriving people of their property, and restraining them of
+their liberty, without due process of law. In fact, in 1905, in the
+case of Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, vol. v., <i>Philippine Report</i>,
+page 116, during an insurrection in Batangas, to control which, the
+presidential election of 1904 being then safely over, the writ of
+habeas corpus had been suspended and martial law declared, the Supreme
+Court of the Philippines held that detention of people as
+reconcentrados under such circumstances &ldquo;for the purpose of
+protecting them&rdquo; was not an illegal restraint of their liberty,
+<i>because the ordinary law had been suspended</i>. This decision held
+it to be both the prerogative and the duty of the Governor-General to
+suspend <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb420" href="#pb420" name=
+"pb420">420</a>]</span>the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety
+so required.</p>
+<p>I refuse to believe for a moment that President Taft, the former
+wise and just judge, in whom is now vested by law the mighty power of
+filling vacancies on the highest court in this great country of ours,
+will seriously contend that that reconcentration law is not in direct
+violation of the above quoted section of the Act of Congress of July 1,
+1902, for the government of the Philippines, and therefore null and
+void. The truth is, it was a piece of careless legislation, dealing
+with conditions that were essentially war conditions, under a
+government which was forever vowing that peace conditions existed, and
+determined not to admit the contrary. The civil government was like
+Lot&rsquo;s wife. It could not look back.</p>
+<p>The Act of Congress of 1902 had made the usual provision permitting
+the governor to declare martial law in a given locality in his
+discretion. But the reconcentration law passed by the Philippine
+Commission was a way of avoiding the exercise of that authority, so as
+to keep up the appearance of peace in the provinces to which it might
+be applied, regardless of how many lives it might cost. In its last
+analysis the reconcentration law was at once an admission of a duty to
+order out the military and a declaration of intention to neglect that
+duty. I suppose the eminent gentlemen who enacted it justified it on
+the idea of teaching the natives how to maintain order themselves by
+letting them stew in the dregs of their own insurrection. Yet no one
+can read the Commission&rsquo;s own description of the widespread
+lawlessness which so long ran riot after the guerrilla warfare
+degenerated into brigandage, without seeing, from their own showing,
+how obvious was their duty to have waited, originally, until law and
+order <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb421" href="#pb421" name=
+"pb421">421</a>]</span>were restored, by not interfering with the war
+itself until it was over, and by keeping the country properly
+garrisoned for a decorous and sufficient period after it <i>was</i>
+over, until something like real peace conditions should exist, on which
+to begin the work of post-bellum reconstruction. After all, it all gets
+us back to the original pernicious programme outlined in President
+McKinley&rsquo;s annual message to Congress of December, 1899, wherein
+was announced the intention to send out the Taft Commission, which
+message also announced, in effect, that it was Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+purpose to begin the work of reconstruction as fast as the patient and
+unconsenting millions &ldquo;loyal to our rule&rdquo; should be rescued
+from the clutch of the hated Tagals.</p>
+<p>Recurring again to the reconcentration law itself, the moral quality
+of executive action putting it in operation was not unlike that which
+would attach should the Governor of Massachusetts, in lieu of ordering
+the state troops to the scene of great strike riots in half a dozen
+towns around Boston, issue a proclamation something like this:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The situation has grown so serious that your local
+police force, as you see, is wholly inadequate to cope with the
+situation. You will all, therefore, thrust your tooth-brushes,
+night-gowns, and a change of clothing, into the family grip, and
+assemble on the Boston Common and in the public gardens, there to
+remain until the necessity for this order ceases to exist, and we will
+there take the best care of you we can, as was done in the case of the
+San Francisco fire. As governor I am unwilling to order out the
+military.</p>
+</div>
+<p>If any lawyer on the Commission gave any thought at the time to the
+validity of the reconcentration law, in its relation to the &ldquo;due
+process of law&rdquo; clause of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb422" href="#pb422" name="pb422">422</a>]</span>Philippine Government
+Act, which none of them probably did, he must simply have justified the
+means by the benevolence of the end, on the idea that he knew so much
+better than Congress possibly could, the needs of the local situation.
+But if you read this law in the light of a knowledge of its practical
+operation, there is more suggestion between its lines of Senator
+Bacon&rsquo;s friend&rsquo;s &ldquo;corpse-carcass stench&rdquo; and
+&ldquo;clouds of vampire bats softly swirling out on their orgies over
+the dead&rdquo; than there is of benevolence. It really was
+unsportsmanlike for the Commission to have entrusted reconcentration to
+the native police and constabulary the native governors had, and it was
+wholly indefensible for them to take the liberty of violating an act of
+Congress in order to live up to their pet fiction about the war being
+&ldquo;entirely over.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>After the term of court at Surigao in the month of May, 1903, I was
+sent to Misamis province, where I remained until September, handling an
+insurrection down there. This province also was nominally in a state of
+peace, <i>i.e.</i>, there was no formal recognition of the existence of
+the insurrection by suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Curiously
+enough, as I wrote Governor Taft afterwards, the Misamis crowd of
+disturbers of the peace were genuine <i>insurrectos</i>. Their movement
+was not so formidable as the Ola insurrection in Albay I dealt with
+later, but they were by no means unmitigated cut-throats. I have often
+wondered how they managed to be so respectable at that late date. They
+did not steal, as did most of the outlaws of 1903. Their avowed purpose
+was to subvert the existing government. The use of this word
+&ldquo;insurrection&rdquo; in connection with these various
+disturbances recalls a pertinent incident. In 1904 there was a vacancy
+on the Supreme Bench of the Islands. Some of my friends, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb423" href="#pb423" name=
+"pb423">423</a>]</span>members of the bar of my district, got up a
+petition to the then Governor-General setting forth in most partial
+terms my alleged qualifications for the place. Now in the Philippines,
+in the candor of informal social intercourse, all of us always called a
+spade a spade, <i>i.e.</i>, we called an insurrection an insurrection,
+instead of referring to the disturbance in the guarded and euphemistic
+terms which you find in all the official reports intended for home
+consumption. So in their petition, these gentlemen recited, among my
+other supposed qualifications, that I had held court in three different
+provinces &ldquo;during insurrections in the same.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The Albay insurrection was the worst one I had to deal with during
+Governor Taft&rsquo;s administration as Governor of the Philippines.
+This was the insurrection headed by Simeon Ola. The first appearance of
+this man Ola in the official reports of the Philippine Government in
+connection with the Albay disturbances of 1902&ndash;3 is in the report
+of the colonel commanding the constabulary for the district which
+included Albay, Col. H. H. Bandholtz, dated June 30, 1903.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e9195src" href="#xd20e9195" name=
+"xd20e9195src">11</a> This report contains a sort of diary of events
+for the year preceding the date of it. An entry for October 28, 1902,
+begins:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Early this month <i>negotiations</i> were opened with
+Simeon Ola, chief of the ladrones in this province, with a view of
+inducing him to surrender.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Think of this great government <i>negotiating</i> with the leader of
+a band of thieves who were openly and flagrantly defying its authority!
+The entry proceeds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">After many promises and conferences extending over a
+period of forty days, during which hostilities were suspended,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb424" href="#pb424" name=
+"pb424">424</a>]</span>Ola <i>broke off negotiations</i> and withdrew
+his entire force and <i>a large number of additional recruits that he
+had secured during the armistice</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Before Ola finally surrendered he is supposed to have had a total
+command ranging at various times from a thousand to 1500 men. And I
+think Colonel Bandholtz must have had in the field opposed to him,
+first and last, at least an equal number of native forces. Ola also
+makes an official reappearance in the report of the Governor of Albay
+Province for 1904.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9226src" href=
+"#xd20e9226" name="xd20e9226src">12</a> It there appears that
+reconcentration was begun in Albay as part of the campaign against Ola
+and his forces, in March, 1903, and continued until the end of October
+of that year. Says this report of the Governor of Albay concerning
+reconcentration:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Naturally, the effect of this <i>unusual volume of
+persons</i> in a limited area was disease and suffering for want of
+food and ordinary living accommodations.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Governor does not say how large the &ldquo;unusual volume of
+persons&rdquo; was that was herded into the reconcentration zones, nor
+does he furnish any mortality statistics. <i>Nobody kept any.</i> How
+much there was of the awful mortality and &ldquo;clouds of vampire bats
+softly swirling out on their orgies over the dead,&rdquo; that Senator
+Bacon&rsquo;s army friend correspondent encountered in Samar does not
+affirmatively appear. The number of people affected by reconcentration
+in Albay and an adjacent province that caught the contagion of unrest
+and had to be given similar treatment, was about 300,000.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e9243src" href="#xd20e9243" name=
+"xd20e9243src">13</a></p>
+<p>In his report for 1903, in describing the Ola insurrection
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb425" href="#pb425" name=
+"pb425">425</a>]</span>of 1902&ndash;3, Governor Taft says: &ldquo;A
+reign of terror was inaugurated throughout the province.&rdquo; He then
+goes on to state that to meet it he applied the reconcentration
+tactics. In the same report he describes what is to my mind the most
+humiliating incident connected with the whole history of the American
+Government in the Philippines, viz., Vice-Governor Wright&rsquo;s visit
+to Albay in 1903, apparently in pursuance of the peace-at-any-price
+policy that the Manila Government was bent on. Governor Taft says of
+the civil government&rsquo;s dealings with His Excellency, the
+Honorable Simeon Ola, the chief of the brigands, that General Wright
+and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino member of the Commission, went down
+to Albay and &ldquo;talked to the people,&rdquo; the idea apparently
+being that those poor unarmed or ill-armed creatures should go after
+the brigands. This was to avoid ordering out the military, and
+summarily putting a stop to the reign of terror as became the dignity
+of this nation. I think these talks had something to do with the origin
+of the charge afterwards made that immunity was promised Ola and the
+men who finally did surrender with him. Of course General Wright made
+no such promises. But the idea got out in the province that the word
+was, &ldquo;Get the guns,&rdquo; the inference being that if Ola and
+his people would come in and surrender their guns they would be lightly
+dealt with. In his book <i>Our Philippine Problem</i>, Professor
+Willis, at page 140, gives what purports to be an agreement signed by
+Colonel Bandholtz, dated September 22, 1903, whereby Bandholtz promises
+Ola immunity, and also promises a number of other things which are on
+their face rankly preposterous. Ola was much on the witness stand
+before me during that term of court, and, everything &ldquo;came out in
+the wash.&rdquo; He was represented by <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb426" href="#pb426" name="pb426">426</a>]</span>competent,
+intelligent, and fearless Filipino counsel, and they did not suggest
+the existence of any such document. No proof of any offer of immunity
+was adduced before me. I think Ola simply finally decided to throw
+himself on the mercy of the government, on the idea that there would be
+more joy over the one sinner that repenteth than over the ninety and
+nine that are already saved. He was probably as much afraid that
+Governor Taft <i>would</i> order out the military as the wretched
+<i>pacificos</i> were that he would not. He immediately turned
+state&rsquo;s evidence against all the men under him of whose
+individual actings and doings he had any knowledge, the prosecuting
+attorney making, with my full approval, a promise to ask executive
+clemency as a reward. This was in keeping with the practice in like
+cases customary in all jurisdictions throughout the English-speaking
+world.</p>
+<p>The magnitude of the Ola insurrection may be somewhat appreciated
+from the financial loss it occasioned. Says Governor Taft, in his
+report for 1903:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Governor [of Albay] estimates that hemp production
+and sale have been interfered with to the extent of some ten to twelve
+millions of dollars Mexican [which is equivalent to five or six million
+dollars American money<span class="corr" id="xd20e9268" title=
+"Not in source">]</span>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e9271src" href=
+"#xd20e9271" name="xd20e9271src">14</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>As the population of the province was about 250,000,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e9278src" href="#xd20e9278" name=
+"xd20e9278src">15</a> a loss of $5,000,000 meant a loss of $20 per
+capita for the six months or so of reconcentration during which the
+farms were neglected. This would be equivalent to a loss of
+$1,800,000,000, in the same length of time to a country having a
+population of 90,000,000, which is the total population figure for the
+United States according to the Census of 1910. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb427" href="#pb427" name="pb427">427</a>]</span></p>
+<p>It was in the latter part of October, 1903, I believe, that Ola
+finally surrendered with some five hundred or six hundred men. I was
+sent to Albay about the middle of November, to assist the regular judge
+of the district, Hon. Adam C. Carson, now one of the justices of the
+Supreme Court of the Philippines, in disposing of the case arising out
+of the Ola performances. Conditions at the time were also very much
+perturbed in various neighboring and other provinces, and the courts
+and constabulary were kept very busy.</p>
+<p>An incident recurs to memory just here which illustrates the state
+of public order. But before relating it a decent respect to the
+opinions of the reader requires me to state my own attitude toward that
+whole situation at the time. I am perfectly clear in my own mind that
+as society stands at present, capital punishment is a necessary part of
+any sensible scheme for its protection. I have no compunction about
+hanging any man for the lawless taking of the life of another. We owe
+it to the community as a measure of protection to your life and mine
+and all others. So far as public order was concerned in the country now
+under consideration in 1903, the &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government was
+simply a well-meaning sham, a military government with a civil name to
+it. When the constabulary would get in the various brigands,
+cut-throats, etc., who might be terrorizing a given district, some of
+them masquerading as patriots, others not even doing that, the courts
+would try them. None of the judges cared anything about any particular
+brigand in any given case except to find out how many, if any, murders,
+rapes, arsons, etc., he had committed during the particular reign of
+terror of which he had been a part. Wherever specific murders were
+proven, the punishment would always be &ldquo;a life for a life.&rdquo;
+And you have no idea how absolutely wanton some of <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb428" href="#pb428" name="pb428">428</a>]</span>the
+murders were, and how cruelly some of the young women, daughters of the
+farmers, were maltreated after they were carried off to the mountains.
+I would hate to try to guess how much more of this sort of thing would
+have had to occur in Albay in 1903 than did occur, to have moved
+Governor Taft to deprive Albay of &ldquo;the protection of a benign
+civil government&rdquo;&mdash;one of the pet expressions of
+contemporaneous official literature&mdash;and say the word to the army
+to take hold of the situation and give the people decent protection.
+But to come to the incident above broached. Shortly after I reached
+Albay, and set to work to hold Part II. of the district court, while my
+colleague, Judge Carson, held Part I. we had a call from a third judge,
+Judge Linebarger, of Chicago, who was on his way to some other
+perturbed region. I think that by that time, late in November, 1903,
+Governor Taft must have known he was soon to leave the Islands to
+become Secretary of War, and therefore was anxious to be able to make
+the best showing possible, in his farewell annual report as Governor,
+as to the &ldquo;tranquillity&rdquo; conditions. At any rate Judge
+Linebarger came to see us, for a few hours, his ship having touched en
+route at the port near the provincial capital of Albay. Judge Carson
+had had a gallows erected near the public square of the town, for the
+execution of some brigand he had convicted, whether it was for
+maltreating some poor farmer&rsquo;s daughter until she died, or
+burying an American alive, or what, I do not now recollect. But in
+going around the town some one suggested, as we passed this gallows,
+that we go up on it to get the view. So we went&mdash;the three of us.
+Then each looked at the other and all thought of the work ahead. Then
+Judge Carson smiled and dispelled the momentary sombreness by repeating
+with grim humor, an old Latin quotation <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb429" href="#pb429" name="pb429">429</a>]</span>he happened to
+remember from his college days at the University of Virginia: <i lang=
+"la">H&aelig;c olim meminisse juvabit</i> (&ldquo;It will be pleasant
+to remember these things hereafter&rdquo;).</p>
+<p>The Ola insurrection had continued from October, 1902, to October,
+1903, without suspension of civil government. During that period the
+jail had been filled far beyond its reasonable capacity most of the
+time. It sometimes had contained many hundreds. As to the sanitary
+conditions, in passing the jail building one day in company with one of
+the provincial officials, he remarked to me, nonchalantly:
+&ldquo;It&rsquo;s equivalent to a death sentence to put a man in that
+jail.&rdquo; I afterwards found out that this was no joke. During most
+of my visit to the province I was too busy holding court and separating
+the sheep from the goats, to think much of anything else. But toward
+the close of the term, after Christmas, after Governor Taft had left
+the Islands and gone home to be Secretary of War, an incident happened
+that produced a profound impression on me, suggested a new view-point,
+and started troubled doubts as to whether the whole Benevolent
+Assimilation business was not a mistake born of a union of avarice and
+piety in which avarice predominated&mdash;doubts which certain events
+of the following year, hereinafter related, converted in conviction
+that any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos would be
+better for all concerned than any government we could give them,
+hampered as we always will be by the ever-present necessity to argue
+that government against the consent of the governed is not altogether
+wrong, and that taxation without representation may be a blessing in
+disguise. The Yule-tide incident above alluded to was this. Most of the
+docket having been disposed of, and there being a lull between
+Christmas and New Year&rsquo;s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb430"
+href="#pb430" name="pb430">430</a>]</span>day which afforded time for
+matters more or less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting
+attorney brought in rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court
+to sign. One was headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other
+with a list of sixty-three names. Both orders recited that &ldquo;the
+foregoing&rdquo; persons had died in the jail&mdash;all but one between
+May 20 and Dec. 3. 1903 (roughly six and one-half months) as will
+appear from an examination of the dates of death&mdash;and concluded by
+directing that the indictments be quashed. The writer was only holding
+an extraordinary term of court there in Albay, and was about to leave
+the province to take charge of another district to which Governor Taft
+had assigned him before leaving the Islands. The newly appointed
+regular judge of the district, Judge Trent, now of the Philippine
+Supreme Court, was scheduled soon to arrive. Therefore the writer did
+not sign the proposed orders but kept them as legal curios. A correct
+translation of one of them appears below, followed by the list of names
+which headed the other (identical) order:</p>
+<p>THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, EIGHTH JUDICIAL
+DISTRICT</p>
+<p>In the Court of First Instance of Albay</p>
+<p>The United States against</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cornelio Rigorosa</td>
+<td>died December</td>
+<td>3, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Fabian Basques</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>25, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Nacion</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>14, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco Rigorosa</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>18, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Anacleto Solano</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>25, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Valentin Cesillano</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>6, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felix Sasutona</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Marcelo de los Santos</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>3, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Marcelo Patingo</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>15, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Raynante</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>7, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb431" href="#pb431" name=
+"pb431">431</a>]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Dionisio Carifiaga</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>4, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felipe Navor</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>17, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Luis Nicol</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Balbino Nicol</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Damiano Nicol</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leoncio Salbaburo</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>20, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Catalino Sideria</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>25, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Marcelo Ariola</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco Cao</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Martin Olaguer</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Juan Neric</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>16, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eufemio Bere</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>21, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Sotero</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>30, 1902</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Juan Payadan</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>10, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Benedicto Milla</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>30, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Placido Porlage</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Gaudencio Oguita</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>11, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Alberto Cabrera</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>8, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Payadan</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>4, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eusebio Payadan</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>10, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leonardo Rebusi</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>2, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Riobaldis</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>2, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Victor Riobaldis</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Mauricio Balbin</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>27, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tomas Rigador</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Miguel de los Santos</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>28, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eustaquio Mapula</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>18, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eugenio Lomibao</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>1, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco Luna</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>7, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Gregorio Sierte</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>31, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Teodoro Patingo</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>21, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Teodorico Tua</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ceferino Octia</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>10, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Graciona Pamplona</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felipe Bonifacio</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Baltazer Bundi</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Locot</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco de Punta</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>20, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pedro Madrid</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>24, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felipe Pusiquit</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>17, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Rufo Mansalan</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>14, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ignacio Titano</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>20, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Alfonso Locot</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>29, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Gil Locot</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Regino Bitarra</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>7, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb432" href="#pb432" name=
+"pb432">432</a>]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bonifacio Bo</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>2, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco de Belen</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>29, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">DECREE</p>
+<p>The defendants above named, charged with divers crimes, having died
+in the provincial jail by reason of various ailments, upon various
+dates, according to official report of the jailer, it is</p>
+<p><span class="sc">ORDERED BY THIS COURT</span>, That the cases
+pending against the said deceased persons be, and the same are hereby,
+quashed, the costs to be charged against the government.</p>
+<hr class="tb">
+<p class="signed">Judge of the Twelfth District acting in the
+Eighth.</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Albay</span>, December 28,
+1903.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The foregoing order contains fifty-seven names. As already
+indicated, the second order was like the first. It contained the names
+of sixty-three other deceased prisoners, as follows, to wit:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Anacleto Avila</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>2, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Gregorio Saquedo</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>21, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco Almonte</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>11, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Faustino Sallao</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>9, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leocadio Pena</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>16, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Juan Ranuco</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>16, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Esteban de Lima</td>
+<td>died February</td>
+<td>4, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Estanislao Jacoba</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>7, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Macario Ordiales</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Laureano Ordiales</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>27, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Reimundo Narito</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>4, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Antonio Polvorido</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Norverto Melgar</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>14, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bartolome Rico</td>
+<td>died November</td>
+<td>8, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Simon Ordiales</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Candido Rosari</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>29, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Saturnino Vuelvo</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>18, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Vicente Belsaida</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>26, 1903<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb433" href="#pb433" name=
+"pb433">433</a>]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felix Canaria</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pedro Cuya</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Evaristo Dias</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>24, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felix Padre</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>8, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Alberto Mantes</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>7, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Joaquin Maamot</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>5, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Santiago Cacero</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>28, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Hilario Zalazar</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tomas Odsinada</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>1, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Oco</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>4, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Julian Lontac</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>27, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ambrosio Rabosa</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Mariano Garcia</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ramon Madrigalejo</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Albino Oyardo</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>1, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Felipe Rotarla</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>29, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Urbano Saralde</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>5, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Gil Mediavillo</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Egidio Mediavillo</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>16, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Mauricio Losano</td>
+<td>died October</td>
+<td>5, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bernabe Carenan</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>27, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pedro Sagaysay</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>29, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Laureano Ibo</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>5, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Vicente Sanosing</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>17, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Francisco Morante</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>10, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Anatollo Sadullo</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>16, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Lucio Rebeza</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>27, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eugenio Sanbuena</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nicolas Oberos</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>26, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Eusebio Rambillo</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tomas Rempillo</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Daniel Patasin</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ignacio Bundi</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>7, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Juan Locot</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Zacarias David Padilla</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>7, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Juan Almazar</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Rufino Quipi</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Antonio Brio</td>
+<td>died June</td>
+<td>13, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Timoteo Enciso</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>12, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Hilario Palaad</td>
+<td>died August</td>
+<td>28, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ventura Prades</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>24, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Alejandro Alevanto</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>22, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Rufino Pelicia</td>
+<td>died May</td>
+<td>20, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Alejo Bruqueza</td>
+<td>died July</td>
+<td>19, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Prudencio Estrada</td>
+<td>died September</td>
+<td>15, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb434" href="#pb434" name=
+"pb434">434</a>]</span></p>
+<p>These lists were printed in an article by the author which appeared
+in the <i>North American Review</i> for January 18, 1907, which article
+was reprinted by Hon. James L. Slayden, of Texas, in the
+<i>Congressional Record</i> for February 12, 1907. There can be little
+doubt that President Taft saw the article, and that if it had contained
+any inaccuracies they would long since have been noticed. So that in
+the Albay jail in 1903 we had a sort of Andersonville prison, or Black
+Hole of Calcutta, on a small scale.</p>
+<p>If the military authorities had had charge of the Albay insurrection
+and of the prisoners in the Albay jail in 1903, it is safe to say that
+the great majority of those who died would have lived. But to have
+ordered out the troops would have been to abandon the official fiction
+that there was peace.</p>
+<p>Of Ola&rsquo;s five or six hundred men, Judge Carson and I, assisted
+by the chief prosecuting attorney of the government, Hon. James Ross,
+turned several hundred loose. Another large batch were disposed of
+under a vagrancy law, which allowed us to put them to work on the roads
+of the provinces for not exceeding two years, usually six to twelve
+months. Most of the remainder, a few score, we tried under the sedition
+law, and sent to Bilibid, the central penitentary at Manila, for terms
+commensurate with their individual conduct and deeds. The more serious
+cases were sent up for longer terms under the brigandage law. We
+indulged in no more maudlin sentiment about those precious scamps who
+had been degrading Filipino patriotism by occasionally invoking its
+name in the course of a long season of preying upon their respectable
+fellow-countrymen than Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles would have indulged. I
+am quite sure that either Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles would have made
+much shorter shrift of the whole bunch <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb435" href="#pb435" name="pb435">435</a>]</span>than Judge Carson and
+I did. It was only the men shown to have committed crimes usually
+punished capitally in this country that we sentenced to death&mdash;a
+dozen or more, all told. Ola was the star witness for the state. He
+held back nothing that would aid the prosecuting attorney to convict
+the men who had followed him for a year. He was given a sentence of
+thirty years (by Judge Carson), as a sort of expression of opinion of
+the most Christian attitude possible concerning his real deserts, but
+his services as state&rsquo;s evidence entitled him to immunity, and
+for that very good and sufficient reason Judge Carson, Prosecuting
+Attorney Ross, and myself so recommended to the Governor.</p>
+<p>Ola could read and write after a fashion, though he was quite an
+ignorant man. But to show what his control must have been over the rank
+and file of his men, let one incident suffice. On the boat going up to
+Manila from Albay, after the term of court was over, Ola was aboard, en
+route for the penitentiary. But, as he was a prospective recipient of
+executive clemency, though the guards kept an eye on him, he was
+allowed the freedom of the ship. One night on the voyage up, the
+weather being extremely warm, I left my stateroom sometime after
+midnight, carrying blanket and pillow, and went back to the storm
+steering-gear at the stern of the ship, to spend the rest of the night
+more comfortably. Waking sometime afterward for some unassignable
+cause, I realized that the crown of another head was tangent to the
+crown of my own, and occupying part of my pillow. It was Ola, the chief
+of the brigands. I raised up, shook the intruder, and said:
+&ldquo;Hello, Ola, what are you doing here?&rdquo; He wakened slowly.
+He had no idea of any first-class passenger being back there, and had
+taken it for granted that I was one of the ship&rsquo;s crew, when he
+decided to share my pillow. As <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb436"
+href="#pb436" name="pb436">436</a>]</span>soon as he realized who I
+was, he sprang to his feet with profound and effusive apologies, and
+paced the deck until morning, perhaps thinking over the possible effect
+of the incident on my recommendation concerning himself.</p>
+<p>After I had recovered the use of all my pillow I went back to sleep
+for a spell. About dawn I was wakened by some of the guards chattering.
+But I heard Ola, who had apparently been keeping watch over my august
+slumbers in the meantime, say in an imperious tone to the guards,
+<i>his keepers</i>, &ldquo;Hush, the judge is sleeping.&rdquo; They
+looked at the brigand chief, and cowed, obeyed.</p>
+<p>Ola was pardoned. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb437" href="#pb437"
+name="pb437">437</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8926" href="#xd20e8926src" name="xd20e8926">1</a></span>
+Macaulay&rsquo;s <i>Trial of Hastings</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8932" href="#xd20e8932src" name="xd20e8932">2</a></span> Says
+Gen. Henry T. Allen, commanding the Philippines constabulary, in his
+report for 1903 (<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt.
+3, p. 49), &ldquo;For some time to come the number of troops (meaning
+American) to be kept here should be <i>a direct function of the number
+of guns put into the hands of natives</i>.&rdquo; He adds, &ldquo;It is
+unwise to ignore the great moral effect of a strong armed force
+<i>above suspicion</i>.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8946" href="#xd20e8946src" name="xd20e8946">3</a></span> The
+constabulary force was about 5000. When disturbances in one province
+would become formidable, constabulary from provinces would be hurried
+thither, thus denuding the latter provinces of proper police
+protection.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8978" href="#xd20e8978src" name="xd20e8978">4</a></span>
+1912.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e8987" href="#xd20e8987src" name="xd20e8987">5</a></span> The
+reference is supposed to be to Mr. McKinley.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9018" href="#xd20e9018src" name="xd20e9018">6</a></span> <i>War
+Department Report</i>, 1902, vol. ix., p. 264.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9032" href="#xd20e9032src" name="xd20e9032">7</a></span> Delaware
+has 2050 square miles, Albay 1783.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9058" href="#xd20e9058src" name="xd20e9058">8</a></span>
+<i>Correspondence Relating to War with Spain</i>, vol. ii., p.
+1249.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9074" href="#xd20e9074src" name="xd20e9074">9</a></span>
+President Roosevelt cabled Kelly, whom he had known in the West many
+years before, congratulating him on the results of his cool and
+determined fearlessness and presence of mind on that occasion, but
+elaboration on the Surigao affair was not part of the insular
+programme, which was one of irrepressible optimism as to the state of
+public order.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9094" href="#xd20e9094src" name="xd20e9094">10</a></span> Every
+province in the Philippines is divided into so many pueblos. Pueblo, in
+Spanish, means <i>town</i>. But the Spanish pueblo is more like a
+township. It does not mean a continuous stretch of residences and other
+buildings, but a given municipal area. Each pueblo is likewise
+subdivided into <i>barrios</i>, dotted usually with hamlets, and groups
+of houses.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9195" href="#xd20e9195src" name="xd20e9195">11</a></span>
+<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 3, p. 92.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9226" href="#xd20e9226src" name="xd20e9226">12</a></span>
+<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 1, p. 366.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9243" href="#xd20e9243src" name="xd20e9243">13</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 170</i>, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9271" href="#xd20e9271src" name="xd20e9271">14</a></span>
+<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1903, pt. 1, p. 32.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e9278" href="#xd20e9278src" name="xd20e9278">15</a></span> 240,
+326, <i>Philippine Census</i>, 1903, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch17" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XVII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Taft, 1903 (<i>Continued</i>)</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The Philippines for the Filipinos.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Speech of Governor
+Taft.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Just before Governor Taft left the Islands in 1903, he
+made a speech which made him immensely popular with the Filipinos and
+immensely unpopular with the Americans. The key-note of the speech was
+&ldquo;The Philippines for the Filipinos.&rdquo; The Filipinos
+interpreted it to mean for them that ultimate independence was not so
+far in the dim distance of what is to happen after all the living are
+dead as to be a purely academic matter. And there was absolutely
+nothing in the speech to negative that idea, although he must have
+known how the great majority of the Filipinos would interpret the
+speech. On the other hand, the Americans in the Islands, popularity
+with whom was then and there a negligible factor, interpreted the
+speech, not inaccurately, to mean for them: &ldquo;If you white men out
+here, not connected with the Government, you Americans, British,
+Germans and Spaniards, and the rest of you, do not like the way I am
+running this country, why, the boats have not quit running between here
+and your respective homes.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10230src"
+href="#xd20e10230" name="xd20e10230src">1</a> Then he came back
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb438" href="#pb438" name=
+"pb438">438</a>]</span>to the United States and has ever since been
+urging American capital to go to the Philippines, all the time opposing
+any declaration by the law-making power of the Government which will
+let the American who goes out there know &ldquo;where he is at,&rdquo;
+<i>i.e.</i>, whether we are or are not going to keep the Islands
+permanently, and how to formulate his earthly plans accordingly, though
+the educated Filipinos are concurrently permitted to clamor against
+American &ldquo;exploitation,&rdquo; American rule, and Americans
+generally, and to keep alive among the masses of their people what they
+call &ldquo;the spirit of liberty,&rdquo; and what the insular
+government calls the spirit of &ldquo;irreconcilableness.&rdquo;
+Clearly, a policy which makes for race friction and race hatred is
+essentially soft-headed, not soft-hearted, and ought not to be
+permitted to continue. Yet it has been true for twelve years, as one of
+President Taft&rsquo;s admiring friends proudly boasted concerning him
+some time since:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">One man virtually holds in his keeping the American
+conscience with the regard to the Philippines.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10249src" href="#xd20e10249" name="xd20e10249src">2</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This is true, and it is not as it should be. We should either stop
+the clamor, or stop the American capital and energy from going to the
+Islands. After an American goes out to the Islands, invests his money
+there, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb439" href="#pb439" name=
+"pb439">439</a>]</span>and casts his fortunes there, unless he is a
+renegade, he sticks to his own people out there. Then the Taft policy
+steps in and bullyrags him into what he calls &ldquo;knuckling to the
+Filipinos,&rdquo; every time he shows any contumacious dissent from the
+Taft decision reversing the verdict of all racial history&mdash;which
+has been up to date, that wheresoever white men dwell in any
+considerable numbers in the same country with Asiatics or Africans, the
+white man will rule. Yet the American in the Philippines, once he is
+beguiled into going there, must bow to the Taft policies. He has taken
+his family to the Islands, and all his worldly interests are there. Yet
+he is living under a despotism, a benevolent despotism, it is true, so
+long as the non-office-holding American does not openly oppose the
+government&rsquo;s policies, but one which, however benevolent, is, so
+far as regards any brooking of opposition from any one outside the
+government hierarchy, as absolute as any of the other despotic
+governments of Asia. Though the Governor of the Philippines does not
+wear as much gilt braid as some of his fellow potentates on the
+mainland of Asia, still, in all executive matters he wields a power
+quite as immediate and substantial, in its operation on his subjects,
+as any of his royal colleagues. It never for a moment occurs either to
+the American Government official in the Philippines, or to the American
+citizen engaged in private business there who is in entire accord with
+the policies of the insular government and on terms of friendship with
+the officials, that the government under which he is living is any more
+of a despotism than the Government of the United States. The shoe never
+pinches the American citizen engaged in private business until he
+begins, for one reason or another, to be &ldquo;at outs&rdquo; with the
+insular government, and to have &ldquo;opinions&rdquo; <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb440" href="#pb440" name=
+"pb440">440</a>]</span>which&mdash;American-like&mdash;he at once wants
+to express. If he permits himself to get thoroughly out of accord with
+the powers that be, the sooner he gets out of the Islands the better
+for him. This is the most notorious single fact in the present
+situation. There is no public opinion to help such a person, in any
+case where he differs with any specific act or policy of the insular
+government. The American colony is comparatively small, say between ten
+and twenty thousand all told, outside the army (which consists of ten
+or twelve thousand individuals living wholly apart from the rest of the
+community). The doctor who is known to have the patronage of high
+government officials is sure of professional success, and his wife is
+sure to receive the social recognition her husband&rsquo;s position in
+the community naturally commands; and this permits her to make
+auspicious entrance into the game of playing at precedence with her
+next neighbor called &ldquo;society,&rdquo; so dear to the hearts of
+many otherwise sensible and estimable women&mdash;to say nothing of
+carpet knights, callow youths, cads, and aging gourmands. Also if the
+doctor and his lady have adult children, their opportunities to marry
+well are multiplied by the sunlight from the seats of the mighty. Thus
+the doctor and his wife are a standing lesson to the man &ldquo;with
+convictions&rdquo; that yearn for utterance, but who is also blessed
+with a discreet helpmate, more concerned in the general welfare and
+happiness of all the family than in seeing her husband&rsquo;s name in
+the paper. What is true of the doctor is also true of the lawyer known
+to be <i>persona grata</i> to the government. Again, the newspaper man
+in favor with the government is sure to get his share of the government
+advertising, according to a very liberal construction, and that insures
+his being able to command reportorial and editorial talent such
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb441" href="#pb441" name=
+"pb441">441</a>]</span>as will sell his paper, and the consequent
+circulation is sure to get him the advertising patronage of the
+mercantile community, thus placing success for him on a solid,
+comfortable basis. Also, a contrary course will, slowly, maybe, but
+surely, freeze out any rash competitor. Consequently, the American in
+the Philippines is deprived of one of his most precious home pleasures,
+viz., letting off steam, in some opposition paper, about the real or
+imagined shortcomings of the men in charge of the government. For the
+reasonable expectancy of life of an opposition paper in Manila is
+pathetically brief. The hapless editor on the prosperous paper,
+whatever his talents, who happens to become afflicted with
+&ldquo;views&rdquo; which he airs in his editorial columns, is soon
+upbraided by his friends at his club as &ldquo;getting cranky,&rdquo;
+and is told by the orthodox old-timers among them, &ldquo;John,
+you&rsquo;ve been out here too long. You better go home.&rdquo; If he
+does not change his tone, the receipts of the advertising department of
+his paper soon fall off, and his friend, the more tactful proprietor,
+who &ldquo;knows how to get along with people,&rdquo; is not long in
+agreeing with the rest of his friends that he has &ldquo;been out here
+too long.&rdquo; Again the successful merchant has too many interests
+at stake in which he needs the cordial friendship of the government to
+be able to afford to antagonize it. And so on, through every walk of
+life, the influence of the government permeates every nook and corner
+of the situation.</p>
+<p>The average public man in the United States would not feel
+&ldquo;nat&rsquo;ral&rdquo; unless intermittently bedewed with steam
+from the exhaust valve of the soul of some &ldquo;outraged
+citizen,&rdquo; through the medium of the public press. But in the
+Philippines a public man occupying a conspicuous position with the
+government may be very <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb442" href=
+"#pb442" name="pb442">442</a>]</span>generally detested and actually
+not know it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10270src" href="#xd20e10270"
+name="xd20e10270src">3</a> The American in the Philippines, with all
+his home connections severed, might as well send his family to the
+poor-house at once as to come out in a paper with an interview or
+speech,&mdash;even supposing any paper would publish it&mdash;which,
+copied by the papers back in the United States, would embarrass the
+National Administration&rsquo;s Philippine policy in any way. The same
+applies to talking too freely for the newspapers when home on a
+visit.</p>
+<p>I think the foregoing makes sufficiently obvious the inherent
+impossibility of the American people ever knowing anything about
+current governmental mistakes in the Philippines, of which there must
+be some, in time for their judgment to have anything to do with shaping
+the course of the government out there for which they are responsible.
+And therefore it shows the inherent unfitness of their governmental
+machinery to govern the Filipinos so long as they do not change the
+home form of government to meet the needs of the colonial situation, by
+providing a method of invoking the public judgment on a single issue,
+as in the case of monarchical ministries, instead of lumping issues as
+we now do. It is certainly a shame that the fate and future of the
+Philippines are to-day dependent upon issues as wholly foreign to
+anything Philippine as is the price of cheese in Kamchatka or the price
+of wool in the United States. Whether the Filipinos are fit for
+self-government or not, under our present form of government we are
+certainly wholly unfit to govern them. In our government of the
+Filipinos, the nature of the case eliminates our most valuable
+governmental asset, to wit, that saving grace of public opinion which
+stops <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb443" href="#pb443" name=
+"pb443">443</a>]</span>public men, none of whom are infallible, before
+they can accomplish irreparable mischief, through uncorrected faith in
+plans of questionable wisdom and righteousness to which their minds are
+made up.</p>
+<p>To show how absolute was the executive and legislative power over
+8,000,000 of people entrusted by the sole authority of President
+McKinley to Governor Taft&mdash;without consulting Congress, though
+afterwards the authority so conferred was ratified by Congress and
+descended from Governor Taft to his successor&mdash;an incident related
+to me in the freedom of social intercourse, and not in the least in
+confidence, by my late beloved friend Arthur W. Fergusson, long
+Executive Secretary to Governor Taft, will suffice. In 1901 the
+Commission had passed a law providing for the constitution of the
+Philippine judiciary,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10279src" href=
+"#xd20e10279" name="xd20e10279src">4</a> according to which law an
+American, in order to be eligible to appointment as a Judge of First
+Instance (the ordinary trial court, or <i lang="la">nisi prius</i>
+court, of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence) must be more than thirty years
+old, and must have practised law in the United States for a period of
+five years before appointed. In 1903 President Roosevelt wanted to make
+Hon. Beekman Winthrop (then under thirty years of age) now (1912),
+Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a Judge of First Instance. Governor
+Taft called Fergusson in and said: &ldquo;Fergy, make me out a
+commission for Beekman Winthrop as a Judge of First Instance.&rdquo;
+Fergusson said: &ldquo;You can&rsquo;t do it, Governor. It&rsquo;s
+against the law. He&rsquo;s not old enough.&rdquo; Winthrop was a
+graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor Taft said humorously,
+&ldquo;I can&rsquo;t eh? I&rsquo;ll show you. Send me a
+stenographer.&rdquo; A law was dictated<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10285src" href="#xd20e10285" name="xd20e10285src">5</a> striking
+out thirty <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb444" href="#pb444" name=
+"pb444">444</a>]</span>years and inserting twenty-five, and adding
+after the words &ldquo;must have practised law for a period of five
+years&rdquo; the words &ldquo;or be a graduate of a reputable law
+school.&rdquo; Fergusson was then called in, and told to go down the
+hall, see the other commissioners,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10290src"
+href="#xd20e10290" name="xd20e10290src">6</a> and get them together,
+which he did, and the law was passed in a few minutes. Then Fergusson
+was sent for, and the Governor said, handing him the new
+&ldquo;law&rdquo;; &ldquo;Now make out that commission.&rdquo; Even if
+Fergusson colored the incident up a bit, in the exercise of his
+inimitable artistic capacity to make <i>anything</i> interesting, his
+story was certainly substantially correct relatively to the
+absoluteness of the authority of the Governor, as will appear by
+reference to the two laws cited.</p>
+<p>It is only fair to say that Winthrop made a very good judge. There
+used to be current in the Philippines a story that Governor Taft had
+said, in more or less humorous vein: &ldquo;Gentlemen, I&rsquo;m
+somewhat of an expert on judges. What you need in a judge
+is&rdquo;&mdash;counting with the index finger of one hand on the
+fingers of the other&mdash;&ldquo;firstly, integrity; secondly,
+courage; thirdly, common sense; and fourthly, he <i>must</i> know a
+<i>little</i> law.&rdquo; Winthrop&rsquo;s integrity, courage, and
+common sense were beyond all question. It could hardly have been
+otherwise. He came of a long line of sturdy and distinguished men, the
+first of whom had come over in the <i>Mayflower</i> days to the
+Massachusetts coast. And, he <i>did</i> know a <i>little</i> law. But
+the manner of his appointment is none the less illustrative of how much
+quicker, Governor Taft could make and publish a law than any of his
+fellow despots<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10315src" href="#xd20e10315"
+name="xd20e10315src">7</a> over on the mainland of Asia, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb445" href="#pb445" name=
+"pb445">445</a>]</span>considering how slow-moving all <i>their</i>
+various grand viziers were, compared with Fergy, and his corps of
+stenographers.</p>
+<p>Having now given, I hope, a more or less sympathetic insight into
+what absolute rulers our governors in the Philippines have been, in the
+very nature of the case, from the beginning, let us observe the change
+of tone of the government, after the reign of the first ended, and the
+reign of the second began. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb446" href=
+"#pb446" name="pb446">446</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10230" href="#xd20e10230src" name="xd20e10230">1</a></span> The
+speech referred to in the text was made at Manila in December, 1903,
+but the same &ldquo;Philippines for the Filipinos&rdquo; policy had
+already been proclaimed much earlier. The <i>Manila American</i> of
+February 28, 1903, reprints from the <i>Iloilo Times</i> of February
+21, 1903, an account of Governor Taft&rsquo;s celebrated Iloilo speech
+of February 19, 1903, which was received with such profound chagrin by
+the American business community in the Islands. There had been much bad
+blood between the American colony at and about Iloilo and the native
+Americano-phobes. The following is from the Iloilo paper&rsquo;s
+account of Governor Taft&rsquo;s speech: &ldquo;The Governor then gave
+some advice to foreigners and Americans, remarking that if they found
+fault with the way the government was being run here, they could leave
+the islands; that the government was being run for the
+Filipinos.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10249" href="#xd20e10249src" name="xd20e10249">2</a></span> James
+LeRoy in <i>The World&rsquo;s Work</i> for December, 1903.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10270" href="#xd20e10270src" name="xd20e10270">3</a></span> A
+familiar instance of this will occur to any one acquainted with the
+situation in the Islands for any considerable part of the last ten
+years.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10279" href="#xd20e10279src" name="xd20e10279">4</a></span> Act
+No. 136, U. S. Philippine Commission, passed June 11, 1901.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10285" href="#xd20e10285src" name="xd20e10285">5</a></span> Act
+1024, Philippine Commission, passed Oct. 10, 1903.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10290" href="#xd20e10290src" name="xd20e10290">6</a></span> There
+were five members of the original Taft Commission, including President
+Taft.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10315" href="#xd20e10315src" name="xd20e10315">7</a></span> I
+neither forget nor gainsay the generally benevolent character of his
+despotism; and having been a beneficiary of it myself I am therefore
+disposed to see much of wisdom in the way it was exercised.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch18" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XVIII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Wright&mdash;1904</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The blame of those ye better</p>
+<p class="line">The hate of those ye guard.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Kipling&rsquo;s</span>
+<i>White Man&rsquo;s Burden</i>.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Governor Taft left the Philippines on or about
+December 23, 1903, to become Secretary of War in President
+Roosevelt&rsquo;s Cabinet, and shortly afterward Vice-Governor Luke E.
+Wright succeeded to the governorship. After the accession of Governor
+Wright, there was no more hammering it into the American business men
+having money invested in the Islands that the Filipino was their
+&ldquo;little brown brother,&rdquo; for whom no sacrifice, however
+sublime, would be more than was expected. Governor Wright was quite
+unpopular with the Filipinos and immensely popular with the Americans
+and Europeans, because, soon after he came into power, he &ldquo;let
+the cat out of the bag,&rdquo; by letting the Filipinos know plainly
+that they might just as well shut up talking about independence for the
+present, so far as he was advised and believed; in other words, that
+Governor Taft&rsquo;s &ldquo;Philippines for the Filipinos&rdquo; need
+not cause any specially billowy sighs of joy just yet, because it had
+no reference to any Filipinos now able to sigh, but only to unborn
+Filipinos who might sigh in some remote future generation; and that the
+slogan which had caused them all to want <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb447" href="#pb447" name="pb447">447</a>]</span>to sob simultaneously
+for joy on the broad chest of Governor Taft was merely a case of an
+amiable unwillingness to tell them an unpleasant truth, viz., that in
+his opinion they were wholly unfit for self-government&mdash;all of
+which, in effect, meant that Governor Taft had been merely
+&ldquo;Keeping the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the
+hope.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The Wright plain talk made the Filipinos one and all feel:
+&ldquo;Alackaday! Our true friend has departed.&rdquo; But as Secretary
+of War Taft, after four years more of trying to please both sides, at
+home, at last frankly told the Filipinos when he went out to attend the
+opening of the first Philippine legislature, in 1907, practically just
+what Governor Wright had begun to tell them from the moment his
+predecessor had exchanged the parting tear with them on the water-front
+at Manila in 1903, the net result of the Wright policy of
+uncompromising honesty on the <i>present</i> political situation, may
+easily be guessed.</p>
+<p>Governor Wright&rsquo;s method of repudiating the Taft straddle took
+for <i>its</i> key-note, in lieu of &ldquo;The Philippines for the
+Filipinos,&rdquo; the slogan &ldquo;An Equal Chance for All.&rdquo;
+What Governor Wright meant was merely that there would be no more
+browbeating of Americans to make them love their little brown brother
+as much as Governor Taft was supposed to love him, but that everybody
+would be treated absolutely alike and nobody coddled. However, the
+Filipinos of course knew that they could not compete with American
+wealth and energy, and so did the Americans in the islands. So what the
+Wright slogan, unquestionably fair as was its intent, inexorably meant
+to everybody concerned except the dignified, straightforward and candid
+propounder of it, was, in effect, the British &ldquo;White Man&rsquo;s
+Burden&rdquo; or Trust-for-Civilization theory, a theory whereunder the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb448" href="#pb448" name=
+"pb448">448</a>]</span>white man who wants some one else&rsquo;s land
+goes and takes it on the idea that he can put it to better use than the
+owner. Thus early did the original &ldquo;jollying&rdquo; Mr. Taft had
+given them become transparent to his little brown brother. Thus early
+did it become clear to the Filipinos that behind the mask of executive
+protestations that they shall some day have independence when fit for
+it, lurks a set determination industriously to earn for an
+indeterminate number of generations yet to come</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">The blame of those ye better</p>
+<p class="line">The hate of those ye guard.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">This book has been written, up to this point, in vain,
+if the preceding chapters have not made clear how much political
+expediency, looking to the welfare of a party in power naturally
+seeking to continue in power, necessarily dominates Philippine affairs
+under American rule. We have observed under the microscope of history,
+made available by the official documents now accessible, the long
+battle between the political expediency germ and the independence bug
+which began in General Anderson&rsquo;s dealings with Aguinaldo and
+continued through General Merritt&rsquo;s and General Otis&rsquo;s
+<i>r&eacute;gimes</i>. We have seen General MacArthur&rsquo;s attempt
+at a wise surgical operation to excise the independence bug from the
+Philippine body politic&mdash;so that the expediency germ might die a
+natural death from having nothing to feed on. We have seen that
+operation interfered with by the Taft Commission during the
+presidential campaign of 1900, because the men in control of the
+republic could not ignore considerations of political expediency; and
+we saw the consequent premature setting up of the civil government in
+1901, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb449" href="#pb449" name=
+"pb449">449</a>]</span>with all its dire consequences in the then as
+yet unconquered parts of the archipelago, southern Luzon, and some of
+the Visayan Islands. We have observed the effective though heroic local
+treatment administered to the Philippine body politic by General Bell
+in Batangas in 1901&ndash;2, with a view of killing off the
+independence bug there. We have seen the fierce struggle between some
+of the bug&rsquo;s belated spawn and the expediency germ&rsquo;s now
+more emboldened forces in Albay in the off year, 1903. We are now to
+take our fifth year&rsquo;s course in the colonial department of
+politico-entomological research, the presidential year 1904.</p>
+<p>It was the way the Samar insurrection of 1904&ndash;5-6 was handled
+which finally convinced me that the Filipinos would not kill any more
+of each other in a hundred years than we have killed, or permitted to
+be killed, of them, in the fell process of Benevolent Assimilation.</p>
+<p>American imperialism is not honest, like the British variety.
+American imperialism knows that Avarice was its father, and Piety its
+mother, and that it takes after its father more than it does after its
+mother. British imperialism frankly aims mostly to make <i>the
+survivors</i> of its policies happy, not the people it immediately
+operates on. American imperialism pretends to be ministering to the
+happiness of the living, and, though it realizes that it is not a
+success in that line, it resents identification with its British
+cousin, by sanctimonious reference to the alleged net good it is doing.
+Yet in its moments of frankness it says, with an air of infinite
+patience under base ingratitude, &ldquo;Well, they will be happy in
+some other generation,&rdquo; and that therefore the number of people
+we <i>have</i> had or <i>may</i> have, to kill, or permit to be killed,
+in the process of Benevolent Assimilation, is wholly negligible. This
+is simply the old, old argument that the end justifies <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb450" href="#pb450" name="pb450">450</a>]</span>the
+means, the argument that has wrought more misery in the world than any
+other since time began.</p>
+<p>When Judge Taft, General Wright, and their colleagues of the Taft
+Commission, came out to the Philippines in 1900, they came full of the
+McKinley convictions about a people whom neither they or Mr. McKinley
+had ever seen, bound hand and foot by political necessity to square the
+freeing of Cuba with the subjugation of the Philippines. A perfectly
+natural evolution of this attitude resulted in the position they at
+once took on arriving in the Islands, viz., that to do for the
+Filipinos what we have done for the Cubans would mean a bloody welter
+of anarchy and chaos. And the presidential contest of 1900 was fought
+and won largely on that issue. After 1900, for all the gentlemen above
+referred to, the proposition was always <i lang="la">res
+adjudicata</i>. All protests by Filipinos to the contrary caused only
+resentment, and welded the authorities more and more hermetically to
+the correctness of the original proposition. Loyalty to the original
+ill-considered decision became impregnated, in their case, with a
+fervor not entirely unlike religious fanaticism, and belief in it
+became a matter of principle, justifying all they had done, and guiding
+all they might thereafter do. So that when General Wright &ldquo;came
+to the throne&rdquo; in our colonial empire, as Governor, and legatee
+of the McKinley-Taft Benevolent Assimilation policies, his attitude in
+all he did was thoroughly honest, and also thoroughly British. He
+honestly believed in the &ldquo;bloody welter of anarchy and
+chaos&rdquo; proposition, and was prepared, in any emergency that might
+arise, to follow his convictions in that regard whithersoever they
+might lead, without variableness or shadow of turning. Take him all in
+all, Governor Wright was about the best man occupying exalted
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb451" href="#pb451" name=
+"pb451">451</a>]</span>station I ever knew personally, President Taft
+himself not excepted; although I still adhere to Colonel
+Roosevelt&rsquo;s opinion of 1901 concerning Mr. Taft, quoted in the
+chapter preceding this, from the <i>Outlook</i> of September 21, 1901,
+notwithstanding that in the contest for the Republican nomination for
+the presidency in 1912, the Colonel &ldquo;recalled&rdquo; that
+opinion. Seriously, a man may &ldquo;combine the qualities which would
+make a first class President of the United States with the qualities
+which would make a first class Chief Justice of the United
+States&rdquo; and still cut a sorry figure trying to fit a square peg
+into a round hole, or a scheme of government, the breath of whose life
+is public opinion, into the running of a remote colonial government,
+the breath of whose life is exemption from being interfered with by
+public opinion.</p>
+<p>After the Albay insurrection of 1903 had been cleaned up, I took
+charge of the Twelfth Judicial District, having been appointed thereto
+by Governor Taft just before he left the islands to become Secretary of
+War. In those trying pioneer days they always seemed to give me the
+insurrections to sift out, but it was purely fortuitous. Whenever you
+ceased to be busy, prompt arrangements were made for you to get busy
+again. Judge Ide, the Minister of Justice, wasted no government
+money.</p>
+<p>The Twelfth District consisted of the two island provinces of Samar
+and Leyte, two of the six Visayan Islands heretofore noticed as the
+only ones worth considering in a general view of the archipelago such
+as the student of world politics wants or needs. Leyte had a population
+of 388,922,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10402src" href="#xd20e10402"
+name="xd20e10402src">1</a> and an area of 3008 square miles.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e10407src" href="#xd20e10407" name=
+"xd20e10407src">2</a> Samar&rsquo;s population was 266,237, and its
+area, 5276 square miles, makes it the third largest island of the
+Philippine Archipelago. So that as Judge <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb452" href="#pb452" name="pb452">452</a>]</span>of the Twelfth
+District, consisting of two provinces, the Governor of each of which
+was <i>ex-officio</i> sheriff of the court for his province, I was, in
+a sense, a sort of shepherd of a political flock of some 650,000
+people, whom I always thought of as a whole as &ldquo;my&rdquo;
+people.</p>
+<p>Samar and Leyte are separated, where nearest together, by a most
+picturesque winding strait bordered with densely wooded hills. San
+Juanico Strait is much narrower than the inland sea of Japan at its
+narrowest point, and almost as beautiful. In fact, at its narrowest
+point it seems little more than a stone&rsquo;s throw in width. It is
+as pretty as the prettiest part of the Golden Horn. Leyte had been put
+under the Civil Government in 1901, and this premature interference
+with the military authorities in the midst of their efforts to pacify
+the island had had the usual result of postponing pacification, by
+filling local politicians, wholly unable to comprehend a government
+which <i>entreated</i> or <i>reasoned</i> with people to do things,
+with the notion that we were resorting to diplomacy in lieu of force
+because of fear of them. Leyte and Samar were strategically one for the
+insurgents, just as the provinces of the Lake district of Luzon,
+described in an earlier chapter, were, because they could flee by night
+from one province to another in small boats without detection, when
+hard pressed by the <i>Americano</i>. The main insurgent general in
+Samar, Lucban, had surrendered to General Grant in 1902, but the
+cheaper fellows stayed out much longer, preying upon those who
+preferred daily toil to cattle-stealing and throat-cutting as a means
+of livelihood, and continuing the political unrest intermittently in
+gradually diminishing degree, through 1903. By the spring of 1904,
+however, there still remained in Samar riffraff enough, the
+<i>jetsam</i> and <i>flotsam</i> of the insurrection&mdash;professional
+outlaws&mdash;to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb453" href="#pb453"
+name="pb453">453</a>]</span>get up some trouble, so that, as brigand
+chiefs, they might resume the r&ocirc;les of Robin Hood, Jesse James,
+<i>et al.</i> During the first half of that year the opportunity these
+worthies had been waiting for, while resting on their oars, developed.
+The crop of municipal officials resulting from the original McKinley
+plan of beginning the work of reconstruction <i>during</i>, instead of
+<i>after</i>, the war, and among the potential village Hampdens,
+instead of among the Cromwells, had resulted in some very rascally
+municipal officials who oppressed the poor, getting the hemp of the
+small farmer, when they would bring it to town, at their own
+prices&mdash;hemp being to Samar what cotton is to the South. From the
+lowland and upland farmers the ever-widening discontent spread to the
+hills, where dwelt a type of people constituting only a small fraction
+of the total population of the Islands&mdash;&ldquo;half savage and
+half child&rdquo;&mdash;but loving their hills, and wholly indisposed,
+of their own initiative, to start trouble, unless manipulated.
+Obviously, then, &ldquo;the public mind&rdquo; of Samar&mdash;those who
+know Samar will smile with me at the phrase, but it will do, for lack
+of a better&mdash;was likely soon to be in a generally inflammable
+condition. By July, 1904, the Robin Hoods, Jesse Jameses, <i>et
+al.</i>, touched the match to the material and a political
+conflagration started, apparently as unguided&mdash;save by the winds
+of impulse&mdash;and certainly as persistent, as a forest fire. Every
+native of the Philippine Islands, whether he be of the 7,000,000
+Christians or of the 500,000 non-Christian tribes, is born with a
+highly developed social instinct either to command or to obey. The
+latter tendency is quite as common in the Philippines as the former is
+in the United States. Hence the Samar disturbances of 1904&ndash;5-6,
+though made up at the outset of raids and depredations by various
+roving bands of outlaws <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb454" href=
+"#pb454" name="pb454">454</a>]</span>yielding allegiance only to their
+immediate chief, soon took on a very formidable military and political
+aspect.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10452src" href="#xd20e10452" name=
+"xd20e10452src">3</a> The roving bands would ask the peaceably inclined
+people our flag was supposed to be protecting, &ldquo;Are you for us or
+for the Americans?&rdquo; promptly chopping their heads off if they
+showed any lack of zeal in denouncing American municipal institutions
+and things American in general. Pursuant to Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+original scheme&mdash;concocted for a people he had never seen, under
+pressure of political necessity&mdash;to rig up in short order a
+government &ldquo;essentially popular in form,&rdquo; a lot of most
+pitiable municipal governments had been let loose on the people, a part
+of our series of kindergarten lessons. The plan was as wise as it will
+be for the Japanese&mdash;some one please hold Captain Hobson while I
+finish the analogy&mdash;when they conquer the United States, to go to
+the Bowery and the Ghetto for mayors of all our cities. Thus by our
+pluperfect benevolence, we had contrived in Samar by 1904 to rouse the
+highland folk, or hill people, whom the Spaniards had always let alone,
+against the pacific agricultural lowland people and the dwellers in the
+coast villages. The latter, or such of them as did not join the hill
+folk for protection, we permitted to be mercilessly butchered by
+wholesale, from August to November, 1904, as hereinafter more fully set
+forth, because ordering out the army to protect them might have been
+construed at home to mean disturbances <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb455" href="#pb455" name="pb455">455</a>]</span>more serious and
+widespread than actually existed, and might therefore affect the
+presidential election in the United States by renewing the notion that
+the Administration had never been frank with the American people
+concerning conditions in the Philippines.</p>
+<p>The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 is dated
+November 1st, which was just a week before the presidential election
+day of that year. Their annual report for 1905 is dated November 1,
+1905. In their report for 1904, the Commission deal with the general
+state of public order in the same roseate manner which, as we have
+seen, had made its first appearance during the political exigencies of
+1900 in the language about &ldquo;the great majority of the
+people&rdquo; being &ldquo;entirely willing&rdquo; to benevolent alien
+domination in lieu of independence. When Rip Van Winkle was trying to
+quit drinking, he used to say after each drink: &ldquo;Oh, we&rsquo;ll
+just let that pass.&rdquo; In their report for 1904, the Commission
+swallow the conditions in Samar with equal nonchalance. After stating
+that some (impliedly negligible) disturbances had occurred in Samar
+&ldquo;two months since,&rdquo; they add that &ldquo;the constabulary
+of the province took the field&rdquo; against the bands of Pulajans, or
+outlaws, and that &ldquo;as a result, they were soon broken up, and are
+being pursued and killed or captured&rdquo; (p. 3). In their report
+dated November 1, 1905, by way of preface to an account of the
+extensive military operations inaugurated in Samar shortly after the
+presidential election of 1904, which operations had not only been in
+progress for nearly a year on the date of the 1905 report, but
+continued for more than a year thereafter, the Commission explain their
+1904 nonchalance about Samar thus: &ldquo;It was then believed that the
+constabulary <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb456" href="#pb456" name=
+"pb456">456</a>]</span>forces had succeeded in checking the further
+progress of the outbreak&rdquo; (p. 47).</p>
+<p>Let us examine the facts on which they based this statement, since
+it meant that they believed that a duly reported epidemic of massacres
+of peaceably inclined people, over whom the American flag was floating
+as a symbol of protection to life and property, had stood effectually
+checked by November 1, 1904, the date of their report. And first, of
+the massacres themselves, their nature and extent.</p>
+<p>The Samar massacres of 1904 began with what we all called down there
+&ldquo;the outbreak of July 10th.&rdquo; In August, 1904, I went to
+Samar to handle the cases arising out of the disturbances there,
+assisted by the (native) Governor of the province, who, under the law
+already alluded to, was <i>ex-officio</i> sheriff of the court, and an
+army of deputy sheriffs, as it were, the constabulary, numbering
+several hundred. The outbreak of July 10th was always known afterwards
+as &ldquo;the Tauiran affair.&rdquo; This Tauiran affair was a raid by
+an outlaw band on the <i>barrio</i> of Tauiran, one of the hamlets of
+the municipal jurisdiction of the township called Gandara, in the
+valley of the Gandara River, in north central Samar, wherein one
+hundred houses, the whole settlement, were burned, and twenty-one
+people killed. The term of court lasted from early in August until
+early in November. The day after the Tauiran affair, over on the other
+fork of the Gandara River, occurred what was called &ldquo;the
+Cantaguic affair.&rdquo; Cantaguic was a hamlet or <i>barrio</i> about
+the size of Tauiran. The brigands killed the lieutenant of police of
+Cantaguic and some others, but they did not kill everybody in the
+place. Instead, after killing a few people, they went to the
+<i>tribunal</i> (town hall), seized the local <i>teniente</i>, or
+municipal representative of American <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb457" href="#pb457" name="pb457">457</a>]</span>authority, tied the
+American flag they found at the <i>tribunal</i> about the head of the
+<i>teniente</i>, turban fashion, poured kerosene oil on it, and took
+the <i>teniente</i> down stairs and out into the public square, where
+they lighted and burned the flag on his head, the chief of the band,
+one Juliano Caducoy by name, remarking to the onlookers that the act
+was intended as a lesson to those serving that flag. They then cut off
+the lips of the <i>teniente</i> so he could not eat (he of course died
+a little later), burned the <i>barrio</i> and carried off fifty of the
+inhabitants. Caducoy was captured some time afterward, and I sentenced
+him to be hanged. There was practically no dispute about the facts.
+After the Cantaguic affair, during the term of court mentioned, the
+provincial doctor, Dr. Cullen, an American who had been a captain
+doctor of volunteers, had occasion to run up to Manila. The doctor was
+a most accomplished gentleman, but he had a fondness for the grewsome
+in description equal to Edgar Allan Poe himself. After he came back he
+told me about having told the Governor-General of the Cantaguic affair,
+and repeated with an evident pleased consciousness of his ability to
+make his hearer&rsquo;s blood curdle, how the Governor had said to him
+slowly, &ldquo;Doctor, that&mdash;is&mdash;<i>aw</i>ful!&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Blood seemed to whet the appetite for slaughter. The records of the
+August&ndash;November, 1904 term of the court of first instance of
+Samar show all the various <i>barrios</i> of the Gandara Valley in
+flames on successive days, after the affairs of July 10th and 11th. I
+do not speak from memory, but from documents contained in a large
+bundle of papers kept ever since, in memory of that incarnadined epoch.
+You find one <i>barrio</i> burned one day and another another day,
+until all the people of the Gandara Valley were made homeless. One of
+the constabulary officers, Lieutenant Bowers, a very <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb458" href="#pb458" name=
+"pb458">458</a>]</span>gallant fellow, testified before me that from
+July 10th to the date of his testimony, which was on or about September
+28th, some 50,000 people had been made homeless in Samar by the
+operations of the outlaws. I deem Lieutenant Bowers&rsquo;s estimate
+quite reasonable. His figures include only one-fifth of the population
+of an island which was in the throes of an all-pervading brigand
+uprising. The conservative nature of Lieutenant Bowers&rsquo;s estimate
+concerning the mischief that had already been wrought by the end of
+September, 1904, and was then gathering destructive potentiality like a
+forest or prairie fire, may be inferred from the contents of a
+memorandum appearing below, furnished me by a Spanish officer of the
+constabulary, a Lieutenant Calderon, who had been an officer of the
+Rural Guard in the Spanish days. It contains a list of fifty-three
+towns, villages, and hamlets (a <i>barrio</i> may be quite a village,
+sometimes even quite a town, though usually it is a hamlet) burned up
+to the date the memorandum was furnished me.</p>
+<p>In order to a clear understanding of these Samar massacres and
+town-burnings of 1904, as well as for general geographical purposes, a
+few preliminary words of explanation will be appropriate just here. A
+province in the Philippines has heretofore been likened to a county
+with us. But in the largest provinces, the <i>subdivisions</i> of
+provinces called <i>municipalities</i> are more like counties; and each
+municipality is in turn subdivided into sections called <i>barrios</i>.
+A municipality (Spanish, <i>pueblo</i>) in the Philippines is not
+primarily a city or town, as we understand it, <i>i.e.</i>, a more or
+less continuous settlement of houses and lots more or less adjacent,
+but a specific area of territory, a township, as it were. This area or
+territory may be 5 &times; 10 square miles, or 10 &times; 20, or more,
+or less. For example, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb459" href=
+"#pb459" name="pb459">459</a>]</span>Samar&rsquo;s area is 5276 square
+miles. Yet it contained in 1904, and probably still contains, only
+twenty-five townships or municipalities all told, each municipality
+being subdivided in turn into <i>barrios</i>. Municipalities in the
+Philippines vary in size as much as counties do with us, and their
+total area accounts for and represents the total area of the province,
+just as the total area of the counties of a State represents with us
+the total area of the State. The seat of government of the municipality
+<i>always</i> bears the same name as the municipality itself, just as
+the county seat of a county usually, or frequently, bears the same name
+as the county, with us. Take for instance, the name of the first
+municipality or township in the list which appears below, Gandara. The
+municipality of Gandara might be described by analogy as the
+&ldquo;county&rdquo; of Gandara, the list of <i>barrios</i> burned as a
+list of towns and villages of the &ldquo;county&rdquo; of Gandara.</p>
+<p>The municipality of Gandara included a watershed in north central
+Samar from which the Gandara River flowed in a southwesterly direction
+to the sea. Within this watershed, parallel 12&frac12; north of the
+equator intersects the 125th meridian of longitude east of Greenwich.
+Northern Samar is a very rich hemp country, Catarman hemp being usually
+quoted higher than any hemp listed on the London market. If you stand
+at the highest point of the Gandara watershed you can see four streams
+flowing off north, northwest, northeast, and southwest to the sea.
+There are some half dozen streams having their source there. Brigands
+making their headquarters there could always, when hard pressed, get
+away in canoes toward the sea in almost any direction they wished. The
+following is Lieutenant Calderon&rsquo;s list: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb460" href="#pb460" name="pb460">460</a>]</span></p>
+<p lang="es">RELACION POR MUNICIPIOS DE LOS BARRIOS QUEMADOS.</p>
+<p>(List by Municipalities of the <i>Barrios</i> Burned.)</p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF GANDARA</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tauiran</td>
+<td>July 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cantaguic</td>
+<td>July 12</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cauilan</td>
+<td>July 13</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Erenas</td>
+<td>July 16</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Blanca Aurora</td>
+<td>July 19</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bulao<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10592src" href="#xd20e10592" name=
+"xd20e10592src">4</a></td>
+<td>July 21</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pizarro</td>
+<td>August 8</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cagibabago</td>
+<td>August 8</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nueva</td>
+<td>August 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Hernandez</td>
+<td>August 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Miguel</td>
+<td>August 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Buao</td>
+<td>August 15</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>El Cano</td>
+<td>August 17</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Enrique</td>
+<td>August 20</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Luis</td>
+<td>August 25</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN</p>
+<p>(Calderon&rsquo;s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned,
+<i>continued</i>)</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Malino</td>
+<td>July 31</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Silanga</td>
+<td>August 9</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ginga</td>
+<td>August 13</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Fernando</td>
+<td>August 15</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Maragadin</td>
+<td>August 20</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Talinga</td>
+<td>August 21</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Santa Cruz</td>
+<td>August 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Dap-dap</td>
+<td>August 29</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Palencia</td>
+<td>August 31</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Albalate</td>
+<td>(date not given)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Villa Hermosa</td>
+<td>(date not given)</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb461" href="#pb461" name=
+"pb461">461</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The above list of villages burned in the township of Catbalogan
+shows how bold the Pulajans had then grown. By that time they were
+committing depredations, robbery, murder, and town-burning, in all the
+various villages within the municipal jurisdiction of the township of
+Catbalogan, coming often within a few miles of the town proper of
+Catbalogan itself, the seat of the provincial government. In the attack
+on Silanga, which occurred August 9th, a number of people were killed.
+Silanga was but little more than an hour&rsquo;s walk from the
+court-house at Catbalogan. The Governor at once wired Manila as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar</span>,
+Aug. 9, 1904.</p>
+<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Executive Secretary</span>,
+Manila:</p>
+<p>The peaceably inclined people of the <i>barrios</i> near here are
+collecting here in large numbers, terrorized by Pulajans who are boldly
+roaming the country, burning <i>barrios</i> within seven or eight miles
+from Catbalogan. They kill men, women, and children without
+distinction. These Pulajans have fled from Gandara where they are being
+actively pursued by constabulary. All forces that could be spared have
+gone out. We have about thirty available fighting men here. <i>Pulajans
+liable at any time to enter Catbalogan.</i> We are in danger of some
+occurrence quite as serious as the Surigao affair.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e10745src" href="#xd20e10745" name="xd20e10745src">5</a> There
+are buildings here which I must protect at all hazards&mdash;Treasury,
+Provincial Jail with ninety-five prisoners, and commissary and ordnance
+stores of constabulary. We need at once at least <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb462" href="#pb462" name=
+"pb462">462</a>]</span>three hundred men, scouts if possible, to handle
+situation, between here and Gandara. Pulajans undoubtedly have friends
+in Catbalogan. I suspect certain of the municipal authorities here. I
+estimate number of Pulajans now operating at about five hundred.</p>
+<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Feito</span>,
+Governor.</p>
+</div>
+<p>On September 2d, the Provincial Governor of Samar sent to Manila the
+following telegram:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan</span>, Sept. 2,
+1904.</p>
+<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Carpenter</span>, Actg. Ex. Secy.,
+Palace, Manila:</p>
+<p>Seven-thirty this evening simultaneous reports from north and south
+sides of town Pulajans approaching. They have not entered yet and may
+not, but have gathered Americans with wives and children in my house.
+Arms supplied. Treasury twenty-five thousand Conant.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e10772src" href="#xd20e10772" name="xd20e10772src">6</a> One
+hundred forty prisoners in jail. Only forty-seven constabulary here. If
+Pulajans enter much needless sacrifice life pacific citizens here. Feel
+sure Pulajans have friends in Catbalogan. Request company either scouts
+or soldiers from Calbayog stationed here, preferably former. Their
+presence guarantee stability.</p>
+<p class="signed">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Feito</span>,
+Governor.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course Governor Feito did not call for the regular army of the
+United States. His job, poor devil, was to demonstrate as best he could
+that the military were not needed. He would at once have been suspected
+of trying to scuttle the ship of &ldquo;benign civil government&rdquo;
+if he had admitted that the regular army was needed. But to return to
+Calderon&rsquo;s list: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb463" href=
+"#pb463" name="pb463">463</a>]</span></p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CALBAYOG<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10789src" href=
+"#xd20e10789" name="xd20e10789src">7</a></p>
+<p>(Calderon&rsquo;s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned,
+<i>continued</i>)</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ylo</td>
+<td>August 17</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Napuro</td>
+<td>August 17</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Balud</td>
+<td>August 17</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF WRIGHT</p>
+<p>(Calderon&rsquo;s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned,
+<i>continued</i>)</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Guinica-an</td>
+<td>July 25</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Calapi</td>
+<td>July 28</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bonga</td>
+<td>August 4</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tutubigan</td>
+<td>August 19</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Motiong</td>
+<td>September 1</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Lau-an</td>
+<td>October 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Sao Jose</td>
+<td>(date not given)</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>A sample of the distressing communications I was getting as these
+massacres progressed is the notification of the Motiong affair of
+September 1st set forth below, which I give as a type of the methodical
+stoicism of those bloody times. Motiong was seven miles down the coast
+road from Catbalogan:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In the district of Motiong, municipality of Wright,
+province of Samar, Philippine Islands, September 1, 1904.</p>
+<p>In the presence of the undersigned Peregrin Albano, member of the
+village council, there being also present the president of the
+Municipal Board of Health, Mr. Tomas San Pablo, and the principal men
+of the place, there has this day occurred the burial of the corpses,
+victims of the Pulajans, in the cemetery of this place, to wit: The
+officer of volunteers, Rafael Rosales, and the following <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb464" href="#pb464" name=
+"pb464">464</a>]</span>volunteers, viz., Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle,
+Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo; also the two women,
+Eustaquia Sapiten and Apolinaria N., also one unknown Pulajan. This in
+fulfilment of the official letter of instructions No. 136, from the
+office of the presidente of the town of Wright dated to-day. Said
+burial ceremonies were conducted by the Reverend Father Marcos Gomez,
+and were attended by the whole volunteer force of this place because of
+the death of their officer Rosales.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Tomas San Pablo</span>,<br>
+President of the Board of Health.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Peregrin Albano</span>,<br>
+Councillor.</p>
+<p>(<i>Illegible</i>)&mdash;&mdash;<span class="sc">Moro</span>,
+Captain of Volunteers.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10893src" href=
+"#xd20e10893" name="xd20e10893src">8</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Fancy having documents like the foregoing handed you with
+ever-increasing regularity as you sauntered, morning after morning,
+from your bath to your coffee and rolls, preparatory to the daily
+sifting of incidents such as that which included the burning of the
+American flag on the head of the municipal representative of American
+authority already mentioned, and other like acts of poor misguided
+peasants stirred up by trifling <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb465"
+href="#pb465" name="pb465">465</a>]</span>scamps representing the dregs
+of insurrection. Motiong was not only within seven miles of the
+court-house at Catbalogan, but it was so near to Camp Bumpus, over in
+Leyte, where the 18th Infantry lay, that an order to them to move in
+the morning would have made life and property in all that
+brigand-harried region safe that night and continuously thereafter.</p>
+<p>General Wm. H. Carter, Major-General U. S. A., well known to the
+American public as the able officer who, in 1911, commanded the United
+States forces mobilized on the Mexican border during the Mexican
+revolution of that year, that ousted President Diaz and seated
+President Madero, was in command at the time&mdash;the fall of
+1904&mdash;of the military district of the Philippines which included
+Samar and Leyte. A word of request to him would have made life
+definitely safe in all the coast towns and their vicinity within two or
+three days after receipt of such a request.</p>
+<p>Besides Gandara, Catbalogan, Calbayog, and Wright, Lieutenant
+Calderon&rsquo;s list included the trio of ill-fated municipalities set
+forth below, concluding with the illustrious name of Taft:</p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td><i>Poblacion</i></td>
+<td>September 5</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Tagabiran</td>
+<td>August 11</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Vicente</td>
+<td>August &mdash;</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Catubig was toward the north end of Samar. On the day of the burning
+and sacking of the <i>poblacion</i> of Catubig, September 5th, which
+was done by a force of several hundred Pulajans, the scouts and
+constabulary, so it was afterward reported, killed a hundred of the
+Catubig Pulajans in an engagement. If this report were correct, as is
+likely, it was the biggest single killing of natives since the early
+days of the insurrection.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e10937src" href=
+"#xd20e10937" name="xd20e10937src">9</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb466" href="#pb466" name="pb466">466</a>]</span>But it did not in the
+least check the Pulajan insurrection, which simply swerved its fury
+from the Catubig region toward the coast (the Pacific coast),
+descending upon the towns, villages, and hamlets of the townships of
+Borongan and Taft, thus:</p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN</p>
+<p>(Calderon&rsquo;s List of <i>Barrios</i> Burned,
+<i>continued</i>)</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Sepa</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Lucsohong</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Maybocog</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Maydolong</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Soribao</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bugas</td>
+<td>Oct. 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Punta Maria</td>
+<td>Oct. 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Canjauay</td>
+<td>Oct. 11</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF TAFT</p>
+<p>(Calderon&rsquo;s List <i>continued</i>)</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Del Remedio</td>
+<td>Sept. 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Julian</td>
+<td>Sept. 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Nena</td>
+<td>Sept. 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Libas</td>
+<td>Sept. 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pagbabangnan</td>
+<td>Sept. 22</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>San Vicente</td>
+<td>Sept. 21</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Jinolaso</td>
+<td>Oct. 3</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Of the twenty-five pueblos or townships of Samar, the Calderon list
+only pretended to throw light on events in nine of them, those being
+the only ones from which definite news had then reached headquarters.
+But as a reign of terror prevailed all over Samar at the time, the rest
+may be imagined, though it can never be ascertained. Of these nine, the
+last two were:</p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF LLORENTE</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pagbabalancayan</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb467" href="#pb467" name=
+"pb467">467</a>]</span></p>
+<p>MUNICIPALITY OF ORAS</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Concepcion</td>
+<td>Sept. 23</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Jipapad</td>
+<td>&mdash;</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>Now it feels just as uncomfortable to be boloed in Pagbabalancayan
+as it would in a place with a more pronounceable name, and the same is
+true of the comparatively mellifluous Jipapad. True, some of these
+places were mere hamlets of twenty to forty houses, but you may be sure
+there were five or six people, on an average, to each house. On the
+other hand, glance back again at the list of towns of the township of
+Taft that were sacked and burned, and consider that San Julian was
+about the size of the provincial capital, Catbalogan, and that
+Catbalogan, the town proper, contained a population of four thousand,
+though looked at from the amphitheatre of hills which surround it,
+Catbalogan does not look like such a very large group of houses.
+Filipino houses are usually full of people. It is easier to live that
+way than to build more houses.</p>
+<p>After the Pulajan descent on Llorente, the people of Llorente all
+went off to the hills <i>to the Pulajans</i> for safety. They were not
+allowed to have firearms. This was forbidden by law, except on
+condition of making formal application for permission, getting it
+finally approved, and giving a bond, conditions which, in practical
+operation, made the prohibition all but absolute. The law was general
+for the whole archipelago. The theory of the law was that the
+inhabitants were under &ldquo;the peace and protection of a benign
+civil government.&rdquo; The real reason of the law was that if the
+people were allowed to bear arms it was very uncertain which side they
+would use them on, our side or the other. But, by 1904, the lowland and
+coast people of Samar would have been glad enough to have stuck to
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb468" href="#pb468" name=
+"pb468">468</a>]</span>us and gone out after the mountain robber bands
+had we armed them. Left unprotected, a feeling seemed to spread in many
+places that about the only thing to do to be safe was to depart from
+under the &ldquo;protection&rdquo; of the American flag and take to the
+hills and join, or seem to join, the uprising.</p>
+<p>Toward the last of September, the provincial treasurer of Samar, an
+American, a Mr. Whittier, visited the east coast of Samar, including
+Taft. On October 5th, he stated before me as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">All the presidentes that I have talked with, and this
+man Hill,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11082src" href="#xd20e11082" name=
+"xd20e11082src">10</a> said that they wanted some protection for their
+towns. Except at Borongan there are no guns in the hands of the
+municipal police.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11085src" href=
+"#xd20e11085" name="xd20e11085src">11</a> This band near Taft was said
+to have nineteen guns, and they felt they could not <i>defend their
+towns with spears</i> against these guns. There were reported to be
+between 200 and 600 in operation on the coast at that time, and they
+felt that they could not defend their towns with the means at hand. I
+found at Taft that they had taken all the records of the municipality,
+and the money, and taken it over to an island away from the main coast,
+in order to protect their money and their records, and I understand the
+same thing was done at Llorente. At Oras they had practically decided
+to take the same step if it became necessary. All of the commercial
+houses on the east coast and a large number of people congregated at
+Borongan, which was safe on account of the protection of the
+constabulary; and the constabulary there were doing very good work,
+<i>doing everything they could with their small force</i>, and they
+(the presidentes) felt that if they had guns in the hands of the
+municipal police or if they had the constabulary <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb469" href="#pb469" name="pb469">469</a>]</span>to
+guard their towns, they could go out after these people themselves.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The importance of all this testimony, relatively to its forever
+sickening any one acquainted with it with colonization by a republic,
+is that a transcript of Mr. Whittier&rsquo;s statement of October 5th
+was placed in the hands of the Governor-General a few days later by Mr.
+Harvey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and yet this situation
+continued until shortly after the presidential election. Several years
+afterwards, in the <i>North American Review</i>, Judge Ide, who was
+Vice-Governor in 1904, after admitting that he was in constant
+consultation with the Governor-General all through that period (by way
+of showing his opportunities for knowing whereof he spoke), denied that
+the failure to order out the military to protect the people from
+massacre had any relation whatever to the presidential election then
+going on in the United States.</p>
+<p>Mr. Whittier also stated before me that the total population of the
+municipality of Taft was 18,000, and that twenty-five men armed with
+guns in each of the four principal villages thereof that were burned
+would have prevented the destruction of those villages. So we did not
+protect the people, and we would not let them protect themselves. I do
+not select the pueblo of Taft on account of its distinguished name.
+&ldquo;What&rsquo;s in a name?&rdquo; The fate of Taft and its
+inhabitants was simply typical of the fate which descended upon scores
+of other places in &ldquo;dark and bloody&rdquo; Samar between the
+outbreak of July 10, 1904, and the presidential election of November
+8th, of that year, and between those two dates the shadow of such a
+fate was over all the towns of the island on which it did not in fact
+descend. Mr. Whittier stated to me informally that at <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb470" href="#pb470" name="pb470">470</a>]</span>the
+time he was speaking of in the above formal statement, there were
+pending and had been pending for a long time (he seemed to think they
+must have been pigeon-holed) applications for permission to bear arms
+from fifteen different pueblos. After Mr. Whittier had finished his
+statement the Presidente of Taft made a like statement on the same day,
+October 5th. My retained copy shows that this official bore the
+ponderous name of Angel Custodio Crisologo. He declared a willingness
+to lead his people against the Pulajans if given guns, though the
+fervent soul <i>did</i> qualify this martial remark by adding,
+&ldquo;If I am well enough,&rdquo; explaining that the presidential
+body was subject to rheumatism. Mr. Crisologo stated among other things
+that there had been eight hundred houses burned in the jurisdiction of
+Taft before he left the east coast for Catbalogan&mdash;about a week
+before. Like Mr. Whittier&rsquo;s, a copy of Mr. Crisologo&rsquo;s
+statement was delivered a few days later to the Governor-General in
+person by the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey, who had been
+present when it was made and taken down.</p>
+<p>This Mr. Harvey need not be, to the western hemisphere reader, a
+mere nebulous antipodal entity, as the Hon. Angel Custodio Crisologo
+might. He is a very live American, a very high-toned gentleman, and an
+excellent lawyer, and was at last accounts still with the insular
+government of the Philippine Islands, though in a higher capacity
+(Solicitor General) than he was at the date of the events herein
+narrated. There was very little congenial society in Catbalogan when
+Mr. Harvey came there to help dispose of the criminal docket, and his
+advent was to me a very welcome oasis in a desert of &ldquo;the
+solitude of my own originality&rdquo;&mdash;or lack of originality. On
+September 19th I had wired <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb471" href=
+"#pb471" name="pb471">471</a>]</span>Vice-Governor Ide that there were
+172 prisoners in the jail awaiting trial and &ldquo;many more
+coming.&rdquo; Of course no justice of the peace would be trusted to
+pass on whether an alleged outlaw should or should not be held for
+trial. If he were secretly in sympathy with the discomfiture American
+authority in Samar was having, he might let the man go, no matter what
+the proof. Also he might seek to clear himself of all suspicion in each
+case by committing men against whom there was no proof, thus
+unnecessarily crowding an already fast filling provincial jail of
+limited dimensions, wherein beriberi<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11116src" href="#xd20e11116" name="xd20e11116src">12</a> was
+already making its dread appearance.</p>
+<p>So the writ of habeas corpus remained unsuspended, thus making it
+possible to so state in later official certificates covering that
+period. But habeas corpus cut no more figure in the situation than it
+did at the battle of Gettysburg, or at the crossing of the Red Sea by
+the chosen people, or at the sinking of the <i>Titanic</i>. The
+constabulary would worry along with such force as they had in the
+island of Samar, only a few hundred, certainly nearer five hundred than
+one thousand. And, whenever they had a battle with the outlaws, if they
+themselves were not annihilated, which happened more than once, they
+would bring back prisoners in droves and put them in the jail, and I
+was expected to sift out how much proof they had, or claimed to have,
+of overt acts by persons not actually captured in action. Of course a
+race then began, a race against death, to see whether death or I would
+get to John Doe or Richard Roe first. And though I held court every day
+except Sunday from <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb472" href="#pb472"
+name="pb472">472</a>]</span>August to November 8th, sometimes getting
+in sixteen hours per day by supplementing a day&rsquo;s work with a
+night session, death would often beat me to some one man on the jail
+list whom I happened to have picked out to get to the next day. Men so
+picked out were men as to whom something I might have heard held out
+the hope of being able to dispose of their cases quickly by letting
+them loose,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11126src" href="#xd20e11126"
+name="xd20e11126src">13</a> thus getting that much farther from the
+danger limit of crowding in the jail. Some of these would be specially
+picked out because reported sick. I kept track of the sick by visiting
+them myself when practicable, and talking to them. Of course many of
+them were brigands&mdash;-Pulajans&mdash;but some of them were the
+saddest looking, most abject little brigands that anybody ever saw. Of
+course you might catch some nasty disease from them, but nobody,
+somehow, ever seemed to have any apprehension on that score in the
+Philippines. This does not argue bravery at all. It is merely the
+listless stoicism that lurks in the climate. I recollect going to walk
+one afternoon, after adjourning court at 5 o&rsquo;clock, saying to the
+prosecuting attorney before adjourning, &ldquo;We will take up the case
+of Capence Coral in the morning; there does not seem, from what I can
+understand, to be enough proof to convict him of anything.&rdquo; Of
+course when you were dealing with hundreds of people, you did not have
+any nerve-racking hysterics about any one man. Leaving the court-house
+I passed by the hospital, where Capence had been transferred, pending
+the arrival of witnesses against him and the rest of the crowd captured
+with him. I asked the hospital steward <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb473" href="#pb473" name="pb473">473</a>]</span>how Capence was. The
+answer was he had died at 4:45&mdash;some twenty minutes before. Death
+had beat me to Capence. When I meet Capence he will know I did the best
+I could. I was under a great strain, a sort of writ of habeas corpus
+incarnate, the only thing remotely suggesting relief from
+unwarranted<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11131src" href="#xd20e11131"
+name="xd20e11131src">14</a> detention on the whole horizon of the
+situation. I was trying to do the best I could by the Constitution, in
+so far as the spirit of it had reached the Philippines. I broke down
+totally under the strain about November 8th, came home in the spring of
+the following year and remained an invalid for several years
+thereafter; and as a noted corporation lawyer once said after recovery
+from a similar illness, &ldquo;I haven&rsquo;t had much
+<i>constitution</i> since, but have been living mostly under the
+by-laws.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>American office-holding in the Philippines is not so popular with
+the Filipinos as to have moved them to any outburst of gratitude in the
+shape of an effort to create a pension system for Americans who lose
+their health in the government service out there. When they leave the
+Islands they become as one dead so far as the Philippine insular
+government is concerned. And <i>the men whose health is more or less
+permanently impaired by disability incurred in line of duty in the
+Philippines are not and will never be numerous or powerful enough back
+home to create any sentiment in favor of a pension system for former
+Philippine employees</i>, since the Philippine business is not a
+subject of much popular enthusiasm at best. So if I had not had private
+resources, the results of the Samar insurrection of 1904 would have
+left me also in the pitiable plight in which I have beheld so many of
+my repatriated former comrades <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb474"
+href="#pb474" name="pb474">474</a>]</span>of the Philippine service in
+the last seven years, to whom the heart of the more fortunate
+ex-Filipino indeed goes out in sympathy. But to return to the race to
+beat death to prisoners in that grim and memorable fall of 1904.</p>
+<p>In September the crowded condition of the jail had begun to tell on
+the inmates. The constabulary force at Catbalogan was quite inadequate
+for the varied emergencies of the situation, there being, besides the
+town itself to protect, the provincial treasury to guard, the
+governor&rsquo;s office, the court-house, and the jail. Consequently
+the jail guard was too small. The jail buildings were in an enclosure a
+little larger than a baseball diamond, surrounded by high stone walls.
+But it was not safe to let the inmates sleep out in the enclosure at
+night. They had to be kept at night in the buildings. Any American who
+has visited the central penitentiary at Manila called Bilibid has seen
+a place almost as clean as a battleship. This is American work. But the
+Filipinos are not trained in sanitary matters, and all they know about
+handling large crowds of prisoners they learned from the Spaniards. The
+Governor was a native half-caste, a very excellent man, but free from
+that horror, which I think is an almost universal American trait, of
+seeing unnecessary and preventable sacrifice of human life, no matter
+whose the life. I inspected the jail as often as was practicable, and
+managed to keep down the death-rate below what it might have been, the
+prisoners being allowed to go out in the open court during the day.
+They also had such medical attention as was available. However, during
+the last five or six weeks of that term of court I would be pretty sure
+to find on my desk every two or three days, on opening court in the
+morning, a notice like this: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb475" href=
+"#pb475" name="pb475">475</a>]</span></p>
+<div lang="es" class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"></p>
+<p class="addressline">Carcel Provincial de Samar, I. F.<br>
+Oficina del Alcaide</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, I.
+F.</span>,<br>
+22 de Septiembre de 1904.</p>
+<p class="addressline"></p>
+<p>Hon. Sr. Juez de I<sup>a</sup> Instancia de esta provincia,<br>
+<span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.</span></p>
+<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Se&ntilde;or</span>:</p>
+<p>Tengo el honor de poner en conocimiento de ese juzgado, que anoche
+entre 12 y 1 de ella, fallecio el procesado, Ramon Boroce, a
+consecuencia de la enfermedad de beriberi, que venia padeciendo.</p>
+<p>Lo que tengo el honor de communicar a ese Juzgado para su superior
+conocimiento.</p>
+<p class="signed">De U. muy respetuosamente,<br>
+<span class="sc">Gonzalo Lucero</span>,</p>
+<p class="signed">Alcaide de la Carcel Provincial.</p>
+</div>
+<p>which being interpreted means:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first addressline">Provincial Jail of Samar, P. I.</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, P.
+I.</span>,<br>
+September 22, 1904.</p>
+<p class="addressline">His honor, the Judge of First Instance of this
+province,<br>
+<span class="sc">Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.</span></p>
+<p class="salute"><span class="sc">Sir</span>:</p>
+<p>I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of the court that last
+night between 12 and 1 o&rsquo;clock, the accused person Ramon Boroce
+died in consequence of the disease of beriberi from which he has been
+suffering; which fact I have the honor to communicate to the court for
+its superior knowledge.</p>
+<p class="signed">Very respectfully,<br>
+<span class="sc">Gonzalo Lucero</span>,</p>
+<p class="signed">Warden of the Provincial Jail.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Now a jail death-rate of only ten or twelve a month was not at all a
+bad record for an insurrection in a Philippine province. It would be
+rank demagoguery <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb476" href="#pb476"
+name="pb476">476</a>]</span>at this late date to be a party to
+anybody&rsquo;s getting excited about it. I was rather proud of it by
+comparison with the jail death-rate of the Albay insurrection of the
+year before, where 120 men had died in the jail in about six months.
+But it began to get on one&rsquo;s nerves to have to expect a
+<i>billet-doux</i> like the above on your desk at the opening of court
+each day, when the accused person had had no commitment trial and may
+have been wholly innocent. It all came back to the difference between
+war and peace, viz., that in war it is to be expected that many
+innocent persons will suffer, but that in peace only the guilty should
+suffer. Moreover, in war that admits it <i>is</i> war, your agents,
+your army, are better able to handle crowds of prisoners than native
+police and constabulary, and the percentage of innocent who suffer with
+the guilty in such war will be far less; whereas the contrary is true
+of war&mdash;waged by constabulary checked by courts&mdash;which
+pretends that a state of peace exists, <i>i.e.</i>, which pretends
+there is no need for declaring martial law and calling on your
+army.</p>
+<p>It was this Samar insurrection which convinced me that waging war
+with courts and constabulary in lieu of the recognized method was, in
+its net results, the cruelest kind of war, and that the civil
+government of the Philippines was a failure, in so far as regarded Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s original injunction to the Taft Commission; where,
+after alluding to the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila to
+our forces, which concluded with the words:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">This city, its inhabitants *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and its
+private property of all descriptions *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* are placed under
+the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army,</p>
+</div>
+<p>he added: <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb477" href="#pb477" name=
+"pb477">477</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the
+Government of the United States to give protection for property and
+life *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I
+charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this
+obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their
+country.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Commenting on this in his inaugural address as Governor of the
+Philippines, Governor Taft had said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">May we not be recreant to the charge, which he truly
+says, concerns the honor and conscience of our country.</p>
+</div>
+<p>No matter who was to blame, here we were in Samar, with the 14th
+Infantry three hours away in one direction at Calbayog, doing nothing,
+and the 18th Infantry five hours away in another direction, at
+Tacloban, doing nothing, and a reign of terror going on in Samar, with
+the peaceably inclined people of the lowlands and coast towns appealing
+to us for protection and not getting it, sometimes crouching in abject
+terror without knowing which way to fly, sometimes taking to the hills
+and joining the outlaws as a measure of self-preservation. &rsquo;Twas
+pitiful, wondrous pitiful! I then and there decided that we ought to
+get out of the Philippines as soon as any decent sort of a native
+government could be set up, and that our republic was not adapted to
+colonization. In his <i>North American Review</i> article above cited,
+in denying that the unwillingness of the Manila government to order out
+the army in Samar in the fall of 1904 had anything to do with the
+possible effect so doing might have had on the presidential election,
+then in progress in the United States, Governor Ide rebuked me with
+patronizing self-righteousness thus: &ldquo;Was Judge Blount opposed to
+kindness?&rdquo; He means in giving the Filipinos, under such
+circumstances, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb478" href="#pb478" name=
+"pb478">478</a>]</span>the &ldquo;protection of civil
+government,&rdquo; instead of ordering out the army. No, but I was
+opposed to using a saw, in lieu of a lancet, in excising the ulcers of
+that body politic at that time. In protesting that there was
+&ldquo;nothing sinister&rdquo; about the failure to use the troops,
+Judge Ide cunningly wonders whether my attitude was subsequently
+assumed after I left the Islands because of &ldquo;proclivities as a
+Democrat,&rdquo; or whether it was merely due to &ldquo;predilections
+in favor of military rule.&rdquo; Read Mr. McKinley&rsquo;s
+instructions to the Taft Commission, above quoted, that to protect life
+and property concerned the honor and conscience of their country, and
+consider if the Ide suggestion does not seem to hide its head and slink
+away in shame before the strong clear light of what was then a plain
+duty. As a matter of fact Judge Charles S. Lobinger, who is still with
+the Philippine judiciary, visited me en route to another point, during
+that Samar term of court, and he will recall, should he ever chance
+upon this book and this chapter, with what vehemence I said to him at
+the time, in effect, &ldquo;Judge, we belong in the Western Hemisphere.
+We have no business out here permanently.&rdquo; If proclivities and
+predilections in favor of affording decent protection to the lives and
+property of defenceless people by properly garrisoning their towns
+constitutes lack of kindness, then the Ide rebuke was well taken.</p>
+<p>These details are not related with Pickwickian gravity in order to
+acquaint the reader with <i>my</i> utterances as being important <i>per
+se</i>. But it <i>is</i> important to make clear to the reader, and he
+is entitled, in all frankness, to have it made clear by one who has now
+so long detained his attention on this great subject, to know just when
+&ldquo;the light from heaven on the road to Damascus&rdquo; broke upon
+this witness, and how and why he <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb479"
+href="#pb479" name="pb479">479</a>]</span>came to be in favor of
+Philippine independence, because the reasons which convinced him may
+seem good in the sight of the reader also. If the man who reads this
+book shall see that the man who wrote it was, in Samar in 1904, neither
+a Republican nor a Democrat, but simply an American in a far distant
+land, jealous of the honor of his country&rsquo;s flag in its capacity
+as a symbol of protection to those over whom it floated, then the work
+will not have been written in vain.</p>
+<p>The presidentes or mayors of the various pueblos were in session at
+Catbalogan in semi-annual convention during the first few days of
+October, 1904, when the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey, visited
+Catbalogan. Mr. Harvey and the writer had taken a number of long walks
+together in the suburbs of Catbalogan, though Major Dade, commanding
+the Samar constabulary, an officer of the regular army, had warned us
+it was not safe outside of town. We had talked over the situation
+fully. Besides all its other aspects, there were a number of American
+women in Catbalogan, an American lawyer&rsquo;s wife, the wife of the
+superintendent of schools, her sister, and others. It was not at all
+likely that the Pulajans would enter Catbalogan, but there was always
+the <i>possibility</i>, not to be wholly ignored, that some such
+episode as that of March 23d, of the preceding year, at Surigao,
+already described, might be repeated. As hereinbefore noted, on August
+9th, the Pulajans had done some killing and burning at Silanga, less
+than ten miles north of Catbalogan and likewise at Motiong, less than
+ten miles south of Catbalogan, on September 1st, and on the evening of
+September 2d, about 7:30, there had been a false alarm caused by some
+native of Catbalogan running down the main street yelling,
+&ldquo;Pulajans! Pulajans!&rdquo; All of which did not tend to make you
+feel <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb480" href="#pb480" name=
+"pb480">480</a>]</span>that your American women were quite as entirely
+safe from harm as they ought to be.</p>
+<p>In the course of one of our walks Mr. Harvey and I had stopped on
+the mountain side overlooking Catbalogan, to catch our breath and take
+in the view of the town below and the sea beyond. I said to him,
+because I knew his mind also was on the one great need of the hour:
+&ldquo;Yes sir, if President Roosevelt were here, and could see this
+situation as we do, he would order out the army and protect these
+defenceless people, no matter which way the chips might fly.&rdquo; Mr.
+Harvey agreed with me. He promised to go back to Manila and tell the
+authorities there so. After we came back to town, we were advised that
+the convention of presidentes desired to have Mr. Harvey favor them
+with an address. He said, &ldquo;What shall I tell them?&rdquo; I said,
+&ldquo;Tell them that if they will do their duty by the American
+Government, the American Government will do its duty by them.&rdquo; He
+spoke Spanish fluently, made a good speech, and told them in effect
+just that thing. Then he went back to Manila, and shortly afterward
+wrote me the two letters which follow:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first addressline"><span class="sc">Department of Justice,
+Philippine Islands,<br>
+Office of the Assistant Attorney-General<br>
+for the Constabulary</span>,</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Manila, P. I.</span>, October 15,
+1904.</p>
+<p><span class="sc">My dear Judge</span>: We arrived in Manila on
+Tuesday morning, the 11th instant, and I prepared my report and
+submitted it to the attorney-general on the 12th, in the meantime
+making a transcript of your summary and delivering a copy of same with
+other information to the attorney-general along with my report. After
+dictating the report and before delivering it I had a conversation with
+General Allen on the situation in Samar and told him what my
+recommendations would be. He agreed that rewards <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb481" href="#pb481" name=
+"pb481">481</a>]</span>should be offered for the capture of Pablo
+Bulan, Antonio Anogar, and Pedro de la Cruz, but took issue on the
+other recommendations, and to my mind he takes a very extreme view; but
+I thought at the time and still think that he wanted to tone me down in
+my feelings in the matter. I think the real cause for his opposition is
+the effect that he fears an aggressive attitude might have on the
+presidential election. In other words, whatever they do aggressively
+might be misconstrued and made use of as political capital.</p>
+<p>At Governor Wright&rsquo;s request I got the report from the
+attorney-general before it was sent up and went over to the
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e11303" title=
+"Source: Malacanan">Malaca&ntilde;an</span>, and the governor read the
+report and read most of the data that I submitted with the report,
+including your summary, and while he did not say much what he did say
+convinced me that there would be something doing if it were not on the
+eve of election, and in my opinion there will be things doing in Samar
+within thirty days.</p>
+<p>I inclose herewith a copy of your summary, and also a copy of my
+report to the attorney-general. On the 18th instant I received your
+telegram to hold the completion of your summary until receipt of a
+letter mailed by you that day. I telegraphed you in reply that my
+report and your summary were placed in the hands of the
+attorney-general on the 12th instant. If there is any additional data
+in your letter mailed on the 13th I will submit it to the proper
+authorities.</p>
+<p>For the lack of time, I will close, and write more next time.</p>
+<p class="signed">Very truly yours,<br>
+(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="sc">Geo. R. Harvey</span>,<br>
+Assistant Attorney-General.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"></p>
+<p class="addressline"><span class="sc">Department of Justice,
+Philippine Islands,<br>
+Office of the Assistant Attorney-General,<br>
+for the Constabulary</span>,</p>
+<p class="dateline"><span class="sc">Manila, P. I.</span>, October 19,
+1904.</p>
+<p><span class="sc">My dear Judge Blount</span>: Since mailing my
+letter to you of last Saturday I have found the copies of your summary
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb482" href="#pb482" name=
+"pb482">482</a>]</span>on the situation in Samar and inclose two
+herewith, in accordance with my promise.</p>
+<p>This week we have received some good news from Samar with reference
+to important captures and killings of Pulajans. I am not in touch with
+what is going on with reference to Samar, and can give you no
+information along that line. As I remember, the governor told me the
+other day when I was talking with him that one more company of scouts
+will be sent down right away.</p>
+<p>I sincerely hope the situation is improving, and that you are
+getting along rapidly in disposing of the large docket before you. If
+there is not a very great improvement in the situation by the 9th of
+November, I think there will be a considerable movement of troops in
+Samar within thirty days. For the good of the government, I hope the
+situation will improve materially before that time. I would like to see
+them put the troops there right now. I am of the opinion that it would
+not affect the election a half-dozen votes, and it might save two or
+three or a half-dozen massacres and the destruction of much
+property.</p>
+<p>With best wishes for your success in your work, and with regards to
+Mr. Block, I am,</p>
+<p class="signed">Very truly yours,</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Geo. R. Harvey</span>,</p>
+<p class="signed">Assistant Attorney-General, Philippines
+Constabulary.<br>
+To Hon. <span class="sc">James H. Blount</span>,<br>
+Judge of First Instance, Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.</p>
+</div>
+<p>These two letters may be found at p. 2532, <i>Congressional
+Record</i>, February 25, 1908, where they were the subject of remark in
+the House of Representatives by Hon. Thomas W. Hardwick of Georgia,
+apropos of Governor Ide&rsquo;s <i>North American Review</i> article of
+December, 1907.</p>
+<p>A few weeks after the presidential election I saw Mr. Harvey in
+Manila. We naturally talked about Samar and his two letters to me. The
+troops had then been <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb483" href="#pb483"
+name="pb483">483</a>]</span>ordered out. He referred to his conference
+with the Governor-General and stated, &ldquo;Yes, he told me that was
+the reason,&rdquo; meaning that the reason for not ordering out the
+troops was the one assigned in his (Harvey&rsquo;s) letter to me, viz.,
+&ldquo;Whatever we do aggressively might be misconstrued and made use
+of as political capital.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>On October 18, 1904, there was received at Manila the following
+cablegram concerning the presidential campaign in the United
+States:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">New York, 16th. Judge Parker, in addressing campaign
+clubs at Esopus the past week returned to the subject of the
+Philippines in the evident hope of making it a paramount issue of the
+campaign. He repeated his former declaration that the retention of the
+Philippines and the carrying out of the policy of the Republican
+Administration have cost six hundred and fifty millions of dollars and
+two hundred thousand lives. Secretary of War Taft, in addressing a mass
+meeting held in Baltimore, Saturday night, ridiculed Judge
+Parker&rsquo;s statement and characterized his figures as alarmist.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course Judge Parker&rsquo;s figures were rather high&mdash;of
+which more anon. He was not going to miss anything in the way of a
+chance of &ldquo;getting a rise&rdquo; out of the Administration, by
+understatement. But some statement from the Philippines at once became
+a supremely important desideratum, to counterbalance Judge
+Parker&rsquo;s over-statement, some optimism to meet the Parker
+pessimism. Encouraged by the public interest aroused by the figures
+furnished him, and the consequent apparent uneasiness it created in
+&ldquo;the enemy&rsquo;s camp,&rdquo; Judge Parker soon had the whole
+Philippine group of islands going to &ldquo;the demnition
+bow-wows.&rdquo; On October 20th, Secretary of War <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb484" href="#pb484" name="pb484">484</a>]</span>Taft
+cabled Governor Wright, then Governor-General of the Islands, a long
+telegram, quoting Judge Parker as having used, among other language
+descriptive of the beatitudes we had conferred on our little brown
+brother, the following: &ldquo;The towns in many places in ruins, whole
+districts in the hands of ladrones.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11389src" href="#xd20e11389" name="xd20e11389src">15</a></p>
+<p>At that time the whole archipelago was absolutely quiet for the
+nonce, except Samar. Samar was the only island where Judge
+Parker&rsquo;s statement was true, and as to Samar, it was absolutely
+true. On October 23d Governor Wright wired Secretary of War Taft as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is nothing warranting the statement that towns
+are in ruins. It is not true that there are whole districts in the
+hands of ladrones. Life and property are as safe here as in the United
+States.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11400src" href="#xd20e11400" name=
+"xd20e11400src">16</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This was followed by a perfectly true and correct picture of the
+peace and quiet which then prevailed for the time being everywhere
+throughout the archipelago, except in Samar, which dark and bloody isle
+was specifically excepted. Then followed a statement as to Samar, full
+of allusions as elaborately optimistic as any of the Taft cablegrams of
+1900, to impliedly inconsiderable &ldquo;prowling bands&rdquo; of
+outlaws in Samar. Of course nobody at home knew the answer to this, so
+it silenced the Parker batteries, and the Samar massacres proceeded
+unchecked. Meanwhile the 14th Infantry at Calbayog, Samar, and the 18th
+Infantry, at Tacloban, Leyte, smiled with astute, if contemptuous,
+tolerance, at the self-inflicted impotence of a republic trying to make
+conquered subjects behave without colliding too violently with home
+sentiment <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb485" href="#pb485" name=
+"pb485">485</a>]</span>against <i>having</i> conquered subjects; sang
+their favorite barrack room song,</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">He may be a brother of Wm. H. Taft,</p>
+<p class="line">But he ain&rsquo;t no friend of mine;</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">and continued to enjoy enforced leisure. They
+<i>did</i> chafe under the restraint, but it at least relieved them
+from the not altogether inspiring task of chasing Pulajans through
+jungles and along the slippery mire of precipitous mountain trails, and
+at the same time permitted the secondest second lieutenant among them
+to swear fierce <i>blas&eacute;</i> oaths, not wholly unjustified,
+about how much better he could run the Islands than they were being
+run.</p>
+<p>On October 26th, I wired Governor Wright at Manila as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Since my letter of October 6th, situation appears
+worse. Additional depredations both on east and west coast. Smith-Bell
+closing out.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11429src" href="#xd20e11429"
+name="xd20e11429src">17</a> Reliable American residing in Wright says
+that during week ending last Sunday thirteen families living along
+river Nacbac, <i>barrio</i> of Tutubigan, said pueblo, kidnapped by
+brigands and carried off to hills. This means some sixty people having
+farms along river, rice ready to be harvested. Seven of the eleven
+<i>barrios</i> of Wright have been burned.</p>
+<p class="signed"><span class="sc">Blount.</span></p>
+</div>
+<p>When I sent that telegram of October 26th, the situation in the
+pueblo of Wright was typical of the reign of terror throughout the
+island. Wright could have been reached by the 18th Infantry (then over
+at Tacloban, in Leyte), and garrisoned on eight hours&rsquo; notice.
+But I had little hope that the telegram would <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb486" href="#pb486" name="pb486">486</a>]</span>stir
+the 18th. The best man I had ever personally known well in high station
+was at the head of the government of the Islands, and as he was my
+friend, I sat down to think the situation out, determined, with the
+prejudice which is the privilege of friendship, to analyze his apparent
+apathy, and to conjecture <i>how many times</i> thirteen families
+&ldquo;having farms along river, rice ready to be harvested&rdquo;
+would have to be carried off to the hills by the brigands in order to
+move the 18th Infantry before the presidential election. Then I
+wondered just how many seconds it would have taken a British
+governor-general, backed by unanimous home sentiment concerning the
+wisdom of having colonies, to have acted, had a great British colonial
+mercantile house like Smith, Bell &amp; Co. appealed to him for
+protection of its interests. And that brought me, there on &ldquo;the
+tie-ribs of earth,&rdquo; as Kipling would phrase it, to the
+fundamentals of the problem. The British imperial idea of which Kipling
+is the voice and Benjamin Kidd the accompanist is based, superficially,
+upon a supposed necessity for the control of the tropics by
+non-tropical peoples, though fundamentally, it is an assertion of the
+right of any people to assume control of the land and destinies of
+another when they feel sure they can govern that other better than that
+other can govern itself. Is this proposition tenable, and if so, within
+what limits? Is it tenable to the point of total elimination of the
+people sought to be improved? If not, then how far? How far is
+incidental sacrifice of human life negligible in the working out of the
+broader problem of &ldquo;the greatest good of the greatest
+number?&rdquo; In his article in the <i>North American Review</i> for
+December, 1907, Governor Ide makes exhaustive answer to &ldquo;the
+doctors who for some months past, in the columns of the <i>North
+American <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb487" href="#pb487" name=
+"pb487">487</a>]</span>Review</i> and elsewhere, have published
+prescriptions for curing the ills of the Filipino people,&rdquo;
+including Senator Francis G. Newlands, Hon. William J. Bryan, and the
+writer. In the course of disposing of the quack last mentioned,
+Governor Ide gets on rather a high horse, asking, with much dignified
+indignation, &ldquo;How many people in the United States would have
+known or cared whether the army was or was not ordered out in Samar in
+1904?&rdquo; I concede that the solicitude was a super-solicitude, as
+do the Harvey letters, but like them, I must recognize its reality.
+However, when Governor Ide reaches this rhapsody of conscious virtue:
+&ldquo;It is inconceivable that the Commission could have been animated
+by the base and ignoble partisan prejudices thus charged against
+them,&rdquo; capping his climax by triumphantly pointing out that
+&ldquo;Governor-General Wright was a life-long Democrat,&rdquo; he doth
+protest too much. For the angelic pinions he thus attaches to himself
+are at once rudely snapped by the reflection that a very short while
+after his article came out in the <i>North American Review</i> Governor
+Wright became Secretary of War in President Roosevelt&rsquo;s Cabinet,
+and a little later took the stump for Taft and Sherman, in 1908.
+Governor Wright did not stoop to deny or extenuate his share in the
+matter, and I honor him for it.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11461src"
+href="#xd20e11461" name="xd20e11461src">18</a> But to stick to your own
+crowd and then deny afterwards that you did so&mdash;that is another
+story. However, let us brush aside such petty attempts to cloud the
+real issue, which is: How many people <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb488" href="#pb488" name="pb488">488</a>]</span>would Governor Wright
+and Vice-Governor Ide have permitted to be massacred by the Pulajans in
+Samar in 1904 before they would have ordered out the military prior to
+the <span class="corr" id="xd20e11474" title=
+"Source: presidental">presidential</span> election? Let us consider the
+case, not with a view of clouding the issue, but of clearing it. The
+truth is, Governor Wright was very gravely concerned about the Samar
+situation from August to November, 1904. Of course it is due to him to
+make perfectly clear that he did not realize the gravity of that
+situation as vividly as those of us who were on the ground in Samar,
+four or five hundred miles away. But the information hereinbefore
+reviewed, conveyed to him by the Provincial Governor, by Mr. Harvey,
+the Assistant Attorney General sent to Samar for the express purpose of
+getting the Manila government in possession of the exact situation, and
+by myself, was certainly sufficient to make him &ldquo;chargeable with
+notice&rdquo; of all that happened thereafter, certainly chargeable
+with knowledge of all that had happened theretofore. Of course there
+was General Allen, the commander-in-chief of the constabulary, at
+Manila, presumably speaking well of his command&mdash;the right arm of
+the civil government&mdash;presumably giving industrious and tactful
+aid and comfort to the idea that the authorities could afford to worry
+along with the constabulary alone until after the presidential
+election. But that could not discount the actual facts reported from
+the afflicted province by the officials on the ground. General Allen,
+it should be noted, remained in Manila all this time. So that any
+Otis-like &ldquo;situation-well-in-hand&rdquo; bouquets he may have
+thrown at his subordinates in Samar, and the situation there generally,
+were mere political hothouse products, surer to be recognized as such
+by the shrewd kindliness of the truly considerable man at the head of
+the government than by most <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb489" href=
+"#pb489" name="pb489">489</a>]</span>any one else he could hand them
+out to. That man knew, to all intents and purposes, in the great and
+noble heart of him, what was really going on in Samar. He knew that
+massacres had been occurring, and that they were likely to keep on
+occurring. In other words, he knew that <i>preventable</i> sacrifice of
+life of defenceless people was going on, and that he could put a stop
+to it any time he saw fit. The question he had to wrestle with was,
+should he stop it, knowing the &ldquo;Hell fer Sartin&rdquo; the
+Democratic orators in the United States would at once luridly describe
+as &ldquo;broke loose&rdquo; in the Philippines? I insist that there is
+no use for any holier-than-thou gentleman to become suffused with any
+glow of indignant conscious rectitude based on the premises we are
+considering. Better to look a little deeper, on the idea that you are
+observing your republic <i lang="la">in flagrante colonizatione</i>,
+with as good a man as you ever have had, or ever will have, among you,
+as the principal actor. Governor Wright&rsquo;s course was entirely
+right, <i>if the Philippine policy was right</i>. If his course was not
+right, it was not right because the Philippine policy is fundamentally
+wrong. Governor Wright of course believed that the Philippine policy
+was right. I myself did not come finally to believe it was wrong until
+it was revealed in all its rawness by the period now under discussion.
+Of course the Governor did not vividly realize that the American women
+in Catbalogan were not entirely safe. If he had, he would have rushed
+the troops there, politics or no politics. But native life was
+politically negligible. What difference would a few score, or even a
+few hundred, natives of Samar make, compared with that pandemonium of
+anarchy and bloodshed all over the archipelago which Messrs. Taft,
+Wright, and Ide had long been insisting would follow Philippine
+independence? Was the whole <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb490" href=
+"#pb490" name="pb490">490</a>]</span>future of 8,000,000 of people to
+be jeopardized to save a few people in Samar? That was the moral
+question before the insular government, in its last analysis. And the
+government faced the proposition squarely, and answered it
+&ldquo;No.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>I will go farther than this. If I had believed, with Messrs. Taft,
+Wright, and Ide, that Philippine independence meant anarchy in the
+Islands, and the orthodox &ldquo;bloody welter of chaos,&rdquo; I too
+might have hesitated to order out the troops on the eve of the
+election, and my hesitation, like theirs, might have continued until
+the election was safely over. So might yours, reader. Don&rsquo;t be so
+certain you would not. Practically absolute power, sure of its own
+benevolence, has temptations to withhold its confidence from the people
+that you wot not of. Don&rsquo;t condemn Governor Wright. Condemn the
+policy, and change your republic back to the course set by its
+founders. Give the Philippine people the independence they of right
+ought to have, instead of secretly hoping to unload them on somebody
+else, through the medium of your next great war.</p>
+<p>The question of whether the troops should have been ordered out or
+not at the time above dealt with is by no means without two sides. On
+the &ldquo;bloody welter&rdquo; side, you have the well-known opinions
+of Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide. On the other side you have before
+you&mdash;for the moment&mdash;only my little opinion. So instead of
+having in Governor Wright a Bluebeard, you simply have a man of great
+personal probity and unflinching moral courage, following his
+convictions to their ultimate logical conclusion without shadow of
+turning, in the act of colonization. In other words, Mr. American, you
+see yourself, as others see you. So face the music and look at
+yourself. In your colony business, you are a house divided against
+itself, which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb491" href="#pb491" name=
+"pb491">491</a>]</span>cannot stand. On the other hand, I knew the
+Filipino people far more intimately than either Mr. Taft, Governor
+Wright, or Judge Ide. I spoke their language&mdash;which they did not.
+I had met them both in peace and in war&mdash;which they had not. I had
+held court for months at a time in various provinces of the archipelago
+from extreme northern Luzon to Mindanao&mdash;which they had not. I had
+met the Filipinos in their homes for years on terms of free and
+informal intercourse impracticable for any governor-general. It was
+therefore perfectly natural that I should know them better than any of
+these eminent gentlemen. I was not prepared to be in a hurry about
+recommending myself out of office by assenting that our guardianship
+over the Filipinos should at once be terminated, but I knew there was
+nothing to the &ldquo;bloody welter&rdquo; proposition. The home life
+of the Filipino is too altogether a model of freedom from discord,
+pervaded as it is by parental, filial, and fraternal love, and their
+patriotism is too universal and genuine, to give the &ldquo;bloody
+welter&rdquo; bugaboo any standing in court.</p>
+<p>But whosoever questions for one moment Governor Wright&rsquo;s high
+personal character, simply does not know the man. To do so, moreover,
+would fatally cloud the issue I have sought to make clear between his
+view of the duty of our government and my own. In his moods that
+reminded one of Lincoln, Governor Wright used to say:
+&ldquo;Don&rsquo;t shoot the organist, he&rsquo;s doing the best he
+can.&rdquo; It is true that his answer to Judge Parker was not a full
+and frank statement of the case. But did it lie in American human
+nature, when your antagonist was recklessly over-stating the case in
+the heat of debate on the eve of a presidential election, to take him
+into your confidence and tell him all you knew, in simple trusting
+faith that he would thereafter <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb492"
+href="#pb492" name="pb492">492</a>]</span>quit exaggerating? To permit
+the dispute to boil down to the real issue, viz., how many lives it was
+permissible to abandon on the &ldquo;greatest good to the greatest
+number&rdquo; theory, would obviously jeopardize the existence of a
+government which the Governor of the Philippines naturally believed to
+be better for all concerned than any other. And there is your
+cul-de-sac. <i>Hinc ill&aelig; lachrym&aelig;.</i></p>
+<p>We can point with pride to many things we have done in the
+Philippines, the public improvements,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11506src" href="#xd20e11506" name="xd20e11506src">19</a> the
+school system, the better sanitation, and a long list of other benefits
+conferred. But in the greatest thing we have done for them, we have
+builded wiser than we knew. &ldquo;God moves in a mysterious way His
+wonders to perform.&rdquo; In fourteen years we have welded the
+Filipinos into one homogeneous political unit. In a most charming book,
+entitled <i>An Englishwoman in the Philippines</i>,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e11512src" href="#xd20e11512" name="xd20e11512src">20</a> we
+can see our attempts to fit government by two political parties into
+over-seas colonization caricatured without sting until we really remind
+ourselves of a hippopotamus caressing a squirrel. In one passage the
+British sister describes our programme as one &ldquo;to educate the
+Filipino for all he is worth, so that he may, in the course of time, be
+fit to govern himself <i>according to American methods</i>; but at the
+same time they have plenty of soldiers to knock him on the head if he
+shows signs of wanting his liberty before the Americans think he is fit
+for it&rdquo;&mdash;&ldquo;A quaint scheme,&rdquo; she na&iuml;vely
+adds, &ldquo;and one full of the go-ahead originality of
+America.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The more we teach the Filipinos, the more intimately <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb493" href="#pb493" name="pb493">493</a>]</span>they
+will become acquainted, <i>in their own way</i>, with the history of
+the relations between our country and theirs from the beginning,
+including the taxation without representation, through Congressional
+legislation (hereinafter noticed) placed or kept on our statute-books
+by the hemp trust and other special interests in the United States. And
+they will learn all these things in the midst of a &ldquo;growing gulf
+between the two peoples.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11526src"
+href="#xd20e11526" name="xd20e11526src">21</a></p>
+<p>In fourteen years we have made these unwilling subjects, whom we
+neither want nor need any more than they want or need us, a unit; a
+unit for Home Rule in preference to alien domination, it is true; but,
+nevertheless, a patriotic unit&mdash;one people&mdash;a potential body
+politic which can take a modest, but self-respecting place in the
+concert of free nations, with only a little more additional help from
+us.</p>
+<p>In the handling of an insurrection in any given province with courts
+and constabulary during the first four or five years after the Taft
+government of the Philippines was founded, the function of a
+representative of the office of the Attorney-General, coming from
+Manila to help the local prosecuting attorney handle a large docket and
+a crowded jail, was by no means remotely analogous to that of a grand
+jury. He originated prosecutions, found &ldquo;No Bill,&rdquo; etc.
+When Mr. Harvey came to Samar, he came direct to the court room, and I
+suspended the trial of the pending case, and, after greeting him, began
+an informal talk which was akin to the nature of a charge to a grand
+jury, putting him in possession of the general aspects of the uprising.
+He was a very just and kindly man, and entered into the spirit of the
+task. I elaborated on the class of cases <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb494" href="#pb494" name="pb494">494</a>]</span>where the defendant
+claimed, as most of them did, &ldquo;Yes, I joined the band of
+brigands, but I was made to do so.&rdquo; It was also indictable to
+furnish supplies to the public enemy. This presented the class of cases
+where the brigands would swoop down on a town and demand rice, and not
+getting it, would sometimes kill the persons refusing it, and so
+intimidate the rest into finding rice for them. Also there was the
+class of cases where a man would claim to have been one of the
+inhabitants of an unprotected town who had gone off to the hills in a
+body, <i>for safety</i>, to propitiate the mountain people by becoming
+part of them. This sort of thing at one time threatened to become
+epidemic with all the coast towns. It did not, however. A <i>modus
+vivendi</i> of some sort, sometimes express, sometimes merely tacit,
+would be arranged between the coast people and the hill people. These
+<i>modus vivendi</i> arrangements enabled the coast people to obtain a
+certain degree of safety, in lieu of that we should have secured them
+but did not, by making the hill folk believe that the coast men were
+against us and for them. At one time the prosecuting attorney got hold
+of evidence sufficient to authorize the issuance of a warrant for the
+Presidente of Balangiga, the man supposed to have engineered the
+massacre of the 9th Infantry in September 1901. I authorized the
+issuance of the warrant for his arrest. But the native governor of the
+province, and also Major Dade, the American regular officer commanding
+the constabulary, satisfied me that we did not have force sufficient to
+protect Balangiga from the Pulajans, if we arrested the presidente,
+who, being <i>persona grata</i> to the Pulajans, was able to keep them
+from descending on his town. To arrest him would therefore mean, in
+their opinion, that the people of Balangiga would take to the hills for
+protection, and join the hill folk, or Pulajans, <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb495" href="#pb495" name="pb495">495</a>]</span>and
+if a town as large as Balangiga set any such example all the coast
+towns might follow it. So the supposed perpetrator of the 9th Infantry
+massacre was allowed to remain unmolested. The American court was
+impotent to enforce its processes.</p>
+<p>In my mass of Philippine papers there is one containing a copy of my
+remarks to the Assistant Attorney-General on his arrival at Catbalogan,
+above referred to as <span class="corr" id="xd20e11552" title=
+"Source: analagous">analogous</span> to a charge to a grand jury at
+home. It is dated Catbalogan, Samar, September 28, 1904, and is headed:
+&ldquo;Remarks by the court upon the occasion of the arrival of
+Assistant Attorney-General Harvey, with regard to the recent
+disturbances in Samar, and the cases for brigandage and sedition
+growing out of the same.&rdquo; Certain parts of this
+<i>contemporary</i> document will doubtless give the reader a more
+vivid apprehension of the then situation than he can get from mere
+subsequent description. Of course the visiting representative of the
+Attorney-General&rsquo;s office was familiar in a general way with the
+manner of the handling of the Albay insurrection in the previous year,
+described in the chapter preceding this. In discussing the Samar
+situation the &ldquo;remarks&rdquo; of the court contain, among other
+things, this passage:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In the cases growing out of the Albay disturbances
+there were a great many people who strayed out to the mountains just
+like cattle. They did not know why or whither they went. As to those
+persons, Judge Carson, Mr. Ross, and myself were unanimous in the
+opinion that some of them could be indicted under the vagrancy law.
+There were others of a greater degree of guilt, but who did not appear
+to have been what you might call ordinary thieves, and we were all
+agreed to indict those under the sedition law, the limit of which is
+ten years and ten thousand dollars. Thus you do not force upon a Judge
+of First Instance the responsibility <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb496" href="#pb496" name="pb496">496</a>]</span>of sentencing a man
+to twenty years of his life for a connection with bandits which may be
+but little more than technical. Besides those two classes, there were
+in Albay of course the bandits proper, to whom the <i>bandolerismo</i>
+[brigandage] law was specially intended to apply. There cannot be any
+doubt about the fact that this <i>bandolerismo</i> law is one of the
+most stringent statutes that ever was on the statute-books of any
+country. It is very far from the purpose of this court to attempt to
+say what would be the wisest legislation, or to say that this is not
+the very best legislation, under the circumstances. <i>How we
+administer the several laws alluded to governing public order, will
+settle whether or not substantial justice is done.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>The men in the United States who in those days were slinging mud at
+the Philippine trial judges as being &ldquo;subservient,&rdquo; wholly
+missed the core of the whole matter. In the provinces where so many
+heavy sentences were imposed, the real situation was that a state of
+war existed, and the judges believed, and I think correctly, that they
+were practically a military commission of one, and much more able to
+give a prisoner a square deal, tempering justice with mercy, than
+officers briefly gathered from the scenes of the fighting to act as a
+military commission. We tried those men with as little prejudice as if
+they had just come from the moon. Moreover, from the italicized
+concluding words of the above excerpt from my talk to the Assistant
+Attorney-General, it will be seen that the court had practically
+unlimited discretion in the matter of punishment, and was, in fact,
+about the only <i>court of criminal equity</i> in the annals of
+Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.</p>
+<p>In the last analysis, the righteousness or unrighteousness of a
+civil government in a country not yet entirely subjugated, depends on
+whether more innocent <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb497" href=
+"#pb497" name="pb497">497</a>]</span>people suffer through completing
+the work of subjugation with constabulary whose &ldquo;prisoners of
+war&rdquo; are tried, to see what they may have done, if anything, by
+one-man courts, or whether more innocent people suffer through
+completing the work of subjugation as any other great power on earth
+but ourselves would have completed it, with an army, trying the
+prisoners by military commission. Unless you yourself were a traitor to
+your country, you considered as criminal attempts to subvert your
+government by cut-throats that no one of the respectable Filipinos,
+from Aguinaldo and Juan Cailles down, would have hesitated to have shot
+summarily. But you sought to make the punishment in each case fit the
+crime, by ascertaining as dispassionately as if the defendant were
+fresh from the moon, just what each accused man had himself done.
+Either Aguinaldo, or an American military commission would have had
+such people shot in bunches, as not entitled to be treated as prisoners
+of war. The trouble with the civil government did not lie in its
+judiciary, but in its constabulary. It was the physical handling of the
+crowds of prisoners by the constabulary, and their failure, because not
+numerous enough, to protect peaceably inclined people, which made it a
+fact that turning the situation over to the military would have meant
+less sacrifice of the innocent along with the guilty. It is much more
+merciful to kill a few hundred people, as a lesson to the rest, and let
+the rest go, with the clear understanding that if they insurrect again
+you will promptly kill a few hundred more, than to permit a reign of
+terror from one month to another and from one year to another, with all
+the untilled fields, famine, pestilence, and other disease this
+involves, merely in order to be able to invoke the blessing of the
+Doctor Lyman Abbots of the world on a supposedly benign
+&ldquo;civil&rdquo; government. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb498"
+href="#pb498" name="pb498">498</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In all my sentences, and in all his indictments, Mr. Harvey and the
+writer sailed close to the wind, by holding only those responsible who
+had taken active parts in the sacking and burning of villages and the
+massacre of their inhabitants. I knew that sooner or later some
+officious prosecuting attorney of less noble mould than Harvey would
+ask me to convict some poor creature of brigandage for giving a little
+rice to the brigands, and my mind was made up to refuse to do so, and
+in so refusing to commit heresy once and for all by expressing my
+sentiments, in the decision, concerning the failure to give adequate
+protection to defenceless people, along the lines indicated in this
+chapter. No such case was in fact presented. I broke down under the
+strain of graver cases early in November and left Samar forever, bound
+for Manila.</p>
+<p>Before I left, the whole island was seething with sedition. I was
+told by a credible American that the chief deputy sheriff of the court,
+an ex-insurgent officer, one of the &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo;
+policy appointees, had remarked among some of his own people where he
+did not expect the remark to be repeated: &ldquo;I see no use
+persecuting our brethren in the hills.&rdquo; The municipal officials
+of the provincial capital, Catbalogan, were suspected by the native
+provincial governor, and the latter in turn was suspected by the Manila
+government. In fact the whole political atmosphere of the island had
+become full of rumor and suspicion as to who was <i>for</i> the
+government, and who was <i>against</i> the government. I left Samar,
+November 8th, which was the day of the presidential election of 1904,
+determined to try no more insurrections. By that time nearly everybody
+in the island was more or less guilty of sedition, and I did not know
+the method of drawing an indictment against a whole people.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb499" href="#pb499" name=
+"pb499">499</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10402" href="#xd20e10402src" name="xd20e10402">1</a></span>
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10407" href="#xd20e10407src" name="xd20e10407">2</a></span>
+<i>Ib.</i>, vol. i., p. 58.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10452" href="#xd20e10452src" name="xd20e10452">3</a></span> Says
+Brigadier-General Wm. H. Carter, in his annual report for 1905 covering
+the Samar outbreak of 1904&ndash;5: &ldquo;Whatever may have been the
+original cause of the outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when success
+had drawn a large proportion of the people away from their homes and
+fields. Except in the largest towns it became simply a question of
+joining the pulajans or being harried by them. <i>In the absence of
+proper protection</i> thousands joined in the movement.&rdquo; See
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 286.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10592" href="#xd20e10592src" name="xd20e10592">4</a></span> Bulao
+was situated on a high bluff on the left bank of a river called the
+Bangahon. The Pulajans entered before daybreak, on July 21st. There was
+a stiff fight at Bulao, also, between our native troops and the enemy
+on August 21st, but Calderon seems to have left it out of his list. See
+Gen. Wm. H. Carter&rsquo;s Report for 1905, <i>War Department
+Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290. Capt. Cary Crockett, a descendant
+of David Crockett, commanded the constabulary, and though badly wounded
+himself, as were also half his command, he defeated a force of Pulajans
+greatly outnumbering his, killing forty-one of them. <i>Report U. S.
+Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 3, p. 90, Report of Col. Wallace
+C. Taylor. I think he was awarded a medal of honor for his work. He
+certainly earned it.</p>
+<p class="footnote">&ldquo;Pulajan&rdquo; means &ldquo;red
+breeches,&rdquo; the uniform of the mountain clans, worn whenever they
+set out to give trouble.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10745" href="#xd20e10745src" name="xd20e10745">5</a></span> Of
+March 23d of the previous year, already described in a previous
+chapter, where Luther S. Kelly&mdash;&ldquo;Yellowstone&rdquo;
+Kelly&mdash;saved the American women by gathering them and a few men in
+the Government House and bluffing the brigands off.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10772" href="#xd20e10772src" name="xd20e10772">6</a></span> The
+&ldquo;Conant&rdquo; peso, named for the noted fiscal expert, Mr.
+Conant. It was worth fifty cents American money.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10789" href="#xd20e10789src" name="xd20e10789">7</a></span> The
+Fourteenth U. S. Infantry was stationed in garrison just outside the
+town proper of Calbayog, which was three hours by steam launch from the
+provincial capital, Catbalogan. But the depredations might have been
+carried to just outside the line of the military reservation, and the
+military folk would not have dared to make a move save on request first
+made by the Civil Government at Manila. In other words the above three
+villages were burned under their noses.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10893" href="#xd20e10893src" name="xd20e10893">8</a></span> One
+seems to get the stoicism better in the original, somehow, so I give
+the body of the original Spanish, as it came to me:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p lang="es" class="footnote first">En el distrito de Motiong,
+municipio de Wright, provincia de Samar, Islas Filipinas, a primero de
+septiembre de mil novecientos quatro. Ante mi Peregrin Albano, consejal
+del mismo, y presente el Presidente de Sanidad Municipal, D. Tomas San
+Pablo y principales del mismo se procedio al enterramiento de los
+cadaveres victimas de los Pulajans en el sementerio de esta localidad
+el oficial de voluntarios, Rafael Rosales y otros voluntarios,
+Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle, Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo
+Lagbo, y particulares Eustaquia Sapiten y Apolinaria N: con otro tanto
+Pulajan desconocido; en conformidad de la carta oficial de la
+presidencia municipal de Wright de fecha de hoy registrada con el
+numero 136.</p>
+<p lang="es" class="footnote">Del citado enteramiento ha sido asistido
+por el Reverendo Padre Marcos Gomez y acompanado por toda la fuerza
+voluntaria del mismo por la muerte del oficial Rosales.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e10937" href="#xd20e10937src" name="xd20e10937">9</a></span> See
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11082" href="#xd20e11082src" name="xd20e11082">10</a></span> Hill
+was Whittier&rsquo;s deputy at Llorente.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11085" href="#xd20e11085src" name="xd20e11085">11</a></span> Even
+if the municipal police had been like C&aelig;sar&rsquo;s wife, they
+were like chaff before the wind in a Pulajan foray, though they were
+somewhat better if well led by some prominent and forceful man of the
+community in an expedition <i>after</i> Pulajans.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11116" href="#xd20e11116src" name="xd20e11116">12</a></span> A
+disease of a dropsical variety, usually attacking the legs first, which
+easily becomes epidemic. It had been the cause of many of the 120
+deaths in the Albay jail during the Ola insurrection. Ideal conditions
+for it are a steady diet of poor rice and lack of exercise.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11126" href="#xd20e11126src" name="xd20e11126">13</a></span> It
+was not well to be too hasty. You might have the head of the whole
+uprising in custody, or one of his most important lieutenants, and find
+it out by the merest accident in the course of hearing a case against
+some apparently abject &ldquo;private of the rear rank.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11131" href="#xd20e11131src" name="xd20e11131">14</a></span> By
+unwarranted I mean without warrant. Nobody bothered much with warrants.
+The times were too strenuous.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11389" href="#xd20e11389src" name="xd20e11389">15</a></span> See
+<i>New York Tribune</i>, Oct. 25, 1904.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11400" href="#xd20e11400src" name="xd20e11400">16</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11429" href="#xd20e11429src" name="xd20e11429">17</a></span>
+Smith, Bell &amp; Co. are an old British mercantile house, well known
+in Manila and Hong Kong.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11461" href="#xd20e11461src" name="xd20e11461">18</a></span>
+<i>The North American Review</i> article by the writer, to which Judge
+Ide was replying, appeared in the issue of that magazine for January
+18, 1907, and could hardly have escaped the attention of anybody
+concerned, having been given wide circulation; (1) by Mr. Andrew
+Carnegie through pamphlet reprints; (2) by Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, in his
+paper, the <i>Commoner</i>; (3) by Hon. James L. Slayden, M. C. of
+Texas, through reprinting in the <i>Congressional Record</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11506" href="#xd20e11506src" name="xd20e11506">19</a></span> Such
+as the breakwater at Manila, the road-building in various provinces,
+etc.&mdash;all, however, be it remembered, being paid for by the
+Filipino people, out of the insular revenues and assets.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11512" href="#xd20e11512src" name="xd20e11512">20</a></span> By
+Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11526" href="#xd20e11526src" name="xd20e11526">21</a></span>
+Words used by Governor-General James F. Smith, in an address at the
+Quill Club, Manila, January 25, 1909.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch19" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XIX</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Wright&mdash;1905</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">My heart is heavy with the fate of that unhappy
+people.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Speech of Hon. A. O. Bacon in U.
+S. Senate.</span><a class="noteref" id="xd20e11604src" href=
+"#xd20e11604" name="xd20e11604src">1</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Because the especially cordial relations which existed
+to the last between Governor Wright and myself<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11608src" href="#xd20e11608" name="xd20e11608src">2</a> are
+familiar to a number of very dear mutual friends, I deem it due both to
+them and to myself, in view of the contents of the preceding chapter,
+to state <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb500" href="#pb500" name=
+"pb500">500</a>]</span>that I see no reason why, in writing a history
+of the American Occupation of the Philippines, I should omit or slur
+the facts which convinced me that that occupation ought to terminate as
+soon as practicable, and that any decent kind of a government of
+Filipinos by Filipinos would be better for all concerned than the
+McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation whereof Governor
+Wright was the legatee. By the thousand and one uncandid threads of
+that programme, slowly woven from 1898 to 1904, as indicated in the
+first sixteen chapters of this book, Governor Wright had found himself
+as hopelessly bound to concealment from the American people of the real
+situation in Samar in the fall of 1904, as a Gulliver in Lilliput.</p>
+<p>When I finally left Samar and came to Manila, in November, 1904, I
+was not prepared to figure out how or how soon, the blunder we made by
+the purchase of the Philippine archipelago could be corrected. But my
+mental attitude toward the whole Philippine problem had undergone a
+complete change. In 1901 Governor Wright, then Vice-Governor, had
+written me: &ldquo;You younger men out here, who have cast your
+fortunes with this country, are to be, in all likelihood, in the
+natural course of events, its future rulers.&rdquo; Up to 1903 I had
+clung to that idea with the devotion of what was really high and
+earnest purpose, untroubled with misgivings of any kind. In November,
+1903, in Albay, Judge Carson and myself had talked over the long
+struggle of the civil government to walk without leaning on the
+military, and, with the readiness of one vested with authority to
+believe such authority wisely vested, and the readiness of a civilian
+lawyer to jealously guard the American home idea that the military
+should be subordinate to the civil authority, I had cordially agreed
+with a sentiment one day expressed by Judge <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb501" href="#pb501" name=
+"pb501">501</a>]</span>Carson concerning Governor Taft about &ldquo;the
+splendid moral fibre of the man,&rdquo; meaning in keeping the military
+from prancing out of the traces. After Governor Taft left the Islands
+to be Secretary of War (December 23, 1903), and while I was still in
+Albay, I had learned of the 120 men who had died in the Albay jail
+while awaiting trial, and thereafter something of the magnitude of the
+Ola insurrection there, and that had given me pause as to the practical
+benevolence of the operation of &ldquo;a benign civil
+government.&rdquo; Then the Samar massacres of 1904, and the gory
+panorama I had there witnessed, had finally convinced me that a
+republic like ours is wholly unfitted to govern people against their
+consent. But I did not tell anybody in Manila all these things. I
+simply pondered them. Grover Cleveland was the only man in the world I
+would have liked to talk to just then freely and fully. And he was not
+about. &ldquo;My heart was heavy with the fate of that unhappy
+people&rdquo; as Senator Bacon had said in the Senate in 1902, after
+visiting the Islands in 1901. I did not condemn Governor Wright. I
+quite realized that I was &ldquo;up against&rdquo; about the largest
+ethical problem of world politics, one on which the nations are much
+divided, and that I was not infallible. I did not say to the Governor:
+&ldquo;Governor, let&rsquo;s resign and go home and tell our people
+that this whole business is a mistake.&rdquo; Nor did I ever lose faith
+in Governor Wright personally. If I had, I might just as well have
+said: &ldquo;After this, the deluge.&rdquo; I would simply have lost
+faith in human nature. I had not then, nor have I since, known a man of
+higher personal character. I had simply lost faith in Benevolent
+Assimilation, and begun to take the Filipino people seriously as a
+potential nation, probably better able to handle their own domestic
+problems than we will ever be able to handle them for them.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb502" href="#pb502" name=
+"pb502">502</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The day after I resigned, Mr. Justice Carson, of the Supreme Court,
+and Mr. Wilfley, the Attorney-General, came to call on me. My friends
+knew I was very much troubled over the Samar business. I was doing some
+grumbling, but without specifying, because to specify would mean that
+we all of us ought to give up the life careers we had planned for
+ourselves in the Islands. I knew the old familiar answer a grumbler was
+sure to get in the Philippines, viz., &ldquo;Old man, you&rsquo;ve been
+out here too long. You better go home.&rdquo; But I did a little more
+grumbling to my friends Judge Carson and Mr. Wilfley, during the course
+of their visit. They could both pretty well guess what was the matter.
+But Judge Carson and I had come out in 1899, and had served through the
+war together. He knew all about the Albay business, and somewhat of the
+Samar business. Wilfley had not come out until the civil government was
+founded in 1901. Mr. Wilfley said cheerily: &ldquo;Oh, Blount, you are
+too conscientious.&rdquo; I shall never forget what happened then.
+Judge Carson said, with a ring of something like anger in his tone:
+&ldquo;No, Wilfley, I&rsquo;ll be d&mdash;d if he is.&rdquo; Is it any
+wonder that ever since I have worn that man, as Hamlet would say,
+&ldquo;in my heart&rsquo;s core&rdquo;? Here was as brave and true an
+Irishman as ever gained distinction on battlefield or bench. <i>And he
+understood.</i> <i>He</i> did not say&mdash;which was the implication
+of Wilfley&rsquo;s tone&mdash;&ldquo;Old man, you&rsquo;ve been out
+here too long, and illness has made you peevish.&rdquo; He knew what
+was the matter. He knew that as trial judges he and I had not been
+small editions of Lord Jeffries, as some of our American critics had
+implied, <span class="sc">BUT HE ALSO KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO METHOD OF
+DRAWING AN INDICTMENT AGAINST A WHOLE PEOPLE</span>.</p>
+<p>Possibly the intensity of my feelings on this great <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb503" href="#pb503" name=
+"pb503">503</a>]</span>subject, then and ever since, hampers the power
+of clear expression. Therefore, a word more in attempt at elucidation.
+In 1898, Judge Carson and I, with many thousands of other young
+Americans, had trooped down to Cuba, in the wake of the impetuous
+Roosevelt, to free the inhabitants of that ill-fated island from
+Spanish rule, drive the Spaniards from the Western Hemisphere, and put
+a stop to Spain&rsquo;s pious efforts &ldquo;to spare the great island
+from the dangers of premature independence,&rdquo; as she always
+expressed her attitude toward Cuba. We had many of us been fired by the
+catchy Roosevelt utterance which did so much to bring on the Spanish
+War, viz., &ldquo;The steps of the White House are <i>slippery with the
+blood of the Cuban reconcentrados</i>.&rdquo; Then in 1899, we had gone
+to the Philippines, and had ever since been engaged there in
+&ldquo;sparing the Islands from the danger of premature
+independence,&rdquo; and the Samar massacres of 1904 were, to me, the
+apotheosis of the work. So that after November 8, 1904, I felt
+&ldquo;The steps of the White House are <i>slippery with the blood of
+the people of my district</i>.&rdquo; It had all been done under the
+pious pretence that the Filipinos welcomed our rule&mdash;a pretence
+which had taken the form for six years of systematic asseveration that
+they did so welcome it. Yet it was not <i>true</i> that they, or any
+appreciable fraction of them, had ever welcomed our rule. <i>And it
+never will be true.</i> Surely no man can see in this book any scolding
+or unkindness. It is an attempt merely to bring home to my countrymen a
+<i>strategic</i> fact, a fact which it is folly to ignore. But to
+return to the thread of our story.</p>
+<p>Four days after the presidential election of 1904, to wit, on
+November 12th, Governor Wright left Manila and went to Samar, including
+in his itinerary various <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb504" href=
+"#pb504" name="pb504">504</a>]</span>others of the southern
+islands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11682src" href="#xd20e11682" name=
+"xd20e11682src">3</a> Soon after their return, the seven hundred native
+troops in Samar were increased to nearly two thousand, and sixteen
+companies of regulars (say one hundred men to a company) were also
+thrown into Samar. It took until the end of 1906 to end the trouble.
+You cannot find in the reports of the civil authorities anything
+explaining their three or four weeks&rsquo; stay in the Visayan Islands
+in November&ndash;December, 1904, that is not absolutely in accord with
+the original Taft obsession of 1900 about the popularity of the
+proposed alien &ldquo;civil&rdquo; government with its subjects.
+Governor Wright&rsquo;s description of the trip says: &ldquo;The warm
+hospitality of the Filipino people made this trip of inspection a most
+agreeable one.&rdquo; As a matter of fact, on such occasions, the more
+disaffected a leader of the people was, the more he would seek, by
+&ldquo;warm hospitality,&rdquo; &ldquo;warm&rdquo; oratory telling the
+visiting mighty what the visiting mighty longed to hear, parades,
+<i>fiestas</i>, etc., to divert suspicion of sedition from himself. The
+poor creatures had met General Young&rsquo;s cavalry column in northern
+Luzon in 1899 with their town bands, doing the only thing they knew of
+to do to &ldquo;temper the wind to the shorn
+lamb&rdquo;&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, to temper it to their several
+communities&mdash;many of them doubtless expecting to be put to the
+sword by General Young&rsquo;s troopers, as the Cossacks did the
+Persians during the brief and sensational sojourn of that brilliant
+young administrator, Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, in Persia in
+1911&ndash;12. I have no doubt that high on the list of those extending
+some of the &ldquo;warm hospitality&rdquo; above mentioned appeared the
+name of Don Jaime de Veyra. Yet in the summer of 1904 Don Jaime had
+gotten out of a sick bed to attend a convention <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb505" href="#pb505" name=
+"pb505">505</a>]</span>called to send delegates to the Democratic
+National Convention in the United States that year,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e11697src" href="#xd20e11697" name="xd20e11697src">4</a> and
+also, in that same year, had run for Governor of Leyte on a platform
+the principal plank of which was <i>Carthago est
+delenda</i>&mdash;&ldquo;Carthago&rdquo; being <i>us</i>, the American
+<i>r&eacute;gime</i>. De Veyra was defeated that time, but ran again
+the next time and was elected. While the writer is not one of those who
+seek to show their &ldquo;breadth of view&rdquo; by gossiping with
+outsiders regarding what is peculiarly our own affair, still, the
+British view-point of the situation in the Visayan Islands, as conveyed
+by an Englishwoman whose husband was engaged in mercantile business
+there in 1904&ndash;5, and who therefore was certainly in a position to
+know the opinion of the little circle of British people at Cebu and
+Iloilo, may not be superfluous here. This lady, living then at Iloilo,
+wrote a series of letters to friends back home in England which she
+afterwards published in book form.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11709src"
+href="#xd20e11709" name="xd20e11709src">5</a> In a letter dated Iloilo,
+January 22, 1905 (page 86), she says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Americans give out and write in their papers that
+the Philippine Islands are completely pacified, and that the Filipinos
+love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives, is
+complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed with
+insurrection and plots; the fighting has never ceased; and the natives
+loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their
+native press and showing their dislike in every possible fashion. Their
+one idea is to be rid of the U. S. A. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* and to be free of
+a burden of taxation which is heavier than any the Spaniards laid on
+them.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb506" href="#pb506" name=
+"pb506">506</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Also an Englishman who was in Samar in 1904&ndash;5, a Mr. Hyatt,
+who, with his brother, served with the American troops there in the
+bloody Pulajan uprising, afterwards wrote a book called the <i>Little
+Brown Brother</i>, wherein he fully corroborates Mrs. Dauncey&rsquo;s
+appreciation of the situation during that period.</p>
+<p>In its blindness to the unanimity of Visayan discontent, as
+manifested in its report now under consideration, the civil government
+of the Philippines was not trying wilfully to deceive anybody. It was
+deceiving itself. It was obeying the law of its life, its existence
+having been originally predicated on the consent of a great free people
+to keep in subjection a weaker people eager to be also free, such
+consent having been obtained through diligent nursing of the original
+idea that the subject people were not in fact so eager, but were, on
+the contrary, in a mental attitude of tearful welcome toward the
+proffered protection of a strong power. In his report for 1905<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e11727src" href="#xd20e11727" name=
+"xd20e11727src">6</a> General William H. Carter, commanding the
+Department of the Philippines which included Samar and the rest of the
+Visayan Islands, gives the key to the Commission&rsquo;s twenty-six-day
+stay in his district in the following part of said report:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Within a few days after the rendition of the annual
+report for last year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11735src" href=
+"#xd20e11735" name="xd20e11735src">7</a> a serious outbreak occurred in
+the Gandara valley, Samar. <i>This was followed by disorders in all the
+other large islands of the department</i>, Negros, Panay, Cebu, and
+Leyte.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Nowhere in the civil government reports do you find the slightest
+recognition that these disorders had <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb507" href="#pb507" name="pb507">507</a>]</span>any relation to each
+other, or to the fundamental problem of public order, or any political
+significance whatsoever, each being treated as a purely local issue,
+the idea that the circumstance of Samar&rsquo;s having been thrown into
+pandemonium by the successes of the enemies of the American Government
+might have encouraged its enemies in the neighboring islands, never
+seeming to occur to the authors of the said reports. General
+Carter&rsquo;s report goes on to state that within five months after
+the Samar outbreak of July, 1904, seven hundred native troops had been
+put in the field in that turbulent island. In December, 1904, troops
+began to be poured into Samar, so that it was not long before the seven
+hundred native troops had become seventeen hundred or eighteen hundred,
+and, says General Carter, &ldquo;in order to free them from garrison
+work in the towns, sixteen companies of the 12th and 14th Infantry were
+distributed about the disaffected coasts to enable the people who so
+desired to <i>come from their hiding places</i>&rdquo;&mdash;whither
+they had gone because the American flag afforded them no
+protection&mdash;&ldquo;and undertake the rebuilding of their burned
+homes.&rdquo; General Carter avoids touching on the civil
+government&rsquo;s (to him well-known) obsession about its popularity,
+a state of mind which could see no &ldquo;political&rdquo; significance
+in outbreaks of any kind. But he does use this very straightforward
+language about Samar:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Whatever may have been the original cause of the
+outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when success had drawn a large
+proportion of the people away from their homes and fields.
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>Except in the largest towns it became simply a
+question of joining the Pulajans or being harried by them.</i> In the
+absence of proper protection thousands joined in the movement.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb508" href="#pb508" name=
+"pb508">508</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Early in 1905, Hon. George Curry, of New Mexico, who was an officer
+of Colonel Roosevelt&rsquo;s regiment in Cuba, and had gone out to the
+Philippines with a volunteer regiment in 1899, remaining with the civil
+Government after 1901, was made Governor of Samar. Governor Curry has
+since been Governor of the Territory of New Mexico, and is now (1912) a
+member of Congress from the recently admitted State of New Mexico.
+Governor Curry has told me since he was elected to Congress that it
+took him all of 1905 and most of 1906, aided by several thousand
+troops, native and regular, to put down that Samar outbreak. Yet a
+certificate signed March 28, 1907, by the Governor-General and his
+associates of the Philippine Commission states that &ldquo;a condition
+of general and complete peace&rdquo; had continued in the Islands for
+two years previous to the date of the certificate.<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e11760src" href="#xd20e11760" name="xd20e11760src">8</a> We
+will come to this certificate in its chronological order later. How
+many and what sort of uprisings were blanketed in that
+&ldquo;forget-it&rdquo; certificate of 1907 is material to the question
+whether or not the National Administration has ever been or is now
+frank with the country about the universality of the desire of the
+Philippine people for independence and local self-government, and
+pertinent to the insistently recurring query: &ldquo;Why should we make
+of the Philippines an American Ireland?&rdquo; But inasmuch as, in
+addition to the Samar uprising which raged all through 1905, another
+insurrection occurred in that year, which was duly
+&ldquo;forgotten&rdquo; by said certificate, this last movement must
+now claim our attention.</p>
+<p>The provinces which were the theatre of the outbreak last above
+mentioned were all near Manila. They were: Cavite, a province of
+135,000 people almost at <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb509" href=
+"#pb509" name="pb509">509</a>]</span>the gates of Manila; Batangas, a
+province of 257,000 inhabitants adjoining Cavite; and Laguna, a
+province of 150,000 people adjoining both. Some five hundred brigands
+headed by cut-throats claiming to be patriots were terrorizing whole
+districts. Far be it from me to lend any countenance to the idea that
+the leaders of this movement, Sakay, Felizardo, Montalon, and the rest
+of their gang, were entitled to any respect. But they certainly had a
+hold on the whole population akin to that of Robin Hood, Little John,
+and Friar Tuck. In refusing in 1907 to commute Sakay&rsquo;s death
+sentence after he was captured, tried, and convicted, Governor-General
+James P. Smith gives some gruesome details concerning the performance
+of that worthy, and his followers, yet in dealing with the nature and
+extent of the trouble they gave the Manila government he says they
+&ldquo;assumed the convenient cloak of patriotism, and under the titles
+of &lsquo;Defenders of the Country&rsquo; and &lsquo;Protectors of the
+People&rsquo; proceeded to inaugurate a reign of terror, devastation,
+and ruin in three of the most beautiful provinces in the
+archipelago.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11769src" href=
+"#xd20e11769" name="xd20e11769src">9</a></p>
+<p>It has already been made clear that, during the time of the
+insurrection against both the Spaniards and Americans, the
+<i>insurrecto</i> forces were maintained by voluntary contributions of
+the people. Major D. C. Shanks, Fourth U. S. Regular Infantry, who was
+Governor of Cavite Province in 1905, after calling attention to this
+fact, adds<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11780src" href="#xd20e11780"
+name="xd20e11780src">10</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When the insurrection was over a number of these
+leaders remained out and refused to surrender. Included among them were
+Felizardo and Montalon. The system <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb510"
+href="#pb510" name="pb510">510</a>]</span>of voluntary contributions,
+carried on during the <i>insurrecto</i> period, was continued after
+establishment of civil government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Again Governor Shanks says, with more of frankness than diplomacy,
+considering that he was a provincial governor under the civil
+government:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The establishment of civil government of this province
+was premature and ill-advised. Records show the capture or surrender
+since establishment of civil government of <i>nearly 600 hostile
+firearms</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>One of the causes contributory to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna
+insurrection is stated in the report of the Governor-General for 1905
+thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In the autumn of 1904 it became necessary to withdraw
+a number of the constabulary from these provinces to assist in
+suppressing disorder which had broken out in the province of
+Samar.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11808src" href="#xd20e11808" name=
+"xd20e11808src">11</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Another of the contributory causes is thus stated:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There was at the time [the fall of 1904] also
+considerable activity among the small group of irreconcilables in
+Manila, who began agitating for immediate independence, doubtless
+because of the supposed effect it would have on the presidential
+election in the United States, in which the Philippines was a large
+topic of discussion. Evidently this was regarded as a favorable time
+for a demonstration by Felizardo, Montalon, De Vega, Oruga, Sakay
+[etc]. <i>All these men had been officers of the Filipino army during
+the insurrection.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>Consider the benevolent casuistry necessary to include these
+fellows, and the tremendous following <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb511" href="#pb511" name="pb511">511</a>]</span>they could get up,
+and did get up, in Cavite, &ldquo;the home of insurrection,&rdquo; and
+the adjacent provinces, in a certificate to &ldquo;a condition of
+general and complete peace&rdquo; alleged in the certificate to have
+prevailed for two years prior to March 28, 1907. To make a long story
+short, on January 31, 1905, a state of insurrection was declared to
+exist, the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in Cavite and Batangas,
+the regular army of the United States was ordered out, and
+reconcentration tactics resorted to, as provided by Section 6 of Act
+781 of the Commission. This is the act already examined at length,
+intended to meet cases of impotency on the part of the insular
+government to protect life and property in any other way. Political
+timidity is conspicuously absent from the resolution of the Philippine
+Commission of January 31, 1905, formally recognizing a break in the
+peerless continuity of the &ldquo;general and complete peace.&rdquo; It
+is virilely frank, the presidential election being then safely
+over.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11825src" href="#xd20e11825" name=
+"xd20e11825src">12</a> It concludes by authorizing the Governor-General
+to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law,
+&ldquo;the public safety requiring it.&rdquo; Then follows a
+proclamation of the same date and tenor, by the Governor-General.</p>
+<p>It appears from the case cited in the foot-note that in the spring
+of 1905, one, Felix Barcelon, filed in the proper court a petition for
+the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was one of the
+reconcentrados corralled and &ldquo;detained and restrained of his
+liberty at the town of Batangas, in the province of Batangas,&rdquo; by
+one of Colonel Baker&rsquo;s constabulary minions down there. The writ
+was denied by the lower court. In one part of the opinion of the
+Supreme Court in the case it is stated (p. 116) that the petitioner
+&ldquo;has been detained <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb512" href=
+"#pb512" name="pb512">512</a>]</span>for a long time *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+not for the commission of any crime and by due process of law, but
+apparently for the purpose of protecting him.&rdquo; The opinion of the
+court, delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, very properly held that the
+detention was lawful <i>under the war power</i>, basing its decision on
+the authority conferred on the Governor-General of the Philippines by
+the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5 of which expressly
+authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus &ldquo;when in
+cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may
+require it.&rdquo; A long legal battle was fought, the court holding
+that the Executive Department of the Government is the one in which is
+vested the exclusive right to say when &ldquo;a state of rebellion,
+insurrection, or invasion&rdquo; exists, and that when it so formally
+declares, <i>that settles the fact that it does exist</i>. At page 98
+of the volume above cited<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11844src" href=
+"#xd20e11844" name="xd20e11844src">13</a> the court held, as to the
+above mentioned resolution of the Philippine Commission and the above
+mentioned executive order declaring a state of insurrection in Cavite
+and Batangas:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The conclusion set forth in the said resolution and
+the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the
+provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the
+constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the
+discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the Government,
+after an investigation of the facts.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Yet two years later the same &ldquo;constituted authorities&rdquo;
+certified to the President of the United States, in effect, as we shall
+see, that no open insurrection against the constituted authorities had
+occurred during the preceding two years. They do not in their
+certificate ignore Cavite and Batangas. They mention <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb513" href="#pb513" name="pb513">513</a>]</span>them
+by name, with a lot of whereases, explaining that after all they really
+believe that the majority of the people in the provinces aforesaid were
+not in sympathy with the uprising. However, after they get through with
+their whereases they face the music squarely, and certify to &ldquo;the
+condition of general and complete peace.&rdquo; Of the &ldquo;nigger in
+the woodpile&rdquo; more anon.</p>
+<p>Governor Wright was not a party to the certificate of 1907. He left
+the Islands on leave November 4, 1905. A speech made by him prior to
+his departure, as published in a Manila paper, indicates an expectation
+to return. He never did. In 1906 he was demoted to be Ambassador to
+Japan, a place of far less dignity, and far less salary, which he
+resigned after a year or so. Vice-Governor Ide acted as
+Governor-General until April 2, 1906, on which date he was formally
+inaugurated as Governor-General.</p>
+<p>Just why Governor Wright did not go back to the Philippines as
+Governor, after his visit to the United States in 1905&ndash;6, does
+not appear. It would seem almost certain that if Secretary of War Taft
+had wanted President Roosevelt to send him back, he would have gone.
+Mr. Taft never did frankly tell the Filipinos until 1907 that they
+might just as well shut up talking about any independence that anybody
+living might hope to see. Governor Wright began to talk that way soon
+after Mr. Taft left the Islands. Possibly Governor Wright undeceived
+them too soon, and thereby made the Philippines more of a troublesome
+issue in the presidential campaign of 1904. President Roosevelt
+recognized the sterling worth of the man, by inviting him to succeed
+Mr. Taft as Secretary of War in 1908. But President Taft did not invite
+him to continue in that capacity after March 4, 1909. Gossip has it
+that when the incoming President Taft&rsquo;s <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb514" href="#pb514" name=
+"pb514">514</a>]</span>letter to the outgoing President
+Roosevelt&rsquo;s last Secretary of War, Governor Wright, was handed to
+the addressee, and its conventional &ldquo;hope to be able to avail
+myself of your services later in some other capacity&rdquo; was read by
+him, the outgoing official quietly remarked: &ldquo;Well, that is a
+little more round-about than the one Jimmie Garfield<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e11864src" href="#xd20e11864" name="xd20e11864src">14</a> got,
+but it&rsquo;s a dismissal just the same.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>I have always thought that the reason Governor Wright did not go
+back to the Philippines as Governor after 1905 was that he did not
+continue to &ldquo;jolly&rdquo; the Filipinos, and abstain from
+ruthlessly crushing their hopes of seeing independence during their
+lifetime, as Mr. Taft did continuously during his stay out there. The
+inevitable tendency of the Wright frank talk was from the beginning to
+discredit the Taft pleasing and evasive nothings. Also, it was
+followed, as we have seen, by quite a crop of serious disturbances of
+public order, and somebody had to be &ldquo;the goat.&rdquo;
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb515" href="#pb515" name=
+"pb515">515</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11604" href="#xd20e11604src" name="xd20e11604">1</a></span>
+Delivered in 1902, after the Senator visited the Islands in 1901.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11608" href="#xd20e11608src" name="xd20e11608">2</a></span> The
+following is a copy of the letter accepting my resignation:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="footnote first dateline">Office of the Civil Governor of the
+Philippine Islands,<br>
+January 25, 1905.</p>
+<p class="footnote salute"><span class="sc">My dear Judge
+Blount</span>:</p>
+<p class="footnote">I have to acknowledge the receipt of your
+communication of yesterday in which you tender your resignation as
+Judge of First Instance at large. I regret extremely that your
+ill-health has made this course imperative. Under all the
+circumstances, however, I am satisfied that you have acted wisely, as I
+have feared for some time that you would be unable to perform the
+duties pertaining to your office because of your physical condition. I,
+therefore, though with much regret accept your resignation.</p>
+<p class="footnote">At the same time I beg to express my appreciation
+of the faithful and efficient services you have rendered in the past. I
+hope very much that a rest and change of climate may have the effect of
+restoring you again to vigorous health, and I assure you that you carry
+with you my best wishes for your future prosperity and happiness.</p>
+<p class="footnote">Sincerely yours,<br>
+<span class="sc">Luke E. Wright</span>,<br>
+<i>Civil Governor</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote">To the Honorable <span class="sc">James H.
+Blount</span>, Judge of First Instance at large, Manila, P. I.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11682" href="#xd20e11682src" name="xd20e11682">3</a></span> See
+annual report of the Governor-General for 1905, in <i>Report of the
+Philippine Commission for 1905</i>, pt. 1, p. 85.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11697" href="#xd20e11697src" name="xd20e11697">4</a></span> Which
+delegates were denied admission to the Convention on the ground that no
+American living in the Philippines could be in sympathy with the
+Democratic programme as to them.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11709" href="#xd20e11709src" name="xd20e11709">5</a></span> <i>An
+Englishwoman in the Philippines</i>, by Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11727" href="#xd20e11727src" name="xd20e11727">6</a></span>
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1905, vol. iii., p. 285.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11735" href="#xd20e11735src" name="xd20e11735">7</a></span> Army
+reports are usually made right after the expiration of the American
+governmental fiscal year, June 30th.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11760" href="#xd20e11760src" name="xd20e11760">8</a></span>
+<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 47.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11769" href="#xd20e11769src" name="xd20e11769">9</a></span> See
+<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38. He
+means Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11780" href="#xd20e11780src" name="xd20e11780">10</a></span>
+<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 212.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11808" href="#xd20e11808src" name="xd20e11808">11</a></span>
+<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 52.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11825" href="#xd20e11825src" name="xd20e11825">12</a></span> For
+a copy of it, see the case of Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, <i>Philippine
+Supreme Court Reports</i>, vol. v., p. 89.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11844" href="#xd20e11844src" name="xd20e11844">13</a></span>
+Volume v., <i>Philippine Reports</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11864" href="#xd20e11864src" name="xd20e11864">14</a></span> Mr.
+Garfield was President Roosevelt&rsquo;s Secretary of the Interior.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch20" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XX</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Ide&mdash;1906</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">The Tariff is a local issue.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">General W. S. Hancock.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">After Governor Wright left the Islands finally on
+November 4, 1905, Vice-Governor Henry C. Ide acted as Governor-General
+until April 2, 1906, when he was duly inaugurated as such. He resigned
+and left the Islands finally in September thereafter.</p>
+<p>All through 1905, Governor Curry, as Governor of Samar, which is the
+third largest island of the archipelago, wrestled with the Pulajan
+uprising there, aided, as has been stated in the previous chapter, by
+the native troops, scouts, and constabulary, and also by the regular
+army. But at the end of 1905 &ldquo;the situation&rdquo; was not yet
+&ldquo;well in hand.&rdquo; Since his election to Congress in 1912,
+Governor Curry has told me that in 1905 many thousands of people of
+Samar participated actively as part of the enemy&rsquo;s force in the
+field during that period. By the spring of 1906 Governor Curry was
+getting a grip on the situation, and in the latter part of March of
+that year, some of the main outlaw chiefs agreed to surrender to him.
+The report of Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, commanding the constabulary of
+the Third District, which included Samar states<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11886src" href="#xd20e11886" name="xd20e11886src">1</a>:
+&ldquo;After several weeks of negotiating, during which time the camp
+of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb516" href="#pb516" name=
+"pb516">516</a>]</span>Pulahanes was visited by Governor Curry, and the
+Pulahan officers visited the settlement at Magtaon&rdquo;&mdash;a
+settlement in south central Samar&mdash;&ldquo;an understanding was
+arrived at by which the Pulahanes were to surrender, March 24, 1906.
+Instead of surrendering as agreed, the Pulahanes, commanded by Nasario
+Aguilar, made a treacherous attack on the constabulary garrison on the
+day and hour appointed for the surrender.&rdquo; The constabulary
+numbered some fifty men, the pulajans about 130. After the pulajans
+opened fire they made a rush on the constabulary and a hand-to-hand
+fight ensued. Colonel Taylor&rsquo;s report continues:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">After the first rush the fighting continued fiercely,
+and when the last of the pulahanes disappeared there remained but seven
+enlisted men of the constabulary able to fight. Seven more were lying
+about more or less seriously wounded and twenty-two were dead. Captain
+Jones received a bad spear thrust in the chest early in the fight, but
+fought on, regardless. Lieutenant Bowers received a gunshot wound
+through the left arm, which, however, did not put him out of the fight.
+Thirty-five dead pulahanes were found on the field and eight more have
+since been found some distance off. The number of wounded who escaped
+cannot be determined. The unarmed Americans present with Governor Curry
+escaped to the river and afterwards rejoined Captain Jones who armed
+them.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The explanation of this treachery, as given by Governor Curry, is
+curious and interesting. The outlaws had intended in good faith to
+surrender as a result of his negotiation with them, but at the last
+moment there arrived to witness the surrender certain native officials
+and other natives bitterly hated by the Pulajans and wholly mistrusted
+by them. Their arrival caused the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb517"
+href="#pb517" name="pb517">517</a>]</span>outlaws to suspect treachery
+themselves and that was the cause of their change of plans. It was not
+until the end of the year 1906 that the various energetic campaigns
+which followed the Magtaon incident finally began to work more or less
+complete restoration of public order by gradual elimination of the
+enemy through killings, captures, and surrenders. An idea of the
+seriousness and magnitude of these operations may be gathered without
+going into the details, from the annual report for 1906 of General
+Henry T. Allen commanding the Philippines Constabulary. This report,
+dated August 31, 1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11901src" href=
+"#xd20e11901" name="xd20e11901src">2</a>, states:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">At present seventeen companies of scouts and four
+companies of American troops under Colonel Smith, 8th U. S. Infantry,
+are operating against the pulahanes, but with success that will be
+largely dependent upon time and attrition.</p>
+</div>
+<p>General Allen adds: &ldquo;The entire 21st Regiment [of Infantry] is
+also in Samar.&rdquo; These facts are here given because they relate to
+the period covered by the certificate of the Philippine Commission of
+March 28, 1907, heretofore alluded to, and which will be more fully
+dealt with hereinafter, which stated that &ldquo;a condition of general
+and complete peace&rdquo; had prevailed throughout the archipelago for
+two years prior to March 28, 1907. Without a brief exposition of all
+these matters, it would be impossible to enable the reader to feel the
+pulse of the Filipino people as it stood at the time of the election of
+their assembly in 1907. The fact of our having been unable to
+discontinue Filipino-killing altogether for any considerable period
+from 1899 to the end of 1906 is too obviously relevant to the state of
+the public mind in 1907 to need elaboration. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb518" href="#pb518" name="pb518">518</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e11916src" href="#xd20e11916" name="xd20e11916src">3</a> deals
+at some length with disturbances which occurred in the island of Leyte
+(area 3000 square miles, population nearly 400,000), beginning in the
+middle of June. It describes among other things a visit of
+Governor-General Ide to Tacloban, the capital of Leyte, made in
+consequence of said disturbances, and conferences held by him there
+with Major-General Wood, commanding all the United States forces in the
+Philippines, Brigadier-General Lee, commanding the Department of the
+Visayas (which included Leyte, headquarters, Iloilo), Colonel Borden,
+commanding the United States forces in the island of Leyte, Colonel
+Taylor, the chief of the constabulary of the District, etc. Certainly
+from this formidable gathering of notables, it is clear that there was
+about to take place in Leyte what our friends of the Lambs&rsquo; Club
+in New York would call &ldquo;An all star performance.&rdquo; Leyte was
+four to five hundred miles from Manila. Yet so serious was the
+disturbance that the highest military and civil representatives of the
+American Government in the archipelago deemed it necessary to meet in
+the island which was the scene of the trouble with a view of handling
+it. Yet in the Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 one finds
+the usual rotund rhetoric treating the disturbances as of no
+&ldquo;political&rdquo; significance&mdash;which was only another way
+of claiming that they were not serious. It is difficult to handle this
+aspect of the matter without imputing to the civil authorities intent
+to deceive, but to leave such an imputation unremoved would be to miss
+the whole significance of the matter. As has already been made clear,
+when Judge Taft, Judge Ide, and their colleagues of the Philippine
+Commission had left Washington for Manila in 1900 Mr. McKinley had
+assured <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb519" href="#pb519" name=
+"pb519">519</a>]</span>them he had no doubt that the better element of
+the Philippine people, once they understood us, would welcome our rule.
+As soon as they set foot in the Philippine Islands they had at once
+begun to act upon the theory that there was no real fundamental
+opposition to us on the part of the people of the Philippines and had
+continued obstinately to act upon that theory ever since. Certainly the
+attitude of the civil government toward the disturbances in Leyte in
+1906 is not surprising when the mind adverts for a moment to the
+panorama of the five more or less sanguinary years already fully
+described hereinbefore and then takes the following bird&rsquo;s-eye
+glance at the official reports for those years.</p>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1900, (page 17) had
+said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+supremacy of the United States.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1901 (page 7) had
+said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The collapse of the insurrection came in May.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1902 (page 3) had
+said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The insurrection as an organized attempt to subvert
+the authority of the United States in these islands is entirely at an
+end,</p>
+</div>
+<p>referring farther on to &ldquo;the whole Christian Philippine
+population&rdquo; as &ldquo;<i>enjoying</i> civil government.&rdquo; If
+the &ldquo;enjoyment&rdquo; thus described had been genuine, continued,
+profound, and sincere, it would have been <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb520" href="#pb520" name="pb520">520</a>]</span>another story. But
+the net attitude of the civil government toward the general health of
+the body politic, relatively to public order, reminds one of the
+cheerful gentleman who remarked of his invalid friend, &ldquo;He seems
+to be &lsquo;enjoying&rsquo; poor health.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1903 (page 25) says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The conditions with respect to tranquillity in the
+islands have greatly improved during the last year.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 (page 1) says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The great mass of the people, however, were domestic
+and peaceable.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905 (part 1, page 59)
+says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">On the whole life and property have been as safe as in
+other civilized countries.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 (page 40) says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Viewing the entire situation the islands are in a
+peaceable and orderly condition aside from&mdash;&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+<p>various disorders which fill some ten pages of the report.</p>
+<p>The inflexible attitude of the Commission from the beginning, of
+treating each successive disturbance of public order as a purely
+&ldquo;local issue,&rdquo; after General Hancock&rsquo;s method with
+the tariff, is thus sufficiently apparent. They always refuse to see in
+successive outbreaks in various parts of the Islands any evidence
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb521" href="#pb521" name=
+"pb521">521</a>]</span>of general and unanimous lack of appreciation
+for a benign alien civil government. Therefore it was of course clearly
+a foregone conclusion, in 1906, that Governor Ide, who had been in the
+Islands all these years, was going to be <span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e11979" title="Source: wholely">wholly</span> unable to see
+anything in the disturbances in Leyte in the least tending to show that
+American rule was unpopular. And yet it was a matter of common
+knowledge all over the Visayan Islands that Jaime Veyra, then Governor
+of Leyte, elected by the people, was one of the most obnoxious
+anti-Americans in the archipelago. Both the army and constabulary were
+ordered out in Leyte and a good deal of fighting occurred before order
+was restored. The report of General Allen, commanding the constabulary
+for that year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e11982src" href="#xd20e11982"
+name="xd20e11982src">4</a> shows one engagement with the outlaws in
+Leyte participated in by the constabulary and the 21st Regular
+Infantry, in which the enemy numbered 450 and left forty-nine dead upon
+the field. All this period is covered by the certificate of general and
+complete peace of 1907, in the fall of which year a Philippine
+legislature was elected. And those of the membership of that body not
+in favor of Philippine independence were almost as few as the Socialist
+party in the American House of Representatives, which, I believe,
+consists of Representative Berger. True, the peace certificate does not
+ignore the Leyte outbreak. It &ldquo;forgets and forgives it,&rdquo; so
+to speak, as we shall see.</p>
+<p>Governor Ide left the Islands finally on September 20, 1906, having
+resigned. Why he should have resigned, it is difficult to say. Take it
+all in all, he made a splendid Governor-General, and ought to have been
+allowed to remain. He knew the Islands from Alpha to Omega and had been
+there six years. His going out of office to make way for still another
+Governor-General <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb522" href="#pb522"
+name="pb522">522</a>]</span>was wholly uncalled for. So far as the
+writer is informed, he was, when he left, still blessed with good
+health. He had filled a very considerable place in the history of his
+country most creditably. He had drawn up a fine code of laws for the
+Islands known as the Ide code. He had made a great minister of finance,
+successfully performing the perilous task of transferring the currency
+of the country from a silver basis to a gold basis, and in so doing had
+proven himself fully a match, in protecting the interests of the
+Government, for the wiley local financiers representing the Hong Kong
+and Shanghai Bank, the chartered bank of India, Australia, and China,
+and other institutions run by experienced men of more or less piratical
+tendencies. As Governor-General of the Islands, his justice, firmness,
+and courtliness of manner combined to produce an administration in
+keeping with the dignity of his great office. After returning to the
+United States, he remained in private life for a time, and was finally
+given a comparatively unimportant post as minister to a second-class
+country, Spain, which post he still occupies (in 1912).</p>
+<p>When, fresh from the memory of the Samar massacres of 1904, I landed
+at Seattle, at the end of my last homeward-bound journey across the
+Pacific, in April, 1905, one of the &ldquo;natives&rdquo; of Seattle
+asked me: &ldquo;Have those people over there ever got quiet
+yet?&rdquo; The question itself seemed an answer to the orthodox
+official attitude at Manila, which had so long been elaborately
+denying, as to each successive local outbreak, that such outbreak bore
+any relation to the original insurrection, or was any wise illustrative
+of the general state of public feeling in the Islands. At the time the
+question was asked, the answer was, &ldquo;Not entirely.&rdquo; Not
+until toward the end of 1906 did &ldquo;Yes&rdquo; become a correct
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb523" href="#pb523" name=
+"pb523">523</a>]</span>answer to the question. In other words, there
+were no more serious outbreaks after 1906, nor was a state of general
+and complete peace ever finally established until then. Since 1906
+there have been occasional despatches from Manila recounting small
+episodes of bloodshed, several of which have had quite a martial ring.
+These have related merely to the country of the Mohammedan Moros, who
+are as wholly apart from the main problem as the American Indian to-day
+is from our tariff and other like questions. The Moros are indeed what
+Kipling calls &ldquo;half savage and half child.&rdquo; They never did
+have anything more to do with the Filipino insurrection against us than
+the American Indian had to do with the Civil War. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb524" href="#pb524" name="pb524">524</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11886" href="#xd20e11886src" name="xd20e11886">1</a></span>
+<i>Report, U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2, p. 255.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11901" href="#xd20e11901src" name="xd20e11901">2</a></span> See
+page 227, <i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11916" href="#xd20e11916src" name="xd20e11916">3</a></span>
+<i>Report, Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 1, p. 37.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e11982" href="#xd20e11982src" name="xd20e11982">4</a></span> See
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 2, p. 228.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch21" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXI</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Smith&mdash;1907&ndash;9</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">Oh, but Honey, <i>dis</i> rabbit dess
+<i>&rsquo;bleeged</i> ter climb <i>dis</i> tree.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Uncle Remus.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&ldquo;On September 20, 1906,&rdquo; says the
+<i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i>,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e12022src" href="#xd20e12022" name="xd20e12022src">1</a>
+&ldquo;the resignation of the Hon. Henry Clay Ide as Governor-General
+became effective, and on that date the Hon. James F. Smith was
+inaugurated as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The year 1907 will be known most prominently to the future history
+of our Far Eastern possession as the year of the opening of the
+Philippine Assembly, which momentous event occurred on October 16th.
+But in the departments both of Politics and Psychology it should be
+known as the year of the Great Certificate. The Great Certificate was a
+certificate signed by certain eminent gentlemen on March 28, 1907,
+which made the preposterous affirmation that <i>a condition of general
+and complete peace</i> had prevailed throughout the archipelago, except
+among the non-Christian tribes, for the two years immediately
+preceding. Taken in its historic setting, that certificate can by no
+possibility escape responsibility, as &ldquo;accessory after the
+fact&rdquo; at least, to the pretence that a similar condition had
+prevailed ever <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb525" href="#pb525" name=
+"pb525">525</a>]</span>since President Roosevelt&rsquo;s final
+war-whoop of July 4, 1902, published to the American troops in the
+Islands on the day named. That war-whoop, it will be remembered, was in
+the form of a presidential proclamation congratulating General Chaffee
+and &ldquo;the gallant officers and men under his command&rdquo; on
+some &ldquo;two thousand combats, great and small,&rdquo; and
+declaring, in effect, that Benevolent Assimilation was at last
+triumphantly vindicated, and that opposition to American rule was at an
+end. The certificate of March 28, 1907, appears at pages 47&ndash;8 of
+the <i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, part 1. If we
+consider what is <i>now</i> going on in the Islands as
+&ldquo;modern&rdquo; history, and the days of the early fighting as
+&ldquo;ancient&rdquo; history, this certificate will serve as the
+connecting link between the two. It furnishes the key-note to all that
+had happened during the American occupation prior to 1907, and the
+key-note of all that has happened since. Therefore, though somewhat
+long, it is deemed indispensable to clearness to submit here in full
+the text of</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">THE GREAT CERTIFICATE OF 1907</p>
+<p>Whereas the census of the Philippine Islands was completed and
+published on the twenty-seventh day of March, nineteen hundred and
+five, which said completion and publication of said census was, on the
+twenty-eighth day of March, nineteen hundred and five, duly published
+and proclaimed to the people by the governor-general of the Philippine
+Islands with the announcement that the President of the United States
+would direct the Philippine Commission to call a general election for
+the choice of delegates to a popular assembly, <i>provided that a
+condition of general and complete peace with recognition of the
+authority of the United States should be certified by the Philippine
+Commission to have continued in the territory of the Philippine Islands
+for <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb526" href="#pb526" name=
+"pb526">526</a>]</span>a period of two years after said completion and
+publication of said census</i>; and</p>
+<p>Whereas since the completion and publication of said census there
+have been <i>no serious disturbances of the public order save and
+except</i> those caused by the noted outlaws and bandit chieftains,
+Felizardo and Montalon, and their followers in the provinces of Cavite
+and Batangas, and those caused in the provinces of Samar and Leyte by
+the non-Christian and fanatical pulahanes resident in the mountain
+districts of the said provinces and the barrios contiguous thereto;
+and</p>
+<p>Whereas the overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces of
+Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte have not taken part in said
+disturbances and have not aided or abetted the lawless acts of said
+bandits and pulahanes; and</p>
+<p>Whereas the great mass and body of the Filipino people have, during
+said period of two years, continued to be law-abiding, peaceful, and
+loyal to the United States, and have continued to recognize and do now
+recognize the authority and sovereignty of the United States in the
+territory of said Philippine Islands: Now, therefore, be it</p>
+<p>Resolved by the Philippine Commission in formal session duly
+assembled, That it, said Philippine Commission, do certify, and it
+<i>does hereby certify</i>, to the President of the United States
+<i>that for a period of two years after the completion and publication
+of the census a condition of general and complete peace, with
+recognition of the authority of the United States, has continued to
+exist</i> and now exists in the territory of said Philippine Islands
+not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes; and be it
+further</p>
+<p>Resolved by said Philippine Commission, That the President of the
+United States be requested, and is hereby requested, to direct said
+Philippine Commission to call a general election for the choice of
+delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said territory in the
+Philippine Islands, which assembly shall be known as the Philippine
+Assembly.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb527" href="#pb527" name=
+"pb527">527</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Let us examine these amiable liberties thus taken with the facts of
+history by men of irreproachable private character, briefly analyzing
+their action. Such an examination and analysis are indispensable to a
+clear understanding by a great free people whose proudest boast is love
+of fair play, of whether the Filipino people, or any appreciable
+fraction of them, have ever in the least consented, or do now in the
+least consent, to our rule, as the small minority among us interested
+in keeping the Islands, have systematically sought, all these years, to
+have this nation believe. As the above certificate of 1907 was the last
+hurdle that Benevolent Assimilation had to leap on the Benevolent
+Hypocrisy course over which we had to gallop in order to get from the
+freeing of Cuba to the subjugation of the Philippines, let us glance
+back for a moment at the first hurdle or two, leapt when Mr. Taft was
+in the Philippine saddle.</p>
+<p>Judge Taft had said on November 30, 1900:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+supremacy of the United States<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12077src"
+href="#xd20e12077" name="xd20e12077src">2</a>;</p>
+</div>
+<p>and, pursuant to that idea, he had set up his civil government on
+July 4, 1901. He never did thereafter admit that he was mistaken in his
+original theory, but kept on trying to fit the facts to his theory,
+hoping that after a while they <i>would</i> fit. He &ldquo;clung to his
+policy of disinterested benevolence with a tenacity born of
+conviction,&rdquo; to borrow a phrase from Governor-General
+Smith&rsquo;s inaugural address of 1907. But in this same inaugural
+address of Governor Smith of 1907, you find, for the first time in all
+the Philippine state papers, a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb528"
+href="#pb528" name="pb528">528</a>]</span>frank admission of the actual
+conditions under which the civil government of 1901 was in fact set up.
+Says he:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills
+and valleys of the Philippines and every town and barrio in the islands
+was smoking hot with rebellion</i>, she [the United States] replaced
+the military with a civil regime and on the smouldering embers of
+insurrection planted civil government.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12095src" href="#xd20e12095" name="xd20e12095src">3</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>That confession, made with the bluntness of a most gallant soldier,
+is as refreshing in its honesty as the Roosevelt war-whoop of 1902.
+There shall be no tiresome repetition here concerning the original
+withholding of the facts from the American people in 1898&ndash;9, but
+to place in juxtaposition Secretary of War Root&rsquo;s representations
+to the American public in the year last named, and the actual facts as
+stated <i>earlier in the same year</i> by General MacArthur, one of our
+best fighting generals, during the thick of the early fighting, in an
+interview already noticed in its proper chronological place, will
+forever fix the genesis of the original lack of frankness as to
+conditions in the Philippines which has naturally and inexorably made
+frankness as to those conditions impossible ever since. As late as
+October 7, 1899, Mr. Root&mdash;who had not then and has not since been
+in the Philippines&mdash;had said in Chicago, in a speech at a dinner
+of the Marquette Club:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Well, against whom are we fighting? Are we fighting
+the Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds of
+islands, inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more than sixty
+different languages, and all but one are ready to accept American
+sovereignty.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb529" href="#pb529" name=
+"pb529">529</a>]</span></p>
+<p>As early as the beginning of April, 1899, just after the taking on
+March 31st of the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur,
+who commanded our troops in the assault on that place, had said, in an
+interview with a newspaper man afterwards verified by the General
+before the Senate Committee of 1902 as substantially correct:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When I first started in against these rebels, I
+believed that Aguinaldo&rsquo;s troops represented only a faction.
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* <i>I did not like to believe that the whole population
+of Luzon *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* was opposed to us</i> *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*. But
+after having come thus far, and having been brought much in contact
+with both <i>insurrectos</i> and <i>amigos</i>,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12125src" href="#xd20e12125" name="xd20e12125src">4</a> <i>I have
+been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are
+loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads</i>.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e12134src" href="#xd20e12134" name=
+"xd20e12134src">5</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>The presidential election of 1900 had been fought out, in the midst
+of considerable bitterness, on the idea that the Root view was correct
+and the MacArthur view was altogether mistaken. So that after 1900, the
+McKinley Administration was irrevocably committed to the Root
+view.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12142src" href="#xd20e12142" name=
+"xd20e12142src">6</a> The Philippine Government had, after 1900,
+diligently set to work to live up to the Root view, and to fit the
+facts to the Root view by prayer and hope, accompanied by asseveration.
+Hence in 1901 the alleged joyous sobs of welcome with which the
+Filipino people are, in effect, described in the report <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb530" href="#pb530" name="pb530">530</a>]</span>of
+the Philippine Commission for that year as having received the
+&ldquo;benign&rdquo; civil government, said sobs or other
+manifestations having spread, if the Commission&rsquo;s report is to be
+taken at its face value, &ldquo;like wild-fire.&rdquo; Hence also the
+attempt of 1902 to minimize the <span class="corr" id="xd20e12147"
+title="Source: insursurrection">insurrection</span> of 1901&ndash;2, in
+Batangas and other provinces of southern Luzon, conducted by what
+Governor Luke E. Wright, in a speech delivered at Memphis in the latter
+part of 1902, called &ldquo;the die-in-the-last-ditch
+contingent.&rdquo; Hence the quiet placing of the province of Surigao
+in the hands of the military in 1903 without suspension of the writ of
+habeas corpus, and the failure to order out the army in Albay in 1903
+and in Samar in 1904. Hence also the prompt use of the army in Samar,
+Batangas, and Cavite in 1905, after the presidential election was
+safely over. Hence also the seething state of sedition which smouldered
+in the Visayan Islands in 1906, punctuated by the outbreak in Leyte of
+that year.</p>
+<p>The psychologic processes by which the distinguished gentlemen who
+signed the Great Certificate of March 28, 1907, got their own consent
+to sign it make the most profoundly interesting study, relatively to
+the general welfare of the world, in all our Philippine experiments so
+far. They are the final flowering of the plant Political Expediency.
+They are the weeds of benevolent casuistry that become from time to
+time unavoidable in a colonial garden tended by a republic based on the
+consent of the governed and therefore by the law of its own life
+unfitted to run any other kind of a government frankly. These processes
+find their origin in the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1,
+1902, known as the Philippine Government Act. Three days after
+President Roosevelt approved the Act, he issued his proclamation of
+July 4, 1902, above noticed, declaring <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb531" href="#pb531" name="pb531">531</a>]</span>the insurrection at
+an end. Section 6 of that Act provided:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Whenever the existing insurrection in the Philippine
+Islands shall have ceased, and <i>a condition of general and complete
+peace shall have been established therein</i>, and the fact shall be
+certified to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President,
+upon being satisfied thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine
+Islands to be taken by said Philippine Commission.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This census was intended to be preliminary to granting the Filipinos
+a legislature of their own, but as a legislature full of
+<i>insurrectos</i> would of course stultify its American sponsors
+before all mankind, it was announced in effect, in publishing the
+census programme, that no legislature would be forthcoming if the
+Filipinos did not quit insurrecting, and remain &ldquo;good&rdquo; for
+two years. If they did remain good for two years after the census was
+finished, then they should have their legislature. During the lull of
+&ldquo;general and complete&rdquo; peace which, in the fall of 1902,
+followed the suppression of the Batangas insurrection of 1901&ndash;2,
+and preceded the Ola insurrection of 1902&ndash;3 in the hemp provinces
+of southern Luzon, the Commission made, on September 25, 1902, the
+certificate contemplated by the above Act of Congress, and the taking
+of the census was accordingly ordered by the President of the United
+States, Mr. Roosevelt, by a proclamation issued the same day.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e12167src" href="#xd20e12167" name=
+"xd20e12167src">7</a> Section 7 of the aforesaid Act of Congress
+provided:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Two years after the completion and publication of the
+census, in case such condition of general and complete peace with
+recognition of the authority of the United States <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb532" href="#pb532" name=
+"pb532">532</a>]</span>shall have continued in the territory of said
+islands <i>not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes</i>,
+and such facts shall have been certified to the President by the
+Philippine Commission, the President upon being satisfied thereof shall
+direct said Commission to call, and the Commission shall call, a
+general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of
+the people of said territory in the Philippine Islands, which shall be
+known as the Philippine Assembly.</p>
+</div>
+<p>On March 27, 1905, the President of the United States was duly
+advised that the census had been completed, and on March 28th, the
+presidential proclamation promising the Filipinos a legislature two
+years later if in the meantime they did not insurrect any, was duly
+published at Manila. It is true that there is no Philippine state paper
+signed by anybody, either by the President of the United States, or the
+Governor-General of the Philippines, or any one else, certifying to a
+condition of &ldquo;general and complete peace&rdquo; between the
+certificate to that effect made by the Philippine Commission on
+September 25, 1902, above mentioned, which authorized commencing the
+census (and was justified by the facts), and the presidential promise
+of March 28, 1905, that if they would &ldquo;be good&rdquo; for two
+years more, they should have a legislature. But the whole manifest
+implication of the representations of fact sought to be conveyed by the
+action both of the Washington and the Manila authorities at the date of
+the presidential promise of March 28, 1905, is that a condition of
+general and complete peace had obtained ever since the last certificate
+to that effect, the certificate of September 25, 1902. Yet, as we saw
+in the chapter covering the last year of Governor Wright&rsquo;s
+administration, besides the Samar disturbances that lasted all through
+1905, a big insurrection was actually <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb533" href="#pb533" name="pb533">533</a>]</span>in full swing in
+Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna provinces, on March 28, 1905, had then
+been in progress since before the first of the year, and continued
+until the latter part of 1905, the then Governor-General, Governor
+Wright, having, by proclamation issued January 31, 1905, declared
+Cavite and Batangas to be in a state of insurrection, ordered the
+military into those provinces, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
+President Roosevelt&rsquo;s proclamation of March 28, 1905, can by no
+possibility be construed as saying to the Filipinos anything other than
+substantially this: &ldquo;You have not insurrected any since my
+proclamation of July 4, 1902. If you will be good two years
+<i>more</i>, you shall have a legislature.&rdquo; What then was the
+Philippine Commission to do at the end of those two years, peppered, as
+they had been, with most annoying outbreaks in various provinces not
+inhabited by &ldquo;Moros or other non-Christian tribes.&rdquo; During
+the presidential campaign of 1904 the Commission had committed
+themselves, as we have seen, to the proposition that nothing serious
+was going on at that time in Samar. So how could they take frank
+official cognizance on paper of the reign of terror let loose there by
+their delay in ordering out the army until after the presidential
+election, a delay which, like a delay of fire-engines to arrive at the
+scene of a fire, had permitted the Samar outbreak to gain such headway
+that it took two years to finally put it down? Then there was the
+outbreak of 1906 in Leyte, described in the last chapter, as to which
+even the Commission had admitted in their annual report for that
+year<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12189src" href="#xd20e12189" name=
+"xd20e12189src">8</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Possibly its [Leyte&rsquo;s] immediate vicinity to
+Samar has had to do with the disturbed conditions.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb534" href="#pb534" name=
+"pb534">534</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In other words, <i>possibly</i>, a fire <i>may</i> spread from one
+field of dry grass to another near by.</p>
+<p>As to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection of 1905, in an
+executive order dated September 28, 1907,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12207src" href="#xd20e12207" name=
+"xd20e12207src">9</a>&mdash;noticed in a previous chapter, but too
+pertinent to be entirely omitted here&mdash;wherein are set forth the
+reasons for withholding executive clemency from the condemned leaders
+of that movement, Governor-General Smith describes in harrowing terms
+&ldquo;a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of the most
+beautiful provinces in the archipelago,&rdquo; wrought by the condemned
+men, who he says &ldquo;assumed the cloak of patriotism, and under the
+titles of &lsquo;Defenders of the Country,&rsquo; and &lsquo;Protectors
+of the People&rsquo; proceeded to inaugurate&rdquo; said reign of
+terror. These men were most of them former insurgent officers who had
+remained out after the respectable generals had all surrendered. This
+Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection was <i>the very sort of thing which
+the conditional promise of a legislature made by Congress to the
+Filipino people</i> in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act of July 1,
+1902&mdash;the Philippine Government Act&mdash;<i>had stipulated should
+not happen</i>. This is no mere <i>dictum</i> of my own. In the case of
+Barcelon against Baker, 5 <i>Philippine Reports</i>, pp. 87 <i>et
+seq.</i>, already very briefly noticed in a previous chapter, the
+Supreme Court of the Islands had, in effect, so held. Section 5 of the
+Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, had provided that if any state of
+affairs serious enough should arise, the Governor of the Philippines
+should have authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus &ldquo;when
+in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may
+require it.&rdquo; Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act had provided, on
+the other hand, that if a condition of general and complete peace
+should prevail for a stated <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb535" href=
+"#pb535" name="pb535">535</a>]</span>period the Filipinos should have a
+legislature. In the case of Barcelon against Baker the Supreme Court
+held that the situation contemplated by Section 5 of the Act of
+Congress had arisen in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas. That, of
+course, automatically, so to speak, made the postponement of the
+Philippine Assembly a necessary logical sequence, under the provisions
+of Sections 6 and 7. These Sections 6 and 7 promised the Filipinos a
+legislature in the event the conditions contemplated by Section 5
+should not arise. Barcelon, who was one of the (non-combatant)
+reconcentrados restrained of his liberty at Batangas, claimed that his
+detention as such reconcentrado by the defendant in the habeas corpus
+proceeding, the constabulary officer, Colonel Baker, was unlawful, in
+that, he being charged with no crime, such detention deprived him of
+his liberty without due process of law. The Philippine Commission,
+however, had declared, by virtue of the authority vested in it by
+Section 5 of the Act of Congress aforesaid, that a state of
+insurrection existed in Cavite and Batangas, and accordingly the
+Governor-General had suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared
+martial law in those provinces. The Attorney-General representing the
+Philippine Commission before the court rested the Government&rsquo;s
+case on the proposition that the petitioner was not entitled to claim
+the ordinary &ldquo;due process of law&rdquo; because &ldquo;open
+insurrection against the constituted authorities&rdquo; existed in the
+provinces named. And the Supreme Court upheld his contention. In so
+holding, they say, among other things (page 93), in construing Section
+5 of the Act of Congress we are considering:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Inasmuch as the President, or Governor-General with
+the approval of the Philippine Commission, can suspend the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb536" href="#pb536" name=
+"pb536">536</a>]</span>privilege of the writ of habeas corpus only
+under the conditions mentioned in the said statute, it becomes their
+duty to make an investigation of the existing conditions in the
+archipelago, <i>or any part thereof</i>, to ascertain whether there
+actually exists a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and
+that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the
+writ of habeas corpus. When this investigation is concluded, and the
+President, or the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
+Commission, <i>declares that there exists these conditions</i>, and
+that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the
+writ of habeas corpus, can the judicial department of the Government
+investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions
+exist?</p>
+</div>
+<p>They answer &ldquo;No!&rdquo; The head note of the decision is as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
+suspended in the Philippine Islands in the case of rebellion,
+insurrection, and invasion, when the public safety requires it, by the
+President of the United States, or by the Governor-General of the
+Philippine Islands with the approval of the Philippine Commission.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Thus the Supreme Court of the Islands squarely held that <i>on the
+fourth day of August, 1905</i> (the day the writ of habeas corpus was
+made returnable), <i>open insurrection existed against the constituted
+authorities in the Islands</i>, in the provinces named, <i>and had
+existed since the Executive Proclamation of January 31st, previous,
+declaring a state of insurrection</i>, and on that ground denied the
+writ. Yet the Commission certified on March 28, 1907, that a state of
+general and complete peace as contemplated by the Act of Congress
+conditionally promising a legislature, had prevailed for the two years
+preceding. In other words the Philippine <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb537" href="#pb537" name="pb537">537</a>]</span>Commission declared a
+state of insurrection to exist in certain populous provinces, and was
+upheld by the Supreme Court of the Islands in so doing, and later
+certified to the continuance of a state of general and complete peace
+covering the same period.</p>
+<p>All the uncandid things&mdash;uncandid in failure to take the
+American people into their confidence&mdash;that have been done by all
+the good men we have sent to the Philippines from the beginning, have
+been justified by those good men to their own consciences on the idea
+that, because the end in view was truly benevolent, therefore the end
+justified the means. As a matter of fact, American Benevolent
+Assimilation in the Philippines has, in its practical operation, worked
+more of misery and havoc, first through war, and since through
+legislation put or kept on the statute books by the influence of
+special interests in the United States with Congress, &ldquo;than any
+which has darkened their unhappy past&rdquo; to use one of Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s early expressions deprecating doing for the
+Philippines what we did for Cuba.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12263src"
+href="#xd20e12263" name="xd20e12263src">10</a></p>
+<p>But let us see just how much the Philippine Commission that signed
+the peace certificate of March 28, 1907, swallowed, and how they
+swallowed it. It will be observed that they sugar-coated their
+certificate with a lot of whereases. The first of these recites
+President Roosevelt&rsquo;s promise of March 28, 1905, that the
+Filipinos should have a legislature two years thereafter
+&ldquo;provided that a condition of general and complete peace with
+recognition of the authority of the United States should be certified
+by the Philippine Commission to have continued in the territory of the
+Philippine Islands for a period of two years&rdquo; after the
+proclamation. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb538" href="#pb538" name=
+"pb538">538</a>]</span>Whereas number two, it will be noted, goes on to
+state that there have been &ldquo;no serious disturbances of public
+order save and except&rdquo; those in Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and
+Leyte,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12273src" href="#xd20e12273" name=
+"xd20e12273src">11</a> the magnitude of which has been fully described
+in previous chapters. Of the Cavite-Batangas insurrection, the only one
+they had previously formally admitted to <i>be</i> an insurrection,
+they say it was &ldquo;caused by certain noted outlaws and bandit
+chieftains [naming them], and their followers.&rdquo; Obviously this
+was hardly sufficient to show that an insurrection they had once
+officially recognized as such was not in fact such at all. So in order
+to justify a statement that &ldquo;a condition of general and complete
+peace&rdquo; had continued in these two great provinces of Cavite and
+Batangas, which they had but shortly previously declared to be in a
+state of insurrection, and been upheld by the Supreme Court in so
+doing, they resort to the old Otis expedient of 1898&ndash;9, worked on
+the American people through Mr. McKinley to show absence of lack of
+consent-of-the-governed. This expedient, as we have seen in the earlier
+chapters of this book, consisted in vague use of the word
+&ldquo;majority.&rdquo; It had stood Judge Taft in good stead in the
+campaign of 1900, because when he then said that &ldquo;the great
+majority of the people&rdquo; were &ldquo;entirely willing&rdquo; to
+accept American rule, there was no earthly way to disprove it in time
+for the verdict of the American people to be influenced by the
+unanimity of the Filipinos against a change of masters in lieu of
+independence. It was the only possible expedient for an American
+conscience, because every American naturally feels that unless he can,
+by some sort of sophistry, persuade himself that &ldquo;the
+majority&rdquo; of the people want a given thing, then the thing is a
+wrong thing to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb539" href="#pb539" name=
+"pb539">539</a>]</span>force upon them. So the ethical hurdle the
+Commission had to leap in order to sign the certificate of 1907 was
+cleared thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The overwhelming majority of the people of said
+provinces have not taken part in said disturbances and have not aided
+and abetted the lawless acts of said bandits.</p>
+</div>
+<p>As a matter of fact, the report of the American Governor of
+Cavite&mdash;and conditions were conceded to be identical in the two
+provinces of Cavite and Batangas&mdash;shows that the reason it was so
+hard to suppress the Cavite-Batangas troubles of 1905 was that the
+people would not help the authorities to apprehend the outlaws. No
+doubt the King of England would have signed a similar certificate as to
+the people of the shires and counties in which Robin Hood, Little John,
+and Friar Tuck, held high carnival. Of course I do not mean to libel
+the fair fame of that fine freebooter Robin Hood and his companions by
+placing the rascally leaders of the bands of outlaws now under
+consideration in the same jolly and respectable class with those
+beloved friends of the childhood of us all. But the Cavite-Batangas
+&ldquo;patriots&rdquo; of 1905 could never have given the authorities
+as much trouble as they did if the people had not at least taken secret
+joy in discomfiture of the American authorities. Until finally
+suppressed, all such movements as these always grew exactly as a
+snow-ball does if you roll it on snow. Says Governor Shanks, a Major of
+the 4th United States Infantry, who was Governor of Cavite, in 1905 in
+his report for that year,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12287src" href=
+"#xd20e12287" name="xd20e12287src">12</a> in explaining the uprising
+under consideration, and the way it grew: &ldquo;The Filipino likes to
+be on the winning side.&rdquo; Certainly this <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb540" href="#pb540" name="pb540">540</a>]</span>is
+not peculiar to the Filipino. Governor Shanks proceeds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The prestige acquired (by the uprising) at San Pedro
+Tunasan, Paranaque, Taal, and San Francisco de Malabon had great weight
+in creating active sympathy for ladrone bands and leaders. Something
+was needed to counterbalance the effect of their combined successes,
+and the appearance of regular troops was just the thing needed.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This explains how &ldquo;the overwhelming majority&rdquo; of which
+the certificate of 1907 speaks was obtained in Cavite. It took six
+months to obtain said &ldquo;majority&rdquo; at that. I suppose the
+campaigning of the American regulars might be credited with obtaining
+the &ldquo;majority,&rdquo; and the reconcentration of brother Baker of
+the constabulary might be accorded the additional credit of making the
+majority &ldquo;overwhelming.&rdquo; If you have, as election tellers,
+so to speak, a soldier with a bayonet on one side, and a constabulary
+officer with a reconcentration camp back of him on the other, you can
+get an &ldquo;overwhelming majority&rdquo; for the continuance of
+American rule even in Cavite province.</p>
+<p>Through men I commanded during the early campaigning, I have killed
+my share of Filipinos in the time of war; and after the civil
+government was set up I had occasion to hang a good many of them, under
+what seemed to me a necessary application of the old Mosaic law,
+&ldquo;An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a
+life.&rdquo; But I thank God I have never been a party to the
+insufferable pretence that they, or any appreciable fraction of them,
+ever consented to our rule. This, however, is the whole theory of the
+Philippine Commission&rsquo;s certificate of March 28, 1907. It is
+curious how generously and supremely frank a brave soldier will get
+when he forgets to be a politician. In <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb541" href="#pb541" name="pb541">541</a>]</span>one of his state
+papers of 1907 Governor-General Smith<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12305src" href="#xd20e12305" name="xd20e12305src">13</a> speaks
+of General Trias, who had been Lieutenant-General of the insurgent army
+in the days of the insurrection, and next in rank to Aguinaldo himself,
+as one &ldquo;whose love of country had been tested on many a well
+fought field of honorable conflict.&rdquo; Contrast this tribute to the
+respectability of the original Philippine war for independence against
+us with the long list of stale falsehoods already reviewed in this
+volume, on the faith of which, in the presidential campaign of 1900,
+the American people were persuaded that to deny to the Filipinos what
+they had accorded to Cuba was righteous! The leaders of the
+Cavite-Batangas uprising of 1905 had been officers of the insurgent
+army, and that was the secret of their hold upon the people of those
+provinces. It is true that they must have been pretty sorry officers,
+and that they were <i>ladrones</i> (brigands). They were cruel and
+unmitigated scoundrels working for purely selfish and vainglorious
+ends. But it was the cloak of patriotism, however, infamously misused,
+that gained them such success as they attained in 1905. Says the
+American Governor of Cavite province in his annual report for
+1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12313src" href="#xd20e12313" name=
+"xd20e12313src">14</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The province should be most carefully watched. I am
+convinced that <i>ladrone leaders do not produce conditions</i>, but
+that <i>the conditions and attitude of the public produce
+ladrones</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>So much for the Cavite-Batangas hurdle. And now as to the Samar and
+Leyte hurdle.</p>
+<p>The signers of the certificate of 1907 justify their certificate as
+to Samar and Leyte on a very ingenious theory. The Act of Congress of
+July 1, 1902, already <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb542" href=
+"#pb542" name="pb542">542</a>]</span>cited, which had provided for the
+taking of a census preliminary to the call of an election for delegates
+to a legislature, had recognized the crude ethnological status of the
+Moros and other non-Christian tribes. These had never had anything
+whatever to do with the insurrection against us. Therefore in making
+the continuance of a state of general and complete peace for a
+prescribed period a condition precedent to granting the Filipinos a
+legislature, the Act of 1902 had limited that condition precedent to
+&ldquo;the territory of said Islands not inhabited by Moros or other
+non-Christian tribes.&rdquo; In fact President Roosevelt&rsquo;s
+proclamation of September 25, 1902, already noticed, ordering the
+taking of the census on the theory that a state of general and complete
+peace then existed, explains that this theory is entirely consistent
+with trouble among the Moros and other non-Christian tribes because
+<i>they</i>, it says, quoting from a statement of the Philippine
+Commission previously made to the President, &ldquo;never have taken
+any part in the insurrection.&rdquo; The Moros and other non-Christian
+tribes were, so to speak, in no sense assets of the Philippine
+insurrection. All the rest of the population was&mdash;that is, if
+there was anything in the veteran General MacArthur&rsquo;s grim jest
+of 1900, prompted by Governor Taft&rsquo;s half-baked opinion to the
+contrary, that &ldquo;ethnological homogeneity&rdquo; was the secret of
+the unanimity of the opposition we met, and that somehow people
+&ldquo;<i>will</i> stick to their own kith and kin.&rdquo; When the
+Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drawn nobody pretended for a
+moment that there were any non-Christian tribes either in Samar or
+Leyte. The whole population of those Islands were valuable
+<i>assets</i> of the insurrection. If any one doubts it, let him ask
+the 9th Infantry. You will find in the Census of 1903 <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb543" href="#pb543" name="pb543">543</a>]</span>that
+there are no non-Christian tribes credited either to Samar or
+Leyte.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12346src" href="#xd20e12346" name=
+"xd20e12346src">15</a> When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was
+drafted, the exception about Moros and other non-Christian tribes was
+intended to except merely certain types of people as distinct from the
+great mass of the Philippine population as islands are from the sea.
+The fact is, no person connected with the Philippine Government
+<i>either before or after</i> the certificate under consideration, ever
+thought of classifying the ignorant country people of the uplands and
+hills of Samar or Leyte, as &ldquo;non-Christian tribes.&rdquo; The
+Philippine Census of 1903 does not so classify them. The very volume of
+the <i>Report of the Philippine Commission for 1907</i> in which the
+certificate aforesaid appears, does not. In that volume,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e12361src" href="#xd20e12361" name=
+"xd20e12361src">16</a> the report of the Executive Secretary deals
+elaborately with the subject of non-Christian tribes. Professor
+Worcester of the Philippine Commission has for the last twelve years
+been the grand official digger-up of non-Christian tribes. He takes as
+much delight at the discovery of a new non-Christian tribe in some
+remote, newly penetrated mountain fastness, as the butterfly catcher
+with the proverbial blue goggles does in the capture of a new kind of
+butterfly. The Executive Secretary&rsquo;s report, out of deference to
+the professor, omits no single achievement of his with reference to his
+anthropological hobby. It treats, with an enthusiasm that would delight
+Mrs. Jellyby herself, of &ldquo;the progress that was made during the
+fiscal year in the work of civilizing non-Christian tribes
+<i>scattered</i> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb544" href="#pb544"
+name="pb544">544</a>]</span>throughout the archipelago.&rdquo; It gives
+an alphabetical list of all the provinces where there are non-Christian
+tribes, and, under the name of each province it gives notes as to the
+progress during the year with those tribes. <i>Neither Samar nor Leyte
+appear in that list of provinces.</i> So that the Samar
+&ldquo;Pulajans,&rdquo; or &ldquo;Red Breeches&rdquo;
+fellows,&mdash;&ldquo;fanatical&rdquo; Pulajans, they are called in the
+certificate&mdash;were &ldquo;non-Christian tribes&rdquo; for peace
+certificate purposes only. One thing which makes it most difficult of
+all for me to understand how these gentlemen got their consent to sign
+that certificate is that each non-Christian tribe in the Philippines
+has a language of its own, whereas the country people of the uplands
+and mountains of Samar and Leyte who are labelled&mdash;or
+libelled&mdash;&ldquo;non-Christian tribes&rdquo; in the certificate of
+1907, were no more different from the rest of the population of those
+islands than, for instance, the ignorant mountain people of Virginia or
+Kentucky are different, ethnologically, from the inhabitants of
+Richmond or Louisville. In his report for 1908,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12375src" href="#xd20e12375" name="xd20e12375src">17</a>
+Governor-General Smith himself makes this perfectly clear, where he
+describes the Samar Pulajan, or mountaineer, thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Pulajan is not a robber or a thief by
+nature&mdash;quite the contrary. He is hard working, industrious, and
+even frugal. He had his little <i>late</i><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12386src" href="#xd20e12386" name="xd20e12386src">18</a> of hemp
+on the side of the mountain, and breaking out his <i>picul</i><a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e12394src" href="#xd20e12394" name=
+"xd20e12394src">19</a> of hemp, he carried it hank by hank for miles
+and miles over almost impassable mountain trails to the nearest town or
+barrio. There he offered it for sale, and if he refused the price
+tendered, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb545" href="#pb545" name=
+"pb545">545</a>]</span>which was generally not more than half the
+value, he soon found himself arrested on a trumped-up charge, and
+unless he compromised by parting with his hemp he found himself, after
+paying his fine and lawyer&rsquo;s fees, without either hemp or
+money.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The non-Christian tribes, on the other hand, never have anything to
+do with the civilized people. The Act of Congress of 1902, therefore,
+had no sort of reference to the simple, ignorant, and ordinarily docile
+mountain folk who tilled the soil, revered the priests, paid their
+<i>cedula</i> or head tax like all the rest of the population of the
+Islands, and carried their agricultural products from season to season,
+their hemp and the like, to the coast towns to market. In other words,
+inclusion of the Samar &ldquo;Pulajans,&rdquo; or &ldquo;Red
+Breeches&rdquo; brigade, and the Leyte bandits, in the peace
+certificate of 1907, as &ldquo;non-Christian tribes&rdquo; was an
+afterthought, having no foundation either in logic or fact. It was a
+part of Benevolent Assimilation. This is clearly apparent from
+President Roosevelt&rsquo;s message to Congress of December,
+1905.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12411src" href="#xd20e12411" name=
+"xd20e12411src">20</a> You do not find any buncombe about
+&ldquo;non-Christian tribes&rdquo; in that message. In there reviewing
+the Samar and other insurrections of 1905 in the Philippines, you find
+him dealing with the real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though
+adopting the view that <i>the Filipino people</i> were to blame
+therefor, because <i>we</i> had placed too much power in the hands of
+an ignorant electorate, which had elected rascally officials.
+&ldquo;Cavite and Samar,&rdquo; he says, &ldquo;are instances of
+reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power of a
+people.&rdquo; If we had let the Filipinos go ahead with their little
+republic in 1898, instead of destroying it as we did, they knew and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb546" href="#pb546" name=
+"pb546">546</a>]</span>would have utilized the true elements of
+strength they had, viz., a very considerable body of educated,
+patriotic men having the loyal confidence of the masses of the people.
+But we proceeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theory that
+<i>the only</i> road to self-government was for an alien people to step
+in and make the ignorant masses the <i>sine qua non</i>. Yet if there
+was one point on which Mr. McKinley had laid more stress than on any
+other, in his original instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft
+Commission, that point was the one consecrated in the following
+language of those instructions:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">In all the forms of government and administrative
+provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission
+should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is
+designed <i>not for *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* the expression of our theoretical
+views</i>, etc.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course the ignorant electorate we perpetrated on Samar as an
+&ldquo;expression of our theoretical views&rdquo; proved that we had
+&ldquo;gone too fast&rdquo; in conferring self-government, or, to quote
+Mr. Roosevelt, had been &ldquo;reposing too much confidence in the
+self-governing power of a people,&rdquo; if to begin with the rankest
+material for constructing a government that there was at hand was to
+offer a fair test of capacity for self-government. But President
+Roosevelt&rsquo;s message, above quoted, shows you that the
+&ldquo;ignorant electorate&rdquo; was merely an ignorant electorate,
+and not a non-Christian tribe, as the Philippine Commission later had
+the temerity to certify they were. Now the plain, unvarnished,
+benevolent truth is just this: The Commission knew that nobody in the
+United States, whether they were <i>for</i> retaining the Islands or
+<i>against</i> retaining them, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb547"
+href="#pb547" name="pb547">547</a>]</span>had any desire to postpone
+granting a legislature to the Philippine people. So in their
+certificate they simply included everybody who had given trouble in
+Samar and Leyte as &ldquo;non-Christian tribes.&rdquo; The only
+justification for this was that they had in fact acted in a most
+un-Christianlike manner,&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, for people who devotedly
+murmur prayers to patron saints in good standing in the church
+calendar. In making their certificate, the Commission simply ignored
+the various uprisings of the preceding two years. They simply said,
+generously, &ldquo;Oh, forget it.&rdquo; They knew nobody in the United
+States begrudged the Filipinos their conditionally promised
+legislature, or cared to postpone it. The leading Filipinos begged the
+authorities to &ldquo;forget&rdquo; the various disturbances that had
+occurred since the publication of the census, and there was a very
+general desire in the Islands to let bygones be bygones, wipe the
+slate, and begin again. Any other attitude would have meant that the
+legislature would have to be postponed. Then the opposition in the
+United States would want to know why, and by 1908 Philippine
+independence might become an issue again. In the eyes of the
+Commission, the end, being benevolent, justified stretching the
+language of the Act of 1902 as if it had been the blessed veil of
+charity itself&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the end justified the means. In fact
+it <i>did</i>&mdash;almost&mdash;justify the means. But not quite. The
+moral quality of the Great Certificate of 1907 was not as reprehensible
+as General Anderson&rsquo;s dealings with Aguinaldo, already described,
+which, like the certificate, were a necessary part of the benevolent
+hypocrisy of Benevolent Assimilation of an unconsenting people. Yet
+General Anderson is an honorable man. It was not as bad as General
+Greene&rsquo;s juggling Aguinaldo out of his trenches before Manila in
+a friendly way, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb548" href="#pb548"
+name="pb548">548</a>]</span>failing to give him a receipt for said
+trenches, as he had promised to do, because such a receipt would show
+co-operation and &ldquo;might look too much like an alliance.&rdquo;
+This also was done on the idea that the end justified the means. Yet
+General Greene is an honorable man. The signers of the great peace
+certificate of 1907 are all honorable men. But they signed that
+certificate, just the same. &ldquo;Judge not that ye be not
+judged.&rdquo; All I have to say is, I would not have signed that
+certificate. I would have said: &ldquo;No, gentlemen, the end does
+<i>not</i> justify the means. The Philippine Assembly must be
+postponed, if we are going to deal frankly with Congress and the folks
+at home. The conditions Congress made precedent to the grant of an
+assembly have <i>not</i> been met, and we each and all of us know it.
+We owe more to our own country and to truth than we do to the
+Filipinos. The Act of Congress of 1902 did not vest in the Philippine
+Commission authority to pardon disturbances of public order. It imposed
+upon the Commission an implied duty to report such disturbances, fully
+and frankly. It is not true that there has been a continuing state of
+general and complete peace in these Islands for the last two years, and
+I for one will not certify that there has been.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The truth is, the attitude of the signers of the certificate was
+like that of Uncle Remus, when interrupted by the little boy in one of
+his stories. When Uncle Remus gets to the point in the rabbit story
+where the rabbit thrillingly escapes from the jaws of death,
+<i>i.e.</i>, from the jaws of the dogs, by climbing a tree, the rapt
+listener interrupts: &ldquo;Why, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can&rsquo;t
+climb a tree.&rdquo; To which Uncle Remus replies, with a reassuring
+wave of the hand, &ldquo;Oh, but Honey, <i>dis</i> rabbit dess
+<i>&rsquo;bleeged</i> ter climb <i>dis</i> tree.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>Should any of my good friends still in the Philippines <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb549" href="#pb549" name="pb549">549</a>]</span>feel
+disposed to censure such levity as the above, I can only say, as
+Kipling writes from England to his Anglo-Indian friends in a foreword
+to one of his books:</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">I have told these tales of our life</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">For a sheltered people&rsquo;s mirth,</p>
+<p class="line">In jesting guise,&mdash;but ye are wise,</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">And ye know what the jest is worth.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first">Moreover, my authority to speak frankly about these
+matters is also aptly stated by the same great poet thus:</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<div class="lg">
+<p class="line">I have eaten your bread and salt,</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">I have drunk your water and wine,</p>
+<p class="line">The deaths ye died I have watched beside</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">And the lives that ye led were mine.</p>
+</div>
+<div class="lg">
+<p class="line">Was there aught that I did not share</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">In vigil or toil or ease,</p>
+<p class="line">One joy or woe that I did not know,</p>
+<p class="line xd20e12488">Dear friends across the seas?</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<p class="first">The above reflections are not placed before the reader
+to show him what a pity it is that the writer was not a member of the
+Philippine Commission at the time of their certificate of 1907, or to
+show what a fine thing for our common country it would be if he were
+made a member of that Commission now. He is, personally, as
+disinterested as if Manila were in the moon, for he cannot live in the
+tropics any more. The effect of a year or so of residence there upon
+white men invalided home for tropical dysentery and then returning to
+the Islands is like the effect of water upon a starched shirt. However,
+it is believed that the facts of official record collected in this
+chapter up to this point are a <i>demonstration</i> of this
+proposition, to wit: <i>What the Philippine Government needs more than
+anything else is that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb550" href=
+"#pb550" name="pb550">550</a>]</span>the minority party in the United
+States should be represented on the Commission</i>. By this I do not
+mean representation by what are called, under Republican
+Administrations, &ldquo;White House&rdquo; Democrats, nor what under a
+Democratic Administration, if one should ever occur, would probably be
+called &ldquo;Copperhead Republicans.&rdquo; I mean the genuine
+article. A Democrat who has cast his fortunes with the Philippines is
+no longer a Democrat relatively to the Philippines, because the
+Democratic party wants to get rid of the Philippines and the Democrat
+in the Philippines of course does not. How absurd it is to talk about
+former Governors Wright and Smith, as &ldquo;life-long
+Democrats,&rdquo; by way of preliminary to using their opinions as
+&ldquo;admissions.&rdquo; In the law of evidence, an
+&ldquo;admission&rdquo; is a statement made against the interest of the
+party making it.</p>
+<p>The first election for representatives in the Philippine Assembly
+was held on July 30, 1907, and on October 16th thereafter the Assembly
+was formally opened by Secretary of War, William H. Taft. The various
+&ldquo;whereases&rdquo; hereinabove reviewed, importing complete
+acquiescence in American rule since President Roosevelt&rsquo;s
+Proclamation of July 4, 1902, were first duly read, and then the
+Assembly was opened. Of course, no man could have been elected to the
+Assembly without at least pretending to be in favor of independence,
+and all but a corporal&rsquo;s guard of them were outspoken in favor of
+the proposition. As the present Governor-General Mr. Forbes, said,
+while Vice-Governor, in the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for February,
+1909:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">To deny the capacity of one&rsquo;s country for
+*&nbsp;*&nbsp;* self-government is essentially unpopular.</p>
+</div>
+<p>When he visited the Philippines to open their Assembly in 1907, Mr.
+Taft had said nothing definite and final <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb551" href="#pb551" name="pb551">551</a>]</span>on the question of
+promising <span class="corr" id="xd20e12539" title=
+"Source: in dependence">independence</span> since his departure from
+the Islands in 1903. His then benevolent unwillingness to tell them
+frankly he did not think they had sense enough to run a government of
+their own, and that they were unfit for self-government, has already
+been reviewed. For two years after 1903 Governor Wright had made them
+pine for the return of Mr. Taft. They longed to hear again some of the
+siren notes of the celebrated speech &ldquo;the Philippines for the
+Filipinos.&rdquo; They had gotten very excited and very happy over that
+speech. Of course they would not have gotten very excited over
+independence supposed to be coming long after they should be dead and
+buried. During the two dark frank years of Governor Wright&rsquo;s
+<i>r&eacute;gime</i>, they had frequently been told that they were not
+fit for independence. So that when Secretary of War Taft had visited
+the Islands in 1905 they all had been on the <i>qui vive</i> for more
+statements vaguely implying an independence they might hope to live to
+see. During the visit of 1905 the time of the visiting Congressional
+party was consumed principally with tariff hearings, and comparatively
+little was said on the subject uppermost in the minds of all Filipinos.
+It is true that Mr. Taft said then <i>he</i> was of the opinion that it
+would take a generation or longer to get the country ready for
+self-government, but he said it in a tactful, kindly way, and did not
+forever crush their hopes. So when he went out to the Islands to open
+the assembly in 1907, the attitude of the whole people in expectation
+of some definite utterances on the question of a definite
+<i>promise</i> of independence at <i>some</i> future time, was just the
+attitude of an audience in a theatre as to which one affirms &ldquo;you
+could hear a pin fall.&rdquo; In this regard Mr. Taft&rsquo;s
+utterances were as follows<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12558src" href=
+"#xd20e12558" name="xd20e12558src">21</a>: <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb552" href="#pb552" name="pb552">552</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I am aware that in view of the issues discussed at the
+election of this assembly I am expected to say something regarding the
+policy of the United States toward these islands. I cannot speak with
+the authority of one who may control that policy. The Philippine
+Islands are territory belonging to the United States, and by the
+Constitution, the branch of that government vested with the power and
+charged with the duty of making rules and regulations for their
+government is Congress. The policy to be pursued with respect to them
+is therefore ultimately for Congress to determine. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I
+have no authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate
+disposition of the Islands.</p>
+</div>
+<p>After that there was some talk about &ldquo;mutually beneficial
+trade relations&rdquo; and &ldquo;improvement of the people both
+industrially and in self-governing capacity.&rdquo; But with regard to
+the &ldquo;process of political preparation of the Filipino
+people&rdquo; for self-government the Secretary said that was a
+question no one could certainly answer; and so far as he was concerned
+he thought it would take &ldquo;considerable longer than a
+generation.&rdquo; Somewhere in the early Philippine State papers there
+is a quotation used by Mr. Taft from Shakespeare about &ldquo;Keeping
+the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope.&rdquo; The
+Filipinos have eagerly read for the last twelve years every utterance
+of Mr. Taft&rsquo;s that they could get hold of. If any of those
+embryonic statesmen of the first Philippine Assembly, familiar with the
+various Taft utterances, had looked up the context of the Shakespearian
+quotation above alluded to, he would have found it to be as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">And be these juggling fiends no more
+believ&rsquo;d,</p>
+<p class="line">That palter with us in a double sense:</p>
+<p class="line">That keep the word of promise to our ear</p>
+<p class="line">And break it to our hope.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12580src" href="#xd20e12580" name="xd20e12580src">22</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb553" href="#pb553" name=
+"pb553">553</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Since the announcement by Secretary of War Taft at the opening of
+the Philippine Assembly in October, 1907, of the policy of indefinite
+retention of the Islands with undeclared intention, the Filipinos have
+of course clearly understood that if they were ever to have
+independence they must look to Congress for it. But they know Congress
+is not interested in them and that they have no influence with it, and
+that the Hemp Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Sugar Trust, have. So
+that since 1907, both the American authorities in the Philippines and
+the Filipinos have settled down, the former suffused with
+benevolence&mdash;hardened however by paternalistic firmness, the
+latter stoically, to the programme of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention. No conceivable programme could be devised more
+ingeniously calculated to engender race hatred. The Filipino newspapers
+call the present policy one of &ldquo;permanent administration for
+inferior and incapable races.&rdquo; The Act of Congress of July 1,
+1902, known as the Philippine Government Act, which is the
+&ldquo;Constitution,&rdquo; so to speak, we have given the Filipinos,
+accords &ldquo;liberty of the press&rdquo; in the exact language of our
+own Constitution. The native press does not fail to use this liberty to
+the limit. Naturally the American press does not remain silent. So here
+are a pair of bellows ever fanning the charcoals of discontent. And the
+masses of the Filipino people read the Filipino papers. If they cannot
+read, their children can. In one of the reports of one of the American
+constabulary officials in the Philippines, there is an account of the
+influence of the native press too graphic to be otherwise than
+accurate. He says one can often see, in the country districts, a group
+of natives gathered about some village Hampden, listening to his
+reading the latest diatribe against the American Occupation. Never was
+there <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb554" href="#pb554" name=
+"pb554">554</a>]</span>such folly in the annals of statesmanship. In
+their native papers, the race situation of course comes in for much
+comment. Now the most notorious and inflexible fact of that race
+situation is that the colonial Anglo-Saxon does not intermarry with
+&ldquo;the yellow and brown&rdquo; subject people, as the Latin
+colonizing races do. It would be an over-statement of the case to say
+that the Filipinos to-day had rather have the Spaniards back as their
+overlords instead of us. In 1898, they &ldquo;tasted the sweets of
+liberty,&rdquo; to use an expression of one of their leaders, and I am
+perfectly sure that to-day the desire of all those people for a
+government of their own is so genuine and universal as that it amounts
+to a very hopeful positive factor in the equation of their capacity for
+self-government. But there is no doubt that many of the Filipinos after
+all have a very warm place in their hearts for the Spanish people. How
+could it be otherwise when so many of the Filipinos are sons and
+grandsons of Spaniards? Much of like and dislike in life&rsquo;s
+journey is determined pre-natally. On the other hand, the American
+women in the Philippines maintain an attitude toward the natives quite
+like that of their British sisters in Hong Kong toward the Chinese, and
+in Calcutta toward the natives there. The social status of an American
+woman who marries a native,&mdash;I myself have never heard of but one
+case&mdash;is like that of a Pacific coast girl who marries a Jap. This
+is merely the instinct of self-defence with which Nature provides the
+weaker sex, just as she provides the porcupine with quills. But look at
+the other side of the picture. When an American man marries a native
+woman, he thereafter finds himself more in touch with his native
+&ldquo;in-laws&rdquo; it is true, but correspondingly, and ever
+increasingly, out of touch with his former associations. This is not as
+it should be. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb555" href="#pb555" name=
+"pb555">555</a>]</span>But it is a most unpleasant and inexorable fact
+of the present situation. In an address delivered at the Quill Club in
+Manila on January 25, 1909, Governor Smith, after reciting the various
+beneficent designs contemplated by the government and the various
+public works consummated (at the expense of the people of the Islands)
+deplored, in spite of it all, what he termed &ldquo;the growing gulf
+between the races.&rdquo; Said he:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">An era of ill feeling has started between Americans
+and Filipinos, and, I hesitate to say it, race hatred.</p>
+</div>
+<p><i>Cherchez la femme!</i> You find her, on the one hand, in the
+American woman whose attitude has been indicated, and you find her, on
+the other, in the refined and virtuous native woman, who finds her
+American husband&rsquo;s relations to his compatriots
+altered&mdash;queered&mdash;since his marriage to her, no matter how
+faithful a wife and mother she may be. This is the unspeakably cruel
+situation we have forced upon the Filipino people&mdash;whom I really
+learned to respect, and became much attached to, before I left the
+Islands&mdash;<i>and President Taft knows it as well as I do</i>. Yet
+he does not take the American people into his confidence. He simply
+worries along with the situation, wishing it would get better, but
+knowing it will get worse. That this situation is a permanent one is
+clearly shown by all the previous teachings of racial history. In his
+<i>Winning of the West</i>, written in 1889, speaking of the French
+settlers in the Ohio valley before 1776, and the cordial social
+relations of the dominant race with the natives&mdash;relations which
+have always obtained with all Latin races under like
+circumstances&mdash;Mr. Roosevelt says (vol. i., page 41): <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb556" href="#pb556" name="pb556">556</a>]</span></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">They were not trammelled by the queer pride which
+makes a man of English stock unwilling to make a red-skinned woman his
+wife, though anxious enough to make her his concubine.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Men of English stock have changed but little in the matter of race
+instinct since 1776. If we had a definite policy, declared by Congress,
+promising independence, the American attitude in the Philippines toward
+the Filipinos would at once change, from the present impossible one, to
+our ordinary natural attitude of courtesy toward all foreigners,
+regardless of their color.</p>
+<p>On May 7, 1909, the Honorable James F. Smith took his departure from
+the Philippine Islands forever and turned over the duties of his office
+to the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, as Acting President of the
+Commission and Governor-General. As in the case of Governors Wright and
+Ide, so in that of Governor Smith, no reason is apparent why the
+Washington Government should have been willing to dispense with the
+services of the incumbent. This was peculiarly true in the case of
+General Smith. He was but fifty years of age when he left the Islands
+in 1909. He has rendered more different kinds of distinguished public
+service than any American who has ever been in the Philippine Islands
+from the time Dewey&rsquo;s guns first thundered out over Manila Bay
+down to this good hour. Going out with the first expedition in 1898 as
+Colonel of the 1st California Regiment, he distinguished himself on
+more than one battlefield in the early fighting and in recognition
+thereof was made a brigadier-general. Subsequent to this he became
+Military Governor of the island of Negros, that one of the six
+principal Visayan Islands which gave less trouble during the
+insurrection and after than any other&mdash;a <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb557" href="#pb557" name=
+"pb557">557</a>]</span>circumstance doubtless not wholly unrelated to
+General Smith&rsquo;s wise and tactful administration there. Later on
+during the military <i>r&eacute;gime</i> he became Collector of Customs
+of the archipelago. The revenues from customs are the principal source
+of revenue of the Philippine Government and the sums of money handled
+are enormous. The customs service, moreover, in most countries, and
+especially in the Philippines, is more subject to the creeping in of
+graft than any other. General Smith&rsquo;s administration of this post
+was in keeping with everything else he did in the Islands. When the
+civil government was founded by Judge Taft in 1901, he was appointed
+one of the Justices of the Supreme Court and filled the duties of that
+office most creditably. Thence he was promoted to the Philippine
+Commission, which is, virtually, the cabinet of the Governor-General.
+Still later he became Vice-Governor, and finally Governor, serving as
+such from September, 1906, to May, 1909. Any other government on earth
+that has over-seas colonies and recognizes the supreme importance of a
+maximum of continuity of policy, would have kept Governor Smith as long
+as it could have possibly induced him to stay, just as the British kept
+Lord Cromer in Egypt. Governor Smith was succeeded by a young man from
+Boston, who had come out to the Islands four years before, and who,
+prior to that time, had never had any public service in the United
+States of any kind, had never been in the Philippine Islands, and
+probably had never seen a Filipino until he landed at Manila.</p>
+<p>General Smith is now (1912) one of the Judges of the Court of
+Customs Appeals at Washington. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb558"
+href="#pb558" name="pb558">558</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12022" href="#xd20e12022src" name="xd20e12022">1</a></span> Pt.
+1, p. 36.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12077" href="#xd20e12077src" name="xd20e12077">2</a></span>
+<i>Report of Taft Philippine Commission for 1900</i>, p. 17.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12095" href="#xd20e12095src" name="xd20e12095">3</a></span> See
+<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12125" href="#xd20e12125src" name="xd20e12125">4</a></span>
+<i>Amigo</i>, in Spanish, means friend. Every non-combatant Filipino
+with whom our people came in contact in the early days always claimed
+to be an &ldquo;amigo,&rdquo; and never was, in any single
+instance.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12134" href="#xd20e12134src" name="xd20e12134">5</a></span> See
+testimony of General MacArthur before the Senate Committee of 1902,
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 1942.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12142" href="#xd20e12142src" name="xd20e12142">6</a></span> The
+adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill, which bill proposes
+ultimate Philippine independence in 1921, is full of the old
+insufferable drivel about &ldquo;tribes,&rdquo; and of the rest of the
+Root views of 1900.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12167" href="#xd20e12167src" name="xd20e12167">7</a></span> See
+<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 211.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12189" href="#xd20e12189src" name="xd20e12189">8</a></span> Part
+1, p. 38.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12207" href="#xd20e12207src" name="xd20e12207">9</a></span>
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 37.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12263" href="#xd20e12263src" name="xd20e12263">10</a></span> See
+President McKinley&rsquo;s annual message to Congress of December,
+1899, <i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1899, p. 34.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12273" href="#xd20e12273src" name="xd20e12273">11</a></span>
+Provinces totalling about a million people.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12287" href="#xd20e12287src" name="xd20e12287">12</a></span>
+<i>Report of U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 211.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12305" href="#xd20e12305src" name="xd20e12305">13</a></span>
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12313" href="#xd20e12313src" name="xd20e12313">14</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, 1906; pt. 1, p. 225.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12346" href="#xd20e12346src" name="xd20e12346">15</a></span> To
+be absolutely accurate, there are 688 people classified as
+&ldquo;wild&rdquo; in the Census figures as to Samar, and 265,549 are
+put down as civilized; the total of population being 266,237.
+<i>All</i> the 388,922 people of Leyte are put down as civilized. See
+<i>Philippine Census</i>, Table of Population, vol. ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12361" href="#xd20e12361src" name="xd20e12361">16</a></span>
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, pt. 1, p. 195.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12375" href="#xd20e12375src" name="xd20e12375">17</a></span> See
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1908, pt. 1, p. 62.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12386" href="#xd20e12386src" name="xd20e12386">18</a></span>
+Tract. You speak of the small farmer&rsquo;s &ldquo;<i>late</i> of
+hemp&rdquo; in the Philippines as you do of his &ldquo;patch of
+cotton&rdquo; in the United States.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12394" href="#xd20e12394src" name="xd20e12394">19</a></span> A
+<i>picul</i> is a bale of a given quantity&mdash;weight.
+&ldquo;Breaking out a <i>picul</i> of hemp&rdquo; is analogous,
+colloquially, to &ldquo;picking a bale of cotton.&rdquo;</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12411" href="#xd20e12411src" name="xd20e12411">20</a></span> See
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, December 5, 1905, p. 103.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12558" href="#xd20e12558src" name="xd20e12558">21</a></span> See
+<i>Report of Philippine Commission</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 215.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12580" href="#xd20e12580src" name="xd20e12580">22</a></span>
+<i>Macbeth</i>, Act V., Sc. 8.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch22" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Governor Forbes&mdash;1909&ndash;1912</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">The trouble with this country to-day is that, under
+long domination by the protected interests, a partnership has grown up
+between them and the Government which the best men in the Republican
+party could not break up if they would.&mdash;<span class="sc">Woodrow
+Wilson.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">When Governor Forbes assumed the duties of
+Governor-General of the Philippines, some ten years after the
+ratification of the Treaty of Paris whereby we bought the Islands, he
+was the ninth supreme representative of American authority we had had
+there since the American occupation began. The following is the
+list:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(1) Gen.</td>
+<td>Thomas M. Anderson</td>
+<td>June 30, 1898&ndash;July 25, 1898</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(2) Gen.</td>
+<td>Wesley Merritt</td>
+<td>July 25, 1898&ndash;Aug. 29, 1898</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(3) Gen.</td>
+<td>Elwell S. Otis</td>
+<td>Aug. 29, 1898&ndash;May 5, 1900</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(4) Gen.</td>
+<td>Arthur MacArthur</td>
+<td>May 5, 1900&ndash;July 4, 1901</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(5) Hon.</td>
+<td>William H. Taft</td>
+<td>July 4, 1901&ndash;Dec. 23, 1903</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(6) Hon.</td>
+<td>Luke E. Wright</td>
+<td>Dec. 23, 1903&ndash;Nov. 4, 1905</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(7) Hon.</td>
+<td>Henry C. Ide</td>
+<td>Nov. 4, 1905&ndash;Sept. 20, 1906</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(8) Hon.</td>
+<td>James F. Smith</td>
+<td>Sept. 20, 1906&ndash;May 7, 1909</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>(9) Hon.</td>
+<td>W. Cameron Forbes</td>
+<td>May 7, 1909&ndash;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12719src" href=
+"#xd20e12719" name="xd20e12719src">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>No one of these distinguished gentlemen has ever had any authority
+to tell the Filipinos what we expect ultimately to do with them. They
+have not known themselves. Is not this distinctly unfair both to
+governors and governed? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb559" href=
+"#pb559" name="pb559">559</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Before Governor Forbes went to the Philippines he had been a largely
+successful business man. He is a man of the very highest personal
+character, and an indefatigable worker. He has done as well as the
+conditions of the problem permit. But he is always between Scylla and
+Charybdis. American capital in or contemplating investment in the
+Islands is continually pressing to be permitted to go ahead and develop
+the resources of the Islands. To keep the Islands from being exploited
+Congress early limited grants of land to a maximum too small to attract
+capital. So those who desire to build up the country, knowing they
+cannot get the law changed, are forever seeking to invent ways to get
+around the law. And, being firm in the orthodox Administration belief
+that discussion of ultimate independence is purely academic,
+<i>i.e.</i>, a matter of no concern to anybody now living, Governor
+Forbes is of course in sympathy with Americans who wish to develop the
+resources of the Islands. On the other hand, he knows that such a
+course will daily and hourly make ultimate independence more certain
+never to come. So do the Filipinos know this. Therefore they clamor
+ever louder and louder against all American attempts to repeal the
+anti-exploiting Acts of Congress by &ldquo;liberal&rdquo;
+interpretation. Many an American just here is sure to ask himself,
+&ldquo;Why all this &lsquo;clamor&rsquo;? Do we not give them good
+government? What just ground have they for complaint?&rdquo; Yes, we do
+give them very good government, so far as the Manila end of the
+business is concerned, except that it is a far more expensive
+government than any people on the earth would be willing to impose on
+themselves. But their main staples are hemp, sugar, and tobacco, and we
+raise the last two in this country. Their sugar and tobacco were
+allowed free entry into the United <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb560"
+href="#pb560" name="pb560">560</a>]</span>States by the Paine Law of
+1909 up to amounts limited in the law, but the Philippine people know
+very well that American sugar and tobacco interests will either dwarf
+the growth of their sugar and tobacco industries by refusing to allow
+the limit raised&mdash;the limit of amounts admitted free of
+duty&mdash;or else that our Sugar Trust and our Tobacco Trust will
+simply ultimately eliminate them by absorption, just as the Standard
+Oil Company used to do with small competitors. In this sort of prospect
+certainly even the dullest intellect must recognize just ground for
+fearing&mdash;nay for <i>plainly foreseeing</i>&mdash;practical
+industrial slavery through control by foreign<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12735src" href="#xd20e12735" name="xd20e12735src">2</a>
+corporations of economic conditions. So much for the two staples in
+which the Philippines may some day become competitors of ours. It took
+Mr. Taft nine years to persuade American sugar and tobacco that they
+would not be in any immediate danger by letting in a little Philippine
+sugar and tobacco free of duty. Then they consented. Not until then did
+they promise not to shout &ldquo;Down with cheap Asiatic labor. We will
+not consent to compete with it.&rdquo; Their mental reservation was, of
+course, and is, &ldquo;if the Philippine sugar and tobacco industries
+get too prosperous, we will either buy them, or cripple them by
+defeating their next attempt to get legislation increasing the amounts
+of Philippine sugar and tobacco admitted into the United States free of
+duty.&rdquo; And the Filipinos <i>know</i> that this is the fate that
+awaits two out of the three main sources of the wealth of their
+country. Their third source of wealth, their main staple, is the
+world-famous Manila hemp. This represents more than half the value of
+their total annual exports. And as to it, &ldquo;practical industrial
+slavery through control by foreign corporations of economic
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb561" href="#pb561" name=
+"pb561">561</a>]</span>conditions&rdquo; is to-day not a <i>fear</i>,
+but a <i>fact</i>. The International Harvester Company has its agents
+at Manila. The said company or allied interests, or both, are large
+importers of Manila hemp. The reports of all the governors-general of
+the Philippines who have preceded Governor Forbes tell, year after
+year, of the millions &ldquo;handed over&rdquo; to American hemp
+importers through &ldquo;the hemp joker&rdquo; of the Act of Congress
+of 1902, hereinafter explained, in the chapter on Congressional
+Legislation (<a href="#ch26">Chapter XXVI</a>.). Why did these
+complaints&mdash;made with annual regularity up to Governor
+Forbes&rsquo;s accession&mdash;cease thereafter? You will find these
+complaints of his predecessors <i>transcribed</i> in the chapter
+mentioned, because if I had re-stated them you might suspect
+exaggeration. The &ldquo;rake-off&rdquo; of the American importers of
+Manila hemp for 1910 was nearly $750,000, as fully explained in
+<a href="#ch26">Chapter XXVI</a>.</p>
+<p>Governor Forbes will be in this country when this book is issued. I
+think he owes it to the American people to explain why he does not
+continue the efforts of his predecessors to halt the depredations of
+the Hemp Trust. Why does he content himself in his last annual report
+with a mild allusion to the fact that the condition of the hemp
+industry is &ldquo;not satisfactory&rdquo;? I have said that Governor
+Forbes is a man of high character, and take pleasure in repeating that
+statement in this connection. The truth is we are running a political
+kindergarten for adults in the Philippines, and those responsible for
+the original blunder of taking them, and all their political heirs and
+assigns since, have sought to evade admitting and setting to work to
+rectify the blunder. Unmasked, this is what the policy of Benevolent
+Assimilation now is. They allege an end, and so justify all the ways
+and means. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb562" href="#pb562" name=
+"pb562">562</a>]</span>Benevolent Assimilation needs the support of the
+International Harvester Company and of all other Big Business
+interested directly or indirectly in Manila hemp. The end justifies the
+means. Hence the silence. Philippine gubernatorial reticence is always
+most reticent about that particular subject on which at the time the
+American people are most peculiarly entitled to information. As long as
+public order was the most pressing question, Philippine gubernatorial
+reticence selected that branch of our colonial problem either for
+especial silence or for superlatively casual allusion, as we have
+already seen. So now with the economic distresses. Frankness would
+obviously furnish too much good argument for winding up this Oriental
+receivership of ours. The Philippine Government will never tell its
+main current troubles until after they are over. But as the present
+trouble&mdash;the economic depredations of powerful special
+interests&mdash;must necessarily be fruitful of discontent which will
+crop out some day to remind us that as we sow so shall we reap, any one
+who helps expose the root of the trouble is doing a public service. No
+Congressman who in silence would permit Big Business to prey upon his
+constituents as Governor Forbes has, could long remain in office.
+Taxation without representation may amount to depredation, and yet
+never be corrected, when the powers that prey have the ear of the
+court, and the victims cannot get the ear of the American people. So
+the Hemp Trust continues to rob the Filipinos under the forms of law,
+and the Mohonk Conference continues to kiss Benevolent Assimilation on
+both cheeks. And Dr. Lyman Abbott periodically says Amen. I am not
+speaking disrespectfully of Dr. Abbott. I am deploring the lack of
+information of our people at home as to conditions in the Philippines.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb563" href="#pb563" name=
+"pb563">563</a>]</span></p>
+<p>It is a relief to turn from such matters to some of the real
+substantial good we have done out there to which Governor Forbes has
+heretofore publicly pointed with just pride. In an article in the
+<i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for February, 1909, Governor Forbes (then
+Vice-Governor) said, among other things:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have completed the separation of Church and State,
+buying out from the religious orders their large agricultural
+properties, which are now administered by the government for the
+benefit of the tenants.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This statement I cannot too cordially endorse. It would be grossly
+unfair not to accord full measure of acclaim to Governor Taft for the
+way he worked out the problem of the Friar Lands. He has been attacked
+in some quarters in this regard, and most unjustly. Not being a
+Catholic, and all my people being Protestants, I have no fear of being
+suspected of special pleading in the matter. The working out of the
+Friar Land problem by Governor Taft in the Philippines was a splendid
+piece of constructive statesmanship. He was at his greatest and best in
+that very transaction. The Treaty of Paris had guaranteed that all
+vested rights should be respected, including those of ecclesiastical
+bodies. The friars had long owned the lands in question. There can be
+no particle of doubt on this point. The tenants on the land had all
+long ago attorned to them, father and son, from time out of mind,
+paying rent regularly. But by claiming jurisdiction over their
+tenants&rsquo; souls also, and getting that jurisdiction effectively
+recognized, the thrifty friars used to raise the rent regularly,
+quieting incipient protest with threats of eternal punishment, or
+protracted stay in purgatory. The advent of our government let loose a
+revolt against the authority of the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb564" href="#pb564" name="pb564">564</a>]</span>friars generally,
+and, their spiritual hold once loosened, this led the tenants to
+dispute the land titles of their spiritual shepherds, who were also
+their temporal landlords. Of course the titles had all been long
+recorded, and looked after by the best legal talent the country
+afforded. As long as you control the future of your tenant&rsquo;s
+soul, you can make him pay his last copeck for rent. But as soon as
+that control is lost, the man on whom the governing of the country
+thereafter devolves has a certain prospect of a great agrarian
+revolution on his hands, having in it many elements of substantial
+righteousness. Governor Taft&rsquo;s capacious mind, prompted by his
+strongest instinct, love of justice, conceived the idea of having the
+Philippine Government raise the money to buy the Friar Lands, by
+issuing bonds, and then buying the Friars out and re-selling the land
+to the tenants on long time, on the instalment plan, the instalments to
+be so graduated as to be equal to a moderate rental. Each tenant stayed
+right where he had been all the time, in possession of the tract he had
+always tilled, he and his father before him. To arrange all this it
+took an Act of Congress authorizing the bond issue, and a visit to Rome
+to arrange the bargain with the Pope. Some say His Holiness drove a
+hard bargain with Governor Taft, or to put it another way, that
+Governor Taft paid the Church people too much for the land. He did not.
+He may not have counted pennies with them, but the lands were worth
+what he paid for them. And the purchase protected the faith and honor
+of our government, as pledged by the Treaty of Paris, and at the same
+time prevented an agrarian revolution&mdash;which would have had a lot
+of elemental justice on its side.</p>
+<p>Another of the good works we have done in the Philippines, to which
+Governor Forbes points in his <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb565"
+href="#pb565" name="pb565">565</a>]</span>magazine article above
+mentioned, is thus noted by him:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have put the finances on a sound and sensible
+basis.</p>
+</div>
+<p>To this also I say Amen. The Forbes article then goes on to say that
+the government of the Islands is self-supporting. This is true, except
+the $14,000,000 a year it costs us to keep out there a garrison of
+12,000 American troops (supplemented by certain native scouts&mdash;see
+chapter on &ldquo;Cost of the Philippines,&rdquo; hereafter). This
+garrison is conceded to be a mere handful, sufficient merely, and
+intended merely&mdash;as a witty English woman has put it in a book on
+the Philippines&mdash;&ldquo;to knock the Filipino on the head in case
+he wants his liberty before the Americans think he is fit for
+it.&rdquo; In other words, we only attempt to keep force enough there
+to quell any outbreak that might occur. So far as possible invasion by
+any foreign power is concerned, our $14,000,000 per annum is an
+absolutely dead loss. Brigadier-General Clarence Edwards, U. S. A.,
+commanding the Bureau of Insular Affairs, said recently<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e12790src" href="#xd20e12790" name=
+"xd20e12790src">3</a> before the Finance Committee of the Senate:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I would never think of the Philippines as a military
+problem for defence. If any nation wants them, it is merely a
+declaration of war.</p>
+</div>
+<p>What a shameful admission for a great nation to subscribe to,
+relatively to people it pretends to be protecting! The programme of the
+War Department is to abandon the Islands to their fate, for the time
+being at least, in our next war, letting them remain a football until
+the end of such war, when, as an independent republic they could, and
+would, rally as one man to the defence of their country against
+invasion, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb566" href="#pb566" name=
+"pb566">566</a>]</span>would, with a little help from us, make life
+unbearable for an invading force. As things stand, we are just as
+impotent as Spain was out there in 1898, and it is utter folly to
+forget what happened then.</p>
+<p>But to return to Governor Forbes&rsquo;s article and to a pleasanter
+feature of the situation. He says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have established schools throughout the
+archipelago, teaching upward of half a million children.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This also is true, and greatly to our credit. But as the American
+hemp trust mulcts the Philippine hemp output about a half million
+dollars a year (as above suggested, and later, in another chapter, more
+fully explained), it follows that each Filipino child pays the hemp
+trust a dollar a year for the privilege of going to school.</p>
+<p>And now let us consider the most supremely important part of
+Governor Forbes&rsquo;s magazine article above quoted. The burden of
+the song of the adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill
+(looking to Philippine independence in 1921)<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12815src" href="#xd20e12815" name="xd20e12815src">4</a> is that
+because there are certain &ldquo;wild tribes&rdquo; scattered
+throughout the archipelago, in the mountain fastnesses, therefore we
+should cling to the present policy of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention until the wild tribes get civilized. Governor
+Forbes&rsquo;s article is an absolute, complete, and final answer to
+the misinformed nonsense of the minority report aforesaid. He says,
+apropos of public order:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is now safe to travel everywhere throughout the
+Islands without carrying a weapon, excepting only in some of the remote
+parts of the mountains, where lurk bands of wild tribes who might
+possibly mistake the object of a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb567"
+href="#pb567" name="pb567">567</a>]</span>visit, and in the southern
+part of the great island of Mindanao which is inhabited by intractable
+Moros.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The foregoing unmasks, in all its contemptible falsehood, the
+pretence that the presence of a few wild tribes in the Philippines is a
+reason for withholding independence from 7,000,000 of Christian people
+in order that a greedy little set of American importers of Manila hemp
+may fatten thereon. True, hemp is not edible, but it is convertible
+into edibles&mdash;and also into campaign funds. That the existence of
+these wild tribes&mdash;the dog-eating Igorrotes and other savages you
+saw exhibited at the St. Louis Exposition of
+1903&ndash;4&mdash;constitute infinitely less reason for withholding
+independence from the Filipinos than the American Indian constituted in
+1776 for withholding independence from us, will be sufficiently
+apparent from a glance at the following table, taken from the
+<i>American Census of the Islands of 1903</i> (vol. ii., p.
+123):<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12829src" href="#xd20e12829" name=
+"xd20e12829src">5</a></p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td><i>Island</i></td>
+<td><i>Civilized</i></td>
+<td><i>Wild</i></td>
+<td><i>Total</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Luzon</td>
+<td>3,575,001</td>
+<td>223,506</td>
+<td>3,798,507</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Panay</td>
+<td>728,713</td>
+<td>14,933</td>
+<td>743,646</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cebu</td>
+<td>592,247</td>
+<td></td>
+<td>592,247</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Bohol</td>
+<td>243,148</td>
+<td></td>
+<td>243,148</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Negros</td>
+<td>439,559</td>
+<td>21,217</td>
+<td>460,776</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Leyte</td>
+<td>357,641</td>
+<td></td>
+<td>357,641</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Samar</td>
+<td>222,002</td>
+<td>688</td>
+<td>222,690</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Mindanao</td>
+<td>246,694</td>
+<td>252,940</td>
+<td>499,634</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>I think the above table makes clear the enormity of the injustice I
+am now trying to crucify. Without stopping to use your pencil, you can
+see that Mindanao, the island where the &ldquo;intractable Moros&rdquo;
+Governor <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb568" href="#pb568" name=
+"pb568">568</a>]</span>Forbes speaks of live, contains about a half
+million people. Half of these are civilized Christians, and the other
+half are the wild, crudely Mohammedan Moro tribes. Above Mindanao on
+the above list, you behold what practically <i>is</i> the Philippine
+archipelago (except Mindanao), viz., Luzon and the six main Visayan
+Islands. If you will turn back to pages 225 <i>et seq.</i>, especially
+to page 228, where the student of world politics was furnished with all
+he needs or will ever care to know about the geography of the
+Philippine Islands, you will there find all the rocks sticking out of
+the water and all the little daubs you see on the map eliminated from
+the equation as wholly unessential to a clear understanding of the
+problem of governing the Islands. That process of elimination left us
+Luzon and the six main Visayan Islands above, as constituting, for all
+practical governmental purposes all the Philippine archipelago except
+the Moro country, Mindanao (<i>i.e.</i>, parts of it), and its adjacent
+islets; Luzon and the Visayan Islands contain nearly 7,000,000 of
+people, and of these the wild tribes, as you can see by a glance at the
+above table, constitute less than 300,000, sprinkled in the pockets of
+their various mountain regions. Nearly all these 300,000 are quite
+tame, peaceable, and tractable, except, as Governor Forbes suggests,
+they &ldquo;might possibly mistake the object of a visit.&rdquo; The
+half million &ldquo;intractable Moros&rdquo; of Mindanao, plus those in
+the adjacent islets, make up another 300,000. These last, it is true,
+will need policing for some time to come, but whether we do that
+policing by retaining Mindanao, or whether we let the Filipinos do it,
+is a detail that has no standing in court as a reason for continuing to
+deny independence to the 7,000,000 of people of Luzon and the Visayan
+Islands because they have some 300,000 backward people in the backwoods
+of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb569" href="#pb569" name=
+"pb569">569</a>]</span>their mountains. Yet see how the ingenuity of
+inspired ignorance states the case, by adding the 300,000 tame tribes
+of Luzon and the Visayas to the 300,000 fierce Moro savages away down
+in Mindanao, near Borneo, so as to get 600,000 &ldquo;wild&rdquo;
+people, and then alluding to the fact that so far only 200,000
+Filipinos are qualified to vote. Says the report of the minority of the
+Committee on Insular Affairs on the pending Jones bill (proposing
+independence in 1921):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The wild and uncivilized inhabitants of the islands
+outnumber, 3 to 1, those who would be qualified to vote under the
+pending bill [the Jones bill].</p>
+</div>
+<p>You see the minority report is counting women and children, when it
+talks about the wild tribes, but not when it talks about voters.
+According to universally accepted general averages, among 7,500,000
+people you should find 1,500,000 adult males. No one doubts that of
+these, by 1921, 500,000 will have become qualified voters. No one can
+deny that any such country having 500,000 qualified voters, the bulk of
+whom are good farmers, and the cream of whom are high-minded educated
+gentlemen, and all of whom are intensely patriotic, will be in good
+shape for promotion to independence. What wearies me about this whole
+matter is that the minority report above mentioned is permitted to get
+off such &ldquo;rot,&rdquo; and the <i>New York Times</i>, the <i>Army
+and Navy Journal</i>, and others, to applaud it, while the
+Administration sits by, silent, and reaps the benefit of such stale,
+though not intentional, falsehoods, without attempting to correct them,
+so that our people may get at the real merits of the question. You see
+this silence inures to the benefit of the interests that have cornered
+the Manila hemp industry. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb570" href=
+"#pb570" name="pb570">570</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In the campaign of 1912 for the Republican nomination for the
+Presidency, there was much mutual recrimination between Colonel
+Roosevelt and Mr. Taft about which of them had been kindest to the
+International Harvester Company. It seems to me it is &ldquo;up
+to&rdquo; Governor Forbes, who in the Philippines has served under the
+present President and his predecessor also, to explain why he has
+abandoned the fight, so long waged by previous governors-general, to
+get what former Governor-General James F. Smith calls &ldquo;the [hemp]
+joker&rdquo; of the Act of Congress of 1902 concerning the Philippines,
+wiped from the statute books of this country. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb571" href="#pb571" name="pb571">571</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12719" href="#xd20e12719src" name="xd20e12719">1</a></span> In
+June, 1912, Governor Forbes was still Governor-General.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12735" href="#xd20e12735src" name="xd20e12735">2</a></span> By
+&ldquo;foreign&rdquo; I mean, of course, American, <i>i.e.</i>,
+non-resident.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12790" href="#xd20e12790src" name="xd20e12790">3</a></span>
+Hearings on Sugar, April 5, 1912.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12815" href="#xd20e12815src" name="xd20e12815">4</a></span>
+Introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. W. A. Jones, of Va.,
+Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House, in March,
+1912.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12829" href="#xd20e12829src" name="xd20e12829">5</a></span> See
+also, in connection with this table, the folding map of the archipelago
+at the end of the book.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch23" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">&ldquo;Non-Christian&rdquo; Worcester</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">Gibbon&rsquo;s</span> <i>Decline
+and Fall of the Roman Empire</i>.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">In the year 1911, the editor of one of the great
+metropolitan papers told me that President Taft told him that the
+Honorable Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the Interior of the
+Philippine Government, was &ldquo;the most valuable man we have on the
+Philippine Commission.&rdquo; Certainly, reproduction of such an
+indorsement from so exalted a source shows a wish to be fair, in one
+who considers Professor Worcester the direst calamity that has befallen
+the Filipinos since the American occupation, neither war, pestilence,
+famine, reconcentration, nor tariff-wrought poverty excepted. During
+all my stay in the Philippines I never did have any official relations
+of any sort with the Professor, and only met him, casually, once, in
+1901. The personal impression left from the meeting was distinctly that
+of an overbearing bully of the beggar-on-horseback type. Conscious of
+liability to error, and preferring that the reader should judge for
+himself, I give the main circumstances upon which this impression is
+based. Soon after the central insular government was set up, in 1901,
+Judge Taft and certain other members of the Philippine Commission, the
+Professor among the number, came into my judicial district to organize
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb572" href="#pb572" name=
+"pb572">572</a>]</span>provincial governments. Their coming to each
+town where they stopped was telegraphed in advance, and before they
+reached the town where I then was holding court each one of the
+American colony of the town was designated by common consent to look
+after a fraction of the Taft party during their stay. The Professor
+fell to my lot. I always was unlucky. However, their stay was only a
+few hours. While they were there, I had occasion to observe that the
+Professor spoke Spanish quite well and so remarked to him. The
+well-bred reply was: &ldquo;You&rsquo;ll find that I know a great many
+things you might not think I knew.&rdquo; Whether this was merely
+&ldquo;The insolence of office&rdquo; cropping out in a previously
+obscure young man suddenly elevated to high station, or whether it was
+an evidence of the Commissioner&rsquo;s idea of the relation of the
+Executive Department of a government to its Judiciary, is a
+question.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e12975src" href="#xd20e12975" name=
+"xd20e12975src">1</a> At all events I think the incident gives an
+insight into the man not irrelevant to what is hereinafter submitted. I
+have met a number of other Americans since who had received impressions
+similar to my own. And the Professor&rsquo;s whole subsequent course in
+the Islands corroborates those impressions. I have never talked to any
+American in the Philippines who had a good word for him. Of course,
+Power, like Property, will always have friends. So that even Professor
+Worcester may have <i>some</i> friends, among his fellow-countrymen
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb573" href="#pb573" name=
+"pb573">573</a>]</span>in those far-away Islands. But it has already
+been made clear in a former chapter how entirely possible it is for a
+man occupying high position in the government out there to be very
+generally and cordially disliked by his own countrymen there and
+actually not know it. Whether this is true of Professor Worcester, or
+not, as a general proposition it is quite possible. One thing is
+certain, namely, that he is very generally and very cordially detested
+by the Filipinos. That this detestation is perfectly natural under the
+circumstances, and entirely justifiable, and that it is a cruel
+injustice to those people, as well as a monumental piece of folly, to
+keep the Professor saddled upon them, it is now in order to show.</p>
+<p>In <a href="#ch6">Chapter VI</a> (<i>ante</i>), we made the
+acquaintance of two young naval officers. Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and
+Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, who, in the fall of 1898, while the fate of
+the Philippines hung in the balance at Paris, and peace still reigned
+in the Islands between us and the Filipinos, made a trip through the
+interior of Luzon, covering some six hundred miles, and afterwards
+furnished Admiral Dewey with a written report of their trip, which was
+later published as a Senate document. Professor Worcester&rsquo;s
+greatest value to President Taft, and also the thing out of which has
+grown, most unfortunately, what seems to be a very cordial mutual
+hatred between him and the Filipinos, is his activities in the matter
+of discovering, getting acquainted with, classifying, tabulating,
+enumerating, and otherwise preparing for salvation, the various
+non-Christian tribes. These tribes have already been briefly dealt with
+in <a href="#ch21">Chapter XXI</a>. (<i>ante</i>), apropos of that part
+of the Great Peace Certificate of 1907 which related to the
+&ldquo;Moros and other non-Christian tribes&rdquo;&mdash;uncivilized
+tribes which, being as distinct from the <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb574" href="#pb574" name="pb574">574</a>]</span>great mass of the
+Filipino people as islets from the sea, had had no more to do with the
+insurrection against us, than the Pawnees, Apaches, and Sioux Indians
+had to do with our Civil War of 1861&ndash;5. They were also dealt
+with, somewhat, in the chapter preceding this. Long before Professor
+Worcester was permanently inflicted upon the Filipino people, one of
+the young naval officers above mentioned, Mr. Sargent, published an
+article in the <i>Outlook</i> for September 2, 1899,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e13003src" href="#xd20e13003" name="xd20e13003src">2</a> based
+on this trip through the interior of Luzon, made by authority of
+Admiral Dewey the year before. In the course of his article Mr. Sargent
+says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Some years ago, at an exposition held at Barcelona,
+Spain, a man and woman were exhibited as representative types of the
+inhabitants of Luzon. The man wore a loin cloth, and the woman a scanty
+skirt. It was evident that they belonged to the lowest plane of
+savagery.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He adds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the
+pride of the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition,
+the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the island.</i>
+The man and woman, while actually natives of Luzon, were captives of a
+wild tribe of Igorrotes of the hills.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Professor Worcester was originally a professor of zo&ouml;logy, or
+something of that sort, in a western university. In the early nineties
+he had made a trip to the Philippines, confining himself then mostly to
+creeping things and quadrupeds&mdash;lizards, alligators, pythons,
+unusual wild beasts, and other forms of animal life of the kind much
+coveted as specimens by museums and <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb575" href="#pb575" name="pb575">575</a>]</span>universities. In
+1899, just after the Spanish War, he got out a book on the Philippines,
+and as an American who had been in the Philippines was then a <i lang=
+"la">rara avis</i>, it came to pass that the reptile-finder ultimately
+became a statesman. He was brought, possibly by conscious worth, to the
+notice of President McKinley, accompanied the Schurman Commission to
+the Islands, in 1899, and the Taft Commission in 1900, and finally
+evolved into his present eminence as Secretary of the Interior and
+official chief finder of non-Christian tribes for the Philippine
+Government.</p>
+<p>The best known of the wild tribes in the Philippines are the
+Igorrotes, the dog-eating savages you saw at the St. Louis Exposition
+in 1903&ndash;4, the same Mr. Sargent speaks of in his article in the
+<i>Outlook</i>. Of course it was not a desire to misrepresent the
+situation, but only the enthusiasm of a zo&ouml;logist,
+anthropologically inclined, and accustomed to carry a kodak, which
+started the Professor to photographing the dog-eating Igorrotes and
+specimens of other non-Christian tribes soon after the Taft Commission
+reached the Philippines. But you cannot get far in the earlier reports
+of the Taft Commission, which was supposed to have been sent out to
+report back on the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government,
+without crossing the trail of the Professor&rsquo;s
+kodak&mdash;pictures of naked Igorrotes and the like. This, however
+innocent, must have been of distinct political value in 1900 and 1904
+in causing the heart of the missionary vote in the United States to
+bleed for those &ldquo;sixty different tribes having sixty different
+languages&rdquo; of which Secretary Root&rsquo;s campaign speeches made
+so much. It must also have greatly awakened the philanthropic interest
+of exporters of cotton goods to learn of those poor &ldquo;savage
+millions&rdquo; wearing only a loin cloth, when they could be wearing
+yards of cotton <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb576" href="#pb576"
+name="pb576">576</a>]</span>cloth. By the time the St. Louis Exposition
+came off, in 1903&ndash;4, it was decided to have the various tribes
+represented there. So specimens were sent of the Igorrote tribe, the
+Tagalos, the Visayans, the Negrito tribe, and various other tribes. The
+Tagalos, the Visayans, etc., being ordinary Filipinos, did not prove
+money-makers. But it was great sport to watch the Igorrotes preparing
+their morning dog. So it was the &ldquo;non-Christian tribes&rdquo;
+that paid. It was they that were most advertised. It was the
+recollection of them that lingered longest with the visitor to the
+Exposition, and there was always in his mind thereafter an association
+of ideas between the Igorrotes and Filipino capacity for
+self-government generally. Many representative Filipinos visited the
+St. Louis Exposition, saw all this, and came home and told about it.
+One very excellent Filipino gentleman, a friend of mine, who was
+Governor of Samar during my administration of the district which
+included that island, sent me one day in October, 1904, a satirical
+note, enclosing a pamphlet he had just received called <i>Catalogue of
+Philippine Views at the St. Louis Exposition</i>. He knew I would
+understand, so he said in the note, that the pamphlet was sent
+&ldquo;in order that you may learn something of certain tribes <i>still
+extant</i> in this country.&rdquo; Concerning all this, I can say of my
+own knowledge exactly what Naval Cadet Sargent said concerning the
+lesser like indignity of the <i>one</i> Igorrote couple exhibited at
+Barcelona <i>while the Filipinos were asking representation in the
+Spanish Cortes, viz.</i>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the
+pride of the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition,
+the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the islands.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb577" href="#pb577" name=
+"pb577">577</a>]</span></p>
+<p>You see our Census of 1903 gave the population of the Philippines at
+about 7,600,000 of which 7,000,000 are put down as civilized
+Christians; and of the remaining 600,000, about half are the savage, or
+semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros, in Mindanao, and the adjacent
+islets down near Borneo. The other 300,000 or so uncivilized people
+scattered throughout the rest of the archipelago, the
+&ldquo;non-Christian tribes,&rdquo; which dwell in the mountain
+fastnesses, remote from &ldquo;the madding crowd,&rdquo; cut little
+more figure, if any, in the general political equation, than the
+American Indian does with us to-day. Take for instance the province of
+Nueva Vizcaya, in the heart of north central Luzon. That was one of the
+provinces of the First Judicial District I presided over in the
+Islands. I think Nueva Vizcaya is Professor Worcester&rsquo;s
+&ldquo;brag&rdquo; province, in the matter of non-Christian
+anthropological specimens, both regarding their number and their
+variety. Yet while I was there, though we knew those people were up in
+the hills, and that there were a good many of them, the civilized
+people all told us that the hill-tribes never bothered them. And on
+their advice I have ridden in safety, unarmed, at night, accompanied
+only by the court stenographer, over the main high-road running through
+the central plateau that constitutes the bulk of Nueva Vizcaya
+province, said plateau being surrounded by a great amphitheatre of
+hills, the habitat of the Worcester pets.</p>
+<p>The non-Christian tribes in the Philippines have been more widely
+advertised in America than anything else connected with the Islands.
+That advertisement has done more harm to the cause of Philippine
+independence by depreciating American conceptions concerning Filipino
+capacity for self-government, than anything that could be devised even
+by the cruel ingenuity of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb578" href=
+"#pb578" name="pb578">578</a>]</span>studied mendacity. And Professor
+Worcester is the P. T. Barnum of the &ldquo;non-Christian tribe&rdquo;
+industry. The Filipinos, though unacquainted with the career of the
+famous menagerie proprietor <i>last</i> named, and his famous remark:
+&ldquo;The American people love to be humbugged,&rdquo; understand the
+malign and far-reaching influence upon their future destiny of the work
+of Professor Worcester, and his services to the present Philippine
+policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, through
+humbugging the American people into the belief that the Islands must be
+retained until the three hundred thousand or so Negritos, Igorrotes,
+and other primitive wild peoples sprinkled throughout the archipelago
+are &ldquo;reconstructed.&rdquo; Is it any wonder that the Filipinos do
+not love the Professor? To keep him saddled upon them as one of their
+rulers is as tactful as it would be to send Senator Tillman on a
+diplomatic mission to Liberia or Haiti.</p>
+<p>Not long ago the famous magazine publisher Mr. S. S. McClure, who, I
+think, is trying to make his life one of large and genuine usefulness
+for good, said to me that if we gave the Filipinos self-government we
+would shortly have another Haiti or Santo Domingo on our hands. He must
+have seen some of Professor Worcester&rsquo;s pictures of Igorrotes and
+Negritos scattered through public documents related to the question of
+Filipino capacity for self-government. Mr. McClure has never, I
+believe, been in the Islands; and the cruelly unjust impression he had
+innocently received was precisely the impression systematically
+developed all these years through the Worcester kodak.</p>
+<p>In February, 1911, there appeared an article in the <i>Sunset</i>
+magazine for that month entitled &ldquo;The Philippines as I Saw
+them.&rdquo; The contributor of the article is no less a personage than
+the Honorable James F. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb579" href=
+"#pb579" name="pb579">579</a>]</span>Smith, former Governor-General of
+the Islands. At the top of the article one reads the legend
+&ldquo;Illustrated by Photographs through the Courtesy of the Bureau of
+Insular Affairs.&rdquo; If you read this legend understandingly, you
+can, in so doing, hear the click of the Worcester kodak. General
+Smith&rsquo;s article is smeared all over with such pictures. One is
+merrily entitled &ldquo;Eighteen Igorrot Fledglings Hatched by the
+American Bird of Freedom.&rdquo; Another is entitled &ldquo;Subano Man
+and woman, Mindanao.&rdquo; Another is a picture of an Ifugao home in
+the province of Nueva Vizcaya, hereinabove mentioned. Ifugao is the
+name of one of the wild tribes, one of the results of Professor
+Worcester&rsquo;s anthropological excavations of the last few years. In
+front of the Ifugao home stands the master of the house, clothed in a
+breech-clout. Next in the menagerie in the article under consideration
+you find a group of Ifugao children, then a Bagobo of Mindanao, then
+some other specimen with a curious name, in which there is a woman
+naked from the waist up and a man in a loin-cloth. Then follows a
+picture of a Tingyan girl from Abra province. And, to cap the climax,
+among the last of these pictures you find a Filipino couple pounding
+rice. The rice pounders are ordinary Filipinos. The woman is decently
+dressed; the man is clothed only from the waist down, having divested
+himself of his upper garment, as is customary in order to work at hard
+labor more comfortably in hot weather. I do not so much blame General
+Smith for this libellous panorama of pictures, scattered though they
+are through an article by him on &ldquo;The Philippines as I Saw
+them.&rdquo; He probably illustrated his article with what the Bureau
+of Insular Affairs sent him, without giving much thought to the matter.
+But the Bureau of Insular Affairs appears to neglect no occasion
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb580" href="#pb580" name=
+"pb580">580</a>]</span>to parade the Philippine archipelago&rsquo;s
+sprinkling of non-Christian tribes before the American public, fully
+knowing that the hopes of the Filipinos for independence must depend
+upon impressions received by the American people concerning the degree
+of civilization they have reached.</p>
+<p>For all these wanton indignities offered their pride and
+self-respect, the Filipinos well know they are primarily indebted to
+Professor Worcester and his non-Christian tribe bureau. The feud
+between the Professor and the Filipino people&mdash;the bad blood has
+been growing so long that the incident hereinafter related justifies
+its being called a feud&mdash;has been peculiarly embittered by the
+missionary aspect of the non-Christian industry. The great body of the
+Filipino people, the whole six or seven millions of them, are
+Catholics&mdash;most of them devout Catholics. Presumably, their desire
+for salvation by the method handed down by their forefathers would not
+be affected by a change from American political supervision to
+independence. Yet the darkest thing ahead of Philippine independence
+prospects is the Protestant missionary vote in the United States.
+Bishop Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippines, one of the noblest
+and most saintly characters that ever lived, has devoted his life
+apparently to missionary work in the Philippines, having twice declined
+a nomination as Bishop of Washington (D.C.). The only field of endeavor
+open to Bishop Brent and his devoted little band of co-workers is the
+non-Christian tribes. It seems that the Catholic and Protestant
+ecclesiastical authorities in the Islands get along harmoniously, a
+kind of <i lang="la">modus vivendi</i> having been arranged between
+them, by which the Protestants are not to do any proselyting among the
+seven millions of Catholic Christians. So this field of endeavor is
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb581" href="#pb581" name=
+"pb581">581</a>]</span>the one Professor Worcester has been
+industriously preparing during the last twelve years. Obviously, every
+time Professor Worcester digs up a new non-Christian tribe he increases
+the prospective harvest of the Protestants, thus corralling more
+missionary vote at home for permanent retention of the Philippines.
+Professor Worcester is quoted in a Manila paper as saying, &ldquo;I am
+under no delusion as to what may be accomplished for the primitive wild
+people. It takes time to reconstruct them.&rdquo; This remark is
+supposed to have been made in a speech before the Young Men&rsquo;s
+Christian Association of Manila. Neither is Mr. Taft under any delusion
+as to how valuable is religious support for the idea of retaining the
+Philippines as a missionary field. The nature of the above allusion to
+Bishop Brent should certainly be sufficient to show that the writer
+yields to no one in affectionate reverence and respect for that rare
+and noble character. But neither Bishop Brent nor any one else can
+persuade him that it is wise to abandon the principle that Church and
+State should be separate, in order that our government may go into the
+missionary business. Since it has become apparent that the Philippines
+will not pay, the Administration has relied solely on missionary
+sentiment. In one of his public utterances Mr. Taft has said in effect,
+&ldquo;The programme of the Republican party with regard to the
+Philippines is one which will make greatly for the spread of Christian
+civilization throughout the Orient.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The foregoing reflections are not intended to raise an issue as to
+the wisdom of foreign missions. They are simply intended to illustrate
+how it is possible and natural for President Taft to consider Professor
+Worcester &ldquo;the most valuable man we have on the Philippine
+Commission.&rdquo; The Professor&rsquo;s menagerie is a <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb582" href="#pb582" name=
+"pb582">582</a>]</span>vote-getter. Also, President Taft&rsquo;s whole
+Philippine policy being founded upon the theory that &ldquo;the great
+majority&rdquo; of the Filipino people are in favor of alien thraldom
+in lieu of independence, he tolerantly permits their editors to
+&ldquo;let off steam&rdquo; through clamor for independence. This
+privilege they do not fail to exercise to the limit. The attitude of
+the Insular Government permits the native press much latitude of
+&ldquo;sauciness,&rdquo; in deference to the American idea about
+liberty of the press. In the exercise of this privilege during the last
+few years the native press has gone the limit. However, there was no
+way to stop them, on the principle to which we had committed ourselves.
+The thing was very mischievous, and became utterly intolerable. There
+was a native paper called <i lang="es">Renacimiento</i> (Renaissance).
+This paper was long permitted to say things more or less seditious in
+character which no self-respecting government should have tolerated.
+This was done pursuant to the original theory, obstinately adhered to
+up to date, that there was no real substantial unwillingness to
+American rule. Of course, if this were true, newspaper noise could do
+no harm. Therefore it was permitted to continue. Finally, however, like
+a boy &ldquo;taking a dare,&rdquo; the <i lang="es">Renacimiento</i>
+published an article on Professor Worcester which intimately and
+sympathetically voiced the general yearning of the Filipino people to
+be rid of the Professor. In so doing, however, the hapless editor
+overstepped the limits of American license, and got into the toils of
+the law, by saying things about the Professor that rendered the editor
+liable to prosecution for criminal libel. The Professor promptly took
+advantage of this misstep, to the great joy of the authorities, who had
+been previously much goaded by independence clamor. The result was that
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb583" href="#pb583" name=
+"pb583">583</a>]</span>the paper was put out of business and the editor
+was put in jail. No doubt the editor ought to have been put in jail,
+but his incarceration incidentally served to tone down Filipino clamor
+for independence. Subsequent to this <i lang="fr">coup
+d&rsquo;&eacute;tat</i>, the Professor did a little venting of feelings
+in his turn. He made a speech at the Y. M. C. A. on October 10, 1910,
+which was a highly unchristian speech to be gotten off in an edifice
+dedicated to the service of Christ. The Manila papers give only
+extracts from the speech, and I have never seen a copy of it. From the
+newspaper accounts, it seems that the Professor was determined to, and
+did, relieve his feelings about the Filipinos. The Manila
+<i>Cable-News</i> of October 11, 1910, quotes the Professor as
+referring to his pets, the non-Christian tribes, as &ldquo;ancestral
+enemies of the Christians.&rdquo; Thus for the first time is developed
+an attitude of being champion of the uncivilized pagan remnant, left
+from prehistoric times, against the Christians of the Islands. The
+<i>Cable-News</i> also says that Professor Worcester &ldquo;laughed at
+the idea that the Islands belonged to the <i>so-called civilized</i>
+people and held that if the archipelago belonged to any one it
+certainly belonged to its original owners the Negritos.&rdquo; This
+remark about the &ldquo;<i>so-called <span class="corr" id="xd20e13108"
+title="Source: civilised">civilized</span> people</i>&rdquo; was as
+tactful as if President Taft should address a meeting of colored people
+in a doubtful state and call them &ldquo;niggers.&rdquo; Another of the
+Manila papers gives an account of the speech from which it appears that
+the burly Professor succeeded in amusing himself at least, if not his
+audience, by suggestions as to the superior fighting qualities of the
+Moros over the Filipinos, which suggestions were on the idea that the
+Moros would lick the Filipinos if we should leave the country. (The
+Moros number 300,000, the Filipinos nearly 7,000,000.) The
+Professor&rsquo;s remarks <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb584" href=
+"#pb584" name="pb584">584</a>]</span>in this regard, according to the
+paper, were a distinct reflection upon the courage of the Filipinos
+generally as a people. The effect of Professor Worcester&rsquo;s speech
+before the Y. M. C. A. may be well imagined. However the facts of
+history do not leave the imagination unaided. The Philippine Assembly,
+representing the whole Filipino people, and desiring to express the
+unanimous feeling of those people with regard to the Worcester speech,
+unanimously passed, soon after the speech was delivered, a set of
+resolutions whereof the following is a translation:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Resolved that the regret of the Assembly be recorded
+for the language attributed to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester,
+Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Government in a discourse
+before the Young Men&rsquo;s Christian Association, October 10, 1910.
+It is improper and censurable in a man who holds a public office and
+who has the confidence of the government. And as the statements made as
+facts are false, slanderous, and offensive to the Philippine people,
+their publication is a grave violation of the instructions given by
+President McKinley which required that public functionaries should
+respect the sensibilities, beliefs, and sentiments of the Philippine
+people, and should show them consideration. The words and the conduct
+of Mr. Worcester tend to sow distrust between the Americans and the
+Filipinos, whose aspirations and duties should not separate them but
+unite them in the pathway which leads to the progress and emancipation
+of the Philippine people. The influence of Mr. Worcester has caused
+injury to the feelings of the Filipinos, <i>encouraged race hatred, and
+tended to frustrate the task undertaken by men of real good will</i> to
+win the esteem, confidence, and respect of the Philippine people for
+the Americans.</p>
+<p>Resolved further that this House desires that these facts
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb585" href="#pb585" name=
+"pb585">585</a>]</span>should be communicated to the President of the
+United States through the Governor of the Philippines and the Secretary
+of War.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Presumably these resolutions were forwarded &ldquo;to the President
+of the United States through the Governor of the Philippines and the
+Secretary of War.&rdquo; But apparently they were pigeonholed when they
+reached Washington. I stumbled on them in the Insular Affairs Committee
+of the House of Representatives whither they had landed through Mr.
+Slayden of Texas. The distinguished veteran Congressman from Texas,
+being known as an enemy of all wrong things, was appealed to by certain
+persons in the United States to bring the matter to the attention of
+Congress. He did so by presenting to the House of Representatives an
+American petition which embodied a copy of the resolutions of the
+Philippine Assembly.</p>
+<p>It thus becomes apparent that one of Professor Worcester&rsquo;s
+principal elements of value is in bullying the Filipinos, and thereby
+smothering manifestations of a desire for independence, the existence
+of which desire is denied by President Taft&rsquo;s Administration. The
+more the Filipinos cry for independence the greater seems the sin of
+holding them in subjection. So that Professor Worcester is very
+valuable in silencing independence clamor and thereby creating an
+appearance of consent of the governed, when there is no consent of the
+governed whatsoever.</p>
+<p>In describing the discontent in distant provinces under brutal
+pro-consuls, which contributed largely to the final disintegration of
+the Roman Empire, Gibbon says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb586" href="#pb586" name=
+"pb586">586</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The total failure of the above temperate, dignified, and vibrant
+protest of the Philippine Assembly to reach the ears of the American
+people is but another reminder that history repeats itself.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb587" href="#pb587" name=
+"pb587">587</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e12975" href="#xd20e12975src" name="xd20e12975">1</a></span> The
+greatest defect of the Philippine Government was in the beginning, and
+still is, that the Philippine Commission, which is the executive
+authority, controls the appointment and assignment of the trial judges,
+and also, largely, their chances for promotion to the Supreme Bench of
+the Islands. The Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the
+President of the United States, often on recommendation of the
+Commission, but thereafter they are absolutely independent. The trial
+judges ought also to be appointed by the President of the United
+States.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13003" href="#xd20e13003src" name="xd20e13003">2</a></span>
+Republished, <i>Congressional Record</i>, January 9, 1900, p. 715.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch24" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIV</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Philippine Civil Service</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">Is our Occupation of the Philippines to be temporary,
+like our occupation of Cuba after the Spanish War, or
+&ldquo;temporary&rdquo; like the British Occupation of Egypt since
+1882? <i>The Unsettled Question.</i></p>
+<p>The policy to be pursued is for Congress to determine. I have no
+authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate disposition
+of the Islands.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236">Secretary of War <span class="sc">Wm. H.
+Taft</span> to Philippine Assembly, 1907.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
+Philippine Government Act, is entitled &ldquo;An Act <i>temporarily</i>
+to provide&rdquo; a government for the Philippine Islands. The young
+American who goes out to the Philippines to take a position with the
+Insular Government there has usually read his share of Kipling, and his
+imagination likes to analogize his prospective employment to the
+British Indian Civil Service. The latter, however, offers a career. But
+what does the former offer? Take the prospects of the rank and file, as
+set forth by Mr. J. R. Arnold, of the Executive Bureau of the
+Philippine Government, in an article published in the <i>North American
+Review</i> for February, 1912. Suppose a young man goes out to the
+Philippines at a salary of $1200. Mr. Arnold discusses fully and
+frankly the cost of living in the Islands, and how much higher board,
+lodging, etc., are out there than in the United States. He states
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb588" href="#pb588" name=
+"pb588">588</a>]</span>that board and lodging will cost $15 to $20 a
+month more than here. So that, so far, a salary of $1200 in the
+Philippines would seem equivalent to a salary of say approximately $950
+in the United States&mdash;say in Washington. Also he calls attention
+to the fact that the government will pay your way <i>out</i>, but you
+must get back the best way you can. He does not say so, but the walking
+is not good all the way from Manila to Washington. Seriously, according
+to the authority from whom we are quoting, it costs $225 to $300 to get
+back. So if you come back at the end of a three years&rsquo;
+stay&mdash;you must contract to stay at least that long&mdash;you must
+have laid by, taking his maximum return fare as the more prudent figure
+to reckon on, one hundred dollars a year to buy your return ticket. Mr.
+Arnold does not say so, but it is a fact, that various little expenses
+<i>will</i> creep in that are sure to amount, even with the most
+rigidly frugal, to $50 per annum that you would never have spent in the
+United States. You are hardly respectable in the Philippines if you do
+not have a <i>muchacho</i>. <i>Muchacho</i>, in Spanish, means the same
+as <i>gar&ccedil;on</i> in French, or valet in English. But
+<i>muchachos</i> are as thick as cigarettes in the Philippines. And you
+can hire one for about $5 a month. To resolve not to have a
+<i>muchacho</i> in the Philippines would be like resolving at home
+never to have your shoes shined, or your clothes pressed. It would be
+contrary to the universal custom of the country, and would therefore be
+&ldquo;impossible.&rdquo; You have not been long in the Philippines
+before you get tired of telling applicants for the position of
+<i>muchacho</i> that you do not want one, and, benumbed by the
+universal custom, you accept the last applicant. You <i>must</i> figure
+on a <i>muchacho</i> as one of your &ldquo;fixed charges.&rdquo; Count
+then an extra $50 annual necessary expense that you <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb589" href="#pb589" name=
+"pb589">589</a>]</span>would not have at home. If you do not succumb to
+the <i>muchacho</i> custom, you will get rid of the $50 in other ways
+fairly classifiable as necessary current expenses. Thus, if you take
+from your $1200, worth $950 in Manila, as above stated, the $100 per
+annum necessary to be laid by against your home-coming, and the other
+$50 last suggested, your salary of $1200 per annum in Manila becomes
+equivalent to one of $800 at home, so far as regards what you are
+likely to save by strict habits of economy. In other words, to figure
+how you are going to come out in the long run, if you go out as a $1200
+man, while your social position will be precisely that of a man
+commanding the same salary in a government position in Washington, you
+must knock off a third of the $1200. This is not the way Mr. Arnold
+states the case exactly. I am simply taking his facts, supplemented by
+what little I have added, and stating them in a way which will perhaps
+illustrate the case better to some people. Mr. Arnold says you are apt
+to get up as high as $1500 and finally even to $1800 in three to five
+years. Suppose you do have that luck. Still, if, as has been made plain
+above, you must consider $1200 in Manila as equal to only $800 in
+Washington (so far as regards what you are going to be able to save
+each year), by the same token you must consider $1500 in Manila as
+being equal to only $1000 in Washington, and $1800 as only $1200.</p>
+<p>The utmost limit of achievement in the Philippine Government
+service, the only one of the higher positions not subject to political
+caprice, the only one regarded out there as a &ldquo;life
+position&rdquo;&mdash;and this excepts neither the Governorship of the
+Islands nor the Commissionerships&mdash;is the position of Justice of
+the Supreme Court. The salary is $10,000 per annum, American money. But
+there is not an American judge on that bench who <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb590" href="#pb590" name=
+"pb590">590</a>]</span>would not be glad at any moment to accept a
+$5000 position as a United States District Judge at home. All of them
+whom I know are most happily married. But I believe their wives would
+quit them if they refused such an offer from the President of the
+United States, or else get so unhappy about it that they would accept
+and come home.</p>
+<p>While we have now considered the case from bottom to top, we did not
+originally figure on the young American going out to the Philippines
+otherwise than single. In this behalf Mr. Arnold himself says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I do not think it can be fairly called other than
+risky for an American to attempt to practise love in a cottage in the
+Philippines.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Says the late Arthur W. Fergusson&mdash;who gave his life to the
+Philippine Civil Service&mdash;in his annual report for 1905, as
+Executive Secretary:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>The one great stumbling-block, and which no
+legislative body can eradicate, is the fact that very few Americans
+intend to make the Philippines their permanent home, or even stay here
+for any extended period.</i> This is doubtless due to the location of
+the islands, their isolation from centres of civilization and culture,
+the enervating climate, lack of entertainment and desirable
+companionship, and distance from the homeland. <i>Every clerk</i>, no
+matter what his ideals or aspirations, <i>realizes after coming here
+that he must at some time in the future return to the United States and
+begin all over again</i>. After spending a year or more in the islands,
+the realization that the sooner the change is made the better, becomes
+more acute. This condition causes, doubtless, the class of men who are
+not adventurous or fond of visiting strange climes to think twice
+before accepting an appointment for service in these islands, and
+generally to remain away, and a <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb591"
+href="#pb591" name="pb591">591</a>]</span>great majority of those who
+do come here to leave the service again after a very short period of
+duty.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13229src" href="#xd20e13229" name=
+"xd20e13229src">1</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Then Mr. Fergusson comes to the obvious but apparently unattainable
+remedy, which he says is</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">to make a Philippine appointment a permanent means of
+livelihood by providing an effective system of transfers to the Federal
+service after a reasonable period of service here. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+Under the present regulations <i>influence must be brought to bear at
+Washington</i> in order that requisition may be made by the Chief of
+some bureau there for the services of a clerk desiring to transfer.</p>
+</div>
+<p>You see, if a Washington Bureau, say the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
+or the Geological Survey, sends a man out to the Islands, he is never
+for a moment separated from the Federal Civil Service or the Federal
+Government&rsquo;s pay-roll. The same is true of civilian employees of
+the army. But the man in the Insular Service, when he wants to get back
+home, is little better off than if he were in the employ of the Cuban
+Government, or the British Indian Government, or that of the Dutch East
+Indies. Mr. Fergusson also says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is believed to be useless to try to influence men
+to come out here unless there is something <i>permanent</i> offered to
+them at the expiration of a reasonable term of service. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;*
+<i>The average European is content to live and die &ldquo;east of
+Suez&rdquo;; the average American is not.</i> *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* I am
+firmly convinced that a <i>permanent</i> service under present
+conditions is entirely out of the question.</p>
+</div>
+<p>How can you have &ldquo;a <i>permanent</i> service&rdquo; unless you
+have a definite declared policy? Why not declare <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb592" href="#pb592" name="pb592">592</a>]</span>the
+purpose of our Government with the regard to the Islands?</p>
+<p>In his annual report for 1906<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13270src"
+href="#xd20e13270" name="xd20e13270src">2</a> Mr. Fergusson says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Our relations to the islands are such that the
+education and specialization of a distinct body of high class men
+purposely for this service as is done in England for the Indian
+service, will probably be always a practical impossibility.</p>
+</div>
+<p>He then goes on to reiterate his annual plea for a law providing for
+transfer as <i>a matter of right, not of influence</i>, from the
+Philippine Civil Service to the Federal Civil Service in the United
+States, and tells of a very capable official of his bureau who got a
+chance during the year just closed to transfer from the Philippines to
+a $1400 government position in the United States, and was glad to get
+it, although $1400 was &ldquo;considerably less than half what he
+received here.&rdquo; Mr. Fergusson quickly gives the key to all this
+in what he calls &ldquo;the haunting fear of having to return to the
+States <i>in debilitated health and out of touch with existent
+conditions, only to face the necessity of seeking a new
+position</i>.&rdquo; He adds:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">That this is not a mere theory is proven by the number
+of army (civilian) employees who contentedly remain year after
+year.</p>
+</div>
+<p>In 1907, Mr. Fergusson reports on the same subject<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e13294src" href="#xd20e13294" name="xd20e13294src">3</a>:
+&ldquo;Matters do not seem to be improving,&rdquo; and that the
+Director of the Insular Civil Service informs him that &ldquo;during
+the fiscal year there were <i>five hundred voluntary separations from
+the service by Americans</i>, of whom one hundred were college
+graduates.&rdquo; He adds: &ldquo;When <i>the expense of getting and
+bringing out new men, and <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb593" href=
+"#pb593" name="pb593">593</a>]</span>of training them to their new work
+is considered</i>, the <i>wastefulness of the present system is
+evident</i>.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>You do not find any quotations from any of the Fergusson disclosures
+in Mr. Arnold&rsquo;s <i>North American Review</i> article. He would
+probably have lost his job, if he had quoted them. Yet the evils
+pointed out by Mr. Fergusson come from one permanent source, the
+uncertainty of the future of every American out there, due to the
+failure of Congress to declare the purpose of the Government.</p>
+<p>On January 30, 1908, Arthur W. Fergusson died in the service of the
+Philippine Government. No general law putting that service on the basis
+he pleaded for to the day of his death has ever yet been passed. Since
+his death, his tactful successor appears to have abandoned further
+pleading, and concluded to worry along with the permanently lame
+conditions inherent in the uncertainty as to whether we are to keep the
+Islands permanently or not, rather than embarrass President Taft by
+discouraging young Americans from going to the Islands.</p>
+<p>The report of the Governor-General of the Philippines for 1907,
+Governor Smith, says<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13319src" href=
+"#xd20e13319" name="xd20e13319src">4</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>American officials and employees have rarely made
+up their minds to cast their fortunes definitely with the Philippines
+or to make governmental service in the tropics a career.</i> Many of
+those who in the beginning were so minded, due to ill health or the
+longing to return to friends or relatives, changed front and preferred
+to return to the home land, there to enjoy life at half the salary in
+the environment to which they were accustomed. *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* That
+which operates probably more than anything else to induce good men
+drawing good salaries to abandon the service *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* is the
+knowledge that they have nothing to look forward to <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb594" href="#pb594" name="pb594">594</a>]</span>when
+broken health or old age shall have rendered them valueless to the
+government.</p>
+</div>
+<p>If Congress should ever care to do anything to improve the
+Philippine Civil Service and the status of Americans entering the same,
+certainly the one supremely obvious thing to do is to make transfer
+back to the civil service in the United States after a term of duty in
+the Islands <i>a matter of right</i>. <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb595" href="#pb595" name="pb595">595</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13229" href="#xd20e13229src" name="xd20e13229">1</a></span> See
+<i>Report U. S. Philippine Commission</i>, 1905, pt. 1, p. 89 <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13270" href="#xd20e13270src" name="xd20e13270">2</a></span>
+<i>Report Philippine Commission</i>, 1906, pt. 1, p. 99.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13294" href="#xd20e13294src" name="xd20e13294">3</a></span> <i>U.
+S. Philippine Commission Report</i>, 1907, pt. 1, p. 149.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13319" href="#xd20e13319src" name="xd20e13319">4</a></span> See
+<i>Report Philippine Commission for 1907</i>, pt. 1, p. 80.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch25" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXV</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Cost of the Philippines</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">If &rsquo;t were well to do right, &rsquo;t were
+better still if &rsquo;t were more profitable.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><i>Cynic Maxims.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">General Otis&rsquo;s annual report for 1899,<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e13352src" href="#xd20e13352" name=
+"xd20e13352src">1</a> dated August 31st, gives the number of Americans
+killed in battle in the Philippines, from the beginning of the American
+occupation to that date, as 380. This includes those wounded who
+afterwards died of such wounds. His report for 1900,<a class="noteref"
+id="xd20e13357src" href="#xd20e13357" name="xd20e13357src">2</a>
+covering the period from his 1899 report to May 5, 1900, gives the
+number of Americans killed in battle from August 31, 1899, to May 1,
+1900, as 258. General MacArthur succeeded General Otis in command of
+the American forces in the Philippines on May 5, 1900. General
+MacArthur&rsquo;s annual report for 1901,<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13362src" href="#xd20e13362" name="xd20e13362src">3</a> gives the
+number of Americans killed in battle between May 5, 1900, and June 30,
+1901, as 245. Thus the total number of Americans killed in battle up to
+the time the Civil Government was set up in 1901, was 883. The military
+reports do not always give the insurgents killed during the periods
+they cover. But on June 4, 1900, as we saw in a previous chapter,
+General MacArthur reported the number of Filipinos killed up to that
+time, so far as our records showed, to be something over 10,000.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb596" href="#pb596" name=
+"pb596">596</a>]</span>General MacArthur&rsquo;s report, above quoted,
+giving our killed for the period it covers (May 5, 1900, to June 30,
+1901), at 245, gives the insurgent killed for the same period as 3854.
+If we add this 3854 to the 10,000 killed up to about where May merged
+into June in 1900, we have 13,854 Filipinos killed up to the time Judge
+Taft was inaugurated as Governor, in 1901. There was no record, of
+course, obtainable or attempted, by the Eighth Army Corps, of Filipinos
+who were wounded and not captured and who subsequently died. It is
+quite safe to assume that such fatalities must have swelled the
+enemy&rsquo;s list up to the time of the setting up of the Civil
+Government far above 16,000 killed. Thus, as has heretofore been
+stated, the ratio of the enemy&rsquo;s loss to our loss was, literally,
+at least 16 to 1, up to the time the civil government was set up.
+General MacArthur&rsquo;s report for 1900<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13370src" href="#xd20e13370" name="xd20e13370src">4</a> would
+seem to bear out the above ratio. He there gives the number of our
+killed, from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900, including the
+wounded who afterwards died of such wounds, at 268, and the
+<span class="corr" id="xd20e13376" title=
+"Source: Filipino">Filipinos</span> killed, &ldquo;as far as of
+record,&rdquo; 3227. While these last figures make our killed for the
+period they relate to, considerably over 200, and the enemy&rsquo;s
+killed but a very small figure over 3200, still, making allowances for
+the enemy&rsquo;s wounded that died afterwards, of which of course we
+have no record, the 16 to 1 ratio would seem to give a fairly accurate
+probable estimate of the relative loss of life.</p>
+<p>These figures are explained by the facts, already noticed
+hereinbefore, that most of our people knew how to shoot and the
+Filipinos did not. The great part of their army were raw recruits who
+did not understand the use of two sights on a rifle, and frequently
+relied solely on the one at the muzzle, not even lifting up the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb597" href="#pb597" name=
+"pb597">597</a>]</span>sight near the lock which when not in use lies
+flat along the gun-barrel, with the result that they almost invariably
+got the range too high and shot over our heads.</p>
+<p>Because the military reports overlap each other in many instances,
+it is not possible to state accurately how many men the Eighth Army
+Corps lost by disease, but our loss chargeable to this account was not
+far from our fatalities on the battlefield.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13385src" href="#xd20e13385" name="xd20e13385src">5</a></p>
+<p>It is not possible to even approximate the enemy&rsquo;s loss other
+than on the battlefield. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey
+Philippine Atlas gives the table estimating the population of the
+various provinces of the Philippine archipelago prior to the American
+occupation. This estimate gives the population of Batangas province at
+312,192. <i>The American Census of the Philippines of 1903</i> gives
+the population of Batangas province at 257,715.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13396src" href="#xd20e13396" name="xd20e13396src">6</a> This
+would present a difference in the population of Batangas prior to 1898
+and its population after the war of 54,477. The provincial secretary of
+Batangas province made a report to Governor Taft on December 18,
+1901<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13399src" href="#xd20e13399" name=
+"xd20e13399src">7</a> on the condition of the province generally. This
+report, as it appears in the Senate Document, is a translation from the
+Spanish. The portion which relates to the reduction of the population
+of Batangas province reads as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by
+disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
+200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the
+province had.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb598" href="#pb598" name=
+"pb598">598</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Of course these appalling figures<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13412src" href="#xd20e13412" name="xd20e13412src">8</a> must be
+taken with a grain of salt. In the first place, the man who furnished
+them was merely reproducing the general impression of his neighbors as
+to the diminution of the population of the province. He does not
+pretend to be dealing with official statistics. On the other hand, all
+of the yearly reports of the various native provincial officers are, as
+a general rule, pathetically optimistic. They all seem to think it
+their duty to present a hopeful view of the situation. In fact if you
+read these reports one after the other, the various signers seem to vie
+with one another in optimism as if their tenure of office depended upon
+it. So that, balancing probabilities, it would seem unlikely that the
+provincial secretary of Batangas would have stated more than what he at
+least believed to represent actual conditions, and the results of the
+war. A comparison of the Atlas population tables above mentioned with
+the census tables of 1903 shows no very startling difference in the
+population of any of the other provinces of the archipelago before and
+after the war except Batangas. It is also notorious that Batangas
+suffered by the war more than any other province in the Philippine
+Islands. However, a glance at the table of population of the various
+provinces of the Census of 1903<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13415src"
+href="#xd20e13415" name="xd20e13415src">9</a> shows you fifty provinces
+with a total of 7,635,426 people. While we will never know whether
+Batangas did or did not lose one hundred thousand as a result of the
+war and its consequences, still, if it did, the other forty-nine
+provinces above mentioned must have lost as many more, that is to say,
+must have lost another hundred thousand. So that while it is all a
+matter of surmise, with nothing more <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb599" href="#pb599" name="pb599">599</a>]</span>certain to go on than
+the foregoing, it would really seem by no means absurd to assume the
+Filipino loss of life, other than on the battlefield, caused by the
+war, and the famine, pestilence, and other disease consequent thereon,
+at not far from 200,000 people. In more than one province, the people
+died like flies, especially the women and children, as a result of
+conditions incident to and consequent upon the war. This will not seem
+an over-statement to men who have lived much among people that do not
+know much about how to take care of themselves in the midst of great
+calamities, people who <i>will</i> eat meat of animals carried off by
+disease, in time of famine; who <i>will</i> drink water contaminated by
+what may for euphony be called sewage; and who are unprovided with any
+save traditional home remedies against cholera, small-pox, etc.</p>
+<p>As to the cost of the Philippines in money, it used to be said in
+the early days that we paid $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000
+insurrection. Just what the Islands have cost us up to date in money it
+is utterly impossible to figure out with any degree of certainty,
+except that a safe minimum may be arrived at. Said the distinguished
+Congressman from Texas, Honorable James L. Slayden, in a speech which
+appears in the <i>Congressional Record</i> of February 25, 1908 (pp.
+2532 <i>et seq.</i>):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">On this point, and in reply to a resolution of the
+Senate in 1902, the Secretary of War reported that the cost of the army
+in the Philippines from June 30, 1898, to July 1, 1902, had been
+$169,853,512.00. To this let us add $114,515,643.00, the admitted cost
+of the army in the Philippines from May 1, 1902, to June 30, 1907, and
+we will have a grand total of $284,369,155.00. That does not take into
+account the additional cost of the navy.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Nor, be it noted, does it count the $20,000,000 we <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb600" href="#pb600" name="pb600">600</a>]</span>paid
+Spain for the Islands, which item, is, however included in another part
+of Mr. Slayden&rsquo;s speech.</p>
+<p>The only other estimate of what the Islands have cost, made in the
+last few years, which seems to be specially worthy of consideration, is
+one which appeared in the <i>New York Evening Post</i> of March 6,
+1907. This estimate was prepared by one of the best trained and most
+conservative newspaper men in the United States, Mr. Edward G. Lowry,
+then Washington correspondent of the <i>Evening Post</i>, and since
+1911, its managing editor. The total which Mr. Lowry arrives at is
+$308,369,155, up to that time. There have been various absurd estimates
+made recklessly without knowledge, but Mr. Lowry&rsquo;s estimate is
+very carefully studied out, and presented in detail in the newspaper
+referred to. From the testimony of Mr. Slayden and Mr. Lowry, given as
+a result of their inquiries into the matter, it would thus seem that
+the Islands must have cost us by the end of 1907 something like
+$300,000,000. The Insular Government is now self-sustaining, except as
+to military affairs.</p>
+<p>The cost per annum of the Philippine (native) scouts, of which there
+are 4000, is paid out of the United States Treasury, and amounts to
+$2,000,000 per annum.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13453src" href=
+"#xd20e13453" name="xd20e13453src">10</a> The number of American troops
+in the islands for the last few years has been about 12,000. Those who
+are wedded to the present Philippine policy of indefinite retention
+with undeclared intention, insist that our military expenses in the
+Philippines, in respect to the regular army out there, are not fairly
+chargeable as a part of the current expenses of the Philippine
+occupation. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb601" href="#pb601" name=
+"pb601">601</a>]</span>This argument must be admitted to have some
+force as far as the navy is concerned, but as to the army it is clearly
+without merit. Under the Act of Congress reorganizing the army of the
+United States after the Spanish War, provision was made for a skeleton
+army of about 60,000 men capable of expansion to something like 100,000
+in time of war. The method of expansion thus contemplated was to have
+companies of, say, for illustration, sixty men, in time of peace, which
+companies could be recruited up to a war footing of one hundred men, in
+time of war. The suggestion that the cost of the part of the regular
+army which we have to keep in the Philippines is not chargeable to the
+Philippines because those same troops would have to be somewhere in the
+United States if they were not where they are, is not well taken. If we
+did not need 12,000 men continually in the Philippines, the army could
+be at once reduced by that much without affecting its present
+organization. If we had no troops in the Philippines this would not
+mean the absolute elimination from the army of enough <i>regiments</i>
+to represent twelve thousand men. It would not eliminate any existing
+organization. It would simply mean contraction of the number of men in
+the several companies of the several regiments of the army toward a
+peace basis to the extent of a total of twelve thousand men, more or
+less. The War Department has long figured on the cost of an American
+soldier in the Philippines per annum including his pay, allowances, and
+transportation out and back, at $1000 per annum. The cost of 12,000
+soldiers at $1000 per annum is $12,000,000, per annum. The conclusion
+would, therefore, seem inevitable that the extra military current
+expense chargeable to our occupation of the Philippines is $12,000,000,
+per annum, outside the Philippine scouts, or, a total <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb602" href="#pb602" name="pb602">602</a>]</span>of
+$14,000,000. Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000, that is
+no reason why we should continue to run a kindergarten for adults out
+there, and let the Monroe Doctrine run to seed. &ldquo;Something&rdquo;
+<i>is not</i> &ldquo;bound to turn up.&rdquo; The Philippine Islands
+will <i>not</i> prove a blessing in disguise. In every war with a
+nation having discontented colonial subjects, the enemy will always
+strike the colony first, and hope for aid from the inhabitants
+thereof.</p>
+<p>Even if the Philippines <i>have</i> cost us $300,000,000, we are a
+nation of nearly 100,000,000 people. So they have cost us, all told, in
+the neighborhood of only about $3 a piece. And we subjugated them by
+mistake, after freeing a less capable people, the Cubans.</p>
+<p>The Panama Canal is to be finished in 1913. This means a splendid,
+but free-for-all contest, for the trade of South America. In South
+America we will meet a tremendous pro-German sentiment, and a by no
+means inconsiderable anti-&ldquo;Yankee&rdquo; sentiment. The bigger
+Germany&rsquo;s army and navy grows, the more she will loom up as the
+one great menace to the peace of the world, and the one avowed enemy of
+the Monroe Doctrine. We need to build up a Pan-American <i>esprit de
+corps</i>, based on the instinct of self-defence. We <i>must</i> win
+the good will of South America, and we cannot do it so long as we
+insist, in another part of the world, upon the righteousness of the
+principle of one Christian people policing a weaker Christian people,
+ostensibly to keep them from having revolutions, and really in the hope
+of ultimate profit. To free the Filipinos should be the first step we
+take after the Panama Canal is completed toward getting ourselves
+foot-loose entirely, with a view of getting everything from the
+Canadian border to the Argentine wheat fields and beyond, solidly and
+sincerely <i>for</i> the Monroe Doctrine. <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb603" href="#pb603" name="pb603">603</a>]</span>In that direction
+lies our only sensible and reasonable hope that the canal will get for
+us the trade and friendship of South America. With such tremendous
+issues at stake, what does it matter to the richest nation on earth
+what the Philippines cost? What does it matter, anyhow, how much it
+costs to do right? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb604" href="#pb604"
+name="pb604">604</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13352" href="#xd20e13352src" name="xd20e13352">1</a></span>
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 142.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13357" href="#xd20e13357src" name="xd20e13357">2</a></span>
+<i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 559&ndash;560.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13362" href="#xd20e13362src" name="xd20e13362">3</a></span> See
+<i>War Department Report</i>, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13370" href="#xd20e13370src" name="xd20e13370">4</a></span>
+<i>War Department Report</i>, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13385" href="#xd20e13385src" name="xd20e13385">5</a></span> From
+July 31, 1898, to May 24, 1900, we lost 1138 men by disease. See
+special report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, <i>Senate Document
+426</i>, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. By the middle of 1900 our soldiers had
+pretty well learned how to take care of themselves in the tropics.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13396" href="#xd20e13396src" name="xd20e13396">6</a></span> See
+vol. ii., p. 102.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13399" href="#xd20e13399src" name="xd20e13399">7</a></span> See
+<i>Senate Document 331</i>, 1902, p. 887.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13412" href="#xd20e13412src" name="xd20e13412">8</a></span>
+Appalling, because there are forty-nine other provinces besides
+Batangas.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13415" href="#xd20e13415src" name="xd20e13415">9</a></span> Vol.
+ii., p. 123.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13453" href="#xd20e13453src" name="xd20e13453">10</a></span> See
+page 78 of the special report of the Secretary of War Taft on the
+Philippines, January 23, 1908, transmitted by President Roosevelt to
+Congress, January 27, 1908, <i>Senate Document 200</i>, 60th Cong., 1st
+Sess.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch26" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVI</h2>
+<h2 class="main">Congressional Legislation</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">Taxation without representation is good cause for
+revolt.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><i>American Speech of 1776.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">As a colony of Spain the Philippines enjoyed certain
+special privileges in the way of trade with the &ldquo;mother
+country.&rdquo; When at the beginning of our military occupation in
+1898 General Otis detailed an army officer to take charge of the
+Customs House, he continued for the time being the Spanish tariff laws
+concerning imports and exports. On September 17, 1901, the Philippine
+Commission passed a tariff act<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13505src"
+href="#xd20e13505" name="xd20e13505src">1</a> fixing the duties on
+imports into the Islands and also continuing to a considerable extent
+the system of duties on Philippine exports inherited from the Spanish
+r&eacute;gime. Among the products of the Philippine Islands on which
+the Act of September 17, 1901, imposed an export tax were the
+following:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Hemp, 75c. per 100 kilos<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13511src" href="#xd20e13511" name="xd20e13511src">2</a>; sugar,
+5c. per 100 kilos; manufactured tobacco, $1.50 per 100 kilos; raw
+tobacco, $1.50 down to 75c. per 100 kilos.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13517src" href="#xd20e13517" name="xd20e13517src">3</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb605" href="#pb605" name=
+"pb605">605</a>]</span></p>
+<p>On March 8, 1902, the United States Congress passed an Act,
+&ldquo;temporarily to provide revenue for the Philippine Islands and
+for other purposes.&rdquo; The Act of 1902 re-enacted the
+Commission&rsquo;s tariff law for the Philippines of September 17,
+1901, with one change, hereinafter to be discussed, as to its export
+tax features. As to the tariffs to be collected at our custom-houses on
+Philippine products shipped to the United States, the Act of 1902
+reduced the rates fixed by the Dingley tariff to seventy-five per cent.
+of said rates. That was all Congress did in the way of lowering our
+tariff wall to Philippine products until 1909, when the Payne-Aldrich
+tariff bill became a law. This twenty-five per cent. reduction was no
+better than no reduction whatever would have been.</p>
+<p>Governor Taft pleaded very earnestly with Congress, at the time of
+the passage of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, for a
+<i>substantial</i> reduction of the Dingley tariff rate on sugar and
+tobacco, so as to give his &ldquo;constituents&rdquo;&mdash;his
+Filipinos&mdash;something in lieu of the markets they had had under
+Spain. But our sugar and tobacco interests defeated his efforts,
+because they feared what they termed &ldquo;competition with cheap
+Asiatic labor.&rdquo;</p>
+<p>The Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, repealed the export duties
+imposed by the Act of the Philippine Commission of September 17, 1901,
+as to exports to the United States, <i>leaving unrepealed</i>, however,
+<i>the export duty on Philippine products shipped to foreign
+countries</i>. Section 2 of said Act of 1902 provided, as to exports
+from the Philippines to the United States, that the rates of duty upon
+products of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United States,
+should be less any duty or tax levied, collected, and paid thereon
+(under the Act of the Philippine Commission of September <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb606" href="#pb606" name="pb606">606</a>]</span>17,
+1901, aforesaid) upon the shipment thereof from the Philippine
+Archipelago. This sounds liberal enough. It is, as far as it goes. But
+what those familiar with the hemp infamy of the Act of 1902 call
+&ldquo;the joker&rdquo; in it, is as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">All <i>articles</i>, the growth and product of the
+Philippine Islands, <i>admitted</i> into the ports of the United States
+<i>free of duty</i> under the provisions of this act, and coming
+directly from said islands to the United States, for use and
+consumption therein, shall be hereafter exempt from any export duties
+imposed in the Philippine Islands.</p>
+</div>
+<p>This also sounds liberal, on first reading, but its object was, and
+its effect has been, to enable the American Hemp Trust to corner and
+control the Manila hemp industry. <i>There is but one article of
+Philippine export which any one in the United States is interested in,
+that was admitted into the United States free of duty under the Dingley
+Act.</i><a class="noteref" id="xd20e13555src" href="#xd20e13555" name=
+"xd20e13555src">4</a> <i>That article is hemp.</i> The object of the
+law was to favor Americans interested in exporting hemp from Manila to
+the United States as against Europeans exporting it to England and
+other foreign countries. This does not look, on its face, either
+unpatriotic or un-Christian. It is not unpatriotic or un-Christian,
+ordinarily, to favor your own people, as against their foreign
+competitors. The moral quality of such favoritism, however, must depend
+on who is to pay for it. Under the Act of 1902, the Manila authorities
+have always collected an export tax on hemp coming to the United
+States, just as they do on hemp going from Manila to foreign countries,
+exactly as if the law abolishing the export tax on hemp coming to the
+United States had never been passed. Later, on proof that the hemp was
+<i>in fact</i> carried to <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb607" href=
+"#pb607" name="pb607">607</a>]</span>the United States and used and
+consumed therein, they refund the export tax. This is on the idea that
+they cannot tell where the hemp is <i>going to</i> until they know
+where it went to, nor where it is <i>going to be</i> &ldquo;used and
+consumed&rdquo; until they know where it <i>was in fact</i> finally
+&ldquo;used and consumed.&rdquo; Of course the small farmer is in no
+position to follow his bale of hemp into the markets of the world and
+show, if it happens to go to the United States, that it did in fact go
+there and that it was there &ldquo;used and consumed,&rdquo; and,
+finally obtaining the proof of this, submit it to the Manila Government
+and get his little export tax on his bale of hemp refunded. Only the
+big buyer&rsquo;s agents at Manila are in a position to do this. So the
+hemp crop is bought and moved under conditions which are the same as if
+<i>all</i> hemp were subject to an export tax. And only the big fish
+get the benefit. For instance, the International Harvester Company has
+its hemp buyers at Manila. And as to the part of the Philippine hemp
+crop it handles, it can, of course, follow the hemp to its ultimate
+consumption in the United States, make the proof, and get the
+refund.</p>
+<p>The wealth of the Philippines is practically entirely agricultural.
+Neither mining nor manufactures cut any appreciable figure. Hemp,
+sugar, tobacco, and copra<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13581src" href=
+"#xd20e13581" name="xd20e13581src">5</a> are the chief staples and main
+exports, and of the first of these Secretary of War Taft says in one of
+his reports:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13584src" href="#xd20e13584"
+name="xd20e13584src">6</a></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The chief export in value and quantity from the
+Philippines is Manila hemp, it amounting to between 60 and 65 per cent.
+of the total exports.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb608" href="#pb608" name=
+"pb608">608</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Let us see just how far, according to the annual reports of our own
+agents in the Philippines&mdash;those charged by us with governing
+them,&mdash;this piece of legislation gotten through by &ldquo;special
+privilege&rdquo; has depressed the Manila hemp industry, the chief
+source of wealth of the Islands. And before we even get to the main
+trouble, let us permit the Insular Government to &ldquo;place on the
+screen,&rdquo; as a preliminary &ldquo;view,&rdquo; a glance at what
+the instinct of self-preservation of American sugar and tobacco
+interests, fearing competition from &ldquo;cheap Asiatic labor,&rdquo;
+have deemed it necessary to do to the Philippine sugar and tobacco
+industries, through the Dingley tariff. The annual report of the
+Philippine Commission for 1904, before it gets to the subject of hemp,
+draws a most gloomy picture of how we killed the markets for sugar and
+tobacco the Islands had under Spain, and gave them none instead. They
+speak of &ldquo;the languishing state of these industries&rdquo; (p.
+26), and describe a state of affairs that sounds more like Egypt under
+Pharaoh than anything else, including a cattle disease that carried off
+ninety per cent. of the beasts of burden of the country, and wholesale
+destruction of crops by locusts.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13596src"
+href="#xd20e13596" name="xd20e13596src">7</a> What they have to say of
+the annual tribute levied by the American Hemp Trust, through Congress,
+on the Manila hemp industry, should not be re-stated, but quoted. They
+say:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13599src" href="#xd20e13599" name=
+"xd20e13599src">8</a></p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We desire to call attention to the injustice effected
+upon the revenues of the islands by section 2 of the Act of Congress
+approved March 8, 1902, which provides that the Philippine Government
+shall refund all export duties imposed upon articles exported from the
+islands into and consumed in the United States. Under the provisions of
+this section there has been collected in the Philippine <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb609" href="#pb609" name=
+"pb609">609</a>]</span>Islands, since its enactment down to the close
+of the fiscal year 1904, the sum of $1,060,460.20 United States
+currency, which is refundable. <i>These refundable duties are
+principally upon hemp exportations to the United States, and are in
+effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of the United States
+who use hemp in their operations.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>They add:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">It is manifestly a discrimination in favor of our
+manufacturers as against those of foreign countries. No good reason is
+perceived why this <i>bounty to American manufacturers</i> should be
+extracted from the treasury of the Philippine Islands, and it is
+respectfully submitted that the law authorizing it should be
+repealed.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1905, after the
+usual complaint about being made a political football by Benevolent
+Assimilation on the one side, and Louisiana and our sugar-beet States
+on the other, and the usual annual and true description of the
+consequent poverty, says concerning hemp:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We have several times in our reports called attention
+to the practical workings of that portion of the Act of Congress
+approved March 8, 1902, which provides for the refund of duties paid on
+articles exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States and
+consumed therein, and have as repeatedly recommended its repeal. <i>It
+is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine Islands, because
+it takes from the insular treasury export duties collected from the
+people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp products in the United
+States.</i> These manufacturers were already prosperous before this
+bounty was given <i>them</i> and <i>it seems hardly consistent with our
+expressions of purpose to build up and develop the Philippine Islands
+when we are</i> thus enriching a few of our own people at their
+expense.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13636src" href="#xd20e13636" name=
+"xd20e13636src">9</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb610" href="#pb610" name=
+"pb610">610</a>]</span></p>
+<p>By the end of the fiscal year 1905 (June 30), the American importers
+of Manila hemp&mdash;of whom the International Harvester Company and
+its allied interests are the most influential&mdash;had, under the
+operation of the rebate system based on the Act of 1902, milked the
+Philippine people to the tune of about $1,000,000. Says the Philippine
+Commission&rsquo;s annual report for 1905, immediately after the
+passage last above quoted:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The amount of duties refunded under this act to
+manufacturers in the United States during the three years ending June
+30, 1905, is $1,057,251.12. Many of the departments of the government
+are much hampered in their operations because of the lack of funds,
+notably the bureau of education, and were the sum thus taken available
+for educational purposes, to say nothing of any other, the government
+would be enabled to give instruction to thousands of Filipino children
+whom they are now unable to reach and who must remain steeped in
+ignorance because of the lack of funds to provide such instruction.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Said the Manila Chamber of Commerce to the Taft Congressional party
+in August, 1905: &ldquo;The country is in a state of financial
+collapse.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13650src" href=
+"#xd20e13650" name="xd20e13650src">10</a></p>
+<p>Says the Philippine Commission&rsquo;s report for 1906 (pt. 1, p.
+68):</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The Commission has repeatedly called attention in its
+reports to the action of Congress providing for a refund of duties paid
+on articles exported from the Islands to the United States and consumed
+therein. The reasons that led the Commission heretofore to recommend
+the repeal of that provision are still operative. Since the passage of
+that act on March 8, 1902, the amount of duties collected and paid into
+the Philippine treasury and handed over to <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb611" href="#pb611" name=
+"pb611">611</a>]</span>manufacturers in the United States down to June
+30, 1906, is $1,471,208.47. <i>This money has been taken out of the
+poverty of the insular treasury to be delivered directly into the hands
+of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Philippine hemp in the
+United States for their enrichment.</i> The cordage interests are
+prosperous and do not need this help; the Philippine Islands are poor.
+Legislation which takes money directly from the Philippine treasury and
+passes it over to a particular industry in the United States is not
+founded on sound principles of political economy or of justice to the
+Filipinos. We renew our recommendation for the repeal of this
+provision.</p>
+</div>
+<p>You also find in the Commission&rsquo;s report for 1906 the usual
+annual protests against the Dingley tariff on Philippine sugar and
+tobacco. Said the Honorable Henry C. Ide in an article in the <i>New
+York Independent</i> for November 22, 1906, written shortly after he
+retired from the office of Governor-General of the Philippines and
+returned to the United States: &ldquo;By annexation we killed the
+Spanish market for Philippine sugar and tobacco, and our tariff shuts
+these products from the United States market, and to-day both these
+[industries] are practically prostrated.&rdquo; In their annual report
+for 1907, the Philippine Commission say with regard to the American
+corner on Philippine hemp:<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13675src" href=
+"#xd20e13675" name="xd20e13675src">11</a> &ldquo;The price of hemp has
+fallen from an average of twenty pesos ($10 American money) per
+picul<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13678src" href="#xd20e13678" name=
+"xd20e13678src">12</a> to thirteen pesos per picul.&rdquo; It thus
+appears that by judicious manipulation of the hemp market at Manila,
+through the leverage of the refund system, based on collection and
+subsequent refunding of the export tax on hemp coming to the United
+States, the Manila agents of the American hemp manufacturers had, as
+early as 1907, beat the price of hemp down to not far above half of
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb612" href="#pb612" name=
+"pb612">612</a>]</span>what it had been formerly. To-day (1912) the
+Filipino hemp farmer gets for his hemp just one half what he got just
+ten years ago. During all this period of economic depression, the
+public utterances and State papers both of President Roosevelt and Mr.
+Taft are full of such preposterous stuff as the following:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No great civilized power has ever managed with such
+wisdom and disinterestedness the affairs of a people committed by the
+accident of war to its hands.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13686src"
+href="#xd20e13686" name="xd20e13686src">13</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>This is what Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft were <i>publicly
+pretending</i> to believe. But at practically the same time, during as
+dark a year, economically, as the American occupation has seen, 1907,
+let us see what they were privately admitting to their intimate
+friends.</p>
+<p>In the <i>North American Review</i> for January 18, 1907, in an
+article contributed to that <i>Review</i> by the author of this volume,
+our treatment of the Philippine people, through our Congress, was
+briefly discussed. The article chanced to attract the attention of Mr.
+Andrew Carnegie, who gave a considerable sum of money to have it
+reprinted and distributed. Some correspondence followed between us, in
+the course of which Mr. Carnegie stated that he had been at the White
+House shortly before writing me, and described what happened as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When at supper with the President [Mr. Roosevelt]
+recently, pointing to Judge Taft [then Secretary of War], who sat
+opposite, he [President Roosevelt] said: &ldquo;Here are the two men in
+all the world most anxious to get out of the Philippines.&rdquo;</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb613" href="#pb613" name=
+"pb613">613</a>]</span></p>
+<p>In another letter Mr. Carnegie described this same incident, this
+other letter&rsquo;s version of President Roosevelt&rsquo;s
+supper-table remark being:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Here are the two men in America most anxious to get
+rid of them [the Philippines].<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13712src"
+href="#xd20e13712" name="xd20e13712src">14</a></p>
+</div>
+<p>Now why all this public boasting about our
+&ldquo;disinterestedness,&rdquo; when, if he had been a Filipino,
+Colonel Roosevelt would probably have hunted up all the American
+speeches of 1776 about taxation without representation, and played
+hide-and-seek with the public prosecutor at Manila, to see how far he
+could violate the sedition statute without getting in jail? And why
+this private admission to his friend Mr. Carnegie, which neither he nor
+Mr. Taft has ever publicly made? Why did he not send a message to
+Congress showing up the hemp rebate system? Simply because to do so
+would lose support for the Administration, would alienate powerful
+interests from the fatuous policy of Benevolent Assimilation bequeathed
+to Mr. Roosevelt by Mr. McKinley. His party was irrevocably committed
+to indefinite retention of the Islands. It was like Lot&rsquo;s wife.
+It could not turn back. So the protected and subsidized interests were
+permitted to continue to prey upon the Philippine people. Tariff evils
+were never President Roosevelt&rsquo;s specialty. Nor has war against
+intrenched privilege of any sort ever been Mr. Taft&rsquo;s specialty.
+Mr. Taft went out to the Philippines in 1907 to open the Philippine
+Assembly. In 1908 he came back and made a report to President Roosevelt
+which is as bland as his Winona declaration that the Payne-Aldrich bill
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb614" href="#pb614" name=
+"pb614">614</a>]</span>is &ldquo;the best tariff bill the Republican
+party ever passed.&rdquo; It makes the American reader&rsquo;s heart
+swell with pious pride at what he is doing for his &ldquo;little brown
+brother,&rdquo; in the matter of vaccination, sewers, school-books, and
+the like. President Roosevelt sent this report to Congress, accompanied
+by a message, from which we have already quoted. In that same message
+he said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">I question whether there is a brighter page in the
+annals of international dealing between the strong and the weak than
+the page which tells of our doings in the Philippines.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Apparently, Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft thought, in 1907, that
+granting the Filipinos a little debating society solemnly called a
+legislative body, but wholly without any real power, was ample
+compensation for deserted tobacco and cane plantations and for the
+price of hemp being beat down below the cost of production by
+manipulation through an Act of Congress passed for the benefit of
+American hemp manufacturers. If we had had a Cleveland in the White
+House about that time, he would have written an essay on taxation
+without representation, with the hemp infamy of this Philippine Tariff
+Act of 1902 as a text, and sent it to Congress as a message demanding
+the repeal of the Act. But the good-will of the Hemp Trust is an asset
+for the policy of Benevolent Assimilation. The Filipino cannot vote,
+and the cordage manufacturer in the United States can. No conceivable
+state of economic desolation to which we might reduce the people of the
+Philippine Islands being other than a blessing in disguise compared
+with permitting them to attend to their own affairs after their own
+quaint and mutually considerate fashion, the Hemp Trust&rsquo;s rope,
+tied into a slip-knot by the Act of 1902, must not be removed from
+their throats. By judicious manipulation of sufficient hemp rope,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb615" href="#pb615" name=
+"pb615">615</a>]</span>you can corral much support for Benevolent
+Assimilation. Therefore, to this good hour, the substance of the hemp
+part of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, remains upon the
+statute books of the United States, to the shame of the nation.</p>
+<p>At last, under the Payne tariff law of 1909, Mr. Taft&rsquo;s long
+and patient quiet work with Congressional committees prevailed upon
+Congress and the interests to admit Philippine sugar and tobacco to
+this country free of duty, up to amounts limited in the Act.<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e13729src" href="#xd20e13729" name=
+"xd20e13729src">15</a> Since then you find the reports of our American
+officials in the Philippines palpitating with gratitude to Congress. As
+a matter of fact all Congress had said to the Filipinos by its action
+may be summed up about thus: &ldquo;The sugar and tobacco interests of
+this country have at last realized that such little of the sugar and
+tobacco you raise as may stray over to this side of the world will not
+be in the least likely to hurt them. Therefore they have graciously
+decided, in their benignity, to permit you to live, provided you do not
+get too prosperous.&rdquo; But this very same Payne bill continued the
+export tax features of the Act of 1902. Section 13 of the Payne bill is
+as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Section 13. That upon the exportation to any foreign
+country from the Philippine Islands, or the shipment thereof to the
+United States or any of its possessions, of the following articles
+there shall be levied, collected, and paid thereon the following export
+duties: <i>Provided</i>, <i>however</i>, <span class="corr" id=
+"xd20e13741" title="Source: That">that</span> all articles the growth
+and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from said
+islands, to the United States or any of its possessions for use and
+consumption therein shall be exempt from any export duties imposed in
+the Philippine Islands:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>352.</td>
+<td>Abaca (hemp), gross weight, 100 kilos, 75 cents.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>353.</td>
+<td>Sugar, gross weight, 100 kilos, 5 cents. <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb616" href="#pb616" name=
+"pb616">616</a>]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>354.</td>
+<td>Copra, gross weight, 100 kilos, 10 cents.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>355.</td>
+<td>Tobacco, gross weight:</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>(<i>a</i>) Manufactured or unmanufactured, except as otherwise
+provided, 100 kilos, $1.30.</p>
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Stems, clippings, and other wastes of tobacco, 100 kilos,
+50 cents.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Let us briefly glance at the net results of this law, and its
+predecessor, the Act of 1902, the export features of which it
+re-enacted. It is important that every fair-minded American who can
+possibly spare the time should take such a glance at what Congress has
+done to the Philippine hemp industry, because of the obvious bearing
+that such taxation without representation will probably have on the
+attitude of the Philippine people whenever we get into a war with a
+foreign power. Certainly the legislation Congress has perpetrated upon
+them, at the behest of special interests in the United States, has not
+soothed the original desire of those people to be free and
+independent.</p>
+<p>At page 27 of the report of the Philippine Collector of Customs for
+1910, a table is given showing the export duties subject to refund
+collected under the Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, and deposited in
+the Philippine treasury to the credit of the Insular Government at the
+end of each fiscal year (June 30), as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1902</td>
+<td>$ 71,064.69</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1903</td>
+<td>527,228.10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1904</td>
+<td>462,433.83</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1905</td>
+<td>486,475.56</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1906</td>
+<td>433,991.79</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1907</td>
+<td>433,458.58</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1908</td>
+<td>370,513.36</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1909</td>
+<td>598,917.69</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td></td>
+<td class="sum">$3,384,083.60</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb617" href="#pb617" name=
+"pb617">617</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The following table, taken from this same annual report of the
+Collector of Customs of the Philippines for 1910 (p. 22) shows the size
+(weight in kilograms), and value, of the annual Philippine hemp crop
+from 1899 to 1910, both inclusive. It gives in one set of columns the
+total exported to all countries, and in the other the part which comes
+to the United States:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td></td>
+<td colspan="2"><i>To All Countries.</i></td>
+<td colspan="2"><i>To United States.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top" class="unit">
+<td></td>
+<td>Kilos</td>
+<td>Value</td>
+<td>Kilos</td>
+<td>Value</td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1899</td>
+<td>59,840,368</td>
+<td>$ 6,185,293</td>
+<td>23,066,248</td>
+<td>$ 2,436,169</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1900</td>
+<td>76,708,936</td>
+<td>11,393,883</td>
+<td>25,763,728</td>
+<td>3,446,141</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1901</td>
+<td>112,215,168</td>
+<td>14,453,110</td>
+<td>18,157,952</td>
+<td>2,402,867</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1902</td>
+<td>109,968,792</td>
+<td>15,841,316</td>
+<td>45,526,960</td>
+<td>7,261,459</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1903</td>
+<td>132,241,594</td>
+<td>21,701,575</td>
+<td>71,654,416</td>
+<td>12,314,312</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1904</td>
+<td>131,817,872</td>
+<td>21,794,960</td>
+<td>61,886,592</td>
+<td>10,631,591</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1905</td>
+<td>130,621,024</td>
+<td>22,146,241</td>
+<td>73,351,136</td>
+<td>12,954,515</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1906</td>
+<td>112,165,384</td>
+<td>19,446,769</td>
+<td>62,045,088</td>
+<td>11,168,226</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1907</td>
+<td>114,701,320</td>
+<td>21,085,081</td>
+<td>58,388,504</td>
+<td>11,326,864</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1908</td>
+<td>115,829,080</td>
+<td>17,311,808</td>
+<td>48,813,720</td>
+<td>7,684,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1909</td>
+<td>149,991,866</td>
+<td>15,883,577</td>
+<td>79,210,362</td>
+<td>8,534,288</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>1910</td>
+<td>170,788,629</td>
+<td>17,404,922</td>
+<td>99,305,102</td>
+<td>10,399,397</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>If you have the time and inclination, you can easily figure out the
+annual &ldquo;rake-off&rdquo; of the American hemp importers from the
+above table. For instance, take the last year, 1910: 99,305,102 kilos
+at 75 cents per 100 kilos is $744,788.26, which is more than 4% of
+$17,404,922, the total value of the hemp crop of the archipelago for
+that year. Add this $744,788.26 to the $3,384,183.60 shown by the above
+table of refundable duties collected from 1902 to 1909 inclusive, and
+you have over $4,000,000 rebates accruing to American importers of
+Manila hemp from 1902 to 1910 inclusive.</p>
+<p>In his remarks on Section 13 of the Payne Law of <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb618" href="#pb618" name="pb618">618</a>]</span>1909
+(above set forth), in the House of Representatives, May 13,
+1909,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e13995src" href="#xd20e13995" name=
+"xd20e13995src">16</a> Hon. Oscar W. Underwood said, in part:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">When you put a tax on your people for engaging in
+export trade, to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully
+meet their foreign competitor and reduce the territory in which they
+can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. Our
+forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
+recognizing the false principle on which an export tax was based, put
+it in the fundamental law of our land that the United States Government
+should not lay export taxes. <i>If we enact this law, we write into the
+statute book for the Philippine Islands, legislation which is little
+short of barbarous, legislation that no government in the civilized
+world except Turkey, and Persia, and other second-class nations
+countenance to-day.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>But the hemp interests won out and the section was adopted. In an
+argument for the repeal of the export tax, delivered in the House of
+Representatives August 19, 1911, the Philippine delegate, Hon. Manuel
+L. Quezon, said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">There is one section in the Philippine tariff law,
+approved August 5, 1909, which is <i>seriously injuring the proper
+commercial development of the islands</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Of course the earnestness with which Mr. Quezon pleaded his cause
+may be imagined from the circumstance that, as he says, he is
+continually advised by letters from his people, and verily believes
+that <i>if the export tax is not taken off soon the Philippine hemp
+industry will be entirely destroyed</i>, and the hemp farmers will have
+to take to raising something else in lieu of hemp, because the present
+prices hardly permit them to live. In the course of his speech Mr.
+Quezon offered <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb619" href="#pb619" name=
+"pb619">619</a>]</span>the following truly eloquent and absolutely
+unanswerable argument:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of
+the United States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in
+force in the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said
+decision also meant that this Government has the power to enact laws
+for the islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution in
+the United States.</p>
+</div>
+<p>It is through the courtesy of Mr. Quezon that such light as I may
+have been able to throw on the subject has been obtained. He has shown
+me letters from the Philippine Chamber of Commerce at Manila and other
+commercial organizations prophesying ruin to the Manila hemp industry
+in the event the export tax should continue. One of these letters is
+addressed to the two Philippine Commissioners in Congress, Mr. Legarda
+and Mr. Quezon. It informs them of the hopes of the Filipinos at Manila
+that they, Messrs. Legarda and Quezon, may be successful in their
+campaign to get the law repealed and that many of them (the Filipinos
+at Manila) feel hopeful of results in that regard. Speaking for their
+fellow countrymen at Manila, they say, &ldquo;The optimists are of the
+opinion that the matter being in such good hands as yours will be
+carried to a successful conclusion.&rdquo; Then they give the darker
+side of the picture thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">But the representatives at this capital of the famous
+syndicate, the International Harvester Company, are of the opinion that
+we will be able to accomplish nothing, and theirs is an opinion to
+which great weight should be attached, because <i>the vast interests
+which that concern represents can set in motion powerful influences to
+keep the present law as it is</i>, since it concerns their interest to
+do so.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb620" href="#pb620" name=
+"pb620">620</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Mr. Quezon has also shown me a letter written to him, March 30,
+1911, by his and my warm personal friend, Hon. James F. Smith, formerly
+Governor-General of the Philippines, now (1912) Judge of the Court of
+Customs Appeals at Washington, D. C., in which letter General Smith
+says, concerning the operation of that part of the export tax act of
+March 8, 1902 (continued by the Payne Tariff Law of 1909) by which
+American manufacturers are relieved from the payment of the export tax
+on Manila hemp:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first"><i>In effect this really and truly amounts to the
+payment by the Philippine Government and the Filipino people of a large
+subsidy to American manufacturers of hemp.</i> More than that, this
+concession to the American manufacturer, by enabling him to undersell
+his British competitor, gives him an undue control of the situation and
+has put him in a position, to some extent, to control prices for the
+raw product.</p>
+</div>
+<p>It seems to me that the American people had better look to their own
+liberties, when they remember that in the campaign for the Republican
+nomination in 1912, the Roosevelt Headquarters gave out that pending
+the Roosevelt dictation of Mr. Taft&rsquo;s nomination in 1908, the
+International Harvester Company furnished a floor of its Chicago
+building to the Taft people, this interesting fact being part of the
+leakage from the Roosevelt-Taft quarrel caused by the Roosevelt charge
+that Mr. Taft was unfit for re-election because he &ldquo;meant well
+<i>feebly</i>&rdquo;; and when it is recalled, on the other hand, that
+in the Roosevelt campaign of 1912 for the presidential nomination for a
+third term, Mr. George W. Perkins,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14049src"
+href="#xd20e14049" name="xd20e14049src">17</a> <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb621" href="#pb621" name="pb621">621</a>]</span>the
+very personification of undue corporation influence with the
+Government, assumed the r&ocirc;le of Warwick for an ex-President who,
+when President, had repudiated the advice of his counsel, Governor
+Harmon, that a railroad company<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14057src"
+href="#xd20e14057" name="xd20e14057src">18</a> be prosecuted for taking
+rebates <i>because the vice-president of the company was his personal
+friend</i>.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14067src" href="#xd20e14067"
+name="xd20e14067src">19</a> But let us return to the Philippine
+rebates, and their corner-stone, the export tax, Section 13 of the
+Payne-Aldrich Tariff.</p>
+<p>In the case of Fairbanks <i>vs.</i> United States, 181 U. S. Supreme
+Court Reports, page 290, a case in which the court was asked to declare
+a certain Act of Congress unconstitutional and void, because it imposed
+what was virtually an export tax, the opinion of the court cites the
+absolute inhibition against such a tax imposed by our Federal
+Constitution, and says concerning the wise theory on which this
+fundamental tenet of our government rests:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The requirement of the Constitution is that exports
+should be free from any governmental burden.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The decision then goes on to elaborate on what it terms &ldquo;that
+freedom from governmental burden in the matter of exports which it was
+the intention of our Constitution to protect and preserve.&rdquo;
+Finally, the court uses an expression which is certainly a stinging
+rebuke to any law-making power that permits the selfish greed of a
+little set of importers to get a law passed imposing for their special
+benefit a paralyzing export tax on the chief staple of a helpless
+colony:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">The power to tax is the power to destroy.</p>
+</div>
+<p>But Mr. Quezon has no vote in Congress and his voice was not heard,
+at least not heeded. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb622" href="#pb622"
+name="pb622">622</a>]</span></p>
+<p>The summation of the whole matter is this: Both the Philippine
+people and the American people are, and long have been, suffering from
+unjust taxation through laws for which special selfish financial
+interests in the United States, exercising grossly undue influence on
+governmental action, are responsible. Neither will ever get relief
+until the government of this nation is wrested from the control of the
+money-hogs and restored to the people. Until that is done, selfish
+greed will continue to sow sedition in the Philippines, and socialism
+in the United States. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb623" href=
+"#pb623" name="pb623">623</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13505" href="#xd20e13505src" name="xd20e13505">1</a></span> Act
+230, U. S. Philippine Commission.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13511" href="#xd20e13511src" name="xd20e13511">2</a></span> For
+the convenience of readers who do not constantly use the metric system:
+A kilo is about <span class="corr" id="xd20e13513" title=
+"Source: 225">2.25</span> lbs.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13517" href="#xd20e13517src" name="xd20e13517">3</a></span>
+According to what part of archipelago grown.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13555" href="#xd20e13555src" name="xd20e13555">4</a></span> The
+Payne law of 1909 continued the export tax, etc.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13581" href="#xd20e13581src" name="xd20e13581">5</a></span> Dried
+cocoa-nut meat, used to make soaps and oils. I do not deal with copra
+because it nearly all goes to Europe, principally to Marseilles.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13584" href="#xd20e13584src" name="xd20e13584">6</a></span>
+<i>Senate Document 200</i>, 1908, Sixtieth Congress, First Session.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13596" href="#xd20e13596src" name="xd20e13596">7</a></span> I
+have myself seen a cloud of locusts three miles long.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13599" href="#xd20e13599src" name="xd20e13599">8</a></span>
+<i>Report</i>, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1904, pt. 1, pp.
+26&ndash;7.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13636" href="#xd20e13636src" name="xd20e13636">9</a></span>
+<i>Report</i>, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, pp.
+72&ndash;3.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13650" href="#xd20e13650src" name="xd20e13650">10</a></span>
+Senator Newlands, <i>North American Review</i>, December,
+1905<span class="corr" id="xd20e13655" title="Not in source">.</span>
+Senator Newlands was one of the party.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13675" href="#xd20e13675src" name="xd20e13675">11</a></span> Part
+1, p. 99.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13678" href="#xd20e13678src" name="xd20e13678">12</a></span>
+137&frac12; lbs.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13686" href="#xd20e13686src" name="xd20e13686">13</a></span>
+President Roosevelt&rsquo;s message to Congress of January 27, 1908,
+transmitting report of Secretary of War Taft on the Philippines.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13712" href="#xd20e13712src" name="xd20e13712">14</a></span>
+Before assuming to use these letters in this book, I sent them to Mr.
+Carnegie and asked his permission to so use them. He returned them to
+me with his consent entered on the back of one of them.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13729" href="#xd20e13729src" name="xd20e13729">15</a></span>
+300,000 tons of sugar, 150,000,000 cigars, etc.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e13995" href="#xd20e13995src" name="xd20e13995">16</a></span>
+<i>Congressional Record</i>, May 13, 1909, p. 2009.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14049" href="#xd20e14049src" name="xd20e14049">17</a></span> Mr.
+Perkins is chairman of the Finance Committee of the International
+Harvester Company, a hundred million dollar corporation owning divers
+subsidiary companies which make twine and cordage. See <span class=
+"sc">Moody&rsquo;s Manual</span>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14057" href="#xd20e14057src" name="xd20e14057">18</a></span> The
+Atcheson, Topeka &amp; <span class="corr" id="xd20e14059" title=
+"Source: Sante">Santa</span> Fe.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14067" href="#xd20e14067src" name="xd20e14067">19</a></span> Paul
+Morton.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch27" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Rights of Man</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">The rights of man cannot be changed. It is the
+government which attempts to change them that must
+change.&mdash;<span class="sc">Webster.</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">It was the homely common sense of Mr. Lincoln that
+first reminded us most vividly how like to the sins of an individual
+are those of a nation. To the Southern man who admires Mr. Lincoln as
+one of the great figures of all time, he seems like a great physician,
+who, with malice toward none and with charity for all, kept vigil for
+four years at the bedside of a sick nation through all the long agony
+of its efforts to throw off from its system the inherited curse of
+slavery. Of course, human slavery was a relic of barbarism. But in
+fixing the Rights of Man, the founders of the Republic actually
+overlooked the fact that a negro was a human being. So that, vast
+property rights having accrued pursuant to that mistake, the march of
+progress had to wipe them out, no matter whom it hurt financially. The
+enormity of the iniquity of human slavery did not dawn suddenly and
+exclusively upon William Lloyd Garrison. He is not the sole, original
+inventor and patentee of the idea. Lord Macaulay&rsquo;s father was
+doing the same sort of agitating in England about the same time.
+Westminster Abbey has its monument to the elder Macaulay, just as
+Commonwealth Avenue has its monument to the elder Garrison.
+Simultaneous <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb624" href="#pb624" name=
+"pb624">624</a>]</span>like stirrings occurred elsewhere throughout
+Christendom. But, of course, in America, arguments for the emancipation
+of the slave first took root most readily in a thrifty section of our
+liberty-loving country which had nothing to lose by abolition.</p>
+<p>John Quincy Adams once said that our government was &ldquo;an
+experiment upon the heart of man.&rdquo; It is because this government
+of the people by the people for the people was a deliberate and
+thoughtful attempt upon the part of its founders to apply the Golden
+Rule as a doctrine of international and inter-individual law, that we
+believe our form of government is the last hope of mankind. It is, as
+we conceive it, the voice of humanity raised in protest against the
+proposition that might makes right. It is, as we conceive it, a
+government which entered the lists of the nations as the champion of
+the human mind, in the great struggle of Mind for the mastery over
+Matter, the world-old struggle between Good and Evil, Light and
+Darkness. Our government, like everything else, must follow the law of
+its being, or die. Its first great sin in violation of the Rights of
+Man was due to heredity. We inherited the institution of slavery, the
+governmental exception to the rule that all men are created with equal
+right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This was a sin
+against human liberty, one of the &ldquo;unalienable&rdquo; Rights of
+Man, upon which the Republic purported to be builded. The consequences
+of that sin are still with us; but, except for the occasional
+bloody-shirt waver, whose intellectual resources are not sufficient to
+provide him with a live issue, we are meeting those consequences, as a
+nation, bravely, and with the mutual forbearance born of the fact that
+none are wholly free from responsibility for present difficulties.</p>
+<p>Our second great national sin was a yielding to the <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb625" href="#pb625" name=
+"pb625">625</a>]</span>temptation of the environment which arose,
+unforeseen, after a splendid war waged for the Rights of Man against
+Spain in Cuba. The Philippine war was waged to subjugate the Filipino
+people, because Mr. McKinley believed it would be financially
+profitable to us to own the islands, and in the face of the fact that
+the only thing he knew officially about the Filipino people was that
+Admiral Dewey thought them superior to the Cubans and more capable of
+self-government. The war in the Philippines was, therefore, a war
+against the Rights of Man. Nowhere in any state paper has any American
+statesman, soldier, or sailor, had the temerity to invoke the name of
+God in connection with the retention of the Philippine Islands. Nowhere
+in any American state paper connected with the Philippines is there any
+reference to &ldquo;a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.&rdquo;
+The sin of our Philippine policy is that it is a denial of the right of
+a people to pursue happiness <i>in their own way</i> instead of in
+<i>somebody else&rsquo;s</i> way. It is a denial of the very principles
+in maintenance of which we went to war against Spain to free Cuba, as
+we had previously gone to war against England to free ourselves.</p>
+<p>Now the reason the nation blundered into taking the Philippines was
+that it believed the Filipinos to be, not a people, but a jumble of
+savage tribes. But the reason the men who controlled the action of the
+government at the time took the Philippines was because they believed
+they would pay. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient number of our
+fellow-citizens&mdash;controlled, some by altruistic motives and some
+by sordid motives&mdash;to cause the nation to follow the lead of those
+then in control. If the men then in control had taken the people into
+their confidence, the blunder would never have been made. If the
+correspondence <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb626" href="#pb626" name=
+"pb626">626</a>]</span>between Mr. McKinley and the Paris Peace
+Commission in the fall of 1898, from which the injunction of secrecy
+was not removed until 1901, had been given out at the time, the treaty
+would never have been ratified except after some such declaration as to
+the Philippines as was made concerning Cuba, some reaffirmance of
+allegiance to faith in our cardinal tenet&mdash;the right of every
+people to pursue happiness in their own way, free from alien
+domination. The Bacon resolution of 1899, which was along this line,
+was defeated only by the deciding vote of the presiding officer, the
+Vice-President of the United States. The passage of that resolution
+would have prevented the Philippine Insurrection. Had it passed, the
+Filipinos would no more have had occasion to think of insurrection than
+the Cubans did. It was Mr. McKinley alone who decided to take the
+Philippines. Congress was not called together in extra session. The
+people were not consulted, except from the rear-end of an observation
+car.</p>
+<p>Most people, whether they be lawyers or not, are more or less
+acquainted with the doctrine of what is called in law a &ldquo;<i>bona
+fide</i> purchaser without notice.&rdquo; No man can claim to be a
+<i>bona fide</i> purchaser without notice, when he knows enough about
+the subject matter of his purchase to put him on reasonable notice of
+the existence of facts which, had he taken the trouble to verify them,
+would have caused him to halt and not purchase. The correspondence in
+1898, made public in 1901, withheld by Mr. McKinley until after his
+second election in 1900, is sufficient to have made any honest man ask
+himself some such question as this: &ldquo;After all, is it not quite
+possible that those people <i>can</i> run a decent government of their
+own? Admiral Dewey says they are superior to the Cubans.&rdquo; But
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb627" href="#pb627" name=
+"pb627">627</a>]</span>Mr. McKinley did not pursue this inquiry, as it
+was his duty to do. He took the islands because he believed they would
+pay, knowing nothing in particular about the Filipinos, except what he
+had learned from Admiral Dewey&rsquo;s brief comment, yet hoping in
+spite of it that they would turn out sufficiently unfit for
+self-government for the event to vindicate the purchase. To demonstrate
+that the Filipinos were wholly unfit for the treatment accorded the
+Cubans was the only possible justification of the initial departure
+from the traditions of the Republic and from the principles which were
+its corner-stone. And he made the departure because the business
+&ldquo;interests&rdquo; of the country then believed&mdash;erroneously
+they all now admit&mdash;that it would pay. He decided to treat eternal
+principles as &ldquo;worn-out formul&aelig;.&rdquo; Senator Hoar once
+declined an invitation extended by his own city of Worcester, to
+deliver a eulogy on Mr. McKinley, because of his Philippine policy.
+True, he tempers the asperity of this action thus: &ldquo;It was not
+because I was behind any other man in admiration or personal affection
+for that lofty and beautiful character. But *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* if a great
+Catholic prelate were to die, his eulogy should not be pronounced by a
+Protestant.&rdquo;<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14135src" href=
+"#xd20e14135" name="xd20e14135src">1</a> But all Senator Hoar&rsquo;s
+speeches against the McKinley Philippine policy were as emphatic as
+Luther&rsquo;s ninety-five theses. He was in possession at the time,
+along with the rest of the Senate, of the correspondence with the Paris
+Peace Commission made public after the presidential election of
+1900.</p>
+<p>Ever since Mr. McKinley took the Philippines, it has been the
+awkward but inexorable duty of the defenders of that good man&rsquo;s
+fame to deprecate Filipino capacity for self-government. President
+Taft&rsquo;s chief life-work since this century began has been to take
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb628" href="#pb628" name=
+"pb628">628</a>]</span>care of his martyred predecessor&rsquo;s fame,
+by proving that Mr. McKinley guessed right in 1898 when he bought the
+Philippines and trusted to luck to be able to make out, in spite of
+what Admiral Dewey had said, a case sufficiently derogatory to Filipino
+intelligence to justify the purchase and subjugation of the islands at
+the very time we were freeing Cuba. Obviously, then, the more utterly
+unfit for self-government in the present or the near future Mr. Taft
+can make the Filipinos out, the nearer he gets to vindicating the
+memory of Mr. McKinley, that is, with men of his own, (Mr.
+Taft&rsquo;s) high character. He insists on treating as children a
+people who got up a well-armed army of thirty-odd thousand men in three
+or four months and held at bay, for two years and a half, some 125,000
+husky American soldiers, over five times as many as it took to drive
+Spain from the Western hemisphere. Physical force is the basis of all
+government among men. If President Taft had anything of the soldier
+instinct of his immediate predecessor, he would not sniff demagoguery
+in the proposition that military efficiency is a better guaranty of
+capacity for self-government than all the school-books in the world,
+and that proven passionate willingness to die for freedom from alien
+domination is the best guaranty conceivable against internecine strife.
+It was a tremendous struggle with his own conscience that Mr. McKinley
+went through with before he decided to repudiate the principles on
+which we took Cuba in order, for a money consideration euphemistically
+called &ldquo;trade expansion,&rdquo; to take the Philippines. He had
+advices before him at the time making it reasonably certain that this
+meant trouble with the Filipinos, i.e., bloodshed in the Philippines,
+the extent of which none could foresee, and about which he was of
+course apprehensive. In the matter of instructing <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb629" href="#pb629" name="pb629">629</a>]</span>our
+Paris Peace Commissioners to insist on Spain&rsquo;s ceding us the
+Philippines, Mr. McKinley took no moral ground tenable like a rock,
+such as truly great men take in great crises of their country&rsquo;s
+history. He did not attempt to lead the people. He simply decided that
+it would be a <i>popular</i> thing to do to take the islands. Fresh
+from a war entered upon to emancipate the Cubans from alien domination,
+he took a step which both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt warned him
+beforehand would <span class="corr" id="xd20e14149" title=
+"Source: probaby">probably</span> mean war&mdash;to subjugate, against
+their will, a people superior to the Cubans. And in taking this step,
+he took into his confidence, neither the people who paid for the war,
+nor the soldiers who fought it. To deny that his motives were
+benevolent would be simply stupid. But he followed the mob which
+shouted from the rear-end of his observation car and repeated by cable
+to the Paris Peace Commission, what the mob yelled. Ever since the
+supposed Philippine Klondyke whispered in President McKinley&rsquo;s
+ear &ldquo;Eat of the imperial fruits of a colonial policy,&rdquo; the
+archives of this government&mdash;the reports of the State, War, and
+Navy Departments, and the Congressional Documents&mdash;have reeked
+with the inevitable consequences of our fall from our high estate. No
+man can serve two masters. Philanthropy for pecuniary profit is a
+paradox. Duplicity ever follows deviation from principle. In our
+dealings in 1898 with Aguinaldo you find vacillation on the part of
+military commanders who personally did not know what fear was, and
+embarrassed hypocrisy in dealing with him on the part of men wearing
+the shoulder-straps of the American army, athwart the frankness of
+whose gaze no such shadow had ever fallen before. You find systematic
+concealment of our intentions in dealing with the insurgents, for fear
+they would insurge before <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb630" href=
+"#pb630" name="pb630">630</a>]</span>the Treaty was signed, and thus
+cause such a revulsion of feeling in <i>our</i> country against the
+purchase of <i>theirs</i> as to defeat the ratification of the treaty.
+After that, you find a systematic minimizing of the opposition to our
+rule, reinforced by subtle depreciation of Filipino intelligence, and
+backed up by a &ldquo;peace-at-any-price&rdquo; policy, periodically
+punctuated by the horrors of war without its dignity. The denial of
+Filipino opposition to our rule, which opposition means merely a
+natural longing for freedom from alien rule, has gradually been
+abandoned. Nobody now clings to that stale fiction. Also, a long course
+of chastening, through reconcentration and kindred severities
+subsequent to the official announcement of a state of general peace,
+has at last gotten the situation as to public order well in hand. The
+only question for those who affect that &ldquo;decent respect to the
+opinions of mankind&rdquo; which the men of 1776 had in mind is,
+&ldquo;Are the Filipinos a people?&rdquo; President Taft was originally
+with Senator Hoar on the Philippine question. At least he was an
+&ldquo;anti-expansionist.&rdquo; In all the heat of subsequent
+controversy he has never made bold to deny the general proposition of
+the unalienable right of every people to liberty and the pursuit of
+happiness in their own way. His position is that the Filipino people
+must be made an exception to the rule because they are not <i>a
+people</i>. This is the strongest I can state his proposition for him.
+It is very difficult to state even with apparent plausibility, anything
+which denies the right of every community of people to immunity from
+alien domination. The case must be an extreme one. The issue which the
+writer raises with the President&rsquo;s policy is that the Filipinos
+<i>are</i> a people.</p>
+<p>I know of no graver responsibility that an American statesman can
+take upon himself before the bar of <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb631" href="#pb631" name="pb631">631</a>]</span>history than to deny
+the right of any given people to self-government. Certainly any man who
+denies that right at least assumes the burden of proof that they are
+unfit to attend to their own affairs. Mr. McKinley assumed it without
+pretending to know anything much about the Filipinos, the motive being
+that the Islands would be profitable to us. When Mr. Taft went to the
+Philippines in 1900, he went, not to investigate the correctness of Mr.
+McKinley&rsquo;s assumption, which was implied in the purchase, but to
+champion it; not to give advice concerning the righteousness of having
+taken over the Philippines, but to bolster up the policy. He assumed
+the burden of proof before he knew anything about the facts. The burden
+has been on him ever since. Any subordinate who helps him to bear that
+burden, finds favor in his eyes. But the burden is greater than he can
+bear. The proof fails. The proof shows that the Filipino people ought
+to be allowed to pursue happiness in their own way instead of being
+made to pursue it in Mr. Taft&rsquo;s way. Once you pretend that our
+true object in the Philippines is the &ldquo;pursuit of
+happiness&rdquo; for them, The Taft policy is condemned by the facts;
+and that is why I am opposed to it. The record shows this. He admits
+it. But he insists, with a sigh, that in some other generation they
+will be happy. Meantime, we are drifting toward our next war carrying
+in tow 8,000,000 of human beings who, if neutralized and let alone
+would not be disturbed by our next war, but whose destinies now must be
+dependent upon the outcome of such war, however little they may be
+concerned in the issues which bring it about.</p>
+<p>The shifty opportunism which once actually held out to the Filipinos
+the hope of some day becoming a State of the United States of America,
+has long since <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb632" href="#pb632" name=
+"pb632">632</a>]</span>lapsed into the silence of shame, because no
+American ever honestly believed that the American people would ever
+countenance any such preposterous proposition. And so a free republic
+based on representative government is face to face with the proposition
+of having a &ldquo;crown colony&rdquo; on its hands which wishes to be,
+and could soon be made fit to be, a free republic also.</p>
+<p>If a federal republic cannot live half slave and half free, can it
+live with millions of the governed denied a voice in the federal
+government confessedly forever? <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb633"
+href="#pb633" name="pb633">633</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14135" href="#xd20e14135src" name="xd20e14135">1</a></span>
+<i>Autobiography of Seventy Years</i>, vol. ii., p. 317.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch28" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXVIII</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Road to Autonomy</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<div class="lgouter">
+<p class="line">Oh be ye not dismayed</p>
+<p class="line">Though ye stumbled and ye strayed.</p>
+</div>
+<p class="first xd20e236"><span class="sc">Kipling</span>&mdash;<i>A
+Song of the English.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">He who points out a wrong without being prepared to
+suggest a remedy presumes upon the patience of his neighbor without
+good and sufficient cause. Up to this point the wrong has been
+unfolded, with such ability as was vouchsafed the narrator, &ldquo;from
+Genesis to Revelations,&rdquo; so to speak; also his own attitude as an
+eye-witness, and its evolution from the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for
+an eye and a tooth for a tooth, to the more Christian doctrines of the
+New Testament. Let us now consider the remedy.</p>
+<p>In the course of our travels with the army in the earlier chapters
+of this book, we first followed its northern advance, from Manila over
+the great central plain drained by the Rio Grande and crossed by the
+railroad connecting Manila Bay with Lingayen Gulf; its further advance
+from the northern borders of the plain over the mountains of Central
+Luzon; and its march from the central mountains to the northern sea, at
+the extreme northern end of the archipelago. We thus saw in detail the
+military conquest and occupation of that part of Luzon lying north of
+the Pasig River. Before leaving that part of the subject, the way the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb634" href="#pb634" name=
+"pb634">634</a>]</span>provinces thus occupied were grouped into
+military districts was indicated. Following the lines of the military
+occupation, it was shown that Northern Luzon was naturally and
+conveniently susceptible of division into four groups of provinces,
+which groups might ultimately be evolved into self-governing
+commonwealths&mdash;States of a Philippine Federal Union, as
+follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Name of State</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Ilocos<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14219src" href="#xd20e14219"
+name="xd20e14219src">1</a></td>
+<td>6,500</td>
+<td>650,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cagayan<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14232src" href="#xd20e14232"
+name="xd20e14232src">2</a></td>
+<td>12,000</td>
+<td>300,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pangasinan<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14242src" href="#xd20e14242"
+name="xd20e14242src">3</a></td>
+<td>4,500</td>
+<td>625,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Pampamga<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14252src" href="#xd20e14252"
+name="xd20e14252src">4</a></td>
+<td>5,000</td>
+<td>650,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">28,000</td>
+<td class="sum">2,225,000</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>It will be remembered that after our narrative had followed the
+occupation of Northern Luzon by the American forces to practical
+completion, we turned to that part of Luzon lying south of Manila, and
+followed the military occupation as it was gradually extended from the
+Pasig River to the extreme point of Southern Luzon. Before closing the
+review of that military panorama, suggestions were made for an ultimate
+grouping of the provinces of Southern Luzon into two governmental units
+intended to be ultimately evolved into states. Those suggestions
+contemplated grouping the provinces of the lake region bordering on the
+Laguna de Bay and the adjacent provinces, into a territory designated
+for convenience as Cavite.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14269src" href=
+"#xd20e14269" name="xd20e14269src">5</a> This territory was to include
+all of Southern Luzon except the hemp peninsula, which lies to the
+south of the Lake <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb635" href="#pb635"
+name="pb635">635</a>]</span>country. It was also suggested in the same
+connection that the three provinces of the hemp peninsula might form a
+convenient ultimate State of Camarines. In other words, two states can
+be made out of Southern Luzon as follows:</p>
+<div class="table">
+<table>
+<thead>
+<tr valign="top" class="label">
+<td><i>Name of State</i></td>
+<td><i>Area</i> (sq. m.)</td>
+<td><i>Population</i></td>
+</tr>
+</thead>
+<tbody>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Cavite</td>
+<td>8,500</td>
+<td>700,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Camarines</td>
+<td>7,000</td>
+<td>600,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr valign="top">
+<td>Total</td>
+<td class="sum">15,500</td>
+<td class="sum">1,300,000</td>
+</tr>
+</tbody>
+</table>
+</div>
+<p>To recapitulate: All of Luzon except Manila and the vicinity can at
+once be divided into the six groups of provinces above
+mentioned&mdash;&ldquo;territories,&rdquo; having what we are
+accustomed in the United States to call a &ldquo;territorial form of
+government,&rdquo; and intended to be made states later. Luzon is about
+the size of Cuba (a little over 40,000 sq. miles), is twice as thickly
+populated (nearly 4,000,000 to Cuba&rsquo;s 2,000,000), and is not
+cursed with a negro question, as Cuba is.</p>
+<p>The above totals, be it remembered, are only round numbers, but they
+get us &ldquo;out of the woods&rdquo; so to speak, and away from a lot
+of unpronounceable names. They show you how to handle Luzon as if it
+were about the size of Ohio&mdash;which it is. And, as has already been
+made clear in the earlier part of this volume, Luzon
+&ldquo;<i>is</i>&rdquo; the Philippines, in a very suggestive sense of
+the phrase, since it contains half the land area of the archipelago
+(outside of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao), and half the total
+population of the whole archipelago, besides being eight or ten times
+as large as any other island of the group except Mindanao; and it also
+contains the city which is the capital and chief port of the
+archipelago, and has been the seat of <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb636" href="#pb636" name="pb636">636</a>]</span>government for over
+three hundred years&mdash;Manila. And Manila is eight or ten times as
+large as any other town in the archipelago.</p>
+<p>After the occupation of Luzon, General Otis&rsquo;s extension of our
+occupation to the Visayan islands was reviewed, and in that connection
+it was pointed out that each of the six largest of those islands to
+wit, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, might be ultimately
+evolved into six states.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14321src" href=
+"#xd20e14321" name="xd20e14321src">6</a></p>
+<p>The smaller islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao could easily be
+disposed of governmentally by being attached to the jurisdiction of one
+of the said six islands.</p>
+<p>There is to-day no reason why a dozen Americans could not be at once
+appointed governors of the twelve prospective autonomous commonwealths
+above indicated, just as the President of the United States has in the
+past appointed governors for New Mexico, Arizona, and other territories
+of the United States which have subsequently been admitted to the
+Union. If the Congress of the United States should promise the
+Filipinos independence, to be granted as soon as American authority in
+the Islands should so recommend, the dozen territorial governments
+intended to be evolved into states of an ultimate federal union could
+soon be whipped into shape where they could take care of themselves to
+the extent that our state governments to-day take care of themselves.
+American representatives of American authority in the Islands, sent out
+to work out such a programme, might be instructed to watch these twelve
+territorial governments, granting to each the right to elect a governor
+in lieu of the appointed governor as soon as in their judgment a given
+territory was worthy of it. I have no doubt <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb637" href="#pb637" name="pb637">637</a>]</span>that
+such recommendations would follow successively as to all of said
+prospective states inside of four or five years. Whether this plan is
+wise or not, it certainly is not, as far as I am concerned, &ldquo;half
+baked.&rdquo; Some five years ago, in the <i>North American
+Review</i>,<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14338src" href="#xd20e14338"
+name="xd20e14338src">7</a> I suggested that Luzon could be so organized
+within less than ten years by American territorial governors selected
+for the work, naming the Honorable George Curry of New Mexico, formerly
+Governor of the territory of New Mexico, and now a member of Congress
+therefrom, as an ideal man to organize one such territory. It is true
+that there are not eleven other men as well qualified for the work as
+Governor Curry. In fact he is probably better qualified for the work
+than any man living. The language used as to Governor Curry in the
+<i>North American Review</i> article referred to was as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If the inhabitants of these regions were told by a man
+whom they liked and would believe, as they would Curry, that they were
+to have autonomous governments like one of the Western Territories of
+the United States, at the very earliest possible moment, and urged to
+get ready for it, they could and would, under his guidance. We would
+get a co-operation from those people we do not now get and never will
+get, so long as we keep them in uncertainty as to what we are going to
+do with them. If next year we should formally disclaim intention to
+retain the islands permanently, and set to work to create autonomous
+Territories destined ultimately to be States of a Federated Philippine
+Republic, whenever fit, we would soon see the way out of this tangle,
+and behold the beginning of the end of it.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Whenever the twelve territorial governments should be gotten into
+smooth working order under elected <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb638"
+href="#pb638" name="pb638">638</a>]</span>native governors, the
+Philippine archipelago would then be <i>nearly</i> ready for
+independence, so far as its internal affairs are concerned. The danger
+of their being annexed on the first pretext by some one of the great
+land-grabbing powers should be met by our guaranteeing them their
+independence, as we do Cuba, until they could be protected by
+neutralization treaties, such as protect Belgium and Switzerland
+to-day, as explained in the chapter which follows this. Powers not
+specifically granted to the several states-in-embryo should of course,
+until the final grant of independence, be reserved to the central
+government at Manila. Manila and Rizal province would be available at
+almost any time as a thirteenth state. So that when the twelve states
+above suggested had shown themselves capable of local self-government,
+Manila and Rizal province might be added to make the final one of
+thirteen original states of a Philippine Republic.</p>
+<p>Any American who has seen a Filipino <i>pueblo</i> transformed, as
+if by magic, from listless apathy to a state of buzzing and busy
+enthusiasm suggestive of a bee-hive, by preparations for some church
+<i>fiesta</i>, or for the coming of some dignitary from Manila, has
+seen something analogous to what would happen if the Filipino body
+politic should suddenly be electrified by a promise of independence
+under some such programme as the above. A generous rivalry would at
+once ensue all over the archipelago in each of the twelve prospective
+states. Each would seek to be the first to be recommended by American
+authority as ready for statehood. I do not believe the annals of
+national experience contain any analogy where every member of a given
+community has rallied to a common cause more completely than the whole
+Filipino people would rally to such a prospective programme of
+independence. The <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb639" href="#pb639"
+name="pb639">639</a>]</span>unanimity would be as absolute as the kind
+we saw among the American people at the outbreak of the Spanish War,
+when Congress one fine morning placed fifty millions of dollars at the
+disposal of President McKinley by a unanimous vote.</p>
+<p>I especially invite attention to the fact that the above programme
+throws away nothing that has been done by us in the Islands in the last
+twelve years in the way of organization. It simply takes it and builds
+upon it. Congress should not attempt to work out the details from this
+end of the line. We should send men out there from here to work them
+out, with local co-operation from the leading Filipinos. Men animated
+by the idea of working out a programme under which <i>the living</i>
+may hope to see the independence of their country, should be sent out
+to take the place of the men now there who are irrevocably committed to
+the programme of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, which
+holds out no hope to the living. It is not wise to arrange the details
+of the programme by act of Congress without a year or two of study of
+the situation by such men <i>on the ground</i>. An act of Congress
+which goes into details before getting the recommendations of such men
+will inevitably set up a lot of straw men easy for the other side to
+knock down. All you need is a program, sanctioned by Congress,
+containing a promise of independence, and men sent out to the islands
+to work out the program. They would report back from time to time, and
+the Congress by whose authority they went out would have no hesitation
+in being guided by their recommendations. If unpatriotic greed for
+office among the Filipinos, or other opposition animated by evil
+motives, should block the game, your Americans so sent out would have
+to recommend the calling of a halt. This ever-present shadow in the
+background <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb640" href="#pb640" name=
+"pb640">640</a>]</span>would in turn throw the shadow of ostracism over
+all demagogues.</p>
+<p>Meantime the Filipinos should be given a Senate, or upper house, in
+which, the thirteen prospective &ldquo;states&rdquo; should be
+represented by two men, the bill therefor to be framed out there, and
+sent back here to Congress for approval. This would give them under the
+plan here suggested, as soon as the Americans sent out should so
+recommend, a Senate of twenty-six members. At present, if the native
+Assembly, or lower house, does not pass the annual appropriations
+necessary to run the government, the appropriation act of the preceding
+year again becomes law. At present, the upper house is the Philippine
+Commission. By withholding its consent, it can prevent any legislation
+whatsoever. So, at present, the Assembly is little more than a debating
+society. All questions as to appropriations, veto of legislation, and
+other details, in the event the Filipinos are given a Senate also,
+should be left to be fixed in the bill recommended by the men sent out
+to work out the program of promise.</p>
+<p>On March 20, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, the distinguished veteran
+Congressman from Virginia, who is Chairman of the Committee on Insular
+Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill entitled
+&ldquo;A bill to establish a qualified independence for the
+Philippines, and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall
+become absolute and complete.&rdquo; The greater part of what precedes
+this paragraph of this chapter was written prior to March 20, 1912. Mr.
+Jones&rsquo;s bill works out the details of the independence problem in
+a manner somewhat different from the plan I suggest, but that does not
+make me any the less heartily in favor of the principle which his bill
+embodies. The supreme virtue of the Jones <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb641" href="#pb641" name="pb641">641</a>]</span>bill is that it
+promises Independence at a fixed date, July 4, 1921. It ends the cruel
+uncertainty, so unjust to both the Filipinos and to the Americans in
+the Philippines, that is contained in the present program of indefinite
+retention with undeclared intention. Five years ago, in the <i>North
+American Review</i> for January 18, and June 21, 1907, the writer
+hereof expressed the belief that an earlier date was feasible,
+thus:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">If three strong and able men, familiar with insular
+conditions, and still young enough to undertake the task<a class=
+"noteref" id="xd20e14388src" href="#xd20e14388" name=
+"xd20e14388src">8</a> were told by a President of the United States, by
+authority of the Congress, &ldquo;Go out there and set up a respectable
+native government in ten years, and then come away,&rdquo; they could
+and would do it, and that government would be a success; and one of the
+greatest moral victories in the annals of free government would have
+been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their
+country&rsquo;s history.</p>
+</div>
+<p>As Mr. Jones&rsquo;s bill allows four years more of time, I believe
+it to be absolutely safe.</p>
+<p>Governor Curry, the Congressman from New Mexico hereinabove
+mentioned, who spent eight years in the Philippines, agrees with the
+fundamental principle of the Jones bill, that as to making a definite
+promise <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb642" href="#pb642" name=
+"pb642">642</a>]</span>of Independence within a few years, and does not
+consider 1921 too early.</p>
+<p>Under the present law, the Philippine Assembly has some eighty
+members, each supposed to represent 90,000 people, more or less. This
+tallies, roughly, with the census total of population, which is
+7,600,000.<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14400src" href="#xd20e14400"
+name="xd20e14400src">9</a> Under the existing law in the Philippines,
+the qualifications for voting are really of two kinds, though nominally
+of three kinds. There is a property qualification, and there is an
+educational qualification. In any case, in order to vote, the
+individual must be twenty-one years old, and must have lived for six
+months in the place where he offers to vote. The property qualification
+requires that the would-be voter own at least $250 worth of property,
+or pay a tax to the amount of $15. The explanation of how a man may not
+own $250 worth of property and yet pay $15 taxes is that under the old
+Spanish system, which we partially adopted, a man might pay such
+<i>cedula</i> or poll-tax as he preferred, according to a graduated
+scale, certain civic rights being accorded to those voluntarily paying
+the higher poll-tax which were denied to those paying less. The
+educational qualification requires the would-be voter to speak, read,
+and write either English or Spanish, or else to have held certain
+enumerated small municipal offices under the Spaniards&mdash;before the
+American occupation. Mr. Jones&rsquo;s bill proposes to add the
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb643" href="#pb643" name=
+"pb643">643</a>]</span>speaking, reading, and writing of the native
+dialect of a given locality<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14408src" href=
+"#xd20e14408" name="xd20e14408src">10</a> to the educational
+qualification. This would double, or perhaps triple, the electorate,
+and would, in my judgment, be wise. Thousands upon thousands of natives
+who only <i>speak</i> a little Spanish can both <i>speak, read, and
+write</i> their native Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan, as the case may be.
+The total of those qualified to vote for members of the Assembly in
+1907 was only about 100,000. At a later election, that number was
+doubled. If there are 7,500,000 people in the archipelago, one fifth of
+these should represent the adult male population, say 1,500,000. Under
+Mr. Jones&rsquo;s bill, the electorate would probably increase to half
+a million long before the date he proposes for independence, July 4,
+1921. But all such details as qualification for voting might, it seems
+to me, be left to people on the ground, their recommendations
+controlling. Under a promise of independence by 1921, a very fair
+electorate of at least one third, possibly one half, of the adult male
+population, could be built up. As the majority report on the Jones
+Bill, dated April 26, 1912, says:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">For nearly ten years the average public-school
+enrolment has not been less than 500,000.<a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14421src" href="#xd20e14421" name="xd20e14421src">11</a></p>
+</div>
+<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb644" href="#pb644" name=
+"pb644">644</a>]</span></p>
+<p>I believe that the Moros should be left as they are for the present.
+The time for solving that problem has not yet been reached. Mr. Jones
+himself evidently bases his idea of allowing the Moro country
+representation in the Philippine Congress, or legislature provided by
+his bill, on the probability that enough Christian people will vote,
+down there, to make up an electorate that would not be
+&ldquo;impossible,&rdquo; <i>i.e.</i>, absurd. For instance, he tells
+me that a great many people have moved into Mindanao from the northern
+islands for commercial reasons, and, if I recollect correctly, that
+Zamboanga, the most beautiful little port in Mindanao, which hardly had
+10,000 people when I was there, now has possibly 50,000. But the Moro
+question need not stand in the way of setting up an independent
+government in the Philippines in 1921, as proposed by his bill. You
+have material for thirteen original states, representing a population
+of nearly seven million Christian people, in Luzon and the six main
+Visayan Islands. Why delay the creation of this republic on account of
+250,000 semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros in Mindanao&mdash;a
+separate island lying off to the south of the proposed
+republic?<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14430src" href="#xd20e14430" name=
+"xd20e14430src">12</a> A happy solution of the matter would be to send
+Mr. Jones out there as Governor-General and let him work out the
+problem on the ground. He has had a long and distinguished career in
+the public service, twenty-two years in Congress. His public record and
+speeches on the Philippine question from the beginning would make him
+to the Filipinos the very incarnation of a <i>bona fide</i> intention
+on our part to give them their independence <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb645" href="#pb645" name="pb645">645</a>]</span>at
+the earliest practical moment, that is, at some time which <i>the
+living</i> might hope to see. When Governor Taft and Mr. Root drew the
+Philippine Government Act of 1902, the former had already been
+president of the Philippine Commission for two years, had been all over
+the archipelago, and knew it well. Suppose the Taft policy should be
+substituted by the more progressive Jones policy. Mr. Jones, or whoever
+is to change the policy, ought to have as much acquaintance with the
+subject, acquired on the ground, as Mr. Taft had when he formulated his
+policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention. The nucleus
+of the Taft policy was stated by Governor Taft to the Senate Committee
+in 1902, as follows<a class="noteref" id="xd20e14445src" href=
+"#xd20e14445" name="xd20e14445src">13</a>:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy
+is to be declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United
+States to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show
+themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing
+popular government, when their relation to the United States, either of
+statehood, or of quasi-independence, like the colony of Australia or
+Canada, can be declared after mutual conference.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The policy which Mr. Jones has favored for the last twelve years is
+almost as well known to the Filipinos as are the views of Mr. Taft
+himself.</p>
+<p>In conclusion, the writer desires to say, with especial emphasis,
+that the suggestions outlining the plan which forms the bulk of this
+chapter are presented in a spirit of entire deference to the views of
+any one else who may have considered this great subject carefully,
+especially to the views of Mr. Jones, whose bill is so entirely right
+in principle. The one supreme need of the situation is a definite
+legislative declaration which <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb646"
+href="#pb646" name="pb646">646</a>]</span>shall make clear to all
+concerned&mdash;to the Filipino demagogue and the American grafter, as
+well as to the great body of the good people of both races out
+there&mdash;that the governing of a remote and alien people is to have
+no permanent place in the purposes of our national life; and that we do
+<i>bona fide</i> intend to give the Filipinos their independence at a
+date in the future which will interest <i>the living</i>, by extending
+to <i>the living</i> the hope to see the independence of their country.
+And the Jones Bill does that. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb647"
+href="#pb647" name="pb647">647</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+<div class="footnotes">
+<hr class="fnsep">
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14219" href="#xd20e14219src" name="xd20e14219">1</a></span> P.
+252, <i>ante</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14232" href="#xd20e14232src" name="xd20e14232">2</a></span> P.
+255.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14242" href="#xd20e14242src" name="xd20e14242">3</a></span> P.
+258.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14252" href="#xd20e14252src" name="xd20e14252">4</a></span> Pp.
+258&ndash;9.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14269" href="#xd20e14269src" name="xd20e14269">5</a></span> The
+name is immaterial, but the grouping is convenient and practicable,
+though not the only grouping practicable.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14321" href="#xd20e14321src" name="xd20e14321">6</a></span>
+<i>See</i> p. 267, <i>ante</i>.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14338" href="#xd20e14338src" name="xd20e14338">7</a></span> For
+June 21, 1907.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14388" href="#xd20e14388src" name="xd20e14388">8</a></span> In
+the article quoted from I named three men, adding &ldquo;or any three
+men of like calibre.&rdquo; One of the three was Justice Adam C.
+Carson, of the Philippine Supreme Court, who has been a member of the
+Philippine Judiciary since the Taft Civil Government was founded in
+1901. If this book has gained for me any character in the estimation of
+any reader who is or may hereafter be clothed with authority, I desire
+to say here, on the very highest public grounds, that, in my judgment,
+Judge Carson is the most considerable man we have out there now
+(1912)&mdash;a good man to have in an emergency. Though not as learned
+in the law as his colleague, Justice Johnson&mdash;who is quite the
+equal, as a jurist, of most of the Federal judges I know in the United
+States, Judge Carson is a man of great breadth of view, and is
+peculiarly endowed with capacity to handle men and situations
+effectively and patriotically.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14400" href="#xd20e14400src" name="xd20e14400">9</a></span> Says
+the census of the Philippines of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15: &ldquo;The
+total population of the Philippine Archipelago on March 2, 1903, was
+7,635,426. Of this number, 6,987,686 enjoyed a considerable degree of
+civilization, while the remainder, 647,740, consisted of wild
+people.&rdquo; By this same Census, the Moros are classified as
+uncivilized, and the population of the island on which they live,
+Mindanao, is given at about 500,000 (499,634, vol. ii., p. 126), of
+which about half only (252,940) are Moros, the rest being civilized.
+The total of the uncivilized people of the archipelago, according to
+the Census, is 647,740 (vol. ii., p. 123), less than 400,000, leaving
+out the Moros.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14408" href="#xd20e14408src" name="xd20e14408">10</a></span>
+Tagalo, Ilocano, and Visayan are the three main dialects that have been
+evolved into written language by the patience of the Spanish priests in
+the last couple of hundred years or so. Probably five sixths of the
+people of the archipelago speak some one of these three dialects. In
+fact they can hardly be called &ldquo;dialects,&rdquo; for there are
+plenty of books&mdash;novels, plays, grammars, histories, dictionaries,
+etc.&mdash;written in Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan. Every educated
+Filipino of the well-to-do classes grows up speaking Spanish and the
+dialect of his native province, while the latter is the only language
+spoken by the less fortunate people of his neighborhood, the poorer
+classes.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14421" href="#xd20e14421src" name="xd20e14421">11</a></span> This
+report is numbered Report 606, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., and accompanies H.
+R. 22143 (the Jones Bill).</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14430" href="#xd20e14430src" name="xd20e14430">12</a></span>
+According to the <i>American Census of the Philippines</i>, of 1903,
+the total population of Mindanao is 499,634 (see vol. ii., p. 126), of
+which 252,940 are Moros, and the rest civilized. In addition to said
+252,940 Moros on Mindanao, the adjacent islets contain some 25,000
+Moros.</p>
+<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id=
+"xd20e14445" href="#xd20e14445src" name="xd20e14445">13</a></span> See
+<i>Senate Document</i> 331, 1902, p. 339.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div id="ch29" class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="label">Chapter XXIX</h2>
+<h2 class="main">The Way Out</h2>
+<div class="epigraph">
+<p class="first">Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland
+has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of Europe that its
+violation would inevitably provoke a storm of indignation.</p>
+<p class="xd20e236"><span class="sc">M. de Martens</span> in the
+<i lang="fr">Revue des Deux Mondes</i>.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">On March 25, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, of Virginia,
+Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a
+resolution (<i>H. J. 278</i>) proposing the neutralization of the
+Philippines, to accompany his Philippine Independence Bill discussed in
+the preceding chapter. Such a resolution, accompanying such a bill,
+both introduced by one of the majority leaders in the House of
+Representatives, lifts the question of Philippine neutralization out of
+the region of the &ldquo;academic,&rdquo; and brings it forward as a
+thing which must, sooner or later, command the serious consideration
+both of Congress and the country. There have been many such resolutions
+before that of Mr. Jones. But they are all the same in principle. All
+contemplate our guaranteeing the Filipinos their independence until the
+treaties they propose shall be consummated. In 1911, there were at
+least nine such resolutions proposing neutralization of the
+Philippines, introduced by the following named gentlemen, the first a
+Republican, the rest Democrats:</p>
+<p>Mr. McCall, of Massachusetts; Mr. Cline, of Indiana; <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb648" href="#pb648" name="pb648">648</a>]</span>Mr.
+Sabath, of Illinois; Mr. Garner, of Texas; Mr. Peters, of
+Massachusetts; Mr. Martin, of Colorado; Mr. Burgess, of Texas; Mr.
+Oldfield, of Arkansas; and Mr. Ferris, of Oklahoma.</p>
+<p>Because the neutralization plan to provide against the Philippines
+being annexed by some other Power in case we ever give them their
+independence would, if successfully worked out, reduce by that much the
+possible area of war, and be a distinct step in the direction of
+universal peace, it is certainly worthy of careful consideration by the
+enlightened judgment of the Congress and the world.</p>
+<p>Mr. McCall is the father of the neutralization idea, so far as the
+House of Representatives is concerned, application of it to the
+Philippines having been first suggested at the Universal Peace
+Conference of 1904, by Mr. Erving Winslow, of Boston. Mr. McCall has
+been introducing his neutralization resolution at every Congress for a
+number of Congresses past.</p>
+<p>The McCall Resolution (<i>H. J. Res. 107</i>) is the oldest, and
+perhaps the simplest, of the various pending resolutions for the
+neutralization of the Philippines, and is typical of all. It reads:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">JOINT RESOLUTION</p>
+<p>Declaring the purpose of the United States to recognize the
+independence of the Filipino people as soon as a stable government can
+be established, and requesting the President to open negotiations for
+the neutralization of the Philippine Islands.</p>
+<p><i>Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
+States of America in Congress assembled</i>:</p>
+<p>That in accordance with the principles upon which its government is
+founded and which were again asserted by it at the outbreak of the war
+with Spain, the United States <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb649"
+href="#pb649" name="pb649">649</a>]</span>declares that the Filipino
+people of right ought to be free and independent, and announces its
+purpose to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government,
+republican in form, can be established by them, and thereupon to
+transfer to such government all its rights in the Philippine Islands
+upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, and to leave the
+sovereignty and control of their country to the Filipino people.</p>
+<p><i>Resolved</i>, That the President of the United States be, and he
+hereby is, requested to open negotiations with such foreign Powers as
+in his opinion should be parties to the compact for the neutralization
+of the Philippine Islands by international agreement.</p>
+</div>
+<p>If the McCall Resolution, or any one of the kindred resolutions,
+were passed, and complied with by the President of the United States,
+and accepted by the other Powers, and the Filipinos were helped to
+organize territorial governments such as Arizona and New Mexico were
+before they became States, several such territories could form the
+nucleus about which to begin to build at once, as indicated in the
+chapter on &ldquo;The Road to Autonomy.&rdquo; A number of such
+territories could be made at once as completely autonomous as the
+governments of the territories of Arizona and New Mexico were before
+their admission to our Union. With those examples to emulate, together
+with the tingling of the general blood that would follow a promise of
+independence and a national life of their own, similar territorial
+governments could be successively organized, as indicated in the
+preceding chapter, throughout the archipelago. These could, in less
+than ten years, be fitted for admission to a federal union of
+autonomous territories, with the string of our sovereignty still tied
+to it, and an American Governor-General still over the whole, as now.
+And when the last island knocked <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb650"
+href="#pb650" name="pb650">650</a>]</span>for admission and was
+admitted, the string could be cut, and the Federal Union of Territories
+admitted, through our good offices, to the sisterhood of nations, as an
+independent Philippine republic. They would not bother the rest of the
+world any more than Belgium and Switzerland do, which are likewise
+protected by neutralization.</p>
+<p>The idea of international neutralization is not without pride of
+ancestry or hope of posterity. It was born out of the downfall of
+Napoleon I. The Treaty of Paris of 1815 declared that</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as
+well as its independence of outside influences, are in conformity with
+the true interests of European politics.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The Congress of Vienna, held afterwards in the same year, at which
+there were present, besides the various monarchs, such men as
+Wellington, Talleyrand, and Metternich, solemnly and finally reiterated
+that declaration. Would not &ldquo;the neutrality and
+inviolability&rdquo; of the Philippines be gladly acceded to by the
+great Powers as being &ldquo;in conformity with the true interests of
+European politics,&rdquo; and Asiatic politics as well?</p>
+<p>Says M. De Martens, in an article in the <i lang="fr">Revue des Deux
+Mondes</i> for November 15, 1903:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland
+has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of the civilized nations
+of Europe that its violation would inevitably provoke a storm of
+indignation.</p>
+</div>
+<p>At present, the Philippines are a potential apple of discord thrown
+into the Balance of Power in the Pacific. The present policy of
+indefinite retention by us, with undeclared intention, leaves everybody
+guessing, including <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb651" href="#pb651"
+name="pb651">651</a>]</span>ourselves. Now is the accepted time, while
+the horizon of the future is absolutely cloudless, to ask Japan to sign
+a treaty agreeing not to annex the Philippine Islands after we give
+them their independence. By her answer she will show her hand. The
+overcrowded monarchies do not pretend any special scruples about
+annexing anything annexable. Germany very frankly insists that she
+became a great Power too late to get her rightful share of the
+earth&rsquo;s surface, and that she <i>must</i> expand somewhither. And
+only the virile menace of the Monroe Doctrine has so far stayed her
+heavy hand from seizing some portion of South America. But probably
+none of the Powers would object to converting the Philippines into
+permanently neutral territory, by the same kind of an agreement that
+protects Switzerland.</p>
+<p>The Treaty of London of 1831, relative to Belgium and Holland,
+declares:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">Within the limits indicated, Belgium shall form an
+independent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be required to
+observe this same neutrality toward all the other states.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The signatories to this treaty were Great Britain, France, Austria,
+Prussia, and Russia. Forty years after it was made, during the
+Franco-Prussian war, when Belgium&rsquo;s neutrality was threatened by
+manifestations of intention on the part both of France and of Prussia
+to occupy some of her territory, England served notice on both parties
+to the conflict that if either violated the territorial integrity of
+Belgium, she, England, would join forces with the other. And the treaty
+was observed. The specific way in which observance of it was compassed
+was this: Great Britain made representations to both France and
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb652" href="#pb652" name=
+"pb652">652</a>]</span>Germany which resulted in two identical
+conventions, signed in August, 1870, at Paris and Berlin, whereby any
+act of aggression by either against Belgium was to be followed by
+England&rsquo;s joining forces with the other against the aggressor. So
+long as human nature does not change very materially, &ldquo;the
+green-eyed monster&rdquo; will remain a powerful factor in human
+affairs. The mutual jealousy of the Powers will always be the saving
+grace, in troubled times, of neutralization treaties signed in time of
+profound peace. If &ldquo;Balance of Power&rdquo; considerations in
+Europe have protected the Turkish Empire from annexation or
+dismemberment all these years, without a neutralization treaty, why
+will not the mutual jealousy of the Powers insure the signing and
+faithful observance of a treaty tending to preserve the Balance of
+Power in the Pacific? Who would object?</p>
+<p>The Panama Canal is to be opened in 1913. We want South America to
+be a real friend to the Monroe Doctrine, which she certainly is not
+enthusiastic about now, and will never be while we remain wedded to the
+McKinley Doctrine of Benevolent Assimilation of unconsenting
+people&mdash;people anxious to develop, under God, along their own
+lines. In 1906, while Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Root
+made a tour of South America. He told those people down there, at Rio
+Janeiro, by way of quieting their fears lest we may some day be moved
+to &ldquo;improve&rdquo; <i>their</i> condition also, through
+benevolent assimilation and vigorous application of the
+&ldquo;uplift&rdquo; treatment:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">We wish for *&nbsp;*&nbsp;* no territory except our
+own. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and
+weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as
+those of the greatest empire, and we deem <span class="pagenum">[<a id=
+"pb653" href="#pb653" name="pb653">653</a>]</span>the observance of
+that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of
+the strong.</p>
+</div>
+<p>That Rio Janeiro speech of Mr. Root&rsquo;s is as noble a
+masterpiece of real eloquence, its setting and all considered, as any
+utterance of any statesman of modern times. Among other things, he
+said:</p>
+<div class="blockquote">
+<p class="first">No student of our times can fail to see that not
+America alone but the whole civilized world is swinging away from its
+old governmental moorings and intrusting the fate of its civilization
+to the capacity of the popular mass to govern. By this pathway mankind
+is to travel, whithersoever it leads. <i>Upon the success of this, our
+great undertaking, the hope of humanity depends.</i></p>
+</div>
+<p>As Secretary of War, &ldquo;civilizing with a Krag,&rdquo; Mr. Root
+reminds one of Cortez and Pizarro. As Secretary of State, he permits us
+to believe that all the great men are not dead yet.</p>
+<p>If, in making that Rio Janeiro speech, Mr. Root laid to his soul the
+flattering unction that the minds of his hearers did not revert
+dubiously to his previous grim missionary work in the Philippines,
+where the percentage of literacy is superior to that of more than one
+Latin-American republic, he is very much mistaken. If he is laboring
+under any such delusion, let him read a book written since then by a
+distinguished South American publicist, called <i>El Porvenir de La
+Americana Latina</i> (&ldquo;The Future of Latin America&rdquo;). If he
+does not read Spanish, he can divine the contents of the book from the
+cartoon which adorns the title-page. The cartoon represents the
+American eagle, flag in claw, standing on the map of North America,
+looking toward South America as if ready for flight, its beak bent over
+Panama, the shadow of its wings already darkening <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb654" href="#pb654" name="pb654">654</a>]</span>the
+northern portions of the sister continent to the south of us. To get
+the trade of South America, in the mighty struggle for commercial
+supremacy which is to follow the opening of the Panama Canal, we must
+win the confidence of South America. We will never do it until we do
+the right thing by the Filipinos. Concerning the Philippines, South
+America reflects that we annexed the first supposedly rich
+non-contiguous Spanish country we ever had a chance to annex that we
+had not previously solemnly vowed we would not annex. We must choose
+between the Monroe Doctrine of mutually respectful Fraternal Relation,
+which contemplates some twenty-one mutually trustful republics in the
+Western Hemisphere, all a unit against alien colonization here, and the
+McKinley Doctrine of grossly patronizing Benevolent Assimilation, which
+contemplates some 8,000,000 of people in the Eastern Hemisphere, all a
+unit against alien colonization there&mdash;a people, moreover, whose
+friendship we have cultivated with the Gatling gun and the gallows, and
+watered with tariff and other legislation enacted without knowledge and
+used without shame.</p>
+<p>We should stop running a kindergarten for adults in Asia, and get
+back to the Monroe Doctrine. There are only two hemispheres to a
+sphere, and our manifest destiny lies in the Western one. We do not
+want the earth. Our mission as a nation is to conserve the republican
+form of government, and the consent-of-the-governed principle, and to
+promote the general peace of mankind by insuring it in our half of the
+earth. The first thing to do to set this country right again is to get
+rid of the Philippines, and give them a square deal, pursuant to the
+spirit of the neutralization resolutions now pending before Congress.
+All these resolutions contain the one supreme need of the hour,
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb655" href="#pb655" name=
+"pb655">655</a>]</span>an honest declaration of intention. The longer
+we fight shy of that, the less likely we are ever to give the Filipinos
+their independence, and the deeper we get into the mire of mistaken
+philanthropy and covert exploitation.</p>
+<p>We should resume our original programme of blazing out the path and
+making clear the way up which any nation of the earth may follow when
+it will. That path lies along the line of actually attempting as a
+nation a practical demonstration of the Power of Righteousness, or, in
+other words, the existence of an Omnipotent Omniscient Benevolent Good
+(whether you spell it with one <i>o</i> or with two is not important)
+shaping, guiding, and directing human affairs, such demonstration to be
+made through the concerted action of a self-governing people under a
+written Constitution based on equality of opportunity and the Golden
+Rule.</p>
+<p>As a people we are very young yet. It is not yet written in the Book
+of Time how long this nation will survive. So far, our government is
+only an experiment. But, as John Quincy Adams once said, it and its
+Constitution are &ldquo;an experiment upon the human heart,&rdquo; to
+see whether or not the Golden Rule will work in government among men.
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb657" href="#pb657" name=
+"pb657">657</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="back">
+<div id="index" class="div1 index"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h2 class="main">Index</h2>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">(Ph. = Philippines or Philippine, according to
+context. Pop. = population.)</p>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">A</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Abra province, <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+<p>Adjutant-General Corbin, cablegrams of 1899 to Otis, <a href=
+"#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>, <a href="#pb306" class=
+"pageref">306</a></p>
+<p>Agriculture, wealth of Ph. is in, <a href="#pb607" class=
+"pageref">607</a>;<br>
+Sugar Trust, Tobacco Trust, Hemp Trust, and Ph. sugar, tobacco, and
+hemp, <a href="#pb560" class="pageref">560</a>&ndash;1, <a href=
+"#pb565" class="pageref">565</a>, <a href="#pb569" class=
+"pageref">569</a>&ndash;70<span class="corr" id="xd20e14640" title=
+"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a>&ndash;622</p>
+<p>Aguinaldo, personal equation of, <a href="#pb5" class=
+"pageref">5</a>, <a href="#pb240" class="pageref">240</a>;<br>
+present demeanor <a href="#pb6" class="pageref">6</a>;<br>
+early dealings with Consul Pratt, <a href="#pb7" class=
+"pageref">7</a>&ndash;15;<br>
+and Wildman, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>;<br>
+with Admiral Dewey, <a href="#pb16" class=
+"pageref">16</a>&ndash;45;<br>
+with General Anderson, <a href="#pb46" class=
+"pageref">46</a>&ndash;66;<br>
+with Merritt, <a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>&ndash;87;<br>
+with Otis, <a href="#pb88" class="pageref">88</a>&ndash;106, <a href=
+"#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>&ndash;185;<br>
+escape through our lines, November, 1899, <a href="#pb246" class=
+"pageref">246</a>;<br>
+capture, 1901, <a href="#pb332" class="pageref">332</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+takes oath of allegiance, <a href="#pb340" class="pageref">340</a>;<br>
+issues proclamation, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p>
+<p>Albay province, area and pop., <a href="#pb265" class=
+"pageref">265</a>;<br>
+insurrection of 1902&ndash;3 in, <a href="#pb432" class=
+"pageref">432</a>&ndash;436</p>
+<p>Alger, R. A., resigns as Secretary of War, <a href="#pb222" class=
+"pageref">222</a></p>
+<p>Allen, H. T., General, on constabulary loyalty, <a href="#pb403"
+class="pageref">403</a>;<br>
+on Samar situation in 1904, <a href="#pb480" class=
+"pageref">480</a>&ndash;1, <a href="#pb488" class=
+"pageref">488</a>;<br>
+in 1906, <a href="#pb517" class="pageref">517</a></p>
+<p>Ambos Camarines. see Camarines</p>
+<p>American governors of Ph., 1898&ndash;1912, list of, <a href=
+"#pb558" class="pageref">558</a></p>
+<p>American Imperialism contrasted with British, <a href="#pb127"
+class="pageref">127</a>, <a href="#pb449" class="pageref">449</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;American Ireland,&rdquo; why make Ph., <a href="#pb508"
+class="pageref">508</a></p>
+<p>American troops, total in Ph., February 4, 1899, <a href="#pb186"
+class="pageref">186</a>;<br>
+total employed in Ph. insurrection, <a href="#pb316" class=
+"pageref">316</a>;<br>
+cost of, to-day, <a href="#pb600" class="pageref">600</a></p>
+<p><i>Amigo</i>, campaign meaning of, <a href="#pb201" class=
+"pageref">201</a>, <a href="#pb242" class="pageref">242</a></p>
+<p>Anderson, T. M., General, dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb46"
+class="pageref">46</a>&ndash;66</p>
+<p>Angeles, MacArthur&rsquo;s advance from, <a href="#pb238" class=
+"pageref">238</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Anti-expansionist,&rdquo; Eighth Army Corps overwhelmingly
+so, <a href="#pb192" class="pageref">192</a>, <a href="#pb199" class=
+"pageref">199</a></p>
+<p>Archipelago, Ph., geography simplified, <a href="#pb228" class=
+"pageref">228</a></p>
+<p>Aringay fight, <a href="#pb119" class="pageref">119</a></p>
+<p>Army songs of Ph.: under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class=
+"pageref">186</a>;<br>
+under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br>
+under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p>
+<p>Army, Taft belittling of work of, <a href="#pb299" class=
+"pageref">299</a>;<br>
+annual cost of, in Ph., to-day, <a href="#pb600" class=
+"pageref">600</a>&ndash;03</p>
+<p>Army and Navy Journal, <a href="#pb569" class="pageref">569</a></p>
+<p>Arnold, Commander, U. S. N., <a href="#pb236" class=
+"pageref">236</a></p>
+<p>Arnold, J. R., on Ph. Civil Service, <a href="#pb587" class=
+"pageref">587</a>&ndash;590</p>
+<p>Aryat, Lawton&rsquo;s advance from, <a href="#pb234" class=
+"pageref">234</a></p>
+<p>Assembly, Philippine, opening of, <a href="#pb550" class=
+"pageref">550</a>;<br>
+address of Secretary Taft, <a href="#pb552" class="pageref">552</a></p>
+<p>Autonomy, road to, <a href="#pb633" class=
+"pageref">633</a>&ndash;646</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">B</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Bacon, A. O., speech in Senate, January 18, 1899,
+<a href="#pb163" class="pageref">163</a>;<br>
+resolution of 1899, <a href="#pb175" class=
+"pageref">175</a>&ndash;7;<br>
+vote on, <a href="#pb178" class="pageref">178</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+letter to author <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>&ndash;2;<br>
+attitude about Bell and Batangas, <a href="#pb393" class=
+"pageref">393</a></p>
+<p>Bacoor, convention of, Aug. 6, 1898, <a href="#pb71" class=
+"pageref">71</a>&ndash;2;<br>
+insurgent capital moved from, to Malolos, <a href="#pb95" class=
+"pageref">95</a>&ndash;6</p>
+<p>Balangiga massacre, <a href="#pb377" class="pageref">377</a></p>
+<p>Bandholtz, Col., Albay insurrection, <a href="#pb423" class=
+"pageref">423</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Barcelon <i>vs.</i> Baker, <a href="#pb511" class=
+"pageref">511</a>&ndash;12, <a href="#pb534" class="pageref">534</a>
+<i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Barrett, John, on Malolos congress, <a href="#pb103" class=
+"pageref">103</a>&ndash;4</p>
+<p>Barry, T. H., General, letter to Secretary Root, <a href="#pb334"
+class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Bass, John F., war correspondent, on insurgent campaign against
+Manila, May&ndash;July, 1898, <a href="#pb82" class=
+"pageref">82</a>;<br>
+on Iloilo fiasco, <a href="#pb153" class="pageref">153</a>, <a href=
+"#pb157" class="pageref">157</a>;<br>
+on MacArthur&rsquo;s advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb195" class=
+"pageref">195</a>&ndash;8;<br>
+signer of round robin, <a href="#pb219" class="pageref">219</a>,
+<a href="#pb221" class="pageref">221</a></p>
+<p>Bataan province, area and pop. <a href="#pb256" class=
+"pageref">256</a></p>
+<p>Batangas province, area and pop. <a href="#pb263" class=
+"pageref">263</a>;<br>
+insurrection of, 1901&ndash;02 in, <a href="#pb371" class=
+"pageref">371</a> <i>et seq.</i>; <a href="#pb384" class=
+"pageref">384</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+losses by the war, <a href="#pb597" class="pageref">597</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Batchelor, J. B., Captain, overruns Cagayan valley, <a href="#pb253"
+class="pageref">253</a>&ndash;4</p>
+<p>Bates, J. C., General, First Division, Eighth Corps, succeeding
+Lawton, <a href="#pb260" class="pageref">260</a> <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb658" href="#pb658" name="pb658">658</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Batson, Matthew A., Major, wounded at Aringay, <a href="#pb119"
+class="pageref">119</a>, <a href="#pb246" class="pageref">246</a></p>
+<p>Bayambang, council of war, <a href="#pb241" class=
+"pageref">241</a>&ndash;2</p>
+<p>Belgium, neutralization of, <a href="#pb651" class=
+"pageref">651</a></p>
+<p>Bell, J. F., General, estimate of Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb5" class=
+"pageref">5</a>;<br>
+report, August, 1898, <a href="#pb74" class="pageref">74</a>, <a href=
+"#pb142" class="pageref">142</a>;<br>
+in advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb197" class="pageref">197</a>;<br>
+Colonel <a href="#pb36" class="pageref">36</a>th Vol. Inf., <a href=
+"#pb237" class="pageref">237</a>;<br>
+in Batangas, <a href="#pb386" class="pageref">386</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, <a href="#pb139" class=
+"pageref">139</a>&ndash;151;<br>
+a Pandora Box, <a href="#pb151" class="pageref">151</a>;<br>
+Otis&rsquo;s doctoring of, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>,
+<a href="#pb191" class="pageref">191</a>;<br>
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s counter-proclamation, <a href="#pb169" class=
+"pageref">169</a>;<br>
+Filipinos in 1898 like Canadians in 1911, <a href="#pb284" class=
+"pageref">284</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Benguet province, area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+<p>Biac-na-Bato, treaty of, <a href="#pb3" class="pageref">3</a></p>
+<p>Bi&ntilde;ang fight, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a></p>
+<p>Bishop. Wm. H., Major, charges against considered, <a href="#pb200"
+class="pageref">200</a>&ndash;202</p>
+<p>Bitterness, of war, <a href="#pb198" class=
+"pageref">198</a>&ndash;205; <a href="#pb299" class=
+"pageref">299</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Black Hole of&rdquo; Albay, <a href="#pb501" class=
+"pageref">501</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Blame of those ye better,&rdquo; policy, <a href="#pb448"
+class="pageref">448</a></p>
+<p>Bliss, C. N., Sec&rsquo;y of Interior, sends geologist to Ph.,
+<a href="#pb48" class="pageref">48</a></p>
+<p>Blount, J. H., with Maccabebe scouts, <a href="#pb235" class=
+"pageref">235</a>, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a>;<br>
+army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a>;<br>
+<i>cochero</i> incident, <a href="#pb366" class="pageref">366</a>;<br>
+Justice of Peace incident, <a href="#pb368" class=
+"pageref">368</a>;<br>
+Ola incident, <a href="#pb435" class="pageref">435</a>;<br>
+resignation as judge, <a href="#pb499" class="pageref">499</a></p>
+<p>Blunder of taking Ph., admitted by Taft, <a href="#pb44" class=
+"pageref">44</a>, <a href="#pb291" class="pageref">291</a></p>
+<p>Bohol, area, pop. etc., <a href="#pb228" class=
+"pageref">228</a>;<br>
+disturbances of 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb371" class="pageref">371</a>
+<i>et seq<span class="corr" id="xd20e15211" title=
+"Not in source">.</span></i>;<br>
+proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href=
+"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Boss, Am I the,&rdquo; <a href="#pb186" class=
+"pageref">186</a></p>
+<p>Boutelle, Lieut., killed in action, <a href="#pb235" class=
+"pageref">235</a></p>
+<p>Bowers, Lieut., testimony on Samar massacres, <a href="#pb458"
+class="pageref">458</a>;<br>
+wounded, <a href="#pb516" class="pageref">516</a></p>
+<p>Bray, Mr., of Singapore, <a href="#pb4" class="pageref">4</a></p>
+<p>Brent, C. H., Bishop, <a href="#pb580" class="pageref">580</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Bryan, W. J., position on Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb130" class=
+"pageref">130</a>;<br>
+on Filipino capacity for self-government, <a href="#pb296" class=
+"pageref">296</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>Bulacan province, area and pop. <a href="#pb233" class=
+"pageref">233</a></p>
+<p>Burgess neutralisation resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Burke, on &ldquo;Conciliation with America,&rdquo; revised, <a href=
+"#pb323" class="pageref">323</a></p>
+<p>Butt, A. W., Major, <a href="#pb76" class="pageref">76</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">C</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Caducoy, Juliano, Samar brigand, <a href="#pb456"
+class="pageref">456</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>Cagayan, province, area and pop. <a href="#pb255" class=
+"pageref">255</a>;<br>
+proposed State of, <a href="#pb255" class="pageref">255</a>, <a href=
+"#pb634" class="pageref">634</a></p>
+<p>Cailies, Juan, General, assassination orders, <a href="#pb314"
+class="pageref">314</a>;<br>
+surrender, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p>
+<p>Calderon, Lieut., list of Samar massacres of 1904, <a href="#pb460"
+class="pageref">460</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>California regiment earns laurels, Feb&rsquo;y 4&ndash;5, 1899,
+<a href="#pb193" class="pageref">193</a></p>
+<p>Caloocan, advance on, <a href="#pb195" class="pageref">195</a>;<br>
+capture, <a href="#pb207" class="pageref">207</a></p>
+<p>Calumpit, capture of, by MacArthur, <a href="#pb212" class=
+"pageref">212</a>;<br>
+Funston&rsquo;s river-crossing incident, <a href="#pb212" class=
+"pageref">212</a></p>
+<p>Camarines, province of, area and pop. <a href="#pb265" class=
+"pageref">265</a>;<br>
+proposed State of, <a href="#pb265" class="pageref">265</a>&ndash;6,
+<a href="#pb635" class="pageref">635</a></p>
+<p>Campaign songs of Ph.:<br>
+under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a>;<br>
+under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br>
+under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p>
+<p>Capacity for self-government, of Filipinos:<br>
+Gen. Chas. King on, <a href="#pb273" class="pageref">273</a>;<br>
+Dewey on, <a href="#pb41" class="pageref">41</a>;<br>
+Bass, J. F., on, <a href="#pb82" class="pageref">82</a>;<br>
+Barrett, John, on, <a href="#pb103" class="pageref">103</a>;<br>
+Dr. Heiser<span class="corr" id="xd20e15404" title=
+"Not in source">,</span> on<span class="corr" id="xd20e15407" title=
+"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>;<br>
+author&rsquo;s views, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>;<br>
+Wilcox and Sargent&rsquo;s<span class="corr" id="xd20e15421" title=
+"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb120" class="pageref">120</a>;<br>
+Gen. Merrit&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb190" class="pageref">190</a>;<br>
+Mr. Bryan&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb296" class="pageref">296</a></p>
+<p>Capital punishment, author&rsquo;s views on, <a href="#pb320" class=
+"pageref">320</a>&ndash;24</p>
+<p>Capture of Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb332" class=
+"pageref">332</a>&ndash;9</p>
+<p>Carabo Society, <a href="#pb278" class="pageref">278</a></p>
+<p>Carabaos, destruction of <a href="#pb90" class="pageref">90</a>%,
+<a href="#pb399" class="pageref">399</a></p>
+<p>Carnegie, Andrew, Roosevelt-Taft supper-table confession to, about
+Ph., <a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>&ndash;13</p>
+<p>Carpet-bag feature of Taft civil government, <a href="#pb304" class=
+"pageref">304</a></p>
+<p>Carson, A. C., army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class=
+"pageref">361</a>;<br>
+call on author, <a href="#pb502" class="pageref">502</a>;<br>
+estimate of, <a href="#pb641" class="pageref">641</a></p>
+<p>Carter, W. H., General, and Samar, in 1904, <a href="#pb454" class=
+"pageref">454</a>, <a href="#pb465" class="pageref">465</a>, <a href=
+"#pb506" class="pageref">506</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>Cartoon, Filipino, of 1899, <a href="#pb191" class=
+"pageref">191</a>&ndash;2</p>
+<p>Casiguran Bay, <a href="#pb335" class="pageref">335</a></p>
+<p>Castner, Joseph, Lieut., <a href="#pb253" class=
+"pageref">253</a></p>
+<p>Catholic Church in Ph., <a href="#pb134" class=
+"pageref">134</a>;<br>
+Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class="pageref">563</a></p>
+<p>Cavite, province, area and pop. <a href="#pb263" class=
+"pageref">263</a>;<br>
+proposed State of, <a href="#pb263" class="pageref">263</a>&ndash;4,
+<a href="#pb635" class="pageref">635</a></p>
+<p>Cebu, area and pop. <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br>
+disturbances of 1901&ndash;2 in, <a href="#pb371" class=
+"pageref">371</a>;<br>
+proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href=
+"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p>
+<p>Censorship of press, Otis&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb219" class=
+"pageref">219</a>;<br>
+round robin, <a href="#pb220" class="pageref">220</a></p>
+<p>Chaffee A. R., General, reprimanded by Roosevelt, <a href="#pb376"
+class="pageref">376</a>;<br>
+differences with Taft, <a href="#pb377" class="pageref">377</a></p>
+<p>Chapelle, Archbishop, opinion of Otis, <a href="#pb88" class=
+"pageref">88</a>;<br>
+on the $20,000,000, <a href="#pb133" class=
+"pageref">133</a>&ndash;4</p>
+<p>Chase, Captain, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Church property in Ph., <a href="#pb134" class=
+"pageref">134</a>;<br>
+Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class="pageref">563</a></p>
+<p>Civil government of 1901, prematurity of, <a href="#pb300" class=
+"pageref">300</a>;<br>
+general view of, <a href="#pb362" class="pageref">362</a></p>
+<p>Civil Service of Ph., <a href="#pb473" class="pageref">473</a>,
+<a href="#pb587" class="pageref">587</a></p>
+<p>Cleveland Grover, on Ph., <a href="#pb183" class="pageref">183</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb659" href="#pb659" name=
+"pb659">659</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Cline neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb647" class=
+"pageref">647</a></p>
+<p>Coghlan, Capt. U. S. N., capture of Spanish garrison at Olongapo,
+<a href="#pb44" class="pageref">44</a></p>
+<p>Collins, Robert, war correspondent, round robin incident, <a href=
+"#pb219" class="pageref">219</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Colonization, we blundered into,&rdquo; Taft, <a href="#pb44"
+class="pageref">44</a>, <a href="#pb291" class="pageref">291</a>;<br>
+apotheosis of, <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a>&ndash;490</p>
+<p>Commerce, <a href="#pb604" class="pageref">604</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Commission, Philippine: Schurman, <a href="#pb31" class=
+"pageref">31</a>, <a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>, <a href=
+"#pb217" class="pageref">217</a>;<br>
+Taft, <a href="#pb282" class="pageref">282</a>&ndash;344</p>
+<p>Congressional legislation, <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a>&ndash;622</p>
+<p>Constabulary, early uncertainty about, <a href="#pb403" class=
+"pageref">403</a>;<br>
+inadequacy of, <a href="#pb404" class="pageref">404</a></p>
+<p>Copra, <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p>
+<p>Corbin, Adjutant-General, on &ldquo;impatience of the [American]
+people&rdquo; in 1899, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>,
+<a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a></p>
+<p>Correspondents, war, round robin, <a href="#pb219" class=
+"pageref">219</a></p>
+<p>Cost of living in Ph., <a href="#pb588" class=
+"pageref">588</a>&ndash;590</p>
+<p>Cost of Ph., annual now, <a href="#pb600" class=
+"pageref">600</a>;<br>
+total, in life and money, <a href="#pb595" class="pageref">595</a>
+<i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Crowder, E. H., Lieut.-Col., <a href="#pb158" class=
+"pageref">158</a>, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a></p>
+<p>Currency, <a href="#pb522" class="pageref">522</a>, <a href="#pb565"
+class="pageref">565</a></p>
+<p>Curry, George, <a href="#pb413" class="pageref">413</a>, <a href=
+"#pb508" class="pageref">508</a>, <a href="#pb515" class=
+"pageref">515</a>, <a href="#pb637" class="pageref">637</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">D</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Davis, C. K., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122"
+class="pageref">122</a></p>
+<p>Davis, O. K., war correspondent, quoted <a href="#pb82" class=
+"pageref">82</a>;<br>
+signs round robin, <a href="#pb219" class="pageref">219</a></p>
+<p>Day, Wm. R., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class=
+"pageref">122</a>;<br>
+position, <a href="#pb134" class="pageref">134</a></p>
+<p>Declaration of Independence, Aguinaldo&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb38"
+class="pageref">38</a>;<br>
+Bacoor convention, <a href="#pb71" class="pageref">71</a></p>
+<p>Defencelessness of Philippines, <a href="#pb565" class=
+"pageref">565</a></p>
+<p>Denby, Charles, <a href="#pb273" class="pageref">273</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p><i>Denver Post&rsquo;s</i> Japanese proposition, <a href="#pb161"
+class="pageref">161</a></p>
+<p>Department [military] of Northern Luzon, Districts of, <a href=
+"#pb252" class="pageref">252</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+of Southern Luzon, <a href="#pb263" class="pageref">263</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Despotism, Ph. Government a benevolent, <a href="#pb439" class=
+"pageref">439</a>&ndash;41</p>
+<p>De Veyra, Jaime, <a href="#pb505" class="pageref">505</a></p>
+<p>Dewey, George, Admiral, original telegram to Aguinaldo, <a href=
+"#pb7" class="pageref">7</a>;<br>
+at Hong Kong before battle of Manila Bay, <a href="#pb16" class=
+"pageref">16</a>;<br>
+the battle, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>;<br>
+subsequent dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb20" class=
+"pageref">20</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+cablegram about Filipino superiority to Cubans, <a href="#pb41" class=
+"pageref">41</a>;<br>
+position against annexation of Ph., <a href="#pb45" class=
+"pageref">45</a>, <a href="#pb125" class="pageref">125</a>;<br>
+issue with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a></p>
+<p>Dingley Act, <a href="#pb605" class="pageref">605</a>, <a href=
+"#pb608" class="pageref">608</a>, <a href="#pb611" class=
+"pageref">611</a>, <a href="#pb615" class="pageref">615</a></p>
+<p>Dodd, Captain, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Dubois, Senator, Taft party of 1905, <a href="#pb356" class=
+"pageref">356</a>&ndash;7</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">E</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Education, <a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a>,
+<a href="#pb643" class="pageref">643</a></p>
+<p>Edwards, Clarence R., Colonel, conspicuous gallantry in early
+fighting, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>;<br>
+desk general since, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>;<br>
+admits Ph. indefensible, <a href="#pb565" class="pageref">565</a></p>
+<p>Eight Army Corps, overwhelmingly against annexing Ph., <a href=
+"#pb192" class="pageref">192</a>, <a href="#pb198" class=
+"pageref">198</a></p>
+<p>Ethnological homogeneity of Filipinos, <a href="#pb295" class=
+"pageref">295</a>, <a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a>, <a href=
+"#pb318" class="pageref">318</a></p>
+<p>Europe&rsquo;s smiles of 1899&ndash;1900, <a href="#pb289" class=
+"pageref">289</a></p>
+<p>Exploitation, Filipino apprehensions, <a href="#pb183" class=
+"pageref">183</a>;<br>
+constant American pressure for, <a href="#pb559" class=
+"pageref">559</a></p>
+<p>Export tax, constitutionality of, questioned, <a href="#pb619"
+class="pageref">619</a>, <a href="#pb621" class="pageref">621</a>;<br>
+depressing effect on hemp industry, <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">F</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Family life of Filipinos, <a href="#pb491" class=
+"pageref">491</a></p>
+<p>February 4, 1899, battle of, <a href="#pb193" class=
+"pageref">193</a></p>
+<p>Feito, Governor of Samar, 1904, during the massacres, <a href=
+"#pb461" class="pageref">461</a>&ndash;2</p>
+<p>Fergusson, A. W., on Winthrop appointment, <a href="#pb443" class=
+"pageref">443</a>;<br>
+on Ph. Civil Service, <a href="#pb590" class=
+"pageref">590</a>&ndash;3;<br>
+death, <a href="#pb593" class="pageref">593</a></p>
+<p>Ferris neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Filipinos, traits in peace and war, <a href="#pb185" class=
+"pageref">185</a>;<br>
+hospitality, <a href="#pb119" class="pageref">119</a>;<br>
+calibre of educated, <a href="#pb103" class="pageref">103</a></p>
+<p>First Expedition to Ph., McKinley on, <a href="#pb46" class=
+"pageref">46</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>Forbes, Gov.<span class="corr" id="xd20e16042" title=
+"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb558" class=
+"pageref">558</a>&ndash;570</p>
+<p>Freedom re-defined, <a href="#pb304" class=
+"pageref">304</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Friar lands, Governor Taft and, <a href="#pb563" class=
+"pageref">563</a>&ndash;4</p>
+<p>Frye, Wm. P., Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class=
+"pageref">122</a>;<br>
+position, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>&ndash;3</p>
+<p>Funston, Frederick, General, crosses river under fire, <a href=
+"#pb212" class="pageref">212</a>;<br>
+captures Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb332" class=
+"pageref">332</a>&ndash;9</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">G</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Garner neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648"
+class="pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Geography of Ph., <a href="#pb225" class=
+"pageref">225</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Gilmore, Lieut., U. S. N., capture, <a href="#pb257" class=
+"pageref">257</a>;<br>
+rescue, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Governors of Ph., American, 1898&ndash;1912, list of, <a href=
+"#pb558" class="pageref">558</a>;<br>
+their great power, <a href="#pb439" class="pageref">439</a></p>
+<p>Gray, George, Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class=
+"pageref">122</a>;<br>
+position, <a href="#pb129" class="pageref">129</a>, <a href="#pb135"
+class="pageref">135</a></p>
+<p>Green, Jimmie (American &ldquo;Tommy Atkins&rdquo;), sentiments in
+1898, at Manila, about &ldquo;expansion,&rdquo; <a href="#pb172" class=
+"pageref">172</a></p>
+<p>Guerrilla warfare decreed by insurgents, <a href="#pb242" class=
+"pageref">242</a>;<br>
+tactics described, <a href="#pb310" class="pageref">310</a></p>
+<p>Guzman case, <a href="#pb113" class="pageref">113</a>&ndash;14</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">H</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Hannay, Lieut., <a href="#pb248" class=
+"pageref">248</a></p>
+<p>Hardin, E. E., Col., <a href="#pb266" class="pageref">266</a></p>
+<p>Hardwick, T. W., M. C., <a href="#pb482" class="pageref">482</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb660" href="#pb660" name=
+"pb660">660</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Hare, L. R., Col., <a href="#pb237" class="pageref">237</a></p>
+<p>Harvester Trust, <a href="#pb561" class="pageref">561</a>&ndash;2,
+<a href="#pb570" class="pageref">570</a>, <a href="#pb610" class=
+"pageref">610</a>&ndash;11, <a href="#pb619" class=
+"pageref">619</a></p>
+<p>Harvey. G. R. Ass&rsquo;t Atty. Gen., <a href="#pb469" class=
+"pageref">469</a>&ndash;70, <a href="#pb479" class=
+"pageref">479</a>&ndash;483</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Hate,&rdquo; etc., policy, <a href="#pb448" class=
+"pageref">448</a></p>
+<p>Hazzard, Captain, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Hazzard, Lieut., <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Heat prostrations of 1899, <a href="#pb208" class=
+"pageref">208</a>&ndash;9</p>
+<p>Heidt, G. V., Lieut., <a href="#pb248" class="pageref">248</a></p>
+<p>Heiser, Dr., on Ph. Assembly, <a href="#pb104" class=
+"pageref">104</a></p>
+<p>Hemp, Governor Forbes&rsquo;s reticence about, <a href="#pb561"
+class="pageref">561</a>;<br>
+Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+American corner on, <a href="#pb611" class=
+"pageref">611</a>&ndash;12</p>
+<p>Hierarchy, Ph. official, imperious influence, <a href="#pb439"
+class="pageref">439</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Higgins, R. R. manager, <a href="#pb101" class="pageref">101</a></p>
+<p>Hoar, Senator, interview with McKinley, <a href="#pb145" class=
+"pageref">145</a>;<br>
+declines deliver eulogy on, <a href="#pb627" class=
+"pageref">627</a></p>
+<p>Home life of Filipinos, <a href="#pb491" class="pageref">491</a></p>
+<p>Homogeneity of Ph. people:<br>
+Taft on, <a href="#pb295" class="pageref">295</a>;<br>
+American census on, <a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a>;<br>
+MacArthur on, <a href="#pb318" class="pageref">318</a>.<br>
+See <a href="#pb133" class="pageref">133</a></p>
+<p>Hong Kong Junta, minutes of, May 4, 1898, <a href="#pb25" class=
+"pageref">25</a>, <a href="#pb96" class="pageref">96</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>Howland, C. R., Captain, <a href="#pb238" class=
+"pageref">238</a></p>
+<p>Howze, R. L., Lt.-Col., <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Hughes, General, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a></p>
+<p>Humor, Filipino, cartoon, <a href="#pb191" class=
+"pageref">191</a>&ndash;2</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">I</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Ickis, W. H., army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class=
+"pageref">361</a></p>
+<p>Ide, H. C., certain statements by, examined, <a href="#pb469" class=
+"pageref">469</a>, <a href="#pb477" class="pageref">477</a>&ndash;9,
+<a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a>&ndash;7;<br>
+succeeds Gov. Wright, <a href="#pb515" class="pageref">515</a>;<br>
+resigns, <a href="#pb521" class="pageref">521</a>;<br>
+estimate of, <a href="#pb522" class="pageref">522</a></p>
+<p>Igorottes, <a href="#pb575" class="pageref">575</a>&ndash;6</p>
+<p>Ilocanos, &ldquo;Yankees of&rdquo; Ph., <a href="#pb247" class=
+"pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Ilocos, proposed State of, <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a>&ndash;3, <a href="#pb634" class="pageref">634</a></p>
+<p>Ilocos Norte area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+<p>Ilocos Sur area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+<p>Iloilo fiasco, <a href="#pb152" class=
+"pageref">152</a>&ndash;163</p>
+<p>Iloilo speech of Governor Taft, 1903, <a href="#pb437" class=
+"pageref">437</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Imperialism, American and British, compared, <a href="#pb127" class=
+"pageref">127</a>, <a href="#pb449" class="pageref">449</a></p>
+<p>Independence, Declaration of, Aguinaldo&rsquo;s first formal,
+<a href="#pb38" class="pageref">38</a>;<br>
+Bacoor convention, <a href="#pb71" class="pageref">71</a>;<br>
+ante-bellum minutes of Hong Kong Junta, <a href="#pb25" class=
+"pageref">25</a></p>
+<p>Insurrection proper, 1899&ndash;1901, <a href="#pb186" class=
+"pageref">186</a>&ndash;344;<br>
+of 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb371" class=
+"pageref">371</a>&ndash;402;<br>
+of 1903, <a href="#pb409" class="pageref">409</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+of 1904, <a href="#pb452" class="pageref">452</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+of 1905, <a href="#pb506" class="pageref">506</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+Leyte disorders of 1906, <a href="#pb518" class="pageref">518</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>International Harvester Company, <a href="#pb607" class=
+"pageref">607</a>, <a href="#pb610" class="pageref">610</a>, <a href=
+"#pb619" class="pageref">619</a>&ndash;20</p>
+<p>Iowa, <a href="#pb51" class="pageref">51</a>st, at Iloilo, <a href=
+"#pb155" class="pageref">155</a></p>
+<p>Isabela province, area and pop. <a href="#pb255" class=
+"pageref">255</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">J</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Japan and the Philippines, <a href="#pb328" class=
+"pageref">328</a>&ndash;331</p>
+<p>Jellyby, Mrs., Uncle Sam as, <a href="#pb358" class=
+"pageref">358</a></p>
+<p>Johnson, Justice, <a href="#pb641" class="pageref">641</a></p>
+<p>Joint High Parleying Board, Otis&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb173" class=
+"pageref">173</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Jones, Captain, wounded, <a href="#pb516" class=
+"pageref">516</a></p>
+<p>Jones Independence Bill, <a href="#pb640" class="pageref">640</a>
+<i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Jones neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb647" class=
+"pageref">647</a></p>
+<p>Judiciary, Ph., its greatest need, <a href="#pb572" class=
+"pageref">572</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">K</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Katipunan Society, <a href="#pb113" class=
+"pageref">113</a></p>
+<p>Kenly, W. L., Lieut., <a href="#pb214" class="pageref">214</a></p>
+<p>Kidd, Benj., <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a></p>
+<p>Kindness, Taft ideas on, <a href="#pb304" class=
+"pageref">304</a></p>
+<p>King, Charles, General, views, <a href="#pb273" class=
+"pageref">273</a></p>
+<p>King. Edw. L., Lieut., <a href="#pb244" class="pageref">244</a></p>
+<p>Kipling, R., <a href="#pb486" class="pageref">486</a></p>
+<p>Knox, Commander, U. S. N., <a href="#pb236" class=
+"pageref">236</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">L</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&ldquo;Lack of a common language&rdquo; fetich,
+<a href="#pb298" class="pageref">298</a></p>
+<p>Laguna province, area and population, <a href="#pb263" class=
+"pageref">263</a>;<br>
+disturbances of 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb372" class=
+"pageref">372</a>;<br>
+of 1905, <a href="#pb509" class="pageref">509</a></p>
+<p>Lands, Friar, <i>see</i> Friar lands</p>
+<p>Language, lack of a common, discussed, <a href="#pb298" class=
+"pageref">298</a></p>
+<p>Lawton, H. W., General, arrives, <a href="#pb209" class=
+"pageref">209</a>;<br>
+Laguna expedition, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>;<br>
+&ldquo;this accursed war,&rdquo; <a href="#pb211" class=
+"pageref">211</a>;<br>
+Northern advance, <a href="#pb234" class="pageref">234</a>;<br>
+good-bye to Young, <a href="#pb239" class="pageref">239</a>;<br>
+killed, <a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a></p>
+<p>Legarda, B. Ph. delegate in Congress, <a href="#pb619" class=
+"pageref">619</a></p>
+<p>Legislation, Congressional, <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a>&ndash;622</p>
+<p>Lepanto-Bontoc, area and pop. <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+<p>LeRoy, James, on Taft, <a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a></p>
+<p>Leyte, area and pop. <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br>
+disorders of 1906, <a href="#pb518" class="pageref">518</a>;<br>
+proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href=
+"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p>
+<p>Lingayen Gulf expedition, <a href="#pb234" class=
+"pageref">234</a>&ndash;6</p>
+<p>Locusts, <a href="#pb608" class="pageref">608</a></p>
+<p>Lodge, H. C, on Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb130" class=
+"pageref">130</a>;<br>
+Aguinaldo jest, <a href="#pb239" class="pageref">239</a>;<br>
+&ldquo;Trade Expansion&rdquo; speech, <a href="#pb275" class=
+"pageref">275</a>;<br>
+on Spanish War, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>, <a href=
+"#pb276" class="pageref">276</a>;<br>
+on chronic disorder in Cuba, <a href="#pb343" class=
+"pageref">343</a></p>
+<p>Logan, Major, killed, <a href="#pb238" class="pageref">238</a></p>
+<p><i>London Times</i>, May 5, 1898, <a href="#pb35" class=
+"pageref">35</a></p>
+<p>Long, Secretary, cautions Dewey, <a href="#pb98" class=
+"pageref">98</a></p>
+<p>Lopez, &ldquo;Presidente&rdquo; etc., <a href="#pb154" class=
+"pageref">154</a></p>
+<p>Lowry, E. G., <a href="#pb600" class="pageref">600</a></p>
+<p>Luna, Captain, drowned, <a href="#pb244" class="pageref">244</a></p>
+<p>Luzon, preponderating importance, <a href="#pb225" class=
+"pageref">225</a>;<br>
+central plain, <a href="#pb232" class="pageref">232</a>;<br>
+wild tribes, <a href="#pb232" class="pageref">232</a>;<br>
+size, <a href="#pb362" class="pageref">362</a> <span class=
+"pagenum">[<a id="pb661" href="#pb661" name="pb661">661</a>]</span></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">M</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">MacArthur and the war, <a href="#pb270" class=
+"pageref">270</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>MacArthur, General:<br>
+on Aguinaldo and Filipinos, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>,
+<a href="#pb309" class="pageref">309</a>;<br>
+advance on Caloocan, <a href="#pb195" class="pageref">195</a>, <a href=
+"#pb207" class="pageref">207</a>;<br>
+up R. R., <a href="#pb234" class="pageref">234</a>;<br>
+differences with Taft, <a href="#pb307" class="pageref">307</a>,
+<a href="#pb382" class="pageref">382</a>;<br>
+on conditions of 1900&ndash;1, <a href="#pb310" class="pageref">310</a>
+<i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+drastic proclamation, <a href="#pb323" class=
+"pageref">323</a>&ndash;5;<br>
+final advice, <a href="#pb355" class="pageref">355</a></p>
+<p>McCall neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>McCutcheon, John T., war correspondent, round robin, <a href=
+"#pb219" class="pageref">219</a>;<br>
+Bi&ntilde;ang fight, <a href="#pb261" class="pageref">261</a></p>
+<p>McKinley, President, Cuban message of 1897, <a href="#pb2" class=
+"pageref">2</a>, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br>
+war message of 1898, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br>
+Aguinaldo&rsquo;s letter to, <a href="#pb36" class=
+"pageref">36</a>;<br>
+cable to Dewey of Aug. <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href=
+"#pb41" class="pageref">41</a>;<br>
+annual message of 1898, <a href="#pb47" class="pageref">47</a>,
+<a href="#pb216" class="pageref">216</a>;<br>
+instructions to Merritt, <a href="#pb50" class="pageref">50</a>;<br>
+to Peace Commissioners, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>,
+<a href="#pb122" class="pageref">122</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, <a href="#pb139" class=
+"pageref">139</a>&ndash;151;<br>
+text of, <a href="#pb147" class="pageref">147</a>;<br>
+its reception at Iloilo, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a>;<br>
+at Manila, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+message of 1899, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+Taft commission foreshadowed in, <a href="#pb287" class=
+"pageref">287</a>;<br>
+instructions to, <a href="#pb359" class="pageref">359</a>, <a href=
+"#pb405" class="pageref">405</a>, <a href="#pb421" class=
+"pageref">421</a>, <a href="#pb476" class="pageref">476</a></p>
+<p>Maccabebe scouts, writer detailed to, <a href="#pb235" class=
+"pageref">235</a>;<br>
+their allegiance analyzed, <a href="#pb333" class=
+"pageref">333</a>;<br>
+used to capture Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Magtaon fight, <a href="#pb516" class="pageref">516</a></p>
+<p><i>Maine</i>, U. S. S., blown up, <a href="#pb3" class=
+"pageref">3</a></p>
+<p>Malabon landing party episode, <a href="#pb209" class=
+"pageref">209</a></p>
+<p>Malolos, insurgent capital, <a href="#pb95" class=
+"pageref">95</a>&ndash;6;<br>
+Congress of, <a href="#pb99" class="pageref">99</a>&ndash;102;<br>
+capture, <a href="#pb208" class="pageref">208</a></p>
+<p>Man, rights of, <a href="#pb623" class=
+"pageref">623</a>&ndash;632</p>
+<p>Manila, siege of, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a> <i>et
+seq.</i>;<br>
+fall of, <a href="#pb83" class="pageref">83</a>&ndash;7;<br>
+importance of, <a href="#pb225" class="pageref">225</a>&ndash;6</p>
+<p>Manila-Dagupan Railway, Higgins claim, <a href="#pb101" class=
+"pageref">101</a></p>
+<p>Manufactures <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p>
+<p>Map of archipelago, see end of volume</p>
+<p>March, P. C., Major, <a href="#pb238" class="pageref">238</a></p>
+<p>Mark Tapley, Taft as, <a href="#pb355" class="pageref">355</a></p>
+<p>Martin neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Masbate, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p>
+<p>Mascardo surrenders, <a href="#pb341" class="pageref">341</a></p>
+<p>Massacre of Americans at Manila, &ldquo;plot&rdquo; considered,
+<a href="#pb199" class="pageref">199</a></p>
+<p>Melliza, R., at Iloilo, <a href="#pb159" class="pageref">159</a></p>
+<p>Merritt, Wesley, General, <a href="#pb46" class=
+"pageref">46</a>;<br>
+instructions, <a href="#pb50" class="pageref">50</a>&ndash;2;<br>
+double-dealing, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>;<br>
+&ldquo;juggling,&rdquo; <a href="#pb81" class="pageref">81</a>;<br>
+receives surrender Manila, <a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>,
+<a href="#pb86" class="pageref">86</a>;<br>
+advice at Paris, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a>;<br>
+complimentary estimate of Filipinos, <a href="#pb190" class=
+"pageref">190</a></p>
+<p>Miller, M. P., General, Iloilo expedition, <a href="#pb152" class=
+"pageref">152</a>&ndash;163</p>
+<p>Millet, F. D., war correspondent, on insurgent siege of Manila,
+<a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+on Greene&rsquo;s &ldquo;juggling,&rdquo; <a href="#pb80" class=
+"pageref">80</a>&ndash;1;<br>
+on inauguration of Malolos government, <a href="#pb99" class=
+"pageref">99</a></p>
+<p>Mindanao, area and pop., <a href="#pb229" class=
+"pageref">229</a>;<br>
+distinct problem, <a href="#pb230" class="pageref">230</a>&ndash;1</p>
+<p>Mindoro, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p>
+<p>Mining, <a href="#pb607" class="pageref">607</a></p>
+<p>Misamis, insurrection of 1902&ndash;3, <a href="#pb442" class=
+"pageref">442</a>&ndash;3</p>
+<p>Missionary vote in U. S., darkest thing ahead of Ph. independence,
+<a href="#pb580" class="pageref">580</a></p>
+<p>Mitchell, Lieut., <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Monroe doctrine and Ph., <a href="#pb602" class="pageref">602</a>,
+<a href="#pb654" class="pageref">654</a></p>
+<p>Moore, Commander, U.S.N., <a href="#pb236" class=
+"pageref">236</a></p>
+<p>Moros, <a href="#pb230" class="pageref">230</a>&ndash;1<span class=
+"corr" id="xd20e17192" title="Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb567"
+class="pageref">567</a>&ndash;9<span class="corr" id="xd20e17198"
+title="Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb577" class=
+"pageref">577</a><span class="corr" id="xd20e17203" title=
+"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb583" class=
+"pageref">583</a><span class="corr" id="xd20e17209" title=
+"Source: ;">,</span> <a href="#pb644" class="pageref">644</a></p>
+<p>Municipal governments, dual, described, <a href="#pb316" class=
+"pageref">316</a>&ndash;18</p>
+<p>Mustin, H. C., Ensign, <a href="#pb236" class="pageref">236</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">N</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Nazro, Lieutenant-Commander, <a href="#pb236" class=
+"pageref">236</a></p>
+<p>Negroes, Filipinos not, <a href="#pb364" class=
+"pageref">364</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Negros, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br>
+proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href=
+"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a></p>
+<p>Neutralization&mdash;the &ldquo;way out,&rdquo; <a href="#pb647"
+class="pageref">647</a>;<br>
+history of, <a href="#pb650" class="pageref">650</a>;<br>
+pending resolutions proposing, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Newlands, F. G., Senator, quoted <a href="#pb356" class=
+"pageref">356</a>&ndash;7, <a href="#pb610" class="pageref">610</a></p>
+<p>Newspapers: round robin of 1899, <a href="#pb220" class=
+"pageref">220</a>;<br>
+present subtle censorship, <a href="#pb440" class="pageref">440</a></p>
+<p>Newton, H. W., Captain, <a href="#pb334" class="pageref">334</a></p>
+<p>Ninth Infantry, Balangiga massacre, <a href="#pb377" class=
+"pageref">377</a></p>
+<p>Northern Luzon (military) &ldquo;Department of,&rdquo; Districts of,
+<a href="#pb252" class="pageref">252</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Nueva Ecija, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class=
+"pageref">233</a></p>
+<p>Nueva Vizcaya, area and pop., <a href="#pb255" class=
+"pageref">255</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">O</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Ohio, size of Luzon, <a href="#pb232" class=
+"pageref">232</a></p>
+<p>Ola, Simeon, <a href="#pb423" class="pageref">423</a> <i>et
+seq.</i>, <a href="#pb436" class="pageref">436</a></p>
+<p>Oldfield neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Olongapo garrison, surrender of, <a href="#pb58" class=
+"pageref">58</a></p>
+<p>Otis and the war: Feb. to fall, 1899, <a href="#pb186" class=
+"pageref">186</a>&ndash;223;<br>
+thence to May, 1900, <a href="#pb224" class=
+"pageref">224</a>&ndash;269</p>
+<p>Otis, E. S., General, quoted, <a href="#pb30" class=
+"pageref">30</a>;<br>
+succeeds Merritt, <a href="#pb88" class="pageref">88</a>;<br>
+Chapelle&rsquo;s estimate of him, <a href="#pb88" class=
+"pageref">88</a>;<br>
+writer&rsquo;s, <a href="#pb89" class="pageref">89</a>;<br>
+ante-bellum dealings with Aguinaldo, <a href="#pb88" class=
+"pageref">88</a>&ndash;106, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>
+<i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Outbreak of February 4, 1899, <a href="#pb186" class=
+"pageref">186</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">P</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Palanan, Aguinaldo captured at, <a href="#pb336"
+class="pageref">336</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Pampanga province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class=
+"pageref">233</a></p>
+<p>Panama Canal horoscoped, <a href="#pb652" class=
+"pageref">652</a></p>
+<p>Panay island, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class=
+"pageref">228</a>;<br>
+proposed state of, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href=
+"#pb636" class="pageref">636</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb662"
+href="#pb662" name="pb662">662</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Pandora Box, Benevolent Assimilation policy proves, <a href="#pb150"
+class="pageref">150</a>&ndash;1</p>
+<p>Pangasinan province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class=
+"pageref">233</a></p>
+<p>Paragua, <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a></p>
+<p>Paris Peace Commission, <a href="#pb122" class=
+"pageref">122</a>;<br>
+negotiations, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>&ndash;138</p>
+<p>Paris, Treaty of, <a href="#pb121" class=
+"pageref">121</a>&ndash;138</p>
+<p>Parker, Alton B., controversy of 1904 with Taft, <a href="#pb483"
+class="pageref">483</a></p>
+<p>Parker, James, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#pb248" class=
+"pageref">248</a></p>
+<p>Patriotism of Filipinos, <a href="#pb185" class="pageref">185</a>,
+<a href="#pb190" class="pageref">190</a>, <a href="#pb297" class=
+"pageref">297</a></p>
+<p>Payne Law of 1909, <a href="#pb615" class="pageref">615</a></p>
+<p>Peace protocol, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>; treaty,
+<a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>&ndash;138</p>
+<p>Perkins. G. W., <a href="#pb620" class="pageref">620</a>&ndash;1</p>
+<p>Peters neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648" class=
+"pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Phelan, H. DuR., <a href="#pb159" class=
+"pageref">159</a>&ndash;162</p>
+<p>Philippine archipelago, geography simplified, <a href="#pb225"
+class="pageref">225</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Philippine Assembly, opening of, <a href="#pb550" class=
+"pageref">550</a>; address of Secretary Taft, <a href="#pb552" class=
+"pageref">552</a></p>
+<p>Philippine Civil Service, <a href="#pb473" class="pageref">473</a>,
+<a href="#pb587" class="pageref">587</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Philippine Government Act, <a href="#pb587" class=
+"pageref">587</a></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Philippines for Filipinos,&rdquo; Taft policy, <a href=
+"#pb437" class="pageref">437</a>;<br>
+Iloilo speech, <a href="#pb437" class="pageref">437</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Pilar, Gregorio, General, death and burial, <a href="#pb248" class=
+"pageref">248</a>&ndash;9</p>
+<p>Placido, Hilario Tal, <a href="#pb336" class=
+"pageref">336</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>Policy, Taft, Ph., stated, <a href="#pb645" class=
+"pageref">645</a></p>
+<p>Political expediency, controlling factor in Ph. affairs, <a href=
+"#pb448" class="pageref">448</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Pratt, Spencer, U. S. Consul General at Singapore, dealings with
+Aguinaldo<span class="corr" id="xd20e17563" title=
+"Not in source">,</span> <a href="#pb4" class=
+"pageref">4</a>&ndash;15</p>
+<p>Press, censorship of, by Otis, <a href="#pb220" class=
+"pageref">220</a>;<br>
+war correspondents, round robin, <a href="#pb220" class=
+"pageref">220</a>&ndash;1;<br>
+virtual censorship now, <a href="#pb440" class="pageref">440</a></p>
+<p>Protocol, peace, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a></p>
+<p>Public opinion in Ph., negligible, <a href="#pb442" class=
+"pageref">442</a>&ndash;3</p>
+<p>Public order, not finally established until 1906, <a href="#pb522"
+class="pageref">522</a></p>
+<p>Purpose of U. S., uncertainty as to, <a href="#pb174" class=
+"pageref">174</a>&ndash;175</p>
+<p>Putnam, G. R., count of Ph. Islands, <a href="#pb227" class=
+"pageref">227</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">Q</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Quezon, Manuel L., Ph. delegate in Congress, speech
+against export tax, <a href="#pb618" class=
+"pageref">618</a>&ndash;19</p>
+<p>Quinlan, D. P., Aringay fight, <a href="#pb246" class=
+"pageref">246</a>;<br>
+buries Gregorio Pilar, <a href="#pb249" class="pageref">249</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">R</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Race friction between Filipinos and Americans,
+<a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a>;<br>
+increased by Taft policy, <a href="#pb439" class="pageref">439</a>,
+<a href="#pb447" class="pageref">447</a>;<br>
+deplored by Gov. Smith, <a href="#pb493" class="pageref">493</a>;<br>
+social equality muddle, <a href="#pb554" class="pageref">554</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Rebate system under export tax, iniquities of, <a href="#pb616"
+class="pageref">616</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Reconcentration in Batangas, 1902, <a href="#pb388" class=
+"pageref">388</a></p>
+<p>Reconcentration Law, <a href="#pb416" class=
+"pageref">416</a>&ndash;422</p>
+<p>Reconstruction days in Ph., <a href="#pb238" class=
+"pageref">238</a>&ndash;9, <a href="#pb381" class=
+"pageref">381</a>&ndash;2</p>
+<p>Refund of export tax, <a href="#pb616" class="pageref">616</a></p>
+<p>Reid, Whitelaw, Peace Commissioner, <a href="#pb122" class=
+"pageref">122</a>;<br>
+position, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>;<br>
+$20,000,000 hint, <a href="#pb136" class="pageref">136</a>&ndash;7</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Rid of Philippines,&rdquo; Roosevelt-Taft private confession
+to Carnegie of desire to be, <a href="#pb612" class=
+"pageref">612</a>&ndash;14</p>
+<p>Rights of Man, <a href="#pb623" class=
+"pageref">623</a>&ndash;632</p>
+<p>Rios, Montero, at Paris, <a href="#pb136" class=
+"pageref">136</a></p>
+<p>Road to Autonomy, <a href="#pb633" class=
+"pageref">633</a>&ndash;646</p>
+<p>Roosevelt, T., Vice-President, crass ignorance of 1900 about
+Filipinos, <a href="#pb10" class="pageref">10</a>, <a href="#pb230"
+class="pageref">230</a>;<br>
+presidential amnesty proclamation of 1902, <a href="#pb312" class=
+"pageref">312</a>, <a href="#pb375" class="pageref">375</a>, <a href=
+"#pb397" class="pageref">397</a>&ndash;8;<br>
+opinion of Taft in 1901, <a href="#pb406" class="pageref">406</a>;<br>
+hypothetical interview, <a href="#pb409" class=
+"pageref">409</a>&ndash;414;<br>
+supper-table confession to Andrew Carnegie about Ph., <a href="#pb612"
+class="pageref">612</a>&ndash;13</p>
+<p>Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, ignorance of 1899, and uncandor of
+1900, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>, <a href="#pb243" class=
+"pageref">243</a>, <a href="#pb327" class="pageref">327</a>, <a href=
+"#pb331" class="pageref">331</a>, <a href="#pb413" class=
+"pageref">413</a>;<br>
+succeeds Alger, <a href="#pb223" class="pageref">223</a>&ndash;4;<br>
+political buncombe of 1900 and public admission of 1904, <a href=
+"#pb279" class="pageref">279</a>&ndash;280;<br>
+Rio Janeiro speech, <a href="#pb652" class=
+"pageref">652</a>&ndash;3;<br>
+intellectual greatness, <a href="#pb224" class="pageref">224</a></p>
+<p>Round robin of war correspondents, <a href="#pb219" class=
+"pageref">219</a>&ndash;222</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">S</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Sabath neutralization resolution, <a href="#pb648"
+class="pageref">648</a></p>
+<p><i>Samar</i>, U. S. S., off San Fabian, <a href="#pb236" class=
+"pageref">236</a></p>
+<p>Samar, area and pop., <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br>
+in 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb372" class="pageref">372</a> <i>et
+seq.</i>, <a href="#pb452" class="pageref">452</a>;<br>
+massacres of 1904, <a href="#pb453" class=
+"pageref">453</a>&ndash;498;<br>
+disturbances of 1905&ndash;6, <a href="#pb503" class=
+"pageref">503</a>&ndash;8.<br>
+See also, <a href="#pb267" class="pageref">267</a>, <a href="#pb636"
+class="pageref">636</a></p>
+<p>Sandico, alleged massacre order of, <a href="#pb200" class=
+"pageref">200</a>.</p>
+<p>San Fernando, de Pampanga, <a href="#pb212" class=
+"pageref">212</a>;<br>
+de Union, taken by Young and his cavalry, <a href="#pb246" class=
+"pageref">246</a></p>
+<p>San Isidro taken by Lawton, <a href="#pb235" class=
+"pageref">235</a></p>
+<p>San Juanico strait, described, <a href="#pb452" class=
+"pageref">452</a></p>
+<p>Sargent, L. R., Naval Cadet, trip through Luzon, <a href="#pb107"
+class="pageref">107</a>&ndash;120;<br>
+on Igorrote exhibitions, <a href="#pb574" class="pageref">574</a></p>
+<p>Schools, number of children in, <a href="#pb566" class=
+"pageref">566</a>, <a href="#pb643" class="pageref">643</a></p>
+<p>Schurman Commission, <a href="#pb31" class="pageref">31</a>,
+<a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>, <a href="#pb217" class=
+"pageref">217</a>;<br>
+Otis&rsquo;s impatience with, <a href="#pb218" class=
+"pageref">218</a></p>
+<p>Schwan, Theodore, General, &ldquo;South line&rdquo; expedition,
+Jan&ndash;Feb. 1900, <a href="#pb260" class="pageref">260</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Scouts, Philippine, annual cost, now, <a href="#pb600" class=
+"pageref">600</a> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb663" href="#pb663"
+name="pb663">663</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Sewall, Captain, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href=
+"#pb245" class="pageref">245</a></p>
+<p>Shanks, Governor of Cavite, <a href="#pb539" class=
+"pageref">539</a></p>
+<p>Singapore, Pratt and Aguinaldo at, <a href="#pb7" class=
+"pageref">7</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Slayden. J. L., M. C., <a href="#pb585" class="pageref">585</a>,
+<a href="#pb599" class="pageref">599</a></p>
+<p>Smith, General Jacob, Samar campaign, 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb378"
+class="pageref">378</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+made scapegoat, <a href="#pb380" class="pageref">380</a></p>
+<p>Smith, James F., Col., First Californians made brigadier, <a href=
+"#pb193" class="pageref">193</a>&ndash;4;<br>
+army to bench, <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a>;<br>
+succeeds Gov. Ide, <a href="#pb524" class="pageref">524</a>;<br>
+peace certificate of 1907, <a href="#pb525" class="pageref">525</a>
+<i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+resigns <a href="#pb556" class="pageref">556</a>;<br>
+letter on hemp iniquity of Payne law, <a href="#pb620" class=
+"pageref">620</a></p>
+<p>Social life of American colony, <a href="#pb440" class=
+"pageref">440</a></p>
+<p>Songs, Philippine campaign:<br>
+under Otis, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a>;<br>
+under MacArthur, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>;<br>
+under Chaffee, <a href="#pb392" class="pageref">392</a></p>
+<p>Sonnichsen, Albert, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Sorsogon province, area and pop., <a href="#pb265" class=
+"pageref">265</a></p>
+<p>Spanish War, President McKinley&rsquo;s message of winter of 1897,
+preceding, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>;<br>
+war message, April 1898, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>;<br>
+peace protocol, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>;<br>
+treaty, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>&ndash;138</p>
+<p>Spenlow and Jorkins, Taft and Chaffee likened to, <a href="#pb390"
+class="pageref">390</a></p>
+<p>Spooner, Senator, <a href="#pb169" class="pageref">169</a></p>
+<p>Starr, C. G., Major, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>,
+<a href="#pb235" class="pageref">235</a></p>
+<p>Stewart, Senator, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a></p>
+<p>Sugar and tobacco, Ph., under Payne law, <a href="#pb560" class=
+"pageref">560</a>;<br>
+other Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604" class=
+"pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Supper-table confession of Roosevelt and Taft to Carnegie about Ph.,
+<a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>&ndash;13</p>
+<p>Surigao insurrection of 1903, <a href="#pb414" class=
+"pageref">414</a>&ndash;16</p>
+<p>Switzerland, neutralization of, <a href="#pb650" class=
+"pageref">650</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">T</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Taft, W. H., &ldquo;we blundered into
+colonization,&rdquo; <a href="#pb44" class="pageref">44</a>, <a href=
+"#pb291" class="pageref">291</a>;<br>
+original reluctance to go to Ph., <a href="#pb291" class=
+"pageref">291</a>;<br>
+Roosevelt-Taft confession to Carnegie of desire to be &ldquo;rid
+of&rdquo; Ph., <a href="#pb612" class="pageref">612</a>&ndash;13;<br>
+Taft commission of 1900, genesis of idea of, <a href="#pb288" class=
+"pageref">288</a>;<br>
+situation on its arrival at Manila, <a href="#pb282" class=
+"pageref">282</a>&ndash;7;<br>
+its initial attitude, <a href="#pb291" class=
+"pageref">291</a>&ndash;4;<br>
+belittles work of army, <a href="#pb299" class="pageref">299</a>;<br>
+insists enemy friendly, <a href="#pb301" class=
+"pageref">301</a>&ndash;5;<br>
+ignores army views, <a href="#pb306" class="pageref">306</a>;<br>
+&ldquo;peace at any price&rdquo; policy, <a href="#pb307" class=
+"pageref">307</a>;<br>
+Governor, 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb345" class=
+"pageref">345</a>&ndash;402;<br>
+prematurity of civil government, <a href="#pb360" class=
+"pageref">360</a>;<br>
+disorders which followed, <a href="#pb371" class=
+"pageref">371</a>&ndash;402;<br>
+last year as Governor, 1903, <a href="#pb403" class=
+"pageref">403</a>&ndash;445;<br>
+Surigao disorders, <a href="#pb414" class=
+"pageref">414</a>&ndash;16;<br>
+reconcentration law, <a href="#pb416" class=
+"pageref">416</a>&ndash;422;<br>
+Misamis insurrection, <a href="#pb422" class=
+"pageref">422</a>&ndash;3;<br>
+Albay &ldquo;reign of terror,&rdquo; <a href="#pb423" class=
+"pageref">423</a>&ndash;5;<br>
+magnitude and details of, <a href="#pb426" class=
+"pageref">426</a>&ndash;9;<br>
+&ldquo;Black Hole of&rdquo; Albay, <a href="#pb430" class=
+"pageref">430</a>&ndash;4;<br>
+Taft unpopularity with Americans in Ph., explained, <a href="#pb437"
+class="pageref">437</a>;<br>
+Iloilo speech, <a href="#pb438" class="pageref">438</a>;<br>
+&ldquo;bullyragging&rdquo; Americans, <a href="#pb439" class=
+"pageref">439</a>;<br>
+absoluteness of his power, <a href="#pb439" class=
+"pageref">439</a>&ndash;445;<br>
+becomes Secretary of War, <a href="#pb446" class="pageref">446</a>;<br>
+St. Louis speech, 1907, <a href="#pb357" class="pageref">357</a>;<br>
+opens Ph. Assembly, 1907, <a href="#pb550" class="pageref">550</a>;<br>
+address, <a href="#pb552" class="pageref">552</a>;<br>
+Friar lands, splendid work in matter of, <a href="#pb563" class=
+"pageref">563</a>;<br>
+likewise as to Ph. finances, <a href="#pb565" class=
+"pageref">565</a>;<br>
+and public education, <a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a></p>
+<p>Tariff Act of 1902, export tax features, <a href="#pb605" class=
+"pageref">605</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Tarlac, MacArthur enters, <a href="#pb239" class=
+"pageref">239</a></p>
+<p>Tarlac province, area and pop., <a href="#pb233" class=
+"pageref">233</a></p>
+<p>Tayabas province, area and pop., <a href="#pb263" class=
+"pageref">263</a>;<br>
+disorders in, 1901&ndash;2, <a href="#pb372" class=
+"pageref">372</a></p>
+<p>Taylor, J. R. M., Captain, <a href="#pb200" class=
+"pageref">200</a></p>
+<p>Taylor, Wallace C., Colonel, <a href="#pb516" class=
+"pageref">516</a></p>
+<p>Tila pass, battle of, <a href="#pb248" class="pageref">248</a></p>
+<p>Tillman, Senator, <a href="#pb169" class="pageref">169</a></p>
+<p>Ti&ntilde;o, General, surrenders, <a href="#pb341" class=
+"pageref">341</a></p>
+<p>Tobacco, Congressional legislation concerning, <a href="#pb604"
+class="pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Trade, <a href="#pb604" class="pageref">604</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>Treaty of Paris, <a href="#pb121" class=
+"pageref">121</a>&ndash;138;<br>
+how we came to pay the $20,000,000, <a href="#pb136" class=
+"pageref">136</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>&ldquo;Tribes&rdquo; and tribal state fetich, <a href="#pb295"
+class="pageref">295</a>&ndash;8, <a href="#pb566" class=
+"pageref">566</a>&ndash;9, <a href="#pb575" class=
+"pageref">575</a>&ndash;81</p>
+<p>Twenty-ninth Inf., U. S. V., <a href="#pb266" class=
+"pageref">266</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">U</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Underwood, Oscar W., <a href="#pb286" class=
+"pageref">286</a>;<br>
+speech against Philippine export tax, <a href="#pb618" class=
+"pageref">618</a></p>
+<p>Union province, area and pop., <a href="#pb252" class=
+"pageref">252</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">V</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Vanderlip, F. A., position on Ph., in 1898, <a href=
+"#pb49" class="pageref">49</a>, <a href="#pb123" class=
+"pageref">123</a></p>
+<p>Vigan, <a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Villa Simeon, <a href="#pb112" class="pageref">112</a>&ndash;15;<br>
+diary of Aguinaldo&rsquo;s flight, <a href="#pb240" class=
+"pageref">240</a>, <a href="#pb246" class="pageref">246</a></p>
+<p>Visayan Islands, <a href="#pb228" class="pageref">228</a>;<br>
+seditious state in 1905, <a href="#pb505" class="pageref">505</a></p>
+<p>Volunteers of 1898, <a href="#pb194" class="pageref">194</a>;<br>
+of 1899, <a href="#pb270" class="pageref">270</a>&ndash;8, <a href=
+"#pb280" class="pageref">280</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">W</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">War with Filipinos, progressive bitterness of,
+<a href="#pb198" class="pageref">198</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+<p>&ldquo;Water-cure,&rdquo; <a href="#pb202" class=
+"pageref">202</a>&ndash;5</p>
+<p>Way out, the, <a href="#pb647" class="pageref">647</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Wealth of Ph. agricultural, <a href="#pb607" class=
+"pageref">607</a></p>
+<p>Wheaton, General, <a href="#pb234" class=
+"pageref">234</a>&ndash;8</p>
+<p>White man, tropics, effect on, <a href="#pb208" class=
+"pageref">208</a>&ndash;9, <a href="#pb549" class="pageref">549</a>,
+<a href="#pb590" class="pageref">590</a>&ndash;3</p>
+<p>Whitsett, G. P., <a href="#pb361" class="pageref">361</a>
+<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb664" href="#pb664" name=
+"pb664">664</a>]</span></p>
+<p>Wilcox-Sargent trip, <a href="#pb107" class=
+"pageref">107</a>&ndash;120</p>
+<p>Wild tribes, <a href="#pb295" class="pageref">295</a>&ndash;8,
+<a href="#pb566" class="pageref">566</a>&ndash;9, <a href="#pb575"
+class="pageref">575</a>&ndash;581</p>
+<p>Wildman, U. S. Consul, Hong Kong, early dealings with Aguinaldo,
+<a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a></p>
+<p>Williams, U. S. Consul, Manila, <a href="#pb29" class=
+"pageref">29</a>, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>, <a href=
+"#pb77" class="pageref">77</a>&ndash;78, <a href="#pb345" class=
+"pageref">345</a></p>
+<p>Wilfley, Atty. Gen., <a href="#pb114" class="pageref">114</a>,
+<a href="#pb502" class="pageref">502</a></p>
+<p>Winship, B., Lieut., <a href="#pb76" class="pageref">76</a></p>
+<p>Winship, Emory, Lieut., U. S. N., off Malabon, <a href="#pb207"
+class="pageref">207</a></p>
+<p>Winslow, Erving, <a href="#pb648" class="pageref">648</a></p>
+<p>Winthrop, Beekman, <a href="#pb443" class="pageref">443</a></p>
+<p>Wood, General, <a href="#pb288" class="pageref">288</a></p>
+<p>Worcester, D. C., <a href="#pb571" class="pageref">571</a> <i>et
+seq.</i></p>
+<p>Wright, Luke, E., Governor:<br>
+1904, <a href="#pb445" class="pageref">445</a>&ndash;498;<br>
+1905, <a href="#pb499" class="pageref">499</a>&ndash;514</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">Y</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">&ldquo;Yankees of Philippines,&rdquo; Ilocanos so
+called<span class="corr" id="xd20e18593" title="Not in source">,</span>
+<a href="#pb247" class="pageref">247</a></p>
+<p>Young, R. W., Major, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a></p>
+<p>Young, General, <a href="#pb235" class="pageref">235</a> <i>et
+seq.</i>, <a href="#pb251" class="pageref">251</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div2"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divHead">
+<h3 class="main">Z</h3>
+</div>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first">Zambales province, area and pop., <a href="#pb256"
+class="pageref">256</a></p>
+<p>Zapote River, battle of, <a href="#pb213" class=
+"pageref">213</a>&ndash;14</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="div1"><span class="pagenum">[<a href=
+"#toc">Contents</a>]</span>
+<div class="divBody">
+<p class="first"></p>
+<div class="figure xd20e18630width" id="map"><img src="images/map.jpg"
+alt="Sketch map of the Philippines." width="537" height="720">
+<p class="figureHead">Sketch map of the Philippines.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<div class="transcribernote">
+<h2 class="main">Colophon</h2>
+<h3 class="main">Availability</h3>
+<p class="first">This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no
+cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give
+it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
+included with this eBook or online at <a class="exlink" title=
+"External link" href=
+"https://www.gutenberg.org/">www.gutenberg.org</a>.</p>
+<p>This eBook is produced by the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+at <a class="exlink" title="External link" href=
+"https://www.pgdp.net/">www.pgdp.net</a>.</p>
+<p><b>James Henderson Blount</b> (1869&ndash;1918) was a US judge who
+went in to the Philippines as a volunteer shortly after the US took
+over this colony from Spain. After his experiences, he became critical
+of the US policy in the Philippines, and urged for an early
+independence of the country.</p>
+<p><i>The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898&ndash;1912</i>
+(first published in 1912) is a critical work on the American rule in
+the Philippines. This work is much criticized by Dean Worchester in his
+book, <i><a class="pglink" title="Link to Project Gutenberg ebook"
+href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/12077">The Philippines, Past and
+Present</a></i> (1914), also present in Project Gutenberg. The latter
+was only returning the favor, as Dean Worcester receives in this work a
+full chapter of harsh criticism.</p>
+<p>This book is prepared from scans of the first edition, available at
+the Internet Archive: <a class="exlink" title="External link" href=
+"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupati01blou">1</a>,
+<a class="exlink" title="External link" href=
+"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupat01blougoog">2</a>,
+<a class="exlink" title="External link" href=
+"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupat00blougoog">3</a>.</p>
+<p>However, the illustrations, including the scan of the title page
+have been taken from scans of the second edition from 1913: <a class=
+"exlink" title="External link" href=
+"http://www.archive.org/details/americanoccupati00blou">1</a>.</p>
+<h3 class="main">Encoding</h3>
+<p class="first"></p>
+<h3 class="main">Revision History</h3>
+<ul>
+<li>2011-06-10 Started.</li>
+</ul>
+<h3 class="main">External References</h3>
+<p>This Project Gutenberg eBook contains external references. These
+links may not work for you.</p>
+<h3 class="main">Corrections</h3>
+<p>The following corrections have been applied to the text:</p>
+<table width="75%" summary=
+"Overview of corrections applied to the text.">
+<tr>
+<th>Page</th>
+<th>Source</th>
+<th>Correction</th>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e933">9</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">d&rsquo; &eacute;tat</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">d&rsquo;&eacute;tat</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e2009">55</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">infering</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">inferring</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e2100">59</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">recognise</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">recognize</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e2228">63</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">similiar</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">similar</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e2892">97</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insistance</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insistence</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e3003">104</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">broad-guaged</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">broad-gauged</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e3122">112</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">she</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">the</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e5588">229</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">substanially</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">substantially</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e5938">246</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">pt.</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">pp.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e6730">267</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">jursidiction</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">jurisdiction</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e7156">295</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e7859">343</a>,
+<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e13655">610</a>, <a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e15211">658</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e7753">334</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">quitely</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">quietly</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e7797">339</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Deleted</i>]</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e7808">340</a>, <a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e11303">481</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Malacanan</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Malaca&ntilde;an</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e8805">394</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurgent</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurgents</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e9067">414</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">become</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">becoming</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e9268">426</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">]</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e11474">488</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">presidental</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">presidential</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e11552">495</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">analagous</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">analogous</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e11979">521</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">wholely</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">wholly</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e12147">530</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insursurrection</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">insurrection</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e12539">551</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">in dependence</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">independence</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e13108">583</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">civilised</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">civilized</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e13376">596</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Filipino</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Filipinos</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e13513">604</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">225</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">2.25</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e13741">615</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">That</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">that</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e14059">621</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Sante</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">Santa</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e14149">629</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">probaby</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">probably</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e14640">657</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17192">661</a>,
+<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17198">661</a>, <a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e17203">661</a>, <a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e17209">661</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">;</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="width20" valign="top"><a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e15404">658</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e15407">658</a>,
+<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e15421">658</a>, <a class="pageref" href=
+"#xd20e16042">659</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd20e17563">662</a>,
+<a class="pageref" href="#xd20e18593">664</a></td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">[<i>Not in source</i>]</td>
+<td class="width40" valign="bottom">,</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the Philippines
+1898-1912, by James H. Blount
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
+
+Author: James H. Blount
+
+Release Date: June 28, 2011 [EBook #36542]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by the
+Digital & Multimedia Center, Michigan State University
+Libraries.)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+               THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+                               1898-1912
+
+
+                                   By
+                            JAMES H. BLOUNT
+
+   Officer of United States Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899-1901
+       United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901-1905
+
+
+
+                               With a Map
+
+                          G. P. Putnam's Sons
+                          New York and London
+                        The Knickerbocker Press
+                                  1912
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                            Copyright, 1912
+                                   By
+                            James H. Blount
+
+                   The Knickerbocker Press, New York
+
+
+
+
+
+
+                                   To
+                           JOHN DOWNEY WORKS
+                             OF CALIFORNIA
+                 AS FINE A TYPE OF CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN
+                                AS EVER
+            GRACED A SEAT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
+                                  WHO
+        BELIEVING, WITH THE WRITER, AS TO THE PHILIPPINES, THAT
+             INDEFINITE RETENTION WITH UNDECLARED INTENTION
+                                   IS
+                          INDEFINITE DRIFTING
+                  HAS READ THE MANUSCRIPT OF THIS WORK
+                            AS IT PROGRESSED
+           LENDING TO ITS PREPARATION THE AID AND COUNSEL OF
+                        AN OLDER AND A WISER MAN
+                                  AND
+                       THE CONTAGIOUS SERENITY OF
+                   CONFIDENCE THAT RIGHT WILL PREVAIL
+                  THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED BY
+                               The Author
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+                                          Pardon, gentles all,
+                        The flat unraised spirit that hath dared
+                        On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth
+                        So great an object.
+
+                                                       Henry V.
+
+
+To have gone out to the other side of the world with an army of
+invasion, and had a part, however small, in the subjugation of a
+strange people, and then to see a new government set up, and, as
+an official of that government, watch it work out through a number
+of years, is an unusual and interesting experience, especially to
+a lawyer. What seem to me the most valuable things I learned in the
+course of that experience are herein submitted to my fellow-countrymen,
+in connection with a narrative covering the whole of the American
+occupation of the Philippines to date.
+
+This book is an attempt, by one whose intimate acquaintance with two
+remotely separated peoples will be denied in no quarter, to interpret
+each to the other. How intelligent that acquaintance is, is of course
+altogether another matter, which the reader will determine for himself.
+
+The task here undertaken is to make audible to a great free nation the
+voice of a weaker subject people who passionately and rightly long to
+be also free, but whose longings have been systematically denied for
+the last fourteen years, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes viciously,
+and always cruelly, on the wholly erroneous idea that where the end is
+benevolent, it justifies the means, regardless of the means necessary
+to the end.
+
+At a time when all our military and fiscal experts agree that having
+the Philippines on our hands is a grave strategic and economic mistake,
+fraught with peril to the nation's prestige in the early stages of our
+next great war, we are keeping the Filipinos in industrial bondage
+through unrighteous Congressional legislation for which special
+interests in America are responsible, in bald repudiation of the
+Open Door policy, and against their helpless but universal protest,
+a wholly unprotected and easy prey to the first first-class Power with
+which we become involved in war. Yet all the while the very highest
+considerations of national honor require us to choose between making
+the Filipino people free and independent without unnecessary delay,
+as they of right ought to be, or else imperilling the perpetuity
+of our own institutions by the creation and maintenance of a great
+standing army, sufficient properly to guard overseas possessions.
+
+A cheerful blindness to the inevitable worthy of Mark Tapley himself,
+the stale Micawberism that "something is bound to turn up," and
+a Mrs. Jellyby philanthropy hopelessly callous to domestic duties,
+expenses, and distresses, have hitherto successfully united to prevent
+the one simple and supreme need of the situation--a frank, formal,
+and definite declaration, by the law-making power of the government,
+of the nation's purpose in the premises. What is needed is a formal
+legislative announcement that the governing of a remote and alien
+people is to have no permanent place in the purposes of our national
+life, and that we do bona fide intend, just as soon as a stable
+government, republican in form, can be established by the people
+of the Philippine Islands, to turn over, upon terms which shall be
+reasonable and just, the government and control of the islands to
+the people thereof.
+
+The essentials of the problem, being at least as immutable as human
+nature and geography, will not change much with time. And whenever
+the American people are ready to abandon the strange gods whose
+guidance has necessitated a new definition of Liberty consistent with
+taxation without representation and unanimous protest by the governed,
+they will at once set about to secure to a people who have proven
+themselves brave and self-sacrificing in war, and gentle, generous,
+and tractable in peace, the right to pursue happiness in their own way,
+in lieu of somebody else's way, as the spirit of our Constitution,
+and the teachings of our God, Who is also theirs, alike demand.
+
+After seven years spent at the storm-centre of so-called "Expansion,"
+the first of the seven as a volunteer officer in Cuba during and after
+the Spanish War, the next two in a like capacity in the Philippines,
+and the remainder as a United States judge in the last-named country,
+the writer was finally invalided home in 1905, sustained in spirit,
+at parting, by cordial farewells, oral and written, personal and
+official, but convinced that foreign kindness will not cure the
+desire of a people, once awakened, for what used to be known as
+Freedom before we freed Cuba and then subjugated the Philippines; and
+that to permanently eradicate sedition from the Philippine Islands,
+the American courts there must be given jurisdiction over thought
+as well as over overt act, and must learn the method of drawing an
+indictment against a whole people.
+
+Seven other years of interested observation from the Western Hemisphere
+end of the line have confirmed and fortified the convictions above
+set forth.
+
+If we give the Filipinos this independence they so ardently desire
+and ever clamor for until made to shut up, "the holy cause,"
+as their brilliant young representative in the American House
+of Representatives, Mr. Quezon, always calls it, will not be at
+once spoiled, as the American hemp and other special interests so
+contemptuously insist, by the gentleman named, and his compatriot,
+Senor Osmena, the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and the rest of
+the leaders of the patriot cause, in a general mutual throat-cutting
+incidental to a scramble for the offices. This sort of contention is
+merely the hiss of the same old serpent of tyranny which has always
+beset the pathway of man's struggle for free institutions.
+
+When first the talk in America, after the battle of Manila Bay,
+about keeping the Philippines, reached the islands, one of the
+Filipino leaders wrote to another during the negotiations between
+their commanding general and our own looking to preservation of
+the peace until the results of the Paris Peace Conference which
+settled the fate of the islands should be known, in effect, thus:
+"The Filipinos will not be fit for independence in ten, twenty, or a
+hundred years if it be left to American colonial office-holders drawing
+good salaries to determine the question." Is there not some human
+nature in that remark? Suppose, reader, you were in the enjoyment
+of a salary of five, ten, or twenty thousand dollars a year as a
+government official in the Philippines, how precipitately would you
+hasten to recommend yourself out of office, and evict yourself into
+this cold Western world with which you had meantime lost all touch?
+
+The Filipinos can run a far better government than the Cubans. In 1898,
+when Admiral Dewey read in the papers that we were going to give Cuba
+independence, he wired home from Manila:
+
+
+    These people are far superior in their intelligence, and more
+    capable of self-government than the people of Cuba, and I am
+    familiar with both races.
+
+
+After a year in Cuba and nearly six in the Philippines, two as an
+officer of the army that subjugated the Filipinos, and the remainder
+as a judge over them, I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral
+Dewey, but with this addition, viz., that the people of those islands,
+whatever of conscious political unity they may have lacked in 1898,
+were welded into absolute oneness as a people by their original
+struggle for independence against us, and will remain forever so
+welded by their incurable aspirations for a national life of their
+own under a republic framed in imitation of ours. Furthermore, the one
+great difference between Cuba and the Philippines is that the latter
+country has no race cancer forever menacing its peace, and sapping
+its self-reliance. The Philippine people are absolutely one people,
+as to race, color, and previous condition. Again, American sugar and
+tobacco interests will never permit the competitive Philippine sugar
+and tobacco industries to grow as Nature and Nature's God intended;
+and the American importers of Manila hemp--which is to the Philippines
+what cotton is to the South--have, through special Congressional
+legislation still standing on our statute books--to the shame of the
+nation--so depressed the hemp industry of the islands that the market
+price it brings to-day is just one half what it brought ten years ago.
+
+If three strong and able Americans, familiar with insular conditions
+and still young enough to undertake the task, were told by a President
+of the United States, by authority of Congress, "Go out there and
+set up a stable native government by July 4, 1921, [1] and then come
+away," they could and would do it; and that government would be a
+success; and one of the greatest moral victories in the annals of
+free government would have been written by the gentlemen concerned
+upon the pages of their country's history.
+
+We ought to give the Filipinos their independence, even if we have
+to guarantee it to them. But, by neutralization treaties with the
+other great Powers similar to those which safeguard the integrity and
+independence of Switzerland to-day, whereby the other Powers would
+agree not to seize the islands after we give them their independence,
+the Philippines can be made as permanently neutral territory in
+Asiatic politics as Switzerland is to-day in European politics.
+
+
+James H. Blount.
+
+1406 G Street, N. W.,
+Washington, D. C.,
+July 4, 1912.
+
+
+P.S.--The preparation of this book has entailed examination of a
+vast mass of official documents, as will appear from the foot-note
+citations to the page and volume from which quotations have been
+made. The object has been to place all material statements of fact
+beyond question. For the purpose of this research work, Mr. Herbert
+Putnam, Librarian of Congress, was kind enough to extend me the
+privileges of the national library, and it would be most ungracious
+to fail to acknowledge the obligation I am under, in this regard,
+to one whom the country is indeed fortunate in having at the head
+of that great institution. I should also make acknowledgment of the
+obligation I am under to Mr. W. W. Bishop, the able superintendent
+of the reading-room, for aid rendered whenever asked, and to my
+life-long friends, John and Hugh Morrison, the most valuable men,
+to the general public, except the two gentlemen above named, on the
+whole great roll of employees of the Library of Congress.
+
+
+J. H. B.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                                 Pages
+Chapter I
+
+Mr. Pratt's Serenade                                              1-15
+
+    Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at Singapore,
+    in the British Straits Settlements, finding Aguinaldo a political
+    refugee at that place at the outbreak of our war with Spain,
+    April 21, 1898, arranges by cable with Admiral Dewey, then at
+    Hong Kong with his squadron, for Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong
+    and thence to Manila, to co-operate by land with Admiral Dewey
+    against the Spaniards, Pratt promising Aguinaldo independence,
+    without authority. Mr. Pratt is later quietly separated from the
+    consular service.
+
+Chapter II
+
+Dewey and Aguinaldo                                              16-45
+
+    After the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey brings
+    Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong, whither he had proceeded from
+    Singapore, lands him at Cavite, and chaperones his insurrection
+    against the Spaniards until the American troops arrive, June 30th.
+
+Chapter III
+
+Anderson and Aguinaldo                                           46-66
+
+    General Anderson's official dealings with Aguinaldo from June 30,
+    1898, until General Merritt's arrival, July 25th,
+
+Chapter IV
+
+Merritt and Aguinaldo                                            67-87
+
+    General Merritt's five weeks' sojourn in the Islands, from July 25,
+    1898, to the end of August, including fall of Manila, August 13th,
+    and our relations with Aguinaldo during period indicated.
+
+Chapter V
+
+Otis and Aguinaldo                                              88-106
+
+    Dealings and relations between, September-December,
+1898.
+
+Chapter VI
+
+The Wilcox-Sargent Trip                                        107-120
+
+    Two American naval officers make an extended tour through
+    the interior of Luzon by permission of Admiral Dewey and with
+    Aguinaldo's consent, in October-November, 1898, while the Paris
+    peace negotiations were in progress. What they saw and learned.
+
+Chapter VII
+
+The Treaty of Paris                                            121-138
+
+    An account of the negotiations, October-December, 1898. How we came
+    to pay Spain $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 insurrection. Treaty
+    signed December 10, 1898.
+
+Chapter VIII
+
+The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation                       139-151
+
+    President McKinley's celebrated proclamation of December 21,
+    1898, cabled out to the Islands, December 27, 1898, after the
+    signing of the Treaty of Paris on the 10th, and intended as
+    a fire-extinguisher, in fact acted merely as a firebrand, the
+    Filipinos perceiving that Benevolent Assimilation meant such
+    measure of slaughter as might be necessary to "spare them from
+    the dangers of" the independence on which they were bent.
+
+Chapter IX
+
+The Iloilo Fiasco                                              152-163
+
+    By order of President McKinley, General Otis abstains from
+    hostilities to await Senate action on Treaty of Paris.
+
+Chapter X
+
+Otis and Aguinaldo (Continued)                          164-185
+
+    Still waiting for the Senate to act.
+
+Chapter XI
+
+Otis and the War                                               186-223
+
+    Covering the period from the outbreak of February 4, 1899, until
+    the fall of that year.
+
+Chapter XII
+
+Otis and the War (Continued)                            224-269
+
+    From the fall of 1899 to the spring of 1900.
+
+Chapter XIII
+
+Macarthur and the War                                          270-281
+
+    Carries the story up to the date of the arrival of the Taft
+    Commission, sent out in the spring of 1900, to help General
+    MacArthur run the war.
+
+Chapter XIV
+
+The Taft Commission                                            282-344
+
+    Shows how the Taft Commission, born of the McKinley Benevolent
+    Assimilation theory that there was no real fundamental opposition
+    to American rule, lived up to that theory, in their telegrams
+    sent home during the presidential campaign of 1900, and in 1901
+    set up a civil government predicated upon their obstinate but
+    opportune delusions of the previous year.
+
+
+            "The papers 'id it 'andsome
+            But you bet the army knows."
+
+
+Chapter XV
+
+Governor Taft--1901-2                                          345-402
+
+    Shows the prematurity of a civil government set up under pressure
+    of political expediency, and the disorders which followed.
+
+Chapter XVI
+
+Governor Taft--1903                                            403-436
+
+    Shows divers serious insurrections in various provinces amounting
+    to what the Commission itself termed, in one instance, "a reign of
+    terror"--situations so endangering the public safety that to fail
+    to order out the army to quell the disturbances was neglect of
+    plain duty, such neglect being due to a set policy of preserving
+    the official fiction that peace prevailed, and that Benevolent
+    Assimilation was a success.
+
+Chapter XVII
+
+Governor Taft--1903 (Continued)                         437-445
+
+    Shows the essentially despotic, though theoretically benevolent,
+    character of the Taft civil government of the Philippines, and
+    its attitude toward the American business community in the Islands.
+
+Chapter XVIII
+
+Governor Wright--1904                                          446-498
+
+    Shows the change of the tone of the government under Governor
+    Taft's successor, his consequent popularity with his fellow-country
+    men in the Islands, and his corresponding unpopularity with the
+    Filipinos. Shows also a long series of massacres of pacificos by
+    enemies of the American government between July and November,
+    1904, permitted out of super-solicitude lest ordering out the
+    army and summarily putting a stop to said massacres might affect
+    the presidential election in the United States unfavorably to
+    Mr. Roosevelt, by reviving the notion that neither the Roosevelt
+    Administration nor its predecessor had ever been frank with the
+    country concerning the state of public order in the Islands.
+
+Chapter XIX
+
+Governor Wright--1905                                          499-514
+
+    Shows the prompt ordering of the army to the scene of the
+    disturbances after the presidential election of 1904 was safely
+    over, and the nature and extent of the insurrections of 1905.
+
+Chapter XX
+
+Governor Ide--1906                                             515-523
+
+    Describes the last outbreak prior to the final establishment of
+    a state of general and complete peace.
+
+Chapter XXI
+
+Governor Smith--1907-9                                         524-557
+
+    Describes divers matters, including a certificate made March 28,
+    1907, declaring that a state of general and complete peace had
+    prevailed for the two years immediately the preceding. Describes
+    also the formal opening of First Philippine Assembly by Secretary
+    of War Taft in October, 1907, and his final announcement to them
+    that he had no authority to end the uncertainty concerning their
+    future which is the corner-stone of the Taft policy of Indefinite
+    Tutelage, and that Congress only could end that uncertainty.
+
+Chapter XXII
+
+Governor Forbes--1909-12                                       558-570
+
+    Suggests the hypocrisy of boasting about "the good we are doing"
+    the Filipinos when predatory special interests are all the while
+    preying upon the Philippine people even more shamelessly than
+    they do upon the American people, and by the same methods, viz.:
+    legislation placed or kept on the statute-books of the United
+    States for their special benefit, the difference being that
+    the American people can help themselves if they will, but the
+    Philippine people cannot.
+
+Chapter XXIII
+
+"Non-Christian" Worcester                                      571-586
+
+    Professor Worcester, the P. T. Barnum of the "non-Christian tribe"
+    industry, and his menagerie of certain rare and interesting wild
+    tribes still extant in the Islands, specimens of which you saw at
+    the St. Louis Exposition of 1903-4; by which device the American
+    people have been led to believe the Igorrotes, Negritos, etc.,
+    to be samples of the Filipino people.
+
+Chapter XXIV
+
+The Philippine Civil Service                                   587-594
+
+    Showing how imperatively simple justice demands that Americans,
+    who go out to enter the Philippine Civil Service should, after
+    a tour of duty out there, be entitled, as matter of right, to
+    be transferred back to the Civil Service in the United States,
+    instead of being left wholly dependent on political influence to
+    "place" them after their final return home.
+
+Chapter XXV
+
+Cost of the Philippines                                        595-603
+
+    In life, and money, together with certain consolatory reflections
+    thereon.
+
+Chapter XXVI
+
+Congressional Legislation                                      604-622
+
+    Showing how a small group of American importers of Manila
+    hemp--hemp being to the Philippines what cotton is to the
+    South--have so manipulated the Philippine hemp industry as to
+    depress the market price of the main source of wealth of the
+    Islands below the cost of production; also other evils of taxation
+    without representation.
+
+Chapter XXVII
+
+The Rights of Man                                              623-632
+
+    Industrial slavery to predatory interests and physical slavery
+    compared.
+
+Chapter XXVIII
+
+The Road to Autonomy                                           633-646
+
+    Shows how entirely easy would be the task of evolving the American
+    Ireland we have laid up for ourselves in the Philippines into
+    complete Home Rule by 1921, the date proposed for Philippine
+    independence in the pending Jones bill, introduced in the House
+    of Representatives in March, 1912.
+
+Chapter XXIX
+
+The Way Out                                                    647-655
+
+    Shows how, by neutralization treaties with the other powers, as
+    proposed in many different resolutions, of both Republican and
+    Democratic origin, now pending in Congress, whereby the other
+    powers should agree not to annex the Islands after we give them
+    their independence, the Philippines can be made permanently neutral
+    territory in Asiatic politics exactly as both Switzerland and
+    Belgium have been for nearly a hundred years in European politics.
+
+Index                                                              657
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+                                                                    Page
+The Capture of Aguinaldo, March 23, 1901--The Central
+Fact of the American Military Occupation                    Frontispiece
+    From the Drawing by F. C. Yohn
+    Copyright by Charles Scribner's Sons
+
+Bird's-eye View of the Philippine Archipelago, Showing
+Preponderating Importance of Luzon                                   228
+
+Outline Sketch of the Theatre of Operations in Luzon, 1899           232
+
+Sketch Map of the Philippines                                     At End
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+MR. PRATT'S SERENADE
+
+                        Had I but served my God with half the zeal
+                        I served my king, he would not in mine age
+                        Have left me naked to mine enemies.
+
+                                      King Henry VIII., Act III., Sc. 2.
+
+
+Any narrative covering our acquisition of the Philippine Islands
+must, of course, centre in the outset about Admiral Dewey, and the
+destruction by him of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on Sunday
+morning, May 1, 1898. But as the Admiral had brought Aguinaldo down
+from Hong Kong to Manila after the battle, and landed him on May
+19th to start an auxiliary insurrection, which insurrection kept the
+Spaniards bottled up in Manila on the land side for three and a half
+months while Dewey did the same by sea, until ten thousand American
+troops arrived, and easily completed the reduction and capture of the
+beleaguered and famished city on August 13th, it is necessary to a
+clear understanding of the de facto alliance between the Americans and
+Aguinaldo thus created, to know who brought the Admiral and Aguinaldo
+together and how, and why.
+
+The United States declared war against Spain, April 21, 1898,
+to free Cuba, and at once arranged an understanding with the Cuban
+revolutionists looking to co-operation between their forces and ours
+to that end. For some years prior to this, political conditions in the
+Philippines had been quite similar to those in Cuba, so that when, two
+days after war broke out, the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General
+of the United States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements,
+found Aguinaldo, who had headed the last organized outbreak against
+Spain in the Philippines, temporarily sojourning as a political
+refugee at Singapore, in the Filipino colony there, he naturally
+sought to arrange for his co-operating with us against Spain, as
+Gomez and Garcia were doing in Cuba. Thereby hangs the story of
+"Mr. Pratt's Serenade." However, before we listen to the band whose
+strains spoke the gratitude of the Filipinos to Mr. Pratt for having
+introduced Aguinaldo to Dewey, let us learn somewhat of Aguinaldo's
+antecedents, as related to the purposes of the introduction.
+
+The first low rumbling of official thunder premonitory to the war
+with Spain was heard in Mr. McKinley's annual message to Congress of
+December, 1897, [2] wherein he said, among other things:
+
+
+    The most important problem with which this government is now
+    called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns
+    its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection.
+
+
+In that very month of December, 1897, Aguinaldo was heading a
+formidable insurrection against Spanish tyranny in the Philippines,
+and the Filipinos and their revolutionary committees everywhere were
+watching with eager interest the course of "The Great North American
+Republic," as they were wont to term our government.
+
+The Report of the First Philippine Commission sent out to the Islands
+by President McKinley in February, 1899, of which President Schurman
+of Cornell University was Chairman, contains a succinct memorandum
+concerning the Filipino revolutionary movement of 1896-7, which had
+been begun by Aguinaldo in 1896, and had culminated in what is known as
+the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato, [3] signed December 14, 1897. This treaty
+had promised certain reforms, such as representation in the Spanish
+Cortez, sending the Friars away, etc., and had also promised the
+leaders $400,000 if Aguinaldo and his Cabinet would leave the country
+and go to Hong Kong. "No definite time was fixed," says President
+Schurman (vol. I., p. 171), "during which these men were to remain
+away from the Philippines; and if the promises made by Spain were not
+fulfilled, they had the right to return." Of course, "the promises made
+by Spain" were not fulfilled. Spain thought she had bought Aguinaldo
+and his crowd off. "Two hundred thousand dollars," says Prof. Schurman,
+"was paid to Aguinaldo when he arrived in Hong Kong." But instead of
+using this money in riotous living, the little group of exiles began
+to take notice of the struggles of their brothers in wretchedness
+in Cuba, and the ever-increasing probability of intervention by the
+United States in that unhappy Spanish colony, which, of course, would
+be their opportunity to strike for Independence. They had only been
+in Hong Kong about two months when the Maine blew up February 15,
+1898, Then they knew there would be "something doing." Hong Kong
+being the cross-roads of the Far East and the gateway to Asia, and
+being only sixty hours across the choppy China Sea from Manila, was
+the best place in that part of the world to brew another insurrection
+against Spain. But Singapore is also a good place for a branch office
+for such an enterprise, being on the main-travelled route between the
+Philippines and Spain by way of the Suez Canal, about four or five days
+out of Hong Kong by a good liner, and but little farther from Manila,
+as the crow flies, than Hong Kong itself. Owing to political unrest
+in the Philippines in 1896-7-8, there was quite a colony of Filipino
+political refugees living at Singapore during that period. Aguinaldo
+had gone over from Hong Kong to Singapore in the latter half of April,
+1898, arriving there, it so chanced, the day we declared war against
+Spain, April 21st. He was immediately sought out by Mr. Pratt, who
+had learned of his presence in the community through an Englishman
+of Singapore, a former resident of Manila, a Mr. Bray, who seems to
+have been a kind of striker for the Filipino general. Aguinaldo had
+come incognito. Out of Mr. Pratt's interview with the insurgent chief
+thus obtained, and its results, grew the episode which is the subject
+of this chapter.
+
+A word just here, preliminary to this interview, concerning the
+personal equation of Aguinaldo, would seem to be advisable.
+
+While I personally chased him and his outfit a good deal in the latter
+part of 1899, in the northern advance of a column of General Lawton's
+Division from San Isidro across the Rio Grande de Pampanga, over the
+boggy passes of the Caraballa Mountains to the China Sea, and up the
+Luzon West Coast road, we never did catch him, and I never personally
+met him but once, and that was after he was captured in 1901. He
+was as insignificant looking physically as a Japanese diplomat. But
+his presence suggested, equally with that of his wonderful racial
+cousins who represent the great empire of the Mikado abroad, both a
+high order of intelligence and baffling reserve. And Major-General
+J. Franklin Bell, recently Chief of Staff, United States Army, who
+was a Major on General Merritt's staff in 1898, having charge of the
+"Office of Military Information," in a confidential report prepared
+for his chief dated August 29, 1898, "sizing up" the various insurgent
+leaders, in view of the then apparent probability of trouble with them,
+gives these notes on Aguinaldo, the head and front of the revolution:
+"Aguinaldo: Honest, sincere, and * * * a natural leader of men." [4]
+
+Any one acquainted with General Bell knows that he knows what he is
+talking about when he speaks of "a natural leader of men," for he is
+one himself. Our ablest men in the early days were the first to cease
+considering the little brown soldiers a joke, and their government an
+opera-bouffe affair. General Bell also says in the same report that he,
+Aguinaldo, is undoubtedly endowed in a wonderful degree with "the power
+of creating among the people confidence in himself." He was, indeed,
+the very incarnation of "the legitimate aspirations of" his people,
+to use one of the favorite phrases of his early state papers, and
+the faithful interpreter thereof. That was the secret of his power,
+that and a most remarkable talent for surrounding himself with an
+atmosphere of impenetrable reserve. This last used to make our young
+army officers suspect him of being what they called a "four-flusher,"
+which being interpreted means a man who is partially successful in
+making people think him far more important than he really is. But
+we have seen General Bell's estimate. And the day Aguinaldo took the
+oath of allegiance to the United States, in 1901, General MacArthur,
+then commanding the American forces in the Philippines, signalized the
+event by liberating 1000 Filipino prisoners of war. General Funston,
+the man who captured him in 1901, says in Scribner's Magazine for
+November, 1911, "He is a man of many excellent qualities and * * *
+far and away the best Filipino I was ever brought in contact with."
+
+Aguinaldo was born in 1869. To-day, 1912, he is farming about twenty
+miles out of Manila in his native province of Cavite; has always
+scrupulously observed his oath of allegiance aforesaid; occasionally
+comes to town and plays chess with Governor-General Forbes; and
+in all respects has played for the last ten years with really fine
+dignity the role of Chieftain of a Lost Cause on which his all had
+been staked. He was a school-teacher at Cavite at one time, but is not
+a college graduate, and so far as mere book education is concerned, he
+is not a highly educated man. Whether or not he can give the principal
+parts of the principal irregular Greek verbs I do not know, but his
+place in the history of his country, and in the annals of wars for
+independence, cannot, and for the honor of human nature should not,
+be a small one. Dr. Rizal, the Filipino patriot whose picture we print
+on the Philippine postage stamps, and who was shot for sedition by the
+Spaniards before our time out there, was what Colonel Roosevelt would
+jocularly call "one of these darned literary fellows." He was a sort of
+"Sweetness and Light" proposition, who only wrote about "The Rights of
+Man," and finally let the Spaniards shoot him--stuck his head in the
+lion's mouth, so to speak. Aguinaldo was a born leader of men, who knew
+how to put the fear of God into the hearts of the ancient oppressors
+of his people. Mr. Pratt's own story of how he earned his serenade
+is preserved to future ages in the published records of the State
+Department. [5] We will now attempt to summarize, not so eloquently as
+Mr. Pratt, but more briefly, the manner of its earning, the serenade
+itself, and its resultant effects both upon the personal fortunes of
+Mr. Pratt and upon Filipino confidence in American official assurances.
+
+It was on the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1898, that Mr. Pratt
+was confidentially informed of Aguinaldo's arrival at Singapore,
+incognito. "Being aware," says Mr. Pratt, "of the great prestige of
+General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at
+home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control
+that he could, I determined at once to see him." Accordingly, he did
+see him the following Sunday morning, the 24th.
+
+At this interview, it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then
+at Hong Kong with his squadron awaiting orders, should so desire,
+Aguinaldo should proceed to Hong Kong to arrange for co-operation
+of the insurgents at Manila with our naval forces in the prospective
+operations against the Spaniards.
+
+Accordingly, that Sunday, Mr. Pratt telegraphed Dewey through our
+consul at Hong Kong:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong arrange
+    with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if
+    desired. Telegraph.
+
+
+Admiral Dewey (then Commodore) replied:
+
+
+    Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
+
+
+This message was received late Sunday night, April 24th, and was
+at once communicated to Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt then did considerable
+bustling around for the benefit of his new-found ally, whom, with
+his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names
+he "succeeded in getting off," to use his phrase, by the British
+steamer Malacca, which left Singapore for Hong Kong, April 26th. In
+the letter reporting all this to the State Department, Mr. Pratt
+adds that he trusts this action "in arranging for his [Aguinaldo's]
+direct co-operation with the commander of our forces" will meet
+with the Government's approval. A little later Mr. Pratt sends the
+State Department a copy of the Singapore Free Press of May 4, 1898,
+containing an impressive account of the above transaction and the
+negotiations leading up to it. This account describes the political
+conditions among the population of the Philippine archipelago, "which,"
+it goes on to say, "merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to
+rise en masse." Speaking of Pratt's interview with Aguinaldo, it says:
+
+
+    General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the
+    Philippines. * * * American protection would be desirable
+    temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted
+    hereafter in Cuba.
+
+
+Mr. Pratt also forwards a proclamation gotten up by the Filipino
+insurgent leaders at Hong Kong and sent over to the Philippines in
+advance of Admiral Dewey's coming, calling upon the Filipinos not
+to heed any appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to
+rally to the support of the latter. This manifesto of the Filipinos
+is headed, prominently--for all we know it may have had a heading
+as big as a Hearst newspaper box-car type announcement of the latest
+violation of the Seventh Commandment--: "America's Allies."
+
+It begins thus:
+
+
+    Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
+    within our reach. * * * The Americans, not from mercenary motives,
+    but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many
+    persecuted people, have considered it opportune * * * etc. [Here
+    follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an American
+    squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines. * * * The
+    Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reinforcements coming
+    from Spain; * * * we insurgents must attack by land. Probably
+    you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans
+    have arms and will find means to assist us. There where you
+    see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our
+    redeemers! [6]
+
+
+For twelve days after his letter to the State Department enclosing
+the above proclamation, Mr. Pratt, so far as the record discloses,
+contemplated his coup d'etat in silent satisfaction. Since its
+successful pulling off, Admiral Dewey had smashed the Spanish fleet,
+and Aguinaldo had started his auxiliary insurrection. The former was
+patting the latter on the back, as it were, and saying, "Go it little
+man." But nobody was patting Pratt on the back, yet. Therefore, on June
+2d, Mr. Pratt writes the State Department, purring for patting thus:
+
+
+    Considering the enthusiastic manner General Aguinaldo has been
+    received by the natives and the confidence with which he already
+    appears to have inspired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted,
+    I think, that I did not over-rate his importance and that I
+    have materially assisted the cause of the United States in the
+    Philippines in securing his co-operation. [7]
+
+
+A glow of conscious superiority, in value to the Government, over
+his consular colleague and neighbor, Mr. Wildman, at Hong Kong,
+next suffuses Mr. Pratt's diction, being manifested thus:
+
+
+    Why this co-operation should not have been secured to us during
+    the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hong
+    Kong, and that he was allowed to leave there without having been
+    approached in the interest of our Government, I cannot understand.
+
+
+Considering that in his letter accepting the nomination for the
+Vice-Presidency two years after this Mr. Roosevelt compared Aguinaldo
+and his people to that squalid old Apache medicine man, Sitting Bull,
+and his band of dirty paint-streaked cut-throats, Mr. Pratt's next
+Pickwickian sigh of complacent, if neglected, worth is particularly
+interesting:
+
+
+    No close observer of what had transpired in the Philippines during
+    the past four years could have failed to recognize that General
+    Aguinaldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filipino
+    insurgents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in
+    the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice
+    and honor.
+
+
+In other words, knowing the proverbial ingratitude of republics,
+Mr. Pratt is determined to impress upon his Government and on the
+discerning historian of the future that he was "the original Aguinaldo
+man." A week later (June 9th) Mr. Pratt writes the Department enclosing
+copies of the Singapore papers of that date, giving an account of
+a generous outburst of Filipino enthusiasm at Singapore in honor
+of America, Admiral Dewey, and, last, if not least, Mr. Pratt. He
+encloses duplicate copies of these newspaper notices "for the press,
+should you consider their publication desirable." His letter begins:
+
+
+    I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion of
+    the receipt of the news of General Aguinaldo's recent successes
+    near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in
+    Singapore and presented an address. * * *
+
+
+He then proceeds with further details of the event, without
+self-laudation. The Singapore papers which he encloses, however, not
+handicapped by the inexorable modesty of official correspondence,
+give a glowing account of the presentation of the "address," and
+of the serenade and toasts which followed. Says one of them, the
+Straits Times:
+
+
+    The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon
+    in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to
+    Raffles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an outlying part. From
+    a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the natives of
+    the Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the
+    consulate. Their object was to present an address to Hon. Spencer
+    Pratt, United States Consul-General, and, partly, to serenade him,
+    for which purpose some twenty-five or thirty of the Filipinos
+    came equipped with musical instruments.
+
+
+First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading and
+presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the Filipino
+community of Singapore. The address pledged the "eternal gratitude"
+of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee,
+alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been
+enabled by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey
+by Consul Pratt to arouse 8,000,000 of Filipinos to take up arms
+"in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of which your
+country is the foremost champion" and trusted "that the United States
+* * * will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you,
+sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to
+us our independence under the protection of the United States."
+
+Mr. Pratt arose and "proceeded speaking in French," says the
+newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtless what
+it was--"to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were
+now proving themselves fit for self-government." The gentleman from
+Alabama then went on to review the mighty events and developments of
+the preceding six weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st,
+
+
+    the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader,
+    General Emilio Aguinaldo, co-operating on land with the Americans
+    at sea, etc. You have just reason to be proud of what has
+    been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your
+    fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I
+    learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore,
+    I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me
+    that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated
+    with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the
+    latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.
+
+
+Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration:
+"At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served,
+and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, [8] there was
+no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments."
+
+Then followed a general drinking of toasts to America, Dewey, Pratt,
+and Aguinaldo. Then the band played. Then the meeting broke up. Then
+the Honorable Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States,
+retired to the seclusion of his apartments in Raffles Hotel, and,
+under the soothing swish of his plunkah, forgot the accursed heat of
+that stepping-off place, Singapore, and dreamed of future greatness.
+
+A few days later the even tenor of Mr. Pratt's meditations was
+disturbed by a letter from the State Department saying, in effect,
+that it was all right to get Aguinaldo's assistance "if in so doing
+he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to
+gratify." [9] But it did not tell him to tell the Filipinos so. For
+Aguinaldo was keeping the Spaniards bottled up in the old walled city
+of Manila on short and ever shortening rations, and American troops
+were on the way to join him, and the shorter the food supply grew
+in Manila the readier the garrison would be to surrender when they
+did arrive, and the fewer American soldiers' lives would have to be
+sacrificed in the final capture of the town. Every day of Aguinaldo's
+service under the Dewey-Pratt arrangement was worth an American life,
+perhaps many. It was too valuable to repudiate, just yet. July 20th,
+the State Department wrote Mr. Pratt a letter acknowledging receipt of
+his of June 9th "enclosing printed copies of a report from the Straits
+Times of the same day, entitled 'Mr. Spencer Pratt's Serenade,'
+with a view to its communication to the press," and not only not
+felicitating him on his serenade, but making him sorry he had ever
+had a serenade. It said, among other things:
+
+"The extract now communicated by you from the Straits Times of the
+9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as
+to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and
+produced an impression which this government would feel compelled
+to regret." [10] Hapless Pratt! "Feel compelled to regret" is State
+Department for "You are liable to be fired."
+
+The letter of reprimand proceeds:
+
+"The address * * * discloses an understanding on their part that * * *
+the ultimate object of our action is * * * the independence of the
+Philippines * * *. Your address does not repel this implication * * *".
+
+The letter then scores Pratt for having called Aguinaldo "the man
+for the occasion," and for having said that the "arrangement" between
+Aguinaldo and Dewey had "resulted so happily," and after a few further
+animadversions, concludes with this great blow to the reading public
+of Alabama:
+
+"For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be
+given to the press lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to
+views the expression of which it had not authorized."
+
+"The Department" was very scrupulous about even the appearance, at
+the American end of the line, of "lending a sanction" to Pratt's
+arrangement with Aguinaldo, while all the time it was knowingly
+permitting the latter to daily risk his own life and the lives of
+his countrymen on the faith of that very "arrangement," and it was
+so permitting this to be done because the "arrangement" was daily
+operating to reduce the number of American lives which it would be
+necessary to sacrifice in the final taking of Manila. The day the
+letter of reprimand was written our troop-ships were on the ocean,
+speeding toward the Philippines. And Aguinaldo and his people were
+fighting the Spaniards with the pent-up feeling of centuries impelling
+their little steel-jacketed messengers of death, thinking of "Cuba
+Libre," and dreaming of a Star of Philippine Independence risen in
+the Far East.
+
+Such are the circumstances from which the Filipino people derived
+their first impressions concerning the faith and honor of a strange
+people they had never theretofore seen, who succeeded the Spaniards
+as their overlords. Mr. Pratt was subsequently quietly separated from
+the consular service, and doubtless lived to regret that he had ever
+unloosed the fountains of his Alabama French on the Filipino colony
+of Singapore.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DEWEY AND AGUINALDO
+
+                    Armaments that thunderstrike the walls
+                    Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake
+                    And monarchs tremble in their capitals.
+
+                                                          Childe Harold.
+
+
+The battle of Manila Bay was fought May 1, 1898. Until the thunder of
+Dewey's guns reverberated around the world, there was perhaps no part
+of it the American people knew less about than the Philippine Islands.
+
+We have all heard much of what happened after the battle, but
+comparatively few, probably, have ever had a glimpse at our great
+sailor while he was there in Hong Kong harbor, getting ready to go
+to sea to destroy the Spanish armada. Such a glimpse is modestly
+afforded by the Admiral in his testimony before the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [11]
+
+Asked by the Committee when he first heard from Aguinaldo and his
+people in 1898, Admiral Dewey said [12]:
+
+
+    I should think about a month before leaving Hong Kong, that is,
+    about the first of April, when it became pretty certain that there
+    was to be war with Spain, I heard that there were a number of
+    Filipinos in the city of Hong Kong who were anxious to accompany
+    the squadron to Manila in case we went over. I saw these men two
+    or three times myself. They seemed to be all very young earnest
+    boys. I did not attach much importance to what they said or to
+    themselves. Finally, before we left Hong Kong for Mirs Bay [13]
+    I received a telegram from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore
+    saying that Aguinaldo was there and anxious to see me. I said to
+    him "All right; tell him to come on," but I attached so little
+    importance to Aguinaldo that I did not wait for him. He did not
+    arrive, and we sailed from Mirs Bay without any Filipinos.
+
+
+From his testimony before the Committee it is clear that Admiral
+Dewey's first impressions of the Filipinos, like those of most
+Americans after him, were not very favorable, that is to say, he did
+not in the outset take them very seriously. It will be interesting
+to consider these impressions, and then to compare them with those he
+gathered on better acquaintance from observing their early struggles
+for independence. The more intimate acquaintance, as has been the case
+with all his fellow countrymen since, caused him to revise his first
+verdict. Answering a question put by Senator Carmack concerning what
+transpired between him and the Philippine Revolutionists at Hong Kong
+before he sailed in search of the Spanish fleet, the Admiral said [14]:
+
+
+    They were bothering me. I was getting my squadron ready for battle,
+    and these little men were coming on board my ship at Hong Kong and
+    taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest
+    importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing; that
+    is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had
+    been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not
+    go. One of them didn't go because he didn't have any tooth-brush.
+
+    Senator Burrows: "Did he give that as his reason?"
+
+    Admiral Dewey: "Yes, he said 'I have no tooth-brush.'"
+
+    They used to come aboard my ship and take my time, and finally
+    I would not see them at all, but turned them over to my staff.
+
+
+Now the lack of a tooth-brush is hardly a valid excuse for not going
+into battle, however great a convenience it may be in campaign. But
+the absence of orders from your commanding officer stands on a very
+different footing. Aguinaldo had not yet arrived. Three hundred years
+of Spanish misgovernment and cruelty is not conducive to aversion
+to fictitious excuses by the lowly in the presence of supreme
+authority. The answer was amusingly uncandid, but disproved neither
+patriotism nor intelligence.
+
+Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong from Singapore a day or so after
+Admiral Dewey had sailed for Manila. Of the battle of May 1st,
+no detailed mention is essential here. Every schoolboy is familiar
+with it. It will remain, as long as the republic lasts, a part of
+the heritage of the nation. But the true glory of that battle, to my
+mind, rests, not upon the circumstance that we have the Philippines,
+but upon the tremendous fact that before it occurred the attitude of
+our State Department toward an American citizen sojourning in distant
+lands and becoming involved in difficulties there had long been,
+"Why didn't he stay at home? Let him stew in his own juice"; whereas,
+since then, to be an American has been more like it was in the days
+of St. Paul to be a Roman citizen.
+
+May 16th, our consul at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, succeeded in
+getting the insurgent leader and his staff off for Manila on board
+the U. S. S. McCulloch by authority of Admiral Dewey. Like his
+colleague over at Singapore, Consul Wildman was bent on the role of
+Warwick. Admiral Dewey was quite busy there in Manila Bay the first
+two or three weeks after the battle, but yielding to the letters
+of Wildman, who meantime had constituted himself a kind of fiscal
+agent at Hong Kong for the prospective revolution in the matter of
+the purchase of guns and otherwise, the Admiral told the commanding
+officer of the McCulloch that on his next trip to Hong Kong he might
+bring down a dozen or so of the Filipinos there. The frame of mind
+they were in on reaching Manila, as a result of the assurances of
+Pratt and Wildman, is well illustrated by a letter the latter wrote
+Aguinaldo a little later (June 25th) which is undoubtedly in keeping
+with what he had been telling him earlier:
+
+
+    Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the
+    sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under
+    which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or
+    the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings
+    for the Filipinos. [15]
+
+
+And at the time, they were.
+
+"Every American citizen who came in contact with the Filipinos at
+the inception of the Spanish War, or at any time within a few months
+after hostilities began," said General Anderson in an interview
+published in the Chicago Record of February 24, 1900, "probably
+told those he talked with * * * that we intended to free them from
+Spanish oppression. The general expression, was 'We intend to whip
+the Spaniards and set you free.'"
+
+The McCulloch arrived in Manila Bay with Aguinaldo and his outfit,
+May 19th. Let Admiral Dewey tell what happened then [16]:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo came to see me. I said, "Well now, go ashore there; we
+    have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavite, go ashore and start
+    your army." He came back in the course of a few hours and said,
+    "I want to leave here; I want to go to Japan." I said, "Don't give
+    it up, Don Emilio." I wanted his help, you know. He did not sleep
+    ashore that night; he slept on board the ship. The next morning
+    he went on shore, still inside my lines, and began recruiting men.
+
+
+Enterprises of great pith and moment have often turned awry and lost
+the name of action for lack of a word spoken in season by a stout
+heart. Admiral Dewey spoke the word, and Aguinaldo, his protege,
+did the rest. "Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did
+wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle * * *."
+[17] In fact, the desperate bravery of those little brown men
+after they got warmed up reminds one of the Japs at the walls of
+Peking, in the advance of the Allied Armies to the relief of the
+foreign legations during the Boxer troubles of 1900. Admiral Dewey
+told the Senate Committee in 1902 that Aguinaldo actually wanted to
+put one of the old smooth-bore Spanish guns he found at Cavite on a
+barge and have him (Dewey) tow it up in front of Manila so he could
+attack the city with it. "I said, 'Oh no, no; we can do nothing until
+our troops come.'"
+
+Otherwise he was constantly advising and encouraging him. Why? Let the
+Admiral answer: "I knew that what he was doing--driving the Spaniards
+in--was saving our troops." [17] In other words they were daily dying
+that American soldiers might live, on the faith of the reasons for
+which we had declared war, and trusting, because of the words of our
+consuls and the acts of our admiral, in the sentiment subsequently
+so nobly expressed by Mr. McKinley in his instructions to the Paris
+peace Commissioners:
+
+
+    The United States in making peace should follow the same high
+    rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. [18]
+
+
+"I did not know what the action of our Government would be," said
+the Admiral to the Committee, [19] adding that he simply used his
+best judgment on the spot at the time; presumably supposing that his
+Government would do the decent thing by these people who considered
+us their liberators. "They looked on us as their liberators," said
+he. [20] "Up to the time the army came he (Aguinaldo) did everything I
+requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I
+saw him almost daily. [21] I had not much to do with him after the
+army came." [22]
+
+That was no ordinary occasion, that midsummer session of the
+Senate Committee in 1902. It was a case of the powerful of the earth
+discussing a question of ethics, even as they do in Boston. The nation
+had been intoxicated in 1898 with the pride of power--power revealed
+to it by the Spanish War; and in a spirit thus mellowed had taken
+the Philippines as a sort of political foreign mission, forgetting
+the injunction of the Fathers to keep Church and State separate,
+but not forgetting the possible profits of trade with the saved. A
+long war with the prospective saved had followed, developing many
+barbarities avenged in kind, and the breezes from the South Seas were
+suggesting the aroma of shambles. "How did we get into all this mess,
+anyhow?" said the people. "Let us pause, and consider." Hear the
+still small voice of a nation's conscience mingling with demagogic
+nonsense perpetrated by potent, grave, and reverend Senators:
+
+
+    Admiral Dewey: "I do not think it makes any difference what my
+    opinion is on these things."
+
+    Senator Patterson: "There is no man whose opinion goes farther
+    with the country than yours does, Admiral, and therefore I think
+    you ought to be very prudent in expressing your views."
+
+    Senator Beveridge (Acting Chairman): "The Chairman will not permit
+    any member to lecture Admiral Dewey on his prudence or imprudence."
+
+
+This of course would read well to "Mary of the Vine-clad Cottage"
+out in Indiana, whose four-year-old boy was named George Dewey--,
+or to her counterpart up in Vermont who might name her next boy
+after the brilliant and distinguished Acting Chairman, in token of
+her choice for the Presidency.
+
+
+    Senator Patterson: "I was not lecturing him."
+
+    Senator Beveridge: "Yes; you said he ought to be prudent."
+
+    Senator Patterson: "And I think it was well enough to suggest
+    those things." [23]
+
+
+Thawed into theorizing by these indubitably genuine evidences of
+a nation's high regard, the man of action tried to help the nation
+out. He said he had used the Filipinos as the Federal troops used the
+negroes in the Civil War. Senator Patterson struck this suggestion
+amidships and sunk it with the remark that the negroes were expecting
+freedom. Admiral Dewey had said "The Filipinos were slaves too"
+and considered him their liberator. [24] But he never did elaborate
+on the new definition of freedom which had followed in the wake of
+his ships to Manila, viz., that Freedom does not necessarily mean
+freedom from alien domination, but only a change of masters deemed
+by the new master beneficial to the "slave."
+
+Apropos of why he accepted Aguinaldo's help, the Admiral also said:
+
+
+    I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure the Filipinos
+    could not take Manila, and I thought that the closer they invested
+    the city the easier it would be when our troops arrived to march
+    in. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they were doing
+    our work. [25]
+
+
+Asked as to how big a force Aguinaldo had under arms then and
+afterwards, the Admiral said maybe 25,000, adding, by way of
+illustration of the pluck, vim, and patriotism of his valuable new-made
+friends, "They could have had any number of men; it was just a question
+of arming them. They could have had the whole population." [26]
+Eleven months after that, when we captured the first insurgent capital,
+Malolos, General MacArthur, the ablest and one of the bravest generals
+we ever set to slaughtering Filipinos, said to a newspaper man just
+after a bloody and of course victorious fight: "When I first started in
+against these rebels, I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented
+only a faction." "I did not like," said this veteran of three
+wars, who was always "on the job" in action out there as elsewhere,
+"I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon * * *
+was opposed to us * * * but after having come thus far, and having
+been brought much in contact with both insurrectos and amigos, I have
+been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are
+loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads". [27]
+
+Is it at all unlikely that Admiral Dewey did in fact say of his
+proteges, the Filipinos, to an American visiting Manila in January,
+1899, three or four weeks before the war broke out, "Rather than
+make a war of conquest upon the Filipino people, I would up anchor
+and sail out of the harbor." [28]
+
+If Dewey and MacArthur were right, then, about the situation around
+Manila in 1898, it was a case of an entire people united in an
+aspiration, and looking to us for its fulfilment.
+
+When the American troops reached the Philippines and perfected
+their battle formations about Manila, and the order to advance
+was given, they did "march in," to use Admiral Dewey's expression
+above quoted. But they did not let the Filipinos have a finger in the
+pie. The conquest and retention of the islands had then been determined
+upon. The Admiral's reasons for saddling his protege with a series of
+bloody battles and a long and arduous campaign are certainly stated
+with the proverbial frankness of the sailorman: "I wanted his help,
+you know." But what was Aguinaldo to get out of the transaction,
+from the Dewey point of view?
+
+"They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards. I do not think they looked
+much beyond that," [29] said the Admiral to the Senate Committee. Let
+us see whether they did or not. Aguinaldo had been shipped by the
+Honorable E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at
+Singapore, from that point to Hong Kong on April 26th, consigned to
+his fellow Warwick, the Honorable Rounseville Wildman, Consul-General
+of the United States at the last-named place, and had been received
+in due course by the consignee. May 5th, at Hong Kong, the Filipino
+Revolutionary Committee had a meeting, the minutes of which we
+subsequently came into possession of, along with other captured
+insurgent papers. The following is an extract from those minutes:
+
+
+    Once the President [Aguinaldo] is in the Philippines with his
+    prestige, he will be able to arouse the masses to combat the
+    demands of the United States, if they should colonize that country,
+    and will drive them, the Filipinos, if circumstances render it
+    necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even
+    if later they should succumb to the weight of the yoke of a new
+    oppressor. If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental
+    principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an
+    attempt will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them. It
+    is probable then that independence will be guaranteed. [30]
+
+
+The truth is that instead of leaving everything to the chance of
+our continuing in the same unselfish frame of mind we were really in
+when the Spanish-American War started, Aguinaldo and his people, not
+sure but what in the wind-up they might even be thrown back upon the
+tender mercies of Spain, played their cards boldly and consistently
+from the beginning with a view of organizing a de facto government
+and getting it recognized by the Powers as such at the very earliest
+practicable moment. They believed that the Lord helps those who help
+themselves. They had anticipated our change of heart and already had
+it discounted before we were aware of it ourselves. They were already
+acting on the idea that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty
+while public opinion in the United States concerning them was in a
+chrysalis state, and trying to develop a new definition of Liberty
+which should comport with the subjugation of distant island subjects
+by a continental commonwealth on the other side of the world based on
+representative government. The prospective subjects did not believe
+that a legislature ten thousand miles away in which they had no vote
+would ever give them a square deal about tariff and other laws dictated
+by special interests. They had had three hundred years of just that
+very sort of thing under Spain and instinctively dreaded continuance
+of it. That their instincts did not deceive them, our later study of
+Congressional legislation will show. The Filipinos had greatly pondered
+their future in their hearts during the last twelve months of Spain's
+colonial empire, watching her Cuban embarrassments with eager eye.
+
+Having seen the frame of mind in which they approached the contract
+implied in Admiral Dewey's cheery words, "Well now, go ashore there
+and start your army," what were the facts of recent history within
+the knowledge of both parties at the time? What had been the screams
+of the American eagle, if any, concerning his moral leadership of
+the family of unfeathered bipeds?
+
+President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December, 1897,
+[31] calling attention to conditions in Cuba as intolerable,
+had declared that if we should intervene to put a stop to them,
+we certainly would not make it the occasion of a land-grab. The
+other nations said: "We are from Missouri." But Mr. McKinley said,
+"forcible annexation" was not to be thought of by us. "That by
+our code of morality would be criminal," etc. So the world said,
+"We shall see what we shall see." Then had come the war message
+of April 11, 1898, [32] reiterating the declaration of the Cuban
+message of December previous, that "forcible annexation by our code of
+morality would be criminal aggression." In other words we announced
+to the overcrowded monarchies of the old world, whose land-lust is
+ever tempted by the broad acres of South America, and ever cooled
+by the virile menace of the Monroe doctrine, that we not only were
+against the principle of land-grabbing, but would not indulge in the
+practice. Immediately upon the conclusion of the reading of the war
+message, Senator Stewart was recognized, and said, among other things:
+"Under the law of nations, intervention for conquest is condemned,
+and is opposed to the universal sentiment of mankind. It is unjust,
+it is robbery, to intervene for conquest." Then Mr. Lodge stood up,
+"in the Senate House a Senator," and said:
+
+
+    We are there [meaning in this present Cuban situation] because we
+    represent the spirit of liberty and the spirit of the new time, and
+    Spain is over against us because she is mediaeval, cruel, dying. We
+    have grasped no man's territory, we have taken no man's property,
+    we have invaded no man's rights. We do not ask their lands. [33]
+
+
+These speeches went forth to the world almost like a part of the
+message itself. And Admiral Dewey, like every other American, in
+his early dealings with Aguinaldo, after war broke out, must have
+assumed a mental attitude in harmony with these announcements. But
+the world said, "All this is merely what you Americans yourselves
+call 'hot air.' We repeat, 'We are from Missouri.'" Then we said:
+"Oh very well, we will show you." So in the declaration of war against
+Spain we inserted the following:
+
+
+    Fourth: That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
+    intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
+    said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its
+    determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government
+    and control of the island to its people.
+
+
+This meant, "It is true we do love the Almighty Dollar very dearly,
+oh, Sisters of the Family of Nations, but there are some axiomatic
+principles of human liberty that we love better, and one of them is the
+'unalienable right' of every people to pursue happiness in their own
+way, free from alien domination." All these things were well known to
+both the contracting parties when Admiral Dewey set Aguinaldo ashore
+at Cavite, May 20, 1898, and got him to start his insurrection "under
+the protection of our guns," as he expressed it. [34] Accordingly,
+when the insurgent leader went ashore, the declaration of war was
+his major premise, the assurances of our consuls and the acts of our
+Admiral pursuant thereto were his minor premise, and Independence was
+his conclusion. Trusting to the faith and honor of the American people,
+he took his life in his hands, left the panoplied safety of our mighty
+squadron, and plunged, single-handed, into the struggle for Freedom.
+
+What was the state of the public mind on shore, and how was it
+prepared to receive his assurances of American aid? Consider the
+following picture in the light of its sombre sequel.
+
+Just as the war broke out, Consul Williams had left Manila and gone
+over to Hong Kong, where he joined Admiral Dewey, and accompanied him
+back to Manila, and was thus privileged to be present at the battle
+of Manila Bay, May 1st. Under date of May 12th, from his consular
+headquarters aboard the U. S. S. Baltimore, he reports [35] going
+ashore at Cavite and being received with enthusiastic greetings by
+vast crowds of Filipinos. "They crowded around me," says Brother
+Williams, "hats off, shouting 'Viva los Americanos,' thronged about
+me by hundreds to shake either hand, even several at a time, men,
+women, and children, striving to get even a finger to shake. So I
+moved half a mile, shaking continuously with both hands."
+
+Tut! tut! says the casual reader. What did the Government at
+Washington know of all these goings on, that it should be charged
+later with having violated as binding a moral obligation as ever a
+nation assumed? It is true that the news of the Williams ovation,
+as in the case of the Pratt serenade, reached Washington only by the
+slow channels of the mail. But Washington did in fact receive the
+said news by due course of mail. When it came, however, Washington
+was nursing visions of savages in blankets smoking the pipe of peace
+with the agents of the Great White Father in the White House--i.e.,
+thought, or hoped, the Filipinos were savages--and remained as deaf
+to the sounds of the Williams ovation as it had been to the strains
+of the Pratt serenade.
+
+However, hardly had Admiral Dewey taken his binoculars from the gig
+that carried Aguinaldo ashore to raise his auxiliary insurrection,
+when he called his Flag Secretary, or the equivalent, and dictated
+the following cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by
+    the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render
+    assistance that will be valuable. [36]
+
+
+This sounds a little more serious than "earnest boys" alleging the
+lack of a toothbrush as an excuse for declining mortal combat, does
+it not? How valuable did this assistance prove? Admiral Dewey had to
+wait three and one half months for the army to arrive, and this is
+how the commanding general of the American forces describes conditions
+as he found them in the latter part of August:
+
+
+    For three and one half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron
+    and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled. All
+    commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food
+    supplies were nearly exhausted. [37]
+
+
+And, he might have added, the taking of the city was thus made
+perfectly easy. Otherwise, as Aguinaldo put it in one of his letters
+to General Otis, we would not have taken a city, but only the ruins
+of a city. Admiral Dewey said to the Senate Committee in 1902: "They
+[the Spaniards] surrendered on August 13th, and they had not gotten
+a thing in after the 1st of May." [38]
+
+In the early part of the next year, 1899, President McKinley sent
+out a kind of olive-branch commission, of which President Schurman
+of Cornell University was Chairman. The olive branch got withered
+in the sulphur of exploding gun-powder, so the Commission contented
+itself with making a report. And this is what they said concerning
+what followed the Dewey-Aguinaldo entente:
+
+
+    Shortly afterwards, the Filipinos began to attack the
+    Spanish. Their number was rapidly augmented by the militia who
+    had been given arms by Spain, all of whom revolted and joined
+    the insurgents. Great Filipino successes followed, many Spaniards
+    were taken prisoners, and while the Spanish troops now remained
+    quietly in Manila, the Filipino forces made themselves masters
+    of the entire island [of Luzon] except that city. [39]
+
+
+Of conditions in July, sixty days after Admiral Dewey had on May 20th
+said to Aguinaldo in effect, "Go it, little man, we need you in our
+business," Mr. Wildman, our Consul at Hong Kong, writing to the State
+Department, said, in defending himself for his share in the business
+of getting Aguinaldo's help under promises, both express and implied,
+which were subsequently repudiated, that after he, Wildman, put the
+insurgent chief aboard the McCulloch, May 16th, bound for Manila to
+co-operate by land with our navy: "He * * * organized a government
+* * * and from that day to this he has been uninterruptedly successful
+in the field and dignified and just as the head of his government,"
+[40] a statement which Admiral Dewey subsequently endorsed. [41]
+
+We have seen the preliminaries of this "government" started under
+the auspices of our Admiral and under what he himself called "the
+protection of our guns" (ante). Let us note its progress. If you
+turn the leaves of the contemporaneous official reports, you see
+quite a moving picture show, and the action is rapid. On May 24th,
+still "under the protection of our guns," Aguinaldo proclaimed his
+revolutionary government and summoned the people to his standard for
+the purpose of driving the Spaniards out forever. The situation was an
+exact counterpart of the cotemporary Cuban one as regards identity of
+purpose between "liberator" and "oppressed." His proclamation promised
+a constitutional convention to be called later (and which was duly
+called later) to elect a President and Cabinet, in whose favor he
+would resign the emergency authority now assumed; referred to the
+United States as "undoubtedly disinterested" and as considering the
+Filipinos "capable of governing for ourselves our unfortunate country";
+and formally announced the temporary assumption of supreme authority
+as dictator. Copies of these proclamations were duly furnished Admiral
+Dewey. The latter was too busy looking after the men behind his guns
+and watching the progress of his plucky little ally to study Spanish,
+so he forwarded them to the Navy Department without comment--"without
+reading them," said he to the Senate Committee in 1902. [42] When his
+attention was called to them before the Committee by one of the members
+reading them, his comment was, "Nothing about independence there, is
+there?" [43] It seems to me it did not take an international lawyer
+to see a good deal "there," about independence. In a proclamation
+published at Tarlac in the latter part of 1899, which appears to have
+been a sort of swan-song of the Philippine Republic, Aguinaldo had
+said, in effect, "Certainly Admiral Dewey did not bring me from Hong
+Kong to Manila to fight the Spaniards for the benefit of American
+Trade Expansion," and in this proclamation he claimed that Admiral
+Dewey promised him independence. It is true, that in a letter to
+Senator Lodge, which that distinguished gentleman read on the floor
+of the Senate on January 31, 1900, Admiral Dewey denounced this last
+statement as false. It is also true that those Americans are few and
+far between who will take Aguinaldo's word in preference to Admiral
+Dewey's. Certainly the writer is not one of them. But Aguinaldo
+is no Spanish scholar, being more of a leader of men than a master
+of language, and what sort of an interpreter acted between him and
+the Admiral does not appear. Certainly he never did get anything in
+writing from Admiral Dewey. But after the latter brought him to Manila,
+set him to fighting the common enemy, and helped him with guns and
+otherwise in quickly organizing an army for the purpose, the Admiral
+was at least put on inquiry as to just what Aguinaldo supposed he was
+fighting for. What did the Admiral probably suppose? He told the Senate
+Committee that the idea that they wanted independence "never entered
+his head." The roar of mighty guns seems to have made it difficult for
+him to hear the prattlings of what Aguinaldo's proclamations of the
+time called "the legitimate aspirations of a people." The milk in the
+cocoanut is this: How could it ever occur to a great naval commander,
+such as Admiral Dewey, familiar with the four quarters of the globe,
+that a coterie of politicians at home would be so foolish as to buy
+a vast straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the South
+Seas which had been a nuisance to every government that ever owned
+them? But let us turn from the Senate Committee's studies of 1902 to
+the progress of the infant republic of 1898 at Cavite.
+
+The same day the above proclamations of May 24th were issued, we
+find Consul Williams, now become a sort of amphibious civilian
+aide to Dewey, having his consular headquarters afloat, on the
+U. S. S. Baltimore, of the squadron, writing the State Department,
+describing the great successes of the insurgents, his various
+conferences with Aguinaldo and the other leaders, and his own
+activities in arranging the execution of a power of attorney whereby
+Aguinaldo released to certain parties in Hong Kong $400,000 then
+on deposit to his credit in a Hong Kong bank, for the purpose of
+enabling them to pay for 3000 stand of arms bought there and expected
+to arrive at Cavite on the morrow, and for other needed expenses of the
+revolutionary movement. He says, in part: "Officers have visited me
+during the darkness of the night to inform the fleet and me of their
+operations, and to report increase of strength. When General Merritt
+arrives he will find large auxiliary land forces adapted to his service
+and used to the climate." [44] Throughout this period Admiral Dewey
+reports various cordial conferences with Aguinaldo, though he is not so
+literary as to vivify his accounts with allusions to the weather. In
+one despatch he states that he has "refrained from assisting him * * *
+with the forces under my command" [45]--explaining to him that "the
+squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops."
+
+Six days after the issuance of the Dictatorship proclamations above
+mentioned, viz., on May 30th, Admiral Dewey cables the Navy Department
+[46]:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited Olympia yesterday. He
+    expects to make general attack May 31st.
+
+
+He did not succeed entirely, but there was hard fighting, and the
+cordon around the doomed Spaniards in Manila and its suburbs was
+drawn ever closer and closer.
+
+The remarkable feat of Aguinaldo's raising a right formidable fighting
+force in twelve days after his little "Return from Elba," which force
+kept growing like a snowball, is difficult, for one who does not know
+the Filipinos, and the conditions then, to credit. It is explained
+by the fact that Admiral Dewey let him have the captured guns in the
+Cavite arsenal, that Cavite was a populous hotbed of insurrection,
+and that many native regiments, or parts of regiments, quite suited
+to be the nucleus of an army, having lots of veteran non-commissioned
+officers, deserted the Spaniards and went over to the insurgents,
+their countrymen, as soon as Aguinaldo arrived.
+
+On June 6th, we have another bulletin sent to the Navy Department
+by Admiral Dewey, transmitting with perceptible satisfaction further
+information as to the progress of his indefatigable protege:
+
+
+    Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of Cavite
+    during the last week; they have had several small victories,
+    taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops,
+    not native. [47]
+
+
+Along about this period Aguinaldo happens to get hold of a belated
+copy of the London Times of May 5, 1898. It contains considerable
+speculation on the future of the Philippines which casts a shadow
+over the soul of the president of the incipient republic. Having read
+President McKinley's immortal State papers about the moral obliquity
+of "forcible annexation," he is moved to write direct to the source
+of those noble sentiments. The letter is dated June 10, 1898. It is
+addressed, with a quaintness now pathetic, "To the President of the
+Republic of the Great North American Nation." It greets the addressee
+with "the most tender effusion of" the writer's soul, expresses his
+"deep and sincere gratitude," in the name of his people, "for the
+efficient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give
+it to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination,
+as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba" and then proceeds to
+tell of "the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading
+in the Times the astounding statement that you, sir, will retain
+these islands," etc. He proceeds:
+
+
+    The Philippine people * * * have seen in your nation, ever since
+    your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here
+    * * * the angel who is the harbinger of their liberty; and they
+    rose like a single wave * * * as soon as I trod these shores; and
+    captured in ten days nearly the whole garrison of this Province
+    of Cavite in whose port I have my government--by the consent of
+    the Admiral of your triumphant fleet. [48]
+
+
+The writer closes his letter with an impassioned protest against
+the occurrence of what is suggested in the Times, and speaks of
+his fellow-countrymen as "a people which trusts blindly in you not
+to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and
+independent," and adds his "fervent prayers for the ever-increasing
+prosperity of your powerful nation." [49]
+
+But the signer of the foregoing letter did not spend all his time
+praying for us, as may be observed in this bulletin from Admiral Dewey
+concerning the way he was lambasting the common enemy, sent the Navy
+Department, June 12th:
+
+
+    Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded
+    Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat
+    most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until
+    the arrival of United States troops thither; I have advised. [50]
+
+
+Four days later Washington chided the hapless Pratt at Singapore about
+having talked to Aguinaldo of "direct co-operation" with Admiral Dewey,
+saying: "To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General
+Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he
+was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to
+gratify." [51] This communication goes on to advise Mr. Pratt that the
+Department cannot approve anything he may have said to Aguinaldo on
+behalf of the United States which would concede that in accepting his
+co-operation we would owe him anything. Yet it did not tell Admiral
+Dewey to quit coaching him, because the service he was rendering
+was too valuable. There is no communication to Admiral Dewey about
+"hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify" in the official
+archives of those times. There was Admiral Dewey coaching Aguinaldo
+and telling him to wait for the main attack until General Merritt
+should arrive with our troops. Why? Because he expected Merritt to
+co-operate with Aguinaldo, and of course Aguinaldo expected exactly
+what Dewey expected.
+
+In reviewing the history of those times the writer has not been
+so careless as to have overlooked Senator Lodge's elaborate speech
+in the Senate on March 7, 1900, wherein attention is called to the
+circumstance that a few days after Aguinaldo landed at Cavite, the
+Navy Department cabled cautioning Dewey to have no alliance with him
+that might complicate us, and that the Admiral answered he had made no
+alliance and would make none. But if actions speak louder than words,
+the Senator's point does not rise above the dignity of a technicality.
+
+The same day the State Department reprimanded Pratt, as above
+indicated, viz., June 16th, Consul Williams at Manila wrote them
+a glowing communication [52] about how "active and almost uniformly
+successful" Aguinaldo was continuing to be. But no resultant enthusiasm
+is of record. Two days later, on June 18th, Aguinaldo issued his
+first formal Declaration of Independence. The infant republic was now
+less than a month old, but it already had a fine set of teeth. The
+Spaniards had seen them. The proclamation was of course addressed to
+the Filipino people, and called on them to rally to the cause, but
+he was also driving at recognition by the Powers. It read in part:
+"In the face of the whole world I have proclaimed that the aspiration
+of my whole life, the final object of all my wishes and efforts,
+is your independence, because I have the inner conviction that it is
+also your constant longing." [53] Many Americans insist that this is
+mere "hot air" and that the average Filipino peasant does not think
+much more than his plough animal, the scoffer himself being stupidly
+unaware that this has been precisely the argument of tyranny in all
+ages. But the pride a people will have in seeing the best educated
+and most able men of their own race in charge of their affairs seems
+to me too obvious to need elaboration. It was always accepted by us
+as axiomatic until we took the Philippines. It is a cruel species of
+wickedness for an American to tell his countrymen that the Filipino
+people do not want independence, for some of them may believe it.
+
+The Declaration of Independence of June 18th is known to students
+of Philippine political archaeology as the Proclamation establishing
+the "dictatorial" government. The principal thing it did was to
+supplement the absolute dictatorship proclaimed May 24th by provisions
+for organizing in detail. It also declared independence. A more
+elaborate Declaration followed on June 23d, known as the proclamation
+establishing the "revolutionary" government. This made provision
+for a Congress, a Cabinet, and courts. Of course it was only a paper
+government the day the ink dried on it. But we will follow it through
+its teething, and adolescence, to the attainment of its majority at
+an inauguration where the president was driven to the place of the
+taking of the oath of office in a coach and four, through a short
+and very self-respecting heyday, and a longer peripatetic existence,
+to final dissolution. The document of June 23d reminds us of a fact
+which in reading it at this late date we are apt to forget, viz.,
+that the Filipinos did not know at what moment their powerful ally,
+the American squadron, might up anchor and sail away to the high
+seas, to meet another Spanish fleet; thus leaving them to the tender
+mercies of the Spaniards, possibly forever. So they were losing no
+time. In fact, they had set to work from the very beginning with a
+determination to try and secure recognition from the Powers at the
+earliest moment. In appealing to the public opinion of the world with a
+view of paving the way to recognition by the Powers--which recognition
+would mean getting arms for war with Spain or any other power without
+the inconveniences of filibustering--Aguinaldo says on behalf of his
+people in the proclamation of June 23d, above mentioned, that they
+"now no longer limit themselves to asking for assimilation with the
+political constitution of Spain, but ask for a complete separation
+(and) strive for independence, completely assured that the time has
+come when they can and ought to govern themselves."
+
+Mr. Frank D. Millet, who reached Manila soon enough (in July) to
+see the ripples of this proclamation, describes the effect on the
+people. While Mr. Millet is one of the best men that anybody ever knew,
+a proposition as to which I am quite sure the President of the United
+States and many people great and small in many lands would affirm my
+judgment, [54] still, he writes from a frankly White Man's Burden or
+land-grabbing standpoint--is in harmony with his environment. At
+page 50 of his book, [55] he reproduces the proclamation last
+above quoted from, and adds the following satirical comment: "This
+flowery production was widely circulated and had a great effect on
+the imagination of the people, who, in the elation of their present
+success in investing the town and in their belief that the United
+States was beginning a campaign in the Philippines to free them from
+Spanish oppression (italics mine) shortly came to think that they
+were already a nation."
+
+Copies of these June proclamations also, as in the case of those
+of May 24th, were duly forwarded by Aguinaldo to Admiral Dewey
+[56] and by him forwarded to Washington without comment. In his
+letter transmitting them to Dewey, Aguinaldo announces that his
+government has "taken possession of the various provinces of the
+archipelago." Just exactly how many provinces he had control of on
+June 23d will be examined later. The very same day the proclamation
+of June 23d declaring independence was issued, Admiral Dewey cabled
+the Navy Department [57]: "Aguinaldo has acted independently of the
+squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress which has been
+wonderful. I have allowed him to take from the arsenal such Spanish
+arms and ammunition as he needed." After adding that "Aguinaldo
+expects to capture Manila without any assistance," the Admiral,
+evidently divining the temptation that was then luring the political
+St. Anthonies at Washington, volunteers this timely suggestion:
+
+
+    In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more
+    capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am
+    familiar with both races. [57]
+
+
+That there may be no doubt about the motive behind that suggestion,
+it may be noted here that the Admiral told the Senate Committee in
+1902: "I wrote that because I saw in the newspapers that Congress
+contemplated giving the Cubans independence." [58]
+
+But this is not all. On August 13th, the day after the Peace
+Protocol was signed, Mr. McKinley wired Admiral Dewey asking about
+"the desirability of the several islands," the "coal and mineral
+deposits," and in reply on August 29th, the Admiral wrote:
+
+
+    In a telegram sent the Department on June 23d, I expressed the
+    opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence
+    and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba,
+    and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them
+    has confirmed me in this opinion. [59]
+
+
+As a result of one year's stay in Cuba, and six in the Philippines--two
+in the army that subjugated the Filipinos and four as a judge over
+them--I heartily concur in the above opinion of Admiral Dewey,
+but with this addition: Whatever of solidarity for governmental
+purposes the Filipinos may have lacked at the date of the Admiral's
+communications, they were certainly welded into conscious political
+unity, as one people, in their war for independence against us.
+
+In the 1609 or Douay (pronounce Dewey) version of the Bible, the
+Latin Vulgate, Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer only says "Lead
+us not into temptation," while Matthew adds "but deliver us from
+evil." The Dewey suggestions to the Washington Government in 1898
+remind a regretful nation of both the evangelical versions mentioned,
+for the first seems to say what Luke says, and the second seems to
+add what Matthew adds.
+
+There is not an American who has known the Filipinos since the
+beginning of the American occupation who doubts for a moment that
+but for our intervention a Republic would have been established out
+there under the lead of Aguinaldo, Mabini, and their associates,
+which would have compared well with the republican governments
+between the United States and Cape Horn. The writer doubts very
+much if President Taft is of a contrary opinion. The real issue is,
+now that we have them, should we keep them in spite of the tariff
+iniquities which the Trusts perpetrate on them through Congress,
+until they have received the best possible tuition we can give them,
+or be content to give them their independence when they are already at
+least as fit for it as the Republics to the South of us, guaranteeing
+them independence by international agreement like that which protects
+Belgium and Switzerland?
+
+Now why did Admiral Dewey repeat to his home government and emphasize
+on August 29th a suggestion so extremely pertinent to the capacity of
+the Filipinos for self-government which he had already made in lucid
+language on June 23d previous? The answer is not far to seek. General
+Anderson had arrived between the two dates, with the first American
+troops that reached the islands after the naval battle of May 1st,
+and brought the Admiral the first intimation, which came somewhat as
+a surprise of course, that there was serious talk in the United States
+of retaining the Philippines. "I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey,"
+says General Anderson in the North American Review for February, 1900,
+"that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to
+hold the Philippines if they were captured." He adds: "Whether Admiral
+Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did or did not give
+Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized,
+the Filipinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather
+than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition,
+as I did subsequently at his request."
+
+General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured
+prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the
+Filipinos--1300 at one clip in the month of June at Olongapo. [60]
+These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented the Filipinos from
+taking until Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon,
+he promptly sent Captain Coghlan with the Raleigh and another of his
+ships to the scene of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the
+German "Hoch der Kaiser" etc. or words to that effect, and made him
+go about his business and let our ally alone. Then Captain Coghlan
+took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them over to Aguinaldo by
+direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as well as the test of,
+an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring into the partnership
+something you lack. The navy had no way to keep prisoners of war. There
+can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey's original notions about meeting
+the problems presented by his great victory of May 1, 1898, had been
+followed, we never would have had any trouble with the Filipinos;
+nor can there be any doubt that he made them his allies and used
+them as such. They were very obedient allies at that, until they
+saw the Washington Government was going to repudiate the "alliance,"
+and withhold from them what they had a right to consider the object
+and meaning of the alliance, if it meant anything.
+
+The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the
+National Geographic Society in Washington, "We blundered into
+colonization." [61] As we have seen, Admiral Dewey repeatedly
+expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the Filipinos
+were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more capable
+of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when
+he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for
+self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a
+coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part
+of the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the
+mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong as the gateway to
+the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the carrying trade of
+the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at Manila by way of
+rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that the taking of the
+islands was a dubious step from a financial standpoint, and a still
+more dubious one from the strategic standpoint of defending them by
+land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or any other first-class
+power. At this late date, when the passions and controversies of that
+period have long since subsided, is it not perfectly clear that after
+he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey not only dealt with the
+Filipinos, until the army came out, substantially as Admiral Sampson
+and General Shatter did with the Cubans, but also that he did all he
+properly could to save President McKinley from the one great blunder
+of our history, the taking of the Philippine Islands?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+ANDERSON AND AGUINALDO
+
+                        Well, honor is the subject of my story.
+
+                                            Julius Caesar, Act. I, Sc. 2.
+
+
+The destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898,
+ten days after the outbreak of the war with Spain, having necessitated
+sending troops to the Philippines to complete the reduction of the
+Spanish power in that quarter, Major-General Wesley Merritt was on
+May 16th selected to organize and command such an expedition.
+
+"The First Expedition," as it was always distinguished, by the officers
+and men of the Eighth Army Corps, there having been many subsequent
+expeditions sent out before our war with the Filipinos was over,
+was itself subdivided into a number of different expeditions, troops
+being hurried to Manila as fast as they could be assembled and properly
+equipped in sufficient numbers. The first batch that were whipped into
+shape left San Francisco under command of Brigadier-General Thomas
+M. Anderson, on May 25th, and arrived off Manila, June 30th. General
+Merritt did not arrive until July 25th. It was General Anderson,
+therefore, who broke the ice of the American occupation of the
+Philippines.
+
+In his annual message to Congress of December, following, [62]
+summing up the War with Spain and its results, Mr. McKinley gives
+a brief account of the First Expedition. After recounting Admiral
+Dewey's victory of May 1st previous, he states that "on the seventh
+day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory at
+Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of the fleet what troops
+would be required." President McKinley does not give the Admiral's
+answer, though he does state that it was received on the 15th day of
+May. The Admiral's answer appears, however, in the Report of the Navy
+Department for 1898, Appendix, page 98. It was: "In my best judgment,
+a well-equipped force of 5000 men." But the President's message does
+state that he at once sent a "total force consisting of 641 officers
+and 15,058 enlisted men."
+
+The difference of view-point of the Admiral and the President is clear
+from the language of both. In recommending 5000 troops, the Admiral
+had said they would be necessary "to retain possession [of Manila]
+and thus control Philippine Islands." This counted, of course, on the
+friendship of the people, as in Cuba. "I had in view simply taking
+possession of the city." said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [63]
+
+The purpose of the President in sending three times as many troops as
+were needed for the purpose Admiral Dewey had in mind is indicated in
+his account of what happened. After describing the taking of Manila
+by our troops on August 13th, the presidential message says:
+
+
+    By this the conquest of the Philippine Islands, virtually
+    accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed
+    by Admiral Dewey's victory of May 1st, was formally sealed. [64]
+
+
+Admiral Dewey contemplated that we should merely remain masters of the
+situation out where he was until the end of the war. President McKinley
+set about to effect "the conquest of the Philippine Islands." The
+naval victory of Manila Bay having made it certain that at the
+conclusion of our war against a decadent monarchy we would at last
+have an adequate coaling station and naval base in the Far East, the
+sending of troops to the Philippines, in appropriate prosecution of
+the war, to reduce and capture Manila, the capital and chief port,
+raised the question at once "And then what?"
+
+The genesis of the idea of taking over the archipelago is traceable
+to within a few days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet.
+
+Within a few days after the official news of the battle of Manila
+Bay reached Washington, the Treasury Department set a man to work
+making a "Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions of the
+Philippine Islands." [65] The Interior Department also awoke, about
+the same time to possibilities of an El Dorado in the new overseas
+conquest. "In May, 1898," says Secretary of the Interior, C. N. Bliss,
+in a letter intended for the Peace Commissioners who met at Paris
+that fall, "by arrangement between the Secretary of War with this
+Department"--Mr. Bliss's grammar is bad, but his meaning is plain--"a
+geologist of the United States Geological Survey accompanied the
+military expedition to the Philippines for the purpose of procuring
+information touching the geological and mineral resources of said
+islands." [66] This report, which accompanies the Bliss letter, reads
+like a mining stock prospectus. That summer an Assistant Secretary of
+the Treasury, presumably echoing the sentiments of the Administration,
+came out in one of the great magazines of the period, the Century,
+with an article in which he said: "We see with sudden clearness that
+some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their
+force. * * * A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force
+* * * the mainspring of commercialism." [67] Of course, the writer did
+not mention that Manila is an out-of-the-way place, so far as regards
+the main-travelled routes across the Pacific Ocean, and also forgot
+that, as has been suggested once before, the carrying trade of the
+world, and the shippers on which it depends, in the contest of the
+nations for the markets of Asia, would never take to the practice of
+unloading at Manila by way of rehearsal, before finally discharging
+cargo on the mainland of Asia, where the name of the Ultimate
+Consumer is legion. Nevertheless "Expansion"--of Trade, mainly--was
+the slogan of the hour, and any one who did not catch the contagion
+of exuberant allusion to "Our New Possessions" was considered crusty
+and out of date. People who referred back to the political maxims of
+Washington's Farewell Address, and the cognate set represented by the
+Monroe Doctrine, were regarded merely as not knowing a good thing
+when they saw it. So on rode the country, on the crest of the wave
+of war. When President McKinley sent the troops to the Philippines,
+their job was to hurry up and effect what his subsequent message to
+Congress describing their work called "the conquest of the Philippine
+Islands." That is, they were to effect a constructive conquest of
+the archipelago before Spain should sue for peace. It never seemed
+to occur to anybody at home that the Filipinos would object. If the
+country had, through some divine interposition, gotten it into its
+head that the Filipinos were quite a decent lot and really did object
+very bitterly, it would have risen in its wrath and smitten down any
+suggestion of forcing a government on them against their will. But
+nobody knew anything about them. They were a wholly new proposition.
+
+General Anderson was of course furnished with a copy of the President's
+instructions to his chief, General Merritt. They are quite long,
+and go into details about a number of administrative matters that
+would necessarily come up after the city should surrender, such as
+the raising of revenue, the military commander's duty under the law
+of nations with regard to the seizure of transportation lines by
+land or sea, the protection of places of worship from desecration or
+destruction, and the like. The only portion of them that is essential
+to a clear understanding of subsequent events is now submitted:
+They are dated Executive Mansion, May 18, 1898, and read in part [68]:
+
+
+    PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MERRITT
+
+    The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by
+    the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the paroling of the
+    garrisons, and acquisition of control of the bay, have rendered
+    it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted
+    by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable
+    and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the
+    Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of
+    the Spanish power in that quarter, and of giving order and security
+    to the islands while in the possession of the United States.
+
+    For the command of this expedition I have designated Major-General
+    Wesley Merritt, and it now becomes my duty to give instructions
+    as to the manner in which the movements shall be conducted.
+
+    The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's
+    territory is the severance of the former political relations of the
+    inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under
+    this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they
+    perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons
+    and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is
+    my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted
+    with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest
+    extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be
+    the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon
+    his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation declaring
+    that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines
+    nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them
+    in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal
+    and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or
+    by honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its
+    efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive
+    the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should
+    be as free from severity as possible. Though the powers of the
+    military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately
+    upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal
+    laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights
+    of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime,
+    are to be considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
+    compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended
+    or superseded by the occupying belligerents; and in practice they
+    are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force
+    and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as
+    they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so
+    far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. * * *
+    The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations
+    will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so.
+
+    While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will
+    be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt
+    measures of a different kind if, unfortunately, the course of the
+    people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance
+    of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or
+    expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute
+    new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or
+    to create such supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In
+    the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided
+    by his judgment and experience and a high sense of justice.
+
+
+While this document declares the purpose of our government to be a "two
+fold purpose," viz., first, to make an appropriate move in the game
+of war, and, second, to police the Islands "while in the possession
+of the United States," it is wholly free from inherent evidence of any
+intention out of harmony with the policy as to Cuba. In fact when the
+city of Santiago de Cuba surrendered to our forces in July thereafter,
+and it became necessary to issue instructions for the guidance of the
+military commander there, exactly the same instructions were given him,
+[69] verbatim et literatim. But in respect of the Cuban instructions
+there was never any concealment practised or necessary because the
+Cubans had been assured by the Teller amendment to the resolutions
+declaring war against Spain that we had no ulterior designs on their
+country, and that, as soon as peace and public order were restored,
+we intended "to leave the government and control of the island to its
+people." The Cuban instructions were therefore frankly and promptly
+published in General Orders No. 101 by the War Department, July 18,
+1898, five days after they were received from the President, and
+were then translated into Spanish and spread broadcast over Santiago
+province without unnecessary delay. I remember poring over a Spanish
+copy of General Orders 101, at Santiago de Cuba, shortly after the
+fall of that city, which copy was one of many already posted about
+that city by direction of General Wood. The words "the powers of the
+military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately
+upon the political condition of the inhabitants" never disturbed the
+Cuban leaders in the least, because they were read in the light of the
+disclaimer contained in the declaration of war. On the other hand,
+the proclamation which the military commander in the Philippines
+was enjoined by his instructions to publish "immediately upon his
+arrival in the islands," which arrival occurred July 25th, was not so
+published until after we had taken Manila, August 13th, and then it
+copied only the glittering generalities of the instructions themselves,
+such as the part assuring the people that we had not come to make war
+on them and that vested rights would be respected, but it carefully
+omitted the words about the powers of the military occupant being
+absolute and supreme, because when the army arrived it found a native
+government that had already issued its declaration of independence,
+was making wonderful progress against the common enemy, and was able
+to put up a right good fight against us also, in case we should deny
+them independence. [70]
+
+General Anderson arrived in Manila Bay, June 30, 1898, with about
+2500 men, and when General Merritt arrived, July 25th, we had about
+10,000 all told, while the Filipinos had half again that many, and
+there were 12,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila. General Anderson had not
+been long camped on the bayshore, under cover of the Navy's guns and
+in the neighborhood of Aguinaldo's headquarters, before he understood
+the whole situation clearly and wrote the War Department as follows:
+
+
+    Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt,
+    I think I should state to you that the establishment of a
+    provisional government on our part will probably bring us in
+    conflict with insurgents.
+
+
+This letter is dated July 18, 1898. [71]
+
+When General Anderson arrived in the islands on June 30th,
+the Washington Government was still wrestling with the angel of
+its announced creed about "Forcible Annexation" being "criminal
+aggression," and Mr. McKinley had to get both that angel's shoulders on
+the mat and put him out of business before he could get his own consent
+to giving any instructions to his generals which might sanction their
+killing people for objecting to forcible annexation. Hence his early
+anxiety to avoid a rupture with the Filipino leaders. The first stage
+of this wrestling coincides in point of time with General Anderson's
+tenure as the ranking military officer commanding our forces in
+the Philippines, which was from June 30th until the date of General
+Merritt's arrival, July 25th. As already made plain, the President's
+instructions for the guidance of the military commander were entirely
+free from any land-grabbing suggestion. On the other hand, when General
+Anderson left San Francisco for Manila, May 25th, there was already
+talk in the United States about retaining the Islands, if they were
+captured, for he so informed Admiral Dewey in the first interview
+they had after the transports which brought his command cast anchor
+near our squadron in Manila Bay on the last day of June. "I was the
+first to tell Admiral Dewey," says he, in the North American Review
+for February, 1900, "that there was any disposition on the part of the
+American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The
+current opinion was setting that way when the expeditionary force
+left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise."
+
+Relegated by the circumstances to his own discretion as to how he
+should act until Washington knew its mind, General Anderson's attitude
+in the outset represented a "peace-at-any-price" policy, suffused
+with benevolent pride at championing the cause of the oppressed, but
+secretly knowing from the beginning that it might become necessary
+later to slaughter said "oppressed," should they seriously object to
+a change of masters.
+
+"On July 1st," says General Anderson, in the North American Review
+article above quoted, "I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey." Of
+the Admiral's dealings with the insurgent chief prior to this time,
+the General says in this same article:
+
+"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did
+or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would
+be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring
+this from their acts rather than from their statements." This last
+quoted passage was read to Admiral Dewey by a member of the Senate
+Committee in 1902, along with other parts of the magazine article
+cited, and he was asked to comment on the same. He said:
+
+"These are General Anderson's statements. They are very interesting,
+indeed; I am here to make my own statements."
+
+He had stated that he never did specifically promise Aguinaldo
+independence, and the questioner was trying to show that his acts had
+amounted to assurances and therefore had committed the Government to
+giving the Filipinos their independence. Then Senator Patterson began
+another question, and had gotten as far as "I want to know whether
+your views--" when out came this, as of a sailor-man clearing decks
+for action:
+
+"I do not like your questions a bit. I did not like them yesterday and
+I do not like them to-day." So the Admiral's feelings were respected
+and the question was not pressed. There is no doubt at all that in
+the Philippines in the summer of 1898 the army turned the back of its
+hand to Aguinaldo as soon as it got there and baldly repudiated what
+the navy had done in the way of befriending the Filipinos. But both
+had acted under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
+and Navy--the President. The Admiral's sensitiveness on the subject
+ought to have been respected. And it was.
+
+By the time Admiral Dewey and General Anderson decided to call on
+"Don Emilio," the day after the General's arrival, the unexpected
+intimations which the latter brought, as to the Washington programme
+for the Philippine revolutionists being different from that as to Cuba,
+had begun to get in its work on the former. Not being a politician,
+the gallant Admiral was there ready and able to carry out any orders
+his government might send him, whenever the politicians should decide
+what they wanted to do. But in the absence of orders, he began to
+trim his sails a bit, so as to be prepared for whatever might be the
+policy. Accordingly, before he and the General started out to pay their
+call on "Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, President of the Revolutionary
+Government of the Philippines and General in Chief of its Army"--as he
+had styled himself in his proclamation of June 23d,--the Admiral said,
+"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your
+blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." And says he, in telling this, "We
+went in that way." [72] The reason of thus avoiding too much ceremony
+toward our "ally" claiming to represent an existing government which
+had lately declared its independence, is explained by an expression
+of the Admiral's concerning said Declaration of Independence itself:
+"That was my idea, not taking it seriously." At that same hearing the
+Admiral explained with much genuine feeling that from the day of the
+naval battle of May 1st until the arrival of the army "these great
+questions" were coming up constantly and he simply met them as they
+arose by acting on his best judgment on the spot at the time. But what
+a terrible mistake it was not to take that Declaration of Independence
+of June 23d, seriously, backed as it was by an army of 15,000 men
+flushed with victory, and under the absolute control of the author of
+the Declaration! Of course the Declaration had been published to the
+army. Could its author have checked them by repudiating it even if
+he had wanted to? As Aguinaldo himself expressed what would happen in
+such a contingency, "They would fail to recognize me as the interpreter
+of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me
+by another more careful of his own honor and dignity." [73]
+
+This Dewey-Anderson call on Aguinaldo was on July 1st. Admiral Dewey
+now began to foresee that the Washington programme was going to
+put him in an awkward position. So he began to take Aguinaldo more
+seriously. On July 4th, he wired Washington: "Aguinaldo proclaimed
+himself President of the Revolutionary Republic on July 1st." [74]
+It was on July 7th that Admiral Dewey captured 1300 armed Spanish
+prisoners, the garrison of Isla la Grande, off Olongapo, and turned
+them over to the forces of the Aguinaldo government because he had
+no way to keep them. [75] Was not that taking that government a
+bit seriously? How wholly unauthorized by the facts was this of "not
+taking it seriously," on the part of "The Liberator of the Filipinos,"
+[76] the immortal victor of Manila Bay, who two months before had
+taught the nation the magnitude of its power for good, in a cause as
+righteous as the crusades of old, and more sensible!
+
+But to return to General Anderson's account in the North American
+Review of his call, with Admiral Dewey, on the insurgent chief: "He
+asked me at once whether the 'United States of the North' either had,
+or would recognize his government. I am not quite sure as to the form
+of the question, whether it was 'had' or 'would'? In either form it was
+embarrassing." General Anderson then tells of Aguinaldo's returning
+his call: "A few days thereafter he made an official call, coming
+with cabinet, staff, and band. He asked if we, the North Americans,
+as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I
+said I could not answer that, but that in 122 years we had established
+no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied
+attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no
+authority for colonies, and I have no fear.'" General Anderson adds:
+"It may seem that my answer was evasive, but I was at the time trying
+to contract with the Filipinos for horses, fuel, and forage."
+
+While this history must not lapse into an almanac, it may not be
+amiss to follow these early stages of this matter through a few more
+successive dates, because the history of that period was all indelibly
+branded into Filipino memory shortly afterward with the red-hot iron
+of war.
+
+July 4th, General Anderson writes the Filipino candidate for
+Independence inviting him to "co-operate with us in military operations
+against the Spanish forces." [77] This was written not to arrange
+any plan of co-operation but in order to get room about Cavite as a
+military base without a row. In his North American Review article
+General Anderson says that on that same day, the Fourth of July,
+Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and review "in honor of
+our national holiday." "He did not come," says the article, "because
+he was not invited as President but as General Aguinaldo." An odd
+situation, was it not? Here was a man claiming to be President of a
+newly established republic based on the principles set forth in our
+Declaration of Independence, which republic had just issued a like
+Declaration, and he was invited to come and hear our declaration read,
+and declined because we would not recognize his right to assert the
+same truths. On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
+it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our Declaration
+before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.
+
+July 6th, General Anderson writes telling Aguinaldo that he is
+expecting more troops soon and therefore "I would like to have your
+excellency's advice and co-operation." [78]
+
+July 9th, General Anderson writes the War Department that Aguinaldo
+tells him he has about 15,000 fighting men, 11,000 armed with guns,
+and some 4000 prisoners, [79] and adds: "When we first landed he
+seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly but I have now come
+to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and
+seems willing to co-operate."
+
+July 13th, we find Admiral Dewey also still in a co-operative mood. On
+that day he cables the Navy Department of the capture of the 1,300
+prisoners on July 7th, mentioned above, which capture was made, it
+appears, because Aguinaldo complained to him that a German war-ship
+was interfering with his operations, [80] the prisoners being at once
+turned over to Aguinaldo, as stated above.
+
+July 18th, is the date of the letter to the War Department
+in which General Anderson states that the establishment of a
+provisional government by us will probably mean a conflict with the
+insurgents. This was equivalent to saying that they will probably be
+ready to fight whenever we assert the "absolute and supreme" authority
+that the President's instructions had directed to be asserted by the
+army as soon as it should arrive in the Philippines. Yet in the fall
+of 1899, President McKinley said he "never dreamed" that Aguinaldo's
+"little band" would oppose our rule to the extent of war against it. It
+would have been more accurate if the martyred Christian gentleman
+who used those words had said he "always hoped" they would not,
+instead of "never dreamed" they would. This letter of July 18th,
+informs the Department:
+
+
+    Aguinaldo has declared himself dictator and self-appointed
+    president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute
+    method of procedure under it.
+
+
+July 19th, General Anderson sends Major (now Major-General) J. F. Bell,
+to Aguinaldo, and asks of him a number of favors, such as any
+soldier may properly ask of an ally, for example, permission to see
+his military maps, etc., and that Aguinaldo "place at his [Bell's]
+disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also
+give him [Bell] a letter or pass addressed to your subordinates which
+will authorize them to furnish him any information they can * * *
+and to facilitate his passage along the lines, upon a reconnaissance
+around Manila, on which I propose to send him." [81] All of which
+Aguinaldo did.
+
+Military training is very keen on honor. Talk about what the French
+call foi d'officier,--the "word of an officer"! Did ever a letter from
+one soldier to another more completely commit the faith and honor of
+his government, to recognition of the existence of an alliance? "In
+122 years we have established no colonies," he had told Aguinaldo. "It
+looks like we are about to go into the colonizing business," he had,
+in effect, said to Admiral Dewey, about the same time.
+
+July 21st, General Anderson writes the Adjutant-General of the army
+as follows:
+
+
+    Since I last wrote, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate
+    system of military government. * * * It may seem strange that I
+    have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator,
+    his declaration of martial law, etc. I wrote such a protest but
+    did not publish it at Admiral Dewey's request. [82]
+
+
+When he wrote this letter, General Anderson was evidently beginning
+to have some compunctions about the trouble he now saw ahead. He was
+a veteran of the Civil War, whose gallantry had then been proven on
+many a field against an enemy compared with whom these people would
+be a picnic. But things did not look to the grim old hero like there
+was going to be a square deal. So he put this in the letter:
+
+
+    I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
+    the natives. They are not ignorant savage tribes, but have
+    a civilization of their own, and although insignificant in
+    appearance are fierce fighters and for a tropical people they are
+    industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work than a
+    regiment of volunteers.
+
+
+Of course, this slam at "volunteers" was a bit rough. But the
+battle-scarred veteran's sense of fair play was getting on his
+nerves. He foresaw the coming conflict, and though he did not shirk it,
+he did not relish it. He understood the "game," and it seemed to him
+the cards were stacked, to meet the necessity of demonstrating that
+forcible annexation, instead of being criminal aggression, was merely
+Trade Expansion, and that his government was right then irrevocably
+committing itself, without any knowledge of, or acquaintance with,
+the Filipinos, to the assumption that they were incapable of running
+a government of their own.
+
+The next day, July 22d, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo a letter
+advising him that he was without orders as yet concerning the question
+of recognizing his government. But that this letter was neither a
+protest nor in the nature of a protest, is evident from its text:
+
+
+    I observe that Your Excellency has announced yourself dictator
+    and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military
+    capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I
+    have no orders from my government on the subject. [83]
+
+
+Yet General Anderson's letter to the Adjutant-General of the army
+of July 18th [84] uses the words "since reading the President's
+instructions to General Merritt," etc., showing that he had a copy
+of them; and those instructions order and direct (see ante) that
+as soon as the commanding general of the American troops arrives
+he is to let the Filipinos know that "the powers of the military
+occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the
+political condition of the inhabitants." A charitable view of the
+matter would be that, technically, those were Merritt's orders,
+not Anderson's. But the whole scheme was to conceal the intention
+to assume supreme authority and keep Aguinaldo quiet "until," as
+General Merritt afterwards expressed it in his report, "I should be
+in possession of the city of Manila, * * * as I would not until then
+be in a position to * * * enforce my authority, in the event that his
+[Aguinaldo's] pretensions should clash with my designs." [85]
+
+The same day that General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo his billet doux
+about the dictatorship, viz., July 22d, he cabled Washington a much
+franker and more serious message; which read: "Aguinaldo declares
+dictatorship and martial law over all islands. The people expect
+independence." The very next day, July 23d, he wrote Aguinaldo asking
+his assistance in getting five hundred horses, and fifty oxen and
+ox-carts, and manifesting considerable impatience that he had not
+already complied with a similar request previously made "as it was
+to fight in the cause of your people." [86] The following day, July
+24th, replying to General Anderson's letter of the 22d wherein General
+Anderson had advised him that he was as yet without orders concerning
+the question of recognizing his government, Aguinaldo wrote:
+
+
+    It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any
+    of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North
+    American nation, which had struggled first for its independence,
+    and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually
+    struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with
+    greater benevolence than any other nation. [87]
+
+
+That cablegram of July 22d, above quoted, in which the commanding
+general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington
+government, "The people expect independence," is the hardest thing in
+the published archives of our government covering that momentous period
+for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. [88] After
+the war with the Filipinos broke out Mr. McKinley said repeatedly in
+public speeches, "I never dreamed they would turn against us." You do
+not find the Anderson cablegram of July 22d in the published report of
+the War Department covering the period under consideration. General
+Anderson addressed it to the Secretary of War and signed it, and,
+probably for lack of army cable facilities, got Admiral Dewey to send
+it to the Secretary of the Navy for transmission to the Secretary of
+War. [89] Certain it must be that at some Cabinet meeting on or after
+July 22, 1898, either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War
+read in the hearing of the President and the rest of his advisers that
+message from General Anderson, "The people expect independence." The
+object here is not to inveigh against Mr. McKinley. It is to show
+that, as Gibbon told us long ago, in speaking of the discontent of
+far distant possessions and the lack of hold of the possessor on the
+affections of the inhabitants thereof, "the cry of remote distress
+is ever faintly heard." The average American to-day, if told the
+Filipinos want independence, will give the statement about the same
+consideration Mr. McKinley did then, and if told that the desire
+among them for a government of their people by their people for their
+people has not been diminished since the late war by tariff taxation
+without representation, and the steady development of race prejudice
+between the dominant alien race and the subject one, he will begin
+to realize by personal experience how faintly the uttered longings
+of a whole people may fall on distant ears.
+
+We saw above that in a letter written July 21st, the day before the
+telegram about the "people expect independence," which letter must
+have reached Washington within thirty days, General Anderson not
+only notified Washington all about Aguinaldo's government and its
+pretensions, but stated that at the request of Admiral Dewey he had
+made no protest against it. [90] Yet straight on through the period
+of General Merritt's sojourn in the Islands, which began July 25th,
+and terminated August 29th, we find no protest ordered by Washington,
+and we further find the purpose of the President as announced in
+the instructions to Merritt, "The powers of the military occupant
+are absolute and supreme" throughout the Islands, not only not
+communicated to the Filipino people, but deliberately suppressed
+from the proclamation published by General Merritt pursuant to those
+instructions. [91]
+
+Comments and conclusions are usually impertinent and unwelcome save as
+mere addenda to facts, but in the light of the facts derivable from
+our own official records, is it any wonder that General Anderson,
+a gallant veteran of the Civil War, and perhaps the most conspicuous
+figure of the early fighting in the Philippines, delivered an address
+some time after he came back home before the Oregon Commandery of
+the Loyal Legion of the United States [92] on the subject, "Should
+republics have colonies?" and answered the question emphatically "No!"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+MERRITT AND AGUINALDO
+
+                    There are no tricks in plain and simple faith.
+
+                                           Julius Caesar, Act IV., Sc. 2.
+
+
+Major-General Wesley Merritt's account of the operations of the troops
+under his command in the First Expedition to the Philippines may be
+found in volume i., part 2, War Department Report for 1898. He left
+San Francisco accompanied by his staff, June 29, 1898, arrived at
+Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th, received the surrender of the city of
+Manila August 13th, and sailed thence August 30th, in obedience to
+orders from Washington to proceed without unnecessary delay to Paris,
+France, for conference with the Peace Commissioners. According to
+General Merritt's report, about the time he arrived Aguinaldo had
+some 12,000 men under arms, with plenty of ammunition, and a number
+of field-pieces. The late lamented Frank D. Millet has preserved for
+us, in his Expedition to the Philippines, some valuable and intimate
+studies of this army of Filipino besiegers whom our troops found
+busily at work when they arrived in the Islands:
+
+
+    It was an interesting sight at Camp Dewey to see the insurgents
+    strolling to and from the front. Pretty much all day long they
+    were coming and going, never in military formation, but singly,
+    and in small groups, perfectly clean and tidy in dress, often
+    accompanied by their wives and children, and all chatting as
+    merrily as if they were going off on a pigeon shoot. The men who
+    sold fish and vegetables in camp in the morning would be seen
+    every day or two dressed in holiday garments, with rifle and
+    cartridge boxes, strolling off to take their turn at the Spaniards.
+
+
+The reader will readily understand that there were many times as many
+volunteers as guns. Mr. Millet continues:
+
+
+    When they had been at the front twenty-four hours they were
+    relieved and returned home for a rest. They generally passed
+    their rifles and equipments on to another man and thus a limited
+    number of weapons served to arm a great many besiegers. They had
+    no distinctive uniform, the only badge of service being a red
+    and blue cockade with a white triangle bearing the Malay symbol
+    of the sun and three stars, and sometimes a red and blue band
+    pinned diagonally across the lower part of the left sleeve. * * *
+    Many of them * * * had belonged to the native volunteer force.
+    * * * The recruits were soon hammered into shape by the veterans
+    of the rank and file. * * * Their men were perfectly obedient
+    to orders * * * and they made the most devoted soldiers. There
+    was no visible Commissary or Quartermaster's Departments, but
+    the insurgent force was always supplied with food and ammunition
+    and there was no lack of transportation. The food issued at the
+    front was mostly rice brought up in carromatas to within a few
+    hundred yards of the trenches, when it was cooked by the women.
+    * * * Each man had a double handful of rice, sometimes enriched
+    by a small proportion of meat and fish, which was served him in
+    a square of plantain leaf. Thus he was unencumbered with a plate
+    or knife or fork and threw away his primitive but excellent dish
+    when he had "licked the platter clean." It was noticeable that
+    the insurgents carried no water bottles nor haversacks, and no
+    equipments indeed, but cartridge boxes. They did not seem to be
+    worried by thirst like our men.
+
+
+"Although insignificant in appearance, they are fierce fighters," wrote
+General Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the army in July. [93]
+
+General Merritt states in his report that Aguinaldo had "proclaimed an
+independent government, republican in form, with himself as President,
+and at the time of my arrival in the Islands the entire edifice
+of executive and legislative departments had been accomplished, at
+least on paper." [94] Of course at that time we were still officially
+declining to take Filipino aspirations for independence seriously,
+and preferred to treat Aguinaldo's government as purely a matter of
+stationery. As a matter of fact, an exhaustive examination of the
+official documents of that period, made with a view of ascertaining
+just how much of that Aguinaldo government of 1898 was stationery
+fiction and how much was stable fact, has absolutely surprised one
+man who was out there from 1899 to 1905 (the writer), and I have no
+doubt will be interesting, as mere matter of political necrology,
+to any American who was there "in the days of the empire" as the
+"ninety-niners" called it.
+
+Early in the spring of 1899, Mr. McKinley sent out the Commission of
+which President Schurman of Cornell University was Chairman, to try to
+stop the war. They bent themselves to the task in a spirit as kindly
+as that in which we know Mr. McKinley himself would have acted. They
+failed because the war was already on and the Filipinos were bent on
+fighting for independence to the bitter end. But they learned a good
+deal about the facts of the earlier situation. Speaking of these in
+their report to the President [95] with especial reference to the
+period beginning with Aguinaldo's landing at Cavite in May, after
+describing how the Filipino successes in battle with the Spaniards
+finally resulted in all of them being driven into Manila, where they
+remained hemmed in, they say:
+
+
+    While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the
+    Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire island
+    except that city.
+
+
+"For three and one half months," says General Otis in describing
+the facts of this same situation a year later, "the insurgents on
+land had kept Manila tightly bottled [meaning while Admiral Dewey
+had been blockading the place by water] * * * and food supplies were
+exhausted." [96] "We had Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island
+was held not by the Spanish but by the Filipinos," said General
+Anderson, in the North American Review for February, 1900. "It is a
+fact that they were in possession, they had gotten pretty much the
+whole thing except Manila," said Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee
+in 1902. [97]
+
+General Merritt took Manila August 13th, and sailed away for Paris
+August 31st, and only a week after that General Otis wired Washington
+(under date of September 7th) from Manila: "Insurgents have captured
+all Spanish garrisons in island [of Luzon] and control affairs outside
+of Cavite and this city." [98]
+
+The recruiting by Aguinaldo of an army of 40,000 men with guns
+within one hundred days after his little "Return from Elba"--"15,000
+fighting men, 11,000 of them armed with guns," in fifty days, [99]
+which number had swelled to nearly 40,000 men with guns in another
+fifty days (by August 29th) [100]--is no more remarkable than his
+progress in organizing his government and making its grip on the
+whole island of Luzon effective in a short space of time.
+
+As all Americans who know the Filipinos know how fond they are of what
+government offices call "paper work," and how their escribientes [101]
+can work like bees in drafting documents, it might be easy to ignore
+Aguinaldo's various proclamations, already hereinbefore noticed in
+Chapter II., as representing merely "a government on paper," were
+there no other proof. But among the insurgent captured papers we
+found long afterward, there is a document containing the minutes of
+a convention of the insurrecto presidentes from all the pueblos of
+fifteen different provinces, on August 6, 1898, which throws a flood
+of light on the subject now under consideration. [102] This convention
+was held at Bacoor, then Aguinaldo's headquarters, a little town on
+the bay shore between Manila and Cavite. The minutes of the convention
+recite that its members had been previously chosen as presidentes
+of their respective pueblos in the manner prescribed by previous
+decrees issued by Aguinaldo (already noticed), and that thereafter
+they had taken the oath of office before Aguinaldo as President of the
+government, etc. They then declare that the Filipino people whom they
+speak for are "not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside
+from the rational aspirations for a free and independent life," and
+"proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the Independence
+of the Philippines." They also re-affirm allegiance to Aguinaldo as
+President of the government and request him to seek recognition of it
+at the hands of the Powers, "because," says the paper, "to no one is it
+permitted to * * * stifle the legitimate aspirations of a people"--as
+if Europe cared a rap what we did to them except in the way of regret
+that it did not have a finger in the pie. However, they were not only
+apprehensive, on the one hand, lest we might be tempted to take their
+country away from Spain for ourselves, but also, on the other hand,
+lest we might in the wind-up decide to leave them to Spain at the end
+of the war. That this last was not an idle fear is shown by the fact
+that during the deliberations of the Paris Peace Commission, Judge
+Gray urged, in behalf of his contention against taking the islands
+at all, that if Dewey had sunk the Spanish fleet off Cadiz, instead
+of in Manila Bay, and the Carlists had incidentally helped us about
+that time, we would have been under no resulting obligation "to stay
+by them at the conclusion of the war." [103] When the presidentes in
+convention assembled as aforesaid got through with their whereases and
+resolutions they presented them to His Excellency the President of the
+Republic, Aguinaldo, who then issued a proclamation which recited,
+among other things: "In these provinces [the fifteen represented
+in the convention] complete order and perfect tranquillity reign,
+administered by the authorities elected" [104] according to his
+previous decrees as Dictator, which decrees have already been placed
+before the reader. The proclamation claims that the new government
+has 9,000 prisoners of war and 30,000 combatants. The former claim
+no one having any acquaintance with those times and conditions
+will question for a moment. As to the 30,000 combatants, if he had
+11,000 men armed with guns on July 9th and 40,000 on August 29th,
+why not 30,000 on August 6th? Of course, men without guns, bolo men,
+do not count for much in a serious connection like this now being
+considered. In November, 1899, at San Jose, in Nueva Ecija province,
+I heard General Lawton tell Colonel Jack Hayes to disarm and turn
+loose 175 bolo men the colonel had just captured and was lining up on
+the public square as we rode into the town. But we are considering how
+much of a government the Filipinos had in 1898, because the answer is
+pertinent to what sort of a government they could run if permitted now
+or at any time in the future; and, physical force being the ultimate
+basis of stability in all government, when we come to estimate how much
+of an army they had when their government was claiming recognition as a
+legitimate living thing, we must remember that "It was just a question
+of arming them. They could have had the whole population." [105]
+
+Now the great significant fact about this Bacoor convention of
+presidentes of August 6th--a week before Manila surrendered to our
+forces--is that in it more than half the population of the island of
+Luzon was represented. The total population of the Philippines is
+about 7,600,000, [106] and, of these, one-half, or 3,800,000 [107]
+live on Luzon. The other islands may be said to dangle from Luzon
+like the tail of a kite. Taking the tables of the American census
+of the Philippines of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123), as a basis on which
+to judge what Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th amounted to if true,
+the population of the provinces thus duly incorporated into the new
+government and in working order on that date, was, in round numbers,
+about as follows: South of Manila:--Cavite, 135,000; Batangas, 260,000;
+Laguna, 150,000; Tayabas, 150,000; North of Manila:--Bulacan, 225,000;
+Pampamga, 225,000; Nueva Ecija, 135,000; Tarlac, 135,000; Pangasinan,
+400,000; Union, 140,000; Bataan, 45,000; Zambales, 105,000. This
+represents a total of more than 2,000,000 of people.
+
+But Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th are not the only evidence as to
+the political status of the provinces of Luzon in August, 1898. Toward
+the end of that month, Maj. J. F. Bell, Chief of General Merritt's
+Bureau of Military Information, made a report on the situation as
+it stood August 29th, the report being made after most careful
+investigation, and intended as a summary of the then situation
+according to the most reliable information obtainable, in order that
+General Merritt might know, as far as practicable, what he would be
+"up against" in the event of trouble with the insurgents. [108]
+
+This report not only corroborates Aguinaldo's claims of August 6th,
+but it also concedes to the Aguinaldo people eight other important
+provinces--four south of the Pasig River with a total population of
+about 630,000, [109] the only four of southern Luzon not included in
+Aguinaldo's claim of August 6th, thus conceding him practically all
+of Luzon south of the Pasig; and it furthermore concedes him four
+great provinces of northern Luzon with a total population of nearly
+600,000. [110] General Bell states that these last are "still in the
+possession of the Spanish," but practically certain to be with the
+insurgents in the very near future. "Insurgents have been dispatched
+to attack the Spanish in these provinces," says the Bell report.
+
+In this same report Major Bell said: "There is not a particle of doubt
+but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt of any
+government to reorganize a colonial government here." [111] When the
+insurgent government was finally dislodged from its last capital and
+Aguinaldo became a fugitive hotly pursued by our troops, he started
+for the mountains of northern Luzon, passing through provinces he
+had never visited before. The diary of one of his staff officers,
+Major Villa, in describing a brief stop they made in a town en route
+(Aringay, in Union province) says: "After the honorable President
+had urged them [the townspeople] to be patriotic, we continued the
+march." [112] They certainly did "continue the march." The Maccabebe
+scouts, of which the writer commanded a company at the time, took
+the town a few hours later, Aguinaldo's rear-guard retiring after
+a brief resistance, following which we found, among the dead in the
+trenches, a major other than Villa. Certainly, to read this little
+extract from the diary of Aguinaldo's retreat is to feel the pulse
+of northern Luzon as to its loyalty to the revolution at that time,
+and is corroborative of these claims of Aguinaldo made in August,
+1898, supplemented, as we have seen them, by General Bell's appraisal.
+
+As to the political conditions which prevailed in southern Luzon,
+particularly in the Camarines, in August and the fall of 1898,
+information derived from one who was there then would seem appropriate
+here. Major Blanton Winship, Judge Advocate's Corps, U. S. A., Major
+Archibald W. Butt, the late lamented military aide to President Taft,
+and the writer, lived together in Manila, in 1900, at the house of a
+Spanish physician, a Dr. Lopez, who had been a "prisoner" at Nueva
+Caceres, a town situated in one of the provinces of southern Luzon
+(Camarines) in the fall of 1898. Dr. Lopez had a large family. They had
+also been "prisoners" down there. No evil befell them at the hands of
+their "captors." They had the freedom of the town they were in. They
+had good reason to be pretty well scared as to what the insurgents
+might do to them. But they were never maltreated. The main impression
+we got from Dr. Lopez and his family was that the political grip of
+the Aguinaldo government on southern Luzon was complete during the
+time they were "prisoners" there. If anybody doubts the absoluteness
+of the grip of the Revolutionary government on the situation in the
+provinces which were represented at the Bacoor convention of August 6,
+1898, above mentioned, when the Filipino Declaration of Independence
+was signed and proclaimed, let him ask any American who had a part
+in putting down the Philippine insurrection what a presidente, an
+insurrecto presidente, in a Filipino town, was in 1899 and 1900. He
+was "the whole thing." Even to-day the presidente of a pueblo is as
+absolute boss of his town as Charles F. Murphy is of Tammany Hall. And
+a town or pueblo in the Philippines is more than an area covered
+by more or less contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more like a
+township in Massachusetts. So that when you account governmentally for
+the pueblos of a given province, you account for every square foot of
+that province and for every man in it. For several years before our war
+with Spain, nearly every Filipino of any education and spirit in the
+archipelago belonged to the secret revolutionary society known as the
+Katipunan. This had its organization in every town when Dewey sank the
+Spanish fleet and landed Aguinaldo at Cavite. The rest may be imagined.
+
+By September, 1898, Aguinaldo was absolute master of the whole of
+Luzon. Before the Treaty of Paris was signed (December 10, 1898), in
+fact while Judge Gray of the Peace Commission was cabling President
+McKinley that not to leave the government of the Philippines to the
+people thereof "would be to make a mockery of instructions," Aguinaldo
+had become equally absolute master of the situation throughout the
+rest of the archipelago outside of Manila.
+
+Toward the end of July, 1898, our Manila Consul, Mr. Williams, who
+was one of our consular triumvirate of would-be Warwicks, or "original
+Aguinaldo men," of 1898, used to have nice talks with Aguinaldo about
+the lion and the lamb lying down together without the lion eating the
+lamb, and in one instance, at least, he goes so far as to represent
+Aguinaldo as willing to some such arrangement--e. g., annexation, or
+some vague scheme of dependence. But whenever we hear from Aguinaldo
+over his own signature, we hear him saying whatever means in Tagalo
+"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." For instance, at page 15, of Senate
+Document 208, he writes Williams, under date of August 1st, with
+fine courtesy:
+
+
+    I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness and
+    ingenuity which you have displayed in painting in an admirable
+    manner the benefits which, especially for me and my leaders, and
+    in general for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of
+    these islands with the United States of America. Ah! that picture,
+    so happy and so finished * * * This is not saying that I am not
+    of your opinion * * * You say all this and yet more will result
+    from annexing ourselves to your people * * * You are my friend
+    and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But why should
+    we say it? Will my people believe it? * * * I have done what they
+    desire, establishing a government * * * not only because it was my
+    duty, but also because had I acted in any other manner they would
+    fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations,
+    and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more
+    careful of his own honor and dignity.
+
+
+Now that we know what was in the Filipino mind when General Merritt
+arrived in the Philippines, let us see what was in the American
+military mind out there at the same time. Says General Merritt:
+"General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his
+services as a subordinate leader." We trust the reason of this
+at once suggests itself from what has preceded, including General
+Anderson's dealings with the insurgent chief. The latter wanted some
+understanding as to what the intentions of our government were, and
+what was to be the programme afterward, should he and his countrymen
+assist in the little fighting that now remained necessary to complete
+the taking of Manila. Those intentions were precisely what Merritt
+was determined to conceal. "As my instructions from the President
+fully contemplated the occupation of the Islands by the American
+land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupant
+are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political
+condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any
+direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in
+possession of the city of Manila." [113]
+
+On one occasion General Merritt passed through the village of Bacoor
+where Aguinaldo had his headquarters, but, says Mr. Millet [114]
+in mentioning this, "They never met." After the taking of the city,
+General Merritt remembered that with some 13,000 Spanish prisoners
+to guard, and a city of 300,000 people, all but a sprinkling of whom
+were in sympathy with the insurgent cause, on his hands, and an army
+of at least 14,000 insurgents--probably far more than that--clamoring
+without the gates of that city, and only 10,000 men of his own with
+whom to handle such a situation, frankness was out of the question,
+in view of his orders from the President. [115] Therefore, on the day
+after the city surrendered, General Merritt issued a proclamation,
+copying [116] verbatim from Mr. McKinley's instructions (ante)
+such innocuous milk-and-water passages as the one which assured the
+people that our government "has not come to wage war upon them * * *
+but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their
+personal and religious rights; all persons who, by active aid or honest
+submission, co-operate with the United States * * * will receive the
+reward of its support and protection." But he carefully omitted the
+words quoted above about the powers of the military occupant being
+absolute and supreme, "lest his [Aguinaldo's] pretensions," to use
+General Merritt's expression, "should clash with my designs." "For
+these reasons," says General Merritt (p. 40), "the preparations for
+the attack on the city were * * * conducted without reference to the
+situation of the insurgent forces."
+
+Here General Merritt is speaking frankly but not accurately. He means
+he made his preparations without any more reference to the situation
+of the insurgent forces than he could help. As a matter of fact,
+their situation bothered him a good deal. They were in the way. For
+instance, there was a whole brigade of them at one point between
+our people and Manila. "This," says General Merritt (p. 41), "was
+overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange if possible
+with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to
+move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control
+of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made,"
+etc. That reads very well--that about "arrange if possible," "no
+objection was made," etc.,--does it not? Nothing there through which
+"the lustre and the moral strength" of the motives that prompted the
+Spanish war might be "dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt
+us," [117] is there? It was stated above that General Merritt was
+speaking frankly in this report. He was. He probably did not know how
+General Greene carried out the order to "arrange if possible with the
+insurgent brigadier-commander." But it so happened that there was a
+newspaper correspondent along with General Greene who has since told
+us. This gentleman was Mr. Frank D. Millet, from whom we have already
+above quoted, the correspondent of the London Times and of Harper's
+Weekly. General Greene had known him years before in the campaigns of
+the Turco-Russian war. Mr. Millet had been a war correspondent in those
+campaigns also, and General Greene was there taking observations. So
+that in the operations against Manila, Mr. Millet, being an old friend
+of General Greene's, known to be a handy man to have around in a close
+place, was acting as a civilian volunteer aide to the general. [118]
+Here is Mr. Millet's account of what happened, taken from his book,
+The Expedition to the Philippines:
+
+
+    On the afternoon of the 28th [of July, 1898], General Greene
+    received a verbal message from General Merritt suggesting that
+    he juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines, always on
+    his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the
+    commanding general to any recognition of the native leaders
+    or opening up the prospect of an alliance. This General Greene
+    accomplished very cleverly.
+
+
+Mr. Millet then goes on to tell how General Greene persuaded one
+of Aguinaldo's generals (Noriel) to evacuate certain trenches so he
+(Greene) could occupy them, "with a condition attached that General
+Greene must give a written receipt for the entrenchments." This
+condition, Mr. Millet says, was imposed by "the astute leader"
+(Aguinaldo). General Greene's "cleverness" consisted in purposely
+failing and omitting to give the receipt, which Mr. Millet says
+"looked very much like a bargain concluded over a signature, and was
+a little more formal than General Greene thought advisable." The key
+to this sorry business may be found in the first paragraph of General
+Merritt's instructions to all his generals at the time:
+
+
+    No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent
+    generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy trenches, but if
+    refused not to use force. [119]
+
+
+"I am quite unable to explain," says Mr. Millet (p. 61), "why we
+did not in the very beginning make them understand that we were
+masters of the situation, and that they must come strictly under our
+authority." The obvious reason was that a war of conquest to subjugate
+a remote people struggling to be free from the yoke of alien domination
+was sure to be more or less unpopular with many of the sovereign
+voters of a republic, and more or less dangerous therefore, like all
+unpopular wars, to the tenure of office of the party in power. So that
+in entering upon a war for conquest, a republic must "play politics,"
+using the military arm of the government for the twofold purpose of
+crushing opposition and proving that there is none.
+
+The maxim which makes all fair in war often covers a multitude of
+sins. But let us turn for a moment from strategy to principle, and
+see what two other distinguished American war correspondents were
+thinking and saying about the same time. Writing to Harper's Weekly
+from Cavite, under date of July 16th, concerning the work of the
+Filipinos during the eight weeks before that, Mr. O. K. Davis said:
+"The insurgents have driven them [the Spaniards] back over twenty
+miles of country practically impassable for our men. * * * Aguinaldo
+has saved our troops a lot of desperately hard campaigning * * *. The
+insurgent works extend clear around Manila, and the Spaniards are
+completely hemmed in. There is no hope for them but surrender." Writing
+to the same paper under date of August 6th, Mr. John F. Bass says:
+"We forget that they drove the Spaniards from Cavite to their present
+intrenched position, thus saving us a long-continued fight through
+the jungle." This gentleman did not tackle the question of inventing
+a new definition of liberty consistent with alien domination. He
+simply says: "Give them their liberty and guarantee it to them." In
+the face of such plucky patriotism as he had witnessed, political
+casuistry about "capacity for self-government" would have hung its
+head. Yet Mr. Bass was by no means a novice. He had served with the
+British army in Egypt in 1895, through the Armenian massacres of 1896,
+and in the Cretan rebellion and Greek War of 1897. His sentiments were
+simply precisely what those of the average American not under military
+orders would have been at the time. After the fall of Manila he wrote
+(August 17th): "I am inclined to think that the insurgents intend to
+fight us if we stay and Spain if we go."
+
+There were 8500 American troops in the taking of the city of Manila,
+on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos were ignored by them, although they
+afterwards claimed to have helped. As a matter of fact, the Spanish
+officers in command were very anxious to surrender and get back to
+Spain. The Filipinos had already made them "long for peace," to use
+a famous expression of General J. F. Bell. The garrison only put up
+a very slight resistance, "to save their face," as the Chinese say,
+i. e., to save themselves from being court-martialed under some
+quixotic article of the Spanish army regulations. The assault was
+begun about 9.30 A.M., and early that afternoon the Spanish flag
+had been lowered from the flag-staff in the main square and the
+Stars and Stripes run up in its stead, amid the convulsive sobs of
+dark-eyed senoritas and the muttered curses of melodramatic Spanish
+cavaliers. Thanks to the Filipinos' three and one half months' work,
+the performance only cost us five men killed out of the 8500. The
+list of wounded totalled 43. Our antecedent loss in the trenches
+prior to the day of the assault had been fourteen killed and sixty
+wounded. So the job was completed, so far as the records show, at a
+cost of less than a score of American lives. [120]
+
+As Aguinaldo's troops surged forward in the wake of the American
+advance they were stopped by orders from the American commander, and
+prevented from following the retreating Spaniards into Manila. They
+were not even allowed what is known to the modern small boy as "a
+look-in." They were not permitted to come into the city to see the
+surrender. President McKinley's message to Congress of December,
+1898, describes "the last scene of the war" as having been "enacted
+at Manila its starting place." [121] It says: "On August 13th,
+after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in which the
+squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally." In this
+connection, by way of explaining Aguinaldo's treatment at the hands of
+our generals from the beginning, the message says, "Divided victory
+was not permissible." "It was fitting that whatever was to be done
+* * * should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States
+alone." But what takes much of the virtue out of the "strong arm"
+proposition is that Generals Merritt and Anderson were carrying out
+President McKinley's orders all the time they were juggling Aguinaldo
+out of his positions before Manila, and giving him evasive answers,
+until the city could be taken by the said "strong arm" alone. For,
+as the message puts it, in speaking of the taking of the city, "By
+this the conquest of the Philippine Islands * * * was formally sealed."
+
+When General Merritt left Manila on August 30th, he proceeded to Paris
+to appear before the Peace Commission there. His views doubtless
+had great weight with them on the momentous questions they had to
+decide. But his views were wholly erroneous, and that they were so
+is not surprising. As above stated, he did not even meet Aguinaldo,
+purposely holding himself aloof from him and his leaders. He never did
+know how deeply they were incensed at being shut out of Manila when
+the city surrendered. In his report prepared aboard the steamship
+China, en route for Paris, he says: "Doubtless much dissatisfaction
+is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents, but * * * I am of the
+opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances,"
+etc. (p. 40). If General Merritt had caught the temper of the trenches
+he would have known better, but he saw nothing of the fighting prior
+to the final scene, nor did he take the field in person on the day of
+the combined assault on the city, August 13th, and therefore missed
+the supreme opportunity to understand how the Filipinos felt. Says
+General Anderson in his report:
+
+
+    I understood from the general commanding that he would be
+    personally present on the day of battle. * * * On the morning of
+    the 13th, General Babcock came to my headquarters and informed
+    me that the major-general commanding would remain on a despatch
+    boat. [122]
+
+
+Indeed, so reduced was Manila, by reason of the long siege conducted by
+the insurgents, that the assault of August 13th, not only was, but was
+expected to be, little more than a sham battle. Says Lieutenant-Colonel
+Pope, chief quartermaster, "On the evening of August 12th an order was
+sent me to report with two battalions of the Second Oregon Volunteers,
+under Colonel Summers the next day on the Kwong Hoi to the commanding
+general on the Newport, as an escort on his entrance into Manila. At
+the hour named, I reported etc." [123] As soon as Spanish "honor"
+was satisfied, up went the white flag and General Merritt was duly
+escorted ashore and into the city, where he received the surrender
+of the Spanish general.
+
+In the Civil War, General Merritt had received six successive
+promotions for gallantry, at Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, Five Forks,
+etc., and had been with Sheridan at Winchester. So the way he
+"commanded" the assault on Manila is proof only of the obligations
+we then owed the Filipinos. They had left very little to be done.
+
+In his account of General Merritt's original personal disembarkation
+at Cavite, Mr. Frank Millet acquaints his readers with a Philippine
+custom we afterwards grew quite familiar with and found quite useful,
+of keeping your shoes dry in landing from a rowboat on a beach
+by riding astride the shoulders of some husky native boatman. The
+boatmen make it a point of special pride not to let their passengers
+get their feet wet. Mr. Millet tells us that a general in uniform
+looks neither dignified nor picturesque under such circumstances,
+and that therefore he will not elaborate on the picture, but that it
+is suggestive "more of the hilarious than of the heroic." Presumably
+when General Merritt went ashore on August 13th, from the despatch
+boat from which he had been watching the assault on Manila, to
+receive the surrender of the Spanish general, he followed the same
+custom of the country he had used on the occasion of his original
+disembarkation. So that in the taking of Manila, we were probably
+literally, as well as ethically, like General Mahone of Virginia as
+he is pictured in a familiar post-bellum negro story, according to
+which the general met a negro on a steep part of the road to heaven,
+told him that St. Peter would only admit mounted parties, mounted
+the negro with the latter's consent, rode on his back the rest of
+the toilsome journey to the heavenly gate, dismounted, knocked,
+and was cordially welcomed by the saint at the sacred portal thus:
+"Why how d' ye do, General Mahone; jess tie yoh hoss and come in."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+OTIS AND AGUINALDO
+
+                            Where people and leaders are agreed,
+                            What can the archon do?
+
+                                                        Athenian Maxims.
+
+
+Major-general Elwell S. Otis and staff arrived at Manila August 21,
+1898. [124] He relieved General Merritt and succeeded to the command
+of the American troops in the Philippines, August 29th. Archbishop
+Chapelle, who was papal delegate to the Philippines in 1900, once
+said to the writer at Manila, in that year, that General Otis was
+"of about the right mental calibre to command a one-company post
+in Arizona." The impatience manifested in the remark was due to
+differences between him and the commanding-general about the Friar
+question. The remark itself was of course intended, and understood, as
+hyperbole. But the selection of General Otis to handle the Philippine
+situation was a serious mistake. He was past sixty when he took
+command. He continued in command from August 29, 1898, to May 5,
+1900, a period of some twenty months. The insurrection was held in
+abeyance for some five months after he took hold, the leaders hoping
+against hope that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to
+them as it did Cuba to the Cubans; and during all that time General
+Otis was apparently unable to see that war would be inevitable in the
+event the decision at Paris was adverse to Filipino hopes. A member
+of General Otis's staff once told me in speaking of the insurrection
+period that his chief pooh-poohed the likelihood of an outbreak
+right along up to the very day before the outbreak of February 4,
+1899, occurred. Before the insurrection came he would not see it,
+and after it came he--literally--did not see it; that is to say,
+during fifteen months of fighting he commanded the Eighth Army Corps
+from a desk in Manila and never once took the field. His Civil War
+record was all right, but he was now getting well along in years. He
+was also a graduate of the Harvard Law School of the Class of 1861,
+rather prided himself on being "a pretty fair jack-leg lawyer," and had
+a most absorbing passion for the details of administrative work. They
+used to say that the only occasion on which General Otis ever went
+out of Manila the whole time he was there was when he went up the
+railroad once to Angeles to see that a proper valuation was put on a
+then recently deceased Quartermaster's Department mule. When he left
+the Islands he remarked to a newspaper man that he had had but one "day
+off" since he had been there. Unswerving devotion to a desk in time of
+war, on the part of the commanding general of the army in the field,
+seemed to him an appropriate subject for just pride. This showed his
+limitations. He was a man wholly unable to see the essentials of an
+important situation, or to take in the whole horizon. He was known
+to the Eighth Corps, his command, as a sort of "Fussy Grandpa," his
+personality and general management of things always suggesting the
+picture of a painfully near-sighted be-spectacled old gentleman busily
+nosing over papers you had submitted, and finding fault to show he knew
+a thing or two. However, he had many eminently respectable traits, and
+did the best he knew how, though wholly devoid of that noble serenity
+of vision which used to enable Mr. Lincoln, amid the darkest and most
+tremendous of his problems, to say with a smile to Horace Greeley:
+"Don't shoot the organist, he's doing the best he can."
+
+Before General Otis relieved General Merritt, the latter had written
+Aguinaldo politely requesting him to move his troops beyond certain
+specified lines about the city, [125] and Aguinaldo had replied
+August 27th, agreeing to do so, but asking that the Americans promise
+to restore to him the positions thus vacated in the event under the
+treaty the United States should leave the Philippines to Spain. [126]
+August 31st, Otis notified Aguinaldo, then still at Bacoor, his first
+capital, that General Merritt had been unexpectedly called away,
+and that he, Otis, being unacquainted with the situation must take
+time before answering the Aguinaldo letter to Merritt of the 27th. On
+September 8th, he did answer, in a preposterously long communication
+of about 3000 words, which says, among other things: "I have not been
+instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in
+regard to its legitimate holdings here"; and therefore declines to
+promise anything about restoring the insurgent positions in the event
+we should leave the Islands to Spain under the treaty. Commenting
+on this in the North American Review for February, 1900, General
+Anderson says: "I believe we came to the parting of the ways when we
+refused this request." General Anderson was right. General Merritt
+had on August 21st sent Aguinaldo a memorandum by the hand of Major
+J. Franklin Bell which promised: "Care will be taken to leave him
+[Aguinaldo] in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the
+government." [127] In the role of political henchman for President
+McKinley, which General Otis seems to have conceived it his duty to
+play from the very beginning in the Philippines, it thus appears that
+he was not troubled about keeping unsullied the faith and honor of
+the government as pledged by his predecessor. His 3000-word letter to
+Aguinaldo of September 8th ignores Merritt's promise as coolly as if
+it had never been made. His only concern appears to have been to leave
+the government free to throw the Filipinos overboard if it should
+wish to. He peevishly implies later on that Aguinaldo's requests in
+this regard were merely a cloak for designs against us (p. 40). But
+his real reason is given in a sort of stage "aside"--a letter to
+the Adjutant-General of the army dated September 12, 1898, wherein he
+explains: "Should I promise them that in case of the return of the city
+to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be placed
+by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe that
+they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the international
+obligations resting upon us * * * no such promise can be given." [128]
+In the sacred name of National Honor what of the Merritt promise? You
+only have to turn a few pages in the War Department Report for 1899
+from the Merritt promise to the Otis repudiation of it. Yes, General
+Anderson was right. It was when General Otis practically repudiated
+in writing the written promise of his predecessor, General Merritt,
+that we "came to the parting of the ways" in our relations with the
+Filipinos. Let no American suppose for a moment that the author of
+this volume is engaged in the ungracious, and frequently deservedly
+thankless task of mere muck-raking. He never met General Otis but once,
+and then for a very brief official interview of an agreeable nature. He
+is only attempting to make a small contribution to the righting of a
+great wrong unwittingly done by a great, free, and generous people to
+another people then struggling to be free--a wrong which he doubts
+not will one day be righted, whether he lives to see it so righted
+or not. General Otis's letter to the Adjutant-General of the army of
+September 12th, above quoted, shows that he was holding himself in
+readiness to carry out in the Philippines any political programme the
+Administration might determine upon, which would mean that he would
+afterwards come home and tell how entirely righteous that programme
+had been. Had the Administration hearkened back to Admiral Dewey's
+suggestion that the Filipinos were far superior to the Cubans, and
+decided to set before General Otis in the Philippines the same task
+it had set before General Wood in Cuba, we would have heard nothing
+about Filipino "incapacity for self-government." General Otis would
+have taken his cue from the President, his commander-in chief, and
+said: "I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral Dewey." Then he
+would have gone to work in a spirit of generous rivalry to do in the
+Philippines just what Wood did in Cuba. And the task would have been
+easier. Had the Administration taken the view urged by Judge Gray,
+as a member of the Paris Peace Commission, that "if we had captured
+Cadiz and the Carlists had helped us [we] would not owe duty to stay
+by them at the conclusion of the war," [129] and therefore we were not
+bound to see the Filipinos through their struggle, General Otis would
+have adopted that view with equal loyalty and in the presidential
+campaign of 1900, he would have furnished the Administration with
+arguments to justify that course. This would have been an easy task,
+also, for two of Spain's fleets had been destroyed by us, leaving
+her but one to guard her home coast cities, and making the sending
+of reinforcements to the besieged and demoralized garrison of Manila
+impossible. The native army she relied on throughout the archipelago
+had gone over bodily to the patriot cause, and there was no hope
+of successful resistance to it. But General Otis did not have the
+boundless prestige of Admiral Dewey and so volunteered no advice. As
+soon as the Administration chose its course, he set to work to prove
+the correctness of it. From him, of course, came all the McKinley
+Administration's original arguments against doing for the Filipinos
+as we did in the case of Cuba. He was the only legitimate source
+the American people could look to at that time to help them in their
+dilemma. They were standing with reluctant feet where democracy and
+its antithesis meet, and Otis was their sole guide. But the guide
+was of the kind who wait until you point and ask "Is that the right
+direction?" and then answer "Yes." Four days after General Otis sent
+his above quoted letter of September 12th, to Adjutant-General Corbin,
+Mr. McKinley signed his instructions to the Paris Peace Commissioners,
+directing them to insist on the cession of Luzon at least, the
+instructions being full of eloquent but specious argument about the
+necessity of establishing a guardianship over people of whom we then
+knew nothing. From that day forward General Otis bent himself to the
+task of showing the righteousness of that course. "I will let nothing
+go that will hurt the Administration," was his favorite expression
+to the newspaper correspondents when they used to complain about
+his press censorship. Hypocrisy is defined to be "a false assumption
+of piety or virtue." The false assumption of piety or virtue which
+has handicapped the American occupation of the Philippines from the
+beginning, and which will always handicap it, until we throw off the
+mask and honestly set to work to give the Filipinos a square deal on
+the question of whether they can or cannot run a decent government of
+their own if permitted, is traceable back to the Otis letter to the
+Adjutant-General of September 12, 1898, ignoring General Merritt's
+promise to leave Aguinaldo "in as good condition as he was found by
+the forces of the government" in case we should, under the terms of
+the treaty of peace, leave the Islands to Spain.
+
+General Otis's letter of September 8th to Aguinaldo is apparently
+intended to convince him that he ought to consider everything the
+Americans had done up to date as exactly the correct thing, according
+to the standards of up-to-date, philanthropic, liberty-loving nations
+which pity double-dealing as mediaeval; and that he should cheer up,
+and feel grateful and happy, instead of sulking, Achilles-like, in his
+tents; and furthermore--which was the crux--that he must move said
+tents. General Otis does not forget "that the revolutionary forces
+under your command have made many sacrifices in the interest of civil
+liberty (observe, he does not call it independence) and for the welfare
+of your people"; admits that they have "endured great hardships, and
+have rendered aid"; and avers, as a reason for Aguinaldo's evacuating
+that part of the environs of Manila occupied by his troops: "It [the
+war with Spain] was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake
+* * * not for * * * aggrandizement or for any national profit." After
+stating, as above indicated, that he does not yet know what the
+policy of the United States is to be "in regard to its legitimate
+holdings here," General Otis proceeds to declare that in any event
+he will not be a party to any joint occupation of any part of the
+city, bay, and harbor of Manila--the territory covered by the Peace
+Protocol of August 13th--and that Aguinaldo must effect the evacuation
+demanded in the letter of General Merritt "before Tuesday the 15th"
+(of September), i.e., within a week. Aguinaldo finally withdrew his
+troops, after much useless parleying and much waste of ink.
+
+There was some of the parleying and ink, however, that was not wholly
+wasted. But to properly appreciate it as illustrative of the fortitude
+and tact which the early Filipino leaders seem to have combined in
+a remarkable degree, some prefatory data are essential.
+
+Aguinaldo's capital was then at Bacoor, one of the small coast villages
+you pass through in going by land from Manila to Cavite. From Manila
+over to Cavite by water is about seven miles, and by land about three
+or four times that. The coast line from Manila to Cavite makes a
+loop, so that a straight line over the water from Manila to Cavite
+subtends a curve, near the Cavite end of which lies Bacoor. Thus,
+Bacoor, being at the mercy of the big guns at Cavite, and also easily
+accessible by a land force from Manila, to say nothing of Dewey's
+mighty armada riding at anchor in the offing, was a good place to
+move away from. There it lay, right in the lion's jaws, should the
+lion happen to get hungry. Aguinaldo had reflected on all this,
+and had determined to get himself a capital away from "the city,
+bay, and harbor of Manila," that is to say, to take his head out
+of the lion's jaws. General Otis's demand of September 8th that
+he move his troops out of the suburbs of Manila determined him to
+move his capital as well. He moved it to a place called Malolos, in
+Bulacan province. Bulacan lies over on the north shore of Manila Bay,
+opposite Cavite province on the south shore. Malolos is situated some
+distance inland, out of sight and range of a fleet's guns, and about
+twenty-odd miles by railroad northwest of Manila. Malolos was also
+desirable because it was in the heart of an insurgent province having a
+population of nearly a quarter of a million people, a province which,
+by reason of being on the north side of the bay, was sure to be in
+touch, strategically and politically, with all Luzon north of the
+Pasig River, just as Cavite province, the birthplace of Aguinaldo,
+and also of the revolutionary government, had been with all Luzon
+south of the Pasig. Should the worst come to the worst--and as has
+already been indicated, the insurgents played a sweepstake game from
+the beginning for independence, with only war as the limit--northern
+Luzon had more inaccessible mountains from which to conduct such
+a struggle for an indefinite period than southern Luzon. But while
+the Otis demand of September 8th decided the matter of the change
+of capital, Aguinaldo could not afford to tell his troops that he
+was moving them from the environs of Manila because made to. He was
+going to accept war cheerfully when it should become necessary to
+fight for independence, but he still had some hopes of the Paris
+Peace Conference deciding to do with the Philippines as with Cuba,
+and wished to await patiently the outcome of that conference. Besides,
+he was getting in shipments of guns all the time, as fast as the
+revenues of his government would permit, and thus his ability to
+protract an ultimate war for independence was constantly enlarging
+by accretion. The Hong Kong conference of the Filipino revolutionary
+leaders held in the city named on May 4, 1898, at which Aguinaldo
+presided, and which mapped out a programme covering every possible
+contingency, has already been mentioned. Its minutes say:
+
+
+    If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles
+    of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will
+    be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them. [130]
+
+
+On the other hand, the minutes of this same meeting as we saw
+recognized that America might be tempted into entering upon a career
+of colonization, once she should get a foothold in the islands. The
+programme of Aguinaldo and his people was thus, from the beginning,
+not to precipitate hostilities until it should become clear that,
+in the matter of land-grabbing, the gleam of hope held out by the
+American programme for Cuba was illusive. According to the minutes of
+the meeting alluded to, such a contingency would, of course, "drive
+them, the Filipinos * * * to a struggle for their independence,
+even if they should succumb to the weight of the yoke," etc. Such
+a struggle, as all the world knows, did ultimately ensue. That
+part of the parleying following Otis's demand of September 8th
+(that Aguinaldo move his troops) which was not useless was this:
+In order to "save their face," with the rank and file of their
+army, the Filipino Commissioners asked General Otis "if I [Otis,]
+would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw
+to the lines which I designated--something which he could show to
+the troops." [131] So, on September 13th, General Otis wrote such a
+"request," and Aguinaldo moved his troops as demanded, but no farther
+than demanded. He wanted to be in the best position possible in case
+the United States should finally leave the Philippines to Spain,
+and always so insisted. Long afterward General Otis insinuated in
+his report that this insistence, which was uniformly pressed until
+after the Treaty was signed, was mere dishonest pretence, to cloak
+warlike intentions against the United States. Yet, as we have seen
+above, one of our Peace Commissioners at Paris, Judge Gray, just
+about the same time, was taking that contingency quite as seriously
+as did Aguinaldo. And early in May, 1898, our Secretary of the Navy,
+Mr. Long, had cabled Admiral Dewey "not to have political alliances
+with the insurgents * * * that would incur liability to maintain their
+cause in the future." [132] Before moving his troops pursuant to the
+Otis demand of September 8th, the Otis "request" was duly published
+to the insurgent army, and as the insurgents withdrew, the American
+troops presented arms in most friendly fashion. "They certainly made a
+brave show," says Mr. Millet (Expedition to the Philippines, p. 255),
+"for they were neatly uniformed, had excellent rifles, marched well,
+and looked very soldierly and intelligent." "The withdrawal," says
+General Otis (p. 10), "was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched
+out in excellent spirits, cheering the American forces." Absolute
+master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with complete
+machinery of government in each province for all matters of justice,
+taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 men at his beck, and his
+whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated
+his permanent government--permanent as opposed to the previous
+provisional government--with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet,
+patterned after our own, [133] just as the South American republics
+had done before him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the
+new capital, on September 15, 1898. The next day, September 16th, at
+Washington, President McKinley delivered to his Peace Commissioners,
+then getting ready to start for the Paris Peace Conference, their
+letter of instructions, directing them to insist on the cession by
+Spain to the United States of the island of Luzon "at least." [134]
+In other words, the day after the little Filipino republic, gay
+with banners and glad with music, started forth on its journey,
+Mr. McKinley signed its death-warrant. The political student of 1912
+may say just here, "Oh, I read all that in the papers at the time,
+or at least it was all ventilated in the Presidential campaign of
+1900." Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Paris Peace Commission were
+not made public until after the Presidential election of 1900. To be
+specific, they were first printed and given out to the public in 1901,
+in Senate Document 148, having been extracted from the jealous custody
+of the Executive by a Senate resolution. It was not until then that the
+veil was lifted. By that time, no American who was not transcendental
+enough to have lost his love for the old maxim, "Right or wrong, my
+country," cared to hear the details of the story. The Filipinos and
+"our boys" had been diligently engaged in killing each other for a
+couple of years, and the American people said, "A truce to scolding;
+let us finish this war, now we are in it."
+
+But to return from the death-warrant of the Philippine republic
+signed by Mr. McKinley on September 16th, to its christening,
+or inauguration, the day before. Mr. Millet gives an intensely
+interesting account of the inaugural ceremonies of September 15th,
+which as Manila correspondent of the London Times and Harper's Weekly
+he had the good fortune to witness. Says he:
+
+
+    The date was at last * * * fixed for September 15th. A few days
+    before Aguinaldo had made a triumphant entry into Malolos in
+    a carriage drawn by white horses, and there had been a general
+    celebration of his arrival, with speeches, a gala dinner, open air
+    concerts, and a military parade. Mr. Higgins (an Englishman), the
+    manager of the Railway, kindly offered to take me up to Malolos to
+    witness the ceremony of the inauguration of the new government.
+    * * * The only other passenger was to be Aguinaldo's secretary
+    * * * a small boyish-looking young man. * * * [135]
+
+
+It seems there had been a strike of the native employees of the
+railway up the road.
+
+
+    Mr. Higgins calmly remarked to the secretary that, in his opinion,
+    if the affairs of the Filipino government were managed in the
+    future as they were at present, the proposed republic would be
+    nothing but a cheap farce. The secretary timidly asked what there
+    was to complain about.
+
+
+Then came a tirade from Higgins, ending with, "I am going to lay this
+* * * before Aguinaldo to-day, and I shall expect you to arrange an
+interview for my friend and myself." Then, turning to the astonished
+Millet, he said in English: "It does these chaps good to be talked
+to straight from the shoulder. Since they came to Malolos, the earth
+isn't big enough to hold them."
+
+This scene on the train is, decidedly, as Thomas Carlyle would say,
+"of real interest to universal history." Mr. Millet's Government was
+a lion about to eat a lamb, but the head of his nation, Mr. McKinley,
+clothed with absolute authority in the premises for the nonce, was
+balking at the diet. Now, Mr. Millet rather admired the British
+boldness, just as a Northern man likes to hear a Southerner talk
+straight from the shoulder to a "darkey." As soon as the era of good
+feeling was over, our people quit treating the Filipinos as Perry
+did the Japanese in 1854, and began calling them "niggers." In fact
+the commanding general found it necessary a little later to put a
+stop to this pernicious practice among the soldiers by issuing a
+General Order prohibiting it. But Mr. Millet's admiration would have
+been somewhat toned down had he known what we found out later. The
+real secret of Higgins's personal arrogance was this. The Filipino
+government needed his railroad in its business. During the war
+which followed, the insurgents long controlled a large part of this
+railway, from Manila to Dagupan, which was the only railway in the
+Philippines. The railway properties suffered much damage incident
+to the war, and--just how willingly is beside the question--the
+company rendered material aid to the insurgent cause. So much did
+they render, that when Higgins had the assurance later to want our
+Government to pay the damages his properties had suffered at the
+hands of the insurgents, our government at Manila promptly turned his
+claim down. Subsequently the London office of his company actually
+inveigled the British Foreign Office into making representation to
+our State Department about the matter--obviously a very grave step,
+in international law. The claim was promptly turned down by Washington
+also, and, happily, that "closed the incident." [136]
+
+Having exploded Mr. Millet's bubble, let us resume the thread of
+his story:
+
+
+    We reached the station [at Malolos] in about an hour and a half.
+    * * * The town numbers perhaps thirty or forty thousand people.
+    * * * From the first humble nipa shack to the great square where
+    the convent stands, thousands of insurgent flags fluttered from
+    every window and every post. * * * Every man had an insurgent
+    tri-color cockade in his hat.
+
+
+Then follows a detailed account of being introduced, after some
+ceremony, to Aguinaldo, who is described as "a small individual,
+in full evening black suit, and flowing black tie." Higgins made his
+complaint about the strikers, and Aguinaldo said, "I will attend to
+this matter of the strikers," and then changed the topic, asking if
+the visitors did not wish to attend the opening of the Congress--which
+they did.
+
+From Mr. Millet's account, it is evident that, like Admiral Dewey
+and most of the Americans who first dealt with the Filipinos except
+Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and J. F. Bell, he failed to take
+the Filipinos as seriously as the facts demanded. At that time the
+Japanese had not yet taught the world that national aspirations are
+not necessarily to be treated with contumely because a people are small
+of stature and not white of skin. Consul Wildman at Hong Kong at first
+wrote the State Department quite peevishly that Aguinaldo seemed much
+more concerned about the kind of cane he should wear than about the
+figure he might make in history. Wildman did not then know, apparently,
+that canes, with all Spanish-Filipino colonial officialdom, were
+badges of official rank, like shoulder-straps are with us. The reader
+will also remember the toothbrush incident hereinbefore reproduced,
+told by Admiral Dewey to the Senate Committee, in 1902. That incident,
+naturally enough, amused the Committee not a little. But we who know
+the Filipino know it was merely an awkward and embarrassed answer due
+to diffidence, and made on the spur of the moment to cloak some real
+reason which if disclosed would not seem so childish.
+
+Misunderstanding is the principal cause of hate in this world. When
+you understand people, hatred disappears in a way strikingly analogous
+to the disappearance of darkness on the arrival of light. The more
+you know of the educated patriotic Filipino, the more certain you
+become that the government we destroyed in 1898 would have worked
+quite as well as most any of the republics now in operation between
+the Rio Grande and Patagonia. The masses of the people down there,
+the peons, are probably quite as ignorant and docile as the Filipino
+tao (peasant), and I question if the educated men of Latin America,
+the class of men who, after all, control in every country, could,
+after meeting and knowing the corresponding class in the Philippines,
+get their own consent to declare the latter their inferiors either
+in intelligence, character, or patriotism.
+
+But to return to the inauguration. Mr. Millet saw the inaugural
+ceremonies in the church, and heard Aguinaldo's address to the
+Congress. Of the audience he says "few among them would have escaped
+notice in a crowd for they were exceptionally alert, keen, and
+intelligent in appearance." Of this same Congress and government,
+Mr. John Barrett, who was American Minister to Siam about that
+time, and is now (1912) head of the Bureau of American Republics
+at Washington--an institution organized and run for the purpose
+of persuading Latin-America that we do not belong to the Imperial
+International Society for the Partition of the Earth and that we are
+not in the business of gobbling up little countries on pretext of
+"policing" them--said in an address before the Shanghai Chamber of
+Commerce on January 12, 1899:
+
+
+    He [Aguinaldo] has organized a government which has practically
+    been administering the affairs of that great island [Luzon] since
+    the American occupation of Manila, which is certainly better
+    than the former administration; he has a properly constituted
+    Cabinet and Congress, the members of which compare favorably with
+    Japanese statesmen.
+
+
+The present Philippine Assembly had not had its first meeting when I
+left the Islands in the spring of 1905. It was organized in 1907. In
+the summer of 1911, I had the pleasure of renewing an old and very
+cordial acquaintance with Dr. Heiser, Director of Public Health
+of the Philippine Islands, who is one of the most considerable men
+connected with our government out there, and is also thoroughly in
+sympathy with its indefinite continuance in its present form. The
+Doctor is a broad-gauged man likely to be worth to any government,
+in matters of Public Health, whatever such government could reasonably
+afford to pay in the way of salary, and is doubtless well-paid by the
+Philippine Insular Government. He can hardly be blamed, therefore,
+for being in sympathy with its indefinite continuance in its present
+form. Doctor Heiser is a man of too much genuine dignity to be very
+much addicted to slang, but when I asked him about the Philippine
+Assembly, I think he said it was "a cracker-jack." At any rate,
+I have never heard any legislative body spoken of in more genuinely
+complimentary terms than those in which he described the Philippine
+Assembly. I learned from him incidentally that their "capacity for
+self-government" is so crude, however, as yet, that the members have
+not yet learned to read newspapers while a colleague whose seat is
+next to theirs is addressing the house and trying to get the attention
+of his fellows, nor do they keep up such a buzz of conversation that
+the man who has the floor cannot hear himself talk. They listen to
+the programme of the public business.
+
+Some five years ago in an article written for the North American Review
+concerning the Philippine problem, the author of the present volume
+said, among other things: "During nearly four years of service on the
+bench in the Philippines the writer heard as much genuine, impassioned,
+and effective eloquence from Filipino lawyers, saw exhibited in the
+trial of causes as much industrious preparation, and zealous, loyal
+advocacy of the rights of clients, as any ordinary nisi prius judge
+at home is likely to meet with in the same length of time." [137] Any
+country that has plenty of good lawyers and plenty of good soldiers,
+backed by plenty of good farmers, is capable of self-government. As
+President Schurman of Cornell University, who headed the first
+Philippine Commission, the one that went out in 1899, said in closing
+his Founder's Day Address at that institution on January 11, 1902:
+"Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better
+than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans." The
+Malolos government which Mr. Millet saw inaugurated on September 15,
+1898, would probably have filled this bill. Had the Filipino people
+then possessed the consciousness of racial and political unity as a
+people which was developed by their subsequent long struggle against
+us for independence, and which has been steadily developing more and
+more under the mild sway of a quasi-freedom whose princely prodigality
+in spreading education is marred only by its declared programme that
+no living beneficiary thereof may hope to see the independence of
+his country, and that the present generation must resign itself to
+tariff schedules "fixed" at Washington, there is no reasonable doubt
+that the original Malolos government of 1898 would have been a very
+"decent kind of government."
+
+All through the last four months of 1898, the two hostile armies faced
+each other in a mood which it needed but a spark to ignite, awaiting
+the outcome of the peace negotiations arranged for in September,
+commenced in October, and concluded in December. While they are thus
+engaged about Manila, let us turn to a happier picture, the situation
+in the provinces under the Aguinaldo government.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE WILCOX-SARGENT TRIP
+
+                A smiling, peaceful, and plenteous land
+                As yet unblighted by the scourge of war;
+                Where happiness and hospitality walk hand in hand
+                And new-born Freedom bows to Law.
+
+                                                              Anonymous.
+
+
+In the last chapter, we saw Aguinaldo's republic formally established
+at Malolos, September 15th, claiming jurisdiction over all Luzon. In
+Chapter IV., entitled "Merritt and Aguinaldo," we saw the political
+condition of southern Luzon in August, 1898, and the following months,
+and verified the correctness of Aguinaldo's claims as to complete
+mastery there then. Let us now examine the state of affairs in northern
+Luzon in the fall of 1898.
+
+In Senate Document 196, 56th Congress, 1st Session, dated February
+26, 1900, transmitted by Secretary of the Navy Long, in response to
+a Senate resolution, may be found a report of a tour of observation
+through the half of Luzon Island which lies north of Manila and the
+Pasig River, made between October 8 and November 20, 1898,--note
+the dates, for the Paris Peace Conference began October 1st and
+ended December 10th,--by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Naval Cadet
+L. R. Sargent. This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under
+date of November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy Department
+for its information, with the comment that it "in my opinion contains
+the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the
+present state of the northern part of Luzon Island." The Admiral's
+endorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report. It
+appears in a book afterwards published by Paymaster Wilcox in 1901,
+entitled Through Luzon on Highways and Byways. The book is merely an
+elaboration of the report, and reproduces most of the report, if not
+all of it, verbatim. The book of Paymaster Wilcox may be treated as,
+practically, official, for historical purposes. The preface recites
+that in October, 1898, American control was effective only in Manila
+and Cavite, that the insurgents, under Aguinaldo, who had proclaimed
+himself President of the whole Archipelago, immediately after Dewey's
+victory, were in supposedly complete possession of every part of
+the Island outside of these two cities, that their lines were so
+close to the outposts of our army that their people could at times
+converse with our soldiers, and that General Otis's authority did
+not extend much beyond a three-mile radius from the centre of Manila,
+while Admiral Dewey held and operated the navy-yard at Cavite. "Even
+the country between Manila and Cavite was in the hands of Aguinaldo,
+so much so that our officers had been refused permission to land at
+any intermediate point by water, and were prohibited from traversing
+the distance by road." Wilcox and Sargent procured leave of absence
+from Admiral Dewey to make their trip. They went first to Malolos, but
+failed to get anything in the way of safe-conduct from Aguinaldo. He
+is described, however, as of "great force of character * * * and
+he dominates all around him with a power that seems peculiar to
+himself." Wilcox had seen him before at Cavite. "He adroitly read
+between the lines that the Government of the United States did not
+then, nor would it at any future time, recognize his authority,"
+says the writer.
+
+Our travellers left Manila, October 8, 1898, on the Manila-Dagupan
+Railway, for a place called Bayambang, which is the capital of
+Pangasinan province, about one hundred miles north of Manila. In
+Pangasinan "the people were all very respectful and polite and offered
+the hospitality of their homes." From Bayambang they struck off from
+the railroad and proceeded eastward comfortably and unmolested a day's
+journey, to a town in the adjoining province of Nueva Ecija (Rosales)
+where they received a cordial reception at the hands of the Presidente
+(Mayor)--Aguinaldo's Presidente of course, not the Presidente left
+over from the Spanish regime. "At this time all the local government
+of the different towns was in the hands of Aguinaldo's adherents,"
+says the descriptive itinerary we are following. The tourists were
+provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort,
+"which was continued by relays all the way to Aparri" (the northernmost
+town of Luzon, at the mouth of the Cagayan River). Paymaster Wilcox
+says he carried five hundred Mexican dollars in his saddle-bags,
+but used only a trifling portion of this amount, "for in every town
+my entertainment was given without pay." They went from Rosales to
+Humingan, in Nueva Ecija. At Humingan they were again entertained
+by the Presidente at dinner, with music following, and comfortably
+housed. The Presidente made many inquiries about "the War with
+Spain and their own future." Their future, as revealed by the raised
+curtain of a year later, was that their country was being overrun by
+Lawton's Division of the Eighth Army Corps, the author of this volume
+having passed through this same town of Humingan in November, 1899,
+as an officer of the scouts used to develop fire for General Lawton's
+column. They journeyed eastward through the province of Nueva Ecija
+from Humingan to a little village (Puncan) in the foothills of the
+mountains they planned to cross. Of this place and the hospitality
+there, our traveller remarks: "I shall never forget the welcome of the
+local official" the Presidente. Thence they proceeded a few more stages
+and parasangs, northward over the Caranglan pass, into Nueva Vizcaya
+province, the watershed of north central Luzon, and thence down the
+valley of the Cagayan River via Iligan and Tuguegarao to Aparri, being
+always hospitably entertained in every town through which they passed
+by the Presidente or Mayor of the town, the local representative of
+the Philippine republic. In the New York Independent of September 14,
+1899, Cadet Sargent, in an article about this trip, gives the words
+of the new Filipino national Hymn, which he describes as sung with
+great enthusiasm everywhere he and Wilcox were entertained in the
+various towns. I desire to preserve a sample verse of it here. The
+music it is set to is much like the Marseillaise--quite as stirring:
+
+
+                    Del sueno de tres siglos
+                    Hermanos Despertad!
+                    Gritando "Fuera Espana!
+                    Viva La Libertad!"
+
+
+which, being interpreted, means:
+
+
+                    From the sleep of three centuries
+                    Brothers, awake!
+                    Crying "Out with Spain!
+                    Live Liberty!"
+
+
+Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip through
+the provinces of southern Luzon about this same time, under similar
+friendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear and
+misery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we now
+know, have found similar conditions.
+
+Some suspicions were aroused on one or two occasions, but once the
+local authorities became convinced that the trip was being made
+by consent of "The Illustrious Presidente" (Aguinaldo--"El Egregio
+Presidente" is the Spanish of it) all was sunshine again. The Mayor
+of each town--the Presidente--would receive from the escort coming
+with them from the last town they had stopped at, a letter from the
+Mayor, or Presidente, of said last town; the old escort would return to
+their town, and a new one would be provided to give them safe-conduct
+to the next town. This was no new-fangled scheme of Aguinaldo's. It
+was an ancient custom of the Spanish Government, and was an ideal
+nucleus of administration for the new government. Curiously enough,
+the army knew practically nothing of this trip in the days of the
+early fighting. All that country was to us a terra incognita, until
+overrun by Captain Bacthelor, with a part of the 25th Infantry
+in the fall of 1899, the following year. So was the rest of the
+archipelago a like terra incognita, until likewise slowly conquered
+by hard fighting. That is why we so utterly failed to understand
+what a wonderfully complete "going concern" Aguinaldo's government
+had become throughout the Philippine archipelago before the Treaty of
+Paris was signed. Descending from the watershed of north central Luzon
+in the province of Nueva Viscaya already mentioned, our travellers
+reached the town of Carig, in the foothills which fringe that side
+of the watershed. There they were met by Simeon Villa, military
+commander of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to
+Aguinaldo afterwards, and was captured by General Funston along
+with Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901. Villa's immediate superior was
+Colonel Tirona, at Aparri, the colonel commanding all the insurgent
+forces of the Cagayan valley. Villa was accompanied by his aide,
+Lieutenant Ventura Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the
+author of the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for
+playing a minor part in the murder of an officer of the Spanish army
+committed under Villa's orders just prior to, or about the time of,
+the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found guilty, and sentenced, but later
+liberated under President Roosevelt's amnesty of 1902. He was guilty,
+but the deceased, so the people in the Cagayan valley used to say,
+in being tortured to death, got only the same sort of medicine he had
+often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad theory
+of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases. Villa was a Tagal
+and had come up from Manila with the expedition commanded by Colonel
+Tirona, which expedition was fitted out with guns furnished Aguinaldo
+by Admiral Dewey, or, if not furnished, permitted to be furnished. But
+Guzman was a member of one of the wealthiest and most influential
+native families of that province (Isabela). General Otis's reports
+are full of the most inexcusable blunders about how "the Tagals"
+took possession of the various provinces and made the people do this
+or that. Villa's relations with Guzman were just about those of a New
+Yorker or a Bostonian sent up to Vermont in the days of the American
+Revolution to help organize the resistance there, in conjunction with
+one of the local leaders of the patriot cause in the Green Mountain
+State. Both were members of the Katipunan, the Filipino Revolutionary
+Secret Society, an organization patterned after Masonry, membership
+in which was always treated by the Spaniards as sedition, and usually
+visited with capital punishment. Nearly every Filipino of any spirit
+belonged to it on May 1, 1898, the date of the naval battle of Manila
+Bay. It is the all-pervading completeness of this organization at that
+time--it could give old Tammany Hall cards and spades--which explains
+the astonishing rapidity of Aguinaldo's political success, i.e., the
+astonishing rapidity with which the Malolos Government acquired control
+of Luzon between May and October, 1898. Their cabalistic watchword was
+"Paisano" (fellow-countryman), their battle cry "Independence." In
+the fall of 1898, at the time of this Wilcox-Sargent trip through
+Luzon, the Filipinos really "had tasted the sweets of Independence,"
+to use the phrase of the people of Iloilo in declining on that ground
+to surrender to General Miller in December thereafter and electing the
+arbitrament of war. The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history
+of that Cagayan valley as almost any other American. It is true there
+were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on the Spaniards. But they
+were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries of tyranny. They do
+not prove unfitness for self-government. I for one prefer to follow
+the example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil
+over all those matters. With the Spaniards it was a case of Sauve qui
+peut. With the Filipinos, it was a case, as old man Dimas Guzman,
+father to this Lieutenant Ventura we have just met, used to put
+it, of Me las vais a pagar, which, liberally interpreted, means,
+"The bad quarter of an hour has arrived for the Spaniards. The day
+of reckoning has come." I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life
+imprisonment for being accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer
+above named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as archfiend of the
+gruesome occasion. I am quite sure I would have hung Villa without any
+compunction at that time, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried
+to get hold of him, but Governor Taft's Attorney-General, Mr. Wilfley,
+wrote me that Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on
+British territory, and extradition would involve application to the
+London Foreign Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough
+of our own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed under
+our predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is now
+practising medicine in Manila. More than one officer of the American
+army that I know, afterwards did things to the Filipinos almost
+as cruel as Villa did to that unhappy Spanish officer, Lieutenant
+Piera. On the whole, I think President Roosevelt acted wisely and
+humanely in wiping the slate. We had new problems to deal with, and
+were not bound to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over from
+the Spanish regime.
+
+It appears that Villa became a little suspicious of the travellers. He
+detained them at Carig seven days. Finally there came a telegram from
+his chief at Aparri, Colonel Tirona, to our two travellers, which read:
+"I salute you affectionately, and authorize Villa to accompany you to
+Iligan." At Iligan, the capital of Isabela province, the travellers
+were lavishly entertained. They were given a grand baile (ball) and
+fiesta (feast), a kind of dinner-dance, we would call it. To the light
+Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then universal acknowledgment
+of the authority of the Aguinaldo government, and the perfect
+tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in the Cagayan
+valley, I may add that as judge of that district in 1901-2 there came
+before me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact would be
+brought out of this or that difference among the local authorities
+having been referred to the Malolos Government for settlement. And
+they always waited until they heard from it. The doubting Thomas will
+attribute this to the partiality of the Filipinos to procrastination
+in general. I know it was due to the hearty co-operation of the
+people with, and their loyalty to, the then existing government,
+and to their pride in it. Mr. Sargent tells a characteristic story
+of Villa, whose vengeful feeling toward the Spaniards showed on all
+occasions. The former Spanish governor of the province was of course
+a prisoner in Villa's custody. Villa had the ex-governor brought in,
+for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them,
+"This is the man who robbed this province of $25,000 during the last
+year of his office." From Iligan our travellers proceeded to Aparri,
+cordially received everywhere, and finding the country in fact, as
+Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period seeking
+recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state of profound
+peace and tranquillity--free from brigandage and the like. At Aparri
+the visitors were cordially welcomed by Colonel Tirona, and much
+feted. While they were there, Tirona transferred his authority to a
+civil regime. Says Paymaster Wilcox:
+
+
+    The steamer Saturnus, which had left the harbor the day before
+    our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the Senators
+    from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the
+    independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel
+    Tirona considered the information of sufficient reliability to
+    justify him in regarding Philippine Independence as assured,
+    and warfare in the Islands at an end.
+
+
+He then goes on to describe the inauguration of civil government
+in Cagayan province. I hope all this will not weary the American
+reader. It was vividly interesting to me when I read it for the first
+time thirteen years afterward, in 1911, because it was such unexpected
+information, so surprising. It will be equally interesting to all other
+Americans who participated in putting down the subsequent insurrection
+and in setting up the Taft civil government in that same valley three
+years later. I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor
+Taft in 1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not
+have occurred had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then
+existing, just like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Of
+course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzon goes,
+so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail to the
+Luzon kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of the 8,000,000 people out there,
+and Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the French and to
+France. Luzon is about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that
+really matter, [138] are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode
+Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos. Describing
+the ceremonies of the inauguration of civil government in Cagayan,
+the Wilcox-Sargent report to Admiral Dewey says:
+
+
+    The Presidentes of all the towns in the province were present at
+    the ceremony. * * * Colonel Tirona made a short speech. * * * He
+    then handed the staff of office to the man who had been elected
+    "Jefe Provincial" [Governor of the Province]. This officer also
+    made a speech in which he thanked the military forces * * * and
+    assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated
+    by the people, where every man, woman, and child stood ready to
+    take up arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with
+    the last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever
+    to bring them back to their former state of dependence. He then
+    knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and took the oath of
+    office. [139]
+
+
+Does not such language in an official report made by officers of
+the navy to Admiral Dewey in November, 1898, show an undercurrent
+of deep feeling at the position the Administration had put Admiral
+Dewey in with Aguinaldo, when it decided to take the Philippines,
+and accordingly sent out an army whose generals ignored his protege?
+
+The speech of the provincial governor was followed, says the
+Wilcox-Sargent report (same page) by speeches from "the other
+officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of
+the three departments--justice, police, and internal revenue. Every
+town in this province has the same organization." Article III. of
+Aguinaldo's decree of June 18th, previous, providing an organic
+law or constitution for his provisional government (see Chapter
+II., ante) had provided precisely the organization which Wilcox
+and Sargent thus saw working at Aparri and throughout the Cagayan
+valley in October, 1898. The importance of all this to the question
+of how the Filipinos feel toward us to-day, in this year of grace,
+1912, and to the element of righteousness there is in that feeling,
+is too obvious to need comment. Americans interested in business in
+the Philippines come back to this country from time to time and give
+out interviews in the papers declaring that the Filipinos do not want
+independence. What they really mean is that it makes no difference
+whether they want it or not, they are not going to get it. And it
+is precisely these Americans, and their business associates in the
+United States, who have gotten through Congress the legislation which
+enables them to give the Filipino just half of what he got ten years
+ago for his hemp, and other like legislation, and the Filipinos
+know it. The gulf in the Philippines between the dominant and the
+subject race will continue to widen as the years go by, so long as
+indirect taxation without representation continues to be perpetrated
+at Washington for the benefit of special interests having a powerful
+lobby. If the American people themselves are groaning under this very
+sort of thing, and apparently unable to help themselves, what is the a
+priori probability as to our voteless and therefore defenceless little
+brown brother. Like the sheep before the shearer, he is dumb. But to
+return to our travellers and their journey.
+
+
+    A Norwegian steamer came into port [meaning the harbor of Aparri]
+    that afternoon, and this seemed our only hope. She was chartered by
+    two Chinamen * * *. At first they refused us permission to embark,
+    and declined to put in at any port on the west coast. No sooner
+    was this related to Colonel Tirona than he sent notice that the
+    ship could not clear without taking us and making a landing where
+    we desired. This argument was convincing.
+
+
+Colonel Tirona provided them with a letter addressed to Colonel
+Tino at Vigan, the chief town of the west coast of Luzon and the
+capital of the province of Ilocos Sur, which province fronts the China
+Sea. Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent proceeded aboard the Norwegian steamer
+from Aparri westward, doubling the northwest corner of Luzon, and
+steaming thence due south to the nearest port. Vigan was the Filipino
+military headquarters of the western half of northern Luzon, just as
+Aparri was at the same time of the eastern half. On the west coast
+the travellers were treated always courteously, but with considerable
+suspicion. The explanation is easy. That region is in closer touch
+with Manila, and with what is going on and may be learned at the
+capital, than is the Cagayan valley which our tourists had just
+left. They bade the commanding officer at Vigan good-bye, November
+13, 1898. Passing south through Namacpacan (which the command I was
+with took a year or so later), they came to San Fernando de Union,
+some twenty miles farther south along the coast road. Here they met
+Colonel Tino and presented their letter from Tirona. He gave them a
+dinner, of course. How a Filipino does love to entertain, and make
+you enjoy yourself! Talk about your "true Southern hospitality"! You
+get it there. "Speeches were made, and great things promised by
+the Philippine republic in the near future" says Mr. Wilcox. After
+the dinner and speech-making came the inevitable dance. After that
+Colonel Tino started them off on their journey southward toward Manila
+duly provided with carriages. Passing Aringay on November 18, 1898
+[140] our travellers finally reached Dagupan, the northern terminus
+of the Manila-Dagupan Railway, and there took a train for Manila,
+120 miles away.
+
+In his report covering the fall of 1898, General Otis always scoldingly
+says of the Filipinos that in all the parleyings of his commissioners
+with Aguinaldo's commissioners before the outbreak, the latter never
+did know what they really wanted. The truth was they believed the
+Americans were going to do with them exactly as every other white
+race they knew of had done with every other brown race they knew of,
+but they did not tell General Otis so. Mr. Wilcox, a more friendly
+witness of that same period states their position thus at page twenty
+of the report to Admiral Dewey: "They desire the protection of the
+United States at sea, but fear any interference on land." "On one
+point they seemed united, viz., that whatever our government may have
+done for them, it had not gained the right to annex them," adding, in
+relation to the physical preparations to make good this contention,
+in the event of war, "The Philippine Government has an organized
+force in every province we visited."
+
+The whole tone of the Wilcox-Sargent report and the subsequent
+Wilcox book is an implied reiteration, after intimate, extended,
+and friendly contact with the people of all Luzon north of the Pasig
+River, of Admiral Dewey's telegram sent to the Navy Department, June
+23, 1898: "The people are far superior in intelligence and capacity
+for self-government to the people of Cuba and I am familiar with both
+races." In fact Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent do not raise the question of
+"capacity for self-government" at all, any more than Commodore Perry
+did when similarly welcomed in 1854 by the Japanese.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE TREATY OF PARIS
+
+                                No man can serve two masters.
+
+                                                        Matthew vi., 24.
+
+                Confine the Empire within those limits which
+                nature seems to have fixed as its natural bulwarks
+                and boundaries.
+
+                                                  Augustus Caesar's Will.
+
+
+This is a tale of three cities, Paris, Washington, and Manila.
+
+Article III. of the Peace Protocol signed at Washington, August 12,
+1898, provided:
+
+
+    The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor
+    of Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace which
+    shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the
+    Philippines. [141]
+
+
+The "Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain" including the
+telegraphic correspondence between President McKinley and our Peace
+Commissioners pending the negotiations, were sent to the Senate,
+January 30, 1899, just one week before the final vote on the treaty,
+but the injunction of secrecy was not removed until January 31,
+1901--after the presidential election of 1900. They then were
+published as Senate Document 148, 56th Congress, 2d Session. It was
+not until then that the veil was lifted. The instructions to the Peace
+Commissioners were dated September 16, 1898. The Commissioners were:
+William R. Day, of Ohio, Republican, just previously Secretary of
+State, now (1912) Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
+States; Whitelaw Reid, Republican, then editor of the New York Tribune,
+now Ambassador to Great Britain, and three members of the United States
+Senate, Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine,
+Republicans, and George Gray, of Delaware, Democrat. Senator Davis
+died in 1900, and Senator Frye in 1911. Senator Gray has been, since
+1899, and is now, United States Circuit Judge for the 3d Judicial
+District. Among other things, the President's instructions to the
+Commissioners said:
+
+
+    It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
+    should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in
+    facing war. * * * The lustre and the moral strength attaching
+    to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate
+    judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour
+    be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us * * * into an
+    adventurous departure on untried paths.
+
+
+By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get down
+to this:
+
+
+    Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial
+    opportunity. * * * The United States cannot accept less than the
+    cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon.
+
+
+Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to
+recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in
+the councils of the Administration [142] declared in one of the great
+reviews of the period: "We see with sudden clearness that some of the
+most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force." Among
+these "revered maxims" thus suddenly fossilized by his ipse dixit,
+Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the teachings of "Washington's
+Farewell Address and the later crystallization of its main thought
+by President Monroe"--the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of
+these "A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force * * *
+the mainspring of commercialism."
+
+As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which renominated
+Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900, Senator Lodge,
+speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris, said: "We make
+no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely
+on account of others. We believe in Trade Expansion."
+
+"Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand," said Mr. Vanderlip's
+Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, about the same
+time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty was made.
+
+The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at Paris,
+October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move of the
+Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent events,
+especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter described
+(Chapter IX.).
+
+"Spanish communication represents," says Judge Day's cablegram to
+the President, [143] "that status quo has been altered and continues
+to be altered to the prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it
+describes as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops."
+
+Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the obvious,
+called the Filipinos our allies.
+
+The Spanish initial move was more immediately prompted by the fact
+that in point of absolute astronomical time Manila, though captured
+when it was morning of August 13th there, was captured when it was
+evening of August 12th, at Washington, and the protocol was signed
+at Washington in the evening of August 12th. While this point was
+material, because we had captured $900,000 in cash in the Spanish
+treasury at Manila and much other property, the title to which, under
+the laws of war between civilized nations, depended on just what
+time it was captured, the matter was finally swallowed up and lost
+sight of in the agreement to give Spain a lump $20,000,000 for the
+archipelago. But the initial move had other aspects. In the event we
+should take the Philippines off her hands, Spain was going to insist
+that we should get back from the Filipinos, our "allies," and restore
+to her all the Spaniards they captured after August 12th. She knew
+that in all probability if we bought the Islands we would be buying
+an insurrection, and she was "taking care of her own" at our expense.
+
+The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a
+bird's-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we should
+take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley cabled
+Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was signed,
+asking as to "the desirability of the several islands," "coal and
+other mineral deposits," and "in a naval and commercial sense which
+(of the several islands) would be most advantageous." [144] Admiral
+Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was "the most desirable,"
+but volunteered no advice. He did state, "No coal of good quality can
+be procured in the Philippine Islands," which is still true. Allusion
+is made to this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is
+there set forth. On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President
+McKinley suggesting that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him
+"whether it would be better * * * to retain Luzon * * * or the whole
+group." Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey before
+General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in writing "on
+general question of Philippines," and that "his report is in your hands
+in response to both questions." But the commission replied that Admiral
+Dewey had sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene's
+and nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion
+from Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis's Report
+(p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently,
+been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898,
+suggesting that we "interfere as little as possible in the internal
+affairs of the Islands." No; Admiral Dewey must be acquitted of having
+ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy the Philippines.
+
+On October 7th the Commission telegraphed Washington that General
+Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian Consul at
+Manila, M. Andre, and that "Consul says United States must take all
+or nothing"; that "if southern islands remained with Spain they would
+be in constant revolt, and United States would have a second Cuba";
+that "Spanish government would not improve," and "would still protect
+monks in their extortion."
+
+To this advice there was absolutely no answer. It was a case of "all or
+nothing," and it had already become a case of "all" when on September
+16th previous Mr. McKinley signed his original instructions to the
+Commission stating "The United States cannot accept less than Luzon."
+
+The Commission's telegram of October 7th goes on to quote from the
+Belgian Consul's opinion that "Present rebellion represents only one
+half of one per cent. of the inhabitants." The Consul was not before
+them in person. They were quoting from a memorandum submitted by him
+to General Merritt at Merritt's request, made at Manila and dated
+August 29th, the day General Merritt sailed away from Manila bound
+for Paris via the Suez Canal. He had brought the memorandum along
+with him. From the previous chapters the reader will, of course,
+understand that Americans and Europeans at Manila in August, 1898,
+were paying very little attention to Aguinaldo and his claims as to
+the extent of his authority in the provinces. It is therefore not
+surprising that M. Andre's memorandum of August 29th should have made
+the foolish statement, "Present rebellion represents only one half of
+one per cent. of inhabitants." But it is eternally regrettable that his
+statement on this point had any weight with the Commissioners, for it
+was, or by that time at least (October 7th) had become, just about 99
+1/2 per cent. wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, by October 7th
+it would have been more accurate to have said, in lieu of the above,
+"Present rebellion represents practically whole people." You see,
+we started an insurrection in May, in October it had become a full
+grown affair, and in December we bought it. The telegram of October
+7th also quoted General Merritt as saying, "Insurgents would be
+victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past,"
+and as considering it "feasible for United States to take Luzon
+and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her
+colonies." These are about the only two sound suggestions General
+Merritt made to that Commission. In the next breath they quote him as
+saying, "Natives could not resist 5000 troops." The fact that they
+did resist more than 120,000 troops, that it took more than that,
+all told, to put down the insurrection, is sufficient to show how
+much General Merritt's advice was worth. He was right on two points,
+as indicated. Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but
+one left to protect her home coast cities. The death knell of her once
+proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not
+possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides the
+Filipinos would have "eaten them up." General Merritt's suggestion to
+"hold them as England does her colonies" was also sensible. In fact
+that was the only thoroughly honest thing to have done, if we were
+going to take them at all. England never acts the hypocrite with her
+colonies. She makes them behave. She does not let native people preach
+sedition in native newspapers, because of "sentimental bosh" about
+freedom of the press, until the whole country becomes a smouldering
+hot-bed of sedition. She has blown offending natives from the cannon's
+mouth, when deemed necessary to cure them and their country of the
+desire for independence. If we are going to have colonies at all, we
+ought to govern them with the upright downright ruthless honesty of
+the British. It is more merciful in the long run. But we ought not to
+have colonies at all. For if there is one thing this republic stands
+for, above all other things, it is the righteousness of aversion to
+a foreign yoke.
+
+In their telegram of October 7th, [145] the Peace Commissioners,
+now squarely confronted with the question of forcible annexation,
+begin to let the Administration down easy. They say:
+
+
+    General Anderson in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June and
+    July seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native
+    authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. Merritt and Dewey
+    both kept clear of any compromising communications.
+
+
+A despatch sent by Judge Day certainly comes from high authority. The
+word "compromising" is therefore important. To say that Admiral
+Dewey did not treat Aguinaldo as an ally is to raise a mere technical
+point. But Aguinaldo never did get anything from him in writing. What
+he got consisted more of deeds than words. And actions speak louder
+than words. We had an alliance with Aguinaldo, a most "compromising"
+alliance and afterwards repudiated it. Admiral Dewey made it and
+General Merritt repudiated it. Dewey did, without the President's
+knowledge, exactly what the President and the American people would
+have had him do at the time. And Merritt did exactly what the President
+ordered him to do. But between the making of the alliance, and the
+repudiation of it, the President and the American people changed their
+minds. I say the American people, because they afterwards ratified
+all that Mr. McKinley did. You see the bitterness that lies away down
+in the secret recesses of the hearts of the Filipino people to-day
+has its source at this point. They had "a gentleman's agreement,"
+as it were, with us, not in writing, made at a time when the thought
+of a colony had never entered our minds. They fought in a common
+cause with us on the faith of that agreement--drove the Spaniards
+into Manila in numerous victorious engagements involving much loss
+of life, on their part, keeping the Dons thereafter bottled up in
+Manila on the land side while their "ally" Admiral Dewey was doing the
+same on the sea side. The said Dons were living on horses and rats,
+and famine was imminent when our troops arrived and began to finish
+the work of taking the beleaguered city. And then, having changed our
+minds and decided to annex the islands, we repudiated our "gentleman's
+agreement," on the idea that the end justified the means. And the end,
+as it has turned out, did not even justify the means, seeing that the
+islands have proved a heavy financial liability instead of a profitable
+asset. Judge Day's telegram to Secretary Hay of October 12th (p. 27)
+contains this curious and surprising passage as to Cuba:
+
+
+    Senator Gray in favor of accepting sovereignty unconditionally
+    * * * that we may thereby avoid future complications with Cubans,
+    claiming sovereignty while we are in process of pacifying island
+    * * * We desire instructions on this point.
+
+
+The future of Cuba, however, trembled in the balance but for
+a moment. Before "the shell-burred cables" had had time to quit
+vibrating with the question thus propounded, there came back this
+splendidly clean-cut answer from the President:
+
+
+    We must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolution of
+    Congress [declaring war].
+
+
+In characterizing Judge Gray's position, above indicated, as
+"surprising," no reflection upon him is intended. On the contrary, such
+a position, assumed by a man of such conceded intellectual probity,
+is illuminating as to the attitude subsequently taken concerning the
+Philippines by the Democratic Senators who voted for the treaty. This
+attitude is stated by Senator Lodge, in his History of the War with
+Spain, with all the incisive forcefulness to which the country has so
+long been accustomed in the public utterances of that distinguished
+man, and, seeing that no promise had been made, as in the case of
+Cuba, Senator Lodge's statement of the position of those who voted
+for the treaty should forever set at rest the stale injustice, still
+occasionally repeated, that Mr. Bryan, "played politics" in 1898-9 in
+urging his friends in the Senate to vote for its ratification. Says
+Senator Lodge (History of the War with Spain, p. 231):
+
+
+    The friends of ratification took the very simple ground that
+    the treaty committed the United States to no policy, but left
+    them free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands;
+    that the American people could be safely entrusted with this
+    grave responsibility, and that patriotism and common sense alike
+    demanded the end of the war and the re-establishment of peace,
+    which could only be effected by the adoption of the treaty.
+
+
+October 14th, Washington wires the commission that Admiral Dewey has
+just cabled:
+
+
+    It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands
+    should be decided as soon as possible. * * * General anarchy
+    prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives
+    appear unable to govern.
+
+
+In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true some
+wild rumors then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans
+at Manila which of course were impossible of verification. I say
+"unfortunately" with some earnestness, because it does not appear on
+the face of his message that they were mere rumors. And, that they
+were wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared
+up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order and
+tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzon at that time has been,
+it is believed, put beyond all doubt. But what manna in the wilderness
+to the McKinley Administration, now that it was bent on taking the
+islands, was that Dewey message of October 14th, "The natives appear
+unable to govern"!
+
+On October 17th, Mr. Day wires Mr. Hay that the Peace Commissioners
+feel the importance of preserving, so far as possible, the condition
+of things existing at the time of signing the protocol, to prevent
+any change in the status quo. He says:
+
+
+    Might not our government * * * take more active and positive
+    measures than heretofore for preservation of order and protection
+    of life and property in Philippine Islands?
+
+
+How could we, when Aguinaldo and his people were in the saddle all
+over Luzon, had taken the status quo between their teeth and run away
+with it, and were prepared to fight if bidden to halt and dismount;
+and, which is more, were preserving order perfectly themselves?
+
+On October 19th, Mr. Hay repeated by wire to Mr. Day a cablegram from
+General Otis which said: "Do not anticipate trouble with insurgents
+* * * Affairs progressing favorably."
+
+General Otis was making a desperate effort to humor Mr. McKinley's
+"consent-of-the-governed" theory and programme. But it was a situation,
+not a theory, which confronted him.
+
+The date of the high-water mark of the Paris peace negotiations is
+October 25th. On that day, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
+
+
+    Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning Philippine
+    Islands are set forth in statements transmitted (by cable also)
+    herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
+    instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in
+    joint commission almost immediately.
+
+
+Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, sent a joint signed statement. They
+urged taking over the whole archipelago, saying that, as their
+instructions provided for the retention at least of Luzon, "we do not
+consider the question of remaining in the Philippine Islands as at
+all now properly before us." They also urged that as Spain governed
+and defended the islands from Manila, we became, with the destruction
+of her fleet and the surrender of her army, "as complete masters of
+the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the
+conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take
+unopposed possession." The vice of this proposition, from the strategic
+as well as the ethical point of view, is of course clear enough now.
+
+Spain's government was already tottering in the Philippines when the
+Spanish-American war broke out. To be "as complete masters as she had
+been" was like becoming the recipient of a quit-claim deed. Also, ours
+was not a case of taking "unopposed possession." An adverse claimant,
+relying on immemorial prescription, was in full possession; all the
+tenants on the land had attorned to him, and he and they were ready to
+defend their claim against all comers with their lives. They reminded
+one of the recurrent small farmer whom some great timber or other
+corporation seeks to oust, patrolling his land lines rifle in hand,
+on the lookout for the corporation's agent and the sheriff with the
+dispossessory warrant.
+
+Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid go on to say:
+
+
+    Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be practically
+    as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part.
+
+
+Hardly any one can fail to read with interest the following accurate
+and vivid picture which they give of the physical strategic unity of
+the Philippine Islands:
+
+
+    There is hardly a single island in the group from which you cannot
+    shoot across to one or more of the others--scarcely another
+    archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so
+    closely together and so interdependent.
+
+
+This explains also why the Filipino people are a people. Whenever
+the American people understand that, they will give them their
+independence, unless they get an idea that government of their people
+by their people for their people would be distasteful to them.
+
+In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Washington on October
+25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid also say:
+
+
+    Public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to
+    retain whole of Philippine Islands.
+
+
+Archbishop Chapelle was in Paris at the time of these negotiations. He
+afterwards told the writer in Manila that he got that $20,000,000 put
+in the Treaty of Paris. The Church preferred that our title should be
+a title by purchase rather than a title by conquest, and Mr. McKinley
+was vigorously urging the latter. Between the legal effects of the
+two, there is a world of difference. The Church outgeneralled the
+President--checkmated him with a bishop. Look at that part of the
+treaty which affects church property:
+
+
+    Article VIII. The * * * cession * * * cannot in any respect impair
+    the property or rights * * * of * * * ecclesiastical * * * bodies.
+
+
+The Church of Rome, or at least some of the ecclesiastical
+bodies pertaining to it in the Philippines, owned the cream of the
+agricultural estates. By the treaty they have not lost a dollar. It
+might have been otherwise, had not Mr. McKinley's original claim of
+title by conquest been overcome at Paris.
+
+Judge Day's memorandum of his own views, telegraphed on October 25th
+along with those of his colleagues, stated that he was unable to agree
+that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group; that
+
+
+    In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often
+    declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs
+    of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be
+    consistent in demands in making peace * * * with due regard to
+    our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and
+    naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
+
+
+Again, he says:
+
+
+    We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a government [he of
+    course did not know what a complete government they had already
+    formed] or to battle against a foe which * * * might readily
+    overcome them.
+
+
+He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards then
+in the Philippines were to get away, and how completely they were at
+the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces. "On all hands"
+says Judge Day, "it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are
+unfit for self-government." Of course we knew absolutely nothing worth
+mentioning about the Filipinos at that time. Judge Day then proposes,
+for the reasons indicated, to accept Luzon and some adjacent islands,
+as being of "strategic advantage," and to leave Spain the rest, with
+a "treaty stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the
+United States." It seems to me that Judge Day's scheme was the least
+desirable of all.
+
+Senator Gray's memorandum of the same date is a red-hot argument
+against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins thus:
+
+
+    The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippine
+    Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
+    accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
+    upon through our history. * * * It will make necessary * * *
+    immense sums for fortifications and harbors * * * Climate and
+    social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth * * *.
+    On whole, instead of indemnity, injury * * *. Cannot agree that
+    any obligation incurred to insurgents * * *. If we had captured
+    Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not be our duty to stay by
+    them at the conclusion of war * * *. No place for * * * government
+    of subject people in American system * * *. Even conceding all
+    benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon * * * the moral
+    grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations
+    of the world * * * for doubtful material advantages and shameful
+    stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. * * *
+    Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us
+    simply keep our word * * *. Above all let us not make a mockery
+    of the [President's] instructions, where, after stating that we
+    took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity * * *
+    and that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for
+    conquest, the President * * * eloquently says: "It is my earnest
+    wish that the United States in making peace should follow the
+    same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war."
+
+
+The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:
+
+
+    The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter
+    is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.
+
+
+Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is
+sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the
+matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On
+October 27th, the Commission wired Washington:
+
+
+    Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr. Reid.
+
+
+It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying to
+find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in sudden
+disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made plain
+the inflexible determination of the American people not to assume the
+Cuban debt. The Ambassador said: "Montero Rios [146] could not return
+to Madrid now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness,"
+and asked delay to see "if some concessions elsewhere might not be
+found which would save Spanish Commissioners from utter repudiation at
+home." There is no doubt that the talk we are now considering was a
+"heart-to-heart" affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of
+the most important talks that have occurred between any two men in
+this world in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint
+to the effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment
+seemed rather inclined to retain the Philippines, "It was possible,"
+he said, "but not probable that out of these conditions the Spanish
+Commissioners might find something either in territory or debt [147]
+which might seem to their people at least like a concession.!" [148]
+
+It was the leaven of this hint that leavened the whole loaf. There
+was doubtless much informal parleying after that, but finally, the
+American Commissioners, having become satisfied that Spanish honor
+would not be offended by an offer having the substance, if not the
+form, of charity, and being very tired of Spain's sparring for wind
+in the hope of a European coalition against us should war be resumed,
+submitted the following proposal:
+
+
+    The Government of the United States is unable to modify the
+    proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago
+    of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners are
+    authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed
+    to, the sum of $20,000,000.
+
+
+This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement that
+
+
+    Upon the acceptance * * * of the proposals herein made * * *
+    but not otherwise, it will be possible * * * to proceed to the
+    consideration * * * of other matters.
+
+
+Also, our Commissioners wired Washington:
+
+
+    If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition * * * nothing
+    remains except to close the negotiations.
+
+
+This was very American and very final. Washington answered: "Your
+proposed action approved."
+
+November 29th, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
+
+
+    Spanish Commissioners at to-day's conference presented a definite
+    and final acceptance of our last proposition.
+
+
+And that is how that twenty millions found its way into the treaty--not
+forgetting the prayers and other contemporaneous activities of
+Archbishop Chapelle.
+
+After the tremendous eight weeks' tension had relaxed, and before
+the final reduction to writing of all the details, we see this dear
+little telegram, from Secretary of State Hay, himself a writer of note,
+come bravely paddling into port, where it was cordially received by
+both sides, taken in out of the wet, and put under the shelter of
+the treaty:
+
+
+    Mr. Hay to Mr. Day: In renewing conventional arrangements do not
+    lose sight of copyright agreement.
+
+
+And here is the last act of the drama:
+
+
+    Mr. Day to Mr. Hay, Paris, December 10, 1898: Treaty signed at
+    8.50 this evening.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION
+
+    Prometheus stole the heavenly fire from the altar of Jupiter to
+    benefit mankind, and Jupiter thereupon punished both Prometheus
+    and the rest of mankind by creating and giving to them the woman
+    Pandora, a supposed blessing but a real curse. Pandora brought
+    along a box of blessings, and when she opened it, everything flew
+    out and away but Hope.
+
+                                                    Tales from AEschylus.
+
+
+The ever-memorable Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, the Pandora
+box of Philippine woes, was signed December 21, 1898, and its contents
+were let loose in the Philippines on January 1, 1899.
+
+Let us consider for a moment the total misapprehension of conditions
+in the islands under which Mr. McKinley drafted and signed that famous
+document--a misapprehension due to General Otis's curious blindness
+to the great vital fact of the situation, viz., that the Filipinos
+were bent on independence from the first, and preparing to fight
+for it to the last. Take the following Otis utterance, for example,
+concerning a date when practically everybody in the Eighth Army Corps,
+and every newspaper correspondent in the Philippines, recognized that
+war would be certain in the event the Paris Peace negotiations should
+result, as common rumor then said they would result, in our taking
+over the islands:
+
+
+    My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of
+    the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a
+    despatch sent to Washington on December 7th, wherein I stated
+    that conditions were improving, and that there were signs of
+    revolutionary disintegration. [149]
+
+
+There can be no doubt that, at the date of that despatch, General
+Otis had been given to understand that under the Treaty of Paris
+we were going to keep the islands if the treaty should be ratified,
+and also that the if might give the Administration trouble, should
+trouble arise with the Filipinos before the if was disposed of at
+home. As heretofore intimated, in addition to his preference for
+legal and administrative work to the work of his profession, in the
+Philippines General Otis constituted himself from the beginning a
+political henchman. Ample evidence will be introduced later on to
+show beyond all doubt that all through the early difficulties, when
+the American people should have been frankly dealt with and given the
+facts, General Otis would, in the exercise of his military powers
+as press censor, always say to the war correspondents, "I will let
+nothing go that will hurt the Administration."
+
+Let us see what the real facts of the Philippine situation were at
+the date of the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, or, which is the same
+thing, when General Otis sent his despatch of December 7th. When
+the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of
+Manila and Cavite, with less than 20,000 men under his command,
+and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all the rest of the
+archipelago, with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command,
+armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy
+with the army of their country. We have already seen the conditions
+in the various provinces at that time and also the inauguration of
+the native central government. Let us now examine the military figures.
+
+Ten thousand American soldiers were on hand when Manila was captured,
+August 13th, and 5000 more had arrived under command of Major-General
+Elwell S. Otis a week or so after the fall of the city. [150] They had
+13,000 Spanish soldiers to guard. In addition to this, by the terms of
+the capitulation, the city (population say 300,000), its inhabitants,
+its churches and educational establishments, and its private property
+of all descriptions had been placed "under the special safeguard of
+the faith and honor of the American army." [151] Some 4500 to 5000
+more troops began to swarm out of San Francisco bound for Manila in
+the latter part of October, 1898, the last of them reaching Manila
+December 11th, the day after the Treaty of Paris was signed. After
+that there were no further additions to General Otis's command prior
+to the outbreak of war with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899. [151] Of
+these (approximately) 20,000 men, only 1500 to 2000 were regulars,
+having the Krag-Jorgensen smokeless gun. The rest were State volunteers,
+armed with the antiquated Springfield rifles, the same the 71st New
+York and the 2d Massachusetts had been permitted to carry into the
+Santiago campaign the summer before. Aguinaldo's people were equipped
+entirely with Mausers captured from the Spaniards, and other rifles,
+bought in Hong Kong mostly, using smokeless ammunition. Major (now
+Major-General) J. F. Bell, who is, in the judgment of many, one of the
+best all-round soldiers in the American army to-day, was in charge
+of the "Division of Military Information" at Manila both before and
+after the taking of the city. General Bell has done many fine things,
+in the way of reckless bravery in battle at the critical moment and of
+bold reconnoitring in campaign, and what he fails to find out about
+an enemy, or a prospective enemy, is not apt to be ascertainable. In
+a report bearing date August 29, 1898, [152] prepared in anticipation
+of possible trouble with the Filipinos, he estimated the number of
+men under arms that Aguinaldo had at between 35,000 and 40,000. This
+estimate is based by General Bell in his report on the number of guns
+out in the hands of the Filipinos, which he figures thus:
+
+
+    Captured from Spanish militia                     12,500
+    From Cavite arsenal                                2,500
+    From Jackson & Evans (American merchants
+        trading with Hong Kong)                        2,000
+    From Spanish (captured in battle)                  8,000
+    In hands of Filipinos previous to May 1, 1898     15,000
+                                                      ------
+                            Total                     40,000
+
+
+From this number General Bell deducts several thousands as having
+been recaptured by the Spaniards, or bought in. I at once hear some
+former comrade-in-arms of the Philippine insurrection say: "Oh,
+no. They couldn't have had as many as 40,000 guns, or near that." I
+thought the same thing when I first read General Bell's report on the
+matter. But he removes the doubt thus: "They are being continually
+sent away to other provinces."
+
+We did not understand Aguinaldo's movements then. All his troops were
+not around Manila. From what I learned from General Lawton and his
+staff in 1899, my belief is that Aguinaldo had perhaps 30,000 men
+with guns around Manila, and out along the railroad, at the time of
+the outbreak of February 4th. It is idle, of course, at this late
+date, to claim that the Filipinos were not bent on independence
+from the first. The matured plans of their leaders, formulated at
+Hong Kong May 4, 1898, before they ever started the insurrection,
+preserved in the captured minutes of the meeting already noticed,
+[153] provide the programme to be adopted in the event we should be
+tempted to keep the islands. In that event, they were prepared against
+surprise, or any necessity for making new plans, and were agreed to
+accept war as inevitable. From the first, they made ready for it.
+
+Governmentally and strategically, the Philippine Islands, except
+Mohammedan Mindanao, which is a separate and distinct problem,
+may be described very simply and sufficiently as consisting of the
+great island of Luzon, on which Manila is situated, and the Visayan
+group. [154] We are already familiar with the conditions in Luzon in
+December, 1898. You hear a great deal about the Philippine archipelago
+consisting of a thousand and one islands, but there are only eight
+that are, broadly speaking, worth considering here. The moment a jagged
+submarine ledge peeps out of the water it becomes an island. And even
+before that it may wreck a ship. But we are talking about islands
+that need to be charted on the sea of world politics. The Visayan
+Islands that really count at all in a great problem such as that we
+are now considering, are but six in number: Panay, capital Iloilo;
+Cebu, capital Cebu; Bohol, Negros, Samar, and Leyte. [155] Iloilo is
+some three hundred and odd miles south of Manila, and, besides being
+the capital of Panay, is the chief port of the Visayas and the second
+city of the archipelago, Cebu being the third. Under the Spaniards,
+as now under us, a vessel might clear from either of these places
+for any part of the world. As we saw in the chapter preceding this,
+as early as November 18th, Admiral Dewey had cabled Washington that
+the entire island of Panay was in possession of insurgents, except
+Iloilo. By the end of December, all the Spanish garrisons in the
+Visayan Islands had surrendered to the insurgents. (Otis's Report,
+p. 61.) Iloilo did not surrender to the insurgents until the day
+before Christmas. But let us not anticipate.
+
+December 13th, General Otis received a petition for protection signed
+by the business men and firms of Iloilo (p. 54), sent of course
+with the approval of the general commanding the imperilled Spanish
+garrison. December 14th, he wired Washington for instructions as
+to what action he should take on this petition, saying, among other
+things, "Spanish authorities are still holding out, but will receive
+American troops"; and adding one of his inevitable notes of optimism as
+to the tameness of Filipino aspirations (at Iloilo) for independence:
+"Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation."
+
+General Otis knew the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the
+insurgents down at Iloilo, and eagerly awaited a reply. President
+McKinley was then away from Washington, on a southern trip, to Atlanta
+and Macon, Georgia, and other points, and nobody at home was giving
+any thought to the Filipinos, while they were knocking successively
+at the gates of the various Visayan capitals, and receiving the
+surrender of their Spanish defenders. It was getting toward the
+yuletide season. President McKinley was engaged, quite seasonably,
+in putting the finishing touches to the great work of his life,
+which was welding the North and the South together forever by wise
+and kindly manipulation of the countless opportunities to do so
+presented by the latest war. It was a season of general peace and
+rejoicing in a thrice-blessed land, and nobody in the United States
+was looking for trouble with the Filipinos. With our people it was a
+case of ignorance being bliss, so far as the Philippine Islands and
+their inhabitants were concerned. In his Autobiography of Seventy
+Years, Senator Hoar tells of an interview with President McKinley
+concerning his (the Senator's) attitude toward the Treaty of Paris,
+early in December, 1898. [156] "He greeted me with the delightful and
+affectionate cordiality which I always found in him. He took me by the
+hand, and said: 'How are you feeling this winter, Mr. Senator?' I was
+determined there should be no misunderstanding. I replied at once:
+'Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President.' The tears came into
+his eyes and he said, grasping my hand again: 'I shall always love
+you whatever you do.'"
+
+It behooves this nation, and all nations, to consider those
+tears. They explain all the subsequent history of the Philippines
+to date. Mr. McKinley had proved himself a gallant soldier in his
+youth, and he knew something of the horrors of war. He was also
+one of the most amiable gentlemen that ever lived. But it is no
+disrespect to his memory to say that while Mr. McKinley was a good
+man, Senator Hoar was his superior in moral fibre, and he knew it,
+and he knew the country knew it. He knew that Senator Hoar was going
+to fight the ratification of the treaty to the last ditch, speaking
+for the Rights of Man and such old "worn out formulae," and that his
+only defence before the bar of history would have to rest on "Trade
+Expansion," alias the "Almighty Dollar." Those tears were harbingers
+of the coming strife in the Philippines. They were shed for such lives
+as that strife might cost. They were an assumption of responsibility
+for such shedding of blood as the treaty might entail. The President
+returned to Washington from his southern trip on December 21st, and
+on December 23d (p. 55) cabled General Otis the following reply to
+his request of December 14th for instructions:
+
+
+    Send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect
+    life and property. It is most important that there should be no
+    conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory but firm.
+
+
+Senator Hoar had put Mr. McKinley on notice that he was going to
+present the ethics of the case in the debate on the treaty. Congress
+had gone home for the holidays, and after it re-assembled in January
+the treaty would come up. The vote was sure to be close, and a too
+vigorous manifestation of belief on the part of the Filipinos that
+this nation was not closing the war with Spain animated by "the same
+high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war" (Mr. McKinley's
+instructions to the Peace Commissioners) might defeat the ratification
+of the treaty. Indeed, the final vote of February 6th, was so
+close that the Administration had but one vote to spare. The final
+vote was fifty-seven to twenty-seven--just one over the necessary
+two-thirds. The smoke of a battle to subjugate the Filipinos might
+"dim the lustre and the moral strength," as Mr. McKinley had expressed
+it in his instructions to the Peace Commissioners, of a war to free
+the Cubans. Therefore there must be no trouble, at least until after
+the ratification of the treaty. President McKinley had invented in
+the case of Cuba a very catchy phrase, "Forcible annexation would be
+criminal aggression," and every time anybody now quoted it on him
+it tended to take the wind out of his sails. So benevolently eager
+was that truly kind-hearted and Christian gentleman to avoid the
+appearance of "criminal aggression" that he evidently got to thinking
+about that telegram of December 23d in which he had authorized General
+Otis to send troops to the relief of the beleaguered Spanish garrison
+at Iloilo, and also about the message from Admiral Dewey received
+November 18th previous, to the effect that the entire island of Panay
+except Iloilo was then already in the hands of the insurgents. The
+result was that he decided not to let his conciliatory proclamation
+of December 21st await the slow process of the mails, and therefore,
+though it consisted of something like one thousand words, he had it
+cabled out to General Otis in full on December 27th. It is now here
+reproduced in full because it precipitated the war in the Philippines,
+and is the key to all our subsequent dealings with them [157]:
+
+
+    THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION
+
+    Executive Mansion, Washington,
+          December 21, 1898.
+
+
+    The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila
+    by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral
+    Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender
+    of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the
+    Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty
+    therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the
+    United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at
+    Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of
+    American arms, the future control, disposition, and government
+    of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In
+    the fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and
+    the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the
+    actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the
+    Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military
+    government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city,
+    harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible
+    despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. In performing this
+    duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to
+    make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in
+    succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former
+    political relations, and in establishing a new political power, the
+    authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing
+    of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for
+    the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It
+    will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to
+    announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not
+    as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives
+    in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and
+    religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by
+    honest submission, co-operate with the Government of the United
+    States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive
+    the reward of its support and protection. All others will be
+    brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness
+    if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. Within the
+    absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and
+    must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation
+    of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws
+    of the territory in respect to private rights and property and
+    the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in
+    force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far
+    as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government
+    are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy
+    of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by
+    officers chosen, as far as practicable, from the inhabitants of
+    the islands. While the control of all the public property and
+    the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while
+    the use and management of all public means of transportation
+    are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States,
+    private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations,
+    is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes
+    and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late
+    government become payable to the authorities of the United States
+    unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates
+    or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether
+    general or local. If private property be taken for military use,
+    it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation,
+    and when payment in cash is not practicable, receipts are to be
+    given. All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual
+    possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will
+    be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and
+    wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement
+    of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such
+    duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their
+    importation. Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount
+    aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect,
+    and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring
+    them in every possible way that full measure of individual
+    rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and
+    by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of
+
+    BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION
+
+    substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary
+    rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, supporting the
+    temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the
+    governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of
+    authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles
+    to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government
+    upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of
+    the United States.
+
+
+        William McKinley.
+
+
+The words used in the foregoing proclamation which were regarded by
+the Filipinos as "fighting words," i. e., as making certain the long
+anticipated probability of a war for independence, are those which
+appear in italics. The rest of the proclamation counted for nothing
+with them. They had been used to the hollow rhetoric and flowery
+promises of equally eloquent Spanish proclamations all their lives,
+they and their fathers before them.
+
+In suing to President McKinley for peace on July 22d, previous, the
+Prime Minister of Spain had justified all the atrocities committed
+and permitted by his government in Cuba during the thirty years'
+struggle for independence there which preceded the Spanish-American
+War by saying that what Spain had done had been prompted only by a
+"desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature
+independence." [158]
+
+Clearly, from the Filipino point of view, the United States was now
+determined "to spare them from the dangers of premature independence,"
+using such force as might be necessary for the accomplishment of that
+pious purpose.
+
+The truth is that, Prometheus-like, we stole the sacred fire from the
+altar of Freedom whereupon the flames of the Spanish War were kindled,
+and gave it to the Filipinos, justifying the means by the end; and
+"the links of the lame Lemnian" have been festering in our flesh ever
+since. The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was a kind of Pandora
+Box, supposed to contain all the blessings of Liberty, but when the
+lid was taken off, woes innumerable befell the intended beneficiaries,
+and left them only the Hope of Freedom--from us. Verily there is
+nothing new under the sun. It is written: "Thou shalt not steal"
+anything--not even "sacred fire." There is no such thing as nimble
+morality. The lesson of the old Greek poet fits our case. So also,
+indeed, do those of the modern sage, Maeterlinck, for the Filipinos
+could have found their own Bluebird for happiness. The record of
+our experience in the Philippines is full of reminders, which will
+multiply as the years go by, that, after all, every people have an
+"unalienable right" to pursue happiness in their own way as opposed to
+somebody else's way. That is the law of God, as God gives me to see the
+right. Conceived during the Christmas holiday season and in the spirit
+of that blessed season and presented to the Filipino people on New
+Year's Day, received by them practically as a declaration of war and
+baptized in the blood of thousands of them in the battle of February
+4th thereafter, the manner of the reception of this famous document,
+the initial reversal and subsequent evolution of its policies, and
+all the lights and shadows of Benevolent Assimilation will be traced
+in the chapters which follow.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE ILOILO FIASCO
+
+            The King of France with forty thousand men
+            Marched up the hill and then marched down again.
+
+                                                     Old English Ballad.
+
+
+We have already seen how busily Aguinaldo occupied himself during
+the protracted peace negotiations at Paris in getting his government
+and people ready for the struggle for independence which he early and
+shrewdly guessed would be ultimately forthcoming. General Otis was in
+no position to preserve the status quo. The status quo was a worm in
+hot ashes that would not stay still. The revolution was a snow-ball
+that would roll. The day after Christmas, General Otis at last sent
+an expedition under General Marcus P. Miller to the relief of Iloilo,
+but when it arrived, December 28th, the Spaniards had already turned
+the town over to the insurgent authorities, and sailed away. When
+General Miller arrived, being under imperative orders from Washington
+to be conciliatory, and under no circumstances to have a clash with
+the insurgents, the Administration's most earnest solicitude being
+to avoid a clash, at least until the treaty of peace with Spain
+should be ratified by the United States Senate, he courteously asked
+permission to land, several times, being refused each time. With
+a request of this sort sent ashore January 1, 1899, he transmitted
+a copy of the proclamation set forth in the preceding chapter. The
+insurgent reply defiantly forbade him to land. Therefore he did not
+land--because Washington was pulling the strings--until after the
+treaty was ratified. "So here we are at Iloilo, an exploded bluff,"
+wrote war correspondent J. F. Bass to his paper, Harper's Weekly.
+
+By the time the treaty was ratified the battle of Manila of February
+4th had occurred, and the pusillanimity of self-doubting diplomacy
+had given way to the red honesty of war. [159]
+
+As was noticed in the chapter preceding this, by the end of December,
+1898, all military stations outside Luzon, with the exception of
+Zamboanga, in the extreme south of the great Mohammedan island of
+Mindanao near Borneo, had been turned over by the Spaniards to the
+insurgents. When General Miller, commanding the expedition to Iloilo,
+arrived in the harbor of that city with his teeming troop-ships and
+naval escorts on December 28th, an aide of the Filipino commanding
+general came aboard the boat he was on and "desired to know," says
+General Miller's report, [160] "if we had anything against them--were
+we going to interfere with them." General Miller then sent some of
+his own aides ashore with a letter to the insurgent authorities,
+explaining the peaceful nature of his errand. They at once asked if
+our people had brought down any instructions from Aguinaldo. Answering
+in the negative, General Miller's aides handed them his olive-branch
+letter. They read it and said they could do nothing without orders
+from Aguinaldo "in cases affecting their Federal Government." The grim
+veteran commanding the American troops smoked on this for a day or
+so, and then asked a delegation of insurgents that were visiting his
+ship by his invitation--they would not let him land, you see--whether
+if he landed they would meet him with armed resistance. The Malay
+reverence for the relation of host and guest resulted in an evasive
+reply. They could not answer. But after they went back to the city
+they did answer. And this is what they wrote:
+
+
+    Upon the return of your commissioners last night, we * * *
+    discussed the situation and attitude of this region of Bisayas in
+    regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government
+    of Luzon (the Aguinaldo government, of course); and * * * I have
+    the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people,
+    the army, and the committee, we insist upon our pretension not
+    to consent * * * to any foreign interference without express
+    orders from the central government of Luzon * * * with which we
+    are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices. * * *
+    If you insist * * * upon disembarking your forces, this is our
+    final attitude. May God forgive you, etc."
+
+                                        Iloilo, December 30, 1898. [161]
+
+
+This letter is recited in General Miller's report to be from "President
+Lopez, of the Federal Government of Visayas." General Miller then
+wrote Otis begging permission to attack on the ground that upon the
+success of the expedition he was in charge of "depends the future
+speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements in the islands." War
+correspondent Bass, who was on the ground at the time, also wrote
+his paper: "The effect on the natives will be incalculable all over
+the islands." But General Otis was trying to help Mr. McKinley nurse
+the treaty through the Senate on the idea that there weren't going to
+be any "insurrectionary movements in the islands," that all dark and
+misguided conspiracies of selfishly ambitious leaders looking to such
+impious ends would fade before the sunlight of Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+Cautioning Otis against any clash at Iloilo, Mr. McKinley wired January
+9th: "Conflict would be most unfortunate, considering the present.
+* * * Time given the insurgents cannot injure us, and must weaken and
+discourage them. They will see our benevolent purpose, etc." [162]
+
+The Iloilo fiasco did indeed furnish to the insurgent cause aid and
+comfort at the psychologic moment when it most needed encouragement to
+bring things to a head. It presented a spectacle of vacillation and
+seeming cowardice which heartened the timid among the insurgents and
+started among them a general eagerness for war which had been lacking
+before. In one of his bulletins [163] to Otis, General Miller tells of
+two boats' crews of the 51st Iowa landing on January 5th, and being met
+by a force of armed natives who "asked them their business and warned
+them off," whereupon they heeded the warning and returned to their
+transport. This regiment had then been cooped up on their transport
+continuously since leaving San Francisco November 3d, previous,
+sixty-three days. They were kept lying off Iloilo until January 29th,
+and then brought back to Manila and landed, after eighty-nine days
+aboard ship, all idea of taking Iloilo before the Senate should act
+having been abandoned.
+
+The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation was received by cable in
+cipher, at Manila, December 29th, and as soon as it had been written
+out in long hand General Otis hurried a copy down to General Miller
+at Iloilo by a ship sailing that day, so that General Miller might
+"understand the position and policy of our government." But he
+forgot to tell Miller to conceal the policy for the present. [164]
+So the latter, on January 1st, not only sent a copy of it to the
+"President of the Federal Government of Visayas," Mr. Lopez, [165]
+but in the note of transmittal he "asked," says his report, "that they
+permit the entry of my troops." [166] What a fatal mistake! Here was
+a proclamation representing all the "majesty, dominion, and power" of
+the American Government, signed by the President of the United States,
+in terms asserting immediate, absolute, and supreme authority, and the
+natives were "asked" if they would "permit" its enforcement. General
+Miller's report says that he also had the proclamation "translated
+into Spanish and distributed to the people." [167] "The people laugh
+at it," he says. "The insurgents call us cowards and are fortifying
+at the point of the peninsula, and are mounting old smooth-bore
+guns left by the Spaniards. They are intrenching everywhere,
+are bent on having one fight, and are confident of victory. The
+longer we wait before the attack the harder it will be to put down
+the insurrection." This is especially interesting in the light of
+President McKinley's justification of the wisdom of temporizing--on
+the idea that delay would weaken the insurgents and could not hurt
+us. "Let no one convince you," writes Miller to Otis on January 5th,
+"that peaceful means can settle the difficulty here."
+
+The appeal to Otis to permit commencement of operations was without
+avail. Otis was the Manila agent of the Aldrich Old Guard in the
+Senate, in charge of the pending treaty. He would simply send the
+disgusted Miller messages not to be hasty, assuring him that the
+firing of a shot at Iloilo would mean the precipitation of general
+conflict about Manila and all over the place, and that this would
+be "most disappointing to the President of the United States, who
+continually urges extreme caution and no conflict." [168]
+
+The Administration was counting senatorial noses at the time, and
+that its anxiety was justified is apparent from the fact already
+noted, that on the final vote whereby the treaty was ratified it had
+but one vote to spare. So General Miller sat sunning himself on the
+deck of his transport, and watching the insurgents working like ants
+at their fortifications, and vainly wishing his 2500 men could get
+ashore at least long enough to stretch themselves a bit. John F. Bass,
+correspondent for Harper's Weekly, left Iloilo, returned to Manila,
+and wrote his paper on January 23d: "I returned to Manila well knowing
+that there was nothing more to be done in Iloilo until the Senate
+voted on the Treaty of Peace."
+
+On the eighth day after General Miller had asked permission of the
+Iloilo village Hampdens to enforce the orders of the President of
+the United States, the "Federal Government of the Visayas," through
+its President, Senor Lopez, finally deigned to notice Mr. McKinley's
+proclamation. It said under date of January 9th:
+
+
+    General: We have the high honor of having received your message,
+    dated January 1st, of this year, enclosing letter of President
+    McKinley. You say in one clause of your message: "As indicated in
+    the President's cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants
+    of the island of Panay ought to obey the political authority of the
+    United States, and they will incur a grave responsibility if, after
+    deliberating, they decide to resist said authority." So the council
+    of state of this region of Visayas are, at this present moment,
+    between the authority of the United States, that you try to impose
+    on us, and the authority of the central government of Malolos.
+
+
+Then follows this remarkable statement of the case for the Filipinos:
+
+
+    The supposed authority of the United States began with the
+    Treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of
+    the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and
+    natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, (and)
+    sacrifices. [169]
+
+
+General Otis was fond of throwing cold water on any particularly
+eloquent Filipino insurrecto document he had occasion to put in
+his reports by saying that Mabini was "the brains of" the Malolos
+Government--meaning the only brains it had [170]--and that he probably
+wrote such document, whatever it might be. But here is a piece of
+real eloquence, originating away down in the Visayan Islands, as
+far away from Malolos as Colonel Stark and his "Green Mountain Boys"
+were from Washington and Hamilton in 1776 and after. What then is the
+explanation of composition so forceful in its impassioned simplicity,
+and in the light of subsequent events, so pathetic? There is but
+one explanation. It came from the heart. It was the cry of the Soul
+of Humanity seeking its natural affiliations. It was the language
+of what Aguinaldo's early state papers always used to call the
+"legitimate aspirations of" his people--legitimate aspirations which
+we later strangled. The reason of the writer's earnestness is that a
+few months later he helped do some of the strangling. Thirteen years
+afterwards, a thorough acquaintance with the Filipino side of the
+matter, derived from an examination of the information which has been
+gradually accumulated and published by our government during that time,
+causes him to say, "Father forgive me, for I knew not what I did." The
+35,000 volunteers of 1899 knew nothing about the Filipinos or their
+side of the case. We were like the deputy sheriff who goes out with
+a warrant duly issued to arrest a man charged with unlawful breach
+of the peace. It is not his business to inquire whether the man is
+guilty or not. If the man resists arrest, he takes the consequences.
+
+On the second day after the above defiance of the President of the
+United States was served up to General Miller, that gallant officer
+having dutifully swallowed it, sent an officer ashore on a diplomatic
+mission. The name and rank of this military ambassador were Acting
+Assistant Surgeon Henry DuR. Phelan, who clearly appears to have been
+a man of keen insight and considerable ability. His written report
+to General Miller of what transpired is a document of permanent
+interest and importance to the annals of men's struggles for free
+institutions. [171] It states that at the meeting the spokesman
+of the Filipinos, Attorney Raimundo Melliza, began by saying that
+"all the Americans owned was Manila." That was unquestionably true,
+so our ambassador, it seems, did not gainsay it. Dr. Phelan suggested
+that the Americans had sacrificed lives and money in destroying the
+power of Spain. The spokesman, Attorney Melliza, replied that "they
+also had made great sacrifice in lives, and that they had a right to
+their country which they had fought for, and that we are here now to
+take from them what they had won by fighting; that they had been our
+allies, and we had used them as such." Dr. Phelan's report goes on to
+say: "I replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time,
+* * * and that as soon as order was assured it would be withdrawn
+* * *. They smiled at this." Well they might. Fourteen years have
+elapsed since then, and the law-making power of the United States has
+never yet declared whether the American occupation of the Philippine
+Islands is to be temporary, like our occupation of Cuba was, or
+permanent, like the British occupation of Egypt is. True, Dr. Phelan
+said "military" occupation, but the smile was provoked by the
+suggestion of temporariness. After the committee smiled, they remarked:
+
+
+    We have fought for independence and feel that we have the power
+    of governing and need no assistance. We are showing it now. You
+    might inquire of the foreigners if it is not so.
+
+
+Dr. Phelan's report proceeds:
+
+
+    They stated that their orders were not to allow us to disembark,
+    and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without
+    express orders from their government.
+
+
+In regard to the Treaty of Paris, the spokesman, Lawyer Melliza, said:
+
+
+    International law forbids a nation to make a contract in regard
+    to taking the liberties of its colonies.
+
+
+Lawyer Melliza was wrong. If he had said "the law of righteousness,"
+instead of "international law," his proposition, thus amended, would
+have been incontrovertible. On September 19, 1911, one of the great
+newspapers of this country, the Denver Post, sent out to the members
+of the Congress of the United States, and to "The Fourth Estate" also,
+the newspaper editors, a circular letter proposing that we sell the
+Philippine Islands to Japan. A member of the United States Senate
+sent this answer:
+
+
+    I do not favor your proposition. Selling the Islands means selling
+    the inhabitants. The question of traffic in human beings, whether
+    by wholesale or retail, was forever settled by the Civil War.
+
+
+About the same time a leading daily paper of Georgia had an editorial
+on the Denver Post's proposition, the most conspicuous feature of
+which was that Japan was too poor to pay us well, should we contemplate
+selling the Filipinos to her, so it was no use to discuss the matter
+at length.
+
+No; Lawyer Melliza's proposition has no standing in international
+law yet. But it has with what Mr. Lincoln's First Inaugural called
+"the better angels of our nature," if we stop to reflect.
+
+Another interesting feature of the Phelan report to General Miller
+is the following:
+
+
+    I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could occupy the
+    city would they agree to it. He replied most emphatically that
+    they would.
+
+
+At that time, in January, 1899, while the debate on the treaty was
+in progress in the United States Senate, there was hardly a province
+in that archipelago where you would not have encountered the same
+inflexible adherence to the Aguinaldo government.
+
+Dr. Phelan's report closes thus:
+
+
+    At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that as this question
+    involved the integrity of the entire republic, it could not
+    be further discussed here, but must be referred to the Malolos
+    Government.
+
+
+There is one other statement made by the spokesman of the Filipinos,
+at their meeting with Dr. Phelan, which arrested and gripped my
+attention. That it may interest the reader as it did me, it will need
+but a word or so as preface. In the fall of that same year, 1899,
+when my regiment, the 29th Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, reached the
+Islands, it was supposed that the insurrection had about played out,
+i.e., that it had been "beaten to a frazzle," because the Filipinos no
+longer offered to do battle in force in the open. Yet all that fall,
+and all through 1900 and after, a most obstinate guerrilla warfare
+was kept up. Anywhere in the archipelago you were liable to be fired
+on from ambush. At first we could not understand this. Later we found
+out it was the result of an order of Aguinaldo's, faithfully carried
+out, not to assemble in large commands, but to conduct a systematic
+guerrilla warfare indefinitely. We learned this by capturing a copy
+of the order, which was quite elaborate. Dr. Phelan's report says:
+
+
+    I told him [Melliza] that the city was in our power, and that we
+    could destroy it at any time * * *. Lawyer Melliza replied that
+    he cared nothing about the city; that we could destroy it if we
+    wished * * *. "We will withdraw to the mountains and repeat the
+    North American Indian warfare. You must not forget that."
+
+
+Later, they did.
+
+On January 15th, General Otis wrote General Miller [172] again
+cautioning him against any clash at Iloilo, and saying of conditions
+at Manila and Malolos: "The revolutionary government is very anxious
+for peaceful relations."
+
+Three days later Senator Bacon saw the situation with clearer vision
+from the other side of the world than General Otis could see it
+under his nose, and said on the floor of the Senate on January 18th
+concerning the conditions at Manila and Malolos:
+
+
+    While there is no declaration of war, while there is no avowal
+    of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other with
+    such divers intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to
+    ignite the magazines which is to explode. [173]
+
+
+The spark was ignited on February 4, 1899, by a sentinel of the
+Nebraska regiment firing on some Filipino soldiers who disregarded
+his challenge to halt, and killing one of them. War once on, General
+Miller was directed on February 10th, after he had lain in Iloilo
+harbor for forty-four days, to take the city. So at last he gave
+written notice to the insurgents in Iloilo demanding the surrender
+of the city and garrison "before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant"
+and requesting them to give warning to all non-combatants. [174]
+Thereupon the insurgents set fire to the city and departed.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+OTIS AND AGUINALDO (Continued)
+
+                A word spoken in due season, how good is it!
+
+                                                       Proverbs xv., 23.
+
+
+In the last chapter we saw the debut of the Benevolent Assimilation
+programme at Iloilo. We are now to observe it at Manila. General Otis
+says in his report for 1899 [175]:
+
+
+    After fully considering the President's proclamation and the
+    temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political
+    problems and the friendly intentions of the United States
+    Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain
+    words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of
+    cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc.,
+    * * * which might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to
+    incite widespread hostilities among the natives. * * * It was my
+    opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the
+    paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government
+    would be clearly brought within the comprehension of the people.
+
+
+Accordingly, he published a proclamation as indicated, on January 4th,
+at Manila. In a less formal communication concerning this proclamation,
+viz., a letter to General Miller at Iloilo, General Otis comes to
+the point more quickly thus:
+
+
+    After some deliberation we put out one of our own which it was
+    believed would suit the temper of the people. [176]
+
+
+The only thing in the Otis proclamation specifically directed toward
+soothing "the temper of the people" was a hint that the United
+States would, under the government it was going to impose, "appoint
+the representative men now forming the controlling element of the
+Filipinos to civil positions of responsibility and trust" (p. 69). And
+this, far from soothing Filipino temper, was interpreted as an offer
+of a bribe if they would desert the cause of their country. The bona
+fides of the offer they did not doubt for a moment. In fact it caught
+a number of the more timid prominent men, especially the elderly ones
+of the ultraconservative element preferring submission to strife. But
+the younger and bolder spirits were faithful, many of them unto death,
+and all of them unto many battles and much "hiking." [177]
+
+General Otis's report goes on to tell how, about the middle of January,
+after he had published his sugar-coated edition of the presidential
+proclamation at Manila, it then at last occurred to him that General
+Miller might have published the original text of it in full at Iloilo,
+and, "fearing that," says he, "I again despatched Lieut. Col. Potter to
+Iloilo"--evidently post-haste. But it appears that when the breathless
+Potter arrived, the lid was already off. The horse had left the stable
+and the door was open, as we saw in the preceding chapter. However,
+as the Otis report indicates in this connection (p. 67), copies of
+the original McKinley proclamation, as published in full at Iloilo by
+General Miller, were of course promptly forwarded by the insurgents at
+Iloilo to the insurgent government at Malolos. So all that General Otis
+got for his pains was detection in the attempt to conceal the crucial
+words asserting American sovereignty in plain English. He tells us
+himself that as soon as the Malolos people discovered the trick, "it
+[the proclamation] became"--in the light of the Otis doctoring--"the
+object of venomous attack." His report was of course written long after
+all these matters occurred, but its language shows a total failure
+on the part of its author, even then, to understand the cause of the
+bitterness he denominates "venom." This bitterness grew naturally
+out of what seemed to the Filipinos an evident purpose of the United
+States to take and keep the Islands and an accompanying unwillingness
+to acknowledge that purpose, as shown by the conspicuous discrepancies
+between the original text of the proclamation as published at Iloilo
+by General Miller, on January 1st, and the modified version of it
+given out by General Otis at Manila on January 4th. "The ablest of
+the insurgent newspapers," says he (p. 69), "which was now issued
+at Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna * * * attacked the
+policy * * * as declared in the proclamation, and its assumption of
+sovereignty * * * with all the vigor of which he was capable." The
+nature of Editor Luna's philippics is not described by General Otis
+in detail, the only specific notion we get of them being from General
+Otis's echo of their tone, which, he tells us, was to the effect that
+"everything tended simply to a change of masters." But in another part
+of the Otis Report (p. 163) we find an epistle written about that
+time by one partisan of the revolution to another, whose key-note,
+given in the following extracts, was doubtless in harmony with the
+Luna editorials:
+
+
+    We shall not have them (Filipinos enough to conduct a decent
+    government) in 10, 20, or a 100 years, because the Yankees
+    will never acknowledge the aptitude of an "inferior" race to
+    govern the country. Do not dream that when American sovereignty
+    is implanted in the country the American office-holders will
+    give up. Never! If * * * it depends upon them to say whether the
+    Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country
+    * * * they will never say it."
+
+
+Is not the American who pretends that he would have done anything but
+just what the Filipinos did, had he been in their place, i.e., fought
+to the last ditch for the independence of his country, the rankest
+sort of a hypocrite? General Otis was a soldier, and his views may
+have been honestly colored by his environment. But how at this late
+date can any fair-minded man read the above extracts illustrative
+of the temper in which the Filipinos went to war with us without
+acknowledging the righteousness of the motives which impelled them?
+
+Aguinaldo promptly met General Otis's proclamation of January 4th
+by a counter-proclamation put out the very next day, in which he
+indignantly protested against the United States assuming sovereignty
+over the Islands. "Even the women," says General Otis (p. 70), "in a
+document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after
+the men were all killed off they were prepared to shed their patriotic
+blood for the liberty and independence of their country." General
+Otis actually intended this last as a sly touch of humor. But when
+we recollect Mr. Millet's description (Chapter IV. ante) of the women
+coming to the trenches and cooking rice for the men while the Filipinos
+were slowly drawing their cordon ever closer about the doomed Spanish
+garrison of Manila in July and August previous, fighting their way over
+the ground between them and the besieged main body of their ancient
+enemies inch by inch, while Admiral Dewey blockaded them by sea,
+General Otis's sly touch of humor loses some of its slyness. "The
+insurgent army also," he says (p. 70), "was especially affected * * *
+and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility
+in war with the United States troops * * * whom it had commenced to
+insult and charge with cowardice."
+
+The benighted condition of the insurgents in this regard was directly
+traceable to the Iloilo fiasco. It was that, principally, which made
+the insurgents so foolishly over-confident and the subsequent slaughter
+of them so tremendous. Further on in his report General Otis says, with
+perceptible petulance, in summing up his case against the Filipinos:
+
+
+    The pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself
+    for Spain * * * was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant
+    masses.
+
+
+Speaking of his own modified version of the Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation, General Otis says (p. 76):
+
+
+    No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual
+    declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly
+    advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5th, issued the
+    following
+
+
+--giving the reply proclamation in full. No man can read the Otis
+report itself without feeling that if he, the reader, had been playing
+Aguinaldo's hand he would have played it exactly as Aguinaldo did. To
+General Otis the government at Malolos--"their Malolos arrangement," he
+used to call it--seemed quite an impudent little opera-bouffe affair,
+"a tin-horn government," as Senator Spooner suggested in the same
+debate on the treaty, in which he called his rugged and fiery friend
+from South Carolina, Senator Tillman, "the Senator from Aguinaldo,"
+and immediately thereafter, with that engaging frankness that always so
+endeared him to his colleagues on both sides of the Chamber, removed
+the sting from the jest by admitting that neither he (Spooner),
+nor Tillman, nor anybody else in the United States, knew anything
+about Aguinaldo or his government. But in the calmer retrospect of
+many years after, we have seen, through the official documents which
+have become available in the interval, that said government was in
+complete and effective control of practically the whole archipelago,
+and had the moral support of the whole population at a time when our
+troops controlled absolutely nothing but the two towns of Manila and
+Cavite. Therefore, when we read in the Aguinaldo proclamation such
+phrases as, "In view of this, I summoned a council of my generals and
+asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of
+both bodies I" did so and so; "My government cannot remain indifferent
+to" this or that act of the Americans assuming sovereignty over the
+islands; "Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities
+if" etc.; they do not sound to us so irritatingly bombastic as they
+did to General Otis, distributed under his nose as the proclamation
+containing them at once was, by thousands, throughout a city of which
+he was nominally in possession, but nine-tenths of whose 300,000
+inhabitants he was obliged to believe in sympathy with the insurgents.
+
+"My government," says the Aguinaldo proclamation, "rules the whole
+of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of Mindanao." Except as to
+Mindanao, which cut absolutely no figure in the insurrection until well
+toward the end of the guerrilla part of it, we have already examined
+this claim and found by careful analysis that it was absolutely true
+by the end of December, 1898.
+
+After a rapid review of how he had been aided and encouraged in
+starting the revolution against the Spaniards by Admiral Dewey, and
+then given the cold shoulder by the army when it came, Aguinaldo's
+manifesto says:
+
+
+    It was also taken for granted that the American forces would
+    necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed
+    to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great
+    hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence
+    in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its
+    independence and for the abolition of slavery, and which posed as
+    the champion and liberator of oppressed peoples. We felt ourselves
+    under the safeguard of a free people.
+
+
+That this statement also was authorized by the facts is evident from
+the minutes of the Hong Kong meeting of May 4th, already noticed,
+presided over by Aguinaldo, and called to formulate the programme
+for the insurrection he was about to sail for the Philippines to
+inaugurate, in which, after much discussion among the revolutionary
+leaders it was agreed that while they must be prepared for all possible
+contingencies, yet,
+
+
+    if Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles
+    of its constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will
+    be made to colonize the Filipinos or annex them. [178]
+
+
+In short, the Aguinaldo proclamation of January 5th suggests with
+a briefness which Filipino familiarity with the great mass of
+facts already laid before the reader in the preceding chapters made
+appropriate, all the causes for which the Malolos Government was ready,
+if need be, to declare war, and winds up by boldly serving General
+Otis with notice that if the Americans try to take Iloilo and the
+Visayan Islands "my government is disposed to open hostilities."
+
+On January 9th President McKinley cabled out to General Otis asking
+if it would help matters to send a commission out to explain to
+the Filipinos our benevolent intentions. This idea thus suggested
+materialized, a few weeks later, in the Schurman Commission, of which
+more anon. The next day, January 10th, General Otis answered endorsing
+the sending of "commissioners of tact and discretion," and adding: [178]
+
+
+    Great difficulty is that leaders cannot control ignorant
+    classes. [179]
+
+
+As a matter of fact the leaders were leading. They were not arguing
+with the tide. They were merely riding the crest of it. Actually,
+General Otis would have stopped "The Six Hundred Marseillaise Who
+Knew How to Die"--the ones whose march to Paris, according to Thomas
+Carlyle, inspired the composition of the French national air, "The
+Marseillaise"--and tried to parley with the head of the column on the
+idea of getting them to abandon their enterprise and disperse to their
+several homes. He also says, in the cablegram under consideration:
+
+
+    If peace kept for several days more immediate danger will have
+    passed.
+
+
+In other words, he was holding off the calf as best he could pending
+the ratification of the treaty. From the text itself, however, of
+General Otis's report, it is clear enough, that even he was getting
+anxious to give the Filipinos a drubbing as soon as the treaty should
+be safely passed. Referring to a message from the President enjoining
+avoidance of a clash with the Filipinos he says (p. 80):
+
+
+    The injunction of his Excellency the President of the United
+    States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent
+    effect upon the command. Officers and men * * * were restless
+    under the restraints * * * imposed, and * * * eager to avenge the
+    insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and
+    aggressive demonstrations of the insurgent army who continue to
+    throng the streets of the business portion of the city.
+
+
+See the lamb kick the lion viciously in the face, and observe the
+lion as he first lifts his eyes heavenward and says meekly: "Thy
+will be done. This is Benevolent Assimilation"; and then turns them
+Senate-ward and murmurs: "I cannot stand this much longer, kind
+sirs. Say when!" The way war correspondent John F. Bass puts the
+situation about this time in a letter to his paper, Harper's Weekly,
+was this:
+
+
+    Jimmie Green [180] bites his lip, hangs on to himself, and finds
+    comfort in the idea that his time will come.
+
+
+After Aguinaldo's ultimatum of January 5th about fighting if we took
+Iloilo, General Otis refrained from taking Iloilo, and continued to
+communicate with the insurgent chieftain, appointing commissioners
+to meet commissioners appointed by him. These held divers and sundry
+sessions, whose only result was to kill time, or at least to mark
+time, while the Administration was getting the treaty through the
+Senate. The object of these meetings is thus set forth in the military
+order of January 9, 1899, appointing the Otis portion of the Joint
+High Parleying Board:
+
+
+    To meet a commission of like number appointed by General Aguinaldo,
+    and to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive
+    at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires
+    of the Filipino people and the people of the United States, that
+    peace and harmonious relations between these respective peoples
+    may be continued. [181]
+
+
+The minutes of the first meeting of this board, prepared by the
+Spanish-speaking clerk or recorder, recite the above declared
+purpose verbatim, in all its verbosity, and then go on to say that
+our side asked
+
+
+    That the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo give
+    their opinion as to what were the purposes, aspirations, aims,
+    and desires of the people of the archipelago.
+
+
+The next paragraph is almost Pickwickian in its unconscious terseness:
+
+
+    To this request the commissioners appointed by General Aguinaldo
+    made response that in their opinion the aspirations, purposes,
+    and desires of the Philippine people might be summed up in two
+    words "Absolute Independence."
+
+
+Of course even General Otis does not reproduce this laconic answer
+as part of his petulant summing up of how little the Filipinos knew,
+before the outbreak of February 4th, as to what they really wanted. He
+merely alludes to it as being of record elsewhere. It is one oL
+the various pieces of jetsam and flotsam that have floated from the
+sea of those great events to the shores of government publications
+since. The minutes of these meetings may be found among the hearings
+before the Senate Committee of 1902. [182]
+
+General Otis's report complains that Aguinaldo's commissioners did not
+know what they wanted, "could not give any satisfactory explanation"
+of the "measure of protection" they wanted, they having declared
+that they would greatly prefer the United States to establish a
+protectorate over them to keep them from being annexed by some other
+power. But he fails to state, which is a fact shown by the minutes of
+the meeting of January 14 (p. 2721), that the Filipino commissioners
+did say that this was a question which would only be reached between
+their government and ours when the latter should agree to officially
+recognize the former. To quote their exact language, which is rather
+clumsily translated, they said: "The aspiration of the Filipino
+people is the independence with the restrictions resulting from the
+conditions which its government may agree with the American, when
+the latter agree to officially recognize the former."
+
+It is perfectly clear from the voluminous minutes of the proceedings
+that the Filipinos were only seeking some declaration of the purpose
+of our government which would satisfy their people that the programme
+was something more than a mere change of masters. "They begged,"
+says General Otis (p. 82), "for some tangible concession from the
+United States Government--one which they could present to the people
+and which might serve to allay excitement." General Otis of course had
+no authority to bind the government and so could make no promise. But
+the day this Otis-Aguinaldo parleying board had its second meeting,
+January 11th, and probably with no more knowledge of its existence
+than the reader has of what is going on in the Fiji Islands at the
+moment he reads these lines, Senator Bacon introduced in the United
+States Senate some resolutions which were precisely the medicine the
+case required and precisely the thing the Filipinos were pleading
+for. These resolutions concluded thus:
+
+
+    That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or
+    intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
+    said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their
+    determination when an independent government shall have been duly
+    erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to
+    said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just,
+    all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon
+    leave the government and control of the islands to their people.
+
+
+They were a twin brother to the Teller Cuban resolution which was
+incorporated into the resolution declaring war against Spain, being
+verbatim the same, except with the necessary changes of name, of
+"islands" for "island," etc.
+
+On January 18th, while the futile parleying board aforesaid was still
+futilely parleying at Manila, Senator Bacon made an argument in the
+Senate in support of his resolution, whose far-sighted statesmanship,
+considered in relation to the analogies of its historic setting,
+most strikingly reminds us of Burke's great speech on conciliation
+with America delivered under similar circumstances nearly a century
+and a quarter earlier. After alluding to the naturalness of the
+apprehension of the Filipinos "that it is the purpose of the United
+States Government to maintain permanent dominion over them," [183]
+Senator Bacon urged:
+
+
+    The fundamental requirement in these resolutions is that the
+    Government of the United States will not undertake to exercise
+    permanent dominion over the Philippine Islands. The resolutions
+    are intentionally made broad, so that those who agree on that
+    fundamental proposition may stand upon them even though they
+    may differ materially as to a great many other things relative
+    to the future course of the government in connection with the
+    Philippine Islands.
+
+
+Senator Bacon then quoted the following from some remarks Senator
+Foraker had previously made in the course of the great debate on
+the treaty:
+
+
+    I do not understand anybody to be proposing to take the Philippine
+    Islands with the idea and view of permanently holding them.
+    * * * The President of the United States does not, I know, and no
+    Senator in this chamber has made any such statement;
+
+
+and added:
+
+
+    If the views expressed by the learned Senator from Ohio in
+    his speech * * * are those upon which we are to act, there is
+    very little difference between us; and there will be no future
+    contention between us * * * if we can have an authoritative
+    expression from The Law-Making Power of the United States in a
+    joint resolution that such is the purpose of the future. [184]
+
+
+Says the Holy Scripture: "A word spoken in season, how good is it!"
+Had the Bacon resolutions passed the United States Senate in January,
+1899, we never would have had any war with the Filipinos. [185]
+They would have presented at the psychologic moment the very thing
+the best and bravest of the Filipino leaders were then pleading
+with General Otis for, something "tangible," something "which they
+could present to their people and which would allay excitement,"
+by allaying the universal fear that we were going to do with them
+exactly as all other white men they had ever heard of had done with
+all other brown men they had ever heard of under like circumstances,
+viz., keep them under permanent dominion with a view of profit.
+
+In his letter accepting the nomination for the Presidency in 1900,
+Mr. McKinley sought to show the Filipinos to have been the aggressors
+in the war by a reference to the fact that the outbreak occurred
+while the Bacon resolution was under discussion in the Senate. This
+hardly came with good grace from an Administration whose friends in
+the Senate had all along opposed not only the Bacon resolution but
+also all other resolutions frankly declaratory of the purpose of our
+government. The supreme need of the hour then was, and the supreme
+need of every hour of every day we have been in the Philippines since
+has been, "an authoritative expression from the law-making power of
+the United States"--not mere surmises of a President, confessedly
+devoid of binding force, but an authoritative expression from the
+law-making power, declaratory of the purpose of our government with
+regard to the Philippine Islands. Secretary of War Taft visited Manila
+in 1907 to be present at the opening of the Philippine Assembly. In
+view of the universal longing which he knew existed for some definite
+authoritative declaration as to whether our government intends to
+keep the Islands permanently or not, he said:
+
+
+    I cannot speak with authority * * *. The policy to be pursued
+    with respect to them is, therefore, ultimately for Congress to
+    determine. * * * I have no authority to speak for Congress in
+    respect to the ultimate disposition of the Islands. [186]
+
+
+This bitter disappointment of the public expectation and hope
+of something definite, certainly did not lessen the belief of
+the Filipinos that we have no notion of ever giving them their
+independence. Had the Senate known what the Filipino commissioners
+were so earnestly asking of the Otis commissioners in January,
+1899, the Bacon resolution would probably have passed. In fact it
+is demonstrable almost mathematically that, had the Administration's
+friends in the Senate allowed that resolution to come to a vote before
+the outbreak of February 4th, instead of filibustering against it until
+after that event, it would have passed. As stated in the foot-note, the
+roll-call on the final vote on it, which was not taken until February
+14th, showed a tie--29 to 29, the Vice-President of the United States
+casting the deciding vote which defeated it. Much dealing with real
+life and real death has blunted my artistic sensibilities to thrills
+from the mere pantomime of the stage. But as here was a vote where,
+had a single Senator who voted No voted Aye, some 300,000,000 of
+dollars, over a thousand lives of American soldiers killed in battle,
+some 16,000 lives of Filipino soldiers killed in battle, and possibly
+100,000 Filipino lives snuffed out through famine, pestilence, and
+other ills consequent on the war, would have been saved, I can not
+refrain from reproducing the vote--perhaps the most uniquely momentous
+single roll-call in the parliamentary history of Christendom [187]:
+
+
+Ayes
+
+            Bacon                   Jones of Nevada
+            Bate                    Lindsay
+            Berry                   McLaurin
+            Caffery                 Martin
+            Chilton                 Money
+            Clay                    Murphy
+            Cockrell                Perkins
+            Faulkner                Pettigrew
+            Gorman                  Pettus
+            Gray                    Quay
+            Hale                    Rawlins
+            Harris                  Smith
+            Heitfield               Tillman
+            Hoar                    Turner
+            Jones of Arkansas
+
+
+Nays
+
+            Allison                 Mantle
+            Burrows                 Morgan
+            Carter                  Nelson
+            Chandler                Penrose
+            Deboe                   Platt of Connecticut
+            Fairbanks               Platt of New York
+            Frye                    Pritchard
+            Gear                    Ross
+            Hanna                   Shoup
+            Hawley                  Simon
+            Kyle                    Stewart
+            Lodge                   Teller
+            McBride                 Warren
+            McEnery                 Wolcott
+            McMillan
+
+
+In January, 1899, the out-and-out land-grabbers had not yet made bold
+to show their hand, the friends of the treaty confining themselves
+to the alleged shame of doing as we had done with Cuba, on account
+of the supposed semi-barbarous condition of "the various tribes out
+there," leaving the possibility of profit to quietly suggest itself
+amid the noisy exhortations of altruism. It was not until after the
+milk of human kindness had been spilled in war that Senator Lodge
+said at the Philadelphia National Republican Convention of 1900:
+
+
+    We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the
+    Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade
+    Expansion.
+
+
+Speaking (p. 82) of the meetings of what for lack of a better term
+I have above called the Otis-Aguinaldo Joint High Parleying Board,
+General Otis says in his report:
+
+
+    Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion,
+    * * * and * * * amusement.
+
+
+The Filipino newspapers called attention to the fact that large
+reinforcements of American troops were on the way to Manila, and very
+plausibly inferred that the parleying was for delay only. By January
+26th the politeness of both the American and the Filipino commissioners
+had been worn to a frazzle, and they adjourned, each recognizing that
+the differences between them could ultimately be settled only on the
+field of battle, in the event of the ratification of the treaty.
+
+January 27th, General Otis cabled to Washington a letter from
+Aguinaldo, of which he says in his report: "I was surprised * * *
+because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose
+to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the
+arbitrament of war" (p. 84). General Otis was "surprised" to the
+last. Aguinaldo's letter is not at all surprising, though extremely
+interesting. It sends General Otis a proclamation issued January 21st,
+announcing the publication of a constitution modelled substantially
+after that of the United States, even beginning with the familiar
+words about "securing the blessings of liberty, promoting the general
+welfare," etc., and concludes with an expression of confident hope that
+the United States will recognize his government, and a bold implication
+of determination to fight if it does not. On the evening of February
+4th an insurgent soldier approaching an American picket failed to
+halt or answer when challenged, and was shot and killed. Nearly
+six months of nervous tension thereupon pressed for liberation in
+a general engagement which continued throughout the night and until
+toward sundown of the next day, thus finally unleashing the dogs of
+war. In the Washington Post of February 6, 1899, Senator Bacon is
+quoted as saying:
+
+
+    I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be necessary to
+    carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain that we
+    could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate
+    adopted my resolution, or a similar resolution announcing our
+    honest intentions with regard to the Philippines.
+
+
+Said the New York Criterion of February 11, 1899:
+
+
+    Whether we like it or not, we must go on slaughtering the natives
+    in the English fashion, and taking what muddy glory lies in this
+    wholesale killing until they have learned to respect our arms. The
+    more difficult task of getting them to respect our intentions
+    will follow.
+
+
+The Washington Post of February 6, 1899, may not have quoted Senator
+Bacon with exactitude. But what the Senator did say on the floor of
+the Senate is important, historically. Under date of February 22,
+1912, Senator Bacon writes me, in answer to an inquiry:
+
+
+    I enclose a speech made by me upon the subject in the Senate
+    February 27, 1899, and upon pages 6, 7, and 8 of which you will
+    find a statement of my position, and the reasons given by me
+    therefor. Of course you cannot go at length into that question
+    in your narration of the events of that day, but my position was
+    that, while I did not approve of the war, and did not approve
+    of the enslavement of the Filipinos, and while if I had my way I
+    would immediately set them free, at the same time, as war was then
+    flagrant, and there were then some twenty odd thousand American
+    troops in the Philippine Islands, we must either support them or
+    leave them to defeat and death. I do not know how far you can use
+    anything then said by me, but if you make allusion to the fact
+    that I was willing to supply money and troops to carry on the war
+    in the Philippines, I would be glad for it to be accompanied by a
+    very brief statement of the ground upon which I based such action.
+
+
+The above makes it unnecessary to quote at length from the speech
+referred to, which may be found at pp. 2456 et seq of the Congressional
+Record for February 27, 1899. However, there is one passage in the
+speech to which I especially say Amen, and invite all whose creed of
+patriotism is not too sublimated for such a common feeling to join
+me in so doing. Senator Bacon will now state the creed:
+
+
+    The oft-repeated expression "our country, right or wrong" has a
+    vital principle in it, and upon that principle I stand.
+
+
+The Senator immediately follows his creed with these commentaries:
+
+
+    In this annexation of the Philippine Islands through the
+    ratification of the treaty, and in waging war to subjugate the
+    Filipinos, I think the country, acting through constitutional
+    authorities, is wrong. But it is not for me to say because the
+    country has been committed to a policy that I do not favor and
+    have opposed, in consequence of which there is war, that I will
+    not support the government.
+
+
+Under the civilizing influence of Krag-Jorgensen rifles and the moral
+uplift of high explosive projectiles, what our soldiers used to call,
+with questionable piety, "the fear of God," was finally put into the
+hearts of the Filipinos, after much carnage by wholesale in battle
+formation and later by retail in a species of guerrilla warfare as
+irritating as it was obstinate. But they have never yet learned to
+respect our intentions, because under the guidance of three successive
+Presidents we have studiously refrained from any authoritative
+declaration as to what those intentions are. We are loth to hark back
+to the only right course, a course similar to our action in Cuba,
+because of the expense we have been to in the Philippines. But we also
+know that the islands are and are likely to continue, a costly burden,
+a nuisance, and a distinct strategic disadvantage in the event of war;
+and that Mr. Cleveland was right when he said:
+
+
+    The government of remote and alien people should have no permanent
+    place in the purposes of our national life.
+
+
+The mistaken policy which involved us in a war to subjugate the
+Filipinos, following our war to free the Cubans, will never stand
+atoned for before the bar of history, nor can the Filipinos ever in
+reason be expected to respect our intentions, until the law-making
+power of the government shall have authoritatively declared what
+those intentions are--i. e., what we intend ultimately to do with the
+islands. Senator Bacon's resolutions of 1899 were, are, and always
+will be the last word on the first act needed to rectify the original
+Philippine blunder, "announcing" as they would, to use the language
+attributed to their distinguished author by the Washington Post of
+February 6, 1899, above-quoted, "our honest intentions with regard to
+the Philippines." So eager is the exploiter to exploit the islands,
+and so apprehensive is the Filipino that the exploiter will have more
+influence at Washington than himself and therefore be able ultimately
+to bring about a practical industrial slavery, that common honesty
+demands such a declaration. To doctor present Filipino discontent
+with Benevolent Uncertainty is a mere makeshift. The remedy the
+situation needs is simple, but as yet untried--Frankness. The chief
+of the causes of the present discontent among the Filipinos with
+American rule is precisely the same old serpent that precipitated
+the war thirteen years ago, to wit, lack of a frank and honest
+declaration of our purpose. The trouble then lay, and still lies,
+and, in the absence of some such declaration as that proposed by
+the Bacon resolution, will always lie in what seemed then, and still
+seems, to the Filipinos "an evident purpose to keep the islands and
+an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that purpose." Some
+may object that one Congress cannot bind another. The same argument
+would have killed the Teller amendment to the declaration of war with
+Spain avowing our purpose as to Cuba. Such an argument assumes that
+this nation has no sense of honor, and that it should cling for a
+while longer to the stale Micawberism that the Islands may yet pay,
+before it decides whether it will do right or not, and signalizes
+such decision by formal announcement through Congress. To men capable
+of such an assumption as the one just indicated, this book is not
+addressed. Three successive Presidents, Messrs. McKinley, Roosevelt,
+and Taft, have with earnest asseveration of benevolent intention tried
+without success all these years to win the affections of the Filipino
+people, and to make them feel that "our flag had not lost its gift of
+benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores," as Mr. McKinley
+used to say. But the corner-stone of the policy was laid before we
+knew anything about how the land lay, and on the assumption, made
+practically without any knowledge whatever on the subject, that the
+Filipino people were incapable of self-government. The corner-stone
+of our Philippine policy has been from the beginning precisely that
+urged by Spain for not freeing Cuba, viz., "to spare the people from
+the dangers of premature independence." The three Presidents named
+above have always been willing to imply independence, but never to
+promise it. And the unwillingness to declare a purpose ultimately to
+give the Filipinos their independence has always been due to the desire
+to catch the vote of those who are determined they shall never have
+it. In this inexorable and unchangeable political necessity lies the
+essential contemptibleness of republican imperialism, and the secret
+of why the Filipinos, notwithstanding our good intentions, do not like
+us, and never will under the present policy. How can you blame them?
+
+Yet the more you know of the Filipinos, the better you like
+them. Self-sacrificing, brave, and faithful unto death in war, they
+are gentle, generous, and tractable in peace. Moreover, respect
+for constituted authority, as such, is innate in practically every
+Filipino, which I am not sure can be predicated concerning each and
+every citizen of my beloved native land. And we can win the grateful
+and lasting affection of the whole seven or eight millions of them any
+day we wish to. How? Have done with vague, vote-catching Presidential
+obiter, and through your Congress declare your purpose!
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+OTIS AND THE WAR
+
+                Am I the boss, or am I a tool,
+                Am I Governor-General or a hobo--hobo;
+                Now I'd like to know who's the boss of the show,
+                Is it me, or Emilio Aguinaldo?
+
+                                Army Song of the Philippines under Otis.
+
+
+"The thing is on," said General Hughes, Provost Marshal of Manila, to
+General Otis, at Malacanan palace, on the night of February 4, 1899,
+about half past eight o'clock, as soon as the firing started. [188]
+He was talking about something which every American in Manila except
+General Otis had for months frankly recognized as inevitable--the war.
+
+On the day of the outbreak of February 4th, General Otis had under
+his command 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men, say in round numbers
+a total of 21,000. Of these some 15,500 were State volunteers mostly
+from the Western States, and the rest were regulars. All the volunteers
+and 1650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, entitled to
+their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of
+ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. The
+total force which he was thus entitled to command for any considerable
+period consisted of less than 4000. Of the 21,000 men on hand as
+aforesaid, on February 4th, deducting those at Cavite and Iloilo,
+the sick and wounded, those serving in civil departments, and in the
+staff organizations, the effective fighting force was 14,000, and of
+these 3000 constituted the Provost Guard in the great and hostile
+city of Manila. [189] Thus there were only 11,000 men, including
+those entitled to discharge, available to engage the insurgent army,
+"which," says Secretary of War Root, "was two or three times that
+number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native
+troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army."
+
+Such was the predicament into which General Otis's supremely zealous
+efforts to help the Administration get the treaty through the Senate
+by withholding from the American people the knowledge of facts which
+might have put them on notice that they were paying $20,000,000 for
+a $200,000,000 insurrection, had brought us. This is not a tale of
+woe. It is a tale of the disgust--good-humored, because stoical--which
+finally found expression at the time in the army song that heads this
+chapter, disgust at unnecessary sacrifice of American life which could
+so easily have been prevented had General Otis only revealed the real
+situation in time to have had plenty of troops on hand. It is a requiem
+over those brave men of the Eighth Army Corps from Pennsylvania,
+Tennessee, and the Western States that bore the brunt of the early
+fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed in 1899 as the
+result of an unpreparedness for war due to anxiety not to embarrass
+Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the Senate,
+an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in order
+to conceal from the people of the United States the unanimity of the
+desire of the Filipinos for Independence.
+
+It is quite true that none of our people then in the Islands realized
+this unanimity in all its pathos at the outset, but it soon became
+clear to everybody except the commanding general. It naturally dawned
+on him last of all, because he did not visit the most reliable sources
+of information, to wit, the battlefields during the fighting, and
+therefore did not see how tenaciously the Filipinos fought for the
+independence of their country. Moreover, General Otis tried to think
+till the last along lines in harmony with the original theory of
+Benevolent Assimilation. Hence Mr. Root's nonsense of 1899 and 1900
+about "the patient and unconsenting millions" dominated by "the Tagalo
+tribe," which nonsense was immensely serviceable in a campaign for the
+presidency wherein antidotes for sympathy with a people struggling
+to be free were of supreme practical political value. General Otis
+actually had Mr. McKinley believing as late as December, 1899, at
+least, that the opposition to a change of masters in lieu of Freedom
+was confined to a little coterie of self-seeking politicians who were
+in the business for what they could get out of it, and that the great
+majority would prefer him, Otis, to Aguinaldo, as governor-general. It
+is difficult on first blush to accept this statement as dispassionately
+correct, but there is no escape from the record. Mr. McKinley said
+in his annual message to Congress in December, 1899, in reviewing
+the direction he gave to the Paris peace negotiations which ended
+in the purchase of the islands, and the war with the Filipinos which
+had followed, and had then been raging since February 4th previous,
+"I had every reason to believe, and still believe that the transfer
+of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of
+the great mass of the Filipino people."
+
+Yet every American soldier who served in the Philippines at the time
+knows that Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand,
+because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their
+aspirations. [190]
+
+During the presidential campaign of 1900, while the war with the
+Filipinos was still raging, partisan rancour bitterly called in
+question the sincerity of President McKinley's statement in his annual
+message to Congress of December, 1899, that he then still believed "the
+transfer of sovereignty was in accord with the wishes and aspirations
+of the great mass of the Filipino people," on the ground that he must
+by the time he made that statement have understood how grossly--however
+honestly--General Otis had misled him as to the unanimity and tenacity
+of the Filipino purpose. But it is only necessary to read Admiral
+Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902 to understand
+Mr. McKinley's allusion in this same message to Congress of 1899 to
+"the sinister ambition of a few leaders," and this, once understood,
+explains the other statement of the message. Admiral Dewey came
+home in the fall of 1899 and undoubtedly filled Mr. McKinley with
+the estimate of Aguinaldo which makes such painful reading in the
+Admiral's testimony of 1902 before the Senate Committee, where he
+abused Aguinaldo like a pick-pocket, so to speak, saying his original
+motive was principally loot. [191] In the fall of 1899 Aguinaldo had
+issued a proclamation claiming that Admiral Dewey originally promised
+him independence, and Admiral Dewey had bitterly denounced this as a
+falsehood, so that the Admiral always cherished a very real resentment
+against the insurgent chief thereafter. His estimate of the Filipino
+leader as being in the insurrection merely for what he could get out
+of it was wholly erroneous, and has long since been exploded, all our
+generals of the early fighting and all Americans who have known him
+since being unanimous that Aguinaldo was and is a sincere patriot;
+but it undoubtedly explains Mr. McKinley's still clinging, in 1899,
+to the notion derived from General Otis that the insurrection did not
+have the moral and material backing of the whole Filipino people. The
+Filipino leaders were familiar with the spirit of our institutions. The
+men who controlled their counsels were high-minded, educated, patriotic
+men. "For myself and the officers and men under my command," wrote
+General Merritt to Aguinaldo in August, 1898, just after the fall
+of Manila, "I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the
+abilities and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the
+Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect." [192]
+
+The leaders believed that the American people did not fully understand
+the identity of the Philippine situation with that in Cuba, and that
+if they had, the treaty would not have been ratified. They also knew
+the supreme futility of trying to get the facts before the American
+people by peaceful means. And it was really with the abandon of genuine
+patriotism that they plunged their country into war. We did not know
+it then, but we do know it now. It would be simply wooden-headed to
+affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us. Of course
+some of the jeunesse doree, as General Bell calls them in one of his
+early reports, [193] grew very aggressive and insulting toward the
+last. But the thinking men went into the war for independence in a
+spirit of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," to correct the
+impression General Otis had communicated to Mr. McKinley, and through
+him to our people, in the hope that the more lives they sacrificed
+in such a war (they risked--and many of them lost--their own also),
+the nearer they would come to refuting the idea that they did not
+know what they wanted. It was the only way they had to appeal to
+Caesar, i.e., to the great heart of the American people. As the war
+grew more and more unpopular in the United States, the impression
+was more and more nursed here at home that the people did not really
+want independence, but were being coerced; and that they were like
+dumb driven cattle. The striking similarity of these suggestions
+to those by which tyranny has always met the struggles of men to
+be free, did not seem to occur to the American public. They were
+accepted as authoritative, being convenient also as an antidote to
+sympathy. General Otis had suppressed such words as "sovereignty,"
+"protection," and the like from his original sugar-coated edition
+of the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, offering an elaborate
+cock-and-bull explanation of why he did so. The Filipino answer to
+this took the form of a very clever newspaper cartoon, representing an
+American in a carromata--a kind of two-wheeled buggy--with a Filipino
+between the shafts pulling it; which cartoon of course, never reached
+the United States. The Filipinos had never heard the story on General
+Mahone about "tie yoh hoss an' come in," [194] but they had heard of
+the jinrickshaws of Japan, and they had read in Holy Writ and elsewhere
+of conquered people becoming hewers of wood and drawers of water to
+invading conquerors. And they are not without a sense of humor. It is
+a common mistake with many Americans--for quite a few among us suffer
+intellectually from over-sophistication--to suppose we monopolize all
+the sense of humor there is, and that that alone is proof of a due
+sense of proportion. At any rate, the Filipinos, with all due respect
+to General Otis's good intentions, understood that "sovereignty" and
+"protection" meant alien domination, so there was nothing in the Otis
+notion that for them those words had a "peculiar meaning which might
+be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite," etc. [195]
+
+Having now gotten into a war on the theory that only a small fraction
+of the Filipino people were opposed to a new and unknown yoke in
+lieu of the old one, General Otis still continued to try to square
+his theory with the facts. For many months he sat at his desk in
+Manila cheerily waging war with an inadequate force, and retaining in
+the service and on the firing line after their terms of enlistment
+expired, under pretence that they consented to it willingly, a lot
+of fellows from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States, who
+had volunteered for the war with Spain, with intent to kill Spaniards
+in order to free Cubans, and not with intent to kill Filipinos for
+also wanting to be free. Seeing nothing of the fighting himself,
+he of course failed to get a correct estimate of the tenacity of
+the Filipino purpose. No purpose is here entertained to suggest
+that any of those early volunteers went around preaching mutiny,
+or feeling mutinous. They did not originally like the Filipinos
+especially; furthermore, they liked the Philippines less than they
+did the Filipinos, and they had a vague notion that some one had
+blundered. But it was not theirs to ask the reason why. Besides,
+the orders from Washington being not to clash with the Filipinos
+at least until the treaty was ratified, the Filipino soldiers and
+subaltern officers had been calling them cowards for some time with
+impunity. So that as soon as the treaty was safely "put over," they
+were very glad to let off steam by killing a few hundred of them. But
+their hearts were not in the fight, in the sense of clear and profound
+conviction of the righteousness of the war. However, war is war, and
+they were soldiers, and "orders is orders," as Tommy Atkins says. So
+let us turn to an honester, if grimmer, side of the picture.
+
+The first battle of the war began about 8:30 o'clock on the night
+of February 4th, and lasted all through that night and until about
+5 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. Our casualties numbered
+about 250 killed and wounded. The insurgent loss was estimated at
+3000. "Those of the insurgents will never be known," says General
+Otis. [196] "We buried 700 of them." [197] There was fighting pretty
+much all around Manila, for the insurgents had the city almost hemmed
+in. An arc of a circle, broken in places possibly, but several miles
+long, drawn about the city, would probably suggest the general idea
+of the enemy's lines. They had been allowed to dig trenches without
+interference while the debate in the Senate on the treaty was in
+progress, pursuant to the temporary "peace-at-any-price" programme. The
+arc was broken into smithereens by 5 P.M. of February 5th. When the
+morning of February 6th came Col. James F. Smith, commanding the First
+Californias, was non est inventus, and so was a large part of his
+regiment. "No one seemed to know definitely his location," says the
+Otis Report. [198] As a matter of fact he had taken two battalions of
+his regiment and waded clean through the enemy's lines, and had to be
+sent for to come back to form again with the line of battle needed to
+protect the city. So the Californias probably carried off the pick of
+the laurels of the first day's fighting. General Anderson, commanding
+the First Division of the Eighth Corps, threw them some very handsome
+well earned bouquets in his report, stating also that their colonel
+had shown "the very best qualities of a volunteer officer"--why he
+limited it to "volunteer" does not appear, but is inferable from the
+well-known disposition of all regulars to consider all volunteers
+"rookies" [199]--and recommended that he be made a brigadier general,
+which shortly afterward was done. [200]
+
+It would be invidious to follow the various phases of the subsequent
+early fighting, and single out one or more States [201] and tell of the
+hard earned and well deserved honors they won, because space forbids
+a proper tribute to the heroism of all of them. As for the regulars,
+[202] they were the same they were at Santiago de Cuba, the same
+they always are anywhere you put them. When a newspaper man would
+come around a regular regiment during the fighting before Santiago
+he would be told that they had no news to give him, "We ain't heroes,
+we're regulars," they would say. After the outbreak of February 4th,
+all our people did well, acted nobly, "Angels could no more." Neither
+could devils, as shown by the losses inflicted on the enemy.
+
+There was more fighting outside Manila during the next two or three
+days, and when that was done the somewhat shattered insurgent legions
+had recoiled to the distantly visible foot-hills, convinced that
+their notion they could take Manila was very foolish and very rash.
+
+At the town of Caloocan, some three or four miles out to the north
+of Manila, were located the shops and round houses of the Manila and
+Dagupan Railway, which runs from Manila in a northwesterly direction
+about 120 miles to Dagupan, and was then the only railroad in the
+archipelago. It was fed by a vast rich farming country, the great
+plain of central Luzon. Naturally, the central plain which fed the
+railroad that traversed it and kept its teeming myriads of small
+farmers in touch with the great outside world was to be sooner or
+later, the theatre of war. To seize transportation is instinctively
+the first tactical move of a military man. Lieutenant-General Luna,
+commander-in-chief, next to Aguinaldo, of the revolutionary forces, the
+man whom later Aguinaldo had shot, was just then at Caloocan with 4000
+men. So it fell to General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of
+the Eighth Corps, to move on Caloocan, which he did on February 10th.
+
+John F. Bass, correspondent for Harper's Weekly, writing from Manila
+a short time after this, describes this movement. It was our first
+move away from the city of Manila. With a few masterly strokes of the
+pen, which I regret there is not space to reproduce here in full,
+Mr. Bass gives a vivid picture of the various engagements, and of
+"a background of burning villages, smoke, fire, shot, and shell, the
+ceaseless tramp of tired and often bleeding feet," etc. "Heroism,"
+he says, "became a matter of course and death an incident." Finally
+his story pauses for a moment thus: "The natural comment is that
+all this is merely war--the business of the soldier. True, nor do
+I think Jimmie Green [Mr. Bass's name for our "Tommy Atkins"] is
+troubled with heroics. He accepts the situation without excitement
+or hysterics. He has little feeling in this matter for his heart is
+not in this fight." Here brother Bass's moralizing ceases abruptly,
+and the contagious excitement of the hour catches him, just as it
+always does the average man under such circumstances:
+
+
+    From La Loma church you may get the full view of our long line
+    crossing the open field, evenly, steadily, irresistibly, like an
+    inrolling wave on the beach * * *. Watch the regiments go forward,
+    and form under fire, and move on and on, and you will exclaim:
+    "Magnificent," and you will gulp a little and feel proud without
+    exactly knowing why. Then gradually the power of that line will
+    force itself upon you, and you will feel that you must follow,
+    that wherever that line goes you must go also. By and by you will
+    be sorry, but for the present the might of an American regiment
+    has got possession of you.
+
+
+Anybody who has ever been with an American regiment in action knows
+exactly how the man who wrote that felt. The American who has never
+had the experience Mr. Bass describes above has missed one way of
+realizing the majesty of the power of the republic whereof he is
+privileged to be a citizen. For if there is one national trait which
+more than any other explains the greatness of our country, it is the
+instinct for organization, the fondness for self-multiplication to
+the nth power by intelligent co-operation with one's fellows to a
+common end. Especially is the experience in question inspiring where
+the example of the field officers is particularly appropriate to the
+occasion. Take for instance the following, concerning the conduct of
+Major J. Franklin Bell in this advance on Caloocan, from the report
+of Major Kobbe, Commanding the Artillery:
+
+
+    As the right cleared the head of the ravine, I could see
+    Maj. J. F. Bell * * * leading a company of Montana troops in front
+    of the right * * * advancing, firing, toward intrenchments * * *.
+    He was on a black horse to the last * * * leading and cheering
+    the men. His work was most gallant and * * * especially cheering
+    to me. [203]
+
+
+No mere scribe can magnify General Bell's matchless efficiency in
+action, but it is certainly inspiring to contemplate. There are no
+"fuss and feathers" about him. Yet his power, proven on many a field
+in the Philippines, to kindle martial ardor by example, suggests the
+ubiquitous "Helmet of Navarre" of Lord Macaulay's poem.
+
+A little later correspondent Bass develops what he meant by "by
+and by you will be sorry." You see it is not comfortable business,
+this of hustling about among the dead and dying. In the excitement,
+you are so liable to step on the face of some poor devil you knew
+well, maybe a once warm friend. In this connection Mr. Bass says:
+"There is this difference between the manner in which American and
+Filipino soldiers die. The American falls in a heap and dies hard;
+the Filipino stretches himself out, and when dead is always found in
+some easy attitude, generally with his head on his arms. They die
+the way a wild animal dies--in just such a position as one finds a
+deer or an antelope which one has shot in the woods."
+
+So far as the writer is advised and believes, nobody who knows
+John F. Bass ever suspected him of being a quitter. He must have
+been reading the London Standard, which said about that time:
+"It is a little startling to find the liberators of Cuba engaged
+in suppressing a youthful republic which claims the sacred right of
+self-government." Bass had written his newspaper in August previous,
+after observing how pluckily the Filipinos had fought and licked
+the Spaniards: "Give them their independence and guarantee it to
+them." The overwhelming sentiment of the Eighth Army Corps when we
+took the Philippines was against taking them; and those who had kept
+informed knew that the Senate had ratified the treaty by a majority
+only one more than enough to squeeze it through, the vote having been
+57 to 27, at least 56 being thus indispensable to make the necessary
+constitutional two-thirds of the 84 votes cast; and that Wall Street
+and the White Man's Burden or land-grabbing contingent--"Philanthropy
+and Five per cent," as Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage put
+it at the time--were responsible for these shambles Mr. Bass describes.
+
+At this juncture some soft-headed gentleman asks: "What is this
+man who writes this book driving at? Is he trying to show that the
+American soldiers in the Philippines in February, 1899, all wanted
+to quit as soon as the war broke out?" Not at all. In the first
+place it hardly lay in American soldier nature to want to quit when
+Aguinaldo was telling us "if you don't take your flag down and out of
+these islands at once and promptly get out yourselves along with it,
+I will proceed to kick you out and throw it out." And in the next
+place, in the war with the Filipinos, as in all other wars, fuel was
+added to the flame as soon as the war broke out. Among the Americans,
+charges soon came into general circulation and acceptance that the
+Filipinos had planned (but been frustrated in) a plot looking to a
+general massacre of all foreigners in Manila. This alleged plot was
+supposed to have been scheduled to be carried out on a certain night
+shortly after February 15, 1899. Among the Filipinos, on the other
+hand, counter-charges soon followed, and met with general credence,
+that the Americans made a practise of killing prisoners taken in
+battle, including the wounded. Neither charge was ever proven, but
+both served the purpose, at the psychologic moment, of possessing
+each side with the desire to kill, which is the business of war. Let
+us glance briefly at these recriminations.
+
+Between pages 1916 and 1917 of Senate Document 331, part 2 [204] may
+be found a photo-lithograph of the celebrated alleged order of the
+Filipino Revolutionary Government of February 15, 1899, to massacre
+all foreign residents of Manila. In his report for 1899 [205] General
+Otis himself describes this order as one "which for barbarous intent
+is unequalled in these modern times in civilized warfare," and speaks
+of it as "issued by the Malolos Government through the responsible
+officer who had raised and organized the hostile inhabitants within
+the city." After Aguinaldo was captured in 1901, according to an
+account given by General MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902, of
+a conversation with the insurgent leader, the latter was shown a copy
+of this document purporting to have been signed by General Luna, one of
+his generals. He disclaimed having in any way sanctioned it, in fact
+disclaimed any prior knowledge of it whatsoever, [206] a disclaimer
+which General MacArthur appears to have accepted as true, frankly and
+entirely. At page 1890 of the same volume, Captain J. R. M. Taylor,
+14th U. S. Infantry, a gallant soldier and an accomplished scholar,
+who was in charge in 1901 of the captured insurgent records at Manila,
+states that he was "informed" that the document was originally "signed
+by Sandico, then Secretary of the Interior" of the revolutionary
+government. Captain Taylor made an attempt to run the matter down,
+but obtained no evidence convincing to him. A like investigation by
+General MacArthur in 1901 had a like result. [207]
+
+On the other hand, Major Wm. H. Bishop, of the 20th Kansas, was
+credited in a soldier's letter written home, which first came to light
+in this country, with killing unarmed prisoners during the advance on
+Caloocan. The charges originated with a private of that regiment. Major
+Bishop denied the charges. [208] An investigation followed, in the
+course of which somebody made an innuendo, or charge--it is not
+important which--that other officers used their influence to prevent
+a full ventilation of the matter, specifically, General Funston,
+then Colonel of the 20th Kansas, and Major Metcalf, of the same
+regiment. These last two also made a most vigorous general denial,
+and nothing whatever was established against them. The whole matter
+was finally disposed of by being forwarded to the War Department at
+Washington by General Otis on July 13, 1899, some six months after the
+occurrences alleged, with the remark that he (General Otis) "doubted
+the wisdom of a court-martial" of the soldier who had made the charge
+against Major Bishop, "as it would give the insurgent authorities a
+knowledge of what was taking place, and they would assert positively
+that our troops practised inhumanities, whether the charges could
+be proven or not" and that they would use the incident "as an excuse
+to defend their own barbarities." [209] The last endorsement on the
+papers preceding General Otis's final endorsement was one by Colonel
+Crowder, now (1912) Judge Advocate General of the United States Army,
+in which he said: "I am not convinced from a careful reading of this
+report, that Private Brenner has made a false charge against Captain
+Bishop"; adding that "considerations of public policy, sufficiently
+grave to silence every other demand, require that no further action
+be taken in this case." [210] The "considerations of public policy"
+were of course those indicated in General Otis's final endorsement on
+the papers, already quoted. They were compellingly controlling, in my
+judgment, independently of the merits. Washing one's soiled linen in
+public is never advisable, and placing a weapon in your enemy's hand
+in time of war is at least equally unwise. Some shreds of this once
+much mooted matter doubtless still linger in the public memory. It
+has been thus briefly ventilated here solely to trace the genesis of
+the bitterness of that war, and of numerous later barbarities avenged
+in kind. The bitterness thus early begun grew as the war went on,
+until every time a hapless Filipino peasant soldier speaking only
+two or three words of Spanish would falsely explain, when captured,
+that he was a non-combatant, an amigo (friend), it usually at once
+filled the captor with vivid recollections of slain comrades, and of
+rumored or sometimes proven mutilation of their bodies after death,
+and these reflections would at once fill him with a yearning desire
+to blow the top of the amigo's head off, whether he yielded to the
+desire or not. Of no instance where he did so yield am I aware. But
+I do know that the invariable statement of all Filipinos unarmed and
+un-uniformed when captured, to the effect that they were amigos, became
+to the American soldier not remotely dissimilar to the waving of a red
+rag at a bull. Of course this was also due, largely, to the guerrilla
+practice of hiding guns when hard-pressed and actually plunging at
+once into some make-believe agricultural pursuit. As for Major Bishop,
+it is inconceivable to me that he gave any order to kill unarmed
+prisoners. Even admitting for the sake of the argument that he is a
+fiend, he is not a fool. As a matter of fact, he was a brave soldier,
+as all the reports show, and is a reputable lawyer, having many warm
+friends whose opinion of any man would command respect anywhere. The
+truth of the whole matter probably is that just before going into
+battle, when our troops were in an ugly temper by reason of the
+rumors of barbarities alleged to have been perpetrated by the enemy,
+or contemplated by him, the word was passed along the line to "Take no
+more prisoners than we have to," and that that thought originated with
+some irresponsible private soldier of the line inflamed by stories
+of mutilation of our dead or of maltreatment of our wounded. Such a
+"word," so passed from man to man, can, in the heat of conflict,
+very soon evolve into something having for practical purposes all
+the force and effect of an order.
+
+Through the foregoing, and like causes, including the "water cure,"
+later invented to persuade amigos to discover the whereabouts of hidden
+insurgent guns or give information as to the movements of the enemy,
+[211] our war with the Filipinos became, before it was over, a rather
+"dark and bloody" affair, accentuated as it was, from time to time,
+by occasional Filipino success in surprising detachments from ambush,
+or by taking them unawares and off their guard in their quarters,
+and eliminating them, the most notable instance of the first being
+the crumpling of a large command of the 15th Infantry by General Juan
+Cailles, in southern Luzon, and the most indelibly remembered and
+important example of the second being the massacre of the 9th Infantry
+people at Balangiga, in Samar, in the fall of 1901. Certainly more
+than one American in that long-drawn-out war did things unworthy of
+any civilized man, things he would have believed it impossible, before
+he went out there, ever to come to. Personally, I have heard, so far
+as I now recollect, of comparatively few barbarities perpetrated
+by Filipinos on captured American soldiers. Barbarities on their
+side seemed to have been reserved for those of their own race whom
+they found disloyal to the cause of their country. Personally I
+have never seen the water-cure administered. But I once went on
+a confidential mission by direction of General MacArthur, in the
+course of which I reported first, on arriving in the neighborhood
+of the contemplated destination, to a general officer of the regular
+army who is still such to-day. [212] That night the general was good
+enough to extend the usual courtesy of a cot to sleep on, in the
+headquarters building. Toward dusk I went to dine with a certain
+lieutenant, also of the regular army. [213] As we approached the
+lieutenant's quarters a sergeant came up with a prisoner, and asked
+instructions as to what to do with him. The lieutenant said: "Take
+him out and find out what he knows. Do you understand, Sergeant?" The
+sergeant saluted, answered in the affirmative, and moved away with
+his prisoner. We went in to the lieutenant's quarters, and while at
+dinner heard groans outside. I said "What is that, Jones?" [214]
+Jones said: "That's the water-cure he's giving that hombre. [215]
+Want to see it?" I replied that I certainly did not. Returning that
+night to the general's headquarters, after breakfast the next morning
+I met my friend Jones coming out of the general's office. I said:
+"What's the matter, what are you doing here," he having mentioned
+the evening before an expedition planned for the morrow. He said:
+"Well, I've just had a talk with the general to see if I could get my
+resignation from the army accepted?" "Why?" said I. "Well," was the
+reply, "that ----" (designating the prisoner of the night before by a
+double barrelled epithet) "died on me last night." Just how the matter
+was hushed up I have never known, but Jones was never punished. More
+than one general officer of the United States Army in the Philippines
+during our war with the Filipinos at least winked at the water-cure
+as a means of getting information, and quite a number of subalterns
+made a custom of applying it for that purpose. It was practically
+the only way you could get them to betray their countrymen. Did
+I report the incident to General MacArthur? Certainly not. It was
+the business of the general commanding the district. The water-cure,
+though very painful, was seldom fatal, and when not fatal was almost
+never permanently damaging, and it was about the only way to shake
+the loyalty of the average Filipino and make him give information
+as to hidden insurgent guns, guerrilla bands, etc. It was a part of
+Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+Let us now return to the early battlefields about Manila which we
+left, initially, to analyze the extreme bitterness of the feeling
+between the combatants that very early began to develop.
+
+We left war correspondent John F. Bass among the dead and dying on
+one of these fields, supposedly musing on the White Man's Burden,
+or Land-Grabbing, or Trust-for-Civilization theory, or whatever it
+was that moved the fifty-seven senators whose votes had ratified
+the treaty by a majority of just one more than the constitutionally
+necessary two-thirds.
+
+The reason the writer lays so much stress on Mr. Bass's letters to
+Harper's Weekly on the early fighting in the Philippines, is because
+his remarks come direct from the battlefield, and are, as it were,
+res gestae. They were made dum fervet opus, to use a law Latin phrase
+which in plain English means "while the iron is hot." They reflect
+more or less accurately the feelings of the men whose deeds he was
+recording. He, and O. K. Davis, now Washington correspondent of the
+New York Times, and John T. McCutcheon, of Chicago, the now famous
+cartoonist (who was with Dewey in the battle of Manila Bay), and
+Robert Collins, now London correspondent of the Associated Press, and
+"Dick" Little of the Chicago Tribune,--a little man about six feet
+three,--and lots of other good men and true, were all through that
+fighting, and we will later come to an issue of personal veracity
+between them and General Otis which culminated in the retirement from
+office of Secretary of War Alger, and ought to have resulted in the
+recall of General Otis, but did not, because to have acknowledged
+what a blunderer General Otis had been and to have relieved him from
+command, as he should have been relieved, would have been to "swap
+horses crossing a stream," as Mr. Lincoln used to put it in declining
+to change generals during a given campaign. The object here is to
+bring out the truth of history as to how the men who bore the brunt of
+the early fighting felt about it. Testimony as to what the officers
+and men of the army said would be of no value, because a complaining
+soldier's complaints are too often only a proof of "cold feet." [216]
+
+These newspaper men, not under military orders, were daily risking
+their lives voluntarily, just to keep the American public informed,
+and the American public were kept in darkness and only vouchsafed
+bulletins giving them the progressive lists of their dead and wounded,
+and this last only on demand made upon Secretary Alger by the people
+of Minnesota, the Dakotas, etc., through their senators. The War
+Department did not want the people to know, did not want to admit
+itself, how plucky, vigorous, and patriotic the resistance was. The
+period of the fighting done by the State Volunteers from February
+until fall, when public opinion finally forced the Administration
+to send General Otis an adequate force, is slurred by Secretary of
+War Root in his report for 1899. I do not mean that it was slurred
+intentionally. But the Philippines were a long way off, and Mr. Root
+and Mr. McKinley naturally relied for their information on their
+commanding general on the spot. There were gallant deeds done in the
+Philippines by those Western fellows of the State regiments which
+volunteered for the war with Spain, that would have made the little
+fighting around Santiago look like--well, to borrow from "Chimmie"
+Fadden's fertile vocabulary, "like 30 cents." But General Otis was
+not in a position to get the thrill of such things from his office
+window, so very few of them were given much prominence by him in his
+despatches to the Adjutant-General of the army. This was wise enough
+from a political standpoint, seeing that a presidential campaign
+was to ensue in 1900 predicated on the proposition that American
+sovereignty was "in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the
+great mass of the Filipinos," to use the words of the President's
+message to Congress of December, 1899.
+
+Caloocan was taken by General MacArthur on February 10th. The natural
+line of advance thereafter was of course up the railroad, because
+the insurgents held it, and needed it as much as we would. Throughout
+February there were engagements too numerous to mention. The navy also
+entertained the enemy whenever he came too near the shores of Manila
+Bay. One incident in particular is worthy of note, and worthy of
+the best traditions of the navy. I refer to the conduct of Assistant
+Engineer Emory Winship off Malabon, March 4, 1899. Malabon is five
+miles north of Manila, on the bay, not far from Caloocan. On the day
+named, a landing party of 125 men from the U. S. S. Bennington went
+ashore near Malabon to make photographs, in aid of navy gunnery, of
+certain entrenchments and buildings that had been struck by shells
+from the Monadnock. They foolishly failed to throw out scouts ahead
+of their column, and were suddenly greeted with a withering fire from
+a whole regiment of insurgents who had seen them first and lain in
+wait for them. They retired with considerably more haste than they
+had gone forth. The insurgents advanced, firing, at double quick,
+toward the comparative handful of Americans, and would undoubtedly
+have killed the last man jack of them, but Engineer Winship, who
+had been left in charge of the tug that brought the landing party
+shoreward, to keep up steam, saw the situation and promptly met it. He
+unlimbered a 37mm. Hotchkiss revolving machine gun which stood in
+the bow of the tug, and opened up with accurate aim on the advancing
+regiment of Filipinos. Naturally he at once became a more important
+target than the retreating body. Nevertheless, he kept pumping lead
+into that long howling murderous advancing brown line until, when
+within two hundred yards of where the tug lay, the line recoiled and
+retreated, and the landing party got safely back to the ship. It was,
+literally, a case of saving the lives of more than a hundred men,
+by fearless promptness and dogged tenacity in the intelligent and
+skilful performance of duty. The awnings of the tug were torn in
+shreds by the enemy's rain of bullets, and her woodwork was much
+peppered. Winship was hit five times, and still carries the bullets
+in his body, having been retired on account of disability resulting
+therefrom, after being promoted in recognition of his work.
+
+Soon after March 25th, General MacArthur, commanding the Second
+Division of the Eighth Army Corps, advanced from Caloocan up the
+railroad to Malolos, the insurgent capital, some twenty miles
+away. Malolos was taken March 31st. Our February killed were six
+officers and seventy-one enlisted men, total seventy-seven, and a total
+of 378 wounded. By the end of March the list swelled to twelve officers
+and 127 enlisted men killed, total 139, and a total of 881 wounded,
+making our total casualties, as reported April 1st, 1020. Also 15%
+of the command, or about 2500, were on sick report on that date from
+heat prostrations and the like. [217] For these and other reasons,
+farther advance up the railroad was halted for a while.
+
+Meantime, General Lawton, with his staff, consisting of Colonel
+Edwards, Major Starr, and Captains King and Sewall, "the big four" they
+were called, had come out from New York City by way of the Suez Canal,
+bringing most welcome reinforcements, the 4th and 17th Infantry. These
+people arrived between the 10th and the 22d of March. What happened
+soon after, as a result of their arrival, must now become for a brief
+moment, a part of the panorama, the lay of the land General Lawton
+first swept over being first indicated.
+
+Luzon is practically bisected, east and west, by the Pasig River
+and a lake out of which it flows almost due west into Manila Bay,
+Manila being at the mouth of the river. Under the Spaniards,
+all Luzon north of the Pasig had been one military district and
+all Luzon south of the Pasig another. The Eighth Army Corps always
+spoke of northern Luzon as "the north line," and of southern Luzon as
+"the south line." The lake above mentioned is called the Laguna de
+Bay. It is nearly as big as Manila Bay, which last is called twenty
+odd miles wide by thirty long. On the map, the Laguna de Bay roughly
+resembles a half-moon, the man in which looks north, the western
+horn being near Manila, and the eastern near the Pacific coast of
+Luzon. General Otis had learned that at a place called Santa Cruz,
+toward the eastern end of the Laguna de Bay, there were a lot of steam
+launches and a Spanish gun-boat, which, if captured, would prove
+invaluable for river fighting and transportation of supplies along
+the Rio Grande de Pampanga and the other streams that watered the
+great central plain through which the railroad ran and which would
+have to be occupied later. So as soon as possible after General
+Lawton arrived and the necessary men could be spared, he was sent
+with 1500 troops to seize and bring back the boats in question. Of
+course the country he should overrun would have to be overrun again,
+because there were not troops enough to spare to garrison and hold
+it. But for the present, the launches would help. This expedition was
+successful, leaving the head of the lake nearest Manila on April 9th,
+and returning April 17th. It met with some good hard fighting on the
+way, sweeping everything before it of course, inflicting considerable
+loss, and suffering some. General Lawton's report mentions, among
+other officers whose conspicuous gallantry and efficiency in action
+attracted his attention, Colonel Clarence R. Edwards, now Chief of
+the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, of whose conduct
+in the capture of Santa Cruz on the morning of April 10th, he says:
+"No line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently
+led." [218] The resistance was pretty real to Colonel Edwards then,
+i.e., the Benevolent Assimilation was quite strenuous, and it continued
+to be so until his great commander was shot through the breast in the
+forefront of battle in the hour of victory in December thereafter,
+and the colonel came home with the general's body. Since then the
+colonel has soldiered no more, but has remained on duty at Washington,
+the birthplace of the original theory that the Filipinos welcomed our
+rule, charged with the duty of yearning over the erring Filipino who
+thinks he can govern himself but is mistaken, and also with the still
+more difficult task of trying to live up to the original theory as
+far as circumstances will permit. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos
+would probably have gotten along much better than the Cubans if we
+had let General Lawton do there what he and General Wood were set to
+work doing in Cuba shortly after Santiago fell. Public opinion is a
+very dangerous thing to trifle with, and when, in September, 1899,
+there was a story going the rounds of the American newspapers that
+Lawton, the hero of El Caney, the man who had reflected more glory
+on American arms in striking the shackles of Spain from Cuba than any
+other one soldier in the army, had called the war in the Philippines
+"this accursed war," the War Department got busy over the cable to
+General Otis and obtained from him a denial that General Lawton had
+made such a remark. But the public knew its Lawton and what he had done
+in Cuba, and had a suspicion there might be some truth in the rumor. So
+the War Department cabled out saying "Newspapers say Lawton's denial
+insufficient," and then repeating the words attributed to him. So
+General Otis sent another denial that filled the bill. [219] Of course
+General Lawton made no such remark. He was too good a soldier. It would
+have demoralized his whole command. But I served under him in both
+hemispheres, and I will always believe that he had a certain amount
+of regret at having to fight the Filipinos to keep them from having
+independence, when they were a so much likelier lot, take it all in
+all, than the Cubans we saw about Santiago. Moreover, I believe that
+had it not been then too late to ask him, he would have subscribed
+to the opinion Admiral Dewey had cabled home the previous summer:
+"These people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable
+of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with
+both races."
+
+After the expedition down the lake, General Lawton went on "The North
+Line." So let us now turn thither also. For wherever Lawton was,
+there was fighting.
+
+In the latter half of April, General MacArthur advanced north along the
+railroad, and took Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio Grande,
+on April 28th. This was the place where under cover of "the accurate
+concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light Artillery commanded by
+Major Young" [220] a few Kansas men with ropes tied to their bodies
+swam the river in the face of a heavy fire from the enemy, fastened
+the ropes to some boats on the enemy's side, and were pulled back
+in the boats, by their comrades, to the side they had come from; the
+Kansans then crossing the river under the lead of the gallant Funston,
+and driving the enemy from his trenches. The desperate bravery of
+the performance, like so many other things General Funston did in the
+Philippines, was so superb that one forgets how contrary it was to all
+known rules of the game of war. If it was Providence that saved Funston
+and his Kansans from annihilation, certainly Providence was ably
+assisted on that occasion by Major Young and his Utah Battery. [221]
+
+Shortly after this General MacArthur entered San Fernando, the second
+insurgent capital, which is forty miles or so up the railroad from
+Manila.
+
+During the month of May General Lawton kept the insurgents busy to
+the east of the railroad, between it and the Pacific coast range,
+taking San Isidro, whither the third insurgent capital was moved after
+Malolos fell, on May 17th. Here he made his headquarters for a time,
+as did General MacArthur at San Fernando.
+
+It had been supposed that practically the whole body of the insurgent
+army was concentrated in the country to the north of Manila, but this
+proved a mistake. They now began to threaten Manila from the country
+south of the Pasig. Says General Otis:
+
+
+    The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the South and
+    it became necessary to throw him back once more. [222]
+
+
+General Lawton was directed to concentrate his troops in the country
+about San Isidro, turn them over to the command of some one else,
+and come to Manila to organize for a campaign on the south line. The
+details of this expedition belong to a military history, which this
+is not. The expedition left its initial point of concentration near
+Manila on June 9th. Its great event was the battle of Zapote River on
+June 13th. Along this river in 1896 the insurgents had gained a great
+victory over the Spaniards. They had trenches on the farther side of
+the river which they deemed impregnable. General Lawton attacked them
+in these intrenchments June 13th. At three o'clock that afternoon
+he wired General Otis at Manila giving him an idea of the battle
+and stating that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with
+determination. At 3:30 o'clock he wired:
+
+
+    We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition; we will
+    need it;
+
+
+and at 4 o'clock:
+
+
+    We have the bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not yet over. It
+    is a battle however. [223]
+
+
+It was in this battle of Zapote River that Lieutenant William L. Kenly,
+of the regular artillery, did what was perhaps the finest single bit
+of soldier work of the whole war, [224] in recognition of which his
+conduct in the battle was characterized as "magnificent" by so thorough
+a soldier as General Lawton, who recommended him to be brevetted for
+distinguished gallantry in the presence of the enemy, with this remark:
+
+
+    As General Ovenshine says, speaking of Lieutenant Kenly and
+    his battery, "This is probably the first time in history that a
+    battery has been advanced and fought without cover within thirty
+    yards of strongly manned trenches." [225]
+
+
+For what he did on that occasion, Kenly ought to have had a medal
+of honor, which, except life insurance and a good education, is the
+finest legacy any government can enable a soldier to bequeath to his
+children. If the war had been backed by the sentiment of the whole
+country, as the Spanish War was, he would have gotten it. As it was,
+the only thing he ever got for it, so far as the writer is advised,
+was to have his name spelt wrong in an account of the incident in
+the only book wherein there has yet been attempted a record of the
+many deeds of splendid daring that marked the only war into which
+this nation ever blundered. [226]
+
+While there were divers and sundry movements of our troops hither
+and thither, and much sacrifice of life, after General Lawton's
+Zapote River campaign in June, no substantial progress was made in
+conquering and occupying the Islands until the fall following the
+Zapote River campaign above mentioned, when the twenty-five regiments
+of volunteers were organized and sent out. All that was done until
+then, after the capture of San Fernando, may be summed up broadly,
+by saying that we protected Manila and held the railroad, as far as
+we had fought our way up it. It is true that the city of Iloilo had
+been occupied on February 11th, the city of Cebu shortly afterward,
+the island of Negros, an oasis of comparative quiet in a great desert
+of hostility, a little later; also that a small Spanish garrison at
+the little port of Jolo in the Mohammedan country near Borneo had
+also been relieved by a small American force on the 19th of May. But
+these irresolute movements accomplished nothing except to deprive
+our force at the front of about 4000 men and to awaken the Visayan
+Islands to active and thorough organization against us.
+
+Preparatory to an understanding of the fall campaign, in which
+patchwork and piecemeal warfare was superseded by the real thing, it
+will now be necessary to consider the political--or let us call it,
+the politico-military--aspect of the first half year of the war.
+
+General Otis's folly had led him to advise Washington as early as
+November, 1898, that he could get along with 25,000 troops, [227]
+and the Otis under-estimate of the resistance we would meet if we
+took the Islands had undoubtedly influenced Mr. McKinley in deciding
+to take them. Twenty-five thousand troops was only 5000 more than
+General Otis had with him at the time he made the recommendation, and
+signified that he was not expecting trouble. The Treaty of Paris was
+signed on December 10, 1898, and on December 16th, President McKinley's
+Secretary of War informed Congress that 25,000 troops would be enough
+for the Philippines. [228] When the treaty was ratified February 6,
+1899, the war in the Philippines had already broken out. On March 2,
+1899, two days before the 55th Congress expired, in fact on the very
+day that Congress appropriated the $20,000,000 to pay Spain for the
+Islands, an act was passed authorizing the President to enlist 35,000
+volunteers to put down the insurrection in the Islands. The term
+of enlistment of these volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901. As
+the New Thought people would say "Hold the Thought!" June 30, 1901,
+is the end of our government's fiscal year. That date, the date of
+expiration of the enlistment of the volunteer army raised under the
+act of March 2, 1899, is a convenient key to the whole history of the
+American occupation of the Philippines since the outbreak of our war
+with the Filipinos, February 4, 1899, including the titanic efforts of
+the McKinley Administration in the latter half of 1899 and the first
+half of 1900 to retrieve the Otis blunders; the premature resumption
+by Judge Taft, during and in aid of Mr. McKinley's campaign for the
+Presidency in 1900, of the original McKinley Benevolent Assimilation
+programme, on the theory, already wholly exploded by a long and bitter
+war, that the great majority of the people welcomed American rule and
+had only been coerced into opposing us; and the premature setting up
+of the Civil Government on July 4, 1901. No candid mind seeking only
+the truth of history can fail to see that when President McKinley
+sent the Taft Commission to the Philippines in the spring of 1900,
+part of their problem was to facilitate Mr. McKinley in avoiding later
+on any further call for volunteers to take the place of those whose
+terms would expire June 30, 1901. The amount of force that has been
+needed to saddle our government firmly on the Filipino people is the
+only honest test by which to examine the claim that it is unto them
+as Castoria unto children. In February, 1899, the dogs of war being
+already let loose, President McKinley had resumed his now wholly
+impossible Benevolent Assimilation programme, by sending out the
+Schurman Commission, which was the prototype of the Taft Commission,
+to yearningly explain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make
+clear to them how unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The
+scheme was like trying to put salt on a bird's tail after you have
+flushed him. This commission was headed by President Schurman, of
+Cornell University. It arrived in March, armed with instructions
+as benevolent in their rhetoric as any the Filipinos had ever read
+in the days of our predecessors in sovereignty, the Spaniards. And
+the commission were of course duly astounded that their publication
+had no effect. The Filipinos in Manila tore them down as soon as
+they were put up. The instructions clothed the commission with
+authority to yield every point in issue except the only one in
+dispute--Independence. On this alone they were firm. But so were
+the people who had already submitted the issue to the arbitrament
+of war. Of course the Schurman Commission, therefore, accomplished
+nothing. It held frequent communication with the enemy in the field
+and came near an open rupture with General Otis, who was nominally a
+member of it. But even that unwise man knew war when he saw it, and
+knew the futility of trying to mix peace with war. War being hell,
+the sooner 'tis over the better for all concerned. After Professor
+Schurman had been quite optimistically explaining our intentions for
+about three months, under the tragically mistaken notion Mr. McKinley
+had originally derived from General Otis that the insurrection had
+been brought about by "the sinister ambition of a few leaders,"
+[229] General Otis wired Washington, on June 4th, "Negotiations and
+conferences with insurgent leaders cost soldiers' lives and prolong our
+difficulties," [230] adding with regard to the Schurman Commission:
+"Ostensibly it will be supported * * * here, and to the outside
+world gentle peace shall prevail," but intimating that he would be
+very much gratified if the Department would allow him to handle the
+enemy, and stop Dr. Schurman from having their leaders come in under
+flags of truce to parley. After that Dr. Schurman's activities seem
+to have been confined to the less mischievous business of gathering
+statistics. His mistake was simply the one he had brought with him,
+derived from President McKinley. He came back home, however, thoroughly
+satisfied that the Filipinos did of a verity want the independence
+they were fighting for, and quite as sure that republics should not
+have colonies as General Anderson's experience had previously made
+him. It has long been known throughout the length and breadth of the
+United States that Dr. Schurman is in favor of Philippine independence.
+
+On June 26th, just thirteen days after the Zapote River fight had
+stopped the insurgents on the south line from threatening almost the
+very gates of the city of Manila itself, General Otis had another
+attack of optimism. On that date he wired Washington: "Insurgent cause
+may collapse at any time." [231] Finally, the war correspondents at
+Manila, wearied with the military press censorship whereby General
+Otis had so long kept the situation from the people at home, with his
+eternal "situation-well-in-hand" telegrams, got together, inspired no
+doubt by the example of the Roosevelt round robin that had rescued the
+Fifth Army Corps from Cuba after the fighting down there, and prepared
+a round robin of their own--a protest against further misrepresentation
+of the facts. This they of course knew General Otis would not let
+them cable home. However, they asked his permission to do so, the
+committee appointed to beard the lion in his den being O. K. Davis,
+John T. McCutcheon, Robert Collins, and John F. Bass. General Otis
+threatened to "put them off the island." This did not bother them in
+the least. General Otis told the War Department afterwards that he
+did not punish them because they were "courting martyrdom," or words
+to that effect. As a matter of fact, they were merely determined that
+the American people should know the facts. That of "putting them off
+the island" was just a fussy phrase of "Mother" Otis, long familiar to
+them. They were under his jurisdiction. But they were Americans, and
+reputable gentlemen, and he knew he was responsible for their right
+treatment. After General Otis had duly put the expected veto on the
+proposed cablegram of protest, the newspaper men sent their protest
+over to Hong Kong by mail, and had it cabled to the United States from
+there. It was published in the newspapers of this country July 17,
+1899. A copy of it may be found in any public library which keeps
+the bound copies of the great magazines, in the Review of Reviews
+for August, 1899, pp. 137-8. It read as follows:
+
+
+    The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American
+    newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following statement:
+
+    We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made
+    public in Washington, the people of the United States have not
+    received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines,
+    but that those despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view
+    that is not shared by the general officers in the field.
+
+    We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing
+    conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension
+    and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to
+    the brigand character of their army.
+
+    We believe the despatches err in the declaration that "the
+    situation is well in hand," and in the assumption that the
+    insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased
+    force.
+
+    We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been
+    under-estimated, and that the statements are unfounded that
+    volunteers are willing to engage in further service.
+
+    The censorship has compelled us to participate in this
+    misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements
+    of facts on the plea that "they would alarm the people at home,"
+    or "have the people of the United States by the ears."
+
+
+The men of the pen had been so long under military rule and had seen
+so much of courts-martial that their document savored of military
+jurisprudence. After making the above charges, it set forth what it
+called "specifications." These were:
+
+
+    Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports
+    of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat
+    prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval
+    operations; and suppression of complete reports of the situation.
+
+
+The paper was signed by John T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong,
+representing the Chicago Record; O. K. Davis and P. G. MacDonnell,
+representing the New York Sun; Robert M. Collins, John P. Dunning,
+and L. Jones, representing the Associated Press; John F. Bass and
+William Dinwiddie, representing the New York Herald; E. D. Skeene,
+representing the Scripps-McRae Association; and Richard Little,
+representing the Chicago Tribune. Mr. Collins, the Associated Press
+representative, wrote his people an account of this whole episode,
+which was also given wide publicity. After describing the committee's
+interview with the General down to a certain point, he says:
+
+
+    But when General Otis came down to the frank admission that it
+    was his purpose to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the
+    public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in
+    ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "My instructions
+    are to let nothing go that can hurt the Administration," we
+    concluded that protest was justifiable.
+
+
+Collins had written what he considered a conservative review of
+the situation in June, saying reinforcements were needed. Of the
+suppression of this he says:
+
+
+    The censor's comment (I made a note of it) was: "Of course we all
+    know that we are in a terrible mess out here, but we don't want the
+    people to get excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet
+    now we will pull through in time [232] without any fuss at home!"
+
+
+Mr. Collins's letter proceeds: "When I went to see him [Otis] he
+repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to pieces."
+
+As to the charge of suppressing the real condition of our sick in
+the hospitals, Mr. Collins says that General Otis remarked that the
+"hospitals were full of perfectly well men who were shirking and should
+be turned out." On June 2, 1899, according to General Otis's report
+(p. 121), sixty per cent. of one of the State volunteer regiments
+were in hospital sick or wounded and there were in its ranks an
+average of but eight men to a company fit for duty. The report of
+the regimental surgeon stating this was forwarded by General Otis
+to Washington with the comment that there were few cases of serious
+illness; that the then "present station of these troops"--the place
+where the fighting was hottest, San Fernando--"is considered by the
+Filipinos as a health resort," and that "when orders to take passage
+to the United States are issued, both the Montana and South Dakota
+troops will recover with astonishing rapidity." [233]
+
+This round robin of course produced a profound sensation in the United
+States. It was just what the American public had long suspected was
+the case. Shortly afterward Secretary of War Alger resigned. Coming
+as it did on the heels of the scandal about "embalmed beef" having
+been furnished to the army in Cuba, it made him too much of a load
+for the Administration to carry. He was succeeded by Mr. Root,
+an eminent member of the New York Bar, whose masterful mind soon
+saw the essentials of the situation and proceeded to get a volunteer
+army recruited, equipped, and sent to the Philippines without further
+unnecessary delay.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+OTIS AND THE WAR (Continued)
+
+              And now, a man of head being at the centre of it,
+              the whole matter gets vital.--Carlyle's French Revolution.
+
+
+There can surely be little doubt in any quarter that Mr. Root is, in
+intellectual endowment and equipment at least, one of the greatest,
+if he is not the greatest, of living American statesmen. Mankind will
+always yield due acclaim to men who, in great emergencies, see the
+essentials of a given situation, and at once proceed to get the thing
+done that ought to be done. Whether the war in the Philippines was
+regrettable or not, it had become, by midsummer of 1899, supremely
+important, from any rational and patriotic standpoint, to end it as
+soon as possible.
+
+Mr. Root had not been in office as Secretary of War very long before
+fleets of troop-ships, carrying some twenty-five well-equipped
+volunteer regiments, [234] were swarming out of New York harbor
+bound for Manila by way of the Suez Canal, and out of the Golden
+Gate for the same destination via Honolulu. Nor was there any
+confusion as in the Cuban helter-skelter. Everything went as if by
+clockwork. Moreover, along with the new and ample force, went a clear,
+masterly, comprehensive plan of campaign, prepared, not by General
+Otis at Manila, but in the War Department at Washington, by officers
+already familiar with the islands.
+
+It was the purpose of this government at last to demonstrate
+conclusively to the Filipino people that the representative of the
+United States at Manila was "the boss of the show," and that Aguinaldo
+was not--a demonstration then sorely needed by the exigencies of
+American prestige. The purpose can readily be appreciated, but to
+understand the plan of campaign, and the method of its execution,
+somewhat of the geography of Luzon must now be considered. Before
+we approach the shores of Luzon and the city of Manila, however,
+let us consider from a distance, in a bird's-eye view, as it were,
+the relation of Luzon to the rest of the archipelago, so as to know,
+in a comprehensive way, what we are "going out for to see." We may as
+well pause at this point, long enough to learn all we will ever need to
+know, for the purposes of the scope of this narrative, concerning the
+general geography of the Philippine archipelago, and the governmental
+problems it presents. (See folding map at end of volume.)
+
+It is a common saying that Paris is France. In the same sense Manila
+is the Philippines. In fact, the latter expression is more accurate
+than the former, for Manila, besides being the capital city of the
+country, and its chief port, is a city of over 200,000 people, while
+no one of the two or three cities next to it in rank in population
+had more than 20,000. [235] By parity of reasoning it may be said that
+Luzon was the Philippines, so far as the problem which confronted us
+when we went there was concerned, relatively both to the original
+conception in 1898 of the struggle for independence, its birth in
+1899, its life, and its slow, lingering obstinate death in 1900-1902,
+in which last year the insurrection was finally correctly stated
+to be practically ended. To know just how and why this was true,
+is necessary to a clear understanding of that struggle, including
+not only its genesis and its exodus, but also its gospels, its acts,
+its revelations, and the multitudinous subsequent commentaries thereon.
+
+The total land area of the Philippine archipelago, according to the
+American Census of 1903, is 115,000 square miles. [236] The area of
+Luzon, the principal island, on which Manila is situated, is 41,000
+square miles, and that of Mindanao, the only other large island, is
+36,000. [237] Between these two large islands, Luzon on the north,
+and Mindanao on the south, there are a number of smaller ones,
+but acquaintance with only six of these is essential to a clear
+understanding of the American occupation. Many Americans, too busy
+to have paid much attention to the Philippine Islands, which are,
+and must ever remain, a thing wholly apart from American life, have a
+vague notion that there are several thousand of them. This is true, in
+a way. American energy has made, for the first time in their history,
+an actual count of them, "including everything which at high tide
+appeared as a separate island." [238] The work was done for our Census
+of 1903 by Mr. George R. Putnam, now head of the Lighthouse Board of
+the United States. Mr. Putnam, counted 3141 of them. [239] Of these,
+of course, many--many hundred perhaps--are merely rocks fit only for a
+resting place for birds. 2775, have an area of less than a square mile
+each, 262 have an area of between 1 and 10 square miles, 73 between 10
+and 100 square miles, and 20 between 100 and 1000 square miles. This
+accounts for, and may dismiss at once from consideration 3130--all but
+11. Most of these 3130 that are large enough to demand even so much
+as a single word here are poorly adapted to human habitation, being
+in most instances, without good harbors or other landing places, and
+usually covered either with dense jungle or inhospitable mountains, or
+both. Their total area is only about 8500 square miles, of the 115,500
+square miles of land in the archipelago. None of them have ever had
+any political significance, either in Spain's time, or our own, and
+therefore, the whole 3130 may at once be eliminated from consideration,
+leaving 11 only requiring any special notice at all--the 11 largest
+islands. Of these, Luzon and Mindanao have already been mentioned. The
+remaining 9, with their respective areas and populations, are:
+
+
+    Island                Area [240]        Population [241]
+                          in Square Miles
+
+    Panay                 4,611               743,646
+    Negros                4,881               560,776
+    Cebu                  1,762               592,247
+    Bohol                 1,411               243,148
+    Samar                 5,031               222,690
+    Leyte                 2,722 [242]         357,641
+    Mindoro               3,851                28,361
+    Masbate               1,236                29,451
+    Paragua               4,027 [243]          10,918
+                         ------             ---------
+         Total           29,532             2,788,878
+
+
+The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141
+islands to eleven, the last three of the nine contained in the above
+table may also be eliminated as follows: (See map at end of volume.)
+
+Paragua, the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of any
+map of the archipelago, extending northeast southwest at an angle
+of about 45 deg., is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much
+except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used.
+
+Masbate--easily located on the map at a glance, because the twelfth
+parallel of north latitude intersects the 124th meridian of longitude
+east of Greenwich in its southeast corner--though noted for cattle
+and other quadrupeds, is not essential to a clear understanding of
+the human problem in its broader governmental aspects.
+
+Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzon,
+pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is
+thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part
+of its area, has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious),
+is also very sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever,
+cut any figure politically, as a disturbing factor. [244]
+
+Eliminating Paragua, Masbate, and Mindoro as not essential to a
+substantially correct general idea of the strategic and governmental
+problems presented by the Philippine Islands, we have left, besides
+Luzon and Mindanao, nothing but the half-dozen islands which appear
+in large type in the above table: Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar,
+Leyte, with a total area of 20,500 square miles. Add these to Luzon's
+41,000 square miles and Mindanao's 36,000, and you have the Philippine
+archipelago as we are to consider it in this book, that is to say,
+two big islands with a half dozen little ones in between, the eight
+having a total area of 97,500 square miles, of which the two big
+islands represent nearly four-fifths.
+
+While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with
+its 36,000 square miles [245] of area, requires that the Philippine
+archipelago be described as stretching over more than 1000 miles
+from north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains
+about 500,000 people all told, [246] half of them semi-civilized,
+[247] the governmental problem it presents has no more to do with
+the main problem of whether, if ever, we are to grant independence
+to the 7,000,000 Christians of the other islands, than the questions
+that have to be passed on by our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have
+to do with the tariff.
+
+Mindanao's 36,000 square miles constitute nearly a third of
+the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that
+fraction of the 97,500 square miles of territory to a consideration
+of which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination
+above indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan,
+semi-civilized Moros would indeed be "like granting self-government
+to an Apache reservation under some local chief," as Mr. Roosevelt,
+in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to grant
+self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo. [248] Furthermore, the Moros,
+so far as they can think, would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be
+entitled to recognition as subjects of, some great nation. [249]
+Again, because, the Filipinos have no moral right to control
+the Moros, and could not if they would, the latter being fierce
+fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate
+domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate of
+the consent-of-the-governed principle has not a leg to stand on
+with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it,
+we have a distinct and separate problem, which cannot be solved
+in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which
+need not in the least delay the advent of independence for the
+other fourteen-fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago
+[250]--all Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is
+true that there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in
+policing the Moros, our government would of course protect them from
+the Moros. If they did not like our government, they could move to
+such parts of the island as we might permit to be incorporated in an
+ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of
+the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo
+(the "Sulu Archipelago," so called, "reigned over" by the Sultan of
+comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always present,
+a distinct and separate problem, and never did have anything more
+to do with the Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins
+and co-religionists over in nearby Borneo, the task which confronted
+Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine
+insurrection, meant, practically, the subjugation of one big island,
+Luzon, containing half the population and one-third the total area of
+the archipelago, and six neighboring smaller ones, the Visayan Islands.
+
+And now let us concentrate our attention upon Luzon as Mr. Root
+no doubt did, with infinite pains, in the fall of 1899. Of the
+7,600,000 people of the Philippines [251] almost exactly one-half,
+i.e., 3,800,000, [252] live on Luzon, and these are practically all
+civilized. [253] It so happens that the State of our Union which is
+nearer the size of Luzon than any other is the one which furnished
+the first American Civil Governor for the Philippine Islands, Governor
+Taft. President Taft's native State of Ohio is 41,061 square miles in
+area, and Luzon is 40,969. [254] Roughly speaking, Luzon may also be
+said to be about the size of Cuba, [255] though it is about twice as
+thickly populated as the latter, Cuba, having something over 2,000,000
+people to Luzon's nearly 4,000,000. [256]
+
+By all Americans in the Philippines since our occupation, the island
+of Luzon is always contemplated as consisting of two parts, to wit,
+northern Luzon, or that part north of Manila, and southern Luzon,
+the part south of Manila. The great central plain of Luzon, lying
+just north of Manila, is nearly as large as the republic of Salvador,
+or the State of New Jersey, i.e., in the neighborhood of 7000 square
+miles area [257]--and, like Salvador, it contains a population of
+something over 1,000,000 inhabitants. The area and population of the
+five provinces of this plain are, according to the Philippine Census
+of 1903, as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area [258] (sq. m.)    Population [259]
+
+    Pangasinan            1,193                      397,902
+    Pampanga                868                      223,754
+    Bulacan               1,173                      223,742
+    Tarlac                1,205                      135,107
+    Nueva Ecija           1,950                      134,147
+                          -----                    ---------
+                          6,389                    1,114,652
+
+
+Roughly speaking, the central plain comprising the above five provinces
+is bounded as follows: On the north by mountains and Lingayen Gulf, on
+the east by a coast range of mountains separating it from the Pacific
+Ocean, on the west by a similar range separating it from the China
+Sea, and on the south by Manila Bay and mountains. The Rio Grande de
+Pampanga flows obliquely across it in a southwesterly direction into
+Manila Bay, and near its western edge runs the railroad from Manila
+to Dagupan on Lingayen gulf. Dagupan is 120 miles from Manila. This
+plain, held by a well-equipped insurgent army backed by the moral
+support of the whole population, became the theatre of war as soon
+as the volunteers of 1899 began to arrive at Manila, the insurgent
+capital being then at Tarlac, a place about two-thirds of the way up
+the railroad from Manila to Dagupan.
+
+Of course the first essential thing to do was to break the backbone
+of the insurgent army, and scatter it, and the next thing to do was
+to capture Aguinaldo, the head and front of the whole business, the
+incarnation of the aspirations of the Filipino people. The operations
+to this end commenced in October, and involved three movements of
+three separate forces:
+
+(1) A column under General Lawton, proceeding up the Rio Grande
+and along the northeastern borders of the plain, and bending around
+westward along its northern boundary toward the gulf of Lingayen,
+garrisoning the towns en route, and occupying the mountain passes
+on the northeast which give exit over the divide into the great
+valleys beyond.
+
+(2) An expedition under General Wheaton, some 2500 in all, proceeding
+by transports to the gulf of Lingayen, the chief port of which,
+Dagupan, was the northern terminus of the railroad; the objective
+being to land on the shore of that gulf at the northwest corner of
+the plain, occupy the great coast road which runs from that point to
+the northern extremity of the island, and also to proceed eastward
+and effect a junction with the Lawton column.
+
+(3) A third column under General MacArthur, proceeding up the railroad
+to the capture of Tarlac, the third insurgent capital, and thence
+still up the railroad to its end at Dagupan, driving the enemy's
+forces before it toward the line held by the first two columns.
+
+On October 12th, General Lawton moved up the Rio Grande from a place
+called Aryat, a few miles up stream from where the railroad crosses the
+river at Calumpit, driving the insurgents before him to the northward
+and westward. His command was made up mainly from the 3d Cavalry and
+the 22d Infantry, together with several hundred scouts, American and
+Maccabebee. On the 20th San Isidro was again captured. That was the
+place Lawton had evacuated in May previous. Arriving in the Islands
+with Colonel E. E. Hardin's regiment, the 29th U. S. Volunteer
+Infantry, on November 3, 1899, the writer was immediately detailed
+to the Maccabebee scouts, to take the place of Lieutenant Boutelle,
+of the regular artillery, a young West Pointer from Oregon, who had
+been killed a day or two previous, and reported to Major C. G. Starr,
+General Lawton's Adjutant-General in the field (whom he had known at
+Santiago de Cuba the previous year) at San Isidro on or about November
+8th. Major Starr said: "We took this town last spring," stating how
+much our loss had been in so doing, "but, partly as a result of the
+Schurman Commission parleying with the insurgents General Otis had
+us fall back. We have just had to take it again." General Lawton
+garrisoned San Isidro this time once for all, and pressed on north,
+capturing the successive towns en route. Meantime, General Young's
+cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts under Major Batson, a lieutenant
+of the regular army, and a medal-of-honor graduate of the Santiago
+campaign, were operating to the west of the general line of advance,
+striking insurgent detachments wherever found and driving them toward
+the line of the railroad. By November 13th, Lawton's advance had
+turned to the westward, according to the concerted plan of campaign
+above described, garrisoning, as fast as they were taken, such of the
+towns of the country over which he swept as there were troops to spare
+for. We knew that Aguinaldo had been at Tarlac when the advance began,
+and every officer and enlisted man of the command was on the qui vive
+to catch him. By November 18th, General Lawton's forces held a line of
+posts extending up the eastern side of the plain, and curving around
+across the northern end to within a few miles of the gulf of Lingayen.
+
+On November 6th, General Wheaton set sail from Manila for Lingayen
+Gulf, with 2500 men of the 13th Regular and 33d Volunteer Infantry,
+and a platoon of the 6th Artillery, convoyed by the ships of the
+navy, and next day the expedition was successfully landed at San
+Fabian, "with effective assistance from the naval convoy against
+spirited resistance," says Secretary of War Root, in his annual
+report for 1899. The navy's assistance on that occasion was indeed
+"effective," but such passing mention hardly covers the case. In
+the first place, they selected the landing point, their patrols
+being already familiar with the coasts. As soon as the transports
+were sighted, about eleven o'clock on the morning of November
+7th, Commander Knox, the senior officer present, who commanded the
+Princeton, and Commander Moore, of the Helena, went out to meet and
+confer with General Wheaton. This done, the landing was effected
+under protection of the navy's guns. Besides the naval vessels
+above named, there were also present the Bennington under Commander
+Arnold, the Manila under Lieutenant-Commander Nazro, and two captured
+Spanish gun-boats small enough to get close in shore, the Callao,
+and the Samar. The troops were disembarked in two columns of small
+boats towed by launches. Lieutenant-Commander Tappan in charge of
+the Callao, and Ensign Mustin, commanding the Samar, were especially
+commended in the despatches of Admiral Watson, commander-in-chief
+of the Asiatic squadron. Both bombarded the insurgent trenches
+at close range during the landing, and Mustin actually steamed in
+between the insurgents and the head of the column of troop-boats,
+so as to intercept and receive the brunt of their fire himself, and,
+selecting a point about seventy-five yards from the enemy's trenches
+whence he could effectually pepper them, ran his ship aground so she
+would stick, and commenced rapid firing at point blank range, driving
+the enemy from his trenches, and enabling Colonel Hare of the 33d,
+and those who followed, to land without being subjected to further
+fire while on the water. [260]
+
+On the 11th of November, Colonel Hare with the 33d Volunteer Infantry
+and one Gatling gun under Captain Charles R. Howland of the 28th
+Volunteer Infantry, a lieutenant of the regular army, and a member of
+General Wheaton's staff, proceeded southeastward to San Jacinto, and
+attacked and routed some 1200 to 1600 intrenched insurgents, Major John
+A. Logan being among our killed. The enemy left eighty-one dead in the
+trenches, and suffered a total loss estimated at three hundred. While
+space does not permit dwelling on the details of engagements, it may be
+remarked here, once for all, that the 33d Volunteer Infantry, Colonel
+Luther R. Hare commanding, made more reputation than any other of the
+twenty-five regiments of the volunteer army of 1899, except, possibly,
+Colonel J. Franklin Bell's regiment, the 36th. This is no reflection on
+the rest. These two were lucky enough to have more opportunities. In
+meeting his opportunities, however, Colonel Hare, like Colonel Bell,
+proved himself a superb soldier; his field-officers, especially Major
+March, [261] were particularly indefatigable; and his men were mostly
+Texans, accustomed to handling a rifle with effect. Space also forbids
+following Captain Howland and his Gatling gun into the engagement of
+November 11th, but from the uniformity with which General Wheaton's
+official reports commend his young aide's bravery and efficiency
+on numerous occasions in 1899-1900, it may be safely assumed that
+those qualities were behind that Gatling gun at San Jacinto. There
+was a vicious rumor started after the San Jacinto fight and given wide
+circulation in the United States, that Major Logan was shot in the back
+by his own men. I saw a major surgeon a few days later who had been
+an eye-witness to his death. He said an insurgent sharpshooter shot
+Major Logan from a tree, and that the said sharpshooter was promptly
+thereafter dropped from his perch full of 33d Infantry bullets. Says
+General Wheaton's despatch of November 12th: "Major Logan fell while
+gallantly leading his battalion." [262]
+
+On November 5th, General MacArthur, with a strong column, composed
+mainly of the 9th, 17th, and 36th Regiments of Infantry, two troops of
+the 4th Cavalry, two platoons of the 1st Artillery, and a detachment
+of scouts, advanced up the railroad from Angeles, in execution of his
+part of the programme. [263] Angeles is some distance up the railroad
+from Calumpit, where the railroad crosses the Rio Grande. [264]
+General MacArthur's column encountered and overwhelmed the enemy
+at every point, entering Tarlac on November 12th, and effecting a
+junction with General Wheaton at Dagupan, the northern terminus of
+the Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 120 miles from Manila, on November 20th.
+
+After General Lawton had finished his part of the round-up, he had
+a final conference with General Young on November 18th at Pozorubio,
+which is near the northeastern border of the plain, bade him good-bye,
+and soon afterward went south to dispose of a body of insurgents who
+were giving trouble near Manila. It was in this last expedition that
+he lost his life at San Mateo about twelve miles out of Manila on
+December 19, 1899.
+
+The first of the two purposes of the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur
+northern advance, viz., the dispersion of the insurgent army of
+northern Luzon had been duly accomplished. The other purpose had
+failed of realization. Aguinaldo had not been captured. He escaped
+through our lines.
+
+Such is in brief the story of the destruction of the Aguinaldo
+government in 1899 by General Otis, or rather by Mr. Root. But the
+trouble about it was that it would not stay destroyed. It "played
+possum" for a while, the honorable President retiring to permanent
+headquarters in the mountains "with his government concealed about
+his person," as Senator Lodge put it later in a summary of the case
+for the Administration, before the Senate, in the spring of 1900. If
+the distinguished and accomplished senator from Massachusetts, in
+adding at that time to the gaiety of nations, had had access to a
+certain diary kept by one of Aguinaldo's personal staff throughout
+that period, subsequently submitted, in 1902, to the Senate Committee
+of that year, he could have swelled the innocuous merriment with such
+cheery entries as "Here we tightened our belts and went to bed on
+the ground"--the time alluded to being midnight after a hard day's
+march without food, the place, some chilly mountain top up which the
+"Honorable Presidente" and party had that day been guided by the
+ever-present and ever-willing paisano (fellow countryman) of the
+immediate neighborhood--whatever the neighborhood--to facilitate them
+in eluding General Young's hard riding cavalry and scouts. The writer
+has no quarrel with Senator Lodge's witticism above quoted, having
+derived on reading it, in full measure, the suggestive amusement it
+was intended to afford. It is true that about all then left of the
+"Honorable Presidente's" government, for the nonce, was in fact
+concealed about his person. It was of a nature easily portable. It
+needed neither bull trains, pack ponies, nor coolies to carry it. It
+consisted solely of the loyal support of the whole people, who looked
+to him as the incarnation of their aspirations. Said General MacArthur
+to the Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo: "He was the
+incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos." "Senator Culberson:
+'And represented the Filipino people?' General MacArthur: 'I think so;
+yes'." [265] We of the 8th Army Corps did not know what a complete
+structure the Philippine republic of 1898-9 was until, having shot
+it to pieces, we had abundant leisure to examine the ruins. To admit,
+in the same breath, participation in that war and profound regret that
+it ever had occurred, is not an incriminating admission. In this case
+as in any other where you have done another a wrong, by thrashing him
+or otherwise, under a mistake of fact, the first step toward righting
+the wrong is to frankly acknowledge it. As soon as Aguinaldo's flight
+and wanderings terminated in the finding of permanent headquarters,
+he began sending messages to his various generals all over Luzon and
+the other islands, and wherever those orders were not intercepted they
+were delivered and loyally obeyed. This kept up until General Funston
+captured him in 1901. One traitor among all those teeming millions
+might have betrayed his whereabouts, but none appeared. The obstinate
+character and long continuance of the warfare in northern Luzon after
+the great round-up which terminated with the final junction of the
+Lawton, Wheaton, and MacArthur columns near Dagupan, as elsewhere
+later throughout the archipelago, was at first very surprising to our
+generals. It had been supposed that to disperse the insurgent army
+would end the insurrection. As events turned out, it only made the
+resistance more effective. So long as the insurgents kept together
+in large bodies they could not hide. And as they were poor marksmen,
+while the men behind our guns, like most other young Americans,
+knew something about shooting, the ratio of their casualties to ours
+was about 16 to 1. [266] When General MacArthur began his advance
+on Tarlac, General Lawton his great march up the valley of the Rio
+Grande, and General Wheaton his closing in from Dagupan, Aguinaldo
+with his cabinet, generals, and headquarters troops abandoned Tarlac,
+their capital, and went up the railroad to Bayambang. Here they held
+a council of war, which General MacArthur describes in his report
+for 1900 (from information obtained later on) as follows:
+
+
+    At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, about November
+    12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the
+    Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the effect
+    that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance
+    in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the
+    army, the generals and the men to return to their own provinces,
+    with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by
+    means of guerrilla warfare. [267]
+
+
+This had been the plan from the beginning, the council of war
+simply determining that the time to put the plan into effect had
+arrived. Accordingly, the uniformed insurgent battalions and regiments
+broke up into small bands which maintained a most persistent guerrilla
+warfare for years thereafter. During those years they seldom wore
+uniforms, disappearing and hiding their guns when hotly pursued,
+and reappearing as non-combatant peasants interrupted in agricultural
+pursuits, with invariable protestations of friendship. Hence all such
+came to be known as amigos (friends), and the word amigo, or friend,
+became a bitter by-word, meaning to all American soldiers throughout
+the archipelago an enemy falsely claiming to be a friend. And every
+Filipino was an "amigo."
+
+Still, the volunteers had arrived in time to enable Mr. Root to make
+a very nice showing to Congress, and through it to the people, in his
+annual report to the President for 1899, dated November 29th. This
+report is full of cheerful chirps from General Otis to the effect
+that the resistance was practically ended, and the substance of the
+information it conveyed duly found its way into the President's message
+of December of that year and through it to the general public. One
+of the Otis despatches said: "Claim to government by insurgents can
+be made no longer." [268] This message went on to state that nothing
+was now left but "banditti," and that the people are all friendly
+to our troops. Thus misled, Mr. Root repeated to the President and
+through him to Congress and the country the following nonsense:
+
+
+    It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away from the
+    immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of the country
+    exceedingly friendly * * *. This was doubtless due in some measure
+    to the fact that the Pampangos, who inhabit the provinces of
+    Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan,
+    as well as the other more northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the
+    Tagalogs, and had simply submitted to the military domination of
+    that tribe, from which they were glad to be relieved.
+
+
+In characterizing this as nonsense no disrespect is intended to
+Mr. Root. He did not know any better. He was relying on General
+Otis. But it is sorely difficult to convey in written words what
+utter nonsense those expressions about "the Pampangos" and "the
+Pangasinanes" are to any one who was in that northern advance in the
+fall of 1899. Imagine a British cabinet minister making a report to
+Parliament in 1776 couched in the following words, to wit:
+
+
+    The Massachusetts-ites, who inhabit Massachusetts, and the
+    Virginia-ites who inhabit Virginia, as well as most of the other
+    inhabitants are unfriendly to the New York-ites, and have simply
+    submitted to the military domination of the last named,
+
+
+and you have a faint idea of the accuracy of Mr. Root's report. It is
+quite true that the Tagalos were the prime movers in the insurrection
+against us, as they had been in all previous insurrections against
+Spain. But the "Tagalo tribe" was no more alone among the Filipino
+people in their wishes and views than the "unterrified" Tammany tribe
+who inhabit the wilds of Manhattan Island, at the mouth of the Hudson
+River, are alone in their views among our people.
+
+On page 70 of this report, Secretary Root reproduces a telegram from
+General Otis dated November 18, 1899, stating that on the road from
+San Nicolas to San Manuel, a day or so previous, General Lawton was
+"cordially received by the inhabitants." He announces in the same
+telegram the drowning of Captain Luna, a volunteer officer from New
+Mexico, who was one of General Lawton's aides, and had been a captain
+in Colonel Roosevelt's regiment of Rough Riders before Santiago. The
+writer happens to have been on that ride with General Lawton from San
+Nicolas to San Manuel, and was within a dozen feet of Captain Luna
+when the angry current of the Agno River caught him and his pony
+in its grip and swept both out of sight forever, along with divers
+troopers of the 4th Cavalry, horses and riders writhing to their
+death in one awful, tangled, struggling mass. He can never forget
+the magnificent dash back into the wide, ugly, swollen stream made
+by Captain Edward L. King of General Lawton's staff, as he spurred
+his horse in, followed by several troopers who had responded to his
+call for mounted volunteers to accompany him in an effort to save the
+lives of the men who went down. Their generous work proved futile. But
+it was inspired partly by common dread of what they knew would happen
+to any half-drowned soldier who might be washed ashore far away from
+the column and captured. If an army was ever "in enemy's country" it
+was then and there. When we reached San Manuel that night, Captains
+King and Sewall, the two surviving personal aides of General Lawton's
+staff, and the writer, stopped, along with the general, in a little
+nipa shack on the roadside. General Lawton, was in an upper room busy
+with couriers and the like, but downstairs King, Sewall, and myself
+set to work to buscar [269] something to eat. I got hold of an hombre
+(literally, a man; colloquially a native peasant man), who went to work
+with apparent alacrity, and managed to provide three ravenously hungry
+young men with a good meal of chicken, eggs, and rice. After supper,
+being new in the country, the writer remarked to the general on the
+alacrity of the hombre. I had brought out from the United States the
+notions there current about the nature of the resistance. General
+Lawton said, with a humorous twinkle in those fine eyes of his:
+"Humph! If you expected to be killed the next minute if you didn't
+find a chicken, you'd probably find one too." It is true that in the
+course of the campaign General Young sent a telegram to General Otis
+at Manila characterizing his reception at the hands of the natives as
+friendly. This was prompted by our column being met as it would come
+into a town by the town band. It did not take long to see through
+this, and other like hypocrisy entirely justifiable in war, though
+such tactics deceived us for a little while at first into thinking
+the people were genuine amigos (friends). General Otis, not being near
+the scene, remained under our original brief illusion. Let us return,
+however, from Mr. Root's "patient and unconsenting millions dominated
+by the Tagalo tribe," of 1899, to the facts, and follow the course
+of events succeeding Lawton's junction with Wheaton and MacArthur
+and his farewell to Young.
+
+General Young, with his cavalry, and the Maccabebee scouts, continued
+in pursuit of Aguinaldo through the passes of the mountains, the
+latter having managed to run the gauntlet of our lines successfully
+by a very close shave. How narrowly he escaped is illustrated by
+the fact that after a fight we had at the Aringay River on November
+19th, in which Major Batson was wounded while gallantly directing
+the crossing of the river, we remained that night in the town of
+Aringay, and at the very time we were "hustling for chow" in Aringay,
+Aguinaldo was in the village of Naguilian an hour or so distant,
+as was authoritatively ascertained long afterward from a captured
+diary of one of his staff officers. [270]
+
+General Young proceeded up the coast road, in hot haste, taking
+one town, San Fernando de Union, after a brief engagement led by
+the general in person--imagine a brigadier-general leading a charge
+at the head of thirty-seven men!--but Aguinaldo had turned off to
+the right and taken to the mountains. General Lawton wired General
+Otis about that time, in effect, in announcing Aguinaldo's escape
+through our lines and his own tireless brigade-commander's bold dash
+in pursuit of him with an inadequate force of cavalry hampered by
+lack of horseshoes and nails for the same, "If Young does not catch
+Aguinaldo, he will at least make him very unhappy." The Young column
+garrisoned the towns along the route over which it went, occupying
+all the western part of Northern Luzon, hereafter described, and also
+later on rescued Lieutenant Gilmore of the navy, Mr. Albert Sonnichsen,
+previously an enlisted man and since a writer of some note, and other
+American prisoners who had been in the hands of the insurgents for
+many months. General Young finally made his headquarters at Vigan,
+in the province of Ilocos Sur, a fine town in a fine country. The
+Ilocanos are called "the Yankees of the Philippines," on account of
+their energy and industry. Vigan is on the China sea coast of Luzon
+(the west coast), about one hundred miles up the old Spanish coast
+road, or "King's Highway" (Camino Real), from Lingayen Gulf (where
+the hundred-and-twenty mile railroad from Manila to Dagupan ends)
+and about eighty miles from the extreme northern end of the island
+of Luzon. [271]
+
+As subsequent policies and their effect on one's attitude toward
+a great historic panorama do not interfere in the least with a
+proper appreciation of the bravery and efficiency of the army of
+one's country, it is with much regret that this narrative cannot
+properly chronicle in detail what the War Department reports record
+of the stirring deeds of General Young, and the officers and men
+of his command, Colonels Hare and Howze, Captains Chase and Dodd,
+and the rest, [272] performed during the long course of the work now
+under consideration. One incident, however, is appropriate in this
+connection, not only to a collection of genre pictures of the war
+itself, but also to a place among the lights and shadows of the general
+picture of the American occupation. On December 2, 1899, Major March
+of the 33d Infantry had his famous fight at Tila pass, in which young
+Gregorio del Pilar, one of the ablest and bravest of the insurgent
+generals, was killed. The locality mentioned is a wild pass in the
+mountains of the west coast of Luzon, that overlook the China Sea, some
+4500 feet above sea level. It was strongly fortified, and was believed
+by the insurgents to be impregnable. The trail winds up the mountains
+in a sharp zigzag, and was commanded by stone barricades loop-holed
+for infantry fire. The advance of our people was checked at first by
+a heavy fire from these barricades. The approach being precipitous,
+it looked for a while as if the position would indeed be impregnable,
+and the idea of taking it by a frontal attack was abandoned. But a
+hill to the left front of the barricade was seized by some of our
+sharpshooters--those Texans of the 33d were indeed sharpshooters--and
+after that, under cover of their fire, our troops managed to get in
+a fire simultaneously both on the flank and rear of the occupants of
+the barricades, climbing the precipitous slope up the mountain side
+by means of twigs and the like, and finally killing some fifty-two of
+the enemy, General Pilar among the number. After the fight was over,
+Lieutenant Quinlan, heretofore mentioned, moved by certain indignities
+in the nature of looting perpetrated upon the remains of General Pilar,
+buried them with such military honors as could be hastily provided,
+after first taking from a pocket of the dead general's uniform a
+souvenir in the shape of an unfinished poem written in Spanish by
+him the night before, addressed to his sweetheart; and, the burial
+finished, the American officer placed on the rude headstone left to
+mark the spot this generous inscription:
+
+
+    General Gregorio Pilar, killed at the battle of Tila Pass, December
+    2d, 1899, commanding Aguinaldo's rear-guard. An officer and a
+    gentleman. (Signed) D. P. Quinlan, 2d Lieutenant, 11th Cavalry.
+
+
+The brief incident over, Quinlan hurried on, rejoined the column,
+and resumed the work of Benevolent Assimilation and the war
+against Home Rule with all the dauntless ardor of his impetuous
+Irish nature. Whatever the ultimate analysis of the ethics of this
+scene--Quinlan at the grave of Pilar--clearly the Second Lieutenant
+Quinlan of 1899 would hardly have agreed with the vice-presidential
+candidate of 1900, Colonel Roosevelt, that granting self-government
+to the Filipinos would be like granting self-government to an Apache
+reservation under some local chief.
+
+The territory occupied and finally "pacified" by General Young,
+with the effective assistance of the officers heretofore mentioned,
+and many other good men and true, was ultimately organized into
+a military district, which was called the First District of the
+Department of Northern Luzon. As territory was fought over, occupied,
+and finally reduced to submission, that territory would be organized
+into a military district by the commanding general or colonel of the
+invading column, under the direction of the division commander. The
+military "Division of the Philippines," which was succeeded by the
+Civil Government of the Philippines under Governor Taft in 1901,
+of course covered all the territory ceded by the Treaty of Paris. It
+was divided into four "Departments," the Department of Northern Luzon,
+the Department of Southern Luzon, the Department of the Visayas, [273]
+and the Department of Mindanao and Jolo. General Young commanded the
+First District of the Department of Northern Luzon--which included
+the three west coast provinces north of Lingayen Gulf, and the three
+adjacent mountain provinces--from the time he led his brigade into
+that region in pursuit of Aguinaldo until shortly before Governor
+Taft's inauguration in the summer of 1901. Many were the combats,
+great and small, of General Young's brigade, in compassing the task
+of crushing the resistance in that part of Luzon into which he led
+the first American troops in the winter of 1899-1900. The resistance
+was obstinate, desperate, and long drawn out, but when he finally
+reported the territory under his command "pacified," it was pacified.
+A soldier's task had been performed in a soldierly manner. The work
+had been done thoroughly. General Young gave the Ilocano country a
+lesson it never forgot, before politics had time to interfere. We
+have never had any trouble in that region from that day to this.
+
+Before the army of occupation had had time to do in southern Luzon what
+General Young did in northern Luzon and thereby secure like permanent
+results in that region, a "peace-at-any-price" policy was inaugurated
+to meet the exigencies of Mr. McKinley's campaign for the Presidency
+in 1900. Our last martyred President clung all through that campaign
+to his original assumption that Benevolent Assimilation would work,
+and that the single burning need of the hour was to make clear to
+the Filipinos what our intentions were--as if powder and lead did
+not spell denial of independence plain enough, as if that were
+not the sole issue, and as if that issue had not been submitted,
+with deadly finality, to the stern arbitrament of war. However,
+neither Lord Roberts in India, nor Lord Kitchener in Egypt ever more
+effectively convinced the people of those countries that his flag
+must be respected as an emblem of sovereignty, than General Young did
+the Ilocanos. Take the month of April, 1900 for instance. Several
+days after the expiration of said month (on May 5th) General Otis
+was relieved and went home. During the month of April, General Young
+killed five hundred insurgents in his district. [274] But this did
+not prevent General Otis, arriving as he did in the United States
+in the month of June, when the national political conventions meet,
+from "repeating the same old story about the insurrection going to
+pieces" [275]--only, not "going" now, but "gone." Nor did it, and like
+sputterings of insurrection all over the place, prevent Judge Taft--the
+"Mark Tapley of this Philippine business" as he humorously told the
+Senate Committee of 1902 he had been called--from cabling home, during
+the presidential campaign of 1900, a series of superlatively optimistic
+bulletins, [276] based on the testimony of Filipinos who had abandoned
+the cause of their country as soon as patriotism meant personal peril,
+all such testimony being eagerly accepted, as testimony of the kind one
+wants and needs badly usually is, in total disregard of information
+directly to the contrary furnished by General MacArthur and other
+distinguished soldiers who had been then on the ground for two years.
+
+The area and population of the territory occupied by General Young,
+the "First District of the Department of Northern Luzon," was,
+according to the Census of 1903, as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area (sq. m.) [277]      Population [278]
+
+    Ilocos Norte          1,330                       178,995
+    Ilocos Sur              471                       187,411
+    Union                   634                       137,839
+    Abra                  1,171                        51,860
+    Lepanto-Bontoc [279]  2,005                        72,750
+    Benguet                 822                        22,745
+                          -----                       -------
+                          6,433                       651,600
+
+
+As this narrative purposes so to present the geography of the
+Philippine Islands as to facilitate an easy remembrance of the
+essentials only of the governmental problem there presented,
+we will hereafter speak of the First District as containing,
+roughly, 6500 square miles, and 650,000 people. Whenever, if ever,
+a Philippine republic is set up, these six provinces are very likely,
+for geographical and other reasons, to become one of the original
+states comprising that republic, just as the states of Mexico are
+made up of groups of provinces. [280]
+
+The rest of the story of the northern campaign of 1899-1900 immediately
+following Aguinaldo's escape into the mountains through General Young's
+and General Lawton's lines, being a necessary part of the American
+occupation of the Philippines, may also serve as a text for further
+acquainting the reader with the geography of Luzon. War is the best
+possible teacher of geography, and it may be well to communicate
+in broken doses, as we received them, the lessons on the subject
+which the 8th Army Corps learned in 1899 and the subsequent years
+so thoroughly that we could all pronounce with astonishing glibness,
+the most unpronounceable names imaginable.
+
+When the great Wheaton-Lawton-MacArthur "Round-up" reached the
+mountains on the northeast of the great central plain, in the
+latter part of November 1899, Captain Joseph B. Batchelor, with
+one battalion of the 24th (negro) Infantry, and some scouts under
+Lieutenant Castner, a very intrepid and tireless officer, boldly cut
+loose from the column of which he was a part, and, pressing on over the
+Caranglan pass, overran the province of Nueva Vizcaya, which is part
+of the watershed of north central Luzon, proceeding from Bayombong,
+the capital of Nueva Vizcaya, down the valley of the Magat River,
+by the same route Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent of the navy had made
+their pleasant junket in the fall of 1898 as described in Chapter VI
+(ante). Following this route Captain Batchelor finally came into
+Isabela province, where the Magat empties into the Cagayan River,
+reaching Iligan, the capital of Isabela, ninety miles northeast of
+Bayombong, about December 8th. From Iligan Batchelor went on, promptly
+overcoming all resistance offered, down the great Cagayan valley, some
+110 miles due north, to the sea at Aparri, the northernmost town of
+Luzon and of the archipelago, where he met two vessels of our navy,
+the Newark and the Helena, under Captain McCalla, and found, to his
+inexpressible (but partially and rather fervently expressed) chagrin,
+that the insurgents who had fled before him, and also the garrison
+at Aparri, had already surrendered to the navy. The territory thus
+covered by Batchelor's bold, brilliant, and memorable march over two
+hundred miles of hostile country from the mountains of central Luzon
+down the Cagayan valley to the northern end of the island, at Aparri,
+[281] consisted of the three provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva
+Vizcaya. The area and population of these three, according to the
+census tables of 1903, are as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.) [282]   Population [283]
+
+    Cagayan               5,052                156,239
+    Isabela               5,018                 76,431
+    Nueva Vizcaya         1,950                 62,541
+                         ------                -------
+    Total                12,020                295,211
+
+
+The troops of Captain Batchelor's command were later on relieved by
+the 16th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hood, under whom the above
+group of three provinces finally became the "Second District of the
+Department of Northern Luzon." As part of the plan to provide the
+reader with a fair general idea of Luzon conveniently portable in
+memory, he is requested to note, at this point, that hereinafter the
+Cagayan valley, with its three provinces, [284] will be alluded to as
+a district containing 12,000 square miles and 300,000 people. As was
+remarked concerning the original military district commanded by General
+Young, to wit, the First District, so of Colonel Hood's district,
+the Second--that is to say, as the Ilocano country may some day become
+the state of Ilocos, so, for like geographical and other governmental
+reasons, the three provinces of the Cagayan valley may some day become
+the state of Cagayan in the possible Philippine republic of the future.
+
+Having now followed the "far-flung battle line" of the volunteers of
+'99 and their comrades in arms, the regulars, from Manila northward
+across the rice paddies of central Luzon and over the mountains to the
+northern extremity of the island, let us return to the central plain,
+for reasons which will be stated in so doing. Between the China Sea
+and the coast range which forms the western boundary of the central
+plain of Luzon, there is a long strip of territory--a west wing of
+the plain, as it were--about 125 miles long, with an average width
+of not more than twenty miles, stretching from Manila Bay to Lingayen
+Gulf. This is divided, for governmental purposes into two provinces,
+Bataan on the south, whose southern extremity lay on Admiral Dewey's
+port side as he entered Manila Bay the night before the naval battle
+of May 1, 1898, and Zambales on the north. The area and population
+of this territory are as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Bataan                 537                    46,787
+    Zambales             2,125                   104,549
+                         -----                   -------
+                         2,662                   151,336
+
+
+Also, between the Pacific Ocean and the coast range which forms the
+eastern boundary of the plain is a longer, narrower, and very sparsely
+populated strip, or east wing, divided also into two provinces,
+Principe on the north and Infanta on the south, each supposed to
+contain about fifteen thousand people. Principe and Infanta are wholly
+unimportant, except that, to avoid confusion, we must account for
+all the provinces visible on the maps of Luzon. These two provinces
+never gave any trouble and no one ever bothered about them. [285]
+In the mountains of Zambales and Bataan, however, as in most of the
+other provinces of the archipelago, the struggle was long kept up,
+just as the Boers kept up their war for independence against Great
+Britain about the same time, by guerrilla warfare.
+
+The central plain with five provinces has already been fully
+described. If to this plain you add its two wings, above mentioned,
+you have the nine provinces of central Luzon you see on the map. And
+if to them you add the six provinces of the Ilocos country and the
+three of the Cagayan valley, you have clearly before you the political
+make-up of northern Luzon--eighteen provinces in all. When central
+Luzon was arranged by districts under the military occupation,
+it was divided into three parts, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
+districts of the Department of Northern Luzon, the Third District
+being under General Jacob H. Smith of Samar fame, [286] the Fourth
+under General Funston, and the Fifth under General Grant. The Sixth
+and last district of northern Luzon was made up of the city of Manila
+and adjacent territory.
+
+General Smith's district, the Third, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Zambales           2,125                    104,549
+    Pangasinan         1,193                    397,902
+    Tarlac             1,205                    135,107
+                       -----                    -------
+                       4,523                    637,558
+
+
+Pangasinan with its near 400,000 people is the largest, in point
+of population, of the twenty-five provinces of Luzon, and the third
+largest of the archipelago.
+
+General Funston's district, the Fourth, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Nueva Ecija        2,169                    134,147
+    Principe [287]       331                     15,853
+                       -----                    -------
+                       2,500                    150,000
+
+
+General Grant's district, the Fifth, comprised the provinces of
+
+
+    Province           Area (sq. m.)           Population
+
+    Bataan               537                     46,787
+    Pampanga             868                    223,754
+    Bulacan            1,173                    223,742
+                       -----                    -------
+                       2,578                    494,283
+
+                       2,500                    150,000
+                       =====                    =======
+    Totals, 4th and
+    5th Districts:     5,078                    644,283
+
+
+It will be seen from the foregoing that the Third District was nearly
+equal in area to the Fourth and Fifth added together, and that the
+same was true as to its population figure.
+
+Just as the six provinces of the Ilocano country, first occupied by
+General Young and organized as "The First District of the Department of
+Northern Luzon," should some day evolve into a State of Ilocos, and the
+three provinces of the Cagayan valley, occupied by Colonel Hood as the
+Second District, into an ultimate State of Cagayan, so the provinces
+of General Smith's old district, the Third, should finally become a
+State of Pangasinan. [288] This Third District may be conveniently
+recollected as accounting for, roughly speaking, 4500 square miles
+of territory and 625,000 people. The total combined area of General
+Funston's old district, the Fourth, [289] and the adjacent one,
+the Fifth, General Grant's district, is--roughly--5000 square miles,
+and its total population 650,000. No reason is apparent why these two
+districts, the Fourth and Fifth, should not ultimately evolve into a
+State of Pampanga. The five original military districts, [290] which
+in 1900 constituted all of the Department of Northern Luzon except
+the city of Manila and vicinity, might make four ultimate states,
+with names, areas, and populations as follows:
+
+
+    State            Area (sq. m.)         Population
+
+    Ilocos            6,500                   650,000
+    Cagayan          12,000                   300,000
+    Pangasinan        4,500                   625,000
+    Pampanga          5,000                   650,000
+                     ------                 ---------
+                     28,000                 2,225,000
+
+
+It may surprise the reader after all the blood and thunder to which
+his attention has hereinabove been subjected, apropos of northern
+Luzon and the winter of 1899-1900, to know that the insurgents were
+still bearding the lion in his den, i. e., General Otis in Manila,
+by operating in very considerable force in the village-dotted country
+within cannon-shot of the road from Manila to Cavite in January,
+1900. Nevertheless such was the case.
+
+On the 4th of January, 1900, General J. C. Bates was assigned to
+the command of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps, General
+Lawton's old division, and an active campaign was commenced in southern
+Luzon. The plan adopted was that General Wheaton with a strong force
+should engage and hold the enemy in the neighborhood of Cavite, while
+General Schwan, starting at the western horn of the half moon to which
+the great lake called Laguna de Bay has already been likened, should
+move rapidly down the west shore of the lake, and around its south
+shore to Santa Cruz near its eastern end, or horn, garrisoning the
+towns en route, as taken, instead of leaving them to be re-occupied by
+the insurgents. Santa Cruz is the same place where General Lawton had
+"touched second base," as it were, with a flying column in April, 1899.
+
+This plan was duly carried out. The Schwan column started from San
+Pedro Macati, the initial rendezvous, a few miles out of Manila,
+on January 4, 1900, now garrisoning the towns en route, instead of
+leaving them to be fought over and captured again as heretofore. The
+first stiff fight we had in that campaign was at Binan, on January 6,
+1900, one of the places General Lawton's expedition had taken when
+he fought his way over the same country the year before. O. K. Davis
+and John T. McCutcheon, who were in that fight and campaign--in fact
+one of them had the ice-cold nerve to photograph the Binan fight while
+it was going on, as I learned when we all went down to the creek near
+the town, after we took it, to freshen up--can testify that we did not
+then hear any nonsense about a "Tagal" insurrection, such as Secretary
+of War Root's Report for 1899, published shortly before, is full of,
+and that on the contrary the whole country was as much a unit against
+us and as loyal to the Aguinaldo government as northern Luzon had
+been. And inasmuch as I am doing some "testifying" along here myself,
+and assuming to brush aside without the slightest hesitation, as wholly
+erroneous, information conveyed to the American public at the time
+in the state papers of President McKinley and Secretary of War Root,
+it is only due the reader, whose attention is being seriously asked,
+that "the witness" should "qualify" as to the opportunities he may
+have had, if any, to know whereof he speaks, concerning the character
+of the opposition. To that end, the following document, which General
+Schwan was kind enough to send me afterwards, is submitted as sent:
+
+
+    EXTRACT COPY.
+
+    Headquarters Detachment Macabebe Scouts.
+    The Adjutant General, Schwan's Expeditionary Brigade:
+
+
+    Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
+    operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts, under my command,
+    while forming a part of your Brigade.
+
+    The Detachment, consisting of five (5) officers and one hundred
+    and forty (140) men, was divided into two companies, commanded
+    by 1st Lt. J. Lee Hall, 33rd Inf., and 1st Lt. Blount, 29th Inf.,
+    left San Pedro Macati the afternoon of Jan. 4th, 1900 * * *.
+
+                * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+
+    I wish to invite your attention, especially, to the good work
+    done in the fight at Binan by Lieut. Blount, 29th Inf., who led
+    the line by at least twenty-five yards * * *.
+
+
+        Very Respectfully,
+        Wm. C. Geiger, 1st Lt. 14th Inf., Com'd'g Det.
+
+
+    I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of extracts from
+    the report of the operations of the Detachment of Macabebe Scouts
+    forming part of an Expeditionary Brigade under my command, in
+    the months of January and February, 1900.
+
+
+        Theo. Schwan,
+        Brig. General, U. S. Vols.
+        Aug. 16, 1900.
+
+
+The activities of Generals Bates and Wheaton, and the Schwan Expedition
+of January-February, 1900, extended the American occupation, so far
+as there were troops enough immediately available to go around, over
+the lake-shore portions and the principal towns of the two great
+provinces of southern Luzon bordering on the Laguna de Bay, viz.,
+Cavite and Laguna; and over parts of the two adjacent provinces of
+Batangas and Tayabas.
+
+Batangas bounds Cavite on the south, and is itself bounded on the
+south by the sea, where a fairly good port offered a fine gateway
+for smuggling arms into the interior from abroad. Tayabas province
+adjoins Laguna on the southeast. Cavite province has always been,
+since the opening of the Suez Canal, about 1869, and the agitations
+for political reform in Spain which culminated in the Spanish republic
+of 1873, quickened the thought of Spain's East Indies, the home of
+insurrection, the breeding place of political agitation. Aguinaldo
+himself was born within its limits in 1869. Laguna province comprehends
+most of the country lying between the southern and eastern lake-shore
+of the Laguna de Bay and the mountains which skirt that body of water
+in the blue distance, all parts of it being thus in easy and safe
+touch by water transportation by night with Cavite, the home and
+headquarters of insurgency.
+
+Just as northern Luzon had been gradually organized into military
+districts as conquered, so was southern Luzon. The territory, over-run,
+as above described, by Generals Bates, Wheaton, and Schwan, was divided
+into two districts. [291] Colonel Hare commanded the First District,
+Cavite province and vicinity. General Hall commanded the Second
+District, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas. The area and population of
+these four provinces, according to the Census of 1903, were as follows:
+
+
+    Province            Area (sq. m.)             Population
+
+    Cavite                619                      134,779
+    Batangas            1,201                      257,715
+    Laguna                629                      148,606
+    Tayabas             5,993                      153,065
+                        -----                      -------
+                        8,442                      694,165
+
+
+For convenience of subsequent allusion, this group of provinces may
+be treated as representing roughly 8500 square miles of territory
+and 700,000 people. These four provinces group themselves together
+naturally from a military standpoint. As physical force is the
+final basis of all government, these four provinces constitute a
+logical administrative governmental unit, as shown by the action
+of our military authorities in their extension of the American
+occupation. It would seem therefore that if there should ever be
+a Philippine republic, they would probably constitute one of its
+states--the State, let us say, of Cavite.
+
+The rest of southern Luzon below that part above described consists of
+a peninsula which, owing to its odd formation, is easy to remember. The
+mainland of Luzon, that is to-say, that part of the island which our
+narrative has already covered, remotely suggests, in shape, the State
+of Illinois. At least it resembles Illinois more than it does any other
+State of our Union, in that its length runs north and south, and its
+average length and width are nearer that of Illinois than any other. At
+the southeast corner of this mainland, the observer of the map will
+see, jutting off to the southeast from the mainland, the peninsula in
+question. It is about a hundred and fifty miles long, with an average
+width of possibly thirty miles--a minimum width of, say, ten miles, and
+a maximum of fifty,--and is separated from Samar by the narrow, swift,
+and treacherous San Bernardino Strait, which connects the Pacific
+Ocean with the China Sea. This peninsula is frequently called "the
+Hemp Peninsula." The importance of controlling the hemp ports prompted
+General Otis to send General Bates with an expedition to those ports on
+February 15, 1900. [292] This expedition did little more than occupy
+those ports. The great interior continued under insurgent control
+some time afterward. The report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Root,
+for 1900, goes on to describe an engagement, or two, sustained by
+the Bates Expedition shortly after it landed, and concludes, with
+a complacency almost Otis-like, by stating that shortly thereafter
+"the normal conditions of industry and trade relations with Manila
+were resumed by the inhabitants." Of course Mr. Root believed this,
+and so did Mr. McKinley. More the pity, as we shall later see. General
+Otis was now getting anxious to go home, and hastened to "occupy"
+and organize the rest of the archipelago, on paper, at least, the
+hemp peninsula becoming, on March 20, 1900, the Third District of
+the Department of Southern Luzon, Brigadier-General James M. Bell
+commanding. The provinces comprised in this district, with their
+areas and populations as given by the Census of 1903, were as follows:
+
+
+    Province              Area (sq. m.)         Population
+
+    Camarines [293]       3,279                  239,405
+    Albay                 1,783                  240,326
+    Sorsogon                755                  120,495
+                          -----                  -------
+                          5,817                  600,226
+
+
+For convenience of subsequent allusion, these three provinces of
+the hemp peninsula which constituted the Third Military District of
+the Military Department of Southern Luzon in 1900, may be regarded
+as comprising, roughly, 6000 square miles of territory and 600,000
+people. If the Philippine republic of the future which is the dream
+of the Filipino people, prove other than an idle dream, the hemp
+peninsula will probably some day constitute a state of that republic,
+an appropriate and probable name for which would be the State of
+Camarines.
+
+The Fourth District of southern Luzon--there were but four--was
+occupied by the 29th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Colonel
+E. E. Hardin, one of the best executive officers General Otis had in
+his whole command. The Fourth District comprised a lot of islands
+unnecessary to be considered at length in this bird's-eye view of
+the panorama, but necessary to be mentioned in outlining the military
+occupation. The 29th, like the other twenty-four volunteer regiments,
+settled down with equanimity to the business of policing a hostile
+country, sang with zest, like the rest of the twenty-five volunteer
+regiments, that old familiar song, "Damn, Damn, Damn the Filipino,"
+etc., and waited with the uniquely admirable stoicism of the American
+soldier for the season of their home-going to roll round, which, under
+the Act of Congress, [294] would be the spring of the following year.
+
+In volume i., part 5, War Department Report, 1899, at pages 5 et seq.,
+may be found a journal illustrating the nature of the "police" work
+done by the volunteers of 1899, in 1900, and at pages 5 et seq. of
+the same report for 1900 (volume i., part 4) may be found a similar
+diary carried up to June 30, 1901. Throughout the period covered by
+those reports, scarcely a day passed without what the military folk
+coolly call "contacts" with the enemy.
+
+The Visayan Islands were in course of time duly organized, as Luzon had
+previously been, departmentally and by military districts. The Visayan
+Islands became the Department of Visayas, divided into districts
+commanded either by regimental commanders having a regiment or more
+with them, or by general officers. For a long time no attempt to make
+military occupation effective in these various islands, save in the
+coast towns, was attempted. However, the indicated disposition of
+troops completed, technically at least, the American occupation of
+the Visayan Islands.
+
+Pursuant to the plan followed, as we have hitherto followed the
+army in our narrative, first throughout northern Luzon and later
+through southern Luzon, some data are now in order concerning the
+Visayan Islands.
+
+As already made clear, there are but six of the Visayan Islands with
+which any one interested in the Philippines merely as a student of
+world politics or of history need bother. The area and population of
+these are as follows: [295]
+
+
+    Island                Area (sq. m.)       Population
+
+    Panay                 4,611                743,646
+    Negros                4,881                460,776
+    Cebu                  1,762                592,247
+    Leyte                 2,722                356,641
+    Samar                 5,031                222,090
+    Bohol                 1,441                243,148
+
+
+Whenever, if ever, an independent republic is established in
+the Philippines, the six islands above mentioned could and should
+constitute self-governing commonwealths similar to the several States
+of the American Union. The rest of the islands lying between Luzon
+and Mindanao could easily be disposed of governmentally by being
+attached to the jurisdiction of one of the said six islands.
+
+Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo were organized as
+the Department of Mindanao and Jolo, under General Kobbe, with
+the 31st Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Pettit's regiment, the 40th
+Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Godwin's regiment, and the 23rd Regular
+Infantry. Thus the archipelago was completely accounted for, for
+the time being, just as all the territory of the United States was
+long accounted for by our military authorities at home, with the
+Department of the East, headquarters Governor's Island, New York; the
+Department of the Lakes, headquarters Chicago; the Department of the
+Gulf, headquarters Atlanta, etc. In this state of the case, General
+Otis re-embraced his early pet delusion--if it was a delusion, which
+charity and the probabilities suggest it should be called--about the
+insurrection having gone to pieces; and decided to come home. Possibly,
+also, he was homesick. General Otis was a very positive character,
+a strong man. But even strong men get homesick after long exile. When
+you hear the call of the homeland after long residence "east of Suez,"
+you must answer the call, duty not forbidding. General Otis had stood
+by his ink wells and the Administration with unswerving devotion
+for twenty months, and was entitled to come back home and tell the
+public all about the fighting in the Philippines, and how entirely
+over it was, and how wholly right Mr. McKinley was in his theory
+that the visible opposition to our rule and the seeming desire to
+be free and independent did not represent the wishes of the Filipino
+people at all, but only the "sinister ambitions of a few unscrupulous
+Tagalo leaders." Accordingly on May 5, 1900, he was relieved at his
+own request, and departed for the United States. He was succeeded
+in command by a very different type of man, Major-General Arthur
+MacArthur, upon whom now devolved the problem of holding down the
+situation and of actually getting it stably "well in hand" by June
+30, 1901, the date of expiration of the term of enlistment of the
+twenty-five volunteer regiments organized under the Act of March
+2, 1899.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+MACARTHUR AND THE WAR
+
+                        Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,
+                        Pock-marked khakiac ladrone; [296]
+                        Underneath the starry flag
+                        Civilize him with a Krag,
+                        And return us to our own beloved home.
+
+                     Army Song of the Philippines under MacArthur. [297]
+
+
+Some one has said, "Let me write the songs of a people and I care
+not who makes their laws." Give me the campaign songs of a war, and
+I will so write the history of that war that he who runs may read,
+and, reading, know the truth. The volunteers of 1899 had, most of
+them, been in the Spanish War of '98. That struggle had been so
+brief that, to borrow a phrase of the principal beneficiary of it,
+Colonel Roosevelt, there had not been "war enough to go 'round." The
+Philippine insurrection had already broken out when the Spanish War
+volunteers returned from Cuba in the first half of 1899. Few of them
+knew exactly where the Philippines were on the map. They simply knew
+that we had bought the islands, that disturbances of public order
+were in progress there, and that the Government desired to suppress
+them. The President had called for volunteers. That was enough. When
+they reached the islands, instead of finding a lot of outlaws,
+brigands, etc., such as that pestiferous, ill-conditioned outfit of
+horse-thieves and cane-field burning patriots we volunteers of '98
+had to comb out of the eastern end of Cuba under General Wood in the
+winter of 1898-9, they found Manila, on their arrival, practically
+almost a besieged city. They knew that the erroneous impression
+they had brought with them was the result of misrepresentation. Who
+was responsible for that misrepresentation they did not attempt to
+analyze. They simply set to work with American energy to put down the
+insurrection. Nobody questioned the unanimity of the opposition. There
+it was, a fact--denied at home, but a fact. In the course of the fight
+against the organized insurgent army they lost a great many of their
+comrades, and in that way the unanimity of the resistance was quite
+forcibly impressed upon them. By kindred psychologic processes equally
+free from mystery, their determination to overcome the resistance
+early became very set--a state of mind which boded no good to the
+Filipinos. The army song given at the beginning of Chapter XI (ante),
+in which General Otis is made to sing, after the fashion of some of
+the characters in Pinafore, that pensive query to himself
+
+
+    Am I the boss, or am I a tool?
+
+
+the first stanza of which closes
+
+
+    Now I'd like to know who's the boss of the show,
+    Is it me or Emilio Aguinaldo?
+
+
+was a point of departure, in the matter of information, which
+served to acquaint them with all that had gone before. They resented
+the loss of prestige to American arms and desired to restore that
+prestige. While engaged in so doing, they became aware, during the
+Presidential year 1900, that the campaign of that year in the United
+States was based largely upon the pretence that the majority of the
+Filipinos welcomed our rule. Naturally, their experience led them to
+a very general and very cordial detestation of this pretence. For one
+thing, it was an unfair belittling of the actual military service
+they were rendering. People hate a lie whether they are able to
+trace its devious windings to its source or sources, or to analyze
+all its causes, or calculate all its possible effects, or not. The
+real rock-bottom falsehood, not as fully understood then as it became
+later, consisted in the impression sought to be produced at home, in
+order to get votes, that the great body of the Filipino people were
+not really in sympathy with their country's struggle for freedom,
+and would be really glad tamely to accept the alien domination so
+benevolently offered by a superior people, but were being coerced into
+fighting through intimidation by a few selfish leaders acting for their
+own selfish ends. While our fighting generals in the field,--General
+MacArthur, for instance, whose interview with a newspaper man just
+after the fall of Malolos, in March, 1899, subsequently verified by
+him before the Senate Committee of 1902, has already been noticed--at
+first believed that it was only a faction that we had to contend with,
+they soon discovered that the whole people were loyal to Aguinaldo and
+the cause he represented. But, while the point as to how unanimous
+the resistance was remained a disputed matter for some little time
+among those of our people who did not have to "go up against it,"
+the most curious fact of that whole historic situation, to my mind,
+is the absolute identity of the disputed suggestion with that which
+had previously been used in like cases in all ages by the powerful
+against people struggling to be free, and the cotemporaneous absence
+of any notation of the coincidence by any conspicuous spectator of
+the drama, to say nothing of us smaller fry who bore the brunt of
+the war or any portion of it.
+
+Those men of '99 in the Philippines realized in 1900, vaguely
+it may be, but actually, that they were waging a war of conquest
+after the manner of the British as sung by Kipling, but under the
+hypocritical pretence that they were doing missionary work to improve
+the Filipino. They did not know whether the Filipinos could or could
+not run a decent government if permitted. It was too early to form
+any judgment. And even then there was no unanimous feeling that they
+could not. Brigadier-General Charles King, the famous novelist,
+who was in the fighting out there during the first half of 1899,
+was quoted in the Catholic Citizen, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in June,
+1899, as having said in an interview given at Milwaukee:
+
+
+    There is no reason in the world why the people should not have
+    the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far as
+    their ability to carry it on goes.
+
+
+The real reason why the war was being waged was stated with the honesty
+which heated public discussion always brings forth, by Hon. Charles
+Denby, a member of the Schurman Commission of 1899, in an article
+which appeared in the Forum for February, 1899, entitled "Why the
+Treaty Should be Ratified:" [298]
+
+
+    The cold, hard, practical question alone remains: "Will the
+    possession of the islands benefit us as a nation?" If it will not,
+    set them free to-morrow.
+
+
+But in the same magazine, the Forum, for June, 1900, in other words
+to the very same audience, in an article whose title is a protest,
+"Do we Owe the Filipinos Independence?" we find this same distinguished
+diplomat sagaciously deferring to that not inconsiderable element of
+the American public which is opposed to wars for conquest, with the
+rank hypocrisy which must ever characterize a republic warring for
+gain against the ideals that made it great, thus:
+
+
+    A little time ought to be conceded to the Administration to
+    ascertain what the wish of the people [meaning the people of the
+    Philippine Islands] really is; [299]
+
+
+adding some of the stale but ever-welcome salve originally invented
+by General Otis for use by Mr. McKinley on the public conscience
+of America, about the war having been "fomented by professional
+politicians," and not having the moral support of the whole people. "A
+majority of the Filipinos are friendly to us," he says. Even as early
+as January 4, 1900, in the New York Independent, we find Mr. Denby
+abandoning all his previous honesty of 1899 about "the cold, hard,
+practical question," and rubbing his hands with invisible soap to
+the tune of the following hypocrisy:
+
+
+    Let us find out how many of the people want independence, and
+    how many are willing to remain loyal to our government. It is
+    believed a large majority [etc.]. [300]
+
+
+The same article even assumed an air of injured innocence and urged
+that as soon as the insurgent army laid down its arms [301] "the
+intentions of our government will be made known by Congress." That
+was just thirteen years ago, and "the intentions of our government"
+have never yet been "made known by Congress," despite the fact
+that the omission has all these years been like a buzzing insect,
+lighting intermittently on the sores of race prejudice and political
+difference in the Philippines, to say nothing of the circumstance
+that such omission leaves everybody guessing, including ourselves. The
+omission has been due to the fact that both the McKinley Administration
+which committed the original blunder of taking the islands, and
+the succeeding Administrations which have been the legatees of that
+blunder, have always needed in their Philippine business the support
+both of those whose votes are caught by the Denby honesty of 1899
+and those whose votes are caught by the Denby hypocrisy of 1900.
+
+War is a great silencer of hypocrisy. In the presence of real sorrow
+and genuine anger, it slinks away and is seen no more until more
+piping times. The lists of casualties had been duly bulletined to
+the United States from time to time between February, 1899, and June,
+1900, so that by the date last named it had become "good politics" to
+throw off the mask. Hence, at the Republican National Convention held
+in Philadelphia June 19-21, 1900, we find that astute past-master of
+the science of government by parties, Senator Lodge, boldly throwing
+off the mask thus:
+
+
+    We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the
+    Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade
+    expansion.
+
+
+Now the words of a United States Senator are much listened to by an
+army in the field. When a war breaks out, it is usually your Senator
+who gets your commission for you originally, and has you promoted
+and made captain, colonel, or general, as the case may be, if you do
+anything to deserve it, or lifted from the ranks to a commission, if
+you do anything to deserve it, or sees that something fitting is done
+if you die in any specially decent way. An army in the field thinks
+a United States Senator is about one of the biggest institutions
+going--which, seriously, is not far from the truth, with all due
+respect to the blase pessimists of the press gallery. Consider then how
+wholly uninspiring, as a sentiment to die by and kill by, the above
+senatorial utterance was to the men in the field in the Philippines,
+who did not even then believe the islands would pay. The "cold, hard,
+practical" fact was, if the Senator was to be believed, that we were
+fighting for what is generically called "Wall Street;" that it was
+primarily a Wall Street war: an expedition fitted out to kill enough
+Filipinos to make the survivors good future customers--"Ultimate
+Consumers"--and only incidentally a war to make people follow your
+way of being happy in lieu of their own. Yet we had most of us, but
+shortly previously to that, gone trooping headlong to Cuba, in the wake
+of the most inspiring single personality of this age--Senator Lodge's
+friend, Colonel Roosevelt--some of our American thoraxes inflated with
+sentiments thus nobly expressed by the same distinguished Senator in
+his speech on the resolution which declared war against Spain:
+
+"We are there" (meaning in the then Cuban situation), Senator Lodge
+had said in the Senate, in the matchless outburst of eloquence with
+which he set the keynote to the war with Spain--
+
+
+    We are there because we represent the spirit of liberty and the
+    new time. * * * We have grasped no man's territory, we have taken
+    no man's property, we have invaded no man's rights. We do not
+    ask their lands. [302]
+
+
+What difference, however, did it make to men under military orders,
+and that far away from home, where American public opinion could not
+and never can affect any given situation in time to help it, whether
+they were serving God or the devil? Everything disappeared but the
+primal fighting instinct. So the slaughter proceeded right merrily,
+at a ratio of about sixteen to one, and many a Filipino died with the
+word "Independence" on his lips, [303] while many an obscure American
+life went out, fighting under the Denby-Lodge dollar-mark flag of
+pseudo-trade expansion. Can you imagine a more thankless job? Do
+you wonder at the song that heads the chapter? Still, war is war,
+once you are in it. All through 1900 the volunteers of 1899 kept on,
+cheerfully doing their country's work, not in the least hampered by
+whys or wherefores, so far as the quality of their work went. They knew
+that the Filipinos were not heathen, and they were not perfectly clear
+that they themselves were doing the Lord's work, unless "putting the
+fear of God into the heart of the insurrecto"--one of their campaign
+expressions--was the Lord's work. However, if any of them gave any
+special thought to the ethics of the situation, this did not in the
+least affect their efficiency in action, nor their determination to
+lick the Filipino into submission. When the brief organized resistance
+of the insurgent armies in the field (February to November, 1899)
+underwent its transition to the far more formidable guerrilla tactics,
+they realized that they were "up against" a long and tedious task,
+in which would be no special glamour, as there had been in Cuba,
+because the war was not much more popular at home than it was with
+them. The rank net hypocrisy of the whole situation, as they viewed
+it, is expressed in the song which heads this chapter. It is an
+answer to the Taft nonsense of 1900 about "the people long for peace
+and are willing to accept government under United States." [304]
+That is why the Caribao Society do not sing it to Mr. Taft when he
+attends their annual banquet, notwithstanding that it is the star
+song of their repertoire. [305] This statement of Judge Taft's, as
+well as other like statements of his which followed it during the
+presidential campaign of 1900, would have been perfectly harmless in
+home politics. It was made in the same spirit of optimism in which
+a Taft man will tell you to-day, "The people are willing to see the
+Taft Administration endorsed." But at that time in the Philippines
+there was no possible way to prove or disprove the statement to the
+satisfaction of anybody at home--or elsewhere, for that matter. And,
+under the circumstances, it was at once a libel on Filipino patriotism
+and an ungracious belittling of the work of the American army. It was
+a libel on Filipino patriotism because it denied the loyal (even if
+ill-advised) unanimity of the Filipino people in their struggle for
+independence, and was a statement made recklessly, without knowledge,
+in aid of a presidential candidate in the United States. That it was
+highly inaccurate was well known to some 70,000 American soldiers then
+in the field, who were daily getting insurrecto lead pumped into them,
+and also well known to their gallant commander, General MacArthur, who
+told Judge Taft just that thing. That it was an ungracious belittling
+of the work of the army is certainly obvious enough, and it was
+so considered by the army, and its commanding general aforesaid,
+who practically told Judge Taft just that thing. But Mr. Root,
+then Secretary of War, was as much interested in Mr. McKinley's
+re-election as Judge Taft was. So he spread the Taft cablegrams
+broadcast throughout the United States during the presidential
+campaign, and pigeonholed the MacArthur messages and reports on the
+situation in the dusty and innocuous desuetude of the War Department
+archives. Four years later at the Republican National Convention of
+1904, Mr. Root told the naked truth, thus:
+
+
+    When the last national convention met, over 70,000 soldiers from
+    more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in check. [306]
+
+
+The foregoing is all a record made and unalterable. It is a fair sample
+of the initial stages of one more of the experiments in colonization
+by a republic which are scattered through history and teach but
+one lesson. All the gentlemen concerned were personally men of high
+type. But look at the net result of their work. The impression it
+produced in the United States, at a tremendously critical period in the
+country's history, when the men at the helm of state were bending every
+energy to railroad the republic into a career of overseas conquest,
+and using the army for that purpose, can be called by a short and ugly
+word. The splendor of Mr. Root's intellect is positively alluring,
+but he is a dangerous man to republican institutions. Mr. Taft's part
+in that conspiracy for the suppression of the facts of the Philippine
+situation in 1900 was really due to kindliness of heart, regret
+at the war, and earnest hope that it would soon end. Mr. Denby's
+part was that of the out-and-out imperialist who has frank doubts
+in his own mind as to whether it is axiomatic, after all, that the
+form of government bequeathed us by our fathers is the best form of
+government yet devised. But the conspiracy was really a sin against
+the progress of the world, because it deceived the American people as
+to the genuineness and unanimity of the desire of the Filipino people
+to imitate the example set by us in 1776, which has since served as
+a beacon-light of hope to so many people in so many lands in their
+several struggles to be free.
+
+By the spring of 1900, when General MacArthur relieved General Otis,
+the volunteers of 1899 had gotten thoroughly warmed up to the work
+of showing the Filipinos who was in fact "the boss of the show,"
+and by June, 1900, when Judge Taft arrived, they had gotten still
+warmer [307]; and in General Otis's successor they had a commander
+who understood his men thoroughly, and was determined to carry out
+honestly, with firmness, and without playing, as his predecessor had
+done, the role of political henchman, the purpose for which the army
+he commanded had been sent to the Islands to accomplish. In this
+state of the case, the Taft Commission came out.
+
+This would seem rather an odd point at which to terminate a chapter on
+"MacArthur and the War," seeing that General MacArthur continued to
+command the American forces in the Philippines and to direct their
+strenuous field operations until July, 1901, more than a year later,
+when he was relieved by General Chaffee, on whom thereafter devolved
+the subsequent conduct of the war. But we must follow the inexorable
+thread of chronological order, and so yield the centre of the stage
+from June, 1900, on, to Mr. Taft, else the resultant net confusion of
+ideas about the American occupation of the Philippines might remain
+as great as that which this narrative is an attempt in some degree
+to correct.
+
+All through the official correspondence of 1899 and 1900 between the
+Adjutant-General of the Army, General Corbin, and General Otis at
+Manila, one sees Mr. McKinley's sensitiveness to public opinion. "In
+view of the impatience of the people" you will do thus and so,
+is a typical sample of this feature of that correspondence. [308]
+Troubled, possibly, with misgivings, as to whether, after all, in view
+of the vigorous and undeniably obstinate struggle for independence
+the Filipinos were putting up, it would not have been wiser to have
+done with them as we had done in the case of Cuba, and troubled,
+beyond the peradventure of a doubt, about the effect of the possible
+Philippine situation on the fortunes of his party and himself in the
+approaching campaign for the presidency, Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taft
+out, in the spring preceding the election of 1900, to help General
+MacArthur run the war. We must now, therefore, turn our attention to
+Mr. Taft, not forgetting General MacArthur in so doing.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+THE TAFT COMMISSION
+
+                                    The papers 'id it 'andsome,
+                                    But you bet the army knows.
+
+                                        Kipling, Ballad of the Boer War.
+
+
+The essentials of the situation which confronted the Taft Commission
+on its arrival in the islands in June, 1900, and the mental attitude
+in which they approached that situation, may now be briefly summarized,
+with entire confidence that such summary will commend itself as fairly
+accurate to the impartial judgment both of the historian of the future
+and of any candid contemporary mind.
+
+It is not necessary to "vex the dull ear" of a mighty people much
+engrossed with their own affairs, by repetition of any further
+details concerning the original de facto alliance between Admiral
+Dewey and Aguinaldo. Suffice it to remind a people whose saving
+grace is a love of fair play, that, after the battle of Manila Bay,
+when Admiral Dewey brought Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong to Cavite,
+both the Admiral and his Filipino allies were keenly cognizant of the
+national purpose set forth in the declaration of war against Spain,
+and that the Filipinos could not have been expected to make any
+substantial distinction between the casual remarks of a victorious
+admiral on the quarter-deck of his flagship in May, remarks concurrent
+and consistent with actual treatment of the Filipinos as allies, and
+the imperious commands of a general ashore in December thereafter,
+acting under specific orders pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. The
+one great fact of the situation, "as huge as high Olympus," they did
+grasp, viz., that both were representatives of America on the ground
+at the time of their respective utterances, and that one in December
+in effect repudiated without a word of explanation what the other
+had done from May to August. They had helped us to take the city of
+Manila in August, and, to use the current phrase of the passing hour,
+coined in this period of awakening of the national conscience to
+a proper attitude toward double-dealing in general, they felt that
+they had been "given the double cross." In other words they believed
+that the American Government had been guilty of a duplicity rankly
+Machiavellian. And that was the cause of the war.
+
+We have seen in the chapters on "The Benevolent Assimilation
+Proclamation" and "The Iloilo Fiasco" that, in the Philippines at
+any rate, no matter how mellifluously pacific it may have sounded at
+home--no matter how soothing to the troubled doubts of the national
+conscience--the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation of December 21,
+1898, was recognized both by the Eighth Army Corps and by Aguinaldo's
+people as a call to arms--a signal to the former to get ready for the
+work of "civilizing with a Krag"; a signal to the latter to gird up
+their loins for the fight to the death for government of their people,
+by their people, for their people; and that the yearning benevolence
+of said proclamation was calculated strikingly to remind the Filipinos
+of Spain's previous traditional yearnings for the welfare of Cuba,
+indignantly cut short by us--yearnings "to spare the great island
+from the danger of premature independence" [309] which that decadent
+monarchy could not even help repeating in the swan-song wherein
+she sued to President McKinley for peace. We did not realize the
+absoluteness of the analogy then. It is all clear enough now. We can
+now understand how and why Mr. McKinley's programme of Annexation and
+Benevolent Assimilation of 1898-9, blindly earnest as was his belief
+that it would make the Filipino people at once cheerfully forego the
+"legitimate aspirations" to which we ourselves had originally given
+a momentum so generous that nothing but bullets could then possibly
+have stopped it, was in fact received by them in a manner compared
+with which Canada's response in 1911 to Speaker Champ Clark's equally
+benevolent suggestion of United States willingness to accord to Canada
+also, gradual Benevolent Assimilation and Ultimate Annexation, was
+one great sisterly sob of sheer joy as at the finding of a long lost
+brother. From the arrival of the American troops on June 30, 1898,
+until the outbreak of February 4, 1899, there had been two armies
+camped not far from each other, one born of the idea of independence
+and bent upon it, the other at first groping in the dark without
+instructions, and finally instructed to deny independence. There
+was never any faltering or evasion on the part of Aguinaldo and his
+people. They knew what they wanted and said so on all occasions. At
+all times and in all places they made it clear, by proclamation, by
+letter, by conversation, and otherwise, that independence was the one
+thing to which, whether they were fit for it or not, they had pledged
+"their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor."
+
+We have seen how easily the war itself could have been averted by the
+Bacon Resolution of January, 1899, or some similar resolution frankly
+declaring the purpose of our government; how here was Senator Bacon
+at this end of the line pleading with his colleagues to be frank,
+and to make a declaration in keeping with "the high purpose" for
+which we had gone to war with Spain, instead of holding on to the
+Philippines on the idea that they might prove a second Klondike,
+while justifying such retention by arbitrarily assuming, without any
+knowledge whatever on the subject, that the Filipinos were incapable
+of self-government; how, there, at the other end of the line, at
+Manila, Aguinaldo's Commissioners, familiar with our Constitution
+and the history and traditions of our government, were making,
+substantially, though in more diplomatic language, precisely the
+same plea, and imploring General Otis's Commissioners to give them
+some assurance which would quiet the apprehensions of their people,
+and calm the fear that the original assurance, "We are going to lick
+the Spaniards and set you free," was now about to be ignored because
+the islands might be profitable to the United States.
+
+We have seen the war itself, as far as it had progressed by June,
+1900, one of the bitterest wars in history, punctuated by frequent
+barbarities avenged in kind, and how, if the Taft Commission had
+not come out with McKinley spectacles on, they would have seen the
+picture of a bleeding, prostrate, and deeply hostile people, still
+bent on fighting to the last ditch, not only animated by a feeling
+against annexation by us similar to that the Canadians would have
+to-day if we should also try the Benevolent Assimilation game on
+them--first with proclamations breathing benevolence and then with
+cannon belching grape-shot--but further animated by the instinctive
+as well as inherited knowledge common to all colored peoples,
+whether red, yellow brown, or black, that wheresoever white men
+and colored live in the same country together, there the white man
+will rule. Understand, this was before Judge Taft had had a chance to
+assure them, with the kindly Taft smile and the hearty Taft hand-shake,
+that their benevolent new masters were going to reverse the verdict
+of the ages, and treat them with a fraternal love wholly free from
+race prejudice. If Judge Taft could only have arrived in January,
+1899, and told them that the Bacon Resolution really represented the
+spirit of the attitude of the American people toward them, then the
+finely commanding bearing of Mr. Taft, and the noble genuineness of
+his desire to see peace on earth and goodwill toward men, might even
+have prevented the war. But this is merely what might have been. What
+actually was, when he did arrive, in June, 1900, was that the milk of
+human kindness had long since been spilled, and his task was to gather
+it up and put it back in the pail. When I, a Southern man who have
+taken part in the only two wars this nation has had in my lifetime,
+reflect that in this year of grace, 1912, Mr. Underwood's otherwise
+matchless availability as the candidate of his party for President is
+questioned on the idea that it might be a tactical blunder, because of
+"the late war," which broke out before either Mr. Underwood or myself
+were born, I cannot share the Taft optimism as to the rapidity with
+which the scars of "the late war" in the Philippines will heal, and
+as to the affectionate gratitude toward the United States with which
+the McKinley-Taft programme of Benevolent Assimilation will presently
+be regarded by the people of the Philippine Islands.
+
+We have seen the futile efforts of the Schurman Commission of 1899,
+sent out that spring, in deference to American public opinion,
+with definite instructions to try and patch up a peace, by talking
+to the leading spirits of a war for independence, now in full swing,
+about the desirability of benevolent leading-strings. "They [meaning
+the Schurman Commission] had come," says Mr. McKinley, in his annual
+message to Congress of December 5, 1899, [310] "with the hope of
+co-operating with Admiral Dewey and General Otis in establishing
+peace and order." They came, they saw, they went, recognizing the
+futility of the errand on which they had been sent. And now came the
+Taft Commission a year later, on precisely the same errand, after the
+Filipinos had sunk all their original petty differences and jealousies
+in a very reasonable instinctive common fear of economic exploitation,
+and a very unreasonable but, to them, very real common fear of race
+elimination, amounting to terror, and been welded into absolute
+oneness--if that were somewhat lacking before--in the fierce crucible
+of sixteen months of bloody fighting against a foreign foe for the
+independence of their common country. President McKinley's message to
+Congress of December, 1899, is full of the old insufferable drivel,
+so grossly, though unwittingly, ungenerous to our army then in the
+field in the Philippines, about the triviality of the resistance
+we were "up against." The message in one place blandly speaks of
+"the peaceable and loyal majority who ask nothing better than to
+accept our authority," in another of "the sinister ambitions of a
+few selfish Filipinos." Thus was outlined, in the message announcing
+the purpose to send out the Taft Commission, the view that no real
+fundamental resistance existed in the islands. Basing contemplated
+action on this sort of stuff, the presidential message outlines the
+presidential purpose as follows--this in December, 1899, mind you:
+
+
+    There is no reason why steps should not be taken from time to
+    time to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form
+    as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops.
+
+
+Then follows the genesis of the idea which resulted in the Taft
+Commission:
+
+
+    To this end I am considering the advisability of the return
+    [to the islands] of the commission [the Schurman Commission]
+    or such of the members thereof as can be secured.
+
+
+In Cuba, General Wood began the work of reconstruction at Havana with
+a central government and the best men he could get hold of, and acted
+through them, letting his plans and purposes percolate downward to
+the masses of the people. Not so in the Philippines. Reconstruction
+there was to begin by establishing municipal governments, to be
+later followed by provincial governments, and finally by a central
+one; in other words, by placing the waters of self-government at
+the bottom of the social fabric among the most ignorant people,
+and letting them percolate up, according to some mysterious law of
+gravitation apparently deemed applicable to political physics. Of
+course, these poor people simply always took their cue from their
+leaders, knowing nothing themselves that could affect the success of
+this project except that we were their enemies and that they might get
+knocked in the head if they did not play the game. "I have believed,"
+says Mr. McKinley, in his message to Congress of December, 1899,
+"that reconstruction should not begin by the establishment of one
+central civil government for all the islands, with its seat at Manila,
+but rather that the work should be commenced by building up from the
+bottom." Whereat, the young giant America bowed, in puzzled hope,
+and worldly-wise old Europe smiled, in silent but amused contempt.
+
+If at the time he formulated this scheme for their government
+Mr. McKinley had known anything about the Philippines, or the
+Filipinos, he would have known that what he so suavely called "building
+from the bottom" was like trying to make water run up hill, i.e.,
+like starting out to have ideas percolate upward, so that through "the
+masses" the more intelligent people might be redeemed. The "nigger
+in the woodpile" lay in the words "essentially popular in form." Of
+course no government by us "essentially popular" was possible at the
+time. But a government "popular in form" would sound well to the
+American people, and, if they could be kept quiet until after the
+presidential election of 1900, maybe the supposed misunderstanding
+on the part of the Filipinos of the benevolence of our intentions
+might be corrected by kindness. Accordingly, the following spring,
+cotemporaneously with General Otis's final departure from Manila to
+the United States, in which free country he might say the war was over
+as much as he pleased without being molested with round-robins by Bob
+Collins, O. K. Davis, John McCutcheon, and the rest of those banes of
+his insular career, who so pestiferously insisted that the American
+public ought to know the facts, the Taft Commission was sent out,
+to "aid" General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had "aided"
+General Otis. [311]
+
+It would seem fairly beyond any reasonable doubt that the official
+information the Taft Commission were given by President McKinley
+concerning the state of public order they would find in the islands
+on arrival was in keeping with the information solemnly imparted
+to Congress by him in December thereafter, which was as follows:
+"By the spring of this year (1900) the effective opposition of the
+dissatisfied Tagals"--always the same minimization of the task of the
+army as a sop to the American conscience--"was virtually ended." Then
+follows a glowing picture of how the Filipinos are going to love us
+after we rescue them from the hated Tagal, but with this circumspect
+reservation: "He would be rash who, with the teachings of contemporary
+history, would fix a limit" as to how long it will take to produce
+such a state of affairs. Looking at that mighty panorama of events
+from the dispassionate standpoint now possible, it seems to me that
+Mr. McKinley's whole Philippine policy of 1899-1900 was animated by
+the belief that the more the Philippine situation should resemble the
+really identical Cuban one in the estimation of the American people,
+the more likely his Philippine policy was to be repudiated at the
+polls in the fall of 1900. The Taft Commission left Washington for
+Manila in the spring of 1900, after their final conference with the
+President who had appointed them and was a candidate for re-election in
+the coming fall, as completely committed as circumstances can commit
+any man or set of men to the programme of occupation which was to
+follow the subjugation of the inhabitants, and to the proposition
+of present incapacity for self-government, its corner-stone;
+to say nothing of the embarrassment felt at Washington by reason
+of having stumbled into a bloody war with people whom we honestly
+wanted to help, had never seen, and had nothing but the kindliest
+feelings for. While the serene and capacious intellect of William
+H. Taft was still pursuing the even tenor of its way in the halls of
+justice (as United States Circuit Judge for the 8th Circuit), the
+Philippine programme was formulated at Washington. Judge Taft went
+to Manila to make the best of a situation which he had not created,
+to write the lines of the Deus ex machina for a Tragedy of Errors
+up to that point composed wholly by others. It has been frequently
+stated and generally believed that when Mr. McKinley sent for him and
+proposed the Philippine mission, Judge Taft replied, substantially:
+"Mr. President, I am not the man for the place. I don't want the
+Philippines." To which Mr. McKinley is supposed to have replied:
+"You are the man for the place, Judge. I had rather have a man out
+there who doesn't want them." The point of the original story lay in
+what Mr. McKinley said. The point of the repetition of it here lies
+in what Mr. Taft said, the inference therefrom being that he did not
+think the true interests of his country "wanted" them, and that had
+he been called into President McKinley's council sooner he would have
+so advised; an inference warranted by his subsequent admission that
+"we blundered into colonization." [312]
+
+It is utterly fatal to clear thinking on this great subject, which
+concerns the liberties of a whole people, to treat Judge Taft's reports
+as Commissioner to, and later Governor of, the Philippines as in the
+nature of a judicial decision on the capacity of the Filipinos for
+self-government. When he consented to go out there, he went, not to
+review the findings of the Paris Peace Commission, but at the urgent
+solicitation of an Administration whose fortunes were irrevocably
+committed to those findings, including the express finding that they
+were unfit for self-government, and the implied one that we must remain
+to improve the condition of the inhabitants. He was thus not a judge
+come out to decide on the fitness of the people for self-government,
+but an advocate to make the best possible case for their unfitness, and
+its corollary, the necessity to remain indefinitely, just as England
+has remained in Egypt. The war itself convinced the whole army of the
+United States that Aguinaldo would have been the "Boss of the Show"
+had Dewey sailed away from Manila after sinking the Spanish fleet. The
+war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have been a small edition
+of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipino republic-that-might-have-been
+would have been, very decidedly, "a going concern," although Aguinaldo
+probably would have been able to say with a degree of accuracy, as
+Diaz might have said in Mexico for so many years, "The Republic? I
+am the Republic." The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D.,
+that the Filipinos are "capable of self-government," unless the kind
+which happens to suit the genius of the American people is the only
+kind of government on earth that is respectable, and the one panacea
+for all the ills of government among men without regard to their
+temperament or historical antecedents. The educated patriotic Filipinos
+can control the masses of the people in their several districts as
+completely as a captain ever controlled a company. [313] While the
+municipal officials of the McKinley-Taft municipal kindergarten were
+stumbling along with the strange new town government system imported
+from America, and atoning to their benignant masters for mistakes by
+writing them letters about how benignant they--the teachers--were,
+they--the pupils,--according to the contemporaneous description by the
+commanding general of the United States forces in the islands, were
+running a superbly efficient municipal system throughout the whole
+archipelago, "simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American
+governments, and in many instances through the same personnel,"
+[314] in aid of the insurrection. General MacArthur humorously adds
+that the town officials "acted openly in behalf of the Americans
+and secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, with considerable
+apparent solicitude for the interest of both." In short, the war
+at once demonstrated their "capacity for self-government" and made
+granting it to them for the time being unthinkable. For the war was
+fought not on the issue of the capacity, but on the issue of the
+granting. The Treaty of Paris settled the "capacity" part. The army
+in 1898, 1899, and 1900 can hardly be said to have had any much more
+decided opinion on the capacity branch of the subject, than Perry did
+about the Japanese in 1854. The Paris Peace Commission having solemnly
+decided the "capacity part" adversely to the Filipinos and the war
+having followed, thereafter Mr. Taft went out to make out the best case
+possible in support of the action of the Peace Commission and, ex vi
+termini, in support of everything made necessary by the fact of the
+purchase. Unless some one goes out to present to the American people
+the other side of the case, they will never arrive at a just verdict.
+
+Committed, a priori, to the task of squaring the McKinley
+Administration with its course as to Cuba, the only course possible
+for the Taft Commission was to set up a benevolent government based
+upon the incompetency of the governed, which, being a standing affront
+to the intelligence of the people, earns their hatred, however it may
+crave their love. By the very bitterness of the opposition it permits
+yet disregards, it binds itself ever more irrevocably to remain a
+benevolent engenderer of malevolence. Government and governed thus get
+wider apart as the years go by, and, the raison d'etre of the former
+being the mental deficiencies of the latter, it must, in self-defence,
+assert those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently
+they are denied. What hope therefore can there be that the light
+that shone upon Saul on the road to Damascus will ever break upon
+the President? What hope that he will ever re-attune his ears to the
+voice of the Declaration of Independence, calling down from where
+the Signers (we hope without untoward exception) have gone, crying:
+"William, William, why persecutest thou me? it is hard for thee to
+kick against the right of a people to pursue happiness in their own
+way"? The difference between the President and the writer is that
+both went out to scoff and the latter remained--much longer--to pray.
+
+The Taft Commission arrived at Manila on June 3, 1900, loaded to the
+guards with kindly belief in the stale falsehood wherewith General
+Otis, ably assisted by his press censor, had been systematically
+soothing Mr. McKinley's and the general American conscience during
+the whole twenty months he had commanded the Eighth Army Corps, [315]
+viz., that the insurrection was due solely to "the sinister ambitions
+of a few selfish leaders," and did not represent the wishes of the
+whole people. It is true that the insurrection originally started
+under Admiral Dewey's auspices and under the initial protection of
+his puissant guns was headed by a group of men most of whom, including
+Aguinaldo, were Tagalos. But all Filipinos look alike, the whole seven
+or eight millions of them. They differ from one another not one whit
+more than one Japanese differs from another. And they all feel alike on
+most things, [316] because they all have the same customs, tastes, and
+habits of thought. Said Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in 1902:
+
+
+    While it is true that there are a number of Christian "tribes,"
+    so-called,--I do not know the number, possibly eight or ten, or
+    twelve,--that speak different languages, there is a homogeneity
+    in the people in appearance, in habits, and in many avenues of
+    thought. To begin with, they are Catholics." [317]
+
+
+Certainly this should forever crucify the stale slander, still
+ignorantly repeated in the United States at intervals, which seeks
+to make the American people think the great body of the Filipino
+people are still in a tribal state, ethnologically. [318] A Tagalo
+leader is about as much a "tribal" leader as is a Tammany "brave"
+of Irish antecedents. In fact there is much in common between the
+two. Both are clannish. Both have a genius for organization that
+is simply superb. Both are irrepressible about Home Rule. Countless
+generations ago the Filipinos were lifted by the Spanish priests out
+of the tribal state, and the educated people all speak Spanish. But
+the original tribal dialects, which the Spanish priests patiently
+mastered and finally reduced for them to a written language, still
+survive in the several localities of their origin. So that every
+Filipino of a well-to-do family is brought up speaking two languages,
+Spanish, and the local dialect of his native place, which is the only
+language known to the poorer natives of the same neighborhood. Surely
+even the valor of ignorance can see that we are presumptuously
+seeking to reverse the order of God and nature in assuming that
+an alien race can lead a people out of the wilderness better than
+could a government by the leading men of their own race to whom the
+less favored look with an ardent pride that would be a guarantee of
+loyal and inspiring co-operation. You can beat a balking horse to
+death but you cannot make him wag his tail, or otherwise indicate
+contentment or a disposition to cordial co-operation which will
+make for progress. Mr. Bryan has visited the Philippines, and his
+evidence is simply cumulative of mine, as mine, based on six years'
+acquaintance with the Filipinos, is simply cumulative of Admiral
+Dewey's testimony of 1898, so often cited hereinbefore, and of the
+opinion of Hon. George Curry, a Republican member of Congress from
+New Mexico who served eight years in the Philippines, and believes
+they can safely be given their independence by 1921. Mr. Bryan says:
+
+
+    So far as their own internal affairs are concerned, they do not
+    need to be subject to any alien government.
+
+
+He further says:
+
+
+    There is a wide difference, it is true, between the general
+    intelligence of the educated Filipino and the laborer on
+    the street and in the field, but this is not a barrier to
+    self-government. Intelligence controls in every government,
+    except where it is suppressed by military force. Nine tenths of
+    the Japanese have no part in the law-making. In Mexico, the gap
+    between the educated classes and the peons is fully as great as,
+    if not greater than, the gap between the extremes of Filipino
+    society. Those who question the capacity of the Filipinos for
+    self-government forget that patriotism raises up persons fitted
+    for the work that needs to be done." [319]
+
+
+It is because I believe that in the Philippines we are doing ourselves
+an injustice and keeping back the progress of the world by depreciating
+and scoffing at the value of patriotism as a factor in self-government
+and in the maintenance of free institutions, that I have written this
+book. There is no more patriotic people in the world than the Filipino
+people. I base this opinion upon an intimate knowledge of them, and
+in the light of considerable observation throughout most of Europe,
+and in Asia from the Golden Horn to the mouth of the Yang-tse. Woe
+to the nonsense, sometimes ignorant, sometimes vicious, wherewith
+we are regaled from time to time by Americans who go to Manila,
+smoke a cigar or two in some American club there, and then come back
+home and depreciate the Filipino people without at least correcting
+Col. Roosevelt's wholly uninformed and cruel random assertions of
+1900 about the Filipinos being a "jumble of savage tribes," and about
+Aguinaldo being "the Osceola of the Filipinos," or their "Sitting
+Bull!" It is wonderfully inspiring to turn from such stale slander to
+Mr. Bryan's above statement of the case for our Oriental subjects,
+a statement framed in his own infinitely sympathetic and inimitable
+way, which says for me just what I had long wanted to express, but
+could not, so well. And in the midst of the recurring slander that the
+Filipino people are "a heterogeneous lot," it is refreshing to find in
+a preface to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, by the
+Director thereof, a passage where, in comparing the tables of that
+census with those of the Twelfth Census of the United States, he says:
+
+
+   "Those of the Philippine Census are somewhat simpler, the
+    differences being due mainly to the more homogeneous character
+    of the population of the Philippine Islands." [320]
+
+
+When we consider the above in the light of the past and present
+operation of our own immigration laws, it is not flattering, but it
+may and should tend to awaken some realization of the manifold nature
+and blinding effects of current misapprehensions in the United States
+concerning the inhabitants of the Philippines. One Filipino does not
+differ from another any more than one American does from another
+American--in fact they differ less, considering immigration. The
+Filipino people are not rendered a heterogeneous lot by having three
+different languages, Ilocano, Tagalo, and Visayan, [321] which are
+respectively the languages spoken in the northern, the central,
+and the southern part of their country, any more than the people
+of Switzerland are rendered heterogeneous by the circumstance that
+in northern Switzerland you find German spoken for the most part,
+while farther south you find French, and near the southernmost
+extremities some Italian. At this late date no credible person
+acquainted with the facts will be so poor in spirit as to deny that
+the motives of the men who originally started the insurrection were
+patriotic. Nor will any one who served under General Otis's command
+in the Philippines deny that that eminent desk soldier continued to
+cling to his early theory that it was a purely Tagalo insurrection
+long after the deadly unanimity of the opposition had seeped, with
+all-pervading thoroughness, into the general mind of the army of
+occupation. The white flag or rag of truce, alias treachery, used
+to be hoisted to put us off our guard in pretence of welcome to our
+columns approaching their towns and barrios. Such use of such a flag,
+followed by treachery, the ultimate weapon of the weak, had been in
+turn followed, with relentless impartiality in countless instances,
+by due unloosening of the vials of American wrath, until every nipa
+shack [322] in the Philippine Islands that remained unburned had
+had its lesson, written in the blood of its occupants or their kin,
+to the tune of the Krag-Jorgensen or the Gatling. Yet General Otis's
+reports are always bland, and always convey the idea of an insurrection
+exclusively Tagalo.
+
+In the summer of 1900, the newly arrived civilians, the Taft
+Commission, had no special interest in the soldiers who, for better,
+for worse, were "doing their country's work," as Kipling calls his
+own country's countless wars against its refractory subjects in the
+far East; and no especial sympathy with that work. Two years later we
+find President Roosevelt, in connection with the general amnesty of
+July 4, 1902, congratulating his "bowld lads," as Mr. Dooley would
+call them--meaning General Chaffee and the Eighth Army Corps--on a
+total of "two thousand combats, great and small" up to that time,
+but you never find in any of Governor Taft's Philippine state
+papers any more affirmative recognition of continued resistance to
+American rule than some mild allusion to "small but hard knocks"
+being administered here and there by the army. From the beginning
+there was a systematic belittling, on the part of the Taft Commission,
+of the work of the army, incidentally to belittling the reality and
+unanimity of the opposition which was daily calling it forth. [323]
+This was not vicious. It was essentially benevolent. It was part of
+the initial fermentation of their preconceived theory. But the trouble
+about their theory was that it was only a theory. It would not square
+with the facts. They were trying to square the subjugation of the
+Philippines with the freeing of Cuba, a task quite as soluble as the
+squaring of a circle. They hoped, with all the kindly benevolence
+of Mr. McKinley himself, that the opposition to our rule was not
+as great as some people seemed to think. They had come out to the
+islands earnestly wishing to find conditions not as bad as they
+had been asserted to be. And the wish became father to the thought
+and the thought soon found expression in words--cablegrams to the
+United States presenting an optimistic view as to the prospects of
+necessity for further shedding of blood in the interest of Benevolent
+Assimilation, alias Trade Expansion. Some flippant person will say,
+"That is a polite way of charging insincerity." This book is not
+addressed to flippant persons. It is a serious attempt to deal with
+a problem involving the liberties of a whole people, and will be,
+as far as the writer can make it, straightforward, dignified, and
+candid. Judge Taft's fearful mistake of 1900-1901 in the matter of his
+premature planting of the civil government--a mistake because based
+on the idea that "the great majority of the people" welcomed American
+rule, and a fearful mistake because fraught with so much subsequent
+sacrifice of life due to too early withdrawal of the police protection
+of the army--was not the first instance in American history where an
+ordinarily level-headed public man has, with egregious folly, mistaken
+the mood and temper of a whole people. The key to his mistake lay in
+the fact that, coming into a strange country in the midst of a war,
+he ignored the advice of the commanding general of the army of his
+country concerning the military situation, and took the advice of a
+few native Tories, or Copperheads, of wealth, who had never really
+been in sympathy with the insurrection and who, flocking about him
+as soon as he arrived, told him what he so longed to be told, viz.,
+that the war did not represent the wishes of the people but was kept
+up by "a conspiracy of assassination" of all who did not contribute
+to it either in service or money. He thereupon decided that the men
+who told him this really represented the voice of the people, and
+that the men in the field who had then been keeping up the struggle
+for independence for sixteen months, in season and out of season,
+were simply "a Mafia on a very large scale." Consequently the Taft
+Commission had been in the islands less than three months when
+Secretary of War Root at Washington was giving the widest possible
+publicity to cablegrams from them, such as that dated August 21,
+1900, mentioned in the preceding chapter, conveying the glad tidings
+that "large number of people long for peace and are willing to accept
+government under United States" [324]; and by November next thereafter,
+the "large number" had grown to "a great majority," and the "willing"
+to "entirely willing." The November statement was:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States. [325]
+
+
+Yet, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the real situation in the
+Philippines at this very time was described four years later at the
+Republican National Convention of 1904 by Mr. Root thus:
+
+
+    When the last national convention met, over 70,000 American
+    soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous enemy
+    in check.
+
+
+Between the date of their arrival in the Islands on June 3d, and the
+date of this August 21st telegram, the Taft Commission did little
+junketing, but remained in Manila imbibing the welcome views of the
+"Tories" or "Copperheads," and seeking very little information from
+the army. But it so happens that the Adjutant-General at Manila used
+to keep a record of the daily engagements during that period, which
+record was later published in the annual War Department Report, [326]
+and it shows a total of about five hundred killings (of Filipinos)
+between June 3d, and August 21st, to say nothing of probably many times
+that number hit but not killed, and therefore able to get away. (You
+could not include any Filipino in your returns of your killings except
+dead you had actually counted.) It also happens that on June 4th,
+the day after Judge Taft's arrival, General MacArthur, in response to
+an order from Washington sent some time previous at the instance of
+Congress, had all the Filipino casualties our military records showed
+up to that time (i. e., during the sixteen months from the day of the
+outbreak, February 4, 1899, to June 3, 1900), tabulated and totalled,
+and the total Filipino killed accordingly reported by cablegram to
+the War Department on June 4, 1900, was 10,780. [327]
+
+Ten thousand in sixteen months is 625 per month. So that by the
+time Judge Taft arrived, the Filipinos had been sufficiently
+beaten into submission to decrease the death-rate due to the
+Independence Bug from something over six hundred per month to about
+two hundred per month. Judge Taft called this enthusiasm. I call it
+exhaustion. Whereupon, exclaims a Boston Anti-Imperialist, "Why don't
+you issue Mr. Taft a certificate as a member of the Ananias Club at
+once, and be done with it?" My answer is that I do not believe the
+Taft Commission in 1900 either knew these figures or wanted to know
+them. They came out preaching a Gospel of Hope to the exclusion of
+all else, a species of mental healing. They said, soothingly to Dame
+Filipina, "Be not afraid; you are well; you are well"--of the desire
+for independence she had conceived, when what that lady needed was the
+surgical operation indispensable for the removal of a still-born child.
+
+The will of the American people is ascertainable, and quadrennially
+announced, through certain prescribed methods. And (nearly)
+everybody takes the result good-humoredly, God bless our country,
+whatever the result. But just how Mr. Taft and his colleagues could
+assume to speak for the "great majority" of the Filipino people at
+the tremendous juncture in their destinies now under consideration
+during the Presidential election of 1900, does not clearly appear,
+except that in their first report they say:
+
+
+    Many witnesses were examined as to the form of government best
+    adapted to these islands and satisfactory to the people, [328]
+
+
+a statement which obviously takes for granted the only point
+involved in the war, viz., whether any kind of alien government
+would be "satisfactory to the people." And in their various other
+communications to Washington they describe themselves, with no small
+degree of benevolent satisfaction, as enthusiastically received by
+natives not under arms at the moment of such reception. As a matter of
+fact, a carpet-bag governor of Georgia might just as well have reported
+to Andrew Johnson an enthusiastic reception at the hands of the people
+whose homes had lately been put to the torch, and their kith and kin to
+the sword, while the whole fair face of nature from Atlanta to the sea
+lay bruised and bleeding under the iron heel of Sherman's army. Let no
+advocate of Indefinite Tutelage whet his scalping-knife for me because
+of the use of that word "carpet-bag." It was as free from ill-will
+as the explosion incident to flash-light photography. We are trying
+to develop a picture of those times. Two at least of the Commission,
+Messrs. Taft and Wright, were the kind of men who in all the personal
+relations of life, meet the ultimate test of human confidence and
+friendship--you would make either, if he would consent to act,
+executor of your will, or testamentary guardian of your child. But
+they came out with the preconceived notion that kindness would win
+the people over, whereas what those people wanted was not foreign
+kindness but home rule, not silken political swaddling clothes,
+but freedom. And as the acquisition of the Philippines has placed
+us under the necessity of getting up a new definition of freedom,
+one consistent with tariff taxation without representation--through
+legislation by a Congress on the other side of the world in which
+"our new possessions" have no vote--it should be added that one of
+the things Freedom meant with us before 1898, was freedom to frame
+the laws--tariff and other--which largely determine the selling
+price of crops and the purchase price of the necessities of life,
+freedom to see the intelligent and educated men of your own race in
+charge of your common destiny, freedom to have a flag as an emblem
+of your common interests, in a word, just Freedom. And that was what
+the war was about. They wanted to be free and independent. Whether
+they were fit for such freedom is wholly foreign to the reality and
+unanimity of their desire for it. General Otis used to be very fond
+of taking the wind out of the sails of their commissioners and other
+officials before the outbreak by saying that their people had not
+the slightest notion of what the word independence meant. It is true
+that they knew nothing about it by experience, but equally true that
+whatever it was, they wanted it. Of the ten thousand men we had already
+killed when Judge Taft arrived, there can be no question, as already
+heretofore suggested, that many of them may have been hit just as
+they were hurrahing for independence, in other words, died with the
+word "Independence" on their lips. When men have been thus fighting
+against overwhelming odds for some sixteen months for government of
+their people by their people for their people--however inarticulate
+the emotions of the rank and file on going into battle--it is idle
+to claim that they do not know what they want, whether the great
+majority of the rank and file can read and write or not. But pursuant
+to the idea that kindness would cure the desire for independence,
+Judge Taft ignored, in the outset, all advice from the military
+department, because that was not the kindness department, accepting
+as truly representative of the temper of the whole people the views
+of a few ultra-conservatives of large means who had always been part
+and parcel of the Spanish Administration.
+
+On the other hand, General MacArthur and the whole Eighth Army Corps
+had seen a great insurrection drag on from month to month and from one
+year to another, under General Otis, when short shrift would have been
+made of it in the outset, and far less life sacrificed, if Mr. McKinley
+had not needed, in aid of his Philippine policy, the support of both
+of those who believed it was right and of those who believed it would
+pay. The one central thought which had seemed to animate General
+Otis from the beginning, a thought which we have already traced
+through all its humiliating manifestations, was that he must neither
+do or permit anything that might hurt the Administration. When the
+"impatience of the people" at home, which figures so prominently in
+the correspondence already cited between the Adjutant General of the
+army, General Corbin, and General Otis at Manila, had begun to cast its
+shadows on the presidential year, 1900, the master mind of Mr. Root had
+interrupted the fatal Otis treatment of the insurrection, indicated by
+General Otis's long failure to call for volunteers, his stupid stream
+of "situation well in hand" and "insurrection about to collapse"
+telegrams, and his utterly unpardonable persistence in calling it a
+purely "Tagalo insurrection," by sending him a competent force, and
+a plan of campaign, and directing him to carry out the plan. General
+Otis did this, because he was told to, and then began again to sing
+the same old song. MacArthur, Wheaton, Lawton, Bates, Young, Funston,
+and the rest of the fighting generals, had submitted to all the Otis
+follies without a murmur, because insubordination degrades an army
+into a rabble. But they [329] believed the army was there to put down
+that insurrection, not to have a symposium with its leaders on the
+rights of man. They had taken up "The White Man's Burden," after the
+manner of Lords Kitchener and Roberts, and they had no qualms. Above
+all, they wanted peace, no matter how much fighting it took to get
+it. Mindful of the attempts of the Schurman Commission of the year
+before to mix peace with war, and of the immense encouragement thus
+given the insurgents, they had not looked forward with enthusiasm to
+the coming of the Taft Commission, and to the highly probable renewal
+of negotiations with the insurgent leaders in the field, pursuant to
+a presidential policy of patching up a peace at any price, suggested
+by the exigencies of political expediency, to give the government a
+semblance of having more or less of the consent of the governed. That
+the anticipations of the military authorities in this regard did not
+receive a pleasant disappointment, has already been suggested by the
+nature of the views adopted by the commission soon after its arrival.
+
+The military view of the situation, as it stood when Judge Taft and his
+colleagues arrived at Manila in June, 1900, is set forth in the annual
+report of the commanding general, General MacArthur, rendered shortly
+thereafter; rendered, not in aid of any political candidate at home,
+nor of a sudden, but at the usual and customary annual season for the
+making of such reports; and rendered by a soldier of no mean experience
+and ability, who was a man of great kindliness of heart as well, to
+the war department of his government, to acquaint it with the facts
+of a military situation he had been dealing with for two years prior
+to the arrival of the Taft Commission. General MacArthur's views,
+as expressed in his report, must now be contrasted with the Taft
+view, not to show that MacArthur is a bigger man than Taft, nor for
+any other idle or petty purpose, but because, if, in 1900, General
+MacArthur was right, and Judge Taft was wrong, about the unanimity
+of the whole Filipino people against us, then the institution of the
+Civil Government of the Philippines on July 4, 1901, was premature;
+and, therefore, by reason of the withdrawal of the strong arm of the
+military at a critical period of public order, it was not calculated
+to give adequate protection to the lives and property of those who
+were willing to abandon the struggle for independence and submit
+to our rule. And if, as we shall see later, it did in fact grossly
+fail to afford such adequate protection for life and property, it was
+derelict in the most sacred duty enjoined upon it by Mr. McKinley's
+instructions to the Taft Commission. But first let me introduce you
+to General MacArthur.
+
+General MacArthur is not only a soldier of a high order of
+ability, but a statesman as well. Moreover, he was a thoroughgoing
+"expansionist." He believed in keeping the Philippines permanently,
+just as England does her colonies. But he was perfectly honest about
+it. He recognized the fact that they were against our rule. But
+he did not attach any more weight to that circumstance than Lord
+Kitchener would have done. Also, he had come out to the islands with
+the first expedition, in 1898, had been in the field continuously
+for fifteen months prior to assuming supreme military command, and
+knew the Filipinos thoroughly. As soon as he took command, on May 5,
+1900, of the 70,000 troops then in the Islands, he set himself with
+patience and firmness to the great task of ending the insurrection,
+which at that time promised to continue indefinitely, the far more
+formidable guerrilla warfare that had followed the brief period of
+serried resistance having now settled down to a chronic stage, aided
+and abetted by the whole population. I have said General MacArthur was
+a "thoroughgoing" expansionist. This needs a slight qualification. At
+first he appears to have had a few qualms. Shortly after the outbreak
+of the war with the Filipinos, when he took the first insurgent capital
+Malolos, in March, 1899, he had said at Malolos, as we have seen,
+to a newspaper man who accompanied the expedition:
+
+
+    When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that
+    Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I did not believe
+    that the whole population of Luzon was opposed to us; but I have
+    been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipinos are
+    loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he represents. [330]
+
+
+General MacArthur's reports concerning the war in the Philippines
+during the period of his command are succinct and luminous. He
+makes it perfectly clear that the original resistance offered by the
+insurgent armies in the field after the arrival of the overwhelmingly
+ample reinforcements sent out from this country in the fall of 1899,
+was little more than a mere flash in the pan, compared with the
+well-planned scheme of resistance which followed the dispersion of
+those armies to the several provinces which had furnished them to
+the cause, and Aguinaldo's simultaneous flight into the mountains
+"with his government concealed about his person," as Senator Lodge
+exultantly described that incident in his speech of April, 1900,
+in defence of the Administration's Philippine policy. Speaking of
+this period, General MacArthur says:
+
+
+    It has since been ascertained that the expediency of adopting
+    guerrilla warfare from the inception of hostilities was seriously
+    discussed by the native leaders, and advocated with much emphasis
+    as the system best adapted to the peculiar conditions of the
+    struggle. It was finally determined, however, that a concentrated
+    field army, conducting regular operations, would, in the event
+    of success, attract the favorable attention of the world, and be
+    accepted as a practical demonstration of capacity for organization
+    and self-government. The disbandment of the field army, therefore,
+    having been a subject of contemplation from the start, the actual
+    event, in pursuance of the deliberate action of the council of
+    war in Bayambang about November 12, 1899 (already hereinbefore
+    noticed), was not regarded by Filipinos in the light of a calamity,
+    but simply as a transition from one form of action to another;
+    a change which by many was regarded as a positive advantage,
+    and was relied upon to accomplish more effectively the end in
+    view. The Filipino idea behind the dissolution of their field
+    army was not at the time of the occurrence well understood in
+    the American camp. As a consequence, misleading conclusions
+    were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had been
+    destroyed, and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of
+    the rebel army by a system of police administration not likely
+    to be either onerous or dangerous. [331]
+
+
+In his report covering the period from May 5th, to October 1, 1900,
+General MacArthur says of the policy of resistance above outlined:
+
+
+    The country affords great advantages for the practical
+    development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the
+    uniform enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at
+    their convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers,
+    and immediately thereafter are within the American lines in
+    the attitude of peaceful natives, absorbed in a dense mass of
+    sympathetic people. [332]
+
+
+In this same connection the report includes a copy of the original
+order of the insurgent government which was the corner stone of the
+guerrilla policy, and states that "systemized regulations" for its
+effective prosecution throughout the archipelago had been compiled
+and published by the Filipino junta, or revolutionary committee at
+Madrid, and distributed among the insurgent forces. The report also
+appends a copy of the "Army Regulations" under which the insurgent
+forces were to conduct the guerrilla warfare. It also describes in
+detail the system of warfare prescribed under these regulations, and
+states that as a result of the measures which he, General MacArthur,
+took to combat that warfare "the 53 stations of American troops
+occupied in the archipelago on November 1, 1899, had on September 1,
+1900, expanded to 413," and that during this period, the casualties
+to our troops were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55 captured, and to the
+insurgents, so far as our records showed, 3227 killed, 694 wounded,
+and 2864 captured. Says he:
+
+
+    The extensive distribution of troops has strained the soldiers
+    of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little command
+    has had to provide its own service of security and information
+    by never ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and
+    regular guards. An idea seems to have been established in the
+    public mind [he meant the public mind at home, of course] that the
+    field work of the army is in the nature of police, in regulating a
+    few bands of guerrillas, and involving none of the vicissitudes of
+    war. [Here he is meeting the Otis theory, then being industriously
+    circulated in the United States.] Such a narrow statement of the
+    case is unfair to the service. In all things requiring endurance,
+    fortitude, and patient diligence, the guerrilla period has been
+    pre-eminent. It is difficult for the non-professional observer
+    [he means Judge Taft] to understand that apparently desultory
+    work, such as has prevailed in the Philippines during the past
+    ten months, [333] has demanded more of discipline and as much
+    of valor as was required during the period of regular operations
+    against the concentrated field forces of the insurrection. It is,
+    therefore, a great privilege to speak warmly in respect of the
+    importance of the service rendered day by day, with unremitting
+    vigilance, by the splendid men who," etc. [334]
+
+
+It was not until July 4, 1902, that President Roosevelt officially
+declared, by his amnesty proclamation of that date that the
+insurrection in the Philippines was at last ended. It was by no
+means beaten to a frazzle, as we shall later see. But of course,
+knowing the impatience of a large portion of the American people with a
+situation about which there was a wide-spread notion that much remained
+undisclosed, Mr. Roosevelt would have issued such a proclamation
+earlier, had the facts seemed to him to so authorize. General
+MacArthur's relentless "never ceasing patrols, explorations," etc.,
+continued straight on through the presidential campaign of 1900 side
+by side in point of time with the roseate Taft cablegrams of the same
+period, and long thereafter--how long will be later indicated. Says
+General MacArthur, in his report for 1901:
+
+
+    It had been suggested that some of the Filipino leaders were
+    willing to submit the issue to the judgment of the American people,
+    which was soon to be expressed at the polls, and to abide by
+    the result of the presidential election of November, 1900. [335]
+    But subsequent events demonstrated that the hope of ending the
+    war without further effusion of blood was not well founded,
+    and that as a matter of fact the Filipinos were organizing for
+    further desperate resistance by means of a general banding of
+    the people in support of the guerrillas in the field. [336]
+
+
+General MacArthur then goes on to tell how, as part of this programme,
+the insurgent authorities,
+
+
+    announced a primal and inflexible principle, to the effect that
+    every native, without any exception, residing within the limits
+    of the archipelago, owed active allegiance to the insurgent
+    cause. This jurisdiction was enjoined under severe penalties,
+    which were systematically enforced.
+
+
+This is what Judge Taft afterwards described as "a conspiracy of
+murder, a Mafia on a very large scale", [337] the characterization
+being made in support of his theory that "the great majority of the
+people" with whom we were then at war would welcome our rule if allowed
+to follow their real preferences, and that they were being cruelly
+coerced to fight for the independence of their country. General
+MacArthur's view, however, did not support this theory. His report
+deals with this branch of the subject thus:
+
+
+    The cohesion of Filipino society in behalf of insurgent
+    interests is most emphatically illustrated by the fact that
+    assassination, which was extensively employed, was generally
+    accepted as a legitimate expression of insurgent governmental
+    authority. The individuals marked for death would not appeal to
+    American protection, although condemned exclusively on account
+    of supposed pro-Americanism.
+
+
+Later on, when we came to understand the Filipinos better, this
+summary method of dealing with the faint-hearted lost much of its
+initial horrifying force, and the failure of such to appeal to us for
+protection lost much of its strangeness. In the first place, nobody
+loves a traitor. Even those to whom he claims to have betrayed his
+countrymen do not trust him implicitly. Again, Latin countries never
+assume that before a man is punished for alleged crime he has been
+confronted with the witnesses against him. Such testimony is, under
+their jurisprudence, frequently received in his absence. The legal
+department of General MacArthur's office once got hold of a captured
+insurgent paper subscribed with the autograph of Juan Cailles, one
+of their best generals. It directed that a named Filipino residing
+in a certain town garrisoned by American troops be executed--we
+of course, would call it "assassinated"--at a certain hour on a
+certain day in a public street of the town, and that the soldier or
+soldiers performing the "execution" should declare to the bystanders,
+if any, in so doing, that it was done because the man was a traitor,
+a friend of the Americans. We kept this paper, intending to hang Juan
+whenever he should be captured. He held out a long time, and finally
+surrendered unconditionally--but he proved such an elegant fellow,
+game as a pebble, courteous as Chesterfield, and immensely popular
+with his people, that it was decided he could be of more service
+as a live governor of a province than he could as a dead general,
+[338] so he was appointed a provincial governor by Governor Taft,
+and made a splendid official.
+
+Another reason why Filipinos suspected, during the insurrection, by
+the more obstinate and stout-hearted of their compatriots who held
+out longer in the struggle for independence, of weakening toward the
+cause of their country, in other words, suspected of what might be
+called "Copperhead" or "Tory" tendencies, would not appeal to us for
+protection, is strikingly presented in General MacArthur's report for
+1901. He says they naturally had "grave doubt as to the wisdom" of
+siding with us, "as the United States had made no formal announcement
+of an inflexible purpose to hold the archipelago and afford protection
+to pro-Americans." [339]
+
+The one great thing that has crippled progress in the Philippines
+from the beginning of the American occupation down to date is the
+uncertainty as to what our policy for the future is to be, the lack of
+some, "formal announcement of an inflexible purpose." And of course
+I mean, as General MacArthur meant, by "formal" announcement, an
+authoritative declaration by the law-making power of the government. If
+Congress should formally declare that it is the purpose of this
+government to hold the Philippines permanently, American and other
+capital would at once go there in abundance and the place would
+"blossom like a rose." If, on the other hand, Congress should formally
+declare that it is the purpose of this government to give the Filipinos
+their independence as soon as a stable native government can be set up,
+thus holding out to the present generation the prospect of living to
+see the independence of their country, the place would also quickly
+blossom as aforesaid, through the generous ardor of native love of
+country. In either event, everybody out there would know where he is
+"at." At present all is uncertainty, both with the resident members
+of the dominant alien race, and with those over whom we are ruling.
+
+It took over 120,000 American troops, first and last, to put down
+the struggle of the Filipinos for independence. [340] The war began
+February 4, 1899, and the last public official announcement that it
+was ended was on July 4, 1902. [341] Of course this does not imply
+that every province was at all times during that period a theatre
+of actual war. Putting down the insurrection was something like
+putting out a fire in a field of dry grass. At first the trouble was
+general. Gradually it diminished toward the end. But for a while,
+no sooner was it quenched in one province than it would break out
+in another. How the Filipinos were able to prolong the struggle
+as long as they did against such apparently overwhelming odds is
+most interestingly explained by General MacArthur in his report
+for 1900. After describing the method he followed of establishing
+native municipal governments in territory as conquered, he says,
+with a patient stateliness that is almost humorous:
+
+
+    The institution of municipal government under American auspices,
+    of course, carried the idea of exclusive fidelity to the sovereign
+    power of the United States. All the necessary moral obligations
+    to that end were readily assumed by municipal bodies, and all
+    outward forms of loyalty and decorum carefully preserved. But
+    precisely at this point the psychologic conditions referred to
+    above [meaning the unity against us], [342] began to work with
+    great energy, in assistance of insurgent field operations. For this
+    purpose most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent
+    municipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the
+    same sphere as the American governments and in many instances
+    through the same personnel--that is to say, the presidentes
+    and town officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and
+    secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may
+    seem, with considerable apparent solicitude for the interests
+    of both. In all matters touching the peace of the town, the
+    regulation of markets, the primitive work possible on roads,
+    streets, and bridges, and the institution of schools, their open
+    activity was commendable; at the same time they were exacting and
+    collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the
+    Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable military information
+    to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the archipelago,
+    there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond
+    dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance
+    thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of
+    American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases
+    for all insurgent military activities; and not only so in the
+    sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of
+    guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it
+    is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband
+    when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio;
+    a manoeuvre quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance
+    of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is
+    transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native. [343]
+
+
+To contrast a cold, hard military fact involving the lives of American
+soldiers with a lot of political nonsense intended for consumption in
+the United States during a presidential election, the next paragraph is
+particularly interesting in the light of the cotemporaneous Taft view:
+[344]
+
+
+    The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost
+    complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such
+    unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion. Intimidation
+    has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the
+    only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and
+    apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. [345]
+    One traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex
+    organization.
+
+
+Then follows this bit of grim humor:
+
+
+    It is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from
+    ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for a time
+    to the appeals of consanguineous leadership--
+
+
+in other words, to stick to their own kith and kin. He had in a
+previous paragraph used that very expression thus: "The people seem to
+be actuated by the idea that in politics or war men are never nearer
+right then when going with their own kith and kin."
+
+In all the foregoing, General MacArthur was not simply trying to score
+a point against Judge Taft, though his resentment of the effort of the
+Taft Commission of 1900 to mix politics with war in the presidential
+year was quite as decided, and quite as well known in the islands at
+the time, as was General Otis's similar attitude toward the Schurman
+Commission of the previous year. [346] He is simply laying before
+the War Department, as a soldier, the familiar facts of a situation
+which he had been dealing with for two years past, as well known to
+the 70,000 officers and men under his command as to himself. And as
+the details into which he goes are simply prefatory to an account of
+the remedy he applied to the situation, that remedy must now claim
+our attention. The remedy General MacArthur finally applied was
+a proclamation, explaining to the Filipino people--"to all classes
+throughout the archipelago," it read, and especially to the leaders in
+the field, many of whose captured comrades-in-arms he had now become
+thoroughly acquainted with--the severities sanctioned by the laws of
+civilized nations under such circumstances, and the reasons therefor;
+and, further, serving them with notice that thenceforward he proposed
+to enforce those laws with full rigor. [347]
+
+The eminent lawyers of the Taft Commission were too busy about that
+time acquainting themselves with the situation through natives not in
+arms, to attach much importance to General MacArthur's proclamation,
+but the Eighth Army Corps always believed that that proclamation,
+and the army's work under it, was the main factor in making the
+civil government at all possible by the date it was set up, July 4,
+1901. The issuance of this document was not only a wise military move,
+but a subtle stroke of statesmanship as well. It assumed that the
+Filipino people were a civilized people, an assumption never indulged
+by Spain during the whole of her rule, but always freely admitted by
+General MacArthur in all his dealings with their leading men to be a
+fact. It therefore appealed to their amour propre, and to the noblesse
+oblige of many of the most obstinate and trusted fighting leaders. The
+writer was, at the date of the proclamation under consideration,
+on duty at General MacArthur's headquarters, as assistant to Colonel
+Crowder, his judge advocate, now Judge Advocate General of the United
+States Army, and prepared the first rough, tentative suggestions
+for the final draft of it, accompanying such suggestions with a
+memorandum showing the course taken by Wellington in France in 1815,
+and by Bismarck's generals at the close of the Franco-Prussian War,
+as well as that followed under General Order No. 100, 1863, for the
+government of the armies of the United States in the field. Having then
+entertained the opinion that that proclamation, though drastic, was
+wise and right under the facts of the situation which confronted us,
+and having nowise changed that opinion since, it may be well for the
+writer of this book to explain his reasons for that opinion. This must
+be done wholly without reference to "the authorities," for neither at
+the bar of public opinion, nor at the bar of final judgment, do "the
+authorities" count for much. In so doing, however, we must start with
+the assumption that it was a case of American military occupation of
+hostile territory, notwithstanding that Judge Taft began soon after
+his arrival in the islands in the June previous to the December now
+referred to, to cable home impressions which, if correct, amounted
+to a denial that the great body of the people were hostile. Military
+occupation is a fact which admits of no debate, and the necessity
+of making your country's flag respected is always fully and keenly
+recognized as the one supreme consideration by every good American
+except one who, obsessed with the idea that kindness will cure the
+desire of a people for independence, proceeds to act on that idea in
+the midst of a war for independence.
+
+Under the laws of war the commanding general of the occupying force
+owes protection, both of life and property, to all persons residing
+within the territory occupied. The object of General MacArthur's
+proclamation was to put a stop to such "executions," or assassinations,
+as that perpetrated by Juan Cailles, mentioned above, and to separate
+the insurgents in the field from their main reliance, the towns. The
+latter end of a bloody war is no time for a discussion of the causes
+of the war between victor and vanquished. Nor is it any time to
+believe the representative of the enemy who tells you that most of
+him is really in sympathy with you and merely coerced. Your duty is to
+stop the war. You and your enemy having had a difference, and having
+referred it to the arbitrament of war, which is, unfortunately, at
+present the only human jurisdiction having power to enforce decisions
+concerning such differences, if you win, and your enemy refuses to
+abide the decision, he is simply, as it were in contempt of court, and,
+in the scheme of things, as at present ordered, deserves punishment
+as an enemy to the general peace. To state the ethics of the matter
+juridically, "there should be an end of litigation"--somewhere.
+
+I do not believe in the doctrine that might makes right, and I cherish
+the high hope that this human family of ours will survive to see war
+superseded, as the ultimate arbiter, by something more like heaven and
+less like hell. But in the Philippines in 1900 it was a situation,
+not a theory, that confronted us, and, as far as my consciously
+fallible thinking apparatus lights the way which then lay before us,
+that way led to a shrine whereon was written "A life for a life." This
+is no mere academic discussion. With me it is a tremendously practical
+one. In the gravest possible acceptation of the term it is awe-fully
+so. If I am wrong, every execution I approved by memorandum review
+furnished Colonel Crowder and General MacArthur, of military commission
+findings out there was wrong, and so were a number of the executions I
+ordered as a judge appointed by Governor Taft under a government which,
+though nominally a civil government, was no more "civil" in so far as
+that term implies absence of necessity for the presence of military
+force, than other governments immediately following conquest usually
+are. The propriety of the imposition of capital punishment by the
+constituted authorities of a nation as part of a set policy to make its
+sovereignty respected, is wholly independent of whether you call your
+colonial government a civil or a military one. So that in justifying
+General MacArthur I am also justifying Governor Taft, and as it was
+on the recommendation of the former that the latter appointed me to
+the Bench, we are certainly all three in the same boat in the matter
+of the capital punishments under consideration. And while the company
+you were in on earth in a given transaction, however distinguished
+that company, is not going to help you with the Recording Angel,
+[348] still, it is some comfort to know that wiser and abler men than
+yourself approved a course of imposing capital punishments to which
+you were a party, such punishments having been inflicted as part of a
+policy whose subsequent evolution revealed it to you as fundamentally
+wrong. And this reflection is quite relevant in the present connection
+to the question whether the government of Benevolent Assimilation we
+have maintained over the Filipinos for the last fourteen years is one
+which was originally imposed by force against their will, or whether
+it was ever welcomed by them or any considerable fraction of them.
+
+That the MacArthur proclamation of December 20, 1900, concerning the
+laws of war, was at the time a military necessity, is as perfectly
+clear to me now as it was then. And yet it may well give the thoughtful
+and patriotic American pause. It is sometimes difficult to understand
+why men are so often entirely willing to go on fighting and dying in
+a cause they must know to be hopeless. The famous passage of Edmund
+Burke's speech on "Conciliation with America,"
+
+
+    If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, so long as foreign
+    troops remained on my native soil, I never would lay down my arms,
+    no, never, never, never!
+
+
+sounds well to us, but from the standpoint of a conqueror, there is
+a good deal of wind-jamming to it, after all. It was the language of
+a man who knew nothing of the horrors of war by actual experience,
+or of what hell it slowly becomes to everybody concerned after most
+of the high officials of the vanquished government have been captured
+and are sleeping on dry, warm beds, eating good wholesome food, and
+smoking good cigars, in comfortable custody, while the vanquished
+army, no longer strong enough to come out in the open and fight, is
+relegated to ambuscades and other tactics equally akin to the methods
+of the assassin. The law of nations in this regard is an expression
+of the views of successive generations of civilized and enlightened
+men of all nations whose profession was war--men familiar with the
+horrors inevitably incident to it and anxious to mitigate them as far
+as possible. That law represents the common consensus of Christendom
+resulting from that experience. It recognizes that after resistance
+becomes utterly hopeless, it becomes a crime against society and
+the general peace, and this is wholly independent of the merits
+or demerits of the questions involved in the war. In other words,
+the greatest good of the greatest number cries aloud that the war
+must stop. The cold, hard fact is that the great majority of the men
+who hold out longest are, usually, either single men having no one
+dependent on them, or nothing to lose, or both, or else they are men
+more or less indifferent to the ties of family affection, and callous
+to the suffering fruitlessly entailed upon innocent noncombatants
+by the various and sundry horrors of war, such as decimation of
+the plough animals of the country due to their running at large
+without caretakers or forage; resultant untilled fields and scant
+food; pestilence and famine consequent upon insufficient nourishment;
+arson, robbery, rape, and murder inevitably committed in such times
+by sorry scamps and ruffians claiming to be patriots but yielding no
+allegiance to any responsible head; and so on, ad infinitum.
+
+General MacArthur's proclamation of December 20, 1900, served
+notice on the leaders of a hopeless cause that assassinations, such
+as that ordered by Juan Cailles, above mentioned, must stop; that
+the universal practice of the townfolk, of sending money, supplies,
+and information concerning our movements to the enemy in the field,
+must stop; that participating in hostilities intermittently, in
+citizen garb, followed by return to home and avocation when too
+hard pressed, must stop; in short that the war must stop. Yet the
+proclamation explained in so firm and kindly a way why the penalties
+it promised were only reasonable under the circumstances, that "as an
+educational document the effect was immediate and far-reaching," [349]
+to quote from an opinion expressed by its author in the body of it,
+an opinion entirely consistent with modesty and fully justified by
+the facts. General MacArthur also goes on to say of his unrelenting
+and rigid enforcement of the terms of this proclamation that the
+results "preclude all possibility of doubt * * * that the effective
+pacification of the archipelago commenced December 20, 1900"--its
+date. It is a part of the history of those times, familiar to all who
+are familiar with them, that the Taft Civil Commission thought its
+assurances of the benevolent intentions of our government were what
+made the civil government possible by midsummer, 1901. But whatever
+the Filipinos may think of us at present, now that they understand us
+better, certainly in 1900-01, in view of the events of the preceding
+two or three years, which formed the basis of the only acquaintance
+they then had with us, and in view of the fact that their experience
+for the preceding two or three hundred years had made force the only
+effective governmental argument with them, and governmental promises a
+mere mockery, and in view of the fact that the "never-ceasing patrols,
+explorations, escorts, outposts," etc., of General MacArthur's 70,000
+men were relentlessly kept up during the six months immediately
+following the proclamation and in aid of it, it at once becomes
+obvious how infinitesimal a fraction of the final partial pacification
+which made the civil government possible, the Taft assurances to the
+Filipinos as to our intentions must have been. These matters are of
+prime importance to any honest effort toward a clear understanding of
+present conditions, because far and away the greatest wrong which we,
+in our genuinely benevolent misinformation, have done the Filipinos,
+not even excepting the tariff legislation perpetrated upon them by
+Congress, lies in the insufferably hypocritical pretence that they
+ever consented to our rule, or that they consent to it now--a pretence
+conceived in 1898 by Trade Expansion, to beguile a nation the breath of
+whose own life is political liberty based on consent of the governed,
+into a career of conquest, but not even countenanced since by those
+who believe the Government should go into the politico-missionary
+business, after the manner of Spain in the sixteenth century.
+
+Having now exhaustively examined the differences of opinion between
+Judge Taft and General MacArthur, when the former set to work,
+in the summer of 1900, to get a civil government started by the
+date of expiration of the term of enlistment of the volunteer army
+(June 30, 1901), let us follow the facts of the situation up to the
+date last named, or, which is practically the same thing, up to the
+inauguration of Judge Taft as Civil Governor of the islands on July 4,
+1901, pausing, in passing, for such reflections as may force themselves
+upon us as pertinent to the Philippine problem of to-day.
+
+On September 19, 1900, General MacArthur wired Secretary of War
+Root--General Corbin, the Adjutant-General of the Army, to be exact,
+but it is the same thing--describing what he calls "considerable
+activity" throughout Luzon, ominously stating that General Young (up
+in the Ilocano country, into which we followed him and his cavalry
+in Chapter XII, ante) "has called so emphatically for more force,"
+that he, MacArthur, feels grave concern; adding that Luzon north of
+the Pasig is "very much disturbed," and that south of the Pasig the
+same conditions prevail. [350]
+
+October 26th, General MacArthur cables outlining a plan for a great
+campaign on comprehensive lines, stating that "Full development of this
+scheme requires about four months and all troops now in the islands,"
+and deprecating any move on Mr. Root's part to reduce his force of
+70,000 men by starting any of the volunteers homeward before it should
+be absolutely necessary. [351] October 28th, General MacArthur wires,
+"Shall push everything with great vigor," adding "Expect to have
+everything in full operation November 15th." [352] November 5th, as
+if to reassure General MacArthur that he and the General understand
+each other and that the Taft cotemporaneous nonsense is not going to
+be allowed to interfere with more serious business, Secretary Root,
+through the Adjutant-General, sends this cable message:
+
+
+    Secretary of War directs no instructions from here be allowed
+    interfere or impede progress your military operations which he
+    expects you force to successful conclusion. [353]
+
+
+So that while the American people were being pacified with the Taft
+cablegrams to Secretary Root that the Filipino people wanted peace,
+General MacArthur, under Mr. Root's direction, was simultaneously
+proceeding to make them want it with the customary argument used
+to settle irreconcilable differences between nations--powder and
+lead. Mr. Root was all the time in constant communication with both,
+but he gave out only the Taft optimism to the public, and withheld the
+actual facts within his knowledge. December 25th, General MacArthur
+wires Secretary Root, "Expectations based on result of election have
+not been realized." "Progress," he says, is "very slow." [354]
+
+And now I come to one of the most important things that all my
+researches into the official records of our government concerning
+the Philippine Islands have developed. On December 28, 1900, General
+MacArthur reports by cable the contents of some important insurgent
+papers captured in Cavite Province about that time. The Filipinos have
+a great way of reducing to writing, or making minutes of, whatever
+occurs at any important conference. This habit they did not abandon
+in the field. The papers in question belonged to General Trias, the
+Lieutenant-General commanding all the insurgent armies in the field,
+and, next to Aguinaldo, the highest official connected with the
+revolutionary government. One of these papers, according to General
+MacArthur's despatch of December 28th, purported to be the minutes of
+a certain meeting had October 11th previous, between General Trias
+and the Japanese Consul at Manila. As to whether or not the paper
+was really authentic, General MacArthur says: "I accept it as such
+without hesitation." Communicating the contents of the paper he says:
+
+
+    Consul advised that Trias visit Japan. Filipinos represented that
+    concessions which they might be forced to make to Washington would
+    be more agreeable if made to Japan, which as a nation of kindred
+    blood would not be likely to assert superiority. Consul said Japan
+    desired coaling station, freedom to trade and build railways. [355]
+
+
+I consider these negotiations of the Japanese Government with the
+Philippine insurgents important to be related here because they have
+never been generally known, for the good reason, of course, that
+the President of the United States cannot take the public into his
+confidence about such grave and delicate matters when they occur. The
+incident is not "ancient history" relatively to present-day problems,
+for the following reasons:
+
+(1) Because it is credibly reported and currently believed in the
+United States that in Japan, during the cruise of our battleship
+fleet around the world in 1907, one of the reception committee of
+Japanese officers who welcomed our officers was recognized by one of
+the latter as having been, not a great while before that, a servant
+aboard an American battleship.
+
+(2) Because of the following incident, related to me, in 1911,
+without the slightest injunction of secrecy, by the Director of
+Public Health of the Philippine Islands, then on a visit to the United
+States. Shortly before the Director's said visit home, while he was out
+in one of the provinces, there was brought to his attention a Filipino
+with a broken arm. There was a Japanese doctor in the town, at least
+a Japanese who had a sign out as a doctor. The Director carried the
+sufferer to the "doctor," not being a surgeon himself. The "doctor"
+turned out to be a civil engineer, who had been making maps and plans
+of fortifications. The plans were found in his possession.
+
+(3) Because from one of the islands through which the northern line of
+the Treaty of Paris runs, situated only a pleasant morning's journey
+in a launch due north of Aparri, the northernmost town of Luzon, you
+can see, on a clear day, with a good field-glass, the southern end of
+Formosa, some 60 or 70 miles away. Japan can land an army on American
+soil at Aparri any time she wants to, overnight--an army several
+times that of the total American force now in the Philippines, [356]
+or likely ever to be there. From Aparri it is 70 miles up the river to
+Tueguegarao, 40 more to Iligan, and 90 more, all fairly good marching,
+to Bayombong, in Nueva Viscaya (total distance, Aparri to Bayombong,
+200 miles) the province which lies in the heart of the watershed of
+Central Luzon. I know what I am talking about, because that region
+was the first judicial district I presided over, and many a hard
+journey I have had over it, circuit riding, on a scrubby pony. Part
+of it I have been through in the company of President Taft. It thus
+appears that from Aparri to Bayombong there would be but a week or
+ten days of unresisted marching to reach the watershed region, Nueva
+Viscaya. The Japanese soldier's ration is mainly rice, so that he can
+carry more days' travel rations than almost any other soldier in the
+world. Never fear about their making the journey inside of a week or
+ten days, once they start. To descend from the watershed aforesaid,
+over the Caranglan Pass, and down the valley of the Rio Grande de
+Pampanga to Manila, another three or four days would be all that would
+be needed. It would be a Japanese picnic. Fortifying Corregidor Island,
+at the entrance to Manila Bay, which is about all the serious scheme
+of defence against a foreign foe we have out there, is quite like
+the reliance of the Spaniards on Morro Castle, at the mouth of the
+harbor of Santiago de Cuba, against our landing at Guantanamo. Our
+garrison in the Philippines, all told, is but a handful. Aparri is an
+absolutely unfortified seaport, at which the Japanese could land an
+army overnight from the southern end of Formosa. There are no military
+fortifications whatsoever to stay the advance of an invading army
+from Aparri down the Cagayan Valley, and thence over the watershed
+of Nueva Viscaya Province, through the Caranglan Pass, and down the
+valley of the Pampanga River to Manila. So that to-day Japan can
+take Manila inside of two weeks any time she wants to. That is why
+I object to the President's "jollying" the situation along as best
+he can, without taking the American people into his confidence. Any
+army officer at our War College will inform any member of the House
+or Senate on inquiry, that Japan can take the Philippines any time
+she wants to. President Taft and the Mikado may keep on exchanging the
+most cordial cablegrams imaginable, but the map-making goes on just the
+same. And, earnest and sincere as both the President and the Emperor
+undoubtedly are in their desire to preserve the general peace, who
+is going to restrain Hobson and Hearst, and several of Japan's public
+men equally distinguished and equally inflammatory? Heads of nations
+cannot restrain gusts of popular passion. The Pacific Coast is not so
+friendly to Japan as the rest of our country, and as between Japan and
+the Pacific Coast, we are pretty apt to stand by the latter without
+inquiring with meticulous nicety into any differences that may arise.
+
+The reason I said in the chapter before this one that Mr. Root is
+a dangerous man to Republican institutions was because he is of the
+type who are constantly finding situations which they consider it best
+for the people not to know about. After the McKinley election of 1900
+was safely "put over," Mr. Root, as Secretary of War, let Judge Taft
+go ahead and ride his dove-of-peace hobby-horse in the Philippines,
+duly repeating to the American people all the cheery Taft cluckings
+to said horse, at a time when the real situation is indicated by such
+grim correspondence as the following cablegram dated January 29, 1901:
+
+
+    Wood, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can
+    give your consent to the immediate withdrawal Tenth Infantry
+    from Cuba. Imperative that we have immediate use of every
+    available company we can lay our hands on for service in the
+    Philippines. (Signed) Corbin. [357]
+
+
+But let us turn from this sorry spectacle of Mr. Root pulling the wool
+over the eyes of his countrymen to make them believe the Filipinos
+were not quite so unconsenting as they seemed to be, and again look
+at the sheer splendor of American military ability to get anything
+done the Government wants done. I refer to the capture of Aguinaldo.
+
+One of the most eminent lawyers in this country once said to me, "I
+would not let that man Funston enter my house." I tried to enlighten
+him, but as I happened to be a guest in his house at the time,
+which entitled him to exemption from light if he insisted--which he
+did--General Funston and he have continued to miss what might have been
+a real pleasure to them both. The following is, as briefly as I can
+dispose of it, the story of the capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901.
+
+Ever since Aguinaldo had escaped through our lines in November,
+1899, his capture had been the one great consummation most devoutly
+wished. It has already been shown how busy with the war the army
+was all the time Judge Taft was gayly jogging away astride of his
+peace hobby about the insurrection being really quite regretted
+and over. However, in the favorite remark with which he used to
+wave the insurrection into thin air, to the effect that it was
+now merely "a Mafia on a large scale," there was one element
+of truth. The general feeling of the people, both educated and
+uneducated, was such as to countenance the attitude of the leaders
+that pro-American tendencies were treason. Any leader who surrendered
+of course was thereafter an object of at least some suspicion to his
+fellow-countrymen, however assiduous his subsequent double-dealing. As
+long as Aguinaldo remained out, this state of affairs was sure to
+continue indefinitely, possibly for years to come. If captured, he
+would probably himself give up the struggle, and use his influence
+with the rest to do likewise. Therefore, in the spring of 1901,
+each and every one of General MacArthur's 70,000 men was, and had
+been since 1899, on the qui vive to make his own personal fortunes
+secure for life, and gain lasting military distinction, by taking
+any sort of chances to capture Aguinaldo. On February 8, 1901, an
+officer of General Funston's district, the Fourth, in central Luzon,
+intercepted a messenger bearing despatches from Aguinaldo to one of
+his generals of that region, directing the general (Lacuna) to send
+some reinforcements to him, Aguinaldo. General Funston's headquarters
+were then at San Fernando, in the province of Pampanga--organized as a
+"civil" government province by act of the Taft Commission just five
+days later. [358] Through these despatches and their bearer, General
+Funston ascertained the hiding-place of the insurgent chieftain to
+be at a place called Palanan, in the mountains of Isabela Province,
+in northeastern Luzon, near the Pacific Coast. Early in the war we had
+availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes,
+who look nowise different from all other Filipinos, but who had, under
+the Spanish government, by reason of long-standing feuds with their
+more rebellious neighbors, come to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish
+authorities. When we came they had transferred that loyalty to us, and
+had now become a recognized and valuable part of our military force. So
+it occurred to General Funston; "Why not personate the reinforcements
+called for, the American officers to command the expedition assuming
+the role of captured American prisoners?" The plan was submitted to
+General MacArthur and adopted. A picked company of Maccabebes was
+selected, consisting of about eighty men, and General Funston decided
+to go himself, taking with him on the perilous expedition four young
+officers of proven mettle: Captain Harry W. Newton, 34th Infantry,
+U. S. Volunteers, now a captain of the Coast Artillery; Captain
+R. T. Hazzard, 11th Volunteer Cavalry; Lieutenant O. P. M. Hazzard,
+his brother, of the same regiment, the latter now an officer of
+the regular army, and Lieutenant Mitchell, "my efficient aid." [359]
+March 6, 1901, the U.S.S. Vicksburg slipped quietly out of Manila Bay,
+bearing the participants in the desperate enterprise--as desperate
+an undertaking as the heart and brain of a soldier ever carried to a
+successful conclusion. General Thomas H. Barry wrote Secretary of War
+Root, after they left, telling of their departure, and stating that
+he did not much expect ever to see them again. The chances were ten
+to one that the eighty men would meet five or ten times their number,
+and, as they were to masquerade as troops of the enemy, they could
+not complain, under the recognized laws of war as to spies, at being
+summarily shot if captured alive. And the whole Filipino people were a
+secret service ready to warn Aguinaldo, should the carefully concocted
+ruse be discovered anywhere along the journey. They went down to the
+southern end of Luzon, and through the San Bernardino Straits into
+the Pacific Ocean, and thence up the east coast of Luzon to Casiguran
+Bay, about 100 miles south of Palanan, landing at Casiguran Bay, March
+14th. The "little Macks," as General Funston calls the Maccabebes, were
+made to discard their dapper American uniforms after they got aboard
+the ship, and don instead a lot of nondescript clothing gathered by
+the military authorities at Manila before the Vicksburg sailed, so
+as to resemble the average insurgent command. Not a man of them had
+been told of the nature of the expedition before sailing. This was
+not for fear of treachery, but lest some one of the faithful "Macks"
+should get his tongue loosed by hospitality before departing. Also,
+their Krag-Jorgensen regulation rifles were taken from them, and a
+miscellaneous assortment of old Springfields, Mausers, etc., given them
+instead, to complete the deception. An ex-insurgent officer, well known
+to Aguinaldo, but now in General Funston's employ, was to play the
+role of commanding officer of the "reinforcements." To read General
+Funston's account of this expedition is a more convincing rebuttal
+of the contemporaneous Taft denials of Filipino hostility and of the
+unanimity of the feeling of the people against us, than a thousand
+quotations from official documents could ever be. It was necessary
+to land more than 100 miles south of Aguinaldo's hiding-place, lest
+the smoke of the approaching vessel should be sighted from a distance,
+and some peasant or lookout give the alarm. Accordingly, they landed at
+Casiguran Bay by night, with the ship's lights screened, the Vicksburg
+at once departing out of sight of land, and agreeing to meet them off
+Palanan, their destination, on March 25th, eleven days later. From the
+beginning they vigilantly and consummately played the role planned,
+the "Macks" having been drilled on the way up, each and all, in the
+story they were to tell at the first village near Casiguran Bay, and
+everywhere thereafter, to the effect that they had come across country,
+and en route had met ten American soldiers out map-making, and had
+killed two, wounded three, and captured five. They were to point to
+General Funston and the four other Americans in corroboration of their
+story. Speaking of himself and his four fellow "prisoners," General
+Funston says, "We were a pretty scrubby looking lot of privates." The
+villagers received the patriot forces, thus flushed with triumph,
+in an appropriate manner, and supplied them with rations and guides
+for the rest of their 100-mile journey to the headquarters of the
+"dictator." General Funston is even at pains to say for the village
+officials that they were very humane and courteous to himself and
+the other four American "prisoners." They reached Palanan Bay,
+eight miles from Palanan, on March 22d. Here Hilario Tal Placido,
+the ex-insurgent officer whose role in the present thrilling drama
+was that of "commanding officer" of the expedition, sent a note to
+Aguinaldo, stating that he had halted his command for a rest at the
+beach preparatory to marching inland and reporting to the Honorable
+Presidente, that they were very much exhausted, and much in need of
+food, and please to send him some. Of course that was the natural card
+to play to put Aguinaldo off his guard. The food came, and the bearers
+returned and casually reported to the Honorable Presidente that his
+honorable reinforcements would soon be along, much to the honorable
+joy--to make the thing a little Japanesque--of the president of the
+honorable republic. This incident has been since made the occasion of
+some criticism--that it was contrary to decency to accept Aguinaldo's
+food and then attack him afterwards. General Funston very properly
+replies in effect that the case would have been very different had he
+thrown himself on Aguinaldo's mercy, taken his food, and used treachery
+afterwards, but that his conduct was entirely correct, under the code
+of war, for the reason that should he and his command be captured
+while personating enemy's forces, Aguinaldo would have had a perfect
+right, under the rules of the game, to shoot them all as spies. He
+adds rather savagely, concerning "certain ladylike persons in the
+United States" who have censured his course in the matter, that he
+"would be very much interested in seeing the results of a surgical
+operation performed on the skull of a man who cannot readily see the
+radical difference between the two propositions," and that he doubts
+if a good quality of calf brains would be revealed by the operation.
+
+At all events, the expedition was very much refreshed by the food
+and highly delighted at the proof, contained in the sending of it,
+that Aguinaldo did not suspect a ruse. But now came one of the many
+emergencies which had to be met by quick wit in the course of that
+memorable adventure. Aguinaldo sent word to leave the "prisoners"
+under a guard in one of the huts by the sea-shore, where there was one
+of the Aguinaldo retainers in charge, an old Tagalo. After a hurried,
+whispered conversation, "prisoner" Funston instructed "Commanding
+Officer" Placido to go ahead with his main column and then a little
+later send back a forged written order purporting to be from Aguinaldo,
+for the "prisoners" to come on also. This was shown to the old Tagalo,
+thus disarming suspicion on his part. But now came the "closest shave"
+they had. The column met a detachment from Aguinaldo's headquarters
+sent down with instructions to relieve the necessarily worn-out
+guard of the newly arrived "re-inforcements" that were supposed to
+be guarding the five prisoners at the beach, and let said guard come
+on up to headquarters with the rest of the "re-inforcements," the
+idea being to still leave the prisoners at the beach so they would
+not learn definitely as to the Aguinaldo whereabouts. Detaining the
+officer commanding this detachment for a moment or so on some pretext,
+the "Commanding Officer" of the "re-inforcements" whispered to a
+Maccabebe corporal to run back and tell General Funston and the rest
+of the "prisoners" to jump in the bushes and hide. This they did,
+lying within thirty feet of the detachment, as it passed them en
+route for the beach. Of course a fight would have meant considerable
+firing, and the quarry might hear it, take fright, and escape. Finally
+they reached Palanan, the "prisoners" quite far in the rear. Placido
+got safely into Aguinaldo's presence, followed at a short distance
+by the main body of his Maccabebes. Aguinaldo's life-guard of some
+fifty men, neatly uniformed, presented arms as Placido entered the
+insurgent headquarters building, and thereafter waited at attention
+outside. Then the worthy Placido entertained the honorable Presidente
+with a few cock-and-bull stories about the march across country,
+etc., made obediently to the President's order, keeping a weather
+eye out of the window all the time. As soon as the Maccabebes had
+come up and formed facing the Aguinaldo life-guard, Placido went to
+the window and ordered them to open fire. This they did, killing
+two of the insurgents and wounding their commanding officer. The
+rest fled, panic-stricken, by reason of the surprise. Then Placido,
+a very stout individual, grabbed Aguinaldo, who only weighs about
+115 pounds, threw him down, and sat on him, until General Funston,
+the Hazzards, Mitchell, and Newton arrived. The orders were iron-clad
+that under no circumstances, if it could be avoided, was Aguinaldo
+to be killed. His signature to proclamations telling the people to
+quit the war was going to be needed too much. The party rested two
+days and then set out for the coast again, on March 25th, the day the
+Vicksburg had agreed to meet them. "At noon" says General Funston,
+"we again saw the Pacific, and far out on it a wisp of smoke--the
+Vicksburg coming in!" In due course they reached Manila Bay. The
+old palace of the Spanish captains-general, then occupied by our
+commanding general, is up the Pasig River, accessible from the bay
+by launch. By that method General Funston took his precious prisoner
+to the palace without the knowledge of a soul in the great city of
+Manila. He arrived before General MacArthur had gotten up. In a few
+minutes the General came out. "Where is Aguinaldo?" said he, dryly. He
+supposed General Funston simply had some details to tell, like the
+commanding officers of hundreds of other expeditions that had gone out
+before that on false scents in search of the illustrious but elusive
+Presidente. "Right here in this house," said General Funston. General
+MacArthur could hardly believe his ears. A few days later, General
+Funston walked into General MacArthur's office. The latter said;
+"Well, Funston, they do not seem to have thought much in Washington
+of your performance. I am afraid you have got into trouble." "At the
+same time he handed me," says General Funston in the Scribner Magazine
+article above mentioned, "a cablegram announcing my appointment as
+a brigadier-general in the regular army."
+
+In his annual report for 1901, [360] General MacArthur describes
+the capture of Aguinaldo as "the most momentous single event of
+the year," stating also that "Aguinaldo was the incarnation of the
+insurrection." This last statement explains why he was so anxious to
+capture him alive. If dead, he would be sure to get re-incarnated in
+the person of some able assistant of his entourage, thus insuring
+undisturbed continuance of the war. He was most graciously treated
+by General MacArthur during his stay as that distinguished soldier's
+"guest" at the Malacanan palace, from March 28th until April 20th. The
+word "guest" is placed in quotations because the host thought so
+much of him that he considered him worth many hundred times his
+weight in gold, and had him watched night and day by a commissioned
+officer. Everything that had been done by the Americans since November,
+1899, was explained to him, and he was made to see that our purposes
+with regard to his people were not only benevolent but also inflexible;
+in other words that there was no altering our determination to make
+his people happy whether they were willing or not. Seeing this,
+Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable. The programme explained to
+Aguinaldo is wittily described by a very bright Englishwoman as a
+plan "to have lots of American school teachers at once set to work
+to teach the Filipino English and at the same time keep plenty of
+American soldiers around to knock him on the head should he get a
+notion that he is ready for self-government before the Americans
+think he is"--a quaint scheme, she adds, "and one characteristic of
+the dauntlessness of American energy." To be brief, on April 19th,
+Aguinaldo took the oath of allegiance to the American Government,
+which all agree he has faithfully observed ever since, and issued
+a proclamation recommending abandonment of further resistance. This
+proclamation was at once published by General MacArthur and signalized
+by the immediate liberation of one thousand prisoners of war, on
+their likewise taking the oath of allegiance.  In his proclamation
+Aguinaldo said, among other things:
+
+
+    The time has come, however, when they [the Filipino people] find
+    their advance along this path [the path of their aspirations]
+    impeded by an irresistible force. * * * Enough of blood, enough
+    of tears and desolation.
+
+
+He concludes by announcing his final unconditional submission to
+American sovereignty and advises others to do likewise. [361]
+
+Soon after this General Tino surrendered in General Young's district,
+and in another part of northern Luzon, General Mascardo, commanding
+the insurgent forces in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales,
+heretofore described as "the west wing of the great central plain,"
+also surrendered. In the latter part of June, General Cailles, with
+whom we have already had occasion to become acquainted, in connection
+with Judge Taft's "Mafia on a large scale," also surrendered in
+Laguna Province. After that, there was never any more trouble in
+northern Luzon. But during the spring of 1901, the Commission had
+been very busy organizing the provinces of southern Luzon under
+civil government, thus cutting short the process of licking it into
+submission and substituting a process of loving it into that state
+through good salaries and otherwise--a policy which postponed the
+final permanent pacification of that ill-fated region for several
+years, as hereinafter more fully set forth.
+
+The unconditional absoluteness with which Judge Taft acted from the
+beginning on the assumption that the Filipinos would make a distinction
+between civil and military rule, and that their objection to us was
+because we had first sent soldiers to rule them and not civilians,
+and that these objections would vanish before the benignant sunlight
+of a government by civilians, is one of the great tragedies of all
+history, considering the countless lives it eventually cost. As a
+matter of fact, the Filipino objection had little or no relation
+to the kind of clothes we wore, whether they were white duck or
+khaki. Their objection was to us, i.e., to an alien yoke. However,
+to heal the bleeding wounds of war, the Filipinos were benevolently
+told to forget it, and a civil government was set up on July 4, 1901,
+pursuant to the amiable delusion indicated. That it has never yet
+proved a panacea, and why, will be developed in the next and subsequent
+chapters, but only in-so-far as such development throws light on the
+present situation--which it is the whole object of this book to do.
+
+And now a few words by way of concluding the present chapter, as
+preliminary to the inauguration of a civil government, cannot be
+misconstrued, though they come from one who held office under it. I
+have certainly made clear that Judge Taft and his colleagues were as
+honest in their delusion about how popular they were with the Filipinos
+as many other public men who have been known to have hobbies, and my
+remarks must be understood as based on the comprehensive bird's-eye
+view which we have had of the whole situation from the outbreak of
+the war with Spain in 1898 to the end of June, 1901, as a summation
+of that situation. It is quite true that all contemporary history is
+as much affected by its environment as the writer of it is by his
+own limitations. But it certainly seems clear now that, in regard
+to the Philippine problem presented in 1898 by the decision to keep
+the islands, the American people were played upon by the politicians
+for the next few years thereafter, sometimes on the idea that the
+Filipino people were not a people but only a jumble of semi-civilized
+tribes incapable of any intelligent notion of what independence meant,
+and sometimes on the idea that while there was no denying that they
+were indeed a civilized, homogeneous, Christian people, yet the great
+majority of them did not want independence, and would prefer to be
+under a strong alien government. But the key-note to the McKinley
+policy from the beginning, his answer to the eager question of his
+own people, was that there was no real absence of the consent of the
+governed. In Senator Lodge's history of the war with Spain, written in
+1899, there is a description of the long struggle for independence in
+Cuba, whose existence Spain denied year after year until we decided
+that patience had ceased to be a virtue, which description is so
+strikingly applicable to the situation in the Philippines during
+the first years of American rule that I cannot refrain from quoting
+it here:
+
+
+    And we were to go on pretending that the war was not there,
+    and that we had answered the unsettled question, when we really
+    had simply turned our heads aside and refused to look. And then
+    when the troublesome matter had been so nicely laid to sleep,
+    the result followed which is usual when Congressmen and Presidents
+    and nations are trying to make shams pass for realities." [362]
+
+
+By the same high token the Philippine question will always remain
+"the unsettled question" until it is settled right. In other words,
+the American occupation of the Philippines, having been originally
+predicated on the idea that the Filipino people did not really
+want independence, a fiction which political expediency incident
+to government by parties inexorably compelled it to try to live up
+to thereafter, took the form, in 1901, of a civil government founded
+upon a benevolent lie, which expressed a hope, not a fact, a hopeless
+hope that can never be a fact. And that is what has been the matter
+with it ever since.
+
+
+                    The papers 'id it 'andsome,
+                    But you bet the army knows.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT--1901-2
+
+                For they have healed the hurt of the daughter of
+                my people slightly, saying--Peace, peace; when there
+                is no peace. Jeremiah viii., 11.
+
+
+On February 22, 1898, the American Consul at Manila, Mr. Williams,
+after he had been at that post for about a month, wrote the State
+Department, describing the Spanish methods of keeping from the world
+the outward and visible manifestations of the desire of the Filipino
+people to be free from their yoke thus:
+
+
+    Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities therefor
+    were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for two years.
+
+
+He adds:
+
+
+    Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists,
+    battles are of almost daily occurrence, etc. [363]
+
+
+As will hereinafter appear, this is not far from a correct description
+of the conditions which prevailed successively in various provinces
+of the Philippines in gradually lessening degree for the six years
+next ensuing after the report of the Taft Commission of November 30,
+1900, wherein they said:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States. [364]
+
+
+We have seen how from the date of the outbreak, February 4, 1899, to
+the date of his final departure from the islands for the United States
+on May 5, 1900, General Otis had diligently supplied the eager ear of
+Mr. McKinley with his "situation well in hand" and "insurrection about
+to collapse" telegrams, Secretary of War Alger having meantime been
+forced out of the cabinet--in part, at least--by a public opinion which
+indignantly believed that the real situation was being withheld. We
+have seen how, from soon after the arrival of the Taft Commission at
+Manila on June 3, 1900, until after the November elections of that
+year, the same eager presidential ear aforesaid was supplied with
+like material through the presumably innocent but opportunely deluded
+optimism of the Commission, as manifested in the above sample message;
+how the actual military situation as described by General MacArthur,
+the military commander at the time, was one of "desperate resistance by
+means of a general banding of the people in support of the guerrillas
+in the field," [365] he having wired the War Department on January 4,
+1901, "Troops throughout the archipelago more active than at any time
+since November, 1899"; [366] and how this had been followed on July
+4, 1901, by a civil government, the inauguration of which could by
+no possibility be construed as affirming to the people of the United
+States anything other than the existence of a state of peace.
+
+We are to trace in this and subsequent chapters how, a short time after
+the civil government was instituted, the insurrection got its second
+wind; how a year later came another public declaration of peace, on
+July 4, 1902; and how this was followed by a long series of public
+disorders, combated by prosecutions for sedition and brigandage,
+until toward the end of 1906. The drama is quite an allegory--Uncle
+Sam wrestling with his guardian angel Consent-of-the-governed. He
+finally gets both the angel's shoulders on the mat, however, and so
+the two have lived at loggerheads in the Philippines ever since.
+
+As soon as we had once blundered into the colonial business, the
+rock-bottom frankness with which we so dearly love to deal with one
+another, let carping Europe deny it as she will, was superseded
+by a systematic effort on the part of the statesmen responsible
+for the blunder to conceal it. It soon became clear to those on the
+inside that the sovereign American people had "bought a gold brick,"
+that is to say, had made a grievous mistake and had done wrong. But
+as it is not expedient for courtiers to tell the sovereign he has
+done wrong, because "The king can do no wrong," thereafter all the
+courtiers,--i. e. persons desiring to control the "sovereign" while
+seeming to obey him--instead of risking loss of the "royal" favor
+by boldly telling the people they had done wrong and ought to mend
+the error of their ways, began to fill their ears and salve their
+conscience with mediaeval doctrines about salvation of the heathen
+through governmental missions maintained by the joint agencies of Cross
+and Sword. For the foregoing and cognate reasons, Senator Lodge's
+description of Spain's last thirty years in Cuba fits our first six
+or seven in the Philippines, beginning in 1899 with the original
+Otis press censorship policy of "not letting anything go that will
+hurt the Administration," and coming on down to a certificate made
+in 1907 by the Philippine Commission for consumption in the United
+States, to the effect that a state of general and complete peace had
+prevailed throughout the islands for a stated period preceding the
+certificate, when, as a matter of fact, during the period covered by
+the certificate, an executive proclamation formally declaring a state
+of insurrection had issued, and the Supreme Court of the islands had
+upheld certain drastic executive action as legal because of the state
+of insurrection recognized by the proclamation.
+
+The Taft civil government of the Philippines set up in 1901 was an
+attempt to answer the question which, during the crucial period of
+our country's history following the Spanish War, rang so persistently
+through the public utterances of both Grover Cleveland and Benjamin
+Harrison: "Mr. President, how are you going to square the subjugation
+of the Philippines with the freeing of Cuba?" Mr. McKinley's
+answer had been, in effect: "Never mind about that, Grover; you and
+Benjamin are back numbers. I will show you 'the latest thing' in the
+consent-of-the-governed line, a government not 'essentially popular,'
+it is true, nor indeed at all 'popular,' in fact very unpopular,
+but 'essentially popular in form.' You lads are not experts on the
+political trapeze." Accordingly, as Senator Lodge said concerning
+the dreary years of continuous public disorders in Cuba under Spain,
+which we finally put a stop to in 1898:
+
+
+    We were to go on pretending that the war was not there, etc.
+
+
+Lack of frankness is usually due to weakness of one sort or
+another. The weakness of the Spanish colonial system lay in the
+impotent poverty of the home government and the graft tendencies
+of the colonial officials. The weakness of the American colonial
+system has always lain in the fundamental unfitness of republican
+governmental machinery for boldly advocating and honestly enforcing
+doctrines which deny frankly and as a matter of course that governments
+derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. There
+are so many people in a republic like ours who will always stand by
+this last proposition as righteous, and as being the chief bulwark
+of their own liberties, and so many who will always regard denial
+of that proposition as an insidious practice calculated ultimately
+to react on their own institutions, that no colonial government of
+conquered subject provinces eager for independence can ever have the
+sympathy and backing of all our people. Thus it is that to get home
+support for the policy, the supreme need of the colonial government
+is constant apology for its own existence, and constant effort to
+show that the subject people do not really want freedom to pursue
+happiness in their own way as badly as their orators say they do;
+that the oratory is mere "hot air"; and that the people really like
+alien domination better than they seem to.
+
+Always in a mental attitude of self-defence against home criticism,
+in its official reports there is ever present with the Philippine
+insular government the tendency and temptation not to volunteer to
+the American people evidence within its possession calculated to
+awaken discussion as to the wisdom of its continuance. It thus usurps
+a legitimate function never intended to be delegated to the Executive,
+but reserved to the people. It thus makes itself the judge of how much
+the people at home shall know. The law of self-preservation prompts
+it not to take the American people into its confidence, at least
+not that portion of them who are opposed on principle to holding
+remote colonies impossible to defend in the event of war without a
+large standing army maintained for the purpose. There is always the
+apprehension that the value of apparently unfavorable evidence will
+not be wisely weighed by the people at home, because of unfamiliarity
+with insular conditions. This is by no means altogether vicious. It
+is a perfectly natural attitude and a good deal can be said in favor
+of it. But the real vice of it lies in the fact that your colonial
+government thus becomes not unlike the president of a certain naval
+board before which a case involving the commission of an officer of
+the navy was once tried. They had no competent official stenographer to
+take down all that transpired. The Navy Department was asked for one,
+but they referred it to the board. The president of the board knew very
+well that "the defence" wanted to show bias on his part. He exuded
+conscious rectitude and plainly resented any suggestion of bias. So
+a stenographer was refused and the case proceeded, the proceedings
+being recorded in long hand by a regular permanent employee of the
+board. Under such circumstances, there is so much which transpires that
+is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial, that the proceedings would
+be interminable if every little thing were recorded. Consequently,
+much that was material, including casual remarks of the president of
+the board clearly indicative of bias sufficient to disqualify any
+judge or juror on earth, failed of entry in the record. However,
+enough was gotten into the record to satisfy the President of the
+United States that the president of the board was not only not
+impartial, but very much prejudiced, and he reversed the action of
+the board. The case of that board is very much like the case of the
+Philippine Government. The case of the latter is, as it were, a case
+involving a question as to how long a guardianship ought to continue,
+and they simply fail and omit to have recorded in a form where it may
+be available to the reviewing authority, the American people, much that
+is material (on the idea of saving the reviewing authority labor and
+trouble), which they think the record ought not to be cumbered with,
+or the reviewing authority bothered with. This practice is due to a
+confident belief that the American people, being so far away, and being
+necessarily so wholly unacquainted with all the ins and outs of the
+situation in the Philippines, are not fitted to pass intelligently on
+the questions which continually confront the colonial government. This
+is not a mental attitude of insult to the intelligence of the people
+of the United States. It is simply a belief that they, the colonial
+officials, know much better than the American people can ever know,
+what is wisest, in each case, to be done in the premises. And there
+is much to be said in favor of this view, so far as details go. The
+fundamental error of it, however, lies in the assumption that the
+American people are forever committed to permanent retention of the
+Philippines, i. e., permanent so far as any living human being is
+concerned--an assumption wholly unauthorized by any declaration of
+the law-making power of this government, and countenanced only by
+the oft-expressed hope of President Taft that that will be the policy
+some day declared, if any definite policy is ever declared. Thus it
+is that throughout the last twelve years those particular facts and
+events which (to me) seem most vitally relevant to the fundamental
+question in the case, viz., whether or not we should continue to
+persist in the original blunder of inaugurating and maintaining a--to
+all intents and purposes--permanent over-seas colonial government,
+have been withheld from the knowledge of the American public. The
+present policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention
+is a mere makeshift to avoid a frank avowal of intention to retain
+the islands for all future time with which anybody living has any
+practical concern. Until it is substituted by a definite declaration
+by Congress similar to the one we made in the case of Cuba, and the
+present American Governor-General and his associates are substituted
+by men sent out to report back how soon they think the Filipinos
+may safely be trusted to attend to their own domestic concerns, all
+crucial facts and situations that might jeopardize the continuance
+of the present American regime in the Philippines will continue,
+as heretofore, to remain unmentioned in the official reports of the
+American authorities now out there. Until that is done, you will never
+hear the Filipino side of the case from anybody whose opinion you are
+willing to make the basis of governmental action. These remarks will,
+obviously from the nature of the case, be quite as true long after
+President Taft, the reader, and I are dead as they are now.
+
+Mr. Taft would be very glad to have Congress declare frankly that it
+is the purpose of this Government to hold the Philippines permanently,
+i. e., permanently so far as the word means continuance of the "uplift"
+treatment long after everybody now on the earth is beneath it. But
+because public opinion in the United States is so much divided as
+to the wisdom of a policy of frankly avowed intention permanently
+to retain the islands, he prefers to leave the whole matter open
+and undetermined, so as to get the support both of those who think
+a definite programme of permanent retention righteous and those who
+think such a programme vicious. He wishes to please both sides of
+a moral issue, on the idea that, as the present policy is in his
+individual judgment best for all concerned, the end justifies the
+means. Yet, as the issue is a moral one, which concerns the cause of
+representative government throughout the world, and a strategic one
+which concerns the national defence, it should, in my judgment, no
+longer be dodged, but squarely met. You constantly hear President Taft
+talking quite out loud here at home, in his public utterances, about
+the great politico-missionary work we are doing in the Philippines
+by furnishing them with the most approved up-to-date methods for
+the pursuit of happiness, the avoidance of graft in government, the
+elimination of crimes of violence, in short the ideal way to minimize
+the ills that human governments are heir to, while every day and every
+dollar spent out there by Americans induced by him to go there, are
+time and money tensely arrayed against the ultimate independence he
+purports to favor. Give the Americans out there a square deal. Let
+them know whether we are going to keep the islands or whether we
+are not. Honesty is a far better policy than the present policy. The
+Americans in the islands, Mr. Taft's agents in the Philippines, talk no
+uncandid and misleading stuff about the Philippines being exclusively
+for the Filipinos. And they do considerable talking. They need looking
+after, if the present pious fiction is to be kept up at this end of the
+line. Nobody in the Philippines to-day, among the Americans, considers
+talk about independence as anything other than political buncombe very
+hampering to their work. Listen to this high official of the insular
+government, who writes in the North American Review for February, 1912:
+
+
+    The somewhat blatant note with which we at the beginning
+    proclaimed our altruistic purposes in the Philippines has died
+    away into a whisper. To say much about it is to incur a charge
+    of hypocrisy. [367]
+
+
+The most important problem which confronted Mr. McKinley when he
+sent Judge Taft to the Philippines was how to so handle the supreme
+question of public order as to avoid any necessity of having to
+ask Congress later for more volunteers to replace those whose terms
+of enlistment would expire June 30, 1901. We have already reviewed
+the strenuous efforts of General MacArthur during the twelve months
+immediately following the arrival of the Taft Commission in June,
+1900, to get rid of the shadow of this necessity by the date named,
+the regular army having been reorganized meantime and considerably
+increased by the Act of February 2, 1901. On March 22, 1901, while
+the Taft Commission was going around the islands with their Federal
+party folk, holding out the prospect of office to those who would
+quit insurging and come in and be good, General MacArthur reported
+progress to Secretary of War Root by cable as follows: "Hope report
+cessation of hostilities before June 30." [368] His idea was to get
+a good military grip on the situation, if possible, by that time,
+and, as a corollary, of course, that the grip thus obtained should
+be diligently retained for a long time, not loosened, so that the
+disturbed conditions incident to many years of war might have a few
+years, at least, in which to settle. In his annual report dated July 4,
+1901, the date of the inauguration of Judge Taft as "Civil Governor,"
+he says, in regard to the imperative necessity for continuing the
+military grip by keeping on hand sufficient forces:
+
+
+    Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede the activity
+    or reduce the efficiency of these instruments will not only be a
+    menace to the present, but put in jeopardy the entire future of
+    American possibilities in the archipelago. [369]
+
+
+General MacArthur believed in keeping the islands permanently. His
+views were frankly imperialistic. He had no salve to offer to the
+conscience of pious thrift at home anxious to believe that the
+Filipinos were not bitterly opposed to our rule, and very much in
+favor of what was supposed to be a glittering opening for Trade
+Expansion. He was thoroughly imbued with the British colonial idea
+known as The White Man's Burden. On the other hand, Governor Taft
+firmly believed that kindness would cure the desire of the people for
+independence. The difference between these two gentlemen was fully
+ventilated afterward before the Senate Committee of 1902. A statement
+of General MacArthur's embodying the crux of this difference was read
+to Governor Taft by Senator Carmack, and the Governor's reply was:
+
+
+    We did not then agree with that statement, and we do not now
+    agree with it. [370]
+
+
+A little later, in the same connection, he said to the same Senate
+Committee, with the cheery tolerance of conflicting views which comes
+only from entire confidence in the soundness of one's own:
+
+
+    I have been called the Mark Tapley of this Philippine business.
+
+
+There is no doubt about the fact that President Taft is an
+optimist. But while optimism is a very blessed thing in a sick-room or
+a financial panic, it is a very poor substitute for powder and lead
+in putting down an insurrection, or in weaning people from a desire
+for independence accentuated by a long war waged for that purpose,
+especially when your kindness must be accompanied by assurances to
+the objects of it that on account of a lack of sufficient intelligence
+they are not fit for the thing they want. It was upon a programme of
+this sort that Governor Taft entered upon the task of reconciling the
+Filipinos to American rule more than ten years ago. The impossibility
+of the task is of course obvious enough from the mere statement of
+it. The subsequent bitterness between him and the military authorities
+was quite carefully and very properly kept from the American public
+because it might get back to the Filipino public. The military folk
+knew that to go around the country setting up provincial and municipal
+governments, carrying a liberal pay-roll, with diligent contemporaneous
+circulation of the knowledge that anybody who would quit fighting
+would stand a good chance to get an office, would seem to many of the
+Filipinos a confession of weakness and fear, sure to cause trouble
+later. Many of them--of course it would be inappropriate to mention
+names--simply did not believe that Mr. Taft was honest in his absurd
+notion. They simply damned "politics" for meddling with war, and let
+it go at that. But the real epic pathos of the whole thing was that
+Mr. Taft was actually sincere. He believed that the majority of the
+Philippine people were for him and his policies. As late as 1905,
+he seems to have clung to this idea, according to various accounts
+by Senators Newlands, Dubois, and others, in magazine articles
+written after their return from a trip to the Philippines in that
+year in company with Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War. In fact so
+impressed were they with the general discontent out there, and yet so
+considerate of their good friend Mr. Taft's feelings in the matter and
+his confidence that the Filipinos loved benevolent alien domination,
+that one of them simply contented himself with the remark:
+
+
+    When we left the islands I do not believe there was a single
+    member of our party who was not sorry we own them, except Secretary
+    Taft himself.
+
+
+Indeed it is not until 1907 that, we find Mr. Taft's paternal
+solicitude for his step-daughter, Miss Filipina, finally reconciling
+itself to the idea that while this generation seems to want Home
+Rule as irreconcilably as Ireland herself and "wont be happy 'til
+it gets it," yet inasmuch as Home Rule is not, in his judgment, good
+for every people, this generation is therefore a wicked and perverse
+generation, and hence the Filipinos must simply resign themselves to
+the idea of being happy in some other generation. This attitude was
+freely stated before the Millers' convention at St. Louis, May 30,
+1907, the speech being reported in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat the
+next day. Said Mr. Taft on that occasion, after admitting that the
+Islands had been a tremendous financial drain on us:
+
+
+    If, then, we have not had material recompense, have we had it in
+    the continuing gratitude of the people whom we have aided?
+
+
+Answering this, in effect, though not in so many words, "Alas, no,"
+he adds, with a sigh which is audible between the lines:
+
+
+    He who would measure his altruism by the thankfulness of those
+    whom he aids, will not persist in good works.
+
+
+Thus we see the Mark Tapley optimism of 1902 become in 1907 a species
+of solicitude which Dickens describes in Bleak House as "Telescopic
+Philanthropy," in the chapter by that title in which he introduces
+the famous Mrs. Jellyby, mother of a large and interesting family,
+"a lady of very remarkable strength of character, who devotes
+herself entirely to the public," who "has devoted herself to an
+extensive variety of public subjects, at various times, and is at
+present devoted to the subject of Africa, with a general view to the
+cultivation of the coffee berry--and the natives,"--to the woeful
+neglect of her own domestic concerns and her large and expensive
+family of children. Since 1907, Mr. Taft has frankly abandoned his
+early delusion about the consent-of-the-governed, and boldly takes
+the position, up to that time more or less evaded, that the consent
+of the governed is not at all essential to just government.
+
+The apotheosis of Uncle Sam as Mrs. Jellyby is to be found in one of
+Mr. Taft's speeches wherein he declared that the present Philippine
+policy was "a plan for the spread of Christian civilization in the
+Orient."
+
+Thus has it been that, under the reactionary influence of a colonial
+policy, this republic has followed its frank abandonment of the idea
+that all just government must derive its origin in the consent of
+the governed by a further abandonment of the idea that Church and
+State should be kept separate. I do not wish to make President Taft
+ridiculous, and could not if I would. Nor do I seek to belittle him
+in the eyes of his people,--for we are "his people," for the time
+being. No one can belittle him. He is too big a man to be belittled
+by anybody. Besides, he is, in many respects beyond all question, a
+truly great man. But he is not the only great man in history who has
+made egregious blunders. And there is no question that we are running
+there on the confines of Asia, in the Philippines, a superfluous
+governmental kindergarten whose sessions should be concluded, not
+suddenly, but without unnecessary delay. The two principal reasons
+for retaining the Filipinos as subjects, or "wards," or by whatever
+euphemism any one may prefer to designate the relation, are, first,
+that a Filipino government would not properly protect life and
+property, and second, that although they complain much at taxation
+without representation through tariff and other legislation placed or
+kept on the statute books of Congress through the influence and for
+the benefit of special interests in the United States, yet that such
+taxation without representation is not so grievous as to justify them
+in feeling as we did in 1776. Whether these reasons for retaining the
+Filipinos as subjects indefinitely are justified by the facts, must
+depend upon the facts. If they are not, the question will then arise,
+"Would a Filipino government be any worse for the Filipinos than the
+one we are keeping saddled on them over their protest?"
+
+In his letter of instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft Commission,
+Mr. McKinley first quoted the noble concluding language with which
+the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila gave an immediate
+and supremely comforting sense of security to a city of some three
+hundred thousand people who had then been continuously in terror of
+their lives for three and one half months, thus:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants, * * * and its private property of
+    all description * * * are placed under the special safeguard of
+    the faith and honor of the American army;
+
+
+and then added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life * * *
+    to all the people of the Philippine Islands. * * * I charge this
+    commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation,
+    which concerns the honor and conscience of their country.
+
+
+How the premature setting up of the civil government of the Philippines
+in 1901 under pressure of political expediency, and the consequent
+withdrawal of the police protection of the army, was followed by a
+long series of disorders combated by prosecutions for sedition and
+brigandage, toward the end of which the writer broke down and left the
+Islands exclaiming inwardly, "I do not know the method of drawing an
+indictment against a whole people," will now be traced, not so much
+to show that the Philippine insular government has failed properly and
+competently to meet the most sacred obligations that can rest upon any
+government, but to show the inherent unfitness of a government based
+on the consent of the governed to run any other kind of a government.
+
+There were five officers of the Philippine volunteer army of 1899-1901
+appointed to the bench by Governor Taft in 1901. Their names and the
+method of their transition from the military to the civil regime
+are indicated by the following communication, a copy of which was
+furnished to each, as indicated in the endorsement which follows the
+signature of Judge Taft:
+
+
+    UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION
+
+    President's Office, Manila, June 17, 1901.
+
+    Major-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. A.,
+
+    Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.
+
+
+    Sir:
+
+    I am directed by the commission to inform you that it has made
+    the following appointments under the recent Judicial Act passed
+    June 11, 1901:
+
+    You will observe that among our appointees are five army officers:
+    Brigadier General James F. Smith, Lieutenant James H. Blount,
+    Jr., 29th Infantry, Captain Adam C. Carson, 28th Infantry; Captain
+    Warren H. Ickis, 36th Infantry; and Lieutenant George P. Whitsett,
+    32d Infantry.
+
+    It is suggested that it would be well for these officers to resign
+    their positions in the United States military service to the end
+    that they may accept the civil positions, take the oath of office,
+    and immediately begin their new duties.
+
+    I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
+
+
+        Your obedient servant,
+
+        (Signed) Wm. H. Taft,
+        President.
+
+
+    Official extract copy respectfully furnished Lieutenant James
+    H. Blount, Jr., 29th Infantry, U. S. Vols., Manila, P. I. Your
+    resignation, if offered in compliance with above letter, will be
+    accepted upon the date preferred.
+
+    By command of Major-General MacArthur:
+
+
+        (Signed) E. H. Crowder
+        Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. Secretary.
+        Military Secretary's Office,
+        June 18, 1901.
+
+
+General Smith had come out as colonel of the 1st Californias, and had
+won his stars on the field of battle, as has already been described in
+an earlier chapter. He went from the army to the Supreme Bench--at
+Manila. The archipelago had been divided by the Taft Commission
+into fifteen judicial districts, containing three or four provinces
+each,--each district court to be a nisi prius or trial court. Judge
+Carson (Va.) went to the Hemp Peninsula District in the extreme south
+of Luzon, already described, and four years later to the Supreme Bench,
+where he still is. Judge Ickis (Ia.) went to Mindanao, and later died
+of the cholera down there. Judge Whitsett (Mo.) went to Jolo (the
+little group of islets near British North Borneo), but his wife died
+soon afterward, and he resigned and came home. The writer (Ga.) went
+to northern Luzon, to the First District hereinafter noticed.
+
+Just here it may be remarked that the reader will need no long
+complicated description of the details of the organization of the new
+government, interspersed with unpronounceable names, if he will simply
+assume the view-point Governor Taft had in the beginning. Governor
+Taft simply analogized his situation to that of a governor of a State
+or Territory at home. His fifty provinces were to him fifty counties,
+twenty-five of them in the main island of Luzon, which, as heretofore
+stated, is about the size of Ohio or Cuba (forty odd thousand square
+miles), and contains half the population and over one-third the total
+land area of the archipelago. However, each of his provincial governors
+was liberally paid, and the authority of a governor of a province
+was, on a small scale, more like that of one of our own state chief
+executives than like the authority and functions of the chairman of
+the Board of County Commissioners of a county with us. For instance,
+the governorship of Cebu, with its 2000 square miles of territory
+and 650,000 inhabitants, was quite as big a job as the governorship
+of New Mexico, or some other one of our newer States.
+
+So that the task on which Governor Taft entered July 4, 1901, was
+the governing of a potential ultimate federal union in miniature,
+containing nearly eight millions of people. One slight mistake I
+think he made was in providing that the governors of the provinces
+should be ex-officio sheriffs of the Courts of First Instance
+(of the fifteen several judicial districts aforesaid). This was to
+enable the Judges of First Instance to keep a weather eye on the
+provincial governors, the judiciary at first being largely American,
+and it being the programme to have native governors, some of them
+recently surrendered insurgent generals, as rapidly as practicable
+and advisable. The scheme was good business, but not tactful. It
+subtracted some wind from the gubernatorial sails to be a sheriff,
+a provincial governor under the Spanish regime having been quite a
+vice-regal potentate. But the judges were as careful to treat their
+native governors with the consideration the authority vested in them
+called for as Governor Taft himself would have been. So no substantial
+harm was done, and the real power in the provinces of questionable
+loyalty remained where it belonged, in American hands.
+
+Just after Governor Taft's inauguration, the four newly appointed
+district judges just out of the army called on the governor. Judge
+Carson was the spokesman, though without pre-arrangement. He said:
+"Governor, we have called to pay our respects and say goodbye before
+going to the provinces. We have been acting under military orders so
+long, that while we are not here to get orders, we would like to have
+any parting suggestions that may occur to you." Governor Taft said:
+"Well, Gentlemen, all I can think of is to remind you that if what
+we have all heard is true the Spanish courts usually operated to the
+delay of justice, rather than to the dispensing of it. So just go
+ahead to your respective districts, and get to work, remembering that
+you are Americans." So we did. Of course none of us loaned ourselves
+for a moment to the amiable Taft fiction that "the great majority of
+the people are entirely willing to government under the supremacy
+of the United States." We had all had a share in the subjugation
+of the Islands as far as it had progressed at that time, and had
+seen the Filipinos fight--unskilfully and ineffectively, it is true
+(because they none of them understood the use of two sights on a rifle,
+and simply could not hit us much), but pluckily enough. We knew the
+Filipinos well, and our attitude was simply that of "Pharaoh and the
+Sergeant," in Kipling's ballad of the conquest of Egypt. However,
+we knew nothing of the Egyptians, except what we had learned in the
+Bible, gave no thought to whether our occupation was to be "temporary"
+like the British occupation of Egypt since 1882, or temporary like
+the American occupation of Cuba in 1898. That was a matter for the
+people of the United States to determine later. But somebody had to
+govern the Islands, and there we were, and there were the Islands. In
+the scheme of things some one had to do that part of the world's work,
+and, as the salaries were liberal, we went to the work, not concerning
+ourselves with amiable fictions of any kind. I think our attitude
+was really one of more intimately sympathetic understanding of the
+Filipinos than that of Governor Taft himself, because we had all known
+them longer, and all spoke their language, i. e., the language of
+the educated and representative men (Spanish), and knew their ways,
+their foibles, and their many indisputably noble traits. But we did
+not start out to play the part of political wet-nurses. Our attitude
+was, if Mr. Filipino does not behave, we will make him.
+
+Judge Carson and myself had one peculiar qualification for fidelity
+to the Taft policies for which we were entitled to no credit. We
+instinctively resented any suggestion comparing the Filipinos to
+negroes. We had many warm friends among the Filipinos, had shared
+their generous hospitality often, and in turn had extended them
+ours. Any such suggestion as that indicated implied that we had been
+doing something equivalent to eating, drinking, dancing, and chumming
+with negroes. And we resented such suggestions with an anger quite as
+cordial and intense as the canons of good taste and loyal friendship
+demanded. I really believe that the southern men in the Philippines
+have always gotten along better with the Filipinos than any other
+Americans out there, and for the reasons just suggested. Not only
+is the universal American willingness to treat the educated Asiatic
+as a human being endowed with certain unalienable rights going to
+redeem him from the down-trodden condition into which British and
+other European contempt for him has kept him, but the American from
+the South out there is a guarantee that he shall never be treated as
+if he were an African. The African is aeons of time behind the Asiatic
+in development; the latter is aeons ahead of us in the mere duration
+of his civilization. The Filipino has many of the virtues both of the
+European and the Asiatic. Christianity has made him the superior in
+many respects, of his neighbor and racial cousin, the Japanese. And
+Spanish civilization has produced among them many educated gentlemen
+whom it is an honor to call friend.
+
+The five lawyers, who on ceasing to be volunteer officers became
+judges, had other incentives also to make the Taft Government a
+success. The possession of power is always pleasant. We knew the
+military folk were going to stand by and watch the civil government,
+and prophesy failure. This of course put us on our metal to impress
+upon the dictatorial gentry of the military profession, with didactic
+firmness, the fundamental importance to all American ideals that the
+military should be subordinate to the civil authority.
+
+The First Judicial District to which the writer was first assigned
+comprised four provinces, Ilocos Norte, in the Ilocano country, the
+province situated at the extreme northwestern corner of Luzon, in the
+military district the conquest of which by General Young has already
+been fully described; and the three provinces of the Cagayan valley,
+[371] overrun by Captain Batchelor on his remarkable march from the
+mountains to the sea in November, 1899, also already described. Here
+I remained for a year, and then came home on leave, desperately
+ill; being given, on returning to the Islands after my recovery,
+an assignment in one of the southern islands, hereinafter dealt with.
+
+We volunteers were all commissioned as judges as of the 15th of June,
+though none of us I believe were mustered out until June 30th. The
+day after I was notified of my appointment as judge, as above set
+forth, desiring to enter upon my judicial emoluments, which were
+several times those I was receiving as a soldier, I removed the
+shoulder-straps and collar ornaments from my white duck suit, and
+went over and took the oath of office before the Chief Justice of
+the Islands. We had not yet been mustered out of the army, but as
+above stated, Governor Taft had suggested to General MacArthur that
+we resign without waiting for the day of muster out, so we could
+get to work that much sooner, and General MacArthur had notified us
+that if we cared to resign at once as suggested, he would cable our
+resignations to Washington. Immediately after qualifying before the
+Chief Justice, I left his office and on emerging from the court-house
+hailed a carromata, [372] but the driver said No, he would not carry
+me. I suggested in a very rudimental way, in rather rudimental Spanish
+suited to him, that he was a common carrier, and as such under a
+duty to transport me. He said his horse was tired. His horse did
+not look tired. He would not have thus casually toyed with veracity
+if I had had my shoulder-straps on. An autoridad (a representative
+of constituted authority) is to the masses of the Filipino people
+something which instinctively challenges their respect and obedience,
+more especially where the "authority" is firm and just. Respect for
+authority is their most conspicuous civic trait, and it is on this
+element in the lower ninety, on the intelligence and capacity to
+guide them of the upper ten, and on the ardent patriotism of both,
+that I predicate my difference with President Taft as to the capacity
+of the Filipino people for self-government. However, as I was to all
+appearances not an "authority," this ignorant man treated me as merely
+one of the Americans who, having invaded his country, apparently were
+not sure whether they were afraid of his people or not. Again I tried
+diplomacy, offering him an exorbitant fare. "Nothing doing." It was
+about siesta time, and he would not budge. Here then was the civil
+government proposition in a nutshell, to take the ignorant people and
+teach them their rights under theoretically free institutions, instead
+of letting their own people do it in their own way; to reason directly
+with such people as this cochero (hackman), to begin at the bottom of
+the social scale right on the jump, the idea being to fit them, the
+sacred (?) majority, to know their rights and "knowing dare maintain"
+them against the educated minority, as if the latter did not have
+a greater natural interest in their welfare than any stranger could
+possibly have. That I indulged all these reflections at the time I
+of course do not mean to say. The significance of the incident has
+of course deepened in the light of the subsequent years. At any rate,
+I did not succeed in budging that cochero. I walked home, forego the
+difference between the military and the judicial salary for the two
+weeks remaining before muster-out day, put my shoulder-straps back on,
+and kept them on until June 30, 1901. [373]
+
+When I first landed on the China seacoast of the district I was to
+preside over, I was met by quite a reception committee of the leading
+men, who conducted me with great courtesy to the provincial capital. A
+little later the justices of the peace paid their respects. One
+of them came thirty miles to do so. The court-room was very long,
+and when I first spied this last man, he was at the other end of
+the room bowing very low. He would bow, then advance a few steps,
+then bow again, then resume the forward march toward me. I reminded
+myself of some ancient king, so profound were his obeisances. At
+first I thought to myself, "He bows too low, he must have been up to
+some devilment lately!" Experience showed me later that it was simply
+one of the ever-present manifestations of the respect of the Filipino
+for constituted authority. They positively love to show their respect
+for authority, just as a good soldier loves to show his respect for
+an officer. Here some American remarks: "Ah, but that is not good
+proof of capacity for self-government. They would not 'cuss out' the
+party in power enough." I answer: Who made you the judge to say that
+our particular form of government and our particular way of doing
+things is better for each and every other people under the sun than
+any they can devise for themselves? But there was of course another
+possible reason for the profundity of the obeisances of my judicial
+subordinate above mentioned. When I reached that province of Ilocos
+Norte in July, 1901, the people were in a state of submission that was
+simply abject. They had at first worked the amigo business on General
+Young, and treachery of that kind had been so inexorably followed by
+dire punishment, that every home in the country had its lesson. Yet
+that was the only way. The poor devils did not seem to know when they
+were licked. This is not maudlin sentiment. It is a protest against the
+cotemporary libel on Filipino patriotism about "the great majority"
+being "entirely willing" to accept our rule, and the cotemporary
+belittling of the work the army had to do to make them accept it.
+
+I remained in charge of the First Judicial District for more
+than a year, and during that period tried few or no crimes of a
+political character, that is to say, indictments for sedition or the
+like--attempts to subvert the government. The district comprised a
+total population of about a half million people, more than one-eighth
+of the population of Luzon, and a total area of over 13,000 square
+miles, nearly one-third of all Luzon. But remember, this was in
+northern Luzon, where the work of pacification was lucidly completed
+by the army before the "peace-at-any-price" policy began. We will see
+what happened in my friend Judge Carson's district, and in the rest of
+southern Luzon later. The principal broad general fact I now recall,
+in connection with the administration of justice in the First Judicial
+District during the year or more I had it, is that the main volume of
+business on the court calendars was crimes of violence of a strictly
+non-political character due to lack of efficient police protection
+in the several communities, consequent on withdrawal of military
+garrisons. The country was in an unsettled state. The aftermath
+of war, lawless violence, was virulently present, and the presence
+of troops scattered through a province, under such circumstances,
+is a wonderful moral force to restrain lawlessness. However high
+the purpose, however kindly the motive, the setting up of a civil
+government in the Philippines at the time it was set up, when the
+country was far from ready for it, was a terrible mistake. Of course
+no one man in a given province or judicial district had a bird's-eye
+view of the whole situation and the whole panorama at the time,
+such as we can get at this distance, in retrospect. Of course it did
+not lie in human nature for the men responsible for the mistake to
+see it at first, and, the die once cast, they had to keep on, with
+intermittent resort to military help, the extent of which help was
+always minimized thereafter. To show how little the general state of
+the archipelago was understood by American provincial officials busy in
+a given part of it, and getting little or no news of the outside world,
+I remained in the First Judicial District from July, 1901, to August,
+1902, and heard nothing of the great insurrection in southern Luzon,
+in Batangas, and the adjacent provinces, which raged during the winter
+of 1901-02, except a vague rumor that there was trouble down there. The
+Filipinos did, however. Of course for Mr. Root to be able to furnish
+in December, 1901, a report, as Secretary of War, to the President,
+for consumption by Congress and the people of this country, to the
+effect that his volunteer army had been mustered out on schedule time,
+June 30, 1901, and a "civil" government set up and in due operation,
+was a nice showing, calculated to sooth latent public discontent with
+wading through slaughter to over-seas dominion. Reports thereafter of
+disturbances could always be waived aside as merely local in character,
+and not serious. If it were stoutly asserted that everything was
+quiet all over the archipelago except in certain parts of certain
+localities, naming them, that sounded well, and as the public at home
+simply skipped the unpronounceable names, not caring much whether they
+represented molecules or hemispheres, all went well. For instance,
+most of the provinces of the archipelago were organized under "civil"
+government prior to the inauguration of Governor Taft, which occurred,
+July 4, 1901, and on July 17th, thereafter, Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol
+were restored to military control. [374] I suppose the fact that
+Batangas, Cebu, and Bohol had been so restored was duly announced
+at the time in the Associated Press despatches from Manila. But
+what light did it throw on the situation? Who knew whether any one
+of these names represented a mountain lair, a country village, a
+remote islet, or a large and populous province? As a matter of fact,
+each was a province, and the total population of the three provinces
+was 1,180,655, [375] and their total area 4651 square miles. [376]
+The eminent gentlemen charged with the government of the Islands,
+once they committed themselves to their "civil" government, persisted
+always in treating the insurrection, as General Hancock's campaign
+speeches used to treat the tariff--as "a local issue." The true
+analogy, that of a house on fire, with the fire partly but not wholly
+under control, and momentarily subject to gusts of wind, never seems
+to have occurred to them. Here were provinces aggregating nearly
+twelve hundred thousand people, officially admitted to be still in
+insurrection within less than two weeks after the announcement of
+the inauguration of a civil government, which included them, with
+its implied assertion of a state of peace as to them.
+
+If to the three provinces above named you add the province of Samar,
+later of dark and bloody fame, you have a fourth province as to which
+not only had there been no "civil" government organized on paper, but
+no claim yet made by any one that we had ever conquered it. We had been
+so busy in Luzon and elsewhere that we had not yet had time to bother
+very much with Samar. The area of Samar is 5276 square miles, and its
+population 266,237. (See the census tables already cited.) In their
+report dated October 15, 1901, [377] you find the Commission admitting
+that "the insurrection still continues in Batangas, Samar, Cebu" and
+"parts of" Laguna and Tayabas provinces. Now the euphemistic limitation
+implied in the words "parts of" is quite negligible, for any serious
+purpose, since our troops kept the insurgents rather constantly on the
+move, and the population in all the "parts of" any province that was
+still holding out backed up the combatants morally and materially,
+with information as to our movements, supplies, etc., whenever
+the insurgent detachments, in the course of their peregrinations,
+happened to pass through those "parts." So, to make a recapitulation
+presenting the political situation admitted by the Commission to exist
+a little over three months after the inauguration of civil government,
+we have the insurrection still in progress as follows:
+
+
+    Province             Area (sq. m.)          Population
+
+    Batangas              1,201                   257,715
+    Cebu                  1,939                   653,727
+    Bohol                 1,511                   269,223
+    Laguna                  629                   148,606
+    Tayabas               5,993                   153,065
+    Samar                 5,276                   266,237
+                         ------                 ---------
+        Total            16,549                 1,748,573
+
+
+According to his own official statements, it thus appears that on
+October 15th, after Governor Taft set up his "civil" government on
+the Fourth of July, throughout one-fifth of the territory and among
+one-fourth of the population insurrection was rampant. The total
+area of the archipelago, if Mohammedan Mindanao be excepted (for the
+reason that the Moros never had anything to do with the Filipinos
+and their insurrection against us), is about 80,000 square miles,
+having a total population of 7,000,000. So that, to restate the
+case, one-fifth of the house was still on fire, and one-fourth of
+the inmates were trying their best to keep the fire from being put out.
+
+Just here I owe it to President Taft, under whose administration
+as governor I served as a judge, as well as to myself, to explain
+why I have so frequently put the word "civil" in quotations in
+referring to the civil government of the Philippines. Broadly
+speaking, if "civil" does not imply consent of the governed, it
+at least distinctly negatives the idea of a bleeding, prostrate,
+and deeply hostile people. And, in that the civil government of the
+Philippines founded in 1901 did so negative the actual conditions it
+was a kindly humbug. When you go around the country sending people
+to the penitentiary by scores for political crimes, and then get
+criticised afterwards for "subserviency" to the government you are
+thus serving, you get a trifle sensitive about such criticism. Now
+the core of the charges made in this country against the Philippine
+judiciary in the early days was that they were parties to a humbug,
+pliable servants of a government which was trying to produce at home
+an incorrect impression of substantial absence of unwillingness on
+the part of the governed. I am very sure that the five ex-officers of
+the volunteer army above named, who went from the army to the bench,
+never did, by act or word, lend themselves to the idea that there was
+any "consent" on the part of the governed. Those of us who had been
+in Cuba with General Wood had but a little while previously observed
+there a civil regime under a military name. We were now, in the
+Philippines, serving a military regime under a civil name. We had all
+of us doubtless--if there was an exception it is immaterial--served
+on military commissions. We therefore felt, without immodesty,
+that we could deal out to insurrectos and their political cousins,
+the brigands, more even-handed justice, as a military commission
+of one, than a board of several officers, booted, spurred, and
+travel-stained from some recent man-hunt. Turning, however, from
+the more inconspicuous objects of Professor Willis's attacks, [378]
+the American trial judges in the Philippines in the pioneer days, to
+the now wide-looming historic personage who was his real objective,
+I was asked at a public meeting in Boston, rather significantly,
+by one of the most eminent lawyers in this country, Mr. Moorfield
+Storey, formerly president of the American Bar Association, whether
+or not there had been attempts in the Philippines, while I was there,
+to make the judiciary subservient to the executive. My answer was, "No,
+the lawyers who have been in charge of the Philippine Government have
+never been guilty of any unprofessional conduct." But the distinguished
+Boston barrister above referred to has a nephew who is now and has been
+since 1909, Governor of the Philippines--and who, before he went out
+there was a representative of Big Business in Boston--Governor Forbes,
+and I have no idea that any judge who during that time has rendered
+any decision of importance he did not like has been promoted to the
+Supreme Bench of the Islands, though I know that under Governor Taft,
+Judge Carson unhesitatingly declared a certain act of the Commission
+null and void as being in conflict with an Act of Congress, and
+before the time-servers had gotten through wondering at his rashness,
+Mr. Taft had him put on the Supreme Bench of the Philippines [379]
+because he liked that kind of a judge.
+
+Having sown the wind by setting up his civil government too soon,
+let us now observe the whirlwind Governor Taft reaped within six
+months thereafter. Of course the civil and military folk were at
+daggers' points. That goes without saying. But their differences
+were decorously suppressed so that the Filipinos did not get hold
+of them. To that end, the situation was also diligently concealed
+in the United States. In his proclamation of July 4, 1902, you find
+President Roosevelt publicly smoothing the ruffled feathers of that
+rugged hero of many battles in two hemispheres, General Chaffee, and
+also commending Governor Taft, and telling them how harmoniously they
+had gotten along together to the credit of their common country. But
+in 1901, shortly after General Chaffee had relieved General MacArthur,
+you find the following cablegram:
+
+
+                                          Executive Mansion, Washington,
+                                                        October 8, 1901.
+
+    Chaffee, Manila: I am deeply chagrined, to use the mildest possible
+    term, over the trouble between yourself and Taft. I wish you
+    to see him personally, and spare no effort to secure prompt and
+    friendly agreement in regard to the differences between you. Have
+    cabled him also. It is most unfortunate to have any action which
+    produces friction and which may have a serious effect both in
+    the Philippines and here at home. I trust implicitly that you
+    and Taft will come to agreement.
+
+        Theodore Roosevelt. [380]
+
+
+The most important words of the above telegram are "and here at
+home." The "serious effect here at home" so earnestly deprecated was
+that the real issue between General Chaffee and Governor Taft might
+be ventilated by some Congressional Committee, and thus bring out
+the prematurity with which, to meet political exigencies, the civil
+government had been set up. The issue was that General Chaffee was
+recognizing the hostility of the people, and deprecating the withdrawal
+of the police protection of the army from districts in which there
+were many people who, though tired of keeping up the struggle, and
+willing to quit, were being harried by the die-in-the-last-ditch
+contingent. This would mean, ultimately, an examination, such as has
+already been made in this volume, of the evidence on which Governor
+Taft based his half-baked opinion of 1900 that "the great majority"
+were "entirely willing" to American sovereignty. It would also show
+up Mr. Root's nonsense about "the patient and unconsenting millions,"
+so shamelessly flouted in the presidential campaign of 1900, and his
+pious Philippics against delivering said millions "into the hands of
+the assassin, Aguinaldo," [381] and would reveal the truth confessed
+by Secretary Root in a speech made to the cadets at West Point in July,
+1902, after the trouble had blown over, in which, apropos of the valor
+and services of the army, he referred proudly to its having then just
+completed the suppression of "an insurrection of 7,000,000 people."
+
+On September 28, 1901, just prior to President Roosevelt's above
+cablegram pouring oil on the troubled politico-military insular
+waters, a company of General Chaffee's command, Company C, of the
+9th Infantry, had been taken off their guard and massacred at a place
+called Balangiga, in the island of Samar. [382] This had made General
+Chaffee somewhat angry, and explains the subsequent dark and bloody
+drama of which General "Jake" Smith was the central figure, whereby
+Samar was made "a howling wilderness." But Governor Taft was filled
+with much more solicitude about the success of his civil government
+than he was about the obscure lives lost at Balangiga. Apropos
+of the Balangiga affair he was wearing the patience of the doughty
+Chaffee with remarks like this: "The people are friendly to the civil
+government," and suavely speaking of "the evidence which accumulates
+on every hand of the desire of the people at large for peace and
+protection by the civil government." [383] The same Taft report goes
+on to deprecate "rigor in the treatment" of the situation and the
+"consequent revulsion in those feelings of friendship toward the
+Americans which have been growing stronger each day with the spread
+and development of the civil government."
+
+General "Jake" Smith was sent to Samar shortly after the Balangiga
+massacre, and did indeed make the place a howling wilderness, with his
+famous "kill-and-burn" orders, instructions to "kill everything over
+ten years old" and so forth, and the army was in sympathy generally
+with most of what he did,--except, of course, the unspeakable "10 year
+old" part--piously exclaiming, as fallible human nature often will in
+such circumstances, "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord." Now the civil
+government could have put a stop to all this if it had wanted to. It
+had the backing of President Roosevelt. But it quietly accepted the
+benefit of such "fear of God"--to use the army's rather sacrilegious
+expression about that Samar campaign--as the military arm put into
+the heart of the Filipino, and went on the even tenor of its way,
+still maintaining that the Filipinos must like us because the civil
+government was so benevolent,--as if the Filipinos drew any nice
+distinctions between Governor Taft and General Chaffee, or supposed
+the two did not represent one and the same government, the government
+of the United States. There was much investigation about that awful
+Samar campaign afterward. General Smith was court-martialed and partly
+whitewashed, at least not dismissed. At General Smith's court-martial,
+there was some dispute about the alleged orders to "kill and burn,"
+to "kill everything over ten years old," etc. But the nature of the
+campaign may be inferred from General Smith's famous circular No. 6,
+which, issued on Christmas eve, 1901, advised his command, in effect,
+that he did not take much stock in the civil commission's confidence
+that the people really wanted peace; that he was "thoroughly convinced"
+that the wealthy people in the towns of his district were aiding the
+insurgents while pretending to be friendly and that he proposed to
+
+
+    adopt a policy that will create in all the minds of all the
+    people a burning desire for the war to cease; a desire or longing
+    so intense, so personal, and so real that it will impel them to
+    devote themselves in real earnest to bringing about a real state
+    of peace. [384]
+
+
+During all his trial troubles, General Smith "took what was coming
+to him" without a murmur, and General Chaffee stuck to him as far as
+he could without assuming the primary responsibility for the fearful
+orders above alluded to. If, when General Smith went to Samar, his
+superior officer, General Chaffee, was in just the direly vengeful
+frame of mind he, General Smith, afterwards displayed, and prompted
+him to do, substantially, what he afterward did, which is by no
+means unlikely, General Smith never whimpered or put the blame on his
+chief. But a fearful lesson was given the Filipinos, and the civil
+government profited by it. General Chaffee was never really pressed
+on whether he did or did not prompt General Smith to do what he did;
+Governor Taft was never even criticised for not protesting; but with
+a flourish of presidential trumpets, General Smith was finally made
+"the goat," by being summarily placed on the retired list, and that
+closed the bloody Samar episode of 1901-02. I wonder General Smith
+has not gone and wept on General Miles's shoulder and like him become
+a member of the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston. Some of the best
+fighting men in the army say that as a soldier in battle General
+Smith is superb. At any rate he may find spiritual consolation in the
+following passage of the Scriptures which fits and describes his case:
+
+
+    But the goat, on which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall be
+    presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him,
+    and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. [385]
+
+
+In his Report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four principal
+provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble shortly after the
+civil government was set up in that year, and had to be returned
+to military control, were organized under civil rule "on the
+recommendation" of the then commanding general (MacArthur) [386]: It
+certainly seems unlikely that the haste to change from military rule
+to civil rule came on the motion of the military. If the Commission
+ever got, in writing, from General MacArthur, a "recommendation" that
+any provinces be placed under civil rule while still in insurrection,
+the text of the writing will show a mere soldiery acquiescence in the
+will of Mr. McKinley, the commander-in-chief. Parol contemporaneous
+evidence will show that General MacArthur told them, substantially,
+that they were "riding for a fall." In fact, whenever an insurrection
+would break out in a province after Governor Taft's inauguration as
+governor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, from
+the commanding general down, was "I told you so." They did not say
+this where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common knowledge
+that they were much addicted to damning "politics" as the cause of
+all the trouble.
+
+Governor Taft's statement in his report for 1901, that the four
+principal provinces, above named, Batangas and the rest, were organized
+under civil rule "on the recommendation of General MacArthur,"
+is fully explained in his testimony before the Senate Committee of
+1902. From the various passages hereinbefore quoted from President
+McKinley's state papers concerning the Philippines, especially
+his messages to Congress, the political pressure Mr. McKinley was
+under from the beginning to make a show of "civil" government, thus
+emphasizing the alleged absence of any real substantial opposition
+to our rule by a seeming absence of necessity for the use of force,
+so as to palliate American repugnance to forcing a government upon an
+unwilling people, has been made clear. There were to be no "dark days
+of reconstruction." The Civil War in the United States from 1861 to
+1865 was a love feast compared with our war in the Philippines. Yet the
+work of reconstruction in the Philippines was to be predicated on the
+theory of consent, so persistently urged by President McKinley before
+the American people from the beginning, viz., that the insurrection
+represented only a small faction of the people. We have seen how
+General MacArthur also had originally, in 1898, entertained this
+notion, and how by the time he took Malolos in March, 1899, he had
+gotten over this notion, and had--regretfully--recognized that "the
+whole people are loyal to Aguinaldo and the cause he represents." And
+now came Governor Taft, after fifteen months more of continuous
+fighting, to tell General MacArthur, on behalf of Mr. McKinley,
+that he, MacArthur, did not know what he was talking about, and that
+"the great majority" were for American rule. The representative
+men of my own State of Georgia welcomed the return of the State to
+military control in 1870. Most of them had been officers of the
+Confederate army. The Federal commander simply told them that if
+they could not restrain the lawless element of their own people, he
+would. By premature setting up of the Philippine civil government,
+the lawless element was allowed full swing. General MacArthur had
+been in the Civil War. He knew something about reconstruction. But
+here were the Taft Commission, with instructions from Mr. McKinley to
+the effect that civil government, government "essentially popular in
+form," was to be set up as fast as territory was conquered. It didn't
+make any difference about the government being "essentially popular"
+just so it was "essentially popular in form." To the Senate Committee
+of 1902, Governor Taft said:
+
+
+    General MacArthur and the Commission did differ as to where the
+    power lay with respect to the organization of civil governments,
+    as to who should say what civil governments should be organized,
+    the Commission contending that, under the instructions, it was
+    left to them, and General MacArthur thinking that everything was
+    subject to military control ultimately, in view of the fact that
+    the islands were in a state of war. [387]
+
+
+Governor Taft then added that he and General MacArthur reached a
+modus vivendi. When a good soldier once finds out just what his
+commander-in-chief wants done, he will endeavor, in loyal good
+faith, to carry out the spirit of instructions, no matter how
+unwise they may seem to him. As soon as General MacArthur saw what
+President McKinley wanted done, he proceeded to co-operate loyally
+with Governor Taft to carry out the plan. He well knew the country
+was not ready for civil government, but if Mr. McKinley was bent on
+crowding civil government forward as fast as territory was conquered,
+he would make his recommendations on that basis. In the matter of
+the utter folly of the prematurity with which the civil government
+was set up in the Philippines in 1901, and the terrible consequences
+to the hapless Filipinos, hereinafter described, which followed,
+by reason of the premature withdrawal of the police protection of
+the army and the sense of security its several garrisons radiated,
+from a country just recovering from some six years of war, General
+MacArthur's exemption from responsibility is shown by his reports
+for 1900 and 1901. [388] The former has already been fully examined,
+and the original sharp differences between him and Governor Taft
+made clear. In the latter report dated July 4, 1901, the date of
+the Taft inauguration as Governor, and also, if I mistake not, the
+day of General MacArthur's final departure for the United States,
+the latter washes his hands of the kindly McKinley-Taft nonsense,
+born of political expediency, about there having never been any real
+fundamental or unanimous resistance, in no uncertain terms thus:
+
+
+    Anything in the immediate future calculated to impede the
+    activity or reduce the efficiency of these instruments [our
+    military forces,] will not only be a menace to the present, but
+    put in jeopardy the entire future of American possibilities in
+    the archipelago. [389]
+
+
+No, President Taft can never make General MacArthur "the goat" for
+what General Bell had to do in Batangas Province in 1901-02 to make
+our "willing" subjects behave. Nor can the ultimate responsibility
+before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the
+United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of
+1899, the population of Batangas Province was 312,192, and according
+to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903 it was 257,715,
+[390] rest entirely on military shoulders. An attempt to place the
+responsibility for the prematurity of the civil government on General
+MacArthur was made by Honorable Henry C. Ide, who was of the Taft
+Commission of 1900, and later Governor General of the Islands, and
+is now Minister to Spain, in the North American Review for December,
+1907. But Mr. Taft, a man of nobler mould, has at least maintained a
+decorous silence on the subject except when interrogated by Congress,
+and when so interrogated, his testimony, above quoted, if analyzed,
+places the responsibility where it honestly belongs. In 1900 the Taft
+Commission were not taking much military advice.
+
+Batangas province was first taken under the wing of the
+peace-at-any-price policy by the Act of the Taft Commission of May 2,
+1901, entitled "An Act Extending the Provisions of 'the Provincial
+Government Act' [391] to the Province of Batangas." By the Act of
+the Commission of July 17, 1901, the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, and
+Bohol, were restored to military control. When the civil authorities
+turned those provinces back to military control, they well knew the
+frame of mind the military were in, and there is no escape from the
+proposition that they, in effect, said to the military: "Take them
+and chasten them; go as far as you like. After you are done with them,
+it will be time enough to pet them again. But for the present we mean
+business." General Bell was scathingly criticised on the floor of the
+United States Senate for what he did in Batangas in 1901-02, but by
+the time he took hold there it had become a case of "spare the rod
+and spoil the child." The substitution by the Commission of kindness,
+and a disposition to forget what the Filipinos could not forget, for
+firmness and the policy of making them submit unreservedly to the
+inevitable,--viz., abandonment of their dream of independence--had
+created among them a well-nigh ineradicable impression that, for some
+reason or other, whether due to disapproval in the United States
+of the so-called "imperial" policy or what not, we were afraid of
+them. General Bell's task in Batangas, therefore, was to eradicate
+this impression all over the archipelago by making an example of the
+Batangas people.
+
+In General Chaffee's report for 1902, [392] he prefaces his account
+of General Bell's operations in Batangas as follows:
+
+
+    The long-continued resistance in the province of Batangas and
+    in certain parts of the bordering provinces of Tayabas, Laguna,
+    and Cavite, had made it apparent to me and to others that the
+    insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist
+    and maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge
+    of practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active
+    support of many who professed friendship for United States
+    authority, etc.
+
+
+This last was a thrust at Governor Taft's new-found Filipino friends
+and advisers, in whose lack of sympathy with the cause of their
+country the Governor so profoundly believed, but in whose continuing
+co-operation in the killing of his soldiers General Chaffee believed
+still more profoundly.
+
+General Bell's famous operations on a large scale in Batangas began
+January 1, 1902. The great mistake of the Civil Commission, to which
+they adhered so long, was in supposing that when the respectable
+military element of the insurgents was pursued to capture or surrender,
+these last could and would thereafter control the situation. As a
+matter of fact, whether they could or not, they did not.
+
+In his celebrated circular order dated Batangas, December 9, 1901,
+General Bell announced:
+
+
+    To all Station Commanders:
+
+    A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares,
+    appears to exist, that the insurrection in this brigade continues
+    because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy
+    ones, pretend to desire, but do not in reality want peace; that
+    when all really want peace, we can have it promptly. Under such
+    circumstances, it is clearly indicated that a policy should be
+    adopted that will, as soon as possible, make the people want
+    peace and want it badly.
+
+    The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments
+    of either individuals or town councils should be such acts
+    publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to
+    the side of Americans by arousing the animosity of the insurgent
+    element. * * * No person should be given credit for loyalty simply
+    because he takes the oath of allegiance, or secretly conveys to
+    Americans worthless information and idle rumors which result in
+    nothing. Those who publicly guide our troops to the camps of the
+    enemy, who publicly identify insurgents, who accompany troops in
+    operations against the enemy, who denounce and assist in arresting
+    the secret enemies of the Government, who publicly obtain and
+    bring reliable and valuable information to commanding officers,
+    those in fact who publicly array themselves against the insurgents,
+    and for Americans, should be trusted and given credit for loyalty,
+    but no others. No person should be given credit for loyalty solely
+    on account of having done nothing for or against us so far as
+    known. Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of
+    this brigade should be either active friend or be classed as enemy.
+
+
+In his Circular Order No. 5, dated Batangas, December 13, 1901, [393]
+General Bell announced that General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's
+Office, 1863, approved and published by order of President Lincoln,
+for the government of the armies of the United States in the field,
+would thereafter be regarded as the guide of his subordinates in the
+conduct of the war. This order is familiar to all who have ever made
+any study of military law. Ordinarily, of course, a captured enemy
+is entitled to "the honors of war," i. e., he must be held, housed,
+and fed, unless exchanged, until the close of the war. But where an
+enemy places himself by his conduct without the pale of the laws of
+war, i. e., where he does not "play the game according to the rules,"
+he may be killed on sight, like other outlaws.
+
+Under General Orders No. 100, 1863, men and squads of men who,
+without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly
+organized hostile army, fight occasionally only, and with intermittent
+returns to their homes and avocations, and frequent assumption of the
+semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character
+and appearance of soldiers; armed prowlers seeking to cut telegraph
+wires, destroy bridges and the like, etc., are not entitled to the
+protection of the laws of war and may be shot on sight. In other
+words, the game being one of life and death, you must take even
+chances with your opponent. General Bell's defenders on the floor of
+the Senate simply relied on General Orders No. 100. However, there is
+nothing about reconcentration in that order. We learned that from the
+Spaniards. In fact we never did succeed in bringing to terms the far
+Eastern colonies we bought from Spain, until we adopted her methods
+with regard to them. Another of the expedients adopted by General Bell
+in Batangas seems harsh, but it was used by Wellington in the latter
+end of the Napoleonic wars, and by the Germans in the latter end of
+the Franco-Prussian War. It was to promise the inhabitants of a given
+territory that whenever a telegraph wire or pole was cut the country
+within a stated radius thereof, including all human habitations,
+would be devastated. It is in General Bell's Circular Order No. 7
+of December 15, 1901, [394] that we find the genesis of the idea of
+basing tactics used by Weyler in Cuba on Mr. Lincoln's General Order
+100. He there says:
+
+
+    Though Section 17, General Orders 100, authorizes the starving
+    of unarmed hostile belligerents as well as armed ones, provided
+    it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is considered
+    neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any person to starve
+    who has come into towns under our control seeking protection.
+
+
+This order goes on to direct that all food supplies encountered
+be brought to the towns. Of course this does not mean supplies
+captured from the enemy's forces, which may lawfully be destroyed
+at once. To those not familiar with reconcentration tactics it
+should be explained that reconcentration means this: You notify,
+by proclamation and otherwise, all persons within a given area, that
+on and after a certain day they must all leave their homes and come
+within a certain prescribed zone or radius of which a named town is
+usually the centre, there to remain until further orders, and that
+all persons found outside that zone after the date named will be
+treated as public enemies. General Bell's order of December 20th,
+provided that rice found in the possession of families outside the
+protected zone should, if practicable, be moved with them to the town
+which was the centre of the zone, that that found apparently cached
+for enemy's use should be confiscated, and also destroyed if necessary.
+
+
+    Whenever it is found absolutely impossible to transport it [any
+    food supply] to a point within the protected zone, it will be
+    burned or otherwise destroyed. These rules will apply to all
+    food products.
+
+
+No person within the reconcentration zones was permitted to go
+outside thereof--cross the dead line--without a written pass. The
+Circular Order of December 23d, apparently solicitous lest subordinate
+commanders might become infected with the Taft belief in Filipino
+affection, directs that after January 1, 1902, all the municipal
+officials, members of the police force, etc., "who have not fully
+complied with their duty by actively aiding the Americans and rendering
+them valuable service," shall be summarily thrown into prison. [395]
+Circular Order No. 19, issued on Christmas Eve, 1901, provided that,
+
+
+    in order to make the existing state oL war and martial law
+    so inconvenient and unprofitable to the people that they will
+    earnestly desire and work for the re-establishment of peace and
+    civil government,
+
+
+subordinate commanders might, under certain prescribed restrictions,
+put everybody they chose to work on the roads. [396] This was an
+ingenious blow at the wealthy and soft-handed, intended to superinduce
+submission by humbling their pride. Note also the seeds of affection
+thus sown for the civil government under the reconstruction period
+which was to follow. In one of Dickens novels there occurs a law
+firm by the name of Spenlow and Jorkins. Mr. Spenlow was quite
+fond of considering himself, and of being considered by others, as
+tender-hearted. Mr. Jorkins did not mind. When the widow and the orphan
+would plead with Mr. Spenlow to stay the foreclosure of a mortgage,
+that benevolent soul would tell them, with a pained expression of
+infinite sympathy, that he would do all he could for them, but that
+they would have to see Mr. Jorkins, "who is a very exacting man,"
+he would say. In the dual American politico-military regime in the
+Philippines of 1901-02, Governor Taft was the Mr. Spenlow, General
+Chaffee the Mr. Jorkins. But the former always seemed to harbor the
+amiable delusion that the Filipinos did not at all consider the firm as
+the movants in each proceeding against them, and that on the contrary
+they were sure to make a favorable contrast in their hearts between
+the kindness of Mr. Spenlow and the harshness of Mr. Jorkins. He
+seemed blind to the fact that the Filipinos, in considering what was
+done by any of us, spelled us--U. S.
+
+General Bell's Circular Order No. 22, also a Christmas Eve product,
+re-iterates the usual purpose to make the people yearn for civil
+government, and the usual warning that none of them really and truly
+want the blessings of American domination and Benevolent Assimilation
+as they truly should, and adds:
+
+
+    To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of
+    war as insupportable as possible; and there is no more efficacious
+    way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people
+    in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such
+    conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The
+    less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey intentions. [397]
+
+
+Under date of December 26, 1901, General Bell reports:
+
+
+    I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2500 men, who will be
+    used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the command.
+    * * * I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly
+    searching each ravine, valley, and mountain peak for insurgents
+    and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of
+    town. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured.
+
+
+Such was the central idea animating the Bell Brigade that overran
+Batangas in 1902. The American soldier in officially sanctioned
+wrath is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling
+to describe him. I have seen him in that mood, but to describe it is
+beyond me. Side by side with innumerable ambuscades incident to the
+nature of the field service as it then was, in which little affairs
+the soldier above mentioned had lost many a "bunkie," there had gone
+on for some time, under the McKinley-Taft peace-at-any-price policy,
+whose keynote was that no American should have a job a Filipino could
+fill, much appointing to municipal and other offices of Filipinos,
+many of whom had at once set to work to make their new offices useful
+to the cause of their country by systematic aid to the ambuscade
+business. With this and the Balangiga massacre ever in mind, the
+men of General Bell's brigade began their work in Batangas in a mood
+which quite made for fidelity in performance of orders to "make living
+unbearable" for the Filipino "by acts, not words." Also, the American
+soldier can sing, sometimes very badly, but often rather irrepressibly,
+until stopped by his officer. Also, whether justly or unjustly is
+beside the question, he considers a politician who pets the enemy
+in the midst of a war a hypocrite. So General Bell's 2500 men began
+that Batangas campaign on New Year's Day, 1902, giving preference,
+out of their repertoire, to a campaign song whose ominous chorus ran:
+
+
+            "He may be a brother of William H. Taft
+            But he ain't no friend of mine,"
+
+
+and between songs they would say purringly to one another, "Remember
+Balangiga." And their commanding officer was the very incarnation of
+this feeling. So listen to the stride of his seven-league boots and
+the ring of his iron heel:
+
+
+    I expect to first clean out the wide Looboo Peninsula. I shall then
+    move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the country
+    westward to the ocean and south of Cavite, returning through
+    Lipa. I shall scour and clean up the Lipa mountains. Swinging
+    northward, the country in the vicinity of [here follows a long
+    list of towns] will be scoured, ending at [a named mountain],
+    which will then be thoroughly searched and devastated. Swinging
+    back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the
+    country of which [two named mountains] are the main peaks.
+
+
+And so on ad libitum. General Bell's course in Batangas was commended
+in the annual report of his immediate superior, a very humane, as
+well as gallant, soldier, General Wheaton, as "a model in suppressing
+insurrections under like circumstances." [398] The Batangas programme
+was approved by General Chaffee, the commanding general. In 1902 the
+United States Senate rang with indiscriminate denunciation of the
+Batangas severities and the Samar "kill and burn" orders. I tried
+in 1903, without success, to satisfy my distinguished and beloved
+fellow-townsman, Senator Bacon, that at the time it was adopted it
+had become a military necessity, which it had. The fact was that the
+McKinley-Taft policy of conciliation, intended to gild the rivets of
+alien domination and cure the desire for independence by coddling,
+had loaned aid and comfort to the enemy, by creating, among a people
+used theretofore solely to force as a governmental agency for making
+sovereignty respected, the pathetic notion that we were afraid of them,
+and might be weakening in respect to our declared programme of denying
+them independence. The Bell opinion of the Commission's confidence in
+Filipino gladness at its advent among them is sufficiently apparent in
+his orders to his troops. On May 23, 1902, Senator Bacon read in the
+Senate a letter from an officer of the army, a West Point graduate and
+a personal friend of the Senator's, whose name he withheld, but for
+whose veracity he vouched, which letter alluded to "a reconcentrado,
+pen with a dead line outside, beyond which everything living is
+shot"; spoke of "this corpse-carcass stench wafted in" (to where the
+letter-writer sat writing) as making it "slightly unpleasant here,"
+and made your flesh crawl thus:
+
+
+    At nightfall clouds of vampire bats softly swirl out on their
+    orgies over the dead.
+
+
+This does not sound to me like Batangas and Bell. It sounds like
+Smith and Samar. There were about 100,000 people, all told, gathered
+in the reconcentrado camps in Batangas under General Bell, [399]
+and they were handled as efficiently as General Funston handled
+matters after the San Francisco fire. There was no starvation in
+those camps. All the reconcentrados had to do was not to cross the
+dead line of the reconcentration zone, and to draw their rations,
+which were provided as religiously as any ordinary American who is
+not a fiend and has plenty of rice on hand for the purpose will give
+it to the hungry. The reconcentrado camps and the people in them were
+daily looked after by medical officers of the American army. General
+Bell's active campaigning began in Batangas January 1, 1902, Malvar
+surrendered April 16 thereafter, and Batangas was thoroughly purged
+of insurrectos and the like by July. During this period the total of
+insurgents killed was only 163, and wounded 209; and 3626 insurgents
+surrendered. [400]
+
+The truth is General Bell's "bark" was much worse than his
+"bite." The inestimable value of what he did in Batangas in 1901-02
+lay in convincing the Filipinos once and for all that we were not
+as impotent as the civil-government coddling had led them quite
+naturally, but very foolishly, to think we were. Reference was
+made above to the fact that the population of Batangas in 1899 was
+312,192, and in 1903, 257,715. Those figures were inserted at the
+outset to make General Bell's "bark" sound louder, but now that we
+are considering his "bite"--how many lives his Batangas lesson to
+the Filipino people cost--another bit of testimony is tremendously
+relevant. On December 18, 1901, the Provincial Secretary of Batangas
+Province reported to Governor Taft that the mortality in Batangas due
+to war, pestilence, and famine "has reduced to a little over 200,000
+the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province
+had." [401] Considering that General Bell's 1901-'02 campaign in that
+ill-fated province cost outright but 163 killed,--how many of the 209
+wounded recovered does not appear; they may have all recovered--the
+Bell programme in Batangas was indeed a very tender model, from
+the humanitarian stand-point, of civilizing with a Krag, a model of
+"suppressing insurrection under like circumstances." But it was never
+again followed. It had made too much noise at home. Senator Bacon's
+"corpse-carcass stench" from supposed reconcentrado pens and his
+"clouds of vampire bats softly swirling on their orgies over the
+dead," so vividly reminded our people of why they had driven Spain
+out of Cuba, that the Administration became apprehensive. Until the
+noise about the Batangas business, our people had been led by Governor
+Taft and President Roosevelt to believe that the Filipinos were most
+sobbingly in love with "a benign civil government" and had forgotten
+all about independence. It was obvious that a repetition of such a
+campaign in any other province might create in the public mind at home
+a disgust with the whole Philippine policy which would be heard at
+the polls in the next presidential election. So the Batangas affair
+made it certain that the army was not going to be ordered out again
+in the Philippines before said next presidential election, at least;
+whatever castigation might be deemed advisable thereafter.
+
+It was intimated above that Senator Bacon's army friend's "clouds of
+vampire bats softly swirling" over the corpses of reconcentrados, were
+doing said swirling not over Batangas at all, but over Samar. Any man
+familiar with the lay of the land in the two provinces can see from
+the letter that it was written from Samar. Moreover, Colonel Wagner
+afterwards testified before the Senate Committee of 1902 [402] that
+if there had been any great mortality in the reconcentration camps
+in Batangas, he would have known of it. He inspected practically
+all those Batangas camps. Nobody who was in the islands at the time
+doubts but what such conditions may have obtained in some places
+under General Smith in Samar, or believes for a moment that any such
+conditions would have been tolerated under General Bell. General Bell
+has that aversion to either causing or witnessing needless suffering,
+which you almost invariably find in men who are both constitutionally
+brave and temperamentally generous and considerate of others. But the
+moral sought to be pointed here is not that the Bell reconcentration
+in Batangas was as merciful as the Smith performances in Samar were
+hellish, but that, in all matters concerning the Philippines, the army,
+as in the case of Senator Bacon's friend, is gagged by operation of
+law, and its enforced silence is peculiarly an asset in the hands of
+the party in power seeking to continue in power, in a distant colonial
+enterprise. Senator Bacon withheld his friend's name, because for an
+army officer to tell the truth about the Philippines would be likely
+to get him into trouble with the President of the United States. The
+President, be it remembered, is also the leader of the political party
+to which he belongs. That is why the country has never been able to
+get any light from those who know the most about the Philippines and
+the wisdom or unwisdom of keeping them, viz., the army. In 1898 this
+republic was beguiled into abandonment of the faiths of the founders
+and started after a gold brick, thinking it was a Klondyke. Then and
+ever since, the most important and material witnesses concerning the
+wisdom or unwisdom of keeping the brick, viz., the army,--which best
+of all knows the rank folly of it--have been gagged by operation
+of law. All republics that have heretofore become monarchies, have
+become so through manipulation of the army by men in power seeking
+to continue in power. We should either resign our expensive kingship
+over the Philippines or get a king for the whole business, and be
+done with it. We have some ready-made coronet initials in T. R. [403]
+
+"On June 23, 1902," says General Chaffee, in his report for that year,
+[404] "by Act No. 421 of the Philippine Commission, so much of Act
+No. 173, of July 17, 1901, as transferred the province of Batangas
+to military control was revoked. Civil government was re-established
+in the province at 12 o'clock noon, July 4, 1902." The rest of the
+1,748,573 people herein above mentioned as constituting the population
+of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, Laguna, Tayabas, and Samar, were also in
+turn made to "want peace and want it badly," and on July 4, 1902,
+President Roosevelt issued his proclamation declaring that a state of
+general and complete peace existed. This is the famous proclamation
+in which he congratulated General Chaffee and the officers and men of
+his command on "a total of more than 2000 combats, great and small,"
+most of them subsequent to the Taft roseate cablegrams of 1900,
+and the still more roseate reports of 1901 from the same source. The
+proclamation appeared in the Philippines as General Orders No. 66,
+Adjutant General's Office, Washington, dated July 4, 1902. [405]
+It directed, in the body of it, that it be "read aloud at parade in
+every military post." It thanked the officers and enlisted men of the
+army in the Philippines, in the name of the President of the United
+States, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal
+devotion with which they had been fighting up to that time, alluded
+to the impliedly lamb-like or turn-the-other-cheek way in which they
+had been behaving (no special reference is made either to Batangas,
+Samar, or the water-cure), and closes with a bully Rooseveltian
+war-whoop about the "more than 2000 combats, great and small," above
+mentioned. It also referred to how, "with admirable good temper and
+loyalty to American ideals its (the army's) commanding generals have
+joined with the civilian agents of the government" in the work of
+superinducing allegiance to American sovereignty. This document is
+one of the most remarkable state papers of that most remarkable of
+men, ex-President Roosevelt, in its evidences of ability to mould
+powerful discordant elements to his will. It put everybody in a good
+humor. And yet, read at every military post, it served notice on the
+military that if they knew which side their bread was buttered on,
+they had better forget everything they knew tending to show the
+prematurity of the setting-up of the civil government, sheath all
+tomahawks and scalping knives they might have whetted and waiting
+for Governor Taft's exit from office, abstain from chatty letters to
+United States Senators telling tales out of school, such as the one
+Senator Bacon had read on the floor of the Senate (already noticed),
+and dutifully perceive, in the future, that the war was ended, as
+officially announced in the proclamation itself.
+
+The report of the Philippine Commission for 1902, declares that the
+insurrection "as an organized attempt to subvert the authority of
+the United States" is over (p. 3). They then proceed, with evident
+sincerity, to describe the popularity of themselves and their
+policies with the same curious blindness you sometimes find in
+your Congressional district, in the type of man who thinks he could
+be elected to Congress "in a walk" if he should only announce his
+candidacy, when as a matter of fact, the great majority of the people
+of his district are, for some notorious reason connected with his
+past history among them,--say his war record--very much prejudiced
+against him. They repeat one of their favorite sentiments about the
+whole country--always except "as hereinafter excepted"--being now
+engaged in enjoying civil government. But they casually admit also that
+"much remains to be done" in suppressing lawlessness and disturbances,
+so as to perfect and accentuate said "enjoyment."
+
+Let us see just what the state of the country was in this regard
+according to their own showing. They say:
+
+
+    The six years of war to which these islands have been subjected
+    have naturally created a class of restless men utterly lacking
+    in habits of industry, taught to live and prey upon the country
+    for their support by the confiscation of food supplies as a
+    war measure, and regarding the duties of a laborer as dull and
+    impossible for one who has tasted the excitement of a guerrilla
+    life. Even to the man anxious to return to agricultural pursuits,
+    the conditions existing present no temptation. By the war
+    and by the rinderpest, chiefly the latter, the carabaos, or
+    water-buffaloes, have been reduced to ten per cent. of their
+    former number.
+
+
+Think of the condition of a country, any country, but especially one
+whose wealth is almost wholly agricultural, which has just had nine
+tenths of its plow animals absolutely swept off the face of the earth
+by war and its immediate consequences. The report proceeds:
+
+
+    The chief food of the common people of these islands is rice,
+    and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people in
+    the cultivation of rice,
+
+
+adding also that the carabao is the chief means of transportation
+of the tobacco, hemp, and other crops to market, and that the few
+remaining carabaos, the ordinary price of which in normal Spanish
+times had been $10 was now $100. Then, after completing a faithful
+picture of supremely thorough desolation such as the Islands had never
+seen since they first rose out of the sea, certainly not during the
+sleepy, easy-going Spanish rule, they say: "The Filipino people of
+the better class have received the passage of the Philippine Act with
+great satisfaction"--meaning the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the
+Philippine Government Act. Gott im Himmel! What did the people care
+about paper constitutions concerning benevolent assimilation? What they
+were interested in was food and safety, not politics; food, raiment,
+shelter, and efficient police protection from the brigandage which
+immediately follows in the wake of all war, not details as to what we
+were going to do with the bleeding and prostrate body politic. But
+the Commission had started out to govern the Filipino people on a
+definite theory,--apparently on the idea that if Americans wore white
+duck and no brass buttons, in lieu of khaki and brass buttons, the
+Filipinos would at once forget the war and be happy with an exceeding
+great happiness. Now the real situation was this. The Islands had not
+yet been thoroughly beaten into submission. Northern Luzon had been
+conquered. The lake region of Southern Luzon had been conquered. The
+most important of the Visayan Islands had been conquered. But the
+extreme southern portion of Luzon, the enormously rich hemp peninsula
+already described in a former chapter, and the adjoining hemp island of
+Samar, were still seething with sedition which later broke out. All
+through the winter of 1900-01 General MacArthur had tried to get
+Mr. Root to let him close the hemp ports. But some powerful influence
+at Washington had prevented the grant of this permission. On January 9,
+1901, General MacArthur had wired Mr. Root:
+
+
+    Hemp in southern Luzon in same relation to present struggle as
+    cotton during rebellion. [406]
+
+
+Nothing doing. General MacArthur must worry along with the
+"blockade-runners" as best he could, no matter how much hemp money
+might be poured into the insurgent coffers. So that in the latter
+part of 1902, although the more respectable of the insurgent leaders
+had then surrendered, even in the hemp country, the flames of public
+disorder, which had flickered for a spell after the Batangas lesson,
+broke out anew in the province of Albay, and in parts of Sorsogon,
+the two provinces of the hemp peninsula having the best sea-ports. The
+man at the head of this Albay insurrection was a sorry scamp of some
+shrewdness by the name of Simeon Ola, with whom I afterwards had an
+interesting and in some respects most amusing acquaintance. But that
+is another story. I have simply brought the whole archipelago abreast
+of the close of 1902, relatively to public order. In this way only
+may the insurrections in Albay and elsewhere in 1902-03, described
+in the chapter which follows, be understood in their relation to a
+comprehensive view of the American occupation from the beginning,
+and not be regarded as "a local issue" like General Hancock's tariff,
+having no general political significance. In this way only may those
+insurrections be understood in their true relation to the history of
+public order in the Islands. The Commission always represented all
+disturbances after 1902 as matters of mere banditti, such as have
+been chronic for generations in Calabria or the Transcaucasus, wholly
+distinct from, instead of being an inevitable political sequel of,
+the years of continuous warfare which had preceded. Their benevolent
+obsession was that the desire of the Philippine people for independence
+was wholly and happily eradicated.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT, 1903
+
+                            Me miserable! Which way shall I fly?
+
+                                                          Paradise Lost.
+
+
+Throughout the last year of Governor Taft's administration in the
+Philippines, 1903, both he, and the peaceably inclined Filipinos in
+the disturbed districts, were between the devil and the deep sea. The
+military handling of the Batangas and Samar disorders of 1901-2 had
+precipitated in the United States Senate a storm of criticism, at
+the hands of Senator Bacon and others, which had reminded a public,
+already satiated with slaughtering a weaker Christian people they had
+never seen in the interest of supposed trade expansion, of "the days
+when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when,
+before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus
+thundered against the oppressor of Africa." [407] He did not want to
+order out the military again if he could help it, and this relegated
+him to his native municipal police and constabulary, experimental
+outfits of doubtful loyalty, [408] and, at best, wholly inadequate, as
+it afterwards turned out, [409] for the maintenance of public order and
+for affording to the peaceably inclined people that sort of security
+for life and property, and that protection against semi-political as
+well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comport with the dignity
+of this nation. The better class of Filipinos, though not so enamored
+of American rule as Governor Taft fondly believed, had by 1903 about
+resigned themselves to the inevitable, and would have liked to see
+brigandage masquerading under the name of patriotism stopped by that
+sort of adequate police protection which was so obviously necessary in
+the disturbed and unsettled conditions naturally consequent upon many
+years of war, and which they of course realized could only be afforded
+by the strong arm of the American army. But they knew that if the army
+were ordered out, the burden of proof as to their own loyalty would
+at once be shifted to them, by the strenuous agents of that strenuous
+institution. The result was a sort of reign of terror for nearly a
+year, in 1902-3, in the richest province of the whole archipelago,
+the hemp-producing province of Albay, at the southern end of Luzon,
+and also in portions of the province of Misamis. These conditions had
+begun in those provinces in 1902, and, not being promptly checked,
+because the army was held in leash and the constabulary were crude and
+inadequate, by 1903 brigandage therein was thriving like a garden of
+weeds. Super-solicitude concerning the possible effect of adequately
+vigorous governmental action in the Philippines on the fortunes of the
+Administration in charge of the Federal Government at Washington, an
+attitude not surprising in the colonial agents of that Administration,
+but which, as we have seen, had been from the beginning, as it must
+ever be, the curse of our colonial system, had rendered American
+sovereignty in the disturbed districts as humiliatingly impotent as
+senile decadence ever rendered Spain.
+
+The average American citizen will admit that the average American
+statesman, even if he be not far-sighted, looks at least a year
+ahead, in matters where both his personal fortunes and those of the
+political party to which he belongs are intimately related to what he
+may be doing at the time. If in 1903 Governor Taft's administration
+of affairs in the Philippines was wholly uninfluenced by any possible
+effect it might have on President Roosevelt's chances for becoming an
+elected President in 1904, then he was a false friend and a very poor
+party man as well. Assuming that he was neither, let us examine his
+course regarding the disturbances of public order in the Philippines
+in that year, as related to the first and most sacred duty of every
+government, adequate protection for life and property.
+
+In President McKinley's original instructions of April 7, 1900,
+to the Taft Commission, after quoting the final paragraph of the
+articles of capitulation of the city of Manila:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants * * * and its private property of all
+    descriptions * * * are hereby placed under the special safeguard
+    of the faith and honor of the American army;
+
+
+the President had added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life
+    * * * to all the people of the Philippine Islands.
+
+    * * * I charge this Commission to labor for the full performance
+    of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of
+    their country.
+
+
+We will probably never again have a better man at the head of the
+Philippine Government than William H. Taft. We have no higher type of
+citizen in the republic to-day than the man now [410] at the head of
+it. In the Outlook of September 21, 1901, there appeared an article
+on the Philippines written in the summer previous by Vice-President
+Roosevelt, entitled "The First Civil Governor," which began as follows:
+
+
+    A year ago a man of wide acquaintance both with American public
+    life and American public men [411] remarked that the first Governor
+    of the Philippines ought to combine the qualities which would make
+    a first-class President of the United States with the qualities
+    which would make a first-class Chief Justice of the United States,
+    and that the only man he knew who possessed all these qualities was
+    Judge William H. Taft, of Ohio. The statement was entirely correct.
+
+
+The writer subscribed then, and still subscribes, to the foregoing
+estimate of Mr. Taft, whether Colonel Roosevelt still does or
+not. Though I dissent most vigorously from more than one of President
+Taft's policies, and though this book is one long dissent from his
+chief pet policy, still it is to me an especial pleasure to do him
+honor where I may, not merely because he has greatly honored me in
+the past, but because my judgment approves the above estimate. Though
+as a party leader he is a very poor general, as Chief Magistrate of
+the nation he has certainly deserved and commanded the cordial esteem
+of the whole country, and the respectful regard of all mankind. With
+this admission freely made, if after reading what follows in this and
+the next chapter, and weighing the same in the light of all that has
+preceded, the reader does not decide that the writer, far from being
+animated by any intelligent high purpose, is merely a foolish person
+of the sounding-brass-and-tinkling-cymbal variety full of sound and
+fury signifying nothing, then he can reach but one other conclusion,
+viz., that colonization by a republic like ours, such as that we
+blundered into by purchasing the Philippines, is a case of a house
+divided against itself, a case of the soul of a nation at war with
+the better angels of its nature, a case where considerations of what
+may be demanded by home considerations of political expediency will
+always operate to the detriment of the Filipino people, and be the
+controlling factor in our government of them. And if I show that
+in the Philippines in 1903 Governor Taft failed properly to protect
+the lives and property of peaceably inclined people, as so sacredly
+enjoined in the language above quoted from President McKinley's
+original instructions to him, lest "the full performance of this
+obligation" might prejudice the presidential prospects of his friend,
+Mr. Roosevelt, and the success of the party to which they belonged,
+then I will have shown that for this republic to be in the colonizing
+business is an absolutely evil thing, and that any man who proposes
+any honorable way out of the conceded blunder of 1898, is entitled to
+a hearing at the hands of the American people, because it "concerns
+the honor and conscience of their country."
+
+Having tried most of the cases which arose out of the public disorders
+in the Philippines in 1903, and knowing from what I thus learned,
+together with what I subsequently learned which Mr. Taft knew then,
+that the most serious of those disorders were very inadequately handled
+by native police, and constabulary, with much wholly unnecessary
+incidental sacrifice of life, in order to preserve the appearance of
+"civil" government and convey the impression of the state of peace
+the name implied, at a time when a reign of terror due to brigandage
+prevailed throughout wide and populous regions in whose soil lay the
+riches of agricultural plenty, while the United States Army looked
+on with a silent disgust which understood the reason, and a becoming
+subordination which regretfully bowed to that reason as one which
+must ever be the curse of colonization by a republic like ours, I
+know whereof I shall speak, and will therefore speak neither lightly
+nor unadvisedly, but soberly, charitably, and in the fear of God.
+
+The insurrection in the Philippines against American authority which
+began with the outbreak of February 4, 1899, and whose last dying
+embers were not finally stamped out until 1906, systematic denials
+by optimist officialdom to the contrary notwithstanding, had three
+distinct stages:
+
+(1) The original fighting in company, battalion, and regimental
+formation, with the ordinary wide-flung battle line; this having
+terminated pursuant to a preconcerted plan early in November, 1899.
+
+(2) A period of guerrilla warfare maintained by the educated,
+patriotic, fighting generals, in a gradually decreasing number of
+provinces, until the summer of 1902.
+
+(3) The final long drawn-out sputterings, which began to get serious
+in the fall of 1902, in provinces prematurely taken under the civil
+government, and stripped of adequate military protection before things
+had been given time to settle down in them to normal.
+
+These last are the "gardens of weeds"--brigandage weeds--above
+mentioned. While the horticultural metaphor will help some, to really
+understand the case nothing so fits it as the more common illustration
+applied to grave public disorders having a common cause which likens
+such matters to a conflagration. The third and last stage through
+which the Philippine insurrection degenerated to final extinction
+is adequately and accurately described in the following extract from
+one of the military reports of 1902:
+
+
+    The surrender or capture of the respectable military element left
+    the control of affairs and the remainder of the arms in the hands
+    of a lot of persons, most of them ignorant, some criminal, and
+    nearly all pertaining to a restless, irresponsible, unscrupulous
+    class of people, whose principal ambition seems to be to live
+    without work, and who have found it possible to so do under the
+    guise of patriotism. [412]
+
+
+Such was the problem which confronted Governor Taft in 1903 as to
+public order and protection of the peaceably inclined people, in the
+two main provinces hereinafter dealt with.
+
+It is a great pity that in 1903 President Roosevelt could not have
+called in Secretary of War Root and sent for Senator Bacon, and those
+of the latter's colleagues whose philippics in the Senate of the year
+previous against Generals Jake Smith and J. Franklin Bell had reminded
+an aroused nation of the days of Cicero and Verres, Tacitus and Africa,
+etc., and had a frank talk with them somewhat after this fashion:
+
+
+    Gentlemen, Governor Taft has a hard job out there in the
+    Philippines. There is a big insurrection going on in the province
+    of Albay, which is the very richest province in the whole
+    archipelago, a province as big as the State of Delaware, [413]
+    having a population of about a quarter of a million people, and he
+    has, for police purposes, a crude outfit of native constabulary,
+    officered mostly by ex-enlisted men of the mustered-out American
+    volunteer regiments. The personnel of the officers may be weeded
+    out later and made a fine body of men, but just at present there
+    are a good many rather tough citizens among them. Moreover, as
+    soon as the constabulary was gotten together they were at once set
+    to work chasing little remnants of the insurgent army all over
+    the archipelago. So as yet they are as undisciplined an outfit
+    as you can well imagine, and have never had any opportunity to
+    act together in any considerable command. Moreover, hardly any
+    Filipinos have yet had a chance to learn much about how to shoot
+    a rifle. Also, they know practically nothing about the interior
+    economy of large commands, such as handling and distributing
+    rations systematically for troops and for prisoners, or doing the
+    same as to clothing, and nothing at all about medical care of
+    the wounded, or the sick, or prisoners. So you can see that to
+    handle this insurrection with such an outfit as this is sure to
+    mean trouble of one sort or another. Wholly unauthorized overtures
+    through officious natives, to the insurgent brigand chiefs, may,
+    possibly, be made, promising them immunity, when they ought to be
+    made an example of; and that will embarrass us in punishing them
+    when we do finally get them, and be an encouragement to other
+    cut-throats to do likewise in the future. Worst of all, you can
+    see that if some five hundred or a thousand of these brigands,
+    or insurgents, or whatever they are, suddenly surrender, the
+    ordinary police accommodations for housing and feeding prisoners
+    will be wholly inadequate; yet we will have to detain them all
+    until our courts can sift them and see which are the mere dumb
+    driven cattle and which are the mischievous fellows. Therefore,
+    in case of such a surrender, the nature of this constabulary
+    force, as I have already described it to you, makes it plain
+    that its inadequacy to meet the serious conditions we are now
+    confronted with may result in our having on our hands a series
+    of little Andersonville prisons that will smell to heaven. The
+    majority of the people of the province are really sick of the
+    war. Their best men have all surrendered and come in. But there
+    is an ignorant creature calling himself a general, by the name of
+    Ola, who seems to have a great deal of influence with the lawless
+    element that do not want to work. Ola has gathered together
+    nearly a thousand malcontents, who obey him implicitly. He is
+    terrorizing Albay province and the regions adjacent thereto,
+    and as the constabulary are not adequate to patrol the whole
+    province, the people do not know whether self-interest demands
+    that they should side with Ola or with us. Clearly, therefore,
+    this is a case for vigorous measures, if we all have a common
+    concern for the national honor, for the maintenance of law and
+    order in a territory we are supposed to be governing, and for
+    the proper protection of life and property there. General Bell
+    or somebody else ought to be sent there to comb that province
+    just as Bell did Batangas. But we don't want any howl about it.
+
+
+At this point of the supposed colloquy,--I say "colloquy," though
+tradition has it that most of President Roosevelt's "colloquys" with
+Senators were what Henry E. Davis, the Sidney Smith of Washington,
+calls "unilateral conversation"--one can imagine the senatorial
+Ciceros exchanging glances expressive of the unspoken thought: "The
+man certainly has his nerve with him. Does he think the Senate is an
+annex of the White House?" Then we can imagine President Roosevelt
+bending strenuously to his task with infinite tactfulness thus:
+
+
+    I put Jake Smith out of business, as you gentlemen all know, for
+    his inhuman methods of avenging the Balangiga massacre in Samar,
+    and I am just as much opposed to cruelty as any of you Senators can
+    be. But Bell in Batangas is an altogether different case from Smith
+    in Samar. All this about the odor of decomposing bodies wafted from
+    reconcentration camps, and "clouds of vampire bats swirling out
+    on their orgies over the dead," that Senator Bacon's army friend,
+    whoever he may be, wrote the Senator, relates to Samar, and never
+    did have any application to Bell's methods in Batangas. Bell did
+    a clean job in a minimum of time and with a minimum sacrifice
+    of life, and, while he did have those reconcentration camps in
+    Batangas, he saw to it religiously that nobody starved, and that
+    all those people received daily medical treatment.
+
+
+For the correctness of the picture of conditions presented in the
+above hypothetical talk, I of course intend to be understood as
+vouching. If such a talk could have been had in 1903 by President
+Roosevelt with Senator Bacon and those of his colleagues who shared his
+views, the Albay situation might have been handled creditably. But the
+Administration was in no position to be frank with the Opposition. No
+Administration has ever yet during the last fourteen years been in a
+position to be frank with the Senate and the country concerning the
+situation at any given time in the Philippines, because at any given
+time there was always so much that it could not afford to re-open
+and explain. Mr. Root, for instance, might have been questioned too
+closely as to why, when Secretary of War, he had gone around the
+country in the fall of 1900 speaking for Mr. McKinley, and talking
+about "the patient and unconsenting millions" so anxious to be rid
+of "Aguinaldo and his band of assassins," when at that very time his
+(Mr. Root's) generals in the Philippines were engaged in activities,
+the magnitude of which may be inferred from a telegram sent from
+Washington to General Wood at Havana, asking if he could possibly
+spare the 10th Infantry, and adding:
+
+
+    Imperative that we have immediate use of every available company
+    that we can lay our hands on for service in the Philippines, [414]
+
+
+although at West Point in 1902 he told the cadets how nobly the army
+had labored in putting down "an insurrection of 7,000,000 people." No,
+the Administration in 1903 simply could not afford to be frank
+concerning the situation in the Philippines. I need not recapitulate
+here any more of the long train of reasons why, because they have all
+been fully explained in the preceding chapters. Of course President
+Roosevelt had no such guilty knowledge of the facts as Mr. Root. He
+was not in constant daily contact with army officers at the War
+Department, familiar with the actual situation in the Philippines,
+as Mr. Root was. He was simply "sticking to Taft." Somewhere along
+about the time the military folk in the Philippines were scoffing at
+the unnecessary sacrifice of life incident to the lack of a strong
+government, President Roosevelt had written his warm personal friend,
+Hon. George Curry, now a member of Congress from New Mexico, who had
+been a captain in his regiment before Santiago, was then an official
+of the civil government of the Philippines, and later Governor of
+New Mexico, by appointment of Mr. Roosevelt: "Stick to Taft, George"
+or words to that effect. Mr. Roosevelt's attitude was simply that
+of an intensely loyal friend of Mr. Taft who simply assumed that the
+Philippine Government was not going to tolerate impotence in the matter
+of protecting life and property. But everybody at both ends of the line
+was too deep in the mire of all the long and systematic withholding
+of facts from the American public which had been occurring ever since
+1898, and which it has been the aim of the preceding chapters to
+illuminate by the light since becoming available in the published
+official records of the Government. Hence, in the hypothetical
+conference above supposed, President Roosevelt was in no position
+to take any high ground. He would have had to admit that the civil
+government of 1901 was set up too soon in order to stand by half-baked
+notions dished out in 1900 by the Taft Commission in aid of his own
+and Mr. McKinley's campaign for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency,
+respectively. In other words the truth about the Philippines from
+the beginning might, and probably would, have seriously jeopardized
+the Roosevelt presidential chances in 1904. So Governor Taft was left
+to his own resources in struggling with the problem of law and order
+in the Islands, intimately understanding the obvious bearing, just
+suggested, of what he might do out there, on the election of 1904. What
+then did Governor Taft do to meet the situation in 1903? Chronological
+order, as well as other considerations making for clearness, would
+suggest that I begin by telling what he did not do.
+
+In May, 1903, I was sent to the province of Surigao to try some cases
+arising out of what has ever since been known in that out-of-the-way
+region as "the affair of March 23d" (1903). In his annual report for
+1903, pages 29 and 30, in describing the Surigao affair, Governor
+Taft correctly states that a band of outlaws came into the town of
+Surigao on the day above named, killed Captain Clark, the officer
+in charge of the constabulary, took the constabulary's guns, while
+they were all away at their mid-day meal, scattered about the town,
+and departed. But Mr. Taft's report disposes of the whole incident
+in a most casual way. As a matter of fact the gist of it was that
+a heroic little band of Americans under Mr. Luther S. Kelly, the
+provincial treasurer, an old Indian scout of the Yellowstone country,
+hastily gathered the seven American women then in the town, one of
+them in a delicate condition, into the stone government house, and
+stood off those semi-civilized sensual brigands until reinforcements
+arrived. Governor Taft's failure adequately to present the gravity of
+the episode in his account of it does not argue well for the subsequent
+solicitude he might feel about other American women in other remote
+provinces which he was anxious to keep on his "pacified list," to
+say nothing of politically negligible native life therein. [415]
+Nor does this report include any of the material facts showing the
+ineffectiveness of the rank and file of the constabulary to cope
+with the situation, or the general feeling of insecurity I found in
+the province as to how far the whole population might be in sympathy
+with the brigands. As a matter of fact, after that Surigao affair,
+Governor Taft had to turn the army loose in the province to go and
+get back and restore to his constabulary the seventy-five to one
+hundred stand-of-arms the brigands had so rudely and impolitely taken
+away from them, and I held court there for a month trying the people
+who were captured and brought in, with Colonel Meyer, of the 11th
+Infantry, one of the most thorough and able soldiers of the United
+States Army, and seven hundred soldiers of his regiment acting as
+deputy sheriffs, and yet all the time the province was under "civil"
+government, nominally. Colonel Meyer got the men who killed Clark,
+and, upon due and ample proof, I hung them, but Surigao was never
+taken for a day from the list of provinces enjoying "the peace and
+protection of a benign civil government." The writ of habeas corpus
+was never suspended for a moment.
+
+In the report above quoted from, Governor Taft remarks that if
+the prompt steps he did take (he had already described the prompt
+sending of the military to the scene) had not been taken, "the trouble
+might have spread." But the Surigao affair seemed to teach the civil
+government nothing in the matter of subsequent protection of life,
+nor did it lessen their persistence in relying on their constabulary
+for due extension of such protection in time of need.
+
+By June, 1903, another scheme was invented for avoiding calling on the
+military. When you are in a foreign country building a new government
+on the ruins of an old one, you naturally find out as much as you
+can about how the old one met its problems. The Spaniards had had
+the same problem in their day about not ordering out the military,
+because they did not have any military to order out. They were too poor
+to garrison the various provinces. They had long followed the plan,
+from time to time, of reconcentrating in the main towns of disturbed
+districts all the country population they could get to come in, and
+then acting on the assumption that all who did not come in were public
+enemies. This meant that when the country people came in, they simply
+looked out for themselves, while away from their homes, and farms,
+as best they could. Of course nobody at all looked after the farms,
+and nobody provided medical attention for the reconcentrados, or
+sanitary attention for the reconcentration camps. This general plan
+was formally sanctioned by the Commission, in so far as the following
+law sanctioned it. The law was enacted, June 1, 1903. It is section
+6, of Act 781, which was an act dealing with all the constabulary
+problems, of which this was one. It read:
+
+
+    In provinces which are infested to such an extent with ladrones or
+    outlaws that the lives and property of residents in the outlying
+    barrios [416] are rendered wholly insecure by continued predatory
+    raids--
+
+
+think of permitting a country to get into any such condition when you
+have an abundance of American troops on hand available to prevent it--
+
+
+    and such outlying barrios thus furnish to the ladrones or outlaws
+    their sources of food supply, and it is not possible with the
+    available police forces constantly to provide protection to
+    such barrios--
+
+
+there being all the time "available police forces," in the shape
+of regular troops, amply able to handle these unsettled conditions,
+which were the inevitable aftermath of lawlessness consequent on five
+or six years of guerrilla warfare--
+
+
+    it shall be within the power of the Governor-General, upon
+    resolution of the Philippine Commission, to authorize the
+    provincial governor to order that the residents of such outlying
+    barrios be temporarily brought--
+
+
+observe the length of time this may last is not limited--
+
+
+    within stated proximity to the poblacion, or larger barrios, of
+    the municipality, there to remain until the necessity for such
+    order ceases to exist.
+
+
+To house and ration the reconcentrados, the following provision is
+made by the statute we are considering:
+
+
+    During such temporary residence, it shall be the duty of the
+    provincial board, out of provincial funds, to furnish such
+    sustenance and shelter as may be needed to prevent suffering
+    among the residents of the barrios thus withdrawn.
+
+
+The act also provides that during the course of the reconcentration,
+where the province does not happen to have the necessary ready
+cash, it may apply to the Commission, in distant Manila, for an
+appropriation to meet the emergency. What is to be done with those
+who starve during the temporary deficit, it does not say. If you
+must have reconcentration, to leave it to such agencies as the above,
+with the native police and constabulary as understudies, in lieu of
+availing yourself of the superb equipment of the American army, with
+all its facilities for handling great masses of people, as they did,
+for instance, after the San Francisco fire, is like preferring the
+Mulligan Guards to the Cold-stream Guards. Furthermore, there is no
+escape from the logic of the fact that reconcentration is essentially
+a war measure. The difference between what is lawful in war and what
+is lawful in peace is not a technical one. In war the innocent must
+often suffer with the guilty. In peace the theory at least is that
+only the guilty suffer. Hence it is that our Constitution is so
+jealous that in time of peace no man's life, liberty, or property,
+shall be taken from him without "due process of law," a provision
+which becomes inoperative in war times, being superseded by martial
+law. I know that the early question, "Does the Constitution follow
+the flag?" was answered by the Supreme Court of the United States in
+the negative as to the Philippines. But the Act of Congress of July
+1, 1902, under which we were governing the Philippines in 1903,
+and still govern them, known as the Philippine Government Act,
+extended to the Islands all the provisions of the Bill of Rights of
+our Constitution except the right of jury trial and the individual
+right to go armed--"bear arms." It specifically said in section 5:
+
+
+    No law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
+    person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
+
+
+It hardly needs argument to show that to bundle the rural population
+of a whole district out of house and home, and make them come to town
+to live indefinitely on such public charity as may drain through the
+itching fingers of impecunious town officials, abandoning meantime
+their growing crops, and the household effects they cannot bring with
+them, is depriving people of their property, and restraining them
+of their liberty, without due process of law. In fact, in 1905, in
+the case of Barcelon vs. Baker, vol. v., Philippine Report, page 116,
+during an insurrection in Batangas, to control which, the presidential
+election of 1904 being then safely over, the writ of habeas corpus
+had been suspended and martial law declared, the Supreme Court of the
+Philippines held that detention of people as reconcentrados under
+such circumstances "for the purpose of protecting them" was not an
+illegal restraint of their liberty, because the ordinary law had been
+suspended. This decision held it to be both the prerogative and the
+duty of the Governor-General to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
+when the public safety so required.
+
+I refuse to believe for a moment that President Taft, the former
+wise and just judge, in whom is now vested by law the mighty power
+of filling vacancies on the highest court in this great country of
+ours, will seriously contend that that reconcentration law is not in
+direct violation of the above quoted section of the Act of Congress
+of July 1, 1902, for the government of the Philippines, and therefore
+null and void. The truth is, it was a piece of careless legislation,
+dealing with conditions that were essentially war conditions, under
+a government which was forever vowing that peace conditions existed,
+and determined not to admit the contrary. The civil government was
+like Lot's wife. It could not look back.
+
+The Act of Congress of 1902 had made the usual provision permitting
+the governor to declare martial law in a given locality in his
+discretion. But the reconcentration law passed by the Philippine
+Commission was a way of avoiding the exercise of that authority,
+so as to keep up the appearance of peace in the provinces to which
+it might be applied, regardless of how many lives it might cost. In
+its last analysis the reconcentration law was at once an admission
+of a duty to order out the military and a declaration of intention
+to neglect that duty. I suppose the eminent gentlemen who enacted
+it justified it on the idea of teaching the natives how to maintain
+order themselves by letting them stew in the dregs of their own
+insurrection. Yet no one can read the Commission's own description
+of the widespread lawlessness which so long ran riot after the
+guerrilla warfare degenerated into brigandage, without seeing,
+from their own showing, how obvious was their duty to have waited,
+originally, until law and order were restored, by not interfering
+with the war itself until it was over, and by keeping the country
+properly garrisoned for a decorous and sufficient period after it
+was over, until something like real peace conditions should exist,
+on which to begin the work of post-bellum reconstruction. After all,
+it all gets us back to the original pernicious programme outlined in
+President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December, 1899,
+wherein was announced the intention to send out the Taft Commission,
+which message also announced, in effect, that it was Mr. McKinley's
+purpose to begin the work of reconstruction as fast as the patient
+and unconsenting millions "loyal to our rule" should be rescued from
+the clutch of the hated Tagals.
+
+Recurring again to the reconcentration law itself, the moral quality
+of executive action putting it in operation was not unlike that which
+would attach should the Governor of Massachusetts, in lieu of ordering
+the state troops to the scene of great strike riots in half a dozen
+towns around Boston, issue a proclamation something like this:
+
+
+    The situation has grown so serious that your local police force,
+    as you see, is wholly inadequate to cope with the situation. You
+    will all, therefore, thrust your tooth-brushes, night-gowns,
+    and a change of clothing, into the family grip, and assemble
+    on the Boston Common and in the public gardens, there to remain
+    until the necessity for this order ceases to exist, and we will
+    there take the best care of you we can, as was done in the case
+    of the San Francisco fire. As governor I am unwilling to order
+    out the military.
+
+
+If any lawyer on the Commission gave any thought at the time to the
+validity of the reconcentration law, in its relation to the "due
+process of law" clause of the Philippine Government Act, which none
+of them probably did, he must simply have justified the means by the
+benevolence of the end, on the idea that he knew so much better than
+Congress possibly could, the needs of the local situation. But if you
+read this law in the light of a knowledge of its practical operation,
+there is more suggestion between its lines of Senator Bacon's friend's
+"corpse-carcass stench" and "clouds of vampire bats softly swirling
+out on their orgies over the dead" than there is of benevolence. It
+really was unsportsmanlike for the Commission to have entrusted
+reconcentration to the native police and constabulary the native
+governors had, and it was wholly indefensible for them to take the
+liberty of violating an act of Congress in order to live up to their
+pet fiction about the war being "entirely over."
+
+After the term of court at Surigao in the month of May, 1903, I was
+sent to Misamis province, where I remained until September, handling an
+insurrection down there. This province also was nominally in a state of
+peace, i.e., there was no formal recognition of the existence of the
+insurrection by suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Curiously
+enough, as I wrote Governor Taft afterwards, the Misamis crowd of
+disturbers of the peace were genuine insurrectos. Their movement
+was not so formidable as the Ola insurrection in Albay I dealt with
+later, but they were by no means unmitigated cut-throats. I have often
+wondered how they managed to be so respectable at that late date. They
+did not steal, as did most of the outlaws of 1903. Their avowed
+purpose was to subvert the existing government. The use of this word
+"insurrection" in connection with these various disturbances recalls
+a pertinent incident. In 1904 there was a vacancy on the Supreme Bench
+of the Islands. Some of my friends, members of the bar of my district,
+got up a petition to the then Governor-General setting forth in most
+partial terms my alleged qualifications for the place. Now in the
+Philippines, in the candor of informal social intercourse, all of
+us always called a spade a spade, i.e., we called an insurrection an
+insurrection, instead of referring to the disturbance in the guarded
+and euphemistic terms which you find in all the official reports
+intended for home consumption. So in their petition, these gentlemen
+recited, among my other supposed qualifications, that I had held
+court in three different provinces "during insurrections in the same."
+
+The Albay insurrection was the worst one I had to deal with during
+Governor Taft's administration as Governor of the Philippines. This
+was the insurrection headed by Simeon Ola. The first appearance of
+this man Ola in the official reports of the Philippine Government in
+connection with the Albay disturbances of 1902-3 is in the report
+of the colonel commanding the constabulary for the district which
+included Albay, Col. H. H. Bandholtz, dated June 30, 1903. [417] This
+report contains a sort of diary of events for the year preceding the
+date of it. An entry for October 28, 1902, begins:
+
+
+    Early this month negotiations were opened with Simeon Ola, chief
+    of the ladrones in this province, with a view of inducing him
+    to surrender.
+
+
+Think of this great government negotiating with the leader of a band
+of thieves who were openly and flagrantly defying its authority! The
+entry proceeds:
+
+
+    After many promises and conferences extending over a period of
+    forty days, during which hostilities were suspended, Ola broke
+    off negotiations and withdrew his entire force and a large number
+    of additional recruits that he had secured during the armistice.
+
+
+Before Ola finally surrendered he is supposed to have had a total
+command ranging at various times from a thousand to 1500 men. And I
+think Colonel Bandholtz must have had in the field opposed to him,
+first and last, at least an equal number of native forces. Ola also
+makes an official reappearance in the report of the Governor of Albay
+Province for 1904. [418] It there appears that reconcentration was
+begun in Albay as part of the campaign against Ola and his forces, in
+March, 1903, and continued until the end of October of that year. Says
+this report of the Governor of Albay concerning reconcentration:
+
+
+    Naturally, the effect of this unusual volume of persons in a
+    limited area was disease and suffering for want of food and
+    ordinary living accommodations.
+
+
+The Governor does not say how large the "unusual volume of persons"
+was that was herded into the reconcentration zones, nor does he
+furnish any mortality statistics. Nobody kept any. How much there was
+of the awful mortality and "clouds of vampire bats softly swirling
+out on their orgies over the dead," that Senator Bacon's army friend
+correspondent encountered in Samar does not affirmatively appear. The
+number of people affected by reconcentration in Albay and an adjacent
+province that caught the contagion of unrest and had to be given
+similar treatment, was about 300,000. [419]
+
+In his report for 1903, in describing the Ola insurrection of 1902-3,
+Governor Taft says: "A reign of terror was inaugurated throughout
+the province." He then goes on to state that to meet it he applied
+the reconcentration tactics. In the same report he describes what
+is to my mind the most humiliating incident connected with the
+whole history of the American Government in the Philippines, viz.,
+Vice-Governor Wright's visit to Albay in 1903, apparently in pursuance
+of the peace-at-any-price policy that the Manila Government was
+bent on. Governor Taft says of the civil government's dealings with
+His Excellency, the Honorable Simeon Ola, the chief of the brigands,
+that General Wright and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino member of the
+Commission, went down to Albay and "talked to the people," the idea
+apparently being that those poor unarmed or ill-armed creatures should
+go after the brigands. This was to avoid ordering out the military,
+and summarily putting a stop to the reign of terror as became the
+dignity of this nation. I think these talks had something to do with
+the origin of the charge afterwards made that immunity was promised
+Ola and the men who finally did surrender with him. Of course General
+Wright made no such promises. But the idea got out in the province
+that the word was, "Get the guns," the inference being that if Ola
+and his people would come in and surrender their guns they would be
+lightly dealt with. In his book Our Philippine Problem, Professor
+Willis, at page 140, gives what purports to be an agreement signed
+by Colonel Bandholtz, dated September 22, 1903, whereby Bandholtz
+promises Ola immunity, and also promises a number of other things
+which are on their face rankly preposterous. Ola was much on the
+witness stand before me during that term of court, and, everything
+"came out in the wash." He was represented by competent, intelligent,
+and fearless Filipino counsel, and they did not suggest the existence
+of any such document. No proof of any offer of immunity was adduced
+before me. I think Ola simply finally decided to throw himself on
+the mercy of the government, on the idea that there would be more joy
+over the one sinner that repenteth than over the ninety and nine that
+are already saved. He was probably as much afraid that Governor Taft
+would order out the military as the wretched pacificos were that he
+would not. He immediately turned state's evidence against all the men
+under him of whose individual actings and doings he had any knowledge,
+the prosecuting attorney making, with my full approval, a promise
+to ask executive clemency as a reward. This was in keeping with the
+practice in like cases customary in all jurisdictions throughout the
+English-speaking world.
+
+The magnitude of the Ola insurrection may be somewhat appreciated
+from the financial loss it occasioned. Says Governor Taft, in his
+report for 1903:
+
+
+    The Governor [of Albay] estimates that hemp production and sale
+    have been interfered with to the extent of some ten to twelve
+    millions of dollars Mexican [which is equivalent to five or six
+    million dollars American money]. [420]
+
+
+As the population of the province was about 250,000, [421] a loss
+of $5,000,000 meant a loss of $20 per capita for the six months or
+so of reconcentration during which the farms were neglected. This
+would be equivalent to a loss of $1,800,000,000, in the same length
+of time to a country having a population of 90,000,000, which is the
+total population figure for the United States according to the Census
+of 1910.
+
+It was in the latter part of October, 1903, I believe, that Ola finally
+surrendered with some five hundred or six hundred men. I was sent to
+Albay about the middle of November, to assist the regular judge of
+the district, Hon. Adam C. Carson, now one of the justices of the
+Supreme Court of the Philippines, in disposing of the case arising
+out of the Ola performances. Conditions at the time were also very
+much perturbed in various neighboring and other provinces, and the
+courts and constabulary were kept very busy.
+
+An incident recurs to memory just here which illustrates the state of
+public order. But before relating it a decent respect to the opinions
+of the reader requires me to state my own attitude toward that whole
+situation at the time. I am perfectly clear in my own mind that as
+society stands at present, capital punishment is a necessary part of
+any sensible scheme for its protection. I have no compunction about
+hanging any man for the lawless taking of the life of another. We owe
+it to the community as a measure of protection to your life and mine
+and all others. So far as public order was concerned in the country
+now under consideration in 1903, the "civil" government was simply a
+well-meaning sham, a military government with a civil name to it. When
+the constabulary would get in the various brigands, cut-throats, etc.,
+who might be terrorizing a given district, some of them masquerading as
+patriots, others not even doing that, the courts would try them. None
+of the judges cared anything about any particular brigand in any
+given case except to find out how many, if any, murders, rapes,
+arsons, etc., he had committed during the particular reign of terror
+of which he had been a part. Wherever specific murders were proven,
+the punishment would always be "a life for a life." And you have no
+idea how absolutely wanton some of the murders were, and how cruelly
+some of the young women, daughters of the farmers, were maltreated
+after they were carried off to the mountains. I would hate to try to
+guess how much more of this sort of thing would have had to occur in
+Albay in 1903 than did occur, to have moved Governor Taft to deprive
+Albay of "the protection of a benign civil government"--one of the pet
+expressions of contemporaneous official literature--and say the word
+to the army to take hold of the situation and give the people decent
+protection. But to come to the incident above broached. Shortly after I
+reached Albay, and set to work to hold Part II. of the district court,
+while my colleague, Judge Carson, held Part I. we had a call from a
+third judge, Judge Linebarger, of Chicago, who was on his way to some
+other perturbed region. I think that by that time, late in November,
+1903, Governor Taft must have known he was soon to leave the Islands to
+become Secretary of War, and therefore was anxious to be able to make
+the best showing possible, in his farewell annual report as Governor,
+as to the "tranquillity" conditions. At any rate Judge Linebarger
+came to see us, for a few hours, his ship having touched en route at
+the port near the provincial capital of Albay. Judge Carson had had a
+gallows erected near the public square of the town, for the execution
+of some brigand he had convicted, whether it was for maltreating some
+poor farmer's daughter until she died, or burying an American alive,
+or what, I do not now recollect. But in going around the town some
+one suggested, as we passed this gallows, that we go up on it to
+get the view. So we went--the three of us. Then each looked at the
+other and all thought of the work ahead. Then Judge Carson smiled
+and dispelled the momentary sombreness by repeating with grim humor,
+an old Latin quotation he happened to remember from his college days
+at the University of Virginia: Haec olim meminisse juvabit ("It will
+be pleasant to remember these things hereafter").
+
+The Ola insurrection had continued from October, 1902, to October,
+1903, without suspension of civil government. During that period the
+jail had been filled far beyond its reasonable capacity most of the
+time. It sometimes had contained many hundreds. As to the sanitary
+conditions, in passing the jail building one day in company with
+one of the provincial officials, he remarked to me, nonchalantly:
+"It's equivalent to a death sentence to put a man in that jail." I
+afterwards found out that this was no joke. During most of my visit
+to the province I was too busy holding court and separating the sheep
+from the goats, to think much of anything else. But toward the close of
+the term, after Christmas, after Governor Taft had left the Islands
+and gone home to be Secretary of War, an incident happened that
+produced a profound impression on me, suggested a new view-point,
+and started troubled doubts as to whether the whole Benevolent
+Assimilation business was not a mistake born of a union of avarice
+and piety in which avarice predominated--doubts which certain events
+of the following year, hereinafter related, converted in conviction
+that any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos would
+be better for all concerned than any government we could give them,
+hampered as we always will be by the ever-present necessity to argue
+that government against the consent of the governed is not altogether
+wrong, and that taxation without representation may be a blessing in
+disguise. The Yule-tide incident above alluded to was this. Most of
+the docket having been disposed of, and there being a lull between
+Christmas and New Year's day which afforded time for matters more or
+less perfunctory in their nature, the prosecuting attorney brought in
+rough drafts of two proposed orders for the court to sign. One was
+headed with a list of fifty-seven names, the other with a list of
+sixty-three names. Both orders recited that "the foregoing" persons
+had died in the jail--all but one between May 20 and Dec. 3. 1903
+(roughly six and one-half months) as will appear from an examination
+of the dates of death--and concluded by directing that the indictments
+be quashed. The writer was only holding an extraordinary term of court
+there in Albay, and was about to leave the province to take charge
+of another district to which Governor Taft had assigned him before
+leaving the Islands. The newly appointed regular judge of the district,
+Judge Trent, now of the Philippine Supreme Court, was scheduled soon
+to arrive. Therefore the writer did not sign the proposed orders
+but kept them as legal curios. A correct translation of one of them
+appears below, followed by the list of names which headed the other
+(identical) order:
+
+
+    THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, EIGHTH
+    JUDICIAL DISTRICT
+
+    In the Court of First Instance of Albay
+
+    The United States against
+
+    Cornelio Rigorosa              died December    3, 1903
+    Fabian Basques                 died September  25, 1903
+    Julian Nacion                  died October    14, 1903
+    Francisco Rigorosa             died October    18, 1903
+    Anacleto Solano                died November   25, 1903
+    Valentin Cesillano             died November    6, 1903
+    Felix Sasutona                 died September  26, 1903
+    Marcelo de los Santos          died June        3, 1903
+    Marcelo Patingo                died November   15, 1903
+    Julian Raynante                died September   7, 1903
+    Dionisio Carifiaga             died October     4, 1903
+    Felipe Navor                   died September  17, 1903
+    Luis Nicol                     died November   23, 1903
+    Balbino Nicol                  died September  23, 1903
+    Damiano Nicol                  died November   23, 1903
+    Leoncio Salbaburo              died November   20, 1903
+    Catalino Sideria               died July       25, 1903
+    Marcelo Ariola                 died October    26, 1903
+    Francisco Cao                  died November   26, 1903
+    Martin Olaguer                 died November   13, 1903
+    Juan Neric                     died November   16, 1903
+    Eufemio Bere                   died November   21, 1903
+    Julian Sotero                  died October    30, 1902
+    Juan Payadan                   died September  10, 1903
+    Benedicto Milla                died July       30, 1903
+    Placido Porlage                died June       13, 1903
+    Gaudencio Oguita               died October    11, 1903
+    Alberto Cabrera                died September   8, 1903
+    Julian Payadan                 died August      4, 1903
+    Eusebio Payadan                died August     10, 1903
+    Leonardo Rebusi                died November    2, 1903
+    Julian Riobaldis               died October     2, 1903
+    Victor Riobaldis               died October    23, 1903
+    Mauricio Balbin                died September  27, 1903
+    Tomas Rigador                  died July       23, 1903
+    Miguel de los Santos           died July       28, 1903
+    Eustaquio Mapula               died November   18, 1903
+    Eugenio Lomibao                died November    1, 1903
+    Francisco Luna                 died August      7, 1903
+    Gregorio Sierte                died October    31, 1903
+    Teodoro Patingo                died November   21, 1903
+    Teodorico Tua                  died September  23, 1903
+    Ceferino Octia                 died November   10, 1903
+    Graciona Pamplona              died September  12, 1903
+    Felipe Bonifacio               died November   26, 1903
+    Baltazer Bundi                 died October    12, 1903
+    Julian Locot                   died October    13, 1903
+    Francisco de Punta             died August     20, 1903
+    Pedro Madrid                   died August     24, 1903
+    Felipe Pusiquit                died July       17, 1903
+    Rufo Mansalan                  died July       14, 1903
+    Ignacio Titano                 died June       20, 1903
+    Alfonso Locot                  died June       29, 1903
+    Gil Locot                      died May        23, 1903
+    Regino Bitarra                 died September   7, 1903
+    Bonifacio Bo                   died August      2, 1903
+    Francisco de Belen             died September  29, 1903
+
+
+    DECREE
+
+    The defendants above named, charged with divers crimes, having
+    died in the provincial jail by reason of various ailments, upon
+    various dates, according to official report of the jailer, it is
+
+    ORDERED BY THIS COURT, That the cases pending against the said
+    deceased persons be, and the same are hereby, quashed, the costs
+    to be charged against the government.
+
+
+    Judge of the Twelfth District acting in the Eighth.
+
+    Albay, December 28, 1903.
+
+
+The foregoing order contains fifty-seven names. As already indicated,
+the second order was like the first. It contained the names of
+sixty-three other deceased prisoners, as follows, to wit:
+
+
+    Anacleto Avila                 died September  2, 1903
+    Gregorio Saquedo               died July      21, 1903
+    Francisco Almonte              died October   11, 1903
+    Faustino Sallao                died October    9, 1903
+    Leocadio Pena                  died October   16, 1903
+    Juan Ranuco                    died October   16, 1903
+    Esteban de Lima                died February   4, 1903
+    Estanislao Jacoba              died October    7, 1903
+    Macario Ordiales               died October   19, 1903
+    Laureano Ordiales              died October   27, 1903
+    Reimundo Narito                died October    4, 1903
+    Antonio Polvorido              died September 12, 1903
+    Norverto Melgar                died June      14, 1903
+    Bartolome Rico                 died November   8, 1903
+    Simon Ordiales                 died September 13, 1903
+    Candido Rosari                 died September 29, 1903
+    Saturnino Vuelvo               died October   18, 1903
+    Vicente Belsaida               died May       26, 1903
+    Felix Canaria                  died June      12, 1903
+    Pedro Cuya                     died July      26, 1903
+    Evaristo Dias                  died July      24, 1903
+    Felix Padre                    died July       8, 1903
+    Alberto Mantes                 died August     7, 1903
+    Joaquin Maamot                 died September  5, 1903
+    Santiago Cacero                died May       28, 1903
+    Hilario Zalazar                died July      26, 1903
+    Tomas Odsinada                 died October    1, 1903
+    Julian Oco                     died October    4, 1903
+    Julian Lontac                  died August    27, 1903
+    Ambrosio Rabosa                died September 19, 1903
+    Mariano Garcia                 died September 12, 1903
+    Ramon Madrigalejo              died August    19, 1903
+    Albino Oyardo                  died October    1, 1903
+    Felipe Rotarla                 died September 29, 1903
+    Urbano Saralde                 died October    5, 1903
+    Gil Mediavillo                 died June      13, 1903
+    Egidio Mediavillo              died June      16, 1903
+    Mauricio Losano                died October    5, 1903
+    Bernabe Carenan                died September 27, 1903
+    Pedro Sagaysay                 died September 29, 1903
+    Laureano Ibo                   died August     5, 1903
+    Vicente Sanosing               died July      17, 1903
+    Francisco Morante              died June      10, 1903
+    Anatollo Sadullo               died September 16, 1903
+    Lucio Rebeza                   died August    27, 1903
+    Eugenio Sanbuena               died August    13, 1903
+    Nicolas Oberos                 died August    26, 1903
+    Eusebio Rambillo               died September 13, 1903
+    Tomas Rempillo                 died August    19, 1903
+    Daniel Patasin                 died August    19, 1903
+    Ignacio Bundi                  died September  7, 1903
+    Juan Locot                     died May       23, 1903
+    Zacarias David Padilla         died August     7, 1903
+    Juan Almazar                   died September 12, 1903
+    Rufino Quipi                   died June      13, 1903
+    Antonio Brio                   died June      13, 1903
+    Timoteo Enciso                 died September 12, 1903
+    Hilario Palaad                 died August    28, 1903
+    Ventura Prades                 died May       24, 1903
+    Alejandro Alevanto             died May       22, 1903
+    Rufino Pelicia                 died May       20, 1903
+    Alejo Bruqueza                 died July      19, 1903
+    Prudencio Estrada              died September 15, 1903
+
+
+These lists were printed in an article by the author which appeared
+in the North American Review for January 18, 1907, which article was
+reprinted by Hon. James L. Slayden, of Texas, in the Congressional
+Record for February 12, 1907. There can be little doubt that President
+Taft saw the article, and that if it had contained any inaccuracies
+they would long since have been noticed. So that in the Albay jail in
+1903 we had a sort of Andersonville prison, or Black Hole of Calcutta,
+on a small scale.
+
+If the military authorities had had charge of the Albay insurrection
+and of the prisoners in the Albay jail in 1903, it is safe to say
+that the great majority of those who died would have lived. But to
+have ordered out the troops would have been to abandon the official
+fiction that there was peace.
+
+Of Ola's five or six hundred men, Judge Carson and I, assisted by
+the chief prosecuting attorney of the government, Hon. James Ross,
+turned several hundred loose. Another large batch were disposed of
+under a vagrancy law, which allowed us to put them to work on the
+roads of the provinces for not exceeding two years, usually six to
+twelve months. Most of the remainder, a few score, we tried under the
+sedition law, and sent to Bilibid, the central penitentary at Manila,
+for terms commensurate with their individual conduct and deeds. The
+more serious cases were sent up for longer terms under the brigandage
+law. We indulged in no more maudlin sentiment about those precious
+scamps who had been degrading Filipino patriotism by occasionally
+invoking its name in the course of a long season of preying upon
+their respectable fellow-countrymen than Aguinaldo or Juan Cailles
+would have indulged. I am quite sure that either Aguinaldo or Juan
+Cailles would have made much shorter shrift of the whole bunch than
+Judge Carson and I did. It was only the men shown to have committed
+crimes usually punished capitally in this country that we sentenced
+to death--a dozen or more, all told. Ola was the star witness for the
+state. He held back nothing that would aid the prosecuting attorney
+to convict the men who had followed him for a year. He was given a
+sentence of thirty years (by Judge Carson), as a sort of expression
+of opinion of the most Christian attitude possible concerning his
+real deserts, but his services as state's evidence entitled him to
+immunity, and for that very good and sufficient reason Judge Carson,
+Prosecuting Attorney Ross, and myself so recommended to the Governor.
+
+Ola could read and write after a fashion, though he was quite an
+ignorant man. But to show what his control must have been over the
+rank and file of his men, let one incident suffice. On the boat going
+up to Manila from Albay, after the term of court was over, Ola was
+aboard, en route for the penitentiary. But, as he was a prospective
+recipient of executive clemency, though the guards kept an eye on him,
+he was allowed the freedom of the ship. One night on the voyage up,
+the weather being extremely warm, I left my stateroom sometime after
+midnight, carrying blanket and pillow, and went back to the storm
+steering-gear at the stern of the ship, to spend the rest of the night
+more comfortably. Waking sometime afterward for some unassignable
+cause, I realized that the crown of another head was tangent to the
+crown of my own, and occupying part of my pillow. It was Ola, the
+chief of the brigands. I raised up, shook the intruder, and said:
+"Hello, Ola, what are you doing here?" He wakened slowly. He had no
+idea of any first-class passenger being back there, and had taken
+it for granted that I was one of the ship's crew, when he decided to
+share my pillow. As soon as he realized who I was, he sprang to his
+feet with profound and effusive apologies, and paced the deck until
+morning, perhaps thinking over the possible effect of the incident
+on my recommendation concerning himself.
+
+After I had recovered the use of all my pillow I went back to
+sleep for a spell. About dawn I was wakened by some of the guards
+chattering. But I heard Ola, who had apparently been keeping watch
+over my august slumbers in the meantime, say in an imperious tone to
+the guards, his keepers, "Hush, the judge is sleeping." They looked
+at the brigand chief, and cowed, obeyed.
+
+Ola was pardoned.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+GOVERNOR TAFT, 1903 (Continued)
+
+                            The Philippines for the Filipinos.
+
+                                                Speech of Governor Taft.
+
+
+Just before Governor Taft left the Islands in 1903, he made a speech
+which made him immensely popular with the Filipinos and immensely
+unpopular with the Americans. The key-note of the speech was "The
+Philippines for the Filipinos." The Filipinos interpreted it to
+mean for them that ultimate independence was not so far in the dim
+distance of what is to happen after all the living are dead as to
+be a purely academic matter. And there was absolutely nothing in
+the speech to negative that idea, although he must have known how
+the great majority of the Filipinos would interpret the speech. On
+the other hand, the Americans in the Islands, popularity with whom
+was then and there a negligible factor, interpreted the speech,
+not inaccurately, to mean for them: "If you white men out here, not
+connected with the Government, you Americans, British, Germans and
+Spaniards, and the rest of you, do not like the way I am running this
+country, why, the boats have not quit running between here and your
+respective homes." [422] Then he came back to the United States and
+has ever since been urging American capital to go to the Philippines,
+all the time opposing any declaration by the law-making power of the
+Government which will let the American who goes out there know "where
+he is at," i.e., whether we are or are not going to keep the Islands
+permanently, and how to formulate his earthly plans accordingly, though
+the educated Filipinos are concurrently permitted to clamor against
+American "exploitation," American rule, and Americans generally,
+and to keep alive among the masses of their people what they call
+"the spirit of liberty," and what the insular government calls the
+spirit of "irreconcilableness." Clearly, a policy which makes for race
+friction and race hatred is essentially soft-headed, not soft-hearted,
+and ought not to be permitted to continue. Yet it has been true for
+twelve years, as one of President Taft's admiring friends proudly
+boasted concerning him some time since:
+
+
+    One man virtually holds in his keeping the American conscience
+    with the regard to the Philippines. [423]
+
+
+This is true, and it is not as it should be. We should either stop
+the clamor, or stop the American capital and energy from going to
+the Islands. After an American goes out to the Islands, invests his
+money there, and casts his fortunes there, unless he is a renegade,
+he sticks to his own people out there. Then the Taft policy steps in
+and bullyrags him into what he calls "knuckling to the Filipinos,"
+every time he shows any contumacious dissent from the Taft decision
+reversing the verdict of all racial history--which has been up to
+date, that wheresoever white men dwell in any considerable numbers
+in the same country with Asiatics or Africans, the white man will
+rule. Yet the American in the Philippines, once he is beguiled into
+going there, must bow to the Taft policies. He has taken his family to
+the Islands, and all his worldly interests are there. Yet he is living
+under a despotism, a benevolent despotism, it is true, so long as the
+non-office-holding American does not openly oppose the government's
+policies, but one which, however benevolent, is, so far as regards any
+brooking of opposition from any one outside the government hierarchy,
+as absolute as any of the other despotic governments of Asia. Though
+the Governor of the Philippines does not wear as much gilt braid
+as some of his fellow potentates on the mainland of Asia, still,
+in all executive matters he wields a power quite as immediate and
+substantial, in its operation on his subjects, as any of his royal
+colleagues. It never for a moment occurs either to the American
+Government official in the Philippines, or to the American citizen
+engaged in private business there who is in entire accord with the
+policies of the insular government and on terms of friendship with
+the officials, that the government under which he is living is any
+more of a despotism than the Government of the United States. The
+shoe never pinches the American citizen engaged in private business
+until he begins, for one reason or another, to be "at outs" with the
+insular government, and to have "opinions" which--American-like--he
+at once wants to express. If he permits himself to get thoroughly
+out of accord with the powers that be, the sooner he gets out of the
+Islands the better for him. This is the most notorious single fact
+in the present situation. There is no public opinion to help such a
+person, in any case where he differs with any specific act or policy
+of the insular government. The American colony is comparatively small,
+say between ten and twenty thousand all told, outside the army (which
+consists of ten or twelve thousand individuals living wholly apart
+from the rest of the community). The doctor who is known to have
+the patronage of high government officials is sure of professional
+success, and his wife is sure to receive the social recognition her
+husband's position in the community naturally commands; and this
+permits her to make auspicious entrance into the game of playing at
+precedence with her next neighbor called "society," so dear to the
+hearts of many otherwise sensible and estimable women--to say nothing
+of carpet knights, callow youths, cads, and aging gourmands. Also
+if the doctor and his lady have adult children, their opportunities
+to marry well are multiplied by the sunlight from the seats of the
+mighty. Thus the doctor and his wife are a standing lesson to the man
+"with convictions" that yearn for utterance, but who is also blessed
+with a discreet helpmate, more concerned in the general welfare and
+happiness of all the family than in seeing her husband's name in
+the paper. What is true of the doctor is also true of the lawyer
+known to be persona grata to the government. Again, the newspaper
+man in favor with the government is sure to get his share of the
+government advertising, according to a very liberal construction,
+and that insures his being able to command reportorial and editorial
+talent such as will sell his paper, and the consequent circulation is
+sure to get him the advertising patronage of the mercantile community,
+thus placing success for him on a solid, comfortable basis. Also, a
+contrary course will, slowly, maybe, but surely, freeze out any rash
+competitor. Consequently, the American in the Philippines is deprived
+of one of his most precious home pleasures, viz., letting off steam,
+in some opposition paper, about the real or imagined shortcomings of
+the men in charge of the government. For the reasonable expectancy
+of life of an opposition paper in Manila is pathetically brief. The
+hapless editor on the prosperous paper, whatever his talents,
+who happens to become afflicted with "views" which he airs in his
+editorial columns, is soon upbraided by his friends at his club as
+"getting cranky," and is told by the orthodox old-timers among them,
+"John, you've been out here too long. You better go home." If he does
+not change his tone, the receipts of the advertising department of his
+paper soon fall off, and his friend, the more tactful proprietor, who
+"knows how to get along with people," is not long in agreeing with
+the rest of his friends that he has "been out here too long." Again
+the successful merchant has too many interests at stake in which he
+needs the cordial friendship of the government to be able to afford
+to antagonize it. And so on, through every walk of life, the influence
+of the government permeates every nook and corner of the situation.
+
+The average public man in the United States would not feel "nat'ral"
+unless intermittently bedewed with steam from the exhaust valve of
+the soul of some "outraged citizen," through the medium of the public
+press. But in the Philippines a public man occupying a conspicuous
+position with the government may be very generally detested and
+actually not know it. [424] The American in the Philippines, with
+all his home connections severed, might as well send his family to
+the poor-house at once as to come out in a paper with an interview or
+speech,--even supposing any paper would publish it--which, copied by
+the papers back in the United States, would embarrass the National
+Administration's Philippine policy in any way. The same applies to
+talking too freely for the newspapers when home on a visit.
+
+I think the foregoing makes sufficiently obvious the inherent
+impossibility of the American people ever knowing anything about
+current governmental mistakes in the Philippines, of which there
+must be some, in time for their judgment to have anything to do with
+shaping the course of the government out there for which they are
+responsible. And therefore it shows the inherent unfitness of their
+governmental machinery to govern the Filipinos so long as they do not
+change the home form of government to meet the needs of the colonial
+situation, by providing a method of invoking the public judgment on
+a single issue, as in the case of monarchical ministries, instead of
+lumping issues as we now do. It is certainly a shame that the fate and
+future of the Philippines are to-day dependent upon issues as wholly
+foreign to anything Philippine as is the price of cheese in Kamchatka
+or the price of wool in the United States. Whether the Filipinos are
+fit for self-government or not, under our present form of government
+we are certainly wholly unfit to govern them. In our government of
+the Filipinos, the nature of the case eliminates our most valuable
+governmental asset, to wit, that saving grace of public opinion
+which stops public men, none of whom are infallible, before they can
+accomplish irreparable mischief, through uncorrected faith in plans of
+questionable wisdom and righteousness to which their minds are made up.
+
+To show how absolute was the executive and legislative power over
+8,000,000 of people entrusted by the sole authority of President
+McKinley to Governor Taft--without consulting Congress, though
+afterwards the authority so conferred was ratified by Congress and
+descended from Governor Taft to his successor--an incident related
+to me in the freedom of social intercourse, and not in the least
+in confidence, by my late beloved friend Arthur W. Fergusson,
+long Executive Secretary to Governor Taft, will suffice. In 1901
+the Commission had passed a law providing for the constitution of
+the Philippine judiciary, [425] according to which law an American,
+in order to be eligible to appointment as a Judge of First Instance
+(the ordinary trial court, or nisi prius court, of Anglo-Saxon
+jurisprudence) must be more than thirty years old, and must have
+practised law in the United States for a period of five years before
+appointed. In 1903 President Roosevelt wanted to make Hon. Beekman
+Winthrop (then under thirty years of age) now (1912), Assistant
+Secretary of the Navy, a Judge of First Instance. Governor Taft called
+Fergusson in and said: "Fergy, make me out a commission for Beekman
+Winthrop as a Judge of First Instance." Fergusson said: "You can't do
+it, Governor. It's against the law. He's not old enough." Winthrop was
+a graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor Taft said humorously,
+"I can't eh? I'll show you. Send me a stenographer." A law was dictated
+[426] striking out thirty years and inserting twenty-five, and adding
+after the words "must have practised law for a period of five years"
+the words "or be a graduate of a reputable law school." Fergusson
+was then called in, and told to go down the hall, see the other
+commissioners, [427] and get them together, which he did, and
+the law was passed in a few minutes. Then Fergusson was sent for,
+and the Governor said, handing him the new "law"; "Now make out
+that commission." Even if Fergusson colored the incident up a bit,
+in the exercise of his inimitable artistic capacity to make anything
+interesting, his story was certainly substantially correct relatively
+to the absoluteness of the authority of the Governor, as will appear
+by reference to the two laws cited.
+
+It is only fair to say that Winthrop made a very good judge. There
+used to be current in the Philippines a story that Governor Taft
+had said, in more or less humorous vein: "Gentlemen, I'm somewhat
+of an expert on judges. What you need in a judge is"--counting with
+the index finger of one hand on the fingers of the other--"firstly,
+integrity; secondly, courage; thirdly, common sense; and fourthly,
+he must know a little law." Winthrop's integrity, courage, and common
+sense were beyond all question. It could hardly have been otherwise. He
+came of a long line of sturdy and distinguished men, the first of whom
+had come over in the Mayflower days to the Massachusetts coast. And,
+he did know a little law. But the manner of his appointment is none
+the less illustrative of how much quicker, Governor Taft could make
+and publish a law than any of his fellow despots [428] over on the
+mainland of Asia, considering how slow-moving all their various grand
+viziers were, compared with Fergy, and his corps of stenographers.
+
+Having now given, I hope, a more or less sympathetic insight into
+what absolute rulers our governors in the Philippines have been, in
+the very nature of the case, from the beginning, let us observe the
+change of tone of the government, after the reign of the first ended,
+and the reign of the second began.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+GOVERNOR WRIGHT--1904
+
+                                The blame of those ye better
+                                The hate of those ye guard.
+
+                                           Kipling's White Man's Burden.
+
+
+Governor Taft left the Philippines on or about December 23, 1903,
+to become Secretary of War in President Roosevelt's Cabinet, and
+shortly afterward Vice-Governor Luke E. Wright succeeded to the
+governorship. After the accession of Governor Wright, there was
+no more hammering it into the American business men having money
+invested in the Islands that the Filipino was their "little brown
+brother," for whom no sacrifice, however sublime, would be more
+than was expected. Governor Wright was quite unpopular with the
+Filipinos and immensely popular with the Americans and Europeans,
+because, soon after he came into power, he "let the cat out of the
+bag," by letting the Filipinos know plainly that they might just as
+well shut up talking about independence for the present, so far as
+he was advised and believed; in other words, that Governor Taft's
+"Philippines for the Filipinos" need not cause any specially billowy
+sighs of joy just yet, because it had no reference to any Filipinos
+now able to sigh, but only to unborn Filipinos who might sigh in
+some remote future generation; and that the slogan which had caused
+them all to want to sob simultaneously for joy on the broad chest
+of Governor Taft was merely a case of an amiable unwillingness to
+tell them an unpleasant truth, viz., that in his opinion they were
+wholly unfit for self-government--all of which, in effect, meant
+that Governor Taft had been merely "Keeping the word of promise to
+the ear and breaking it to the hope."
+
+The Wright plain talk made the Filipinos one and all feel:
+"Alackaday! Our true friend has departed." But as Secretary of War
+Taft, after four years more of trying to please both sides, at home, at
+last frankly told the Filipinos when he went out to attend the opening
+of the first Philippine legislature, in 1907, practically just what
+Governor Wright had begun to tell them from the moment his predecessor
+had exchanged the parting tear with them on the water-front at Manila
+in 1903, the net result of the Wright policy of uncompromising honesty
+on the present political situation, may easily be guessed.
+
+Governor Wright's method of repudiating the Taft straddle took for its
+key-note, in lieu of "The Philippines for the Filipinos," the slogan
+"An Equal Chance for All." What Governor Wright meant was merely that
+there would be no more browbeating of Americans to make them love
+their little brown brother as much as Governor Taft was supposed
+to love him, but that everybody would be treated absolutely alike
+and nobody coddled. However, the Filipinos of course knew that they
+could not compete with American wealth and energy, and so did the
+Americans in the islands. So what the Wright slogan, unquestionably
+fair as was its intent, inexorably meant to everybody concerned except
+the dignified, straightforward and candid propounder of it, was, in
+effect, the British "White Man's Burden" or Trust-for-Civilization
+theory, a theory whereunder the white man who wants some one else's
+land goes and takes it on the idea that he can put it to better
+use than the owner. Thus early did the original "jollying" Mr. Taft
+had given them become transparent to his little brown brother. Thus
+early did it become clear to the Filipinos that behind the mask of
+executive protestations that they shall some day have independence
+when fit for it, lurks a set determination industriously to earn for
+an indeterminate number of generations yet to come
+
+
+                The blame of those ye better
+                The hate of those ye guard.
+
+
+This book has been written, up to this point, in vain, if the
+preceding chapters have not made clear how much political expediency,
+looking to the welfare of a party in power naturally seeking to
+continue in power, necessarily dominates Philippine affairs under
+American rule. We have observed under the microscope of history,
+made available by the official documents now accessible, the long
+battle between the political expediency germ and the independence
+bug which began in General Anderson's dealings with Aguinaldo and
+continued through General Merritt's and General Otis's regimes. We
+have seen General MacArthur's attempt at a wise surgical operation
+to excise the independence bug from the Philippine body politic--so
+that the expediency germ might die a natural death from having nothing
+to feed on. We have seen that operation interfered with by the Taft
+Commission during the presidential campaign of 1900, because the men
+in control of the republic could not ignore considerations of political
+expediency; and we saw the consequent premature setting up of the civil
+government in 1901, with all its dire consequences in the then as yet
+unconquered parts of the archipelago, southern Luzon, and some of the
+Visayan Islands. We have observed the effective though heroic local
+treatment administered to the Philippine body politic by General Bell
+in Batangas in 1901-2, with a view of killing off the independence
+bug there. We have seen the fierce struggle between some of the bug's
+belated spawn and the expediency germ's now more emboldened forces
+in Albay in the off year, 1903. We are now to take our fifth year's
+course in the colonial department of politico-entomological research,
+the presidential year 1904.
+
+It was the way the Samar insurrection of 1904-5-6 was handled which
+finally convinced me that the Filipinos would not kill any more of
+each other in a hundred years than we have killed, or permitted to
+be killed, of them, in the fell process of Benevolent Assimilation.
+
+American imperialism is not honest, like the British variety. American
+imperialism knows that Avarice was its father, and Piety its
+mother, and that it takes after its father more than it does
+after its mother. British imperialism frankly aims mostly to make
+the survivors of its policies happy, not the people it immediately
+operates on. American imperialism pretends to be ministering to the
+happiness of the living, and, though it realizes that it is not a
+success in that line, it resents identification with its British
+cousin, by sanctimonious reference to the alleged net good it is
+doing. Yet in its moments of frankness it says, with an air of infinite
+patience under base ingratitude, "Well, they will be happy in some
+other generation," and that therefore the number of people we have
+had or may have, to kill, or permit to be killed, in the process of
+Benevolent Assimilation, is wholly negligible. This is simply the old,
+old argument that the end justifies the means, the argument that has
+wrought more misery in the world than any other since time began.
+
+When Judge Taft, General Wright, and their colleagues of the Taft
+Commission, came out to the Philippines in 1900, they came full of the
+McKinley convictions about a people whom neither they or Mr. McKinley
+had ever seen, bound hand and foot by political necessity to square the
+freeing of Cuba with the subjugation of the Philippines. A perfectly
+natural evolution of this attitude resulted in the position they
+at once took on arriving in the Islands, viz., that to do for the
+Filipinos what we have done for the Cubans would mean a bloody welter
+of anarchy and chaos. And the presidential contest of 1900 was fought
+and won largely on that issue. After 1900, for all the gentlemen above
+referred to, the proposition was always res adjudicata. All protests
+by Filipinos to the contrary caused only resentment, and welded the
+authorities more and more hermetically to the correctness of the
+original proposition. Loyalty to the original ill-considered decision
+became impregnated, in their case, with a fervor not entirely unlike
+religious fanaticism, and belief in it became a matter of principle,
+justifying all they had done, and guiding all they might thereafter
+do. So that when General Wright "came to the throne" in our colonial
+empire, as Governor, and legatee of the McKinley-Taft Benevolent
+Assimilation policies, his attitude in all he did was thoroughly
+honest, and also thoroughly British. He honestly believed in the
+"bloody welter of anarchy and chaos" proposition, and was prepared,
+in any emergency that might arise, to follow his convictions in that
+regard whithersoever they might lead, without variableness or shadow
+of turning. Take him all in all, Governor Wright was about the best
+man occupying exalted station I ever knew personally, President Taft
+himself not excepted; although I still adhere to Colonel Roosevelt's
+opinion of 1901 concerning Mr. Taft, quoted in the chapter preceding
+this, from the Outlook of September 21, 1901, notwithstanding that in
+the contest for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1912,
+the Colonel "recalled" that opinion. Seriously, a man may "combine the
+qualities which would make a first class President of the United States
+with the qualities which would make a first class Chief Justice of the
+United States" and still cut a sorry figure trying to fit a square peg
+into a round hole, or a scheme of government, the breath of whose life
+is public opinion, into the running of a remote colonial government,
+the breath of whose life is exemption from being interfered with by
+public opinion.
+
+After the Albay insurrection of 1903 had been cleaned up, I took charge
+of the Twelfth Judicial District, having been appointed thereto by
+Governor Taft just before he left the islands to become Secretary of
+War. In those trying pioneer days they always seemed to give me the
+insurrections to sift out, but it was purely fortuitous. Whenever you
+ceased to be busy, prompt arrangements were made for you to get busy
+again. Judge Ide, the Minister of Justice, wasted no government money.
+
+The Twelfth District consisted of the two island provinces of Samar and
+Leyte, two of the six Visayan Islands heretofore noticed as the only
+ones worth considering in a general view of the archipelago such as
+the student of world politics wants or needs. Leyte had a population
+of 388,922, [429] and an area of 3008 square miles. [430] Samar's
+population was 266,237, and its area, 5276 square miles, makes it the
+third largest island of the Philippine Archipelago. So that as Judge
+of the Twelfth District, consisting of two provinces, the Governor of
+each of which was ex-officio sheriff of the court for his province,
+I was, in a sense, a sort of shepherd of a political flock of some
+650,000 people, whom I always thought of as a whole as "my" people.
+
+Samar and Leyte are separated, where nearest together, by a most
+picturesque winding strait bordered with densely wooded hills. San
+Juanico Strait is much narrower than the inland sea of Japan at its
+narrowest point, and almost as beautiful. In fact, at its narrowest
+point it seems little more than a stone's throw in width. It is as
+pretty as the prettiest part of the Golden Horn. Leyte had been put
+under the Civil Government in 1901, and this premature interference
+with the military authorities in the midst of their efforts to pacify
+the island had had the usual result of postponing pacification, by
+filling local politicians, wholly unable to comprehend a government
+which entreated or reasoned with people to do things, with the notion
+that we were resorting to diplomacy in lieu of force because of fear
+of them. Leyte and Samar were strategically one for the insurgents,
+just as the provinces of the Lake district of Luzon, described in
+an earlier chapter, were, because they could flee by night from
+one province to another in small boats without detection, when hard
+pressed by the Americano. The main insurgent general in Samar, Lucban,
+had surrendered to General Grant in 1902, but the cheaper fellows
+stayed out much longer, preying upon those who preferred daily toil
+to cattle-stealing and throat-cutting as a means of livelihood,
+and continuing the political unrest intermittently in gradually
+diminishing degree, through 1903. By the spring of 1904, however,
+there still remained in Samar riffraff enough, the jetsam and flotsam
+of the insurrection--professional outlaws--to get up some trouble,
+so that, as brigand chiefs, they might resume the roles of Robin
+Hood, Jesse James, et al. During the first half of that year the
+opportunity these worthies had been waiting for, while resting on
+their oars, developed. The crop of municipal officials resulting from
+the original McKinley plan of beginning the work of reconstruction
+during, instead of after, the war, and among the potential village
+Hampdens, instead of among the Cromwells, had resulted in some very
+rascally municipal officials who oppressed the poor, getting the hemp
+of the small farmer, when they would bring it to town, at their own
+prices--hemp being to Samar what cotton is to the South. From the
+lowland and upland farmers the ever-widening discontent spread to
+the hills, where dwelt a type of people constituting only a small
+fraction of the total population of the Islands--"half savage and
+half child"--but loving their hills, and wholly indisposed, of their
+own initiative, to start trouble, unless manipulated. Obviously,
+then, "the public mind" of Samar--those who know Samar will smile
+with me at the phrase, but it will do, for lack of a better--was
+likely soon to be in a generally inflammable condition. By July,
+1904, the Robin Hoods, Jesse Jameses, et al., touched the match to
+the material and a political conflagration started, apparently as
+unguided--save by the winds of impulse--and certainly as persistent,
+as a forest fire. Every native of the Philippine Islands, whether
+he be of the 7,000,000 Christians or of the 500,000 non-Christian
+tribes, is born with a highly developed social instinct either to
+command or to obey. The latter tendency is quite as common in the
+Philippines as the former is in the United States. Hence the Samar
+disturbances of 1904-5-6, though made up at the outset of raids and
+depredations by various roving bands of outlaws yielding allegiance
+only to their immediate chief, soon took on a very formidable military
+and political aspect. [431] The roving bands would ask the peaceably
+inclined people our flag was supposed to be protecting, "Are you for
+us or for the Americans?" promptly chopping their heads off if they
+showed any lack of zeal in denouncing American municipal institutions
+and things American in general. Pursuant to Mr. McKinley's original
+scheme--concocted for a people he had never seen, under pressure of
+political necessity--to rig up in short order a government "essentially
+popular in form," a lot of most pitiable municipal governments had
+been let loose on the people, a part of our series of kindergarten
+lessons. The plan was as wise as it will be for the Japanese--some
+one please hold Captain Hobson while I finish the analogy--when
+they conquer the United States, to go to the Bowery and the Ghetto
+for mayors of all our cities. Thus by our pluperfect benevolence,
+we had contrived in Samar by 1904 to rouse the highland folk, or hill
+people, whom the Spaniards had always let alone, against the pacific
+agricultural lowland people and the dwellers in the coast villages. The
+latter, or such of them as did not join the hill folk for protection,
+we permitted to be mercilessly butchered by wholesale, from August to
+November, 1904, as hereinafter more fully set forth, because ordering
+out the army to protect them might have been construed at home to mean
+disturbances more serious and widespread than actually existed, and
+might therefore affect the presidential election in the United States
+by renewing the notion that the Administration had never been frank
+with the American people concerning conditions in the Philippines.
+
+The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 is dated
+November 1st, which was just a week before the presidential election
+day of that year. Their annual report for 1905 is dated November 1,
+1905. In their report for 1904, the Commission deal with the general
+state of public order in the same roseate manner which, as we have
+seen, had made its first appearance during the political exigencies
+of 1900 in the language about "the great majority of the people"
+being "entirely willing" to benevolent alien domination in lieu
+of independence. When Rip Van Winkle was trying to quit drinking,
+he used to say after each drink: "Oh, we'll just let that pass." In
+their report for 1904, the Commission swallow the conditions in Samar
+with equal nonchalance. After stating that some (impliedly negligible)
+disturbances had occurred in Samar "two months since," they add that
+"the constabulary of the province took the field" against the bands
+of Pulajans, or outlaws, and that "as a result, they were soon broken
+up, and are being pursued and killed or captured" (p. 3). In their
+report dated November 1, 1905, by way of preface to an account of
+the extensive military operations inaugurated in Samar shortly after
+the presidential election of 1904, which operations had not only
+been in progress for nearly a year on the date of the 1905 report,
+but continued for more than a year thereafter, the Commission explain
+their 1904 nonchalance about Samar thus: "It was then believed that
+the constabulary forces had succeeded in checking the further progress
+of the outbreak" (p. 47).
+
+Let us examine the facts on which they based this statement, since it
+meant that they believed that a duly reported epidemic of massacres
+of peaceably inclined people, over whom the American flag was floating
+as a symbol of protection to life and property, had stood effectually
+checked by November 1, 1904, the date of their report. And first,
+of the massacres themselves, their nature and extent.
+
+The Samar massacres of 1904 began with what we all called down there
+"the outbreak of July 10th." In August, 1904, I went to Samar to
+handle the cases arising out of the disturbances there, assisted by
+the (native) Governor of the province, who, under the law already
+alluded to, was ex-officio sheriff of the court, and an army of
+deputy sheriffs, as it were, the constabulary, numbering several
+hundred. The outbreak of July 10th was always known afterwards as
+"the Tauiran affair." This Tauiran affair was a raid by an outlaw
+band on the barrio of Tauiran, one of the hamlets of the municipal
+jurisdiction of the township called Gandara, in the valley of the
+Gandara River, in north central Samar, wherein one hundred houses,
+the whole settlement, were burned, and twenty-one people killed. The
+term of court lasted from early in August until early in November. The
+day after the Tauiran affair, over on the other fork of the Gandara
+River, occurred what was called "the Cantaguic affair." Cantaguic was
+a hamlet or barrio about the size of Tauiran. The brigands killed the
+lieutenant of police of Cantaguic and some others, but they did not
+kill everybody in the place. Instead, after killing a few people,
+they went to the tribunal (town hall), seized the local teniente,
+or municipal representative of American authority, tied the American
+flag they found at the tribunal about the head of the teniente, turban
+fashion, poured kerosene oil on it, and took the teniente down stairs
+and out into the public square, where they lighted and burned the
+flag on his head, the chief of the band, one Juliano Caducoy by name,
+remarking to the onlookers that the act was intended as a lesson to
+those serving that flag. They then cut off the lips of the teniente
+so he could not eat (he of course died a little later), burned the
+barrio and carried off fifty of the inhabitants. Caducoy was captured
+some time afterward, and I sentenced him to be hanged. There was
+practically no dispute about the facts. After the Cantaguic affair,
+during the term of court mentioned, the provincial doctor, Dr. Cullen,
+an American who had been a captain doctor of volunteers, had occasion
+to run up to Manila. The doctor was a most accomplished gentleman,
+but he had a fondness for the grewsome in description equal to Edgar
+Allan Poe himself. After he came back he told me about having told the
+Governor-General of the Cantaguic affair, and repeated with an evident
+pleased consciousness of his ability to make his hearer's blood curdle,
+how the Governor had said to him slowly, "Doctor, that--is--awful!"
+
+Blood seemed to whet the appetite for slaughter. The records of the
+August-November, 1904 term of the court of first instance of Samar show
+all the various barrios of the Gandara Valley in flames on successive
+days, after the affairs of July 10th and 11th. I do not speak from
+memory, but from documents contained in a large bundle of papers
+kept ever since, in memory of that incarnadined epoch. You find one
+barrio burned one day and another another day, until all the people
+of the Gandara Valley were made homeless. One of the constabulary
+officers, Lieutenant Bowers, a very gallant fellow, testified before
+me that from July 10th to the date of his testimony, which was on or
+about September 28th, some 50,000 people had been made homeless in
+Samar by the operations of the outlaws. I deem Lieutenant Bowers's
+estimate quite reasonable. His figures include only one-fifth of the
+population of an island which was in the throes of an all-pervading
+brigand uprising. The conservative nature of Lieutenant Bowers's
+estimate concerning the mischief that had already been wrought
+by the end of September, 1904, and was then gathering destructive
+potentiality like a forest or prairie fire, may be inferred from the
+contents of a memorandum appearing below, furnished me by a Spanish
+officer of the constabulary, a Lieutenant Calderon, who had been an
+officer of the Rural Guard in the Spanish days. It contains a list
+of fifty-three towns, villages, and hamlets (a barrio may be quite a
+village, sometimes even quite a town, though usually it is a hamlet)
+burned up to the date the memorandum was furnished me.
+
+In order to a clear understanding of these Samar massacres and
+town-burnings of 1904, as well as for general geographical purposes,
+a few preliminary words of explanation will be appropriate just here.
+A province in the Philippines has heretofore been likened to a county
+with us. But in the largest provinces, the subdivisions of provinces
+called municipalities are more like counties; and each municipality
+is in turn subdivided into sections called barrios. A municipality
+(Spanish, pueblo) in the Philippines is not primarily a city or town,
+as we understand it, i.e., a more or less continuous settlement
+of houses and lots more or less adjacent, but a specific area of
+territory, a township, as it were. This area or territory may be 5 x
+10 square miles, or 10 x 20, or more, or less. For example, Samar's
+area is 5276 square miles. Yet it contained in 1904, and probably still
+contains, only twenty-five townships or municipalities all told, each
+municipality being subdivided in turn into barrios. Municipalities
+in the Philippines vary in size as much as counties do with us, and
+their total area accounts for and represents the total area of the
+province, just as the total area of the counties of a State represents
+with us the total area of the State. The seat of government of the
+municipality always bears the same name as the municipality itself,
+just as the county seat of a county usually, or frequently, bears
+the same name as the county, with us. Take for instance, the name of
+the first municipality or township in the list which appears below,
+Gandara. The municipality of Gandara might be described by analogy
+as the "county" of Gandara, the list of barrios burned as a list of
+towns and villages of the "county" of Gandara.
+
+The municipality of Gandara included a watershed in north central Samar
+from which the Gandara River flowed in a southwesterly direction to
+the sea. Within this watershed, parallel 12 1/2 north of the equator
+intersects the 125th meridian of longitude east of Greenwich. Northern
+Samar is a very rich hemp country, Catarman hemp being usually quoted
+higher than any hemp listed on the London market. If you stand at the
+highest point of the Gandara watershed you can see four streams flowing
+off north, northwest, northeast, and southwest to the sea. There are
+some half dozen streams having their source there. Brigands making
+their headquarters there could always, when hard pressed, get away
+in canoes toward the sea in almost any direction they wished. The
+following is Lieutenant Calderon's list:
+
+
+    RELACION POR MUNICIPIOS DE LOS BARRIOS QUEMADOS.
+
+    (List by Municipalities of the Barrios Burned.)
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF GANDARA
+
+    Tauiran                    July 10
+    Cantaguic                  July 12
+    Cauilan                    July 13
+    Erenas                     July 16
+    Blanca Aurora              July 19
+    Bulao [432]                July 21
+    Pizarro                  August  8
+    Cagibabago               August  8
+    Nueva                    August 10
+    Hernandez                August 10
+    San Miguel               August 10
+    Buao                     August 15
+    El Cano                  August 17
+    San Enrique              August 20
+    San Luis                 August 25
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Malino                   July   31
+    Silanga                  August  9
+    Ginga                    August 13
+    San Fernando             August 15
+    Maragadin                August 20
+    Talinga                  August 21
+    Santa Cruz               August 22
+    Dap-dap                  August 29
+    Palencia                 August 31
+    Albalate           (date not given)
+    Villa Hermosa      (date not given)
+
+
+The above list of villages burned in the township of Catbalogan
+shows how bold the Pulajans had then grown. By that time they were
+committing depredations, robbery, murder, and town-burning, in all the
+various villages within the municipal jurisdiction of the township
+of Catbalogan, coming often within a few miles of the town proper
+of Catbalogan itself, the seat of the provincial government. In the
+attack on Silanga, which occurred August 9th, a number of people
+were killed. Silanga was but little more than an hour's walk from
+the court-house at Catbalogan. The Governor at once wired Manila
+as follows:
+
+
+                                        Catbalogan, Samar, Aug. 9, 1904.
+
+    Executive Secretary, Manila:
+
+    The peaceably inclined people of the barrios near here are
+    collecting here in large numbers, terrorized by Pulajans who are
+    boldly roaming the country, burning barrios within seven or eight
+    miles from Catbalogan. They kill men, women, and children without
+    distinction. These Pulajans have fled from Gandara where they are
+    being actively pursued by constabulary. All forces that could be
+    spared have gone out. We have about thirty available fighting
+    men here. Pulajans liable at any time to enter Catbalogan. We
+    are in danger of some occurrence quite as serious as the Surigao
+    affair. [433] There are buildings here which I must protect at all
+    hazards--Treasury, Provincial Jail with ninety-five prisoners, and
+    commissary and ordnance stores of constabulary. We need at once at
+    least three hundred men, scouts if possible, to handle situation,
+    between here and Gandara. Pulajans undoubtedly have friends in
+    Catbalogan. I suspect certain of the municipal authorities here. I
+    estimate number of Pulajans now operating at about five hundred.
+
+        (Signed) Feito, Governor.
+
+
+On September 2d, the Provincial Governor of Samar sent to Manila the
+following telegram:
+
+
+                                              Catbalogan, Sept. 2, 1904.
+
+    Carpenter, Actg. Ex. Secy., Palace, Manila:
+
+    Seven-thirty this evening simultaneous reports from north
+    and south sides of town Pulajans approaching. They have not
+    entered yet and may not, but have gathered Americans with wives
+    and children in my house. Arms supplied. Treasury twenty-five
+    thousand Conant. [434] One hundred forty prisoners in jail. Only
+    forty-seven constabulary here. If Pulajans enter much needless
+    sacrifice life pacific citizens here. Feel sure Pulajans have
+    friends in Catbalogan. Request company either scouts or soldiers
+    from Calbayog stationed here, preferably former. Their presence
+    guarantee stability.
+
+        (Signed) Feito, Governor.
+
+
+Of course Governor Feito did not call for the regular army of the
+United States. His job, poor devil, was to demonstrate as best he
+could that the military were not needed. He would at once have been
+suspected of trying to scuttle the ship of "benign civil government"
+if he had admitted that the regular army was needed. But to return
+to Calderon's list:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CALBAYOG [435]
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+
+    Ylo                       August 17
+    Napuro                    August 17
+    Balud                     August 17
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF WRIGHT
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Guinica-an                  July 25
+    Calapi                      July 28
+    Bonga                      August 4
+    Tutubigan                 August 19
+    Motiong                 September 1
+    Lau-an                   October 10
+    Sao Jose           (date not given)
+
+
+A sample of the distressing communications I was getting as these
+massacres progressed is the notification of the Motiong affair
+of September 1st set forth below, which I give as a type of the
+methodical stoicism of those bloody times. Motiong was seven miles
+down the coast road from Catbalogan:
+
+
+    In the district of Motiong, municipality of Wright, province of
+    Samar, Philippine Islands, September 1, 1904.
+
+    In the presence of the undersigned Peregrin Albano, member of
+    the village council, there being also present the president of
+    the Municipal Board of Health, Mr. Tomas San Pablo, and the
+    principal men of the place, there has this day occurred the
+    burial of the corpses, victims of the Pulajans, in the cemetery
+    of this place, to wit: The officer of volunteers, Rafael Rosales,
+    and the following volunteers, viz., Gualberto Gabane, Juan Pacle,
+    Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo; also the two women,
+    Eustaquia Sapiten and Apolinaria N., also one unknown Pulajan. This
+    in fulfilment of the official letter of instructions No. 136,
+    from the office of the presidente of the town of Wright dated
+    to-day. Said burial ceremonies were conducted by the Reverend
+    Father Marcos Gomez, and were attended by the whole volunteer
+    force of this place because of the death of their officer Rosales.
+
+
+    Tomas San Pablo,
+    President of the Board of Health.
+
+    Peregrin Albano,
+    Councillor.
+
+    (Illegible)----Moro, Captain of Volunteers. [436]
+
+
+Fancy having documents like the foregoing handed you with
+ever-increasing regularity as you sauntered, morning after morning,
+from your bath to your coffee and rolls, preparatory to the daily
+sifting of incidents such as that which included the burning of
+the American flag on the head of the municipal representative of
+American authority already mentioned, and other like acts of poor
+misguided peasants stirred up by trifling scamps representing the
+dregs of insurrection. Motiong was not only within seven miles of
+the court-house at Catbalogan, but it was so near to Camp Bumpus,
+over in Leyte, where the 18th Infantry lay, that an order to them
+to move in the morning would have made life and property in all that
+brigand-harried region safe that night and continuously thereafter.
+
+General Wm. H. Carter, Major-General U. S. A., well known to the
+American public as the able officer who, in 1911, commanded the United
+States forces mobilized on the Mexican border during the Mexican
+revolution of that year, that ousted President Diaz and seated
+President Madero, was in command at the time--the fall of 1904--of
+the military district of the Philippines which included Samar and
+Leyte. A word of request to him would have made life definitely safe
+in all the coast towns and their vicinity within two or three days
+after receipt of such a request.
+
+Besides Gandara, Catbalogan, Calbayog, and Wright, Lieutenant
+Calderon's list included the trio of ill-fated municipalities set
+forth below, concluding with the illustrious name of Taft:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG
+
+    Poblacion              September  5
+    Tagabiran                 August 11
+    San Vicente               August --
+
+
+Catubig was toward the north end of Samar. On the day of the burning
+and sacking of the poblacion of Catubig, September 5th, which was done
+by a force of several hundred Pulajans, the scouts and constabulary,
+so it was afterward reported, killed a hundred of the Catubig Pulajans
+in an engagement. If this report were correct, as is likely, it was
+the biggest single killing of natives since the early days of the
+insurrection. [437] But it did not in the least check the Pulajan
+insurrection, which simply swerved its fury from the Catubig region
+toward the coast (the Pacific coast), descending upon the towns,
+villages, and hamlets of the townships of Borongan and Taft, thus:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN
+
+    (Calderon's List of Barrios Burned, continued)
+
+    Sepa                     Sept. 23
+    Lucsohong                Sept. 23
+    Maybocog                 Sept. 23
+    Maydolong                Sept. 23
+    Soribao                  Sept. 23
+    Bugas                     Oct. 10
+    Punta Maria               Oct. 10
+    Canjauay                  Oct. 11
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF TAFT
+
+    (Calderon's List continued)
+
+    Del Remedio              Sept. 22
+    San Julian               Sept. 22
+    Nena                     Sept. 22
+    Libas                    Sept. 22
+    Pagbabangnan             Sept. 22
+    San Vicente              Sept. 21
+    Jinolaso                 Oct.   3
+
+
+Of the twenty-five pueblos or townships of Samar, the Calderon
+list only pretended to throw light on events in nine of them,
+those being the only ones from which definite news had then reached
+headquarters. But as a reign of terror prevailed all over Samar at the
+time, the rest may be imagined, though it can never be ascertained. Of
+these nine, the last two were:
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF LLORENTE
+
+    Pagbabalancayan          Sept. 23
+
+
+    MUNICIPALITY OF ORAS
+
+    Concepcion               Sept. 23
+    Jipapad                     --
+
+
+Now it feels just as uncomfortable to be boloed in Pagbabalancayan
+as it would in a place with a more pronounceable name, and the same
+is true of the comparatively mellifluous Jipapad. True, some of
+these places were mere hamlets of twenty to forty houses, but you
+may be sure there were five or six people, on an average, to each
+house. On the other hand, glance back again at the list of towns of
+the township of Taft that were sacked and burned, and consider that
+San Julian was about the size of the provincial capital, Catbalogan,
+and that Catbalogan, the town proper, contained a population of
+four thousand, though looked at from the amphitheatre of hills which
+surround it, Catbalogan does not look like such a very large group
+of houses. Filipino houses are usually full of people. It is easier
+to live that way than to build more houses.
+
+After the Pulajan descent on Llorente, the people of Llorente all went
+off to the hills to the Pulajans for safety. They were not allowed
+to have firearms. This was forbidden by law, except on condition of
+making formal application for permission, getting it finally approved,
+and giving a bond, conditions which, in practical operation, made
+the prohibition all but absolute. The law was general for the whole
+archipelago. The theory of the law was that the inhabitants were under
+"the peace and protection of a benign civil government." The real
+reason of the law was that if the people were allowed to bear arms it
+was very uncertain which side they would use them on, our side or the
+other. But, by 1904, the lowland and coast people of Samar would have
+been glad enough to have stuck to us and gone out after the mountain
+robber bands had we armed them. Left unprotected, a feeling seemed
+to spread in many places that about the only thing to do to be safe
+was to depart from under the "protection" of the American flag and
+take to the hills and join, or seem to join, the uprising.
+
+Toward the last of September, the provincial treasurer of Samar, an
+American, a Mr. Whittier, visited the east coast of Samar, including
+Taft. On October 5th, he stated before me as follows:
+
+
+    All the presidentes that I have talked with, and this man Hill,
+    [438] said that they wanted some protection for their towns. Except
+    at Borongan there are no guns in the hands of the municipal
+    police. [439] This band near Taft was said to have nineteen
+    guns, and they felt they could not defend their towns with spears
+    against these guns. There were reported to be between 200 and 600
+    in operation on the coast at that time, and they felt that they
+    could not defend their towns with the means at hand. I found at
+    Taft that they had taken all the records of the municipality,
+    and the money, and taken it over to an island away from the
+    main coast, in order to protect their money and their records,
+    and I understand the same thing was done at Llorente. At Oras
+    they had practically decided to take the same step if it became
+    necessary. All of the commercial houses on the east coast and
+    a large number of people congregated at Borongan, which was
+    safe on account of the protection of the constabulary; and the
+    constabulary there were doing very good work, doing everything
+    they could with their small force, and they (the presidentes)
+    felt that if they had guns in the hands of the municipal police
+    or if they had the constabulary to guard their towns, they could
+    go out after these people themselves.
+
+
+The importance of all this testimony, relatively to its forever
+sickening any one acquainted with it with colonization by a republic,
+is that a transcript of Mr. Whittier's statement of October 5th
+was placed in the hands of the Governor-General a few days later by
+Mr. Harvey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and yet this situation
+continued until shortly after the presidential election. Several
+years afterwards, in the North American Review, Judge Ide, who
+was Vice-Governor in 1904, after admitting that he was in constant
+consultation with the Governor-General all through that period (by
+way of showing his opportunities for knowing whereof he spoke),
+denied that the failure to order out the military to protect the
+people from massacre had any relation whatever to the presidential
+election then going on in the United States.
+
+Mr. Whittier also stated before me that the total population of the
+municipality of Taft was 18,000, and that twenty-five men armed with
+guns in each of the four principal villages thereof that were burned
+would have prevented the destruction of those villages. So we did not
+protect the people, and we would not let them protect themselves. I
+do not select the pueblo of Taft on account of its distinguished
+name. "What's in a name?" The fate of Taft and its inhabitants was
+simply typical of the fate which descended upon scores of other places
+in "dark and bloody" Samar between the outbreak of July 10, 1904, and
+the presidential election of November 8th, of that year, and between
+those two dates the shadow of such a fate was over all the towns of
+the island on which it did not in fact descend. Mr. Whittier stated to
+me informally that at the time he was speaking of in the above formal
+statement, there were pending and had been pending for a long time
+(he seemed to think they must have been pigeon-holed) applications
+for permission to bear arms from fifteen different pueblos. After
+Mr. Whittier had finished his statement the Presidente of Taft made
+a like statement on the same day, October 5th. My retained copy
+shows that this official bore the ponderous name of Angel Custodio
+Crisologo. He declared a willingness to lead his people against
+the Pulajans if given guns, though the fervent soul did qualify
+this martial remark by adding, "If I am well enough," explaining
+that the presidential body was subject to rheumatism. Mr. Crisologo
+stated among other things that there had been eight hundred houses
+burned in the jurisdiction of Taft before he left the east coast
+for Catbalogan--about a week before. Like Mr. Whittier's, a copy
+of Mr. Crisologo's statement was delivered a few days later to
+the Governor-General in person by the Assistant Attorney-General,
+Mr. Harvey, who had been present when it was made and taken down.
+
+This Mr. Harvey need not be, to the western hemisphere reader, a
+mere nebulous antipodal entity, as the Hon. Angel Custodio Crisologo
+might. He is a very live American, a very high-toned gentleman, and
+an excellent lawyer, and was at last accounts still with the insular
+government of the Philippine Islands, though in a higher capacity
+(Solicitor General) than he was at the date of the events herein
+narrated. There was very little congenial society in Catbalogan when
+Mr. Harvey came there to help dispose of the criminal docket, and his
+advent was to me a very welcome oasis in a desert of "the solitude
+of my own originality"--or lack of originality. On September 19th I
+had wired Vice-Governor Ide that there were 172 prisoners in the jail
+awaiting trial and "many more coming." Of course no justice of the
+peace would be trusted to pass on whether an alleged outlaw should
+or should not be held for trial. If he were secretly in sympathy
+with the discomfiture American authority in Samar was having, he
+might let the man go, no matter what the proof. Also he might seek to
+clear himself of all suspicion in each case by committing men against
+whom there was no proof, thus unnecessarily crowding an already fast
+filling provincial jail of limited dimensions, wherein beriberi [440]
+was already making its dread appearance.
+
+So the writ of habeas corpus remained unsuspended, thus making it
+possible to so state in later official certificates covering that
+period. But habeas corpus cut no more figure in the situation than
+it did at the battle of Gettysburg, or at the crossing of the Red
+Sea by the chosen people, or at the sinking of the Titanic. The
+constabulary would worry along with such force as they had in the
+island of Samar, only a few hundred, certainly nearer five hundred
+than one thousand. And, whenever they had a battle with the outlaws,
+if they themselves were not annihilated, which happened more than
+once, they would bring back prisoners in droves and put them in
+the jail, and I was expected to sift out how much proof they had,
+or claimed to have, of overt acts by persons not actually captured
+in action. Of course a race then began, a race against death, to see
+whether death or I would get to John Doe or Richard Roe first. And
+though I held court every day except Sunday from August to November
+8th, sometimes getting in sixteen hours per day by supplementing a
+day's work with a night session, death would often beat me to some
+one man on the jail list whom I happened to have picked out to get to
+the next day. Men so picked out were men as to whom something I might
+have heard held out the hope of being able to dispose of their cases
+quickly by letting them loose, [441] thus getting that much farther
+from the danger limit of crowding in the jail. Some of these would be
+specially picked out because reported sick. I kept track of the sick
+by visiting them myself when practicable, and talking to them. Of
+course many of them were brigands---Pulajans--but some of them were
+the saddest looking, most abject little brigands that anybody ever
+saw. Of course you might catch some nasty disease from them, but
+nobody, somehow, ever seemed to have any apprehension on that score
+in the Philippines. This does not argue bravery at all. It is merely
+the listless stoicism that lurks in the climate. I recollect going
+to walk one afternoon, after adjourning court at 5 o'clock, saying to
+the prosecuting attorney before adjourning, "We will take up the case
+of Capence Coral in the morning; there does not seem, from what I can
+understand, to be enough proof to convict him of anything." Of course
+when you were dealing with hundreds of people, you did not have any
+nerve-racking hysterics about any one man. Leaving the court-house I
+passed by the hospital, where Capence had been transferred, pending
+the arrival of witnesses against him and the rest of the crowd captured
+with him. I asked the hospital steward how Capence was. The answer was
+he had died at 4:45--some twenty minutes before. Death had beat me to
+Capence. When I meet Capence he will know I did the best I could. I
+was under a great strain, a sort of writ of habeas corpus incarnate,
+the only thing remotely suggesting relief from unwarranted [442]
+detention on the whole horizon of the situation. I was trying to do
+the best I could by the Constitution, in so far as the spirit of it
+had reached the Philippines. I broke down totally under the strain
+about November 8th, came home in the spring of the following year
+and remained an invalid for several years thereafter; and as a noted
+corporation lawyer once said after recovery from a similar illness,
+"I haven't had much constitution since, but have been living mostly
+under the by-laws."
+
+American office-holding in the Philippines is not so popular with
+the Filipinos as to have moved them to any outburst of gratitude in
+the shape of an effort to create a pension system for Americans who
+lose their health in the government service out there. When they
+leave the Islands they become as one dead so far as the Philippine
+insular government is concerned. And the men whose health is more or
+less permanently impaired by disability incurred in line of duty in
+the Philippines are not and will never be numerous or powerful enough
+back home to create any sentiment in favor of a pension system for
+former Philippine employees, since the Philippine business is not a
+subject of much popular enthusiasm at best. So if I had not had private
+resources, the results of the Samar insurrection of 1904 would have
+left me also in the pitiable plight in which I have beheld so many
+of my repatriated former comrades of the Philippine service in the
+last seven years, to whom the heart of the more fortunate ex-Filipino
+indeed goes out in sympathy. But to return to the race to beat death
+to prisoners in that grim and memorable fall of 1904.
+
+In September the crowded condition of the jail had begun to tell on
+the inmates. The constabulary force at Catbalogan was quite inadequate
+for the varied emergencies of the situation, there being, besides
+the town itself to protect, the provincial treasury to guard, the
+governor's office, the court-house, and the jail. Consequently the jail
+guard was too small. The jail buildings were in an enclosure a little
+larger than a baseball diamond, surrounded by high stone walls. But
+it was not safe to let the inmates sleep out in the enclosure at
+night. They had to be kept at night in the buildings. Any American
+who has visited the central penitentiary at Manila called Bilibid
+has seen a place almost as clean as a battleship. This is American
+work. But the Filipinos are not trained in sanitary matters, and all
+they know about handling large crowds of prisoners they learned from
+the Spaniards. The Governor was a native half-caste, a very excellent
+man, but free from that horror, which I think is an almost universal
+American trait, of seeing unnecessary and preventable sacrifice of
+human life, no matter whose the life. I inspected the jail as often
+as was practicable, and managed to keep down the death-rate below
+what it might have been, the prisoners being allowed to go out in
+the open court during the day. They also had such medical attention
+as was available. However, during the last five or six weeks of that
+term of court I would be pretty sure to find on my desk every two or
+three days, on opening court in the morning, a notice like this:
+
+
+    Carcel Provincial de Samar, I. F.
+    Oficina del Alcaide
+
+    Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.,
+    22 de Septiembre de 1904.
+
+    Hon. Sr. Juez de Ia Instancia de esta provincia,
+    Catbalogan, Samar, I. F.
+
+    Senor:
+
+    Tengo el honor de poner en conocimiento de ese juzgado, que
+    anoche entre 12 y 1 de ella, fallecio el procesado, Ramon Boroce,
+    a consecuencia de la enfermedad de beriberi, que venia padeciendo.
+
+    Lo que tengo el honor de communicar a ese Juzgado para su superior
+    conocimiento.
+
+    De U. muy respetuosamente,
+    Gonzalo Lucero,
+
+    Alcaide de la Carcel Provincial.
+
+
+which being interpreted means:
+
+
+    Provincial Jail of Samar, P. I.
+
+    Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.,
+    September 22, 1904.
+
+    His honor, the Judge of First Instance of this province,
+    Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.
+
+    Sir:
+
+    I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of the court that last
+    night between 12 and 1 o'clock, the accused person Ramon Boroce
+    died in consequence of the disease of beriberi from which he has
+    been suffering; which fact I have the honor to communicate to
+    the court for its superior knowledge.
+
+    Very respectfully,
+    Gonzalo Lucero,
+
+    Warden of the Provincial Jail.
+
+
+Now a jail death-rate of only ten or twelve a month was not at all a
+bad record for an insurrection in a Philippine province. It would be
+rank demagoguery at this late date to be a party to anybody's getting
+excited about it. I was rather proud of it by comparison with the jail
+death-rate of the Albay insurrection of the year before, where 120
+men had died in the jail in about six months. But it began to get on
+one's nerves to have to expect a billet-doux like the above on your
+desk at the opening of court each day, when the accused person had
+had no commitment trial and may have been wholly innocent. It all
+came back to the difference between war and peace, viz., that in war
+it is to be expected that many innocent persons will suffer, but that
+in peace only the guilty should suffer. Moreover, in war that admits
+it is war, your agents, your army, are better able to handle crowds
+of prisoners than native police and constabulary, and the percentage
+of innocent who suffer with the guilty in such war will be far less;
+whereas the contrary is true of war--waged by constabulary checked
+by courts--which pretends that a state of peace exists, i.e., which
+pretends there is no need for declaring martial law and calling on
+your army.
+
+It was this Samar insurrection which convinced me that waging war
+with courts and constabulary in lieu of the recognized method was,
+in its net results, the cruelest kind of war, and that the civil
+government of the Philippines was a failure, in so far as regarded
+Mr. McKinley's original injunction to the Taft Commission; where,
+after alluding to the articles of capitulation of the city of Manila
+to our forces, which concluded with the words:
+
+
+    This city, its inhabitants * * * and its private property of all
+    descriptions * * * are placed under the special safeguard of the
+    faith and honor of the American Army,
+
+
+he added:
+
+
+    As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of
+    the United States to give protection for property and life * * *
+    to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this
+    commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation,
+    which concerns the honor and conscience of their country.
+
+
+Commenting on this in his inaugural address as Governor of the
+Philippines, Governor Taft had said:
+
+
+    May we not be recreant to the charge, which he truly says,
+    concerns the honor and conscience of our country.
+
+
+No matter who was to blame, here we were in Samar, with the
+14th Infantry three hours away in one direction at Calbayog,
+doing nothing, and the 18th Infantry five hours away in another
+direction, at Tacloban, doing nothing, and a reign of terror going
+on in Samar, with the peaceably inclined people of the lowlands
+and coast towns appealing to us for protection and not getting it,
+sometimes crouching in abject terror without knowing which way to fly,
+sometimes taking to the hills and joining the outlaws as a measure
+of self-preservation. 'Twas pitiful, wondrous pitiful! I then and
+there decided that we ought to get out of the Philippines as soon
+as any decent sort of a native government could be set up, and that
+our republic was not adapted to colonization. In his North American
+Review article above cited, in denying that the unwillingness of
+the Manila government to order out the army in Samar in the fall
+of 1904 had anything to do with the possible effect so doing might
+have had on the presidential election, then in progress in the United
+States, Governor Ide rebuked me with patronizing self-righteousness
+thus: "Was Judge Blount opposed to kindness?" He means in giving
+the Filipinos, under such circumstances, the "protection of civil
+government," instead of ordering out the army. No, but I was opposed
+to using a saw, in lieu of a lancet, in excising the ulcers of that
+body politic at that time. In protesting that there was "nothing
+sinister" about the failure to use the troops, Judge Ide cunningly
+wonders whether my attitude was subsequently assumed after I left
+the Islands because of "proclivities as a Democrat," or whether it
+was merely due to "predilections in favor of military rule." Read
+Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Taft Commission, above quoted,
+that to protect life and property concerned the honor and conscience
+of their country, and consider if the Ide suggestion does not seem to
+hide its head and slink away in shame before the strong clear light
+of what was then a plain duty. As a matter of fact Judge Charles
+S. Lobinger, who is still with the Philippine judiciary, visited me
+en route to another point, during that Samar term of court, and he
+will recall, should he ever chance upon this book and this chapter,
+with what vehemence I said to him at the time, in effect, "Judge,
+we belong in the Western Hemisphere. We have no business out here
+permanently." If proclivities and predilections in favor of affording
+decent protection to the lives and property of defenceless people
+by properly garrisoning their towns constitutes lack of kindness,
+then the Ide rebuke was well taken.
+
+These details are not related with Pickwickian gravity in order to
+acquaint the reader with my utterances as being important per se. But
+it is important to make clear to the reader, and he is entitled,
+in all frankness, to have it made clear by one who has now so long
+detained his attention on this great subject, to know just when "the
+light from heaven on the road to Damascus" broke upon this witness,
+and how and why he came to be in favor of Philippine independence,
+because the reasons which convinced him may seem good in the sight
+of the reader also. If the man who reads this book shall see that
+the man who wrote it was, in Samar in 1904, neither a Republican nor
+a Democrat, but simply an American in a far distant land, jealous
+of the honor of his country's flag in its capacity as a symbol of
+protection to those over whom it floated, then the work will not have
+been written in vain.
+
+The presidentes or mayors of the various pueblos were in session
+at Catbalogan in semi-annual convention during the first few days
+of October, 1904, when the Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Harvey,
+visited Catbalogan. Mr. Harvey and the writer had taken a number of
+long walks together in the suburbs of Catbalogan, though Major Dade,
+commanding the Samar constabulary, an officer of the regular army,
+had warned us it was not safe outside of town. We had talked over
+the situation fully. Besides all its other aspects, there were a
+number of American women in Catbalogan, an American lawyer's wife,
+the wife of the superintendent of schools, her sister, and others. It
+was not at all likely that the Pulajans would enter Catbalogan, but
+there was always the possibility, not to be wholly ignored, that some
+such episode as that of March 23d, of the preceding year, at Surigao,
+already described, might be repeated. As hereinbefore noted, on August
+9th, the Pulajans had done some killing and burning at Silanga, less
+than ten miles north of Catbalogan and likewise at Motiong, less than
+ten miles south of Catbalogan, on September 1st, and on the evening
+of September 2d, about 7:30, there had been a false alarm caused
+by some native of Catbalogan running down the main street yelling,
+"Pulajans! Pulajans!" All of which did not tend to make you feel
+that your American women were quite as entirely safe from harm as
+they ought to be.
+
+In the course of one of our walks Mr. Harvey and I had stopped on the
+mountain side overlooking Catbalogan, to catch our breath and take in
+the view of the town below and the sea beyond. I said to him, because
+I knew his mind also was on the one great need of the hour: "Yes sir,
+if President Roosevelt were here, and could see this situation as we
+do, he would order out the army and protect these defenceless people,
+no matter which way the chips might fly." Mr. Harvey agreed with
+me. He promised to go back to Manila and tell the authorities there
+so. After we came back to town, we were advised that the convention of
+presidentes desired to have Mr. Harvey favor them with an address. He
+said, "What shall I tell them?" I said, "Tell them that if they will
+do their duty by the American Government, the American Government will
+do its duty by them." He spoke Spanish fluently, made a good speech,
+and told them in effect just that thing. Then he went back to Manila,
+and shortly afterward wrote me the two letters which follow:
+
+
+    Department of Justice, Philippine Islands,
+    Office of the Assistant Attorney-General
+    for the Constabulary,
+
+                                        Manila, P. I., October 15, 1904.
+
+
+    My dear Judge: We arrived in Manila on Tuesday morning,
+    the 11th instant, and I prepared my report and submitted it
+    to the attorney-general on the 12th, in the meantime making a
+    transcript of your summary and delivering a copy of same with other
+    information to the attorney-general along with my report. After
+    dictating the report and before delivering it I had a conversation
+    with General Allen on the situation in Samar and told him what
+    my recommendations would be. He agreed that rewards should be
+    offered for the capture of Pablo Bulan, Antonio Anogar, and Pedro
+    de la Cruz, but took issue on the other recommendations, and to my
+    mind he takes a very extreme view; but I thought at the time and
+    still think that he wanted to tone me down in my feelings in the
+    matter. I think the real cause for his opposition is the effect
+    that he fears an aggressive attitude might have on the presidential
+    election. In other words, whatever they do aggressively might be
+    misconstrued and made use of as political capital.
+
+    At Governor Wright's request I got the report from the
+    attorney-general before it was sent up and went over to the
+    Malacanan, and the governor read the report and read most of the
+    data that I submitted with the report, including your summary, and
+    while he did not say much what he did say convinced me that there
+    would be something doing if it were not on the eve of election,
+    and in my opinion there will be things doing in Samar within
+    thirty days.
+
+    I inclose herewith a copy of your summary, and also a copy of my
+    report to the attorney-general. On the 18th instant I received
+    your telegram to hold the completion of your summary until receipt
+    of a letter mailed by you that day. I telegraphed you in reply
+    that my report and your summary were placed in the hands of the
+    attorney-general on the 12th instant. If there is any additional
+    data in your letter mailed on the 13th I will submit it to the
+    proper authorities.
+
+    For the lack of time, I will close, and write more next time.
+
+
+        Very truly yours,
+        (Signed) Geo. R. Harvey,
+        Assistant Attorney-General.
+
+
+
+
+    Department of Justice, Philippine Islands,
+    Office of the Assistant Attorney-General,
+    for the Constabulary,
+
+                                        Manila, P. I., October 19, 1904.
+
+
+    My dear Judge Blount: Since mailing my letter to you of last
+    Saturday I have found the copies of your summary on the situation
+    in Samar and inclose two herewith, in accordance with my promise.
+
+    This week we have received some good news from Samar with
+    reference to important captures and killings of Pulajans. I
+    am not in touch with what is going on with reference to Samar,
+    and can give you no information along that line. As I remember,
+    the governor told me the other day when I was talking with him
+    that one more company of scouts will be sent down right away.
+
+    I sincerely hope the situation is improving, and that you are
+    getting along rapidly in disposing of the large docket before
+    you. If there is not a very great improvement in the situation
+    by the 9th of November, I think there will be a considerable
+    movement of troops in Samar within thirty days. For the good of the
+    government, I hope the situation will improve materially before
+    that time. I would like to see them put the troops there right
+    now. I am of the opinion that it would not affect the election a
+    half-dozen votes, and it might save two or three or a half-dozen
+    massacres and the destruction of much property.
+
+    With best wishes for your success in your work, and with regards
+    to Mr. Block, I am,
+
+
+        Very truly yours,
+
+        Geo. R. Harvey,
+
+        Assistant Attorney-General, Philippines Constabulary.
+        To Hon. James H. Blount,
+        Judge of First Instance, Catbalogan, Samar, P. I.
+
+
+These two letters may be found at p. 2532, Congressional Record,
+February 25, 1908, where they were the subject of remark in the House
+of Representatives by Hon. Thomas W. Hardwick of Georgia, apropos of
+Governor Ide's North American Review article of December, 1907.
+
+A few weeks after the presidential election I saw Mr. Harvey
+in Manila. We naturally talked about Samar and his two letters
+to me. The troops had then been ordered out. He referred to his
+conference with the Governor-General and stated, "Yes, he told me
+that was the reason," meaning that the reason for not ordering out
+the troops was the one assigned in his (Harvey's) letter to me, viz.,
+"Whatever we do aggressively might be misconstrued and made use of
+as political capital."
+
+On October 18, 1904, there was received at Manila the following
+cablegram concerning the presidential campaign in the United States:
+
+
+    New York, 16th. Judge Parker, in addressing campaign clubs at
+    Esopus the past week returned to the subject of the Philippines
+    in the evident hope of making it a paramount issue of the
+    campaign. He repeated his former declaration that the retention
+    of the Philippines and the carrying out of the policy of the
+    Republican Administration have cost six hundred and fifty millions
+    of dollars and two hundred thousand lives. Secretary of War Taft,
+    in addressing a mass meeting held in Baltimore, Saturday night,
+    ridiculed Judge Parker's statement and characterized his figures
+    as alarmist.
+
+
+Of course Judge Parker's figures were rather high--of which more
+anon. He was not going to miss anything in the way of a chance of
+"getting a rise" out of the Administration, by understatement. But some
+statement from the Philippines at once became a supremely important
+desideratum, to counterbalance Judge Parker's over-statement, some
+optimism to meet the Parker pessimism. Encouraged by the public
+interest aroused by the figures furnished him, and the consequent
+apparent uneasiness it created in "the enemy's camp," Judge Parker
+soon had the whole Philippine group of islands going to "the demnition
+bow-wows." On October 20th, Secretary of War Taft cabled Governor
+Wright, then Governor-General of the Islands, a long telegram, quoting
+Judge Parker as having used, among other language descriptive of the
+beatitudes we had conferred on our little brown brother, the following:
+"The towns in many places in ruins, whole districts in the hands of
+ladrones." [443]
+
+At that time the whole archipelago was absolutely quiet for the nonce,
+except Samar. Samar was the only island where Judge Parker's statement
+was true, and as to Samar, it was absolutely true. On October 23d
+Governor Wright wired Secretary of War Taft as follows:
+
+
+    There is nothing warranting the statement that towns are in
+    ruins. It is not true that there are whole districts in the hands
+    of ladrones. Life and property are as safe here as in the United
+    States. [444]
+
+
+This was followed by a perfectly true and correct picture of the
+peace and quiet which then prevailed for the time being everywhere
+throughout the archipelago, except in Samar, which dark and bloody
+isle was specifically excepted. Then followed a statement as to
+Samar, full of allusions as elaborately optimistic as any of the Taft
+cablegrams of 1900, to impliedly inconsiderable "prowling bands" of
+outlaws in Samar. Of course nobody at home knew the answer to this,
+so it silenced the Parker batteries, and the Samar massacres proceeded
+unchecked. Meanwhile the 14th Infantry at Calbayog, Samar, and the 18th
+Infantry, at Tacloban, Leyte, smiled with astute, if contemptuous,
+tolerance, at the self-inflicted impotence of a republic trying to
+make conquered subjects behave without colliding too violently with
+home sentiment against having conquered subjects; sang their favorite
+barrack room song,
+
+
+            He may be a brother of Wm. H. Taft,
+            But he ain't no friend of mine;
+
+
+and continued to enjoy enforced leisure. They did chafe under the
+restraint, but it at least relieved them from the not altogether
+inspiring task of chasing Pulajans through jungles and along the
+slippery mire of precipitous mountain trails, and at the same time
+permitted the secondest second lieutenant among them to swear fierce
+blase oaths, not wholly unjustified, about how much better he could
+run the Islands than they were being run.
+
+On October 26th, I wired Governor Wright at Manila as follows:
+
+
+    Since my letter of October 6th, situation appears worse. Additional
+    depredations both on east and west coast. Smith-Bell closing
+    out. [445] Reliable American residing in Wright says that during
+    week ending last Sunday thirteen families living along river
+    Nacbac, barrio of Tutubigan, said pueblo, kidnapped by brigands
+    and carried off to hills. This means some sixty people having
+    farms along river, rice ready to be harvested. Seven of the eleven
+    barrios of Wright have been burned.
+
+            Blount.
+
+
+When I sent that telegram of October 26th, the situation in the pueblo
+of Wright was typical of the reign of terror throughout the island.
+Wright could have been reached by the 18th Infantry (then over at
+Tacloban, in Leyte), and garrisoned on eight hours' notice. But I had
+little hope that the telegram would stir the 18th. The best man I had
+ever personally known well in high station was at the head of the
+government of the Islands, and as he was my friend, I sat down to
+think the situation out, determined, with the prejudice which is the
+privilege of friendship, to analyze his apparent apathy, and to
+conjecture how many times thirteen families "having farms along river,
+rice ready to be harvested" would have to be carried off to the hills
+by the brigands in order to move the 18th Infantry before the
+presidential election. Then I wondered just how many seconds it
+would have taken a British governor-general, backed by unanimous
+home sentiment concerning the wisdom of having colonies, to have
+acted, had a great British colonial mercantile house like Smith,
+Bell & Co. appealed to him for protection of its interests. And that
+brought me, there on "the tie-ribs of earth," as Kipling would phrase
+it, to the fundamentals of the problem. The British imperial idea of
+which Kipling is the voice and Benjamin Kidd the accompanist is based,
+superficially, upon a supposed necessity for the control of the tropics
+by non-tropical peoples, though fundamentally, it is an assertion of
+the right of any people to assume control of the land and destinies
+of another when they feel sure they can govern that other better than
+that other can govern itself. Is this proposition tenable, and if so,
+within what limits? Is it tenable to the point of total elimination of
+the people sought to be improved? If not, then how far? How far is
+incidental sacrifice of human life negligible in the working out of
+the broader problem of "the greatest good of the greatest number?" In
+his article in the North American Review for December, 1907, Governor
+Ide makes exhaustive answer to "the doctors who for some months past,
+in the columns of the North American Review and elsewhere, have
+published prescriptions for curing the ills of the Filipino people,"
+including Senator Francis G. Newlands, Hon. William J. Bryan, and the
+writer. In the course of disposing of the quack last mentioned,
+Governor Ide gets on rather a high horse, asking, with much dignified
+indignation, "How many people in the United States would have known or
+cared whether the army was or was not ordered out in Samar in 1904?"
+I concede that the solicitude was a super-solicitude, as do the Harvey
+letters, but like them, I must recognize its reality. However, when
+Governor Ide reaches this rhapsody of conscious virtue: "It is
+inconceivable that the Commission could have been animated by the
+base and ignoble partisan prejudices thus charged against them,"
+capping his climax by triumphantly pointing out that "Governor-General
+Wright was a life-long Democrat," he doth protest too much. For the
+angelic pinions he thus attaches to himself are at once rudely snapped
+by the reflection that a very short while after his article came out
+in the North American Review Governor Wright became Secretary of War
+in President Roosevelt's Cabinet, and a little later took the stump
+for Taft and Sherman, in 1908. Governor Wright did not stoop to deny
+or extenuate his share in the matter, and I honor him for it. [446]
+But to stick to your own crowd and then deny afterwards that you did
+so--that is another story. However, let us brush aside such petty
+attempts to cloud the real issue, which is: How many people would
+Governor Wright and Vice-Governor Ide have permitted to be massacred
+by the Pulajans in Samar in 1904 before they would have ordered out
+the military prior to the presidential election? Let us consider the
+case, not with a view of clouding the issue, but of clearing it. The
+truth is, Governor Wright was very gravely concerned about the Samar
+situation from August to November, 1904. Of course it is due to him
+to make perfectly clear that he did not realize the gravity of that
+situation as vividly as those of us who were on the ground in Samar,
+four or five hundred miles away. But the information hereinbefore
+reviewed, conveyed to him by the Provincial Governor, by Mr. Harvey,
+the Assistant Attorney General sent to Samar for the express purpose
+of getting the Manila government in possession of the exact situation,
+and by myself, was certainly sufficient to make him "chargeable with
+notice" of all that happened thereafter, certainly chargeable with
+knowledge of all that had happened theretofore. Of course there
+was General Allen, the commander-in-chief of the constabulary, at
+Manila, presumably speaking well of his command--the right arm of
+the civil government--presumably giving industrious and tactful aid
+and comfort to the idea that the authorities could afford to worry
+along with the constabulary alone until after the presidential
+election. But that could not discount the actual facts reported
+from the afflicted province by the officials on the ground. General
+Allen, it should be noted, remained in Manila all this time. So that
+any Otis-like "situation-well-in-hand" bouquets he may have thrown
+at his subordinates in Samar, and the situation there generally,
+were mere political hothouse products, surer to be recognized as
+such by the shrewd kindliness of the truly considerable man at the
+head of the government than by most any one else he could hand them
+out to. That man knew, to all intents and purposes, in the great and
+noble heart of him, what was really going on in Samar. He knew that
+massacres had been occurring, and that they were likely to keep on
+occurring. In other words, he knew that preventable sacrifice of life
+of defenceless people was going on, and that he could put a stop to it
+any time he saw fit. The question he had to wrestle with was, should he
+stop it, knowing the "Hell fer Sartin" the Democratic orators in the
+United States would at once luridly describe as "broke loose" in the
+Philippines? I insist that there is no use for any holier-than-thou
+gentleman to become suffused with any glow of indignant conscious
+rectitude based on the premises we are considering. Better to look
+a little deeper, on the idea that you are observing your republic in
+flagrante colonizatione, with as good a man as you ever have had, or
+ever will have, among you, as the principal actor. Governor Wright's
+course was entirely right, if the Philippine policy was right. If his
+course was not right, it was not right because the Philippine policy
+is fundamentally wrong. Governor Wright of course believed that the
+Philippine policy was right. I myself did not come finally to believe
+it was wrong until it was revealed in all its rawness by the period now
+under discussion. Of course the Governor did not vividly realize that
+the American women in Catbalogan were not entirely safe. If he had,
+he would have rushed the troops there, politics or no politics. But
+native life was politically negligible. What difference would a few
+score, or even a few hundred, natives of Samar make, compared with
+that pandemonium of anarchy and bloodshed all over the archipelago
+which Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide had long been insisting would
+follow Philippine independence? Was the whole future of 8,000,000 of
+people to be jeopardized to save a few people in Samar? That was the
+moral question before the insular government, in its last analysis. And
+the government faced the proposition squarely, and answered it "No."
+
+I will go farther than this. If I had believed, with Messrs. Taft,
+Wright, and Ide, that Philippine independence meant anarchy in the
+Islands, and the orthodox "bloody welter of chaos," I too might have
+hesitated to order out the troops on the eve of the election, and
+my hesitation, like theirs, might have continued until the election
+was safely over. So might yours, reader. Don't be so certain you
+would not. Practically absolute power, sure of its own benevolence,
+has temptations to withhold its confidence from the people that you
+wot not of. Don't condemn Governor Wright. Condemn the policy, and
+change your republic back to the course set by its founders. Give
+the Philippine people the independence they of right ought to have,
+instead of secretly hoping to unload them on somebody else, through
+the medium of your next great war.
+
+The question of whether the troops should have been ordered out
+or not at the time above dealt with is by no means without two
+sides. On the "bloody welter" side, you have the well-known opinions
+of Messrs. Taft, Wright, and Ide. On the other side you have before
+you--for the moment--only my little opinion. So instead of having in
+Governor Wright a Bluebeard, you simply have a man of great personal
+probity and unflinching moral courage, following his convictions to
+their ultimate logical conclusion without shadow of turning, in the
+act of colonization. In other words, Mr. American, you see yourself,
+as others see you. So face the music and look at yourself. In your
+colony business, you are a house divided against itself, which
+cannot stand. On the other hand, I knew the Filipino people far more
+intimately than either Mr. Taft, Governor Wright, or Judge Ide. I spoke
+their language--which they did not. I had met them both in peace and
+in war--which they had not. I had held court for months at a time in
+various provinces of the archipelago from extreme northern Luzon to
+Mindanao--which they had not. I had met the Filipinos in their homes
+for years on terms of free and informal intercourse impracticable
+for any governor-general. It was therefore perfectly natural that I
+should know them better than any of these eminent gentlemen. I was
+not prepared to be in a hurry about recommending myself out of office
+by assenting that our guardianship over the Filipinos should at once
+be terminated, but I knew there was nothing to the "bloody welter"
+proposition. The home life of the Filipino is too altogether a model
+of freedom from discord, pervaded as it is by parental, filial, and
+fraternal love, and their patriotism is too universal and genuine,
+to give the "bloody welter" bugaboo any standing in court.
+
+But whosoever questions for one moment Governor Wright's high personal
+character, simply does not know the man. To do so, moreover, would
+fatally cloud the issue I have sought to make clear between his
+view of the duty of our government and my own. In his moods that
+reminded one of Lincoln, Governor Wright used to say: "Don't shoot
+the organist, he's doing the best he can." It is true that his
+answer to Judge Parker was not a full and frank statement of the
+case. But did it lie in American human nature, when your antagonist
+was recklessly over-stating the case in the heat of debate on the
+eve of a presidential election, to take him into your confidence
+and tell him all you knew, in simple trusting faith that he would
+thereafter quit exaggerating? To permit the dispute to boil down to
+the real issue, viz., how many lives it was permissible to abandon on
+the "greatest good to the greatest number" theory, would obviously
+jeopardize the existence of a government which the Governor of the
+Philippines naturally believed to be better for all concerned than
+any other. And there is your cul-de-sac. Hinc illae lachrymae.
+
+We can point with pride to many things we have done in the
+Philippines, the public improvements, [447] the school system, the
+better sanitation, and a long list of other benefits conferred. But in
+the greatest thing we have done for them, we have builded wiser than
+we knew. "God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform." In
+fourteen years we have welded the Filipinos into one homogeneous
+political unit. In a most charming book, entitled An Englishwoman in
+the Philippines, [448] we can see our attempts to fit government by
+two political parties into over-seas colonization caricatured without
+sting until we really remind ourselves of a hippopotamus caressing a
+squirrel. In one passage the British sister describes our programme
+as one "to educate the Filipino for all he is worth, so that he may,
+in the course of time, be fit to govern himself according to American
+methods; but at the same time they have plenty of soldiers to knock
+him on the head if he shows signs of wanting his liberty before the
+Americans think he is fit for it"--"A quaint scheme," she naively adds,
+"and one full of the go-ahead originality of America."
+
+The more we teach the Filipinos, the more intimately they will become
+acquainted, in their own way, with the history of the relations
+between our country and theirs from the beginning, including the
+taxation without representation, through Congressional legislation
+(hereinafter noticed) placed or kept on our statute-books by the hemp
+trust and other special interests in the United States. And they will
+learn all these things in the midst of a "growing gulf between the
+two peoples." [449]
+
+In fourteen years we have made these unwilling subjects, whom we
+neither want nor need any more than they want or need us, a unit; a
+unit for Home Rule in preference to alien domination, it is true; but,
+nevertheless, a patriotic unit--one people--a potential body politic
+which can take a modest, but self-respecting place in the concert of
+free nations, with only a little more additional help from us.
+
+In the handling of an insurrection in any given province with
+courts and constabulary during the first four or five years after
+the Taft government of the Philippines was founded, the function of
+a representative of the office of the Attorney-General, coming from
+Manila to help the local prosecuting attorney handle a large docket
+and a crowded jail, was by no means remotely analogous to that of a
+grand jury. He originated prosecutions, found "No Bill," etc. When
+Mr. Harvey came to Samar, he came direct to the court room, and I
+suspended the trial of the pending case, and, after greeting him,
+began an informal talk which was akin to the nature of a charge to
+a grand jury, putting him in possession of the general aspects of
+the uprising. He was a very just and kindly man, and entered into
+the spirit of the task. I elaborated on the class of cases where
+the defendant claimed, as most of them did, "Yes, I joined the band
+of brigands, but I was made to do so." It was also indictable to
+furnish supplies to the public enemy. This presented the class of
+cases where the brigands would swoop down on a town and demand rice,
+and not getting it, would sometimes kill the persons refusing it,
+and so intimidate the rest into finding rice for them. Also there was
+the class of cases where a man would claim to have been one of the
+inhabitants of an unprotected town who had gone off to the hills in a
+body, for safety, to propitiate the mountain people by becoming part of
+them. This sort of thing at one time threatened to become epidemic with
+all the coast towns. It did not, however. A modus vivendi of some sort,
+sometimes express, sometimes merely tacit, would be arranged between
+the coast people and the hill people. These modus vivendi arrangements
+enabled the coast people to obtain a certain degree of safety, in
+lieu of that we should have secured them but did not, by making the
+hill folk believe that the coast men were against us and for them. At
+one time the prosecuting attorney got hold of evidence sufficient to
+authorize the issuance of a warrant for the Presidente of Balangiga,
+the man supposed to have engineered the massacre of the 9th Infantry
+in September 1901. I authorized the issuance of the warrant for his
+arrest. But the native governor of the province, and also Major Dade,
+the American regular officer commanding the constabulary, satisfied me
+that we did not have force sufficient to protect Balangiga from the
+Pulajans, if we arrested the presidente, who, being persona grata to
+the Pulajans, was able to keep them from descending on his town. To
+arrest him would therefore mean, in their opinion, that the people
+of Balangiga would take to the hills for protection, and join the
+hill folk, or Pulajans, and if a town as large as Balangiga set any
+such example all the coast towns might follow it. So the supposed
+perpetrator of the 9th Infantry massacre was allowed to remain
+unmolested. The American court was impotent to enforce its processes.
+
+In my mass of Philippine papers there is one containing a copy of my
+remarks to the Assistant Attorney-General on his arrival at Catbalogan,
+above referred to as analogous to a charge to a grand jury at home. It
+is dated Catbalogan, Samar, September 28, 1904, and is headed:
+"Remarks by the court upon the occasion of the arrival of Assistant
+Attorney-General Harvey, with regard to the recent disturbances in
+Samar, and the cases for brigandage and sedition growing out of the
+same." Certain parts of this contemporary document will doubtless
+give the reader a more vivid apprehension of the then situation than
+he can get from mere subsequent description. Of course the visiting
+representative of the Attorney-General's office was familiar in a
+general way with the manner of the handling of the Albay insurrection
+in the previous year, described in the chapter preceding this. In
+discussing the Samar situation the "remarks" of the court contain,
+among other things, this passage:
+
+
+    In the cases growing out of the Albay disturbances there were
+    a great many people who strayed out to the mountains just like
+    cattle. They did not know why or whither they went. As to those
+    persons, Judge Carson, Mr. Ross, and myself were unanimous in the
+    opinion that some of them could be indicted under the vagrancy
+    law. There were others of a greater degree of guilt, but who did
+    not appear to have been what you might call ordinary thieves,
+    and we were all agreed to indict those under the sedition law,
+    the limit of which is ten years and ten thousand dollars. Thus you
+    do not force upon a Judge of First Instance the responsibility of
+    sentencing a man to twenty years of his life for a connection with
+    bandits which may be but little more than technical. Besides those
+    two classes, there were in Albay of course the bandits proper,
+    to whom the bandolerismo [brigandage] law was specially intended
+    to apply. There cannot be any doubt about the fact that this
+    bandolerismo law is one of the most stringent statutes that ever
+    was on the statute-books of any country. It is very far from the
+    purpose of this court to attempt to say what would be the wisest
+    legislation, or to say that this is not the very best legislation,
+    under the circumstances. How we administer the several laws
+    alluded to governing public order, will settle whether or not
+    substantial justice is done.
+
+
+The men in the United States who in those days were slinging mud at
+the Philippine trial judges as being "subservient," wholly missed
+the core of the whole matter. In the provinces where so many heavy
+sentences were imposed, the real situation was that a state of war
+existed, and the judges believed, and I think correctly, that they were
+practically a military commission of one, and much more able to give
+a prisoner a square deal, tempering justice with mercy, than officers
+briefly gathered from the scenes of the fighting to act as a military
+commission. We tried those men with as little prejudice as if they had
+just come from the moon. Moreover, from the italicized concluding words
+of the above excerpt from my talk to the Assistant Attorney-General,
+it will be seen that the court had practically unlimited discretion
+in the matter of punishment, and was, in fact, about the only court
+of criminal equity in the annals of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
+
+In the last analysis, the righteousness or unrighteousness of a civil
+government in a country not yet entirely subjugated, depends on whether
+more innocent people suffer through completing the work of subjugation
+with constabulary whose "prisoners of war" are tried, to see what
+they may have done, if anything, by one-man courts, or whether more
+innocent people suffer through completing the work of subjugation as
+any other great power on earth but ourselves would have completed it,
+with an army, trying the prisoners by military commission. Unless you
+yourself were a traitor to your country, you considered as criminal
+attempts to subvert your government by cut-throats that no one of
+the respectable Filipinos, from Aguinaldo and Juan Cailles down,
+would have hesitated to have shot summarily. But you sought to
+make the punishment in each case fit the crime, by ascertaining
+as dispassionately as if the defendant were fresh from the moon,
+just what each accused man had himself done. Either Aguinaldo, or
+an American military commission would have had such people shot in
+bunches, as not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. The trouble
+with the civil government did not lie in its judiciary, but in its
+constabulary. It was the physical handling of the crowds of prisoners
+by the constabulary, and their failure, because not numerous enough,
+to protect peaceably inclined people, which made it a fact that turning
+the situation over to the military would have meant less sacrifice of
+the innocent along with the guilty. It is much more merciful to kill
+a few hundred people, as a lesson to the rest, and let the rest go,
+with the clear understanding that if they insurrect again you will
+promptly kill a few hundred more, than to permit a reign of terror
+from one month to another and from one year to another, with all the
+untilled fields, famine, pestilence, and other disease this involves,
+merely in order to be able to invoke the blessing of the Doctor Lyman
+Abbots of the world on a supposedly benign "civil" government.
+
+In all my sentences, and in all his indictments, Mr. Harvey and the
+writer sailed close to the wind, by holding only those responsible
+who had taken active parts in the sacking and burning of villages and
+the massacre of their inhabitants. I knew that sooner or later some
+officious prosecuting attorney of less noble mould than Harvey would
+ask me to convict some poor creature of brigandage for giving a little
+rice to the brigands, and my mind was made up to refuse to do so,
+and in so refusing to commit heresy once and for all by expressing my
+sentiments, in the decision, concerning the failure to give adequate
+protection to defenceless people, along the lines indicated in this
+chapter. No such case was in fact presented. I broke down under the
+strain of graver cases early in November and left Samar forever,
+bound for Manila.
+
+Before I left, the whole island was seething with sedition. I was
+told by a credible American that the chief deputy sheriff of the
+court, an ex-insurgent officer, one of the "peace-at-any-price"
+policy appointees, had remarked among some of his own people where he
+did not expect the remark to be repeated: "I see no use persecuting
+our brethren in the hills." The municipal officials of the provincial
+capital, Catbalogan, were suspected by the native provincial governor,
+and the latter in turn was suspected by the Manila government. In
+fact the whole political atmosphere of the island had become full of
+rumor and suspicion as to who was for the government, and who was
+against the government. I left Samar, November 8th, which was the
+day of the presidential election of 1904, determined to try no more
+insurrections. By that time nearly everybody in the island was more
+or less guilty of sedition, and I did not know the method of drawing
+an indictment against a whole people.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX
+
+GOVERNOR WRIGHT--1905
+
+        My heart is heavy with the fate of that unhappy people.
+
+                       Speech of Hon. A. O. Bacon in U. S. Senate. [450]
+
+
+Because the especially cordial relations which existed to the last
+between Governor Wright and myself [451] are familiar to a number of
+very dear mutual friends, I deem it due both to them and to myself,
+in view of the contents of the preceding chapter, to state that I
+see no reason why, in writing a history of the American Occupation
+of the Philippines, I should omit or slur the facts which convinced
+me that that occupation ought to terminate as soon as practicable,
+and that any decent kind of a government of Filipinos by Filipinos
+would be better for all concerned than the McKinley-Taft programme of
+Benevolent Assimilation whereof Governor Wright was the legatee. By the
+thousand and one uncandid threads of that programme, slowly woven from
+1898 to 1904, as indicated in the first sixteen chapters of this book,
+Governor Wright had found himself as hopelessly bound to concealment
+from the American people of the real situation in Samar in the fall
+of 1904, as a Gulliver in Lilliput.
+
+When I finally left Samar and came to Manila, in November, 1904, I
+was not prepared to figure out how or how soon, the blunder we made
+by the purchase of the Philippine archipelago could be corrected. But
+my mental attitude toward the whole Philippine problem had undergone
+a complete change. In 1901 Governor Wright, then Vice-Governor, had
+written me: "You younger men out here, who have cast your fortunes with
+this country, are to be, in all likelihood, in the natural course of
+events, its future rulers." Up to 1903 I had clung to that idea with
+the devotion of what was really high and earnest purpose, untroubled
+with misgivings of any kind. In November, 1903, in Albay, Judge Carson
+and myself had talked over the long struggle of the civil government
+to walk without leaning on the military, and, with the readiness of one
+vested with authority to believe such authority wisely vested, and the
+readiness of a civilian lawyer to jealously guard the American home
+idea that the military should be subordinate to the civil authority,
+I had cordially agreed with a sentiment one day expressed by Judge
+Carson concerning Governor Taft about "the splendid moral fibre of
+the man," meaning in keeping the military from prancing out of the
+traces. After Governor Taft left the Islands to be Secretary of War
+(December 23, 1903), and while I was still in Albay, I had learned of
+the 120 men who had died in the Albay jail while awaiting trial, and
+thereafter something of the magnitude of the Ola insurrection there,
+and that had given me pause as to the practical benevolence of the
+operation of "a benign civil government." Then the Samar massacres
+of 1904, and the gory panorama I had there witnessed, had finally
+convinced me that a republic like ours is wholly unfitted to govern
+people against their consent. But I did not tell anybody in Manila
+all these things. I simply pondered them. Grover Cleveland was the
+only man in the world I would have liked to talk to just then freely
+and fully. And he was not about. "My heart was heavy with the fate
+of that unhappy people" as Senator Bacon had said in the Senate in
+1902, after visiting the Islands in 1901. I did not condemn Governor
+Wright. I quite realized that I was "up against" about the largest
+ethical problem of world politics, one on which the nations are much
+divided, and that I was not infallible. I did not say to the Governor:
+"Governor, let's resign and go home and tell our people that this whole
+business is a mistake." Nor did I ever lose faith in Governor Wright
+personally. If I had, I might just as well have said: "After this,
+the deluge." I would simply have lost faith in human nature. I had not
+then, nor have I since, known a man of higher personal character. I
+had simply lost faith in Benevolent Assimilation, and begun to take
+the Filipino people seriously as a potential nation, probably better
+able to handle their own domestic problems than we will ever be able
+to handle them for them.
+
+The day after I resigned, Mr. Justice Carson, of the Supreme Court,
+and Mr. Wilfley, the Attorney-General, came to call on me. My friends
+knew I was very much troubled over the Samar business. I was doing
+some grumbling, but without specifying, because to specify would mean
+that we all of us ought to give up the life careers we had planned for
+ourselves in the Islands. I knew the old familiar answer a grumbler
+was sure to get in the Philippines, viz., "Old man, you've been out
+here too long. You better go home." But I did a little more grumbling
+to my friends Judge Carson and Mr. Wilfley, during the course of their
+visit. They could both pretty well guess what was the matter. But Judge
+Carson and I had come out in 1899, and had served through the war
+together. He knew all about the Albay business, and somewhat of the
+Samar business. Wilfley had not come out until the civil government
+was founded in 1901. Mr. Wilfley said cheerily: "Oh, Blount, you are
+too conscientious." I shall never forget what happened then. Judge
+Carson said, with a ring of something like anger in his tone: "No,
+Wilfley, I'll be d--d if he is." Is it any wonder that ever since I
+have worn that man, as Hamlet would say, "in my heart's core"? Here was
+as brave and true an Irishman as ever gained distinction on battlefield
+or bench. And he understood. He did not say--which was the implication
+of Wilfley's tone--"Old man, you've been out here too long, and illness
+has made you peevish." He knew what was the matter. He knew that as
+trial judges he and I had not been small editions of Lord Jeffries,
+as some of our American critics had implied, BUT HE ALSO KNEW THAT
+THERE WAS NO METHOD OF DRAWING AN INDICTMENT AGAINST A WHOLE PEOPLE.
+
+Possibly the intensity of my feelings on this great subject, then
+and ever since, hampers the power of clear expression. Therefore,
+a word more in attempt at elucidation. In 1898, Judge Carson and I,
+with many thousands of other young Americans, had trooped down to
+Cuba, in the wake of the impetuous Roosevelt, to free the inhabitants
+of that ill-fated island from Spanish rule, drive the Spaniards from
+the Western Hemisphere, and put a stop to Spain's pious efforts "to
+spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence,"
+as she always expressed her attitude toward Cuba. We had many of us
+been fired by the catchy Roosevelt utterance which did so much to
+bring on the Spanish War, viz., "The steps of the White House are
+slippery with the blood of the Cuban reconcentrados." Then in 1899,
+we had gone to the Philippines, and had ever since been engaged there
+in "sparing the Islands from the danger of premature independence,"
+and the Samar massacres of 1904 were, to me, the apotheosis of the
+work. So that after November 8, 1904, I felt "The steps of the White
+House are slippery with the blood of the people of my district." It had
+all been done under the pious pretence that the Filipinos welcomed our
+rule--a pretence which had taken the form for six years of systematic
+asseveration that they did so welcome it. Yet it was not true that
+they, or any appreciable fraction of them, had ever welcomed our
+rule. And it never will be true. Surely no man can see in this book
+any scolding or unkindness. It is an attempt merely to bring home to
+my countrymen a strategic fact, a fact which it is folly to ignore. But
+to return to the thread of our story.
+
+Four days after the presidential election of 1904, to wit, on November
+12th, Governor Wright left Manila and went to Samar, including in
+his itinerary various others of the southern islands. [452] Soon
+after their return, the seven hundred native troops in Samar were
+increased to nearly two thousand, and sixteen companies of regulars
+(say one hundred men to a company) were also thrown into Samar. It
+took until the end of 1906 to end the trouble. You cannot find in the
+reports of the civil authorities anything explaining their three or
+four weeks' stay in the Visayan Islands in November-December, 1904,
+that is not absolutely in accord with the original Taft obsession of
+1900 about the popularity of the proposed alien "civil" government with
+its subjects. Governor Wright's description of the trip says: "The
+warm hospitality of the Filipino people made this trip of inspection
+a most agreeable one." As a matter of fact, on such occasions, the
+more disaffected a leader of the people was, the more he would seek,
+by "warm hospitality," "warm" oratory telling the visiting mighty
+what the visiting mighty longed to hear, parades, fiestas, etc.,
+to divert suspicion of sedition from himself. The poor creatures
+had met General Young's cavalry column in northern Luzon in 1899
+with their town bands, doing the only thing they knew of to do to
+"temper the wind to the shorn lamb"--i.e., to temper it to their
+several communities--many of them doubtless expecting to be put
+to the sword by General Young's troopers, as the Cossacks did the
+Persians during the brief and sensational sojourn of that brilliant
+young administrator, Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, in Persia in 1911-12. I
+have no doubt that high on the list of those extending some of the
+"warm hospitality" above mentioned appeared the name of Don Jaime de
+Veyra. Yet in the summer of 1904 Don Jaime had gotten out of a sick
+bed to attend a convention called to send delegates to the Democratic
+National Convention in the United States that year, [453] and also,
+in that same year, had run for Governor of Leyte on a platform
+the principal plank of which was Carthago est delenda--"Carthago"
+being us, the American regime. De Veyra was defeated that time,
+but ran again the next time and was elected. While the writer is not
+one of those who seek to show their "breadth of view" by gossiping
+with outsiders regarding what is peculiarly our own affair, still,
+the British view-point of the situation in the Visayan Islands, as
+conveyed by an Englishwoman whose husband was engaged in mercantile
+business there in 1904-5, and who therefore was certainly in a position
+to know the opinion of the little circle of British people at Cebu and
+Iloilo, may not be superfluous here. This lady, living then at Iloilo,
+wrote a series of letters to friends back home in England which she
+afterwards published in book form. [454] In a letter dated Iloilo,
+January 22, 1905 (page 86), she says:
+
+
+    The Americans give out and write in their papers that the
+    Philippine Islands are completely pacified, and that the Filipinos
+    love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives,
+    is complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed
+    with insurrection and plots; the fighting has never ceased; and
+    the natives loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so
+    openly in their native press and showing their dislike in every
+    possible fashion. Their one idea is to be rid of the U. S. A.
+    * * * and to be free of a burden of taxation which is heavier than
+    any the Spaniards laid on them.
+
+
+Also an Englishman who was in Samar in 1904-5, a Mr. Hyatt, who,
+with his brother, served with the American troops there in the bloody
+Pulajan uprising, afterwards wrote a book called the Little Brown
+Brother, wherein he fully corroborates Mrs. Dauncey's appreciation
+of the situation during that period.
+
+In its blindness to the unanimity of Visayan discontent, as manifested
+in its report now under consideration, the civil government of
+the Philippines was not trying wilfully to deceive anybody. It was
+deceiving itself. It was obeying the law of its life, its existence
+having been originally predicated on the consent of a great free
+people to keep in subjection a weaker people eager to be also free,
+such consent having been obtained through diligent nursing of the
+original idea that the subject people were not in fact so eager, but
+were, on the contrary, in a mental attitude of tearful welcome toward
+the proffered protection of a strong power. In his report for 1905
+[455] General William H. Carter, commanding the Department of the
+Philippines which included Samar and the rest of the Visayan Islands,
+gives the key to the Commission's twenty-six-day stay in his district
+in the following part of said report:
+
+
+    Within a few days after the rendition of the annual report for
+    last year [456] a serious outbreak occurred in the Gandara valley,
+    Samar. This was followed by disorders in all the other large
+    islands of the department, Negros, Panay, Cebu, and Leyte.
+
+
+Nowhere in the civil government reports do you find the slightest
+recognition that these disorders had any relation to each other, or to
+the fundamental problem of public order, or any political significance
+whatsoever, each being treated as a purely local issue, the idea that
+the circumstance of Samar's having been thrown into pandemonium by
+the successes of the enemies of the American Government might have
+encouraged its enemies in the neighboring islands, never seeming to
+occur to the authors of the said reports. General Carter's report goes
+on to state that within five months after the Samar outbreak of July,
+1904, seven hundred native troops had been put in the field in that
+turbulent island. In December, 1904, troops began to be poured into
+Samar, so that it was not long before the seven hundred native troops
+had become seventeen hundred or eighteen hundred, and, says General
+Carter, "in order to free them from garrison work in the towns, sixteen
+companies of the 12th and 14th Infantry were distributed about the
+disaffected coasts to enable the people who so desired to come from
+their hiding places"--whither they had gone because the American flag
+afforded them no protection--"and undertake the rebuilding of their
+burned homes." General Carter avoids touching on the civil government's
+(to him well-known) obsession about its popularity, a state of mind
+which could see no "political" significance in outbreaks of any
+kind. But he does use this very straightforward language about Samar:
+
+
+    Whatever may have been the original cause of the outbreak, it was
+    soon lost sight of when success had drawn a large proportion of
+    the people away from their homes and fields. * * * Except in the
+    largest towns it became simply a question of joining the Pulajans
+    or being harried by them. In the absence of proper protection
+    thousands joined in the movement.
+
+
+Early in 1905, Hon. George Curry, of New Mexico, who was an officer
+of Colonel Roosevelt's regiment in Cuba, and had gone out to the
+Philippines with a volunteer regiment in 1899, remaining with the
+civil Government after 1901, was made Governor of Samar. Governor
+Curry has since been Governor of the Territory of New Mexico,
+and is now (1912) a member of Congress from the recently admitted
+State of New Mexico. Governor Curry has told me since he was
+elected to Congress that it took him all of 1905 and most of
+1906, aided by several thousand troops, native and regular, to
+put down that Samar outbreak. Yet a certificate signed March 28,
+1907, by the Governor-General and his associates of the Philippine
+Commission states that "a condition of general and complete peace"
+had continued in the Islands for two years previous to the date
+of the certificate. [457] We will come to this certificate in its
+chronological order later. How many and what sort of uprisings were
+blanketed in that "forget-it" certificate of 1907 is material to the
+question whether or not the National Administration has ever been or
+is now frank with the country about the universality of the desire of
+the Philippine people for independence and local self-government, and
+pertinent to the insistently recurring query: "Why should we make of
+the Philippines an American Ireland?" But inasmuch as, in addition to
+the Samar uprising which raged all through 1905, another insurrection
+occurred in that year, which was duly "forgotten" by said certificate,
+this last movement must now claim our attention.
+
+The provinces which were the theatre of the outbreak last above
+mentioned were all near Manila. They were: Cavite, a province of
+135,000 people almost at the gates of Manila; Batangas, a province of
+257,000 inhabitants adjoining Cavite; and Laguna, a province of 150,000
+people adjoining both. Some five hundred brigands headed by cut-throats
+claiming to be patriots were terrorizing whole districts. Far be it
+from me to lend any countenance to the idea that the leaders of this
+movement, Sakay, Felizardo, Montalon, and the rest of their gang,
+were entitled to any respect. But they certainly had a hold on
+the whole population akin to that of Robin Hood, Little John, and
+Friar Tuck. In refusing in 1907 to commute Sakay's death sentence
+after he was captured, tried, and convicted, Governor-General James
+P. Smith gives some gruesome details concerning the performance of
+that worthy, and his followers, yet in dealing with the nature and
+extent of the trouble they gave the Manila government he says they
+"assumed the convenient cloak of patriotism, and under the titles of
+'Defenders of the Country' and 'Protectors of the People' proceeded
+to inaugurate a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of
+the most beautiful provinces in the archipelago." [458]
+
+It has already been made clear that, during the time of the
+insurrection against both the Spaniards and Americans, the insurrecto
+forces were maintained by voluntary contributions of the people. Major
+D. C. Shanks, Fourth U. S. Regular Infantry, who was Governor of Cavite
+Province in 1905, after calling attention to this fact, adds [459]:
+
+
+    When the insurrection was over a number of these leaders remained
+    out and refused to surrender. Included among them were Felizardo
+    and Montalon. The system of voluntary contributions, carried on
+    during the insurrecto period, was continued after establishment
+    of civil government.
+
+
+Again Governor Shanks says, with more of frankness than diplomacy,
+considering that he was a provincial governor under the civil
+government:
+
+
+    The establishment of civil government of this province was
+    premature and ill-advised. Records show the capture or surrender
+    since establishment of civil government of nearly 600 hostile
+    firearms.
+
+
+One of the causes contributory to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna
+insurrection is stated in the report of the Governor-General for
+1905 thus:
+
+
+    In the autumn of 1904 it became necessary to withdraw a number
+    of the constabulary from these provinces to assist in suppressing
+    disorder which had broken out in the province of Samar. [460]
+
+
+Another of the contributory causes is thus stated:
+
+
+    There was at the time [the fall of 1904] also considerable activity
+    among the small group of irreconcilables in Manila, who began
+    agitating for immediate independence, doubtless because of the
+    supposed effect it would have on the presidential election in
+    the United States, in which the Philippines was a large topic
+    of discussion. Evidently this was regarded as a favorable time
+    for a demonstration by Felizardo, Montalon, De Vega, Oruga, Sakay
+    [etc]. All these men had been officers of the Filipino army during
+    the insurrection.
+
+
+Consider the benevolent casuistry necessary to include these fellows,
+and the tremendous following they could get up, and did get up, in
+Cavite, "the home of insurrection," and the adjacent provinces, in a
+certificate to "a condition of general and complete peace" alleged
+in the certificate to have prevailed for two years prior to March
+28, 1907. To make a long story short, on January 31, 1905, a state
+of insurrection was declared to exist, the writ of habeas corpus was
+suspended in Cavite and Batangas, the regular army of the United States
+was ordered out, and reconcentration tactics resorted to, as provided
+by Section 6 of Act 781 of the Commission. This is the act already
+examined at length, intended to meet cases of impotency on the part
+of the insular government to protect life and property in any other
+way. Political timidity is conspicuously absent from the resolution of
+the Philippine Commission of January 31, 1905, formally recognizing
+a break in the peerless continuity of the "general and complete
+peace." It is virilely frank, the presidential election being then
+safely over. [461] It concludes by authorizing the Governor-General
+to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law, "the
+public safety requiring it." Then follows a proclamation of the same
+date and tenor, by the Governor-General.
+
+It appears from the case cited in the foot-note that in the spring of
+1905, one, Felix Barcelon, filed in the proper court a petition for the
+writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was one of the reconcentrados
+corralled and "detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of
+Batangas, in the province of Batangas," by one of Colonel Baker's
+constabulary minions down there. The writ was denied by the lower
+court. In one part of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case it
+is stated (p. 116) that the petitioner "has been detained for a long
+time * * * not for the commission of any crime and by due process of
+law, but apparently for the purpose of protecting him." The opinion of
+the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, very properly held that
+the detention was lawful under the war power, basing its decision on
+the authority conferred on the Governor-General of the Philippines
+by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5 of which expressly
+authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus "when in
+cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may
+require it." A long legal battle was fought, the court holding that the
+Executive Department of the Government is the one in which is vested
+the exclusive right to say when "a state of rebellion, insurrection,
+or invasion" exists, and that when it so formally declares, that
+settles the fact that it does exist. At page 98 of the volume above
+cited [462] the court held, as to the above mentioned resolution of
+the Philippine Commission and the above mentioned executive order
+declaring a state of insurrection in Cavite and Batangas:
+
+
+    The conclusion set forth in the said resolution and the said
+    executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the provinces
+    of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the constituted
+    authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of
+    the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after
+    an investigation of the facts.
+
+
+Yet two years later the same "constituted authorities" certified to
+the President of the United States, in effect, as we shall see, that
+no open insurrection against the constituted authorities had occurred
+during the preceding two years. They do not in their certificate
+ignore Cavite and Batangas. They mention them by name, with a lot
+of whereases, explaining that after all they really believe that the
+majority of the people in the provinces aforesaid were not in sympathy
+with the uprising. However, after they get through with their whereases
+they face the music squarely, and certify to "the condition of general
+and complete peace." Of the "nigger in the woodpile" more anon.
+
+Governor Wright was not a party to the certificate of 1907. He
+left the Islands on leave November 4, 1905. A speech made by him
+prior to his departure, as published in a Manila paper, indicates
+an expectation to return. He never did. In 1906 he was demoted to be
+Ambassador to Japan, a place of far less dignity, and far less salary,
+which he resigned after a year or so. Vice-Governor Ide acted as
+Governor-General until April 2, 1906, on which date he was formally
+inaugurated as Governor-General.
+
+Just why Governor Wright did not go back to the Philippines as
+Governor, after his visit to the United States in 1905-6, does
+not appear. It would seem almost certain that if Secretary of War
+Taft had wanted President Roosevelt to send him back, he would have
+gone. Mr. Taft never did frankly tell the Filipinos until 1907 that
+they might just as well shut up talking about any independence that
+anybody living might hope to see. Governor Wright began to talk that
+way soon after Mr. Taft left the Islands. Possibly Governor Wright
+undeceived them too soon, and thereby made the Philippines more of
+a troublesome issue in the presidential campaign of 1904. President
+Roosevelt recognized the sterling worth of the man, by inviting
+him to succeed Mr. Taft as Secretary of War in 1908. But President
+Taft did not invite him to continue in that capacity after March 4,
+1909. Gossip has it that when the incoming President Taft's letter
+to the outgoing President Roosevelt's last Secretary of War, Governor
+Wright, was handed to the addressee, and its conventional "hope to be
+able to avail myself of your services later in some other capacity"
+was read by him, the outgoing official quietly remarked: "Well, that
+is a little more round-about than the one Jimmie Garfield [463] got,
+but it's a dismissal just the same."
+
+I have always thought that the reason Governor Wright did not go back
+to the Philippines as Governor after 1905 was that he did not continue
+to "jolly" the Filipinos, and abstain from ruthlessly crushing their
+hopes of seeing independence during their lifetime, as Mr. Taft did
+continuously during his stay out there. The inevitable tendency of
+the Wright frank talk was from the beginning to discredit the Taft
+pleasing and evasive nothings. Also, it was followed, as we have seen,
+by quite a crop of serious disturbances of public order, and somebody
+had to be "the goat."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX
+
+GOVERNOR IDE--1906
+
+                                The Tariff is a local issue.
+
+                                                  General W. S. Hancock.
+
+
+After Governor Wright left the Islands finally on November 4, 1905,
+Vice-Governor Henry C. Ide acted as Governor-General until April 2,
+1906, when he was duly inaugurated as such. He resigned and left the
+Islands finally in September thereafter.
+
+All through 1905, Governor Curry, as Governor of Samar, which is the
+third largest island of the archipelago, wrestled with the Pulajan
+uprising there, aided, as has been stated in the previous chapter,
+by the native troops, scouts, and constabulary, and also by the
+regular army. But at the end of 1905 "the situation" was not yet
+"well in hand." Since his election to Congress in 1912, Governor
+Curry has told me that in 1905 many thousands of people of Samar
+participated actively as part of the enemy's force in the field during
+that period. By the spring of 1906 Governor Curry was getting a grip
+on the situation, and in the latter part of March of that year, some
+of the main outlaw chiefs agreed to surrender to him. The report of
+Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, commanding the constabulary of the Third
+District, which included Samar states [464]: "After several weeks of
+negotiating, during which time the camp of the Pulahanes was visited
+by Governor Curry, and the Pulahan officers visited the settlement
+at Magtaon"--a settlement in south central Samar--"an understanding
+was arrived at by which the Pulahanes were to surrender, March 24,
+1906. Instead of surrendering as agreed, the Pulahanes, commanded by
+Nasario Aguilar, made a treacherous attack on the constabulary garrison
+on the day and hour appointed for the surrender." The constabulary
+numbered some fifty men, the pulajans about 130. After the pulajans
+opened fire they made a rush on the constabulary and a hand-to-hand
+fight ensued. Colonel Taylor's report continues:
+
+
+    After the first rush the fighting continued fiercely, and when
+    the last of the pulahanes disappeared there remained but seven
+    enlisted men of the constabulary able to fight. Seven more were
+    lying about more or less seriously wounded and twenty-two were
+    dead. Captain Jones received a bad spear thrust in the chest early
+    in the fight, but fought on, regardless. Lieutenant Bowers received
+    a gunshot wound through the left arm, which, however, did not put
+    him out of the fight. Thirty-five dead pulahanes were found on the
+    field and eight more have since been found some distance off. The
+    number of wounded who escaped cannot be determined. The unarmed
+    Americans present with Governor Curry escaped to the river and
+    afterwards rejoined Captain Jones who armed them.
+
+
+The explanation of this treachery, as given by Governor Curry, is
+curious and interesting. The outlaws had intended in good faith to
+surrender as a result of his negotiation with them, but at the last
+moment there arrived to witness the surrender certain native officials
+and other natives bitterly hated by the Pulajans and wholly mistrusted
+by them. Their arrival caused the outlaws to suspect treachery
+themselves and that was the cause of their change of plans. It was not
+until the end of the year 1906 that the various energetic campaigns
+which followed the Magtaon incident finally began to work more or
+less complete restoration of public order by gradual elimination of
+the enemy through killings, captures, and surrenders. An idea of the
+seriousness and magnitude of these operations may be gathered without
+going into the details, from the annual report for 1906 of General
+Henry T. Allen commanding the Philippines Constabulary. This report,
+dated August 31, 1906 [465], states:
+
+
+    At present seventeen companies of scouts and four companies of
+    American troops under Colonel Smith, 8th U. S. Infantry, are
+    operating against the pulahanes, but with success that will be
+    largely dependent upon time and attrition.
+
+
+General Allen adds: "The entire 21st Regiment [of Infantry] is also in
+Samar." These facts are here given because they relate to the period
+covered by the certificate of the Philippine Commission of March 28,
+1907, heretofore alluded to, and which will be more fully dealt with
+hereinafter, which stated that "a condition of general and complete
+peace" had prevailed throughout the archipelago for two years prior
+to March 28, 1907. Without a brief exposition of all these matters,
+it would be impossible to enable the reader to feel the pulse of
+the Filipino people as it stood at the time of the election of their
+assembly in 1907. The fact of our having been unable to discontinue
+Filipino-killing altogether for any considerable period from 1899 to
+the end of 1906 is too obviously relevant to the state of the public
+mind in 1907 to need elaboration.
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 [466] deals at some
+length with disturbances which occurred in the island of Leyte (area
+3000 square miles, population nearly 400,000), beginning in the middle
+of June. It describes among other things a visit of Governor-General
+Ide to Tacloban, the capital of Leyte, made in consequence of said
+disturbances, and conferences held by him there with Major-General
+Wood, commanding all the United States forces in the Philippines,
+Brigadier-General Lee, commanding the Department of the Visayas (which
+included Leyte, headquarters, Iloilo), Colonel Borden, commanding
+the United States forces in the island of Leyte, Colonel Taylor, the
+chief of the constabulary of the District, etc. Certainly from this
+formidable gathering of notables, it is clear that there was about to
+take place in Leyte what our friends of the Lambs' Club in New York
+would call "An all star performance." Leyte was four to five hundred
+miles from Manila. Yet so serious was the disturbance that the highest
+military and civil representatives of the American Government in the
+archipelago deemed it necessary to meet in the island which was the
+scene of the trouble with a view of handling it. Yet in the Report of
+the Philippine Commission for 1906 one finds the usual rotund rhetoric
+treating the disturbances as of no "political" significance--which
+was only another way of claiming that they were not serious. It
+is difficult to handle this aspect of the matter without imputing
+to the civil authorities intent to deceive, but to leave such an
+imputation unremoved would be to miss the whole significance of the
+matter. As has already been made clear, when Judge Taft, Judge Ide,
+and their colleagues of the Philippine Commission had left Washington
+for Manila in 1900 Mr. McKinley had assured them he had no doubt that
+the better element of the Philippine people, once they understood us,
+would welcome our rule. As soon as they set foot in the Philippine
+Islands they had at once begun to act upon the theory that there was
+no real fundamental opposition to us on the part of the people of
+the Philippines and had continued obstinately to act upon that theory
+ever since. Certainly the attitude of the civil government toward the
+disturbances in Leyte in 1906 is not surprising when the mind adverts
+for a moment to the panorama of the five more or less sanguinary years
+already fully described hereinbefore and then takes the following
+bird's-eye glance at the official reports for those years.
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1900, (page 17) had said:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1901 (page 7) had said:
+
+
+    The collapse of the insurrection came in May.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1902 (page 3) had said:
+
+
+    The insurrection as an organized attempt to subvert the authority
+    of the United States in these islands is entirely at an end,
+
+
+referring farther on to "the whole Christian Philippine population"
+as "enjoying civil government." If the "enjoyment" thus described had
+been genuine, continued, profound, and sincere, it would have been
+another story. But the net attitude of the civil government toward
+the general health of the body politic, relatively to public order,
+reminds one of the cheerful gentleman who remarked of his invalid
+friend, "He seems to be 'enjoying' poor health."
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1903 (page 25) says:
+
+
+    The conditions with respect to tranquillity in the islands have
+    greatly improved during the last year.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1904 (page 1) says:
+
+
+    The great mass of the people, however, were domestic and peaceable.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905 (part 1, page 59)
+says:
+
+
+    On the whole life and property have been as safe as in other
+    civilized countries.
+
+
+The Report of the Philippine Commission for 1906 (page 40) says:
+
+
+    Viewing the entire situation the islands are in a peaceable and
+    orderly condition aside from----
+
+
+various disorders which fill some ten pages of the report.
+
+The inflexible attitude of the Commission from the beginning, of
+treating each successive disturbance of public order as a purely
+"local issue," after General Hancock's method with the tariff,
+is thus sufficiently apparent. They always refuse to see in
+successive outbreaks in various parts of the Islands any evidence
+of general and unanimous lack of appreciation for a benign alien
+civil government. Therefore it was of course clearly a foregone
+conclusion, in 1906, that Governor Ide, who had been in the Islands
+all these years, was going to be wholly unable to see anything in the
+disturbances in Leyte in the least tending to show that American rule
+was unpopular. And yet it was a matter of common knowledge all over
+the Visayan Islands that Jaime Veyra, then Governor of Leyte, elected
+by the people, was one of the most obnoxious anti-Americans in the
+archipelago. Both the army and constabulary were ordered out in Leyte
+and a good deal of fighting occurred before order was restored. The
+report of General Allen, commanding the constabulary for that year
+[467] shows one engagement with the outlaws in Leyte participated
+in by the constabulary and the 21st Regular Infantry, in which the
+enemy numbered 450 and left forty-nine dead upon the field. All
+this period is covered by the certificate of general and complete
+peace of 1907, in the fall of which year a Philippine legislature
+was elected. And those of the membership of that body not in favor
+of Philippine independence were almost as few as the Socialist party
+in the American House of Representatives, which, I believe, consists
+of Representative Berger. True, the peace certificate does not ignore
+the Leyte outbreak. It "forgets and forgives it," so to speak, as we
+shall see.
+
+Governor Ide left the Islands finally on September 20, 1906, having
+resigned. Why he should have resigned, it is difficult to say. Take
+it all in all, he made a splendid Governor-General, and ought to
+have been allowed to remain. He knew the Islands from Alpha to Omega
+and had been there six years. His going out of office to make way
+for still another Governor-General was wholly uncalled for. So far
+as the writer is informed, he was, when he left, still blessed with
+good health. He had filled a very considerable place in the history
+of his country most creditably. He had drawn up a fine code of laws
+for the Islands known as the Ide code. He had made a great minister of
+finance, successfully performing the perilous task of transferring the
+currency of the country from a silver basis to a gold basis, and in so
+doing had proven himself fully a match, in protecting the interests
+of the Government, for the wiley local financiers representing the
+Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the chartered bank of India, Australia,
+and China, and other institutions run by experienced men of more or
+less piratical tendencies. As Governor-General of the Islands, his
+justice, firmness, and courtliness of manner combined to produce an
+administration in keeping with the dignity of his great office. After
+returning to the United States, he remained in private life for a time,
+and was finally given a comparatively unimportant post as minister to
+a second-class country, Spain, which post he still occupies (in 1912).
+
+When, fresh from the memory of the Samar massacres of 1904, I landed
+at Seattle, at the end of my last homeward-bound journey across the
+Pacific, in April, 1905, one of the "natives" of Seattle asked me:
+"Have those people over there ever got quiet yet?" The question itself
+seemed an answer to the orthodox official attitude at Manila, which had
+so long been elaborately denying, as to each successive local outbreak,
+that such outbreak bore any relation to the original insurrection,
+or was any wise illustrative of the general state of public feeling
+in the Islands. At the time the question was asked, the answer was,
+"Not entirely." Not until toward the end of 1906 did "Yes" become
+a correct answer to the question. In other words, there were no
+more serious outbreaks after 1906, nor was a state of general and
+complete peace ever finally established until then. Since 1906 there
+have been occasional despatches from Manila recounting small episodes
+of bloodshed, several of which have had quite a martial ring. These
+have related merely to the country of the Mohammedan Moros, who are
+as wholly apart from the main problem as the American Indian to-day
+is from our tariff and other like questions. The Moros are indeed
+what Kipling calls "half savage and half child." They never did have
+anything more to do with the Filipino insurrection against us than
+the American Indian had to do with the Civil War.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI
+
+GOVERNOR SMITH--1907-9
+
+        Oh, but Honey, dis rabbit dess 'bleeged ter climb dis tree.
+
+                                                            Uncle Remus.
+
+
+"On September 20, 1906," says the Report of the Philippine Commission
+for 1907, [468] "the resignation of the Hon. Henry Clay Ide as
+Governor-General became effective, and on that date the Hon. James
+F. Smith was inaugurated as Governor-General of the Philippine
+Islands."
+
+The year 1907 will be known most prominently to the future history of
+our Far Eastern possession as the year of the opening of the Philippine
+Assembly, which momentous event occurred on October 16th. But in the
+departments both of Politics and Psychology it should be known as the
+year of the Great Certificate. The Great Certificate was a certificate
+signed by certain eminent gentlemen on March 28, 1907, which made the
+preposterous affirmation that a condition of general and complete
+peace had prevailed throughout the archipelago, except among the
+non-Christian tribes, for the two years immediately preceding. Taken
+in its historic setting, that certificate can by no possibility escape
+responsibility, as "accessory after the fact" at least, to the pretence
+that a similar condition had prevailed ever since President Roosevelt's
+final war-whoop of July 4, 1902, published to the American troops in
+the Islands on the day named. That war-whoop, it will be remembered,
+was in the form of a presidential proclamation congratulating General
+Chaffee and "the gallant officers and men under his command" on some
+"two thousand combats, great and small," and declaring, in effect,
+that Benevolent Assimilation was at last triumphantly vindicated,
+and that opposition to American rule was at an end. The certificate of
+March 28, 1907, appears at pages 47-8 of the Report of the Philippine
+Commission for 1907, part 1. If we consider what is now going on in
+the Islands as "modern" history, and the days of the early fighting as
+"ancient" history, this certificate will serve as the connecting link
+between the two. It furnishes the key-note to all that had happened
+during the American occupation prior to 1907, and the key-note of
+all that has happened since. Therefore, though somewhat long, it is
+deemed indispensable to clearness to submit here in full the text of
+
+
+    THE GREAT CERTIFICATE OF 1907
+
+    Whereas the census of the Philippine Islands was completed and
+    published on the twenty-seventh day of March, nineteen hundred and
+    five, which said completion and publication of said census was,
+    on the twenty-eighth day of March, nineteen hundred and five, duly
+    published and proclaimed to the people by the governor-general of
+    the Philippine Islands with the announcement that the President
+    of the United States would direct the Philippine Commission to
+    call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular
+    assembly, provided that a condition of general and complete peace
+    with recognition of the authority of the United States should be
+    certified by the Philippine Commission to have continued in the
+    territory of the Philippine Islands for a period of two years
+    after said completion and publication of said census; and
+
+    Whereas since the completion and publication of said census there
+    have been no serious disturbances of the public order save and
+    except those caused by the noted outlaws and bandit chieftains,
+    Felizardo and Montalon, and their followers in the provinces of
+    Cavite and Batangas, and those caused in the provinces of Samar
+    and Leyte by the non-Christian and fanatical pulahanes resident
+    in the mountain districts of the said provinces and the barrios
+    contiguous thereto; and
+
+    Whereas the overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces
+    of Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte have not taken part in said
+    disturbances and have not aided or abetted the lawless acts of
+    said bandits and pulahanes; and
+
+    Whereas the great mass and body of the Filipino people have,
+    during said period of two years, continued to be law-abiding,
+    peaceful, and loyal to the United States, and have continued to
+    recognize and do now recognize the authority and sovereignty of
+    the United States in the territory of said Philippine Islands:
+    Now, therefore, be it
+
+    Resolved by the Philippine Commission in formal session duly
+    assembled, That it, said Philippine Commission, do certify, and it
+    does hereby certify, to the President of the United States that for
+    a period of two years after the completion and publication of the
+    census a condition of general and complete peace, with recognition
+    of the authority of the United States, has continued to exist
+    and now exists in the territory of said Philippine Islands not
+    inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes; and be it further
+
+    Resolved by said Philippine Commission, That the President of the
+    United States be requested, and is hereby requested, to direct
+    said Philippine Commission to call a general election for the
+    choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said
+    territory in the Philippine Islands, which assembly shall be
+    known as the Philippine Assembly.
+
+
+Let us examine these amiable liberties thus taken with the facts of
+history by men of irreproachable private character, briefly analyzing
+their action. Such an examination and analysis are indispensable to
+a clear understanding by a great free people whose proudest boast is
+love of fair play, of whether the Filipino people, or any appreciable
+fraction of them, have ever in the least consented, or do now in the
+least consent, to our rule, as the small minority among us interested
+in keeping the Islands, have systematically sought, all these years,
+to have this nation believe. As the above certificate of 1907 was
+the last hurdle that Benevolent Assimilation had to leap on the
+Benevolent Hypocrisy course over which we had to gallop in order to
+get from the freeing of Cuba to the subjugation of the Philippines,
+let us glance back for a moment at the first hurdle or two, leapt
+when Mr. Taft was in the Philippine saddle.
+
+Judge Taft had said on November 30, 1900:
+
+
+    A great majority of the people long for peace and are entirely
+    willing to accept the establishment of a government under the
+    supremacy of the United States [469];
+
+
+and, pursuant to that idea, he had set up his civil government on July
+4, 1901. He never did thereafter admit that he was mistaken in his
+original theory, but kept on trying to fit the facts to his theory,
+hoping that after a while they would fit. He "clung to his policy
+of disinterested benevolence with a tenacity born of conviction,"
+to borrow a phrase from Governor-General Smith's inaugural address of
+1907. But in this same inaugural address of Governor Smith of 1907,
+you find, for the first time in all the Philippine state papers,
+a frank admission of the actual conditions under which the civil
+government of 1901 was in fact set up. Says he:
+
+
+    While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills and valleys
+    of the Philippines and every town and barrio in the islands was
+    smoking hot with rebellion, she [the United States] replaced the
+    military with a civil regime and on the smouldering embers of
+    insurrection planted civil government. [470]
+
+
+That confession, made with the bluntness of a most gallant soldier,
+is as refreshing in its honesty as the Roosevelt war-whoop of
+1902. There shall be no tiresome repetition here concerning the
+original withholding of the facts from the American people in 1898-9,
+but to place in juxtaposition Secretary of War Root's representations
+to the American public in the year last named, and the actual facts
+as stated earlier in the same year by General MacArthur, one of
+our best fighting generals, during the thick of the early fighting,
+in an interview already noticed in its proper chronological place,
+will forever fix the genesis of the original lack of frankness as to
+conditions in the Philippines which has naturally and inexorably made
+frankness as to those conditions impossible ever since. As late as
+October 7, 1899, Mr. Root--who had not then and has not since been
+in the Philippines--had said in Chicago, in a speech at a dinner of
+the Marquette Club:
+
+
+    Well, against whom are we fighting? Are we fighting the
+    Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds of
+    islands, inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more than
+    sixty different languages, and all but one are ready to accept
+    American sovereignty.
+
+
+As early as the beginning of April, 1899, just after the taking on
+March 31st of the first insurgent capital, Malolos, General MacArthur,
+who commanded our troops in the assault on that place, had said, in
+an interview with a newspaper man afterwards verified by the General
+before the Senate Committee of 1902 as substantially correct:
+
+
+    When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that
+    Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. * * * I did not like
+    to believe that the whole population of Luzon * * * was opposed to
+    us * * *. But after having come thus far, and having been brought
+    much in contact with both insurrectos and amigos, [471] I have
+    been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses
+    are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads. [472]
+
+
+The presidential election of 1900 had been fought out, in the midst of
+considerable bitterness, on the idea that the Root view was correct
+and the MacArthur view was altogether mistaken. So that after 1900,
+the McKinley Administration was irrevocably committed to the Root
+view. [473] The Philippine Government had, after 1900, diligently set
+to work to live up to the Root view, and to fit the facts to the Root
+view by prayer and hope, accompanied by asseveration. Hence in 1901 the
+alleged joyous sobs of welcome with which the Filipino people are, in
+effect, described in the report of the Philippine Commission for that
+year as having received the "benign" civil government, said sobs or
+other manifestations having spread, if the Commission's report is to
+be taken at its face value, "like wild-fire." Hence also the attempt
+of 1902 to minimize the insurrection of 1901-2, in Batangas and other
+provinces of southern Luzon, conducted by what Governor Luke E. Wright,
+in a speech delivered at Memphis in the latter part of 1902, called
+"the die-in-the-last-ditch contingent." Hence the quiet placing of
+the province of Surigao in the hands of the military in 1903 without
+suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the failure to order
+out the army in Albay in 1903 and in Samar in 1904. Hence also the
+prompt use of the army in Samar, Batangas, and Cavite in 1905, after
+the presidential election was safely over. Hence also the seething
+state of sedition which smouldered in the Visayan Islands in 1906,
+punctuated by the outbreak in Leyte of that year.
+
+The psychologic processes by which the distinguished gentlemen
+who signed the Great Certificate of March 28, 1907, got their
+own consent to sign it make the most profoundly interesting study,
+relatively to the general welfare of the world, in all our Philippine
+experiments so far. They are the final flowering of the plant Political
+Expediency. They are the weeds of benevolent casuistry that become from
+time to time unavoidable in a colonial garden tended by a republic
+based on the consent of the governed and therefore by the law of its
+own life unfitted to run any other kind of a government frankly. These
+processes find their origin in the provisions of the Act of Congress
+of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Government Act. Three days
+after President Roosevelt approved the Act, he issued his proclamation
+of July 4, 1902, above noticed, declaring the insurrection at an
+end. Section 6 of that Act provided:
+
+
+    Whenever the existing insurrection in the Philippine Islands shall
+    have ceased, and a condition of general and complete peace shall
+    have been established therein, and the fact shall be certified to
+    the President by the Philippine Commission, the President, upon
+    being satisfied thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine
+    Islands to be taken by said Philippine Commission.
+
+
+This census was intended to be preliminary to granting the Filipinos
+a legislature of their own, but as a legislature full of insurrectos
+would of course stultify its American sponsors before all mankind,
+it was announced in effect, in publishing the census programme, that
+no legislature would be forthcoming if the Filipinos did not quit
+insurrecting, and remain "good" for two years. If they did remain good
+for two years after the census was finished, then they should have
+their legislature. During the lull of "general and complete" peace
+which, in the fall of 1902, followed the suppression of the Batangas
+insurrection of 1901-2, and preceded the Ola insurrection of 1902-3 in
+the hemp provinces of southern Luzon, the Commission made, on September
+25, 1902, the certificate contemplated by the above Act of Congress,
+and the taking of the census was accordingly ordered by the President
+of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, by a proclamation issued the
+same day. [474] Section 7 of the aforesaid Act of Congress provided:
+
+
+    Two years after the completion and publication of the census, in
+    case such condition of general and complete peace with recognition
+    of the authority of the United States shall have continued in
+    the territory of said islands not inhabited by Moros or other
+    non-Christian tribes, and such facts shall have been certified
+    to the President by the Philippine Commission, the President
+    upon being satisfied thereof shall direct said Commission to
+    call, and the Commission shall call, a general election for the
+    choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said
+    territory in the Philippine Islands, which shall be known as the
+    Philippine Assembly.
+
+
+On March 27, 1905, the President of the United States was duly
+advised that the census had been completed, and on March 28th,
+the presidential proclamation promising the Filipinos a legislature
+two years later if in the meantime they did not insurrect any, was
+duly published at Manila. It is true that there is no Philippine
+state paper signed by anybody, either by the President of the United
+States, or the Governor-General of the Philippines, or any one else,
+certifying to a condition of "general and complete peace" between
+the certificate to that effect made by the Philippine Commission on
+September 25, 1902, above mentioned, which authorized commencing the
+census (and was justified by the facts), and the presidential promise
+of March 28, 1905, that if they would "be good" for two years more,
+they should have a legislature. But the whole manifest implication
+of the representations of fact sought to be conveyed by the action
+both of the Washington and the Manila authorities at the date of the
+presidential promise of March 28, 1905, is that a condition of general
+and complete peace had obtained ever since the last certificate to that
+effect, the certificate of September 25, 1902. Yet, as we saw in the
+chapter covering the last year of Governor Wright's administration,
+besides the Samar disturbances that lasted all through 1905, a big
+insurrection was actually in full swing in Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna
+provinces, on March 28, 1905, had then been in progress since before
+the first of the year, and continued until the latter part of 1905,
+the then Governor-General, Governor Wright, having, by proclamation
+issued January 31, 1905, declared Cavite and Batangas to be in a
+state of insurrection, ordered the military into those provinces, and
+suspended the writ of habeas corpus. President Roosevelt's proclamation
+of March 28, 1905, can by no possibility be construed as saying to
+the Filipinos anything other than substantially this: "You have not
+insurrected any since my proclamation of July 4, 1902. If you will be
+good two years more, you shall have a legislature." What then was the
+Philippine Commission to do at the end of those two years, peppered,
+as they had been, with most annoying outbreaks in various provinces
+not inhabited by "Moros or other non-Christian tribes." During the
+presidential campaign of 1904 the Commission had committed themselves,
+as we have seen, to the proposition that nothing serious was going
+on at that time in Samar. So how could they take frank official
+cognizance on paper of the reign of terror let loose there by their
+delay in ordering out the army until after the presidential election,
+a delay which, like a delay of fire-engines to arrive at the scene of
+a fire, had permitted the Samar outbreak to gain such headway that it
+took two years to finally put it down? Then there was the outbreak
+of 1906 in Leyte, described in the last chapter, as to which even
+the Commission had admitted in their annual report for that year [475]:
+
+
+    Possibly its [Leyte's] immediate vicinity to Samar has had to do
+    with the disturbed conditions.
+
+
+In other words, possibly, a fire may spread from one field of dry
+grass to another near by.
+
+As to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection of 1905, in an executive
+order dated September 28, 1907, [476]--noticed in a previous chapter,
+but too pertinent to be entirely omitted here--wherein are set forth
+the reasons for withholding executive clemency from the condemned
+leaders of that movement, Governor-General Smith describes in harrowing
+terms "a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of the most
+beautiful provinces in the archipelago," wrought by the condemned
+men, who he says "assumed the cloak of patriotism, and under the
+titles of 'Defenders of the Country,' and 'Protectors of the People'
+proceeded to inaugurate" said reign of terror. These men were most
+of them former insurgent officers who had remained out after the
+respectable generals had all surrendered. This Cavite-Batangas-Laguna
+insurrection was the very sort of thing which the conditional promise
+of a legislature made by Congress to the Filipino people in Sections 6
+and 7 of the Act of July 1, 1902--the Philippine Government Act--had
+stipulated should not happen. This is no mere dictum of my own. In
+the case of Barcelon against Baker, 5 Philippine Reports, pp. 87 et
+seq., already very briefly noticed in a previous chapter, the Supreme
+Court of the Islands had, in effect, so held. Section 5 of the Act of
+Congress of July 1, 1902, had provided that if any state of affairs
+serious enough should arise, the Governor of the Philippines should
+have authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases
+of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require
+it." Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act had provided, on the other hand,
+that if a condition of general and complete peace should prevail for
+a stated period the Filipinos should have a legislature. In the case
+of Barcelon against Baker the Supreme Court held that the situation
+contemplated by Section 5 of the Act of Congress had arisen in the
+provinces of Cavite and Batangas. That, of course, automatically, so
+to speak, made the postponement of the Philippine Assembly a necessary
+logical sequence, under the provisions of Sections 6 and 7. These
+Sections 6 and 7 promised the Filipinos a legislature in the event
+the conditions contemplated by Section 5 should not arise. Barcelon,
+who was one of the (non-combatant) reconcentrados restrained of his
+liberty at Batangas, claimed that his detention as such reconcentrado
+by the defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding, the constabulary
+officer, Colonel Baker, was unlawful, in that, he being charged with
+no crime, such detention deprived him of his liberty without due
+process of law. The Philippine Commission, however, had declared,
+by virtue of the authority vested in it by Section 5 of the Act of
+Congress aforesaid, that a state of insurrection existed in Cavite and
+Batangas, and accordingly the Governor-General had suspended the writ
+of habeas corpus and declared martial law in those provinces. The
+Attorney-General representing the Philippine Commission before
+the court rested the Government's case on the proposition that the
+petitioner was not entitled to claim the ordinary "due process of
+law" because "open insurrection against the constituted authorities"
+existed in the provinces named. And the Supreme Court upheld his
+contention. In so holding, they say, among other things (page 93),
+in construing Section 5 of the Act of Congress we are considering:
+
+
+    Inasmuch as the President, or Governor-General with the approval
+    of the Philippine Commission, can suspend the privilege of the
+    writ of habeas corpus only under the conditions mentioned in the
+    said statute, it becomes their duty to make an investigation of
+    the existing conditions in the archipelago, or any part thereof,
+    to ascertain whether there actually exists a state of rebellion,
+    insurrection, or invasion, and that the public safety requires the
+    suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. When
+    this investigation is concluded, and the President, or the
+    Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Commission,
+    declares that there exists these conditions, and that the public
+    safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
+    habeas corpus, can the judicial department of the Government
+    investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions
+    exist?
+
+
+They answer "No!" The head note of the decision is as follows:
+
+
+    The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in
+    the Philippine Islands in the case of rebellion, insurrection,
+    and invasion, when the public safety requires it, by the President
+    of the United States, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine
+    Islands with the approval of the Philippine Commission.
+
+
+Thus the Supreme Court of the Islands squarely held that on the
+fourth day of August, 1905 (the day the writ of habeas corpus
+was made returnable), open insurrection existed against the
+constituted authorities in the Islands, in the provinces named,
+and had existed since the Executive Proclamation of January 31st,
+previous, declaring a state of insurrection, and on that ground denied
+the writ. Yet the Commission certified on March 28, 1907, that a state
+of general and complete peace as contemplated by the Act of Congress
+conditionally promising a legislature, had prevailed for the two
+years preceding. In other words the Philippine Commission declared
+a state of insurrection to exist in certain populous provinces, and
+was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Islands in so doing, and later
+certified to the continuance of a state of general and complete peace
+covering the same period.
+
+All the uncandid things--uncandid in failure to take the American
+people into their confidence--that have been done by all the good men
+we have sent to the Philippines from the beginning, have been justified
+by those good men to their own consciences on the idea that, because
+the end in view was truly benevolent, therefore the end justified the
+means. As a matter of fact, American Benevolent Assimilation in the
+Philippines has, in its practical operation, worked more of misery and
+havoc, first through war, and since through legislation put or kept on
+the statute books by the influence of special interests in the United
+States with Congress, "than any which has darkened their unhappy past"
+to use one of Mr. McKinley's early expressions deprecating doing for
+the Philippines what we did for Cuba. [477]
+
+But let us see just how much the Philippine Commission that signed the
+peace certificate of March 28, 1907, swallowed, and how they swallowed
+it. It will be observed that they sugar-coated their certificate with
+a lot of whereases. The first of these recites President Roosevelt's
+promise of March 28, 1905, that the Filipinos should have a legislature
+two years thereafter "provided that a condition of general and
+complete peace with recognition of the authority of the United States
+should be certified by the Philippine Commission to have continued in
+the territory of the Philippine Islands for a period of two years"
+after the proclamation. Whereas number two, it will be noted, goes
+on to state that there have been "no serious disturbances of public
+order save and except" those in Cavite, Batangas, Samar, and Leyte,
+[478] the magnitude of which has been fully described in previous
+chapters. Of the Cavite-Batangas insurrection, the only one they had
+previously formally admitted to be an insurrection, they say it was
+"caused by certain noted outlaws and bandit chieftains [naming them],
+and their followers." Obviously this was hardly sufficient to show
+that an insurrection they had once officially recognized as such
+was not in fact such at all. So in order to justify a statement
+that "a condition of general and complete peace" had continued in
+these two great provinces of Cavite and Batangas, which they had
+but shortly previously declared to be in a state of insurrection,
+and been upheld by the Supreme Court in so doing, they resort to the
+old Otis expedient of 1898-9, worked on the American people through
+Mr. McKinley to show absence of lack of consent-of-the-governed. This
+expedient, as we have seen in the earlier chapters of this book,
+consisted in vague use of the word "majority." It had stood Judge
+Taft in good stead in the campaign of 1900, because when he then
+said that "the great majority of the people" were "entirely willing"
+to accept American rule, there was no earthly way to disprove it
+in time for the verdict of the American people to be influenced by
+the unanimity of the Filipinos against a change of masters in lieu
+of independence. It was the only possible expedient for an American
+conscience, because every American naturally feels that unless he
+can, by some sort of sophistry, persuade himself that "the majority"
+of the people want a given thing, then the thing is a wrong thing to
+force upon them. So the ethical hurdle the Commission had to leap in
+order to sign the certificate of 1907 was cleared thus:
+
+
+    The overwhelming majority of the people of said provinces have
+    not taken part in said disturbances and have not aided and abetted
+    the lawless acts of said bandits.
+
+
+As a matter of fact, the report of the American Governor of Cavite--and
+conditions were conceded to be identical in the two provinces of
+Cavite and Batangas--shows that the reason it was so hard to suppress
+the Cavite-Batangas troubles of 1905 was that the people would not
+help the authorities to apprehend the outlaws. No doubt the King of
+England would have signed a similar certificate as to the people of
+the shires and counties in which Robin Hood, Little John, and Friar
+Tuck, held high carnival. Of course I do not mean to libel the fair
+fame of that fine freebooter Robin Hood and his companions by placing
+the rascally leaders of the bands of outlaws now under consideration
+in the same jolly and respectable class with those beloved friends of
+the childhood of us all. But the Cavite-Batangas "patriots" of 1905
+could never have given the authorities as much trouble as they did if
+the people had not at least taken secret joy in discomfiture of the
+American authorities. Until finally suppressed, all such movements
+as these always grew exactly as a snow-ball does if you roll it on
+snow. Says Governor Shanks, a Major of the 4th United States Infantry,
+who was Governor of Cavite, in 1905 in his report for that year, [479]
+in explaining the uprising under consideration, and the way it grew:
+"The Filipino likes to be on the winning side." Certainly this is
+not peculiar to the Filipino. Governor Shanks proceeds:
+
+
+    The prestige acquired (by the uprising) at San Pedro Tunasan,
+    Paranaque, Taal, and San Francisco de Malabon had great weight in
+    creating active sympathy for ladrone bands and leaders. Something
+    was needed to counterbalance the effect of their combined
+    successes, and the appearance of regular troops was just the
+    thing needed.
+
+
+This explains how "the overwhelming majority" of which the certificate
+of 1907 speaks was obtained in Cavite. It took six months to obtain
+said "majority" at that. I suppose the campaigning of the American
+regulars might be credited with obtaining the "majority," and the
+reconcentration of brother Baker of the constabulary might be accorded
+the additional credit of making the majority "overwhelming." If you
+have, as election tellers, so to speak, a soldier with a bayonet on
+one side, and a constabulary officer with a reconcentration camp
+back of him on the other, you can get an "overwhelming majority"
+for the continuance of American rule even in Cavite province.
+
+Through men I commanded during the early campaigning, I have killed my
+share of Filipinos in the time of war; and after the civil government
+was set up I had occasion to hang a good many of them, under what
+seemed to me a necessary application of the old Mosaic law, "An eye
+for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life." But I thank
+God I have never been a party to the insufferable pretence that they,
+or any appreciable fraction of them, ever consented to our rule. This,
+however, is the whole theory of the Philippine Commission's certificate
+of March 28, 1907. It is curious how generously and supremely frank a
+brave soldier will get when he forgets to be a politician. In one of
+his state papers of 1907 Governor-General Smith [480] speaks of General
+Trias, who had been Lieutenant-General of the insurgent army in the
+days of the insurrection, and next in rank to Aguinaldo himself, as one
+"whose love of country had been tested on many a well fought field
+of honorable conflict." Contrast this tribute to the respectability
+of the original Philippine war for independence against us with the
+long list of stale falsehoods already reviewed in this volume, on the
+faith of which, in the presidential campaign of 1900, the American
+people were persuaded that to deny to the Filipinos what they had
+accorded to Cuba was righteous! The leaders of the Cavite-Batangas
+uprising of 1905 had been officers of the insurgent army, and that
+was the secret of their hold upon the people of those provinces. It
+is true that they must have been pretty sorry officers, and that they
+were ladrones (brigands). They were cruel and unmitigated scoundrels
+working for purely selfish and vainglorious ends. But it was the
+cloak of patriotism, however, infamously misused, that gained them
+such success as they attained in 1905. Says the American Governor of
+Cavite province in his annual report for 1906 [481]:
+
+
+    The province should be most carefully watched. I am convinced
+    that ladrone leaders do not produce conditions, but that the
+    conditions and attitude of the public produce ladrones.
+
+
+So much for the Cavite-Batangas hurdle. And now as to the Samar and
+Leyte hurdle.
+
+The signers of the certificate of 1907 justify their certificate as to
+Samar and Leyte on a very ingenious theory. The Act of Congress of July
+1, 1902, already cited, which had provided for the taking of a census
+preliminary to the call of an election for delegates to a legislature,
+had recognized the crude ethnological status of the Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes. These had never had anything whatever to do
+with the insurrection against us. Therefore in making the continuance
+of a state of general and complete peace for a prescribed period a
+condition precedent to granting the Filipinos a legislature, the Act
+of 1902 had limited that condition precedent to "the territory of said
+Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes." In fact
+President Roosevelt's proclamation of September 25, 1902, already
+noticed, ordering the taking of the census on the theory that a
+state of general and complete peace then existed, explains that this
+theory is entirely consistent with trouble among the Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes because they, it says, quoting from a statement
+of the Philippine Commission previously made to the President,
+"never have taken any part in the insurrection." The Moros and other
+non-Christian tribes were, so to speak, in no sense assets of the
+Philippine insurrection. All the rest of the population was--that is,
+if there was anything in the veteran General MacArthur's grim jest of
+1900, prompted by Governor Taft's half-baked opinion to the contrary,
+that "ethnological homogeneity" was the secret of the unanimity of the
+opposition we met, and that somehow people "will stick to their own
+kith and kin." When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drawn
+nobody pretended for a moment that there were any non-Christian tribes
+either in Samar or Leyte. The whole population of those Islands were
+valuable assets of the insurrection. If any one doubts it, let him
+ask the 9th Infantry. You will find in the Census of 1903 that there
+are no non-Christian tribes credited either to Samar or Leyte. [482]
+When the Philippine Government Act of 1902 was drafted, the exception
+about Moros and other non-Christian tribes was intended to except
+merely certain types of people as distinct from the great mass of the
+Philippine population as islands are from the sea. The fact is, no
+person connected with the Philippine Government either before or after
+the certificate under consideration, ever thought of classifying the
+ignorant country people of the uplands and hills of Samar or Leyte,
+as "non-Christian tribes." The Philippine Census of 1903 does not
+so classify them. The very volume of the Report of the Philippine
+Commission for 1907 in which the certificate aforesaid appears,
+does not. In that volume, [483] the report of the Executive Secretary
+deals elaborately with the subject of non-Christian tribes. Professor
+Worcester of the Philippine Commission has for the last twelve years
+been the grand official digger-up of non-Christian tribes. He takes
+as much delight at the discovery of a new non-Christian tribe in
+some remote, newly penetrated mountain fastness, as the butterfly
+catcher with the proverbial blue goggles does in the capture of a
+new kind of butterfly. The Executive Secretary's report, out of
+deference to the professor, omits no single achievement of his
+with reference to his anthropological hobby. It treats, with an
+enthusiasm that would delight Mrs. Jellyby herself, of "the progress
+that was made during the fiscal year in the work of civilizing
+non-Christian tribes scattered throughout the archipelago." It
+gives an alphabetical list of all the provinces where there are
+non-Christian tribes, and, under the name of each province it gives
+notes as to the progress during the year with those tribes. Neither
+Samar nor Leyte appear in that list of provinces. So that the Samar
+"Pulajans," or "Red Breeches" fellows,--"fanatical" Pulajans, they
+are called in the certificate--were "non-Christian tribes" for peace
+certificate purposes only. One thing which makes it most difficult
+of all for me to understand how these gentlemen got their consent
+to sign that certificate is that each non-Christian tribe in the
+Philippines has a language of its own, whereas the country people
+of the uplands and mountains of Samar and Leyte who are labelled--or
+libelled--"non-Christian tribes" in the certificate of 1907, were no
+more different from the rest of the population of those islands than,
+for instance, the ignorant mountain people of Virginia or Kentucky
+are different, ethnologically, from the inhabitants of Richmond or
+Louisville. In his report for 1908, [484] Governor-General Smith
+himself makes this perfectly clear, where he describes the Samar
+Pulajan, or mountaineer, thus:
+
+
+    The Pulajan is not a robber or a thief by nature--quite the
+    contrary. He is hard working, industrious, and even frugal. He
+    had his little late [485] of hemp on the side of the mountain,
+    and breaking out his picul [486] of hemp, he carried it hank by
+    hank for miles and miles over almost impassable mountain trails
+    to the nearest town or barrio. There he offered it for sale,
+    and if he refused the price tendered, which was generally not
+    more than half the value, he soon found himself arrested on a
+    trumped-up charge, and unless he compromised by parting with his
+    hemp he found himself, after paying his fine and lawyer's fees,
+    without either hemp or money.
+
+
+The non-Christian tribes, on the other hand, never have anything to
+do with the civilized people. The Act of Congress of 1902, therefore,
+had no sort of reference to the simple, ignorant, and ordinarily
+docile mountain folk who tilled the soil, revered the priests, paid
+their cedula or head tax like all the rest of the population of the
+Islands, and carried their agricultural products from season to season,
+their hemp and the like, to the coast towns to market. In other words,
+inclusion of the Samar "Pulajans," or "Red Breeches" brigade, and the
+Leyte bandits, in the peace certificate of 1907, as "non-Christian
+tribes" was an afterthought, having no foundation either in logic
+or fact. It was a part of Benevolent Assimilation. This is clearly
+apparent from President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December,
+1905. [487] You do not find any buncombe about "non-Christian
+tribes" in that message. In there reviewing the Samar and other
+insurrections of 1905 in the Philippines, you find him dealing with
+the real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting the
+view that the Filipino people were to blame therefor, because we
+had placed too much power in the hands of an ignorant electorate,
+which had elected rascally officials. "Cavite and Samar," he says,
+"are instances of reposing too much confidence in the self-governing
+power of a people." If we had let the Filipinos go ahead with their
+little republic in 1898, instead of destroying it as we did, they
+knew and would have utilized the true elements of strength they had,
+viz., a very considerable body of educated, patriotic men having
+the loyal confidence of the masses of the people. But we proceeded
+to ram down their throats a preconceived theory that the only road
+to self-government was for an alien people to step in and make the
+ignorant masses the sine qua non. Yet if there was one point on which
+Mr. McKinley had laid more stress than on any other, in his original
+instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Taft Commission, that point was
+the one consecrated in the following language of those instructions:
+
+
+    In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which
+    they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in
+    mind that the government which they are establishing is designed
+    not for * * * the expression of our theoretical views, etc.
+
+
+Of course the ignorant electorate we perpetrated on Samar as an
+"expression of our theoretical views" proved that we had "gone too
+fast" in conferring self-government, or, to quote Mr. Roosevelt,
+had been "reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power
+of a people," if to begin with the rankest material for constructing
+a government that there was at hand was to offer a fair test of
+capacity for self-government. But President Roosevelt's message,
+above quoted, shows you that the "ignorant electorate" was merely an
+ignorant electorate, and not a non-Christian tribe, as the Philippine
+Commission later had the temerity to certify they were. Now the plain,
+unvarnished, benevolent truth is just this: The Commission knew that
+nobody in the United States, whether they were for retaining the
+Islands or against retaining them, had any desire to postpone granting
+a legislature to the Philippine people. So in their certificate they
+simply included everybody who had given trouble in Samar and Leyte
+as "non-Christian tribes." The only justification for this was that
+they had in fact acted in a most un-Christianlike manner,--i.e., for
+people who devotedly murmur prayers to patron saints in good standing
+in the church calendar. In making their certificate, the Commission
+simply ignored the various uprisings of the preceding two years. They
+simply said, generously, "Oh, forget it." They knew nobody in the
+United States begrudged the Filipinos their conditionally promised
+legislature, or cared to postpone it. The leading Filipinos begged the
+authorities to "forget" the various disturbances that had occurred
+since the publication of the census, and there was a very general
+desire in the Islands to let bygones be bygones, wipe the slate, and
+begin again. Any other attitude would have meant that the legislature
+would have to be postponed. Then the opposition in the United States
+would want to know why, and by 1908 Philippine independence might
+become an issue again. In the eyes of the Commission, the end, being
+benevolent, justified stretching the language of the Act of 1902
+as if it had been the blessed veil of charity itself--i.e., the end
+justified the means. In fact it did--almost--justify the means. But not
+quite. The moral quality of the Great Certificate of 1907 was not as
+reprehensible as General Anderson's dealings with Aguinaldo, already
+described, which, like the certificate, were a necessary part of the
+benevolent hypocrisy of Benevolent Assimilation of an unconsenting
+people. Yet General Anderson is an honorable man. It was not as bad
+as General Greene's juggling Aguinaldo out of his trenches before
+Manila in a friendly way, and failing to give him a receipt for said
+trenches, as he had promised to do, because such a receipt would show
+co-operation and "might look too much like an alliance." This also was
+done on the idea that the end justified the means. Yet General Greene
+is an honorable man. The signers of the great peace certificate of
+1907 are all honorable men. But they signed that certificate, just the
+same. "Judge not that ye be not judged." All I have to say is, I would
+not have signed that certificate. I would have said: "No, gentlemen,
+the end does not justify the means. The Philippine Assembly must be
+postponed, if we are going to deal frankly with Congress and the folks
+at home. The conditions Congress made precedent to the grant of an
+assembly have not been met, and we each and all of us know it. We owe
+more to our own country and to truth than we do to the Filipinos. The
+Act of Congress of 1902 did not vest in the Philippine Commission
+authority to pardon disturbances of public order. It imposed upon
+the Commission an implied duty to report such disturbances, fully
+and frankly. It is not true that there has been a continuing state of
+general and complete peace in these Islands for the last two years,
+and I for one will not certify that there has been."
+
+The truth is, the attitude of the signers of the certificate was like
+that of Uncle Remus, when interrupted by the little boy in one of his
+stories. When Uncle Remus gets to the point in the rabbit story where
+the rabbit thrillingly escapes from the jaws of death, i.e., from the
+jaws of the dogs, by climbing a tree, the rapt listener interrupts:
+"Why, Uncle Remus, a rabbit can't climb a tree." To which Uncle
+Remus replies, with a reassuring wave of the hand, "Oh, but Honey,
+dis rabbit dess 'bleeged ter climb dis tree."
+
+Should any of my good friends still in the Philippines feel disposed to
+censure such levity as the above, I can only say, as Kipling writes
+from England to his Anglo-Indian friends in a foreword to one of
+his books:
+
+
+            I have told these tales of our life
+              For a sheltered people's mirth,
+            In jesting guise,--but ye are wise,
+              And ye know what the jest is worth.
+
+
+Moreover, my authority to speak frankly about these matters is also
+aptly stated by the same great poet thus:
+
+
+            I have eaten your bread and salt,
+              I have drunk your water and wine,
+            The deaths ye died I have watched beside
+              And the lives that ye led were mine.
+
+            Was there aught that I did not share
+              In vigil or toil or ease,
+            One joy or woe that I did not know,
+              Dear friends across the seas?
+
+
+The above reflections are not placed before the reader to show him
+what a pity it is that the writer was not a member of the Philippine
+Commission at the time of their certificate of 1907, or to show what
+a fine thing for our common country it would be if he were made a
+member of that Commission now. He is, personally, as disinterested
+as if Manila were in the moon, for he cannot live in the tropics
+any more. The effect of a year or so of residence there upon white
+men invalided home for tropical dysentery and then returning to the
+Islands is like the effect of water upon a starched shirt. However,
+it is believed that the facts of official record collected in this
+chapter up to this point are a demonstration of this proposition,
+to wit: What the Philippine Government needs more than anything else
+is that the minority party in the United States should be represented
+on the Commission. By this I do not mean representation by what are
+called, under Republican Administrations, "White House" Democrats,
+nor what under a Democratic Administration, if one should ever occur,
+would probably be called "Copperhead Republicans." I mean the genuine
+article. A Democrat who has cast his fortunes with the Philippines
+is no longer a Democrat relatively to the Philippines, because the
+Democratic party wants to get rid of the Philippines and the Democrat
+in the Philippines of course does not. How absurd it is to talk about
+former Governors Wright and Smith, as "life-long Democrats," by way
+of preliminary to using their opinions as "admissions." In the law
+of evidence, an "admission" is a statement made against the interest
+of the party making it.
+
+The first election for representatives in the Philippine Assembly was
+held on July 30, 1907, and on October 16th thereafter the Assembly
+was formally opened by Secretary of War, William H. Taft. The various
+"whereases" hereinabove reviewed, importing complete acquiescence in
+American rule since President Roosevelt's Proclamation of July 4, 1902,
+were first duly read, and then the Assembly was opened. Of course,
+no man could have been elected to the Assembly without at least
+pretending to be in favor of independence, and all but a corporal's
+guard of them were outspoken in favor of the proposition. As the
+present Governor-General Mr. Forbes, said, while Vice-Governor,
+in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909:
+
+
+    To deny the capacity of one's country for * * * self-government
+    is essentially unpopular.
+
+
+When he visited the Philippines to open their Assembly in 1907,
+Mr. Taft had said nothing definite and final on the question of
+promising independence since his departure from the Islands in
+1903. His then benevolent unwillingness to tell them frankly he did not
+think they had sense enough to run a government of their own, and that
+they were unfit for self-government, has already been reviewed. For
+two years after 1903 Governor Wright had made them pine for the return
+of Mr. Taft. They longed to hear again some of the siren notes of
+the celebrated speech "the Philippines for the Filipinos." They had
+gotten very excited and very happy over that speech. Of course they
+would not have gotten very excited over independence supposed to be
+coming long after they should be dead and buried. During the two dark
+frank years of Governor Wright's regime, they had frequently been
+told that they were not fit for independence. So that when Secretary
+of War Taft had visited the Islands in 1905 they all had been on the
+qui vive for more statements vaguely implying an independence they
+might hope to live to see. During the visit of 1905 the time of the
+visiting Congressional party was consumed principally with tariff
+hearings, and comparatively little was said on the subject uppermost
+in the minds of all Filipinos. It is true that Mr. Taft said then he
+was of the opinion that it would take a generation or longer to get
+the country ready for self-government, but he said it in a tactful,
+kindly way, and did not forever crush their hopes. So when he went
+out to the Islands to open the assembly in 1907, the attitude of the
+whole people in expectation of some definite utterances on the question
+of a definite promise of independence at some future time, was just
+the attitude of an audience in a theatre as to which one affirms
+"you could hear a pin fall." In this regard Mr. Taft's utterances
+were as follows [488]:
+
+
+    I am aware that in view of the issues discussed at the election of
+    this assembly I am expected to say something regarding the policy
+    of the United States toward these islands. I cannot speak with
+    the authority of one who may control that policy. The Philippine
+    Islands are territory belonging to the United States, and by the
+    Constitution, the branch of that government vested with the power
+    and charged with the duty of making rules and regulations for their
+    government is Congress. The policy to be pursued with respect
+    to them is therefore ultimately for Congress to determine. * * *
+    I have no authority to speak for Congress in respect to the
+    ultimate disposition of the Islands.
+
+
+After that there was some talk about "mutually beneficial trade
+relations" and "improvement of the people both industrially and in
+self-governing capacity." But with regard to the "process of political
+preparation of the Filipino people" for self-government the Secretary
+said that was a question no one could certainly answer; and so far as
+he was concerned he thought it would take "considerable longer than a
+generation." Somewhere in the early Philippine State papers there is
+a quotation used by Mr. Taft from Shakespeare about "Keeping the word
+of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope." The Filipinos have
+eagerly read for the last twelve years every utterance of Mr. Taft's
+that they could get hold of. If any of those embryonic statesmen of the
+first Philippine Assembly, familiar with the various Taft utterances,
+had looked up the context of the Shakespearian quotation above alluded
+to, he would have found it to be as follows:
+
+
+            And be these juggling fiends no more believ'd,
+            That palter with us in a double sense:
+            That keep the word of promise to our ear
+            And break it to our hope. [489]
+
+
+Since the announcement by Secretary of War Taft at the opening
+of the Philippine Assembly in October, 1907, of the policy of
+indefinite retention of the Islands with undeclared intention,
+the Filipinos have of course clearly understood that if they were
+ever to have independence they must look to Congress for it. But
+they know Congress is not interested in them and that they have no
+influence with it, and that the Hemp Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the
+Sugar Trust, have. So that since 1907, both the American authorities
+in the Philippines and the Filipinos have settled down, the former
+suffused with benevolence--hardened however by paternalistic firmness,
+the latter stoically, to the programme of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention. No conceivable programme could be devised more
+ingeniously calculated to engender race hatred. The Filipino newspapers
+call the present policy one of "permanent administration for inferior
+and incapable races." The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
+Philippine Government Act, which is the "Constitution," so to speak,
+we have given the Filipinos, accords "liberty of the press" in the
+exact language of our own Constitution. The native press does not
+fail to use this liberty to the limit. Naturally the American press
+does not remain silent. So here are a pair of bellows ever fanning
+the charcoals of discontent. And the masses of the Filipino people
+read the Filipino papers. If they cannot read, their children can. In
+one of the reports of one of the American constabulary officials in
+the Philippines, there is an account of the influence of the native
+press too graphic to be otherwise than accurate. He says one can often
+see, in the country districts, a group of natives gathered about some
+village Hampden, listening to his reading the latest diatribe against
+the American Occupation. Never was there such folly in the annals of
+statesmanship. In their native papers, the race situation of course
+comes in for much comment. Now the most notorious and inflexible
+fact of that race situation is that the colonial Anglo-Saxon does
+not intermarry with "the yellow and brown" subject people, as the
+Latin colonizing races do. It would be an over-statement of the case
+to say that the Filipinos to-day had rather have the Spaniards back
+as their overlords instead of us. In 1898, they "tasted the sweets
+of liberty," to use an expression of one of their leaders, and I
+am perfectly sure that to-day the desire of all those people for a
+government of their own is so genuine and universal as that it amounts
+to a very hopeful positive factor in the equation of their capacity for
+self-government. But there is no doubt that many of the Filipinos after
+all have a very warm place in their hearts for the Spanish people. How
+could it be otherwise when so many of the Filipinos are sons and
+grandsons of Spaniards? Much of like and dislike in life's journey is
+determined pre-natally. On the other hand, the American women in the
+Philippines maintain an attitude toward the natives quite like that of
+their British sisters in Hong Kong toward the Chinese, and in Calcutta
+toward the natives there. The social status of an American woman who
+marries a native,--I myself have never heard of but one case--is like
+that of a Pacific coast girl who marries a Jap. This is merely the
+instinct of self-defence with which Nature provides the weaker sex,
+just as she provides the porcupine with quills. But look at the other
+side of the picture. When an American man marries a native woman,
+he thereafter finds himself more in touch with his native "in-laws"
+it is true, but correspondingly, and ever increasingly, out of touch
+with his former associations. This is not as it should be. But it is
+a most unpleasant and inexorable fact of the present situation. In
+an address delivered at the Quill Club in Manila on January 25,
+1909, Governor Smith, after reciting the various beneficent designs
+contemplated by the government and the various public works consummated
+(at the expense of the people of the Islands) deplored, in spite of
+it all, what he termed "the growing gulf between the races." Said he:
+
+
+    An era of ill feeling has started between Americans and Filipinos,
+    and, I hesitate to say it, race hatred.
+
+
+Cherchez la femme! You find her, on the one hand, in the American woman
+whose attitude has been indicated, and you find her, on the other,
+in the refined and virtuous native woman, who finds her American
+husband's relations to his compatriots altered--queered--since his
+marriage to her, no matter how faithful a wife and mother she may
+be. This is the unspeakably cruel situation we have forced upon the
+Filipino people--whom I really learned to respect, and became much
+attached to, before I left the Islands--and President Taft knows it
+as well as I do. Yet he does not take the American people into his
+confidence. He simply worries along with the situation, wishing it
+would get better, but knowing it will get worse. That this situation
+is a permanent one is clearly shown by all the previous teachings
+of racial history. In his Winning of the West, written in 1889,
+speaking of the French settlers in the Ohio valley before 1776,
+and the cordial social relations of the dominant race with the
+natives--relations which have always obtained with all Latin races
+under like circumstances--Mr. Roosevelt says (vol. i., page 41):
+
+
+    They were not trammelled by the queer pride which makes a man
+    of English stock unwilling to make a red-skinned woman his wife,
+    though anxious enough to make her his concubine.
+
+
+Men of English stock have changed but little in the matter of race
+instinct since 1776. If we had a definite policy, declared by Congress,
+promising independence, the American attitude in the Philippines toward
+the Filipinos would at once change, from the present impossible one,
+to our ordinary natural attitude of courtesy toward all foreigners,
+regardless of their color.
+
+On May 7, 1909, the Honorable James F. Smith took his departure from
+the Philippine Islands forever and turned over the duties of his
+office to the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, as Acting President of the
+Commission and Governor-General. As in the case of Governors Wright
+and Ide, so in that of Governor Smith, no reason is apparent why the
+Washington Government should have been willing to dispense with the
+services of the incumbent. This was peculiarly true in the case of
+General Smith. He was but fifty years of age when he left the Islands
+in 1909. He has rendered more different kinds of distinguished public
+service than any American who has ever been in the Philippine Islands
+from the time Dewey's guns first thundered out over Manila Bay down to
+this good hour. Going out with the first expedition in 1898 as Colonel
+of the 1st California Regiment, he distinguished himself on more
+than one battlefield in the early fighting and in recognition thereof
+was made a brigadier-general. Subsequent to this he became Military
+Governor of the island of Negros, that one of the six principal
+Visayan Islands which gave less trouble during the insurrection and
+after than any other--a circumstance doubtless not wholly unrelated
+to General Smith's wise and tactful administration there. Later on
+during the military regime he became Collector of Customs of the
+archipelago. The revenues from customs are the principal source of
+revenue of the Philippine Government and the sums of money handled
+are enormous. The customs service, moreover, in most countries, and
+especially in the Philippines, is more subject to the creeping in of
+graft than any other. General Smith's administration of this post was
+in keeping with everything else he did in the Islands. When the civil
+government was founded by Judge Taft in 1901, he was appointed one of
+the Justices of the Supreme Court and filled the duties of that office
+most creditably. Thence he was promoted to the Philippine Commission,
+which is, virtually, the cabinet of the Governor-General. Still later
+he became Vice-Governor, and finally Governor, serving as such from
+September, 1906, to May, 1909. Any other government on earth that has
+over-seas colonies and recognizes the supreme importance of a maximum
+of continuity of policy, would have kept Governor Smith as long
+as it could have possibly induced him to stay, just as the British
+kept Lord Cromer in Egypt. Governor Smith was succeeded by a young
+man from Boston, who had come out to the Islands four years before,
+and who, prior to that time, had never had any public service in the
+United States of any kind, had never been in the Philippine Islands,
+and probably had never seen a Filipino until he landed at Manila.
+
+General Smith is now (1912) one of the Judges of the Court of Customs
+Appeals at Washington.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII
+
+GOVERNOR FORBES--1909-1912
+
+            The trouble with this country to-day is that,
+            under long domination by the protected interests,
+            a partnership has grown up between them and the
+            Government which the best men in the Republican
+            party could not break up if they would.--Woodrow Wilson.
+
+
+When Governor Forbes assumed the duties of Governor-General of the
+Philippines, some ten years after the ratification of the Treaty
+of Paris whereby we bought the Islands, he was the ninth supreme
+representative of American authority we had had there since the
+American occupation began. The following is the list:
+
+
+    (1) Gen. Thomas M. Anderson       June  30, 1898-July 25, 1898
+    (2) Gen. Wesley Merritt           July  25, 1898-Aug. 29, 1898
+    (3) Gen. Elwell S. Otis           Aug.  29, 1898-May 5, 1900
+    (4) Gen. Arthur MacArthur         May    5, 1900-July 4, 1901
+    (5) Hon. William H. Taft          July   4, 1901-Dec. 23, 1903
+    (6) Hon. Luke E. Wright           Dec.  23, 1903-Nov. 4, 1905
+    (7) Hon. Henry C. Ide             Nov.   4, 1905-Sept. 20, 1906
+    (8) Hon. James F. Smith           Sept. 20, 1906-May 7, 1909
+    (9) Hon. W. Cameron Forbes        May    7, 1909- [490]
+
+
+No one of these distinguished gentlemen has ever had any authority to
+tell the Filipinos what we expect ultimately to do with them. They
+have not known themselves. Is not this distinctly unfair both to
+governors and governed?
+
+Before Governor Forbes went to the Philippines he had been a largely
+successful business man. He is a man of the very highest personal
+character, and an indefatigable worker. He has done as well as the
+conditions of the problem permit. But he is always between Scylla
+and Charybdis. American capital in or contemplating investment in the
+Islands is continually pressing to be permitted to go ahead and develop
+the resources of the Islands. To keep the Islands from being exploited
+Congress early limited grants of land to a maximum too small to attract
+capital. So those who desire to build up the country, knowing they
+cannot get the law changed, are forever seeking to invent ways to get
+around the law. And, being firm in the orthodox Administration belief
+that discussion of ultimate independence is purely academic, i.e.,
+a matter of no concern to anybody now living, Governor Forbes is of
+course in sympathy with Americans who wish to develop the resources of
+the Islands. On the other hand, he knows that such a course will daily
+and hourly make ultimate independence more certain never to come. So
+do the Filipinos know this. Therefore they clamor ever louder and
+louder against all American attempts to repeal the anti-exploiting
+Acts of Congress by "liberal" interpretation. Many an American just
+here is sure to ask himself, "Why all this 'clamor'? Do we not give
+them good government? What just ground have they for complaint?" Yes,
+we do give them very good government, so far as the Manila end of
+the business is concerned, except that it is a far more expensive
+government than any people on the earth would be willing to impose
+on themselves. But their main staples are hemp, sugar, and tobacco,
+and we raise the last two in this country. Their sugar and tobacco
+were allowed free entry into the United States by the Paine Law of
+1909 up to amounts limited in the law, but the Philippine people know
+very well that American sugar and tobacco interests will either dwarf
+the growth of their sugar and tobacco industries by refusing to allow
+the limit raised--the limit of amounts admitted free of duty--or else
+that our Sugar Trust and our Tobacco Trust will simply ultimately
+eliminate them by absorption, just as the Standard Oil Company used
+to do with small competitors. In this sort of prospect certainly even
+the dullest intellect must recognize just ground for fearing--nay for
+plainly foreseeing--practical industrial slavery through control by
+foreign [491] corporations of economic conditions. So much for the
+two staples in which the Philippines may some day become competitors
+of ours. It took Mr. Taft nine years to persuade American sugar and
+tobacco that they would not be in any immediate danger by letting
+in a little Philippine sugar and tobacco free of duty. Then they
+consented. Not until then did they promise not to shout "Down with
+cheap Asiatic labor. We will not consent to compete with it." Their
+mental reservation was, of course, and is, "if the Philippine sugar
+and tobacco industries get too prosperous, we will either buy them,
+or cripple them by defeating their next attempt to get legislation
+increasing the amounts of Philippine sugar and tobacco admitted into
+the United States free of duty." And the Filipinos know that this is
+the fate that awaits two out of the three main sources of the wealth
+of their country. Their third source of wealth, their main staple, is
+the world-famous Manila hemp. This represents more than half the value
+of their total annual exports. And as to it, "practical industrial
+slavery through control by foreign corporations of economic conditions"
+is to-day not a fear, but a fact. The International Harvester Company
+has its agents at Manila. The said company or allied interests,
+or both, are large importers of Manila hemp. The reports of all the
+governors-general of the Philippines who have preceded Governor Forbes
+tell, year after year, of the millions "handed over" to American hemp
+importers through "the hemp joker" of the Act of Congress of 1902,
+hereinafter explained, in the chapter on Congressional Legislation
+(Chapter XXVI.). Why did these complaints--made with annual
+regularity up to Governor Forbes's accession--cease thereafter? You
+will find these complaints of his predecessors transcribed in the
+chapter mentioned, because if I had re-stated them you might suspect
+exaggeration. The "rake-off" of the American importers of Manila hemp
+for 1910 was nearly $750,000, as fully explained in Chapter XXVI.
+
+Governor Forbes will be in this country when this book is issued. I
+think he owes it to the American people to explain why he does not
+continue the efforts of his predecessors to halt the depredations
+of the Hemp Trust. Why does he content himself in his last annual
+report with a mild allusion to the fact that the condition of
+the hemp industry is "not satisfactory"? I have said that Governor
+Forbes is a man of high character, and take pleasure in repeating that
+statement in this connection. The truth is we are running a political
+kindergarten for adults in the Philippines, and those responsible
+for the original blunder of taking them, and all their political
+heirs and assigns since, have sought to evade admitting and setting
+to work to rectify the blunder. Unmasked, this is what the policy of
+Benevolent Assimilation now is. They allege an end, and so justify
+all the ways and means. Benevolent Assimilation needs the support
+of the International Harvester Company and of all other Big Business
+interested directly or indirectly in Manila hemp. The end justifies
+the means. Hence the silence. Philippine gubernatorial reticence is
+always most reticent about that particular subject on which at the time
+the American people are most peculiarly entitled to information. As
+long as public order was the most pressing question, Philippine
+gubernatorial reticence selected that branch of our colonial problem
+either for especial silence or for superlatively casual allusion, as
+we have already seen. So now with the economic distresses. Frankness
+would obviously furnish too much good argument for winding up this
+Oriental receivership of ours. The Philippine Government will never
+tell its main current troubles until after they are over. But as
+the present trouble--the economic depredations of powerful special
+interests--must necessarily be fruitful of discontent which will
+crop out some day to remind us that as we sow so shall we reap,
+any one who helps expose the root of the trouble is doing a public
+service. No Congressman who in silence would permit Big Business to
+prey upon his constituents as Governor Forbes has, could long remain in
+office. Taxation without representation may amount to depredation, and
+yet never be corrected, when the powers that prey have the ear of the
+court, and the victims cannot get the ear of the American people. So
+the Hemp Trust continues to rob the Filipinos under the forms of law,
+and the Mohonk Conference continues to kiss Benevolent Assimilation
+on both cheeks. And Dr. Lyman Abbott periodically says Amen. I am not
+speaking disrespectfully of Dr. Abbott. I am deploring the lack of
+information of our people at home as to conditions in the Philippines.
+
+It is a relief to turn from such matters to some of the real
+substantial good we have done out there to which Governor Forbes
+has heretofore publicly pointed with just pride. In an article
+in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909, Governor Forbes (then
+Vice-Governor) said, among other things:
+
+
+    We have completed the separation of Church and State, buying out
+    from the religious orders their large agricultural properties,
+    which are now administered by the government for the benefit of
+    the tenants.
+
+
+This statement I cannot too cordially endorse. It would be grossly
+unfair not to accord full measure of acclaim to Governor Taft for the
+way he worked out the problem of the Friar Lands. He has been attacked
+in some quarters in this regard, and most unjustly. Not being a
+Catholic, and all my people being Protestants, I have no fear of being
+suspected of special pleading in the matter. The working out of the
+Friar Land problem by Governor Taft in the Philippines was a splendid
+piece of constructive statesmanship. He was at his greatest and best
+in that very transaction. The Treaty of Paris had guaranteed that all
+vested rights should be respected, including those of ecclesiastical
+bodies. The friars had long owned the lands in question. There can be
+no particle of doubt on this point. The tenants on the land had all
+long ago attorned to them, father and son, from time out of mind,
+paying rent regularly. But by claiming jurisdiction over their
+tenants' souls also, and getting that jurisdiction effectively
+recognized, the thrifty friars used to raise the rent regularly,
+quieting incipient protest with threats of eternal punishment,
+or protracted stay in purgatory. The advent of our government let
+loose a revolt against the authority of the friars generally, and,
+their spiritual hold once loosened, this led the tenants to dispute
+the land titles of their spiritual shepherds, who were also their
+temporal landlords. Of course the titles had all been long recorded,
+and looked after by the best legal talent the country afforded. As
+long as you control the future of your tenant's soul, you can make him
+pay his last copeck for rent. But as soon as that control is lost,
+the man on whom the governing of the country thereafter devolves
+has a certain prospect of a great agrarian revolution on his hands,
+having in it many elements of substantial righteousness. Governor
+Taft's capacious mind, prompted by his strongest instinct, love of
+justice, conceived the idea of having the Philippine Government raise
+the money to buy the Friar Lands, by issuing bonds, and then buying
+the Friars out and re-selling the land to the tenants on long time,
+on the instalment plan, the instalments to be so graduated as to be
+equal to a moderate rental. Each tenant stayed right where he had
+been all the time, in possession of the tract he had always tilled,
+he and his father before him. To arrange all this it took an Act of
+Congress authorizing the bond issue, and a visit to Rome to arrange
+the bargain with the Pope. Some say His Holiness drove a hard bargain
+with Governor Taft, or to put it another way, that Governor Taft paid
+the Church people too much for the land. He did not. He may not have
+counted pennies with them, but the lands were worth what he paid for
+them. And the purchase protected the faith and honor of our government,
+as pledged by the Treaty of Paris, and at the same time prevented an
+agrarian revolution--which would have had a lot of elemental justice
+on its side.
+
+Another of the good works we have done in the Philippines, to which
+Governor Forbes points in his magazine article above mentioned,
+is thus noted by him:
+
+
+    We have put the finances on a sound and sensible basis.
+
+
+To this also I say Amen. The Forbes article then goes on to say
+that the government of the Islands is self-supporting. This is
+true, except the $14,000,000 a year it costs us to keep out there a
+garrison of 12,000 American troops (supplemented by certain native
+scouts--see chapter on "Cost of the Philippines," hereafter). This
+garrison is conceded to be a mere handful, sufficient merely,
+and intended merely--as a witty English woman has put it in a book
+on the Philippines--"to knock the Filipino on the head in case he
+wants his liberty before the Americans think he is fit for it." In
+other words, we only attempt to keep force enough there to quell any
+outbreak that might occur. So far as possible invasion by any foreign
+power is concerned, our $14,000,000 per annum is an absolutely dead
+loss. Brigadier-General Clarence Edwards, U. S. A., commanding the
+Bureau of Insular Affairs, said recently [492] before the Finance
+Committee of the Senate:
+
+
+    I would never think of the Philippines as a military problem for
+    defence. If any nation wants them, it is merely a declaration
+    of war.
+
+
+What a shameful admission for a great nation to subscribe to,
+relatively to people it pretends to be protecting! The programme of
+the War Department is to abandon the Islands to their fate, for the
+time being at least, in our next war, letting them remain a football
+until the end of such war, when, as an independent republic they
+could, and would, rally as one man to the defence of their country
+against invasion, and would, with a little help from us, make life
+unbearable for an invading force. As things stand, we are just as
+impotent as Spain was out there in 1898, and it is utter folly to
+forget what happened then.
+
+But to return to Governor Forbes's article and to a pleasanter feature
+of the situation. He says:
+
+
+    We have established schools throughout the archipelago, teaching
+    upward of half a million children.
+
+
+This also is true, and greatly to our credit. But as the American
+hemp trust mulcts the Philippine hemp output about a half million
+dollars a year (as above suggested, and later, in another chapter,
+more fully explained), it follows that each Filipino child pays the
+hemp trust a dollar a year for the privilege of going to school.
+
+And now let us consider the most supremely important part of Governor
+Forbes's magazine article above quoted. The burden of the song of
+the adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill (looking to
+Philippine independence in 1921) [493] is that because there are
+certain "wild tribes" scattered throughout the archipelago, in the
+mountain fastnesses, therefore we should cling to the present policy of
+indefinite retention with undeclared intention until the wild tribes
+get civilized. Governor Forbes's article is an absolute, complete,
+and final answer to the misinformed nonsense of the minority report
+aforesaid. He says, apropos of public order:
+
+
+    It is now safe to travel everywhere throughout the Islands without
+    carrying a weapon, excepting only in some of the remote parts of
+    the mountains, where lurk bands of wild tribes who might possibly
+    mistake the object of a visit, and in the southern part of the
+    great island of Mindanao which is inhabited by intractable Moros.
+
+
+The foregoing unmasks, in all its contemptible falsehood, the pretence
+that the presence of a few wild tribes in the Philippines is a reason
+for withholding independence from 7,000,000 of Christian people in
+order that a greedy little set of American importers of Manila hemp may
+fatten thereon. True, hemp is not edible, but it is convertible into
+edibles--and also into campaign funds. That the existence of these wild
+tribes--the dog-eating Igorrotes and other savages you saw exhibited at
+the St. Louis Exposition of 1903-4--constitute infinitely less reason
+for withholding independence from the Filipinos than the American
+Indian constituted in 1776 for withholding independence from us, will
+be sufficiently apparent from a glance at the following table, taken
+from the American Census of the Islands of 1903 (vol. ii., p. 123):
+[494]
+
+
+        Island      Civilized       Wild        Total
+
+        Luzon       3,575,001    223,506    3,798,507
+        Panay         728,713     14,933      743,646
+        Cebu          592,247                 592,247
+        Bohol         243,148                 243,148
+        Negros        439,559     21,217      460,776
+        Leyte         357,641                 357,641
+        Samar         222,002        688      222,690
+        Mindanao      246,694    252,940      499,634
+
+
+I think the above table makes clear the enormity of the injustice I am
+now trying to crucify. Without stopping to use your pencil, you can
+see that Mindanao, the island where the "intractable Moros" Governor
+Forbes speaks of live, contains about a half million people. Half
+of these are civilized Christians, and the other half are the wild,
+crudely Mohammedan Moro tribes. Above Mindanao on the above list,
+you behold what practically is the Philippine archipelago (except
+Mindanao), viz., Luzon and the six main Visayan Islands. If you will
+turn back to pages 225 et seq., especially to page 228, where the
+student of world politics was furnished with all he needs or will
+ever care to know about the geography of the Philippine Islands,
+you will there find all the rocks sticking out of the water and all
+the little daubs you see on the map eliminated from the equation
+as wholly unessential to a clear understanding of the problem of
+governing the Islands. That process of elimination left us Luzon and
+the six main Visayan Islands above, as constituting, for all practical
+governmental purposes all the Philippine archipelago except the Moro
+country, Mindanao (i.e., parts of it), and its adjacent islets;
+Luzon and the Visayan Islands contain nearly 7,000,000 of people,
+and of these the wild tribes, as you can see by a glance at the above
+table, constitute less than 300,000, sprinkled in the pockets of their
+various mountain regions. Nearly all these 300,000 are quite tame,
+peaceable, and tractable, except, as Governor Forbes suggests, they
+"might possibly mistake the object of a visit." The half million
+"intractable Moros" of Mindanao, plus those in the adjacent islets,
+make up another 300,000. These last, it is true, will need policing
+for some time to come, but whether we do that policing by retaining
+Mindanao, or whether we let the Filipinos do it, is a detail that has
+no standing in court as a reason for continuing to deny independence
+to the 7,000,000 of people of Luzon and the Visayan Islands because
+they have some 300,000 backward people in the backwoods of their
+mountains. Yet see how the ingenuity of inspired ignorance states the
+case, by adding the 300,000 tame tribes of Luzon and the Visayas to
+the 300,000 fierce Moro savages away down in Mindanao, near Borneo,
+so as to get 600,000 "wild" people, and then alluding to the fact
+that so far only 200,000 Filipinos are qualified to vote. Says the
+report of the minority of the Committee on Insular Affairs on the
+pending Jones bill (proposing independence in 1921):
+
+
+    The wild and uncivilized inhabitants of the islands outnumber, 3
+    to 1, those who would be qualified to vote under the pending bill
+    [the Jones bill].
+
+
+You see the minority report is counting women and children,
+when it talks about the wild tribes, but not when it talks about
+voters. According to universally accepted general averages, among
+7,500,000 people you should find 1,500,000 adult males. No one doubts
+that of these, by 1921, 500,000 will have become qualified voters. No
+one can deny that any such country having 500,000 qualified voters, the
+bulk of whom are good farmers, and the cream of whom are high-minded
+educated gentlemen, and all of whom are intensely patriotic, will be in
+good shape for promotion to independence. What wearies me about this
+whole matter is that the minority report above mentioned is permitted
+to get off such "rot," and the New York Times, the Army and Navy
+Journal, and others, to applaud it, while the Administration sits by,
+silent, and reaps the benefit of such stale, though not intentional,
+falsehoods, without attempting to correct them, so that our people
+may get at the real merits of the question. You see this silence
+inures to the benefit of the interests that have cornered the Manila
+hemp industry.
+
+In the campaign of 1912 for the Republican nomination for the
+Presidency, there was much mutual recrimination between Colonel
+Roosevelt and Mr. Taft about which of them had been kindest to
+the International Harvester Company. It seems to me it is "up to"
+Governor Forbes, who in the Philippines has served under the present
+President and his predecessor also, to explain why he has abandoned
+the fight, so long waged by previous governors-general, to get what
+former Governor-General James F. Smith calls "the [hemp] joker" of
+the Act of Congress of 1902 concerning the Philippines, wiped from
+the statute books of this country.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII
+
+"NON-CHRISTIAN" WORCESTER
+
+            The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.
+
+                          Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
+
+
+In the year 1911, the editor of one of the great metropolitan
+papers told me that President Taft told him that the Honorable
+Dean C. Worcester, the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine
+Government, was "the most valuable man we have on the Philippine
+Commission." Certainly, reproduction of such an indorsement from
+so exalted a source shows a wish to be fair, in one who considers
+Professor Worcester the direst calamity that has befallen the
+Filipinos since the American occupation, neither war, pestilence,
+famine, reconcentration, nor tariff-wrought poverty excepted. During
+all my stay in the Philippines I never did have any official relations
+of any sort with the Professor, and only met him, casually, once,
+in 1901. The personal impression left from the meeting was distinctly
+that of an overbearing bully of the beggar-on-horseback type. Conscious
+of liability to error, and preferring that the reader should judge for
+himself, I give the main circumstances upon which this impression is
+based. Soon after the central insular government was set up, in 1901,
+Judge Taft and certain other members of the Philippine Commission,
+the Professor among the number, came into my judicial district to
+organize provincial governments. Their coming to each town where they
+stopped was telegraphed in advance, and before they reached the town
+where I then was holding court each one of the American colony of
+the town was designated by common consent to look after a fraction
+of the Taft party during their stay. The Professor fell to my lot. I
+always was unlucky. However, their stay was only a few hours. While
+they were there, I had occasion to observe that the Professor spoke
+Spanish quite well and so remarked to him. The well-bred reply was:
+"You'll find that I know a great many things you might not think I
+knew." Whether this was merely "The insolence of office" cropping
+out in a previously obscure young man suddenly elevated to high
+station, or whether it was an evidence of the Commissioner's idea
+of the relation of the Executive Department of a government to its
+Judiciary, is a question. [495] At all events I think the incident
+gives an insight into the man not irrelevant to what is hereinafter
+submitted. I have met a number of other Americans since who had
+received impressions similar to my own. And the Professor's whole
+subsequent course in the Islands corroborates those impressions. I
+have never talked to any American in the Philippines who had a good
+word for him. Of course, Power, like Property, will always have
+friends. So that even Professor Worcester may have some friends,
+among his fellow-countrymen in those far-away Islands. But it has
+already been made clear in a former chapter how entirely possible it
+is for a man occupying high position in the government out there to
+be very generally and cordially disliked by his own countrymen there
+and actually not know it. Whether this is true of Professor Worcester,
+or not, as a general proposition it is quite possible. One thing is
+certain, namely, that he is very generally and very cordially detested
+by the Filipinos. That this detestation is perfectly natural under
+the circumstances, and entirely justifiable, and that it is a cruel
+injustice to those people, as well as a monumental piece of folly,
+to keep the Professor saddled upon them, it is now in order to show.
+
+In Chapter VI (ante), we made the acquaintance of two young naval
+officers. Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, who,
+in the fall of 1898, while the fate of the Philippines hung in the
+balance at Paris, and peace still reigned in the Islands between us
+and the Filipinos, made a trip through the interior of Luzon, covering
+some six hundred miles, and afterwards furnished Admiral Dewey with
+a written report of their trip, which was later published as a Senate
+document. Professor Worcester's greatest value to President Taft, and
+also the thing out of which has grown, most unfortunately, what seems
+to be a very cordial mutual hatred between him and the Filipinos,
+is his activities in the matter of discovering, getting acquainted
+with, classifying, tabulating, enumerating, and otherwise preparing
+for salvation, the various non-Christian tribes. These tribes have
+already been briefly dealt with in Chapter XXI. (ante), apropos of
+that part of the Great Peace Certificate of 1907 which related to the
+"Moros and other non-Christian tribes"--uncivilized tribes which,
+being as distinct from the great mass of the Filipino people as
+islets from the sea, had had no more to do with the insurrection
+against us, than the Pawnees, Apaches, and Sioux Indians had to do
+with our Civil War of 1861-5. They were also dealt with, somewhat,
+in the chapter preceding this. Long before Professor Worcester was
+permanently inflicted upon the Filipino people, one of the young
+naval officers above mentioned, Mr. Sargent, published an article in
+the Outlook for September 2, 1899, [496] based on this trip through
+the interior of Luzon, made by authority of Admiral Dewey the year
+before. In the course of his article Mr. Sargent says:
+
+
+    Some years ago, at an exposition held at Barcelona, Spain,
+    a man and woman were exhibited as representative types of the
+    inhabitants of Luzon. The man wore a loin cloth, and the woman
+    a scanty skirt. It was evident that they belonged to the lowest
+    plane of savagery.
+
+
+He adds:
+
+
+    I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the pride of the
+    real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition, the
+    knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the island. The
+    man and woman, while actually natives of Luzon, were captives of
+    a wild tribe of Igorrotes of the hills.
+
+
+Professor Worcester was originally a professor of zoology, or something
+of that sort, in a western university. In the early nineties he had
+made a trip to the Philippines, confining himself then mostly to
+creeping things and quadrupeds--lizards, alligators, pythons, unusual
+wild beasts, and other forms of animal life of the kind much coveted as
+specimens by museums and universities. In 1899, just after the Spanish
+War, he got out a book on the Philippines, and as an American who had
+been in the Philippines was then a rara avis, it came to pass that
+the reptile-finder ultimately became a statesman. He was brought,
+possibly by conscious worth, to the notice of President McKinley,
+accompanied the Schurman Commission to the Islands, in 1899, and
+the Taft Commission in 1900, and finally evolved into his present
+eminence as Secretary of the Interior and official chief finder of
+non-Christian tribes for the Philippine Government.
+
+The best known of the wild tribes in the Philippines are the Igorrotes,
+the dog-eating savages you saw at the St. Louis Exposition in 1903-4,
+the same Mr. Sargent speaks of in his article in the Outlook. Of
+course it was not a desire to misrepresent the situation, but only the
+enthusiasm of a zoologist, anthropologically inclined, and accustomed
+to carry a kodak, which started the Professor to photographing the
+dog-eating Igorrotes and specimens of other non-Christian tribes
+soon after the Taft Commission reached the Philippines. But you
+cannot get far in the earlier reports of the Taft Commission, which
+was supposed to have been sent out to report back on the capacity of
+the Filipinos for self-government, without crossing the trail of the
+Professor's kodak--pictures of naked Igorrotes and the like. This,
+however innocent, must have been of distinct political value in
+1900 and 1904 in causing the heart of the missionary vote in the
+United States to bleed for those "sixty different tribes having sixty
+different languages" of which Secretary Root's campaign speeches made
+so much. It must also have greatly awakened the philanthropic interest
+of exporters of cotton goods to learn of those poor "savage millions"
+wearing only a loin cloth, when they could be wearing yards of cotton
+cloth. By the time the St. Louis Exposition came off, in 1903-4,
+it was decided to have the various tribes represented there. So
+specimens were sent of the Igorrote tribe, the Tagalos, the Visayans,
+the Negrito tribe, and various other tribes. The Tagalos, the Visayans,
+etc., being ordinary Filipinos, did not prove money-makers. But it was
+great sport to watch the Igorrotes preparing their morning dog. So it
+was the "non-Christian tribes" that paid. It was they that were most
+advertised. It was the recollection of them that lingered longest
+with the visitor to the Exposition, and there was always in his mind
+thereafter an association of ideas between the Igorrotes and Filipino
+capacity for self-government generally. Many representative Filipinos
+visited the St. Louis Exposition, saw all this, and came home and told
+about it. One very excellent Filipino gentleman, a friend of mine,
+who was Governor of Samar during my administration of the district
+which included that island, sent me one day in October, 1904, a
+satirical note, enclosing a pamphlet he had just received called
+Catalogue of Philippine Views at the St. Louis Exposition. He knew I
+would understand, so he said in the note, that the pamphlet was sent
+"in order that you may learn something of certain tribes still extant
+in this country." Concerning all this, I can say of my own knowledge
+exactly what Naval Cadet Sargent said concerning the lesser like
+indignity of the one Igorrote couple exhibited at Barcelona while
+the Filipinos were asking representation in the Spanish Cortes, viz.:
+
+
+    I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the pride of
+    the real Filipino people than that caused by this exhibition,
+    the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the islands.
+
+
+You see our Census of 1903 gave the population of the Philippines
+at about 7,600,000 of which 7,000,000 are put down as civilized
+Christians; and of the remaining 600,000, about half are the
+savage, or semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros, in Mindanao,
+and the adjacent islets down near Borneo. The other 300,000 or so
+uncivilized people scattered throughout the rest of the archipelago,
+the "non-Christian tribes," which dwell in the mountain fastnesses,
+remote from "the madding crowd," cut little more figure, if any,
+in the general political equation, than the American Indian does
+with us to-day. Take for instance the province of Nueva Vizcaya,
+in the heart of north central Luzon. That was one of the provinces
+of the First Judicial District I presided over in the Islands. I
+think Nueva Vizcaya is Professor Worcester's "brag" province, in the
+matter of non-Christian anthropological specimens, both regarding
+their number and their variety. Yet while I was there, though we knew
+those people were up in the hills, and that there were a good many
+of them, the civilized people all told us that the hill-tribes never
+bothered them. And on their advice I have ridden in safety, unarmed,
+at night, accompanied only by the court stenographer, over the main
+high-road running through the central plateau that constitutes the
+bulk of Nueva Vizcaya province, said plateau being surrounded by a
+great amphitheatre of hills, the habitat of the Worcester pets.
+
+The non-Christian tribes in the Philippines have been more
+widely advertised in America than anything else connected with
+the Islands. That advertisement has done more harm to the cause
+of Philippine independence by depreciating American conceptions
+concerning Filipino capacity for self-government, than anything that
+could be devised even by the cruel ingenuity of studied mendacity. And
+Professor Worcester is the P. T. Barnum of the "non-Christian tribe"
+industry. The Filipinos, though unacquainted with the career of
+the famous menagerie proprietor last named, and his famous remark:
+"The American people love to be humbugged," understand the malign
+and far-reaching influence upon their future destiny of the work
+of Professor Worcester, and his services to the present Philippine
+policy of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, through
+humbugging the American people into the belief that the Islands must be
+retained until the three hundred thousand or so Negritos, Igorrotes,
+and other primitive wild peoples sprinkled throughout the archipelago
+are "reconstructed." Is it any wonder that the Filipinos do not love
+the Professor? To keep him saddled upon them as one of their rulers
+is as tactful as it would be to send Senator Tillman on a diplomatic
+mission to Liberia or Haiti.
+
+Not long ago the famous magazine publisher Mr. S. S. McClure, who, I
+think, is trying to make his life one of large and genuine usefulness
+for good, said to me that if we gave the Filipinos self-government
+we would shortly have another Haiti or Santo Domingo on our hands. He
+must have seen some of Professor Worcester's pictures of Igorrotes and
+Negritos scattered through public documents related to the question
+of Filipino capacity for self-government. Mr. McClure has never,
+I believe, been in the Islands; and the cruelly unjust impression he
+had innocently received was precisely the impression systematically
+developed all these years through the Worcester kodak.
+
+In February, 1911, there appeared an article in the Sunset magazine for
+that month entitled "The Philippines as I Saw them." The contributor
+of the article is no less a personage than the Honorable James
+F. Smith, former Governor-General of the Islands. At the top of the
+article one reads the legend "Illustrated by Photographs through
+the Courtesy of the Bureau of Insular Affairs." If you read this
+legend understandingly, you can, in so doing, hear the click of the
+Worcester kodak. General Smith's article is smeared all over with
+such pictures. One is merrily entitled "Eighteen Igorrot Fledglings
+Hatched by the American Bird of Freedom." Another is entitled "Subano
+Man and woman, Mindanao." Another is a picture of an Ifugao home
+in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, hereinabove mentioned. Ifugao is
+the name of one of the wild tribes, one of the results of Professor
+Worcester's anthropological excavations of the last few years. In
+front of the Ifugao home stands the master of the house, clothed in a
+breech-clout. Next in the menagerie in the article under consideration
+you find a group of Ifugao children, then a Bagobo of Mindanao, then
+some other specimen with a curious name, in which there is a woman
+naked from the waist up and a man in a loin-cloth. Then follows a
+picture of a Tingyan girl from Abra province. And, to cap the climax,
+among the last of these pictures you find a Filipino couple pounding
+rice. The rice pounders are ordinary Filipinos. The woman is decently
+dressed; the man is clothed only from the waist down, having divested
+himself of his upper garment, as is customary in order to work at hard
+labor more comfortably in hot weather. I do not so much blame General
+Smith for this libellous panorama of pictures, scattered though they
+are through an article by him on "The Philippines as I Saw them." He
+probably illustrated his article with what the Bureau of Insular
+Affairs sent him, without giving much thought to the matter. But the
+Bureau of Insular Affairs appears to neglect no occasion to parade the
+Philippine archipelago's sprinkling of non-Christian tribes before
+the American public, fully knowing that the hopes of the Filipinos
+for independence must depend upon impressions received by the American
+people concerning the degree of civilization they have reached.
+
+For all these wanton indignities offered their pride and self-respect,
+the Filipinos well know they are primarily indebted to Professor
+Worcester and his non-Christian tribe bureau. The feud between the
+Professor and the Filipino people--the bad blood has been growing so
+long that the incident hereinafter related justifies its being called
+a feud--has been peculiarly embittered by the missionary aspect of
+the non-Christian industry. The great body of the Filipino people,
+the whole six or seven millions of them, are Catholics--most of them
+devout Catholics. Presumably, their desire for salvation by the method
+handed down by their forefathers would not be affected by a change
+from American political supervision to independence. Yet the darkest
+thing ahead of Philippine independence prospects is the Protestant
+missionary vote in the United States. Bishop Brent, Episcopal Bishop
+of the Philippines, one of the noblest and most saintly characters
+that ever lived, has devoted his life apparently to missionary work
+in the Philippines, having twice declined a nomination as Bishop of
+Washington (D.C.). The only field of endeavor open to Bishop Brent and
+his devoted little band of co-workers is the non-Christian tribes. It
+seems that the Catholic and Protestant ecclesiastical authorities in
+the Islands get along harmoniously, a kind of modus vivendi having
+been arranged between them, by which the Protestants are not to do
+any proselyting among the seven millions of Catholic Christians. So
+this field of endeavor is the one Professor Worcester has been
+industriously preparing during the last twelve years. Obviously,
+every time Professor Worcester digs up a new non-Christian tribe
+he increases the prospective harvest of the Protestants, thus
+corralling more missionary vote at home for permanent retention of
+the Philippines. Professor Worcester is quoted in a Manila paper as
+saying, "I am under no delusion as to what may be accomplished for
+the primitive wild people. It takes time to reconstruct them." This
+remark is supposed to have been made in a speech before the Young Men's
+Christian Association of Manila. Neither is Mr. Taft under any delusion
+as to how valuable is religious support for the idea of retaining the
+Philippines as a missionary field. The nature of the above allusion to
+Bishop Brent should certainly be sufficient to show that the writer
+yields to no one in affectionate reverence and respect for that rare
+and noble character. But neither Bishop Brent nor any one else can
+persuade him that it is wise to abandon the principle that Church
+and State should be separate, in order that our government may go
+into the missionary business. Since it has become apparent that the
+Philippines will not pay, the Administration has relied solely on
+missionary sentiment. In one of his public utterances Mr. Taft has
+said in effect, "The programme of the Republican party with regard
+to the Philippines is one which will make greatly for the spread of
+Christian civilization throughout the Orient."
+
+The foregoing reflections are not intended to raise an issue as to the
+wisdom of foreign missions. They are simply intended to illustrate
+how it is possible and natural for President Taft to consider
+Professor Worcester "the most valuable man we have on the Philippine
+Commission." The Professor's menagerie is a vote-getter. Also,
+President Taft's whole Philippine policy being founded upon the theory
+that "the great majority" of the Filipino people are in favor of
+alien thraldom in lieu of independence, he tolerantly permits their
+editors to "let off steam" through clamor for independence. This
+privilege they do not fail to exercise to the limit. The attitude
+of the Insular Government permits the native press much latitude of
+"sauciness," in deference to the American idea about liberty of the
+press. In the exercise of this privilege during the last few years
+the native press has gone the limit. However, there was no way to
+stop them, on the principle to which we had committed ourselves. The
+thing was very mischievous, and became utterly intolerable. There was
+a native paper called Renacimiento (Renaissance). This paper was long
+permitted to say things more or less seditious in character which
+no self-respecting government should have tolerated. This was done
+pursuant to the original theory, obstinately adhered to up to date,
+that there was no real substantial unwillingness to American rule. Of
+course, if this were true, newspaper noise could do no harm. Therefore
+it was permitted to continue. Finally, however, like a boy "taking a
+dare," the Renacimiento published an article on Professor Worcester
+which intimately and sympathetically voiced the general yearning of
+the Filipino people to be rid of the Professor. In so doing, however,
+the hapless editor overstepped the limits of American license, and
+got into the toils of the law, by saying things about the Professor
+that rendered the editor liable to prosecution for criminal libel. The
+Professor promptly took advantage of this misstep, to the great joy of
+the authorities, who had been previously much goaded by independence
+clamor. The result was that the paper was put out of business and the
+editor was put in jail. No doubt the editor ought to have been put in
+jail, but his incarceration incidentally served to tone down Filipino
+clamor for independence. Subsequent to this coup d'etat, the Professor
+did a little venting of feelings in his turn. He made a speech at
+the Y. M. C. A. on October 10, 1910, which was a highly unchristian
+speech to be gotten off in an edifice dedicated to the service
+of Christ. The Manila papers give only extracts from the speech,
+and I have never seen a copy of it. From the newspaper accounts,
+it seems that the Professor was determined to, and did, relieve his
+feelings about the Filipinos. The Manila Cable-News of October 11,
+1910, quotes the Professor as referring to his pets, the non-Christian
+tribes, as "ancestral enemies of the Christians." Thus for the first
+time is developed an attitude of being champion of the uncivilized
+pagan remnant, left from prehistoric times, against the Christians
+of the Islands. The Cable-News also says that Professor Worcester
+"laughed at the idea that the Islands belonged to the so-called
+civilized people and held that if the archipelago belonged to any
+one it certainly belonged to its original owners the Negritos." This
+remark about the "so-called civilized people" was as tactful as
+if President Taft should address a meeting of colored people in a
+doubtful state and call them "niggers." Another of the Manila papers
+gives an account of the speech from which it appears that the burly
+Professor succeeded in amusing himself at least, if not his audience,
+by suggestions as to the superior fighting qualities of the Moros over
+the Filipinos, which suggestions were on the idea that the Moros would
+lick the Filipinos if we should leave the country. (The Moros number
+300,000, the Filipinos nearly 7,000,000.) The Professor's remarks
+in this regard, according to the paper, were a distinct reflection
+upon the courage of the Filipinos generally as a people. The effect
+of Professor Worcester's speech before the Y. M. C. A. may be well
+imagined. However the facts of history do not leave the imagination
+unaided. The Philippine Assembly, representing the whole Filipino
+people, and desiring to express the unanimous feeling of those people
+with regard to the Worcester speech, unanimously passed, soon after
+the speech was delivered, a set of resolutions whereof the following
+is a translation:
+
+
+    Resolved that the regret of the Assembly be recorded for the
+    language attributed to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary
+    of the Interior of the Philippine Government in a discourse
+    before the Young Men's Christian Association, October 10,
+    1910. It is improper and censurable in a man who holds a public
+    office and who has the confidence of the government. And as the
+    statements made as facts are false, slanderous, and offensive to
+    the Philippine people, their publication is a grave violation of
+    the instructions given by President McKinley which required that
+    public functionaries should respect the sensibilities, beliefs,
+    and sentiments of the Philippine people, and should show them
+    consideration. The words and the conduct of Mr. Worcester tend
+    to sow distrust between the Americans and the Filipinos, whose
+    aspirations and duties should not separate them but unite them
+    in the pathway which leads to the progress and emancipation of
+    the Philippine people. The influence of Mr. Worcester has caused
+    injury to the feelings of the Filipinos, encouraged race hatred,
+    and tended to frustrate the task undertaken by men of real good
+    will to win the esteem, confidence, and respect of the Philippine
+    people for the Americans.
+
+    Resolved further that this House desires that these facts should
+    be communicated to the President of the United States through
+    the Governor of the Philippines and the Secretary of War.
+
+
+Presumably these resolutions were forwarded "to the President
+of the United States through the Governor of the Philippines and
+the Secretary of War." But apparently they were pigeonholed when
+they reached Washington. I stumbled on them in the Insular Affairs
+Committee of the House of Representatives whither they had landed
+through Mr. Slayden of Texas. The distinguished veteran Congressman
+from Texas, being known as an enemy of all wrong things, was appealed
+to by certain persons in the United States to bring the matter to
+the attention of Congress. He did so by presenting to the House of
+Representatives an American petition which embodied a copy of the
+resolutions of the Philippine Assembly.
+
+It thus becomes apparent that one of Professor Worcester's principal
+elements of value is in bullying the Filipinos, and thereby smothering
+manifestations of a desire for independence, the existence of which
+desire is denied by President Taft's Administration. The more the
+Filipinos cry for independence the greater seems the sin of holding
+them in subjection. So that Professor Worcester is very valuable in
+silencing independence clamor and thereby creating an appearance of
+consent of the governed, when there is no consent of the governed
+whatsoever.
+
+In describing the discontent in distant provinces under brutal
+pro-consuls, which contributed largely to the final disintegration
+of the Roman Empire, Gibbon says:
+
+
+    The cry of remote distress is ever faintly heard.
+
+
+The total failure of the above temperate, dignified, and vibrant
+protest of the Philippine Assembly to reach the ears of the American
+people is but another reminder that history repeats itself.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV
+
+THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL SERVICE
+
+        Is our Occupation of the Philippines to be temporary,
+        like our occupation of Cuba after the Spanish War, or
+        "temporary" like the British Occupation of Egypt since
+        1882? The Unsettled Question.
+
+        The policy to be pursued is for Congress to determine.
+        I have no authority to speak for Congress in respect
+        to the ultimate disposition of the Islands.
+
+              Secretary of War Wm. H. Taft to Philippine Assembly, 1907.
+
+
+The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Government
+Act, is entitled "An Act temporarily to provide" a government for the
+Philippine Islands. The young American who goes out to the Philippines
+to take a position with the Insular Government there has usually
+read his share of Kipling, and his imagination likes to analogize
+his prospective employment to the British Indian Civil Service. The
+latter, however, offers a career. But what does the former offer? Take
+the prospects of the rank and file, as set forth by Mr. J. R. Arnold,
+of the Executive Bureau of the Philippine Government, in an article
+published in the North American Review for February, 1912. Suppose a
+young man goes out to the Philippines at a salary of $1200. Mr. Arnold
+discusses fully and frankly the cost of living in the Islands, and
+how much higher board, lodging, etc., are out there than in the United
+States. He states that board and lodging will cost $15 to $20 a month
+more than here. So that, so far, a salary of $1200 in the Philippines
+would seem equivalent to a salary of say approximately $950 in the
+United States--say in Washington. Also he calls attention to the
+fact that the government will pay your way out, but you must get
+back the best way you can. He does not say so, but the walking is not
+good all the way from Manila to Washington. Seriously, according to
+the authority from whom we are quoting, it costs $225 to $300 to get
+back. So if you come back at the end of a three years' stay--you must
+contract to stay at least that long--you must have laid by, taking
+his maximum return fare as the more prudent figure to reckon on, one
+hundred dollars a year to buy your return ticket. Mr. Arnold does not
+say so, but it is a fact, that various little expenses will creep in
+that are sure to amount, even with the most rigidly frugal, to $50
+per annum that you would never have spent in the United States. You
+are hardly respectable in the Philippines if you do not have a
+muchacho. Muchacho, in Spanish, means the same as garcon in French,
+or valet in English. But muchachos are as thick as cigarettes in the
+Philippines. And you can hire one for about $5 a month. To resolve not
+to have a muchacho in the Philippines would be like resolving at home
+never to have your shoes shined, or your clothes pressed. It would be
+contrary to the universal custom of the country, and would therefore be
+"impossible." You have not been long in the Philippines before you get
+tired of telling applicants for the position of muchacho that you do
+not want one, and, benumbed by the universal custom, you accept the
+last applicant. You must figure on a muchacho as one of your "fixed
+charges." Count then an extra $50 annual necessary expense that you
+would not have at home. If you do not succumb to the muchacho custom,
+you will get rid of the $50 in other ways fairly classifiable as
+necessary current expenses. Thus, if you take from your $1200, worth
+$950 in Manila, as above stated, the $100 per annum necessary to be
+laid by against your home-coming, and the other $50 last suggested,
+your salary of $1200 per annum in Manila becomes equivalent to one of
+$800 at home, so far as regards what you are likely to save by strict
+habits of economy. In other words, to figure how you are going to come
+out in the long run, if you go out as a $1200 man, while your social
+position will be precisely that of a man commanding the same salary
+in a government position in Washington, you must knock off a third of
+the $1200. This is not the way Mr. Arnold states the case exactly. I
+am simply taking his facts, supplemented by what little I have added,
+and stating them in a way which will perhaps illustrate the case
+better to some people. Mr. Arnold says you are apt to get up as high
+as $1500 and finally even to $1800 in three to five years. Suppose
+you do have that luck. Still, if, as has been made plain above, you
+must consider $1200 in Manila as equal to only $800 in Washington
+(so far as regards what you are going to be able to save each year),
+by the same token you must consider $1500 in Manila as being equal
+to only $1000 in Washington, and $1800 as only $1200.
+
+The utmost limit of achievement in the Philippine Government service,
+the only one of the higher positions not subject to political caprice,
+the only one regarded out there as a "life position"--and this excepts
+neither the Governorship of the Islands nor the Commissionerships--is
+the position of Justice of the Supreme Court. The salary is $10,000
+per annum, American money. But there is not an American judge on that
+bench who would not be glad at any moment to accept a $5000 position
+as a United States District Judge at home. All of them whom I know
+are most happily married. But I believe their wives would quit them
+if they refused such an offer from the President of the United States,
+or else get so unhappy about it that they would accept and come home.
+
+While we have now considered the case from bottom to top, we did not
+originally figure on the young American going out to the Philippines
+otherwise than single. In this behalf Mr. Arnold himself says:
+
+
+    I do not think it can be fairly called other than risky for
+    an American to attempt to practise love in a cottage in the
+    Philippines.
+
+
+Says the late Arthur W. Fergusson--who gave his life to the Philippine
+Civil Service--in his annual report for 1905, as Executive Secretary:
+
+
+    The one great stumbling-block, and which no legislative body
+    can eradicate, is the fact that very few Americans intend to
+    make the Philippines their permanent home, or even stay here
+    for any extended period. This is doubtless due to the location
+    of the islands, their isolation from centres of civilization
+    and culture, the enervating climate, lack of entertainment and
+    desirable companionship, and distance from the homeland. Every
+    clerk, no matter what his ideals or aspirations, realizes after
+    coming here that he must at some time in the future return to
+    the United States and begin all over again. After spending a
+    year or more in the islands, the realization that the sooner the
+    change is made the better, becomes more acute. This condition
+    causes, doubtless, the class of men who are not adventurous or
+    fond of visiting strange climes to think twice before accepting
+    an appointment for service in these islands, and generally to
+    remain away, and a great majority of those who do come here to
+    leave the service again after a very short period of duty. [497]
+
+
+Then Mr. Fergusson comes to the obvious but apparently unattainable
+remedy, which he says is
+
+
+    to make a Philippine appointment a permanent means of livelihood
+    by providing an effective system of transfers to the Federal
+    service after a reasonable period of service here. * * * Under
+    the present regulations influence must be brought to bear at
+    Washington in order that requisition may be made by the Chief of
+    some bureau there for the services of a clerk desiring to transfer.
+
+
+You see, if a Washington Bureau, say the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
+or the Geological Survey, sends a man out to the Islands, he is never
+for a moment separated from the Federal Civil Service or the Federal
+Government's pay-roll. The same is true of civilian employees of the
+army. But the man in the Insular Service, when he wants to get back
+home, is little better off than if he were in the employ of the Cuban
+Government, or the British Indian Government, or that of the Dutch
+East Indies. Mr. Fergusson also says:
+
+
+    It is believed to be useless to try to influence men to come out
+    here unless there is something permanent offered to them at the
+    expiration of a reasonable term of service. * * * The average
+    European is content to live and die "east of Suez"; the average
+    American is not. * * * I am firmly convinced that a permanent
+    service under present conditions is entirely out of the question.
+
+
+How can you have "a permanent service" unless you have a definite
+declared policy? Why not declare the purpose of our Government with
+the regard to the Islands?
+
+In his annual report for 1906 [498] Mr. Fergusson says:
+
+
+    Our relations to the islands are such that the education and
+    specialization of a distinct body of high class men purposely
+    for this service as is done in England for the Indian service,
+    will probably be always a practical impossibility.
+
+
+He then goes on to reiterate his annual plea for a law providing for
+transfer as a matter of right, not of influence, from the Philippine
+Civil Service to the Federal Civil Service in the United States,
+and tells of a very capable official of his bureau who got a chance
+during the year just closed to transfer from the Philippines to a
+$1400 government position in the United States, and was glad to get
+it, although $1400 was "considerably less than half what he received
+here." Mr. Fergusson quickly gives the key to all this in what he calls
+"the haunting fear of having to return to the States in debilitated
+health and out of touch with existent conditions, only to face the
+necessity of seeking a new position." He adds:
+
+
+    That this is not a mere theory is proven by the number of army
+    (civilian) employees who contentedly remain year after year.
+
+
+In 1907, Mr. Fergusson reports on the same subject [499]: "Matters
+do not seem to be improving," and that the Director of the Insular
+Civil Service informs him that "during the fiscal year there were five
+hundred voluntary separations from the service by Americans, of whom
+one hundred were college graduates." He adds: "When the expense of
+getting and bringing out new men, and of training them to their new
+work is considered, the wastefulness of the present system is evident."
+
+You do not find any quotations from any of the Fergusson disclosures
+in Mr. Arnold's North American Review article. He would probably have
+lost his job, if he had quoted them. Yet the evils pointed out by
+Mr. Fergusson come from one permanent source, the uncertainty of the
+future of every American out there, due to the failure of Congress
+to declare the purpose of the Government.
+
+On January 30, 1908, Arthur W. Fergusson died in the service of the
+Philippine Government. No general law putting that service on the basis
+he pleaded for to the day of his death has ever yet been passed. Since
+his death, his tactful successor appears to have abandoned further
+pleading, and concluded to worry along with the permanently lame
+conditions inherent in the uncertainty as to whether we are to keep
+the Islands permanently or not, rather than embarrass President Taft
+by discouraging young Americans from going to the Islands.
+
+The report of the Governor-General of the Philippines for 1907,
+Governor Smith, says [500]:
+
+
+    American officials and employees have rarely made up their minds
+    to cast their fortunes definitely with the Philippines or to make
+    governmental service in the tropics a career. Many of those who
+    in the beginning were so minded, due to ill health or the longing
+    to return to friends or relatives, changed front and preferred to
+    return to the home land, there to enjoy life at half the salary
+    in the environment to which they were accustomed. * * * That
+    which operates probably more than anything else to induce good men
+    drawing good salaries to abandon the service * * * is the knowledge
+    that they have nothing to look forward to when broken health or
+    old age shall have rendered them valueless to the government.
+
+
+If Congress should ever care to do anything to improve the Philippine
+Civil Service and the status of Americans entering the same, certainly
+the one supremely obvious thing to do is to make transfer back to
+the civil service in the United States after a term of duty in the
+Islands a matter of right.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV
+
+COST OF THE PHILIPPINES
+
+                If 't were well to do right, 't were better still
+                if 't were more profitable.
+
+                                                           Cynic Maxims.
+
+
+General Otis's annual report for 1899, [501] dated August 31st, gives
+the number of Americans killed in battle in the Philippines, from
+the beginning of the American occupation to that date, as 380. This
+includes those wounded who afterwards died of such wounds. His report
+for 1900, [502] covering the period from his 1899 report to May 5,
+1900, gives the number of Americans killed in battle from August 31,
+1899, to May 1, 1900, as 258. General MacArthur succeeded General
+Otis in command of the American forces in the Philippines on May 5,
+1900. General MacArthur's annual report for 1901, [503] gives the
+number of Americans killed in battle between May 5, 1900, and June 30,
+1901, as 245. Thus the total number of Americans killed in battle up
+to the time the Civil Government was set up in 1901, was 883. The
+military reports do not always give the insurgents killed during
+the periods they cover. But on June 4, 1900, as we saw in a previous
+chapter, General MacArthur reported the number of Filipinos killed
+up to that time, so far as our records showed, to be something over
+10,000. General MacArthur's report, above quoted, giving our killed
+for the period it covers (May 5, 1900, to June 30, 1901), at 245,
+gives the insurgent killed for the same period as 3854. If we add this
+3854 to the 10,000 killed up to about where May merged into June in
+1900, we have 13,854 Filipinos killed up to the time Judge Taft was
+inaugurated as Governor, in 1901. There was no record, of course,
+obtainable or attempted, by the Eighth Army Corps, of Filipinos who
+were wounded and not captured and who subsequently died. It is quite
+safe to assume that such fatalities must have swelled the enemy's list
+up to the time of the setting up of the Civil Government far above
+16,000 killed. Thus, as has heretofore been stated, the ratio of the
+enemy's loss to our loss was, literally, at least 16 to 1, up to the
+time the civil government was set up. General MacArthur's report for
+1900 [504] would seem to bear out the above ratio. He there gives the
+number of our killed, from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900,
+including the wounded who afterwards died of such wounds, at 268, and
+the Filipinos killed, "as far as of record," 3227. While these last
+figures make our killed for the period they relate to, considerably
+over 200, and the enemy's killed but a very small figure over 3200,
+still, making allowances for the enemy's wounded that died afterwards,
+of which of course we have no record, the 16 to 1 ratio would seem to
+give a fairly accurate probable estimate of the relative loss of life.
+
+These figures are explained by the facts, already noticed hereinbefore,
+that most of our people knew how to shoot and the Filipinos did
+not. The great part of their army were raw recruits who did not
+understand the use of two sights on a rifle, and frequently relied
+solely on the one at the muzzle, not even lifting up the sight near
+the lock which when not in use lies flat along the gun-barrel, with
+the result that they almost invariably got the range too high and
+shot over our heads.
+
+Because the military reports overlap each other in many instances,
+it is not possible to state accurately how many men the Eighth Army
+Corps lost by disease, but our loss chargeable to this account was
+not far from our fatalities on the battlefield. [505]
+
+It is not possible to even approximate the enemy's loss other than
+on the battlefield. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey
+Philippine Atlas gives the table estimating the population of the
+various provinces of the Philippine archipelago prior to the American
+occupation. This estimate gives the population of Batangas province
+at 312,192. The American Census of the Philippines of 1903 gives
+the population of Batangas province at 257,715. [506] This would
+present a difference in the population of Batangas prior to 1898 and
+its population after the war of 54,477. The provincial secretary of
+Batangas province made a report to Governor Taft on December 18, 1901
+[507] on the condition of the province generally. This report, as it
+appears in the Senate Document, is a translation from the Spanish. The
+portion which relates to the reduction of the population of Batangas
+province reads as follows:
+
+
+    The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease,
+    such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
+    200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years
+    the province had.
+
+
+Of course these appalling figures [508] must be taken with a grain
+of salt. In the first place, the man who furnished them was merely
+reproducing the general impression of his neighbors as to the
+diminution of the population of the province. He does not pretend
+to be dealing with official statistics. On the other hand, all of
+the yearly reports of the various native provincial officers are,
+as a general rule, pathetically optimistic. They all seem to think
+it their duty to present a hopeful view of the situation. In fact if
+you read these reports one after the other, the various signers seem
+to vie with one another in optimism as if their tenure of office
+depended upon it. So that, balancing probabilities, it would seem
+unlikely that the provincial secretary of Batangas would have stated
+more than what he at least believed to represent actual conditions,
+and the results of the war. A comparison of the Atlas population
+tables above mentioned with the census tables of 1903 shows no very
+startling difference in the population of any of the other provinces
+of the archipelago before and after the war except Batangas. It is
+also notorious that Batangas suffered by the war more than any other
+province in the Philippine Islands. However, a glance at the table
+of population of the various provinces of the Census of 1903 [509]
+shows you fifty provinces with a total of 7,635,426 people. While
+we will never know whether Batangas did or did not lose one hundred
+thousand as a result of the war and its consequences, still, if it did,
+the other forty-nine provinces above mentioned must have lost as many
+more, that is to say, must have lost another hundred thousand. So that
+while it is all a matter of surmise, with nothing more certain to go on
+than the foregoing, it would really seem by no means absurd to assume
+the Filipino loss of life, other than on the battlefield, caused by the
+war, and the famine, pestilence, and other disease consequent thereon,
+at not far from 200,000 people. In more than one province, the people
+died like flies, especially the women and children, as a result of
+conditions incident to and consequent upon the war. This will not
+seem an over-statement to men who have lived much among people that
+do not know much about how to take care of themselves in the midst
+of great calamities, people who will eat meat of animals carried off
+by disease, in time of famine; who will drink water contaminated by
+what may for euphony be called sewage; and who are unprovided with
+any save traditional home remedies against cholera, small-pox, etc.
+
+As to the cost of the Philippines in money, it used to be said
+in the early days that we paid $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000
+insurrection. Just what the Islands have cost us up to date in money
+it is utterly impossible to figure out with any degree of certainty,
+except that a safe minimum may be arrived at. Said the distinguished
+Congressman from Texas, Honorable James L. Slayden, in a speech which
+appears in the Congressional Record of February 25, 1908 (pp. 2532
+et seq.):
+
+
+    On this point, and in reply to a resolution of the Senate in
+    1902, the Secretary of War reported that the cost of the army
+    in the Philippines from June 30, 1898, to July 1, 1902, had been
+    $169,853,512.00. To this let us add $114,515,643.00, the admitted
+    cost of the army in the Philippines from May 1, 1902, to June 30,
+    1907, and we will have a grand total of $284,369,155.00. That
+    does not take into account the additional cost of the navy.
+
+
+Nor, be it noted, does it count the $20,000,000 we paid Spain for
+the Islands, which item, is, however included in another part of
+Mr. Slayden's speech.
+
+The only other estimate of what the Islands have cost, made in the
+last few years, which seems to be specially worthy of consideration,
+is one which appeared in the New York Evening Post of March 6,
+1907. This estimate was prepared by one of the best trained and
+most conservative newspaper men in the United States, Mr. Edward
+G. Lowry, then Washington correspondent of the Evening Post, and
+since 1911, its managing editor. The total which Mr. Lowry arrives
+at is $308,369,155, up to that time. There have been various absurd
+estimates made recklessly without knowledge, but Mr. Lowry's estimate
+is very carefully studied out, and presented in detail in the newspaper
+referred to. From the testimony of Mr. Slayden and Mr. Lowry, given
+as a result of their inquiries into the matter, it would thus seem
+that the Islands must have cost us by the end of 1907 something like
+$300,000,000. The Insular Government is now self-sustaining, except
+as to military affairs.
+
+The cost per annum of the Philippine (native) scouts, of which there
+are 4000, is paid out of the United States Treasury, and amounts
+to $2,000,000 per annum. [510] The number of American troops in the
+islands for the last few years has been about 12,000. Those who are
+wedded to the present Philippine policy of indefinite retention
+with undeclared intention, insist that our military expenses in
+the Philippines, in respect to the regular army out there, are not
+fairly chargeable as a part of the current expenses of the Philippine
+occupation. This argument must be admitted to have some force as far
+as the navy is concerned, but as to the army it is clearly without
+merit. Under the Act of Congress reorganizing the army of the United
+States after the Spanish War, provision was made for a skeleton army
+of about 60,000 men capable of expansion to something like 100,000
+in time of war. The method of expansion thus contemplated was to have
+companies of, say, for illustration, sixty men, in time of peace, which
+companies could be recruited up to a war footing of one hundred men,
+in time of war. The suggestion that the cost of the part of the regular
+army which we have to keep in the Philippines is not chargeable to
+the Philippines because those same troops would have to be somewhere
+in the United States if they were not where they are, is not well
+taken. If we did not need 12,000 men continually in the Philippines,
+the army could be at once reduced by that much without affecting its
+present organization. If we had no troops in the Philippines this would
+not mean the absolute elimination from the army of enough regiments
+to represent twelve thousand men. It would not eliminate any existing
+organization. It would simply mean contraction of the number of men in
+the several companies of the several regiments of the army toward a
+peace basis to the extent of a total of twelve thousand men, more or
+less. The War Department has long figured on the cost of an American
+soldier in the Philippines per annum including his pay, allowances,
+and transportation out and back, at $1000 per annum. The cost of
+12,000 soldiers at $1000 per annum is $12,000,000, per annum. The
+conclusion would, therefore, seem inevitable that the extra military
+current expense chargeable to our occupation of the Philippines is
+$12,000,000, per annum, outside the Philippine scouts, or, a total
+of $14,000,000. Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000,
+that is no reason why we should continue to run a kindergarten for
+adults out there, and let the Monroe Doctrine run to seed. "Something"
+is not "bound to turn up." The Philippine Islands will not prove a
+blessing in disguise. In every war with a nation having discontented
+colonial subjects, the enemy will always strike the colony first,
+and hope for aid from the inhabitants thereof.
+
+Even if the Philippines have cost us $300,000,000, we are a nation
+of nearly 100,000,000 people. So they have cost us, all told, in
+the neighborhood of only about $3 a piece. And we subjugated them by
+mistake, after freeing a less capable people, the Cubans.
+
+The Panama Canal is to be finished in 1913. This means a splendid,
+but free-for-all contest, for the trade of South America. In South
+America we will meet a tremendous pro-German sentiment, and a by no
+means inconsiderable anti-"Yankee" sentiment. The bigger Germany's
+army and navy grows, the more she will loom up as the one great
+menace to the peace of the world, and the one avowed enemy of the
+Monroe Doctrine. We need to build up a Pan-American esprit de corps,
+based on the instinct of self-defence. We must win the good will of
+South America, and we cannot do it so long as we insist, in another
+part of the world, upon the righteousness of the principle of one
+Christian people policing a weaker Christian people, ostensibly to
+keep them from having revolutions, and really in the hope of ultimate
+profit. To free the Filipinos should be the first step we take after
+the Panama Canal is completed toward getting ourselves foot-loose
+entirely, with a view of getting everything from the Canadian border
+to the Argentine wheat fields and beyond, solidly and sincerely
+for the Monroe Doctrine. In that direction lies our only sensible
+and reasonable hope that the canal will get for us the trade and
+friendship of South America. With such tremendous issues at stake,
+what does it matter to the richest nation on earth what the Philippines
+cost? What does it matter, anyhow, how much it costs to do right?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI
+
+CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
+
+        Taxation without representation is good cause for revolt.
+
+                                                American Speech of 1776.
+
+
+As a colony of Spain the Philippines enjoyed certain special
+privileges in the way of trade with the "mother country." When at the
+beginning of our military occupation in 1898 General Otis detailed
+an army officer to take charge of the Customs House, he continued
+for the time being the Spanish tariff laws concerning imports and
+exports. On September 17, 1901, the Philippine Commission passed
+a tariff act [511] fixing the duties on imports into the Islands
+and also continuing to a considerable extent the system of duties
+on Philippine exports inherited from the Spanish regime. Among the
+products of the Philippine Islands on which the Act of September 17,
+1901, imposed an export tax were the following:
+
+
+    Hemp, 75c. per 100 kilos [512]; sugar, 5c. per 100 kilos;
+    manufactured tobacco, $1.50 per 100 kilos; raw tobacco, $1.50
+    down to 75c. per 100 kilos. [513]
+
+
+On March 8, 1902, the United States Congress passed an Act,
+"temporarily to provide revenue for the Philippine Islands and for
+other purposes." The Act of 1902 re-enacted the Commission's tariff
+law for the Philippines of September 17, 1901, with one change,
+hereinafter to be discussed, as to its export tax features. As
+to the tariffs to be collected at our custom-houses on Philippine
+products shipped to the United States, the Act of 1902 reduced the
+rates fixed by the Dingley tariff to seventy-five per cent. of said
+rates. That was all Congress did in the way of lowering our tariff
+wall to Philippine products until 1909, when the Payne-Aldrich tariff
+bill became a law. This twenty-five per cent. reduction was no better
+than no reduction whatever would have been.
+
+Governor Taft pleaded very earnestly with Congress, at the time
+of the passage of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, for a
+substantial reduction of the Dingley tariff rate on sugar and tobacco,
+so as to give his "constituents"--his Filipinos--something in lieu
+of the markets they had had under Spain. But our sugar and tobacco
+interests defeated his efforts, because they feared what they termed
+"competition with cheap Asiatic labor."
+
+The Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, repealed the export duties
+imposed by the Act of the Philippine Commission of September 17,
+1901, as to exports to the United States, leaving unrepealed,
+however, the export duty on Philippine products shipped to foreign
+countries. Section 2 of said Act of 1902 provided, as to exports
+from the Philippines to the United States, that the rates of duty
+upon products of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United
+States, should be less any duty or tax levied, collected, and paid
+thereon (under the Act of the Philippine Commission of September
+17, 1901, aforesaid) upon the shipment thereof from the Philippine
+Archipelago. This sounds liberal enough. It is, as far as it goes. But
+what those familiar with the hemp infamy of the Act of 1902 call
+"the joker" in it, is as follows:
+
+
+    All articles, the growth and product of the Philippine Islands,
+    admitted into the ports of the United States free of duty
+    under the provisions of this act, and coming directly from said
+    islands to the United States, for use and consumption therein,
+    shall be hereafter exempt from any export duties imposed in the
+    Philippine Islands.
+
+
+This also sounds liberal, on first reading, but its object was, and
+its effect has been, to enable the American Hemp Trust to corner
+and control the Manila hemp industry. There is but one article of
+Philippine export which any one in the United States is interested
+in, that was admitted into the United States free of duty under the
+Dingley Act. [514] That article is hemp. The object of the law was
+to favor Americans interested in exporting hemp from Manila to the
+United States as against Europeans exporting it to England and other
+foreign countries. This does not look, on its face, either unpatriotic
+or un-Christian. It is not unpatriotic or un-Christian, ordinarily,
+to favor your own people, as against their foreign competitors. The
+moral quality of such favoritism, however, must depend on who is to
+pay for it. Under the Act of 1902, the Manila authorities have always
+collected an export tax on hemp coming to the United States, just as
+they do on hemp going from Manila to foreign countries, exactly as
+if the law abolishing the export tax on hemp coming to the United
+States had never been passed. Later, on proof that the hemp was in
+fact carried to the United States and used and consumed therein, they
+refund the export tax. This is on the idea that they cannot tell where
+the hemp is going to until they know where it went to, nor where it
+is going to be "used and consumed" until they know where it was in
+fact finally "used and consumed." Of course the small farmer is in
+no position to follow his bale of hemp into the markets of the world
+and show, if it happens to go to the United States, that it did in
+fact go there and that it was there "used and consumed," and, finally
+obtaining the proof of this, submit it to the Manila Government and
+get his little export tax on his bale of hemp refunded. Only the big
+buyer's agents at Manila are in a position to do this. So the hemp
+crop is bought and moved under conditions which are the same as if
+all hemp were subject to an export tax. And only the big fish get
+the benefit. For instance, the International Harvester Company has
+its hemp buyers at Manila. And as to the part of the Philippine hemp
+crop it handles, it can, of course, follow the hemp to its ultimate
+consumption in the United States, make the proof, and get the refund.
+
+The wealth of the Philippines is practically entirely
+agricultural. Neither mining nor manufactures cut any appreciable
+figure. Hemp, sugar, tobacco, and copra [515] are the chief staples
+and main exports, and of the first of these Secretary of War Taft
+says in one of his reports: [516]
+
+
+    The chief export in value and quantity from the Philippines is
+    Manila hemp, it amounting to between 60 and 65 per cent. of the
+    total exports.
+
+
+Let us see just how far, according to the annual reports of our
+own agents in the Philippines--those charged by us with governing
+them,--this piece of legislation gotten through by "special privilege"
+has depressed the Manila hemp industry, the chief source of wealth of
+the Islands. And before we even get to the main trouble, let us permit
+the Insular Government to "place on the screen," as a preliminary
+"view," a glance at what the instinct of self-preservation of American
+sugar and tobacco interests, fearing competition from "cheap Asiatic
+labor," have deemed it necessary to do to the Philippine sugar and
+tobacco industries, through the Dingley tariff. The annual report of
+the Philippine Commission for 1904, before it gets to the subject of
+hemp, draws a most gloomy picture of how we killed the markets for
+sugar and tobacco the Islands had under Spain, and gave them none
+instead. They speak of "the languishing state of these industries"
+(p. 26), and describe a state of affairs that sounds more like Egypt
+under Pharaoh than anything else, including a cattle disease that
+carried off ninety per cent. of the beasts of burden of the country,
+and wholesale destruction of crops by locusts. [517] What they have to
+say of the annual tribute levied by the American Hemp Trust, through
+Congress, on the Manila hemp industry, should not be re-stated,
+but quoted. They say: [518]
+
+
+    We desire to call attention to the injustice effected upon the
+    revenues of the islands by section 2 of the Act of Congress
+    approved March 8, 1902, which provides that the Philippine
+    Government shall refund all export duties imposed upon articles
+    exported from the islands into and consumed in the United
+    States. Under the provisions of this section there has been
+    collected in the Philippine Islands, since its enactment down to
+    the close of the fiscal year 1904, the sum of $1,060,460.20 United
+    States currency, which is refundable. These refundable duties
+    are principally upon hemp exportations to the United States,
+    and are in effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of
+    the United States who use hemp in their operations.
+
+
+They add:
+
+
+    It is manifestly a discrimination in favor of our manufacturers
+    as against those of foreign countries. No good reason is perceived
+    why this bounty to American manufacturers should be extracted from
+    the treasury of the Philippine Islands, and it is respectfully
+    submitted that the law authorizing it should be repealed.
+
+
+The annual report of the Philippine Commission for 1905, after the
+usual complaint about being made a political football by Benevolent
+Assimilation on the one side, and Louisiana and our sugar-beet
+States on the other, and the usual annual and true description of
+the consequent poverty, says concerning hemp:
+
+
+    We have several times in our reports called attention to the
+    practical workings of that portion of the Act of Congress approved
+    March 8, 1902, which provides for the refund of duties paid
+    on articles exported from the Philippine Islands to the United
+    States and consumed therein, and have as repeatedly recommended
+    its repeal. It is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine
+    Islands, because it takes from the insular treasury export duties
+    collected from the people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp
+    products in the United States. These manufacturers were already
+    prosperous before this bounty was given them and it seems hardly
+    consistent with our expressions of purpose to build up and develop
+    the Philippine Islands when we are thus enriching a few of our
+    own people at their expense. [519]
+
+
+By the end of the fiscal year 1905 (June 30), the American importers of
+Manila hemp--of whom the International Harvester Company and its allied
+interests are the most influential--had, under the operation of the
+rebate system based on the Act of 1902, milked the Philippine people to
+the tune of about $1,000,000. Says the Philippine Commission's annual
+report for 1905, immediately after the passage last above quoted:
+
+
+    The amount of duties refunded under this act to manufacturers in
+    the United States during the three years ending June 30, 1905,
+    is $1,057,251.12. Many of the departments of the government are
+    much hampered in their operations because of the lack of funds,
+    notably the bureau of education, and were the sum thus taken
+    available for educational purposes, to say nothing of any other,
+    the government would be enabled to give instruction to thousands
+    of Filipino children whom they are now unable to reach and who
+    must remain steeped in ignorance because of the lack of funds to
+    provide such instruction.
+
+
+Said the Manila Chamber of Commerce to the Taft Congressional party in
+August, 1905: "The country is in a state of financial collapse." [520]
+
+Says the Philippine Commission's report for 1906 (pt. 1, p. 68):
+
+
+    The Commission has repeatedly called attention in its reports
+    to the action of Congress providing for a refund of duties paid
+    on articles exported from the Islands to the United States and
+    consumed therein. The reasons that led the Commission heretofore to
+    recommend the repeal of that provision are still operative. Since
+    the passage of that act on March 8, 1902, the amount of duties
+    collected and paid into the Philippine treasury and handed over
+    to manufacturers in the United States down to June 30, 1906,
+    is $1,471,208.47. This money has been taken out of the poverty
+    of the insular treasury to be delivered directly into the hands
+    of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Philippine hemp in
+    the United States for their enrichment. The cordage interests are
+    prosperous and do not need this help; the Philippine Islands are
+    poor. Legislation which takes money directly from the Philippine
+    treasury and passes it over to a particular industry in the United
+    States is not founded on sound principles of political economy
+    or of justice to the Filipinos. We renew our recommendation for
+    the repeal of this provision.
+
+
+You also find in the Commission's report for 1906 the usual
+annual protests against the Dingley tariff on Philippine sugar and
+tobacco. Said the Honorable Henry C. Ide in an article in the New York
+Independent for November 22, 1906, written shortly after he retired
+from the office of Governor-General of the Philippines and returned
+to the United States: "By annexation we killed the Spanish market for
+Philippine sugar and tobacco, and our tariff shuts these products
+from the United States market, and to-day both these [industries]
+are practically prostrated." In their annual report for 1907,
+the Philippine Commission say with regard to the American corner on
+Philippine hemp: [521] "The price of hemp has fallen from an average of
+twenty pesos ($10 American money) per picul [522] to thirteen pesos
+per picul." It thus appears that by judicious manipulation of the
+hemp market at Manila, through the leverage of the refund system,
+based on collection and subsequent refunding of the export tax on
+hemp coming to the United States, the Manila agents of the American
+hemp manufacturers had, as early as 1907, beat the price of hemp down
+to not far above half of what it had been formerly. To-day (1912)
+the Filipino hemp farmer gets for his hemp just one half what he got
+just ten years ago. During all this period of economic depression,
+the public utterances and State papers both of President Roosevelt
+and Mr. Taft are full of such preposterous stuff as the following:
+
+
+    No great civilized power has ever managed with such wisdom and
+    disinterestedness the affairs of a people committed by the accident
+    of war to its hands. [523]
+
+
+This is what Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft were publicly pretending to
+believe. But at practically the same time, during as dark a year,
+economically, as the American occupation has seen, 1907, let us see
+what they were privately admitting to their intimate friends.
+
+In the North American Review for January 18, 1907, in an article
+contributed to that Review by the author of this volume, our
+treatment of the Philippine people, through our Congress, was briefly
+discussed. The article chanced to attract the attention of Mr. Andrew
+Carnegie, who gave a considerable sum of money to have it reprinted and
+distributed. Some correspondence followed between us, in the course
+of which Mr. Carnegie stated that he had been at the White House
+shortly before writing me, and described what happened as follows:
+
+
+    When at supper with the President [Mr. Roosevelt] recently,
+    pointing to Judge Taft [then Secretary of War], who sat opposite,
+    he [President Roosevelt] said: "Here are the two men in all the
+    world most anxious to get out of the Philippines."
+
+
+In another letter Mr. Carnegie described this same incident, this other
+letter's version of President Roosevelt's supper-table remark being:
+
+
+    Here are the two men in America most anxious to get rid of them
+    [the Philippines]. [524]
+
+
+Now why all this public boasting about our "disinterestedness,"
+when, if he had been a Filipino, Colonel Roosevelt would probably
+have hunted up all the American speeches of 1776 about taxation
+without representation, and played hide-and-seek with the public
+prosecutor at Manila, to see how far he could violate the sedition
+statute without getting in jail? And why this private admission
+to his friend Mr. Carnegie, which neither he nor Mr. Taft has ever
+publicly made? Why did he not send a message to Congress showing up
+the hemp rebate system? Simply because to do so would lose support
+for the Administration, would alienate powerful interests from the
+fatuous policy of Benevolent Assimilation bequeathed to Mr. Roosevelt
+by Mr. McKinley. His party was irrevocably committed to indefinite
+retention of the Islands. It was like Lot's wife. It could not turn
+back. So the protected and subsidized interests were permitted to
+continue to prey upon the Philippine people. Tariff evils were never
+President Roosevelt's specialty. Nor has war against intrenched
+privilege of any sort ever been Mr. Taft's specialty. Mr. Taft went
+out to the Philippines in 1907 to open the Philippine Assembly. In
+1908 he came back and made a report to President Roosevelt which is
+as bland as his Winona declaration that the Payne-Aldrich bill is
+"the best tariff bill the Republican party ever passed." It makes
+the American reader's heart swell with pious pride at what he is
+doing for his "little brown brother," in the matter of vaccination,
+sewers, school-books, and the like. President Roosevelt sent this
+report to Congress, accompanied by a message, from which we have
+already quoted. In that same message he said:
+
+
+    I question whether there is a brighter page in the annals of
+    international dealing between the strong and the weak than the
+    page which tells of our doings in the Philippines.
+
+
+Apparently, Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft thought, in 1907, that granting
+the Filipinos a little debating society solemnly called a legislative
+body, but wholly without any real power, was ample compensation for
+deserted tobacco and cane plantations and for the price of hemp being
+beat down below the cost of production by manipulation through an Act
+of Congress passed for the benefit of American hemp manufacturers. If
+we had had a Cleveland in the White House about that time, he would
+have written an essay on taxation without representation, with the
+hemp infamy of this Philippine Tariff Act of 1902 as a text, and sent
+it to Congress as a message demanding the repeal of the Act. But the
+good-will of the Hemp Trust is an asset for the policy of Benevolent
+Assimilation. The Filipino cannot vote, and the cordage manufacturer in
+the United States can. No conceivable state of economic desolation to
+which we might reduce the people of the Philippine Islands being other
+than a blessing in disguise compared with permitting them to attend
+to their own affairs after their own quaint and mutually considerate
+fashion, the Hemp Trust's rope, tied into a slip-knot by the Act of
+1902, must not be removed from their throats. By judicious manipulation
+of sufficient hemp rope, you can corral much support for Benevolent
+Assimilation. Therefore, to this good hour, the substance of the hemp
+part of the Philippine Tariff Act of March 8, 1902, remains upon the
+statute books of the United States, to the shame of the nation.
+
+At last, under the Payne tariff law of 1909, Mr. Taft's long and
+patient quiet work with Congressional committees prevailed upon
+Congress and the interests to admit Philippine sugar and tobacco to
+this country free of duty, up to amounts limited in the Act. [525]
+Since then you find the reports of our American officials in the
+Philippines palpitating with gratitude to Congress. As a matter
+of fact all Congress had said to the Filipinos by its action may be
+summed up about thus: "The sugar and tobacco interests of this country
+have at last realized that such little of the sugar and tobacco you
+raise as may stray over to this side of the world will not be in the
+least likely to hurt them. Therefore they have graciously decided,
+in their benignity, to permit you to live, provided you do not get
+too prosperous." But this very same Payne bill continued the export
+tax features of the Act of 1902. Section 13 of the Payne bill is
+as follows:
+
+
+    Section 13. That upon the exportation to any foreign country from
+    the Philippine Islands, or the shipment thereof to the United
+    States or any of its possessions, of the following articles
+    there shall be levied, collected, and paid thereon the following
+    export duties: Provided, however, that all articles the growth
+    and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from said
+    islands, to the United States or any of its possessions for use
+    and consumption therein shall be exempt from any export duties
+    imposed in the Philippine Islands:
+
+    352. Abaca (hemp), gross weight, 100 kilos, 75 cents.
+    353. Sugar, gross weight, 100 kilos, 5 cents.
+    354. Copra, gross weight, 100 kilos, 10 cents.
+    355. Tobacco, gross weight:
+
+    (a) Manufactured or unmanufactured, except as otherwise provided,
+    100 kilos, $1.30.
+
+    (b) Stems, clippings, and other wastes of tobacco, 100 kilos,
+    50 cents.
+
+
+Let us briefly glance at the net results of this law, and its
+predecessor, the Act of 1902, the export features of which it
+re-enacted. It is important that every fair-minded American who can
+possibly spare the time should take such a glance at what Congress has
+done to the Philippine hemp industry, because of the obvious bearing
+that such taxation without representation will probably have on the
+attitude of the Philippine people whenever we get into a war with a
+foreign power. Certainly the legislation Congress has perpetrated upon
+them, at the behest of special interests in the United States, has not
+soothed the original desire of those people to be free and independent.
+
+At page 27 of the report of the Philippine Collector of Customs for
+1910, a table is given showing the export duties subject to refund
+collected under the Act of Congress of March 8, 1902, and deposited
+in the Philippine treasury to the credit of the Insular Government
+at the end of each fiscal year (June 30), as follows:
+
+
+                    1902        $  71,064.69
+                    1903          527,228.10
+                    1904          462,433.83
+                    1905          486,475.56
+                    1906          433,991.79
+                    1907          433,458.58
+                    1908          370,513.36
+                    1909          598,917.69
+                               -------------
+                               $3,384,083.60
+
+
+The following table, taken from this same annual report of the
+Collector of Customs of the Philippines for 1910 (p. 22) shows the
+size (weight in kilograms), and value, of the annual Philippine hemp
+crop from 1899 to 1910, both inclusive. It gives in one set of columns
+the total exported to all countries, and in the other the part which
+comes to the United States:
+
+
+              To All Countries.         To United States.
+                 Kilos        Value       Kilos        Value
+
+        1899   59,840,368  $ 6,185,293  23,066,248  $ 2,436,169
+        1900   76,708,936   11,393,883  25,763,728    3,446,141
+        1901  112,215,168   14,453,110  18,157,952    2,402,867
+        1902  109,968,792   15,841,316  45,526,960    7,261,459
+        1903  132,241,594   21,701,575  71,654,416   12,314,312
+        1904  131,817,872   21,794,960  61,886,592   10,631,591
+        1905  130,621,024   22,146,241  73,351,136   12,954,515
+        1906  112,165,384   19,446,769  62,045,088   11,168,226
+        1907  114,701,320   21,085,081  58,388,504   11,326,864
+        1908  115,829,080   17,311,808  48,813,720    7,684,000
+        1909  149,991,866   15,883,577  79,210,362    8,534,288
+        1910  170,788,629   17,404,922  99,305,102   10,399,397
+
+
+If you have the time and inclination, you can easily figure out the
+annual "rake-off" of the American hemp importers from the above
+table. For instance, take the last year, 1910: 99,305,102 kilos
+at 75 cents per 100 kilos is $744,788.26, which is more than 4%
+of $17,404,922, the total value of the hemp crop of the archipelago
+for that year. Add this $744,788.26 to the $3,384,183.60 shown by the
+above table of refundable duties collected from 1902 to 1909 inclusive,
+and you have over $4,000,000 rebates accruing to American importers
+of Manila hemp from 1902 to 1910 inclusive.
+
+In his remarks on Section 13 of the Payne Law of 1909 (above set
+forth), in the House of Representatives, May 13, 1909, [526] Hon. Oscar
+W. Underwood said, in part:
+
+
+    When you put a tax on your people for engaging in export trade,
+    to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully meet
+    their foreign competitor and reduce the territory in which they
+    can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. Our
+    forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
+    recognizing the false principle on which an export tax was based,
+    put it in the fundamental law of our land that the United States
+    Government should not lay export taxes. If we enact this law,
+    we write into the statute book for the Philippine Islands,
+    legislation which is little short of barbarous, legislation that
+    no government in the civilized world except Turkey, and Persia,
+    and other second-class nations countenance to-day.
+
+
+But the hemp interests won out and the section was adopted. In an
+argument for the repeal of the export tax, delivered in the House of
+Representatives August 19, 1911, the Philippine delegate, Hon. Manuel
+L. Quezon, said:
+
+
+    There is one section in the Philippine tariff law, approved
+    August 5, 1909, which is seriously injuring the proper commercial
+    development of the islands.
+
+
+Of course the earnestness with which Mr. Quezon pleaded his cause may
+be imagined from the circumstance that, as he says, he is continually
+advised by letters from his people, and verily believes that if the
+export tax is not taken off soon the Philippine hemp industry will be
+entirely destroyed, and the hemp farmers will have to take to raising
+something else in lieu of hemp, because the present prices hardly
+permit them to live. In the course of his speech Mr. Quezon offered
+the following truly eloquent and absolutely unanswerable argument:
+
+
+    Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
+    States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in force in
+    the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said decision
+    also meant that this Government has the power to enact laws for
+    the islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution
+    in the United States.
+
+
+It is through the courtesy of Mr. Quezon that such light as I may
+have been able to throw on the subject has been obtained. He has
+shown me letters from the Philippine Chamber of Commerce at Manila
+and other commercial organizations prophesying ruin to the Manila
+hemp industry in the event the export tax should continue. One of
+these letters is addressed to the two Philippine Commissioners in
+Congress, Mr. Legarda and Mr. Quezon. It informs them of the hopes of
+the Filipinos at Manila that they, Messrs. Legarda and Quezon, may be
+successful in their campaign to get the law repealed and that many
+of them (the Filipinos at Manila) feel hopeful of results in that
+regard. Speaking for their fellow countrymen at Manila, they say,
+"The optimists are of the opinion that the matter being in such good
+hands as yours will be carried to a successful conclusion." Then they
+give the darker side of the picture thus:
+
+
+    But the representatives at this capital of the famous syndicate,
+    the International Harvester Company, are of the opinion that we
+    will be able to accomplish nothing, and theirs is an opinion to
+    which great weight should be attached, because the vast interests
+    which that concern represents can set in motion powerful influences
+    to keep the present law as it is, since it concerns their interest
+    to do so.
+
+
+Mr. Quezon has also shown me a letter written to him, March 30, 1911,
+by his and my warm personal friend, Hon. James F. Smith, formerly
+Governor-General of the Philippines, now (1912) Judge of the Court of
+Customs Appeals at Washington, D. C., in which letter General Smith
+says, concerning the operation of that part of the export tax act of
+March 8, 1902 (continued by the Payne Tariff Law of 1909) by which
+American manufacturers are relieved from the payment of the export
+tax on Manila hemp:
+
+
+    In effect this really and truly amounts to the payment by the
+    Philippine Government and the Filipino people of a large subsidy
+    to American manufacturers of hemp. More than that, this concession
+    to the American manufacturer, by enabling him to undersell his
+    British competitor, gives him an undue control of the situation
+    and has put him in a position, to some extent, to control prices
+    for the raw product.
+
+
+It seems to me that the American people had better look to their
+own liberties, when they remember that in the campaign for the
+Republican nomination in 1912, the Roosevelt Headquarters gave out
+that pending the Roosevelt dictation of Mr. Taft's nomination in
+1908, the International Harvester Company furnished a floor of its
+Chicago building to the Taft people, this interesting fact being
+part of the leakage from the Roosevelt-Taft quarrel caused by the
+Roosevelt charge that Mr. Taft was unfit for re-election because he
+"meant well feebly"; and when it is recalled, on the other hand, that
+in the Roosevelt campaign of 1912 for the presidential nomination for
+a third term, Mr. George W. Perkins, [527] the very personification
+of undue corporation influence with the Government, assumed the role
+of Warwick for an ex-President who, when President, had repudiated
+the advice of his counsel, Governor Harmon, that a railroad company
+[528] be prosecuted for taking rebates because the vice-president of
+the company was his personal friend. [529] But let us return to the
+Philippine rebates, and their corner-stone, the export tax, Section
+13 of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.
+
+In the case of Fairbanks vs. United States, 181 U. S. Supreme Court
+Reports, page 290, a case in which the court was asked to declare a
+certain Act of Congress unconstitutional and void, because it imposed
+what was virtually an export tax, the opinion of the court cites
+the absolute inhibition against such a tax imposed by our Federal
+Constitution, and says concerning the wise theory on which this
+fundamental tenet of our government rests:
+
+
+    The requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be
+    free from any governmental burden.
+
+
+The decision then goes on to elaborate on what it terms "that freedom
+from governmental burden in the matter of exports which it was the
+intention of our Constitution to protect and preserve." Finally,
+the court uses an expression which is certainly a stinging rebuke to
+any law-making power that permits the selfish greed of a little set
+of importers to get a law passed imposing for their special benefit
+a paralyzing export tax on the chief staple of a helpless colony:
+
+
+    The power to tax is the power to destroy.
+
+
+But Mr. Quezon has no vote in Congress and his voice was not heard,
+at least not heeded.
+
+The summation of the whole matter is this: Both the Philippine
+people and the American people are, and long have been, suffering
+from unjust taxation through laws for which special selfish financial
+interests in the United States, exercising grossly undue influence on
+governmental action, are responsible. Neither will ever get relief
+until the government of this nation is wrested from the control
+of the money-hogs and restored to the people. Until that is done,
+selfish greed will continue to sow sedition in the Philippines,
+and socialism in the United States.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVII
+
+THE RIGHTS OF MAN
+
+                        The rights of man cannot be changed. It is
+                        the government which attempts to change them
+                        that must change.--Webster.
+
+
+It was the homely common sense of Mr. Lincoln that first reminded
+us most vividly how like to the sins of an individual are those of a
+nation. To the Southern man who admires Mr. Lincoln as one of the great
+figures of all time, he seems like a great physician, who, with malice
+toward none and with charity for all, kept vigil for four years at the
+bedside of a sick nation through all the long agony of its efforts to
+throw off from its system the inherited curse of slavery. Of course,
+human slavery was a relic of barbarism. But in fixing the Rights of
+Man, the founders of the Republic actually overlooked the fact that a
+negro was a human being. So that, vast property rights having accrued
+pursuant to that mistake, the march of progress had to wipe them out,
+no matter whom it hurt financially. The enormity of the iniquity of
+human slavery did not dawn suddenly and exclusively upon William Lloyd
+Garrison. He is not the sole, original inventor and patentee of the
+idea. Lord Macaulay's father was doing the same sort of agitating in
+England about the same time. Westminster Abbey has its monument to
+the elder Macaulay, just as Commonwealth Avenue has its monument to
+the elder Garrison. Simultaneous like stirrings occurred elsewhere
+throughout Christendom. But, of course, in America, arguments for
+the emancipation of the slave first took root most readily in a
+thrifty section of our liberty-loving country which had nothing to
+lose by abolition.
+
+John Quincy Adams once said that our government was "an experiment
+upon the heart of man." It is because this government of the people
+by the people for the people was a deliberate and thoughtful attempt
+upon the part of its founders to apply the Golden Rule as a doctrine
+of international and inter-individual law, that we believe our form
+of government is the last hope of mankind. It is, as we conceive
+it, the voice of humanity raised in protest against the proposition
+that might makes right. It is, as we conceive it, a government which
+entered the lists of the nations as the champion of the human mind,
+in the great struggle of Mind for the mastery over Matter, the
+world-old struggle between Good and Evil, Light and Darkness. Our
+government, like everything else, must follow the law of its being,
+or die. Its first great sin in violation of the Rights of Man was due
+to heredity. We inherited the institution of slavery, the governmental
+exception to the rule that all men are created with equal right to
+life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This was a sin against
+human liberty, one of the "unalienable" Rights of Man, upon which
+the Republic purported to be builded. The consequences of that sin
+are still with us; but, except for the occasional bloody-shirt waver,
+whose intellectual resources are not sufficient to provide him with a
+live issue, we are meeting those consequences, as a nation, bravely,
+and with the mutual forbearance born of the fact that none are wholly
+free from responsibility for present difficulties.
+
+Our second great national sin was a yielding to the temptation of
+the environment which arose, unforeseen, after a splendid war waged
+for the Rights of Man against Spain in Cuba. The Philippine war was
+waged to subjugate the Filipino people, because Mr. McKinley believed
+it would be financially profitable to us to own the islands, and in
+the face of the fact that the only thing he knew officially about
+the Filipino people was that Admiral Dewey thought them superior
+to the Cubans and more capable of self-government. The war in the
+Philippines was, therefore, a war against the Rights of Man. Nowhere
+in any state paper has any American statesman, soldier, or sailor,
+had the temerity to invoke the name of God in connection with the
+retention of the Philippine Islands. Nowhere in any American state
+paper connected with the Philippines is there any reference to "a
+decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The sin of our Philippine
+policy is that it is a denial of the right of a people to pursue
+happiness in their own way instead of in somebody else's way. It is a
+denial of the very principles in maintenance of which we went to war
+against Spain to free Cuba, as we had previously gone to war against
+England to free ourselves.
+
+Now the reason the nation blundered into taking the Philippines was
+that it believed the Filipinos to be, not a people, but a jumble
+of savage tribes. But the reason the men who controlled the action
+of the government at the time took the Philippines was because they
+believed they would pay. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient number
+of our fellow-citizens--controlled, some by altruistic motives and
+some by sordid motives--to cause the nation to follow the lead of
+those then in control. If the men then in control had taken the people
+into their confidence, the blunder would never have been made. If the
+correspondence between Mr. McKinley and the Paris Peace Commission
+in the fall of 1898, from which the injunction of secrecy was not
+removed until 1901, had been given out at the time, the treaty would
+never have been ratified except after some such declaration as to
+the Philippines as was made concerning Cuba, some reaffirmance of
+allegiance to faith in our cardinal tenet--the right of every people
+to pursue happiness in their own way, free from alien domination. The
+Bacon resolution of 1899, which was along this line, was defeated only
+by the deciding vote of the presiding officer, the Vice-President of
+the United States. The passage of that resolution would have prevented
+the Philippine Insurrection. Had it passed, the Filipinos would no more
+have had occasion to think of insurrection than the Cubans did. It was
+Mr. McKinley alone who decided to take the Philippines. Congress was
+not called together in extra session. The people were not consulted,
+except from the rear-end of an observation car.
+
+Most people, whether they be lawyers or not, are more or less
+acquainted with the doctrine of what is called in law a "bona
+fide purchaser without notice." No man can claim to be a bona fide
+purchaser without notice, when he knows enough about the subject
+matter of his purchase to put him on reasonable notice of the
+existence of facts which, had he taken the trouble to verify them,
+would have caused him to halt and not purchase. The correspondence
+in 1898, made public in 1901, withheld by Mr. McKinley until after
+his second election in 1900, is sufficient to have made any honest
+man ask himself some such question as this: "After all, is it not
+quite possible that those people can run a decent government of
+their own? Admiral Dewey says they are superior to the Cubans." But
+Mr. McKinley did not pursue this inquiry, as it was his duty to
+do. He took the islands because he believed they would pay, knowing
+nothing in particular about the Filipinos, except what he had learned
+from Admiral Dewey's brief comment, yet hoping in spite of it that
+they would turn out sufficiently unfit for self-government for the
+event to vindicate the purchase. To demonstrate that the Filipinos
+were wholly unfit for the treatment accorded the Cubans was the only
+possible justification of the initial departure from the traditions of
+the Republic and from the principles which were its corner-stone. And
+he made the departure because the business "interests" of the country
+then believed--erroneously they all now admit--that it would pay. He
+decided to treat eternal principles as "worn-out formulae." Senator Hoar
+once declined an invitation extended by his own city of Worcester,
+to deliver a eulogy on Mr. McKinley, because of his Philippine
+policy. True, he tempers the asperity of this action thus: "It was
+not because I was behind any other man in admiration or personal
+affection for that lofty and beautiful character. But * * * if a great
+Catholic prelate were to die, his eulogy should not be pronounced
+by a Protestant." [530] But all Senator Hoar's speeches against the
+McKinley Philippine policy were as emphatic as Luther's ninety-five
+theses. He was in possession at the time, along with the rest of the
+Senate, of the correspondence with the Paris Peace Commission made
+public after the presidential election of 1900.
+
+Ever since Mr. McKinley took the Philippines, it has been the awkward
+but inexorable duty of the defenders of that good man's fame to
+deprecate Filipino capacity for self-government. President Taft's
+chief life-work since this century began has been to take care
+of his martyred predecessor's fame, by proving that Mr. McKinley
+guessed right in 1898 when he bought the Philippines and trusted
+to luck to be able to make out, in spite of what Admiral Dewey had
+said, a case sufficiently derogatory to Filipino intelligence to
+justify the purchase and subjugation of the islands at the very
+time we were freeing Cuba. Obviously, then, the more utterly unfit
+for self-government in the present or the near future Mr. Taft can
+make the Filipinos out, the nearer he gets to vindicating the memory
+of Mr. McKinley, that is, with men of his own, (Mr. Taft's) high
+character. He insists on treating as children a people who got up a
+well-armed army of thirty-odd thousand men in three or four months
+and held at bay, for two years and a half, some 125,000 husky American
+soldiers, over five times as many as it took to drive Spain from the
+Western hemisphere. Physical force is the basis of all government
+among men. If President Taft had anything of the soldier instinct
+of his immediate predecessor, he would not sniff demagoguery in the
+proposition that military efficiency is a better guaranty of capacity
+for self-government than all the school-books in the world, and that
+proven passionate willingness to die for freedom from alien domination
+is the best guaranty conceivable against internecine strife. It was
+a tremendous struggle with his own conscience that Mr. McKinley went
+through with before he decided to repudiate the principles on which we
+took Cuba in order, for a money consideration euphemistically called
+"trade expansion," to take the Philippines. He had advices before him
+at the time making it reasonably certain that this meant trouble with
+the Filipinos, i.e., bloodshed in the Philippines, the extent of which
+none could foresee, and about which he was of course apprehensive. In
+the matter of instructing our Paris Peace Commissioners to insist on
+Spain's ceding us the Philippines, Mr. McKinley took no moral ground
+tenable like a rock, such as truly great men take in great crises of
+their country's history. He did not attempt to lead the people. He
+simply decided that it would be a popular thing to do to take the
+islands. Fresh from a war entered upon to emancipate the Cubans from
+alien domination, he took a step which both Admiral Dewey and General
+Merritt warned him beforehand would probably mean war--to subjugate,
+against their will, a people superior to the Cubans. And in taking
+this step, he took into his confidence, neither the people who paid
+for the war, nor the soldiers who fought it. To deny that his motives
+were benevolent would be simply stupid. But he followed the mob which
+shouted from the rear-end of his observation car and repeated by cable
+to the Paris Peace Commission, what the mob yelled. Ever since the
+supposed Philippine Klondyke whispered in President McKinley's ear
+"Eat of the imperial fruits of a colonial policy," the archives of
+this government--the reports of the State, War, and Navy Departments,
+and the Congressional Documents--have reeked with the inevitable
+consequences of our fall from our high estate. No man can serve two
+masters. Philanthropy for pecuniary profit is a paradox. Duplicity
+ever follows deviation from principle. In our dealings in 1898 with
+Aguinaldo you find vacillation on the part of military commanders who
+personally did not know what fear was, and embarrassed hypocrisy in
+dealing with him on the part of men wearing the shoulder-straps of the
+American army, athwart the frankness of whose gaze no such shadow had
+ever fallen before. You find systematic concealment of our intentions
+in dealing with the insurgents, for fear they would insurge before the
+Treaty was signed, and thus cause such a revulsion of feeling in our
+country against the purchase of theirs as to defeat the ratification
+of the treaty. After that, you find a systematic minimizing of
+the opposition to our rule, reinforced by subtle depreciation of
+Filipino intelligence, and backed up by a "peace-at-any-price" policy,
+periodically punctuated by the horrors of war without its dignity. The
+denial of Filipino opposition to our rule, which opposition means
+merely a natural longing for freedom from alien rule, has gradually
+been abandoned. Nobody now clings to that stale fiction. Also, a long
+course of chastening, through reconcentration and kindred severities
+subsequent to the official announcement of a state of general peace,
+has at last gotten the situation as to public order well in hand. The
+only question for those who affect that "decent respect to the opinions
+of mankind" which the men of 1776 had in mind is, "Are the Filipinos
+a people?" President Taft was originally with Senator Hoar on the
+Philippine question. At least he was an "anti-expansionist." In all
+the heat of subsequent controversy he has never made bold to deny
+the general proposition of the unalienable right of every people to
+liberty and the pursuit of happiness in their own way. His position
+is that the Filipino people must be made an exception to the rule
+because they are not a people. This is the strongest I can state his
+proposition for him. It is very difficult to state even with apparent
+plausibility, anything which denies the right of every community of
+people to immunity from alien domination. The case must be an extreme
+one. The issue which the writer raises with the President's policy
+is that the Filipinos are a people.
+
+I know of no graver responsibility that an American statesman can
+take upon himself before the bar of history than to deny the right
+of any given people to self-government. Certainly any man who denies
+that right at least assumes the burden of proof that they are unfit
+to attend to their own affairs. Mr. McKinley assumed it without
+pretending to know anything much about the Filipinos, the motive being
+that the Islands would be profitable to us. When Mr. Taft went to the
+Philippines in 1900, he went, not to investigate the correctness of
+Mr. McKinley's assumption, which was implied in the purchase, but to
+champion it; not to give advice concerning the righteousness of having
+taken over the Philippines, but to bolster up the policy. He assumed
+the burden of proof before he knew anything about the facts. The
+burden has been on him ever since. Any subordinate who helps him
+to bear that burden, finds favor in his eyes. But the burden is
+greater than he can bear. The proof fails. The proof shows that the
+Filipino people ought to be allowed to pursue happiness in their
+own way instead of being made to pursue it in Mr. Taft's way. Once
+you pretend that our true object in the Philippines is the "pursuit
+of happiness" for them, The Taft policy is condemned by the facts;
+and that is why I am opposed to it. The record shows this. He admits
+it. But he insists, with a sigh, that in some other generation they
+will be happy. Meantime, we are drifting toward our next war carrying
+in tow 8,000,000 of human beings who, if neutralized and let alone
+would not be disturbed by our next war, but whose destinies now must
+be dependent upon the outcome of such war, however little they may
+be concerned in the issues which bring it about.
+
+The shifty opportunism which once actually held out to the Filipinos
+the hope of some day becoming a State of the United States of America,
+has long since lapsed into the silence of shame, because no American
+ever honestly believed that the American people would ever countenance
+any such preposterous proposition. And so a free republic based on
+representative government is face to face with the proposition of
+having a "crown colony" on its hands which wishes to be, and could
+soon be made fit to be, a free republic also.
+
+If a federal republic cannot live half slave and half free, can it
+live with millions of the governed denied a voice in the federal
+government confessedly forever?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVIII
+
+THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY
+
+                                Oh be ye not dismayed
+                                Though ye stumbled and ye strayed.
+
+                                         Kipling--A Song of the English.
+
+
+He who points out a wrong without being prepared to suggest a remedy
+presumes upon the patience of his neighbor without good and sufficient
+cause. Up to this point the wrong has been unfolded, with such ability
+as was vouchsafed the narrator, "from Genesis to Revelations," so to
+speak; also his own attitude as an eye-witness, and its evolution from
+the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,
+to the more Christian doctrines of the New Testament. Let us now
+consider the remedy.
+
+In the course of our travels with the army in the earlier chapters of
+this book, we first followed its northern advance, from Manila over
+the great central plain drained by the Rio Grande and crossed by the
+railroad connecting Manila Bay with Lingayen Gulf; its further advance
+from the northern borders of the plain over the mountains of Central
+Luzon; and its march from the central mountains to the northern sea,
+at the extreme northern end of the archipelago. We thus saw in detail
+the military conquest and occupation of that part of Luzon lying
+north of the Pasig River. Before leaving that part of the subject, the
+way the provinces thus occupied were grouped into military districts
+was indicated. Following the lines of the military occupation, it was
+shown that Northern Luzon was naturally and conveniently susceptible of
+division into four groups of provinces, which groups might ultimately
+be evolved into self-governing commonwealths--States of a Philippine
+Federal Union, as follows:
+
+
+    Name of State     Area (sq. m.)    Population
+
+    Ilocos [531]          6,500           650,000
+    Cagayan [532]        12,000           300,000
+    Pangasinan [533]      4,500           625,000
+    Pampamga [534]        5,000           650,000
+                         ------         ---------
+    Total                28,000         2,225,000
+
+
+It will be remembered that after our narrative had followed the
+occupation of Northern Luzon by the American forces to practical
+completion, we turned to that part of Luzon lying south of Manila,
+and followed the military occupation as it was gradually extended
+from the Pasig River to the extreme point of Southern Luzon. Before
+closing the review of that military panorama, suggestions were made
+for an ultimate grouping of the provinces of Southern Luzon into two
+governmental units intended to be ultimately evolved into states. Those
+suggestions contemplated grouping the provinces of the lake region
+bordering on the Laguna de Bay and the adjacent provinces, into a
+territory designated for convenience as Cavite. [535] This territory
+was to include all of Southern Luzon except the hemp peninsula,
+which lies to the south of the Lake country. It was also suggested
+in the same connection that the three provinces of the hemp peninsula
+might form a convenient ultimate State of Camarines. In other words,
+two states can be made out of Southern Luzon as follows:
+
+
+    Name of State    Area (sq. m.)      Population
+
+    Cavite              8,500              700,000
+    Camarines           7,000              600,000
+                       ------            ---------
+    Total              15,500            1,300,000
+
+
+To recapitulate: All of Luzon except Manila and the vicinity
+can at once be divided into the six groups of provinces above
+mentioned--"territories," having what we are accustomed in the United
+States to call a "territorial form of government," and intended to
+be made states later. Luzon is about the size of Cuba (a little over
+40,000 sq. miles), is twice as thickly populated (nearly 4,000,000 to
+Cuba's 2,000,000), and is not cursed with a negro question, as Cuba is.
+
+The above totals, be it remembered, are only round numbers, but
+they get us "out of the woods" so to speak, and away from a lot of
+unpronounceable names. They show you how to handle Luzon as if it were
+about the size of Ohio--which it is. And, as has already been made
+clear in the earlier part of this volume, Luzon "is" the Philippines,
+in a very suggestive sense of the phrase, since it contains half the
+land area of the archipelago (outside of the Mohammedan island of
+Mindanao), and half the total population of the whole archipelago,
+besides being eight or ten times as large as any other island of the
+group except Mindanao; and it also contains the city which is the
+capital and chief port of the archipelago, and has been the seat of
+government for over three hundred years--Manila. And Manila is eight
+or ten times as large as any other town in the archipelago.
+
+After the occupation of Luzon, General Otis's extension of our
+occupation to the Visayan islands was reviewed, and in that connection
+it was pointed out that each of the six largest of those islands to
+wit, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, might be ultimately
+evolved into six states. [536]
+
+The smaller islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao could easily be
+disposed of governmentally by being attached to the jurisdiction of
+one of the said six islands.
+
+There is to-day no reason why a dozen Americans could not be at
+once appointed governors of the twelve prospective autonomous
+commonwealths above indicated, just as the President of the United
+States has in the past appointed governors for New Mexico, Arizona,
+and other territories of the United States which have subsequently
+been admitted to the Union. If the Congress of the United States should
+promise the Filipinos independence, to be granted as soon as American
+authority in the Islands should so recommend, the dozen territorial
+governments intended to be evolved into states of an ultimate federal
+union could soon be whipped into shape where they could take care of
+themselves to the extent that our state governments to-day take care
+of themselves. American representatives of American authority in the
+Islands, sent out to work out such a programme, might be instructed
+to watch these twelve territorial governments, granting to each the
+right to elect a governor in lieu of the appointed governor as soon
+as in their judgment a given territory was worthy of it. I have no
+doubt that such recommendations would follow successively as to all
+of said prospective states inside of four or five years. Whether this
+plan is wise or not, it certainly is not, as far as I am concerned,
+"half baked." Some five years ago, in the North American Review,
+[537] I suggested that Luzon could be so organized within less than
+ten years by American territorial governors selected for the work,
+naming the Honorable George Curry of New Mexico, formerly Governor of
+the territory of New Mexico, and now a member of Congress therefrom,
+as an ideal man to organize one such territory. It is true that there
+are not eleven other men as well qualified for the work as Governor
+Curry. In fact he is probably better qualified for the work than
+any man living. The language used as to Governor Curry in the North
+American Review article referred to was as follows:
+
+
+    If the inhabitants of these regions were told by a man whom they
+    liked and would believe, as they would Curry, that they were to
+    have autonomous governments like one of the Western Territories
+    of the United States, at the very earliest possible moment,
+    and urged to get ready for it, they could and would, under his
+    guidance. We would get a co-operation from those people we do not
+    now get and never will get, so long as we keep them in uncertainty
+    as to what we are going to do with them. If next year we should
+    formally disclaim intention to retain the islands permanently, and
+    set to work to create autonomous Territories destined ultimately
+    to be States of a Federated Philippine Republic, whenever fit,
+    we would soon see the way out of this tangle, and behold the
+    beginning of the end of it.
+
+
+Whenever the twelve territorial governments should be gotten into
+smooth working order under elected native governors, the Philippine
+archipelago would then be nearly ready for independence, so far as
+its internal affairs are concerned. The danger of their being annexed
+on the first pretext by some one of the great land-grabbing powers
+should be met by our guaranteeing them their independence, as we
+do Cuba, until they could be protected by neutralization treaties,
+such as protect Belgium and Switzerland to-day, as explained in
+the chapter which follows this. Powers not specifically granted
+to the several states-in-embryo should of course, until the final
+grant of independence, be reserved to the central government at
+Manila. Manila and Rizal province would be available at almost any
+time as a thirteenth state. So that when the twelve states above
+suggested had shown themselves capable of local self-government,
+Manila and Rizal province might be added to make the final one of
+thirteen original states of a Philippine Republic.
+
+Any American who has seen a Filipino pueblo transformed, as if by
+magic, from listless apathy to a state of buzzing and busy enthusiasm
+suggestive of a bee-hive, by preparations for some church fiesta,
+or for the coming of some dignitary from Manila, has seen something
+analogous to what would happen if the Filipino body politic should
+suddenly be electrified by a promise of independence under some such
+programme as the above. A generous rivalry would at once ensue all
+over the archipelago in each of the twelve prospective states. Each
+would seek to be the first to be recommended by American authority as
+ready for statehood. I do not believe the annals of national experience
+contain any analogy where every member of a given community has rallied
+to a common cause more completely than the whole Filipino people would
+rally to such a prospective programme of independence. The unanimity
+would be as absolute as the kind we saw among the American people at
+the outbreak of the Spanish War, when Congress one fine morning placed
+fifty millions of dollars at the disposal of President McKinley by
+a unanimous vote.
+
+I especially invite attention to the fact that the above programme
+throws away nothing that has been done by us in the Islands in the
+last twelve years in the way of organization. It simply takes it and
+builds upon it. Congress should not attempt to work out the details
+from this end of the line. We should send men out there from here to
+work them out, with local co-operation from the leading Filipinos. Men
+animated by the idea of working out a programme under which the living
+may hope to see the independence of their country, should be sent out
+to take the place of the men now there who are irrevocably committed
+to the programme of indefinite retention with undeclared intention,
+which holds out no hope to the living. It is not wise to arrange
+the details of the programme by act of Congress without a year or
+two of study of the situation by such men on the ground. An act of
+Congress which goes into details before getting the recommendations
+of such men will inevitably set up a lot of straw men easy for the
+other side to knock down. All you need is a program, sanctioned by
+Congress, containing a promise of independence, and men sent out to
+the islands to work out the program. They would report back from time
+to time, and the Congress by whose authority they went out would have
+no hesitation in being guided by their recommendations. If unpatriotic
+greed for office among the Filipinos, or other opposition animated by
+evil motives, should block the game, your Americans so sent out would
+have to recommend the calling of a halt. This ever-present shadow
+in the background would in turn throw the shadow of ostracism over
+all demagogues.
+
+Meantime the Filipinos should be given a Senate, or upper house,
+in which, the thirteen prospective "states" should be represented by
+two men, the bill therefor to be framed out there, and sent back here
+to Congress for approval. This would give them under the plan here
+suggested, as soon as the Americans sent out should so recommend,
+a Senate of twenty-six members. At present, if the native Assembly,
+or lower house, does not pass the annual appropriations necessary
+to run the government, the appropriation act of the preceding year
+again becomes law. At present, the upper house is the Philippine
+Commission. By withholding its consent, it can prevent any legislation
+whatsoever. So, at present, the Assembly is little more than a debating
+society. All questions as to appropriations, veto of legislation, and
+other details, in the event the Filipinos are given a Senate also,
+should be left to be fixed in the bill recommended by the men sent
+out to work out the program of promise.
+
+On March 20, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, the distinguished veteran
+Congressman from Virginia, who is Chairman of the Committee on Insular
+Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill entitled
+"A bill to establish a qualified independence for the Philippines, and
+to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute
+and complete." The greater part of what precedes this paragraph of
+this chapter was written prior to March 20, 1912. Mr. Jones's bill
+works out the details of the independence problem in a manner somewhat
+different from the plan I suggest, but that does not make me any the
+less heartily in favor of the principle which his bill embodies. The
+supreme virtue of the Jones bill is that it promises Independence at
+a fixed date, July 4, 1921. It ends the cruel uncertainty, so unjust
+to both the Filipinos and to the Americans in the Philippines, that
+is contained in the present program of indefinite retention with
+undeclared intention. Five years ago, in the North American Review
+for January 18, and June 21, 1907, the writer hereof expressed the
+belief that an earlier date was feasible, thus:
+
+
+    If three strong and able men, familiar with insular conditions,
+    and still young enough to undertake the task [538] were told by
+    a President of the United States, by authority of the Congress,
+    "Go out there and set up a respectable native government in
+    ten years, and then come away," they could and would do it,
+    and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest
+    moral victories in the annals of free government would have
+    been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their
+    country's history.
+
+
+As Mr. Jones's bill allows four years more of time, I believe it to
+be absolutely safe.
+
+Governor Curry, the Congressman from New Mexico hereinabove mentioned,
+who spent eight years in the Philippines, agrees with the fundamental
+principle of the Jones bill, that as to making a definite promise of
+Independence within a few years, and does not consider 1921 too early.
+
+Under the present law, the Philippine Assembly has some eighty
+members, each supposed to represent 90,000 people, more or less. This
+tallies, roughly, with the census total of population, which is
+7,600,000. [539] Under the existing law in the Philippines, the
+qualifications for voting are really of two kinds, though nominally
+of three kinds. There is a property qualification, and there is
+an educational qualification. In any case, in order to vote, the
+individual must be twenty-one years old, and must have lived for six
+months in the place where he offers to vote. The property qualification
+requires that the would-be voter own at least $250 worth of property,
+or pay a tax to the amount of $15. The explanation of how a man may
+not own $250 worth of property and yet pay $15 taxes is that under the
+old Spanish system, which we partially adopted, a man might pay such
+cedula or poll-tax as he preferred, according to a graduated scale,
+certain civic rights being accorded to those voluntarily paying the
+higher poll-tax which were denied to those paying less. The educational
+qualification requires the would-be voter to speak, read, and write
+either English or Spanish, or else to have held certain enumerated
+small municipal offices under the Spaniards--before the American
+occupation. Mr. Jones's bill proposes to add the speaking, reading,
+and writing of the native dialect of a given locality [540] to the
+educational qualification. This would double, or perhaps triple,
+the electorate, and would, in my judgment, be wise. Thousands upon
+thousands of natives who only speak a little Spanish can both speak,
+read, and write their native Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan, as the
+case may be. The total of those qualified to vote for members of the
+Assembly in 1907 was only about 100,000. At a later election, that
+number was doubled. If there are 7,500,000 people in the archipelago,
+one fifth of these should represent the adult male population, say
+1,500,000. Under Mr. Jones's bill, the electorate would probably
+increase to half a million long before the date he proposes for
+independence, July 4, 1921. But all such details as qualification for
+voting might, it seems to me, be left to people on the ground, their
+recommendations controlling. Under a promise of independence by 1921,
+a very fair electorate of at least one third, possibly one half, of
+the adult male population, could be built up. As the majority report
+on the Jones Bill, dated April 26, 1912, says:
+
+
+    For nearly ten years the average public-school enrolment has not
+    been less than 500,000. [541]
+
+
+I believe that the Moros should be left as they are for the
+present. The time for solving that problem has not yet been
+reached. Mr. Jones himself evidently bases his idea of allowing the
+Moro country representation in the Philippine Congress, or legislature
+provided by his bill, on the probability that enough Christian people
+will vote, down there, to make up an electorate that would not be
+"impossible," i.e., absurd. For instance, he tells me that a great
+many people have moved into Mindanao from the northern islands for
+commercial reasons, and, if I recollect correctly, that Zamboanga,
+the most beautiful little port in Mindanao, which hardly had 10,000
+people when I was there, now has possibly 50,000. But the Moro
+question need not stand in the way of setting up an independent
+government in the Philippines in 1921, as proposed by his bill. You
+have material for thirteen original states, representing a population
+of nearly seven million Christian people, in Luzon and the six main
+Visayan Islands. Why delay the creation of this republic on account
+of 250,000 semi-civilized, crudely Mohammedan Moros in Mindanao--a
+separate island lying off to the south of the proposed republic? [542]
+A happy solution of the matter would be to send Mr. Jones out there as
+Governor-General and let him work out the problem on the ground. He
+has had a long and distinguished career in the public service,
+twenty-two years in Congress. His public record and speeches on the
+Philippine question from the beginning would make him to the Filipinos
+the very incarnation of a bona fide intention on our part to give
+them their independence at the earliest practical moment, that is,
+at some time which the living might hope to see. When Governor Taft
+and Mr. Root drew the Philippine Government Act of 1902, the former
+had already been president of the Philippine Commission for two
+years, had been all over the archipelago, and knew it well. Suppose
+the Taft policy should be substituted by the more progressive Jones
+policy. Mr. Jones, or whoever is to change the policy, ought to have
+as much acquaintance with the subject, acquired on the ground, as
+Mr. Taft had when he formulated his policy of indefinite retention
+with undeclared intention. The nucleus of the Taft policy was stated
+by Governor Taft to the Senate Committee in 1902, as follows [543]:
+
+
+    My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy is to be
+    declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United States
+    to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show
+    themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing
+    popular government, when their relation to the United States,
+    either of statehood, or of quasi-independence, like the colony
+    of Australia or Canada, can be declared after mutual conference.
+
+
+The policy which Mr. Jones has favored for the last twelve years is
+almost as well known to the Filipinos as are the views of Mr. Taft
+himself.
+
+In conclusion, the writer desires to say, with especial emphasis,
+that the suggestions outlining the plan which forms the bulk of this
+chapter are presented in a spirit of entire deference to the views
+of any one else who may have considered this great subject carefully,
+especially to the views of Mr. Jones, whose bill is so entirely right
+in principle. The one supreme need of the situation is a definite
+legislative declaration which shall make clear to all concerned--to the
+Filipino demagogue and the American grafter, as well as to the great
+body of the good people of both races out there--that the governing
+of a remote and alien people is to have no permanent place in the
+purposes of our national life; and that we do bona fide intend to
+give the Filipinos their independence at a date in the future which
+will interest the living, by extending to the living the hope to see
+the independence of their country. And the Jones Bill does that.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIX
+
+THE WAY OUT
+
+                Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland
+                has now taken such lodgment in the conscience of
+                Europe that its violation would inevitably provoke
+                a storm of indignation.
+
+                             M. de Martens in the Revue des Deux Mondes.
+
+
+On March 25, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, of Virginia, Chairman of the
+House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a resolution (H. J. 278)
+proposing the neutralization of the Philippines, to accompany his
+Philippine Independence Bill discussed in the preceding chapter. Such
+a resolution, accompanying such a bill, both introduced by one of the
+majority leaders in the House of Representatives, lifts the question
+of Philippine neutralization out of the region of the "academic,"
+and brings it forward as a thing which must, sooner or later, command
+the serious consideration both of Congress and the country. There
+have been many such resolutions before that of Mr. Jones. But they
+are all the same in principle. All contemplate our guaranteeing the
+Filipinos their independence until the treaties they propose shall
+be consummated. In 1911, there were at least nine such resolutions
+proposing neutralization of the Philippines, introduced by the
+following named gentlemen, the first a Republican, the rest Democrats:
+
+Mr. McCall, of Massachusetts; Mr. Cline, of Indiana; Mr. Sabath,
+of Illinois; Mr. Garner, of Texas; Mr. Peters, of Massachusetts;
+Mr. Martin, of Colorado; Mr. Burgess, of Texas; Mr. Oldfield, of
+Arkansas; and Mr. Ferris, of Oklahoma.
+
+Because the neutralization plan to provide against the Philippines
+being annexed by some other Power in case we ever give them their
+independence would, if successfully worked out, reduce by that much
+the possible area of war, and be a distinct step in the direction of
+universal peace, it is certainly worthy of careful consideration by
+the enlightened judgment of the Congress and the world.
+
+Mr. McCall is the father of the neutralization idea, so far as
+the House of Representatives is concerned, application of it to
+the Philippines having been first suggested at the Universal Peace
+Conference of 1904, by Mr. Erving Winslow, of Boston. Mr. McCall has
+been introducing his neutralization resolution at every Congress for
+a number of Congresses past.
+
+The McCall Resolution (H. J. Res. 107) is the oldest, and perhaps the
+simplest, of the various pending resolutions for the neutralization
+of the Philippines, and is typical of all. It reads:
+
+
+    JOINT RESOLUTION
+
+    Declaring the purpose of the United States to recognize
+    the independence of the Filipino people as soon as a stable
+    government can be established, and requesting the President to
+    open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
+
+    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
+    States of America in Congress assembled:
+
+    That in accordance with the principles upon which its government
+    is founded and which were again asserted by it at the outbreak of
+    the war with Spain, the United States declares that the Filipino
+    people of right ought to be free and independent, and announces
+    its purpose to recognize their independence as soon as a stable
+    government, republican in form, can be established by them, and
+    thereupon to transfer to such government all its rights in the
+    Philippine Islands upon terms which shall be reasonable and just,
+    and to leave the sovereignty and control of their country to the
+    Filipino people.
+
+    Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby
+    is, requested to open negotiations with such foreign Powers as in
+    his opinion should be parties to the compact for the neutralization
+    of the Philippine Islands by international agreement.
+
+
+If the McCall Resolution, or any one of the kindred resolutions,
+were passed, and complied with by the President of the United States,
+and accepted by the other Powers, and the Filipinos were helped to
+organize territorial governments such as Arizona and New Mexico were
+before they became States, several such territories could form the
+nucleus about which to begin to build at once, as indicated in the
+chapter on "The Road to Autonomy." A number of such territories could
+be made at once as completely autonomous as the governments of the
+territories of Arizona and New Mexico were before their admission to
+our Union. With those examples to emulate, together with the tingling
+of the general blood that would follow a promise of independence and
+a national life of their own, similar territorial governments could
+be successively organized, as indicated in the preceding chapter,
+throughout the archipelago. These could, in less than ten years, be
+fitted for admission to a federal union of autonomous territories,
+with the string of our sovereignty still tied to it, and an American
+Governor-General still over the whole, as now. And when the last island
+knocked for admission and was admitted, the string could be cut, and
+the Federal Union of Territories admitted, through our good offices, to
+the sisterhood of nations, as an independent Philippine republic. They
+would not bother the rest of the world any more than Belgium and
+Switzerland do, which are likewise protected by neutralization.
+
+The idea of international neutralization is not without pride of
+ancestry or hope of posterity. It was born out of the downfall of
+Napoleon I. The Treaty of Paris of 1815 declared that
+
+
+    the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as well as its
+    independence of outside influences, are in conformity with the
+    true interests of European politics.
+
+
+The Congress of Vienna, held afterwards in the same year, at
+which there were present, besides the various monarchs, such men as
+Wellington, Talleyrand, and Metternich, solemnly and finally reiterated
+that declaration. Would not "the neutrality and inviolability" of
+the Philippines be gladly acceded to by the great Powers as being
+"in conformity with the true interests of European politics," and
+Asiatic politics as well?
+
+Says M. De Martens, in an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes for
+November 15, 1903:
+
+
+    Respect for the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland has now taken
+    such lodgment in the conscience of the civilized nations of Europe
+    that its violation would inevitably provoke a storm of indignation.
+
+
+At present, the Philippines are a potential apple of discord thrown
+into the Balance of Power in the Pacific. The present policy of
+indefinite retention by us, with undeclared intention, leaves everybody
+guessing, including ourselves. Now is the accepted time, while the
+horizon of the future is absolutely cloudless, to ask Japan to sign
+a treaty agreeing not to annex the Philippine Islands after we give
+them their independence. By her answer she will show her hand. The
+overcrowded monarchies do not pretend any special scruples about
+annexing anything annexable. Germany very frankly insists that she
+became a great Power too late to get her rightful share of the earth's
+surface, and that she must expand somewhither. And only the virile
+menace of the Monroe Doctrine has so far stayed her heavy hand from
+seizing some portion of South America. But probably none of the Powers
+would object to converting the Philippines into permanently neutral
+territory, by the same kind of an agreement that protects Switzerland.
+
+The Treaty of London of 1831, relative to Belgium and Holland,
+declares:
+
+
+    Within the limits indicated, Belgium shall form an independent
+    and perpetually neutral state. She shall be required to observe
+    this same neutrality toward all the other states.
+
+
+The signatories to this treaty were Great Britain, France, Austria,
+Prussia, and Russia. Forty years after it was made, during the
+Franco-Prussian war, when Belgium's neutrality was threatened by
+manifestations of intention on the part both of France and of Prussia
+to occupy some of her territory, England served notice on both parties
+to the conflict that if either violated the territorial integrity of
+Belgium, she, England, would join forces with the other. And the treaty
+was observed. The specific way in which observance of it was compassed
+was this: Great Britain made representations to both France and Germany
+which resulted in two identical conventions, signed in August, 1870,
+at Paris and Berlin, whereby any act of aggression by either against
+Belgium was to be followed by England's joining forces with the other
+against the aggressor. So long as human nature does not change very
+materially, "the green-eyed monster" will remain a powerful factor in
+human affairs. The mutual jealousy of the Powers will always be the
+saving grace, in troubled times, of neutralization treaties signed in
+time of profound peace. If "Balance of Power" considerations in Europe
+have protected the Turkish Empire from annexation or dismemberment all
+these years, without a neutralization treaty, why will not the mutual
+jealousy of the Powers insure the signing and faithful observance of
+a treaty tending to preserve the Balance of Power in the Pacific? Who
+would object?
+
+The Panama Canal is to be opened in 1913. We want South America to
+be a real friend to the Monroe Doctrine, which she certainly is not
+enthusiastic about now, and will never be while we remain wedded
+to the McKinley Doctrine of Benevolent Assimilation of unconsenting
+people--people anxious to develop, under God, along their own lines. In
+1906, while Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Root made
+a tour of South America. He told those people down there, at Rio
+Janeiro, by way of quieting their fears lest we may some day be moved
+to "improve" their condition also, through benevolent assimilation
+and vigorous application of the "uplift" treatment:
+
+
+    We wish for * * * no territory except our own. We deem the
+    independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member
+    of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of
+    the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the
+    chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong.
+
+
+That Rio Janeiro speech of Mr. Root's is as noble a masterpiece of
+real eloquence, its setting and all considered, as any utterance of
+any statesman of modern times. Among other things, he said:
+
+
+    No student of our times can fail to see that not America alone
+    but the whole civilized world is swinging away from its old
+    governmental moorings and intrusting the fate of its civilization
+    to the capacity of the popular mass to govern. By this pathway
+    mankind is to travel, whithersoever it leads. Upon the success
+    of this, our great undertaking, the hope of humanity depends.
+
+
+As Secretary of War, "civilizing with a Krag," Mr. Root reminds one
+of Cortez and Pizarro. As Secretary of State, he permits us to believe
+that all the great men are not dead yet.
+
+If, in making that Rio Janeiro speech, Mr. Root laid to his soul
+the flattering unction that the minds of his hearers did not revert
+dubiously to his previous grim missionary work in the Philippines,
+where the percentage of literacy is superior to that of more than one
+Latin-American republic, he is very much mistaken. If he is laboring
+under any such delusion, let him read a book written since then by
+a distinguished South American publicist, called El Porvenir de La
+Americana Latina ("The Future of Latin America"). If he does not read
+Spanish, he can divine the contents of the book from the cartoon which
+adorns the title-page. The cartoon represents the American eagle,
+flag in claw, standing on the map of North America, looking toward
+South America as if ready for flight, its beak bent over Panama,
+the shadow of its wings already darkening the northern portions of
+the sister continent to the south of us. To get the trade of South
+America, in the mighty struggle for commercial supremacy which is to
+follow the opening of the Panama Canal, we must win the confidence of
+South America. We will never do it until we do the right thing by the
+Filipinos. Concerning the Philippines, South America reflects that
+we annexed the first supposedly rich non-contiguous Spanish country
+we ever had a chance to annex that we had not previously solemnly
+vowed we would not annex. We must choose between the Monroe Doctrine
+of mutually respectful Fraternal Relation, which contemplates some
+twenty-one mutually trustful republics in the Western Hemisphere, all
+a unit against alien colonization here, and the McKinley Doctrine of
+grossly patronizing Benevolent Assimilation, which contemplates some
+8,000,000 of people in the Eastern Hemisphere, all a unit against
+alien colonization there--a people, moreover, whose friendship we
+have cultivated with the Gatling gun and the gallows, and watered
+with tariff and other legislation enacted without knowledge and used
+without shame.
+
+We should stop running a kindergarten for adults in Asia, and get back
+to the Monroe Doctrine. There are only two hemispheres to a sphere,
+and our manifest destiny lies in the Western one. We do not want the
+earth. Our mission as a nation is to conserve the republican form
+of government, and the consent-of-the-governed principle, and to
+promote the general peace of mankind by insuring it in our half of
+the earth. The first thing to do to set this country right again is
+to get rid of the Philippines, and give them a square deal, pursuant
+to the spirit of the neutralization resolutions now pending before
+Congress. All these resolutions contain the one supreme need of the
+hour, an honest declaration of intention. The longer we fight shy
+of that, the less likely we are ever to give the Filipinos their
+independence, and the deeper we get into the mire of mistaken
+philanthropy and covert exploitation.
+
+We should resume our original programme of blazing out the path and
+making clear the way up which any nation of the earth may follow when
+it will. That path lies along the line of actually attempting as a
+nation a practical demonstration of the Power of Righteousness, or,
+in other words, the existence of an Omnipotent Omniscient Benevolent
+Good (whether you spell it with one o or with two is not important)
+shaping, guiding, and directing human affairs, such demonstration
+to be made through the concerted action of a self-governing people
+under a written Constitution based on equality of opportunity and
+the Golden Rule.
+
+As a people we are very young yet. It is not yet written in the Book
+of Time how long this nation will survive. So far, our government is
+only an experiment. But, as John Quincy Adams once said, it and its
+Constitution are "an experiment upon the human heart," to see whether
+or not the Golden Rule will work in government among men.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+NOTES
+
+
+[1] The date contemplated by the pending Philippine Independence
+Bill, introduced in the House of Representatives in March, 1912,
+by Hon. W. A. Jones, Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs.
+
+[2] Congressional Record, December 6, 1897, p. 3.
+
+[3] Split Rock.
+
+[4] Senate Document 62, p. 381.
+
+[5] See pages 341 et seq., Senate Document 62, part 1, 55th Cong.,
+3d Sess., 1898-9.
+
+[6] Senate Document 62, p. 346.
+
+[7] Ib., 349.
+
+[8] The natives in and about Singapore are Mohammedans, forbidden by
+their religion to use alcoholic beverages.
+
+[9] Senate Document 62, p. 354.
+
+[10] Senate Document 62, p. 356.
+
+[11] Hearings on Philippine affairs, Senate Document 331, part 3,
+57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1901-2, proceedings of June 26-8, 1902.
+
+[12] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2927.
+
+[13] The Senate Document has it backwards "left Mirs Bay for Hong
+Kong," clearly an error.
+
+[14] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2932.
+
+[15] Cong. Record, April 17, 1900, p. 4287.
+
+[16] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2928.
+
+[17] Ib.
+
+[18] S. D. 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.
+
+[19] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2937.
+
+[20] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2934.
+
+[21] Ib., p. 2967.
+
+[22] See pp. 2928 and 2956, S. D. 331, part 3.
+
+[23] S. D. 331, pt.3, p. 2965.
+
+[24] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
+
+[25] Ib., p. 2936.
+
+[26] Ib., p. 2940.
+
+[27] See letter of H. Irving Hancock, American war correspondent in
+the field, dated Manila, May 3, 1899, published New York Criterion,
+June 17, 1899. This Hancock interview with General MacArthur was
+quoted in debate on the floor of the Senate on April 17, 1900 (see
+Cong. Rec. of that date), and was corroborated by General MacArthur
+himself as substantially correct in that officer's testimony before
+the Senate in 1902, S. D. 331, pt. 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session,
+p. 1942, in answer to questions put by Senator Culberson.
+
+[28] Rev. Clay Macaulay, who afterwards made that statement in a
+letter to the Boston Transcript.
+
+[29] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2939.
+
+[30] S. D. 208, part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 7, 8.
+
+[31] Cong. Record, December, 1897.
+
+[32] See Cong. Record, April 11, 1898, pp. 3699 et seq.
+
+[33] Cong. Record, April 13, 1898, pp. 3701 et seq.
+
+[34] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.
+
+[35] S. D. 62, p. 327.
+
+[36] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, App., p. 100. Dispatch May 20, 1898.
+
+[37] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 13.
+
+[38] S. D. 331, pt. 3, p. 2930.
+
+[39] Report Schurman Commission, vol. i., p. 172.
+
+[40] S. D. 62, p. 337.
+
+[41] S. D. 331, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2951.
+
+[42] S. D. 331, p. 2955.
+
+[43] Ib., p. 2954.
+
+[44] S. D. 62, pp. 328-9.
+
+[45] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 103.
+
+[46] Ib., p. 102.
+
+[47] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 102.
+
+[48] S. D. 62, p. 362.
+
+[49] Ib., pp. 360-1.
+
+[50] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 106.
+
+[51] S. D. 62, p. 354.
+
+[52] S. D. 62, p. 329.
+
+[53] Ib., p. 432.
+
+[54] Alas, that rare man, Frank Millet, perished in the Titanic
+disaster of April, 1912, since the above was written.
+
+[55] Expedition to the Philippines.
+
+[56] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 111.
+
+[57] See p. 2934, S. D. 331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[58] See p. 2934, S. D. 331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[59] S. D. 62, p. 383.
+
+[60] See Admiral Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee of 1902,
+S. D. 331, pp. 2942, 2957.
+
+[61] See National Geographic Magazine, August, 1905.
+
+[62] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898.
+
+[63] See p. 2938, S. D. 331 (1902).
+
+[64] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898, p. 5.
+
+[65] Senate Document 169, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. (1898).
+
+[66] Ib.
+
+[67] Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, August, 1898 Century Magazine.
+
+[68] See p. 85, S. D. 208, 1900.
+
+[69] See General Orders No. 101, series 1898, Adjutant-General's
+Office, Washington, July 18, 1898, a copy of which accompanied the
+President's message to Congress of December, 1898, and may be seen
+at p. 783, House Document No. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9.
+
+[70] For a copy of this proclamation, see p. 86, S. D. 208, 56th Cong.,
+1st Sess.
+
+[71] S. D. 208, p. 8.
+
+[72] S. D. 331, p. 2976, Hearings before Senate Committee, 1902.
+
+[73] S. D. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 16.
+
+[74] Correspondence, War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 720.
+
+[75] For Admiral Dewey's cable report of this, see Navy Dept. Report,
+1898, Appendix, p. 110. For particulars, given by him subsequently,
+see S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2942.
+
+[76] S. D. 331, pt. 3, 1902, p. 2942, and thereabouts.
+
+[77] S. D. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 4.
+
+[78] S. D. 208, p. 4.
+
+[79] Anderson only had about 2500 troops then.
+
+[80] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 110; S. D. 331, 1902,
+p. 2942.
+
+[81] Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 8.
+
+[82] Ib., pp. 12-13.
+
+[83] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 9.
+
+[84] Ib., p. 8.
+
+[85] See page 40 of General Merritt's Report, War Dept. Report, 1898,
+vol. i., part 2.
+
+[86] S. D. 208, 1900, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.
+
+[87] Ib., p. 10.
+
+[88] The writer is certainly one of these, and while calling in
+question the wisdom and righteousness of our Philippine policy,
+he cannot refrain from avowing just here a feeling of individual
+obligation to Mr. Root for his exquisite tribute to the personal
+equation of Mr. McKinley, delivered at the National Republican
+Convention of 1904, which was, in part, as follows: "How wise and
+skilful he was. How modest and self-effacing. How deep his insight
+into the human heart. How swift the intuitions of his sympathy. How
+compelling the charm of his gracious presence. He was so unselfish,
+so genuine a lover of his kind. And he was the kindest and tenderest
+friend who ever grasped another's hand. Alas, that his virtues did
+plead in vain against his cruel fate."
+
+[89] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 117.
+
+[90] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 13.
+
+[91] For the Merritt proclamation, see S. D. 208, p. 86.
+
+[92] In 1906.
+
+[93] S. D. 208, 1900, p. 13.
+
+[94] Ib., p. 40.
+
+[95] Report First Philippine Commission, vol. i., p. 172.
+
+[96] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4. Otis report, p. 13.
+
+[97] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2941.
+
+[98] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 788.
+
+[99] May 19th-July 9th; see General Anderson's report to the
+Adjutant-General of the army of July 9, 1898, S. D. 208, p. 6.
+
+[100] See Major J. F. Bell's report to Merritt of August 29, 1898,
+S. D. 62, p. 379.
+
+[101] Clerks.
+
+[102] See S. D. 208, pp. 101-2.
+
+[103] Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 34.
+
+[104] S. D. 208, p. 99.
+
+[105] Admiral Dewey to Senate Committee, 1902, S. D. 331, 1902,
+p. 2940.
+
+[106] 7,635,426. See Philippine Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15.
+
+[107] 3,798,507. See Philippine Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 125.
+
+[108] See Senate Document 62, 1898, p. 379.
+
+[109] Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon.
+
+[110] Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Cagayan.
+
+[111] S. D. 62, p. 380.
+
+[112] Diary of Major Simeon Villa, p. 1898, Senate Document 331,
+pt. 3, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1902.
+
+[113] See Merritt's Report for 1898, War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i.,
+pt. 2, p. 40.
+
+[114] Expedition to the Philippines, p. 61.
+
+[115] "With 10,000 men, we would have had to guard 13,300 Spanish
+prisoners, and to fight 14,000 Filipinos," says General Anderson,
+North American Review for February, 1900.
+
+[116] Senate Document 208, p. 86.
+
+[117] Mr. McKinley's instructions to the Peace Commissioners, Senate
+Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, p. 6.
+
+[118] See General Greene's Report, W. D. R., 1898, vol. i., pt. 2,
+p. 72, where Mr. Millet's conduct in the assault on the city receives
+special mention.
+
+[119] War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 73.
+
+[120] See War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 58.
+
+[121] Congressional Record, December 5, 1898, p. 5.
+
+[122] War Dept. Report, 1898, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 57.
+
+[123] Ib., vol. i., pt. 4, p. 190.
+
+[124] See his Report, War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 3.
+
+[125] On August 20th. War Dept. Report,1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 345.
+
+[126] Ib., p. 5.
+
+[127] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. 1., pt. 4, pp. 346-7.
+
+[128] Ib. p. 335.
+
+[129] Senate Document 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34.
+
+[130] S. D. 208, pt. ii., pp. 7, 8.
+
+[131] Otis's Report, p. 10.
+
+[132] Navy Dept. Report, 1898, Appendix, p. 101.
+
+[133] To say nothing of the "chariot and four, and a band of a hundred
+pieces, and everything in the grandest style," of which Admiral Dewey
+told the Senate Committee in 1902 (S. D. 331, 1902, p. 2972).
+
+[134] See p. 7, S. D. 148, 56th Cong., 2d Sess.
+
+[135] Expedition to the Philippines, p. 255.
+
+[136] "Putting the road and accessories into the same state as they
+were on February 4, 1899," was the language in which Mr. Higgins
+formulated his demand in a letter to General Otis on Jan. 25, 1900. See
+War Dept. Record, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 516.
+
+[137] North American Review, January 18, 1907, p. 140.
+
+[138] The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always
+dealt with in this book as a separate and distinct problem.
+
+[139] Senate Document 196, 56th Cong., 1st. Sess., p. 14.
+
+[140] Here the author's commanding officer, Major Batson, was shot
+a year and a day later while directing with his usual clear-headed
+intrepidity the fire of a part of his battalion to protect the crossing
+of the rest of it over the Aringay River, we being at the time in hot
+pursuit of Aguinaldo, whose rear-guard made a stand in the trenches
+on the other side of the river.
+
+[141] Senate Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9, p. 283.
+
+[142] Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the
+Treasury, now (1912) President of the National City Bank, New York,
+in the Century Magazine, August, 1898.
+
+[143] S. D. 148, p. 15.
+
+[144] Navy Department Report for 1898, Appendix, p. 122.
+
+[145] Senate Document 148, p. 19.
+
+[146] Chairman of the Spanish Commission.
+
+[147] Meaning evidently payment of some of Spain's debts with money
+she could probably get from us for the asking, as a matter of sympathy
+for the fellow who is "down and out."
+
+[148] Mr. McKinley had before that sent word significantly that he
+was not unmindful of the distressing financial embarrassments of Spain.
+
+[149] Otis's Report for 1899, p. 43.
+
+[150] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 3.
+
+[151] Ib., pt. 2, p. 75.
+
+[152] Senate Document 62, p. 379.
+
+[153] Published at page 7 of Senate Document 208, pt. 2, 56th Congress,
+1st Session (1900).
+
+[154] Called in Spanish "Visayas," or Bisayas. Visayas is an
+adjective derived from the name of the Bay of Biscay, "b" and "v"
+being interchangeable in Spanish.
+
+[155] For a fuller description of the archipelago, see Chapter XII.
+
+[156] Vol. ii., p. 315.
+
+[157] This proclamation has been printed many times, in various
+government publications, e.g., War Department Report, 1899, vol. i.,
+pt. 4, pp. 355-6; Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session
+(1900), pp. 82-3, etc.
+
+[158] Senate Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, p. 272.
+
+[159] The "self-doubting" lay in the doubt of the Administration as
+to whether its programme of conquest would or would not be ratified
+by the Senate. The "pusillanimity" lay, wholly unbeknown to Washington
+of course, in the estimate of us it produced among the Filipinos.
+
+[160] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 62.
+
+[161] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 64.
+
+[162] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 79.
+
+[163] Ib., p. 67.
+
+[164] "I sent you the President's proclamation, not for publication,
+but for your information," wrote Otis to Miller after the latter had
+let the cat out of the bag. Senate Document 208, p. 58.
+
+[165] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54.
+
+[166] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.
+
+[167] Ibid.
+
+[168] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 59.
+
+[169] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), pp. 54-5.
+
+[170] Colonel Enoch H. Crowder, General Otis's Judge Advocate, was
+"the brains of" the Otis government. But the difference between General
+Otis and Aguinaldo was that Aguinaldo always had the good sense to
+follow Mabini's advice, while Otis did not always follow Crowder's.
+
+[171] Senate Document 208, p. 56.
+
+[172] S. D. 208, p. 58.
+
+[173] See Congressional Record, January 18, 1899, p. 734.
+
+[174] Senate Document 208, p. 59.
+
+[175] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 66.
+
+[176] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, p. 58, letter
+to General Miller.
+
+[177] A campaign synonym for forced marching. It has no known
+etymology, but to the initiated it suggests torrential downpouring
+of rain and bedraggled mud-spattered columns of troops.
+
+[178] Senate Document 208, pt. 2, p. 7.
+
+[179] Otis Report, p. 80.
+
+[180] The American "Tommy Atkins."
+
+[181] Otis Report, 1899 War Dept. Rpt., 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 81.
+
+[182] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 2709 et seq.
+
+[183] Congressional Record, January 11, 1899, p. 735.
+
+[184] Ib., January 18, 1899, p. 733.
+
+[185] The vote on the Bacon resolution was a tie, 29 to 29, and
+the Vice-President of the United States then cast the deciding vote
+against it. Cong. Rec., Feby. 14, 1899, p. 1845.
+
+[186] See Present-Day Problems, by Wm. H. Taft, p. 9; Dodd, Mead, &
+Co., N. Y., 1908.
+
+[187] Congressional Record, February 14, 1899, p. 1846 (55th Cong.,
+3d Sess.).
+
+[188] See General Hughes's testimony before Senate Committee, 1902,
+Senate Document 331, p. 508.
+
+[189] See Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President for
+1899, pp. 7 et seq.
+
+[190] This is no mere attempt at rhetorical decoration. Said General
+MacArthur to the Senate Committee in 1902 concerning Aguinaldo:
+"He was the incarnation of the feelings of the Filipinos." Senate
+Document 331, 1902, p. 1926.
+
+[191] Senate Document 331, 1902, pp. 2927 et seq.
+
+[192] Senate Document 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23.
+
+[193] Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-9, p. 383.
+
+[194] See end of Chapter IV. ante.
+
+[195] Otis Report for 1899, p. 66.
+
+[196] Report, p. 99.
+
+[197] Ib., p. 100.
+
+[198] Ib., p. 150.
+
+[199] Raw recruits.
+
+[200] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 375.
+
+[201] There were thirteen States represented by at least one
+organization. These were the First Californias, Second Oregons, First
+Colorados, First Nebraskas, Tenth Pennsylvanias, Major Young's Utah
+Battery, the First Idahos, Thirteenth Minnesotas, the North Dakota
+Artillery, the Twentieth Kansas, and the Tennessees, Montanas,
+and Wyomings.
+
+[202] The regular regiments represented were the 14th, 8th, and
+23d Infantry and 4th Cavalry. There were also some batteries of the
+Third Regular Artillery, and a number of Engineers, Hospital Corps,
+and Signal Corps people.
+
+[203] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 440.
+
+[204] Hearings on affairs in Philippine Islands, 1902.
+
+[205] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 109.
+
+[206] Senate Document 331, p. 1890.
+
+[207] Senate Document 331, pp. 1890 et seq.
+
+[208] Ib., p. 1436.
+
+[209] Senate Document 331, p. 1448.
+
+[210] Ib., pt. 2, p. 1447.
+
+[211] The "water cure" (a cure for reticence) consisted in placing
+a bamboo reed in the victim's mouth and pouring water down his
+throat thus painfully distending his stomach and crowding all his
+viscera. Allowed to void this after a time, he would, under threat
+of repetition, give the desired information.
+
+[212] Since the above was written, the officer in question has joined
+the Great Majority. It was that fearless, faithful, and kindly man,
+General Fred. D. Grant, who died in April, 1912.
+
+[213] The lieutenant is no longer in the army, but he resigned
+voluntarily long after the incident related in the text, and for
+reasons wholly foreign to said incident.
+
+[214] Of course my host's name was not Jones, but Jones will do.
+
+[215] Spanish for man.
+
+[216] A Philippine campaign expression for losing one's nerve and
+wanting to quit.
+
+[217] Otis's Report, p. 133.
+
+[218] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 35. In this handsome
+commendation General Lawton also included Maj. Charles G. Starr,
+one of the best all-round soldiers I ever knew.
+
+[219] See Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+pp. 1068 et seq.
+
+[220] Otis's Report, p. 115.
+
+[221] An interesting account of this experience is given by General
+Funston himself in the October, 1911, number of Scribner's Magazine,
+in an article entitled "From Malolos to San Fernando."
+
+[222] Otis's Report, p. 136.
+
+[223] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 138.
+
+[224] Except, of course, the capture of Aguinaldo by General Funston
+nearly two years later.
+
+[225] See General Lawton's Report on the Zapote River fight, War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 282.
+
+[226] See Harper's History of the War in the Philippines, p. 214,
+where the name of the gentleman is spelled "Kanly."
+
+[227] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Otis Despatches
+of November 27th, vol. ii., p. 846.
+
+[228] House Document 85, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.
+
+[229] The words quoted are from President McKinley's message to
+Congress of December, 1899.
+
+[230] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1002.
+
+[231] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1020.
+
+[232] Meaning, of course, in time not to embarrass President McKinley's
+prospective candidacy for re-election in 1900, in a campaign in
+which all knew the acquisition of the Philippines was sure to be the
+paramount issue.
+
+[233] War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i., part 4, p. 122.
+
+[234] Strictly speaking, only twenty-three regiments were sent out
+from the United States. Under the Act of March 2, 1899, providing the
+volunteer army of 35,000 men for the Philippines, twenty-four regiments
+of infantry and one of cavalry were organized. The infantry regiments
+were numbered Twenty-six to Forty-nine, both inclusive, the numbering
+taking up where the numbering of the regular infantry regiments then
+ended, with the Twenty-fifth. The cavalry regiment was called the
+Eleventh Cavalry, the regular cavalry regimental enumeration ending at
+that time with the Tenth. The Eleventh Cavalry and the Thirty-sixth
+Infantry were organized, officered, and largely recruited from men
+of the State Volunteers sent out in '98, who, in consideration of
+liberal inducements offered by the Government, consented to remain.
+
+[235] The population of the city of Manila according to the Philippine
+Census of 1903, vol. ii., p. 16; was 219,928. The three next largest
+towns are: Laoag, in the province of Ilocos Norte, about 270 miles
+north of Manila, near the northwest corner of Luzon, population 19,699;
+Iloilo, capital of the island of Panay and chief city and port of the
+Visayan Islands, some 300 miles south of Manila, population 19,054;
+and Cebu, capital and chief port of the island of Cebu, a day's
+voyage from Iloilo, population 18,330. See Philippine Census of 1903,
+vol. ii., p. 38.
+
+[236] 115,026 is the exact figure. See Philippine Census, vol. i.,
+p. 57.
+
+[237] The exact figure for Luzon is 40,969, and that for Mindanao,
+36,292. Ib.
+
+[238] Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 56.
+
+[239] Ibid.
+
+[240] Table of Areas, Census, 1903, vol. i., p. 263.
+
+[241] Table of Populations, ib., vol. ii., p. 126.
+
+[242] Total of these six in large type 20,418 square miles, say
+roughly 20,500.
+
+[243] Total of these last three in smaller type 9114 square miles.
+
+[244] There is a large sugar estate on Mindoro, supposed to contain
+over 60,000 acres or, say, ninety odd square miles, which in 1911
+figured in a congressional investigation of certain charges against
+Professor Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, but this
+is wholly separate from the original problem of public order.
+
+[245] The exact figure is 36,292. Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 263.
+
+[246] 499,634, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 126.
+
+[247] The semi-civilized Moros of Mindanao live mostly in the interior,
+and have a crude form of Mohammedanism. The civilized Christian
+Filipinos of Mindanao live mostly on the littoral.
+
+[248] This was said in no mere speech. Speeches are often
+misquoted. It was a letter signed by the foremost man of this age,
+Mr. Roosevelt, written September 15, 1900, accepting the nomination
+for the Vice-Presidency. (See Proceedings of the Republican National
+Committee, 1900, p. 86.) Yet it represented then one of the many
+current misapprehensions about the Filipinos which moved this great
+nation to destroy a young republic set up in a spirit of intelligent
+and generous emulation of our own.
+
+[249] One of the sultans, or head-men, was believed in 1899, to have
+tried on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca made before we took
+the Philippines, by some dickering at Singapore or near there in
+the Straits Settlements, to sell out for a consideration to Great
+Britain, so as to be under the protection and in the pay of British
+North Borneo.
+
+[250] The fraction used is based on 500,000 (the population of
+Mindanao), being that fraction of 7,500,000 (which last is, roughly
+speaking, the total population of the archipelago). The census figures
+being 499,634 and 7,635,426 respectively, as heretofore stated.
+
+[251] 7,635,426. Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 15.
+
+[252] 3,798,507. Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 125.
+
+[253] 223,506 is the total of the uncivilized tribes still extant
+in Luzon, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 125, but they live in the
+mountains and you might live in the Philippines a long lifetime
+without ever seeing a sample of them, unless you happen to be an
+energetic ethnologist fond of mountain climbing.
+
+[254] Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 57.
+
+[255] The area of Cuba is about 44,000 square miles.
+
+[256] Except Ohio, the States of Pennsylvania and Tennessee are nearer
+the size of Luzon than any others of the Union, the former containing
+about 45,000 square miles and the latter about 42,000.
+
+[257] This comparison does not pretend to be mathematically exact. New
+Jersey's area is nearer 8000 than 7000 square miles. For further
+illustration by comparison, it may be noted in this connection that
+the area of Massachusetts is over 8000 square miles (8315) and that of
+Vermont between 9000 and 10,000 (9565). As Costa Rica has only 368,780
+inhabitants (Statesman's Year Book), the province of Pangasinan alone
+contains more people than the republic of Costa Rica. The average of
+intelligence and industry of the masses in both is doubtless about
+the same, with the probabilities in favor of Pangasinan.
+
+[258] Table of Areas, Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[259] Table of Populations, ib., vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[260] In alluding, in complimentary terms, to this officer's
+gallant conduct on that occasion, Harper's History of the War in the
+Philippines spells the name "Hustin," as it had previously misspelled
+the name of the star actor among the younger officers who participated
+in the Zapote River fight "Kanly." "Such is fame." The gentleman's
+right name is Mustin. He is now a lieutenant-commander, well known
+in the navy to-day, as the inventor of the "Mustin gun-sight."
+
+[261] There is a notable unanimity, among the men in the army of about
+Major March's age and rank, in the opinion that he is a man of very
+extraordinary ability. This unanimity is so generous and genuine that
+I deem it a duty as well as a pleasure to emphasize it here.
+
+[262] See Otis's Report covering September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900,
+War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 261.
+
+[263] The 12th, part of the 25th, and the 32d Infantry being used to
+guard the railroad and for other purposes.
+
+[264] Calumpit will be remembered as the place where in the previous
+spring Colonel Funston and his Kansans performed the daring and
+successful manoeuvre of crossing the Bagbag River under fire.
+
+[265] Senate Document 331, pt. 2 (1902), p. 1926.
+
+[266] This ratio is no jest. It is a statistical fact, figured out
+from one of the War Department Reports.
+
+[267] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59.
+
+[268] Report of Secretary of War, 1899, p. 12.
+
+[269] Campaign Spanish for "look for." Generals Lawton and Young had
+cut loose from their base of supplies and their command was trusting
+for subsistence to living upon the country.
+
+[270] See translation of diary of Major Simeon Villa, Senate Document
+331, pt. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), p. 1988. It was in this
+Aringay fight that one of the narrowest escapes from death in battle
+ever officially authenticated occurred. Lieutenant Dennis P. Quinlan,
+now a captain of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, was struck just over the heart
+by an insurgent bullet (probably more or less spent) while crossing the
+river in the face of a hot fire, the bullet being deflected by a plug
+of tobacco carried in the breast pocket of the regulation campaign
+blue shirt he was wearing, which pocket, any one acquainted with
+that shirt will remember, is at the left breast just over the heart
+(War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 6, pp. 166, 279). He was
+knocked over, but soon recovered and went on. The flesh of the left
+breast over the heart was bruised black and blue. He was recommended
+for a medal of honor on account of the incident (War Department Report,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 7, p. 136).
+
+[271] If these figures are not exact, they are approximately
+correct. We always called it three hundred miles from Manila to the
+northern end of Luzon via Vigan and the lighthouse at Cape Bojeador.
+
+[272] For instance, there was what used to be known to the 8th Corps
+as "Col. Jim Parker's night attack at Vigan," which occurred early in
+December, 1899, soon after that place was occupied, the insurgents
+coming into the town in large numbers, at night under command of
+General Tinio, through a tunnel so it was said, and being driven
+out only after desperate close quarters' fighting from about two
+o'clock in the morning until after broad daylight, leaving the streets
+and plaza of Vigan much cumbered with their dead. Again, later on,
+there was the sudden order, swiftly executed, in obedience to which
+Lieutenant Grayson V. Heidt with a part of a troop of the 3d Cavalry,
+rode from Laoag to Batac to the rescue of a besieged garrison at the
+latter place, arriving in time to prevent a small Custer massacre,
+the garrison having gotten short of ammunition, and having just managed
+to telegraph for reinforcements a few moments before the enemy cut the
+telegraph wire. Then, there was Lieutenant Hannay, of the 22d Infantry,
+who being at the front, received an order from General Lawton to come
+back to build a bridge. The order made him sick, the surgeon reported
+him sick, the messenger returned with that message, and then Hannay
+promptly got well, and stayed at the front. And so on, ad infinitum.
+
+[273] The Visayan Islands--the half-dozen islands between Luzon and
+Mindanao already mentioned, as the only ones worth mentioning for
+our purposes, together with the various smaller islands, islets,
+and rocks "visible at high water."
+
+[274] "During April, in the First District, comprising the provinces
+of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Union, Abra, Lepanto, Benguet, and Bontoc,
+Brigadier General S. B. M. Young, commanding, the insurgents manifested
+considerable activity and endeavored to take the offensive against
+the scattered detachments in the district. The insurgents were in
+every instance defeated, and lost more than 500 men killed." War
+Dept. Report 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 196.
+
+[275] The language quoted is that employed by Robert Collins,
+Associated Press Correspondent, in connection with the Round Robin
+incident of nine months previous, described in the concluding part
+of the chapter preceding this.
+
+[276] Hereinafter more fully set forth.
+
+[277] For the Table of Areas, see Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[278] For the Table of Populations, see Philippine Census, vol. ii.,
+p. 123.
+
+[279] Under the Spaniards, these were two provinces. They were combined
+by us.
+
+[280] A province in Latin countries corresponds more nearly to what
+we call a county than to anything else familiar to our system of
+political divisions.
+
+[281] For the details of this march, see War Department Report, 1900,
+vol. i., pt. 4, p. 309. Captain Batchelor had neither orders nor
+permission to do what he did. When he cut loose from the command he
+belonged to, he took very long chances on finding subsistence for
+his men in the unknown country he had set out to conquer, to say
+nothing of the highly probable chances of annihilation of his whole
+command. When an officer commanding troops does this in time of war,
+he does so at his peril, and signal success is his only salvation.
+
+[282] Area tables, Philippine Census, vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[283] Population tables, Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[284] Though Nueva Vizcaya is not in the Cagayan valley, but on a
+plateau of the great divide, still, its streams all flow into the
+Cagayan valley, and that term will be used in this book, as it is
+colloquially in the Philippines, to include not only the Cagayan valley
+proper, but also the adjoining tributary province of Nueva Vizcaya.
+
+[285] The only thing of interest to the American people that ever
+happened over there was the capture of Lieutenant Gilmore of the Navy,
+and his men, at Baler, on the Pacific coast, in Principe, a capture
+which, it will be recollected, was followed by long captivity, and
+ultimately terminated in rescue. The interested student will see
+these two provinces on the American maps of the islands, but they
+were each attached by the Taft government for administration purposes
+to another province, and do not appear in the American census list
+of provinces. Therefore, they cut no figure in the census totals,
+either of area or population.
+
+[286] The officer on whom public attention in the United States was
+later focussed by an alleged order, charged to have been issued by him
+in a campaign in Samar to "kill everything over ten years old." This
+alleged order was called by the American newspapers of the period
+"Jake Smith's Kill and Burn Order."
+
+[287] The figures as to Principe are mere arbitrary guesses, the exact
+figures used being fixed on merely to get convenient round numbers,
+there being no statistics as to Principe.
+
+[288] Of course the Filipinos should be consulted as to what provinces
+should constitute each state, but I am simply sketching a tentative
+governmental scheme based upon the way our army perfected its original
+grip on public order and the general administrative situation.
+
+[289] All along here we, of course, deal in round numbers only.
+
+[290] See War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 45 et
+seq. The city of Manila and vicinity constituted the Sixth District
+of the Department of Northern Luzon.
+
+[291] War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., part 5, pp. 47-8.
+
+[292] War Dept. Report, 1900, vol. i., part 1, p. 9.
+
+[293] The Spanish word camarin means a warehouse. The province of
+Camarines was originally two provinces, and is still referred to as
+two, though governmentally but one.
+
+[294] Of March 2, 1899. Under it the term of enlistment of the
+volunteers was to expire June 30, 1901.
+
+[295] Table of Areas, Philippine Census of 1903, vol. i., p. 263. Table
+of Population, ib., vol. ii., pp. 123 et seq.
+
+[296] Copper-colored thief.
+
+[297] Sung to the tune of "Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching."
+
+[298] See Forum, vol. xxvi., p. 647.
+
+[299] See Forum, vol. xxix., p. 403.
+
+[300] These quotations are not taken from a scrap-book. Many
+readers forget that the bound volumes of all the great magazines are
+permanently available in the great libraries of the country.
+
+[301] Hostilities had not yet broken out when the article now being
+considered appeared on January 4th, and did not break out until thirty
+days later, to wit, on February 4th.
+
+[302] Congressional Record, April 13, 1898, p. 3701.
+
+[303] In the early days of the fighting they used to hurrah a good
+deal, and shout "Viva la Independencia" (Live Independence).
+
+[304] See Judge Taft's cablegram to Secretary of War Root of August
+21, 1900, War Department Report, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[305] The Caribao Society is an organization composed mainly of
+officers of the regular army, but to which any one who served as an
+officer, volunteer or regular, in the Philippine Insurrection, is
+eligible. Their principal function, like that of the famous Gridiron
+Club, is to give an annual dinner.
+
+[306] Addresses at Republican National Convention (1904), p. 62,
+published by Isaac H. Blanchard & Co., New York, 1904. The Republican
+National Convention of 1900 met June 19th, just sixteen days after
+the Taft Commission arrived at Manila.
+
+[307] General MacArthur relieved General Otis May 5, 1900, and the
+Taft Commission arrived at Manila June 3d thereafter.
+
+[308] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1051.
+
+[309] Letter of July 22, 1898, by Duc d'Almodovar del Rio, Prime
+Minister of Spain, to President McKinley, suing for peace. Senate
+Document 62, pt. 1, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 272-3.
+
+[310] See Congressional Record of that date, p. 33.
+
+[311] General Otis's appreciation of such "aid" was thus expressed
+in his cablegram to Washington of June 4, 1899: "Negotiations
+and conferences with insurgents cost soldiers' lives and prolong
+our difficulties." Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain,
+vol. ii., p. 1002.
+
+[312] Address by Secretary of War Taft before the National Geographic
+Society at Washington, published in the official organ of that Society,
+National Geographic Magazine for August, 1905.
+
+[313] Says General Chaffee in his annual report for 1902: "The
+intelligent element controlled the ignorant masses as perfectly as
+ever a captain controlled the men of his company." War Department
+Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.
+
+[314] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.
+
+[315] August 29, 1898, to May 5, 1900.
+
+[316] Especially independence.
+
+[317] Senate Document 331 (1902), pt. 1, page 50.
+
+[318] A slander ignorantly repeated by the adverse report of the
+minority of the Insular Affairs Committee of the House, on the Jones
+Bill, introduced in March, 1912, proposing ultimate independence
+in 1921.
+
+[319] See The Commoner, April 27, 1906.
+
+[320] Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 9.
+
+[321] These are the three main lines of cleavage, linguistically
+speaking. Nearly all the minor dialects are kin to some one of the
+principal three.
+
+[322] Peasant's hut, usually of bamboo, thatched with stout straw
+(nipa). It is the log cabin of the Philippines.
+
+[323] By way of protest against this kind of belittling of the army's
+work, General MacArthur says in his annual report (War Dept. Rept.,
+1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60), "Such a narrow statement of the case is
+unfair to the service," adding a handsome tribute, which might have
+come very graciously from the Commission had it felt so disposed, to
+"the endurance, fortitude, and valor" of his 70,000 men during the
+precise period while the Commission was filling the American papers
+with politically opportune nonsense about "Peace, peace," when there
+was no peace.
+
+[324] See Report of Secretary of War Root for 1900. War Department
+Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[325] See Report of Taft Philippine Commission of 1900, p. 17.
+
+[326] War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 34-42.
+
+[327] S. D. 435, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.
+
+[328] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, November, 1900, p. 15.
+
+[329] General Lawton was killed in battle in the hour of victory at a
+point only about twelve miles out of Manila, in the winter preceding
+the spring of 1900 in which the Taft Commission left the United States
+for Manila.
+
+[330] This interview was indorsed as substantially correct by General
+MacArthur before the Senate Committee of 1902, Senator Culberson first
+reading it to him and then asking him if it quoted him correctly. See
+hearing on Philippine affairs, 1902, Senate Document 331, pt. 2,
+p. 1942.
+
+[331] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88.
+
+[332] Ibid., 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[333] November, 1899, to September, 1900, both inclusive.
+
+[334] W. D. R., 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[335] Judge Taft had cabled Secretary of War Root on August 21, 1900,
+after his arrival in June: "Defining of political issues in United
+States reported here in full, gave hope to insurgent officers still
+in arms, * * * and stayed surrenders to await result of election." See
+War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 80.
+
+[336] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 89.
+
+[337] See Report of Taft Commission to Secretary of War, dated November
+30, 1900.
+
+[338] A sample of one of these death sentences that Cailles and all
+the rest of the insurgent generals were accustomed to issue against
+their "Copperheads" may be seen in General MacArthur's report for
+1900. War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 63.
+
+[339] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.
+
+[340] See Report of Secretary Root for 1902, p. 13.
+
+[341] Just how correct this was will be examined later.
+
+[342] "The people seem to be actuated by the idea that men are
+never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin." War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 61.
+
+[343] General MacArthur's Annual Report dated October 1, 1900. War
+Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 61-2.
+
+[344] General MacArthur's report which we are now quoting from,
+dated October 1, 1900, was forwarded by the ordinary course of mail,
+and even if it arrived before the day of the November election, the
+Secretary of War certainly did not at once place it before the public.
+
+[345] Compare this MacArthur, October 1, 1900, statement with the Taft
+statements of the same situation between June and November, 1900, as
+expressed for instance in his November, 1900, report to the Secretary
+of War thus: "A great majority of the people long for peace and are
+entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under
+the supremacy of the United States. They are, however, restrained
+by fear. * * * Without this, armed resistance to the United States
+authority would have long ago ceased. It is a Mafia on a very large
+scale." Report, Taft Commission, November 30, 1900, p. 17. This was
+before Judge Taft met Juan Cailles above mentioned and liked him well
+enough to make him governor of a province, in spite of his being an
+"assassin," in other words a Filipino general who had a few weak-kneed
+fellows shot for being too friendly with the Americans.
+
+[346] Chapter XI., ante.
+
+[347] See War Department Report, 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, pp. 65-6.
+
+[348] As for my share as a soldier in that Philippine Insurrection,
+admitting, as I now do, that it was a tragedy of errors, the President
+of the United States would indeed be a very impotent Chief Executive
+if it were every American's duty to deliberate as a judge on the
+Bench before he decided to answer a president's call for volunteers
+in an emergency. I am not yet so highly educated as to find no
+inward response to the sentiment, "Right or wrong, my country." If
+this sentiment is not right, no republic can long survive, for the
+ultimate safety of republics must lie in volunteer soldiery.
+
+[349] Page 93.
+
+[350] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1211.
+
+[351] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1222.
+
+[352] Ibid., vol. ii., p. 1223.
+
+[353] Ibid., p. 1226.
+
+[354] Ibid., p. 1237.
+
+[355] See Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1239.
+
+[356] Ten or twelve thousand.
+
+[357] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1249.
+
+[358] See Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission Division of Insular
+Affairs, War Department, Washington, 1901, p. 181.
+
+[359] See General Funston's article on "The Capture of Aguinaldo,"
+which appeared in Scribner's Magazine for November, 1911.
+
+[360] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i. pt. 4, p. 99.
+
+[361] For a copy of this proclamation see War Department Report,
+1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 100.
+
+[362] The War with Spain, by H. C. Lodge, p. 20.
+
+[363] Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler, Senate Document 62 (1898), p. 319.
+
+[364] See First Report of Taft Philippine Commission to the Secretary
+of War, p. 17.
+
+[365] General MacArthur's report for 1901, War Department Report,
+1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 90.
+
+[366] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1241.
+
+[367] J. R. Arnold, of the Philippine Civil Service Board, in North
+American Review, for February, 1912.
+
+[368] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1261.
+
+[369] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.
+
+[370] Senate Document 331, pt. 1, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902,
+p. 136.
+
+[371] Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya.
+
+[372] A kind of two-wheeled buggy, the principal public vehicle
+of Manila.
+
+[373] As it turned out, I lost nothing in the end, because my
+resignation of my military commission was not acted on at Washington,
+and I only ceased to be an officer of the army by operation of law
+at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1901, as had been provided
+by the Act of Congress of March 2, 1899, organizing the twenty-five
+regiments for Philippine service.
+
+[374] See the Act of the U. S. Philippine Commission of July 17,
+1901, entitled, "An act restoring the provinces of Batangas, Cebu,
+and Bohol, to the executive control of the military governor," in
+Public Laws, U. S. Philippine Commission, Division of Insular Affairs,
+War Department.
+
+[375] See American Census of the Philippines, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[376] Ib., vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[377] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 7.
+
+[378] See pages 102 et seq. of Our Philippine Problem by H. Parker
+Willis, Professor of Economics and Politics in Washington and Lee
+University. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1905.
+
+[379] Where he still is.
+
+[380] Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1297.
+
+[381] The words quoted were used by Mr. Root in a speech delivered
+at Youngstown, Ohio, October 25, 1900.
+
+[382] Sixty-six men and three officers were surprised at breakfast
+and cut off from their guns by several hundred bolo men who had come
+into town as unarmed natives under pretence of attending a church
+fiesta. Forty-five men and officers were killed after a desperate
+resistance. Twenty-four only were able to escape. War Department
+Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.
+
+[383] Governor Taft's Report for 1901, War Department Report, 1901,
+vol. i., pt. 8, p. 8.
+
+[384] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 208.
+
+[385] Leviticus xvi., 10.
+
+[386] War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 8, p. 12.
+
+[387] Senate Document 331, pt. 1, p. 86, 57th Congress, 1st Session
+(1902).
+
+[388] War Department Report for 1900, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 59 et
+seq. Ibid., 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 88 et seq.
+
+[389] Report for 1901, p. 98.
+
+[390] See Philippine Census, vol. ii, p. 123.
+
+[391] The Provincial Government Act was an act passed February 6,
+1901, outlining the general scheme of government for the several
+provinces, and indicating the various tempting official positions
+attaching thereto.
+
+[392] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 191.
+
+[393] Senate Document 331, p. 1612 et seq.
+
+[394] Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1614.
+
+[395] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 1622.
+
+[396] Ibid., p. 1623.
+
+[397] S. D. 331, 1902, p. 1628.
+
+[398] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 221.
+
+[399] Colonel Wagner's testimony before Senate Committee of
+1902. Senate Document 331, pt. 3, p. 2873.
+
+[400] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 284.
+
+[401] Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 887.
+
+[402] Senate Document 331, pt. 3, p. 2878.
+
+[403] Theodore Rex.
+
+[404] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 192.
+
+[405] Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+pp. 1352-3.
+
+[406] Military Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii.,
+p. 1244.
+
+[407] Macaulay's Trial of Hastings.
+
+[408] Says Gen. Henry T. Allen, commanding the Philippines
+constabulary, in his report for 1903 (Report U. S. Philippine
+Commission, 1903, pt. 3, p. 49), "For some time to come the number of
+troops (meaning American) to be kept here should be a direct function
+of the number of guns put into the hands of natives." He adds, "It
+is unwise to ignore the great moral effect of a strong armed force
+above suspicion."
+
+[409] The constabulary force was about 5000. When disturbances in one
+province would become formidable, constabulary from provinces would
+be hurried thither, thus denuding the latter provinces of proper
+police protection.
+
+[410] 1912.
+
+[411] The reference is supposed to be to Mr. McKinley.
+
+[412] War Department Report, 1902, vol. ix., p. 264.
+
+[413] Delaware has 2050 square miles, Albay 1783.
+
+[414] Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii., p. 1249.
+
+[415] President Roosevelt cabled Kelly, whom he had known in the West
+many years before, congratulating him on the results of his cool
+and determined fearlessness and presence of mind on that occasion,
+but elaboration on the Surigao affair was not part of the insular
+programme, which was one of irrepressible optimism as to the state
+of public order.
+
+[416] Every province in the Philippines is divided into so many
+pueblos. Pueblo, in Spanish, means town. But the Spanish pueblo is more
+like a township. It does not mean a continuous stretch of residences
+and other buildings, but a given municipal area. Each pueblo is
+likewise subdivided into barrios, dotted usually with hamlets, and
+groups of houses.
+
+[417] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 3, p. 92.
+
+[418] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 1, p. 366.
+
+[419] Senate Document 170, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.
+
+[420] Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 1, p. 32.
+
+[421] 240, 326, Philippine Census, 1903, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[422] The speech referred to in the text was made at Manila in
+December, 1903, but the same "Philippines for the Filipinos" policy had
+already been proclaimed much earlier. The Manila American of February
+28, 1903, reprints from the Iloilo Times of February 21, 1903, an
+account of Governor Taft's celebrated Iloilo speech of February 19,
+1903, which was received with such profound chagrin by the American
+business community in the Islands. There had been much bad blood
+between the American colony at and about Iloilo and the native
+Americano-phobes. The following is from the Iloilo paper's account
+of Governor Taft's speech: "The Governor then gave some advice to
+foreigners and Americans, remarking that if they found fault with the
+way the government was being run here, they could leave the islands;
+that the government was being run for the Filipinos."
+
+[423] James LeRoy in The World's Work for December, 1903.
+
+[424] A familiar instance of this will occur to any one acquainted
+with the situation in the Islands for any considerable part of the
+last ten years.
+
+[425] Act No. 136, U. S. Philippine Commission, passed June 11, 1901.
+
+[426] Act 1024, Philippine Commission, passed Oct. 10, 1903.
+
+[427] There were five members of the original Taft Commission,
+including President Taft.
+
+[428] I neither forget nor gainsay the generally benevolent character
+of his despotism; and having been a beneficiary of it myself I am
+therefore disposed to see much of wisdom in the way it was exercised.
+
+[429] Philippine Census, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[430] Ib., vol. i., p. 58.
+
+[431] Says Brigadier-General Wm. H. Carter, in his annual report for
+1905 covering the Samar outbreak of 1904-5: "Whatever may have been
+the original cause of the outbreak, it was soon lost sight of when
+success had drawn a large proportion of the people away from their
+homes and fields. Except in the largest towns it became simply a
+question of joining the pulajans or being harried by them. In the
+absence of proper protection thousands joined in the movement." See
+War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 286.
+
+[432] Bulao was situated on a high bluff on the left bank of a river
+called the Bangahon. The Pulajans entered before daybreak, on July
+21st. There was a stiff fight at Bulao, also, between our native
+troops and the enemy on August 21st, but Calderon seems to have
+left it out of his list. See Gen. Wm. H. Carter's Report for 1905,
+War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290. Capt. Cary Crockett,
+a descendant of David Crockett, commanded the constabulary, and though
+badly wounded himself, as were also half his command, he defeated
+a force of Pulajans greatly outnumbering his, killing forty-one of
+them. Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 3, p. 90, Report
+of Col. Wallace C. Taylor. I think he was awarded a medal of honor
+for his work. He certainly earned it.
+
+"Pulajan" means "red breeches," the uniform of the mountain clans,
+worn whenever they set out to give trouble.
+
+[433] Of March 23d of the previous year, already described in a
+previous chapter, where Luther S. Kelly--"Yellowstone" Kelly--saved
+the American women by gathering them and a few men in the Government
+House and bluffing the brigands off.
+
+[434] The "Conant" peso, named for the noted fiscal expert,
+Mr. Conant. It was worth fifty cents American money.
+
+[435] The Fourteenth U. S. Infantry was stationed in garrison just
+outside the town proper of Calbayog, which was three hours by steam
+launch from the provincial capital, Catbalogan. But the depredations
+might have been carried to just outside the line of the military
+reservation, and the military folk would not have dared to make a
+move save on request first made by the Civil Government at Manila. In
+other words the above three villages were burned under their noses.
+
+[436] One seems to get the stoicism better in the original, somehow,
+so I give the body of the original Spanish, as it came to me:
+
+
+    En el distrito de Motiong, municipio de Wright, provincia de
+    Samar, Islas Filipinas, a primero de septiembre de mil novecientos
+    quatro. Ante mi Peregrin Albano, consejal del mismo, y presente el
+    Presidente de Sanidad Municipal, D. Tomas San Pablo y principales
+    del mismo se procedio al enterramiento de los cadaveres victimas
+    de los Pulajans en el sementerio de esta localidad el oficial de
+    voluntarios, Rafael Rosales y otros voluntarios, Gualberto Gabane,
+    Juan Pacle, Dionisio Daisno, Pedro Damtanan, Carmelo Lagbo, y
+    particulares Eustaquia Sapiten y Apolinaria N: con otro tanto
+    Pulajan desconocido; en conformidad de la carta oficial de la
+    presidencia municipal de Wright de fecha de hoy registrada con
+    el numero 136.
+
+    Del citado enteramiento ha sido asistido por el Reverendo Padre
+    Marcos Gomez y acompanado por toda la fuerza voluntaria del mismo
+    por la muerte del oficial Rosales.
+
+
+[437] See War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 290.
+
+[438] Hill was Whittier's deputy at Llorente.
+
+[439] Even if the municipal police had been like Caesar's wife, they
+were like chaff before the wind in a Pulajan foray, though they were
+somewhat better if well led by some prominent and forceful man of
+the community in an expedition after Pulajans.
+
+[440] A disease of a dropsical variety, usually attacking the legs
+first, which easily becomes epidemic. It had been the cause of many
+of the 120 deaths in the Albay jail during the Ola insurrection. Ideal
+conditions for it are a steady diet of poor rice and lack of exercise.
+
+[441] It was not well to be too hasty. You might have the head of the
+whole uprising in custody, or one of his most important lieutenants,
+and find it out by the merest accident in the course of hearing a
+case against some apparently abject "private of the rear rank."
+
+[442] By unwarranted I mean without warrant. Nobody bothered much
+with warrants. The times were too strenuous.
+
+[443] See New York Tribune, Oct. 25, 1904.
+
+[444] Ibid.
+
+[445] Smith, Bell & Co. are an old British mercantile house, well
+known in Manila and Hong Kong.
+
+[446] The North American Review article by the writer, to which Judge
+Ide was replying, appeared in the issue of that magazine for January
+18, 1907, and could hardly have escaped the attention of anybody
+concerned, having been given wide circulation; (1) by Mr. Andrew
+Carnegie through pamphlet reprints; (2) by Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, in his
+paper, the Commoner; (3) by Hon. James L. Slayden, M. C. of Texas,
+through reprinting in the Congressional Record.
+
+[447] Such as the breakwater at Manila, the road-building in various
+provinces, etc.--all, however, be it remembered, being paid for by
+the Filipino people, out of the insular revenues and assets.
+
+[448] By Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.
+
+[449] Words used by Governor-General James F. Smith, in an address
+at the Quill Club, Manila, January 25, 1909.
+
+[450] Delivered in 1902, after the Senator visited the Islands in 1901.
+
+[451] The following is a copy of the letter accepting my resignation:
+
+             Office of the Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands,
+                                                   January 25, 1905.
+
+    My dear Judge Blount:
+
+    I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
+    yesterday in which you tender your resignation as Judge of First
+    Instance at large. I regret extremely that your ill-health has made
+    this course imperative. Under all the circumstances, however, I am
+    satisfied that you have acted wisely, as I have feared for some
+    time that you would be unable to perform the duties pertaining
+    to your office because of your physical condition. I, therefore,
+    though with much regret accept your resignation.
+
+    At the same time I beg to express my appreciation of the faithful
+    and efficient services you have rendered in the past. I hope very
+    much that a rest and change of climate may have the effect of
+    restoring you again to vigorous health, and I assure you that
+    you carry with you my best wishes for your future prosperity
+    and happiness.
+
+        Sincerely yours,
+        Luke E. Wright,
+        Civil Governor.
+
+    To the Honorable James H. Blount, Judge of First Instance at large,
+    Manila, P. I.
+
+[452] See annual report of the Governor-General for 1905, in Report
+of the Philippine Commission for 1905, pt. 1, p. 85.
+
+[453] Which delegates were denied admission to the Convention on the
+ground that no American living in the Philippines could be in sympathy
+with the Democratic programme as to them.
+
+[454] An Englishwoman in the Philippines, by Mrs. Campbell Dauncey.
+
+[455] War Department Report, 1905, vol. iii., p. 285.
+
+[456] Army reports are usually made right after the expiration of
+the American governmental fiscal year, June 30th.
+
+[457] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 47.
+
+[458] See Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38. He
+means Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna.
+
+[459] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 212.
+
+[460] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 52.
+
+[461] For a copy of it, see the case of Barcelon vs. Baker, Philippine
+Supreme Court Reports, vol. v., p. 89.
+
+[462] Volume v., Philippine Reports.
+
+[463] Mr. Garfield was President Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior.
+
+[464] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2, p. 255.
+
+[465] See page 227, Report of Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2.
+
+[466] Report, Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 1, p. 37.
+
+[467] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 2, p. 228.
+
+[468] Pt. 1, p. 36.
+
+[469] Report of Taft Philippine Commission for 1900, p. 17.
+
+[470] See Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.
+
+[471] Amigo, in Spanish, means friend. Every non-combatant Filipino
+with whom our people came in contact in the early days always claimed
+to be an "amigo," and never was, in any single instance.
+
+[472] See testimony of General MacArthur before the Senate Committee
+of 1902, Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1942.
+
+[473] The adverse minority report on the pending Jones bill, which
+bill proposes ultimate Philippine independence in 1921, is full of
+the old insufferable drivel about "tribes," and of the rest of the
+Root views of 1900.
+
+[474] See Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 211.
+
+[475] Part 1, p. 38.
+
+[476] Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 37.
+
+[477] See President McKinley's annual message to Congress of December,
+1899, Congressional Record, December 5, 1899, p. 34.
+
+[478] Provinces totalling about a million people.
+
+[479] Report of U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 211.
+
+[480] Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 38.
+
+[481] Ibid., 1906; pt. 1, p. 225.
+
+[482] To be absolutely accurate, there are 688 people classified as
+"wild" in the Census figures as to Samar, and 265,549 are put down
+as civilized; the total of population being 266,237. All the 388,922
+people of Leyte are put down as civilized. See Philippine Census,
+Table of Population, vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[483] Report of Philippine Commission for 1907, pt. 1, p. 195.
+
+[484] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1908, pt. 1, p. 62.
+
+[485] Tract. You speak of the small farmer's "late of hemp" in the
+Philippines as you do of his "patch of cotton" in the United States.
+
+[486] A picul is a bale of a given quantity--weight. "Breaking out
+a picul of hemp" is analogous, colloquially, to "picking a bale
+of cotton."
+
+[487] See Congressional Record, December 5, 1905, p. 103.
+
+[488] See Report of Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. 1, p. 215.
+
+[489] Macbeth, Act V., Sc. 8.
+
+[490] In June, 1912, Governor Forbes was still Governor-General.
+
+[491] By "foreign" I mean, of course, American, i.e., non-resident.
+
+[492] Hearings on Sugar, April 5, 1912.
+
+[493] Introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. W. A. Jones,
+of Va., Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House,
+in March, 1912.
+
+[494] See also, in connection with this table, the folding map of
+the archipelago at the end of the book.
+
+[495] The greatest defect of the Philippine Government was in the
+beginning, and still is, that the Philippine Commission, which is
+the executive authority, controls the appointment and assignment of
+the trial judges, and also, largely, their chances for promotion
+to the Supreme Bench of the Islands. The Justices of the Supreme
+Court are appointed by the President of the United States, often on
+recommendation of the Commission, but thereafter they are absolutely
+independent. The trial judges ought also to be appointed by the
+President of the United States.
+
+[496] Republished, Congressional Record, January 9, 1900, p. 715.
+
+[497] See Report U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, p. 89
+et seq.
+
+[498] Report Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 1, p. 99.
+
+[499] U. S. Philippine Commission Report, 1907, pt. 1, p. 149.
+
+[500] See Report Philippine Commission for 1907, pt. 1, p. 80.
+
+[501] War Department Report, 1899, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 142.
+
+[502] Ibid., pp. 559-560.
+
+[503] See War Department Report, 1901, vol. i., pt. 4, p. 98.
+
+[504] War Department Report, vol. i., pt. 5, p. 60.
+
+[505] From July 31, 1898, to May 24, 1900, we lost 1138 men by
+disease. See special report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, Senate
+Document 426, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. By the middle of 1900 our soldiers
+had pretty well learned how to take care of themselves in the tropics.
+
+[506] See vol. ii., p. 102.
+
+[507] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 887.
+
+[508] Appalling, because there are forty-nine other provinces besides
+Batangas.
+
+[509] Vol. ii., p. 123.
+
+[510] See page 78 of the special report of the Secretary of War
+Taft on the Philippines, January 23, 1908, transmitted by President
+Roosevelt to Congress, January 27, 1908, Senate Document 200, 60th
+Cong., 1st Sess.
+
+[511] Act 230, U. S. Philippine Commission.
+
+[512] For the convenience of readers who do not constantly use the
+metric system: A kilo is about 2.25 lbs.
+
+[513] According to what part of archipelago grown.
+
+[514] The Payne law of 1909 continued the export tax, etc.
+
+[515] Dried cocoa-nut meat, used to make soaps and oils. I do not
+deal with copra because it nearly all goes to Europe, principally
+to Marseilles.
+
+[516] Senate Document 200, 1908, Sixtieth Congress, First Session.
+
+[517] I have myself seen a cloud of locusts three miles long.
+
+[518] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1904, pt. 1, pp. 26-7.
+
+[519] Report, U. S. Philippine Commission, 1905, pt. 1, pp. 72-3.
+
+[520] Senator Newlands, North American Review, December, 1905. Senator
+Newlands was one of the party.
+
+[521] Part 1, p. 99.
+
+[522] 137 1/2 lbs.
+
+[523] President Roosevelt's message to Congress of January 27, 1908,
+transmitting report of Secretary of War Taft on the Philippines.
+
+[524] Before assuming to use these letters in this book, I sent them
+to Mr. Carnegie and asked his permission to so use them. He returned
+them to me with his consent entered on the back of one of them.
+
+[525] 300,000 tons of sugar, 150,000,000 cigars, etc.
+
+[526] Congressional Record, May 13, 1909, p. 2009.
+
+[527] Mr. Perkins is chairman of the Finance Committee of the
+International Harvester Company, a hundred million dollar corporation
+owning divers subsidiary companies which make twine and cordage. See
+Moody's Manual.
+
+[528] The Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe.
+
+[529] Paul Morton.
+
+[530] Autobiography of Seventy Years, vol. ii., p. 317.
+
+[531] P. 252, ante.
+
+[532] P. 255.
+
+[533] P. 258.
+
+[534] Pp. 258-9.
+
+[535] The name is immaterial, but the grouping is convenient and
+practicable, though not the only grouping practicable.
+
+[536] See p. 267, ante.
+
+[537] For June 21, 1907.
+
+[538] In the article quoted from I named three men, adding "or
+any three men of like calibre." One of the three was Justice Adam
+C. Carson, of the Philippine Supreme Court, who has been a member
+of the Philippine Judiciary since the Taft Civil Government was
+founded in 1901. If this book has gained for me any character in
+the estimation of any reader who is or may hereafter be clothed with
+authority, I desire to say here, on the very highest public grounds,
+that, in my judgment, Judge Carson is the most considerable man we
+have out there now (1912)--a good man to have in an emergency. Though
+not as learned in the law as his colleague, Justice Johnson--who is
+quite the equal, as a jurist, of most of the Federal judges I know
+in the United States, Judge Carson is a man of great breadth of view,
+and is peculiarly endowed with capacity to handle men and situations
+effectively and patriotically.
+
+[539] Says the census of the Philippines of 1903, vol. ii., p. 15:
+"The total population of the Philippine Archipelago on March 2,
+1903, was 7,635,426. Of this number, 6,987,686 enjoyed a considerable
+degree of civilization, while the remainder, 647,740, consisted of wild
+people." By this same Census, the Moros are classified as uncivilized,
+and the population of the island on which they live, Mindanao, is
+given at about 500,000 (499,634, vol. ii., p. 126), of which about
+half only (252,940) are Moros, the rest being civilized. The total of
+the uncivilized people of the archipelago, according to the Census, is
+647,740 (vol. ii., p. 123), less than 400,000, leaving out the Moros.
+
+[540] Tagalo, Ilocano, and Visayan are the three main dialects
+that have been evolved into written language by the patience of the
+Spanish priests in the last couple of hundred years or so. Probably
+five sixths of the people of the archipelago speak some one of these
+three dialects. In fact they can hardly be called "dialects," for there
+are plenty of books--novels, plays, grammars, histories, dictionaries,
+etc.--written in Tagalo, Ilocano, or Visayan. Every educated Filipino
+of the well-to-do classes grows up speaking Spanish and the dialect
+of his native province, while the latter is the only language spoken
+by the less fortunate people of his neighborhood, the poorer classes.
+
+[541] This report is numbered Report 606, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., and
+accompanies H. R. 22143 (the Jones Bill).
+
+[542] According to the American Census of the Philippines, of 1903,
+the total population of Mindanao is 499,634 (see vol. ii., p. 126),
+of which 252,940 are Moros, and the rest civilized. In addition to
+said 252,940 Moros on Mindanao, the adjacent islets contain some
+25,000 Moros.
+
+[543] See Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 339.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the
+Philippines 1898-1912, by James H. Blount
+
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