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diff --git a/36303.txt b/36303.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e04cf89 --- /dev/null +++ b/36303.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4510 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Our Revolution, by Leon Trotzky + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Our Revolution + Essays on Working-Class and International Revolution, 1904-1917 + +Author: Leon Trotzky + +Translator: Moissaye J. Olgin + +Release Date: June 2, 2011 [EBook #36303] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUR REVOLUTION *** + + + + +Produced by Gary Rees and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was +produced from scanned images of public domain material +from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + + + + + OUR REVOLUTION + + Essays on Working-Class and International Revolution, 1904-1917 + + BY + LEON TROTZKY + + + Collected and Translated, with Biography and Explanatory Notes + + BY + MOISSAYE J. OLGIN + Author of "The Soul of the Russian Revolution" + + + [Illustration] + + + NEW YORK + HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY + 1918 + + + + + COPYRIGHT, 1918, + BY + HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY + + + Published March, 1918 + + + + +PREFACE + + +The world has not known us Russian revolutionists. The world has +sympathized with us; the world abroad has given aid and comfort to our +refugees; the world, at times, even admired us; yet the world has not +known us. Friends of freedom in Europe and America were keenly anxious +to see the victory of our cause; they watched our successes and our +defeats with breathless interest; yet they were concerned with material +results. Our views, our party affiliations, our factional divisions, our +theoretical gropings, our ideological constructions, to us the leading +lights in our revolutionary struggles, were foreign to the world. All +this was supposed to be an internal Russian affair. + +The Revolution has now ceased to be an internal Russian affair. It has +become of world-wide import. It has started to influence governments and +peoples. What was not long ago a theoretical dispute between two +"underground" revolutionary circles, has grown into a concrete +historical power determining the fate of nations. What was the +individual conception of individual revolutionary leaders is now ruling +millions. + +The world is now vitally interested in understanding Russia, in learning +the history of our Revolution which is the history of the great Russian +nation for the last fifty years. This involves, however, knowing not +only events, but also the development of thoughts, of aims, of ideas +that underlie and direct events; gaining an insight into the immense +volume of intellectual work which recent decades have accumulated in +revolutionary Russia. + +We have selected Leon Trotzky's contribution to revolutionary thought, +not because he is now in the limelight of history, but because his +conceptions represent a very definite, a clear-cut and intrinsically +consistent trend of revolutionary thought, quite apart from that of +other leaders. We do not agree with many of Trotzky's ideas and +policies, yet we cannot overlook the fact that these ideas have become +predominant in the present phase of the Russian Revolution and that they +are bound to give their stamp to Russian democracy in the years to come, +whether the present government remains in power or not. + +The reader will see that Trotzky's views as applied in Bolsheviki ruled +Russia are not of recent origin. They were formed in the course of the +First Russian Revolution of 1905, in which Trotzky was one of the +leaders. They were developed and strengthened in the following years of +reaction, when many a progressive group went to seek compromises with +the absolutist forces. They became particularly firm through the world +war and the circumstances that led to the establishment of a republican +order in Russia. Perhaps many a grievous misunderstanding and +misinterpretation would have been avoided had thinking America known +that those conceptions of Trotzky were not created on the spur of the +moment, but were the result of a life-long work in the service of the +Revolution. + +Trotzky's writings, besides their theoretical and political value, +represent a vigor of style and a clarity of expression unique in Russian +revolutionary literature. + +M.J. OLGIN. + +New York, February 16th, 1918. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + Biographical Notes 3 + + The Proletariat and the Revolution 23 + + The Events in Petersburg 47 + + Prospects of a Labor Dictatorship 63 + + The Soviet and the Revolution 147 + + Preface to _My Round Trip_ 163 + + The Lessons of the Great Year 169 + + On the Eve of a Revolution 179 + + Two Faces 187 + + The Growing Conflict 199 + + War or Peace? 205 + + Trotzky on the Platform in Petrograd 213 + + + + +LEON TROTZKY + +BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES + + +Trotzky is a man of about forty. He is tall, strong, angular; his +appearance as well as his speech give the impression of boldness and +vigor. His voice is a high tenor ringing with metal. And even in his +quiet moments he resembles a compressed spring. + +He is always aggressive. He is full of passion,--that white-hot, +vibrating mental passion that characterizes the intellectual Jew. On the +platform, as well as in private life, he bears an air of peculiar +importance, an indefinable something that says very distinctly: "Here is +a man who knows his value and feels himself chosen for superior aims." +Yet Trotzky is not imposing. He is almost modest. He is detached. In the +depths of his eyes there is a lingering sadness. + +It was only natural that he, a gifted college youth with a strong +avidity for theoretical thinking, should have exchanged, some twenty +years ago, the somber class-rooms of the University of Odessa for the +fresh breezes of revolutionary activity. That was the way of most gifted +Russian youths. That especially was the way of educated young Jews whose +people were being crushed under the steam-roller of the Russian +bureaucracy. + +In the last years of the nineteenth century there was hardly enough +opportunity to display unusual energy in revolutionary work. Small +circles of picked workingmen, assembling weekly under great secrecy +somewhere in a backyard cabin in a suburb, to take a course in sociology +or history or economics; now and then a "mass" meeting of a few score +laborers gathered in the woods; revolutionary appeals and pamphlets +printed on a secret press and circulated both among the educated classes +and among the people; on rare occasions, an open manifestation of +revolutionary intellectuals, such as a meeting of students within the +walls of the University--this was practically all that could be done in +those early days of Russian revolution. Into this work of preparation, +Trotzky threw himself with all his energy. Here he came into the closest +contact with the masses of labor. Here he acquainted himself with the +psychology and aspirations of working and suffering Russia. This was the +rich soil of practical experience that ever since has fed his +revolutionary ardor. + +His first period of work was short. In 1900 we find him already in +solitary confinement in the prisons of Odessa, devouring book after book +to satisfy his mental hunger. No true revolutionist was ever made +downhearted by prison, least of all Trotzky, who knew it was a brief +interval of enforced idleness between periods of activity. After two and +a half years of prison "vacation" (as the confinement was called in +revolutionary jargon) Trotzky was exiled to Eastern Siberia, to Ust-Kut, +on the Lena River, where he arrived early in 1902, only to seize the +first opportunity to escape. + +Again he resumed his work, dividing his time between the revolutionary +committees in Russia and the revolutionary colonies abroad. 1902 and +1903 were years of growth for the labor movement and of +Social-Democratic influence over the working masses. Trotzky, an +uncompromising Marxist, an outspoken adherent of the theory that only +the revolutionary workingmen would be able to establish democracy in +Russia, devoted much of his energy to the task of uniting the various +Social-Democratic circles and groups in the various cities of Russia +into one strong Social-Democratic Party, with a clear program and +well-defined tactics. This required a series of activities both among +the local committees and in the Social-Democratic literature which was +conveniently published abroad. + +It was in connection with this work that Trotzky's first pamphlet was +published and widely read. It was entitled: _The Second Convention of +The Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party_ (Geneva, 1903), and dealt +with the controversies between the two factions of Russian +Social-Democracy which later became known as the Bolsheviki and the +Mensheviki. Trotzky's contribution was an attempt at reconciliation +between the two warring camps which professed the same Marxian theory +and pursued the same revolutionary aim. The attempt failed, as did many +others, yet Trotzky never gave up hope of uniting the alienated +brothers. + +On the eve of the Revolution of 1905, Trotzky was already a +revolutionary journalist of high repute. We admired the vigor of his +style, the lucidity of his thought and the straightness of his +expression. Articles bearing the pseudonym "N. Trotzky" were an +intellectual treat, and invariably aroused heated discussions. It may +not be out of place to say a few words about this pseudonym. Many an +amazing comment has been made in the American press on the Jew Bronstein +"camouflaging" under a Russian name, Trotzky. It seems to be little +known in this country that to assume a pen name is a practice widely +followed in Russia, not only among revolutionary writers. Thus "Gorki" +is a pseudonym; "Shchedrin" (Saltykov) is a pseudonym. "Fyodor Sologub" +is a pseudonym. As to revolutionary writers, the very character of their +work has compelled them to hide their names to escape the secret police. +Ulyanov, therefore, became "Lenin," and Bronstein became "Trotzky." As +to his "camouflaging" as a Russian, this assertion is based on sheer +ignorance. Trotzky is not a genuine Russian name--no more so than +Ostrovski or Levine. True, there was a Russian playwright Ostrovski, and +Tolstoi gave his main figure in _Anna Karenin_ the name of Levine. Yet +Ostrovski and Levine are well known in Russia as Jewish names, and so is +Trotzky. I have never heard of a Gentile bearing the name Trotzky. +Trotzky has never concealed his Jewish nationality. He was too proud to +dissimulate. Pride is, perhaps, one of the dominant traits of his +powerful personality. + +Revolutionary Russia did not question the race or nationality of a +writer or leader. One admired Trotzky's power over emotion, the depth of +his convictions, the vehemence of his attacks on the opponents of the +Revolution. As early as 1904, one line of his revolutionary conceptions +became quite conspicuous: _his opposition to the liberal movement in +Russia_. In a series of essays in the Social-Democratic _Iskra_ +(_Spark_), in a collection of his essays published in Geneva under the +title _Before January Ninth_, he unremittingly branded the Liberals for +lack of revolutionary spirit, for cowardice in face of a hateful +autocracy, for failure to frame and to defend a thoroughly democratic +program, for readiness to compromise with the rulers on minor +concessions and thus to betray the cause of the Revolution. No one else +was as eloquent, as incisive in pointing out the timidity and meekness +of the Zemstvo opposition (Zemstvo were the local representative bodies +for the care of local affairs, and the Liberal land owners constituted +the leading party in those bodies) as the young revolutionary agitator, +Trotzky. Trotzky's fury against the wavering policy of the well-to-do +Liberals was only a manifestation of another trait of his character: +_his desire for clarity in political affairs_. Trotzky could not +conceive of half-way measures, of "diplomatic" silence over vital +topics, of cunning moves and concealed designs in political struggles. +The attitude of a Milukov, criticizing the government and yet willing to +acquiesce in a monarchy of a Prussian brand, criticizing the +revolutionists and yet secretly pleased with the horror they inflicted +upon Romanoff and his satellites, was simply incompatible with Trotzky's +very nature and aroused his impassioned contempt. To him, black was +always black, and white was white, and political conceptions ought to be +so clear as to find adequate expression in a few simple phrases. + +Trotzky's own political line was the Revolution--a violent uprising of +the masses, headed by organized labor, forcibly to overthrow bureaucracy +and establish democratic freedom. With what an outburst of blazing joy +he greeted the upheaval of January 9, 1905--the first great +mass-movement in Russia with clear political aims: "The Revolution has +come!" he shouted in an ecstatic essay completed on January 20th. "The +Revolution has come. One move of hers has lifted the people over scores +of steps, up which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves +with hardships and fatigue. The Revolution has come and destroyed the +plans of so many politicians who had dared to make their little +political calculations with no regard for the master, the revolutionary +people. The Revolution has come and destroyed scores of superstitions, +and has manifested the power of the program which is founded on the +revolutionary logic of the development of the masses.... The Revolution +has come and the period of our infancy has passed." + +The Revolution filled the entire year of 1905 with the battle cries of +ever-increasing revolutionary masses. The political strike became a +powerful weapon. The village revolts spread like wild-fire. The +government became frightened. It was under the sign of this great +conflagration that Trotzky framed his theory of _immediate transition +from absolutism to a Socialist order_. His line of argument was very +simple. The working class, he wrote, was the only real revolutionary +power. The bourgeoisie was weak and incapable of adroit resistance. The +intellectual groups were of no account. The peasantry was politically +primitive, yet it had an overwhelming desire for land. "Once the +Revolution is victorious, political power necessarily passes into the +hands of the class that has played a leading role in the struggle, and +that is the working class." To secure permanent power, the working class +would have to win over the millions of peasants. This would be possible +by recognizing all the agrarian changes completed by the peasants in +time of the revolution and by a radical agrarian legislation. "Once in +power, the proletariat will appear before the peasantry as its +liberator." On the other hand, having secured its class rule over +Russia, why should the proletariat help to establish parliamentary rule, +which is the rule of the bourgeois classes over the people? "To imagine +that Social-Democracy participates in the Provisional Government, +playing a leading role in the period of revolutionary democratic +reconstruction, insisting on the most radical reforms and all the time +enjoying the aid and support of the organized proletariat,--only to step +aside when the democratic program is put into operation, to leave the +completed building at the disposal of the bourgeois parties and thus to +open an era of parliamentary politics where Social-Democracy forms only +a party of opposition,--to imagine this would mean to compromise the +very idea of a labor government." Moreover, "once the representatives of +the proletariat enter the government, not as powerless hostages, but as +a leading force, the divide between the minimum-program and the +maximum-program automatically disappears, collectivism becomes the order +of the day," since "political supremacy of the proletariat is +incompatible with its economic slavery." It was precisely the same +program which Trotzky is at present attempting to put into operation. +This program has been his guiding star for the last twelve years. + +In the fall of 1905 it looked as if Trotzky's hope was near its +realization. The October strike brought autocracy to its knees. A +Constitution was promised. A Soviet (Council of Workmen's Deputies) was +formed in Petersburg to conduct the Revolution. Trotzky became one of +the strongest leaders of the Council. It was in those months that we +became fully aware of two qualities of Trotzky's which helped him to +master men: his power as a speaker, and his ability to write short, +stirring articles comprehensible to the masses. In the latter ability +nobody equals him among Russian Socialists. The leaders of Russian +Social-Democracy were wont to address themselves to the intellectual +readers. Socialist writers of the early period of the Revolution were +seldom confronted with the necessity of writing for plain people. +Trotzky was the best among the few who, in the stormy months of the 1905 +revolution, were able to appeal to the masses in brief, strong, yet +dignified articles full of thought, vision, and emotion. + +The Soviet was struggling in a desperate situation. Autocracy had +promised freedom, yet military rule was becoming ever more atrocious. +The sluices of popular revolutionary movement were open, yet +revolutionary energy was being gradually exhausted. The Soviet acted as +a true revolutionary government, ignoring the government of the +Romanoffs, giving orders to the workingmen of the country, keeping a +watchful eye on political events; yet the government of the old regime +was regaining its self-confidence and preparing for a final blow. The +air was full of bad omens. + +It required an unusual degree of revolutionary faith and vigor to +conduct the affairs of the Soviet. Trotzky was the man of the hour. +First a member of the Executive Committee, then the chairman of the +Soviet, he was practically in the very vortex of the Revolution. He +addressed meetings, he ordered strikes, he provided the vanguard of the +workingmen with firearms; he held conferences with representatives of +labor unions throughout the country, and--the irony of history--he +repeatedly appeared before the Ministers of the old regime as a +representative of labor democracy to demand from them the release of a +prisoner or the abolition of some measures obnoxious to labor. It was in +this school of the Soviet that Trotzky learned to see events in a +national aspect, and it was the very existence of the Soviet which +confirmed his belief in the possibility of a revolutionary proletarian +dictatorship. Looking backward at the activities of the Soviet, he thus +characterized that prototype of the present revolutionary government in +Russia. "The Soviet," he wrote, "was the organized authority of the +masses themselves over their separate members. This was a true, +unadulterated democracy, without a two-chamber system, without a +professional bureaucracy, with the right of the voters to recall their +representative at will and to substitute another." In short, it was the +same type of democracy Trotzky and Lenin are trying to make permanent in +present-day Russia. + +The black storm soon broke loose. Trotzky was arrested with the other +members of the "revolutionary government," after the Soviet had existed +for about a month and a half. Trotzky went to prison, not in despair, +but as a leader of an invincible army which though it had suffered +temporary defeat, was bound to win. Trotzky had to wait twelve years for +the moment of triumph, yet the moment came. + +In prison Trotzky was very active, reading, writing, trying to sum up +his experience of the revolutionary year. After twelve months of +solitary confinement he was tried and sentenced to life exile in +Siberia: the government of the enemies of the people was wreaking +vengeance on the first true representatives of the people. On January 3, +1907, Trotzky started his trip for Obdorsk, in Northern Siberia on the +Arctic Ocean. + +He was under unusual rigid surveillance even for Russian prisons. Each +movement of his and of his comrades was carefully guarded. No +communication with the outer world was permitted. The very journey was +surrounded by great secrecy. Yet such was the fame of the Soviet, that +crowds gathered at every station to greet the prisoners' train, and even +the soldiers showed extraordinary respect for the imprisoned +"workingmen's deputies" as they called them. "We are surrounded by +friends on every side," Trotzky wrote in his note book. + +In Tiumen the prisoners had to leave the railway train for sleighs +drawn by horses. The journey became very tedious and slow. The monotony +was broken only by little villages, where revolutionary exiles were +detained. Here and there the exiles would gather to welcome the leaders +of the revolution. Red flags gave touches of color to the blinding white +of the Siberian snow. "Long live the Revolution!" was printed with huge +letters on the surface of the northern snow, along the road. This was +beautiful, but it gave little consolation. The country became ever more +desolate. "Every day we move down one step into the kingdom of cold and +wilderness," Trotzky remarked in his notes. + +It was a gloomy prospect, to spend years and years in this God forsaken +country. Trotzky was not the man to submit. In defiance of difficulties, +he managed to escape before he reached the town of his destination. As +there was only one road along which travelers could move, and as there +was danger that authorities, notified by wire of his escape, could stop +him at any moment, he left the road and on a sleigh drawn by reindeer he +crossed an unbroken wilderness of 800 versts, over 500 miles. This +required great courage and physical endurance. The picturesque journey +is described by Trotzky in a beautiful little book, _My Round Trip_. + +It was in this Ostiak sleigh, in the midst of a bleak desert, that he +celebrated the 20th of February, the day of the opening of the Second +Duma. It was a mockery at Russia: here, the representatives of the +people, assembled in the quasi-Parliament of Russia; there, a +representative of the Revolution that created the Duma, hiding like a +criminal in a bleak wilderness. Did he dream in those long hours of his +journey, that some day the wave of the Revolution would bring him to the +very top? + +Early in spring he arrived abroad. He established his home in Vienna +where he lived till the outbreak of the great war. His time and energy +were devoted to the internal affairs of the Social-Democratic Party and +to editing a popular revolutionary magazine which was being smuggled +into Russia. He earned a meager living by contributing to Russian +"legal" magazines and dailies. + +I met him first in 1907, in Stuttgart. He seemed to be deeply steeped in +the revolutionary factional squabbles. Again I met him in Copenhagen in +1910. He was the target of bitter criticism for his press-comment on one +of the Social-Democratic factions. He seemed to be dead to anything but +the problem of reconciling the Bolsheviki with the Mensheviki and the +other minor divisions. Yet that air of importance which distinguished +him even from the famous old leaders had, in 1910, become more apparent. +By this time he was already a well-known and respected figure in the +ranks of International Socialism. + +In the fall of 1912 he went into the Balkans as a war correspondent. +There he learned to know the Balkan situation from authentic sources. +His revelations of the atrocities committed on both sides attracted wide +attention. When he came back to Vienna in 1913 he was a stronger +internationalist and a stronger anti-militarist than ever. + +His house in Vienna was a poor man's house, poorer than that of an +ordinary American workingman earning eighteen dollars a week. Trotzky +has been poor all his life. His three rooms in a Vienna working-class +suburb contained less furniture than was necessary for comfort. His +clothes were too cheap to make him appear "decent" in the eyes of a +middle-class Viennese. When I visited his house I found Mrs. Trotzky +engaged in housework, while the two light-haired lovely boys were +lending not inconsiderable assistance. The only thing that cheered the +house were loads of books in every corner, and, perhaps, great though +hidden hopes. + +On August 3, 1914, the Trotzkys, as enemy aliens, had to leave Vienna +for Zurich, Switzerland. Trotzky's attitude towards the war was a very +definite one from the very beginning. He accused German Social-Democracy +for having voted the war credits and thus endorsed the war. He accused +the Socialist parties of all the belligerent countries for having +concluded a truce with their governments which in his opinion was +equivalent to supporting militarism. He bitterly deplored the collapse +of Internationalism as a great calamity for the emancipation of the +world. Yet, even in those times of distress, he did not remain inactive. +He wrote a pamphlet to the German workingmen entitled _The War and +Internationalism_ (recently translated into English and published in +this country under the title _The Bolsheviki and World Peace_) which was +illegally transported into Germany and Austria by aid of Swiss +Socialists. For this attempt to enlighten the workingmen, one of the +German courts tried him in a state of contumacy and sentenced him to +imprisonment. He also contributed to a Russian Socialist daily of +Internationalist aspirations which was being published by Russian +exiles in Paris. Later he moved to Paris to be in closer contact with +that paper. Due to his radical views on the war, however, he was +compelled to leave France. He went to Spain, but the Spanish government, +though not at war, did not allow him to stay in that country. He was +himself convinced that the hand of the Russian Foreign Ministry was in +all his hardships. + +So it happened that in the winter 1916-1917, he came to the United +States. When I met him here, he looked haggard; he had grown older, and +there was fatigue in his expression. His conversation hinged around the +collapse of International Socialism. He thought it shameful and +humiliating that the Socialist majorities of the belligerent countries +had turned "Social-Patriots." "If not for the minorities of the +Socialist parties, the true Socialists, it would not be worth while +living," he said once with deep sadness. Still, he strongly believed in +the internationalizing spirit of the war itself, and expected humanity +to become more democratic and more sound after cessation of hostilities. +His belief in an impending Russian Revolution was unshaken. Similarly +unshaken was his mistrust of the Russian non-Socialist parties. On +January 20, 1917, less than two months before the overthrow of the +Romanoffs, he wrote in a local Russian paper: "Whoever thinks critically +over the experience of 1905, whoever draws a line from that year to the +present day, must conceive how utterly lifeless and ridiculous are the +hopes of our Social-Patriots for a revolutionary cooeperation between the +proletariat and the Liberal bourgeoisie in Russia." + +His demand for _clarity_ in political affairs had become more pronounced +during the war and through the distressing experiences of the war. +"There are times," he wrote on February 7, 1917, "when diplomatic +evasiveness, casting glances with one eye to the right, with the other +to the left, is considered wisdom. Such times are now vanishing before +our eyes, and their heroes are losing credit. War, as revolution, puts +problems in their clearest form. For war or against war? For national +defense or for revolutionary struggle? The fierce times we are living +now demand in equal measure both fearlessness of thought and bravery of +character." + +When the Russian Revolution broke out, it was no surprise for Trotzky. +He had anticipated it. He had scented it over the thousands of miles +that separated him from his country. He did not allow his joy to +overmaster him. The March revolution in his opinion was only a +beginning. It was only an introduction to a long drawn fight which would +end in the establishment of Socialism. + +History seemed to him to have fulfilled what he had predicted in 1905 +and 1906. The working class was the leading power in the Revolution. The +Soviets became even more powerful than the Provisional Government. +Trotzky preached that it was the task of the Soviets to become _the_ +government of Russia. It was his task to go to Russia and fight for a +labor government, for Internationalism, for world peace, for a world +revolution. "If the first Russian revolution of 1905," he wrote on March +20th, "brought about revolutions in Asia,--in Persia, Turkey, +China,--the second Russian revolution will be the beginning of a +momentous Social-revolutionary struggle in Europe. Only this struggle +will bring real peace to the blood-drenched world." + +With these hopes he went to Russia,--to forge a Socialist Russia in the +fire of the Revolution. + +Whatever may be our opinion of the merits of his policies, the man has +remained true to himself. His line has been straight. + + + + +THE PROLETARIAT AND THE REVOLUTION + + The essay _The Proletariat and the Revolution_ was published at the + close of 1904, nearly one year after the beginning of the war with + Japan. This was a crucial year for the autocratic rulers of Russia. + It started with patriotic demonstrations, it ended with a series of + humiliating defeats on the battlefields and with an unprecedented + revival of political activities on the part of the well-to-do + classes. The Zemstvos (local elective bodies for the care of local + affairs) headed by liberal landowners, conducted a vigorous + political campaign in favor of a constitutional order. Other + liberal groups, organizations of professionals (referred to in + Trotzky's essay as "democrats" and "democratic elements") joined in + the movement. The Zemstvo leaders called an open convention in + Petersburg (November 6th), which demanded civic freedom and a + Constitution. The "democratic elements" organized public gatherings + of a political character under the disguise of private banquets. + The liberal press became bolder in its attack on the + administration. The government tolerated the movement. Prince + Svyatopolk-Mirski, who had succeeded Von Plehve, the reactionary + dictator assassinated in July, 1904, by a revolutionist, had + promised "cordial relations" between government and society. In the + political jargon, this period of tolerance, lasting from August to + the end of the year, was known as the era of "Spring." + + It was a thrilling time, full of political hopes and expectation. + Yet, strange enough, the working class was silent. The working + class had shown great dissatisfaction in 1902 and especially in + summer, 1903, when scores of thousands in the southwest and in the + South went on a political strike. During the whole of 1904, + however, there were almost no mass-manifestations on the part of + the workingmen. This gave an occasion to many a liberal to scoff at + the representatives of the revolutionary parties who built all + their tactics on the expectation of a national revolution. + + To answer those skeptics and to encourage the active members of the + Social-Democratic party, Trotzky wrote his essay. Its main value, + which lends it historic significance, is the clear diagnosis of the + political situation. Though living abroad, Trotzky keenly felt the + pulse of the masses, the "pent up revolutionary energy" which was + seeking for an outlet. His description of the course of a national + revolution, the role he attributes to the workingmen, the + non-proletarian population of the cities, the educated groups, and + the army; his estimation of the influence of the war on the minds + of the raw masses; finally, the slogans he puts before the + revolution,--all this corresponds exactly to what happened during + the stormy year of 1905. Reading _The Proletariat and the + Revolution_, the student of Russian political life has a feeling + as if the essay had been written _after_ the Revolution, so closely + it follows the course of events. Yet, it appeared before January + 9th, 1905, i.e., before the first great onslaught of the Petersburg + proletariat. + + Trotzky's belief in the revolutionary initiative of the working + class could not be expressed in a more lucid manner. + + +The proletariat must not only conduct a revolutionary propaganda. The +proletariat itself must move towards a revolution. + +To move towards a revolution does not necessarily mean to fix a date for +an insurrection and to prepare for that day. You never can fix a day and +an hour for a revolution. The people have never made a revolution by +command. + +What _can_ be done is, in view of the fatally impending catastrophe, to +choose the most appropriate positions, to arm and inspire the masses +with a revolutionary slogan, to lead simultaneously all the reserves +into the field of battle, to make them practice in the art of fighting, +to keep them ready under arms,--and to send an alarm all over the lines +when the time has arrived. + +Would that mean a series of exercises only, and not a decisive combat +with the enemy forces? Would that be mere manoeuvers, and not a street +revolution? + +Yes, that would be mere manoeuvers. There is a difference, however, +between revolutionary and military manoeuvers. Our preparations can +turn, at any time and independent of our will, into a real battle which +would decide the long drawn revolutionary war. Not only can it be so, it +_must_ be. This is vouched for by the acuteness of the present political +situation which holds in its depths a tremendous amount of revolutionary +explosives. + +At what time mere manoeuvers would turn into a real battle, depends +upon the volume and the revolutionary compactness of the masses, upon +the atmosphere of popular sympathy which surrounds them and upon the +attitude of the troops which the government moves against the people. + +Those three elements of success must determine our work of preparation. +Revolutionary proletarian masses _are_ in existence. We ought to be able +to call them into the streets, at a given time, all over the country; we +ought to be able to unite them by a general slogan. + +All classes and groups of the people are permeated with hatred towards +absolutism, and that means with sympathy for the struggle for freedom. +We ought to be able to concentrate this sympathy on the proletariat as a +revolutionary power which alone can be the vanguard of the people in +their fight to save the future of Russia. As to the mood of the army, it +hardly kindles the heart of the government with great hopes. There has +been many an alarming symptom for the last few years; the army is +morose, the army grumbles, there are ferments of dissatisfaction in the +army. We ought to do all at our command to make the army detach itself +from absolutism at the time of a decisive onslaught of the masses. + +Let us first survey the last two conditions, which determine the course +and the outcome of the campaign. + +We have just gone through the period of "political renovation" opened +under the blare of trumpets and closed under the hiss of knouts,--the +era of Svyatopolk-Mirski--the result of which is hatred towards +absolutism aroused among all the thinking elements of society to an +unusual pitch. The coming days will reap the fruit of stirred popular +hopes and unfulfilled government's pledges. Political interest has +lately taken more definite shape; dissatisfaction has grown deeper and +is founded on a more outspoken theoretical basis. Popular thinking, +yesterday utterly primitive, now greedily takes to the work of political +analysis. All manifestations of evil and arbitrary power are being +speedily traced back to the principal cause. Revolutionary slogans no +more frighten the people; on the contrary, they arouse a thousandfold +echo, they pass into proverbs. The popular consciousness absorbs each +word of negation, condemnation or curse addressed towards absolutism, as +a sponge absorbs fluid substance. No step of the administration remains +unpunished. Each of its blunders is carefully taken account of. Its +advances are met with ridicule, its threats breed hatred. The vast +apparatus of the liberal press circulates daily thousands of facts, +stirring, exciting, inflaming popular emotion. + +The pent up feelings are seeking an outlet. Thought strives to turn into +action. The vociferous liberal press, however, while feeding popular +unrest, tends to divert its current into a small channel; it spreads +superstitious reverence for "public opinion," helpless, unorganized +"public opinion," which does not discharge itself into action; it brands +the revolutionary method of national emancipation; it upholds the +illusion of legality; it centers all the attention and all the hopes of +the embittered groups around the Zemstvo campaign, thus systematically +preparing a great debacle for the popular movement. Acute +dissatisfaction, finding no outlet, discouraged by the inevitable +failure of the legal Zemstvo campaign which has no traditions of +revolutionary struggle in the past and no clear prospects in the future, +must necessarily manifest itself in an outbreak of desperate terrorism, +leaving radical intellectuals in the role of helpless, passive, though +sympathetic onlookers, leaving liberals to choke in a fit of platonic +enthusiasm while lending doubtful assistance. + +This ought not to take place. We ought to take hold of the current of +popular excitement; we ought to turn the attention of numerous +dissatisfied social groups to one colossal undertaking headed by the +proletariat,--to the _National Revolution_. + +The vanguard of the Revolution ought to wake from indolence all other +elements of the people; to appear here and there and everywhere; to put +the questions of political struggle in the boldest possible fashion; to +call, to castigate, to unmask hypocritical democracy; to make democrats +and Zemstvo liberals clash against each other; to wake again and again, +to call, to castigate, to demand a clear answer to the question, _What +are you going to do?_ to allow no retreat; to compel the legal liberals +to admit their own weakness; to alienate from them the democratic +elements and help the latter along the way of the revolution. To do this +work means to draw the threads of sympathy of all the democratic +opposition towards the revolutionary campaign of the proletariat. + +We ought to do all in our power to draw the attention and gain the +sympathy of the poor non-proletarian city population. During the last +mass actions of the proletariat, as in the general strikes of 1903 in +the South, nothing was done in this respect, and this was the weakest +point of the preparatory work. According to press correspondents, the +queerest rumors often circulated among the population as to the +intentions of the strikers. The city inhabitants expected attacks on +their houses, the store keepers were afraid of being looted, the Jews +were in a dread of pogroms. This ought to be avoided. _A political +strike, as a single combat of the city proletariat with the police and +the army, the remaining population being hostile or even indifferent, is +doomed to failure._ + +The indifference of the population would tell primarily on the morale of +the proletariat itself, and then on the attitude of the soldiers. Under +such conditions, the stand of the administration must necessarily be +more determined. The generals would remind the officers, and the +officers would pass to the soldiers the words of Dragomirov: "Rifles are +given for sharp shooting, and nobody is permitted to squander cartridges +for nothing." + +_A political strike of the proletariat ought to turn into a political +demonstration of the population_, this is the first prerequisite of +success. + +The second important prerequisite is the mood of the army. A +dissatisfaction among the soldiers, a vague sympathy for the +"revoluters," is an established fact. Only part of this sympathy may +rightly be attributed to our direct propaganda among the soldiers. The +major part is done by the practical clashes between army units and +protesting masses. Only hopeless idiots or avowed scoundrels dare to +shoot at a living target. An overwhelming majority of the soldiers are +loathe to serve as executioners; this is unanimously admitted by all +correspondents describing the battles of the army with unarmed people. +The average soldier aims above the heads of the crowd. It would be +unnatural if the reverse were the case. When the Bessarabian regiment +received orders to quell the Kiev general strike, the commander declared +he could not vouch for the attitude of his soldiers. The order, then, +was sent to the Cherson regiment, but there was not one half-company in +the entire regiment which would live up to the expectations of their +superiors. + +Kiev was no exception. The conditions of the army must now be more +favorable for the revolution than they were in 1903. We have gone +through a year of war. It is hardly possible to measure the influence of +the past year on the minds of the army. The influence, however, must be +enormous. War draws not only the attention of the people, it arouses +also the professional interest of the army. Our ships are slow, our guns +have a short range, our soldiers are uneducated, our sergeants have +neither compass nor map, our soldiers are bare-footed, hungry, and +freezing, our Red Cross is stealing, our commissariat is +stealing,--rumors and facts of this kind leak down to the army and are +being eagerly absorbed. Each rumor, as strong acid, dissolves the rust +of mental drill. Years of peaceful propaganda could hardly equal in +their results one day of warfare. The mere mechanism of discipline +remains, the faith, however, the conviction that it is right to carry +out orders, the belief that the present conditions can be continued, +are rapidly dwindling. The less faith the army has in absolutism, the +more faith it has in its foes. + +We ought to make use of this situation. We ought to explain to the +soldiers the meaning of the workingmen's action which is being prepared +by the Party. We ought to make profuse use of the slogan which is bound +to unite the army with the revolutionary people, _Away with the War!_ We +ought to create a situation where the officers would not be able to +trust their soldiers at the crucial moment. This would reflect on the +attitude of the officers themselves. + +The rest will be done by the street. It will dissolve the remnants of +the barrack-hypnosis in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people. + +The main factor, however, remain the revolutionary masses. True it is +that during the war the most advanced elements of the masses, the +thinking proletariat, have not stepped openly to the front with that +degree of determination which was required by the critical historic +moment. Yet it would manifest a lack of political backbone and a +deplorable superficiality, should one draw from this fact any kind of +pessimistic conclusions. + +The war has fallen upon our public life with all its colossal weight. +The dreadful monster, breathing blood and fire, loomed up on the +political horizon, shutting out everything, sinking its steel clutches +into the body of the people, inflicting wound upon wound, causing mortal +pain, which for a moment makes it even impossible to ask for the causes +of the pain. The war, as every great disaster, accompanied by crisis, +unemployment, mobilization, hunger and death, stunned the people, caused +despair, but not protest. This is, however, only a beginning. Raw masses +of the people, silent social strata, which yesterday had no connection +with the revolutionary elements, were knocked by sheer mechanical power +of facts to face the central event of present-day Russia, the war. They +were horrified, they could not catch their breaths. The revolutionary +elements, who prior to the war had ignored the passive masses, were +affected by the atmosphere of despair and concentrated horror. This +atmosphere enveloped them, it pressed with a leaden weight on their +minds. The voice of determined protest could hardly be raised in the +midst of elemental suffering. The revolutionary proletariat which had +not yet recovered from the wounds received in July, 1903, was powerless +to oppose the "call of the primitive." + +The year of war, however, passed not without results. Masses, yesterday +primitive, to-day are confronted with the most tremendous events. They +must seek to understand them. The very duration of the war has produced +a desire for reasoning, for questioning as to the meaning of it all. +Thus the war, while hampering for a period of time the revolutionary +initiative of thousands, has awakened to life the political thought of +millions. + +The year of war passed not without results, not a single day passed +without results. In the lower strata of the people, in the very depths +of the masses, a work was going on, a movement of molecules, +imperceptible, yet irresistible, incessant, a work of accumulating +indignation, bitterness, revolutionary energy. The atmosphere our +streets are breathing now is no longer an atmosphere of blank despair, +it is an atmosphere of concentrated indignation which seeks for means +and ways for revolutionary action. Each expedient action of the vanguard +of our working masses would now carry away with it not only all our +revolutionary reserves, but also thousands and hundreds of thousands of +revolutionary recruits. This mobilization, unlike the mobilization of +the government, would be carried out in the presence of general +sympathy and active assistance of an overwhelming majority of the +population. + +In the presence of strong sympathies of the masses, in the presence of +active assistance on the part of the democratic elements of the people; +facing a government commonly hated, unsuccessful both in big and in +small undertakings, a government defeated on the seas, defeated in the +fields of battle, despised, discouraged, with no faith in the coming +day, a government vainly struggling, currying favor, provoking and +retreating, lying and suffering exposure, insolent and frightened; +facing an army whose morale has been shattered by the entire course of +the war, whose valor, energy, enthusiasm and heroism have met an +insurmountable wall in the form of administrative anarchy, an army which +has lost faith in the unshakable security of a regime it is called to +serve, a dissatisfied, grumbling army which more than once has torn +itself free from the clutches of discipline during the last year and +which is eagerly listening to the roar of revolutionary voices,--such +will be the conditions under which the revolutionary proletariat will +walk out into the streets. It seems to us that no better conditions +could have been created by history for a final attack. History has done +everything it was allowed by elemental wisdom. The thinking +revolutionary forces of the country have to do the rest. + +A tremendous amount of revolutionary energy has been accumulated. It +should not vanish with no avail, it should not be dissipated in +scattered engagements and clashes, with no coherence and no definite +plan. All efforts ought to be made to concentrate the bitterness, the +anger, the protest, the rage, the hatred of the masses, to give those +emotions a common language, a common goal, to unite, to solidify all the +particles of the masses, to make them feel and understand that they are +not isolated, that simultaneously, with the same slogan on the banner, +with the same goal in mind, innumerable particles are rising everywhere. +If this understanding is achieved, half of the revolution is done. + +We have got to summon all revolutionary forces to simultaneous action. +How can we do it? + +First of all we ought to remember that the main scene of revolutionary +events is bound to be the city. Nobody is likely to deny this. It is +evident, further, that street demonstrations can turn into a popular +revolution only when they are a manifestation of _masses_, i.e., when +they embrace, in the first place, the workers of factories and plants. +To make the workers quit their machines and stands; to make them walk +out of the factory premises into the street; to lead them to the +neighboring plant; to proclaim there a cessation of work; to make new +masses walk out into the street; to go thus from factory to factory, +from plant to plant, incessantly growing in numbers, sweeping police +barriers, absorbing new masses that happened to come across, crowding +the streets, taking possession of buildings suitable for popular +meetings, fortifying those buildings, holding continuous revolutionary +meetings with audiences coming and going, bringing order into the +movements of the masses, arousing their spirit, explaining to them the +aim and the meaning of what is going on; to turn, finally, the entire +city into one revolutionary camp, this is, broadly speaking, the plan of +action. + +The starting point ought to be the factories and plants. That means that +street manifestations of a serious character, fraught with decisive +events, ought to begin with _political strikes of the masses_. + +It is easier to fix a date for a strike, than for a demonstration of +the people, just as it is easier to move masses ready for action than to +organize new masses. + +A political strike, however, not a _local, but a general political +strike all over Russia_,--ought to have a general political slogan. This +slogan is: _to stop the war and to call a National Constituent +Assembly_. + +This demand ought to become nation-wide, and herein lies the task for +our propaganda preceding the all-Russian general strike. We ought to use +all possible occasions to make the idea of a National Constituent +Assembly popular among the people. Without losing one moment, we ought +to put into operation all the technical means and all the powers of +propaganda at our disposal. Proclamations and speeches, educational +circles and mass-meetings ought to carry broadcast, to propound and to +explain the demand of a Constituent Assembly. There ought to be not one +man in a city who should not know that his demand is: a National +Constituent Assembly. + +The peasants ought to be called to assemble on the day of the political +strike and to pass resolutions demanding the calling of a Constituent +Assembly. The suburban peasants ought to be called into the cities to +participate in the street movements of the masses gathered under the +banner of a Constituent Assembly. All societies and organizations, +professional and learned bodies, organs of self-government and organs of +the opposition press ought to be notified in advance by the workingmen +that they are preparing for an all-Russian political strike, fixed for a +certain date, to bring about the calling of a Constituent Assembly. The +workingmen ought to demand from all societies and corporations that, on +the day appointed for the mass-manifestation, they should join in the +demand of a National Constituent Assembly. The workingmen ought to +demand from the opposition press that it should popularize their slogan +and that on the eve of the demonstration it should print an appeal to +the population to join the proletarian manifestation under the banner of +a National Constituent Assembly. + +We ought to carry on the most intensive propaganda in the army in order +that on the day of the strike each soldier, sent to curb the "rebels," +should know that he is facing the people who are demanding a National +Constituent Assembly. + + +EXPLANATORY NOTES + + "_The hiss of the knout_" which ended the era of "cordial + relations" was a statement issued by the government on December 12, + 1904, declaring that "all disturbances of peace and order and all + gatherings of an anti-governmental character must and will be + stopped by all legal means in command of the authorities." The + Zemstvo and municipal bodies were advised to keep from political + utterings. As to the Socialist parties, and to labor movement in + general, they were prosecuted under Svyatopolk-Mirski as severely + as under Von Plehve. + + "_The vast apparatus of the liberal press_" was the only way to + reach millions. The revolutionary "underground" press, which + assumed towards 1905 unusual proportions, could, after all, reach + only a limited number of readers. In times of political unrest, the + public became used to read between the lines of the legal press all + it needed to feed its hatred of oppression. + + By "_legal_" _press_, "_legal_" _liberals_ are meant the open + public press and those liberals who were trying to comply with the + legal requirements of absolutism even in their work of condemning + the absolutist order. The term "legal" is opposed by the term + "revolutionary" which is applied to political actions in defiance + of law. + + _Dragomirov_ was for many years Commander of the Kiev Military + region and known by his epigrammatic style. + + + + +THE EVENTS IN PETERSBURG + + This is an essay of triumph. Written on January 20, 1905, eleven + days after the "bloody Sunday," it gave vent to the enthusiastic + feelings of every true revolutionist aroused by unmistakable signs + of an approaching storm. The march of tens of thousands of + workingmen to the Winter Palace to submit to the "Little Father" a + petition asking for "bread and freedom," was on the surface a + peaceful and loyal undertaking. Yet it breathed indignation and + revolt. The slaughter of peaceful marchers (of whom over 5,000 were + killed or wounded) and the following wave of hatred and + revolutionary determination among the masses, marked the beginning + of broad revolutionary uprisings. + + For Trotzky, the awakening of the masses to political activity was + not only a good revolutionary omen, but also a defeat of liberal + ideology and liberal tactics. Those tactics had been planned under + the assumption that the Russian people were not ripe for a + revolution. Trotzky, a thorough revolutionist, _saw_ in the liberal + movement a manifestation of political superstitions. To him, the + _only_ way to overthrow absolutism was the way of a violent + revolution. Yet, when the liberals proudly asserted that the + revolutionary masses of Russia were only a creation of the + overheated phantasy of the revolutionists, while the movement of + the well-to-do intelligent elements was a flagrant fact, the + Social-Democrats had no material proofs to the contrary, except + sporadic outbursts of unrest among the workingmen and, of course, + the conviction of those revolutionists who were in touch with the + masses. It is, therefore, easy to understand the triumph of a + Trotzky or any other Socialist after January 9th. In Trotzky's + opinion, the 9th of January had put liberalism into the archives. + "We are done with it for the entire period of the revolution," he + exclaims. The most remarkable part of this essay, as far as + political vision is concerned, is Trotzky's prediction that the + left wing of the "Osvoboshdenie" liberals (later organized as the + Constitutional Democratic Party) would attempt to become leaders of + the revolutionary masses and to "tame" them. The Liberals did not + fail to make the attempt in 1905 and 1906, but with no success + whatever. Neither did Social-Democracy, however, completely succeed + in leading the masses all through the revolution, in the manner + outlined by Trotzky in this essay. True, the Social-Democrats were + the party that gained the greatest influence over the workingmen in + the stormy year of 1905; their slogans were universally accepted by + the masses; their members were everywhere among the first ranks of + revolutionary forces; yet events developed too rapidly and + spontaneously to make the leadership of a political organization + possible. + + +How invincibly eloquent are facts! How utterly powerless are words! + +The masses have made themselves heard! They have kindled revolutionary +flames on Caucasian hill-tops; they have clashed, breast against breast, +with the guards' regiments and the cossacks on that unforgettable day of +January Ninth; they have filled the streets and squares of industrial +cities with the noise and clatter of their fights.... + +The revolutionary masses are no more a theory, they are a fact. For the +Social-Democratic Party there is nothing new in this fact. We had +predicted it long ago. We had seen its coming at a time when the noisy +liberal banquets seemed to form a striking contrast with the political +silence of the people. _The revolutionary masses are a fact_, was our +assertion. The clever liberals shrugged their shoulders in contempt. +Those gentlemen think themselves sober realists solely because they are +unable to grasp the consequences of great causes, because they make it +their business to be humble servants of each ephemeral political fact. +They think themselves sober statesmen in spite of the fact that history +mocks at their wisdom, tearing to pieces their school books, making to +naught their designs, and magnificently laughing at their pompous +predictions. + +"_There are no revolutionary people in Russia as yet._" "_The Russian +workingman is backward in culture, in self-respect, and (we refer +primarily to the workingmen of Petersburg and Moscow) he is not yet +prepared for organized social and political struggle._" + +Thus Mr. Struve wrote in his _Osvoboshdenie_. He wrote it on January +7th, 1905. Two days later the proletariat of Petersburg arose. + +"_There are no revolutionary people in Russia as yet._" These words +ought to have been engraved on the forehead of Mr. Struve were it not +that Mr. Struve's forehead already resembles a tombstone under which so +many plans, slogans, and ideas have been buried,--Socialist, liberal, +"patriotic," revolutionary, monarchic, democratic and other ideas, all +of them calculated not to run too far ahead and all of them hopelessly +dragging behind. + +"_There are no revolutionary people in Russia as yet_," so it was +declared through the mouth of _Osvoboshdenie_ by Russian liberalism +which in the course of three months had succeeded in convincing itself +that liberalism was the main figure on the political stage and that its +program and tactics would determine the future of Russia. Before this +declaration had reached its readers, the wires carried into the remotest +corners of the world the great message of the beginning of a National +Revolution in Russia. + +Yes, the Revolution has begun. We had hoped for it, we had had no doubt +about it. For long years, however, it had been to us a mere deduction +from our "doctrine," which all nonentities of all political +denominations had mocked at. They never believed in the revolutionary +role of the proletariat, yet they believed in the power of Zemstvo +petitions, in Witte, in "blocs" combining naughts with naughts, in +Svyatopolk-Mirski, in a stick of dynamite.... There was no political +superstition they did not believe in. Only the belief in the proletariat +to them was a superstition. + +History, however, does not question political oracles, and the +revolutionary people do not need a passport from political eunuchs. + +The Revolution has come. One move of hers has lifted the people over +scores of steps, up which in times of peace we would have had to drag +ourselves with hardships and fatigue. The Revolution has come and +destroyed the plans of so many politicians who had dared to make their +little political calculations with no regard for the master, the +revolutionary people. The Revolution has come and destroyed scores of +superstitions, and has manifested the power of the program which is +founded on the revolutionary logic of the development of the masses. + +The Revolution has come, and the period of our political infancy has +passed. Down to the archives went our traditional liberalism whose only +resource was the belief in a lucky change of administrative figures. Its +period of bloom was the stupid reign of Svyatopolk-Mirski. Its ripest +fruit was the Ukase of December 12th. But now, January Ninth has come +and effaced the "Spring," and has put military dictatorship in its +place, and has promoted to the rank of Governor-General of Petersburg +the same Trepov, who just before had been pulled down from the post of +Moscow Chief of Police by the same liberal opposition. + +That liberalism which did not care to know about the revolution, which +hatched plots behind the scenes, which ignored the masses, which +counted only on its diplomatic genius, has been swept away. _We are done +with it for the entire period of the revolution._ + +The liberals of the left wing will now follow the people. They will soon +attempt to take the people into their own hands. The people are a power. +One must _master_ them. But they are, too, a _revolutionary_ power. One, +therefore, must _tame_ them. This is, evidently, the future tactics of +the _Osvoboshdenie_ group. Our fight for a revolution, our preparatory +work for the revolution must also be our merciless fight against +liberalism for influence over the masses, for a leading role in the +revolution. In this fight we shall be supported by a great power, the +very logic of the revolution! + +The Revolution has come. + +The _forms_ taken by the uprising of January 9th could not have been +foreseen. A revolutionary priest, in perplexing manner placed by history +at the head of the working masses for several days, lent the events the +stamp of his personality, his conceptions, his rank. This form may +mislead many an observer as to the real substance of the events. The +actual meaning of the events, however, is just that which +Social-Democracy foresaw. The central figure is the Proletariat. The +workingmen start a strike, they unite, they formulate political demands, +they walk out into the streets, they win the enthusiastic sympathy of +the entire population, they engage in battles with the army.... The +hero, Gapon, has not created the revolutionary energy of the Petersburg +workingmen, he only unloosed it. He found thousands of thinking +workingmen and tens of thousands of others in a state of political +agitation. He formed a plan which united all those masses--for the +period of one day. The masses went to speak to the Tzar. They were faced +by Ulans, cossacks, guards. Gapon's plan had not prepared the workingmen +for that. What was the result? They seized arms wherever they could, +they built barricades.... They fought, though, apparently, they went to +beg for mercy. This shows that they went _not to beg, but to demand_. + +The proletariat of Petersburg manifested a degree of political alertness +and revolutionary energy far exceeding the limits of the plan laid out +by a casual leader. Gapon's plan contained many elements of +revolutionary romanticism. On January 9th, the plan collapsed. Yet the +revolutionary proletariat of Petersburg is no romanticism, it is a +living reality. So is the proletariat of other cities. An enormous wave +is rolling over Russia. It has not yet quieted down. One shock, and the +proletarian crater will begin to erupt torrents of revolutionary lava. + +The proletariat has arisen. It has chosen an incidental pretext and a +casual leader--a self-sacrificing priest. That seemed enough to start +with. It was not enough to _win_. + +_Victory_ demands not a romantic method based on an illusory plan, but +revolutionary tactics. _A simultaneous action of the proletariat of all +Russia must be prepared._ This is the first condition. No local +demonstration has a serious political significance any longer. After the +Petersburg uprising, only an all-Russian uprising should take place. +Scattered outbursts would only consume the precious revolutionary energy +with no results. Wherever spontaneous outbursts occur, as a late echo of +the Petersburg uprising, _they must be made use of to revolutionize and +to solidify the masses, to popularize among them the idea of an +all-Russian uprising_ as a task of the approaching months, perhaps only +weeks. + +This is not the place to discuss the technique of a popular uprising. +The questions of revolutionary technique can be solved only in a +practical way, under the live pressure of struggle and under constant +communication with the active members of the Party. There is no doubt, +however, that the technical problems of organizing a popular uprising +assume at present tremendous importance. Those problems demand the +collective attention of the Party. + + [Trotzky then proceeds to discuss the question of armament, + arsenals, clashes with army units, barricades, etc. Then he + continues:] + +As stated before, these questions ought to be solved by local +organizations. Of course, this is only a minor task as compared with the +political leadership of the masses. Yet, this task is most essential for +the political leadership itself. The organization of the revolution +becomes at present the axis of the political leadership of revolting +masses. + +What are the requirements for this leadership? A few very simple things: +freedom from routine in matters of organization; freedom from miserable +traditions of underground conspiracy; a broad view; courageous +initiative; ability to gauge situations; courageous initiative once +more. + +The events of January 9th have given us a revolutionary beginning. We +must never fall below this. We must make this our starting point in +moving the revolution forward. We must imbue our work of propaganda and +organization with the political ideas and revolutionary aspirations of +the uprising of the Petersburg workers. + +The Russian revolution has approached its climax--a national uprising. +The organization of this uprising, which would determine the fate of the +entire revolution, becomes the day's task for our Party. + +No one can accomplish it, but we. Priest Gapon could appear only once. +He cherished extraordinary illusions, that is why he could do what he +has done. Yet he could remain at the head of the masses for a brief +period only. The memory of George Gapon will always be dear to the +revolutionary proletariat. Yet his memory will be that of a hero who +opened the sluices of the revolutionary torrent. Should a new figure +step to the front now, equal to Gapon in energy, revolutionary +enthusiasm and power of political illusions, his arrival would be too +late. What was great in George Gapon may now look ridiculous. There is +no room for a second George Gapon, as the thing now needed is not an +illusion, but clear revolutionary thinking, a decisive plan of action, a +flexible revolutionary organization which would be able to give the +masses a slogan, to lead them into the field of battle, to launch an +attack all along the line and bring the revolution to a victorious +conclusion. + +Such an organization can be the work of Social-Democracy only. No other +party is able to create it. No other party can give the masses a +revolutionary slogan, as no one outside our Party has freed himself from +all considerations not pertaining to the interests of the revolution. No +other party, but Social-Democracy, is able to organize the action of the +masses, as no one but our Party is closely connected with the masses. + +Our Party has committed many errors, blunders, almost crimes. It +wavered, evaded, hesitated, it showed inertia and lack of pluck. At +times it hampered the revolutionary movement. + +_However, there is no revolutionary party but the Social-Democratic +Party!_ + +Our organizations are imperfect. Our connections with the masses are +insufficient. Our technique is primitive. + +_Yet, there is no party connected with the masses but the +Social-Democratic Party!_ + +At the head of the Revolution is the Proletariat. At the head of the +Proletariat is Social-Democracy! + +Let us exert all our power, comrades! Let us put all our energy and all +our passion into this. Let us not forget for a moment the great +responsibility vested in our Party: a responsibility before the Russian +Revolution and in the sight of International Socialism. + +The proletariat of the entire world looks to us with expectation. Broad +vistas are being opened for humanity by a victorious Russian revolution. +Comrades, let us do our duty! + +Let us close our ranks, comrades! Let us unite, and unite the masses! +Let us prepare, and prepare the masses for the day of decisive actions! +Let us overlook nothing. Let us leave no power unused for the Cause. + +Brave, honest, harmoniously united, we shall march forward, linked by +unbreakable bonds, brothers in the Revolution! + + +EXPLANATORY NOTES + + _Osvoboshdenie_ (_Emancipation_) was the name of a liberal magazine + published in Stuttgart, Germany, and smuggled into Russia to be + distributed among the Zemstvo-liberals and other progressive + elements grouped about the Zemstvo-organization. The + _Osvoboshdenie_ advocated a constitutional monarchy; it was, + however, opposed to revolutionary methods. + + _Peter Struve_, first a Socialist, then a Liberal, was the editor + of the _Osvoboshdenie_. Struve is an economist and one of the + leading liberal journalists in Russia. + + _Zemstvo-petitions_, accepted in form of resolutions at the + meetings of the liberal Zemstvo bodies and forwarded to the central + government, were one of the means the liberals used in their + struggle for a Constitution. The petitions, worded in a very + moderate language, demanded the abolition of "lawlessness" on the + part of the administration and the introduction of a "legal order," + i.e., a Constitution. + + _Sergius Witte_, Minister of Finance in the closing years of the + 19th Century and up to the revolution of 1905, was known as a + bureaucrat of a liberal brand. + + _The Ukase of December 12th, 1905_, was an answer of the government + to the persistent political demands of the "Spring" time. The Ukase + promised a number of insignificant bureaucratic reforms, not even + mentioning a popular representation and threatening increased + punishments for "disturbances of peace and order." + + _Trepov_ was one of the most hated bureaucrats, a devoted pupil of + Von Plehve's in the work of drowning revolutionary movements in + blood. + + _George Gapon_ was the priest who organized the march of January + 9th. Trotzky's admiration for the heroism of Gapon was originally + shared by many revolutionists. Later it became known that Gapon + played a dubious role as a friend of labor, and an agent of the + government. + + _The_ "_Political illusions_" of George Gapon, referred to in this + essay, was his assumption that the Tzar was a loving father to his + people. Gapon hoped to reach the Emperor of all the Russias and to + make him "receive the workingmen's petition from hand to hand." + + + + +PROSPECTS OF A LABOR DICTATORSHIP + + This is, perhaps, the most remarkable piece of political writing + the Revolution has produced. Written early in 1906, after the great + upheavals of the fall of 1905, at a time when the Russian + revolution was obviously going down hill, and autocracy, after a + moment of relaxation, was increasing its deadly grip over the + country, the essays under the name _Sum Total and Prospectives_ + (which we have here changed into a more comprehensible name, + _Prospects of Labor Dictatorship_) aroused more amazement than + admiration. They seemed so entirely out of place. They ignored the + liberal parties as quite negligible quantities. They ignored the + creation of the Duma to which the Constitutional Democrats attached + so much importance as a place where democracy would fight the + battles of the people and win. They ignored the very fact that the + vanguard of the revolution, the industrial proletariat, was beaten, + disorganized, downhearted, tired out. + + The essays met with opposition on the part of leading + Social-Democratic thinkers of both the Bolsheviki and Mensheviki + factions. The essays seemed to be more an expression of Trotzky's + revolutionary ardor, of his unshakable faith in the future of the + Russian revolution, than a reflection of political realities. It + was known that he wrote them within prison walls. Should not the + very fact of his imprisonment have convinced him that in drawing a + picture of labor dictatorship he was only dreaming? + + History has shown that it was not a dream. Whatever our attitude + towards the course of events in the 1917 revolution may be, we must + admit that, in the main, this course has taken the direction + predicted in Trotzky's essays. There is a labor dictatorship now in + Russia. It is a _labor_ dictatorship, not a "dictatorship of the + proletariat and the peasants." The liberal and radical parties have + lost influence. The labor government has put collective ownership + and collective management of industries on the order of the day. + The labor government has not hesitated in declaring Russia to be + ready for a Socialist revolution. It was compelled to do so under + the pressure of revolutionary proletarian masses. The Russian army + has been dissolved in the armed people. The Russian revolution has + called the workingmen of the world to make a social revolution. + + All this had been outlined by Trotzky twelve years ago. When one + reads this series of essays, one has the feeling that they were + written not in the course of the first Russian upheaval (the essays + appeared in 1906 as part of a book by Trotzky, entitled _Our + Revolution_, Petersburg, N. Glagoleff, publisher) but as if they + were discussing problems of the present situation. This, more than + anything else, shows the _continuity_ of the revolution. The great + overthrow of 1917 was completed by the same political and social + forces that had met and learned to know each other in the storms of + 1905 and 1906. The ideology of the various groups and parties had + hardly changed. Even the leaders of the major parties were, in the + main, the same persons. Of course, the international situation was + different. But even the possibility of a European war and its + consequences had been foreseen by Trotzky in his essays. + + Twelve years ago those essays seemed to picture an imaginary world. + To-day they seem to tell the history of the Russian revolution. We + may agree or disagree with Trotzky, the leader, nobody can deny the + power and clarity of his political vision. + + * * * * * + + In the _first_ chapter, entitled "Peculiarities of Our Historic + Development," the author gives a broad outline of the growth of + absolutism in Russia. Development of social forms in Russia, he + says, was slow and primitive. Our social life was constructed on an + archaic and meager economic foundation. Yet, Russia did not lead an + isolated life. Russia was under constant pressure of higher + politico-economical organisms,--the neighboring Western states. The + Russian state, in its struggle for existence, outgrew its economic + basis. Historic development in Russia, therefore, was taking place + under a terrific straining of national economic forces. The state + absorbed the major part of the national economic surplus and also + part of the product necessary for the maintenance of the people. + The state thus undermined its own foundation. On the other hand, to + secure the means indispensable for its growth, the state forced + economic development by bureaucratic measures. Ever since the end + of the seventeenth century, the state was most anxious to develop + industries in Russia. "New trades, machines, factories, production + on a large scale, capital, appear from a certain angle to be an + artificial graft on the original economic trunk of the people. + Similarly, Russian science may appear from the same angle to be an + artificial graft on the natural trunk of national ignorance." This, + however, is a wrong conception. The Russian state could not have + created something out of nothing. State action only accelerated the + processes of natural evolution of economic life. State measures + that were in contradiction to those processes were doomed to + failure. Still, the role of the state in economic life was + enormous. When social development reached the stage where the + bourgeoisie classes began to experience a desire for political + institutions of a Western type, Russian autocracy was fully + equipped with all the material power of a modern European state. It + had at its command a centralized bureaucratic machinery, incapable + of regulating modern relations, yet strong enough to do the work of + oppression. It was in a position to overcome distance by means of + the telegraph and railroads,--a thing unknown to the + pre-revolutionary autocracies in Europe. It had a colossal army, + incompetent in wars with foreign enemies, yet strong enough to + maintain the authority of the state in internal affairs. + + Based on its military and fiscal apparatus, absorbing the major + part of the country's resources, the government increased its + annual budget to an enormous amount of two billions of rubles, it + made the stock-exchange of Europe its treasury and the Russian + tax-payer a slave to European high finance. Gradually, the Russian + state became an end in itself. It evolved into a power independent + of society. It left unsatisfied the most elementary wants of the + people. It was unable even to defend the safety of the country + against foreign foes. Yet, it seemed strong, powerful, invincible. + It inspired awe. + + It became evident that the Russian state would never grant reforms + of its own free will. As years passed, the conflict between + absolutism and the requirements of economic and cultural progress + became ever more acute. There was only one way to solve the + problem: "to accumulate enough steam inside the iron kettle of + absolutism to burst the kettle." This was the way outlined by the + Marxists long ago. Marxism was the only doctrine that had correctly + predicted the course of development in Russia. + + * * * * * + + In the _second_ chapter, "City and Capital," Trotzky attempts a + theoretical explanation to the weakness of the middle-class in + Russia. Russia of the eighteenth, and even of the major part of the + nineteenth, century, he writes, was marked by an absence of cities + as industrial centers. Our big cities were administrative rather + than industrial centers. Our primitive industries were scattered in + the villages, auxiliary occupations of the peasant farmers. Even + the population of our so called "cities," in former generations + maintained itself largely by agriculture. Russian cities never + contained a prosperous, efficient and self-assured class of + artisans--that real foundation of the European middle class which + in the course of revolutions against absolutism identified itself + with the "people." When modern capitalism, aided by absolutism, + appeared on the scene of Russia and turned large villages into + modern industrial centers almost over night, it had no middle-class + to build on. In Russian cities, therefore, the influence of the + bourgeoisie is far less than in western Europe. Russian cities + practically contain great numbers of workingmen and small groups of + capitalists. Moreover, the specific political weight of the Russian + proletariat is larger than that of the capital employed in Russia, + because the latter is to a great extent _imported_ capital. Thus, + while a large proportion of the capital operating in Russia exerts + its political influence in the parliaments of Belgium or France, + the working class employed by the same capital exert their entire + influence in the political life of Russia. As a result of these + peculiar historic developments, the Russian proletariat, recruited + from the pauperized peasant and ruined rural artisans, has + accumulated in the new cities in very great numbers, "and nothing + stood between the workingmen and absolutism but a small class of + capitalists, separated from the 'people' (i.e., the middle-class in + the European sense of the word), half foreign in its derivation, + devoid of historic traditions, animated solely by a hunger for + profits." + + +CHAPTER III + +1789-1848-1905 + +History does not repeat itself. You are free to compare the Russian +revolution with the Great French Revolution, yet this would not make the +former resemble the latter. The nineteenth century passed not in vain. + +Already the year of 1848 is widely different from 1789. As compared with +the Great Revolution, the revolutions in Prussia or Austria appear +amazingly small. From one viewpoint, the revolutions of 1848 came too +early; from another, too late. That gigantic exertion of power which is +necessary for the bourgeois society to get completely square with the +masters of the past, can be achieved either through powerful _unity_ of +an entire nation arousing against feudal despotism, or through a +powerful development of _class struggle_ within a nation striving for +freedom. In the first case--of which a classic example are the years +1789-1793,--the national energy, compressed by the terrific resistance +of the old regime, was spent entirely in the struggle against reaction. +In the second case--which has never appeared in history as yet, and +which is treated here as hypothetical--the actual energy necessary for a +victory over the black forces of history is being developed within the +bourgeois nation through "civil war" between classes. Fierce internal +friction characterizes the latter case. It absorbs enormous quantities +of energy, prevents the bourgeoisie from playing a leading role, pushes +its antagonist, the proletariat, to the front, gives the workingman +decades' experience in a month, makes them the central figures in +political struggles, and puts very tight reins into their hands. Strong, +determined, knowing no doubts, the proletariat gives events a powerful +twist. + +Thus, it is either--or. Either a nation gathered into one compact whole, +as a lion ready to leap; or a nation completely divided in the process +of internal struggles, a nation that has released her best part for a +task which the whole was unable to complete. Such are the two polar +types, whose purest forms, however, can be found only in logical +contraposition. + +Here, as in many other cases, the middle road is the worst. This was the +case in 1848. + +In the French Revolution we see an active, enlightened bourgeoisie, not +yet aware of the contradictions of its situation; entrusted by history +with the task of leadership in the struggle for a new order; fighting +not only against the archaic institutions of France, but also against +the forces of reaction throughout Europe. The bourgeoisie consciously, +in the person of its various factions, assumes the leadership of the +nation, it lures the masses into struggle, it coins slogans, it dictates +revolutionary tactics. Democracy unites the nation in one political +ideology. The people--small artisans, petty merchants, peasants, and +workingmen--elect bourgeois as their representatives; the mandates of +the communities are framed in the language of the bourgeoisie which +becomes aware of its Messianic role. Antagonisms do not fail to reveal +themselves in the course of the revolution, yet the powerful momentum of +the revolution removes one by one the most unresponsive elements of the +bourgeoisie. Each stratum is torn off, but not before it has given over +all its energy to the following one. The nation as a whole continues to +fight with ever increasing persistence and determination. When the upper +stratum of the bourgeoisie tears itself away from the main body of the +nation to form an alliance with Louis XVI, the democratic demands of the +nation turn _against_ this part of the bourgeoisie, leading to universal +suffrage and a republican government as logically consequent forms of +democracy. + +The Great French Revolution is a true national revolution. It is more +than that. It is a classic manifestation, on a national scale, of the +world-wide struggle of the bourgeois order for supremacy, for power, for +unmitigated triumph. In 1848, the bourgeoisie was no more capable of a +similar role. It did not want, it did not dare take the responsibility +for a revolutionary liquidation of a political order that stood in its +way. The reason is clear. The task of the bourgeoisie--of which it was +fully aware--was not to secure its _own_ political supremacy, but to +secure for itself _a share_ in the political power of the old regime. +The bourgeoisie of 1848, niggardly wise with the experience of the +French bourgeoisie, was vitiated by its treachery, frightened by its +failures. It did not lead the masses to storm the citadels of the +absolutist order. On the contrary, with its back against the absolutist +order, it resisted the onslaught of the masses that were pushing it +forward. + +The French bourgeoisie made its revolution great. Its consciousness was +the consciousness of the people, and no idea found its expression in +institutions without having gone through its consciousness as an end, as +a task of political construction. It often resorted to theatrical poses +to conceal from itself the limitations of its bourgeois world,--yet it +marched forward. + +The German bourgeoisie, on the contrary, was not doing the revolutionary +work; it was "doing away" with the revolution from the very start. Its +consciousness revolted against the objective conditions of its +supremacy. The revolution could be completed not by the bourgeoisie, but +against it. Democratic institutions seemed to the mind of the German +bourgeois not an aim for his struggle, but a menace to his security. + +Another class was required in 1848, a class capable of conducting the +revolution beside the bourgeoisie and in spite of it, a class not only +ready and able to push the bourgeoisie forward, but also to step over +its political corpse, should events so demand. None of the other +classes, however, was ready for the job. + +_The petty middle class_ were hostile not only to the past, but also to +the future. They were still entangled in the meshes of medieval +relations, and they were unable to withstand the oncoming "free" +industry; they were still giving the cities their stamp, and they were +already giving way to the influences of big capital. Steeped in +prejudices, stunned by the clatter of events, exploiting and being +exploited, greedy and helpless in their greed, they could not become +leaders in matters of world-wide importance. Still less were the +_peasants_ capable of political initiative. Scattered over the country, +far from the nervous centers of politics and culture, limited in their +views, the peasants could have no great part in the struggles for a new +order. The _democratic intellectuals_ possessed no social weight; they +either dragged along behind their elder sister, the liberal bourgeoisie, +as its political tail, or they separated themselves from the bourgeoisie +in critical moments only to show their weakness. + +_The industrial workingmen_ were too weak, unorganized, devoid of +experience and knowledge. The capitalist development had gone far enough +to make the abolition of old feudal relations imperative, yet it had not +gone far enough to make the working class, the product of new economic +relations, a decisive political factor. Antagonism between bourgeoisie +and proletariat, even within the national boundaries of Germany, was +sharp enough to prevent the bourgeoisie from stepping to the front to +assume national hegemony in the revolution, yet it was not sharp enough +to allow the proletariat to become a national leader. True, the internal +frictions of the revolution had prepared the workingmen for political +independence, yet they weakened the energy and the unity of the +revolution and they caused a great waste of power. The result was that, +after the first successes, the revolution began to plod about in painful +uncertainty, and under the first blows of the reaction it started +backwards. Austria gave the clearest and most tragic example of +unfinished and unsettled relations in a revolutionary period. It was +this situation that gave Lassalle occasion to assert that henceforward +revolutions could find their support only in the class struggle of the +proletariat. In a letter to Marx, dated October 24, 1849 he writes: "The +experiences of Austria, Hungary and Germany in 1848 and 1849 have led me +to the firm conclusion that no struggle in Europe can be successful +unless it is proclaimed from the very beginning as purely Socialistic. +No struggle can succeed in which social problems appear as nebulous +elements kept in the background, while on the surface the fight is +being conducted under the slogan of national revival of bourgeois +republicanism." + +We shall not attempt to criticize this bold conclusion. One thing is +evident, namely that already at the middle of the nineteenth century the +national task of political emancipation could not be completed by a +unanimous concerted onslaught of the entire nation. Only the independent +tactics of the proletariat deriving its strength from no other source +but its class position, could have secured a victory of the revolution. + +The Russian working class of 1906 differs entirely from the Vienna +working class of 1848. The best proof of it is the all-Russian practice +of the Councils of Workmen's Deputies (Soviets). Those are no +organizations of conspirators prepared beforehand to step forward in +times of unrest and to seize command over the working class. They are +organs consciously created by the masses themselves to cooerdinate their +revolutionary struggle. The Soviets, elected by and responsible to the +masses, are thoroughly democratic institutions following the most +determined class policy in the spirit of revolutionary Socialism. + +The differences in the social composition of the Russian revolution are +clearly shown in the question of arming the people. + +_Militia_ (national guard) was the first slogan and the first +achievement of the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 in Paris, in all the +Italian states and in Vienna and Berlin. In 1846, the demand for a +national guard (i.e., the armament of the propertied classes and the +"intellectuals") was put forth by the entire bourgeois opposition, +including the most moderate factions. In Russia, the demand for a +national guard finds no favor with the bourgeois parties. This is not +because the liberals do not understand the importance of arming the +people: absolutism has given them in this respect more than one object +lesson. The reason why liberals do not like the idea of a national guard +is because they fully realize the impossibility of creating in Russia an +armed revolutionary force outside of the proletariat and against the +proletariat. They are ready to give up this demand, as they give up many +others, just as the French bourgeoisie headed by Thiers preferred to +give up Paris and France to Bismarck rather than to arm the working +class. + +The problem of an armed revolution in Russia becomes essentially a +problem of the proletariat. National militia, this classic demand of +the bourgeoisie of 1848, appears in Russia from the very beginning as a +demand for arming the people, primarily the working class. Herein the +fate of the Russian revolution manifests itself most clearly. + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROLETARIAT + +A revolution is an open contest of social forces in their struggle for +political power. + +The state is not an end in itself. It is only a working machine in the +hands of the social force in power. As every machine, the state has its +motor, transmission, and its operator. Its motive power is the class +interest; its motor are propaganda, the press, influences of school and +church, political parties, open air meetings, petitions, insurrections; +its transmission is made up of legislative bodies actuated by the +interest of a caste, a dynasty, a guild or a class appearing under the +guise of Divine or national will (absolutism or parliamentarism); its +operator is the administration, with its police, judiciary, jails, and +the army. + +The state is not an end in itself. It is, however, the greatest means +for organizing, disorganizing and reorganizing social relations. + +According to who is directing the machinery of the State, it can be an +instrument of profoundest transformations, or a means of organized +stagnation. + +Each political party worthy of its name strives to get hold of political +power and thus to make the state serve the interests of the class +represented by the party. Social-Democracy, as the party of the +proletariat, naturally strives at political supremacy of the working +class. + +The proletariat grows and gains strength with the growth of capitalism. +From this viewpoint, the development of capitalism is the development of +the proletariat for dictatorship. The day and the hour, however, when +political power should pass into the hands of the working class, is +determined not directly by the degree of capitalistic development of +economic forces, but by the relations of class struggle, by the +international situation, by a number of subjective elements, such as +tradition, initiative, readiness to fight.... + +It is, therefore, not excluded that in a backward country with a lesser +degree of capitalistic development, the proletariat should sooner reach +political supremacy than in a highly developed capitalist state. Thus, +in middle-class Paris, the proletariat consciously took into its hands +the administration of public affairs in 1871. True it is, that the reign +of the proletariat lasted only for two months, it is remarkable, +however, that in far more advanced capitalist centers of England and the +United States, the proletariat never was in power even for the duration +of one day. To imagine that there is an automatic dependence between a +dictatorship of the proletariat and the technical and productive +resources of a country, is to understand economic determinism in a very +primitive way. Such a conception would have nothing to do with Marxism. + +It is our opinion that the Russian revolution creates conditions whereby +political power can (and, in case of a victorious revolution, _must_) +pass into the hands of the proletariat before the politicians of the +liberal bourgeoisie would have occasion to give their political genius +full swing. + +Summing up the results of the revolution and counter-revolution in 1848 +and 1849, Marx wrote in his correspondences to the New York _Tribune_: +"The working class in Germany is, in its social and political +development, as far behind that of England and France as the German +bourgeoisie is behind the bourgeoisie of those countries. Like master, +like man. The evolution of the conditions of existence for a numerous, +strong, concentrated, and intelligent proletariat goes hand in hand +with the development of the conditions of existence for a numerous, +wealthy, concentrated and powerful middle class. The working class +movement itself never is independent, never is of an exclusively +proletarian character until all the different factions of the middle +class, and particularly its most progressive faction, the large +manufacturers, have conquered political power, and remodeled the State +according to their wants. It is then that the inevitable conflict +between employer and the employed becomes imminent, and cannot be +adjourned any longer."[1] This quotation must be familiar to the reader, +as it has lately been very much abused by scholastic Marxists. It has +been used as an iron-clad argument against the idea of a labor +government in Russia. If the Russian capitalistic bourgeoisie is not +strong enough to take governmental power into its hands, how is it +possible to think of an industrial democracy, i.e., a political +supremacy of the proletariat, was the question. + + [1] Karl Marx, _Germany in 1848_. (English edition, pp. 22-23.) + +Let us give this objection closer consideration. + +Marxism is primarily a method of analysis,--not the analysis of texts, +but the analysis of social relations. Applied to Russia, is it true +that the weakness of capitalistic liberalism means the weakness of the +working class? Is it true, not in the abstract, but in relation to +Russia, that an independent proletarian movement is impossible before +the bourgeoisie assume political power? It is enough to formulate these +questions in order to understand what hopeless logical formalism there +is hidden behind the attempt to turn Marx's historically relative remark +into a super-historic maxim. + +Our industrial development, though marked in times of prosperity by +leaps and bounds of an "American" character, is in reality miserably +small in comparison with the industry of the United States. Five million +persons, forming 16.6 per cent. of the population engaged in economic +pursuits, are employed in the industries of Russia; six millions and +22.2 per cent. are the corresponding figures for the United States. To +have a clear idea as to the real dimensions of industry in both +countries, we must remember that the population of Russia is twice as +large as the population of the United States, and that the output of +American industries in 1900 amounted to 25 billions of rubles whereas +the output of Russian industries for the same year hardly reached 2.5 +billions. + +There is no doubt that the number of the proletariat, the degree of its +concentration, its cultural level, and its political importance depend +upon the degree of industrial development in each country. + +This dependence, however, is not a direct one. Between the productive +forces of a country on one side and the political strength of its social +classes on the other, there is at any given moment a current and cross +current of various socio-political factors of a national and +international character which modify and sometimes completely reverse +the political expression of economic relations. The industry of the +United States is far more advanced than the industry of Russia, while +the political role of the Russian workingmen, their influence on the +political life of their country, the possibilities of their influence on +world politics in the near future, are incomparably greater than those +of the American proletariat. + +In his recent work on the American workingman, Kautsky arrives at the +conclusion that there is no immediate and direct dependence between the +political strength of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of a country +on one hand and its industrial development on the other. "Here are two +countries," he writes, "diametrically opposed to each other: in one of +them, one of the elements of modern industry is developed out of +proportion, i.e., out of keeping with the stage of capitalistic +development; in the other, another; in America it is the class of +capitalists; in Russia, the class of labor. In America there is more +ground than elsewhere to speak of the dictatorship of capital, while +nowhere has labor gained as much influence as in Russia, and this +influence is bound to grow, as Russia has only recently entered the +period of modern class struggle." Kautsky then proceeds to state that +Germany can, to a certain degree, study her future from the present +conditions in Russia, then he continues: "It is strange to think that it +is the Russian proletariat which shows us our future as far as, not the +organization of capital, but the protest of the working class is +concerned. Russia is the most backward of all the great states of the +capitalist world. This may seem to be in contradiction with the economic +interpretation of history which considers economic strength the basis of +political development. This is, however, not true. It contradicts only +that kind of economic interpretation of history which is being painted +by our opponents and critics who see in it not a _method of analysis_, +but a _ready pattern_."[2] These lines ought to be recommended to those +of our native Marxians who substitute for an independent analysis of +social relations a deduction from texts selected for all emergencies of +life. No one can compromise Marxism as shamefully as these bureaucrats +of Marxism do. + + [2] K. Kautsky, _The American and the Russian Workingman_. + +In Kautsky's estimation, Russia is characterized, economically, by a +comparatively low level of capitalistic development; politically, by a +weakness of the capitalistic bourgeoisie and by a great strength of the +working class. This results in the fact, that "the struggle for the +interests of Russia as a whole has become the task of _the only powerful +class in Russia_, industrial labor. This is the reason why labor has +gained such a tremendous political importance. This is the reason why +the struggle of Russia against the polyp of absolutism which is +strangling the country, turned out to be a single combat of absolutism +against industrial labor, a combat where the peasantry can lend +considerable assistance without, however, being able to play a leading +role.[3] + + [3] D. Mendeleyer, _Russian Realities_, 1906, p. 10. + +Are we not warranted in our conclusion that the "man" will sooner gain +political supremacy in Russia than his "master"? + + * * * * * + +There are two sorts of political optimism. One overestimates the +advantages and the strength of the revolution and strives towards ends +unattainable under given conditions. The other consciously limits the +task of the revolution, drawing a line which the very logic of the +situation will compel him to overstep. + +You can draw limits to all the problems of the revolution by asserting +that this is a bourgeois revolution in its objective aims and inevitable +results, and you can close your eyes to the fact that the main figure in +this revolution is the working class which is being moved towards +political supremacy by the very course of events. + +You can reassure yourself by saying that in the course of a bourgeois +revolution the political supremacy of the working class can be only a +passing episode, and you can forget that, once in power, the working +class will offer desperate resistance, refusing to yield unless +compelled to do so by armed force. + +You can reassure yourself by saying that social conditions in Russia are +not yet ripe for a Socialist order, and you can overlook the fact that, +once master of the situation, the working class would be compelled by +the very logic of its situation to organize national economy under the +management of the state. + +The term _bourgeois revolution_, a general sociological definition, +gives no solution to the numerous political and tactical problems, +contradictions and difficulties which are being created by the mechanism +of a _given_ bourgeois revolution. + +Within the limits of a bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth +century, whose objective was the political supremacy of capital, the +dictatorship of the _Sans-Culottes_ turned out to be a fact. This +dictatorship was not a passing episode, it gave its stamp to a whole +century that followed the revolution, though it was soon crushed by the +limitations of the revolution. + +Within the limits of a revolution at the beginning of the twentieth +century, which is also a bourgeois revolution in its immediate objective +aims, there looms up a prospect of an inevitable, or at least possible, +supremacy of the working class in the near future. That this supremacy +should not turn out to be a passing episode, as many a realistic +Philistine may hope, is a task which the working class will have at +heart. It is, then, legitimate to ask: is it inevitable that the +dictatorship of the proletariat should clash against the limitations of +a bourgeois revolution and collapse, or is it not possible that under +given _international conditions_ it may open a way for an ultimate +victory by crushing those very limitations? Hence a tactical problem: +should we consciously strive toward a labor government as the +development of the revolution will bring us nearer to that stage, or +should we look upon political power as upon a calamity which the +bourgeois revolution is ready to inflict upon the workingmen, and which +it is best to avoid? + + +CHAPTER V + +THE PROLETARIAT IN POWER AND THE PEASANTRY + +In case of a victorious revolution, political power passes into the +hands of the class that has played in it a dominant role, in other +words, it passes into the hands of the working class. Of course, +revolutionary representatives of non-proletarian social groups may not +be excluded from the government; sound politics demands that the +proletariat should call into the government influential leaders of the +lower middle class, the intelligentzia and the peasants. The problem is, +_Who will give substance to the politics of the government, who will +form in it a homogeneous majority?_ It is one thing when the government +contains a labor majority, which representatives of other democratic +groups of the people are allowed to join; it is another, when the +government has an outspoken bourgeois-democratic character where labor +representatives are allowed to participate in the capacity of more or +less honorable hostages. + +The policies of the liberal capitalist bourgeoisie, notwithstanding all +their vacillations, retreats and treacheries, are of a definite +character. The policies of the proletariat are of a still more definite, +outspoken character. The policies of the intelligentzia, however, a +result of intermediate social position and political flexibility of this +group; the politics of the peasants, a result of the social +heterogeneity, intermediate position, and primitiveness of this class; +the politics of the lower middle class, a result of muddle-headedness, +intermediate position and complete want of political traditions,--can +never be clear, determined, and firm. It must necessarily be subject to +unexpected turns, to uncertainties and surprises. + +To imagine a revolutionary democratic government without representatives +of labor is to see the absurdity of such a situation. A refusal of labor +to participate in a revolutionary government would make the very +existence of that government impossible, and would be tantamount to a +betrayal of the cause of the revolution. A participation of labor in a +revolutionary government, however, is admissible, both from the +viewpoint of objective probability and subjective desirability, _only +in the role of a leading dominant power_. Of course, you can call such a +government "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," +"dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the +intelligentzia," or "a revolutionary government of the workingmen and +the lower middle class." This question will still remain: Who has the +hegemony in the government and through it in the country? _When we speak +of a labor government we mean that the hegemony belongs to the working +class._ + +The proletariat will be able to hold this position under one condition: +if it broadens the basis of the revolution. + +Many elements of the working masses, especially among the rural +population, will be drawn into the revolution and receive their +political organization only after the first victories of the revolution, +when the revolutionary vanguard, the city proletariat, shall have seized +governmental power. Under such conditions, the work of propaganda and +organization will be conducted through state agencies. Legislative work +itself will become a powerful means of revolutionizing the masses. The +burden thrust upon the shoulders of the working class by the +peculiarities of our social and historical development, the burden of +completing a bourgeois revolution by means of labor struggle, will thus +confront the proletariat with difficulties of enormous magnitude; on the +other hand, however, it will offer the working class, at least in the +first period, unusual opportunities. This will be seen in the relations +between the proletariat and the peasants. + +In the revolutions of 1789-93, and 1848, governmental power passed from +absolutism into the hands of the moderate bourgeois elements which +emancipated the peasants before revolutionary democracy succeeded or +even attempted to get into power. The emancipated peasantry then lost +interest in the political ventures of the "city-gentlemen," i.e., in the +further course of the revolution; it formed the dead ballast of "order," +the foundation of all social "stability," betraying the revolution, +supporting a Cesarian or ultra-absolutist reaction. + +The Russian revolution is opposed to a bourgeois constitutional order +which would be able to solve the most primitive problems of democracy. +The Russian revolution will be against it for a long period to come. +Reformers of a bureaucratic brand, such as Witte and Stolypin, can do +nothing for the peasants, as their "enlightened" efforts are continually +nullified by their own struggle for existence. The fate of the most +elementary interests of the peasantry--the entire peasantry as a +class--is, therefore, closely connected with the fate of the revolution, +i.e., with the fate of the proletariat. + +_Once in power, the proletariat will appear before the peasantry as its +liberator._ + +Proletarian rule will mean not only democratic equality, free +self-government, shifting the burden of taxation on the propertied +classes, dissolution of the army among the revolutionary people, +abolition of compulsory payments for the Church, but also recognition of +all revolutionary changes made by the peasants in agrarian relations +(seizures of land). These changes will be taken by the proletariat as a +starting point for further legislative measures in agriculture. Under +such conditions, the Russian peasantry will be interested in upholding +the proletarian rule ("labor democracy"), at least in the first, most +difficult period, not less so than were the French peasants interested +in upholding the military rule of Napoleon Bonaparte who by force +guaranteed to the new owners the integrity of their land shares. + +But is it not possible that the peasants will remove the workingmen +from their positions and take their place? No, this can never happen. +This would be in contradiction to all historical experiences. History +has convincingly shown that the peasantry is incapable of an independent +political role. + +The history of capitalism is the history of subordination of the village +by the city. Industrial development had made the continuation of feudal +relations in agriculture impossible. Yet the peasantry had not produced +a class which could live up to the revolutionary task of destroying +feudalism. It was the city which made rural population dependent on +capital, and which produced revolutionary forces to assume political +hegemony over the village, there to complete revolutionary changes in +civic and political relations. In the course of further development, the +village becomes completely enslaved by capital, and the villagers by +capitalistic political parties, which revive feudalism in parliamentary +politics, making the peasantry their political domain, the ground for +their preelection huntings. Modern peasantry is driven by the fiscal and +militaristic system of the state into the clutches of usurers' capital, +while state-clergy, state-schools and barrack depravity drive it into +the clutches of usurers' politics. + +The Russian bourgeoisie yielded all revolutionary positions to the +Russian proletariat. It will have to yield also the revolutionary +hegemony over the peasants. Once the proletariat becomes master of the +situation, conditions will impel the peasants to uphold the policies of +a labor democracy. They may do it with no more political understanding +than they uphold a bourgeois regime. The difference is that while each +bourgeois party in possession of the peasants' vote uses its power to +rob the peasants, to betray their confidence and to leave their +expectations unfulfilled, in the worst case to give way to another +capitalist party, the working class, backed by the peasantry, will put +all forces into operation to raise the cultural level of the village and +to broaden the political understanding of the peasants. + +Our attitude towards the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat and +the peasantry" is now quite clear. It is not a question whether we think +it "admissible" or not, whether we "wish" or we "do not wish" this form +of political cooeperation. In our opinion, it simply cannot be realized, +at least in its direct meaning. Such a cooeperation presupposes that +either the peasantry has identified itself with one of the existing +bourgeois parties, or it has formed a powerful party of its own. Neither +is possible, as we have tried to point out. + + +CHAPTER VI + +PROLETARIAN RULE + +The proletariat can get into power only at a moment of national +upheaval, of sweeping national enthusiasm. The proletariat assumes power +as a revolutionary representative of the people, as a recognized leader +in the fight against absolutism and barbaric feudalism. Having assumed +power, however, the proletariat will open a new era, an era of positive +legislation, of revolutionary politics, and this is the point where its +political supremacy as an avowed spokesman of the nation may become +endangered. + +The first measures of the proletariat--the cleansing of the Augean +stables of the old regime and the driving away of their +inhabitants--will find active support of the entire nation whatever the +liberal castraters may tell us of the power of some prejudices among the +masses. The work of political cleansing will be accompanied by +democratic reorganization of all social and political relations. The +labor government, impelled by immediate needs and requirements, will +have to look into all kinds of relations and activities among the +people. It will have to throw out of the army and the administration all +those who had stained their hands with the blood of the people; it will +have to disband all the regiments that had polluted themselves with +crimes against the people. This work will have to be done immediately, +long before the establishment of an elective responsible administration +and before the organization of a popular militia. This, however, will be +only a beginning. Labor democracy will soon be confronted by the +problems of a normal workday, the agrarian relations and unemployment. +The legislative solution of those problems will show the _class +character_ of the labor government. It will tend to weaken the +revolutionary bond between the proletariat and the nation; it will give +the economic differentiation among the peasants a political expression. +Antagonism between the component parts of the nation will grow step by +step as the policies of the labor government become more outspoken, lose +their general democratic character and become _class policies_. + +The lack of individualistic bourgeois traditions and anti-proletarian +prejudices among the peasants and the intelligentzia will help the +proletariat assume power. It must not be forgotten, however, that this +lack of prejudices is based not on political understanding, but on +political barbarism, on social shapelessness, primitiveness, and lack of +character. These are all qualities which can hardly guarantee support +for an active, consistent proletarian rule. + +The abolition of the remnants of feudalism in agrarian relations will be +supported by all the peasants who are now oppressed by the landlords. A +progressive income tax will be supported by an overwhelming majority of +the peasants. Yet, legislative measures in defense of the rural +proletariat (farm hands) will find no active support among the majority, +and will meet with active opposition on the part of a minority of the +peasants. + +The proletariat will be compelled to introduce class struggle into the +village and thus to destroy that slight community of interests which +undoubtedly unites the peasants as a whole. In its next steps, the +proletariat will have to seek for support by helping the poor villagers +against the rich, the rural proletariat against the agrarian +bourgeoisie. This will alienate the majority of the peasants from labor +democracy. Relations between village and city will become strained. The +peasantry as a whole will become politically indifferent. The peasant +minority will actively oppose proletarian rule. This will influence part +of the intellectuals and the lower middle class of the cities. + +Two features of proletarian politics are bound particularly to meet with +the opposition of labor's allies: _Collectivism_ and _Internationalism_. +The strong adherence of the peasants to private ownership, the +primitiveness of their political conceptions, the limitations of the +village horizon, its distance from world-wide political connections and +interdependences, are terrific obstacles in the way of revolutionary +proletarian rule. + +To imagine that Social-Democracy participates in the provisional +government, playing a leading role in the period of revolutionary +democratic reconstruction, insisting on the most radical reforms +and all the time enjoying the aid and support of the organized +proletariat,--only to step aside when the democratic program is put into +operation, to leave the completed building at the disposal of the +bourgeois parties and thus to open an era of parliamentary politics +where Social-Democracy forms only a party of opposition,--to imagine +this would mean to compromise the very idea of a labor government. It is +impossible to imagine anything of the kind, not because it is "against +principles"--such abstract reasoning is devoid of any substance--but +because it is _not real_, it is the worst kind of Utopianism, it is the +revolutionary Utopianism of Philistines. + +Our distinction between a minimum and maximum program has a great and +profound meaning only under bourgeois rule. The very fact of bourgeois +rule eliminates from our minimum program all demands incompatible with +private ownership of the means of production. Those demands form the +substance of a Socialist revolution, and they presuppose a dictatorship +of the proletariat. The moment, however, a revolutionary government is +dominated by a Socialist majority, the distinction between minimum and +maximum programs loses its meaning both as a question of principle and +as a practical policy. _Under no condition will a proletarian government +be able to keep within the limits of this distinction._ + +Let us take the case of an eight hour workday. It is a well established +fact that an eight hour workday does not contradict the capitalist +order; it is, therefore, well within the limits of the Social-Democratic +minimum program. Imagine, however, its realization in a revolutionary +period, when all social passions are at the boiling point. An eight hour +workday law would necessarily meet with stubborn and organized +opposition on the part of the capitalists--let us say in the form of a +lock-out and closing down of factories and plants. Hundreds of thousands +of workingmen would be thrown into the streets. What ought the +revolutionary government to do? A bourgeois government, however radical, +would never allow matters to go as far as that. It would be powerless +against the closing of factories and plants. It would be compelled to +make concessions. The eight hour workday would not be put into +operation; the revolts of the workingmen would be put down by force of +arms.... + +Under the political domination of the proletariat, the introduction of +an eight hour workday must have totally different consequences. The +closing down of factories and plants cannot be the reason for increasing +labor hours by a government which represents not capital, but labor, and +which refuses to act as an "impartial" mediator, the way bourgeois +democracy does. A labor government would have only one way out--to +expropriate the closed factories and plants and to organize their work +on a public basis. + +Or let us take another example. A proletarian government must +necessarily take decisive steps to solve the problem of unemployment. +Representatives of labor in a revolutionary government can by no means +meet the demands of the unemployed by saying that this is a bourgeois +revolution. Once, however, the state ventures to eliminate +unemployment--no matter how--a tremendous gain in the economic power of +the proletariat is accomplished. The capitalists whose pressure on the +working class was based on the existence of a reserve army of labor, +will soon realize that they are powerless _economically_. It will be the +task of the government to doom them also to _political_ oblivion. + +Measures against unemployment mean also measures to secure means of +subsistence for strikers. The government will have to undertake them, if +it is anxious not to undermine the very foundation of its existence. +Nothing will remain for the capitalists but to declare a lock-out, to +close down factories and plants. Since capitalists can wait longer than +labor in case of interrupted production, nothing will remain for a labor +government but to meet a general lock-out by expropriating the factories +and plants and by introducing in the biggest of them state or communal +production. + +In agriculture, similar problems will present themselves through the +very fact of land-expropriation. We cannot imagine a proletarian +government expropriating large private estates with agricultural +production on a large scale, cutting them into pieces and selling them +to small owners. For it the only open way is to organize in such estates +cooeperative production under communal or state management. This, +however, _is the way of Socialism_. + +Social-Democracy can never assume power under a double obligation: to +put the _entire_ minimum program into operation for the sake of the +proletariat, and to keep strictly _within the limits_ of this program, +for the sake of the bourgeoisie. Such a double obligation could never be +fulfilled. Participating in the government, not as powerless hostages, +but as a leading force, the representatives of labor _eo ipso_ break the +line between the minimum and maximum program. _Collectivism becomes the +order of the day._ At which point the proletariat will be stopped on +its march in this direction, depends upon the constellation of forces, +not upon the original purpose of the proletarian Party. + +It is, therefore, absurd to speak of a _specific_ character of +proletarian dictatorship (or a dictatorship of the proletariat _and_ the +peasantry) within a bourgeois revolution, viz., a _purely democratic_ +dictatorship. The working class can never secure the democratic +character of its dictatorship without overstepping the limits of its +democratic program. Illusions to the contrary may become a handicap. +They would compromise Social-Democracy from the start. + +Once the proletariat assumes power, it will fight for it to the end. One +of the means to secure and solidify its power will be propaganda and +organization, particularly in the village; another means will be a +_policy of Collectivism_. Collectivism is not only dictated by the very +position of the Social-Democratic Party as the party in power, but it +becomes imperative as a means to secure this position through the active +support of the working class. + + * * * * * + +When our Socialist press first formulated the idea of a _Permanent +Revolution_ which should lead from the liquidation of absolutism and +civic bondage to a Socialist order through a series of ever growing +social conflicts, uprisings of ever new masses, unremitting attacks of +the proletariat on the political and economic privileges of the +governing classes, our "progressive" press started a unanimous indignant +uproar. Oh, they had suffered enough, those gentlemen of the +"progressive" press; this nuisance, however, was too much. Revolution, +they said, is not a thing that can be made "legal!" Extraordinary +measures are allowable only on extraordinary occasions. The aim of the +revolutionary movement, they asserted, was not to make the revolution go +on forever, but to bring it as soon as possible into the channels of +_law_, etc., etc. The more radical representatives of the same +democratic bourgeoisie do not attempt to oppose the revolution from the +standpoint of completed constitutional "achievements": tame as they are, +they understand how hopeless it is to fight the proletariat revolution +with the weapon of parliamentary cretinism _in advance_ of the +establishment of parliamentarism itself. They, therefore, choose another +way. They forsake the standpoint of law, but take the standpoint of what +they deem to be facts,--the standpoint of historic "possibilities," the +standpoint of political "realism,"--even ... even the standpoint of +"Marxism." It was Antonio, the pious Venetian bourgeois, who made the +striking observation: + + Mark you this, Bassanio, + The devil can cite scriptures for his purpose. + +Those gentlemen not only consider the idea of labor government in Russia +fantastic, but they repudiate the very probability of a Social +revolution in Europe in the near historic epoch. The necessary +"prerequisites" are not yet in existence, is their assertion. + +Is it so? It is, of course, not our purpose to set a time for a Social +revolution. What we attempt here is to put the Social revolution into a +proper historic perspective. + + +CHAPTER VII + +PREREQUISITES TO SOCIALISM + +Marxism turned Socialism into a science. This does not prevent some +"Marxians" from turning Marxism into a Utopia. + + [Trotzky then proceeds to find logical flaws in the arguments of N. + Roshkov, a Russian Marxist, who had made the assertion that Russia + was not yet ripe for Socialism, as her level of industrial technique + and the class-consciousness of her working masses were not yet high + enough to make Socialist production and distribution possible. Then + he goes back to what he calls "prerequisites to Socialism," which in + his opinion are: (1) development of industrial technique; (2) + concentration of production; (3) social consciousness of the masses. + In order that Socialism become possible, he says, it is not + necessary that each of these prerequisites be developed to its + logically conceivable limit.] + +All those processes (development of technique, concentration of +production, growth of mass-consciousness) go on simultaneously, and not +only do they help and stimulate each other, but they also _hamper and +limit_ each other's development. Each of the processes of a higher order +presupposes the development of another process of a lower order, yet the +full development of any of them is incompatible with the full +development of the others. + +The logical limit of technical development is undoubtedly a perfect +automatic mechanism which takes in raw materials from natural resources +and lays them down at the feet of men as ready objects of consumption. +Were not capitalism limited by relations between classes and by the +consequences of those relations, the class struggle, one would be +warranted in his assumption that industrial technique, having approached +the ideal of one great automatic mechanism within the limits of +capitalistic economy, _eo ipso_ dismisses capitalism. + +The concentration of production which is an outgrowth of economic +competition has an inherent tendency to throw the entire population into +the working class. Taking this tendency apart from all the others, one +would be warranted in his assumption that capitalism would ultimately +turn the majority of the people into a reserve army of paupers, lodged +in prisons. This process, however, is being checked by revolutionary +changes which are inevitable under a certain relationship between social +forces. It will be checked long before it has reached its logical limit. + +And the same thing is true in relation to social mass-consciousness. +This consciousness undoubtedly grows with the experiences of every day +struggle and through the conscious efforts of Socialist parties. +Isolating this process from all others, we can imagine it reaching a +stage where the overwhelming majority of the people are encompassed by +professional and political organizations, united in a feeling of +solidarity and in identity of purpose. Were this process allowed to grow +quantitatively without changing in quality, Socialism might be +established peacefully, through a unanimous compact of the citizens of +the twenty-first or twenty-second Century. The historic prerequisites to +Socialism, however, do not develop in isolation from each other; _they +limit each other_; reaching a certain stage, which is determined by many +circumstances, but which is very far from their mathematical limits, +they undergo a qualitative change, and in their complex combination they +produce what we call a Social revolution. + +Let us take the last mentioned process, the growth of social +mass-consciousness. This growth takes place not in academies, but in the +very life of modern capitalistic society, on the basis of incessant +class struggle. The growth of proletarian class consciousness makes +class struggles undergo a transformation; it deepens them; it puts a +foundation of principle under them, thus provoking a corresponding +reaction on the part of the governing classes. The struggle between +proletariat and bourgeoisie has its own logic; it must become more and +more acute and bring things to a climax long before the time when +concentration of production has become predominant in economic life. It +is evident, further, that the growth of the political consciousness of +the proletariat is closely related with its numerical strength; +proletarian dictatorship presupposes great numbers of workingmen, strong +enough to overcome the resistance of the bourgeois counter-revolution. +This, however, does not imply that the overwhelming majority of the +people must consist of proletarians, or that the overwhelming majority +of proletarians must consist of convinced Socialists. Of course, the +fighting revolutionary army of the proletariat must by all means be +stronger than the fighting counter-revolutionary army of capital; yet +between those two camps there may be a great number of doubtful or +indifferent elements who are not actively helping the revolution, but +are rather inclined to desire its ultimate victory. The proletarian +policy must take all this into account. + +This is possible only where there is a hegemony of industry over +agriculture, and a hegemony of the city over the village. + +Let us review the prerequisites to Socialism in the order of their +diminishing generality and increasing complexity. + +1. Socialism is not only a problem of equal distribution, but also a +problem of well organized production. Socialistic, i.e., cooeperative +production on a large scale is possible only where economic progress has +gone so far as to make a large undertaking more productive than a small +one. The greater the advantages of a large undertaking over a small one, +i.e., the higher the industrial technique, the greater must be the +economic advantages of socialized production, the higher, consequently, +must be the cultural level of the people to enable them to enjoy equal +distribution based on well organized production. + +This first prerequisite of Socialism has been in existence for many +years. Ever since division of labor has been established in +manufactories; ever since manufactories have been superseded by +factories employing a system of machines,--large undertakings become +more and more profitable, and consequently their socialization would +make the people more prosperous. There would have been no gain in making +all the artisans' shops common property of the artisans; whereas the +seizure of a manufactory by its workers, or the seizure of a factory by +its hired employees, or the seizure of all means of modern production by +the people must necessarily improve their economic conditions,--the more +so, the further the process of economic concentration has advanced. + +At present, social division of labor on one hand, machine production on +the other have reached a stage where the only cooeperative organization +that can make adequate use of the advantages of collectivist economy, is +the State. It is hardly conceivable that Socialist production would +content itself with the area of the state. Economic and political +motives would necessarily impel it to overstep the boundaries of +individual states. + +The world has been in possession of technical equipment for collective +production--in one or another form--for the last hundred or two hundred +years. _Technically_, Socialism is profitable not only on a national, +but also to a large extent on an international scale. Why then have all +attempts at organizing Socialist communities failed? Why has +concentration of production manifested its advantages all through the +eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not in Socialistic, but in +capitalistic forms? The reason is that there was no social force ready +and able to introduce Socialism. + +2. Here we pass from the prerequisite of industrial technique to the +_socio-economic_ prerequisite, which is less general, but more complex. +Were our society not an antagonistic society composed of classes, but a +homogeneous partnership of men consciously selecting the best economic +system, a mere calculation as to the advantages of Socialism would +suffice to make people start Socialistic reconstruction. Our society, +however, harbors in itself opposing interests. What is good for one +class, is bad for another. Class selfishness clashes against class +selfishness; class selfishness impairs the interests of the whole. To +make Socialism possible, a social power has to arise in the midst of the +antagonistic classes of capitalist society, a power objectively placed +in a position to be interested in the establishment of Socialism, at +the same time strong enough to overcome all opposing interests and +hostile resistance. It is one of the principal merits of scientific +Socialism to have discovered such a social power in the person of the +proletariat, and to have shown that this class, growing with the growth +of capitalism, can find its salvation only in Socialism; that it is +being moved towards Socialism by its very position, and that the +doctrine of Socialism in the presence of a capitalist society must +necessarily become the ideology of the proletariat. + +How far, then, must the social differentiation have gone to warrant the +assertion that the second prerequisite is an accomplished fact? In other +words, what must be the numerical strength of the proletariat? Must it +be one-half, two-thirds, or nine-tenths of the people? It is utterly +futile to try and formulate this second prerequisite of Socialism +arithmetically. An attempt to express the strength of the proletariat in +mere numbers, besides being schematic, would imply a series of +difficulties. Whom should we consider a proletarian? Is the +half-paupered peasant a proletarian? Should we count with the +proletariat those hosts of the city reserve who, on one hand, fall into +the ranks of the parasitic proletariat of beggars and thieves, and, on +the other hand, fill the streets in the capacity of peddlers, i.e., of +parasites on the economic body as a whole? It is not easy to answer +these questions. + +The importance of the proletariat is based not only on its numbers, but +primarily on its role in industry. The political supremacy of the +bourgeoisie is founded on economic power. Before it manages to take over +the authority of the state, it concentrates in its hands the national +means of production; hence its specific weight. The proletariat will +possess no means of production of its own before the Social revolution. +Its social power depends upon the circumstance that the means of +production in possession of the bourgeoisie can be put into motion only +by the hands of the proletariat. From the bourgeois viewpoint, the +proletariat is also one of the means of production, forming, in +combination with the others, a unified mechanism. Yet the proletariat is +the only non-automatic part of this mechanism, and can never be made +automatic, notwithstanding all efforts. This puts the proletariat into a +position to be able to stop the functioning of the national economic +body, partially or wholly--through the medium of partial or general +strikes. + +Hence it is evident that, the numerical strength of the proletariat +being equal, its importance is proportional to the mass of the means of +production it puts into motion: the proletarian of a big industrial +concern represents--other conditions being equal--a greater social unit +than an artisan's employee; a city workingman represents a greater unit +than a proletarian of the village. In other words, the political role of +the proletariat is greater in proportion as large industries predominate +over small industries, industry predominates over agriculture, and the +city over the village. + +At a period in the history of Germany or England when the proletariats +of those countries formed the same percentage to the total population as +the proletariat in present day Russia, they did not possess the same +social weight as the Russian proletariat of to-day. They could not +possess it, because their objective importance in economic life was +comparatively smaller. The social weight of the cities represents the +same phenomenon. At a time when the city population of Germany formed +only 15 per cent. of the total nation, as is the case in present-day +Russia, the German cities were far from equaling our cities in economic +and political importance. The concentration of big industries and +commercial enterprises in the cities, and the establishment of closer +relations between city and country through a system of railways, has +given the modern cities an importance far exceeding the mere volume of +their population. Moreover, the growth of their importance runs ahead of +the growth of their population, and the growth of the latter runs ahead +of the natural increase of the entire population of the country. In +1848, the number of artisans, masters and their employees, in Italy was +15 per cent. of the population, the same as the percentage of the +proletariat, including artisans, in Russia of to-day. Their importance, +however, was far less than that of the Russian industrial proletariat. + +The question is not, how strong the proletariat is numerically, but what +is its position in the general economy of a country. + + [The author then quotes figures showing the numbers of wage-earners + and industrial proletarians in Germany, Belgium and England: in + Germany, in 1895, 12.5 millions proletarians; in Belgium 1.8 + millions, or 60 per cent. of all the persons who make a living + independently; in England 12.5 millions.] + +In the leading European countries, city population numerically +predominates over the rural population. Infinitely greater is its +predominance through the aggregate of means of production represented by +it, and through the qualities of its human material. The city attracts +the most energetic, able and intelligent elements of the country. + +Thus we arrive at the conclusion that economic evolution--the growth of +industry, the growth of large enterprises, the growth of cities, the +growth of the proletariat, especially the growth of the industrial +proletariat--have already prepared the arena not only for the _struggle_ +of the proletariat for political power, but also for the _conquest_ of +that power. + +3. Here we approach the third prerequisite to Socialism, the +_dictatorship of the proletariat_. + +Politics is the plane where objective prerequisites intersect with +subjective. On the basis of certain technical and socio-economic +conditions, a class puts before itself a definite task--to seize power. +In pursuing this task, it unites its forces, it gauges the forces of the +enemy, it weighs the circumstances. Yet, not even here is the +proletariat absolutely free: besides subjective moments, such as +understanding, readiness, initiative which have a logic of their own, +there are a number of objective moments interfering with the policies of +the proletariat, such are the policies of the governing classes, state +institutions (the army, the class-school, the state-church), +international relations, etc. + +Let us first turn our attention to the subjective moment; let us ask, +_Is the proletariat ready for a Socialist change?_ It is not enough that +development of technique should make Socialist economy profitable from +the viewpoint of the productivity of national labor; it is not enough +that social differentiation, based on technical progress, should create +the proletariat, as a class objectively interested in Socialism. It is +of prime importance that this class should _understand_ its objective +interests. It is necessary that this class should _see_ in Socialism the +only way of its emancipation. It is necessary that it should unite into +an army powerful enough to seize governmental power in open combat. + +It would be a folly to deny the necessity for the preparation of the +proletariat. Only the old Blanquists could stake their hopes in the +salutary initiative of an organization of conspirators formed +independently of the masses. Only their antipodes, the anarchists, could +build their system on a spontaneous elemental outburst of the masses +whose results nobody can foresee. When Social-Democracy speaks of +seizing power, it thinks of _a deliberate action of a revolutionary +class_. + +There are Socialists-ideologists (ideologists in the wrong sense of the +word, those who turn all things upside down) who speak of preparing the +proletariat for Socialism as a problem of moral regeneration. The +proletariat, they say, and even "humanity" in general, must first free +itself from its old selfish nature; altruistic motives must first become +predominant in social life. As we are still very far from this ideal, +they contend, and as human nature changes very slowly, Socialism appears +to be a problem of remote centuries. This view seems to be very +realistic, evolutionistic, etc. It is in reality a conglomeration of +hackneyed moralistic considerations. + +Those "ideologists" imagine that a Socialist psychology can be acquired +before the establishment of Socialism; that in a world ruled by +capitalism the masses can be imbued with a Socialist psychology. +Socialist psychology as here conceived should not be identified with +Socialist aspirations. The former presupposes the absence of selfish +motives in economic relations, while the latter are an outcome of the +class psychology of the proletariat. Class psychology, and Socialist +psychology in a society not split into classes, may have many common +features, yet they differ widely. + +Cooeperation in the struggle of the proletariat against exploitation has +developed in the soul of the workingmen beautiful sprouts of idealism, +brotherly solidarity, a spirit of self-sacrifice. Yet those sprouts +cannot grow and blossom freely within capitalist society: individual +struggle for existence, the yawning abyss of poverty, differentiations +among the workingmen themselves, the corrupting influence of the +bourgeois parties,--all this interferes with the growth of idealism +among the masses. + +However, it is a fact that, while remaining selfish as any of the lower +middle class, while not exceeding the average representative of the +bourgeois classes by the "human" value of his personality, the average +workingman learns in the school of life's experience that _his most +primitive desires and most natural wants can be satisfied only on the +debris of the capitalist order_. + +If Socialism should attempt to create a new human nature within the +limits of the old world, it would be only a new edition of the old +moralistic Utopias. The task of Socialism is not to create a Socialist +psychology as a prerequisite to Socialism, but to create Socialist +conditions of human life as a prerequisite to a Socialist psychology. + + +CHAPTER VIII + +A LABOR GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA AND SOCIALISM + +The objective prerequisites of a Social revolution, as we have shown +above, have been already created by the economic progress of advanced +capitalist countries. But how about Russia? Is it possible to think that +the seizure of power by the Russian proletariat would be the beginning +of a Socialist reconstruction of our national economy? + +A year ago we thus answered this question in an article which was +mercilessly bombarded by the organs of both our factions. We wrote: + +"The workingmen of Paris, says Marx, had not expected miracles from the +Commune. We cannot expect miracles from a proletarian dictatorship now. +Governmental power is not almighty. It is folly to think that once the +proletariat has seized power, it would abolish capitalism and introduce +socialism by a number of decrees. The economic system is not a product +of state activity. What the proletariat will be able to do is to +shorten economic evolution towards Collectivism through a series of +energetic state measures. + +"The starting point will be the reforms enumerated in our so-called +minimum program. The very situation of the proletariat, however, will +compel it to move along the way of collectivist practice. + +"It will be comparatively easy to introduce the eight hour workday and +progressive taxation, though even here the center of gravity is not the +issuance of a 'decree,' but the organization of its practical +application. It will be difficult, however,--and here we pass to +Collectivism--to organize production under state management in such +factories and plants as would be closed down by their owners in protest +against the new law. + +"It will be comparatively simple to issue a law abolishing the right of +inheritance, and to put it into operation. Inheritances in the form of +money capital will not embarrass the proletariat and not interfere with +its economy. To be, however, the inheritor of capital invested in land +and industry, would mean for a labor government to organize economic +life on a public basis. + +"The same phenomenon, on a vastly larger scale, is represented by the +question of expropriation (of land), with or without compensation. +Expropriation with compensation has political advantages, but it is +financially difficult; expropriation without compensation has financial +advantages, but it is difficult politically. Greater than all the other +difficulties, however, will be those of an economic nature, the +difficulties of organization. + +"To repeat: a labor government does not mean a government of miracles. + +"Public management will begin in those branches where the difficulties +are smallest. Publicly managed enterprises will originally represent +kind of oases linked with private enterprises by the laws of exchange of +commodities. The wider the field of publicly managed economy will grow, +the more flagrant its advantages will become, the firmer will become the +position of the new political regime, and the more determined will be +the further economic measures of the proletariat. Its measures it will +base not only on the national productive forces, but also on +international technique, in the same way as it bases its revolutionary +policies not only on the experience of national class relations but also +on the entire historic experience of the international proletariat." + +_Political supremacy of the proletariat is incompatible with its +economic slavery._ Whatever may be the banner under which the +proletariat will find itself in possession of power, it will be +compelled to enter the road of Socialism. It is the greatest Utopia to +think that the proletariat, brought to the top by the mechanics of a +bourgeois revolution, would be able, even if it wanted, to limit its +mission by creating a republican democratic environment for the social +supremacy of the bourgeoisie. Political dominance of the proletariat, +even if it were temporary, would extremely weaken the resistance of +capital which is always in need of state aid, and would give momentous +opportunities to the economic struggle of the proletariat. + +A proletarian regime will immediately take up the agrarian question with +which the fate of vast millions of the Russian people is connected. In +solving this, as many another question, the proletariat will have in +mind the main tendency of its economic policy: to get hold of a widest +possible field for the organization of a Socialist economy. The forms +and the tempo of this policy in the agrarian question will be +determined both by the material resources that the proletariat will +be able to get hold of, and by the necessity to cooerdinate its +actions so as not to drive possible allies into the ranks of the +counter-revolution. + +It is evident that the _agrarian_ question, i.e., the question of rural +economy and its social relations, is not covered by the _land_ question +which is the question of the forms of land ownership. It is perfectly +clear, however, that the solution of the land question, even if it does +not determine the future of the agrarian evolution, would undoubtedly +determine the future agrarian policy of the proletariat. In other words, +the use the proletariat will make of the land must be in accord with its +general attitude towards the course and requirements of the agrarian +evolution. The land question will, therefore, be one of the first to +interest the labor government. + +One of the solutions, made popular by the Socialist-Revolutionists, is +the _socialization of the land_. Freed from its European make-up, it +means simply "equal distribution" of land. This program demands an +expropriation of all the land, whether it is in possession of landlords, +of peasants on the basis of private property, or it is owned by village +communities. It is evident that such expropriation, being one of the +first measures of the new government and being started at a time when +capitalist exchange is still in full swing, would lead the peasants to +believe that they are "victims of the reform." One must not forget that +the peasants have for decades made redemption payments in order to turn +their land into private property; many prosperous peasants have made +great sacrifices to secure a large portion of land as their private +possession. Should all this land become state property, the most bitter +resistance would be offered by the members of the communities and by +private owners. Starting out with a reform of this kind, the government +would make itself most unpopular among the peasants. + +And why should one confiscate the land of the communities and the land +of small private owners? According to the Socialist-Revolutionary +program, the only use to be made of the land by the state is to turn it +over to all the peasants and agricultural laborers on the basis of equal +distribution. This would mean that the confiscated land of the +communities and small owners would anyway return to individuals for +private cultivation. Consequently, there would be _no economic gain_ in +such a confiscation and redistribution. _Politically_, it would be a +great blunder on the part of the labor government as it would make the +masses of peasants hostile to the proletarian leadership of the +revolution. + +Closely connected with this program is the question of hired +agricultural labor. Equal distribution presupposes the prohibition of +using hired labor on farms. This, however, can be only a _consequence_ +of economic reforms, it cannot be decreed by a law. It is not enough to +forbid an agricultural capitalist to hire laborers; one must first +secure agricultural laborers a fair existence; furthermore, this +existence must be profitable from the viewpoint of social economy. To +declare equal distribution of land and to forbid hired labor, would mean +to compel agricultural proletarians to settle on small lots, and to put +the state under obligation to provide them with implements for their +socially unprofitable production. + +It is clear that the intervention of the proletariat in the organization +of agriculture ought to express itself not in settling individual +laborers on individual lots, but in organizing _state or communal +management of large estates_. Later, when socialized production will +have established itself firmly, a further step will be made towards +socialization by forbidding hired labor. This will eliminate small +capitalistic enterprises in agriculture; it will, however, leave +unmolested those private owners who work their land wholly or to a great +extent by the labor of their families. To expropriate such owners can by +no means be a desire of the Socialistic proletariat. + +The proletariat can never indorse a program of "equal distribution" +which on one hand demands a useless, purely formal expropriation of +small owners, and on the other hand it demands a very real parceling of +large estates into small lots. This would be a wasteful undertaking, a +pursuance of a reactionary and Utopian plan, and a political harm for +the revolutionary party. + + * * * * * + +How far, however, can the Socialist policy of the working class advance +in the economic environment of Russia? One thing we can say with perfect +assurance: it will meet political obstacles long before it will be +checked by the technical backwardness of the country. _Without direct +political aid from the European proletariat the working class of Russia +will not be able to retain its power and to turn its temporary supremacy +into a permanent Socialist dictatorship._ We cannot doubt this for a +moment. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a _Socialist +revolution in the West would allow us to turn the temporary supremacy of +the working class directly into a Socialist dictatorship_. + + +CHAPTER IX + +EUROPE AND THE REVOLUTION + +In June, 1905, we wrote: + +"More than half a century passed since 1848. Half a century of +unprecedented victories of capitalism all over the world. Half a century +of "organic" mutual adaptation of the forces of the bourgeois and the +forces of feudal reaction. Half a century in which the bourgeoisie has +manifested its mad appetite for power and its readiness to fight for it +madly! + +"As a self-taught mechanic, in his search for perpetual motion, meets +ever new obstacles and piles mechanism over mechanism to overcome them, +so the bourgeoisie has changed and reconstructed the apparatus of its +supremacy avoiding 'supra-legal' conflicts with hostile powers. And as +the self-taught mechanic finally clashes against the ultimate +insurmountable obstacle,--the law of conservation of energy,--so the +bourgeoisie had to clash against the ultimate implacable barrier,--class +antagonism, fraught with inevitable conflict. + +"Capitalism, forcing its economic system and social relations on each +and every country, has turned the entire world into one economic and +political organism. As the effect of the modern credit system, with the +invisible bonds it draws between thousands of enterprises, with the +amazing mobility it lends to capital, has been to eliminate local and +partial crises, but to give unusual momentum to general economic +convulsions, so the entire economic and political work of capitalism, +with its world commerce, with its system of monstrous foreign debts, +with its political groupings of states, which have drawn all reactionary +forces into one world-wide co-partnership, has prevented local political +crises, but it has prepared a basis for a social crisis of unheard of +magnitude. Driving unhealthy processes inside, evading difficulties, +staving off the deep problems of national and international politics, +glossing over all contradictions, the bourgeoisie has postponed the +climax, yet it has prepared a radical world-wide liquidation of its +power. It has clung to all reactionary forces no matter what their +origin. It has made the Sultan not the last of its friends. It has not +tied itself on the Chinese ruler only because he had no power: it was +more profitable to rob his possessions than to keep him in the office +of a world gendarme and to pay him from the treasury of the bourgeoisie. +Thus the bourgeoisie made the stability of its political system wholly +dependent upon the stability of the pre-capitalistic pillars of +reaction. + +"This gives events an international character and opens a magnificent +perspective; political emancipation, headed by the working class of +Russia, will elevate its leader to a height unparalleled in history, it +will give Russian proletariat colossal power and make it the initiator +of world-wide liquidation of capitalism, to which the objective +prerequisites have been created by history." + +It is futile to guess how the Russian revolution will find its way to +old capitalistic Europe. This way may be a total surprise. To illustrate +our thought rather than to predict events, we shall mention Poland as +the possible connecting link between the revolutionary East and the +revolutionary West. + + [The author pictures the consequences of a revolution in Poland. A + revolution in Poland would necessarily follow the victory of the + revolution in Russia. This, however, would throw revolutionary + sparks into the Polish provinces of Germany and Austria. A + revolution in Posen and Galicia would move the Hohenzollerns and + Hapsburgs to invade Poland. This would be a sign for the proletariat + of Germany to get into a sharp conflict with their governments. A + revolution becomes inevitable.] + +A revolutionary Poland, however, is not the only possible starting point +for a European revolution. The system of armed peace which became +predominant in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war, was based on a +system of European equilibrium. This equilibrium took for granted not +only the integrity of Turkey, the dismemberment of Poland, the +preservation of Austria, that ethnographic harlequin's robe, but also +the existence of Russian despotism in the role of a gendarme of the +European reaction, armed to his teeth. The Russo-Japanese war has given +a mortal blow to this artificial system in which absolutism was the +dominant figure. For an indefinite period Russia is out of the race as a +first-class power. The equilibrium has been destroyed. On the other +hand, the successes of Japan have incensed the conquest instincts of the +capitalistic bourgeoisie, especially the Stock Exchange, which plays a +colossal role in modern politics. _The possibilities of a war on +European territory have grown enormously._ Conflicts are ripening here +and there; so far they have been settled in a diplomatic way, but +nothing can guarantee the near future. _A European war, however, means a +European revolution._ + +Even without the pressure of such events as war or bankruptcy, a +revolution may take place in the near future in one of the European +countries as a result of acute class struggles. We shall not make +computations as to which country would be first to take the path of +revolution; it is obvious, however, that class antagonisms have for the +last years reached a high degree of intensity in all the European +countries. + +The influence of the Russian revolution on the proletariat of Europe is +immense. Not only does it destroy the Petersburg absolutism, that main +power of European reaction; it also imbues the minds and the souls of +the European proletariat with revolutionary daring. + +It is the purpose of every Socialist party to revolutionize the minds of +the working class in the same way as development of capitalism has +revolutionized social relations. The work of propaganda and organization +among the proletariat, however, has its own intrinsic inertia. The +Socialist parties of Europe--in the first place the most powerful of +them, the German Socialist party--have developed a conservatism of their +own, which grows in proportion as Socialism embraces ever larger masses +and organization and discipline increase. Social-Democracy, personifying +the political experience of the proletariat, can, therefore, at a +certain juncture, become an immediate obstacle on the way of an open +proletarian conflict with the bourgeois reaction. In other words, the +propaganda-conservatism of a proletarian party can, at a certain moment, +impede the direct struggle of the proletariat for power. The colossal +influence of the Russian revolution manifests itself in killing party +routine, in destroying Socialist conservatism, in making a clean contest +of proletarian forces against capitalist reaction a question of the day. +The struggle for universal suffrage in Austria, Saxony and Prussia has +become more determined under the direct influence of the October strike +in Russia. An Eastern revolution imbues the Western proletariat with +revolutionary idealism and stimulates its desire to speak "Russian" to +its foes. + +The Russian proletariat in power, even if this were only the result of a +passing combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, +would meet organized opposition on the part of the world's reaction, and +readiness for organized support on the part of the world's proletariat. +Left to its own resources, the Russian working class must necessarily be +crushed the moment it loses the aid of the peasants. Nothing remains for +it but to link the fate of its political supremacy and the fate of the +Russian revolution with the fate of a Socialist revolution in Europe. +All that momentous authority and political power which is given to the +proletariat by a combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois +revolution, it will thrust on the scale of class struggle in the entire +capitalistic world. Equipped with governmental power, having a +counter-revolution behind his back, having the European reaction in +front of him, the Russian workingman will issue to all his brothers the +world over his old battle-cry which will now become the call for the +last attack: _Proletarians of all the world, unite!_ + + +EXPLANATORY NOTES + + The first _Council of Workmen's Deputies_ was formed in Petersburg, + on October 13th, 1905, in the course of the great general October + strike that compelled Nicholas Romanoff to promise a Constitution. + It represented individual factories, labor unions, and included + also delegates from the Socialist parties. It looked upon itself as + the center of the revolution and a nucleus of a revolutionary labor + government. Similar Councils sprung up in many other industrial + centers. It was arrested on December 3d, having existed for fifty + days. Its members were tried and sent to Siberia. + + _Intelligentzia_ is a term applied in Russia to an indefinite, + heterogeneous group of "intellectuals," who are not actively and + directly involved in the industrial machinery of capitalism, and at + the same time are not members of the working class. It is customary + to count among the _Intelligentzia_ students, teachers, writers, + lawyers, physicians, college professors, etc. However, the term + _Intelligentzia_ implies also a certain degree of idealism and + radical aspirations. + + _Witte_ was the first prime-minister under the quasi-constitution + granted on October 17th, 1905. _Stolypin_ was appointed prime + minister after the dissolution of the first Duma in July, 1906. + + Under the _minimum program_ the Social-Democrats understand all + that range of reforms which can be obtained under the existing + capitalist system of "private ownership of the means of + production," such as an eight hour workday, social insurance, + universal suffrage, a republican order. The _maximum program_ + demands the abolition of private property and public management of + industries, i.e., Socialism. + + "_Some prejudices among the masses_" referred to in this essay is + the alleged love of the primitive masses for their Tzar. This was + an argument usually put forth by the liberals against republican + aspirations. + + _Lower-Middle-Class_ is the only term half-way covering the Russian + "Mieshchanstvo" used by Trotzky. "Mieshchanstvo" has a + socio-economic meaning, and a flavor of moral disapproval. Socially + and economically it means those numerous inhabitants of modern + cities who are engaged in independent economic pursuits, as + artisans (masters), shopkeepers, small manufacturers, petty + merchants, etc., who have not capital enough to rank with the + bourgeoisie. Morally "Mieshchanstvo" presupposes a limited horizon, + lack of definite revolutionary or political ideas, and lack of + political courage. + + The _Village community_ is a remnant of old times in Russia. Up to + 1906 the members of the village were not allowed to divide the land + of the community among the individual peasants on the basis of + private property. The land legally belonged to the entire community + which allotted it to its members. Since 1906 the compulsory + character of communal land-ownership was abandoned, yet in very + great areas of Russia it still remained the prevailing system of + land-ownership. + + Besides having a share in the community-land, the individual + peasant could acquire a piece of land out of his private means (the + seller being usually the landlord) and thus become a _small private + owner_. + + + + +THE SOVIET AND THE REVOLUTION + +(Fifty Days) + + About two years after the arrest of the Soviet of 1905, a number of + former leaders of that organization, among them Chrustalyov Nossar, + the first chairman, and Trotzky, the second chairman, met abroad + after having escaped from Siberian exile. They decided to sum up + their Soviet experiences in a book which they called _The History + of the Council of Workingmen's Deputies_. The book appeared in 1908 + in Petersburg, and was immediately suppressed. One of the essays of + this book is here reprinted. + + In his estimation of the role of the Soviet Trotzky undoubtedly + exaggerates. Only by a flight of imagination can one see in the + activities of the Soviet regarding the postal, telegraph and + railroad strikers the beginnings of a Soviet control over + post-office, telegraph and railroads. It is also a serious question + whether the Soviet was really a leading body, or whether it was led + by the current of revolutionary events which it was unable to + control. What makes this essay interesting and significant is + Trotzky's assertion that "the first new wave of the revolution will + lead to the creation of Soviets all over the country." This has + actually happened. His predictions of the formation of an + all-Russian Soviet, and of the program the Soviets would follow, + have also been realized in the course of the present revolution. + + +1 + +The history of the Soviet is a history of fifty days. The Soviet was +constituted on October 13th; its session was interrupted by a military +detachment of the government on December 3rd. Between those two dates +the Soviet lived and struggled. + +What was the substance of this institution? What enabled it in this +short period to take an honorable place in the history of the Russian +proletariat, in the history of the Russian Revolution? + +The Soviet organized the masses, conducted political strikes, led +political demonstrations, tried to arm the workingmen. But other +revolutionary organizations did the same things. The substance of the +Soviet was its effort to become _an organ of public authority_. The +proletariat on one hand, the reactionary press on the other, have called +the Soviet "a labor government"; this only reflects the fact that the +Soviet was in reality _an embryo of a revolutionary government_. In so +far as the Soviet was in actual possession of authoritative power, it +made use of it; in so far as the power was in the hands of the military +and bureaucratic monarchy, the Soviet fought to obtain it. Prior to the +Soviet, there had been revolutionary organizations among the industrial +workingmen, mostly of a Social-Democratic nature. But those were +organizations _among_ the proletariat; their immediate aim was to +_influence the masses_. The Soviet is an organization _of_ the +proletariat; its aim is to fight for _revolutionary power_. + +At the same time, the Soviet was _an organized expression of the will of +the proletariat as a class_. In its fight for power the Soviet applied +such methods as were naturally determined by the character of the +proletariat as a class: its part in production; its numerical strength; +its social homogeneity. In its fight for power the Soviet has combined +the direction of all the social activities of the working class, +including decisions as to conflicts between individual representatives +of capital and labor. This combination was by no means an artificial +tactical attempt: it was a natural consequence of the situation of a +class which, consciously developing and broadening its fight for its +immediate interests, had been compelled by the logic of events to assume +a leading position in the revolutionary struggle for power. + +The main weapon of the Soviet was a political strike of the masses. The +power of the strike lies in disorganizing the power of the government. +The greater the "anarchy" created by a strike, the nearer its victory. +This is true only where "anarchy" is not being created by anarchic +actions. The class that puts into motion, day in and day out, the +industrial apparatus and the governmental apparatus; the class that is +able, by a sudden stoppage of work, to paralyze both industry and +government, must be organized enough not to fall the first victim of the +very "anarchy" it has created. The more effective the disorganization of +government caused by a strike, the more the strike organization is +compelled to assume governmental functions. + +The Council of Workmen's Delegates introduces a free press. It organizes +street patrols to secure the safety of the citizens. It takes over, to a +greater or less extent, the post office, the telegraph, and the +railroads. It makes an effort to introduce the eight hour workday. +Paralyzing the autocratic government by a strike, it brings its own +democratic order into the life of the working city population. + + +2 + +After January 9th the revolution had shown its power over the minds of +the working masses. On June 14th, through the revolt of the Potyomkin +Tavritchesky it had shown that it was able to become a material force. +In the October strike it had shown that it could disorganize the enemy, +paralyze his will and utterly humiliate him. By organizing Councils of +Workmen's Deputies all over the country, _it showed that it was able to +create authoritative power_. Revolutionary authority can be based only +on active revolutionary force. Whatever our view on the further +development of the Russian revolution, it is a fact that so far no +social class besides the proletariat has manifested readiness to uphold +a revolutionary authoritative power. The first act of the revolution was +an encounter in the streets of the _proletariat_ with the monarchy; the +first serious victory of the revolution was achieved through the +_class-weapon of the proletariat_, the political strike; the first +nucleus of a revolutionary government was _a proletarian +representation_. The Soviet is the first democratic power in modern +Russian history. The Soviet is the organized power of the masses +themselves over their component parts. This is a true, unadulterated +democracy, without a two-chamber system, without a professional +bureaucracy, with the right of the voters to recall their deputy any +moment and to substitute another for him. Through its members, through +deputies elected by the workingmen, the Soviet directs all the social +activities of the proletariat as a whole and of its various parts; it +outlines the steps to be taken by the proletariat, it gives them a +slogan and a banner. This art of directing the activities of the masses +on the basis of organized self-government, is here applied for the first +time on Russian soil. Absolutism ruled the masses, but it did not direct +them. It put mechanical barriers against the living creative forces of +the masses, and within those barriers it kept the restless elements of +the nation in an iron bond of oppression. The only mass absolutism ever +directed was the army. But that was not directing, it was merely +commanding. In recent years, even the directing of this atomized and +hypnotized military mass has been slipping out of the hands of +absolutism. Liberalism never had power enough to command the masses, or +initiative enough to direct them. Its attitude towards mass-movements, +even if they helped liberalism directly, was the same as towards +awe-inspiring natural phenomena--earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. The +proletariat appeared on the battlefield of the revolution as a +self-reliant aggregate, totally independent from bourgeois liberalism. + +The Soviet was a _class-organization_, this was the source of its +fighting power. It was crushed in the first period of its existence not +by lack of confidence on the part of the masses in the cities, but by +the limitations of a purely urban revolution, by the relatively passive +attitude of the village, by the backwardness of the peasant element of +the army. The Soviet's position among the city population was as strong +as could be. + +The Soviet was not an official representative of the entire half million +of the working population in the capital; its organization embraced +about two hundred thousand, chiefly industrial workers; and though its +direct and indirect political influence was of a much wider range, there +were thousands and thousands of proletarians (in the building trade, +among domestic servants, day laborers, drivers) who were hardly, if at +all, influenced by the Soviet. There is no doubt, however, that the +Soviet represented the interests of _all_ these proletarian masses. +There were but few adherents of the Black Hundred in the factories, and +their number dwindled hour by hour. The proletarian masses of Petersburg +were solidly behind the Soviet. Among the numerous intellectuals of +Petersburg the Soviet had more friends than enemies. Thousands of +students recognized the political leadership of the Soviet and ardently +supported it in its decisions. Professional Petersburg was entirely on +the side of the Soviet. The support by the Soviet of the postal and +telegraph strike won it the sympathy of the lower governmental +officials. All the oppressed, all the unfortunate, all honest elements +of the city, all those who were striving towards a better life, were +instinctively or consciously on the side of the Soviet. The Soviet was +actually or potentially a representative of an overwhelming majority of +the population. Its enemies in the capital would not have been dangerous +had they not been protected by absolutism, which based its power on the +most backward elements of an army recruited from peasants. The weakness +of the Soviet was not its own weakness, it was the weakness of a purely +urban revolution. + +The fifty day period was the period of the greatest power of the +revolution. _The Soviet was its organ in the fight for public +authority._ The class character of the Soviet was determined by the +class differentiation of the city population and by the political +antagonism between the proletariat and the capitalistic bourgeoisie. +This antagonism manifested itself even in the historically limited field +of a struggle against absolutism. After the October strike, the +capitalistic bourgeoisie consciously blocked the progress of the +revolution, the petty middle class turned out to be a nonentity, +incapable of playing an independent role. The real leader of the urban +revolution was the proletariat. Its class-organization was the organ of +the revolution in its struggle for power. + + +3 + +The struggle for power, for public authority--this is the central aim of +the revolution. The fifty days of the Soviet's life and its bloody +finale have shown that urban Russia is too narrow a basis for such a +struggle, and that even within the limits of the urban revolution, a +local organization cannot be the central leading body. For a national +task the proletariat required an organization on a national scale. The +Petersburg Soviet was a local organization, yet the need of a central +organization was so great that it had to assume leadership on a national +scale. It did what it could, still it remained primarily the +_Petersburg_ Council of Workmen's Deputies. The urgency of an +all-Russian labor congress which undoubtedly would have had authority to +form a central leading organ, was emphasized even at the time of the +first Soviet. The December collapse made its realization impossible. The +idea remained, an inheritance of the Fifty Days. + +The idea of a Soviet has become ingrained in the consciousness of the +workingmen as the first prerequisite to revolutionary action of the +masses. Experience has shown that a Soviet is not possible or desirable +under all circumstances. The objective meaning of the Soviet +organization is to create conditions for disorganizing the government, +for "anarchy," in other words for a revolutionary conflict. The present +lull in the revolutionary movement, the mad triumph of reaction, make +the existence of an open, elective, authoritative organization of the +masses impossible. There is no doubt, however, that _the first new wave +of the revolution will lead to the creation of Soviets all over the +country_. An All-Russian Soviet, organized by an All-Russian Labor +Congress, will assume leadership of the local elective organizations of +the proletariat. Names, of course, are of no importance; so are details +of organization; the main thing is: a centralized democratic leadership +in the struggle of the proletariat for a popular government. History +does not repeat itself, and the new Soviet will not have again to go +through the experience of the Fifty Days. These, however, will furnish +it a complete program of action. + +This program is perfectly clear. + +To establish revolutionary cooeperation with the army, the peasantry, and +the plebeian lower strata of the urban bourgeoisie. To abolish +absolutism. To destroy the material organization of absolutism by +reconstructing and partly dismissing the army. To break up the entire +bureaucratic apparatus. To introduce an eight hour workday. To arm the +population, starting with the proletariat. To turn the Soviets into +organs of revolutionary self-government in the cities. To create +Councils of Peasants' Delegates (Peasants' Committees) as local organs +of the agrarian revolution. To organize elections to the Constituent +Assembly and to conduct a preelection campaign for a definite program on +the part of the representatives of the people. + +It is easier to formulate such a program than to carry it through. If, +however, the revolution will ever win, the proletariat cannot choose +another. The proletariat will unfold revolutionary accomplishment such +as the world has never seen. The history of Fifty Days will be only a +poor page in the great book of the proletariat's struggle and ultimate +triumph. + + + + +PREFACE TO _MY ROUND TRIP_ + + Trotzky was never personal. The emotional side of life seldom + appears in his writings. His is the realm of social activities, + social and political struggles. His writings breathe logic, not + sentiment, facts, not poetry. The following preface to his _Round + Trip_ is, perhaps, the only exception. It speaks of the man Trotzky + and his beliefs. Note his confession of faith: "History is a + tremendous mechanism serving our ideals." ... + + +At the Stockholm Convention of the Social-Democratic Party, some curious +statistical data was circulated, showing the conditions under which the +party of the proletariat was working: + +The Convention as a whole, in the person of its 140 members, had spent +in prison one hundred and thirty-eight years and three and a half +months. + +The Convention had been in exile one hundred and forty-eight years and +six and a half months. + +Escaped from prison: Once, eighteen members of the Convention; twice, +four members. + +Escaped from exile: Once, twenty-three; twice, five; three times, one +member. + +The length of time the Convention as a whole had been active in +Social-Democratic work, was 942 years. It follows that the time spent in +prison and exile is about one-third of the time a Social-Democrat is +active. But these figures are too optimistic. "The Convention has been +active in Social-Democratic work for 942 years"--this means merely that +the activities of those persons had been spread over so many years. +Their actual period of work must have been much shorter. Possibly all +these persons had worked, actually and directly, only one-sixth or +one-tenth of the above time. Such are conditions of underground +activity. On the other hand, the time spent in prison and exile is real +time: the Convention had spent over fifty thousand days and nights +behind iron bars, and more than that in barbarous corners of the +country. + +Perhaps I may give, in addition to these figures, some facts about +myself. The author of these lines was arrested for the first time in +January, 1898, after working for ten months in the workmen's circles of +Nikolayev. He spent two and a half years in prison, and escaped from +Siberia after living there two years of his four years' exile. He was +arrested the second time on December 3rd, 1905, as a member of the +Petersburg Council of Workmen's Deputies. The Council had existed for +fifty days. The arrested members of the Soviet each spent 400 days in +prison, then they were sent to Obdorsk "forever." ... Each Russian +Social-Democrat who has worked in his Party for ten years could give +similar statistics about himself. + +The political helter-skelter which exists in Russia since October 17th +and which the Gotha Almanach has characterized with unconscious humor as +"_A Constitutional Monarchy under an absolute Tzar_," has changed +nothing in our situation. This political order cannot reconcile itself +with us, not even temporarily, as it is organically incapable of +admitting any free activity of the masses. The simpletons and hypocrites +who urge us to "keep within legal limits" remind one of Marie Antoinette +who recommended the starving peasants to eat cake! One would think we +suffer from an organic aversion for cake, a kind of incurable disease! +One would think our lungs infected with an irresistible desire to +breathe the atmosphere of the solitary dungeons in the Fortress of Peter +and Paul! One would think we have no other use for those endless hours +pulled out of our lives by the jailers. + +We love our underground just as little as a drowning person loves the +bottom of the sea. Yet, we have as little choice, as, let us say +directly, the absolutist order. Being fully aware of this we can afford +to be optimists even at a time when the underground tightens its grip +around our necks with unrelenting grimness. It will not choke us, we +know it! We shall survive! When the bones of all the great deeds which +are being performed now by the princes of the earth, their servants and +the servants of their servants will have turned to dust, when nobody +will know the graves of many present parties with all their +exploits--the Cause we are serving will rule the world, and our Party, +now choking underground, will dissolve itself into humanity, for the +first time its own master. + +History is a tremendous mechanism serving our ideals. Its work is slow, +barbarously slow, implacably cruel, yet the work goes on. We believe in +it. Only at moments, when this voracious monster drinks the living blood +of our hearts to serve it as food, we wish to shout with all our might: + +_What thou dost, do quickly!_ + +Paris, April 8/21, 1907. + + + + +THE LESSONS OF THE GREAT YEAR + + This essay was published in a New York Russian newspaper on January + 20th, 1917, less than two months before the Second Russian + Revolution. Trotzky then lived in New York. The essay shows how his + contempt, even hatred, for the liberal parties in Russia had grown + since 1905-6. + + +(January 9th, 1905--January 9th, 1917) + +Revolutionary anniversaries are not only days for reminiscence, they are +days for summing up revolutionary experiences, especially for us +Russians. Our history has not been rich. Our so-called "national +originality" consisted in being poor, ignorant, uncouth. It was the +revolution of 1905 that first opened before us the great highway of +political progress. On January 9th the workingman of Petersburg knocked +at the gate of the Winter Palace. On January 9th the entire Russian +people knocked at the gate of history. + +The crowned janitor did not respond to the knock. Nine months later, +however, on October 17th, he was compelled to open the heavy gate of +absolutism. Notwithstanding all the efforts of bureaucracy, a little +slit stayed open--forever. + +The revolution was defeated. The same old forces and almost the same +figures now rule Russia that ruled her twelve years ago. Yet the +revolution has changed Russia beyond recognition. The kingdom of +stagnation, servitude, vodka and humbleness has become a kingdom of +fermentation, criticism, fight. Where once there was a shapeless +dough--the impersonal, formless people, "Holy Russia,"--now social +classes consciously oppose each other, political parties have sprung +into existence, each with its program and methods of struggle. + +January 9th opens _a new Russian history_. It is a line marked by the +blood of the people. There is no way back from this line to Asiatic +Russia, to the cursed practices of former generations. There is no way +back. There will never be. + +Not the liberal bourgeoisie, not the democratic groups of the lower +bourgeoisie, not the radical intellectuals, not the millions of Russian +peasants, but the _Russian proletariat_ has by its struggle started the +new era in Russian history. This is basic. On the foundation of this +fact we, Social-Democrats, have built our conceptions and our tactics. + +On January 9th it was the priest Gapon who happened to be at the head of +the Petersburg workers,--a fantastic figure, a combination of +adventurer, hysterical enthusiast and impostor. His priest's robe was +the last link that then connected the workingmen with the past, with +"Holy Russia." Nine months later, in the course of the October strike, +the greatest political strike history has ever seen, there was at the +head of the Petersburg workingmen their own elective self-governing +organization--the Council of Workmen's Deputies. It contained many a +workingman who had been on Gapon's staff,--nine months of revolution had +made those men grow, as they made grow the entire working class which +the Soviet represented. + +In the first period of the revolution, the activities of the proletariat +were met with sympathy, even with support from liberal society. The +Milukovs hoped the proletariat would punch absolutism and make it more +inclined to compromise with the bourgeoisie. Yet absolutism, for +centuries the only ruler of the people, was in no haste to share its +power with the liberal parties. In October, 1905, the bourgeoisie +learned that it could not obtain power before the back-bone of Tzarism +was broken. This blessed thing could, evidently, be accomplished only by +a victorious revolution. But the revolution put the working class in the +foreground, it united it and solidified it not only in its struggle +against Tzarism, but also in its struggle against capital. The result +was that each new revolutionary step of the proletariat in October, +November and December, the time of the Soviet, moved the liberals more +and more in the direction of the monarchy. The hopes for revolutionary +cooeperation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat turned out a +hopeless Utopia. Those who had not seen it then and had not understood +it later, those who still dream of a "national" uprising against +Tzarism, do not understand the revolution. For them class struggle is a +sealed book. + +At the end of 1905 the question became acute. The monarchy had learned +by experience that the bourgeoisie would not support the proletariat in +a decisive battle. The monarchy then decided to move against the +proletariat with all its forces. The bloody days of December followed. +The Council of Workmen's Deputies was arrested by the Ismailovski +regiment which remained loyal to Tzarism. The answer of the proletariat +was momentous: the strike in Petersburg, the insurrection in Moscow, the +storm of revolutionary movements in all industrial centers, the +insurrection on the Caucasus and in the Lettish provinces. + +The revolutionary movement was crushed. Many a poor "Socialist" readily +concluded from our December defeats that a revolution in Russia was +impossible without the support of the bourgeoisie. If this be true, it +would only mean that a revolution in Russia is impossible. + +Our _upper industrial bourgeoisie_, the only class possessing actual +power, is separated from the proletariat by an insurmountable barrier of +class hatred, and it needs the monarchy as a pillar of order. The +Gutchkovs, Krestovnikovs and Ryabushinskys cannot fail to see in the +proletariat their mortal foe. + +Our _middle and lower industrial and commercial bourgeoisie_ occupies a +very insignificant place in the economic life of the country, and is all +entangled in the net of capital. The Milukovs, the leaders of the lower +middle class, are successful only in so far as they represent the +interests of the upper bourgeoisie. This is why the Cadet leader called +the revolutionary banner a "red rag"; this is why he declared, after the +beginning of the war, that if a revolution were necessary to secure +victory over Germany, he would prefer no victory at all. + +Our _peasantry_ occupies a tremendous place in Russian life. In 1905 it +was shaken to its deepest foundations. The peasants were driving out +their masters, setting estates on fire, seizing the land from the +landlords. Yes, the curse of the peasantry is that it is scattered, +disjointed, backward. Moreover, the interests of the various peasant +groups do not coincide. The peasants arose and fought adroitly against +their local slave-holders, yet they stopped in reverence before the +all-Russian slave-holder. The sons of the peasants in the army did not +understand that the workingmen were shedding their blood not only for +their own sake, but also for the sake of the peasants. The army was an +obedient tool in the hands of Tzarism. It crushed the labor revolution +in December, 1905. + +Whoever thinks about the experiences of 1905, whoever draws a line from +that year to the present time, must see how utterly lifeless and pitiful +are the hopes of our Social-Patriots for revolutionary cooeperation +between the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie. + +During the last twelve years big capital has made great conquests in +Russia. The middle and lower bourgeoisie has become still more dependent +upon the banks and trusts. The working class, which had grown in numbers +since 1905, is now separated from the bourgeoisie by a deeper abyss than +before. If a "national" revolution was a failure twelve years ago, +there is still less hope for it at present. + +It is true in the last years that the cultural and political level of +the peasantry has become higher. However, there is less hope now for a +revolutionary uprising of the peasantry as a whole than there was twelve +years ago. The only ally of the urban proletariat may be the proletarian +and half-proletarian strata of the village. + +But, a skeptic may ask, is there then any hope for a victorious +revolution in Russia under these circumstances? + +One thing is clear--if a revolution comes, it will not be a result of +cooeperation between capital and labor. The experiences of 1905 show that +this is a miserable Utopia. To acquaint himself with those experiences, +to study them is the duty of every thinking workingman who is anxious to +avoid tragic mistakes. It is in this sense that we have said that +revolutionary anniversaries are not only days for reminiscences, but +also days for summing up revolutionary experiences. + + + _Gutchkov_, _Ryabushinsky_ and _Krestovnikov_ are representatives + of big capital in Russia. Gutchkov is the leader of the moderately + liberal party of Octobrists. He was War Minister in the first + Cabinet after the overthrow of the Romanoffs. + + + + +ON THE EVE OF A REVOLUTION + + This essay was written on March 13th, 1917, when the first news of + unrest in Petrograd had reached New York. + + +The streets of Petrograd again speak the language of 1905. As in the +time of the Russo-Japanese war, the masses demand bread, peace, and +freedom. As in 1905, street cars are not running and newspapers do not +appear. The workingmen let the steam out of the boilers, they quit their +benches and walk out into the streets. The government mobilizes its +Cossacks. And as was in 1905, only those two powers are facing each +other in the streets--the revolutionary workingmen and the army of the +Tzar. + +The movement was provoked by lack of bread. This, of course, is not an +accidental cause. In all the belligerent countries the lack of bread is +the most immediate, the most acute reason for dissatisfaction and +indignation among the masses. All the insanity of the war is revealed to +them from this angle: it is impossible to produce necessities of life +because one has to produce instruments of death. + +However, the attempts of the Anglo-Russian semi-official news agencies +to explain the movement by a temporary shortage in food, or to snow +storms that have delayed transportation, are one of the most ludicrous +applications of the policy of the ostrich. The workingmen would not stop +the factories, the street cars, the print shops and walk into the +streets to meet Tzarism face to face on account of snow storms which +temporarily hamper the arrival of foodstuffs. + +People have a short memory. Many of our own ranks have forgotten that +the war found Russia in a state of potent revolutionary ferment. After +the heavy stupor of 1908-1911, the proletariat gradually healed its +wounds in the following years of industrial prosperity; the slaughter of +strikers on the Lena River in April, 1912, awakened the revolutionary +energy of the proletarian masses. A series of strikes followed. In the +year preceding the world war, the wave of economic and political strikes +resembled that of 1905. When Poincare, the President of the French +Republic, came to Petersburg in the summer of 1904 (evidently to talk +over with the Tzar how to free the small and weak nations) the Russian +proletariat was in a stage of extraordinary revolutionary tension, and +the President of the French Republic could see with his own eyes in the +capital of his friend, the Tzar, how the first barricades of the Second +Russian Revolution were being constructed. + +The war checked the rising revolutionary tide. We have witnessed a +repetition of what happened ten years before, in the Russo-Japanese war. +After the stormy strikes of 1903, there had followed a year of almost +unbroken political silence--1904--the first year of the war. It took the +workingmen of Petersburg twelve months to orientate themselves in the +war and to walk out into the streets with their demands and protests. +January 9th, 1905, was, so to speak, the official beginning of our First +Revolution. + +The present war is vaster than was the Russo-Japanese war. Millions of +soldiers have been mobilized by the government for the "defense of the +Fatherland." The ranks of the proletariat have thus been disorganized. +On the other hand, the more advanced elements of the proletariat had to +face and weigh in their minds a number of questions of unheard of +magnitude. What is the cause of the war? Shall the proletariat agree +with the conception of "the defense of the Fatherland"? What ought to +be the tactics of the working-class in war time? + +In the meantime, the Tzarism and its allies, the upper groups of the +nobility and the bourgeoisie, had during the war completely exposed +their true nature,--the nature of criminal plunderers, blinded by +limitless greed and paralyzed by want of talent. The appetites for +conquest of the governing clique grew in proportion as the people began +to realize its complete inability to cope with the most elementary +problems of warfare, of industry and supplies in war time. +Simultaneously, the misery of the people grew, deepened, became more and +more acute,--a natural result of the war multiplied by the criminal +anarchy of the Rasputin Tzarism. + +In the depths of the great masses, among people who may have never been +reached by a word of propaganda, a profound bitterness accumulated under +the stress of events. Meantime the foremost ranks of the proletariat +were finishing digesting the new events. The Socialist proletariat of +Russia came to after the shock of the nationalist fall of the most +influential part of the International, and decided that new times call +us not to let up, but to increase our revolutionary struggle. + +The present events in Petrograd and Moscow are a result of this internal +preparatory work. + +A disorganized, compromised, disjointed government on top. An utterly +demoralized army. Dissatisfaction, uncertainty and fear among the +propertied classes. At the bottom, among the masses, a deep bitterness. +A proletariat numerically stronger than ever, hardened in the fire of +events. All this warrants the statement that we are witnessing the +beginning of the Second Russian Revolution. Let us hope that many of us +will be its participants. + + + + +TWO FACES + + +(Internal Forces of the Russian Revolution) + +Let us examine more closely what is going on. + +Nicholas has been dethroned, and according to some information, is under +arrest. The most conspicuous Black Hundred leaders have been arrested. +Some of the most hated have been killed. A new Ministry has been formed +consisting of Octobrists, Liberals and the Radical Kerensky. A general +amnesty has been proclaimed. + +All these are facts, big facts. These are the facts that strike the +outer world most. Changes in the higher government give the bourgeoisie +of Europe and America an occasion to say that the revolution has won and +is now completed. + +The Tzar and his Black Hundred fought for their power, for this alone. +The war, the imperialistic plans of the Russian bourgeoisie, the +interests of the Allies, were of minor importance to the Tzar and his +clique. They were ready at any moment to conclude peace with the +Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs, to free their most loyal regiment for war +against their own people. + +The Progressive Bloc of the Duma mistrusted the Tzar and his Ministers. +This Bloc consisted of various parties of the Russian bourgeoisie. The +Bloc had two aims: one, to conduct the war to a victorious end; another, +to secure internal reforms: more order, control, accounting. A victory +is necessary for the Russian bourgeoisie to conquer markets, to increase +their territories, to get rich. Reforms are necessary primarily to +enable the Russian bourgeoisie to win the war. + +The progressive imperialistic Bloc wanted _peaceful_ reforms. The +liberals intended to exert a Duma pressure on the monarchy and to keep +it in check with the aid of the governments of Great Britain and France. +They did not want a revolution. They knew that a revolution, bringing +the working masses to the front, would be a menace to their domination, +and primarily a menace to their imperialistic plans. The laboring +masses, in the cities and in the villages, and even in the army itself, +want peace. The liberals know it. This is why they have been enemies of +the revolution all these years. A few months ago Milukov declared in +the Duma: "If a revolution were necessary for victory, I would prefer no +victory at all." + +Yet the liberals are now in power--through the Revolution. The bourgeois +newspaper men see nothing but this fact. Milukov, already in his +capacity as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, has declared that the +revolution has been conducted in the name of a victory over the enemy, +and that the new government has taken upon itself to continue the war to +a victorious end. The New York Stock Exchange interpreted the Revolution +in this specific sense. There are clever people both on the Stock +Exchange and among the bourgeois newspaper men. Yet they are all +amazingly stupid when they come to deal with mass-movements. They think +that Milukov manages the revolution, in the same sense as they manage +their banks or news offices. They see only the liberal governmental +reflection of the unfolding events, they notice only the foam on the +surface of the historical torrent. + +The long pent-up dissatisfaction of the masses has burst forth so late, +in the thirty-second month of the war, not because the masses were held +by police barriers--those barriers had been badly shattered during the +war--but because all liberal institutions and organs, together with +their Social-Patriotic shadows, were exerting an enormous influence over +the least enlightened elements of the workingmen, urging them to keep +order and discipline in the name of "patriotism." Hungry women were +already walking out into the streets, and the workingmen were getting +ready to uphold them by a general strike, while the liberal bourgeoisie, +according to news reports, still issued proclamations and delivered +speeches to check the movement,--resembling that famous heroine of +Dickens who tried to stem the tide of the ocean with a broom. + +The movement, however, took its course, from below, from the +workingmen's quarters. After hours and days of uncertainty, of shooting, +of skirmishes, the army joined in the revolution, from below, from the +best of the soldier masses. The old government was powerless, paralyzed, +annihilated. The Tzar fled from the capital "to the front." The Black +Hundred bureaucrats crept, like cockroaches, each into his corner. + +Then, and only then, came the Duma's turn to act. The Tzar had attempted +in the last minute to dissolve it. And the Duma would have obeyed, +"following the example of former years," had it been free to adjourn. +The capitals, however, were already dominated by the revolutionary +people, the same people that had walked out into the streets despite the +wishes of the liberal bourgeoisie. The army was with the people. Had not +the bourgeoisie attempted to organize its own government, a +revolutionary government would have emerged from the revolutionary +working masses. The Duma of June 3rd would never have dared to seize the +power from the hands of Tzarism. But it did not want to miss the chance +offered by interregnum: the monarchy had disappeared, while a +revolutionary government was not yet formed. Contrary to all their part, +contrary to their own policies and against their will, the liberals +found themselves in possession of power. + +Milukov now declares Russia will continue the war "to the end." It is +not easy for him so to speak: he knows that his words are apt to arouse +the indignation of the masses against the new government. Yet he had to +speak to them--for the sake of the London, Paris and American Stock +Exchanges. It is quite possible that he cabled his declaration for +foreign consumption only, and that he concealed it from his own +country. + +Milukov knows very well that _under given conditions he cannot continue +the war, crush Germany, dismember Austria, occupy Constantinople and +Poland_. + +The masses have revolted, demanding bread and peace. The appearance of a +few liberals at the head of the government has not fed the hungry, has +not healed the wounds of the people. To satisfy the most urgent, the +most acute needs of the people, _peace_ must be restored. The liberal +imperialistic Bloc does not dare to speak of peace. They do not do it, +first, on account of the Allies. They do not do it, further, because the +liberal bourgeoisie is to a great extent responsible before the people +for the present war. The Milukovs and Gutchkovs, not less than the +Romanoff camarilla, have thrown the country into this monstrous +imperialistic adventure. To stop the war, to return to the ante-bellum +misery would mean that they have to account to the people for this +undertaking. The Milukovs and Gutchkovs are afraid of the liquidation of +the war not less than they were afraid of the Revolution. + +This is their aspect in their new capacity, as the government of +Russia. They are compelled to continue the war, and they can have no +hope of victory; they are afraid of the people, and people do not trust +them. + +This is how Karl Marx characterized a similar situation: + +"From the very beginning ready to betray the people and to compromise +with the crowned representatives of the old regime, because the +bourgeoisie itself belongs to the old world; ... keeping a place at the +steering wheel of the revolution not because the people were back of +them, but because the people pushed them forward; ... having no faith in +themselves, no faith in the people; grumbling against those above, +trembling before those below; selfish towards both fronts and aware of +their selfishness; revolutionary in the face of conservatives, and +conservative in the face of revolutionists, with no confidence in their +own slogans and with phrases instead of ideas; frightened by the world's +storm and exploiting the world's storm,--vulgar through lack of +originality, and original only in vulgarity; making profitable business +out of their own desires, with no initiative, with no vocation for +world-wide historic work ... a cursed senile creature condemned to +direct and abuse in his own senile interests the first youthful +movements of a powerful people,--a creature with no eyes, with no ears, +with no teeth, with nothing whatever,--this is how the Prussian +bourgeoisie stood at the steering wheel of the Prussian state after the +March revolution." + +These words of the great master give a perfect picture of the Russian +liberal bourgeoisie, as it stands at the steering wheel of the +government after _our_ March revolution. "With no faith in themselves, +with no faith in the people, with no eyes, with no teeth." ... This is +their political face. + +Luckily for Russia and Europe, there is another face to the Russian +Revolution, a genuine face: the cables have brought the news that the +Provisional Government is opposed by a Workmen's Committee which has +already raised a voice of protest against the liberal attempt to rob the +Revolution and to deliver the people to the monarchy. + +Should the Russian Revolution stop to-day as the representatives of +liberalism advocate, to-morrow the reaction of the Tzar, the nobility +and the bureaucracy would gather power and drive Milukov and Gutchkov +from their insecure ministerial trenches, as did the Prussian reaction +years ago with the representatives of Prussian liberalism. But the +Russian Revolution will not stop. Time will come, and the Revolution +will make a clean sweep of the bourgeois liberals blocking its way, as +it is now making a clean sweep of the Tzarism reaction. + +(Published in New York on March 17, 1917.) + + + _June Third_, 1907, was the day on which, after the dissolution of + the First and Second Dumas, the Tzar's government, in defiance of + the Constitution, promulgated a new electoral law which eliminated + from the Russian quasi-Parliament large groups of democratic + voters, thus securing a "tame" majority obedient to the command of + the government. To say "The Duma of June Third" is equivalent to + saying: "a Duma dominated by representatives of rich land-owners + and big business," generally working hand in hand with autocracy, + though pretending to be representatives of the people. In the Duma + of June Third, the Octobrists and all parties to the right of them + were with the government, the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) and + all parties to the left of them were in the opposition. + + The _Progressive Bloc_ was formed in the Duma in 1915. It included + a number of liberal and conservative factions, together with the + Cadets, and was opposed to the government. Its program was a + Cabinet responsible to the Duma. + + + + +THE GROWING CONFLICT + + +An open conflict between the forces of the Revolution, headed by the +city proletariat and the anti-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie +temporarily at the head of the government, is more and more impending. +It cannot be avoided. Of course, the liberal bourgeoisie and the +quasi-Socialists of the vulgar type will find a collection of very +touching slogans as to "national unity" against class divisions; yet no +one has ever succeeded in removing social contrasts by conjuring with +words or in checking the natural progress of revolutionary struggle. + +The internal history of unfolding events is known to us only in +fragments, through casual remarks in the official telegrams. But even +now it is apparent that on two points the revolutionary proletariat is +bound to oppose the liberal bourgeoisie with ever-growing determination. + +The first conflict has already arisen around the question of the form of +government. The Russian bourgeoisie needs a monarchy. In all the +countries pursuing an imperialistic policy, we observe an unusual +increase of personal power. The policy of world usurpations, secret +treaties and open treachery requires independence from Parliamentary +control and a guarantee against changes in policies caused by the change +of Cabinets. Moreover, for the propertied classes the monarchy is the +most secure ally in its struggle against the revolutionary onslaught of +the proletariat. + +In Russia both these causes are more effective than elsewhere. The +Russian bourgeoisie finds it impossible to deny the people universal +suffrage, well aware that this would arouse opposition against the +Provisional Government among the masses, and give prevalence to the +left, the more determined wing of the proletariat in the Revolution. +Even that monarch of the reserve, Michael Alexandrovitch, understands +that he cannot reach the throne without having promised "universal, +equal, direct and secret suffrage." It is the more essential for the +bourgeoisie to create right now a monarchic counterbalance against the +deepest social-revolutionary demands of the working masses. _Formally_, +in words, the bourgeoisie has agreed to leave the question of a form of +government to the discretion of the Constituent Assembly. Practically, +however, the Octobrist-Cadet Provisional Government will turn all the +preparatory work for the Constituent Assembly into a campaign in favor +of a monarchy against a Republic. The character of the Constituent +Assembly will largely depend upon the character of those who convoke it. +It is evident, therefore, that right now the revolutionary proletariat +will have _to set up its own organs, the Councils of Workingmen's +Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, against the executive organs of the +Provisional Government_. In this struggle the proletariat ought to unite +about itself the rising masses of the people, with one aim in view--_to +seize governmental power_. Only a Revolutionary Labor Government will +have the desire and ability to give the country a thorough democratic +cleansing during the work preparatory to the Constituent Assembly, to +reconstruct the army from top to bottom, to turn it into _a +revolutionary militia_ and to show the poorer peasants in practice that +their only salvation is in a support of a revolutionary labor regime. A +Constituent Assembly convoked after such preparatory work will truly +reflect the revolutionary, creative forces of the country and become a +powerful factor in the further development of the Revolution. + +The second question that is bound to bring the internationally inclined +Socialist proletariat in opposition to the imperialistic liberal +bourgeoisie, is _the question of war and peace_. + +(Published in New York, March 19, 1917.) + + + + +WAR OR PEACE? + + +The question of chief interest, now, to the governments and the peoples +of the world is, What will be the influence of the Russian Revolution on +the War? Will it bring peace nearer? Or will the revolutionary +enthusiasm of the people swing towards a more vigorous prosecution of +the war? + +This is a great question. On its solution depends not only the outcome +of the war, but the fate of the Revolution itself. + +In 1905, Milukov, the present militant Minister of Foreign Affairs, +called the Russo-Japanese war an adventure and demanded its immediate +cessation. This was also the spirit of the liberal and radical press. +The strongest industrial organizations favored immediate peace in spite +of unequaled disasters. Why was it so? Because they expected internal +reforms. The establishment of a Constitutional system, a parliamentary +control over the budget and the state finances, a better school system +and, especially, an increase in the land possessions of the peasants, +would, they hoped, increase the prosperity of the population and create +a _vast internal market_ for Russian industry. It is true that even +then, twelve years ago, the Russian bourgeoisie was ready to usurp land +belonging to others. It hoped, however, that abolition of feudal +relations in the village would create a more powerful market than the +annexation of Manchuria or Corea. + +The democratization of the country and liberation of the peasants, +however, turned out to be a slow process. Neither the Tzar, nor the +nobility, nor the bureaucracy were willing to yield any of their +prerogatives. Liberal exhortations were not enough to make them give up +the machinery of the state and their land possessions. A revolutionary +onslaught of the masses was required. This the bourgeoisie did not want. +The agrarian revolts of the peasants, the ever growing struggle of the +proletariat and the spread of insurrections in the army caused the +liberal bourgeoisie to fall back into the camp of the Tzarist +bureaucracy and reactionary nobility. Their alliance was sealed by the +_coup d'etat_ of June 3rd, 1907. Out of this _coup d'etat_ emerged the +Third and the Fourth Dumas. + +The peasants received no land. The administrative system changed only in +name, not in substance. The development of an internal market consisting +of prosperous farmers, after the American fashion, did not take place. +The capitalist classes, reconciled with the regime of June 3rd, turned +their attention to the usurpation of foreign markets. A new era of +Russian imperialism ensues, an imperialism accompanied by a disorderly +financial and military system and by insatiable appetites. Gutchkov, the +present War Minister, was formerly a member of the Committee on National +Defense, helping to make the army and the navy complete. Milukov, the +present Minister of Foreign Affairs, worked out a program of world +conquests which he advocated on his trips to Europe. Russian imperialism +and his Octobrist and Cadet representatives bear a great part of the +responsibility for the present war. + +By the grace of the Revolution which they had not wanted and which they +had fought, Gutchkov and Milukov are now in power. For the continuation +of the war, for victory? Of course! They are the same persons who had +dragged the country into the war for the sake of the interests of +capital. All their opposition to Tzarism had its source in their +unsatisfied imperialistic appetites. So long as the clique of Nicholas +II. was in power, the interests of the dynasty and of the reactionary +nobility were prevailing in Russian foreign affairs. This is why Berlin +and Vienna had hoped to conclude a separate peace with Russia. Now, +purely imperialistic interests have superseded the Tzarism interests; +pure imperialism is written on the banner of the Provisional Government. +"The government of the Tzar is gone," the Milukovs and Gutchkovs say to +the people, "now you must shed your blood for the common interests of +the entire nation." Those interests the imperialists understand as the +reincorporation of Poland, the conquest of Galicia, Constantinople, +Armenia, Persia. + +This transition from an imperialism of the dynasty and the nobility to +an imperialism of a purely bourgeois character, can never reconcile the +Russian proletariat to the war. An international struggle against the +world slaughter and imperialism are now our task more than ever. The +last despatches which tell of an anti-militaristic propaganda in the +streets of Petrograd show that our comrades are bravely doing their +duty. + +_The imperialistic boasts of Milukov to crush Germany, Austria and +Turkey are the most effective and most timely aid for the Hohenzollerns +and Hapsburgs...._ Milukov will now serve as a scare-crow in their +hands. The liberal imperialistic government of Russia has not yet +started reform in its own army, yet it is already helping the +Hohenzollerns to raise the patriotic spirit and to mend the shattered +"national unity" of the German people. Should the German proletariat be +given a right to think that all the Russian people and the main force of +the Russian Revolution, the proletariat, are behind the bourgeois +government of Russia, it would be a terrific blow to the men of our +trend of mind, the revolutionary Socialists of Germany. To turn the +Russian proletariat into patriotic cannon food in the service of the +Russian liberal bourgeoisie would mean _to throw the German working +masses into the camp of the chauvinists and for a long time to halt the +progress of a revolution in Germany_. + +The prime duty of the revolutionary proletariat in Russia is to show +that there is _no power_ behind the evil imperialistic will of the +liberal bourgeoisie. The Russian Revolution has to show the entire world +its real face. + +_The further progress of the revolutionary struggle in Russia and the +creation of a Revolutionary Labor Government supported by the people +will be a mortal blow to the Hohenzollerns because it will give a +powerful stimulus to the revolutionary movement of the German +proletariat and of the labor masses of all the other countries._ If the +first Russian Revolution of 1905 brought about revolutions in Asia--in +Persia, Turkey, China--the Second Russian Revolution will be the +beginning of a powerful social-revolutionary struggle in Europe. Only +this struggle will bring real peace to the blood-drenched world. + +No, the Russian proletariat will not allow itself to be harnessed to the +chariot of Milukov imperialism. The banner of Russian Social-Democracy +is now, more than ever before, glowing with bright slogans of inflexible +Internationalism: + +Away with imperialistic robbers! + +Long live a Revolutionary Labor Government! + +Long live Peace and the Brotherhood of Nations! + +(Published in New York, March 20, 1917.) + + + + +TROTZKY ON THE PLATFORM IN PETROGRAD + + +(From a Russian paper) + +Trotzky, always Trotzky. + +Since I had seen him the last time, he has been advanced in rank: he has +become the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He has succeeded +Tchcheidze, the wise, sober leader who has lost the confidence of the +revolutionary masses. He holds the place of Lenin, the recognized leader +of the left wing of Social-Democracy, whose absence from the capital is +due to external, accidental causes. + +It seems to me that Trotzky has become more nervous, more gloomy, and +more restrained. Something like a freezing chill emanates from his deep +and restless eyes; a cool, determined, ironical smile plays around his +mobile Jewish lips, and there is a chill in his well-balanced, clear-cut +words which he throws into his audience with a peculiar calmness. + +He seems almost lonesome on the platform. Only a small group of +followers applaud. The others protest against his words or cast angry, +restless glances at him. He is in a hostile gathering. He is a stranger. +Is he not also a stranger to those who applaud him and in whose name he +speaks from this platform? + +Calm and composed he looks at his adversaries, and you feel it is a +peculiar joy for him to see the rage, the fear, the excitement his words +provoke. He is a Mephisto who throws words like bombs to create a war of +brothers at the bedside of their sick mother. + +He knows in advance which words will have the greatest effect, which +would provoke the most bitter resentment. And the more extreme, the more +painful his words are, the firmer and stronger is his voice, the slower +his speech, the more challenging his tone. He speaks a sentence, then he +stops to wait till the storm is over, then he repeats his assertion, +with sharper intonation and with more disdain in his tone. Only his eyes +become more nervous, and a peculiar disquieting fire is blazing in them. + +This time he does not speak; he reads a written declaration. He reads it +with pauses, sometimes accentuating the words, sometimes passing over +them quickly, but all the time he is aware of the effect and waits for a +response. + +His voice is the voice of a prophet, a preacher: + +"Petrograd is in danger! The Revolution is in danger! The people are in +danger!" ... + +He is a stranger on the platform, and yet--electric currents flow from +him to his surroundings, creating sincere though primitive enthusiasm on +one side, on the other anger and spite. He opens vast perspectives +before the naive faithful masses: + +"Long live an immediate, honest, democratic peace!" + +"All power to the Workmen's Councils! All the land to the people!" + + + + + INDEX + + + Absolutism, role of, in outgrowing economic basis, 69; + in promoting industry and science, 69, 70; + as an end in itself, 70-71. + + Agrarian question, 132-136. + + Armament for the Revolution, 57-58. + + Army, 35, 36, 37. + + Bourgeoisie, imperialistic plans of, 189-191; + afraid of peace, 194-5; + reactionary, 203-4; + responsible for the war, 209-211. + + Capitalism, preparing its own collapse, 138-9; + and feudal reaction, 139-140. + + Cities, as scene of revolutionary battles, 41; + social structure of, 71-72. + + Class consciousness, of proletariat, as prerequisite to Socialism, + 124-128. + + Constituent Assembly, as a revolutionary slogan, 43-44. + + Demonstrations, in the streets, 41-42; + to become of nation-wide magnitude, 57. + + French Revolution, 73-77. + + Gapon, 59, 62; 172-3. + + Intelligentzia, 145. + + January Ninth, 49; 59-60; 171-173. + + June Third, 198. + + Labor Dictatorship, 94-97; + crushing absolutism, abandoning its remnants, 103-104; + introducing class politics, 103; + introducing class struggle in the village, 104-105; + introducing Collectivism and Internationalism, 105; + abandoning distinction between minimum and maximum program, 106; + and eight hour workday, 106-108; + and unemployment, 108-9; + and agriculture, 109; + and Collectivism, 109-110; + and class consciousness, 124-128; + incompatible with economic slavery, 132; + and agrarian question, 132-136. + + Liberalism, denying the existence of revolutionary masses, 52-53; + defeated by events of January 9th, 54; + trying to "tame" revolutionary people, 55; + not reliable as partner in Revolution, 173-174; 176-7. + + Manoeuvers, revolutionary, 29-30. + + Masses, drawn into the Revolution, 37-39; + as a political reality, 51-52; + stirred by world-war, 183-4. + + Middle-class (_see_ Bourgeoisie), weakness of, in Russia, 71, 72. + + Militia, 81-82. + + "Osvoboshdenie," 52, 53, 62. + + Peasantry, as of no significance in Revolution, 175-7. + + Poland, as possible revolutionary link between Russia and Europe, + 140-41. + + Prerequisites to Socialism, in relation to each other, 113-117. + + Proletariat, as a vanguard of the Revolution, 33-35; + role of, in events of January 9th, 56-57; + stronger than bourgeoisie in Russia, 72; + growing with capitalism, 84; + may sooner reach political supremacy in a backward country, 84-85; + 87-91; + as liberator of peasants, 98-100; + as a class objectively opposed to capitalism, 119-124; + to revolutionize European proletariat, 142-4. + + Revolution, in Europe, as aid to Socialism in Russia, 136-7; + may be result of shattered European equilibrium, 141-42; + as result of Russian Revolution, 142-4. + + Revolution, in general, 83; + of bourgeois character, 92-93. + + Revolution, of _1848_, 77-80. + + Revolution, of _1917_, its causes, 181-5; + social forces in, 191-192; + to stir up revolution in Germany, 212. + + Social-Democracy, foresaw revolution, 55-6; + natural leader of the Revolution, 60-61. + + Soviet, distinguishing Russian Revolution from that of _1848_, 80; + short history of, 145; + general survey of the role of, 151-4; + as class-organization, 154-156; + as organ of political authority, 158-9; + an imminent form of Russian Revolution, 160; + program of (outlined by Trotzky for the future), 160-1; + to fight against Provisional Government, 203. + + "Spring," 24-25; 32; 54. + + Strike, political, as beginning of Revolution, 35-36; 42, 43. + + Struve, 62. + + Technique, industrial, as prerequisite to Socialism, 113; 117-119. + + "Underground," and the revolutionist, 165-8. + + War, Russo-Japanese, 25; + of the world, as influencing masses, 183-4. + + Witte, 62, 145. + + Zemstvo, movement of, in _1904_, 24-25; 33; 62. + + + + +TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: + + +Obvious typesetting errors have been corrected. Questionable or vintage +spelling has been left as printed in the original publication. +Variations in spelling have been left as printed, unless otherwise noted +in the following. + +In the original publication, each chapter listed in the Contents section +was preceded by a "title page" containing only the chapter title as +listed in the Contents, followed by a blank page. The chapter title was +repeated on the first page in each chapter. The chapter title pages have +not been reproduced in this transcription. + +Page 90: The following phrase, beginning a quotation, has no closing +quotation mark in the original publication: "the struggle for the +interests of Russia as a whole...." + +Page 145: Transcribed "on" as "of" to match the quoted phrase on p. 106: +"private ownership of the means of production". Originally printed as: +"'private ownership on the means of production'". + +Page 174: Transcribed "Caucasas" as "Caucasus". As originally printed: +"the insurrection on the Caucasas and in the Lettish provinces." + +Page 193: Supplied "to" in the following phrase, shown in brackets: "Yet +he had to speak [to] them...." + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Our Revolution, by Leon Trotzky + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUR REVOLUTION *** + +***** This file should be named 36303.txt or 36303.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/3/0/36303/ + +Produced by Gary Rees and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was +produced from scanned images of public domain material +from the Google Print project.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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