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diff --git a/36209-h/36209-h.htm b/36209-h/36209-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ed52da --- /dev/null +++ b/36209-h/36209-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,20942 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<!-- $Id: header.txt 236 2009-12-07 18:57:00Z vlsimpson $ --> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Franco-German War of 1870—71, + by Field-Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; +} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; +} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; +} /* page numbers */ + +.blockquot { + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.u {text-decoration: underline;} + +.caption {font-weight: bold;} + +.figcenter { + margin: auto; + text-align: center; +} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +.tnote { + border: dashed 1px; + margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; + padding-bottom: .5em; padding-top: .5em; + padding-left: .5em; padding-right: .5em; +} + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Franco-German War of 1870-71, by +Count Helmuth, von Moltke + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Franco-German War of 1870-71 + +Author: Count Helmuth, von Moltke + +Translator: Archibald Forbes + +Release Date: May 24, 2011 [EBook #36209] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71 *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Moti Ben-Ari and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + + +</pre> + + + + + +<h1><span class="smcap">The Franco-German War of 1870—71</span></h1> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[i]</a></span></p> + +<div class="center">BY</div> + +<h2><span class="smcap">Field-Marshal</span> COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE</h2> + +<div class="center">TRANSLATION REVISED BY</div> + +<h3>ARCHIBALD FORBES</h3> + + +<div class="center"><i>WITH A MAP, NOTES, AND ORDERS OF BATTLE</i> +<br /><br /> +LONDON<br /> +JAMES R. OSGOOD, McILVAINE & CO.<br /> +45, <span class="smcap">Albemarle Street</span>, W.<br /> +1893<br /> +[<i>All rights reserved</i>] +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[ii]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[iii]</a></span></p> +<h2>NOTE.</h2> + + +<p>The translation has been thoroughly revised for the +sense as well as in regard to technical military terms +and expressions. To the name of every German general +officer mentioned in the text has been affixed, within +brackets, his specific command, a liberty which the +reader will perhaps not resent, since the interpolation +is intended to facilitate his clearer understanding of +a narrative condensed by the author with extreme +severity.</p> + +<p>In further aid of elucidation there has been occasionally +inserted, also within brackets, a date, a figure, +or a word.</p> + +<p>A few footnotes will be found, which may perhaps +be excused as not wholly irrelevant. In the Appendix +have been inserted the "Orders of Battle" of both sides, +as in the first period of the war.</p> + +<div class="right">A. F.</div> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[iv]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[v]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2>PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>Field-Marshal von Moltke began this history of the +War of 1870—1 in the spring of the year 1887, and +during his residence at Creisau he worked at it for +about three hours every morning. On his return to +Berlin in the autumn of that year, the work was not +quite finished, but he completed it by January, 1888, +at Berlin, placed it in my hands, and never again +alluded to the subject.</p> + +<p>The origin of the book was as follows. I had several +times entreated him, but in vain, to make use of his +leisure hours at Creisau in noting down some of his +rich store of reminiscences. He always objected, in +the same words: "Everything official that I have had +occasion to write, or that is worth remembering, is to be +seen in the Archives of the Staff Corps. My personal +experiences had better be buried with me." He had a +dislike to memoirs in general, which he was at no pains +to conceal, saying that they only served to gratify the +writer's vanity, and often contributed to distort important +historical events by the subjective views of an +individual, and the intrusion of trivial details. It +might easily happen that a particular character which +in history stood forth in noble simplicity should be +hideously disfigured by the narrative of some personal +experiences, and the ideal halo which had surrounded +it be destroyed. And highly characteristic of +Moltke's magnanimity are the words he once uttered +on such an occasion, and which I noted at the time: +"Whatever is published in a military history is always +dressed for effect: yet it is a duty of piety and patriotism +never to impair the prestige which identifies the +glory of our Army with personages of lofty position."<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[vi]</a></span></p> + +<p>Not long after our arrival at Creisau, early in 1887, I +repeated my suggestion. In reply to my request that +he would write an account of the Campaign of 1870—1, +he said: "You have the official history of the war. +That contains everything. I admit," he added, "that +it is too full of detail for the general type of readers, +and far too technical. An abridgment must be made +some day." I asked him whether he would allow me +to lay the work on his table, and next morning he +began the narrative contained in this volume, and +comparing it as he went on with the official history, +carried it through to the end.</p> + +<p>His purpose was to give a concise account of the +war. But, while keeping this in view, he involuntarily—as +was unavoidable in his position—regarded +the undertaking from his own standpoint as Chief of +the General Staff, and marshalled results so as to agree +as a whole with the plan of campaign which was known +only to the higher military authorities. Thus this +work, which was undertaken in all simplicity of purpose, +as a popular history, is practically from beginning +to end the expression of a private opinion of the war +by the Field-Marshal himself.</p> + +<p>The Appendix: "On a pretended Council of War in +the Wars of William I. of Prussia," was written in +1881. In a book by Fedor von Koppen, "Männer +und Thaten, vaterländische Balladen" (<i>Men and Deeds: +Patriotic Songs</i>), which the poet presented to the Field-Marshal, +there is a poem entitled, "<i>A German Council +of War at Versailles</i>" (with a historical note appended), +describing an incident which never occurred, and +which, under the conditions by which the relations +of the Chief of the Staff to his Majesty were regulated, +never could have occurred. To preclude any such +mistakes for the future, and to settle once and for all +the truth as to the much-discussed question of the +Council of War, the Field-Marshal wrote this paper, +to which he added a description of his personal experience<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[vii]</a></span> +of the battle of Königgrätz. It is this narrative +which, shortly after the writer's death, was published +in the <i>Allgemeine Zeitung</i> of Munich, in the somewhat +abridged and altered form in which the Field-Marshal +had placed it at the disposal of Professor von Treitscke, +the well-known historian.</p> + +<div class="right"> +<span class="smcap">Count Helmuth von Moltke</span>,<br /> +Major and Adjutant to his<br /> +Imperial Majesty. +</div> + +<p>Berlin, June 25th, 1891.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[viii]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[ix]</a></span></p> + + +<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">PART I.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Preparations for War</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_2">2</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Combat of Weissenburg (4th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Wörth (6th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_14">14</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Spicheren (6th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Right-wheel of the German Army</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_26">26</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Colombey-Nouilly (14th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_29">29</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour (16th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_34">34</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat (18th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_49">49</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">New Distribution of the Army</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_64">64</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Army of Châlons</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_66">66</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Beaumont (30th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_76">76</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Sedan (1st September)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_87">87</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center" colspan="2"></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">PART II.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align="left">Sortie from Metz (26th August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_102">102</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Noisseville (31st August)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_106">106</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Change of Government in Paris</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_114">114</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Retreat of General Vinoy</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_116">116</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">March on Paris of IIIrd Army and the Army of the Meuse</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Investment of Paris (19th September)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">First Negotiations for Peace</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Toul (23rd September)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_130">130</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Strasburg (28th September)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Operations round Paris to 15th October</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Action of Artenay (10th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Engagement at Orleans (11th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Soissons (15th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Storming of Châteaudun (18th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Sortie against Malmaison (21st October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_153">153</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Storming of Le Bourget (30th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_156">156</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Sortie from Metz against Bellevue (7th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[x]</a></span>Capitulation of Metz (27th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">New Distribution of the Army</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Operations of the XIVth Corps in the South-East (October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_166">166</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Schlettstadt (24th October)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Breisach (10th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_174">174</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Verdun (9th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Advance of Ist and IInd Armies (up to mid-November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Engagement at Coulmiers (9th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_181">181</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Operations of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_187">187</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Situation of IInd Army (second half of November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Beaune la Rolande (28th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Advance of the Army of the Loire to the relief of Paris</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Loigny—Poupry (2nd December)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_199">199</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Paris in November</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Attempt of the Army of Paris to break out (30th November and 2nd December)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_207">207</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Advance of the Ist Army in November</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_216">216</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Amiens (17th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of La Fère (27th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_221">221</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Thionville (24th November)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_222">222</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Investment of Belfort in November</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of Orleans (3rd and 4th December)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Offensive Operations South, East, and West</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Fighting of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg (7th—10th December)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Interruption of important offensive operations in December</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_245">245</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The XIVth Corps in December</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Ist Army in December</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Reduction of Mézières (1st January, 1871)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_257">257</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Paris in December</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_259">259</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Combat of Le Bourget (21st December)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_261">261</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Bombardment of Mont-Avron (27th December)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_264">264</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Army of the East under General Bourbaki</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_269">269</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle in front of Le Mans (10th—12th January)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_284">284</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Occurrences northward of Paris during January</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Battle of Bapaume (3rd January)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_305">305</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Fighting on the Lower Seine (4th January)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_308">308</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Reduction of Péronne (9th January)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_310">310</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle of St. Quentin (19th January)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Occurrences in the South-Eastern Seat of War up to 17th January</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Siege of Belfort</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Transfer of the French Army of the East to the South-Eastern Seat of War (end of December)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_328">328</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span style="margin-left: 2em;">Action of Villersexel (9th January)</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Battle on the Lisaine (15th—17th January)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_338">338</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Artillery Attack on Paris (January, 1871)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_349">349</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[xi]</a></span> +Battle of Mont Valérien (19th January)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_355">355</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Prosecution of the Artillery Attack on Paris to the Armistice</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_361">361</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Operations of the Army of the South under General von Manteuffel</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_366">366</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">General Hann von Weyhern's March on Dijon</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_390">390</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Occupation of the Departments of the Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_391">391</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Prosecution of the Siege of Belfort</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_393">393</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Armistice</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_399">399</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">The Homeward March of the German Army</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_406">406</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center" colspan="2"></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center" colspan="2">APPENDIX.</td></tr> + +<tr><td align="left">On the pretended Council of War in the Wars of King William I.</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_413">413</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">"Orders of Battle" of the French and German Armies in the first period of the war</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_419">419</a></td></tr> +</table> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[xii]</a></span> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[1]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.</h2> + + + + +<h2>PART I.</h2> + + +<p>The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small +armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer +a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters +or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole +nations to arms; there is scarcely a family that has not +had to bewail lost ones. The entire financial resources +of the State are appropriated to military purposes, and +the seasons of the year have no influence on the unceasing +progress of hostilities. As long as nations +exist distinct one from the other there will be quarrels +that can only be settled by force of arms; but, in the +interests of humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will +become the less frequent, as they become the more +terrible.</p> + +<p>Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of +monarchs which endangers peace; but the impulses of +a nation, its dissatisfaction with its internal conditions, +the strife of parties and the intrigues of their leaders. +A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is +more easily carried by a large assembly, of which no +one of the members bears the sole responsibility, than +by a single individual, however lofty his position; and +a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a parliament +composed of wise men. The great wars of recent times +have been declared against the wish and will of the +reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse possesses so +great influence that it is able to have armies called +into the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[2]</a></span> +and Egypt have had European armies of occupation +inflicted upon them simply to satisfy the demands of +the <i>haute finance</i>. To-day the question is not so much +whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as +whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent +war. For example, united Germany has hitherto used +her strength only to maintain European peace; while +the weakness of a neighbouring Government continues +to involve the gravest risk of war.</p> + +<p>It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations +that the war of 1870—71 originated. A Napoleon on +the throne of France was bound to justify his pretensions +by political and military successes. Only temporarily +was the French nation contented by the victories +of its arms in remote fields of war; the triumphs of +the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded +as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French demanded +revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch +set itself against the autocratic Government of the +Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his +internal authority was weakened, and one day the +nation was informed by its representatives that it +desired war with Germany.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Preparations for War.</span></h2> + + +<p>The wars carried on by France beyond seas, essentially +on behalf of financial interests, had consumed immense +sums and had undermined the discipline of the army. +Her army was by no means in thorough preparedness +for a great war, but, in the temper of the nation, the +Spanish succession question furnished an opportune +pretext on which to go to war. The French Reserves +were called out on July 15th, and, as if the opportunity +for a rupture was on no account to be let slip, only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[3]</a></span> +four days later the French declaration of war was presented +at Berlin.</p> + +<p>One Division of the French Army was ordered to +the Spanish frontier as a corps of observation; only +such troops as were absolutely necessary were left in +Algiers and in Civita Vecchia; Paris and Lyons were +sufficiently garrisoned. The entire remainder of the +army: 332 battalions, 220 squadrons, 924 guns, in all +about 300,000 men, formed the Army of the Rhine, +which, divided into eight Corps, was, at any rate in the +first instance, to be under the sole direction of a central +head. The Emperor himself was the fitting person to +undertake this weighty duty, pending whose arrival +Marshal Bazaine was to command the gathering forces.</p> + +<p>It is very probable that the French reckoned on the +old dissensions of the German races. Not that they +dared to look forward to the South Germans as allies, +but they hoped to paralyze their offensive by an early +victory, perhaps even to win them over to their side. +It was true that Prussia by herself was still a mighty +antagonist, and that her armed forces were of superior +strength; but peradventure this advantage might be +counterbalanced by rapidity of action.</p> + +<p>The French plan of campaign was indeed based on +the delivery of sudden unexpected attacks. The +powerful fleet of war-ships and transports was to be +utilized to land a considerable force in Northern +Prussia, which should there engage a part of the +Prussian troops, while the main body of the German +army, it was assumed, would await the first French +attack behind the strong defensive line of the Rhine. +A French force was to cross the Rhine promptly, at +and below Strasburg, thus avoiding the great German +fortresses; its function being, at the very outset of the +campaign, to cut off the South-German army charged +with the defence of the Black Forest, and prevent it +from effecting a junction with the North Germans. +In the execution of this plan it was imperative that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[4]</a></span> +main body of the French army should be massed in +Alsace. Railway accommodation, however, was so +inadequate that in the first instance it was only possible +to transport 100,000 men to Strasburg; 150,000 had to +leave the railway at Metz, and remain there till they +could be moved forward. Fifty thousand men in the +Châlons camp were intended to serve as supports, and +115 battalions were destined for field service as soon as +the National Guard should relieve them in the interior. +The various Corps were distributed as follows:—</p> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="right">Imperial Guard,</td><td align="left">General Bourbaki—Nancy.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">Ist Corps,</td><td align="left">Marshal MacMahon—Strasburg.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">IInd Corps,</td><td align="left">General Frossard—St. Avold.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">IIIrd Corps,</td><td align="left">Marshal Bazaine—Metz.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">IVth Corps,</td><td align="left">General Ladmirault—Thionville.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">Vth Corps,</td><td align="left">General Failly—Bitsch.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">VIth Corps,</td><td align="left">Marshal Canrobert—Châlons.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">VIIth Corps,</td><td align="left">General Félix Douay—Belfort.</td></tr> +</table> +</div> + +<p>Thus while there were but two Corps in Alsace, there +were five on the Moselle; and, so early as the day of the +declaration of war, one of the latter, the IInd Corps, +had been pushed forward close to the German frontier, +about St. Avold and Forbach. General Frossard, its +commander, was, however, under strict injunctions to +commit himself to no serious undertaking.</p> + +<p>The regiments had been hurried away from their +peace stations before the arrival of their complement of +men, and without waiting for their equipments. Meanwhile +the called-out reservists accumulated in the +depôts, overflowed the railway stations and choked the +traffic. Their transmission to their destinations was at +a standstill, for it was often unknown at the depôts +where the regiments to which the reservists were to be +sent were for the time encamped. When at length +they joined they were destitute of the most necessary +articles of equipment. The Corps and Divisions lacked +trains, hospitals and nearly the whole of the <i>personnel</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[5]</a></span> +of their administration. No magazines had been established +in advance, and the troops were to depend on +the stores in the fortresses. These were in a neglected +state, for in the assured expectation that the armies +would be almost immediately launched into the enemy's +country they had received little attention. It was of a +piece with this that the French Staff-officers had been +provided with maps of Germany, but not of their own +country. The Ministry of War in Paris was overwhelmed +with claims, protestations, and expostulations, +till finally it was left to the troops to help themselves +as best they could. "<i>On se débrouillera</i>," was the hope +of the authorities.</p> + +<p>When the Emperor arrived at Metz eight days after +the declaration of war, the forces were not yet up to their +strength, and even the precise whereabouts of whole +bodies of troops was for the time unknown. He +ordered the advance of the army, but his Marshals protested +that its internal plight was so unsatisfactory as to +make this impossible for the time. The general conviction +was gradually impressing itself on the French, +that instead of continuing to aim at invasion of the +enemy's country, their exertions would have to be confined +to the defence of their own territory. A strong +German army was reported to be assembling between +Mayence and Coblentz; and instead of reinforcements +being sent forward from Metz to Strasburg, much heavier +ones would have to be ordered from the Rhine to the +Saar. The determination to invade South Germany was +already abandoned; the fleet sailed, but without carrying +a force to be landed on the north German coast.</p> + +<p>Germany had been surprised by the declaration of +war, but she was not unprepared. That was a possibility +which had been foreseen.</p> + +<p>After the withdrawal of Austria from the German +connection, Prussia had taken upon itself the sole +leadership, and had gradually formed closer relations +with the South-German States. The idea of national<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[6]</a></span> +unification had been revived, and found an echo in the +patriotic sentiments of the entire people.</p> + +<p>The mobilization machinery of the North-German +army had been elaborated from year to year, in accord +with the changing conditions, by the combined exertions +of the War Ministry and the General Staff. Every +branch of the administration throughout the country +had been kept informed of all it needed to know in this +relation. The Berlin authorities had also come to +a confidential understanding with the Chiefs of the +General Staffs of the South-German States on all +important points. The principle was established that +Prussian assistance was not to be reckoned on for the +defence of any particular point, such as the Black Forest; +and that South Germany would be best protected by an +offensive movement into Alsace from the middle Rhine, +to be effectively supported by a large army massed +there. That the Governments of Bavaria, Würtemberg, +Baden and Hesse, to all appearance uncovering their +own territories, were ready to place their contingents +under the command of King William, proved their +entire confidence in the Prussian leadership.</p> + +<p>This understanding enabled the preparations which +it entailed to be proceeded with. The train and march +tables were worked out for each body of troops, with +the most minute directions as to the respective starting-points, +the day and hour of departure, the duration of +the journey, the refreshment stations, and points of +detrainment. In the locality of concentration cantonments +were assigned to each Corps and Division, and +magazines were established with due regard to the most +convenient sites; and thus, when the stroke of war +inevitably impended, there was required only the Royal +signature to start the whole mighty movement in its +smooth, swift course. Nothing needed to be changed in +the directions originally given; it sufficed to follow the +plans previously thought out and prepared.</p> + +<p>The aggregated mobile forces were formed into three<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[7]</a></span> +separate Armies, on the basis of an elaborate tabular +statement drawn up by the Chief of the Prussian +General Staff.</p> + +<p>The Ist Army, under the command of General von +Steinmetz, consisted of, in the first instance, only the +VIIth and VIIIth Corps, with one Division of cavalry; +60,000 men all told. It was ordered to assemble at +Wittlich and form the right wing.</p> + +<p>The IInd Army, under the command of Prince +Frederick Charles, consisted of the IIIrd, IVth, Xth, +and Guard Corps, with two Divisions of cavalry. Assembling +in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen, +it was to form the centre, with a strength of 134,000 men.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Army, under the command of the Crown +Prince of Prussia, consisted of the Vth and XIth +Prussian, and the Ist and IInd Bavarian Corps, the +Würtemberg and Baden Field Divisions, with one Division +of cavalry. Its approximate strength was 130,000 +men; it was to constitute the left wing, and to concentrate +about Landau and Rastatt.</p> + +<p>The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the +Hesse Divisions, was along with the XIIth Royal Saxon +Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men in front of +Mayence, for the reinforcement of the IInd Army to a +strength of 194,000 men.</p> + +<p>The three Armies numbered together 384,000 men.</p> + +<p>There still remained the Ist, IInd, and VIth +Corps, numbering 100,000 men; but they were not +at first included, as railway transport for them was +not available for three weeks to come. The 17th +Division and certain bodies of Landwehr troops were +detailed to defend the coasts.</p> + +<p>It is apparent that numerically the German armies +were considerably superior to the French. Inclusive +of the garrisons and reserves about one million of +men and over 200,000 horses were on the ration list.</p> + +<p>On the night of July 16th the Royal order for +mobilization was issued, and when his Majesty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[8]</a></span> +arrived in Mayence fourteen days later, he found +300,000 men assembled on the Rhine and beyond.</p> + +<p>The plan of campaign submitted by the Chief of +the General Staff, and accepted by the King, proves +that officer to have had his eye fixed, from the first, +upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession +of which is of more importance in France than in +other countries. On the way thither the hostile forces +were to be driven as persistently as possible back from +the fertile southern provinces into the more confined +background to the north. But beyond everything the +plan of campaign was based on the resolve to attack the +enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German +forces always so compact that this could be done +with the advantage of superior numbers. The specific +dispositions for the accomplishment of those objects +were left to be adopted on the spot; the advance to the +frontier was alone pre-arranged in every detail.</p> + +<p>It is a delusion to imagine that a plan of campaign +can be laid down far ahead and fulfilled with exactitude. +The first collision with the enemy creates a new +situation in accordance with its result. Some things +intended will have become impracticable; others, which +originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All +that the leader of an army can do is to form a correct +estimate of the circumstances, to decide for the best for +the moment, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.</p> + +<p>The advance of the French troops to the frontier, +while as yet imperfectly mobilized, which was an extremely +hazardous measure in itself, was evidently with +the intent of utilizing the temporary advantage of +having a superior force at immediate disposition by +taking at unawares the German armies in the act of +developing their advance-movements. But, notwithstanding, +the German commanders did not deviate +from their purpose of promptly effecting this first +advance in front of the Rhine. The railway transport +of the Corps of the IInd and IIIrd Armies, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[9]</a></span> +ended at the Rhine; thence the troops marched on foot +into the cantonments prepared on the left bank of the +river. They moved in echelon, advancing only so +many at a time as would make room for the body +in rear, in the first instance to the line Bingen-Dürkheim-Landau. +The farther advance towards the +frontier was not to be undertaken until the Divisions +and Corps were all assembled, and provided with the +necessary trains; and then they were to march forward +in a state of readiness to confront the enemy at any +moment.</p> + +<p>The massing of the Ist Army appeared to be +less threatened, because its route was protected by +neutral territory, and was covered by the garrisons of +Trèves, Saarlouis and Saarbrücken, the German outposts +on the Saar.</p> + +<p>The Ist Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at +Wadern, in the first days of August. The IInd Army, +which meanwhile had been increased to a strength of +194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments +to Alsenz-Günnstadt, at the farther base of the Haardt +Mountains, a position which had been thoroughly inspected +by an officer of the General Staff, and where +the troops might confidently await an attack. The 5th +and 6th cavalry Divisions were reconnoitring the country +in front. The IIIrd Army was still assembling on +both banks of the Rhine.</p> + +<p>The French so far had made no serious attempt at +Saarbrücken; Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel, with one +battalion and three squadrons, was able successfully to +withstand their petty attacks. It had meanwhile been +observed that the hostile forces were moving farther to +the right, towards Forbach and Bitsch. This seemed to +indicate that the two French Corps known to be about +Belfort and Strasburg, might purpose crossing the Rhine +and marching through the Black Forest. It seemed +therefore all the more important that the IIIrd Army +should be set in motion as early as possible, for one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[10]</a></span> +thing to protect the right bank of the Upper Rhine by +an advance on the left; for another, to cover the left +flank of the IInd Army during its advance.</p> + +<p>A telegraphic order to that effect was despatched +on the evening of July 30th, but the Head-quarters of +the IIIrd Army wished to wait for the arrival of the +VIth Corps and of the trains. Whereupon, regardless +of this delay, the IInd Army was put in march +towards the Saar, where the French were beginning +to be active.</p> + +<p>The time had gone by when they might have taken +advantage of their over-hasty mobilization; the inefficient +condition of the troops had paralyzed every +attempt at activity. France had been long waiting +for the news of a victory, and something had to be done +to appease public impatience. So, in order to do something, +it was resolved (as is usual in such circumstances) +to undertake a reconnoissance in force, and, it may be +added, with the usual result.</p> + +<p>On August 2nd three entire Army Corps were set +in motion against three battalions, four squadrons, and +one battery in Saarbrücken. The Emperor himself and +the Prince Imperial shared in the enterprise. The +IIIrd Corps advanced on Völklingen, the Vth through +Saargemünd, the IInd on Saarbrücken.</p> + +<p>Saarbrücken was evacuated after a gallant defence +and repeated counter-strokes, but the French did not +press across the Saar; convinced, possibly, that they had +wasted their strength in a stroke in the air, and had +nowhere gained any insight into the dispositions of the +enemy.</p> + +<p>The French military chiefs now hesitated for a long +while between conflicting resolutions. Orders were +given and recalled on the strength of mere rumours. +The left wing was reinforced because 40,000 +Prussians were supposed to have marched through +Trèves, the Guard received contradictory orders, and +the bare apparition of a small German force about<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[11]</a></span> +Lörrach in the Black Forest occasioned the order +that the VIIth Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus +the French forces were straggled over the wide area +between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the +Germans were advancing in compact masses towards +the Saar.</p> + +<p>This scattered state of their forces finally induced +the French leaders to divide them into two separate +Armies. Marshal MacMahon took command, but only +provisionally, of the Ist, VIIth, and Vth Corps, of which +the latter had therefore to draw in to him from Bitsch. +The other Corps remained under Marshal Bazaine, with +the exception of the Imperial Guard, the command of +which the Emperor reserved to himself.</p> + +<p>It had now become a pressing necessity to protect the +left wing of the advancing IInd German Army against +the French forces in Alsace, and the IIIrd Army was +therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August 4th, +without waiting any longer for its trains. The Ist +Army, forming the right wing, was in complete readiness +near Wadern and Losheim, three or four days' +march nearer to the Saar than the IInd Army in the +centre. It received the order to concentrate in the +neighbourhood of Tholey and there halt for the present. +For one thing, this army, the weakest of the three, could +not be exposed single-handed to an encounter with +the enemy's main force; and for another, it was available +to serve as an offensive flank in case the IInd +Army should meet the enemy on emerging from the +forest zone of the Palatinate.</p> + +<p>In the execution of this order, the Ist Army had so +extended its cantonments southward that they trenched +on the line of march of the IInd Army, and it had to +evacuate the quarters about Ottweiler in favour of the +latter. This involved a difficulty, as all the villages to +the north were full, and as room had also to be found for +the Ist Corps, now advancing by Birkenfeld. General +von Steinmetz therefore decided to march his whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[12]</a></span> +army in the direction of Saarlouis and Saarbrücken. +The IInd Army, on August 4th, stood assembled ready +for action, and received orders to deploy on the farther +side of the forest zone of Kaiserslautern.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Combat of Weissenburg.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 4th.)</div> + + +<p>On this day the Corps of the IIIrd Army, consisting +of 128 battalions, 102 squadrons, and 80 batteries, +which had been assembled in bivouac behind the Klingsbach, +crossed the French frontier, marching on a broad +front to reach the Lauter between Weissenburg and +Lauterburg. This stream affords an exceptionally +strong defensive position, but on August 4th only one +weak Division and a cavalry brigade of the Ist French +Corps covered this point, the main body of that Corps +being still on the march towards the Palatinate.</p> + +<p>Early in the morning the Bavarians forming the +right wing encountered a lively resistance before +the walls of Weissenburg, which were too strong to be +stormed. But very soon after the two Prussian Corps +crossed the Lauter lower down. General von Bose +led forward the XIth Corps (which he commanded) +with intent to turn the French right flank on the +Geisberg, while General von Kirchbach, with the Vth +Corps (which he commanded) advanced against the +enemy's front. Thirty field-guns were meanwhile +massed against the railway station of Weissenburg. +It and subsequently the town were taken, after a bloody +struggle.</p> + +<p>So early as ten o'clock General Douay had ordered a +retreat, which was seriously threatened by the movement +against the Geisburg; and the château of that +name, a very defensible building, was most obstinately +defended to enable the French to retire. The Grenadiers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[13]</a></span> +of the King's Regiment No. 7 in vain assailed +it by storm, suffering heavy loss; nor did its +defenders surrender until, with the greatest difficulty, +artillery had been dragged up on to the height.</p> + +<p>The French Division, which had been attacked by +three German Corps, effected a retreat after an obstinate +struggle, though in great disorder, having suffered +much loss. Its gallant Commander had been killed. +The Germans had to bewail a proportionately considerable +loss; their casualties were 91 officers and 1460 +men. General von Kirchbach had been wounded +while fighting in the foremost rank.</p> + +<p>The 4th Division of cavalry had met with much +delay in the course of a nineteen miles' march by the +crossing of the columns of infantry. It did not reach +the scene of combat, and all touch of the enemy, now +retiring to the westward, was lost.</p> + +<p>Uncertain as to the direction whence fresh hostile +forces might be approaching, the IIIrd Army advanced +on the 5th of August by diverging roads in the direction +of Hagenau and Reichshofen; yet not so far apart but +that it should be possible for the Corps to reconcentrate +in one short march. The Crown Prince intended +to allow his troops a rest on the following day, so as to +have them fresh for a renewed attack as soon as the +situation was made clear.</p> + +<p>But already, that same evening, the Bavarians on +the right flank and the Vth Corps in the front had a +sharp encounter with the enemy, who showed behind +the Sauer in considerable strength. It was to be +assumed that Marshal MacMahon had brought up the +VIIth Corps from Strasburg, but it remained a question +whether he intended to join Marshal Bazaine by +way of Bitsch, or whether, having secured his line of +retreat thither, he meant to accept battle at Wörth. +Yet again there was the possibility that he might himself +initiate the offensive. The Crown Prince, to make +sure in any case of a preponderance of force, determined<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[14]</a></span> +to concentrate his army in the neighbourhood of Sulz +on August 6th. The IInd Bavarian Corps received +separate instructions to watch the road from Bitsch with +one Division; the other Division was to strike the hostile +attack in flank on the western bank of the Sauer, in +the event of artillery fire about Wörth being heard.</p> + +<p>Marshal MacMahon was endeavouring with all his +might to concentrate his three Corps, and he really had +the intention to make an immediate attack on his +invading foe. A Division of the VIIth Corps, which +had but just been sent to Mülhausen to strengthen the +defence of Alsace, was at once recalled to Hagenau, +and early on the 6th formed the right wing of the +strong position which the Ist Corps had taken up behind +the Sauer, and in front of Fröschwiller, Elsasshausen, +and Eberbach. On the left, Lespart's Division +of the Vth Corps was expected from Bitsch, of which +the other Divisions were only now on march from +Saargemünd by way of Rohrbach. Meanwhile Ducrot's +Division formed a refused flank on the French left.</p> + +<p>Neither the German nor the French leaders expected +the collision before the following day, but when, as in +this case, the adversaries are in so close proximity, the +conflict may break out at any moment, even against +the wish of the higher commanders.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Wörth.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 6th.)</div> + + +<p>After a good deal of skirmishing between the respective +outposts during the night, the Commander of +the 20th German Brigade<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> thought it expedient to seize<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[15]</a></span> +a passage over the Sauer, which flowed just in his +front and constituted a serious obstacle. The bridge +leading to Wörth had been destroyed, but the sharp-shooters +waded through the river, and at seven o'clock +pressed into the town, which the French had left +unoccupied.</p> + +<p>Soon enough they realized that before them was a +numerous enemy in a strong position.</p> + +<p>The broad meadows of the Sauer all lie within effective +range of the commanding slopes on the right bank; +and the long-ranging chassepôt fire could not but tell +heavily. On the French side of the river the terrain +was dotted with vineyards and hop-gardens, which +afforded great advantages for defensive purposes.</p> + +<p>The combat which had begun at Wörth was broken +off after lasting half an hour, but the artillery of both +sides had taken part in it, and the sound of cannon-fire +had been the signal prescribed to Hartmann's IInd +Bavarian Corps, acting on which it now advanced from +Langensulzbach, and was soon engaged in a brisk fight +with the left flank of the French. The latter on their +side had advanced on their right to the attack of Gunstett, +where they came in contact with the advancing +XIth Prussian Corps.</p> + +<p>The din of battle, rolling from the north and south +alike, was heard by the Vth Corps in its position +opposite to Wörth; and it seemed imperative that it +should engage with vigour the enemy's centre in order +to hinder him from throwing himself with all his +strength on one or other of the German flanks.</p> + +<p>The artillery was brought up, and by ten o'clock 108 +guns were in action on the eastern slope of the Sauer +valley.</p> + +<p>Some infantry detachments waded breast-high +through the river, but this dashing attempt, undertaken +in inadequate strength, miscarried, and it was +only by strenuous efforts that a foothold was maintained +on the other side.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[16]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Crown Prince sent orders that nothing was to +be undertaken that would bring on a battle on that +day. But by this time the Vth Corps was so seriously +engaged that the fight could not be broken off without +obvious disadvantage. General von Kirchbach therefore +determined to continue the contest on his own +responsibility.</p> + +<p>The frontal attack was an undertaking of great +difficulty, and could scarcely succeed unless with the +co-operation of another on the flank. But at this juncture +the Bavarians, who, in position as they were on the +right, could have afforded this co-operation, obeyed the +breaking off command, which had also reached them in +the course of the fighting, and withdrew to Langensulzbach. +There was, however, the XIth Corps in +position on the left, eager to strike in. It seized the +Albrechts-häuser farm, and pressed forward into the +Niederwald.</p> + +<p>In front of Wörth the battle hung, consisting of a +succession of attacks renewed again and again on either +side; each assailant in turn getting worsted, in consequence +of the nature of the country. By degrees, however, +the collective battalions, and finally the artillery +of the Vth Corps, were brought over to the west bank of +the Sauer; while the XIth Corps had already won +there a firm point of support for further advance.</p> + +<p>Just then, near Morsbronn, notwithstanding the evident +unfavourable nature of the ground, two Cuirassier +and one Lancer regiments of Michel's brigade hurled +themselves with reckless daring on a body of German +infantry taken in the act of wheeling to the right. +But the 32nd Regiment, far from seeking cover, +received in open order the charging mass of over +1000 horse with a steady fire which did great execution. +The Cuirassiers especially suffered immense +loss. Only a few horsemen broke through the +firing line and gained the open ground; many were +taken prisoners in the village, the remainder rode<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[17]</a></span> +in wild gallop as far as Walburg. There they encountered +the Prussian 13th Hussars, suffered further +loss, and disappeared from the field.</p> + +<p>It is true that the infantry of the French right +wing succeeded in driving back the foremost detachments +of the Germans about Albrechts-häuser farm, +but the further advance of the former was shattered by +the fire of newly-unmasked artillery.</p> + +<p>When finally the last battalions had crossed the +Sauer, the XIth Corps made its way through the +Niederwald, fighting its way step by step. The +northern edge of the forest was reached by 2.30, and +there a junction was formed with the left flank of the +Vth Corps. The burning village of Elsasshausen was +carried by storm, and the little copse south of Fröschwiller +was also won after a gallant defence.</p> + +<p>Thus crowded together in a limited space, the French +army was in a situation of imminent danger. Its left +flank, it is true, still held out against the renewed attack +of the Bavarians, who had re-entered the action, +but its front and right flank were terribly hard +pressed, and even its retreat was seriously threatened. +Marshal MacMahon therefore tried to obtain a +breathing space by a heavy counter-stroke to the +south. The weak German detachments standing to +the east of Elsasshausen, thrown into confusion by +the vehement attack, were in part driven back into +the Niederwald, but were quickly rallied and brought +up again. Here the French cavalry strove once +more to change the fortunes of the day. Bonnemain's +Division, notwithstanding the unfavourable +nature of the ground, threw itself on the dishevelled +front of the enemy, suffered terrible losses, and was +shattered without having been able effectively to +charge home.</p> + +<p>The Würtembergers now came up from the south, +and the Bavarians from the north. General von Bose, +though twice wounded, led what of his troops he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[18]</a></span> +could collect to the storm of the burning Fröschwiller, +the enemy's last stronghold. The artillery moved up +within case-shot range, and thus cleared the road for +the infantry which was pushing forward from all sides. +After maintaining to the utmost a resolute and gallant +resistance until five o'clock, the French retreated in +great disorder towards Reichshofen and Niederbronn.</p> + +<p>At the Falkenstein stream, Lespart's Division, just +arrived on the field, made a short stand, but these +fresh troops offered only brief resistance, and were +swept away in the general rout.</p> + +<p>This victory of the IIIrd Army had been dearly paid +for with the loss of 489 officers and 10,000 men. The +loss on the French side is not exactly known, but of +prisoners alone they left 200 officers and 9000 men, +and in the German hands there remained 33 guns and +2000 horses.</p> + +<p>The disintegration of the French army must have +been so complete as to throw it altogether out of hand. +Only one brigade of Lespart's Division took the road by +Bitsch to join the French main army at St. Avold; all +the rest of the army, following an infectious impulse, +rolled unhaltingly in a south-western direction towards +Saverne.</p> + +<p>As in the Head-quarter of the IIIrd Army it had not +been intended to fight on August 6th, the 4th Division of +cavalry had not left its quarters in the rear, and was +therefore not available to take up the pursuit; it did +not reach Gunstett until nine o'clock in the evening. +But, in order to be at hand at any rate for the next +day, Prince Albert marched his command on during +the night as far as Eberbach; after three hours' rest +he started again, and after covering thirty-six miles,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> +came up in the evening with the rearguard of the +enemy near Steinberg, at the foot of the Vosges. +Without infantry it would have been impossible for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[19]</a></span> +Division to push farther, but the sight of it gave the +enemy a fresh impulse of flight. The Ist Corps stampeded +again in the night and reached Saarburg, where +it joined the Vth Corps. Thus the French had a start +of twenty-three and a half miles, and continued their +retreat on Lunéville, unmolested by the Germans.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> General Walther von Montbary. It is Molkte's custom throughout +this work, except in regard to his prime aversion, Prince +Frederick Charles, to refrain from naming an officer whom by implication +he is censuring, but this is simply a <i>nuance</i>, since he +specifies the culprit's military position.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Throughout the miles are English miles.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Spicheren.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 6th.)</div> + + +<p>Let us now turn to the events which occurred, on +this same 6th of August, in another part of the theatre +of war.</p> + +<p>The IInd Army, its southern (left) flank covered by the +IIIrd Army, had been moving to the westward, while the +Corps it still lacked were being brought up by railway. +Its leading Corps, having traversed unmolested the +long defiles of the forest-belt of Kaiserslautern, reached +on the 5th the line Neunkirchen-Zweibrücken. The +cavalry, scouting into French territory, reported that +the enemy was retreating. Everything seemed to +indicate that the French would await the attack of the +Germans in a strong defensive position. The nearest +position of the kind that offered was that on the farther +bank of the Moselle, of which Metz protected one flank, +Thionville the other. It was decided that if the French +were found in that position, the Ist Army should hold +the enemy in front, while the IInd made a circuit south +of Metz, and so the enemy be forced either to retire +or to fight. In case of disaster the IInd Army was +to fall back on the IIIrd, now advancing over the +Vosges.</p> + +<p>The protrusion to the south-westward<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> of the Ist Army +towards the Saar, which had not been intended by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[20]</a></span> +supreme Command, had brought its left wing in upon the +line of march laid down for the IInd, and detachments of +the two armies had to cross each other at Saarbrücken +on the 6th. Thus there was indeed no lack of strength +at that point; but as a battle on that day was neither +expected nor probable, the synchronous arrival of +troops had not been pre-arranged, and so detachments +could only come up by quite unprescribed routes and +arrive one after the other at different hours.</p> + +<p>The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps was the first +to reach Saarbrücken, towards noon on the 6th.</p> + +<p>General Frossard, considering his position there very +hazardous, had left the night before, without waiting +for permission, and had fallen back with the IInd Corps +on Spicheren, where it had entrenched itself. The +IIIrd, IVth, and Vth Corps were behind, at distances of +from nine to nineteen miles, and the Imperial Guard +was about twenty-three miles rearward. The Emperor, +therefore, had it in his power to collect five Corps for a +battle in the vicinity of Cocheren, or, on the other +hand, to support Frossard with at least four Divisions, +if that General were confident that his position was +strong enough to hold.</p> + +<p>The range of heights which upheaves itself immediately +behind Saarbrücken is capable of affording a +serious obstacle to a hostile passage of the Saar. It +was known that the French had evacuated those +heights, but General von Kameke thought it prudent +to seize them at once, in order to secure the debouche +of the columns following him. When, in the forenoon, +two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry Division showed +themselves on the drill-ground on the ridge above the +farther bank, they were greeted with a hot fire from +the Spicheren heights. But as it seemed highly probable, +from the previous behaviour of the French, that +the force seen there was only the rear-guard of the +retiring enemy, General von Kameke (commanding +14th Infantry Division) ordered an immediate attack,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[21]</a></span> +since he had the promise of reinforcements. General +von Zastrow (commanding VIIth Corps), as soon as he +recognized that the 14th Division had involved itself in +a serious engagement, allowed the 13th to go forward. +General von Alvensleben (its commander) also ordered +up to Saarbrücken all the available troops of the IIIrd +Corps, and with equal promptitude General von Goeben +(commanding VIIIth Corps) hurried thither the entire +16th Division. Generals von Döring (commanding +9th Infantry Brigade) and von Barnekow (commanding +16th Infantry Division), belonging respectively to these +two Corps (IIIrd and VIIIth), had besides already +struck forward from Tudweiler and Fischbach in the +direction of the cannon-thunder, even before receiving +orders to that effect.</p> + +<p>The position occupied by the French was one of +exceptional advantage. In the centre projected the +Red Hill (der Rothe Berg), a precipitous and almost +inaccessible cliff; and the steep slopes on either side +were densely wooded. On the left the massive buildings +of the Stiering-Wendel ironworks furnished a +separate defensive position.</p> + +<p>Had the strength of the enemy been fully known +the attack would certainly have been delayed until the +whole of the 14th Division had arrived. As a matter +of fact, at the beginning of the fight, about noon, only +von François' Brigade (27th) had come up, and this +force, in the effort to facilitate an attack on the naturally +strong position held by the enemy's front, assailed +in the first instance both his flanks.</p> + +<p>At first it succeeded in making progress. On the left +the 39th Regiment drove the swarms of hostile skirmishers +out of the wood of Gifert, but then became +exposed to the bitter fire of a French battalion lining +the farther side of a deep hollow. On the right flank +its 3rd Battalion, together with the 74th Regiment, +seized the wood of Stiering. But the enemy's superior +strength soon displayed itself in violent counter-attacks,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[22]</a></span> +and when Von Woyna's<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Brigade (28th) reached the +field it had to furnish reinforcements to both flanks. +Thus, at an early stage, intermingling of battalions and +companies began, which increased with every subsequent +rush, and made the control of the combat a +matter of extraordinary difficulty. Added to this was +the circumstance that three Commanding Generals in +succession came up to the scene of the conflict, and one +after the other took the chief control.</p> + +<p>At about one o'clock, simultaneously with the +flanks, the Fusilier Battalion of the 74th Regiment +pushed forward in front, under a severe fire across +the open ground towards the Red Hill, and, under such +trivial cover as offered, established itself at the foot +of the cliff. When at about three o'clock the Prussian +artillery compelled the foe to move his guns +farther up the hill, the Fusiliers, with General von +François at their head, began to climb the cliff. The +French Chasseurs, evidently taken by surprise, were +driven from the most advanced entrenchments with +clubbed rifles and at the point of the bayonet. The +9th company of the 39th Regiment followed close, and +the gallant General, charging farther forward along +with it, fell pierced by five bullets. Nothing daunted, +the small body of Fusiliers made good its grip of the +narrow spur of the cliff.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, a crisis was imminent. The 14th +Division was extended over a distance of about three +and a half miles, its left wing had been repulsed by +greatly superior forces in the wood of Gifert, its right +wing was hard pressed at Stiering. But now, at four +o'clock, the heads of the 5th and 16th Divisions simultaneously +struck in, shortly after their batteries, which +had been sent on ahead, had come into action.</p> + +<p>The left wing, strongly reinforced, now again pressed +forward. General von Barnekow<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> led trusty succours<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[23]</a></span> +up on to the Red Hill, where the Fusiliers had almost +entirely exhausted their ammunition, and drove the +French out from all their entrenchments. As the +result of a fierce struggle the Germans also succeeded +in taking possession of the western part of the wood of +Gifert. The right wing with sharp fighting had pressed +on to Alt Stiering and was approaching the enemy's line +of retreat, the Forbach highway. General Frossard +had, however, recognized the danger threatened at this +point, and reinforced his left wing to the strength of a +Division and a half. This force advanced to the attack +at five o'clock. On the German side there was no +formed force to oppose to it, so all the previously +gained advantages were lost.</p> + +<p>If the 13th Division<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> had here struck in with a resolute +attack, the battle would have ended. This +Division after, indeed, a march of nearly nineteen +miles had reached Puttlingen at one o'clock, where it +was little more than four miles distant from Stiering. +When the fighting about Saarbrücken was heard it is +true that at four p.m. the advanced guard moved forward +to Rossel. It would seem that the roar of the +cannon was not audible in that wooded region; the +impression was that the combat was over, and the +Division bivouacked at Völkingen, which place had +been previously named as the end of its march by the +Corps Commander at a time when he was, of course, +unable to foresee the change in the situation.</p> + +<p>The French offensive movement had meanwhile been +brought to a stand by the seven batteries in position on +the Folster height; the infantry then succeeded in +making fresh progress, under the personal leadership +of General von Zastrow.</p> + +<p>The nature of the ground entirely prohibited the +twenty-nine squadrons of cavalry which had arrived +from all directions and were drawn up out of the range +of fire, from taking part in the action. The Hussars +tried in vain to ride up the Red Hill, but in spite of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[24]</a></span> +incredible difficulties Major von Lyncker finally gained +the summit with eight guns, amid the loud cheering of +the hard-pressed infantry. The guns, as each one came +up, at once came into action against three French batteries; +but quite half of the gunners were shot down +by sheltered French tirailleurs, at a range of about 800 +paces. A small strip of ground in front was indeed +won, but the narrow space allowed of no deployment +against the wide front of the enemy.</p> + +<p>But effective assistance was coming from the right. +General von Goeben had despatched all the battalions of +the 16th Division not yet engaged, in the decisive direction +toward Stiering. While one part of these troops +made a frontal attack on the village, the rest climbed +from the high-road up the defiles of the Spicheren woods, +in a hand-to-hand encounter drove the French from the +saddle leading to the Red Hill, and pushed them farther +and farther back towards the Forbach height.</p> + +<p>Even as late as seven o'clock on the French right +wing Laveaucoupet's Division, supported by part of +Bataille's, advanced to the attack and once more penetrated +into the oft-contested Gifert wood, but the danger +threatening the French left wing from the Spicheren +wood paralyzed this effort. By nightfall the French +were falling back over the whole plateau.</p> + +<p>At nine o'clock, when their "Retreat" call was +sounding from the heights, General von Schwerin (commanding +10th Infantry Brigade) made sure of night +quarters by occupying Stiering, where resistance was +only quelled, at many points, after a hand-to-hand fight. +The advanced guard of the 13th Division advanced on +Forbach, but did not occupy it, having allowed itself +to be hoodwinked by some French Dragoons in +possession.</p> + +<p>Apart from this, General Frossard had abandoned the +line of retreat by the so seriously threatened Forbach-St. +Avold road, and fell back with all his three divisions +on Oetingen. The darkness, and the impossibility of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[25]</a></span> +handling large bodies of cavalry in such a country, +saved him from further pursuit.</p> + +<p>General von Steinmetz ordered the reorganization of +the dislocated bodies of troops that same night. Some +of them had marched more than twenty-eight miles; +two batteries, arriving from Königsberg by rail, had +immediately set out for the battle-field. But it remains +that the Germans at no time of the day +attained the numerical strength of the enemy in this +engagement, which had been begun with insufficient +forces. Only thirteen batteries could be brought into +action in the limited space, and the cavalry remained +excluded from all participation. It was only natural, +under the circumstances, that the losses of the assailants +were greater than those of the defence. The Prussians +lost 4871, the French 4078 men. The fact was significant +that a considerable number of unwounded French +prisoners were taken in this early action.</p> + +<p>In strong contrast to the comradeship and mutual +helpfulness displayed by the Prussian Generals, and the +eagerness of their troops to hurry into the fight, was the +strange vacillation of the Divisions in General Frossard's +rear; of which three, indeed, were sent forward to his +support, but only two came up, and that when the fight +was already ended.</p> + +<p>It has been vehemently asserted that the battle of +Spicheren was fought in an ill-judged locality, and that +it interfered with more important plans. It certainly had +not been anticipated. But, generally speaking, a tactical +victory rarely fails to fit in with a strategic design. +Success in battle has always been thankfully accepted, +and turned to account. By the battle of Spicheren the +IInd French Corps was prevented from withdrawing +unharmed; touch of the enemy's main force was +obtained, and to the supreme Direction of the armies +was afforded a basis for further resolutions.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[26]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> South-eastward.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> There were two Major-Generals of this name, both commanding +Brigades; one the 28th, VIIth Corps, the other 39th, Xth Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Commanding 16th Division, VIIIth Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Commanded by General Glümen.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Right Wheel of the German Army.</span></h2> + + +<p>Marshal MacMahon in his retreat had taken a +direction which entirely severed his touch with Marshal +Bazaine.</p> + +<p>As he was not pursued, he could have used the Lunéville-Metz +railway to effect his union with the French +main army; for up to the 9th it was still open. But +rumour had it that the Prussians had already appeared +in Pont à Mousson, and the state of his troops did not +permit him thus early to risk another engagement.</p> + +<p>His Ist Corps, therefore, marched southwards on +Neufchâteau, whence Châlons could be reached by railway. +The Vth Corps was being shifted to and fro by +contradictory orders from the Emperor's head-quarters. +First it was to proceed to Nancy, then to take an +opposite direction towards Langres. On arriving at +Charmes it was ordered to Toul, but from Chaumont it +was finally directed to proceed to Châlons. General +Trochu had there located the newly-formed XIIth +Corps, and behind this gathering point the VIIth Corps +also managed to get away from Alsace and reach Rheims +by rail by way of Bar sur Aube and Paris.</p> + +<p>Thus by August 22nd a Reserve Army was formed, +consisting of four Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, +under the command of Marshal MacMahon, who, however, +at a distance, as he was, of about 120 miles, +was unable to render timely assistance to Marshal +Bazaine, who stood directly in the line of the advancing +enemy.</p> + +<p>When the news of the double disaster of August 6th +reached the Imperial Head-quarter, the first impression +there was that it would be necessary to retreat +immediately on Châlons with Bazaine's army; and the +VIth Corps, a portion of which was already being +transported thence to Metz, was ordered to retrace its +steps. But this resolution was presently retracted. +The Emperor had not merely to consider the foreign<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[27]</a></span> +enemy, but public opinion within his own realm. The +sacrifice of entire provinces at the very beginning of +a war which had been undertaken with such high +anticipations, would have provoked the unbounded +indignation of the French people. There were still +200,000 men who could be brought together in front +of the Moselle, supported by a large fortress, and though +the enemy would still have the superiority in numbers, +his army was holding a line nearly sixty miles long. +It had yet to cross the Moselle, and this would +necessitate a dislocation which might create a weakness +at the critical moment.</p> + +<p>In the IIIrd German Army the disorderly condition +of the defeated enemy was not known, nor even the +direction of his retreat. It was expected that +MacMahon's Army would be found rallied on the +farther side of the Vosges for renewed resistance; and +as it was impossible to cross the mountains except in +detached columns, the German advance was very +cautious, and by short marches only. Though the +distance between Reichshofen and the Saar is not more +than about twenty-eight miles in a straight line, that +river was only reached in five days. Nothing was seen +of the enemy, except in the fortified places, small +indeed, but too strong to be taken by storm, which +command the highways in the mountains. Bitsch had +to be avoided by a fatiguing circuit, Lichtenberg was +captured by surprise, Lützelstein had been abandoned +by its garrison, the investment of Pfalzburg was handed +over to the approaching VIth Corps, and Marsal +capitulated after a short resistance.</p> + +<p>The German left wing had no enemy before it, and +could be brought into closer connection with the centre. +To bring the three armies abreast of each other a wheel +to the right was requisite. The advance of the Ist and +IInd Armies had, however, to be delayed, as the IIIrd +did not reach the Saar until August 12th. The whole +movement was so arranged that the IIIrd Army was to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[28]</a></span> +use the roads by Saarunion and Dieuze, and to southward; +the IInd those by St. Avold and Nomény and to +southward; the Ist those by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, +the last also taking the direction of Metz.</p> + +<p>The cavalry Divisions which were reconnoitring far +to the front, reported the enemy as retreating all along +the line. They ranged close up to Metz, and across +the Moselle both above and below the place, forcing +the detachments of Canrobert's Corps, which had again +been ordered up from Châlons, to return thither. All +their information indicated that very large masses were +encamped in front of Metz. From this it might equally +be inferred that the enemy intended to retreat further, +or, with his whole force concentrated, to strike hard at +the right wing of the German Army, at the moment +when the impending crossing of the Moselle should +make its severance from the left wing unavoidable.</p> + +<p>The chief Head-quarter restricted itself in ordinary +course to issuing general directions, the execution of +which was left in detail to the army commanders; but +in this instance it was deemed necessary in the +momentary circumstances to regulate the movements of +each separate corps by specific orders. On August +11th the Head-quarter of his Majesty was therefore +transferred to St. Avold, in the front line, and midway +between the Ist and IInd Armies, so as, by being in +the immediate vicinity, to be able to exercise timely +authority to either hand. The three Corps of the Ist +Army advanced towards the German Nied on August +12th, only to find that the French had evacuated that +position. Three Corps of the IInd Army on the left of +the Ist also moved forward in prolongation of the same +front by Faulquemont and Morhange, while two others +followed.</p> + +<p>On the next day the IInd Army reached the Seille, +without encountering the enemy, and occupied Pont à +Mousson with infantry.</p> + +<p>The strangely inactive attitude of the French made +it seem quite probable that they might not make any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[29]</a></span> +stand in front of Metz, a probability strengthened by +the reports of the German cavalry, which was scouting +as far as Toul and on to the Verdun road. But there +always loomed the possibility that the enemy would +throw himself with 200 battalions on the Ist Army, +now in his immediate front. The two Corps forming +the right wing of the IInd Army were therefore +ordered to halt for the present, a little to the south of +Metz, ready to deliver a shattering blow on the flank +of any such attack. If the enemy preferred to assail +these Corps, then would devolve on the Ist Army on its +part the prompt assumption of the offensive.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the other Corps of the IInd Army were +pursuing the march towards the Moselle farther to the +southward; if the enemy should attack them with +superior forces after they had crossed the river, it +would be possible for them, in case of need, to fall back +on the IIIrd Army.</p> + +<p>So much caution was not universally deemed +essential; it was argued that the French seemed +already committed to full retreat, they ought not to +be allowed to get away without punishment, and it +followed that the German Army should strike without +delay. The French had, indeed, already committed +themselves to a further retreat; but when in the afternoon +(of the 14th) the VIIth Corps discerned their retrograde +movement, a fight began on the hither side of +the Moselle, which, by the voluntary intervention of +the nearest bodies of troops, developed into a battle in +the course of the evening.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Colombey—Nouilly.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 14th.)</div> + + +<p>The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability +to hold that place for a fortnight, if left to his own +resources; but the chosen and intrenched position on +the Nied, taken up to cover the fortress, had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[30]</a></span> +found locally defective, and the French Head-quarter +hoped to find a more favourable defensive position +in the vicinity of Verdun.</p> + +<p>Military necessity outweighed even a politic regard +for public opinion, and the Emperor, although he had +transferred the command-in-chief to Marshal Bazaine, +still remained with the army, for it would have been +impossible for him to return to Paris in existing +circumstances.</p> + +<p>Very early in the morning of the 14th August the +multitudinous trains were being withdrawn through +the city, and towards noon the IInd, IVth, and VIth +Corps got in motion, while the IIIrd Corps remained +in position behind the deep valley of the Colombey +brook, to cover the retirement.</p> + +<p>When, at four in the afternoon, the break-up of the +enemy was perceived, General von der Goltz (commanding +26th Infantry Brigade) with the advanced guard +of the VIIth Corps struck him in the act, and wrenched +from him Colombey and the Château d'Aubigny on +his right flank. But, at the first cannon sound, the +French columns immediately turned about, fully +equipped for fighting, and eager, after their many +previous disasters, to break the spell by a desperate +effort. Castagny's Division threw itself in greatly +superior force upon the weak German detachment in +the isolated position of Colombey, which held its own +only by the utmost exertion.</p> + +<p>Already the advanced guard of the Ist Army Corps +was approaching by both the high-roads from Saarbrücken +and Saarlouis; and its batteries having pushed +on ahead, at once took part in the engagement. Passing +through Lauvallier, the infantry followed close, climbed +the eastern slope of the plateau of Bellecroix, and +farther to the right drove the enemy out of the wood +east of Mey. But the presence at this point of the +main body of the French IIIrd Corps gave pause to the +German offensive for the time.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[31]</a></span></p> + +<p>The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile +followed their respective advanced guards, the two +latter having been held in full readiness by General +von Manteuffel ever since his outposts had reported +that the enemy was moving. General von Zastrow, +too, arrived on the field, and took over the command +of the left wing. Soon sixty field-pieces were in action +against the enemy. General von Osten-Sacken hurried +forward the 25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy, +and climbed on to the edge of the upland. The clump +of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken by +storm, was surrounded on three sides, was lost again in +a bloody conflict, and was once more recaptured. Soon +afterwards two batteries succeeded in establishing themselves +above Planchette, whose fire drove the French +back as far as Borny; yet still the conflict raged on +both sides with the utmost fury.</p> + +<p>But now there threatened the German right the +danger of being out-flanked. General Ladmirault, on +learning that Grenier's Division had been driven out of +Mey, immediately set out to its support with his other +two Divisions, retook the village, and pressed farther forward +by the Bouzonville road. General von Manteuffel +had meanwhile given the necessary orders for holding, +at all hazards, the deep-cut trough of the Vallières +brook which covered the flank. The 1st Brigade was +posted behind Noisseville as general reserve, the 4th, +and part of the artillery of the Ist Corps, marched by +the Bouzonville road to confront General Ladmirault +near Poix, while the remaining batteries from the +southern slopes to the eastward of Nouilly enfiladed his +advance. On the left, Glümer's Division (13th) had all +this time been holding its ground at Colombey, and +now, at seven o'clock in the evening, Woyna's Brigade +came to its assistance, and took possession of the +copses westward of Colombey. A very welcome reinforcement +now arrived from the IInd Army remaining +halted on the Seille.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[32]</a></span></p> + +<p>The 18th Infantry Division, after a heavy march, +had bivouacked near Buchy in the afternoon, but when +General von Wrangel (its commander) was informed +that fighting was audible from the locality of the Ist +Army, he promptly set his Division in motion in that +direction. He drove the enemy out of Peltre, and +then in conjunction with Woyna's Brigade occupied +Grigy, somewhat in rear of the French position in front +of Borny.</p> + +<p>On the right wing of the fighting line, the 2nd +Division had also pushed on towards Mey, by way of +Nouilly and through the adjacent vineyards; and, as +darkness was setting in, that village and the adjoining +woods were wrenched from the enemy. The French +had not advanced beyond Villers L'Orme, and they now +withdrew all along their line from that village to Grigy. +The Prussians, as they followed up after dark, were +molested only by the fire of the heavy guns of the +forts, more especially Fort St. Julien.</p> + +<p>The engagement of August 14th cost them the heavy +loss of 5000 men, inclusive of 200 officers; while the +French lost only 3600 men, their IIIrd Corps being +the heaviest sufferer. The vicinity of a great fortress +of course prevented the reaping of the fruits of victory +by an immediate pursuit. It was for the same reason +that a battle on the part of the Ist Army on that day +had not been included in the concerted plan of action, +though the possibility of such an occurrence had been +foreseen. Although it was true that but one Division of +the IInd Army (the 18th) had been able to hasten to the +aid of the Ist, and that after the late opening of the fight, +its assault on the left<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> flank of the enemy had not failed +of its effect.</p> + +<p>The manner in which the battle originated rendered +unity of direction impossible.</p> + +<p>It was but the advanced-guards of four Divisions +which were the troops principally engaged; and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[33]</a></span> +daring attacks made on greatly superior hostile forces +by small bodies unfollowed by immediate supports +occasioned many critical moments, which might have +been dangerous if the enemy had pushed forward more +energetically in closely concentrated strength. But +while, for instance, his IIIrd Corps received no support +from the Imperial Guard standing close behind it, the +contrast presented itself that on the Prussian side, in +this as in the previous battles, there shone forth, along +with their ready acceptance of personal responsibility, +the eager mutual helpfulness of all the commanders +within reach of the battle-field.</p> + +<p>An essential share of the success of the day must be +attributed to the artillery. Hurrying along in front, +leaving the responsibility of covering it to the advanced +guards which reached forward before the main bodies +of the Divisions had time to come up, it drove the +French completely out of their positions before Metz, +and back under the guns of the defences of the +place.</p> + +<p>The protection so afforded to the enemy rendered +it impossible that the victory of Colombey-Nouilly +should yield any trophies, but the supreme Command +was quite content with the results obtained. The retreat +of the enemy had been arrested, and a day had +been gained for the crossing of the Moselle by the IInd +and IIIrd Armies.</p> + +<p><i>August 15th.</i>—In the early morning of the 15th the +cavalry had ridden forward to the outworks of Metz, but +found none of the enemy on this side of the fortress. +A few shells scared away the Imperial Head-quarter +from Longeville on the further side of the Moselle.</p> + +<p>As King William was riding over to visit the Ist +Army, immense clouds of dust were observed rising on +the further side of the fortress; and it was no longer +doubtful that the French had begun their retreat, and +that the IInd Army was henceforth free to follow +across the Moselle with all its Corps.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[34]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Ist Corps of the Ist Army was necessarily left at +Courcelles, south of Metz, to protect the railway, the +other two were brought up leftward towards the Seille; +and they were also by-and-by to cross the Moselle higher +up, so as to avoid interference from the fortress.</p> + +<p>The French had started again on the retreat interrupted +on the previous day, but proceeded little more +than four miles<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> beyond Metz on August 15th. Their +cavalry only went somewhat farther ahead, by both the +roads to Verdun.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Corps of the German IInd Army crossed +the Moselle at Novéant, by the bridge which was found +intact, and by a flying pontoon bridge; its artillery, +however, was forced to make a détour by Pont à Mousson.</p> + +<p>It was not until late at night that the troops were +all across and in bivouac close to the left bank. One +Division of the Xth Corps remained at Pont à Mousson +and the other advanced to Thiaucourt. The cavalry +scouted farther forward towards the Metz-Verdun +road, and struck in on the French cavalry near Mars la +Tour. Several small engagements took place, but +when early in the afternoon twenty-four Prussian +squadrons had assembled, the French retired on Vionville. +The Guard Corps and the IVth Corps crossed at +Dieulouard and Marbache, higher up the river.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Army advanced to the line Nancy-Bayon. +On this day an attempt to seize the fortress of +Thionville by surprise proved a failure.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Clearly should be "right."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> On the night of 15th, four of Bazaine's five Corps (less one +Division) bivouacked at distances of from eight to ten miles westward +of Metz; viz., from beyond Rezonville rearward to Gravelotte.</p></div> + +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 16th.)</div> + + +<p>In the Head-quarter of the IInd Army there was the +belief that serious fighting with the French was no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[35]</a></span> +more to be anticipated on the Moselle, and therefore +two Corps, the IIIrd and the Xth, were ordered to +march on August 16th, northwards toward the road to +Verdun by way of Gorze and Thiaucourt, while the +other Corps were directed to advance by forced marches +westwards towards the Meuse.</p> + +<p>The French retreat from Metz was, however, not +completely effected on this day. The trains blocked +every road, and in the forenoon three Divisions still +remained behind in the Moselle valley. The Emperor, +however, escorted by two brigades of cavalry, had +departed at an early hour by the road through Etain, +which was still comparatively safe. As the right wing +of the army could not yet follow, the prosecution of +the retreat was postponed until the afternoon, and +the left wing, which had already begun the march, +was sent back again into its bivouacs. But so early +as nine o'clock Prussian shells startled the troops from +their rest.</p> + +<p>Major Körber had advanced with four batteries +close up to Vionville under cover of the cavalry, and +the French troopers, surprised by their fire, fled in +utter confusion through the camp of the infantry. +The latter, however, briskly got under arms in good +order, and the artillery opened a heavy fire. Destitute +at first of infantry supports, the Prussian guns were +withdrawn. Matters soon became serious.</p> + +<p>General von Alvensleben, fearing lest he should fail +to overtake the enemy, had started again with the IIIrd +Corps after a short night's rest. The 6th Division +marched on the left, by Onville; the 5th, on the right, +followed the long forest valley on the way to Gorze. +This valley so capable of defence was found unoccupied +by the enemy, who indeed had taken very few precautions. +The advanced-guard presently encountered +Bergés' French Division on the open plateau south of +Flavigny, and General von Stülpnagel (commanding 5th +Infantry Division) soon discovered that he had before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[36]</a></span> +him an enemy whom it would take all his strength to +beat. At ten o'clock he began operations by sending +forward the 10th Brigade (commanded by General von +Schwerin); and opened fire with twenty-four guns.</p> + +<p>Both sides now assumed the offensive. The Prussians, +on the right, fought their way with varying +fortunes through the wood, often in hand-to-hand +encounter, and, towards eleven o'clock, succeeded in +reaching the spur of the wood of St. Arnould projecting +in the direction of Flavigny. Their left wing, on the +contrary, was repulsed; even the artillery was in +danger; but the 52nd Regiment hurried forward and +re-established the fight at the cost of bloody sacrifices. +Its 1st Battalion lost every one of its officers, the +colours passed from hand to hand as its bearers were +successively shot down, and the commander of the 9th +Brigade, General von Döring, fell mortally wounded. +General von Stülpnagel rode up into the foremost line +of fire, inspiriting the men with brave words, while +General von Schwerin collected the remnants of troops +bereft of their leaders, and, reinforced by a detachment +of the Xth Corps from Novéant, carried the height +in front of Flavigny, whence the French presently +retired.</p> + +<p>On the assumption that the French were already prosecuting +the retreat, the 6th Division had been ordered +forward towards Etain by way of Mars la Tour, to bar +the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun. When +it reached the height of Tronville, whence could be seen +how things really stood, the brigades wheeled to the +right in the direction of Vionville and Flavigny. The +artillery going on in advance, formed a formidable line +of batteries, the fire of which prepared the way for a +farther advance, and by half-past eleven the 11th Brigade +had taken possession of Vionville in spite of heavy +losses. From thence, and from the south, in conjunction +with the 10th Brigade, an attack was then directed +on Flavigny, which had been set on fire by shell-fire.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[37]</a></span> +The different detachments were hereabouts very much +mixed, but by skilfully taking advantage of every fold +of the ground, the individual regimental officers succeeded +in getting their men steadily forward, in spite +of the heavy fire of the hostile infantry and artillery. +Flavigny was taken by assault, and one cannon and a +number of prisoners fell into the hands of the brave +Brandenburgers.</p> + +<p>Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the +forest of St. Arnould constituted the points of support +of the Prussian front now facing to the east; but this +front was more than four miles long, and the whole +infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt all +in one line. The second line consisted only of the 5th +and 6th Cavalry Divisions and half of the 37th Brigade +near Tronville.</p> + +<p>The position of the French was one of great advantage. +Their left flank leaned on Metz, their right was +protected by formidable batteries on the old Roman road +and a strong force of cavalry; and so they could await +with confidence a frontal attack on the part of a +venturesome enemy.</p> + +<p>The possibility of continuing the march to Verdun +on this day, under the protection of a strong covering +rearguard, was, no doubt, out of the question. Supposing +the Marshal earnest above everything to effect +his retreat, he could do so only by fighting hard for +his right of way, and by so freeing himself from the +enemy blocking his path.</p> + +<p>It is not easy to discern, from a purely military +standpoint, why this course was not resorted to. +There was the full certainty that only part, and +probably only a small part, of the German host could +as yet have reached the left side of the Moselle, and +when in the course of the day the Divisions detained +about Metz arrived, the French had greatly the +superiority in strength. But it seems that the Marshal's +chief solicitude was lest he should be forced to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[38]</a></span> +relinquish his touch of Metz; and he gave almost his +whole attention to his left wing. Constantly sending +fresh reinforcements thither, he massed the whole +Guard Corps and part of the VIth Corps opposite the +Bois des Ognons, whence an attack was exceptionally +improbable. One is tempted to assume that political +reasons alone thus early actuated Bazaine in his +resolve to cling to Metz.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Prussians slowly but surely made +their way beyond Flavigny and Vionville, and, assisted +by a heavy fire from the artillery, compelled the right +wing of the IInd French Corps to retire on Rezonville, +a movement which became a flight when the French +Generals Bataille and Valazé were killed.</p> + +<p>To regain the lost ground the French Guard Cuirassier +Regiment threw itself resolutely on the pursuers. +But its attack was cut short by the rapid fire of two companies +of the 52nd Regiment drawn up in line, which +reserved their fire till the enemy were within 250 +paces. The horsemen sweeping right and left rushed +into the fire of more infantry behind; 243 horses +strewed the field, and only the remnants of the regiment +wheeled about in swift flight, pursued by two +Hussar regiments which had dashed forward from +Flavigny. A French battery in front of Rezonville +had hardly time to discharge a few shots before it was +surrounded. For want of teams the Prussians could +not, indeed, carry off the captured guns; but the +Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who had +himself brought them up, was for several minutes in +imminent danger of being taken prisoner.</p> + +<p>The 6th Prussian Cavalry Division had also been +ordered to the front. After passing through the line +of artillery and deploying as well as the limited space +permitted, it found itself face to face with fresh and +completely formed troops. Marshal Bazaine had taken +the precaution of substituting for the routed bodies +of the IInd Corps the Guard Grenadier Division,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[39]</a></span> +which he had at last prevailed on himself to bring up +from his unengaged left wing, but not without filling +the vacancy by a Division of the IIIrd Corps. Thus +the Prussian cavalry was received with such an overwhelming +musketry and artillery fire that it halted, +and deliberately retired, its retreat being covered by +two squadrons of Uhlans, which time after time showed +a front against the enemy. The cavalry had not +actually engaged, but its advance had gained time and +opportunity for the artillery to move further forward +in one line from the spur of the wood to Flavigny.</p> + +<p>It was now two o'clock. So far General von Alvensleben +had deceived the enemy with regard to the +slenderness of his force by acting incessantly on the +offensive. But the battle was now at a standstill, the +battalions were visibly thinned, their strength was +sapped by four hours of hard fighting, and the ammunition +of the infantry was almost exhausted. Not a +battalion, not a battery remained in reserve behind the +fighting line standing there in the fire. It was now +required to conserve the success won with so much +blood by acting thenceforth on the defensive.</p> + +<p>The left wing was in especial danger, being under +the fire of the powerful artillery deployed on the +Roman road. Their greatly superior numbers enabled +the French to extend farther and farther to the right, +threatening thus completely to envelop the Prussian +flank.</p> + +<p>Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had discerned +the right moment to press forward against +Vionville with all his might. At this critical instant +there was on the German side only a small detachment +of the 5th Cavalry Division available to check this effort. +Two brigades had necessarily been sent to strengthen the +left flank, and of the 12th Brigade remaining in rear of +Vionville two squadrons had been detached to the +Tronville copses. The two regiments ordered to +undertake the task of charging the advancing enemy—the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[40]</a></span> +Magdeburg Cuirassiers and the Altmark Uhlans—were +consequently each but three squadrons strong, in +all 800 horses.</p> + +<p>General von Bredow, commanding the 12th Cavalry +Brigade, first traversed in column the shallow hollow +sinking down from Vionville, then wheeled to the right +and mounted the slope to the eastward, both his +regiments on one front. Received immediately with +heavy artillery and infantry fire, he threw himself on the +hostile ranks. The first line is ridden over, the line of +guns is broken through, gunners and teams are put to the +sword. The second French line is powerless to resist +this vigorous onslaught, and even the more distant +batteries limbered up to drive away.</p> + +<p>But the rapture of victory and the impetuosity of the +charge carried the handful of troopers too far, and after +a gallop of 3000 paces they found themselves surrounded +by the French cavalry, which attacked them +from all sides. There was no scope for a second charge, +and so after several encounters with the French horse +the brigade was forced to cut its way back through the +French infantry, whose bullets accompanied it home. +Only one-half of the command returned to Flavigny, +where it was reorganized into two squadrons. The +devoted self-sacrifice of the two heroic regiments effected +the result, that the French entirely discontinued their +attack on Vionville.</p> + +<p>At three o'clock four of their Divisions advanced +towards the Tronville copses. Barby's cavalry brigade +(11th), watching the western verge, had to retire before +the enemy's fire, and the German infantry occupying the +wood also had to yield to a strength so superior; the +batteries which were in action between Vionville and +the copses were assailed in rear from the west through +the glades of the copses, and were likewise forced to +retire. But not until the lapse of an hour did the +French succeed in overcoming the obstinate resistance +of four staunch battalions.</p> + +<p>At the subsequent roll-call near Tronville, it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[41]</a></span> +ascertained that the 24th Regiment had lost 1000 +men and 52 officers, and that the 2nd Battalion of the +20th Regiment had lost all its officers. The 37th +demi-Brigade, which of its own accord had been +fighting valiantly in support since noon, took possession +of the village of Tronville and prepared it +for an obstinate defence.</p> + +<p>It was not till after three that the IIIrd Corps, +which had been fighting for seven<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> hours almost single-handed, +received effective assistance.</p> + +<p>While the Xth Corps was on the march through +Thiaucourt, its advanced guard heard cannon-fire from +the direction of Vionville. The Corps Commander, +General von Voigts-Rhetz, immediately set out for the +battle-field, and having personally ascertained how +matters stood, he sent back the requisite orders to his +approaching troops.</p> + +<p>In this instance again it was the artillery which, +hurrying on in advance, masterfully struck into the +conflict. Its fire, in conjunction with that of the +promptly further advancing batteries of the IIIrd Corps, +checked the French rush made on both sides of the +Tronville copses simultaneously. At half-past three +the head of von Woyna's Brigade (39th) fell on, drove +the enemy back into the wood, and finally, supported +by Diringshofen's Brigade (40th), took possession of +its northern outskirts.</p> + +<p>The right wing of the IIIrd Corps had also received +some reinforcement.</p> + +<p>The 32nd Brigade of the VIIIth Corps, on being +called upon to assist the 5th Division, fatigued though +it was by a long march, immediately advanced from +the Moselle by Arry. The 11th Regiment joined it, +and three batteries were sent ahead to commence +operations; this force emerged at five o'clock from the +forest of St. Arnould. It at once made an assault on +the heights in front of Maison Blanche, but, though it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[42]</a></span> +made three strenuous efforts in succession, failed to +carry them, since Marshal Bazaine had greatly +strengthened his position in front of Rezonville. Then +the French, in their turn, took the offensive there; but +were equally unable to establish themselves firmly on +the heights, swept as they were by the well-directed +fire of the Prussian artillery; and they had to withdraw +from the attempt. Petty struggles for this +position were renewed later on both sides, but those +spurts came to nothing because of the fire of the +respective artillery; and the fighting on the German +right became in the main stationary.</p> + +<p>That on the German left two French Divisions had +retired before a few newly-arrived battalions, and had +evacuated the Tronville copses, can only be explained +by a report having reached Bazaine's head-quarters +that the enemy was coming in upon his right flank in +the vicinity of Hannonville.</p> + +<p>The enemy referred to was Wedell's Brigade (38th), +which, while on the march in the direction of Etain +according to its original orders, had received counter-instructions +while halted at St. Hilaire at noon, to +hurry to the field of battle. General von Schwartzkoppen +(commanding 19th Infantry Division) decided +to march by the highway to Mars la Tour, in the hope +of falling on the enemy either in flank or in rear. But +the French meanwhile had extended their reinforced +right wing to the sunken valley west of Bruville, where +three Divisions of their cavalry were massed in position.</p> + +<p>Thus when General von Wedell advanced to the +attack on both sides of Tronville, which the French +themselves had fired, his brigade—only five battalions +strong—found itself in face of the long deployed front of +the 4th French Corps. The two Westphalian regiments +advanced steadily under the storm of shell and +mitrailleuse fire till they suddenly reached the edge +of a deep ravine hitherto unseen. This, however, +they soon traversed, and were climbing the farther +ascent, when they were met by a murderous shower<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[43]</a></span> +of bullets from the French infantry which hemmed +them in closely on every side. After almost every +one of the commanders and regimental officers had +fallen, the wreck of the battalions fell back into the +ravine; 300 men were taken prisoners, having no +strength left to ascend the steep southern rise after +the fatigue of a twenty-eight miles march. The remainder +rallied at Tronville under the shot-torn colours +which Colonel von Cranach, the only officer who still had +a horse under him, had brought back in his own hand. +Seventy-two officers and 2542 men were missing +out of 95 officers and 4546 men—more than half. +The French followed up their success, but were checked +on the right by the headlong charge of the 1st Guard +Dragoons, which cost that regiment 250 horses and nearly +all its officers; and on the left by the 4th squadron of the +2nd Guard Dragoons, which attacked three times its +strength of Chasseurs d'Afrique.</p> + +<p>But there now imminently threatened the charge of +a great mass of French cavalry, which disclosed itself +on the open plateau of Ville sur Yron. This consisted +of Legrand's Division and de France's Guard Brigade in +four compact echelons, overlapping each other to the +right. On the German side, all the still disposable +cavalry joined Barby's brigade, and the body thus made +up, consisting only of sixteen squadrons, was formed for +action in two lines west of Mars la Tour. Farther in +advance stood the 13th Dragoons, halted to receive the +Guard-squadron on its return from its recent charge. +The 13th galloped forward to meet the charge of +Montaigu's Hussar Brigade, which constituted the first +line of the French cavalry mass, and which broke +through the (over-wide) intervals of the Prussian +squadrons. But General von Barby promptly appeared +with the other regiments on the upland of Ville sur +Yron, where at a quarter to seven the cavalry masses +came into collision.</p> + +<p>A mighty cloud of dust concealed the varying phases +of the hand-to-hand encounter of 5000 horsemen which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[44]</a></span> +gradually declared itself in favour of the Prussians. +General Montaigu, severely wounded, was taken +prisoner, and General Legrand fell while leading his +Dragoons to the assistance of the Hussars.</p> + +<p>De France's Brigade allowed the enemy to approach +within 150 paces, and then its Lancer regiment rushed +impetuously upon the Hanoverian Uhlans; but the +latter outflanked it, and received unexpected assistance +from the 5th squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, +which, returning from a reconnaissance, plunged forward +over fences and ditches and fell upon the enemy +in flank, while the Westphalian Cuirassiers at the same +time broke his front. The Chasseurs d'Afrique strove +in vain to hinder the enveloping tactics of the Hanoverian +Dragoons; the clouds of dust drifted farther and +farther northward, and the whole mass of French horse +drew away towards the wooded slopes of Bruville, +behind which there were still five regiments of Clérembault's +Cavalry Division. Clérembault permitted one +of his brigades to cross the valley, but the fleeing +Hussars and some misunderstood signals threw it into +confusion. It was borne back, and not until the French +infantry confronted the Prussian pursuers in the covering +valley did the latter desist from the pursuit.</p> + +<p>The Prussian regiments quietly re-formed and then +withdrew at a walk to Mars la Tour, followed at a great +distance by part of Clérembault's Division.</p> + +<p>This, the greatest cavalry combat of the war, had the +effect of making the French right wing give up all further +attempts to act on the offensive. The Germans +mourned the loss of many superior officers, who always, +at the head of their men, had set them a glorious +example.</p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles had hastened to the field of +battle. The day was nearly at an end, darkness approaching, +and the battle won. The Prussians in the +evening stood on the ground which in the morning had +been occupied by the French. Though General von +Alvensleben had in the first instance been under the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[45]</a></span> +impression that he would have only the French rear-guard +to deal with, he did not hesitate for a moment to +become the assailant when he found the entire French +Army before him. With his single Corps he maintained +the fight till the afternoon, and drove back the +enemy from Flavigny to Rezonville, a distance of more +than two miles. This was one of the most brilliant +achievements of all the war.</p> + +<p>Thanks to the valuable assistance of the Xth Corps it +was possible to carry on the battle through the afternoon +on the defensive, but only by most resolute +counter-attacks by the cavalry, and by the unflinching +tenacity of the artillery.</p> + +<p>It was clearly most unadvisable to challenge by renewed +attacks an enemy who still outnumbered the +Germans; which action, since no further reinforcements +could be hoped for, could not but jeopardize the success +so dearly bought. The troops were exhausted, most +of their ammunition was spent, the horses had been +under the saddle for fifteen hours without fodder; some +of the batteries could only move at a walk, and the +nearest Army Corps on the left bank of the Moselle, +the XIIth,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> was distant more than a day's march.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding all these considerations, an order +from Prince Frederick Charles's Head-quarter issued +at seven o'clock, commanded a renewed and general +attack on the enemy's positions. The Xth Corps was +quite incapable of answering this demand; and only +part of the artillery went forward on the right followed +by some infantry. The batteries indeed reached the +much-disputed plateau south of Rezonville, but only +to be exposed on two sides to the fire of infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[46]</a></span> +and artillery. Fifty-four guns of the French Guard +alone, in position on the farther side of the valley, were +taking them in flank. The Prussian batteries were +compelled to retreat to their previous position, but +two brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division still pressed +forward. Scarcely able to discern in the increasing +darkness where lay their proper line of attack, they +came under very sharp infantry fire, and withdrew with +great loss.</p> + +<p>Fighting did not entirely cease until ten o'clock. On +either side 16,000 men had fallen. On either side pursuit +was out of the question. The Germans reaped the +fruits of this victory solely in its results. The troops, +worn out by a twelve hours' struggle, bivouacked on +the victorious but bloody field, immediately opposite +the French position.</p> + +<p>Those Corps of the IInd Army which had not taken +part in the battle, were on that day on march towards +the Meuse. The advanced guard of the IVth Corps on +the left wing was heading towards Toul. This fortress, +commanding a railway-line of importance to the further +progress of the German Army, was reported to be but +feebly held, and it was resolved to attempt its capture +by a <i>coup de main</i>. But the bombardment of it by +field-artillery proved quite ineffective. Bastions of +masonry and wide wet ditches made a storm impossible. +An attempt to batter down the gates by shot +and thus gain an entrance proved a failure. Finally +the undertaking was given up, and not without some +loss on the part of the Germans.</p> + +<p>At the Royal Head-quarter in Pont à Mousson it +had become known by about noon on the 16th that the +IIIrd Corps was engaged in serious conflict, and that +the Xth and IXth were hastening up to its support. +The far-reaching consequences of this information were +recognized at once.</p> + +<p>The French were arrested in their withdrawal from +Metz, but it was to be presumed as a certainty that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[47]</a></span> +they would again make strenuous efforts to force open +their interrupted line of retreat. The XIIth Corps +was therefore ordered to set out for Mars la Tour as +early as three o'clock next morning; the VIIth and +VIIIth Corps to stand in readiness at Corny and Arry. +The bridging operations were to be pushed with the +utmost vigour during the night. The Head-quarter of +the IInd Army sent from Gorze the order to the Guard +Corps to make a forced march to Mars la Tour, and +there take up a position on the left of the XIIth Corps. +The execution of these orders was facilitated by the +foresight of the Commanders, who had in the course of +the day received news of the battle which was being +fought. Prince George of Saxony at once placed his +Division on the march to Thiaucourt, and the Prince of +Würtemberg assembled the Infantry of the Guard in +its cantonments farther northward in readiness for an +early march.</p> + +<p><i>August 17th.</i>—On this morning, at sunrise, the +French outposts were observed still occupying the +sweep of front from Bruville to Rezonville. Behind +them were noticed a stir and much noise of signalling, +which might be the indications equally of an attack +or of a retirement.</p> + +<p>The King arrived from Pont à Mousson at Flavigny +as early as six o'clock. The reports sent in to headquarters +until noon by the reconnoitring cavalry were +somewhat contradictory; they left it uncertain whether +the French were concentrating towards Metz, or were +pursuing their retreat by the two still open roads +through Etain and Briey. Preparations for the +offensive were nowhere observed. By one o'clock, +after a skirmish on the way, the head of the VIIth +Corps had reached the northern skirt of the Bois +des Ognons, over against which the French subsequently +abandoned Gravelotte. The VIIIth Corps +stood ready at Gorze, the IXth, IIIrd, and Xth remained +in their positions, the XIIth and the Guard +Corps were on the march. Seven Corps and three<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[48]</a></span> +Cavalry Divisions could be counted on for the following +day; for to-day all attacks were forbidden.</p> + +<p>In making the dispositions for the impending battle +of August 18th, two possible contingencies were foreseen +and had to be provided for. To meet both the +left wing was to be sent forward in a northerly +direction through Doncourt towards the nearest of the +routes still open for the retreat of the French. If the +enemy were already retiring, he was to be at once +attacked and detained while the right wing was +hurrying up in support.</p> + +<p>In case the enemy should be remaining about Metz, +the German left wing was to swing eastwards and out-flank +his farthest north position, while the right was to +hold his left closely engaged until this movement was +accomplished. The battle, under these circumstances, +probably could not be decided until late in the day, +owing to the wide-sweeping movement of a portion of +the army. A peculiar feature of the situation was +that both parties had to fight with inverted front, and +sacrifice for the time their respective lines of communication. +The consequences of victory or defeat +would thus be greatly enhanced or aggravated, but the +French had the advantage of having as their base a +large place of arms with its resources.</p> + +<p>A decision having been arrived at, by two o'clock +orders were published at Flavigny for an advance by +echelons from the left wing. The guidance of individual +Corps during the battle was to turn on the +reports which should be brought in. The King then +returned to Pont à Mousson.</p> + +<p>As early as nine o'clock in the morning the Saxon +Cavalry Division had reached the Etain road to +the west of Conflans, and had reported no enemy +visible except a few stragglers. Still, this only proved +that on the 17th the French had not yet taken up +their retreat.</p> + +<p>In rear of its cavalry the XIIth Corps arrived<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[49]</a></span> +during the day in the vicinity of Mars la Tour and +Puxieux, and left of it the Guard bivouacked in the +evening at Hannonville sur Yron, in accordance with +order. The IInd Corps, which ever since it left the +railway had followed close on the IInd Army, reached +Pont à Mousson, and was ordered to march forward by +Buxières at four next morning.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Five; viz. from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The Hessian Division of the IXth Corps was on the left bank, +much nearer the field than the XIIth—so near indeed that portions +of it were actually engaged; and its other Division crossed the river +in the night. The <i>Staff History</i> assigns the proximity of the IXth +Corps as a leading reason for the action of Prince Frederick Charles +which Moltke denounces. Both the VIIth and VIIIth Corps (the +latter of which had a brigade engaged in the battle) were more +immediately available than the distant XIIth.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 18th.)</div> + + +<p>Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to +prosecute the march to Verdun now that the Germans +were so close on the flank of such a movement. He +preferred to concentrate his forces near Metz, in a +position which he rightly considered as almost +impregnable.</p> + +<p>Such an one was afforded him by the range of +heights stretching along the western verge of the valley +of Chatel. Their face looking toward the enemy sloped +away like a glacis, while the short and steep decline in +the rear afforded cover for the reserves. Along the flat +crown of the heights from Roncourt to Rozerieulles, a distance +of about seven miles, were posted the VIth, IVth, +IIIrd, and IInd Corps in succession from the north; +for which distance there were available from eight to +ten men to the pace (Schritt). A brigade of the +Vth Corps stood near Ste. Ruffine in the valley of +the Moselle; the cavalry was in rear of both flanks. +In front of the IInd and IIIrd Corps shelter-trenches +had been thrown up, battery emplacements and +covered ways of communication constructed, and the +farmsteads lying out to the front converted into little +forts. To approach this (left) wing from the west it +was necessary to cross the deep ravine of the Mance. +The VIth Corps on the other hand was wholly without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[50]</a></span> +an engineer park; and it is indicative of the general +ill-equipment of the French that, for the transport of +the wounded to the rear, in spite of the enormous +trains, provision waggons had to be unloaded and their +contents burnt. This Corps was therefore unable to +construct fortified flank defences toward the forest of +Jaumont, such as would have given to the right wing +the character of formidable strength. This would undoubtedly +have been the place for the Guard, but in +his apprehension of an attack from the south the +Marshal held that Corps in reserve at Plappeville.</p> + +<p>The King returned to Flavigny at six o'clock on the +morning of the 18th. All commanding officers were instructed +to send their reports thither, and officers of the +General Staff belonging to the Royal Head-quarter +were besides sent out in different directions to report +information as to the progress of the engagement.</p> + +<p>The following were the initial dispositions. The +VIIth Army Corps, which was to form the pivot for +the eventual wheel to the right, occupied the Bois de +Vaux and Bois des Ognons; the VIIIth, which the +King had reserved at his own disposition, stood halted +near Rezonville ready to march to the north or to the +east, as might be required. The IXth Corps, on its +left, advanced towards St. Marcel, while the IIIrd and +Xth followed in second line. The Guard and XIIth +Corps moved in a northerly direction.</p> + +<p>In consequence of the Head-quarter of the IInd +Army having ordered the XIIth Corps, although it +stood on the right,<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> to form the extreme left, a serious +delay occurred from the crossing of the respective lines +of march. The Saxon troops had not entirely passed +through Mars-la-Tour until nine o'clock, and till then +the Guard Corps could not follow.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[51]</a></span></p> +<p>Meanwhile the advanced guard of the XIIth Corps +had already reached Jarny, and pursued its march as +far as Briey without encountering the enemy.</p> + +<p>Before information to this effect came in, the conviction +had been reached in the Royal Head-quarter +that at all events the main forces of the enemy still +remained before Metz; there was, however, a difference +of opinion as to the extension of the French front, which +it was assumed did not reach beyond Montigny. The +Head-quarter of the IInd Army was therefore instructed +not to extend further northward, but to attack the +enemy's right wing with the IXth Corps, and push in +the direction of Batilly with the Guard and the XIIth +Corps. The Ist Army was not to begin its frontal +attack until the IInd should be ready to co-operate.</p> + +<p>In obedience to those instructions Prince Frederick +Charles ordered the IXth Corps to march towards Verneville, +and, in case the French right wing should be found +there, to begin the action by promptly bringing a large +force of artillery into action. The Guard was to continue +its advance by way of Doncourt to support the +IXth as soon as possible. The XIIth was to remain +at Jarny for the present.</p> + +<p>A little later fresh reports came in, which indicated +that the IXth Corps, should it proceed in the manner +ordered, would not strike the enemy on his flank, but +full on his front. The Prince, in the discretion of his +high position, therefore determined that the Corps +should postpone its attack till the Guard Corps should +have been brought to bear upon Amanvillers. At the +same time the XIIth Corps was to push on to Ste. +Marie aux Chênes.</p> + +<p>But while these orders were being expedited, there +was heard from Verneville at twelve o'clock the roar of +the first cannon shots.</p> + +<p>The two Corps of the left wing had, moreover, of their +own accord, taken an easterly direction, and the IIIrd +Corps moved up in rear of the IXth to the Caulre farm.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[52]</a></span></p> + +<p>General von Manstein, the commander of the IXth +Corps, had observed from Verneville a French camp +at Amanvillers, which apparently lay in negligent +repose. From his standpoint it could not be discerned +that to his left about St. Privat great masses of troops +were in position. Thinking that in this camp he had +the enemy's right wing before him, he determined to +act on his original orders and at once take the foe by +surprise. Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.</p> + +<p>But the French troops showed great alacrity in +moving up into their prepared positions. The isolated +initiative of the single Corps naturally drew upon it not +only the fire of the troops opposite to it, but also that +of the hostile Corps to right and left.</p> + +<p>In the effort to find a location affording something +of shelter, the Prussian batteries had taken position in +a fold of the slope looking towards Amanvillers, and +facing to the south-east, where, however, they were exposed +from the north, on the flank and even in the +rear, to the fire of the enemy's artillery, as well as to +the massed fire of his infantry.</p> + +<p>To meet this, it was necessary to send forward the +infantry battalions nearest at hand. They took +possession of the eastern point of the Bois de la Cusse +on the left, and on the right seized the farmhouses of +L'Envie and Chantrenne, and forced their way into the +Bois des Genivaux. Thus the front of the 18th Division +in action extended along a distance of 4000 paces.</p> + +<p>It had to endure very heavy loss from the circumstance +that the French with their long-range Chassepôt +rifles could afford to keep out of the effective range +of the needle-gun; the artillery suffered exceptionally +severely. One of the batteries had already lost forty-five +gunners when the enemy's sharpshooters swarmed +forward on it. Infantry protection was not available +at the moment, and two guns were lost. By two +o'clock the batteries still remaining in position were +almost unserviceable, and no relief arrived till the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[53]</a></span> +Hessian Division reached Habonville, and brought +up on the left of the distressed batteries, five +batteries on either side of the railway, which diverted +on themselves to a considerable extent the concentrated +fire of the enemy. The batteries of the 18th Division, +which had suffered most, could now be withdrawn in +succession, but even in the act of retreat they had to +drive off the pursuers by grape-shot.</p> + +<p>The artillery of the IIIrd Corps and the Guard also +came to the aid of the IXth, and those of the damaged +guns of the last, which were still at all fit for +service, were at once brought up again into the fighting +line. Thus there was formed in front of Verneville and +as far as St. Ail an artillery front of 130 pieces, whose +fire now opposed the enemy's artillery with conspicuous +success. Now that the IIIrd Corps was approaching +Verneville and the 3rd Guard Brigade had reached +Habonville, it was no longer to be apprehended that +the French would succeed in piercing this line.</p> + +<p>The main body of the Guard Corps reached St. Ail +so early as two o'clock. General von Pape (commanding +Ist Guard Division) at once recognized that by +wheeling to the east he would not only not strike the +enemy on that right flank of his which had to be +turned, but would expose his own left flank to the +hostile force occupying Ste. Marie aux Chênes. This +town-like village, in itself extremely strong, and also +strongly flanked by the main stronghold of the enemy's +right, it was necessary to gain before making any +further advance; but, in obedience to superior orders, +the General had to await the co-operation of the Saxon +Corps.</p> + +<p>The foremost troops of this Corps had already +reached the vicinity of Batilly, but it was still distant +from Ste. Marie more than two miles, so that its +batteries could not be pushed forward into position +west of that place until three o'clock. But as the +Guard had sent most of its own artillery to the support<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[54]</a></span> +of the IXth Corps the Saxon batteries were of essential +service. Ten batteries now directed their fire upon +Ste. Marie, and by the time its effect was discernible, +the 47th Brigade of the XIIth Corps came up. At +half-past three the Prussian and Saxon battalions +hurled themselves on the town from the south, the west, +and the north, with loud hurrahs and without returning +the fire of the enemy. The French were driven +from it with the loss of several hundred men taken +prisoners.</p> + +<p>The Saxons eagerly followed up, and north of Ste. +Marie there ensued a lively infantry fight, which +masked the fire of the artillery. The brigade having +obeyed the order to retire, the batteries immediately +re-opened fire, and the repeated efforts of the French +to recover the lost position were frustrated.</p> + +<p>Soon afterwards the IXth Corps succeeded in storming +and firmly holding the farm of Champenois, but all +further attempts by isolated battalions or companies to +force their way forward against the broad and compact +front of the French were then manifestly futile. Thus, +towards five o'clock, the infantry fire altogether died +out, and the artillery fired only an occasional shot. +The exhaustion of both sides caused for the time an +almost total suspension of hostilities in this part of the +field.</p> + +<p>The Royal Head-quarter had firmly maintained the +resolution, that the Ist Army should not commit itself +to a serious offensive until the IInd had grappled with +the enemy. But when the day was half-spent and +when about noon heavy firing was heard from Vionville,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> +it was to be assumed that the moment for action had +arrived; still, for the present, permission was only given +to the Ist Army to engage in the artillery preparation.</p> + +<p>Sixteen batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps +accordingly drew up right and left of Gravelotte on +the highway passing through that village. Their fire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[55]</a></span> +was ineffective, because they were too far distant from +the enemy; and furthermore they suffered from the +fire of the French tirailleurs nestling in the opposite +woods. It became necessary to drive those out, and +thus there occurred here a premature infantry fight. +The French were cleared out from the eastern declivity +of the Mance ravine, and the artillery line, now increased +to twenty batteries, was able to advance closer up to +the western brink and now direct the strength of its fire +against the main position of the enemy.</p> + +<p>But the battalions of the 29th Brigade pushed the +attack further. They pressed on leftward into the +southern section of the Bois des Genivaux, but were +unable to obtain touch of the IXth Corps in possession +of the northern portion of the forest, since the French +firmly held the intervening ground. On the right +sundry detachments took possession of the quarries and +gravel-pits near St. Hubert.</p> + +<p>The artillery meanwhile had gained the mastery over +that of the enemy, several of whose batteries were +silenced, and others prevented from coming into position. +The French fire was in part directed on the +farm-steading of St. Hubert, to the vicinity of which +portions of the 30th Brigade had spurted forward. +These formidable premises close under the face of the +enemy's main position, and in spite of a very heavy fire +therefrom, were stormed at three o'clock. The 31st +Brigade also now promptly crossed the ravine, but a +further advance against the farms of Moscou and +Leipzig, over a bare stretch of ground encompassed by +the enemy on its wooded edges, did not succeed, and +resulted only in heavy loss. On the extreme right, the +26th Brigade had taken possession of Jussy, thus +securing the connection of the German army towards +Metz, but found it impossible to cross the deep valley +of Rozerieulles.</p> + +<p>Everywhere the advanced positions of the French had +been driven in, the farms in their front were blazing, their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[56]</a></span> +artillery appeared to be crushed, and, as the situation +was viewed from Gravelotte, there needed nothing but +to follow up the success. General von Steinmetz +therefore, at four o'clock, ordered a renewed attack +with fresh forces.</p> + +<p>While the VIIth Corps occupied the border of the +woodland, four batteries, backed by the 1st Cavalry +Division, moved at a trot through the ravine, about +1500 paces across, which lies east of Gravelotte. But +as soon as the head of the deep column came in sight of +the enemy he redoubled his rifle and artillery fire, which +had till now been kept under. One battery lost in a +twinkling the men serving four of its guns, and it was +only by an extreme effort that it was withdrawn to the +border of the wood; another never succeeded in deploying. +On the other hand, Hasse's battery remained in +action, in spite of the loss of seventy-five horses, and +Gnügge's battery stood fast near St. Hubert, regardless +of the return fire from the quarries.</p> + +<p>The foremost regiment of cavalry bent to the right +at a gallop on leaving the hollow way, and advanced +towards Point du Jour, but the enemy, being completely +under cover, offered no mark for an attack. Clearly +there was no field here for the utilization of this arm, +so the regiments withdrew across the Mance ravine +under a heavy fire from all sides.</p> + +<p>The result of the ill-success of this attempt was that +swarms of French tirailleurs now poured down from +Point du Jour, and drove the Prussian detachments +still remaining on the bare plateau backward to the +skirts of the wood. Chassepôt bullets even reached +the position of the Royal Commander-in-Chief and his +personal staff, and Prince Adalbert's horse was shot +under him.</p> + +<p>Fresh forces pushed forward and drove the enemy +back into his main position. St. Hubert remained in +German possession, though the gunners of the battery +in post there were equal to the service of but one gun.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[57]</a></span> +But all partial attempts to advance over the exposed +plateau proved a failure; and here also at about five +o'clock in the afternoon there occurred a lull in the +fighting, during which the weary troops on both sides +reorganized themselves and took breath.</p> + +<p>About this time King William and his staff rode forward +to the swell south of Malmaison. But from there +nothing could be discerned of the situation of the left +flank of the army, at a distance as it was of more than +four miles. The French artillery had almost entirely +ceased along the whole front from La Folie to Point du +Jour; but to the northward the thunder of the cannon +fire roared louder than ever. It was six o'clock, the +day was nearly at an end, and it was imperative that +the decisive result should be precipitated. The King +therefore ordered the Ist Army to make a renewed advance +in support of which he placed the IInd Corps, +just arrived after a long march, at the disposal of +General von Steinmetz.</p> + +<p>The battalions of the VIIth Corps which were still +serviceable, except five which remained in reserve, +were again sent across the Mance ravine, and in support +of them the battalions holding the Bois de Vaux advanced +in the direction of Point du Jour and the quarries.</p> + +<p>The IInd Corps of the French Army thus assailed +was now reinforced by the Guard Voltigeur Division. +All the reserves were hurried up into the foremost line. +The artillery burst into redoubled fire, and a crushing +musketry fire was concentrated on the advancing +enemy. Then the French themselves took the offensive +with a huge swarm of tirailleurs, which hurled backward +upon the wood-fringes the small leaderless bodies +of German troops that had been lying in the shallow +folds of the plateau.</p> + +<p>There, however, the sally found its limit; and there +still remained at disposition a fresh Army Corps in full +strength.</p> + +<p>The IInd Corps, the last to come up by rail into the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[58]</a></span> +theatre of war, had hitherto followed in the wake of +the army by forced marches, and had not been able to +take part in any engagement. It had started from +Pont à Mousson at 2 a.m. and, taking the road by +Buxières and Rezonville, arrived south of Gravelotte towards +evening. The Pomeranians expressed their eager +desire to get at the enemy before the day should end.</p> + +<p>It would have been more proper if the Chief of the +General Staff of the Army, who was personally on the +spot at the time, had not permitted this movement at +so late an hour of the evening. A body of troops, +still completely intact, might have been of great value +the next day; but it could hardly be expected on this +evening to effect a decisive reversal of the situation.</p> + +<p>Hurrying through Gravelotte, the foremost battalions +of the IInd Corps pushed forward to the quarries, and +up to within a few hundred paces of Point du Jour; +but those following soon found themselves involved in +the throng of the broken detachments remaining under +fire south of St. Hubert, and the further advance towards +Moscou was arrested. In the growing darkness friend +became indistinguishable from foe, and the firing had +to be broken off. Not, however, until ten o'clock did +it entirely cease.</p> + +<p>It was, to be sure, an advantage that the fresh troops +of the IInd Corps were available to hold the foremost +fighting-line for the night, behind which the intermixed +detachments of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps were +enabled to reorganize themselves.</p> + +<p>The whole course of the struggle had conclusively +proved that the French left flank, almost impregnable +as it was by nature and art, could not be forced even +by the most devoted bravery and the greatest sacrifices. +Both sides were now facing each other in threatening +proximity, and both in attitude to renew the battle on +the following morning. The result of the day turned +on the events evolving themselves on the opposite +flank.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[59]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Prince of Würtemberg,<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> then in St. Ail, had +judged at a quarter-past five that the moment was +come for an attack on the French right wing; but that +wing extended considerably further north than the +front of the Guard Corps reached; further, indeed, +than the French Commander-in-Chief himself was +aware. The Saxons had, indeed, participated in the +seizure of Ste. Marie aux Chênes, but after that event +the Crown Prince<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> deemed it necessary to assemble +his Corps in front of the Bois d'Auboué, before proceeding +to attack the enemy in flank. One of his +brigades had to come up from Jarny, another from +Ste. Marie; and, since the Corps had been delayed in +getting away from Mars la Tour, its direct attack could +not be expected at the earliest for an hour to come.</p> + +<p>The 4th Infantry Brigade of the Guard Corps, in +accordance with orders received, proceeded in the +prescribed direction of Jerusalem, immediately south of +St. Privat. As soon as General von Manstein observed +this movement, he ordered the 3rd Guard Brigade, which +had been placed at his orders, immediately to advance +from Habonville direct upon Amanvillers. Between and +abreast of these two brigades marched Hessian battalions. +It was not till half-an-hour later that the 1st Guard +Division leftward of the 2nd moved forward from Ste. +Marie against St. Privat. This combined offensive +movement was directed against the broad front of the +French VIth and IVth Corps. Their respective strongholds +of St. Privat and Amanvillers had as yet hardly +felt the fire of the German batteries, which had hitherto +found enough to do in combating the enemy's artillery +outside the villages.</p> + +<p>In front of the French main position on the crown of +the height had been prepared on the slope behind the +hedges and low walls, which rose terrace-wise backward, +tier on tier of shelter trenches. Behind these defences<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[60]</a></span> +towered the village named St. Privat, castle-like with +its massive houses, which were garrisoned to the very +roofs. The bare slope stretching in its front was thus +exposed to an overwhelming storm of projectiles.</p> + +<p>The losses of the Guard Corps marching forward to +attack a front so formidable were simply enormous. +In the course of half an hour five battalions lost all, the +others the greater part of their officers, especially those +of the higher grades. Thousands of dead and wounded +marked the track of the battalions pressing valiantly +forward in spite of their cruel losses. The ranks as +fast as they were thinned constantly closed up again, +and their cohesion was not lost even under the leadership +of young lieutenants and ensigns. As they drew +nearer to the enemy the needle-gun came into full +utility. The French were driven from all their foremost +positions, in which, for the most part, they did +not await the final struggle. By a quarter-past six +the battalions had advanced to within 600 to 800 +paces of Amanvillers and St. Privat. The troops, +weary from the strained exertion, halted under the +steeper slopes offering some, though small, protection, +and in the shelter trenches abandoned by the enemy. +Only four battalions now remained in reserve at Ste. +Marie, behind the line which now extended to a +length of 4000 paces. Every charge of the French +cavalry and of de Cissey's Division had been steadily +repelled with the aid of twelve batteries of the Guard +Corps which had hastened up; but detachments +commingled under stress of untold losses, had to show +a resolute front against two French Corps in close +proximity for more than half-an-hour, before relief +came to them.</p> + +<p>It was nearly seven o'clock when on the left of the +Guard, two brigades of Saxon infantry reached the +scene of strife; the other two were still assembling in +the forest of Auboué; their artillery, however, had for +a considerable time been maintaining a lively fire on +Roncourt.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[61]</a></span></p> + +<p>When Bazaine received word that the Germans +were stretching out in constantly increasing extension +with intent to outflank his right, he at three p.m. +ordered Picard's Guard Grenadier Division posted at +Plappeville, to march towards the threatened flank. +Though the distance to be covered was little more than +four miles, this all-important reinforcement, having +diverged to rightward from the direct road through +the woodland, had not yet arrived; and Marshal Canrobert, +who was fending off with all his might the +converging masses of Prussian assailants, decided to +concentrate his troops more closely about the strong +position of St. Privat. The retreat from Roncourt +would be adequately covered by a small rearguard, since +the border of the Bois de Jaumont was being held.</p> + +<p>Thus it happened that the Saxons did not find the +strong resistance at Roncourt which they had expected, +and after a slight skirmish entered the village together +with the companies of the extreme left of the Guard; +a body of Saxon infantry had previously been +diverted to the right from the road to Roncourt and +marched direct on St. Privat to the support of the +Guard.</p> + +<p>The fire of twenty-four batteries of the two German +Corps wrought awful havoc there. Many houses were +set on fire, or crumbled under the concentrated crash +of the shells. But the French were determined to hold +to the last extremity this point, decisive as it was of the +fate of the day. The batteries of their right flank were +hurried into position between St. Privat and the Bois +de Jaumont, whence their fire would enfilade the +further advance of the Saxons on the former place. +Other batteries went southward to confront the Prussians, +and the simultaneous final rush of the German +battalions was met by a rattling fire from the French +riflemen under cover in their lines of shelter trenches.</p> + +<p>All those obstacles were gradually overcome in the +course of the assault, although again with heavy loss; +some detachments halting occasionally for a moment to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[62]</a></span> +pour in a volley, others again never firing a shot. By +sundown the attack had swept up to within 300 +paces of St. Privat. Some detachments of the Xth +Corps, which had reached St. Ail, closed up, and now +the final onset was made from every side at once. +The French still defended the burning houses and the +church with great obstinacy, till, finding themselves +completely surrounded, they surrendered at about +eight o'clock. More than 2000 men were here taken +prisoners, and the wounded were rescued from the +burning houses.</p> + +<p>The defeated troops of the VIth French Corps hurriedly +retired into the valley of the Moselle, their retreat +covered by the brigade holding the Bois de Jaumont +and by the cavalry. Only then did the Guard Grenadier +Division make its first appearance, and the Reserve +Artillery of the French Army deployed east of Amanvillers. +The German batteries at once took up the +fight, which lasted till late in the night, and in the +course of which Amanvillers was burned.</p> + +<p>In that quarter the retirement of the IVth French +Corps had also already commenced, masked, however, by +repeated heavy attacks to the front. In the course of +these there occurred a hand-to-hand encounter with the +charging battalions of the right wing of the Guard and +the left of the IXth Corps. Amanvillers, however, +remained in the hands of the French for the night. +Not until three o'clock on the morning of the 19th +did the IIIrd French Corps evacuate its position about +Moscou; and the IInd Corps held its ground until five +o'clock, engaged in constant sharp frays with the outposts +of the Pomeranians, who on its withdrawal took +possession of the plateaus of Moscou and Point du +Jour.</p> + +<p>The results attained on the 18th of August had been +made possible only by the battles of the 14th and 16th.</p> + +<p>The French estimate their losses at 13,000 men. In +October 173,000 were still in Metz, consequently it is +certain that the enemy had at disposition in the battle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[63]</a></span> +of the 18th of August more than 180,000 men. The +exact strength of the seven<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> German Corps on that +day amounted to 178,818 men. Thus with the forces +on either side of approximately equal strength, the +French had been driven out of a position of almost +unrivalled natural advantage.</p> + +<p>Naturally the loss of the assailants was much heavier +than that of the defence; it amounted to 20,584 men, +among them 899 officers.</p> + +<p>Whereas by the war-establishment the average is +one officer to every forty men, in this battle one +officer fell to every twenty-three men; glorious testimony +to the example set by their leaders to their +brave men, but also a loss which could not be restored +during the course of the war. Altogether the six +battles fought in the first fourteen days of August had +cost the German army 50,000 men.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> It was naturally +impossible immediately to call out at home a sufficient +levy in substitution for the losses; but reinforcements +drawn from the time-expired cadres were already +bespoken.</p> + +<p>First of all that same evening the earliest instalment +of the trains and the Field-Hospitals had to be brought +up from the right bank of the Moselle; and the ammunition +had to be replenished throughout. In +Rezonville, thronged as it was with the wounded, it +was with difficulty that a little garret for the King and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[64]</a></span> +shelter for his General Staff were found. Its members +were engrossed throughout the night in preparing the +dispositions which the new phase of the situation +created by the victory rendered immediately necessary. +This exertion enabled all those orders to be laid before +his Majesty for approval on the morning of the +19th.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The XIIth Corps never stood on the right. It occupied its +assigned position on the extreme left, and the delay arose from the +Guard Corps having occupied a position other than that designed for +it, and having been allowed to remain there.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Vionville in text seems a slip of the pen for Verneville.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Commanding the Guard Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Of Saxony, commanding XIIth Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> These figures represent only the infantry of the eight (not seven) +Corps engaged; they do not include the cavalry, 24,584; the artillery, +at least as strong; nor the officerhood of the two armies, numbering +several thousands. Inclusive of those items the German host "employed" +in the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat numbered, in round +figures, 232,000 combatants. Accepting Moltke's own estimate of +ten defenders per "Schrith" of front, there works out a total of +133,000 men, as the strength of the French army "employed" in +the battle.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> During the first fourteen days of August, the German troops +were in conflict with the enemy on five occasions: viz. Saarbrücken, +2nd, loss 79; Weissenburg, 4th, loss 1551; Wörth, 6th, loss 10,642; +Spicheren, 6th, loss 4871; Borny, 14th, loss 5000. Total losses +during the fourteen days, 22,143.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">New Distribution of the Army.</span></h2> + + +<p>The siege of Metz had formed no part of the +original plan of campaign; it had been intended to do +no more than merely to maintain an observation on +the place when the main army should have passed it on +the advance towards Paris; and a Reserve Division, +consisting of eighteen battalions, sixteen squadrons, and +thirty-six guns, detailed for that duty, was now near at +hand.</p> + +<p>Under the altered conditions, however, the regular +investment of Metz was now necessary, and this +involved a radical alteration of the existing arrangements +throughout the whole army.</p> + +<p>A separate army under the command of Prince +Frederick Charles, consisting of the Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth +Corps of the former Ist Army, the IInd, IIIrd, IXth, +and Xth Corps of the IInd Army, the Reserve Division +and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 +men, was assigned to the duty of investing Metz.</p> + +<p>The Guard, IVth, and XIIth Corps and the 5th and +6th Cavalry Divisions were formed into a separate army +under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony; +it was styled "The Army of the Meuse" and was +138,000 strong.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> This and the IIIrd Army, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[65]</a></span> +numbered 223,000 men, were directed to advance +against the new French army forming at Châlons.</p> + +<p>Certainly the army investing Metz was left weaker +than the blockaded enemy. It was to be expected +that the latter would renew his efforts to break out to +the westward. Prince Frederick Charles' main forces +were therefore to remain on the left bank of the +Moselle.</p> + +<p>All these orders received the approval of the King, +and were dispatched to the commanding officers by +eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th.</p> + +<p>In accordance with the orders of Prince Frederick +Charles, the Xth Corps occupied the woodland districts +of the lower Moselle as far as St. Privat, while the IInd +held the high ridge from that point to Moscou. To the +right of the IInd, the VIIIth and VIIth Corps followed +on, the latter positioned on both sides of the Upper +Moselle. The Ist Corps occupied the Pouilly upland to +left and right of the Seille, specially charged to protect +the great magazines which were being established at +Remilly and Pont à Mousson. The 3rd Reserve +Division moved to the vicinity of Retonfay, north-east +of Metz. The IXth and IIIrd Corps cantoned at +St. Marie and Verneville as reserve. All the troops +immediately set about the construction of earthworks, +and of bridges over the Moselle above and below the +fortress.</p> + +<p>Of the Corps now belonging to the Army of the Meuse, +the XIIth assembled at Conflans and the Guards at Mars +la Tour; the IVth Corps, which had not been ordered +to Metz, had already reached Commercy.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Army, after crossing the Vosges range, and +having left a Bavarian brigade blockading Toul, was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[66]</a></span> +pressing forward in three columns. Its foremost Corps +had already reached the Meuse, but were obliged to halt +there for two days, so as to cross the river approximately +abreast of the Meuse army. Its cavalry meanwhile +patrolled three marches ahead as far as Châlons and +Vitry, where, for the first time since Wörth, it regained +touch of the enemy. The French encountered were +only guarding posts on the Marne railway-line, which +retired when the traffic thereon ceased.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> These figures are erroneous. It is manifest that three Corps and +two Cavalry Divisions, most of which had been materially weakened by +casualties, could not furnish a strength of 138,000 men; nor could +the IIIrd Army, originally 130,000 strong, swelled by one Corps and +diminished by battle losses of 12,000, approximate a strength of +223,000. As a matter of fact, on August 22nd, the Meuse Army was +86,275 strong, and the IIIrd Army 137,622; the two armies together +had a total strength, in round numbers, of 224,000 men.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Army of Châlons.</span></h2> + + +<p>Meanwhile at Châlons there had been formed a French +army of 166 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 380 guns, +consisting of the Ist, Vth, VIIth, and XIIth Corps.</p> + +<p>Of the last the Division which had been left behind +on the Spanish frontier formed the nucleus, to which +was added a body of very superior troops, consisting of +four regiments of marines; later the two cavalry divisions +also joined. General Trochu, who had been made Governor +of Paris, had taken back with him thither eighteen +battalions of Gardes-Mobiles, they having already given +such proofs of insubordination that it was thought unsafe +to confront them with the enemy.</p> + +<p>The Emperor had arrived in Châlons and had placed +Marshal MacMahon in command of the newly-formed +army. In the French Head-quarter it was not unnaturally +assumed that Marshal Bazaine was in retreat +from Metz. By an advance of the Army of Châlons +merely to Verdun the armies could form a junction with +each other in the course of a few days, and so a fighting +force be formed which might make head against +the hitherto victorious enemy. On the other hand, +MacMahon had to concern himself with the duty of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[67]</a></span> +covering Paris, and that capital, no less than his own +right flank, was threatened by the appearance of the +Crown Prince of Prussia's army on the Meuse.</p> + +<p>For the attainment of a decision between advancing +and retiring, it was beyond everything necessary to +know the direction which Marshal Bazaine might have +taken.</p> + +<p>On the 18th tidings had come from him, that he had +maintained his position in a battle about Rezonville, +but that his troops had to be supplied with ammunition +and supplies before they could renew the march. +From this it seemed only too probable that the communications +of the Army of the Rhine were already +threatened; and MacMahon determined to march on +Rheims, whence he could either reach Paris, though by +a somewhat circuitous route, or move in the direction +of the other army.</p> + +<p>But when it became known that the Crown Prince +of Prussia's army had not even been near Metz, and +that Prussian cavalry had already appeared before +Vitry, the Marshal could not deceive himself as to the +danger involved in the latter alternative. With sound +judgment, therefore, he stood out against the order of +the Empress and the Ministry to undertake that enterprise; +he determined against it, and announced his +resolution to march to Paris. Under its walls he could +accept a battle with advantage, since the fortifications, +even in the event of defeat, assured a safe retreat and +precluded pursuit.</p> + +<p>Further reports from Metz did not afford a clear +insight into the situation there. Also on the 18th, +"the army had held its position," the narrative ran—only +the right wing had changed front. "The troops +required two or three days' rest," but the Marshal +"counted still on being able to move out in a northerly +direction," and fight his way to Châlons by the Montmédy—Ste. +Menehould route, if this road was not +strongly held by the enemy. In that case, he would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[68]</a></span> +march on Sedan, and even by Mézières, in order to +reach Châlons.</p> + +<p>Bazaine might already have committed himself +to the movement thus indicated, and therefore Marshal +MacMahon, who was not the man to leave +his fellow-soldier in the lurch, instead of marching +on Paris, set forth on the 23rd in the direction of +Stenay.</p> + +<p>The suddenness of this decision caused all the preparations +for the undertaking to be left unexecuted. +At the end of the first day's march the troops reached +the Suippe late in the evening in pouring rain. They +lacked every necessary, and two Corps remained +entirely without food. The Marshal was therefore +forced to move his army further northward to Rethel, +where large magazines of provisions had been established, +and where the railway facilitated the bringing +up of stores. Even on the third day's march the army +had made little progress eastward. The left wing +remained at Rethel, the right reached the Aisne, near +Vouziers. On August 26th the main army was still +standing between Attigny and Le Chêne on the +Ardennes canal, while the VIIth Corps and a regiment +of Hussars lay in front of Vouziers for the +protection of the right flank.</p> + +<p>While the French army was thus marching eastward +by a wide détour, the German forces, which had been put +in motion at the same time, were for their part marching +due westward.</p> + +<p>According to orders issued from the supreme Head-quarter +at Pont à Mousson, the advance on the enemy, +supposed to be at Châlons, was to be effected in such +manner that the IIIrd Army, marching on the left of +the Army of the Meuse, should have the start by a +day's march, so that the enemy, wherever he might +stand halted, could be struck simultaneously in front and +on his right flank, and thus forced away northward from +the direction of Paris. The two armies were to converge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[69]</a></span> +as they advanced, and to reach the line of Ste. Menehould—Vitry +on the 26th.</p> + +<p>On the first day's march, the armies still on a front +some fifty-six miles long, the Meuse was reached; on +the second day, the 24th, they advanced to the line +St. Dizier—Bar le Duc—Verdun. The attempts to +take the latter place and Toul in the by-going proved +unsuccessful.</p> + +<p>So early as on that day the 4th Cavalry Division, +which had pushed far ahead, sent in important news. +The Rhenish dragoons had found Châlons and the +camp at Mourmelon deserted, and notwithstanding the +destruction effected, there still remained in the latter +considerable booty. An intercepted letter written by a +French officer, which intimated that the relief of Metz +was in prospect, and another which stated that Marshal +MacMahon was at Rheims with 150,000 men and was +fortifying his position there, were corroborated by the +Paris newspapers.</p> + +<p>On the 25th the Army of the Meuse formed a line +from Sommeille to Dombasle, while the heads of +columns of the IIIrd Army were already executing +the march prescribed for the following day, on the +Ste. Menehould—Vitry road. The small fortress of +Vitry, a few hours after a battalion of Mobiles had +left the place, surrendered to the 4th Cavalry Division. +On its march to Ste. Menehould, thence to be forwarded +by train to Paris, this battalion, 1000 strong, fell into +the hands of the 6th Cavalry Division as it was moving +on Dampierre, and was carried away captive.</p> + +<p>The 5th Cavalry Division reached Ste. Menehould, +and the 12th followed on the same road as far as +Clermont, patrolling the country up to Varennes, +within nine miles of the French outposts at Grand Pré, +but without learning anything as to the whereabouts of +the French army.</p> + +<p>The scouting service to any great distance on the +right of the army was hindered by the vicinity of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[70]</a></span> +forest of Argonnes, which it was difficult for the +cavalry to penetrate without the assistance of infantry. +The inhabitants of the country began to show themselves +extremely hostile. The Government had +provided them with arms, and organized a general +rising. The Germans, who hitherto had made war on +the Emperor alone, were now forced to use their arms +against the population. The franctireurs, though +not affecting operations on a large scale, were a +source of much annoyance to the smaller undertakings, +and as it naturally embittered the soldiers to realize that +they were no longer safe either by day or night, the +character of the war became more stern, and the +sufferings of the country were increased.</p> + +<p>A Paris telegram, sent by way of London, reached +this day (25th) the Royal Head-quarter at Bar le Duc. +It stated that MacMahon was at Rheims, and sought +to effect a junction with Bazaine.</p> + +<p>It is always a serious matter to exchange, without the +most pressing necessity, a once-settled and well-devised +plan for a new and unprepared scheme. It would have +been unwise and unskilful hastily to alter the whole +direction of the advance because of rumours and +information which might later probably turn out to be +unfounded. Endless difficulties must result from such +a course; the arrangements for bringing up baggage +and reinforcements would have to be cancelled, and +aimless marches might impair the confidence of the +troops in their commanders.</p> + +<p>The orders for the following day, issued at eleven +o'clock in the morning, prescribed therefore for both +armies merely a slight alteration of direction; Rheims +instead of Châlons was indicated as the objective. The +cavalry of the right wing, however, was explicitly +ordered to advance to Buzancy and Vouziers, where a +thorough insight into the situation could not but be +obtained.</p> + +<p>In war it is for the most part with probabilities only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[71]</a></span> +that the strategist can reckon; and the probability, as a +rule, is that the enemy will do the right thing. Such a +course could not be anticipated as that the French army +would uncover Paris and march along the Belgian +frontier to Metz. Such a move seemed strange, and indeed +somewhat venturesome; but nevertheless it was +possible. The chief of the General Staff, therefore, that +same day worked out a tabular detail of marches, upon +which the three Corps of the Army of the Meuse, together +with the two Bavarian Corps which were nearest that +army, could be brought together in the vicinity of Damvillers, +on the right bank of the Meuse, in three not +over-severe marches.</p> + +<p>These forces, with the two Corps standing in reserve +at Metz, which could be brought up, would constitute +a force of 150,000 men, which might give battle in +the specified vicinity, or compel the enemy to do so on +the march to Longuyon. Without employing this +reserve, there was every prospect that the advance of +the French could be brought to a halt on this side of the +Meuse, and then another Corps of the IIIrd Army +could be brought up.</p> + +<p>This march-table was soon to be brought into service. +Fresh news arrived in the course of the same afternoon. +The newspapers revealed the secret by publishing vehement +speeches delivered in the National Assembly to +the effect "that the French general who should leave +his comrade in the lurch, deserved the execration of the +country." It would be a disgrace, it was protested, to +the French nation if the brave Bazaine were left unsuccoured: +from all this, and considering the effect of +such phrases on the French, it was to be expected +that military considerations would give way to political. +A telegram from London, quoting the Paris +<i>Temps</i>, stated that MacMahon had suddenly resolved +to hasten to the assistance of Bazaine, though the +abandonment of the road to Paris endangered the +safety of France.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[72]</a></span></p> + +<p>The King, before night, approved of the march to the +right, and the orders were dispatched that night direct +to the respective Army Corps on the march.</p> + +<p>On the 26th his Majesty moved his head-quarter +to Clermont. The Crown Prince of Saxony had set +out for Varennes early in the morning with the XIIth +Corps, and had ordered the Guards to Dombasle, the +IVth Corps to Fleury.</p> + +<p>The cavalry, sent forward in every direction, found +that the enemy had evacuated the region of the Suippe +valley and had not yet entered that of the Meuse; that +Buzancy and Grand Pré were in occupation of the +French, and that a large encampment of their VIIth +Corps had been specifically perceived on the height +of Vouziers. The apparition of a few handsful of +cavalry, despatched thither on observation duty, occasioned +an almost unaccountable excitement. General +Douay, quartered at Vouziers, received the most +exaggerated reports, and must have thought that +a general attack by the German army was imminent. +The VIIth Corps was kept under arms the entire +night in pouring rain, and the Marshal resolved to +advance towards Vouziers and Buzancy with all his +forces on the following morning. Thus the march +to the east received a check as early as the 27th, but +the untruthfulness of the reports very soon became +sufficiently apparent.</p> + +<p>If the German chiefs were deeply interested in gaining +an insight into the enemy's movements, so on the +French side this requisite was certainly urgent in no +less imperative degree. With judicious disposal of their +cavalry on the right flank, a surprise like that above +mentioned would have been impossible, but the 1st +French Cavalry Division was placed on the left flank, +where there was no danger whatever, and the 2nd was +rearmost of everything. It seemed as though in the +French army less attention was paid to the repulse +of an attack than to the evasion of one, and to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[73]</a></span> +the unobserved attainment of Montmédy, the point +of rendezvous with the other army. When the +movement of the Germans from southward could no +longer be doubted, it would certainly have been best +for the French to take the vigorous offensive in that +direction with intent to defeat them, or at least to +sweep them out of the vicinity of their own line of +march. If they had failed in this they would, at any +rate, have readily learnt that their undertaking was +impracticable, and that its further prosecution must +certainly result in a catastrophe. It must, however, +be admitted that the German cavalry formed an +almost impenetrable screen. The Marshal could not +know that his enemy was écheloned from Vitry to +Varennes, a distance of more than thirty-seven miles, +and was not at all in form to attack him just then in +serious earnest.</p> + +<p><i>August 27th.</i>—The Marshal had cleared up his misconception, +and on the 27th he continued his march, at +least with part of his troops. The VIIth and Vth Corps +covered the movement at Vouziers and Buzancy, the +XIIth advanced to Le Chêne, and the 1st Cavalry +Division to Beaumont, probably to ascertain the +whereabouts of Marshal Bazaine. The Ist Corps +and the 2nd Cavalry Division remained behind on the +Aisne.</p> + +<p>The Saxon Corps, the furthest forward of the German +Army, had received direct orders to march to Dun on +the 27th, and secure on the right bank the passages +over the Meuse, as far as Stenay. It reached Stenay +at three o'clock in the afternoon, and threw forward a +post on the left bank.</p> + +<p>The cavalry clung closely to the enemy and followed +his movements, often engaging in petty skirmishes. +The departure of the Vth French Corps from Buzancy +in the direction of Le Chêne was at once detected, as +also was the march to Beaumont; and the Saxon +Cavalry Division pushed forward that evening to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[74]</a></span> +Nouart. The Bavarian Corps reached the Clermont-Verdun +road, the 5th Ste. Menehould; the other Corps +of the IIIrd Army were hurrying by forced marches +in a northerly direction.</p> + +<p>The prospect now seemed certain that the enemy +would be overtaken on the left bank of the Meuse. +Word was sent to the blockading army before Metz +that the two Corps asked for were no longer required, +but they had already set out.</p> + +<p>The latest dispositions made by Marshal MacMahon +clearly betokened a last effort on his part to persevere +in the original direction. He was écheloned along the +northernmost of the roads by which he could reach Metz, +but had left a strong reserve on the Aisne on which he +might fall back. When he now learnt that nothing had +been seen of the Army of the Rhine at Montmédy, but +that it actually was still at Metz, he resolved on retreating, +and, after giving orders to that effect for the +following morning, reported his intention to Paris.</p> + +<p>From thence during the night came the most +strenuous remonstrances. The Minister of War telegraphed, +"If you leave Bazaine in the lurch, the revolution +will break out," and the Council of Ministers +issued a peremptory order to relieve Metz. The troops +in front of the Marshal, it was urged, were nothing +more than part of the army investing Metz; he had the +start of the Crown Prince of Prussia by several days' +march; and General Vinoy had already left Paris for +Rheims with the newly-formed XIIIth Corps as a reinforcement +to him.</p> + +<p>The Marshal silenced his military convictions and +issued new orders. But the troops had started in +advance of the promulgation of them. The change of +route gave rise to much confusion; the roads were +bad, and quarters for the night were not reached until +darkness had long set in; the men were weary, wet to +the skin, and depressed in spirits.</p> + +<p><i>August 28th.</i>—Little more than nine miles' distance +eastward was attained. The XIIth Corps reached La<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[75]</a></span> +Besace, the Ist was on the march to Le Chêne, the +VIIth was halted at Boult aux Bois because of a false +report that two Prussian Corps were occupying +Buzancy, further ahead. On the strength of this +report the Vth Corps moved toward that town by +way of Bar, but went on to Bois des Dames in the +afternoon. Neither of these movements was interfered +with. The German cavalry had strict orders, while +watching the French as closely as possible, not in any +way to check or press them, and the Saxon cavalry +evacuated Nouart on the approach of the enemy. The +Germans had to await the coming up of the IIIrd +Army, the rearmost Corps of which, the VIth, had only +just reached Ste. Menehould.</p> + +<p><i>August 29th.</i>—For this day also a non-offensive +attitude was prescribed, and the bringing on of decisive +operations was postponed until the 30th.</p> + +<p>The Marshal in his head-quarter at Stonne had been +informed that the Germans occupied Dun, and that the +bridges over the Meuse had been destroyed. He +had no pontoon-train, and could cross the river +only lower down, at Mouzon and Villers. His XIIth +Corps and 1st Cavalry Division passed over to the +right bank unhindered at these points; the Ist Corps +and the 2nd Cavalry Division proceeded to Raucourt. +The VIIth Corps, delayed on march by petty skirmishes +on its right flank, did not reach its destination +at La Besace, but went into bivouac at Oches. +The Vth Corps was to have moved to Beaumont, but +the staff officer carrying the order fell into the hands +of the Prussian cavalry together with his escort. +General de Failly therefore marched upon Stenay, +according to his original instructions.</p> + +<p>Up to this time, apart from the cavalry, the Saxon +Corps alone had been in contact with the enemy, but +the Guard now came up to Buzancy in parallel line, +while the Saxon Corps crossed over to the left bank +of the Meuse at Dun. Its advanced guard at once +took possession of the wooded spur to the north-east<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[76]</a></span> +of Nouart, drove out the French cavalry, and +pressed ahead to Champy, where it encountered a +strong force in Lespart's Division. The purpose of the +reconnaissance having been attained, the advanced +guard was called in. The French Division, in consequence +of fresh orders received from the Marshal, +withdrew simultaneously in a northerly direction.</p> + +<p>On the German side four Corps of the IIIrd Army +were now within nine miles rearward of the Army of +the Meuse. The 5th Cavalry Division stood at Attigny +on the enemy's line of communication; the 6th was +hanging on the heels of the French columns of march, +and, among other things, had taken Boncq with a dismounted +party. The Royal Head-quarter was now +advanced to Grand Pré, and, as the result of the various +reports which had poured in, the resolution was taken +to attack the enemy on the following day, before he +should cross the Meuse. The Army of the Meuse was +to march towards Beaumont, the IIIrd Army to move +forward between that place and Le Chêne. To bring +both armies to a parallel front, the right wing was not +to move until ten o'clock, while the left<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> was to start +before six o'clock. Only the trains absolutely requisite +for the battle were to follow.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Beaumont.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 30th.)</div> + + +<p>On the 30th of August, at ten o'clock, the King set +out for Sommauthe by way of Buzancy. Both the +Bavarian Corps were on the march thither, the Vth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[77]</a></span> +Corps advanced in the centre towards Oches, the XIth, +together with the Würtemberg Division, was heading +for Le Chêne, the VIth for Vouziers. The IVth Corps +on the right was advancing by Belval, the XIIth +reached to the Meuse, while the Guard Corps followed +in rear as a reserve.</p> + +<p>Marshal MacMahon had issued orders for the attainment +of the object that his entire army should +on this day cross to the right bank of the Meuse; +only the baggage trains and sick were to remain +behind.</p> + +<p>His Ist Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division had left +Raucourt so early as seven; they crossed the river at +Remilly, light bridges having been thrown over for the +infantry. The VIIth Corps at Oches had struck camp +still earlier at four o'clock, but as it took with it in the +march all its waggons, even the empty ones, the trains +formed a column more than nine miles in length, and +seven of its battalions were forced to march alongside +the road in the capacity of baggage guard; so that the +brigade bringing up the rear was unable to start until +ten o'clock. This long procession soon came into contact +with the Prussian cavalry, was fired upon by +artillery, and compelled to arrest its march. Not till +one o'clock could the movement on La Besace be +resumed, and then, as heavy firing was heard from +Beaumont, General Douay conceived it right to abandon +the road to Mouzon and take that to Remilly.</p> + +<p>To the Vth Corps had been precautionally assigned +the duty of covering the march of the other two. The +troops had reached the vicinity of Beaumont only at +4 a.m., and were thoroughly exhausted by fighting +and the night-march. General de Failly therefore +determined to halt his Corps for cooking and rest +before pursuing the march. Precautionary measures +seem to have been altogether neglected, though it must +have been known that the enemy was now close at +hand. While at half-past one the officers and men were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[78]</a></span> +engaged in their meal, Prussian shells suddenly burst +among these heedless groups.</p> + +<p>The two Corps of the German right wing had to move +through a wooded tract in four wholly independent +columns, by ways sodden with rain. The Crown Prince +of Saxony therefore ordered that no single column +should attempt to enter on an attack before the neighbouring +one was ready to co-operate.</p> + +<p>The IVth Corps had started very early, and after a +short rest had pursued its march at ten o'clock. When +at noon the head of the 8th Division emerged from the +forest, it discerned from its elevated position the +enemy's camp about 800 paces distant, in the condition +as described. General Schöler (commanding the +Division) held that the opportunity of so complete a +surprise was not to be let pass; the proximity of his +force could not long remain undetected by the enemy. +He announced it by his cannon-fire.</p> + +<p>The Division soon recognized that it had drawn +upon itself an enemy of immensely superior strength. +The French rapidly got under arms, and dense swarms +of riflemen hurried to the front, whose long-range +Chassepôts inflicted great losses, especially upon the +artillerymen. The main body of the 8th Division had +meanwhile come up to the assistance of its advanced +guard, and ere long the 7th Division appeared on the +right. The French assailed it too with great impetuosity, +and could only be repulsed at the bayonet-point. +Presently, however, the foremost battalions of both +Divisions made their way into the French camp in front +of Beaumont, into the town itself, and finally into a +second camp located northward of it. Seven guns, of +which the teams were missing, and which continued +firing up to the last moment, a number of gunners, +waggons and horses, fell into the hands of the assailants.</p> + +<p>Whilst now, about two o'clock, a pause occurred in +the infantry fight, fourteen batteries of the IVth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[79]</a></span> +Corps engaged in a contest with the French artillery +deployed on the stretch of heights north of Beaumont. +The German artillery mass was presently strengthened +by the Saxon artillery on the right, and by the Bavarian +batteries on the left. This formidable and commanding +artillery line, constantly advancing in echelon, promptly +squandered the mitrailleuses, and at three o'clock the +remaining French batteries also were silenced.</p> + +<p>The IInd Bavarian Corps, on the left of the Prussian +IVth, was advancing on La Thibaudine, when it was +quite unexpectedly attacked from the west by a strong +force of the enemy.</p> + +<p>These troops were Conseil Dumesnil's Division of the +VIIth French Corps, which was continuing in march +to Mouzon in error, acting on its original orders. +Completely surprised as it was, and attacked in +front and flank, the Division gave up all hope of cutting +its way through, and at about four o'clock beat a hasty +retreat northwards, leaving two guns behind.</p> + +<p>The Bavarians had in the meantime taken possession +of the farm of Thibaudine, and the Prussians that of +Harnoterie. The wooded hills prevented a clear view +of the surrounding country; the enemy had completely +disappeared.</p> + +<p>General de Failly was making strenuous efforts to +collect his scattered forces in front of Mouzon, under +cover of a rear-guard halted at La Sartelle; and +General Lebrun had left behind on the left side of the +Meuse an infantry and a cavalry brigade and three +batteries belonging to the XIIth Corps, to render him +assistance.</p> + +<p>At five o'clock the 8th Division, headed by the 13th +Brigade, was pushing toilsomely through the dense +forest of Givodeau, on its way to operate against this +new defensive position. On emerging from the wood the +battalions, which had fallen into some confusion, were +received by a brisk fire at short range. The repeated +efforts of the riflemen to advance were unsuccessful,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[80]</a></span> +and the dense underwood hindered the clubbed mass +behind them from forming. By the time the Saxon +Corps had succeeded with extreme difficulty in extricating +itself from the forest and swamps of the Wamme +stream, and had reached Létanne, the impracticability +of further progress in the Meuse valley became apparent, +since numerous French batteries, in unassailable +positions on the opposite side of the river, commanded +all the low ground. The Corps therefore ascended the +plateau, moved in its turn through the Givodeau woods, +and debouching thence swelled the strength of the +forces assembled on the northern border, where, however, +their development on a broader front was impossible. +So about six o'clock the infantry engagement +came to a stand for a time in this quarter.</p> + +<p>On the left the 14th Brigade had come up into line +with the 13th, and this body (the 7th Division) was +followed by the 8th Division in two columns.</p> + +<p>The 93rd Regiment had carried the height to the +north-east of Yoncq, and advanced in pursuit of the +enemy as far as to the foot of Mont de Brune. Four +mitrailleuses and eight guns, some of them with their +entire teams, fell thus into the hands of the Anhalters.</p> + +<p>When, at half-past five, the artillery had come up into +position, and at the same time the 27th Regiment was +approaching, General Zychlinski (commanding 14th +Brigade) advanced to the enveloping attack.</p> + +<p>The French occupied in strength the summit of the +entirely isolated hill; their batteries faced to eastward +against the Bois de Givodeau, whence an assault +threatened; but they swiftly changed front to the south +and directed a heavy fire on the 93rd and the 2nd Battalion +of the 27th, as they charged up on this face while +the Fusilier battalion was at the same time pressing +forward from the west. Regardless of their losses, the +assailants eagerly scaled the ascent, the brigade and +regimental commanders at their head. Six French +guns were seized while in action, in spite of a brave<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[81]</a></span> +resistance by the gunners and covering troops, and the +enemy was pursued as far as the Roman road. Here +four more guns, completely horsed, which had been +abandoned by the artillerymen, fell into the hands of +the conquerors.</p> + +<p>The three battalions<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> hurried on towards Mouzon, +without waiting for the support of the<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> 14th Brigade +following in rear, but they suddenly found themselves +threatened by a cavalry-charge.</p> + +<p>Marshal MacMahon had recognized the fact that the +only thing left him now to do was to effect as orderly +an evacuation as possible of the left bank of the Meuse; +the reinforcements sent across from the right had +already been recalled. The 5th Cuirassier Regiment +alone still remained. When, a little to the north of the +Faubourg de Mouzon, it was reached by the fire of +the advancing Prussians, the French regiment hurled +itself upon the enemy with a noble contempt for death.</p> + +<p>The shock struck the 10th Company of the 27th +Regiment. The soldiers, without closing their ranks, +waited for the word of command of their leader, Captain +Helmuth, and then fired a volley at close range, which +struck down eleven officers and 100 men, the brave +commander of the band of horsemen falling fifteen +paces in front of his men. The survivors rushed back +towards the Meuse, and, as all the bridges had been +removed, they strove to gain the other side by swimming.</p> + +<p>Considerable masses of the enemy were still in front +of Mouzon, and upon these the batteries of the IVth +Corps, as one after another they came into action, +directed their fire. Two Bavarian batteries brought +under their fire the bridge at Villers, lower down the +river, and prevented it from being used. Then the +suburb was carried after a fierce encounter, and here +too the bridge across the Meuse was taken and held. +The enemy, deprived of every way of retreat, received<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[82]</a></span> +with a hot fire the 8th Division emerging from the valley +of the Yoncq, but was gradually driven back towards +the river. The French troops in front of the Bois de +Givodeau were also in a hopeless plight; they were +assailed by the 7th Division and XIIth Corps, and +were dispersed after an obstinate struggle. By nightfall +the French had ceased their resistance on the hither +side of the Meuse. Many lagging stragglers were taken +prisoners, others hid themselves in the copses and farmhouses, +or tried to escape by swimming the river.</p> + +<p>In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack +suffered far heavier loss than the defence. The Army +of the Meuse lost 3500 combatants, the preponderating +loss falling on the IVth Corps. The French estimated +their loss at 1800; but in the course of the day and on +the following morning, 3000 prisoners, mostly unwounded, +fell into the hands of the victors, with 51 +guns, 33 ammunition and many other waggons, and a +military chest containing 150,000 francs. And, what +was of supreme importance, by the result of this battle +the French army had been driven into an extremely +unfavourable position.</p> + +<p>While the IVth Corps had been chiefly sustaining the +day's battle, the Saxon Cavalry had pushed forward +on the right bank of the Meuse, and had reconnoitred +towards Mouzon and Carignan. The Guard Corps +reached Beaumont, and General von der Tann with the +1st Bavarian Corps was at Raucourt, having marched +by way of La Besace with some slight skirmishing on +the way. The IInd Bavarian Corps was assembled at +Sommauthe, the Vth Corps had reached Stonne, the +XIth, La Besace. Thus seven Corps now stood in +close concentration between the Meuse and the Bar.</p> + +<p>The King rode back to Buzancy after the battle, as +all the villages in the vicinity of the battle-field were +crowded with the wounded. Here, as previously at +Clermont, was felt the great inconvenience of inadequate +lodging for hundreds of illustrious guests and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[83]</a></span> +their suites, when, for once in a way for military +reasons, head-quarters were established in a small +village, instead of in a large town. Shelter for those +officers whose duty it was to prepare the necessary +orders for the morrow was only found late at night, +and with considerable difficulty.</p> + +<p>These orders instructed that on the 31st two Corps +of the Army of the Meuse should cross over to the +right bank of the river, to prevent the possibility of +further progress of the French to Metz by way of +Montmédy. Two Corps of the army besieging Metz +were besides already posted in that direction about +Etain and Briey. The IIIrd Army was to continue its +movement in the northward direction.</p> + +<p>As the situation had now developed itself, it already +seemed within sight that the Army of Châlons might +be compelled to cross over into neutral territory, and +the Belgian Government was therefore asked through +diplomatic channels to concern itself with its disarmament +in that event. The German troops had orders at +once to cross the Belgian frontier, should the enemy +not lay down his arms there.</p> + +<p>While the Vth French Corps was still fighting about +Beaumont, and when the rest of the army had crossed +the Meuse, General MacMahon had ordered the concentration +of his army on Sedan. He did not intend +to offer battle there, but it was indispensable to give +his troops a short rest, and provide them with food and +ammunition. He then meant to continue the retreat +by way of Mézières, which General Vinoy was just +then approaching with the newly-formed XIIIth Corps. +The Ist Corps, which had arrived at Carignan early in +the afternoon, detached two of its divisions to Douzy in +the evening to check any further advance of the Germans.</p> + +<p>Though any pursuit immediately after the battle of +Beaumont was prevented by the intervening river, the +retreat of the French soon assumed the ominous +character of a rout. The troops were utterly worn out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[84]</a></span> +by their exertions by day and night, in continuous +rain and with but scanty supplies of food. The marching +to and fro, to no visible purpose, had undermined +their confidence in their leaders, and a series of luckless +fights had shaken their self-reliance. Thousands of +fugitives, crying for bread, crowded round the waggons +as they struggled forward to reach the little fortress +which had so unexpectedly become the central rallying +point of a great army.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Napoleon arrived at Sedan from +Carignan late in the evening of the 30th; the VIIth +Corps reached Floing during the night, but the XIIth +Corps did not arrive at Bazeilles until the following +morning. The Vth Corps mustered at the eastern +suburb of Sedan in a fearfully shattered state, followed +in the afternoon of the 31st by the Ist, which, after +many rear-guard actions with the German cavalry, +took up a position behind the Givonne valley. To +pursue the march to Mézières on that day was not to +be thought of. The XIIth Corps had that same +evening to show a front at Bazeilles, where the thunder +of their cannon already heralded the arrival of the +Germans. The destruction of the bridges there and at +Donchery was ordered, but the order remained unexecuted, +owing to the worn-out condition of the men.</p> + +<p><i>August 31st.</i>—Of the army of the Meuse the Guard +and 12th Cavalry Divisions had crossed the Meuse +at Pouilly, and by a pontoon bridge at Létanne, +and swept the country between the Meuse and the +Chiers. Following close upon the rear of the French +and harassing them in skirmishes till they reached +their new position, they brought in as prisoners +numbers of stragglers. The Guard Corps then crossed +the Chiers at Carignan and halted at Sachy; the XIIth +pushed on to about Douzy on the Meuse,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> while its +advanced guard thrust ahead on the further side (of +the Chiers) as far as Francheval. The IVth Corps +remained at Mouzon.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[85]</a></span></p> +<p>The 4th Cavalry Division of the IIIrd Army reconnoitred +in the direction of Sedan, drove back the +French outposts from Wadelincourt and Frénois, and, +moving from the latter place, seized the railroad under +the fire of hostile artillery. The 6th Cavalry Division +on the left flank proceeded on the way to Mézières as +far as Poix.</p> + +<p>When the Ist Bavarian Corps reached Remilly before +noon, it came under heavy fire from the opposite side +of the river, and at once brought up its batteries in +position on the hither slope of the valley of the Meuse. +A sharp cannonade ensued, by the end of which sixty +Bavarian guns were engaged. It was only now that +the French attempted to blow up the railway bridge +south of Bazeilles, but the vigorous fire of the 4th +Jäger Battalion drove off the enemy with his engineers, +the Jägers threw the powder-barrels into the river, +and at midday crossed the bridge. The battalion +entered Bazeilles in the face of a storm of bullets, and +occupied the northern fringe of the straggling place. +Thus the XIIth French Corps was forced to move up +into a position between Balan and Moncelle, where, +having been reinforced by batteries belonging to the Ist +Corps, it had to encounter, and that with considerable +waste of power, the daring little band of Germans.</p> + +<p>General von der Tann<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> did not however hold it +advisable to commit himself on that day to a serious +conflict on the further side of the Meuse with a closely +compacted enemy, while his own Corps was still unconcentrated; +and, since the weak detachment in Bazeilles +had no hope of being reinforced, it withdrew therefrom +at about half-past three without being pursued.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile two pontoon bridges had been laid at +Allicourt, without molestation from the French. +These and the railway bridge were barricaded for the +night, while eighty-four guns further secured them from +being crossed. The Ist Bavarian Corps went into +bivouac at Angecourt, the IInd at Hancourt.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[86]</a></span></p> +<p>To the left of the Bavarians the XIth Corps marched +towards Donchery, followed by the Vth. The advanced +guard found the place unoccupied, and extended +itself on the further side of the river. By three o'clock +two other bridges were completed close below Donchery, +whilst the railway bridge above the place, also +found unguarded, was destroyed.</p> + +<p>On the extreme left the Würtemberg and the 6th +Cavalry Divisions came in contact with the XIIIth +French Corps, which had just arrived at Mézières.</p> + +<p>The King removed his head-quarters to Vendresse.</p> + +<p>In spite of a succession of occasionally very severe +marches in bad weather, and of being in regard to supplies +chiefly beholden to requisitioning, the Army of the +Meuse advancing on the east, and the IIIrd Army on +the south, were now directly in face of the concentrated +French Army. Marshal MacMahon could scarcely have +realized that the only chance of safety for his army, or +even for part of it, lay in the immediate prosecution of +his retreat on the 1st of September. It is true that +the Crown Prince of Prussia, in possession as he was of +every passage over the Meuse, would have promptly +taken that movement in flank in the narrow space, little +more than four miles wide, which was bounded on the +north by the frontier. That nevertheless the attempt +was not risked was only to be explained by the actual +condition of the exhausted troops; for on this day the +French Army was not yet capable of undertaking a +disciplined march involving fighting; it could only +fight where it stood.</p> + +<p>On the German side it was still expected that the +Marshal would strike for Mézières. The Army of the +Meuse was ordered to attack the enemy's positions with +the object of detaining him in them; the IIIrd Army, +leaving only one Corps on the left bank, was to press +forward on the right side of the river.</p> + +<p>The French position about Sedan was covered to rearward +by the fortress. The Meuse and the valleys of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[87]</a></span> +the Givonne and the Floing brooks offered formidable +obstructions, but it was imperative that those outmost +lines should be obstinately held. The Calvary height +of Illy was a very important point, strengthened as it +was by the Bois de Garenne in its rear, whence a high +ridge stretching to Bazeilles afforded much cover in its +numerous dips and shoulders. In the event of a retreat +into neutral territory in the last extremity, the road +thereto lay through Illy. Bazeilles, on the other hand, +locally a very strong point of support to the Givonne +front, constituted an acute salient, which, after the loss +of the bridges across the Meuse, was open to attack on +two sides.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> The Army of the Meuse constituted the right wing; the IIIrd +Army, the left.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Of 27th and 93rd Regiments.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Read in "rest of the."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Douzy is on the north bank of the Chiers.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Commanding Ist Bavarian Corps.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Sedan.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(September 1st.)</div> + + +<p>In order, in co-operation with the Army of the +Meuse, to hold fast the enemy in his position, General +von der Tann sent his Ist Brigade over the pontoon-bridges +against Bazeilles so early as four o'clock in a +thick morning mist. The troops attacked the place, +but now found the streets barricaded, and were fired on +from every house. The leading company pressed on as +far as to the northern egress, suffering great losses, +but the others, while engaged in arduous street-fighting, +were driven out of the western part of Bazeilles +by the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of the French XIIth +Corps. They however kept possession of the buildings +at the southern end, and from thence issued to repeated +assaults. As fresh troops were constantly coming up +on both sides, the French being reinforced to the extent +even of a brigade of the Ist and one of the Vth Corps, +the murderous combat long swayed to and fro; in +particular the struggle for the possession of the Villa<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[88]</a></span> +Beurmann, situated in front of the exit, and commanding +the main street throughout its whole length, lasted +for a stricken hour. The inhabitants took an active +part in the fighting, and so they inevitably drew fire +upon themselves.</p> + +<p>The fire of the strong array of guns drawn up on the +left slope of the valley of the Meuse naturally could not +be directed on the surging strife in Bazeilles, which +was now blazing in several places, but at eight o'clock, +on the arrival of the 8th Prussian Division at Remilly, +General von der Tann threw his last brigades into the +fight. The walled park of the château of Monvillers +was stormed and an entrance won into the Villa Beurmann. +The artillery crossed the bridges at about nine +o'clock, and the 8th Division was requested to support +the combat in which the right wing of the Bavarians was +also engaged southward of Bazeilles about Moncelle.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<p>In this direction Prince George of Saxony<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> had so +early as five o'clock despatched an advanced guard of +seven battalions from Douzy. They drove the French +from Moncelle, pressed ahead to Platinerie and the +bridge there, and, in spite of the enemy's heavy fire, +took possession of the houses bordering the further +side of the Givonne brook, which they immediately +occupied for defensive purposes. Communication with +the Bavarians was now established, and the battery of +the advanced guard moved up quickly into action on +the eastern slope; but a further infantry support could +not at first be afforded to this bold advance.</p> + +<p>Marshal MacMahon had been struck by a splinter +from a shell near Moncelle at 6 a.m. He had named +General Ducrot as his successor in the chief command, +passing over two senior Corps commanders. Apprized +of this promotion at seven o'clock, that General issued +the necessary orders for the prompt assemblage of the +army at Illy, in preparation for an immediate retreat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[89]</a></span> +on Mézières. He had already despatched Lartigue's +Division of his own Corps to safeguard the crossing +of the Givonne ravine at Daigny; the Divisions of +Lacretelle and Bassoigne were ordered to take the +offensive against the Saxons and Bavarians, to gain +time for the withdrawal of the rest of the troops. The +divisions forming the second line were to start +immediately in a northerly direction.</p> + +<p>But the Minister of War had appointed General de +Wimpffen, recently returned from Algiers, to the command +of the Vth Corps in room of General de Failly, +and had at the same time given him a commission +empowering him to assume the command of the Army in +case of the disability of the Marshal.</p> + +<p>General de Wimpffen knew the army of the Crown +Prince to be in the neighbourhood of Donchery. He +regarded the retreat to Mézières as utterly impracticable, +and was bent on the diametrically opposite course of +breaking out to Carignan, not doubting that he +could drive aside the Bavarians and Saxons, and so +succeed in effecting a junction with Marshal Bazaine. +When he heard of the orders just issued by General +Ducrot, and at the same time observed that an +assault on Moncelle seemed to be taking an auspicious +course, he produced—to his ruin—the authoritative +commission which had been bestowed on him.</p> + +<p>General Ducrot submitted without any remonstrance; +he might probably not have been averse to be relieved +of so heavy a responsibility. The Divisions of the +second line which were in the act of starting immediately +were recalled; and the further advance of +the weak Bavarian and Saxon detachments was soon +hard pressed by the impact of the first stroke of the +enemy rushing on to the attack.</p> + +<p>By seven in the morning, while one regiment of the +Saxon advanced guard had gone in upon Moncelle, +the other on its right had to concern itself with the +threatening advance of Lartigue's Division. With that +body it soon became engaged in a heavy fire-fight.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[90]</a></span> +The regiment had laid down its packs on the march, +and had omitted to take out the cartridges carried in +them. Thus it soon ran short of ammunition, and the +repeated and violent onslaughts of the Zouaves, directed +principally against its unprotected right flank, had to +be repulsed with the bayonet.</p> + +<p>On the left in this quarter a strong artillery line had +gradually been formed, which by half-past eight o'clock +amounted to twelve batteries. But Lacretelle's Division +was now approaching by the Givonne bottom, +and dense swarms of tirailleurs forced the German +batteries to retire at about nine o'clock. The guns, +withdrawn into a position at a somewhat greater +distance, drove back with their fire the enemy in the +hollow, and presently returned to the position previously +occupied.</p> + +<p>The 4th Bavarian Brigade had meanwhile pushed +forward into Moncelle, and the 46th Saxon Brigade +also came up, so that it was possible to check the +trifling progress made by Bassoigne's Division.</p> + +<p>On the right flank of the Saxons, which had been +hard pressed, much-needed supports now arrived from +the 24th Division, and at once took the offensive. The +French were driven back upon Daigny, with the loss +of five guns. Then in conjunction with the Bavarians, +who were pushing on through the valley to the northward, +the village of Daigny, the bridge and the farmstead +of La Rapaille were carried after a bitter fight.</p> + +<p>About ten o'clock the Guard Corps reached the upper +Givonne. Having started in the night, the Corps was +marching in two columns, when cannon thunder from +Bazeilles heard afar off caused the troops to quicken +their pace. In order to render assistance by the +shortest road, the left column would have had to +traverse two deep ravines and the pathless wood of +Chevallier, so it took the longer route by Villers +Cernay, which place the head of the right column +passed in ample time to take part with the Saxons in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[91]</a></span> +the contest with Lartigue's Division, and to capture +two of its guns.</p> + +<p>The Divisions ordered back by General Ducrot had +already resumed their former positions on the western +slopes, and fourteen batteries of the Guard Corps now +opened fire upon them from the east.</p> + +<p>At the same hour (ten o'clock) the 7th Division of +the IVth Corps had arrived near Lamécourt, and the +8th near Remilly, both places rearward of Bazeilles; +the head of the latter had reached the Remilly railway +station.</p> + +<p>The first attempt of the French to break out eastward +to Carignan proved a failure, and their retreat +westward to Mézières was also already cut off, for the +Vth and XIth Corps of the IIIrd Army, together with +the Würtemberg Division, had been detailed to move +northward to the road leading to that place. These +troops had started early in the night, and at six +a.m. had crossed the Meuse at Donchery, and by the +three pontoon bridges further down the river. The +advanced patrols found the Mézières road quite clear +of the enemy, and the heavy cannonade heard from the +direction of Bazeilles made it appear probable that the +French had accepted battle in their position at Sedan. +The Crown Prince, therefore, ordered the two Corps, +which already had reached the upland of Vrigne, to +swing to their right and advance on St. Menges; the +Würtembergers were to remain behind to watch +Mézières. General von Kirchbach then indicated +Fleigneux to his advanced guard as the objective of +the further movement, which had for its purpose the +barring of the escape of the French into Belgium, and +the establishment of a junction with the right wing of +the Army of the Meuse.</p> + +<p>The narrow pass about 2000 paces long between the +heights and the river traversed by the road to St. +Albert, was neither held nor watched by the French. +It was not till the advanced guard reached St. Menges<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[92]</a></span> +that it encountered a French detachment, which soon +withdrew. The German advance then deployed against +Illy. Two companies moved to the right and took +possession of Floing, where they maintained themselves +for the next two hours without assistance against +repeated attacks.</p> + +<p>The earliest arriving Prussian batteries had to exert +themselves to the utmost to maintain themselves +against the much superior strength of French artillery +in action about Illy. At first they had for their only +escort some cavalry and a few companies of infantry, +and as these bodies debouched from the defile of St. +Albert, they found themselves an enticing object of attack +to Margueritte's Cavalry Division halted on the aforesaid +plateau of Illy. It was at nine o'clock that General +Galliffet rode down to the attack at the head of three +regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique and two squadrons +of Lancers formed in three lines. The first fury of the +charge fell upon two companies of the 87th Regiment, +which met it with a hail of bullets at sixty yards range. +The first line charged some horse-lengths further +forward, then wheeled outward to both flanks, and +came under the fire of the supporting troops occupying +the broom copses. The Prussian batteries, too, showered +their shell fire into the throng of French horsemen, +who finally went about in confusion, and, having suffered +great losses, sought refuge in the Bois de Garenne.</p> + +<p>At ten o'clock, the same hour at which the assaults +of the French on Bazeilles and about Daigny were +being repulsed, fourteen batteries of the XIth Corps +were already in action on and near the ridge south-east +of St. Menges; to swell which mass presently +came up those of the Vth Corps. Powerful infantry +columns were in march upon Fleigneux, and thus the +ring surrounding Sedan was already at this hour nearly +closed. The one Bavarian Corps and the artillery reserves +on the left bank of the Meuse were considered +strong enough to repel any attempt of the French to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[93]</a></span> +break through in that direction; five Corps were on +the right bank, ready for a concentric attack.</p> + +<p>The Bavarians and Saxons, reinforced by the head +of the IVth Corps, issued from the burning Bazeilles +and from Moncelle, and, in spite of a stubborn resistance, +drove the detachments of the French XIIth Corps +in position eastward of Balan back upon Fond de +Givonne.</p> + +<p>Once in possession of the southern spur of the ridge +sloping down from Illy, and while awaiting the renewed +attacks of the French, the extreme urgency was realized +of reassembling the different Corps and of re-forming +the troops, which had fallen into great confusion.</p> + +<p>As soon as this was done, the 5th Bavarian Brigade +advanced on Balan. The troops found but a feeble +resistance in the village itself; but it was only after a +hard fight that they succeeded in occupying the park +of the château situated at its extreme end. From +thence, soon after midday, the foremost battalion extended +close up to the walls of the fortress, and exchanged +shots with the garrison. There now ensued a +stationary musketry fight with the enemy once again +firmly posted about Fond de Givonne. At one o'clock +the French, having evidently been reinforced, took the +offensive, after a preparatory cannonade and mitrailleuse +fire. The 5th Bavarian Brigade was driven back +for some considerable distance, but presently, supported +by the 6th, regained its old position after an hour's +hard fighting.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Saxon Corps had extended itself in the +northern part of the valley against Givonne. There +also the foremost detachments of the Guard Corps were +already established, as well as in Haybés. The Prussian +artillery forced the French batteries to change their +positions more than once, and had already caused +several of them to go out of action. To gain breathing +space here, the French repeatedly tried to send forward +large bodies of tirailleurs, and ten guns were brought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[94]</a></span> +up into the still occupied Givonne, but these were +taken before they could unlimber. The Prussian shells +also fell with some effect among the French troops +massed in the Bois de Garenne, though fired from a +long distance.</p> + +<p>After the Franctireurs de Paris had been driven out +of Chapelle, the Guard-cavalry dashed through Givonne +and up the valley, and at noon the Hussars had succeeded +in establishing direct contact with the left flank +of the IIIrd Army.</p> + +<p>The 41st Brigade of that army had left Fleigneux +and was descending the upper valley of the Givonne, +and the retreat of the French from Illy in a southern +direction had already begun. The 87th Regiment +seized eight guns which were in action, and captured +thirty baggage waggons with their teams, as well as +hundreds of cavalry horses wandering riderless. The +cavalry of the advanced guard of the Vth Corps also +made prisoners of General Brahaut and his staff, besides +a great number of dispersed infantrymen and 150 +draught-horses, together with forty ammunition and +baggage waggons.</p> + +<p>In the direction of Floing there was also an attempt +on the part of the French to break through; but the +originally very weak infantry posts at that point had +gradually been strengthened, and the French were +driven from the locality as quickly as they had entered. +And now twenty-six batteries of the Army of the +Meuse<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> crossed their fire with that of the Guard batteries, +in position on the eastern slope of the Givonne +valley. The effect was overwhelming. The French +batteries were shattered and many ammunition waggons +exploded.</p> + +<p>General de Wimpffen at first took the advance of +the Germans from the north for nothing more than a +demonstration, but toward midday became completely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[95]</a></span> +convinced that it was a real attack. He therefore +ordered that the two Divisions of the Ist Corps halted in +second line behind the Givonne front, should now return +to the Illy height in support of General Douay. On +rejoining the XIIth Corps he found it in full retreat +on Sedan, and now urgently requested General Douay +to despatch assistance in the direction of Bazeilles. +Maussion's Brigade did actually go thither, followed by +Dumont's Division, which latter was relieved in the +foremost line by Conseil Dumesnil's Division. All this +marching and counter-marching was executed in the +space south of the Bois de Garenne dominated by the +cross fire of the German artillery. The recoil of the +cavalry heightened the confusion, and several battalions +drew back into the insecure protection of the forest. +General Douay, it is true, reinforced by portions of the +Vth Corps, retook the Calvary (of Illy), but was forced +to abandon it by two o'clock; and the forest (of +Garenne) behind it was then shelled by sixty guns of +the Guard artillery.</p> + +<p>Liébert's Division alone had up to now maintained +its very strong position on the heights north of Casal. +The amassing at Floing of a sufficient strength from +the German Vth and XIth Corps could only be effected +very gradually. After one o'clock, however, detachments +began to climb the steep hill immediately in its +front, while others went round to the south towards +Gaulier and Casal, and yet others came down from +Fleigneux. The complete intermixture of the troops +prevented any unity of command; and a bloody contest +was carried on for a long time with varying fortunes. +The French Division, attacked on both flanks and also +heavily shelled, at last had its power of resistance +undermined; and the reserves of the VIIth Corps +having already been called off to other parts of the +battle-field, the French cavalry once more devotedly +struck in to maintain the fight.</p> + +<p>General Margueritte, with five regiments of light +horse, and two of Lancers, charged to the rescue out of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[96]</a></span> +the Bois de Garenne. Almost at the outset he fell +severely wounded, and General Galliffet took his place. +The advance was over very treacherous ground, and +even before the actual charge was delivered the cohesion +of the ranks was broken by the heavy flanking fire +of the Prussian batteries. Still, with thinned ranks but +with unflinching resolution, the individual squadrons +charged on the troops of the 43rd Infantry Brigade, partly +lying in cover, partly standing out on the bare slope +in swarms and groups; and also on the reinforcements +hurrying from Fleigneux. The first line of the former +was pierced at several points, and a band of these +brave troopers dashed from Casal through the intervals +between eight guns blazing into them with case-shot, but +the companies beyond stopped their further progress. +Cuirassiers issuing from Gaulier fell on the hostile +rear, but encountering the Prussian Hussars in the +Meuse valley, galloped off northward. Other detachments +cut their way through the infantry as far as the +narrow pass of St. Albert, where they were met by the +battalions debouching therefrom. Others again entered +Floing only to succumb to the 5th Jägers, who had to +form front back to back. These attacks were repeated +by the French again and again in the shape of detached +fights, and the murderous turmoil lasted for half an hour +with steadily diminishing fortune for the French. The +volleys of the German infantry delivered steadily at a +short range strewed the whole field with dead and +wounded horsemen. Many fell into the quarries or +down the steep declivities, a few may have escaped by +swimming the Meuse; and scarcely more than half of +these brave troops returned to the protection of the forest.</p> + +<p>But this magnificent sacrifice and glorious effort of +the French cavalry could not change the fate of the +day. The Prussian infantry had lost but little in the +cut-and-thrust encounters, and at once resumed the +attack against Liébert's Division. But in this onslaught +they sustained heavy losses; for instance, all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[97]</a></span> +three battalions of the 6th Regiment had to be +commanded by lieutenants. But when Casal had been +stormed, the French, after a spirited resistance, withdrew +at about three o'clock to their last refuge in the +Bois de Garenne.</p> + +<p>When between one and two o'clock the fighting in +Bazeilles had at first taken a favourable turn, General +de Wimpffen reverted to his original plan of driving +from the village the Bavarians, now exhausted by a +long struggle, and of breaking a way through to +Carignan with the Ist, Vth, and XIIth Corps; while +the VIIth Corps was to cover the rear of this movement. +But the orders issued to that effect in part never +reached the Corps; in part did so so late that circumstances +forbade their being carried out.</p> + +<p>In consequence of previously mentioned orders, +besides Bassoigne's Division, the Divisions of Goze +and Grandchamp were still available. Now, at +about three in the afternoon, the two last-named +advanced from Fond de Givonne, over the ridge to the +eastward, and the 23rd Saxon Division, which was +marching up the valley on the left bank of the Givonne, +found itself suddenly attacked by closed battalions accompanied +by batteries. With the support of the left +wing of the Guard Corps and of the artillery fire from +the eastern slope, it soon succeeded in repulsing the +hostile masses, and indeed drove them across the valley +back to Fond de Givonne. The energy of the French +appeared to be by this time exhausted, for they +allowed themselves to be taken prisoners by hundreds. +As soon as a firm footing had been gained on the +heights west of the Givonne, the German artillery +established itself there, and by three o'clock an artillery +line of twenty-one batteries stretching from Bazeilles to +Haybés was in action.</p> + +<p>The Bois de Garenne, in which many broken bands +of all Corps and of all arms were straggling in search +of refuge, still remained to be gained. After a short<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[98]</a></span> +cannonade the 1st Guard-Division climbed the +heights from Givonne, and were joined by Saxon +battalions, the left wing of the IIIrd army at the +same time coming on from Illy. A wild turmoil +ensued, in which isolated bands offered violent resistance, +while others surrendered by thousands; nor was +it until five o'clock that the Germans had complete +possession of the forest.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile long columns of French could be seen +pouring down on Sedan from the surrounding heights. +Disordered bodies of troops huddled closer and closer +in and up to the fortress, and shells from the German +batteries on both sides of the Meuse were constantly +exploding in the midst of the chaos. Pillars of fire were +soon rising from the city, and the Bavarian riflemen, +who had pushed forward through Torcy, were preparing +to climb the palisades at the gate when, at about half-past +four, the white flags were visible on the towers.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Napoleon had declined to follow +General de Wimpffen in his attempt to break through +the German lines; he had, on the contrary, ordered +him to enter into negotiations with the enemy. In +consequence of the renewal of the order to that effect +the French suddenly ceased firing.</p> + +<p>General Reille now made his appearance in the +presence of the King, who had watched the action +since early morning from the hill south of Frénois. +He was the bearer of an autograph letter from the +Emperor, whose presence in Sedan was till then unknown. +He placed his sword in the hand of the +King, but as this was clearly only an act of personal +surrender, the answer stipulated that an officer should +be commissioned with full powers to treat with General +von Moltke as to the surrender of the French Army.</p> + +<p>This painful duty was imposed on General de +Wimpffen, who was in no way responsible for the +desperate straits into which the French army had been +brought.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[99]</a></span></p> + +<p>The negotiations were held at Donchery in the night +between the 1st and 2nd September. On the part of +the Germans it had to be insisted on that they durst +not forego the advantages gained over so powerful an +enemy as France. Since the French had regarded +the victory of German arms over other nationalities +in the light of an offence to France, any untimely +generosity might cause them to forget their own defeat. +The only course to pursue was to insist upon the +disarmament and captivity of their entire army, +with the exception that the officers were to be free on +parole.</p> + +<p>General de Wimpffen declared it impossible to accept +conditions so hard, the negotiations were broken +off, and the French officers returned to Sedan at one +o'clock on the morning of the 2nd. Before their +departure they were given to understand that unless +the offered terms were accepted by nine o'clock that +morning the artillery would reopen fire.</p> + +<p>The capitulation was signed by General de Wimpffen +on the morning of the 2nd, further resistance being +obviously impossible.</p> + +<p>Marshal MacMahon was very fortunate in having +been disabled so early in the battle, else on him would +have inevitably devolved the duty of signing the capitulation; +and though he had only carried out the +orders forced upon him by the Paris authorities, he +could hardly have sat in judgment, as he afterwards +did, on the comrade he had failed to relieve.</p> + +<p>It is difficult to understand why we Germans celebrate +the 2nd of September—a day on which nothing +memorable happened, but what was the inevitable +result of the previous day's work; the day on which the +army really crowned itself with glory was the 1st of +September.</p> + +<p>The splendid victory of that day had cost the Germans +460 officers and 8500 men. The French losses were far +greater; they amounted to 17,000 men, and were chiefly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[100]</a></span> +wrought because of the full development of the fire +of the German artillery.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="left">During the battle there were taken prisoners</td><td align="right">21,000</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">By the Capitulation</td><td align="right">83,000</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">———</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">A total of </td><td align="right">104,000</td><td align="left"> sent into captivity.</td></tr> +</table> +</div> + +<p>The prisoners for the present were assembled on the +peninsula of Iges formed by the Meuse. As supplies +for them were entirely lacking, the Commandant of +Mézières permitted the unrestricted transport of provisions +by the railway as far as Donchery. Two Army +Corps were assigned to the duty of guarding and +escorting the convoys of prisoners, who were sent off in +successive bodies 2000 strong by two roads, one to +Etain, and the other by Clermont to Pont à Mousson, +where the prisoners were taken over by the army +investing Metz, and forwarded to various parts of +Germany.</p> + +<p>On Belgian territory 3000 men had been disarmed.</p> + +<p>The spoils of war taken at Sedan consisted of three +standards, 419 field-pieces, 139 fortress guns, 66,000 +rifles, over 1000 waggons, and 6000 serviceable +horses.</p> + +<p>With the entire nullification of this army fell the +Empire in France.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[101]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Moncelle is northward of Bazeilles.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Now commanding XIIth Corps, since his elder brother's appointment +to command of the Army of the Meuse.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Sense and accuracy alike indicate that "Army of the Meuse" in +text should be "Third Army," <i>vide</i> Staff History, part I. 2nd vol. +pp. 361, 367, and 370.—Clarke's authorized Trs.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>PART II.</h2> + + +<p>While one half of the German Army was thus engaged +in a victorious advance, the other half remained stationary +before Metz.</p> + +<p>The foremost line of outposts of the investment +embraced a circuit of more than twenty-eight miles. +An attempt of the concentrated forces of the enemy +to break through would have met at the beginning +of the blockade with but slight opposition. It was +therefore extremely urgent that the several posts +should be strengthened by fortifications. These works, +the clearing of the neighbouring battle-fields, the close +watch kept over every movement of the enemy, the +construction of a telegraph-line connecting the quarters +of the several Staffs, and finally the erection of a sufficiency +of shelter, kept the troops and their leaders +amply occupied. Besides the care of the wounded, +provision had to be made for the sick, whose number +was daily increased by the unusually severe weather +and lack of shelter. The provisioning of the troops +was, however, facilitated by their stationary attitude, +and in addition there now flowed in upon them from +their homes a copious supply of love-gifts.</p> + +<p>The first days of the investment went by without +any attempts to break out on the part of the French. +They too were busy reorganizing, collecting ammunition +and supplies.</p> + +<p>On the 20th of August Marshal Bazaine had +written to Châlons: "I will give due notice of my<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[102]</a></span> +march if, taking everything into consideration, I can +undertake any such attempt." On the 23rd he reported +to the Emperor: "If the news of the extensive reductions +in the besieging army is confirmed, I shall set +out on the march, and that by way of the northern +fortresses, in order to risk nothing."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Sortie from Metz.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 26th.)</div> + + +<p>On the 26th of August, when the Army of Châlons +was still nearly seventy miles distant from the Ardennes +Canal, and its advance on Metz was as yet not generally +known, Marshal Bazaine collected his main forces on +the right bank of the Moselle.</p> + +<p>This movement had not escaped the notice of the +German posts of observation, and the field-telegraph +at once disseminated the information.</p> + +<p>To support the 3rd Reserve Division at Malroy, ten +battalions of the Xth Corps crossed from the left bank +of the Moselle to Argancy on the right bank. The +25th Division held itself in readiness at the bridge of +Hauconcourt, and the Ist Corps closed up towards +Servigny. In the event of the success of a breach +towards the north, the IIIrd, IVth, and part of the IXth +Corps were available to intercept the enemy's march +about Thionville.</p> + +<p>The crossing from the island of Chambière by the +field-bridges which had been built, seriously delayed +the French advance; the IIIrd, IInd, IVth, and VIth +Corps, however, by about noon stood closely concentrated +between Mey and Grimont. Advanced detachments +had already at several points driven in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[103]</a></span> +German posts south-east of Metz, but instead of now +entering upon a general attack, Marshal Bazaine summoned +all his Corps Commanders to a conference at +Grimont. The Commandant of Metz then made it +known that the artillery ammunition in hand would +suffice for only one battle, that when it was exhausted +the army would find itself defenceless in midst of the +German hosts; the fortress, he continued, was not +defensible in its present state, and could not stand a +siege if the army were to be withdrawn from the place. +All those things might certainly have been seen into +during the stay in Metz; and much more did they +behove to have been known before the army should +cut loose. It was particularly enforced, "That the +preservation of the Army was the best service that could +be rendered to the country, more especially if negotiations +for peace should be entered into." The generals +present all spoke against the prosecution of the proposed +movement; and the Commander-in-Chief, who +had refrained from expressing any opinion in the +matter, gave the order to retire at four o'clock.</p> + +<p>The whole affair of the 26th of August can only be +regarded in the light of a parade manœuvre. Bazaine +reported to the Minister of War that the scarcity of +artillery ammunition made it "impossible" to break +through the hostile lines, unless an offensive operation +from the outside "should force the enemy to raise the +investment." Information as to the "temper of the +people" was earnestly requested.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that Bazaine was influenced, not +wholly by military, but also by political considerations; +still it may be asked whether he could have +acted differently in the prevailing confusion of France. +From the correspondence referred to, and his behaviour +in the battles before Metz, his reluctance to quit the +place was evident. Under its walls he could maintain +a considerable army in unimpaired condition till the +given moment. At the head of the only French army<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[104]</a></span> +not yet shattered,<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> he might find himself in a position +of greater power than any other man in the country. +This army must, of course, first be freed from the +bonds which now confined it. Even if it should succeed +in forcibly breaking out it would be greatly +weakened; and it was not inconceivable that the +Marshal, as the strongest power in the land, might be +able to offer a price which should induce the enemy to +grant him a passage. Then when at length the time +for making peace should come, the Germans would no +doubt ask: "Who in France is the authority with whom +we can negotiate now that the Empire is overthrown, +and who is strong enough to give a guarantee that the +obligations which he will have undertaken shall be performed?" +That the Marshal, if his plans had come +to fulfilment, would have acted otherwise than in the +interest of France is neither proved nor to be assumed.</p> + +<p>But presently a number of men combined in Paris, +who, without consulting the nation, constituted themselves +the Government of the country, and took the +direction of its affairs into their own hands. In opposition +to this party, Marshal Bazaine, with his army at +his back, could well come forward as a rival or a foe; +nay, and—this was his crime in the eyes of the Paris +Government—he might restore the authority of the +Emperor to whom he had sworn allegiance. Whether +he might not thus have spared his country longer +misery and greater sacrifices may be left undecided. +But that he was subsequently charged with treason +obviously arose, no doubt, from the national vanity of +the French, which demanded a "Traitor" as a scapegoat +for the national humiliation.</p> + +<p>Soon after this demonstration, for it was nothing +more, of the besieged army, the investing forces were, +in fact, reduced by the despatch, on the 29th, in accordance +with orders from the supreme Headquarter,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[105]</a></span> +of the IInd and IIIrd Corps to Briey and Conflans, there +to remain. To be sure, from those positions it was in +their power to attack either of the French Marshals, as +might prove requisite; while the XIIIth Corps, newly +formed of the 17th Division, hitherto retained to +defend the coast, and from the Landwehr, was already +within a short distance of Metz.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Marshal Bazaine might have realized +that he must abandon his delusion as to a release by +means of negotiations; and he now firmly resolved to +cut his way out by dint of force. The troops were +served out with three days' provisions, and the intendance +was furnished with a supply of "iron rations" +from the magazines of the fortress. That the attempt +should again be made on the right bank of the Moselle +was only to be expected; since by far the larger portion +of the enemy's forces stood entrenched on the left bank. +It would have been very difficult to traverse that hilly +region, intersected by deep ravines; and finally the +army of the Crown Prince on the march to Paris +would have had to be encountered. East of Metz, on +the other hand, there afforded ample space for the +full development of the French forces. By bending of +the south the open country was to be reached, offering +no effective intercepting position to the enemy, whose +line of investment was weakest in that direction. The +march to the north and along the Belgian frontier +entailed more danger and greater obstacles, yet the +Marshal had explicitly indicated this particular road as +that by which he intended to move. The Army of +Châlons was also marching in that direction; its +approach was already reported; and on the 31st of +August, on which day, in fact, Marshal MacMahon's +forces reached Stenay<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> in such disastrous circumstances, +Bazaine's army also issued from Metz.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[106]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> The Army of Châlons was still unimpaired on August 26th.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> "Stenay," probably a slip of the pen for "Sedan," where +MacMahon's army was gathered on August 31st. It never reached +Stenay.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Noisseville.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(August 31st.)</div> + + +<p>Of the French Corps then located on the right bank +of the Moselle,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> the IIIrd was to cover on the right +flank the advance of the others; one Division was +ordered to move early in a south-easterly direction +with intent to mislead the enemy, its other three +Divisions to take position threatening Noisseville. +Three pontoon bridges were constructed for the crossing +of the rest of the army, and accesses to the heights +in front of St. Julien were prepared. The passage of +the IVth and VIth Corps was to begin at six o'clock, +and they were to take a position which, linking on its +right with the IIIrd Corps, should extend from the +village of Mey by Grimont to the Moselle; the IInd +Corps and the Guard were to follow and form a second +line. With the passage of the artillery reserve and +the cavalry it was expected that the crossing of the +Moselle should be finished by ten o'clock; the trains +were halted on the Isle of Chambière. Thus it was +intended that by noon five Corps should be ready for +the assault of the section of the line of investment from +Retonfay (on the French right) to Argancy (on the left), +a distance of about seven miles, which space had for its +defenders only two German Divisions.</p> + +<p>So early as seven o'clock Montaudon's Division issued +from Fort Queuleu, and heading eastward drove the +opposing outposts back on Aubigny. But this demonstration +did not in the least deceive the Germans. +The stir in the French camp had been observed quite +early, and when the mist cleared off and great masses +of French troops were seen in front of Fort St. +Julien, an attempt to break through to the north +was anticipated with certainty, and the necessary dispositions +were immediately undertaken to foil the +effort.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[107]</a></span></p> +<p>The 28th Brigade of the VIIth Corps was dispatched +to protect Courcelles, so that thus the 3rd Brigade of +the Ist Corps could be brought nearer to Servigny. The +troops of the Xth Corps which could be spared from +their own section of the line of defence on the left bank +were again set in motion to cross to the right, and the +IXth Corps was held in readiness in anticipation of its +having eventually to follow. The IIIrd Corps and the +Ist Cavalry Division were recalled from Briey and +directed to the plateau of Privat; the IInd was to +stand ready to move off.</p> + +<p>The attempt of the French to break out proved on +this day even less successful than on the 26th; the +IVth and VIth Corps crossed each other at the bridges, +and they only reached their rendezvous position at one +o'clock, though it was little more than three miles +further; they then abandoned the intention of an immediate +assault, and set about cooking. A few skirmishes +on the east of Aubigny and on the north towards +Rupigny came to nothing. The Imperial Guard did +not come up till three o'clock, the artillery and cavalry +were still behind.</p> + +<p>As entire quiescence now supervened, the Germans +came to the conclusion that the attack must be intended +for the following day. To save the strength of the +troops, part of the reinforcements ordered up had +already been sent back, when, at about four o'clock, +the French suddenly opened a heavy artillery fire.</p> + +<p>The Marshal had again summoned his commanders +to assemble at Grimont, this time to inform them of +his dispositions for the attack. It was evident that the +French could not advance towards the north until they +had gained elbow-room by means of an offensive movement +in the eastern direction, and had secured their +right flank. For even if they succeeded in breaking +through the Malroy-Charly line, they could get no +further so long as the Germans were at Servigny and +swept with their fire the plain as far as the Moselle, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[108]</a></span> +space not more than 5000 paces broad. The Marshal +could not in any case reckon on carrying through his +Artillery Reserve, which did not reach the battle-field +until six o'clock, and the extrication of the baggage +trains which had been left behind on the Isle of +Chambière was clearly impossible. The Cavalry Corps +was still defiling, and could not come up until nine +o'clock in the evening.</p> + +<p>This unsatisfactory aspect of affairs was in complete +accord with the character of the dispositions of the +French commanders.</p> + +<p>Marshal Le Bœuf received orders to advance with +the IInd and IIIrd Corps on both sides of the valley of +St. Barbe, and outflank from the south the 1st Prussian +Division at Servigny, while the IVth Corps assailed it +in front. The VIth Corps had the task of thrusting +forward against the Reserve Division at Charly-Malroy. +Marshal Canrobert was to command the two latter +Corps, and the Guard was to be held back as reserve.</p> + +<p>Thus General von Manteuffel had at first to confront +with a small force a greatly superior enemy. This +opposition might be undertaken either in the St. Barbe +position, to outflank which was by no means easy, or on +the line of Servigny—Poix—Failly, which, though more +exposed, afforded much greater scope for the use of +artillery. The latter position was chosen on the advice +of General von Bergmann commanding the artillery, +and the Landwehr Brigade was ordered into it from +Antilly, where its place was taken by the 25th Division. +Ten batteries were advanced to a distance of 1000 paces +in front of the line of villages held by the infantry. +Their fire proved so superior to that of the enemy, that +the hostile batteries were soon silenced. The attack on +Rupigny by the French IVth Corps, supported on the +flank though it was by three batteries, remained +stationary for a considerable time, and as the Prussians +had not yet been driven back on St. Barbe, the VIth +French Corps meanwhile could not enter upon any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[109]</a></span> +serious attack on the Reserve Division at Malroy-Charly. +For the same reason Marshal Canrobert received +the order for the present only to send a +detachment of his force to the attack of the village of +Failly, the northern point of support of the Servigny +position.</p> + +<p>Tixier's Division therefore moved out at 7.30 in the +evening from Villers L'Orme, but met with a most +obstinate resistance at Failly. Though attacked on two +sides, pelted by a storm of projectiles, and, as regarded +a part of them, engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, the +East Prussians stoutly held possession of their ground +till the Landwehr Brigade came to their assistance from +Vremy.</p> + +<p>Up till now the situation southward of Servigny had +worn a more favourable aspect for the French than +in this northern re-entering angle between two hostile +positions; their IInd and IIIrd Corps in the former +quarter had only the 3rd Brigade of the Ist Prussian +Corps to deal with in front of Retonfay. Montaudon's +and Metman's Divisions moved down by way of Nouilly +into the valley of the Vallières brook; Clinchant's +Brigade stormed the brewery in the face of strong +resistance, and by seven o'clock the defenders of Noisseville +were forced to evacuate the place. Montoy and +Flanville were also taken possession of by the French, +and further south the outposts of the German 4th Brigade +were thrown back through Coincy and Château +Aubigny. The batteries of the 1st Division, after enduring +for a long time the fire of strong swarms of +tirailleurs from the deep hollow south of them, were +forced about seven o'clock to retire in echelon to the +infantry position on the Poix—Servigny line, fending off +for a time the pursuing enemy with case-shot.</p> + +<p>But to this position the Prussians now held on +staunchly, although completely out-flanked on their +left. Potier's Brigade ascended the northern slope of +the Vallières valley, but found it impossible to reach<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[110]</a></span> +Servigny. A moment later Cissey's Brigade rushed forward +from the west, and seized the graveyard outside +the village. The French IVth Corps struck at the centre +of the Prussian position, but without success. Its effort +to penetrate between Poix and Servigny was frustrated +by the offensive stroke delivered by the battalions of the +2nd Brigade constituting the last reserve—a counter +attack in which all the troops at hand at once joined. +With drums beating they hurled themselves on the +French, swept them out of the graveyard, and drove +them back down the slope.</p> + +<p>In support of the fierce fight here, the 3rd Brigade +about half-past eight marched on Noisseville, whence +it promptly expelled the small detachment found in +possession, but subsequently yielded to superior numbers, +and withdrew to St. Marais.</p> + +<p>The din of strife had now fallen silent at all points, +and the fight seemed to be ended. The infantry of the +1st Division were moving into the villages, and the +artillery was going into bivouac, when suddenly at nine +o'clock a great mass of French infantry advanced in the +darkness to an attack on Servigny. This proved to be +Aymard's Division; it entered the village without +firing a shot, surprised the garrison, and drove it out +after a fierce hand-to-hand fight. This episode remained +unnoticed for a long time, even by the nearest +troops; but these then rushed to arms, and pouring in +from all sides, drove the French back beyond the +graveyard, which thenceforth remained in German +possession.</p> + +<p>It was now ten o'clock at night. The 1st Division +had kept its ground against an enemy of superior +strength; but the French had penetrated into the unoccupied +gap between the 3rd and 4th Brigades, and +were a standing menace to the German flank at Servigny +from their position at Noisseville.</p> + +<p><i>September 1st.</i>—The 18th Division, by a night-march, +crossed from the left to the right bank of the Moselle at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[111]</a></span> +four o'clock in the morning, and reinforced with a +brigade both flanks of the line Malroy—Charly—Bois +de Failly. The 25th Division was now able to fall back +from Antilly to St. Barbe, where, with the 6th Landwehr +Brigade, it formed a reserve for the Poix—Servigny +position.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 1st of September a thick mist +still shrouded the plain when all the troops stood to +arms.</p> + +<p>Marshal Bazaine now again indicated to his generals +the seizure of St. Barbe as the prime objective, since +that alone could render possible the march to the +north; and he added, "In the event of failure, we shall +maintain our positions." This expression could only +indicate the intention, in the event specified, of remaining +under shelter of the cannon of Metz, and evinced +but little confidence in the success of the enterprise +now engaged in.<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> + +<p>So early as five o'clock the 3rd Brigade had deployed +on the Saarlouis road to prevent the further progress +of the enemy on the left flank of the 1st Division. It +swept the slopes in the direction of Montoy with the +fire of twenty guns, and when Noisseville had been +well plied for a considerable time by the fire of the +artillery of the 2nd Brigade, about seven o'clock the +43rd Regiment carried the village by storm. A fierce +fight ensued in and about the houses: two French +brigades struck into the combat, and after a long whirl +of fighting the German regiment was driven out again. +Battalions of the 3rd Brigade came up just as the fight +was over, but the attack was not renewed.</p> + +<p>Now that the direction of the French effort to break +out was no longer doubtful, the 28th Brigade had +started from Courcelles at six in the morning to reinforce<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[112]</a></span> +the Ist Corps. Its two batteries silenced those of +the French at Montoy, and then directed their fire on +Flanville. The enemy soon began to abandon the +burning village, which, at nine o'clock, the Rhinelanders +entered from the south and the East Prussians +from the north. Marshal Le Bœuf again sent forward +Bastoul's Division on Montoy, but the extremely +effective fire of the Prussian artillery compelled it to +turn back.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Brigade had meanwhile taken up a position +on the upland of Retonfay, where it was now joined by +the 28th. The 3rd Cavalry Division was reinforced by +the Hessian Horse Brigade, and these troops with the +artillery mass made up presently to 114 guns, formed +a rampart against any further progress of the IInd and +IIIrd French Corps.</p> + +<p>The fighting had now died out on the right wing +of the French army; but the IVth Corps had been +enjoined to await the direct advance of the troops of that +wing before renewing its attack on the artillery-front +and village entrenchments of the line from Servigny to +Poix, whose strength had been proved on the previous +day. But towards eleven o'clock, after Noisseville +had been heavily bombarded, the 3rd Prussian Brigade, +supported by the Landwehr, advanced southward of the +position, pushed its attack against that point, and +compelled the French to withdraw from the burning +village.</p> + +<p>Marshal Canrobert, on the northern front of the +sortie, had brought up his batteries at Chieulles by +half-past eight, and their fire, seconded by that of the +artillery of the fortress, caused a temporary evacuation +of Rupigny; but the village was soon reoccupied. +Tixier's Division had made two fruitless attempts to +seize Failly, and now, on the other hand, the 36th +Brigade of the 18th Division came up, and taking the +offensive in conjunction with the Reserve Division, at +ten o'clock drove the French back over the Chieulles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[113]</a></span> +stream. They made still another onslaught on Failly, +but the flanking fire made this also a failure.</p> + +<p>Marshal Le Bœuf, though he still had more than +two Divisions to oppose it, held himself obliged to +retreat on account of the approach of the Prussian 3rd +Brigade on his right flank; and in consequence of the +receipt of this intelligence, Marshal Bazaine at mid-day +ordered the fighting to be broken off at all other points.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Rhine which issued from Metz on +August 31st, with a strength of 137,000 men,<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> had +been successfully opposed by no more than 36,000 +Prussians. In this battle for the first time in the war +the French were the assailants, the Germans had the +rôle of the defence. That the Germans lost 3400 men +against the loss of 3000 by the French, must be attributed +to the higher properties of the infantry weapon +of the latter. But the superiority of the Prussian +artillery was decisively proved, and this it was which +rendered possible General von Manteuffel's unshaken +resistance.</p> + +<p>The VIIth Corps remained on the right bank of the +Norelle, where the line of investment was now further +strengthened by the arrival of the XIIIth Corps under +the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. On +the left bank the IInd and IIIrd Corps were now able +to return to their respective previous positions. On +the same day and at about the same hour when the destruction +of one French army was completed at Sedan, +the other was returning to an apparently more and more +hopeless detention in Metz. Thus the issue of the war +was already beyond doubt after a campaign of but two +months' duration; though the war itself was far from +being ended.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[114]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> The IInd and IIIrd Army.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> The wording of Bazaine's order dispenses with any speculation +on this point. He wrote, "In the event of failure, we shall +maintain our positions, strengthen ourselves therein, <i>and retire in the +evening under Forts St. Julien and Queuleu</i>."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> The estimate of the total strength of the Army of the Rhine +on the 22nd August is given at 137,728 men in the German Staff +History. It deducts for garrison and normal outpost duty details +amounting to over 17,000 men; and reckons the marching out +strength for the battle of 31st August—1st September at "about +120,000 men."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Change of Government in Paris.</span></h2> + + +<p>When, in the night of the 4th of September, the +news of the disaster of Sedan and the Emperor's +surrender became known in Paris, the Legislative Body +met in a rapidly successive series of sittings for the purpose +of selecting an Administrative Committee. The +mob cut those deliberations short by forcing its way +into the Chamber and proclaiming the Republic there +and at the Hôtel de Ville, amidst the acclamations of +the people. Though the troops were under arms in +their barracks, the Government till now in power +offered no resistance; the Empress left Paris; General +Trochu and several members of the Minority in the +Chamber combined to form a Government, which they +styled "The Government of National Defence and +War." "War to the bitter end" was its motto, and +the entire nation was to be called to arms. Not an inch +of territory, not a stone of the fortresses was to be +yielded up to the enemy.</p> + +<p>Such a Government, devoid of any legitimate foundation, +necessarily thirsted for results, and could be little +disposed to allow the war to end in peace.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding all the early reverses of the war, +France was too rich in resources to find herself as yet +by any means defenceless. General Vinoy was still in +the field. All the scattered Corps, the Marine troops +and the Gendarmerie could gather to him. There was, +too, the "Territorial Militia," numbering 468,000 men, +an institution which the country owed to Marshal Niel, +whose far-seeing work of reorganization had been cut +short only too soon. Further, there was available +to be called up the falling-due contingent of 100,000 +conscripts, as well as the National Guard. It followed +that France was thus able to put into the field +a million of men, without reckoning Franctireurs and +Volunteer Corps. The reserve store of 2000 guns and +400,000 Chassepôts assured the means of armament,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[115]</a></span> +and the workshops of neutral England were ready and +willing to fulfil commissions. Such resources for war, +backed by the active patriotism of the nation, could +maintain a prolonged resistance if a master will +should inspire it with energy.</p> + +<p>And such a will was disclosed in the person of +Gambetta.</p> + +<p>Minister of War, he had at the same time, by the +French system of government, the direction of military +operations, and certainly he was not the man to loosen +his grasp of the chief command. For in a Republic, a +victorious general at the head of the Army would at once +have become Dictator in his stead. M. de Freycinet, +another civilian, served under Gambetta as a sort of +Chief of the General Staff, and the energetic, but dilettante, +commandership exercised by these gentlemen cost +France very dear. Gambetta's rare energy and unrelenting +determination availed, indeed, to induce the +entire population to take up arms, but not to direct +these hasty levies with comprehensive unity of purpose. +Without giving them time to be trained into fitness for +the field, with ruthless severity he despatched them +into the field in utter inefficiency as they were called +out, to attempt the execution of ill-digested plans +against an enemy on whose firm solidity all their +courage and devotion was inevitably wrecked. He +prolonged the struggle at the cost of heavy sacrifices +on both sides, without turning the balance in favour of +France.</p> + +<p>In any event the German chiefs had still great difficulties +to overcome.</p> + +<p>The battles already won had cost heavy losses; in +officers especially the losses were irreparable. Half the +army was detained before Metz and Strasburg. The +transport and guarding of already more than 200,000 +prisoners required the services of a large part of the +new levies being formed at home. The numerous +fortresses had not indeed hindered the invasion of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[116]</a></span> +German army, but they had to be invested or kept +under observation to secure the rearward communications, +and to safeguard the forwarding and victualling +of troops; and each further advance into the enemy's +country involved increased drafts of armed men. After +the battle of Sedan only 150,000 men were available for +further operations in the field. There could be no +doubt that the new objective must be Paris, as the seat +of the new Government and the centre of gravity, so to +speak, of the whole country. On the very day of the +capitulation of Sedan, all the dispositions were made +for the renewal of the advance.</p> + +<p>To spare the troops, the movement was to be carried +out on a very broad front, which involved no risk, for +of the French Corps, the XIIIth alone could possibly +cause any detention. And, indeed, only Blanchard's +Division of that Corps was now at Mézières; its other +two Divisions had but just begun their march when they +received orders to halt preparatory to returning (to +Paris).</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Retreat of General Vinoy.</span></h2> + + +<p>General Vinoy's most urgent anxiety was—very +rightly—to reach Paris with the least possible loss. +This was not very easy to accomplish, since the VIth +Prussian Corps, which had taken no part in the battle +of Sedan, was at Attigny in such a position that as a +matter of distance, as far as to Laon, it could reach any +point of any line of the enemy's retreat before, or as +soon as the latter. General von Tümpling, commanding +that Corps, had already taken possession of Rethel +with the 12th Division by the evening of September +1st, thus closing the high-road to Paris. Only extraordinary +forced marching and a succession of fortunate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[117]</a></span> +circumstances could save from destruction Blanchard's +Division, which had already wasted its ammunition in +small conflicts.</p> + +<p>General Vinoy supplied the troops with several days' +rations, enjoined the strictest discipline on the march, +and during the night between 1st and 2nd September +set out on the road to Rethel, where he expected to +find Exéa's Division; which, however, availing itself of +the section of railway still undestroyed, had already +gone back to Soissons.</p> + +<p>It was still early morning (of 2nd) when the French +column of march came in contact with the 5th and +presently with the 6th Prussian Cavalry Divisions, +without, however, being seriously attacked. It was not +till about ten o'clock, and within about seven miles of +Rethel, that the French general learnt that place was +in hostile possession, whereupon he decided on turning +westward to Novion Porcien. He sent his rear-guard +against the enemy's horse-artillery, but seeing hardly +anything but cavalry in its front, it soon resumed the +march. At about four in the afternoon the Division +reached Novion, where it went into bivouac.</p> + +<p>General von Hoffmann (commanding the 12th +Prussian Division) had taken up a position at Rethel, +and was awaiting the enemy, of whose approach he +had been warned. Having ridden out in person, he +became aware of Vinoy's deviation from the Rethel road, +and at four in the afternoon marched to Ecly, where +he arrived late in the evening. Part of his troops +scouted forward toward Château Porcien.</p> + +<p>General Vinoy, on learning that this road, too, was +closed to him, quited his bivouac again at half-past one +on the morning (of 3rd), leaving his fires burning, and +set out on a second night-march in pouring rain and +total darkness.</p> + +<p>At first he took a northerly direction, to reach Laon +at worst by the byways. By tracks fathomless in mud, +and with frequent alarms, but without being reached<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[118]</a></span> +by the enemy, he trudged into Château Porcien at +half-past seven on the morning of the 3rd, and there +halted for a couple of hours. The trend of the roads +now compelled him again to take a southerly direction, +and when the head of his column reached Séraincourt, +the sound of firing told him that his rear had been +attacked by the Germans.</p> + +<p>The Prussian cavalry had, early the same morning, +discovered the French departure, but this important +information found General von Hoffmann no longer in +Ecly. He had already started thence to search for the +enemy at Novion-Porcien, where he might well be +expected to be after his first night-march, but at half-past +nine the Prussian general found the place empty. +Thus, that morning, the German and French Divisions +had marched past each other in different directions at +a distance apart of little more than four miles. The +thick weather had prevented them seeing each other. +General Vinoy this day reached Montcornet, in what +plight may be imagined. The 12th Division continued +its pursuit in the westerly direction, but came up +only with the rear stragglers of the fast-retreating +enemy, and took up alarm-quarters in Chaumont +Porcien.</p> + +<p>This march of the enemy ought not indeed to have +remained unobserved and unchecked under the eye of +two Cavalry Divisions, but it has to be said that these +were called off at an unfortunate moment.</p> + +<p>It was, in fact, in consequence of a report that the +French forces were assembled at Rheims, that the +Headquarter of the IIIrd Army had ordered the +immediate return of the VIth Corps and the two Divisions +of cavalry. These at once relinquished the +pursuit, and General von Tümpling ordered his two +Infantry Divisions to march at once on Rheims. The +11th, which had been holding Rethel, set out forthwith. +General von Hoffmann, on the contrary, followed up the +French, on his own responsibility, as far as was possible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[119]</a></span> +without cavalry to overtake them. Not till the following +day did the 12th Division reach the Suippe.</p> + +<p><i>September 4th.</i>—General Vinoy made his way northward +again, by way of Marle, where he received the news +of the Emperor's surrender and of the outbreak of the +revolution in Paris. His presence there was now of +the greatest importance, and on the 13th he reached +the French capital with the two other divisions of his +Corps from Laon and Soissons.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>THE MARCH ON PARIS<br /> +<span class="smcap">of the IIIrd Army and the Army of the Meuse.</span></h2> + + +<p>During these occurrences the German armies, on the +4th September, had begun their advance on Paris. +The first thing to be done was to disentangle the mass +of troops assembled in the cramped space around Sedan. +The IIIrd Army, of which the XIth and the Ist +Bavarian Corps were still remaining there, had to +make two long marches forward in order that the +Army of the Meuse should regain its line of supply +(Etappen-line).</p> + +<p>The news of a great assemblage of French troops at +Rheims soon proved to be unfounded. Early on the +4th, detachments of Prussian horse entered the hostile +and excited city, the 11th Division arrived that afternoon, +and on the following day the German King's +head-quarters were established in the old city where +the French Kings had been wont to be crowned.</p> + +<p>On the 10th of September the IIIrd Army had +reached the line Dormans—Sezanne, and the VIth Corps +had pushed forward to Château Thierry. The Army +of the Meuse, after the failure of a coup-de-main on +Montmédy, was advancing between Rheims and Laon.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[120]</a></span> +Cavalry sent far in advance covered this march executed +on a front so exceptionally broad. The scouts everywhere +found the inhabitants in a very hostile temper; +the franctireurs attacked with great recklessness, and +had to be driven out of several villages by dismounted +troopers. The roads were in many places wrecked by +the tearing up of the stone pavement, and the bridges +were blown up.</p> + +<p>On the approach of the 6th Cavalry Division Laon +had capitulated. Small detachments of troops of the +line were taken prisoners, 25 guns, 100 stores of arms +and ammunition were seized as prizes, and 2000 +Gardes-Mobiles were dismissed to their homes on +parole to take no further part in the war. While +friends and foes were assembled in large numbers in +the courtyard of the citadel, the powder-magazine +blew up, having probably been intentionally fired, and +did great damage both there and in the town. The +Prussians had fifteen officers and ninety-nine men killed +and wounded; among the wounded were the Division-Commander +and his general-staff officer. The French +lost 300 men; the commandant of the fortress was +mortally wounded.</p> + +<p>On the 16th the Army of the Meuse was between +Nanteuil and Lizy-on-Ourcq; the 5th Cavalry Division +had advanced to Dammartin; the 6th to beyond Beaumont, +sending patrols up to before St. Denis. The +IIIrd Army was spread over the area from Meaux to +Compte Robert. Strong military bridges had been +thrown over the Marne at Trilport and Lagny to +replace the permanent ones which had been blown up, +and on the 17th the Vth Corps reached the Upper +Seine.</p> + +<p>To secure the draw-bridges at Villeneuve St. Georges, +the 17th Brigade pushed on down the right bank of the +Seine towards Paris, and at Mont Mesly it encountered +Exéa's Division, which had been sent out by General +Vinoy to bring in or destroy stores of supplies. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[121]</a></span> +fight which ensued ended in the French being driven +back under shelter of Fort Charenton.</p> + +<p>The IInd Bavarian Corps also reached the Seine on +this day and bridged the river at Corbeil. The 2nd +Cavalry Division was in observation in front of Saclay, +towards Paris. The Royal head-quarter moved to +Meaux by way of Château Thierry. The complete +investment of the French capital was now imminent.</p> + +<p>The works constructed under Louis Philippe effectually +protected the city from being taken by storm. +The artillery armament of the place consisted of over +2627 pieces, including 200 of the largest calibres of naval +ordnance. There were 500 rounds for each gun, and +in addition a reserve of three million kilogrammes of +powder. As concerned the active strength of the +garrison, besides the XIIIth Corps which had returned +from Mézières, a new Corps, the XIVth, had been +raised in Paris itself. These 50,000 troops of the line, +14,000 highly efficient and staunch marines and sailors, +and about 8000 gensd'armes, customs officers, and +forest-guards, formed the core of the defence. There +were besides 115,000 Gardes-Mobiles, who had been +drawn in from outside at an earlier date. The National +Guard was formed into 130 battalions, which, however, +being defective in equipment and poorly disciplined, +could be employed only in the defence of the inner +circle of fortifications. The volunteers, though +numerous, proved for the most part useless.</p> + +<p>In all the besieged force was over 300,000 strong, +thus it was far more than double the strength of the +besiegers as yet on the spot, of whom there were at +the outside only about 60,000 men available, with 5000 +cavalry and 124 field-batteries. On the Seine the +defence had five floating batteries and nine section-built +gunboats originally intended for the Rhine; on the +railways were some guns mounted on armour-plated +trucks.</p> + +<p>Great difficulties necessarily attended the victualling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[122]</a></span> +of two million human beings for a long period; however, +the authorities had succeeded in gathering into +Paris 3000 oxen, 6000 swine, and 180,000 sheep, with +considerable stores of other provisions, so that perfect +confidence was justifiable, that Paris could hold out for +six weeks at least.</p> + +<p>Orders issued from the head-quarter at Meaux +charged the Army of the Meuse with the investment +of the capital on the right bank of the Seine and +Marne,<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> and the IIIrd Army with the section on the +left bank of both rivers. As a general rule the troops +were to remain beyond range of the fire of the fortress, +but, short of that, were to keep as close as possible so +as to curtail the circuit of environment. The close +connection of the two armies was to be secured above +Paris by several bridges across both the rivers, and +below the city, by the cavalry occupying Poissy. To +the IIIrd Army was to belong the duty of reconnoitring +in the direction of Orleans. In case of any +attempt to relieve the capital it was to allow the +relieving force to approach within a short distance, and +then, leaving the investment to be maintained by +weak details, to strike the enemy with its main body.</p> + +<p>Without relief from outside, a close passive blockade +must inevitably result in the capitulation of Paris, +though probably not for some weeks or even months. +As an ultimate compulsory measure there remained +recourse to a bombardment.</p> + +<p>At the time when Paris was fortified it was not +foreseen that improvements in the artillery arm would +double or treble the range of fire. The exterior forts, +especially on the south, were at so short a distance +from the enceinte that the city could easily be reached +by the fire of heavy batteries.</p> + +<p>The Germans have been blamed for not having had +recourse at an earlier date to this expedient of bombardment;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[123]</a></span> +but this criticism indicates an inadequate +appreciation of the difficulties which stood in the way +of its earlier execution.</p> + +<p>It may safely be accepted that the attack of a large +fortified place in the heart of an enemy's country is +simply impossible so long as the invader is not master +of the railways or waterways leading to it, by which +may be brought up in full quantity the requisite +material. The conveyance of this by the ordinary +highways, even for a short distance, is in itself a +herculean undertaking. Up to this time the German +army had the control of only one railway in French +territory, and this was fully occupied in the maintenance +of supplies for the armies in the field: in bringing +up reinforcements and equipment; in conveying +rearward wounded, sick and prisoners. But even this +much of railway service ended at Toul; and the +attempt to turn that fortress by laying a temporary +section of line found insurmountable difficulties in the +nature of the ground. Further forward there interposed +itself a scarcely inferior obstacle in the complete +destruction of the Nanteuil tunnel, to repair which +would probably require weeks.</p> + +<p>Even then, for the further transport from Nanteuil +up to the Paris front of 300 heavy guns with 500 +rounds for each gun, there were requisite 4500 four-wheeled +waggons, such as were not in use in the +country, and 10,000 horses. Thus a bombardment was, +in the earlier period, not to be thought of, and in any +case the object of it would not be to destroy Paris, but +merely to exert a final pressure on the inhabitants; and +this influence would be more effectual when a long +blockade had shaken the resolution of the besieged than +it was likely to be at the beginning of the investment.</p> + +<p><i>September 18th.</i>—Corresponding directions communicated +to the respective army commands, ordered +the resumption of the march on the enemy's capital.</p> + +<p>On the 18th the Army of the Meuse, swinging leftward, +had the XIIth Corps at Claye, the Guard Corps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[124]</a></span> +at Mitry, and the IVth Corps at Dammartin, one march +from Paris.</p> + +<p>All the villages in front of St. Denis were occupied +by the French. It seemed as if the investment on the +north front of Paris would be resisted, and the Crown +Prince of Saxony took measures for next day to follow +up and support the IVth Corps, which led the advance. +The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, hastening on to +Pontoise, were given two companies of Jägers and a +pontoon train, and after a bridge had been laid they +crossed the Oise.</p> + +<p>The Vth Corps of the IIIrd Army passed over the +Seine at Villeneuve-St.-Georges and advanced to +Palaiseau and the Upper Bièvre. The advanced guard +came into collision with Bernis' French Cavalry Brigade. +The 47th Regiment at once proceeded to the attack, +and stormed the walled farmsteads of Dame Rose and +Trivaux. But on the southern skirt of the forest of +Meudon the whole of the French XIVth Corps was +drawn up; on its left stood a Division of the XIIIth +Corps. The regiment retired on Petit Bicêtre without +being followed, and there took up a defensive position.</p> + +<p>The IInd Bavarian Corps marched from Corbeil by +Longjumeau on a parallel front with the Vth Corps, +and on the right the VIth occupied both banks of the +Seine. These Corps, too, had several brushes with the +enemy.</p> + +<p>The Würtemberg Division at Lagny and Gournay +was to cross the Marne forthwith, and so establish +communication between the two armies.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Viz., from the Marne above Paris in a wide half-circle to +the Seine below it. The rayon of the Army of the Meuse subsequently +extended to the right bank of the Seine above Paris.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Investment of Paris.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(September 19th.)</div> + + +<p>On the 19th September the IVth Corps met with +no opposition in its advance to St. Brice; it drove detachments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[125]</a></span> +of the enemy from the neighbouring villages +back under cover of the heavy guns of St. Denis, and +pushed forward towards the Lower Seine. The Guard +Corps followed it as far as Dugny, and lined the +Morée brook, which was dammed up at its mouth, and +afforded useful cover for the line of investment along +a considerable distance. Further to the left the XIIth +Corps took up a position extending to the Marne, and +on the left bank of that river the Würtemberg Division +advanced to Champigny.</p> + +<p>On this day the Vth Corps of the IIIrd Army +marched on Versailles in two columns. The 47th +Regiment had again the duty of covering the march +along the hostile front. The French evidently were +anxious to remain masters of the important heights in +front of the fortifications of Paris, and in the early +morning two divisions of their XIVth Corps marched +out of the neighbouring forest of Meudon against Petit +Bicêtre and Villacoublay. Supported by a numerous +artillery, which set on fire the farm-buildings of Petit +Bicêtre, they drove back the German outposts; but +reinforcements from the Vth Corps presently came +up to Villacoublay, and to Abbaye aux Bois from the +IInd Bavarian Corps.</p> + +<p>The left brigade of the latter had crossed the +columns marching on Versailles in the valley of the +Bièvre; but the sound of fighting from the field of +strife induced General von Dietl<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> to advance with his +detachments as they came up singly, on both sides of +the high-road to Bicêtre. A conjunct assault with the +Prussians still fighting in the Bois de Garenne, was +successful in repulsing the French at Pavé blanc. +Meanwhile the enemy by half-past eight had formed an +artillery front of fifty guns, and three regiments of +march advanced to renew the attack on Petit Bicêtre +and the Bois de Garenne. They were received with +a destructive musketry fire, and not even General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[126]</a></span> +Ducrot's personal influence could persuade the troops, +who were young recruits, to go forward. The Zouaves +posted about the farm of Trivaux were finally thrown +into such confusion by some shells falling among them +that they hurried back to Paris in headlong flight.</p> + +<p>General Ducrot had to abandon his attempt. His +Divisions retired in evident disorder on Clamart and +Fontenay, under cover of the artillery and of the +cavalry, which had resolutely endured the hostile fire; +pursued at their heels by the German troops. The +Bavarians stormed Pavé blanc under a heavy cannon +fire; the Prussians retook Dame Rose after a trivial +skirmish, and pushed on past the farm of Trivaux into +the forest of Meudon. The French still held the +heights of Plessis-Piquet, which were to them of vast +importance and very easy of defence, as well as the +redoubt at Moulin de la Tour, where nine field-batteries +at once came into action, the fire from which commanded +the whole of the western field of operations.</p> + +<p>The main body of the Bavarian Corps had meanwhile +moved southward, and during its advance on +Fontenay aux Roses, about nine o'clock, it came under +a hot fire from the height, as well as a flanking fire +from a redoubt near Hautes Bruyères. Being informed +of the situation at the scene of conflict on the +plateau of Bicêtre, General von Hartmann (the Corps +Commander) at once sent thither an artillery reinforcement, +and ordered the 5th Brigade to attempt a junction +to his left by way of Malabry. As soon as this brigade +had deployed under a hot Chassepôt and artillery fire +between Pavé blanc and Malabry, General von Walther +(commanding 3rd Bavarian Division) passed to the +attack of Plessis-Piquet. The artillery advanced to a +short distance on the hither side of the park wall, and +then the infantry broke out from the wood of Verrières, +and, after a brief but sharp struggle, took possession of +the mill lying to the southward. After half an hour's +artillery preparation, the Bavarians advanced on Hachette<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[127]</a></span> +by rushes, and broke into the park of Plessis. The +French kept up a hot fire from the redoubt of Moulin +de la Tour on the localities wrenched from them, by +which the Bavarian field batteries suffered severely; +but they still effectively supported the further advance +of the infantry, who now got close in under the earthworks. +However, the defenders were already on the +point of retiring, and when about three o'clock one +Bavarian company entered, it found the place deserted +and the guns left in position.</p> + +<p>Caussade's Division had left Clamart and was on the +way to Paris; Maussion's had abandoned the heights of +Bagneux on the pretence of having received mistaken +orders, and Hughes' Division was with difficulty brought +to a halt under cover of Fort Montrouge.</p> + +<p>The Bavarian Corps now took up the position it had +won on the plateau of Bicêtre to the right of the Vth +Corps. The fight had cost the former 265 men and the +latter 178; the French lost 661 killed and above 300 +prisoners.</p> + +<p>The condition in which the French XIVth Corps +returned to Paris caused such dismay that General +Trochu found himself obliged to withdraw a Division +of the XIIIth from Vincennes for the defence of the +enceinte.</p> + +<p>It was subsequently argued that it would have +been possible to capture one of the forts on this +day by forcing an entrance along with the fugitive +enemy, with the result of materially shortening +the siege. But the forts did not need to open their +gates to shelter fugitives, to whom those of the +capital stood open. The escalade of masonry escarpments +eighteen feet high can never be successful +without much preparation. Ventures of this character +are rarely ordered by superior authority; but can be +attempted only in a propitious moment by those on the +spot. In this case probable failure would have endangered +the important success of the day.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[128]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Vth Corps had meanwhile proceeded on its march +to Versailles; a few National Guards, who had collected +at the entrance to the town, were driven off or disarmed +by the German Hussars. The 9th Division +held the eastern exits of the town, the 10th encamped +at Rocquencourt, and strong outposts were +pushed out on the Bougival—Sèvres line. The 18th +Brigade, which remained at Villacoubay to support the +Bavarians in case of need, did not reach Versailles +until the evening.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Bavarian Division remained on the heights +in front of Plessis Piquet, its outposts confronting the +forest of Meudon, where the French were still in possession +of the château; and the pioneers at once altered +the redoubt of La Tour du Moulin so as to front north. +The 12th Division was encamped at Fontenay and +rearward as far as Châtenay.</p> + +<p>The main body of the VIth Corps had taken position +at Orly, its outposts extending from Choisy le Roi past +Thiais to Chevilly. Maud'huy's Division attempted to +drive in the outpost line at the last-named village, but +without success. A brigade of the same Corps at +Limeil, on the right bank of the Seine, was engaged in +skirmishing with the French at Créteil. Within touch, +further to the right, the Würtemberg Division held the +(left) bank of the Marne from Ormesson to Noisy le +Grand, behind which latter place the pontoon bridge +near Gournay assured communication with the Saxon +Corps.</p> + +<p>Thus on the 19th of September the investment of +Paris was complete on all sides. Six Army Corps +stood in a deployment some fifty miles in circumference +immediately in front of the enemy's capital, +in some places actually within range of his guns, its +rear guarded by a large force of cavalry.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[129]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Commanding 1st Bavarian Infantry Brigade.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">First Negotiations for Peace.</span></h2> + + +<p>In full expectation of a battle to the north of Paris, +the King had ridden out to join the Guard Corps, and +in the evening his head-quarters were moved to +Ferrières.</p> + +<p>Here thus early Monsieur Jules Favre made his +appearance to negotiate for peace on the basis of "not +one foot of soil." He believed that after all their +victories and losses, the Germans would come to terms +on payment of a sum of money. It was self-evident +that such a proposal could not be taken into consideration, +and only the eventuality of granting an armistice +was seriously discussed.</p> + +<p>It was in the political interest of Germany as well, +to afford the French nation the possibility of establishing +by its own free and regular election a government +which should have full right to conclude a peace +creditable to the people; for the self-constituted de +facto Government ruling in Paris was the offspring of +a revolution, and might at any moment be removed by +a counter-revolution.</p> + +<p>From a military point of view it was true that any +pause in the active operations was a disadvantage. It +would afford the enemy time to push forward his preparations, +and by raising for a time the investment of +Paris would give the capital the opportunity to reprovision +itself at discretion.</p> + +<p>The armistice could, therefore, only be granted in +consideration of a corresponding equivalent.</p> + +<p>To secure the subsistence of the respective German +armies, Strasburg and Toul, which now intercepted the +railway communication, must be given over. The +siege of Metz was to be maintained; but with regard to +Paris, either the blockade was to continue; or, if it were +raised, one of the forts commanding the capital was to +be occupied by the Germans. The Chamber of Deputies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[130]</a></span> +was to be allowed to meet at Tours in full +freedom.</p> + +<p>These conditions, especially the surrender of the +fortified places, were absolutely rejected on the French +side, and the negotiations were broken off. Eight days +later Toul and Strasburg were in the hands of the +Germans.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Toul.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(September 23rd.)</div> + + +<p>As soon as the German coast seemed no longer +threatened by the danger of a landing of French troops, +the 17th Division, which had been left behind there, +was ordered to join the army in France. It arrived +before Toul on September 12th.</p> + +<p>This place, in itself exempt from capture by storm +but commanded by neighbouring heights, had till now +been invested by Etappen troops of the IIIrd Army, +and shelled by the guns taken at Marsal and with field-guns, +but without any particular effect. The infantry +on the other hand had established a footing behind +the railway embankment and in the suburbs close up to +the foot of the glacis, so that sorties by the garrison were +rendered almost impossible. In view of these circumstances +half the Division was presently sent to Châlons, +where sixteen battalions and fifteen squadrons barely +sufficed to deal with the extremely hostile attitude of +the people, hold the Etappen-lines and safeguard the +communication with Germany. Thus only seven +battalions, four squadrons, and four field-batteries remained +before Toul.</p> + +<p>On the 18th there arrived from Nancy by railway +ten 15 cm. and sixteen 12 cm. siege guns. The intention<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[131]</a></span> +was to attack the western face, which was +enfiladed from Mont St. Michel, and then to breach the +south-west bastion; but first an (unsuccessful) attempt +was made to reduce the place by the shorter process of +subjecting it to a bombardment with field artillery.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 22nd battery-emplacements for +the siege artillery were constructed by the infantry; +three on Mont St. Michel, seven on the heights on the +left bank of the Moselle, and one on the right bank. +Next morning sixty-two guns opened fire, and at half-past +three in the afternoon the white flag was hoisted +on the Cathedral.</p> + +<p>The handing over of the place followed the same +day (23rd), on the conditions as had been granted +at Sedan. A hundred and nine officers were released +on parole, 2240 rank and file were taken prisoners. +Six companies took possession the same evening of the +city, which on the whole had suffered little.</p> + +<p>Twenty-one heavy guns, about 3000 stand of arms, +and large stores of provisions and forage were the prizes +of success.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Strasburg.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(September 28th.)</div> + + +<p>Immediately after the victory of Wörth, the reduction +of Strasburg became a primary object. This +strong fortified position, bridge-head as it was commanding +the Rhine, was a standing menace to Southern +Germany.</p> + +<p>When Marshal MacMahon evacuated Alsace, only +three battalions of the line were left with the commandant +of Strasburg. But with stragglers from the +various regiments engaged at Wörth, with sundry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[132]</a></span> +fourth battalions and reserve detachments, and finally +with Mobiles and National Guards, the strength of the +garrison had increased to 23,000 men. There was a +complete absence of engineer troops, but 130 marines +formed an excellent nucleus; the armament of the +fortress was also ample.</p> + +<p>So early as on the 11th August the Baden Division had +been detailed to observe Strasburg. Notwithstanding +the smallness of its force the Division had advanced +unchecked by the enemy on the Ruprechtsau as +far as the Rhine-and-Ill Canal; had occupied the +village of Schiltigheim, almost within rifle-shot of the +fortifications: and, having promptly prepared it for +defence, pushed forward into the suburb of Königshofen.</p> + +<p>In the course of eight days there arrived, under the +command of General von Werder, the Guard Landwehr +and 1st Reserve Divisions, and one cavalry brigade, in +all 46 battalions, 24 squadrons, and 18 field-batteries; +as well as a siege-train of 200 rifled cannon and 88 +mortars, with 6000 foot artillerymen and ten companies +of fortress-pioneers; a total strength of 40,000 men.</p> + +<p>The unloading of the guns brought from Magdeburg, +Coblentz, and Wesel was begun on August 18th at the +railway station of Vendenheim, by a detachment of the +Railway Battalion.</p> + +<p>The engineer-depôt was established at Hausberge, +a wagon-park at Lampertsheim, and provision made +for permanent magazines. A complete blockade was +established, and the field-telegraph kept up communication +between all the posts.</p> + +<p>To attain the desired end with the least possible +delay, an attempt was made, contrary to the advice of +General of Engineers Schultz, though with the sanction +of the supreme Head-quarter, to force the town to +surrender by stress of a bombardment. The request +that the women and children should be allowed to +withdraw was necessarily refused.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[133]</a></span></p> + +<p>The erection of the batteries for the bombardment in +the dark, wet nights was attended with great difficulties. +Meanwhile only the field-guns could fire on the city; +but the batteries whose armament of heavy guns was +complete opened fire on the night of the 24th—25th; +and soon a great fire was raging. Kehl, on the +right bank of the river, was also set on fire by the +shell-fire.</p> + +<p>The Bishop of Strasburg came out to the outposts at +Schiltigheim to entreat forbearance for the citizens. +Much as damage to this German city was to be +regretted, since the Prelate was not empowered to +negotiate the bombardment was continued through +the night of the 25th, when it reached its height. +But the headquarter staff at Mundolsheim became +convinced that this mode of attack would not accomplish +the desired object, and that the more +deliberate course of a regular siege would have to be +resorted to. General von Mertens was placed in charge +of the engineer operations, General Decker was given +the direction of the artillery.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 29th—30th August the first +parallel was opened very close to the glacis, and soon +was prolonged from the Rhine and Marne canal, through +the churchyard of St. Helena, to the Jewish cemetery +at Königshofen.</p> + +<p>The number of batteries on the left bank of the +Rhine was soon increased to 21, on the right bank to +4; so that 124 guns of the heaviest calibre were ready +in protected positions to begin the contest with the +guns of the fortress. The further offensive operations +were directed against bastions Nos. 11 and 12 on the +north-west salient of the fortress. In the night of +September 1st—2nd the second parallel was completed, +but not without opposition. A strong sortie of +fourteen companies of the garrison made at daybreak +(of 2nd) upon the island of Waken, and in front of +Kronenburg and Königshofen, was repulsed.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[134]</a></span></p> + +<p>The fortress then opened a heavy fire, pouring such +a storm of projectiles on the siege-works that they had +to be abandoned, till at about nine o'clock the artillery +of the attack had silenced the guns of the fortress. A +second sortie followed on the 3rd September, which +was not repulsed before it had reached the second +parallel.</p> + +<p>A short truce was granted at the request of the +commandant, to allow of the burial of the dead lying +in front of the works. And on this day a grand +salvo announced to the besieged the victory of Sedan.</p> + +<p>Incessant rain had filled the trenches of the second +parallel, 2400 paces in length, ankle-deep with water, +and it was not till the 9th that they were completely +repaired. Five batteries were moved forward from the +first parallel, as special batteries were required to crush +the fire of lunette No. 44, which took in flank all the +approaches. These soon silenced its guns, and the +lunette was abandoned by the garrison.</p> + +<p>There were now 96 rifled cannon pieces and 38 +mortars in full fire at very short range. Each gun +was authorized to fire twenty rounds a day and ten +shrapnel each night. The large Finkmatt Barracks +were destroyed by fire, and the Stone Gate was so much +injured that it had to be buttressed with sandbags. +The garrison withdrew the guns behind the parapet, +and only fired their mortars. However, in order to +push forward the siege-works, sap-rollers had to be +brought into use.</p> + +<p>When it was discovered that mining galleries were +being driven in front of lunette No. 53, Captain Ledebour +let himself down by a rope into the ditches, and with +the help of his pioneers removed the charges of powder.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 13th—14th, the crest of +the glacis in front of both the lunettes Nos. 52 +and 53 was reached. The crowning was then begun +by means of the double traverse sap, and was finished +in four days.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[135]</a></span></p> + +<p>The attack henceforth was exclusively directed against +bastion No. 11.</p> + +<p>To run off the water from the ditches of the fortress +it was necessary to destroy the sluices by the Jews' +Gate. These were invisible from any part of the field +of attack, and the desired result could only be very +incompletely obtained by artillery fire at a distance of +more than a mile. Detachments of the 34th Fusilier +Regiment, therefore, on the 15th, marched on the +sluices under a heavy rifle fire from the besieged, and +destroyed the dam.</p> + +<p>The island of Sporen was at this time taken possession +of by the Baden corps.</p> + +<p>When the mortar-batteries had for the most part +been moved up into the second parallel, the gun-batteries +were also advanced nearer, and the wall-piece +detachments did such execution by their accurate +practice that the defenders never more dared to show +themselves by day.</p> + +<p>The retaining wall of lunette No. 53 could only be +reached by indirect fire; but 1000 shells made a breach, +and on the 19th September two mines were fired, which +blew up the counterscarp and brought it down to the +level of the water of the ditch. The pioneers immediately +set about laying a dam of fascines across the +ditch. A party sent over in a boat found the work +abandoned. The gorge was closed under heavy rifle fire +from the ramparts of the main fortress, and the parapet +reversed so as to face the place.</p> + +<p>The next lunette to the left, No. 52, was merely an +earthwork, and the attack had already been pushed +forward as far as the edge of the ditch, but earth +screens had first to be thrown up and covered in with +railway iron, as a protection against the heavy fire +of shell from bastion No. 12. The construction of a +dam of fascines or earth, more than sixty paces across, +and with the ditch full of water almost fathom deep, +would have taken a long time; so it was decided to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[136]</a></span> +make a cask bridge of beer-barrels, of which a quantity +had been found in Schiltigheim. This work was begun +at dusk on the 21st, under no better protection than a +screen of boards to prevent observation, and it was +finished by ten o'clock. Here again the defenders had +not waited for the escalade, and this lunette, too, was +immediately prepared for being held. Both lunettes +were now furnished with batteries of mortars and guns +to silence the fire from the ravelines and counter-guards +of the front of attack, against which five dismounted +and counter-batteries were also directed.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 22nd—23rd the Germans +advanced from lunette No. 52, partly by flying sap and +partly by the deep sap, and there followed the crowning +of the glacis in the front of counter-guard No. 51. +A breaching fire was immediately opened against the +east face of bastion No. 11, and the west face of bastion +No. 12. The splinters of stone compelled the defenders +to abandon the counter-guards. The scarp of bastion +No. 11 fell on the 24th, after a shell-fire of 600 rounds. +The bringing down of the earthwork angle which +remained standing, was postponed till the beginning of +the assault.</p> + +<p>It was more difficult to breach bastion No. 12, +because of the limited opportunity for observing the +effect of the fire. It was not till the 26th that a breach +thirty-six feet wide was made, after firing 467 long +shells. And even then, for the actual assault to +succeed, the deep wet ditch at the foot of the bastion +had to be crossed.</p> + +<p>News of the fall of the Empire had indeed reached +Strasburg, but General Uhrich would not listen +to the prayers of the citizens that he would put +an end to their sufferings. The Republic was proclaimed.</p> + +<p>The siege had lasted thirty days, but the place was +still well supplied with food and stores; the garrison +was not materially weakened by the loss of 2500 men,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[137]</a></span> +but its heterogeneous elements prevented its effective +employment in large bodies outside the walls. From +the first the small blockading force had been allowed to +approach close to the works; and the moment when +the artillery of a fortress always has the advantage +over the attack had been little utilized.</p> + +<p>The German artillery had proved much the stronger, +both as regards material and in its advantageous +employment. Under its powerful protection the work +of the pioneers and infantry was carried on with equal +courage and caution, never swerving from the object in +view. The storming of the main walls was now to be +imminently expected, and no relief from outside could +be hoped for.</p> + +<p>On the afternoon of September 27th, the white flag +was seen flying from the Cathedral tower; firing ceased +and the sapper-works were stopped.</p> + +<p>In Königshofen at two in the following morning the +capitulation was settled, on the Sedan conditions. Five +hundred officers and 17,000 men were made prisoners, +but the former were free to go on their parole. The +National Guards and franctireurs were dismissed to +their homes, after laying down their arms and pledging +themselves to fight no more. All the cash remaining +in the state bank, 1200 guns, 200,000 small arms and +considerable stores proved a valuable prize of war.</p> + +<p>At eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th, companies +of Prussian and Baden troops took over the +National, Fischer, and Austerlitz gates. The French +garrison marched out at the National Gate, General +Uhrich at their head. At first the march was conducted +in good order, but before long numbers of +drunken men broke the ranks and refused to obey, or +threw down their arms. The prisoners were taken in +the first instance to Rastatt, under the escort of two +battalions and two squadrons.</p> + +<p>The old city of the German Reich, which had been +seized by France in time of peace nearly two centuries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[138]</a></span> +earlier, was now restored by German valour to the +German fatherland.</p> + +<p>The siege had cost the Germans 39 officers and 894 +men. The city unhappily could not have been spared +great suffering. Four hundred and fifty houses were +utterly destroyed, 10,000 inhabitants were roofless, +nearly 2000 were killed or wounded. The museum +and picture gallery, the town hall and theatre, the +new church, the gymnasium, the Commandant's residence, +and alas! the public library of 200,000 volumes +had fallen a prey to the flames.</p> + +<p>The noble Cathedral showed many marks of shot, +and the citadel was a heap of ruins. Under the wreck +of the assailed works in the western front lay buried +burst cannon.</p> + +<p>The fall of Toul and of Strasburg produced a not +unimportant change in the military situation. Considerable +forces were now free for other services, and +the railway transport could be brought up nearer to +the armies. The material no longer required at +Strasburg could not indeed be at once employed +for the artillery offensive against Paris; it needed +considerable re-equipment, and was to do duty meanwhile +in the reduction of several smaller places. +The newly-opened railway line was made use of to +bring up the Guard Landwehr Division to the army +investing Paris. A new Army Corps, the XIVth, was +created of the Baden Division, a combined brigade +consisting of the 30th and 34th Prussian regiments, +and one cavalry brigade; which, under the command +of General von Werder, marched on the Upper Seine. +The 1st Reserve Division remained behind as the +garrison of Strasburg.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[139]</a></span></p> +<h2><span class="smcap">Operations round Paris to 15th October.</span></h2> + + +<p>The Government in the now closely-blockaded +capital, could not make its behests heard and obeyed +throughout France. It therefore decided on sending a +delegation of two of its members out into the provinces, +their seat of direction to be at Tours. They could quit +Paris only in a balloon. One of these delegates was +Gambetta, whose restless energy soon made itself +conspicuously felt, and lasted during the continuance +of the war. Monsieur Thiers, meanwhile, had been +visiting the European courts on the errand of inducing +them to interpose their good offices in favour +of France.</p> + +<p>After the mishap of September 19th the feeling in +Paris was against any great offensive demonstrations for +the present; but the troops of the line still remained +outside the walls under protection of the outlying forts. +The Divisions of the XIIIth Corps were encamped on +the south front and on the plateau of Vincennes; the +XIVth was at Boulogne, Neuilly and Clichy behind +the loops of the Seine, with Mont Valérien in its front, +which was held by two line-battalions, after the flight, +on the 20th, of the Gardes-Mobiles from that impregnable +stronghold, in great disorder back into Paris. The +defence of the northern front of the city remained +entrusted to the Gardes-Mobiles.</p> + +<p>On the German side the positions of the Army of +the Meuse, which were to be occupied and defended to +the uttermost, extended from Chatou along the Seine +to the heights of Montmorency, and onward along the +Morée and the skirts of the forest of Bondy as far +as the Marne. In close touch with the flank of the +Army of the Meuse at the Marne, the lines of the +Würtemberg Division carried on the investment from +Noisy le Grand across the Joinville peninsula to +Ormesson. The XIth Corps arriving from Sedan on +the 23rd filled up the interval from Ormesson to Villeneuve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[140]</a></span> +St. Georges, and the 1st Bavarian Corps occupied +Longjumeau as a protection against attempts from the +direction of Orleans. The VIth Corps could now be +entirely transferred to the left bank of the Seine, where +the line of defence extended along the wooded heights +south of Paris to Bougival.</p> + +<p>The Head-quarter of the King and that of the IIIrd +Army were at Versailles, that of the Army of the +Meuse was transferred to Vert-Galant. Numerous +bridges facilitated the inter-communication of the +various portions of the forces, telegraphs and signal-lights +insured their rapid concentration, and every +movement of the French was watched from eligible +posts of observation.</p> + +<p>There was no lack of accommodation for the troops, for +every village was deserted; but this made the difficulty +of obtaining supplies all the greater. The fugitive +inhabitants had driven off their cattle and destroyed their +stores; there remained only the apparently inexhaustible +wine-cellars. For the first few days all the food +needed had to be drawn from the Commissariat trains, +but ere long the cavalry succeeded in obtaining considerable +supplies. High prices and good discipline secured +a market. Only the troops in advanced positions had +to bivouac or build huts, many within range of the +hostile artillery, some even within rifle-shot of the +enemy. Near St. Cloud, for instance, no one could show +himself without becoming a mark for the chassepôts +from behind the shutters of the houses opposite. The +outposts here could only be relieved at night, and +sometimes had to remain on duty two or three days at +a time. The advanced positions of the Bavarians at +Moulin la Tour were also much exposed, and the visits +of superior officers to them always drew a sharp +cannonade. Le Bourget, standing as it did in advance +of the line of inundation, was especially liable to a +surprise. That village had been seized on 20th (Sept.) +by a battalion of the Guard Corps, at whose approach<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[141]</a></span> +400 Gardes-Mobiles had fled, leaving their baggage. +Only one company occupied this post, on account of +the heavy fire of the adjacent forts.</p> + +<p>Some petty sorties from St. Denis met with no +success; but an attempt by detachments of the VIth +Corps to occupy the village of Villejuif and the +redoubt of Hautes Bruyères proved unsuccessful. +They forced their way in several times, but always had +to retire under the fire of the neighbouring forts of +Bicêtre and Ivry, and because of the superior strength +of Maud'huy's Division. The French afterwards armed +the redoubts with heavy guns.</p> + +<p><i>September 30th.</i>—Early on this day a cannonade of +an hour and a half's duration from the southern forts +and batteries announced a sortie in that direction. By +six o'clock two brigades of the XIIIth French Corps +deployed against Thiais and Choisy le Roi. Strong +swarms of tirailleurs drove in the outposts of the VIth +Corps, and forced the field-guns in position between +those two villages to retire; but then the fire of the +infantry garrisons checked any further attack on the +part of the French. Further to the west a third +brigade got into Chevilly and seized a factory on +the road to Belle Epine; but its determined attack +failed to obtain possession of the whole village. +The 11th Division was alarmed in its rearward +quarters, and hurried forward to the support of the +12th. The factory was recovered from the French, +and the Prussian batteries now opened fire, and worked +such havoc among the enemy as he retired on Saussaye, +that, shunning the attack of the infantry, he +fled in great disorder to Hautes Bruyères and Villejuif. +A brigade which had forced its way into L'Hay was in +the same way driven back, leaving 120 prisoners for +the most part unwounded. In the farmstead at the +north entrance of Chevilly, however, the French still +held their ground with great obstinacy. Not till they +were completely surrounded, and had made an ineffectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[142]</a></span> +attempt to force a passage, did surrender +those brave defenders, who numbered about 100.</p> + +<p>The whole series of attacks was entirely defeated by +about nine o'clock, and General Vinoy vainly endeavoured +to incite the diminished battalions at Hautes +Bruyères to renew the struggle.</p> + +<p>These few morning hours had cost the VIth Corps +28 officers and 413 men; and the French many more.</p> + +<p>Two simultaneous feint-attacks on Sèvres and on +Mesly on the right bank of the Seine, came to nothing. +The German outposts, at first driven in, re-occupied +their ground by about nine o'clock.</p> + +<p>After thus failing to gain space towards the southward +by this sortie, the besieged proceeded to assure +themselves of the ground already in their possession +by the construction of entrenchments. They fortified +Villejuif and extended their lines from Hautes Bruyères +past Arcueil to the Mill of Pichon, so that there the +Bavarian outposts had to be drawn in nearer to Bourg-la-Reine.</p> + +<p>Otherwise, throughout the first half of the month of +October the garrison of Paris restricted itself for the +most part to daily cannonades. Guns of the heaviest +calibre were directed on the most petty objects. It was +sheer waste of ammunition, just as though the aim was +to get rid of the stores on hand. If one of the gigantic +long shells happened to fall on an outpost, the destruction +was of course terrible; but on the whole they did +little execution.</p> + +<p>Apart from the noise of the cannonade to which one +soon became accustomed, in Versailles, whence none of +the residents had fled, it might have been thought a +time of profound peace. The admirable discipline of +the German troops allowed the townsfolk to pursue +their business undisturbed; the hosts were well paid +for the billeting imposed on them, and the country +people could cultivate their fields and gardens in peace. +At St. Cloud every room was kept in the same order<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[143]</a></span> +as when the Imperial family had left it, till the shells +from Mont Valérien reduced that delightful palace with +all its treasures of art to a heap of charred ruins. It +was the French fire, too, which wrecked the Château of +Meudon, the porcelain factory of Sèvres, and whole +villages in the nearer environs. And it was also the +French themselves who, without any necessity, felled +half the Bois de Boulogne.</p> + +<p>The investment line was considerably strengthened +on the 10th and 16th of October, when the 17th Division +arriving from Toul relieved the 21st at Bonneuil, +and the latter took up a position between the Bavarians +and the Vth Corps, in the Meudon—Sèvres tract; and +when the Guard Landwehr Division came up and +occupied St. Germain.</p> + +<p>These movements were observed from Paris, and +to clear up the situation, General Vinoy advanced at +nine o'clock on 13th October with about 26,000 men +and 80 guns, against the position held by the IInd +Bavarian Corps.</p> + +<p>Four battalions of Gardes-Mobiles, protected by the +fire of the nearest forts and of field batteries, advanced +to the attack of Bagneux, and forced their way over +the entrenchments wrecked by artillery fire, into the +heart of the place, whence the defenders retired to +Fontenay, when at eleven o'clock the French 10th +Regiment of the line had also come up. Reinforced by +a fresh battalion, and supported by an effective flanking +fire from Châtillon, the Bavarians now made so firm a +stand that the enemy could make no further progress, +but began to put Bagneux in a state of defence. Meanwhile +the 4th Bavarian Division had stood to arms, and +by about 1.30 General von Bothmer (its commander) +moved it up from Sceaux and from Fontenay, and proceeded +to surround Bagneux. The barricades erected +by the enemy were carried, who however still offered +an obstinate resistance in the northern part of the +village.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[144]</a></span></p> + +<p>A French battalion had also made its way into +Châtillon, but the Bavarian battalion in occupation +there held its own until assistance came, and +the enemy was driven out of the place after a sharp +conflict.</p> + +<p>A third brigade seized Clamart, which at that time +was not yet included in the German intrenched lines; +but it failed to climb the ascent to Moulin de la Tour, +although the defenders on the plateau above were +exposed to the fire of the forts.</p> + +<p>General Vinoy had convinced himself that forces which +were a match for him confronted him at every point, +and at three o'clock he decided to break off the fight. +The French bodies of troops gradually disappeared +behind the forts, and had all vanished by dusk. The +Bavarians returned to their former fore-post positions, +and the garrison of Bagneux was increased to two +battalions.</p> + +<p>All France had meanwhile been arming with eager +haste. Armies of considerable strength were being +massed at Rouen and Evreux, at Besançon, and especially +behind the Loire, of very various composition no +doubt, and above all lacking in professional officers to +drill and discipline them. Great battles were therefore +in the first instance to be avoided; the enemy was +to be constantly harassed by small engagements. +Thus, towards the end of September, General Delarue +advanced from Evreux with his "Eclaireurs de la +Seine" up to the vicinity of St. Germain. But the +5th Cavalry Division, supported by two Bavarian +battalions, drove these bands back to Dreux behind +the Eure. The woods in front of the 6th Cavalry +Division were also full of hostile parties, who were, +however, swept out without much difficulty beyond +Rambouillet to Epernon.</p> + +<p>Matters looked more serious to the south of Paris, +in front of the 4th Cavalry Division, which was in +observation towards the Loire.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[145]</a></span></p> + +<p>The newly-formed French XVth Corps had assembled +at Orleans in three Divisions with a strength of 60,000 +men, and it occupied the whole forest-belt on the +right bank of the river. To counteract the danger +threatening the investment from that direction, the 1st +Bavarian Corps and the 22nd Division of the XIth +had been put in march on Arpajon and Montcléry +as soon as they were freed from duty at Sedan; and +on the 6th of October they were placed, with the 2nd +Cavalry Division, under the command of General von +der Tann.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Action of Artenay.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 10th.)</div> + + +<p>When General von der Tann received instructions +to take the offensive against Orleans, he marched +on the 9th of October to the vicinity of St. Péravy +without meeting any serious opposition, and on the +10th advanced on Artenay. The 4th Cavalry Division +covered the right flank; the 2nd remained near +Pithiviers, where the enemy had collected in great +force.</p> + +<p>General La Motterouge on the same day also moved +out on Artenay with the XVth French Corps, having the +wood in his rear occupied by Gardes-Mobiles; and so +the advanced guards of both sides met at a short +distance to the north of the common objective.</p> + +<p>While the Bavarian light horse on the right were +driving the French cavalry before them, the infantry +deployed across the road near to Dambron. The +22nd Division marched forward on Dambron with +both Cavalry Divisions on its flanks. Under the +fire of the Bavarian batteries, the French had gone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[146]</a></span> +about to Artenay, where the Germans were ready to +receive them. Attacked in front and threatened by +bodies of horse, at about two o'clock, leaving their +tents standing, they began a retreat which soon degenerated +into flight. The cavalry seized four field-guns +and took above 250 prisoners. Six hundred +more, who had reached Croix Briquet, surrendered +there to the Bavarian infantry on the arrival of the +latter.</p> + +<p>The German troops had made a long march; General +von der Tann therefore allowed them rest for the day +in and around Artenay, and only the advanced guard +went on to Chevilly, to pursue the march to Orleans +next day.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Engagement at Orleans.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 11th.)</div> + + +<p>On this day, the 22nd Division, for the time only +6000 strong, moved to the right flank of the advance, +and drove the French out of several villages partly +prepared for defence; it was not till about ten o'clock +that it met with serious opposition from an intrenched +position at Ormes.</p> + +<p>The French Commander after the disaster at Artenay +had decided on a retreat behind the Loire, to cover +which he had halted about 15,000 men on the right +bank of the river, in a position which possessed many +essentials towards a good defence.</p> + +<p>General von Wittich (commanding 22nd Division) +first sent the 44th Brigade against this position at +Ormes, and opened fire from seven batteries. The +troops of his left wing, supported by the Bavarian +right, made their way but slowly over the plain east of +the enemy's position, and various enclosures and buildings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[147]</a></span> +had to be stormed and taken as they advanced. +This threatening attitude of the German right, however, +shook the firmness of the defence, and, after some hours' +hard fighting, the French began to retreat. No sooner +was this observed by the Germans than two batteries +were brought up to within 800 paces, and the 83rd +Regiment stormed the entrenchments at two in the afternoon, +but with heavy loss. Detachments of the 43rd +Brigade had meanwhile reached the road in rear of +Ormes, and took 800 prisoners. But the villages, gardens +and vineyards which line the road to Orleans for +more than four miles on either side, were serious +obstacles to the advance of the Germans in close +formation, and the Division did not arrive at Petit St. +Jean till three o'clock, of which the nearest buildings +were forcibly taken possession of.</p> + +<p>The Bavarian Corps, which had also met with a +stout resistance at Saran, pushed forward to Bel Air, +but with great loss, especially in the artillery. Here +the nature of the ground did not allow of the deployment +of the guns, a further attack came to a standstill, +and at half-past four the French were still stoutly holding +their own at Les Aides, till the advance of the 4th +Bavarian Brigade to Murlins threatened their line of +retreat. They made a renewed stand behind the railway +embankment, 1000 paces in front of the town, and +the railway-station and gas-works had also to be taken +by assault.</p> + +<p>It was already five o'clock when General von der +Tann led his reserve, the 1st Bavarian Brigade, to the +decisive assault of Grand Ormes. The 32nd Prussian +Regiment crossed the embankment on the left flank of +the French, who now retired into the suburb of St. Jean. +The 1st Bavarian Regiment, hurrying in their rear, +was received with a hot fire at the gate of the city; +but with its officers marching at its head it reached the +market-place about seven o'clock.</p> + +<p>The French hurried across the bridge over the Loire,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[148]</a></span> +while the 43rd Prussian and 1st Bavarian Brigades +seized the principal buildings and the passages across +the river; but as darkness fell they desisted from +further advance and bivouacked on the open places +of the city.</p> + +<p>The day had cost the Germans a loss of 900 men, the +3rd Bavarian Brigade having suffered most severely. +But their hard-won victory promptly dispelled the disquietude +of the investing armies caused by the threatening +attitude of the French; and 5000 rifles, ten +locomotives and sixty railway-carriages were welcome +prizes.</p> + +<p>The French rear-guard had lost in detached combats +and retreats alone 1800 prisoners; but it had covered +the retreat of the main body of the Army of the South +for a whole day against superior forces, with praiseworthy +determination. In the open field, where skilful +handling of masses is possible, it would soon have been +defeated; but in street-fighting unflinching personal +courage is all that is needed in the defender, and the +latest recruits of the newly created French levies did +not lack that attribute.</p> + +<p>On the following day the 1st Bavarian Division +took possession of the suburb of St. Marceau, on the +further side of the Loire, and advanced to the Loiret. +The 2nd Cavalry Division scouted through the Sologne, +the 4th on the right bank ranged to the westward.</p> + +<p>The French XVth Corps had continued its retreat to +Salbris and Pierrefitte, behind the Sauldre.</p> + +<p>It was certainly to be wished that its pursuit could +have been followed up to Vierzon and Tours, so that +the vast arsenals at the first-named town might have +been destroyed, and the Government Delegation driven +away from the other. But it must not be forgotten +that though the French forces had been discomfited at +Artenay, favoured by the nature of the locality they +had escaped utter defeat by retreat. General von der +Tann was disproportionately weak in the infantry arm,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[149]</a></span> +and hostile masses were disclosing themselves on all +sides. A new French Army Corps, the XVIth, appeared +at Blois, below Orleans, and at Gien, above +that city; the German cavalry met with resistance +in the forest of Marchénoir and before Châteaudun; +and everywhere the inhabitants and volunteers appeared +so full of confidence that the proximity of +reinforcements was to be presumed.</p> + +<p>So it behoved the Germans to restrict themselves to +the occupation of Orleans and the line of the Loire; +and for this purpose the Bavarian Corps, with the 2nd +Cavalry Division, seemed a sufficient force. The 22nd +Infantry and 4th Cavalry Divisions were recalled to +the IIIrd Army; on their return march they were +charged to disperse the volunteers who had made their +appearance at Châteaudun and Chartres.</p> + +<p>General von der Tann had the bridges over the +Loiret and the Loire prepared for destruction, an +Etappen-line was established to Longjumeau, and the +Bavarian Railway Detachment set to work to restore +the line to Villeneuve.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Soissons.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 15th.)</div> + + +<p>Soissons still hindered the further utilization of the +railway, which had been re-opened at the time of the +fall of Toul as far as Rheims. This fortress had been +bombarded by field artillery without success when the +Army of the Meuse passed by it on the march to Paris, +and since then it had only been kept under observation +until on October 6th eight Landwehr battalions, four +squadrons, two batteries, two companies of pioneers, +and four of fortress artillery made good the investment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[150]</a></span></p> + +<p>Soissons, with its walls about 26 feet high, had complete +immunity from escalade, and the damming of the +Crise brook made it unassailable on the south. The +south-west front, on the other hand, had only a dry +ditch, with no counterscarp of masonry; here, too, the +town was commanded by Mont Marion, rising to a +height of 300 feet at a distance of little more than +a mile. Against this face of the fortress, therefore, the +artillery attack was directed at short range, when on +the 11th October there arrived from Toul 26 Prussian +siege-guns with 170 rounds for each, and 10 French +mortars. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg took over +the command.</p> + +<p>In a clear moonlight night the artillery with the help +of the infantry was brought up on to the heights of +Ste. Geneviève; the construction of the batteries about +Belleu and in Mont Marion was completed and the +arming of them effected. At six in the morning of +12th October they opened fire simultaneously.</p> + +<p>The besieged answered with great spirit but with +small results, and the accurate fire of the Prussian +artillery soon subdued that of the enemy in the particular +front.</p> + +<p>A narrow breach was visible by next day, and the +fire from the fortress was evidently much enfeebled; +but the commandant decidedly rejected the demand +that he should capitulate. On the 14th he increased +the number of guns on his south front, so that the +batteries on Ste. Geneviève had an arduous struggle. +The French also laboured hard along the front of the +attack to restore the severely damaged works, brought +more guns up to the ramparts, and closed the breach by +retrenchment.</p> + +<p>But on the 15th these repairs were soon demolished +again by the artillery of the attack, and a breach was +made 40 paces wide and amply spread with earth. As +the fortress still kept up a brisk fire, it was determined +to bring up the field-batteries within 900 paces. But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[151]</a></span> +at eight in the evening, when this operation was just +begun, the commandant opened negotiations and surrendered +the place on the Sedan terms. The garrison +marched out next morning, for the most part drunk. +A thousand Gardes-Mobiles were dismissed on parole, +3800 regulars were made prisoners.</p> + +<p>The attack had cost 120 men; 128 guns and 8000 +small arms became prize of war, besides vast stores of +provisions.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Storming of Châteaudun.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 18th.)</div> + + +<p>In obedience to instructions, General von Wittich +marched on Châteaudun with the 22nd Division on the +afternoon of the 18th. The French troops of the line +had already been ordered to retire on Blois, but about +1800 National Guards and volunteers still remained, +prepared under cover of barricades and walls to receive +the enemy. The infantry attack was also made more +difficult by the nature of the ground, and four batteries +had to keep up a hot fire for a long time.</p> + +<p>It was not till dusk that a general assault was had +recourse to. Inside the town the enemy made a desperate +resistance. House after house had to be won, the +fighting lasted until late into the night, and a large +part of the place was set on fire. The volunteers +finally escaped, leaving 150 prisoners and abandoning +the inhabitants to their fate; and these, though they +had taken part in the struggle, were let off with a fine.</p> + +<p>At noon on the 21st the Division arrived in front of +Chartres, where 10,000 French were said to have assembled. +The marine infantry and Gardes-Mobiles +advanced to the attack, but were repulsed by the fire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[152]</a></span> +of seven batteries. The General commanding the +Division had deployed both his brigades southward of the +city, and with the assistance of his cavalry, which had +been joined by the 6th (Cavalry) Division, completely +surrounded it. The fate of Châteaudun had been a +warning to the municipal authorities, and at three +o'clock an agreement was come to by which the troops +were to be withdrawn, the National Guards to lay down +their arms, and the gates to be thrown open.</p> + +<p>General Wittich's orders were to remain at Chartres +for the present, while the 6th Cavalry Division was to +occupy Maintenon, and so cover the investing army to +the west.</p> + +<p>Not less fervid was the rush to arms in the north, in +Picardy and Normandy. The Saxon Cavalry Division, +supported by detachments of the Army of the Meuse, +had in the early part of October driven the franctireurs +and Gardes-Mobiles beyond the Oise and the +Epte on Amiens, taking some hundreds of prisoners. +But fresh swarms were constantly coming on, and had +to be attacked at Breteuil, Montdidier, and Etrêpagny, +so that no less than eleven battalions, twenty-four +squadrons, and four batteries, were by degrees employed +in this direction for the protection of the besieging +force. But by the end of the month the French +forces were so systematically organized and in so great +strength, that for the time the Germans had to confine +themselves to holding on the defensive the line of the +Epte.</p> + +<p>To the south-east also, in the forest-land of Fontainebleau, +hostilities were prosecuted by the volunteers, +particularly against requisition-parties of cavalry; and +from Nangis obstruction was threatened to the transport +of the siege-guns. A small force of Würtemberg +troops seized Montereau, which, though barricaded, was +not defended; the inhabitants gave up their arms, and +the detachment marched on Nogent. This town was +held by a large body of Gardes-Mobiles. After breaching<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[153]</a></span> +the walls of the churchyard, the Würtembergers, +in the face of a hot fire, made their way into the place. +The French still offered a stout resistance in its interior, +but finally retired on Troyes, leaving 600 dead and +wounded. The small flying column rejoined its +Division, having traversed over 126 miles in six days.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Sortie Against Malmaison.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 21st.)</div> + + +<p>The French capital had now been invested for more +than four weeks, and it seemed not impossible, because +of the long continuance of inactivity, that it might be +brought to surrender by famine. All the sorties hitherto +attempted had only had for their object to drive +the enemy from the closest vicinity; a new effort was +to aim at greater results. The project was to cross the +Seine below Paris at Bezons and Carrières, and to make +a simultaneous attack on the positions of the IVth +Prussian Corps on the heights of Argenteuil from the +south, and from St.-Denis from the east. A march on +Rouen by Pontoise was to follow, into a district not +yet altogether exhausted of resources. The Army of +the Loire was also to proceed thither by railway by +way of Le Mans, and so there would be massed in that +region an army of 250,000 men.</p> + +<p>The Prussian Vth Corps, it was true, stood right on +the flank of such an advance across the Seine; its +outposts had several times been seen in Rueil. As a +preliminary step, General Ducrot undertook to force +back this body with 10,000 men and 120 field-guns. +Then an intrenched line from Valérien to Carrières +would close the peninsula against interference from the +southward.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[154]</a></span></p> + +<p>Perhaps, in the face of much-dreaded "public +opinion" and the growing restlessness of political +parties in Paris, it was more the urgency to be doing +something than any serious hope of success which gave +rise to such far-reaching schemes. Considerable difficulties +had to be met in attacking the enemy's lines, and +greater must inevitably arise if the attack should +succeed. It was vain to think of bringing through the +miles-long trains which are indispensable for victualling +an army. Serious embarrassment would ensue when +the troops had consumed the three days' rations they +would carry with them. To live on the country the +army must disperse itself; but with the enemy at its +heels close concentration was indispensable. And, in +any case, it is hard to see what would have been gained +by withdrawing from Paris the forces which had been +assembled for the defence of the capital. Success could +only have been hoped for if an army from without had +been so near as to be able immediately to give the hand +to the troops marching out.</p> + +<p>However, on the 21st of October, after Mont Valérien +had all the morning kept up a seemingly ineffective fire, +General Ducrot advanced at about one o'clock to attack +the position of the Prussian 19th Brigade whose supports +held the line Bougival—Jonchère—Fohlenkoppel. +Fourteen French field-batteries deployed on either side +of Rueil and about the southern base of Valérien; the +infantry advanced in five columns behind this artillery +front.</p> + +<p>On the German side only two batteries could at first +engage in the unequal duel, and one of these near the +Villa Metternich had very soon to retire. The French +guns advanced rightward to within 1400 paces of Bougival, +and at three o'clock four companies of Zouaves +rushed out of Rueil. Being received with a hot fire, +they wheeled into the park of Malmaison, and without +opposition seized the Château of Buzanval and the +eastern slope of the deep-cut ravine of Cucufa. And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[155]</a></span> +here one of their batteries was brought up into the +fighting-line to support them.</p> + +<p>While the main body of the 9th Division advanced +from Versailles on Vaucresson, the 10th deployed +against the ravine and at Villa Metternich. The infantry +fire lasted for a full hour, and wrought the +French much loss. When at about four o'clock they +seemed sufficiently shaken, and a reinforcement of the +Guard Landwehr had come up from St. Germain on the +left, the German left wing advanced from Bougival and +over the height of Jonchère, forced its way into +Malmaison in spite of violent opposition, and followed +the retreating Zouaves as far as Rueil. The right wing +at the same time having turned the head of the Cucufa +ravine, charged against its eastern slope, drove out the +enemy, seized the battery of two guns, and occupied +the Château of Buzanval.</p> + +<p>The French now retired on all sides, firing ceased by +six o'clock, and the 10th Division, which had repulsed +the enemy's assaults single-handed, re-established its +previous fore-post line.</p> + +<p>The struggle had cost the Germans 400 men. The +French, on the other hand, had in this luckless enterprise +left 500 dead and wounded, and 120 prisoners.</p> + +<p>Soon after this affair the French began to throw up +entrenchments within 800 paces of the line of the +Guard Corps; and in the early morning of the 28th, +General Bellemare, under cover of the darkness, +advanced on Le Bourget with a force of several +battalions.</p> + +<p>The German company in occupation there, taken +completely by surprise, could only retire before such +overwhelming numbers, to Pont Iblon and Blanc Mesnil. +The French promptly barricaded themselves in the +place and prepared it for an obstinate defence. A +German battalion made a vain attempt that evening to +drive them out; it was repulsed with heavy loss. +Equally unsuccessful next day was the fire of thirty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[156]</a></span> +field-guns directed against the place from Pont Iblon. +Then, however, the Crown Prince of Saxony issued +imperative orders to the Guard Corps to recapture Le +Bourget without delay.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Storming of Le Bourget.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 30th.)</div> + + +<p>Accordingly on October 30th, nine battalions of the +2nd Guard-Division and five batteries, under the command +of Lieutenant-General von Budritzki,<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> were assembled +at Dugny, Pont Iblon and Blanc Mesnil for a concentric +attack on Le Bourget. The artillery in action +along the bank of the Morée inundation opened the +attack at about eight in the morning, and then the infantry +went forward. The terrain was perfectly open, +and the advance was under fire, not merely from Le +Bourget, but also from the heavy guns of the forts. +Nevertheless the Grenadier Battalion of the Queen +Elizabeth Regiment, at the head of the central column, +at nine o'clock made a successful assault, charging +over the barricade at the northern end of the village, +and entering it through a breach in the wall promptly +made by the pioneers. The Emperor Francis Grenadier +Regiment advanced against its western face and took +possession of the park. A fierce street-fight ensued on +a further advance into the village, in the course of +which there fell the commanders of both regiments, +Colonels von Zaluskowski and Count Waldersee. The +walled farmsteads left of the main street, were stormed +one after another in spite of a determined defence; the +windows of the church, high up in the walls as they +were, were broken in and scaled, and a hand-to-hand +fight raged furiously inside the sacred building. The +Guard Rifle-Battalion forced its way into the glass-works.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[157]</a></span></p> +<p>At half-past nine the French attempted to bring up +into Le Bourget reinforcements from Aubervillers and +Drancy; but the left German column had meanwhile +seized the railway-embankment, placed a detachment +of the Emperor Alexander Regiment to hold it, and +was forcing its way into the southern quarter of the +village. Two batteries had taken up position on the +Mollette brook, and their fire drove back the enemy +and even compelled him to evacuate Drancy.</p> + +<p>At ten o'clock the French still held the buildings on +the north side of the Mollette. These were now +assailed from the south. The 4th Company of the +Emperor Alexander Regiment crossed the stream and +forced its way through a breach made by the sappers +into the farmstead in which the enemy's main force +was gathered. The defenders had to be quelled with +the bayonet and with clubbed arms, and here the +French Colonel de Baroche met his death.</p> + +<p>Although by this time—eleven o'clock—all the three +attacking columns had struck hands in the heart of Le +Bourget, the enemy continued the struggle in detached +houses and gardens with embittered desperation till +the afternoon, while all the forts on the north front +of Paris overwhelmed the place with shell-fire. It was +not till half-past one that the troops of the attack could +withdraw by companies to their respective quarters. +Two battalions remained to garrison Le Bourget.</p> + +<p>The desperate resistance of the French showed how +important they considered their retention of this post. +Its success had cost the 2nd (Guard) Division 500 men. +The enemy's loss is not known, but 1200 prisoners +were taken. This new disaster added to the dissatisfaction +of the inhabitants of Paris. The revolutionary +factions, which at all times lurk in the French capital, +came ominously to the front.</p> + +<p>Highly-coloured reports could no longer conceal +utter lack of results; the authority of the Government +was steadily on the wane. It was accused of incapacity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[158]</a></span> +nay, of treason. Noisy mobs clamoured for +arms, and even a part of the National Guard took part +in the tumult. The Hôtel de Ville was surrounded by +a throng shouting "Vive la Commune!" and though +other troops dispersed these gatherings, the ringleaders, +though well known, went unpunished.</p> + +<p>On the 31st of October uproarious masses again +paraded the streets. As General Trochu had forbidden +the sentries at the Hôtel de Ville to use their +arms, the rebels forced their way in. The Ministers +were their prisoners till the evening, when some battalions +which remained staunch liberated them.</p> + +<p>Monsieur Thiers, who had returned from his fruitless +tour among the European Courts, thought the time +had come for re-opening negotiations with Versailles. +On the part of the Germans there was still the readiness +to grant an armistice, but it was naturally impossible +to accede to the condition demanded by the French, that +the city should be re-provisioned, and so hostilities had +to take their course.</p> + +<p>At this time, towards the end of October, the situation +on the Moselle had assumed an aspect which +essentially modified that of the whole war.</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<div class="right"><a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></div> + +<p>By the exchange of German prisoners for French +who had fought at Sedan, details of the disaster which +had befallen France in that battle were currently +known in Metz. But Marshal Bazaine declared that +the Army of the Rhine would continue to defend +the country against the invaders, and maintain +public order against the evil passions of disloyal men—a +resolution which certainly could be interpreted +in more ways than one. It would have been +eminently satisfactory to the Germans, politically +speaking, if there had been in France an available<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[159]</a></span> +power, apart from the pretentious but feeble Government +in Paris, with which to come to an understanding +as regarded the termination of the war. Permission +was therefore given for the admission to +Metz of a person representing himself to have a commission +from the exiled Imperial family. As he was +unable to authenticate himself in this capacity to the +satisfaction of Marshal Bazaine, General Bourbaki was +allowed to pass through the German lines that he +might betake himself to London, where, however, the +Empress Eugénie declined all intervention in the +already so disastrous affairs of France. The General +then placed his services at the disposal of the National +Defence Government at Tours.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the army which had been beleaguered +in Metz since the day of Noisseville maintained a +waiting attitude. The necessary supplies for 70,000 +inhabitants, including the country-folk who had taken +refuge in the city, had originally been enough to last +three months and a half, those for the regular garrison +were calculated for about five months; but for the +Army of the Rhine there was sustenance in store for +only forty-one days, and there was forage for only +twenty-five.</p> + +<p>Certainly it was possible to supplement the supplies +for the troops by purchase from the abundant stores of +the citizens; but ere long smaller rations of bread +were served out and horses were being slaughtered to +furnish animal food, so that most of the cavalry regiments +were reduced to two squadrons.</p> + +<p>On the German side, the service of supplying +197,326 men and 33,136 horses was one of great difficulty. +The outbreak of cattle-plague in Germany +restricted the importation of live beasts to those purchased +in Holland and Belgium. The meat rations had +to be supplemented by tinned provisions; and increased +rations of oats had to take the place of hay and straw.</p> + +<p>The losses of the army had hitherto been made good +from the reserves, but the transport of the prisoners from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[160]</a></span> +Sedan alone required the services of fourteen battalions +of the force blockading Metz. Thus it had not +yet been possible to provide sufficient shelter for the +troops near the wide extension of the entrenched line. +Raw, rainy weather had come on early in the season, +and a fourth part of the men were still roofless; so that +by degrees the sick in hospital reached the alarming +number of 40,000.</p> + +<p>Although fifty heavy guns had been brought up +from Germany, they were useless for the bombardment +of Metz, since in consequence of the superior calibre of +the fortress artillery they could only be fired at night, +and with frequent change of position. There was +nothing for it but to hope for the best, and have +patience.</p> + +<p>For four weeks already had the besieged been consuming +their stores. To replenish those in some degree, +and at the same time to revive the spirit of the troops +by active measures, the Marshal decided on fetching +in all the provisions to be found in the villages inside +the line of the German investment, under cover of a +sortie.</p> + +<p>At noon on September 22nd Fort St. Julien opened +a heavy fire on the outposts of the Ist Corps. Strong +bodies of infantry then advanced on the villages to the +eastward, drove in the picquets of the enemy, and returned +to Metz with the stores which had been seized. +But a similar attempt made next afternoon on the villages +to the north was less successful. Most of the waggons +had to return empty, under the fire of the Prussian +batteries quickly brought up into position. Finally, +on the 27th, a sortie for the same purpose was made to +the southward, which led to a series of small conflicts +and the capture in Peltre of a German company, +which was surrounded by a much stronger force. A +simultaneous sally on the left bank of the Moselle was +baffled by the fire of the alert artillery of the besieging +force.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[161]</a></span></p> + +<p>Thionville, on the north of Metz, had hitherto only +been kept under observation by a small force, which +could not hinder the garrison from scouring the country +as far as the neighbouring frontier, taking many prisoners, +seizing fifty waggon-loads of supplies, and even +diverting into the fortress a whole train of provision-trucks +while passing by the now restored railway from +Luxemburg.</p> + +<p>In point of fact, the Army of the Rhine would have +found in Thionville an important rallying-point at the +end of its first day's march, if the blockade of Metz +could have been broken through. Prince Frederick +Charles, realizing this, took care to strengthen the +investing lines to the north, on the right bank of the +Moselle. On October 1st the Xth Corps took up the +position hitherto held by the Reserve Division Kummer, +which was transferred to the left bank of the river. +The Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth Corps closed up to the right, +and the IInd occupied the space between the Seille and +the Moselle; the troops before Thionville were also reinforced.</p> + +<p>The Marshal had really once more determined to +break out to the northward, and that on both banks +of the river. New bridges were constructed behind +St. Julien and from the island of Chambière, the +nearest German outposts on the north and west of Metz +were pushed back by a series of daily skirmishes. +Under cover of the fire of the forts the French established +themselves firmly in Lessy and Ladonchamps. +The troops to be left in Metz were expressly selected; +the others tested as to their marching powers. +Light-signals were arranged with Thionville, and all +preparations made for a sortie on the 7th.</p> + +<p>Then the French commander suddenly changed his +mind, and the proposed enterprise collapsed into a +foraging expedition.</p> + +<p>For this, indeed, large forces were set in motion; +the Guard Voltigeur Division, the VIth Corps, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[162]</a></span> +the IVth in the forest of Woippy. The movement was +also to be supported by the IIIrd Corps on the right +bank of the river.</p> + +<p>Four hundred waggons were in readiness to carry +off the stores from the large farms lying north of +Ladonchamps.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Commanding 2nd Guard-Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> In text there is at this point no Section-Headline, although the +subject changes; but the succeeding pages till commencement of +new Section are headed: "Die Lage vor Metz im October." This +heading is followed in translation.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Sortie from Metz against Bellevue.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 7th.)</div> + + +<p>Although the start from Woippy planned for eleven +o'clock, was not effected till one, the Landwehr companies +on outpost duty were driven in by superior +numbers, and as they defended their positions till their +ammunition was exhausted, they also lost a considerable +number of prisoners. But the artillery of the +Landwehr Division prevented the removal of the +stores; the 5th Division advancing from Norroy struck +the left flank of the French attack and drove the enemy +back on Bellevue, where a stationary fight developed +itself.</p> + +<p>The French IIIrd Corps advanced on the right bank +of the Moselle against Malroy and Noisseville. Here, +too, the outpost line fell back; but behind it stood the +Xth and Ist Corps, ready for action. The respective +Corps commanders at once perceived that this attack +was only a feint. Although threatened himself, General +von Voigts-Rhetz sent his 38th Brigade across the +Moselle at Argancy by half-past two to assist the +Landwehr Division, and when General von Manteuffel +forwarded him supports to Charly, the 37th Brigade +followed.</p> + +<p>No sooner had the first reinforcements arrived than +General von Kummer on his side took the offensive,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[163]</a></span> +recaptured the farmsteads from the enemy after a +sharp struggle just as the latter were about to retire, +and then, supported on the right by part of the 5th +Division, moved on Bellevue at about six in the evening. +Ladonchamps, however, still remained in the +hands of the French. Late in the evening the 19th +and Reserve Divisions advanced on this place. The +premises of the château, which were surrounded by a +moat, were carefully intrenched and strongly defended +by infantry and guns. The darkness precluded effective +artillery action, and the attack failed; but all the +other points previously held by the Germans were re-occupied.</p> + +<p>The day had cost the Prussians 1700 killed and +wounded, besides 500 reported missing. The French +loss was given out to be no more than 1193.</p> + +<p>This attempt on the part of the French might be +regarded as tentative, and preliminary only to a real +effort to break through; perhaps it was so intended. +The German troops therefore remained in the positions +they had occupied at the close of the fighting, +in expectation of renewed hostilities on the morrow.</p> + +<p>The forts in fact opened a heavy fire on the farm-buildings +early on the 8th, while the German batteries +directed their fire on Ladonchamps. Strong columns +also advanced along the right bank of the Moselle, but +nowhere attempted a serious attack. The Prussian +troops therefore presently retired to their quarters.</p> + +<p>The artillery duel was carried on for the next few +days, but with diminished energy. Constant rain +made all field operations very difficult, and increased +the sufferings of the men on both sides. In Metz the +lack of victuals was becoming very painfully felt. So +early as on the 8th the commandant had announced +that his stores would not last longer than for twelve +days. A council of war, held on the 10th, was, however, +of opinion that the greatest service the Army of +the Rhine could do to France was to hold out as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[164]</a></span> +long as possible, since it thus continued to detain a +hostile army under the walls of Metz.</p> + +<p>The Marshal now sent General Boyer to negotiate at +Versailles, but his instructions were to demand a free +exit for the army and explicitly to refuse the terms of +the Sedan capitulation.</p> + +<p>The state of affairs in Metz was perfectly well +known to the Germans. The number of men who +were taken willing prisoners while digging potatoes +increased every day. They reported that disturbances +had broken out in the city, in which even part of the +soldiers had taken part, and that the commander-in-chief +had been compelled to proclaim the Republic. +And since the Empress had declared that she would +never give her consent to any diminution of French +territory, no further political negotiations were possible +with the chiefs of the Army of the Rhine.</p> + +<p>On the 20th the distribution of stores came to an +end within the fortress, and the troops thenceforth for +the most part subsisted on horseflesh. The original +stock of 20,000 horses was reduced by a thousand a +day. The want of bread and salt was severely felt, +and the soaked, deep ground made living in camp +almost unendurable.</p> + +<p>After the failure of the negotiations at Versailles, +the imperative necessity of entering into negotiations +with the Headquarter of the besieging army was +recognized by a council of war held on the 24th.</p> + +<p>The first interview had no result, as the Marshal +still stipulated for free egress on condition of withdrawing +to Algiers, or the alternative of an armistice +with the reprovisioning of Metz. On the German side +the surrender of the fortress and the march out of the +garrison as prisoners of war were insisted on, and on +these conditions the capitulation was signed on the +evening of the 27th of October.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[165]</a></span></p> +<h2><span class="smcap">Capitulation of Metz.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 27th.)<a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></div> + + +<p>On the morning of the 29th<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Prussian flags were +hoisted on the great outworks of Metz. At one o'clock +the French garrison marched out by six roads in +perfect silence and correct military formation.<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> At +each specified position a Prussian Army Corps stood +to receive the prisoners, who were immediately placed +in bivouacs previously prepared, and supplied with +food. The officers were allowed to keep their swords +and to return to Metz; provisions were immediately +sent in.</p> + +<p>Marshal Bazaine set out for Cassel.</p> + +<p>In the course of the day the 26th Brigade occupied +Metz. The city had suffered no injury, but the +state of the camps showed what the troops had suffered +during the siege of seventy-two days.</p> + +<p>The Germans during that time had lost 240 officers +and 5500 men in killed and wounded.</p> + +<p>Six thousand French officers and 167,000 men were +taken prisoners, beside 20,000 sick who could not be +at once removed, about 200,000 in all.<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> Fifty-six +Imperial eagles, 622 field and 876 fortress guns, 72 +mitrailleuses and 260,000 rifles fell into the hands of +the Germans.</p> + +<p>The prisoners were transported by way of Trèves +and Saarbrücken, escorted by Landwehr battalions, +and as these would have also to guard them when in +Germany, their return to field service was not to be +reckoned on. +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[166]</a></span></p><div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> The Protocol embodying the terms of capitulation was signed on +the evening of the 27th; its provisions came into effect at and after +10 a.m. of the 29th.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> On the contrary, there were much drunkenness and disorder.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> The 20,000 sick were included in the total of 173,000 officers +and men surrendered.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">New Distribution of the Army.</span></h2> + + +<p>The capitulation of Metz, which Prince Frederick +Charles had brought about under such serious difficulties, +materially improved the prospects of the war for +Germany.</p> + +<p>At the Royal Headquarter at Versailles, even before +the catastrophe but in confident anticipation of it, +decisions had been arrived at as to the respective +destinations of the forces it would release for service, +and communicated in advance to the superior Commanders.</p> + +<p>The Ist, VIIth and VIIIth Corps, with the 3rd +Cavalry Division, were thenceforth to constitute the +Ist Army, under the command of General von Manteuffel. +Its orders were to advance into the Compiègne +region and cover the investment of Paris on +the north. But apart from these orders it had various +other duties to fulfil; it was to occupy Metz and lay +siege to Thionville and Montmédy.</p> + +<p>The IInd, IIIrd, IXth and Xth Corps, with the 1st +Cavalry Division, were to constitute the IInd Army +under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, which +was ordered to advance on the Middle Loire.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Operations of the XIVth Corps in the +South-East.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October.)</div> + + +<p>Since the fall of Strasburg the newly-formed +XIVth Corps had been employed in safe-guarding the +communications between the German armies standing +fast respectively before Metz and before Paris. +General von Werder had no great battle to look<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[167]</a></span> +forward to, but a succession of small engagements. +To prepare his four infantry brigades for independent +action under such circumstances, he detailed artillery +and cavalry to each. In this formation the Corps +crossed the Vosges by the two roads through Schirmeck +and Barr, driving swarms of hostile Franctireurs +out of the narrow passes without material delay. +But on emerging from the mountains it at once met +with serious opposition.</p> + +<p>The French General Cambriels had been at Epinal +with about 30,000 men ever since the beginning of +October, and under cover of this force numerous +battalions of National Guards and Gardes-Mobiles had +been formed in the south of France.</p> + +<p>On the 6th, General von Degenfeld<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> with the advanced +guard of the Baden force approached St. Dié, +marching on both banks of the Meurthe. The weak +column was beset on all sides by far superior forces, yet +after repeated attacks it succeeded in taking the villages +which the enemy had been holding.</p> + +<p>The struggle, which lasted seven hours, ended with +the eccentric retreat of the enemy to Rambervillers and +Bruyères. It had cost the Germans 400 and the French +1400 men. The Baden force bivouacked on the field, +and presently found that the French had evacuated St. +Dié. General Cambriels had, in fact, collected all his +available forces in intrenched positions about Bruyères. +The Baden Brigade advanced on these on the 11th, +drove the Gardes-Mobiles and volunteers from the outlying +villages, climbed the heights on both sides of the +town, and forced its way into it with inconsiderable +loss. The enemy retired to the southward on Remiremont.</p> + +<p>From the small resistance hitherto made by the +French, though so far superior in numbers, General +von Werder assumed that they would hardly make a +stand before reaching Besançon, so he immediately<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[168]</a></span> +countermanded further pursuit, though somewhat early +in the day, and concentrated his forces on Epinal, +which place was taken possession of by the Germans +after insignificant fighting. From thence an etappen-route +and telegraph-line were opened to Lunéville and +Nancy, magazines were formed, and the trains, which +were following the Corps from Saverne by Blamont to +Baccarat, were brought up. The railway along the +Moselle remained, however, useless for a long time, in +consequence of injury done to it by the enemy.</p> + +<p>General von Werder was now anxious, in accordance +with his instructions of September 30th, to march on +the Upper Seine by Neufchâteau, but a telegram from +the supreme Headquarter directed him in the first +instance to complete the rout of the enemy in his +vicinity under General Cambriels.</p> + +<p>The Corps accordingly put itself in motion forthwith +through Conflans and Luxeuil on Vesoul, and +information was received that the enemy had in fact +halted at the Ognon, taken up quarters there, and +received reinforcements. General von Werder determined +to attack at once. He ordered that the passages +over the river should be secured on the 22nd; further +decisions were postponed till reports should be brought +in. The 1st Baden Brigade came up on the right by +nine o'clock, reaching Marnay and Pin without having +encountered the French; it secured the bridges there, +and then halted to await further orders. On the left +flank the franctireurs were driven out of the woods +by the 3rd Brigade, which also stormed Perrouse, and +at about half-past two seized the bridge over the +Ognon at Voray. In the centre the head of the +advanced guard of the 2nd Brigade entered Etuz after +a slight skirmish, but had to withdraw at eleven +o'clock to the northern bank, before the enemy's flank +attack from out the woods. Afterwards, when the +main force came up and the artillery opened fire, +the place was taken for the second time at one o'clock.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[169]</a></span> +But a prolonged fire-fight ensued, the French making +an obstinate stand in front of the passage over the +river at Cussey. Orders had already been sent to the +1st Brigade to move up on the southern bank from Pin +on the enemy's flank and rear. But it could not reach +the ground until six o'clock, when the battle was over. +When two batteries had made good the possession of +the bridge over the Ognon under a heavy fire, the +enemy hastily retired, pursued by the Badeners; he +was again driven out of his rearward positions, but +when night fell he still remained in possession of several +points in front of Besançon.</p> + +<p>The Germans had lost 120 men, the French 150 and +200 prisoners. In opposition to Gambetta, who was +himself in Besançon, General Cambriels obstinately +resisted every order to renew the advance, and would +only consent to maintain his strong position under the +walls of the fortress.</p> + +<p>Parties sent out to reconnoitre on the right reported +the presence of French forces at Dôle and Auxonne, +the advance-guard probably of an "Army of the Vosges" +under Garibaldi, which was assembling on the +Doubs. General von Werder disregarded it, and on +the 26th moved his Corps to Dampierre and Gray. +Beyond the Saône all the roads were broken up, the +woods choked with abatis, and the whole population in +arms. But the franctireurs and Gardes-Mobiles were +dispersed without difficulty, and a column marching +without any precautions was driven back on the Vingeanne +brook, where 15 officers and 430 men laid down +their arms.</p> + +<p>From further reports and the information of the prisoners +it was known that Dijon was strongly garrisoned. +In expectation, therefore, of an attack from that side, +the XIVth Corps was assembled behind the Vingeanne, +whence early on October 30th General von Beyer<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> +marched on Dijon with the 1st and 3rd Brigades.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[170]</a></span> +Filled with apprehension by recent events, the National +Guards in Dijon had already laid down their +arms, the Gardes-Mobiles and the line troops of the +garrison had retreated southwards; but the inhabitants +were assured that the forces would be brought back to +defend them. About 8000 men were available, but +they insisted on their commander pledging himself to +fight only outside the city.</p> + +<p>The advanced posts on the Tille were driven in by the +Baden advanced guard; the village of St. Apollinaire +and the neighbouring heights were taken with a rush at +noon, in spite of a hot fire. Meanwhile the main body +had come up, and at three o'clock six German batteries +opened fire. The vineyards and numerous farmsteads +in the neighbourhood of Dijon, and especially the +strongly barricaded park south of the city, gave the +defence a great advantage. Nevertheless, the Baden +infantry continued its steady advance and closed in on +the northern and eastern suburbs by a wide encircling +movement.</p> + +<p>Here a fierce combat ensued, in which the inhabitants +took part. House after house had to be stormed, +but the attack came to a stand at the deep-cut bed of +the Suzon brook, which borders the city on the east. It +was four o'clock, and the impending struggle could not +be ended before dark. General von Beyer therefore +broke off the fight; the battalions were withdrawn and +retired to quarters in the adjacent villages; only the +artillery still kept up its fire.</p> + +<p>The Germans had lost about 150 and the French 100 +men; but of the latter 200 were taken prisoners.</p> + +<p>In the course of the night a deputation came out +to beg that the town might be spared; its members +undertook to furnish supplies for 20,000 men, and to +guarantee the good behaviour of the inhabitants. +The Baden troops took possession of Dijon on the 31st.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile fresh instructions had reached General +von Werder. They prescribed that he was to protect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[171]</a></span> +the left flank of the IInd Army advancing to the Loire +and at the same time to cover Alsace and the troops +besieging Belfort, where two reserve Divisions had now +arrived. It was intended that the XIVth Corps, while +retaining its hold on Dijon, should also move to Vesoul +and hold in check from there the gathering of hostile +troops round Besançon and at Langres. Some offensive +movement on Châlons<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> and Dôle was also insisted on.</p> + +<p>General von Werder's position was more difficult +than was recognized at Versailles. At Besançon alone +there were 45,000 French troops, under the command +of a new leader, General Crouzat. Garibaldi had collected +12,000 between Dôle and Auxonne; lower down +the Saône valley a new Corps was being formed of +18,000 men, and 12,000 National Guards and Gardes-Mobiles +threatened from Langres the flank of the isolated +German Corps. But the French, instead of +attacking this slender force with overwhelming numbers—spread +out as it was over a distance of fifty-six miles +from Lure to Dijon and Gray—were haunted by the +apprehension that the Germans, reinforced from Metz, +might be intending an attack on Lyons. General +Crouzat, leaving a strong garrison in Besançon, consequently +marched to Chagny, where up to November +12th he was reinforced from the south to a strength of +50,000 men. The Garibaldian volunteers moved up to +Autun to protect Bourges.</p> + +<p>General von Werder meanwhile had occupied Vesoul, +and had the south face of the city put in a state of +defence.</p> + +<p>The only event of importance during the course of +October which remains to be mentioned was the action +taken against the French forts lying rearward of the +German armies.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of the month the newly constituted +4th Reserve Division, of fifteen battalions, eight squadrons,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[172]</a></span> +thirty-six guns, and a company of fortress-pioneers, +had assembled in Baden, and crossed the +Rhine at Neuenburg. The vicinity was first cleared +of franctireurs, Mülhausen was occupied, and, by the +express desire of its municipal authorities, the excited +artisan inhabitants were disarmed. General von +Schmeling (commanding the Division) was instructed +to besiege Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt, and at once +set about the investment of each of these places with a +brigade. On October 7th the East Prussian Landwehr +invested Breisach, and the field-batteries shelled the +place, but without effect. The other brigade, having +been forced to detach considerably, reached Schlettstadt +very weak, but was reinforced by Etappen troops +to such extent that the place was invested with 8 +battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries. At the same +time 12 companies of fortress-artillery and 4 companies +of pioneers arrived from Strasburg with the necessary +siege material, and an artillery park of fifty-six heavy +guns was established at St. Pilt; the engineer park +was located at Kinzheim.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Commanding 2nd Baden Brigade.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Commanding Baden Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> Châlons-sur-Saône.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Schlettstadt.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(October 24th.)</div> + + +<p>At the beginning of the blockade, inundations and +marsh-land rendered Schlettstadt, a fortified town of +10,000 inhabitants, unapproachable on the east and +south, and partly on the north. The place itself, perfectly +safe from storm, with high walls and a wet ditch, +was armed with 120 guns, but garrisoned with only +2000 men, for the most part Gardes-Mobiles. There +was a deficiency of safe casemates, and on the west<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[173]</a></span> +front vineyards and hedgerows favoured the near +approach of assaults, while the railway embankment +was a ready-made protecting wall for the construction +of the first parallel. To divert the attention of the +besieged from this front of attack, a battery was constructed +on the 20th at the Kappel Mill on the south-east, +from which fire was opened on the barracks and +magazine in the town, and on the sluice which maintained +the inundation. By the evening of the 21st, +the infantry posts had advanced to within 400 paces +of the glacis, and the construction of the first parallel +was proceeded with that night, immediately behind +the railway, as well as of emplacements for six +batteries within 1230 feet from the ramparts. The +garrison fired in the dark on the entire field of +attack, but almost without effect. By the morning +the trenches were two feet wide and three and a half +feet deep, and 20 heavy guns and 8 mortars were ready +to open fire. A hot artillery duel now began with +the fortress, which replied very steadily. The battery +at the mill subjected the west front to a telling +reverse fire, and several guns and embrasures were +severely damaged. The town was fired at several +points, and the defenders' fire gradually ceased. +During the night, which was very stormy, the batteries +of the attack kept up their fire, the parallel was +widened and two new batteries were begun.</p> + +<p>At daybreak of the 24th the white flag was seen +flying, and a capitulation was forthwith signed, by +which Schlettstadt surrendered with its garrison and +war-material. The commandant begged the Germans +to take possession at once, as the greatest disorder +reigned within the town. The public buildings were +being plundered by the mob and the drunken soldiery, +and a powder-magazine was actually on fire. The +German battalions promptly restored order, extinguished +the flames, and took away the prisoners. +Seven thousand stand of arms fell into German hands,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[174]</a></span> +besides the fortress artillery and a large quantity of +stores. The siege had cost the victors only twenty men. +Schlettstadt was occupied by Etappen troops, and +the battalions released from duty there marched into +southern Alsace, three of them going to strengthen the +siege of Breisach, which was now being proceeded +with.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Breisach.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 10th.)</div> + + +<p>This fortress, lying in the plain and of very symmetrical +shape, was proof against a coup-de-main +because of its ditches, which were dry indeed, but faced +with solid masonry. The garrison of over 5000 men +had well-protected quarters in the bomb-proof casemates +of the ravelins. Fort Mortier, standing near the Rhine, +and constructed for independent defence, effectually +commanded the ground over which the intended attack +must be made on the north-west front of the fortress. +Therefore 12 heavy guns were brought up from Rastatt +to Alt Breisach, where the right bank of the Rhine +commands the fort at effective range.</p> + +<p>It was not till near the end of October that the siege-guns +arrived before New Breisach from Schlettstadt, +and when the infantry had closed up and all preparations +were complete, fire from 24 heavy guns was +opened on the fortress on November 2nd from Wolfgantzen, +Biesheim and Alt Breisach.</p> + +<p>By three o'clock a large part of the town was on +fire, and detachments of infantry were skirmishing +with the French posts at the foot of the glacis. Fort +Mortier had suffered exceptionally severely. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[175]</a></span> +an attempt to storm it was repulsed, but at +six o'clock it capitulated, an utter ruin. Only one +gun remained in serviceable condition. Two new +mortar batteries were erected to shell the main +fortress, the defence became perceptibly more feeble, +and on November 10th Breisach surrendered on the +same terms as Schlettstadt, but the garrison was +allowed to march out with the honours of war. The +fortifications were almost uninjured, but the town was +for the most part burnt down or severely damaged. +The success had cost the Germans only 70 men; 108 +guns, 6000 small arms and large quantities of stores +fell into their hands.</p> + +<p>While these strongholds in Alsace-Lorraine were +thus being reduced, Verdun still intercepted the line of +railway which formed the shortest line of communication +with Germany.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Taking of Verdun.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 9th.)</div> + + +<p>This place, too, was made quite storm-free by high +walls and deep wet ditches; but, on the other hand, it +was surrounded by a ring of heights whence it could +be seen into, and at the foot of these heights villages +and vineyards favoured an approach to within a short +distance of the outworks.</p> + +<p>The fortress was armed with 140 guns and abundantly +victualled, and the garrison, which had been +supplemented by escaped prisoners, was 6000 strong. +A bombardment by field-artillery had already proved +perfectly ineffectual. For a long time Verdun was only +under observation, at first by cavalry, and afterwards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[176]</a></span> +by a small mixed force. At the end of September the +65th Regiment and twelve companies of Landwehr +assembled under General von Gayl before the east face +of the place. It was not till October 9th that two companies +of fortress-artillery brought up some French +heavy guns from Toul and Sedan. The infantry now +advanced to within a few hundred paces of the west +and north fronts and there established itself. Under +this cover the construction of the batteries was begun +on the evening of October 12th.</p> + +<p>The heavy ground after the rain, and the rocky +subsoil very thinly covered, made the work uncommonly +difficult, yet by next morning fifty-two +guns were able to open fire. But the fortress replied +with such effect that before noon two batteries on the +Côte de Hayvaux on the westward were reduced to +inaction.</p> + +<p>In the course of this three days' artillery engagement, +15 German guns were placed out of action, +the artillery lost 60 men and the infantry 40. The +disabled guns on the walls of the enemy were constantly +replaced by fresh ones.</p> + +<p>The garrison, which was far stronger than the +besiegers, now assumed the offensive. During the +stormy night of the 19th—20th, the picquets on the +Hayvaux were overpowered, and the guns in the +battery there were spiked. On the 28th a sortie in +greater force was made. The French climbed up Mont +St. Michel, lying northward of Verdun, and destroyed +the breast-works and bomb-proofs of the batteries, +from which, however, the guns had been withdrawn. +Another body pushed up the Hayvaux, and as the +soaked state of the ground prevented the guns from +being withdrawn, they were totally disabled. The +villages in the neighbourhood were also occupied by +the French.</p> + +<p>It was now evident that the means hitherto brought +to bear on the reduction of Verdun were quite inadequate.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[177]</a></span> +But after the fall of Metz the Ist Army was +able to send up reinforcements. At the end of the +month 5 battalions and 2 companies of pioneers and +several of artillery arrived, and also a quantity of +German material.</p> + +<p>The siege park now numbered 102 guns with abundant +ammunition, and preparations were at once made +for a regular attack.</p> + +<p>But for this the garrison did not wait. After an +armistice had been granted, the place capitulated on +November 8th, in virtue of which the garrison, with +exception of the local National Guards, became prisoners +of war. The officers were dismissed on parole +with their swords and personal property, and it was +agreed that the war-material in store should be given +back on the conclusion of peace.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Advance of Ist and IInd Armies up to +Mid November.</span></h2> + + +<p>The Ist Army having in addition undertaken the +siege of Mézières, the 1st Infantry Division moved +on that place, and the 3rd Brigade, sent forward by +railway to Soissons, on November 15th set about the +siege of the small fortress of La Fère. The rest of the +Ist Corps reached Rethel on the same day, the VIIIth +Rheims, and the 3rd Cavalry Division Tagnon, between +the two places named. The VIIth Corps was still +fully engaged in guarding the prisoners and in besieging +Thionville and Montmédy.</p> + +<p>Of the IInd Army the IXth Corps and 1st Cavalry +Division reached Troyes on the 10th, the IIIrd Vendeuvre, +the Xth Neufchâteau and Chaumont. The +important railway connections there and at Bologne<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[178]</a></span> +were occupied, and the injury done to the line to +Blesme was repaired, so as to open up a new line of +communication. The health of the German forces had +been materially improved by short marches along +good roads and by abundant supplies; but a telegram +from Versailles now ordered an accelerated advance.</p> + +<p>The Government in Paris being powerless, the Delegation +at Tours was displaying increased activity. +Gambetta, as Minister both of War and of the Interior, +was exercising the power almost of a Dictator, and the +fiery energy of this remarkable man had achieved the +feat of placing 600,000 armed men and 1400 guns in +the field in the course of a few weeks.</p> + +<p>In the Arrondissements the National Guards were +formed into companies and battalions; then in each +Department these were consolidated into brigades; and +finally the brigades were incorporated along with the +nearest troops of the line and Gardes-Mobiles into the +larger Army-Corps.</p> + +<p>Thus, in the course of October, under cover of the +troops of General d'Aurelle de Paladines which had +re-crossed the Loire, a new XVIIth Corps was made up +at Blois, another, the XVIIIth, at Gien, and a third, +under Admiral Jaurès, at Nogent le Rotrou. A large +force was in Picardy under General Bourbaki, another +at Rouen under Briand, and a third on the left bank of +the Seine under Fiéreck.</p> + +<p>The detachments of the army investing Paris, which +were pushed forward to the south, west, and north, +already met in all directions strong forces of the enemy, +which they indeed repulsed in many small encounters, +but could not follow up to the places of their origin. +For such purposes the arrival of the army released from +the siege of Metz was needed, and this was not to be +looked for before some time in November, while now in +October there was threatened a general advance of the +French forces on Paris.</p> + +<p>Having regard to the inferior strength of General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[179]</a></span> +von Tann's Division holding Orleans, at a French +council of war held at Tours it was decided to recover +that important place. The attack was to be delivered +chiefly from the west. The French XVth Corps—two +Infantry Divisions and one of Cavalry—therefore assembled +at Mer on the northern bank of the Lower Loire, +and the main body of the XVIth behind the forest of +Marchénoir. The remaining portions of both Corps +were to co-operate on the Upper Loire by way of Gien. +Any further advance was not projected, at any rate for +the present; on the contrary, General d'Aurelle's +instructions were to form an intrenched camp about +Orleans for 200,000 men.</p> + +<p>General von Tann's reconnoitring parties to the westward +everywhere met hostile detachments, which were +indeed driven back by restraining skirmishes into the +forest of Marchénoir without much difficulty, but which +betrayed the vicinity of large forces of the enemy. On +the whole an attack from the south-west on the investing +army before Paris seemed the likeliest event, since +this would threaten both the German Head-quarter in +Versailles and the siege-park at Villacoublay; while the +German reinforcements from the eastward would have +the furthest distance to reach the quarter indicated.</p> + +<p>The French forces to the west of Orleans were already +extended over a wide stretch of country from Beaugency +to Châteaudun. The volunteers grew bolder +every day, and the people more hostile.</p> + +<p>At last, in quest of some more accurate information, +Count Stolberg (commanding 2nd Cavalry Division) +on November 7th made a reconnaissance in force. +Three regiments of the 2nd Cavalry Division, two +batteries, and some companies of Bavarian Infantry +advanced by Ouzouer and drove the enemy out of +Marolles, but they found the skirts of the forest strongly +held.</p> + +<p>General Chanzy had brought up all his immediately +available troops to St. Laurent des Bois. A sharp fire-fight<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[180]</a></span> +ensued, lasting about half an hour, which caused +severe losses in the Bavarian infantry; and then, as +the great superiority of the French was evident, the +engagement was broken off.</p> + +<p>As a matter of fact, both the French Corps were +already in full march on Orleans. Reaching the forest +on the 8th, they occupied it firmly, their right wing at +Messas and Meung, their left at Ouzouer. The XVth +Corps was next to move to the right to the Mauve and +the XVIth to the left on Coulmiers. The heads of +those Corps showed themselves at Bardon and Charsonville +respectively. Both the French Cavalry Divisions +were directed northward on Prénouvellon to turn the +right wing of the Bavarians with a force of ten regiments, +six batteries, and numerous volunteer bands, +and thus to cut off their retreat on Paris.</p> + +<p>To counteract this attempt the Bavarian Cuirassier +Brigade started for St. Péravy, the 2nd Cavalry Division +for Baccon, and, further south, the 2nd Bavarian +Infantry Division advancing from Orleans held the +country about Huisseau and St. Ay.</p> + +<p>But an attack was also threatening the German rear +from the considerable force at Gien. General von der +Tann realized that it was now the last moment when +he could hope to extricate himself from so hazardous a +position; and that same evening he issued the necessary +orders. However desirable it was to keep possession +of Orleans, he could not accept battle in so thickly +wooded country, where the action of his relatively strong +artillery and cavalry would be seriously impeded, and +where indeed he might be entirely hemmed in. The +General, however, determined to strike at the most +immediately threatening hostile force in the open +country about Coulmiers, where he would at the same +time be nearer to the 22nd Division at Chartres, on +which he could call for support.</p> + +<p>General von Wittich had already asked and obtained +permission to fall back on Orleans, but on the 9th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[181]</a></span> +he had only reached Voves, with his cavalry at Orgères; +thus he could not take any direct part in that +day's fighting.</p> + +<p>The IInd Army was in full march from Metz, but on +this day its head had but just arrived at Troyes.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Engagement at Coulmiers.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 9th.)</div> + + +<p>Left thus to its own resources, the Ist Bavarian +Corps moved out in the night, and on the morning +of the 9th stood concentrated on the skirts of the forest +between Château Montpipeau and Rosières, with the +village of Coulmiers in its front. The Bavarian Cuirassiers +on the right wing protected the line of retreat +by St. Sigismond; the 2nd Cavalry Division was distributed +by brigades along the whole front, with detachments +well in advance and infantry posts ready in +support. Only a small detachment remained in Orleans +after the bridge over the Loiret had been destroyed, +to protect the numerous sick and wounded in +the field hospitals, and occupy the city at any rate till +the result of the fight was decided.</p> + +<p>The first reports brought in that morning were of +the advance of a strong hostile column from Cravant +on Fontaines and Le Bardon. This was Rébillard's +Brigade, which, as it seemed, aimed at turning the +Bavarian left flank and marching direct on Orleans. +To oppose it on the bank of the Mauve, General von +der Tann at about nine o'clock sent the 3rd Brigade in +a southerly direction to Préfort, a little over two miles +distant, and as at the same time a sharp contest had +now begun at the outposts near Baccon, the 1st Brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[182]</a></span> +marched to La Renardière. The remainder of the +Corps remained in and behind Coulmiers. The General's +intention was to assume the offensive from this +point against the enemy's left flank, if, as seemed probable, +the latter should attempt to push his chief +attack across the Mauve. In furtherance of this intention +the cavalry of the right flank was ordered to close +in to Coulmiers.</p> + +<p>But the superior strength of the French allowed of +their fetching a much wider compass to the left. +While General d'Aurelle with the XVth Corps detained +the Bavarians southward of the road from +Ouzouer to Orleans, General Chanzy advanced with +Barry's Division against their centre and directed +Jauréguiberry's Division northward against their right; +and finally the strong force of French cavalry under +General Reyau moved in the direction of Patay, thus +threatening the German communication with Paris.</p> + +<p>This movement of the French XVIth Corps compelled +General von Tann, at the very beginning of the +engagement, to despatch the 2nd Brigade, which had +constituted his reserve, to prolong his right wing +northwards towards Champs, and thus obtain touch +with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. The Bavarian Cuirassiers, +retiring according to orders from St. Péravy to +the southward, about eleven o'clock encountered +Reyau's cavalry, which, however, restricted itself to a +mere cannonade.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, after a stout resistance, the advanced +posts of the Bavarians had been driven in by the +enemy's superior strength. The 1st Rifle Battalion, +after having retarded the advance of the French horse-batteries +through Champdry for a long time, retreated +from Baccon to La Rivière,<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> where it expected to be +received by the 2nd (Rifle Battalion). But the situation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[183]</a></span> +of the latter soon became very critical. Peytavin's +Division closely followed up through Baccon, beset +La Rivière with five batteries, and then attacked the +burning village from three sides at once. After energetic +reprisals the Riflemen retired in good order on +the 1st Brigade in Renardière, where General Dietl +had taken up a position for defence.</p> + +<p>After the evacuation of Baccon by the Bavarians, +Barry's Division had continued its advance through +Champdry, and its batteries deployed opposite Coulmiers +and in front of Saintry, in preparation for an +assault by strong lines of tirailleurs.</p> + +<p>The 4th Bavarian Brigade occupied the park extending +to the west; the quarries further in front were +occupied by two battalions, two others were sent to the +right to the farmsteads of Ormeteau and Vaurichard, +so as to keep up some sort of communication with the +2nd Brigade. One battery to the south and four +batteries to the north of Coulmiers were supported by +the 5th Cavalry Brigade.</p> + +<p>Thus at noon the Bavarian Corps, with only three +brigades, held the ground from Renardière to the +front of Gémigny, its front disproportionately extended +to a length of more than four miles. But the French +right wing remained quite inactive, so that the 3rd +Brigade which had been sent to Préfort was recalled +to Renardière.</p> + +<p>When the French Corps had made good its foothold +opposite the thin Bavarian line, it attacked in earnest +at about one o'clock.</p> + +<p>The Riflemen in Renardière had indeed repulsed the +enemy's first rush, but this position was no longer +tenable with only four battalions against the whole of +Peytavin's Division. At about one o'clock General +Dietl retired unmolested, under cover of an intermediate +position, on the wood of Montpipeau, and +occupied its border. Here he was joined by the 3rd +Brigade, which on its retirement from Préfort had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[184]</a></span> +found Renardière already evacuated. The French had +followed up from thence but hesitatingly, came under +the fire of six batteries between the points of the forests +at La Planche and Coulmiers, and made no further +advance with their right wing.</p> + +<p>In the centre Barry's Division about one o'clock +had driven the Bavarian Riflemen out of the stone-quarries +in front of Coulmiers. Not till three o'clock +did it advance to a renewed general attack on the 4th +Brigade, which was repulsed by the fire of the German +guns and the repeated charges of the 5th Cavalry +Brigade.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, d'Aries' Brigade of the XVth French +Corps, after leaving Renardière, arrived southward of +Coulmiers, and its batteries strengthened the fire which +was being directed on that village. The Bavarian +guns were compelled before the rush of the French +tirailleurs to take ground further in rear, where +they resumed their activity, while the infantry +drove the French out of the park at the point of the +bayonet.</p> + +<p>But after four hours' fighting the resistance of this +single brigade against three French brigades had become +extremely arduous. Of the whole Corps only +two battalions remained intact as a reserve at Bonneville, +no reinforcement was to be looked for from anywhere, +and on the right flank the French threatened +the communications with Chartres as well as with +Paris. At four in the afternoon General von der +Tann gave orders to break off the fight and to retire +by brigades from the left wing on Artenay.</p> + +<p>Fresh troops of the enemy at this moment forced +their way into the park of Coulmiers. Colonel Count +von Ysenburg held the eastern outlets of the village, +and withdrew his troops by alternate echelons through +Gémigmy in good order.</p> + +<p>It now proved of the greatest importance that the +2nd Brigade should have been able to maintain its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[185]</a></span> +position in front of this village, thus covering the +further retreat.</p> + +<p>At noon, General von Orff (in command of the +Brigade), on approaching Champs and Cheminiers, had +found these villages occupied by Deplanque's French +Brigade. First he silenced its artillery, then he +deployed his four battalions for action, with the 4th +Cavalry Brigade on the right flank.</p> + +<p>Reyau's Cavalry ere long came up between these +two villages, after it had given up its two hours' +cannonade against the Bavarian Cuirassiers and had +been driven out of St. Sigismond by dismounted +hussars. But this body of horse soon got out from +under the fire of the Bavarian guns and moved off to +the westward, it was said because it mistook Lipkowski's +volunteers, skirmishing further to the north, for +German reinforcements advancing. And when the +Bavarian horse-batteries opened fire on Champs from +the north-east, the French abandoned the place at +about two o'clock, in great disorder.</p> + +<p>General von Orff now brought the artillery up to +within 500 paces of Cheminiers, and marched the +infantry up through the intervals.</p> + +<p>Admiral Jauréguiberry, however, arriving in person, +succeeded in rallying the wavering troops, and this +attack failed. The French batteries soon compelled +the Bavarian horse-batteries to retire.</p> + +<p>When, at about three o'clock, Bourdillon's Brigade +and the reserve artillery of the XVIth French Corps +also arrived at Champs, and news was brought of the +state of the fighting at Coulmiers, General von Orff +determined to refrain from all further attack, and confined +himself to maintaining his position in front of +Gémigny to the last extremity. Unshaken by the fire +of the numerous hostile batteries, the weak brigade +repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy.</p> + +<p>Thus the 4th Brigade was enabled unmolested to +retire from Coulmiers by Gémigny and St. Péravy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[186]</a></span> +and the 1st, from Montpipeau further eastward, on +Coinces. The 2nd Brigade followed to Coinces, and +finally the 3rd formed the rear-guard as far as St. +Sigismond, where it halted and bivouacked. The +cavalry covered the retreat on all sides.</p> + +<p>After a short rest the retreat of the main body was +continued during the night, by very bad roads. Artenay +was reached by the morning. Orleans was +evacuated, and the garrison which had been left there +rejoined its Corps. The stores were conveyed by railway +back to Toury; but one ammunition column, 150 +prisoners, and the sick who could not be moved, fell +into the hands of the French.</p> + +<p>This contest of 20,000 Germans against 70,000 +French cost the former about 800 in killed and +wounded; the enemy's loss was nearly double.</p> + +<p>From Artenay, on November 10th, the 2nd Brigade +undertook the duty of covering the further march on +Toury, where close quarters were available. Thither, +too, came the 22nd Division from Chartres, and took +up a position at Janville close to the Bavarians. +General von der Tann had extricated himself from a +difficult position with much skill and good fortune. +The enemy did not attempt a pursuit. General +d'Aurelle restricted himself to awaiting further reinforcements +in a strong position before Orleans. The +French preparations were, however, in greater activity +on the Upper Loir and the Eure.</p> + +<p>On the German side the IInd Army Corps arrived +before Paris on the 5th of November; the 3rd Division +was included in the investing line between the Seine +and Marne; the 4th moved on to Longjumeau.</p> + +<p>When the Guard Landwehr took possession of the +peninsula of Argenteuil, a brigade of the IVth Corps +became available for service on the north side of the +capital. On the south side, the 17th Division at Rambouillet, +the 22nd at Chartres, and the Bavarian Corps, +which had moved to Ablis, with the 4th and 6th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[187]</a></span> +Cavalry Divisions, were ultimately formed into a separate +Army-Detachment of the IIIrd Army, under the +command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and it +was ordered to betake itself in the first instance to +Dreux.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> According to the <i>Staff History</i>, on La Renardière and La Grande +Motte.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Operations of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg.</span></h2> + + +<p>On the 17th of November the 17th Division advanced +by Maintenon. On the left, a French detachment was +driven back across the Blaise; and when a few companies +of marines, who attempted to block the high-road, +had been disposed of, General von Tresckow +(commanding the Division) marched into Dreux that +evening. The combat had cost the Germans 50 men, +the French 150 and 50 prisoners.</p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles, whose forces were now +at length assembled before Orleans in face of the +enemy, expressed the wish that the (Grand Duke's) +Detachment should advance on Tours by way of Le +Mans. The Grand Duke accordingly marched on +Nogent le Rotrou, which place, being the central +rendezvous of the French levies, promised to be the +scene of an obstinate resistance.</p> + +<p>After several skirmishes the Detachment approached +the place, but when on the 22nd preparations were +being made to storm it from three sides, it was found +that the enemy had already evacuated it. At the +same time orders arrived from the supreme Headquarter, +instructing the Grand Duke to fall back at +once on Beaugency to join the right wing of the IInd +Army, which it was necessary should immediately be +reinforced in view of the superior strength of the +enemy. "The force now massing before Orleans is to +postpone all hostilities until the arrival of the Detachment. +The slight opposition offered by the French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[188]</a></span> +on the Eure and Huisne sufficiently shows that no +serious danger threatens on that side; the enemy in +that quarter need only be kept under observation by +cavalry." The Detachment was not to be permitted +even a single rest day, and its march was to be +conducted with the utmost speed.</p> + +<p>On the 23rd, the Divisions had closed up on their +respective heads, and the Grand Duke on the 24th +moved on Châteaudun and Vendôme; but the +Bavarian Corps only got as far as Vibraye, while the +two Prussian Divisions withdrew from the difficult +country of the Perche, and the cavalry found the whole +line of the Loir held by the enemy.</p> + +<p>In fact, the French had sent a brigade of the troops +massed behind the forest of Marchénoir by railway to +Vendôme, expressly to protect the Government at +Tours, while General de Sonis had advanced with the +rest of the XVIIth Corps on Brou. Here on the 25th +his advance met an ammunition column and bridge-train +of the Bavarian Corps. At first only the 10th +Cavalry Brigade could engage the enemy, but when +presently two companies and eight guns had occupied +the bridge over the Loir at Yèvres, the waggons were +got through Brou in safety, and the enemy could not +enter that place till the cavalry had continued its +march.</p> + +<p>The Bavarian Corps was meanwhile advancing on +Mondoubleau and St. Calais, not certainly the shortest +route to Beaugency, but, on the contrary, on the direct +road to Tours. The two Divisions only reached the +vicinity of Vibraye and Authon.</p> + +<p>The appearance of a hostile force at Brou was +deemed of sufficient importance to justify a détour by +that place, postponing for the moment the prescribed +march on the Loire. But when the 22nd Division +approached Brou on the 26th, it found that the enemy +had already retired during the night. The Government +at Tours had ordered the whole of the XVIIth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[189]</a></span> +Corps to concentrate at Vendôme for their protection. +But when the German cavalry made its appearance +at Cloyes and Fréteval, General Sonis considered that +he could not pursue his march further along the Loir, +and made a détour by Marchénoir. But two night-marches +so shattered the levies for the first time +collected in mass that whole swarms of stragglers +wandered about the neighbourhood all day and could +only with difficulty be re-assembled at Beaugency.</p> + +<p>To imbue the operations with unity of command, the +Grand Duke was now, by instruction from the supreme +Head-quarter, placed under Prince Frederick Charles's +orders, and General von Stosch<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> was despatched to +undertake the duties of Chief of the Staff to the +Detachment. That force by the Prince's orders was +to come in with all speed to Janville, whither troops of +the IXth Corps would be sent to meet it by way of +Orgères.</p> + +<p>The Grand Duke therefore marched, on the 27th, +with both his (Prussian) Divisions (17th and 22nd) to +Bonneval, where there was already a squadron of the +2nd Cavalry Division. The Bavarian Corps, which, +after finding Brou abandoned, had been directed on +Courtalin, marched to Châteaudun. Having thus +accomplished a junction with the IInd Army, the sorely +fatigued troops of the Detachment were allowed a day's +rest on the 28th, in quarters on the Loir.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Until then Commissary-General. He succeeded Colonel von +Krenski as the Grand Duke's Chief of Staff.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Situation of IInd Army.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(Second half of November.)</div> + + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles had hastened the advance +of his army as much as possible, but it had met<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[190]</a></span> +with many hindrances. The roads were broken up, +National Guards and franctireurs stood watchful for +mischief, and even the country people had taken +up arms. However, by November 14th the IXth +Corps with the 1st Cavalry Division reached Fontainebleau, +whence it pursued its march to Angerville. +The IIIrd Corps was following on Pithiviers. Of the +Xth Corps the 40th Brigade was left at Chaumont, to +make connection with the XIVth Corps; the 36th +reached Montargis and Beaune la Rolande on the 21st.<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> +The two brigades following in rear (37th and 39th) +had a sharp encounter on the 24th at Ladon and +Maizières. In this combat 170 French prisoners +were taken, who belonged to a corps which, as General +von Werder had already reported, was proceeding +under General Crouzat's command from Chagny to +Gien by railway. The order of battle was found on an +officer who was among the prisoners.</p> + +<p>That while the Grand Duke's Detachment was +marching to join it, the IInd Army, only now fully +concentrated, was in very close proximity to considerable +forces of the enemy, was ascertained beyond doubt +by several reconnoissances.</p> + +<p>On the 24th troops of the IXth Corps advanced +along the great high-road. A few shells caused the +enemy to evacuate Artenay, pursued by the cavalry as +far as Croix Briquet. Early in the same day a mixed +detachment of all arms from the IIIrd Corps reached +Neuville aux Bois. Two detachments of the 38th +Brigade marched on Bois Commun and Bellegarde, +but everywhere those inquisitive reconnaissances were +met by very superior numbers of the enemy.</p> + +<p>It was ascertained that the position of the French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[191]</a></span> +before Orleans extended for about 37 miles from the +Conie to Loing; and the massing of troops, especially +on their (right) flank, made it highly probable that +they proposed advancing by Fontainebleau on the rear +of the besieging army. Still, this intention was not +so evident as to justify Prince Frederick Charles in +leaving the great highways from Orleans to Paris unguarded. +However, to enable him to lend his left wing +timely support in case of need, he moved the 5th +Infantry Division of the IIIrd Corps and the 1st +Cavalry Division to Boynes, nearer to the Xth Corps +which was weak, and the 6th Division occupied +Pithiviers in their stead. The quarters at Bazoches +vacated by the 6th Division, were assigned to the IXth +Corps. Finally, the Grand Duke received orders to +reach Toury with his heads of columns by the 29th at +latest. These dispositions were all carried out in due +course.</p> + +<p>Immediately after its success at Coulmiers the French +Army of the Loire seemed for the moment only to have +thought of securing itself against a counter-blow. It +retired on Orleans, threw up extensive entrenchments, +for which marine artillery was even brought up from +Cherbourg, and awaited the arrival of further reinforcements. +The XXth Corps, already mentioned, +40,000 strong, joined the XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth +at Gien, in addition to one Division of the XVIIIth +newly assembled at Nevers, and finally the volunteer +bands under Cathelineau and Lipowski.</p> + +<p>Thus the French Army round Orleans numbered +200,000; the German infantry opposed to this host for +the time reached a strength of not more than 45,000 +men.</p> + +<p>Gambetta soon became urgent for renewed offensive +operations. As General d'Aurelle raised objections to +an advance by Pithiviers and Malesherbes, the Dictator +himself took in hand the dispositions. In the night of +the 22nd—23rd he telegraphed orders from Tours that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[192]</a></span> +the XVth Corps was at once to assemble at Chilleurs +aux Bois and reach Pithiviers on the 24th; the +XXth to march to Beaune la Rolande; and that then +both Corps were to advance by way of Fontainebleau +on Paris. The General pointed out that, according +to his reckoning, 80,000 Germans must be encountered +in an open country, and that it would be +more advisable to await their attack in an intrenched +position. Further, that this movement could be of no +service in affording succour to the distressed capital, +and that meanwhile there would remain unperformed +the strengthening of the right wing, where on the 24th +the unsteadiness of the XVIIIth and XXth Corps had +caused the loss of the already mentioned fight at Ladon +and Maizières.</p> + +<p>In accordance with instructions received from Tours +on the 26th, General Crouzat ordered the advance for +the 28th of the two Corps he commanded—the XVIIIth +by the right through Juranville, the XXth by the left +through Bois Commun—for an encompassing attack on +Beaune la Rolande. The XVth Corps in addition was +moved up to Chambon in support, and Cathelineau's +volunteers went forward to Courcelles.</p> + +<p>As we have seen, on this same day the Grand Duke's +Detachment had come up on the extreme right of the +IInd German Army. On the left stood the Xth Corps +with the 38th Brigade at Beaune, the 39th at Les +Côtelles; the 37th, with the Corps artillery, had +advanced to Marcilly between these two places.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> There seems some confusion here. The 36th Brigade belonged, +not to the Xth, but to the IXth Corps. The 38th Brigade is stated +in the <i>Staff History</i> to have reached Beaune la Rolande on 23rd, the +rest of the Corps (exclusive of the 40th Brigade) still behind at +Montargis.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Beaune la Rolande.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 28th.)</div> + + +<p>The French attack on November 28th failed because +of the miscarriage of the projected combination, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[193]</a></span> +two separate attempts exerting little reciprocal influence. +On the right, the head of the XVIIIth Corps struck +the outposts of the 39th Brigade at an early hour, in +front of Juranville and Lorcy. Not until after a stout +resistance were these driven in by about nine o'clock +on Les Côtelles and behind the railway-embankment +at Corbeilles, where they took possession of the park.</p> + +<p>The French could now deploy in the open country +in front of Juranville, and following up with strong +lines of tirailleurs preceding them, they forced their +way into Corbeilles and drove the garrison out to the +north and west. But meanwhile, on the other side, a +reinforcement from the reserve at Marcilly reached Les +Côtelles, and now Colonel von Valentini passed to +the attack of Juranville with the 56th Regiment. The +artillery could afford no co-operation, the enemy made +an obstinate resistance, and not till noon did he begin +to retreat, while bitter fighting still continued round +some detached houses. But when strong columns +came up from Maizières and Corbeilles, the Germans +were compelled to abandon the conquered village, +carrying off with them 300 prisoners.</p> + +<p>About two o'clock the greater portion of the French +Corps deployed near Juranville for an attack on the +position at Long Cour, into which the 39th Brigade +had retired. But since the attack had not been prepared +by artillery, it came to nothing under the fire of +five Prussian batteries.</p> + +<p>The first attack on Les Côtelles was also repulsed, +but when it was repeated an hour later, the Germans had +to abandon the place with the loss of fifty men taken +prisoners. A gun, seven of the gunners of which had +fallen, sank so deep in the soft ground that the few +men left could not drag it out.</p> + +<p>The XVIIIth French Corps, however, made no +further way, but, as dusk came on, contented itself with +an ineffective cannonade, and finally the 39th Brigade +was able to maintain its position abreast of Beaune.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[194]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the left wing of the French line of battle the +attack had also from the first been of an encompassing +tendency, the 2nd Division of the XXth Corps having +advanced on Beaune, and the 1st on Batilly. But it +was near noon before the arrival of part of its 3rd +Division, which had remained in reserve, enabled the +enemy to drive in the German advanced posts from +Bois de la Leu to the cross-roads north-west of Beaune. +And here also the 38th Brigade soon found itself under +the artillery and infantry fire from Pierre Percée, the +enemy continually gaining ground from the northward. +The retreat had to be continued along the Cæsar +road, whereon a gun, of which the men and horses had +for the most part perished, fell into the enemy's hands. +About the same time the 2nd French Division ascended +the heights to the east of Beaune, and Colonel von +Cranach was first enabled to rally the 57th Regiment +further rearward, near La Rue Boussier, whereby the +withdrawal of the batteries hurrying away from Marcilly +was covered, and the further advance of the enemy was +then arrested. Any such effort on his part entirely +ceased when he was suddenly threatened on his own flank +by the 1st Prussian Cavalry Division advancing from +Boynes, and came under fire of its horse-batteries.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the 16th Regiment found itself completely +isolated in Beaune, and surrounded on three sides by +the enemy.</p> + +<p>The town, which was surrounded by the remains of +a high wall, and the churchyard were as far as possible +prepared for defence. The enemy, after his first onset +by strong swarms of riflemen had been driven back, +set about bombarding the town. His shells burst +through the walls of the churchyard and set a few +buildings on fire, but every attempt at an assault was +steadfastly repulsed.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, General von Woyna had replenished +the ammunition of his batteries, and while occupying +Romainville on the right, he also took up a position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[195]</a></span> +opposite the copses of Pierre Percée, so that by three +o'clock he was able to bring up seven companies on the +east side of Beaune.</p> + +<p>About this time assistance came with the arrival +of the IIIrd Army Corps. While the 6th Division was +still pressing on towards Pithiviers, the 5th had already +that morning stood to arms in front of that place. +The first news from Beaune had sounded so far from +alarming, that the Corps-artillery retired to its quarters. +Nevertheless, in consequence of the increasing cannon +thunder and later information of a serious encounter, +General von Alvensleben gave the word for the Corps +to advance, with the 5th Division of which General +von Stülpnagel had already set out of his own initiative. +The 6th followed, and detached a battalion to observe +towards Courcelles; wherein, however, Cathelineau's +volunteers remained inactive.</p> + +<p>Part of the 52nd Regiment, which was marching at +the head of the column, turned off to the right, and, +supported by artillery, began a fire-fight about 4.30 +against Arconville and Batilly. Another part penetrated +into the Bois de la Leu and the copses near La +Pierre Percée, where it recaptured the gun which had +been lost there earlier. Four batteries in position on +the road from Pithiviers, behind Fosse des Prés, +directed their fire on the enemy still holding his ground +on the west side of Beaune, from which he was finally +driven by the 12th Regiment, and pursued as far as +Mont Barrois.</p> + +<p>After dark the Xth Corps encamped about Long Cour, +Beaune and Batilly, and the 5th Division in its rear; +the 6th remained at Boynes, where the 1st Division of +Cavalry also found accommodation.</p> + +<p>In the battle of Beaune la Rolande General von +Voigts-Rhetz had to hold his ground against the enemy +with 11,000 men against 60,000, with three brigades +against six Divisions, until help reached him towards +evening. This action cost the Germans 900 and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[196]</a></span> +French 1300 men in killed and wounded; and 1800 +unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the +Germans.</p> + +<p>In the evening the French XXth Corps had retreated +as far as Bois Commun and Bellegarde; the XVIIIth, +on the contrary, had taken up its position near Vernouille +and Juranville, in fact, directly in front of the +Xth German Corps, on the ground which the former +had won. The expectation was therefore not unnatural +that the fighting would recommence on the morrow.</p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles, therefore, directed the Xth +and IIIrd Corps to assemble on the 29th in full preparedness. +The IXth received orders to advance with +two brigades towards Boynes and Bazoches, and the +remaining troops were to follow as soon as the Grand +Duke's Detachment should have reached the main road +to Paris. Of it in the course of the day the heads +arrived, the 4th Cavalry Division at Toury, the infantry +at Allaines and Orgères. The 6th Cavalry Division, +which was marching on the right flank, met first with +opposition at Tournoisis.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile General Crouzat had been instructed from +Tours by a message which reached him on the evening +of the 28th, to desist for the present from further +offensive attack, and the French right wing was thereupon +drawn further back. On the 30th both Corps +moved leftward, in order to be again nearer to the +XVth. For the purpose of disguising this lateral +movement, detachments were sent in a northerly +direction and met reconnoitring parties of the German +Xth and IIIrd Corps, with which skirmishes took +place at Maizières, St. Loup and Mont Barrois; and +the movement of the French was soon detected, in the +first instance on their left flank.</p> + +<p>The Government at Tours had received news from +Paris that General Ducrot would attempt on the +29th to break through the German investing lines with +100,000 men and 400 guns, and endeavour to connect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[197]</a></span> +with the Army of the Loire in a southerly direction. +The balloon which carried this despatch had descended +in Norway, whence the message had been forwarded. +It was concluded from this that the General was already +vigorously engaged, and that help must be no longer +delayed. Commissioned by Gambetta, M. Freycinet +submitted to a council of war called by General +d'Aurelle, a scheme for the advance of the whole army +on Pithiviers. In the event of a refusal by the Commander-in-Chief +to accept the same, M. Freycinet carried +an order for his supersession.</p> + +<p>It was decided in the first place to execute a wheel +to the right with the left wing, Chilleurs aux Bois +forming the pivot of the movement. While a front was +thus being formed against Pithiviers, the Corps of +the right wing on a parallel front were to await the +order to move until this was accomplished. The +XXIst Corps was to be sent to Vendôme to cover the +left flank.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Advance of the Army of the Loire to the +Relief of Paris.</span></h2> + + +<p>As the result of those dispositions, on the 1st of +December the XVIth Corps moved on Orgères, in the +direction of the railway; the XVIIth followed to Patay +and St. Péravy.</p> + +<p>Opposite to these forces, on the right wing of the +IInd German Army the 17th Division of the Grand +Duke's Detachment had arrived at Bazoches, the 22nd +at Toury, and the Bavarian Corps reached the vicinity +of Orgères. Thus the hostile shock fell first on the +last body. Attacked in front by a far superior force, +and threatened in flank by Michel's Cavalry Division, +the 1st Bavarian Brigade was forced to retreat at three<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[198]</a></span> +o'clock to Villepion. The 2nd Brigade approaching +from Orgères, halted to the west of Nonneville, and the +4th marched up to between Villepion and Faverolles, +which position the Bavarians, in spite of heavy losses, +succeeded in holding for a long time. On their right +wing Prince Leopold of Bavaria, with the four guns +of his battery still serviceable, arrested the enemy's +advance on Nonneville, but under the personal leadership +of Admiral Jauréguiberry the French forced their +way into Villepion. As night drew on, and the want +of ammunition was becoming serious, the 1st Bavarian +Brigade went to Loigny; the 2nd, however, did not retreat +until five o'clock to Orgères, where also the 3rd +arrived in the evening, whilst the 4th joined the 1st +at Loigny.</p> + +<p>The engagement cost both sides about 1000 men, and +only the foremost Bavarian detachments were forced +back for a short distance.</p> + +<p>This measure of success, and the news from Paris, rekindled +in Tours ardent hopes of victory. As will be +seen further on, a sortie from Paris on 30th November +had certainly so far succeeded that the village of Epinay +on the northern section of the line of investment +was occupied for a short time. Thereupon it was +summarily concluded that this was the village of the +same name which lay to the south near Longjumeau, +and that there was now scarcely any obstacle to the +junction of the Army of Orleans with that of Paris. +Cathelineau's volunteer Corps was directed at once +to occupy the forest of Fontainebleau, and the imminent +annihilation of the Germans was announced to the +country.</p> + +<p>The head of the Army of Orleans, nevertheless, had +barely made half a day's march in the direction of Paris, +and the right wheel of the left wing remained to be accomplished. +The XVIth Corps was to attempt to reach +the line Allaines-Toury by the 2nd of December; the +XVIIth was to follow, and the XVth, marching from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[199]</a></span> +Chilleurs through Artenay, was to close to the right. +The Grand Duke, on the report of the great force in +which the enemy was approaching, determined to +march to meet him with the whole strength of the +Detachment. The requisite orders were issued at eight +o'clock in the morning to the Divisions, which were +already standing prepared on their respective assembling-grounds. +The Bavarian Corps was directed to +take up a position opposite Loigny with its left wing +at Château-Goury; the 17th Division to march immediately +from Santilly to Lumeau, and the 22nd from +Tivernon to Baigneaux. The cavalry was to undertake +the protection of both wings.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Loigny—Poupry.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(December 2nd.)</div> + + +<p>The Bavarian Corps was still engaged in the advance +from Maladerie when the French ascended the heights +to the west of Loigny. The 1st Division, therefore, +marched towards Villeprévost, and the 2nd held the +line Beauvilliers-Goury.</p> + +<p>At 8 a.m. General Chanzy set out with his 2nd +and 3rd Divisions from Terminiers, for Loigny and +Lumeau. The 1st followed in reserve, and Michel's +Cavalry Division covered the left flank. In spite of +the strong fire of the defenders, the 2nd Division by +nine o'clock advanced close upon Beauvilliers, but then +it had to give way before the onset of the Bavarians, +who now on their side attacked Loigny. When, +however, at 10.30 the whole French Corps advanced, +deployed on a broad front from Nonneville to Neuvilliers, +they had to fall back with great losses. They, +however, found a rallying point at Beauvilliers, where +the fire of the Corps artillery gave pause to the +advance of the enemy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[200]</a></span></p> + +<p>The combat surged backwards and forwards until, at +11.30, the 2nd Bavarian Brigade joined in the fray. +The 4th Cavalry Division charged the left flank of the +enemy; and Michel's Division fell back on the XVIIth +Corps, numerous prisoners thus falling into the hands +of the German troopers. In the meantime the Bavarian +infantry had marched to Ferme Morâle with intent to +renew the attack, but there found itself under fire so +destructive that it was forced to turn back. Thereupon +the horse-batteries on the flank enfiladed the enemy's +wing with such effect, that the farm was set on fire and +General von Orff found himself able to take possession +of it.</p> + +<p>At Beauvilliers, meanwhile, the 2nd Division had +only with great difficulty resisted the vigorous onslaughts +of the French, whose rifle-swarms were already +so close that the batteries were compelled to retire +to positions further back. But the success of the right +wing soon extended to the left. Breaking out from Beauvilliers, +as well as from Château Goury, the Bavarians +drove Jauréguiberry's Division back to Loigny.</p> + +<p>Shortly after noon the firing of the French became +again remarkably energetic, especially against Château +Goury. The battalions of the Bavarian left wing were +forced back upon the park.</p> + +<p>During these events the two Prussian Divisions had +continued their advance. The artillery of the 17th +pressed on in order to engage the enemy, while the +head of the infantry reached Lumeau in time to prevent +its occupation by the opposing forces. Strong swarms +of French riflemen fought their way up quite close to +the place, but they were finally driven back by +a well-directed fire of musketry and shell; whereupon +the Division assailed the right flank of the French +attack.</p> + +<p>The 22nd Division also marched through Baigneaux +to Anneux, and joined in the pursuit of the retreating +enemy. A number of prisoners and a battery +were captured, and the enemy, after a vain attempt to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[201]</a></span> +make another stand near Neuvilliers, at last fled towards +Terminiers in utter disorder.</p> + +<p>After this result of the fighting about Lumeau, +General von Tresckow was able to go to the assistance +of the hard-pressed left wing of the Bavarians. Under +cover of the fire of eight batteries the 33rd Brigade +moved against the flank of the French masses which +were now making a fierce attack on Château Goury. +Taken by surprise, these retired upon Loigny. But +there, too, the Mecklenburg battalions forced in, +shoulder to shoulder with the Bavarians, and it was +only in the churchyard on high ground at the west +end of the village, that an obstinate resistance was +made for some time longer. The French, as they +retired on Villepion, suffered from a destructive fire +from eighty guns massed near Loigny.</p> + +<p>At 2.30 General von der Tann caused the whole of +his 1st Division, after the replenishment of its ammunition, +to advance once more; this movement, however, +was arrested by the fire of the enemy.</p> + +<p>Michel's Division moved up to oppose the advance of +the German cavalry on the right flank, but went about +as soon as it came within range of the horse-batteries.</p> + +<p>Because of the exposed condition of his right flank, +General Chanzy had sent a few battalions to form a +refused flank<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> near Terre-noire. Behind this a brigade +of the XVIIth Corps came up near Faverolles, and to +the right of Villepion the Papal Zouaves advanced +against Villours.</p> + +<p>General von Tresckow now threw in his last reserves. +Two battalions of the 75th Regiment broke +into the place at the first charge, and in conjunction +with all the troops fighting in the vicinity, drove back +the French columns to Villepion.</p> + +<p>The approach of darkness brought the fighting here +to a close.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[202]</a></span></p> +<p>While the French XVIth Corps had been fighting +single-handed with great persistence all day, the XVth, +according to orders, had advanced through Artenay +along the Paris high-road. There it was opposed only +by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. That force was attacked +about mid-day near Dambron by the 3rd French +Division, which formed the left-flank column, while the +other two Divisions held much further to the right.</p> + +<p>So soon as this information came in from the cavalry, +General von Wittich moved off with the whole of the +22nd Division from Anneux in the direction of Poupry. +The head of the column reached that place at the +double, and succeeded in driving back the enemy, who +had already broken in there and occupied the forest +belts to the north. Six batteries then came into action, +resting on Morâle to the south. The French deployed +between Dambron and Autroches, and maintained a +persistent fire while their remaining Divisions came up. +After an encounter with the troops from Poupry, they +occupied with their right wing the small copses which +lay near, in front of the forest-land to the north, placed +the artillery in the intervals, and began at three o'clock +an attack from thence. This, however, withered under +a fire of grape-shot from the defenders, and the menace +of a charge by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which General +von Colomb had set in motion in the open country to +the west of Dambron. An attack on Morâle by the +left wing from Autroches likewise miscarried. But at +four o'clock the French advanced along their whole +front, preceded by great swarms of tirailleurs. They +were repulsed at Poupry, and likewise at Morâle, at +which latter place two companies of pioneers joined in +the fight; on the other hand, their right wing pushed +into the forest, and compelled its defenders to retreat. +But Prussian battalions yet remaining in reserve, +advanced from Poupry, and drove the enemy back into +the copses, where he had still to defend himself against +an attack by the cavalry.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[203]</a></span></p> + +<p>The fighting was now stopped by the approach of +night. The 22nd Division remained under arms till +eleven o'clock in the position which it had seized, and +only then withdrew to Anneux. The 3rd Cavalry +Division quartered for the night in Baigneaux. The +17th Division remained in position near Lumeau, having +Loigny in its front, which it occupied in concert with +the Bavarians, who extended further to the right as +far as Orgères.</p> + +<p>The day had cost the French 4000 killed and wounded, +and the Germans fully as many, but 2500 unwounded +prisoners, eight guns, one mitrailleuse and a standard belonging +to the enemy were left in possession of the latter.</p> + +<p>On the French side, the XVth Corps retired to +Artenay and received orders, under cover of a Division +to be left there, to occupy the defensive position previously +held on the skirt of the forest.</p> + +<p>Thus the intended further advance of the left wing +of the Army of Orleans had not succeeded. The XVIth +Corps, lacking the support of the XVIIth, had indeed +lost ground, but still maintained itself with its most +advanced line on Villepion, Faverolles and Terminiers. +General Chanzy therefore considered himself justified +in making yet another effort against the German right +wing on the following day.</p> + +<p>The German strength consisted of five Corps, and +stood close in front of the enemy; further reinforcements +could not be immediately expected, but by the +supreme Command it was judged that the moment had +now come to put an end to the standing menace from +the south against the investment of Paris.</p> + +<p>At mid-day of the 2nd, the order came from the Royal +Head-quarter to undertake an attack on Orleans in full +strength, and in the course of that day Prince Frederick +Charles gave the requisite instructions to this end.</p> + +<p>It is here necessary to go back a little in order to see +how circumstances developed events during November +at various other points.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[204]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> To the German term "Haken-stellung" there is perhaps no precisely +equivalent expression in our military vocabulary. "Refused +flank" is probably approximate.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Paris in November.</span></h2> + + +<p>The tidings, which became known on the 14th November, +of the happy result of the action at Coulmiers on +the 9th, had rekindled in Paris universal hope. No one +doubted that the enemy would find it necessary to send +large forces in the Orleans direction, which would considerably +weaken the investment line, particularly in +its southern section.</p> + +<p>In order to contribute towards the hoped-for approaching +relief by active co-operation, three separate +armies were formed out of the garrison of Paris.</p> + +<p>The first, under General Clément Thomas, consisted +of 226 battalions of the National Guard, in round +numbers 130,000 men. Its duty was the defence of the +enceinte and the maintenance of quietude within the +city. The second, under General Ducrot, constituted the +most trustworthy element, especially the troops of the +former XIIIth and XIVth Corps. This army was +apportioned into three (Infantry) Corps and one Cavalry +Division, and it consisted of fully 100,000 men and +more than 300 guns. It was designed for active service +in the field, and for making sorties on the investing +forces. The third army, under General Vinoy, +70,000 strong, was made up of six Divisions of Gardes-Mobiles +and one Cavalry Division; and to it also +Maud'huy's Division of the line was assigned. It was +to aid the more important sorties by diversions on subordinate +fronts. In addition to all these details, 80,000 +Gardes-Mobiles were in the forts, and 35,000 more in +St. Denis under Admiral de la Roncière.</p> + +<p>The available military strength consequently amounted +to above 400,000 men.</p> + +<p>The garrison exhibited a lively activity in petty +nocturnal enterprises. The heavy guns of the defences +carried to Choisy le Roi, and even as far as Beauregard, +near Versailles. On the peninsula of Gennevilliers +trenchwork was energetically set about, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[205]</a></span> +task of bridge-building was undertaken. Many signs +pointed to an intended effort on the part of the French +to break out in a westerly direction. But since, as +long as the IInd Army was still incomplete, the +greatest danger threatened from the south, the supreme +Command in Versailles, as already mentioned, ordered +the IInd Corps into the position behind the Yvette +from Villeneuve to Saclay. On the north of Paris the +Guard Corps extended itself leftward as far as Aulnay, +the XIIth sent one brigade across to the south bank of +the Marne, and the Würtemberg Division moved into +the interval between the Marne and the Seine caused by +the shifting of the IInd Corps.</p> + +<p>On November 18th the summons from Tours reached +Paris, calling on the latter with all promptitude to +reach the hand to the Army of the Loire; certainly +somewhat prematurely, since, as we know, that army +was at the time concerning itself only in regard to +defensive measures.</p> + +<p>In Paris all preparations were actually made for a +great sortie. But as the earlier attacks on the front of +the VIth Corps had shown that this section of the investment +was materially strengthened by fortifications +about Thiais and Chevilly, it was decided in the first +instance to gain the plateau east of Joinville and from +thence to bend rightward towards the south. The attention +of the Germans was to be distracted by attacks in +the opposite direction.</p> + +<p>On the 18th,<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> the day on which the Army of Orleans +had vainly striven to press forward to Beaune la Rolande, +General Ducrot assembled the IInd Army of +Paris in the neighbourhood of Vincennes, and Mont +Avron was occupied on the following day by Hugues' +Division of the IIIrd Army. As, however, the construction +of the bridges (over the Marne) at Champigny +and Bry was delayed, the battle was postponed +till the 30th; but it was left to the commanders of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[206]</a></span> +subordinate affairs to carry them out simultaneously +with the chief enterprise or in advance of it. Accordingly, +Maud'huy's Division assembled in the night of +28th—29th behind the redoubt of Hautes Bruyères, +and advanced against L'Hay before daybreak.</p> + +<p>Warned by the heavy firing from the southern forts, +General von Tümpling (commanding VIth Corps) had +early ordered the 12th Division to get under arms in its +fighting positions, and the 11th to assemble at Fresnes.</p> + +<p>The French, favoured by the darkness, made their +way through the vineyards into L'Hay; but were successfully +driven back by the Germans with the bayonet +and clubbed arms.</p> + +<p>After a prolonged fire-fight, the French renewed +their onslaught at 8.30, but without success; and then +the defenders, reinforced from the reserve, retaliated +with a vigorous counterstroke. At ten o'clock the +enemy retreated to Villejuif.</p> + +<p>Admiral Pothuau at the same time had moved up the +Seine with Marines and National Guards. An outpost +at Gare aux Bœufs was surprised and captured, and +Choisy le Roi was fired upon by field-guns, fortress +artillery, and gunboats which appeared on the Seine. +Just as the Grenadiers of the 10th (Prussian) Regiment +were on the point of making an attack, General +Vinoy broke off the fight.</p> + +<p>This demonstration cost the French 1000 men and +300 uninjured prisoners; the Prussians, remaining +under cover, lost only 140 men. The fortress kept up +its fire till mid-day, and then the enemy was allowed a +short truce, to remove his numerous wounded.</p> + +<p>Against the front of the Vth Corps also, a strong +infantry force advanced at eight o'clock upon Garches +and Malmaison, and drove in part of the outposts. But +it soon found itself opposed by closed battalions, and at +noon retreated to Valérien.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[207]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Obvious misprint for 28th.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Attempt of the Army of Paris to break +out.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 30th and December 2nd.)</div> + + +<p>On November 30th the IInd Paris Army opened +the battle which was to decide the fate of the capital.</p> + +<p>To hinder the reinforcement of the Germans towards +the real point of attack, almost every section of their +line of investment was again engrossed by sorties.</p> + +<p>To the duty of pushing an attack against the southern +front, General Ducrot assigned Susbielle's Division of +his IInd Corps. It reached Rosny so early as three +o'clock in the morning, crossed the Marne at Créteil by +a field-bridge, and from thence, briskly supported by +the nearest forts, opened fire on the outpost line of the +Würtemberg Division, which had been pushed forward +to Bonneuil and Mesly.</p> + +<p>General von Obernitz (commanding the Division) had +an extended position to maintain. His 1st Brigade was +at Villiers on the peninsula of Joinville, his 2nd at +Sucy en Brie, and his 3rd at Brévannes. The Division +was placed under the Commander of the Army of the +Meuse, who had been instructed from Versailles to reinforce +it strongly by the XIIth Corps, or even by +troops of the Guard Corps.</p> + +<p>From the great accumulation of hostile forces on +Mont Avron, the Saxon Corps believed itself directly +threatened on the right bank of the Marne, and requested +to be immediately transferred to the left; the +Crown Prince of Saxony gave the order that the whole +24th Division should assemble there on the following day.</p> + +<p>Thus for the present the only aid that could be rendered +to the Würtembergers was from the wing of the +IInd Corps at Villeneuve, of which the 7th Infantry +Brigade moved up near Brévannes to Valenton.</p> + +<p>The fire of its three batteries hurrying thither, first +brought the advance of the French Division to a stand.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[208]</a></span> +The attempt of the Würtembergers to seize Mont-Mesly +failed at first; but after a strenuous artillery fire they +succeeded in carrying the hill by twelve o'clock, and +the Prussian battalions forced their way into Mesly. +The Würtemberg horse cut in upon the enemy's retreating +guns with great success. At 1.30 the re-opening +of the fire from the forts proclaimed the end of +this sortie. It cost the Germans 350 men, and the +French 1200.</p> + +<p>During this time the front of the VIth Corps had not +been at all molested. General Vinoy, who had not +been informed of the advance of Susbielle's Division, +when its retreat was noticed caused to be opened from +Fort Ivry and the adjoining works a brisk fire, which +was augmented by gunboats on the Seine and armour-plated +batteries on the railway. Then Admiral +Pothuau advanced against Choisy le Roi and Thiais. +His Marines, after driving out the Prussian fore-posts, +again settled themselves firmly in Gare aux +Bœufs. But the further advance failed, and General +Vinoy recalled his troops, after which the fighting +at Mesly ceased, and only the thunder of artillery +continued till five o'clock.</p> + +<p>After a preliminary cannonade from Valérien the +Gardes-Mobiles advanced against the front of the Vth +Corps about seven o'clock. They were, however, repulsed +by the outposts and supporting troops in readiness, +and retired at eleven o'clock.</p> + +<p>On the northern front of Paris there occurred also +a sharp fight. At mid-day Fort de la Briche, supported +by field-guns and a floating battery, opened a +heavy fire on the low-lying village of Epinay on the +right bank of the Seine. At two o'clock Haurion's +Brigade advanced, two companies of marines pressed +into the place along the bank of the river, and drove +out the garrison, which consisted of only one company. +A second also retired from the defence-works in a +northerly direction towards Ormesson. At three<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[209]</a></span> +o'clock in the afternoon, the village, up to some still +obstinately defended farms on the further side of the +mill-race, fell into the hands of the French.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the troops of the IVth Corps had assembled, +and seven batteries came into action on the overhanging +heights. The infantry rushed upon the village +from all sides with loud cheers, and about four o'clock, +after a fierce street-fight, recovered possession of the +posts which had been lost; and it was this transitory +conquest that was to raise so great hopes in Tours. +The losses on both sides amounted to 300 men.</p> + +<p>Those affairs were all mere feints to facilitate the chief +action; and whilst the investing troops were thus +engaged and held fast at all points, two Corps of the +IInd French Army at 6.30 in the morning crossed the +bridges at Joinville and Nogent which had been completed +during the night. After repulsing the German +outposts they both deployed, and stretched completely +across the peninsula between Champigny and Bry. +The IIIrd Corps had taken the road along the north +bank of the Marne, towards Neuilly, to cross the river +there, thus threatening to compromise the position +of the Saxon Corps, which therefore still detained the +47th Brigade on the right bank, though it had been +assigned to the assistance of the Würtembergers. +Consequently there were available to oppose the two +French Corps on the left bank, only two German +brigades extended over about four miles, the Saxon +48th about Noisy, and the Würtemberg 1st from +Villiers to Chennevières.</p> + +<p>At ten o'clock Maussion's Division advanced against +the Park of Villiers. Supported by Saxon detachments +from Noisy, the Würtembergers repulsed a first attack, +but in following it up met with heavy losses. The +French batteries of two Divisions and those of the +Artillery Reserve formed line in front of the park. +On their right Faron's Division, not without heavy +losses, succeeded in gaining possession of Champigny,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[210]</a></span> +and had then established itself in front of that village +to defend the occupation of it.</p> + +<p>General Ducrot's original idea had been to maintain +a stationary fight on the peninsula until he should be +joined at Noisy by his IIIrd Corps. But as news +arrived that at eleven o'clock it was still on the +northern side of the Marne, he ordered an immediate +general attack by both his other Corps.</p> + +<p>On the left the advance was checked for a considerable +time by the German batteries which had been +pushed forward between Noisy and Villiers, and when +Colonel von Abendroth moved out from both villages +with six companies of the 48th Brigade to an attack in +close formation, the French fell back into the vineyards +on the western slope of the plateau, leaving +behind two guns, which, however, the Saxons could +not carry away for want of teams.</p> + +<p>In the centre of the line of fight, Berthaut's Division +tried to push forward south of Villiers, but by the fire +of five batteries in position there and at Coeuilly its +ranks were so severely thinned that it gave ground +before the advance of a Saxon battalion.</p> + +<p>On the right wing, the guns which had been brought +up into position in front of Champigny had at last been +compelled by the German artillery to withdraw, and +had sought cover further north, near the lime-kilns. A +body of French infantry had advanced along the riverside +to Maison Blanche, but meanwhile the 2nd Würtemberg +Brigade, although itself attacked at Sucy, despatched +a reinforcement of two companies and a battery +to Chennevières. Advancing from the Hunting-lodge, +the Würtembergers took 200 French prisoners at +Maison Blanche; though, on the other hand, an attempt +to carry the heights in front of Champigny with the companies +assembled at Coeuilly failed with heavy loss. As +the result, however, of a renewed flank-attack from the +Hunting-lodge, Faron's Division, which had already been +severely shaken, was obliged to retreat to Champigny.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[211]</a></span></p> + +<p>General Ducrot decided to be content, for that day, +with having established a firm footing on the left bank +of the Marne, and he brought up sixteen batteries to a +position in his front, to secure the wedge of ground he +had gained. On the following day the attack was to be +renewed by all the three Corps.</p> + +<p>The Germans, on their part, had to congratulate +themselves on having maintained their ground against +greatly superior numbers. And so in the afternoon the +fight gradually died away, until it broke out again in +the north.</p> + +<p>The French IIIrd Corps, marching up the right bank +of the Marne, had occupied Neuilly in force, and had +driven in the outposts of the Saxon 47th Brigade. +Under cover of six batteries the construction of two +military bridges below Neuilly was begun at ten o'clock, +and finished by noon. But just at this time it happened, +as we have seen, that the French were in retreat +from the plateau, so the crossing did not occur until +two o'clock in the afternoon. Bellemare's Division +marched down the valley to Bry, where it closed on +the left flank of the IInd Corps. A regiment of +Zouaves, trying to ascend the plateau from Bry, lost half +its men and all its officers. Notwithstanding, General +Ducrot decided to employ his reinforced strength +in the immediate renewal of the attack on Villiers.</p> + +<p>Strengthened by four battalions, the Division advanced +in this direction, although the artillery had not +succeeded in battering down the park wall; repeated +onslaughts by rifle-swarms were repulsed, and finally +the French retreated into the valley. The simultaneous +attacks of Berthaut's Division along the railway +line and of Faron's Division on the Hunting-lodge +also miscarried. Not till darkness had set in did the +firing cease on both sides.</p> + +<p>Near Chelles, on the line in which the French IIIrd +Corps had been advancing in the morning, the Crown +Prince of Saxony had collected the 23rd Division; but as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[212]</a></span> +soon as the enemy's real objective was penetrated, he +despatched part of the 47th Brigade and a portion of +the Corps Artillery to the threatened position held by +the Würtembergers. Not less opportunely had General +von Obernitz, as soon as the fighting at Mesly was +over, sent three battalions to the Hunting-lodge. In the +night orders came from the supreme Head-quarter for +the IInd and VIth Corps to send reinforcements to the +endangered points of the line of investment, and the +7th and 21st Brigades arrived at Sucy on the following +day, the 1st of December.</p> + +<p>On the French side the attempt to break through +without help from outside was already considered as +well-nigh hopeless, and it was only the fear of popular +indignation which caused the IIIrd Army to remain +longer on the left bank of the Marne. Instead of +attacking, the French began to intrench themselves, +and in order to clear the battle-field a truce was +arranged. The thunder of the cannon from Mont +Avron had to serve for the present to keep up the +spirits of the Parisians. The Germans also worked +at the strengthening of their positions, but, suffering +from the sudden and extreme cold, part at least of the +troops withdrew into quarters further rearward.</p> + +<p>The command of the whole of the German Army +between the Marne and the Seine was assumed by +General von Fransecky (commanding IInd Corps). +The Head-quarter of the Army of the Meuse had +already given instructions that Prince George (of +Saxony) with all the available troops of the XIIth +Corps, should make surprise-attacks on Bry and Champigny +in the early morning of the 2nd.</p> + +<p>With this object, on the morning specified the 24th +Division assembled at Noisy, the 1st Würtemberg +Brigade at Villiers, and the 7th Prussian Brigade at +the Hunting-lodge.</p> + +<p>The foremost battalions of the Saxon Division drove +back the enemy's outposts by a sudden rush, took<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[213]</a></span> +100 prisoners, and after storming a barricade entered +Bry. Here ensued an embittered fight in the streets +and houses, in which the 2nd Battalion of the 107th +Regiment lost nearly all its officers. Nevertheless it +maintained its hold on the northern part of the village, +in spite of the heavy fire of the forts.</p> + +<p>The Würtembergers also forced an entrance into +Champigny, but soon met with fierce resistance from +the enemy sheltered in the buildings. The previously +occupied Bois de la Lande had to be abandoned, and +General Ducrot now determined to resort to the offensive. +The strong artillery line on his front came into +action at about nine o'clock, and two Divisions deployed +in rear of it.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Fusilier battalion of the Colberg +Regiment marched once more from the Hunting-lodge +on Bois de la Lande, and carried it with the first +onslaught. The French, firing heavily from the railway +embankments, struck down the Pomeranians with +clubbed rifles and at the point of the bayonet. A +fierce fight was carried on at the same time at the lime-pits, +where at noon 160 French laid down their arms. +When six Würtemberg and nine Prussian batteries +had been by degrees brought into action against +Champigny, General Hartmann<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> succeeded in getting as +far as the road leading to Bry. As, however, the +batteries were now being masked by their own infantry, +and were suffering, too, under the heavy projectiles fired +from the forts, they were withdrawn into the hollow of +the Hunting-lodge. At two o'clock the 1st Würtemberg +and 7th Prussian Brigades established themselves +firmly in the line from the churchyard of +Champigny to the Bois de la Lande.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the French divisions of Bellemare and +Susbielle had reached the battle-field from the right +bank of the Marne. The two Saxon battalions in Bry, +having already lost 36 officers and 638 men, were compelled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[214]</a></span> +by the approach of the enemy in very superior +force, to evacuate the village and retire on Noisy, but +not without taking 300 prisoners with them. The rest +of the Saxon forces held Villiers, where the still available +batteries also were in position.</p> + +<p>While, at two o'clock, the French were bringing up +a strong artillery mass against this point, four batteries +of the IInd Corps rushed out of the hollow near the +Hunting-lodge at a gallop upon their flank, and opened +fire at a range of 2000 paces. In less than ten minutes +the French batteries fell back and the Prussian batteries +returned to their sheltered position. Several hostile +battalions which, at about three o'clock, attempted a +renewed assault on Villiers, were repulsed with no +difficulty, and at five o'clock the fighting ceased. The +French merely kept up a fire of field and fortress +artillery until dark.</p> + +<p>General Ducrot had received information in the +course of the day, that the Army of the Loire was +marching on Fontainebleau, and he was, therefore, very +anxious to continue to maintain his position outside +Paris.</p> + +<p>During the night of December 2nd—3rd, provisions +were procured, and the teams and ammunition of the +batteries were made up; but the approach of support +from without was in no wise confirmed.</p> + +<p>The troops were completely exhausted by the previous +disastrous fighting, and the Commander-in-Chief was +justified in apprehending a repulse on the Marne by +the enemy's invigorated forces. He therefore ordered +a retreat, the troops being informed that the attack +should be renewed as soon as their preparedness for +fighting should have been re-established.</p> + +<p>Soon after midnight the divisions were assembled +behind the outposts, and the trains were sent back first. +At noon the troops were able to follow over the bridges +at Neuilly, Bry, and Joinville. Only one brigade +remained in position to cover the passage.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[215]</a></span></p> + +<p>The retreat was very skilfully covered by a series of +small attacks on the German outposts. The French +batteries had opened fire at Le Plant and Bry by daybreak, +and the withdrawal of the enemy's army was +completely hidden by the thick mist.</p> + +<p>General Fransecky assembled the Saxon and the +Würtemberg Divisions in a fighting position at Villiers +and Cœuilly, the 7th Brigade with the Corps-Artillery +of the IInd Corps and two regiments of the VIth at +Chennevières, intending to wait for the expected reinforcement +which the VIth Corps had agreed to furnish +for the 4th. The 23rd Division also received orders +from the Crown Prince of Saxony to cross to the left +bank of the Marne, whilst the Guard Corps had meanwhile +extended its outposts to Chelles.</p> + +<p>So remained matters on the 3rd, with the exception +of petty frays, and at four o'clock in the afternoon the +troops were able to return to quarters. When early on +the 4th patrols rode forward towards Bry and Champigny, +they found these places vacated, and the +peninsula of Joinville deserted by the enemy.</p> + +<p>The IInd French Army, which had been severely +reduced and its internal cohesion much shaken, returned +to Paris; on its own report it had lost 12,000 men. +The German troops engaged had lost 6200 men, but +resumed their former positions in the investing line.</p> + +<p>This energetic attempt on the part of General Ducrot +was the most serious effort that was made for the relief +of Paris. It was directed towards what was at the +moment the weakest point of the investment, but met +with any success only at the outset.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[216]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Commanding 3rd Infantry Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> A legend was subsequently circulated that the voice of one +general in a German council of war had, in opposition to all the +others, prevented the removal of the chief head-quarters from Versailles. +Apart from the fact that during the whole course of the +invasion no council of war was ever held, it never occurred to any +member of the King's military suite to set so bad an example to the +army. [Moltke.]</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Advance of the Ist Army in November.</span></h2> + + +<p>The newly-formed levies in northern France were not +remaining inactive. Rouen and Lille were their chief +centres. In front of the latter place, the Somme with +its fortified passages at Ham, Péronne, Amiens, and +Abbeville afforded a line equally advantageous for +attacks to the front or for secure retreat. Isolated +advances had, indeed, on various occasions, been driven +back by detachments of the Army of the Meuse, but +these were too weak to rid themselves of the continued +molestation by pursuit pushed home.</p> + +<p>We have already seen how, after the fall of Metz, the +IInd Army marched to the Loire, and the Ist into the +northern departments of France.</p> + +<p>A large portion of the Ist Army was at first detained +on the Moselle by having had to undertake the transport +of the numerous prisoners and the observation of +the fortresses which interrupted the communications +with Germany. The whole VIIth Corps was either in +Metz or before Thionville and Montmédy. Of the Ist +Corps, the 1st Division was detached to Rethel,<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> the 4th +Brigade transported by railway through Soissons to +the investment of La Fère, and the 3rd Cavalry +Division sent on towards the forest of Argonnes. The +remaining five brigades followed with the artillery on +the 7th November.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p> + +<p>Marching on a wide front, the force reached the +Oise between Compiègne and Chauny on the 20th. +In front of the right wing the cavalry, supported by a +battalion of Jägers, came in contact with Gardes-Mobiles +at Ham and Guiscard; in face of the infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[217]</a></span> +columns the hostile bodies fell back on Amiens. It +was learned that 15,000 men were there, and that +reinforcements were continually joining.</p> + +<p>On the 25th the 3rd Brigade reached Le Quesnel. +The 15th Division of the VIIIth Corps advanced beyond +Montdidier, and the 16th to Breteuil, whence it established +connection with the Saxon detachments about +Clermont. On the 26th the right wing closed up to Le +Quesnel, the left to Moreuil and Essertaux. The cavalry +scouted forward towards the Somme, the right bank of +which it found occupied. The enemy's attitude indicated +that he was confining himself to the defence of +that position. General von Manteuffel thereupon determined +to attack, without waiting for the arrival of the +1st Division, the transport of which from Rethel was +extraordinarily delayed. His intention, in the first +instance, was to utilize the 27th in drawing closer in +his forces, which were extended along a front of some +nineteen miles. But the battle was unexpectedly +fought on that same day.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> According to statement on p. <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, to Mézières.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> The "five brigades" mentioned in the text consisted of the 3rd +of Ist Corps, and the four composing the VIIIth Corps, of which, +the Ist and VIIth, the Ist Army was made up. The 1st Cavalry +Division, originally belonging to the Ist Army, was transferred to the +IInd Army by the reorganization following the capitulation of Metz.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Amiens.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 17th.)</div> + + +<p>General Farre, with his 17,500 men distributed into +three brigades, stood eastward of Amiens on the south +bank of the Somme, about Villers Bretonneux and +Longueau along the road to Péronne, holding also the +villages and copses on his front. Besides these troops +there were 8000 Gardes-Mobiles occupying an intrenched +position about two and a half miles in front +of the city.</p> + +<p>In accordance with instructions from the Army +Headquarter, General von Goeben (commanding the +VIIIth Corps) had given orders for the 27th that the +15th Division should take up quarters at Fouencamps +and Sains; the 16th at Rumigny and Plachy and in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[218]</a></span> +villages further back; the Corps-Artillery at Grattepanche. +Consequently the VIIIth Corps was to be +assembled before Amiens between the Celle and the +Noye, at the distance, then, of nearly two and a half +miles from the Ist Corps, and divided from it by the +latter brook and the Avre. General von Bentheim +(commanding the 1st Division, Ist Corps<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a>) on the other +hand, had sent his advanced guard, the 3rd Brigade, +into quarters north of the Luce.</p> + +<p>At an early hour that brigade seized the passages of +the brook at Démuin, Hangard, and Domart. At ten +o'clock it moved forward in order to occupy the +appointed quarters, and as the enemy were already in +possession, a fight began which gradually increased in +magnitude.</p> + +<p>The wooded heights on the north bank of the Luce +were taken without any particular resistance, and +maintained in spite of several counter strokes by the +French. The artillery pushed forward through the +intervals of the infantry. On the left the 4th Regiment +seized the village of Gentelles, on the right the +44th Regiment rushed up to within 300 paces of the +left flank of the French position, and by a vigorous +onslaught carried by storm the earthworks at the railway +cutting east of Villers Bretonneux. Soon after +mid-day heavy hostile masses drew up at Bretonneux +and in Cachy, directly opposite the 3rd Brigade, +which was extended along a front of some four miles.</p> + +<p>On the left wing of the Germans the 16th Division +had by eleven o'clock already reached its assigned +quarters, and had driven the enemy out of Hébecourt, +as well as out of the woods north of that village towards +Dury. The 15th Division, in compliance with the +enjoined assemblage of the VIIIth Corps on the left bank +of the Noye, moved westward from Moreuil through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[219]</a></span> +Ailly to Dommartin, its advance guard which had been +holding Hailles marching direct on Fouencamps. Thus +it happened that before noon the roads from Roye and +Montdidier between the two Corps were left completely +uncovered by troops on the German side, while a French +brigade was standing at the fork of these roads at +Longueau, though, in fact, it remained absolutely inactive. +This interval was at first screened only by the +numerous retinue and staff escort of the Commander-in-Chief; +and then it was to some extent filled by the +battalion constituting the guard of the headquarter. +As, however, after ten o'clock the French on their side +commenced an attack on the 3rd Brigade, General von +Manteuffel ordered the 15th Division to join in the +fight as far as possible toward the right wing.</p> + +<p>After a staunch defence the companies of the 4th +Regiment were driven back out of the Bois de Hangard +towards the declivity of the height in front of Démuin, +and subsequently, having expended all their ammunition, +the defenders of Gentelles were driven back to +Domart.</p> + +<p>General von Strubberg (commanding 30th Infantry +Brigade, VIIIth Corps), on instructions from the scene of +combat in front of the Luce, had sent four battalions in +that direction, which crossed the Avre, but came under +such a heavy fire from the Bois de Gentelles that their +further advance was prevented, and they had to change +front against the wood. Behind them, however, the +other detachments of the 30th Brigade pressed forward +to St. Nicolas on the right bank, and to Boves on the +left, and in co-operation with the 29th Brigade drove +the French from the neighbouring Ruinenberg.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile a part of the approaching 1st Division +came up behind the 3rd Brigade. The artillery positions +were considerably strengthened, and the cannon +fire was directed against the earthworks south of Bretonneux. +As the nearest support the Crown Prince's +Regiment went forward, and soon the French were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[220]</a></span> +again driven out of the Bois de Hangard. The East +Prussians following them up, took cover in front of the +earthworks; several detachments of the 4th and 44th +Regiments gradually collected there from the neighbouring +woods, and the enemy was then driven back +from this position. Thirteen batteries now silenced +the French artillery, and, after they had fired for some +time on Bretonneux, the place was, at four o'clock, +seized by the Prussians pouring in from all sides with +drums beating. The French in its interior made +only a weak defence at isolated points; for the most +part they hurried over the Somme at Corbie under +cover of the darkness, and with the loss of 180 unwounded +prisoners.</p> + +<p>When, somewhat later, the French General Lecointe +advanced with the reserve brigade on Domart, he found +that crossing point already in possession of the 1st +Division, and turned back. Cachy only was held by +the French till late in the evening.</p> + +<p>The troops of the Ist Corps were distributed for the +night in the hamlets to the south of the Luce; but +the outposts were established on the northern bank of +the Somme, and Bretonneux also remained occupied.</p> + +<p>On the left wing of the battle-field the 16th Division +had advanced to Dury, and had driven the French out +of the neighbouring churchyard, but had been forced to +withdraw from an attack on the enemy's extensive and +strongly defended line of intrenchment. It bivouacked +behind Dury.</p> + +<p>It was night before General von Manteuffel received +information which proved that the enemy had been +completely defeated. Early in the morning of the +28th the patrols of the Ist Corps found the region +clear of the enemy as far as the Somme, and all the +bridges across the river destroyed. At noon General +von Goeben entered Amiens, the citadel of which +capitulated two days later with its garrison of 400 men +and 30 cannon.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[221]</a></span></p> + +<p>One peculiarity of the battle of the 27th November +was the disproportionately great extent of the battle-field +to the number of the troops engaged. General +Farre, with 25,000 men in round numbers, covered a +front of about fourteen miles from Pont de Metz south +of Amiens to the east of Villers Bretonneux, and with +the Somme close on his rear. The Germans attacked +on approximately the same breadth of front, with the +result that there was a break in the middle of their +line. The danger caused by this gap was not taken +advantage of during the morning through the inactivity +of the enemy, and it was then nullified by the +occupation of St. Nicolas.</p> + +<p>The superiority of numbers was on the side of the +Germans, for, although of the approaching 1st Division +only the Crown Prince's Regiment could take part in +the fighting, they were 30,000 strong. The 3rd +Brigade bore the brunt of the battle, losing 630 +men and 34 officers out of a total of 1300. The +French also lost about 1300, besides 1000 reported +missing. Part of the National Guard threw down +their arms and fled to their homes. The main body of +the French Corps retired on Arras.</p> + +<p>Immediately after the battle the Ist Army was +reinforced by the 4th Brigade, which had been brought +from La Fère.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> In effect commanding the whole Ist Corps, although nominally +Manteuffel was still chief of it, as well as in command of the Ist +Army.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of La Fère.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 27th.)</div> + + +<p>This little fortress became of importance since it +closed the line of railway passing through Rheims, +both to Amiens and to Paris. Lying in open, wet, low +ground overflowed by the Somme and its tributaries, +it was difficult of approach; otherwise, the fortifications<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[222]</a></span> +merely consisted of an isolated wall, with sundry +earthworks close in front of it, and it was entirely +seen into from heights on the east at a distance of not +more than 1500 metres.</p> + +<p>The brigade (4th of Ist Corps) as a preliminary +measure had invested La Fère on the 15th November, +and when the siege-train arrived from Soissons with +thirty-two heavy guns, seven batteries were built and +armed during the night of the 25th on the heights +already mentioned. On the following morning these +opened fire, and on the 27th the place capitulated. +Gardes-Mobiles to the number of 2300 were taken +prisoners, and the most serviceable of the 113 guns +found were brought away to arm the citadel of Amiens. +The reinforcement of the Ist Army by the VIIth Corps +meanwhile was not yet even in prospect, since the latter +still had further work to do on the Moselle; the +greater part of the 14th Division only arrived before +Thionville on November 13th.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Reduction of Thionville.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(November 24th.)</div> + + +<p>This fortress, shut in on all sides by hills, was +entirely without bomb-proof protection; direct +approach from the south was, on the other hand, +rendered difficult by artificial inundations, and on +the west and north by swamps. General von Kameke +therefore decided to await the result of a heavy +bombardment before resorting to a regular attack. +Batteries were erected on both banks of the Moselle, +and on the morning of the 22nd eighty-five guns +opened fire. At first the fortress answered briskly. +In the following night the infantry detailed to the task +of throwing up the first parallel, advanced to within<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[223]</a></span> +600 paces of the west front, but, in consequence +of pouring rain and the condition of the ground the +work made but small progress. However, on the 24th +at mid-day the commandant proposed negotiations +for the surrender of the place. The garrison, 4000 +strong, with the exception of the National Guard +belonging to the place, became prisoners and were sent +to Germany; and 199 guns, besides a considerable +amount of supplies, arms and ammunition, fell into the +hands of the conqueror.</p> + +<p>The 14th Division was now required to lay siege to +the northern frontier fortresses, which would occupy it +for some time. The 13th Division, by orders from the +supreme Head-quarter, was assigned to the operations +in southern France.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Investment of Belfort in November.</span></h2> + + +<p>On the south-east section of the theatre of war Belfort +had become the centre of continual petty enterprises +on the part of French flying detachments in rear of +the XIVth Corps, which under General von Werder +stood about Vesoul.</p> + +<p>But when the troops previously before Strasburg +had been relieved by a newly formed body from +Germany, the troops before Neu-Breisach became +available, and were set in march on Upper Alsace; +while the 1st Reserve Division reached Belfort on the +3rd November, and by the 8th had effected the preliminary +investment of that place. The greater part of +the 4th Reserve Division marched to join the XIVth +Corps at Vesoul, a detachment under General von +Debschitz occupied Montbéliard, and the 67th +Regiment held Mulhouse and Delle.</p> + +<p>Glancing back on the German successes during<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[224]</a></span> +November and the general military position at the end +of the month, we see the great sortie from Paris +repulsed<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>; in the north the menace to the investment +of being hemmed in done away with by General von +Manteuffel's victory at Amiens; in the east Thionville, +Breisach, Verdun, and La Fère taken, Montmédy and +Belfort surrounded; and in the south Prince Frederick +Charles ready to attack the French army before Orleans.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> The great sortie to the east of Paris was not repulsed until +December 2nd.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Orleans.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(December 3rd and 4th.)</div> + + +<p>When soon after noon of 2nd December the telegraphed +order to take the offensive against Orleans +reached the headquarter of the IInd Army, the Prince +on the same day assembled the Xth Corps at Beaune la +Rolande and Boynes, the IIIrd at Pithiviers, and the +IXth at Bazoches les Gallerandes. By evening the +collected forces had their marching orders.</p> + +<p>The attack was to comprise two days of fighting. +The IIIrd Corps was first to advance on Loury by way +of Chilleurs aux Bois; the Xth was to follow to Chilleurs; +and the IXth was to attack Artenay at half-past +nine. The 1st Cavalry Division supported by infantry +was to be on observation on the left flank towards the +Yonne; the 6th was to follow the right wing. The +Grand Duke, to whom it had been left to arrange the +details of his own march westward of the Paris main +road, ordered the 22nd Division to support the attack +on Artenay, the Bavarian Corps to advance on Lumeau, +the 17th Division to remain for the present at Anneux.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[225]</a></span> +The 4th Cavalry Division was charged with the duty +of scouting on the right flank.</p> + +<p>So early as nine o'clock in the morning on the 3rd of +December the IIIrd Corps met eight battalions and six +batteries of the enemy at Santeau. The 12th Brigade +and the artillery of the 6th Division intercalated in the +columns of march in rear of the foremost battalions, +thereupon deployed about La Brosse. After a few +rounds a battery of the left wing had to be withdrawn +from the fight which had now commenced; on the right, +on the other hand, the Corps-Artillery gradually came up, +and by noon seventy-eight Prussian guns were in action.</p> + +<p>The French, yielding to strength so overwhelming, +retired on Chilleurs; but, when the German batteries +had advanced within 2000 paces of that place, and the +right flank of the former was threatened by an assault +of the Jäger battalions, they began a retreat towards +the forest, and at three o'clock part of the 5th Division +followed them up through the glen leading to the +southward, and the 6th by the high road. As these had +been obstructed in many places, it was six o'clock in +the evening before the clearing by Loury was reached.</p> + +<p>On the right, heavy musketry-firing was heard in the +region of Neuville, and tidings also arrived that on the +left the French had occupied Nancray.</p> + +<p>In consequence of this, a reinforcement from the +reserve remaining in Chilleurs was brought up; one +regiment was thrown out fronting towards the west, a +second towards the east, and under cover of the outposts +extended toward the south the remainder of the +troops went into bivouac and quarters at Loury.</p> + +<p>The IXth Corps had first assembled at Château +Gaillard on the main road to Paris, and then advanced +along the chaussée through Dambron against Villereau. +At Assas it met the enemy, who was soon driven back +by its artillery, and disappeared towards Artenay. +At about ten o'clock an obstinate contest was engaged +in against the batteries of the 2nd French Division in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[226]</a></span> +position here, in which part of the Corps-Artillery presently +bore part, seconded later by the batteries of the +22nd Division, which had come up to Poupry. General +Martineau retreated slowly by successive detachments, +his artillery leading, before the overwhelming fire of +ninety guns, on La Croix Briquet and Ferme d'Arblay.</p> + +<p>At twelve o'clock the Germans occupied Artenay, +and after half an hour's rest they renewed the offensive. +There occurred a long and obstinate fire-fight both of +infantry and artillery, while the 22nd Division pushed +forward on the enemy's left flank. At two o'clock his +guns were silenced, the left-wing column of the IXth +Corps seized the farm of Arblay, and the centre by +hard fighting drove the enemy back along the high +road through La Croix Briquet to Andeglou, where +under cover of the marine artillery resistance was kept +up till dark.</p> + +<p>General Puttkamer<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> had brought up five batteries to +within 800 paces of Chevilly, and the 22nd Division +was advancing on the burning village, when the chief +Command gave the order to halt, the Grand Duke hesitating +to engage in a night attack on the intrenched +village. But when, soon after, a Hussar patrol brought +the information that it was already evacuated, General +von Wittich ordered its occupation. The troops +bivouacked in a heavy snowstorm, in and to the rear +of La Croix Briquet.</p> + +<p>About the time of the first advance the IXth Corps +had sent a detachment of four Hessian battalions leftward +against St. Lyé. They met with opposition at +La Tour, drove the enemy back on St. Germain, but +could not dislodge him from that place.</p> + +<p>When the Xth Corps, marching round by Pithiviers +unmolested, about three o'clock reached the vicinity of +Chilleurs in rear of the IIIrd Corps, part of the 20th +Division went on in the direction of the fighting about +Neuville, the noise of which in the evening was also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[227]</a></span> +heard at Loury. Darkness had already come on and +precluded the use of artillery, but the infantry broke +into the village at several points. But it found the +streets barricaded, and met with obstinate resistance, +so that the prosecution of the attack had to be postponed +till the following day.</p> + +<p>The XVth French Corps had sustained single-handed +the onslaught of three Prussian Corps. Strong masses +of the Army of Orleans, to right and to left of that +Corps, made but feeble efforts in the course of the +day to support it. General Chanzy alone, when at +about two o'clock he heard heavy firing from Artenay, +ordered forward the 2nd Division of the XVIth Corps, +though he had already that morning begun his retreat +on St. Péravy and Boulay. But this reinforcement +encountered the Prussian 17th Division, which, coming +up from Anneux, was on the point of joining in the +fight at Andeglou, and with it the Bavarian Corps +advancing from Lumeau. Their strong united artillery +in position at Chameul and Sougy, soon forced the +enemy to retire. Douzy and then Huêtre were taken, +and the château of Chevilly was occupied by the 17th +Division. Here too darkness put an end to the fighting. +The troops of the right wing quartered at Provenchères, +Chameul and rearward.</p> + +<p>Thus the German army had made its way without +very heavy fighting to within nine miles of Orleans. +The French, indeed, had maintained their ground till +evening in the neighbourhood of Neuville, but the +forces holding on there were ordered to retire in the +night. They were to gain the road from Pithiviers by +Rebréchien, and make a circuit by Orleans to Chevilly. +But they thus came under the fire of the IIIrd German +Corps quartered in Loury, and fled in disorder back +into the forest, whence they attempted to reach their +destination by detachments.</p> + +<p>It was only to be expected that the French would +stoutly defend their intrenchments at Gidy and Cercottes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[228]</a></span> +on the following day, if only to keep open their +way of retreat through Orleans. Prince Frederick +Charles therefore ordered the Grand Duke's Detachment +and the IXth Corps to make an encompassing +attack on both points on the 4th. The IIIrd Corps +was to advance from Loury on Orleans, and the Xth, +again forming the reserve, was to follow to Chevilly.</p> + +<p>General d'Aurelle had retired to Saran on the evening +of the 3rd. Here he saw the 2nd Division of the +XVth Corps fleeing by in utter rout, and heard also that +the 1st had failed to make a stand at Chilleurs. The +Corps of his right wing were altogether shattered as +regarded their internal cohesion by the battle of Beaune, +and those of his left no less by the fight at Loigny. +The French General could not but dread being driven +on the Loire with undisciplined masses, and the consequent +block of the only passage of the river at Orleans. +He decided therefore on an eccentric retreat. Only the +XVth Corps was to retire by Orleans; General Crouzat +was to cross the Loire at Gien, General Chanzy at +Beaugency. The reassemblage remained to be attempted +behind the Sauldre. The necessary dispositions +were made during the night, and communicated to the +Government. From the Board of Green Cloth at +Tours, counter orders of course came next morning to +maintain the Orleans position, which practically was +already wrecked; but the General adhered firmly to his +own determination.</p> + +<p>On December 4th the IIIrd Army Corps marched +out of Loury in two columns by the high road and the +tracks through Vennecy. Both bodies reached Boigny +by noon, having met only stragglers. A detachment +was sent to the right to Neuville, which made prize +of seven derelict guns and many rifles. To the left, +another detachment occupied Chézy on the Loire. +After a short rest the main columns advanced, and by +two o'clock the 6th Division reached Vaumainbert, +which was occupied by detachments of the French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[229]</a></span> +XVth Corps. Although the country was not open +enough to allow of the employment of artillery, the +place was taken by the Brandenburgers in spite of the +stout resistance of the French Marine Infantry, and the +fire of the batteries on the heights to the north of St. +Loup could now be directed on the suburb of Orleans.</p> + +<p>The 5th Division had meanwhile come up behind the +6th and took part in the fight.</p> + +<p>The XXth French Corps, which was still at Chambon, +in the eastern part of the forest opposite Beaune la +Rolande, had received orders at four in the morning +from Tours direct, to march on Orleans. Contrary +orders had previously arrived from General d'Aurelle, +but nothing subsequently came to hand. General +Crouzat had, as a precaution, sent his train across the +Loire by way of Jargeau, and then marched in the prescribed +direction. When, at half-past two he met at +Pont aux Moines the German detachment despatched to +Chézy, he determined to cut his way through by force +of arms; but as General von Stülpnagel reinforced his +two battalions with the rest of his Division, the French +general gave up that attempt and retreated across the +river, making the passage at Jargeau.</p> + +<p>On the German side the attack on St. Loup<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> was +unsuccessful; and since from the locality of the fighting +on the part of the other Corps no tidings reached him, +and darkness was approaching, General von Alvensleben +postponed any further attack on the city till the +following day.</p> + +<p>North of Orleans the IXth Army Corps advanced +from La Croix Briquet on the intrenched position of +Cercottes. At about one o'clock the foremost detachments +of infantry entered the place. The 2nd Division +of the French XVth Corps was driven back by the fire +of the artillery into the vineyards in front of the city. +Here the infantry alone could continue the struggle.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[230]</a></span> +The French defended every tenable spot, and especially +in the railway station close to Orleans held their own +with great persistency. It and the adjacent deep road-cutting +were fortified with barricades and rifle-pits, +and armed with naval guns. It was not till nightfall, +about half-past five, that these posts were abandoned, +but the contest was continued further back. To avoid +street-fighting in the dark, General von Manstein +broke off the fight for the day at about seven o'clock.</p> + +<p>The advanced guard of the 17th Division of the Grand +Duke's Detachment had found Gidy intrenched and +strongly occupied. But at the approach of the IXth +Corps the French about eleven o'clock thought proper +to abandon the position, leaving behind eight guns. +The German Division, to avoid the wood, now moved +in a westerly direction on Boulay, whither the 22nd +and the 2nd Cavalry Division followed as a reserve.</p> + +<p>Here the Bavarian Corps and the 4th Cavalry +Division were already engaged in a fight, having previously +driven the French out of Bricy and Janvry. +When the artillery had for some time been in action, +General von der Tann passed to the assault at about +twelve o'clock. But the French did not wait for this; +they beat a hasty retreat, leaving some of their guns in +the defences.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cavalry Division took up the pursuit. The +4th Hussars of the 5th Brigade, trotting forward through +Montaigu, charged a dismounted French battery and +seized all its guns; another near Ormes was left to be +carried off by the horse battery. From thence a strong +body of French horse suddenly appeared on the left +flank of the 4th Brigade as it was crossing the Châteaudun +road. But the Blücher Hussars, promptly +wheeling into line, drove the enemy back through the +village on Ingré.</p> + +<p>The 4th Cavalry Division was placed on observation +on the right flank of the Detachment; and the Hussars +of the 2nd Life Regiment here rode down 250 men<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[231]</a></span> +forming the escort of a waggon column escaping by the +road to Châteaudun, and captured the convoy.</p> + +<p>While the Germans were thus converging on Orleans +from the east and north, in the west the XVIIth French +Corps and the 1st Division of the XVIth were still in the +field about Patay and St. Péravy. General Chanzy had +assembled the latter about Coinces, and, to protect himself +against its threatened attack on his flank, General +von der Tann formed front at Bricy with his 3rd Infantry +Brigade, the Cuirassiers, and the artillery reserve. +The 4th Cavalry Division marched on Coinces, where +General von Bernhardi, clearing a wide ditch with four +squadrons of Uhlans, drove a body of French horse +back on St. Péravy without its having been able to do +more than fire one carbine-volley. Other squadrons +of the 9th Brigade rode down the French tirailleurs, +and pursued the cavalry till it reached the protection +of strong bodies of infantry. The 8th Brigade was in +observation toward Patay, and after that place had +come under the fire of a battery and been abandoned, +General Chanzy gave up all further attack and retired +behind the forest of Montpipeau.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cavalry Division now made for the Loire +immediately below Orleans. Its artillery destroyed a +bridge at Chapelle over which a baggage-train was +passing, and compelled the French troops, which were +marching towards Cléry along the further bank, to flee +back to Orleans. Two military railway-trains from +thence were not to be stopped by the firing, but a train +coming from Tours, in which, as it happened, was +Gambetta himself, returned thither with all speed.</p> + +<p>The Bavarian Corps meanwhile was advancing by the +high road, and the 22nd Division, in touch with the IXth +Corps, on the old Châteaudun road; the 17th Division +between the two on La Borde. This last Division +at about 3.30 had to carry on its way the strongly +defended village of Heurdy; and when the Bavarians +from Ormes turned to the right on Ingré, it proceeded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[232]</a></span> +by the high road towards St. Jean de la Ruelle. +Having overcome all opposition there too, the head of +the Division reached the gates of Orleans at about six +o'clock.</p> + +<p>General von Tresckow entered into negotiations with +the military authorities there for the orderly occupation +of the town. An agreement was arrived at by ten +o'clock, and shortly after midnight the Grand Duke +marched in with the 17th Division, promptly followed +by the 2nd Bavarian Brigade. The bridge over the +Loire, which the French had not found time to blow +up, was secured with all speed. The rest of the troops +found quarters for the night, to the west and north of +the city.</p> + +<p>The peremptory orders from the Government to hold +Orleans had shaken General d'Aurelle's original determination. +When the mass of the XVth Corps arrived +there in the forenoon, he was anxious to make a final +stand. But the necessary orders could not be transmitted +to the Corps of the right wing, nor carried out +by those of the left; and by five o'clock the General in +command was convinced of the futility of any further +resistance. The artillery of the XVth Corps was in the +first instance forwarded to La Ferté St. Aubin; the +infantry followed. The XXth Corps, as we have seen, +was at Jargeau; the XVIIIth recrossed the Loire at +Sully; the XVIth and XVIIth moved off westward +in the direction of Beaugency, but remained on the +right bank of the river.</p> + +<p>The two days' battle had cost the Germans 1700 +men; the French lost 20,000, of whom 1800 were taken +prisoners. Their large army lately massed before +Orleans, was now split up into three separate bodies.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[233]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Commanding Artillery of IXth Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> The northern suburb of Orleans.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Offensive Operations South, East, and West.</span></h2> + + +<p>The troops were too much exhausted for immediate +pursuit in any of these three directions.</p> + +<p>It was ordered that only the 6th Cavalry Division, +reinforced by an infantry detachment of the 18th Division, +should follow up the enemy making to the southward, +ascertain his whereabouts, and destroy the concentration +of the railways from Bourges, Orleans and Tours +at the Vierzon junction. This Cavalry was in quarters +to the north of the city; the French XVth Corps had a +considerable start of it, and the main body of the latter +had reached Salbris, when, on December 6th, two days +after the battle, General von Schmidt (commanding +14th Brigade, 6th Cavalry Division) arrived by a forced +march at La Ferté St. Aubin. Here he found a detachment +of the 18th Division, which had already driven +the French rear-guard back on La Motte Beuvron, but +was now recalled to the Loiret. Only two companies +of the 36th Regiment and one of pioneers joined the +further advance, and followed the cavalry partly in +waggons and partly on gun-limbers.</p> + +<p>On the 7th, under direct orders from Tours, the +French Corps left the high road to the south, and made +a flank march of twenty miles in an easterly direction +to Aubigny Ville. The cavalry, supported to the best +of their power by its artillery and the small infantry +detachment, had a sharp fight with the French rear-guard +at Nouan le Fuzelier, and again in the evening +at Salbris, in which the French finally had the best of +it. The neighbourhood being very thinly populated, +the Division had to return in the night to Nouan, to +find shelter from the bitter winter weather.</p> + +<p>Long before daybreak on the 8th, the French rear-guard +evacuated Salbris to avoid a further encounter +with the enemy, whose strength was greatly overestimated. +After some slight skirmishes the Cavalry +Division reached Vierzon that evening. The telegraph<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[234]</a></span> +wires were cut and the railway line torn up in +several places, 70 goods vans were made prize of, +the direction of the enemy's retreat was ascertained, +and any offensive movement on the part of the +French from that side for the time was reckoned very +improbable.</p> + +<p>The Division had fulfilled its task; it was now +ordered to leave one brigade in observation, and to +advance in the direction of Blois with the rest. General +(Count) von der Groeben (commanding 14th Cavalry +Brigade) maintained his positions at Vierzon and Salbris +till the 14th.</p> + +<p>The winter marches of the 6th Cavalry Division were +exceptionally arduous. It was almost impossible to +travel excepting by the high roads, and they were so +slippery with ice that it was often necessary to dismount +and lead the horses. The inhabitants of the Sologne +were extremely hostile, and troopers patrolling in +advance were fired upon in every village. The French +forces, on the other hand, made but a feeble resistance. +Numerous prisoners and large quantities of abandoned +war matériel bore witness to a hasty retreat, in many +cases indicated panic-flight. Nevertheless, in spite of +much desultory marching and counter-marching, the +Corps on December 13th finally succeeded in joining the +right wing of the Army of Orleans at Bourges. The +plight in which it arrived there may be gathered from +the telegraphic <i>Correspondance Urgente</i> of the Tours +Government with General Bourbaki, who, when General +d'Aurelle was dismissed from the command in chief, had +assumed command of the three Corps.</p> + +<p>The delegate Freycinet, who was no doubt kept well +informed by the country people, assured General +Bourbaki that he had only a weak force of cavalry in +his front, and called upon him repeatedly, and in the +most urgent terms, to advance against Blois. The +General retorted that if he were to undertake that +operation, not a gun, not a man of his three Corps would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[235]</a></span> +ever be seen again. His intention was to retreat +without delay from Bourges on St. Amand, and if +necessary yet further; all he dreaded was lest he should +be attacked before he could accomplish this, and so +be involved in overwhelming disaster.</p> + +<p>The Minister of War himself went to Bourges, but +he too renounced all idea of a serious offensive movement +when he saw the disorder of the troops; "I have +never seen anything so wretched." It was with difficulty +that he carried his point that the Corps should not +retreat, but should await events under cover of one of +them pushed forward towards Vierzon.</p> + +<p>On the day when General von Schmidt entered +Vierzon, the XVth Corps was in the vicinity of Henrichemont, +at about an equal distance with himself +from Bourges. The XVIIIth and XXth Corps were +at Aubigny Ville and Cernay, from two to three +marches away. It can scarcely be doubted that if the +18th Division had followed the advance of the 6th +Cavalry Division, possession would have been obtained +of Bourges and of the vast military establishments +there.</p> + +<p>To the east of Orleans the IIIrd German Corps +marched up the river through Châteauneuf. It met +only stragglers, till on the 7th two Divisions of the +XVIIIth French Corps attempted to cross to the right +bank of the Loire at Gien. There came about an +advanced-guard fight at Nevoy, with the result that +these Divisions retreated across the bridge in the night, +and continued their march on Bourges.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Fighting of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(December 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.)</div> + + +<p>The Grand Duke's Detachment stood westward, close +to the retreating left wing of the enemy. In contrast<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[236]</a></span> +to the disorder of the right wing, General Chanzy, probably +the most capable of all the leaders whom the +Germans had to encounter in the battle-field, had very +rapidly in so great measure restored the discipline and +spirit of his defeated troops, that they were able not +only to make a stand, but even to take the offensive. +They had, it is true, been considerably reinforced by +the newly formed XXIst Corps and by Camô's Division. +The latter formed the advanced guard at Meung; behind +it were the XVIth Corps at Beaugency, the +XVIIth at Cravant, and the XXIst at St. Laurent on +the edge of the forest of Marchénoir.</p> + +<p>On the day after the fight the troops of the Grand +Duke were given a rest-day; only the cavalry pursued +the French. The 4th Cavalry Division reached +Ouzouer; the 2nd came upon considerable masses of +infantry behind Meung.</p> + +<p>On the 7th, the Grand Duke's forces advanced on a +very wide front. The 17th Division, on the left wing, +marched on Meung, where its artillery opened a combat +with that of the enemy. The French held possession of +the narrow lanes of the village, which further westward +was pierced by the main road to Beaugency. Towards +four o'clock a Mecklenburg battalion carried Langlochère +by storm, but found itself threatened on both +sides by the approach of hostile columns. On the left +Foinard was presently occupied, and a gun captured +there, while on the right the 1st Bavarian Brigade +advanced on La Bourie. Here, almost at the same +moment, the 2nd Cavalry Division came up by by-roads +from Renardière, having driven the enemy out of Le +Bardon by the fire of its guns. The Bavarians had now +to march out to meet a hostile mass advancing from +Grand Chatre. Supported by the horse batteries, they +maintained till nightfall a stubborn fight, which ended +in the retreat of the French on Beaumont.</p> + +<p>During this conflict on the left wing of the Detachment, +the 1st Bavarian Division, considerably on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[237]</a></span> +right, were marching on Baccon, the 22nd on Ouzouer; +and finding that the French were offering a determined +resistance, the Grand Duke decided on closing in his +forces to the left.</p> + +<p><i>December 8th.</i>—To this end the 22nd Division moved +southward from Ouzouer through Villermain. After +repulsing the swarms of tirailleurs which attacked its +left flank under cover of a thick fog, General von +Wittich directed his march on Cravant, to effect a +junction with the right wing of the 1st Bavarian Division +already engaged in a hot struggle. They had repulsed +an attack of the enemy pushed forward from +Villechaumont, and the 2nd (Bavarian) Division advanced +by the road from Cravant to Beaugency; but +when three French Divisions came on afresh, it retreated +on Beaumont. Here it found support from the 1st +(Bavarian Division) and 17 batteries were gradually +brought up into the fighting line. Their fire and an +impetuous attack from three Bavarian brigades at last +forced the enemy to fall back, and the position on the +high road was recovered.</p> + +<p>The French now, on their side, brought up a strong +force of artillery, and prepared to advance on Cravant +with their XVIIth Corps. But the 22nd German Division +having taken Beauvert and Layes by the way, had +already reached Cravant at about one o'clock, and was +in position there with the 4th Cavalry Division on +its right and the 2nd on its left. So when, at about +three o'clock, dense French columns advanced on +Cravant, they were repulsed by a powerful counter-stroke +delivered by the 44th Brigade, in conjunction +with the Bavarians, and were soon driven out +of Layes, which they had entered while advancing. +The five batteries nearest to Cravant had suffered +so severely meanwhile that they had to be withdrawn. +When finally at about four o'clock the Bavarian +battalions advanced to storm the height in their front, +they were met by fresh troops of the enemy, and after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[238]</a></span> +losing a great part of their officers were compelled +to retreat on the artillery position at Beaumont. +Later, however, the French abandoned Villechaumont.</p> + +<p>On the left wing of the Detachment the 17th Division +pursued the retreating French through Vallées and +Villeneuve, and then at about noon made an attack +on Messas. The defence was obstinate, and it was +not till dusk that it succeeded in gaining full possession +of the place. The artillery directed its fire on dense +masses showing about Vernon, the infantry stormed the +height of Beaugency, and finally forced its way into +the town itself, where a French battery fell into its +hand. Camô's Division then retired on Tavers, and at +midnight General von Tresckow fell upon Vernon, +whence the French, taken entirely by surprise, fled to +Bonvalet.</p> + +<p>The Headquarter of the IInd Army had determined +to set in march on Bourges the IIIrd, Xth, and IXth +Corps, from Gien, from Orleans, and also from Blois. +But the Detachment in its advance on Blois by +the right bank of the Loire had met with unexpected +resistance lasting for two days. In the supreme +Headquarter at Versailles it was regarded as indispensable +that the Grand Duke should immediately be +reinforced by at least one Division. Telegraphic orders +to that effect arrived at ten o'clock on December 9th. +The IXth Corps, which was already on the march along +the left bank and had found no enemy in its front, +could not give the requisite support, since all the +bridges over the river had been blown up. The IIIrd +Corps was therefore ordered to leave only a detachment +in observation at Gien, and to turn back to +Orleans. The Xth Corps was to call in its detachments +standing eastward of the city and march forward +to Meung. Meanwhile on the 9th the Detachment +remained still quite unsupported while actually confronting +with four Infantry Divisions, eleven French<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[239]</a></span> +Divisions. And early on that morning General Chanzy +took the offensive.</p> + +<p><i>December 9th.</i>—The two Prussian Divisions at Beauvert +and Messas stood firmly awaiting the hostile onslaught. +The two Bavarian Divisions, because of their +severe losses, were held in reserve at Cravant, but soon +had to come up into the fighting line, when at seven +o'clock strong columns of the enemy advanced on Le +Mée.</p> + +<p>Dense swarms of tirailleurs were repulsed both there +and before Vernon, and were later shattered by the fire +of the devoted German artillery, which silenced the +French guns and then directed its fire on Villorceau. +In spite of a stout defence, this village was +carried and occupied about half-past ten by the Bavarian +infantry. The French advance on Villechaumont +in greatly superior force was also repulsed, with the +assistance of three battalions and two batteries of the +22nd Division. The Thüringers<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> then stormed Cernay, +where 200 French laid down their arms, and one of +their batteries lost its teams and limbers.</p> + +<p>On the right wing of the Detachment, in consequence +of a misunderstanding, the Germans evacuated +Layes and Beauvert, and the French occupied these +villages. However, with the assistance of the 2nd +Bavarian Brigade, the 44th (Brigade) drove them out +again from both places. Further to the north, the +4th Cavalry Division was in observation of a French +detachment approaching Villermain.</p> + +<p>The French made renewed efforts, advancing again +at mid-day on Cravant in strong columns; but this +movement General Tresckow took in flank from Messas.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[240]</a></span> +He left only a weak detachment in Beaugency, and +secured himself towards Tavers in the villages on his +left. The main body of the 17th Division advanced +on Bonvalet, reinforced the hardly-pressed Bavarians +in Villorceau, and occupied itself Villemarceau in front +of that place. Here the Division had to maintain a +severe struggle, at about three o'clock, with close +columns of the French XVIth and XVIIth Corps. +The infantry rushing on the enemy with cheers succeeded, +however, in repulsing him and holding its +ground in spite of a hot fire. At the same time three +Bavarian battalions, accompanied by cavalry and artillery, +marched up from Cravant and drove the French +out of Villejouan. Yet further to the right a battalion +of the 32nd Regiment took possession of Ourcelle. A +line from thence to Tavers defined the section of terrain +laboriously wrung from the enemy.</p> + +<p>The fight ended with the retreat of the enemy on +Josnes and Dugny.</p> + +<p>On this day the IIIrd Corps was still on the march to +Orleans. The IXth from its position on the left bank, +could only take part in the fighting by the fire of its +artillery on Meung and Beaugency. It was not till +near Blois that it met French detachments. Fifty +men of one of the Hessian battalions carried the defended +château of Chambord lying rightward of the +line of march, and there took 200 prisoners and made +prize of twelve ammunition waggons with their +teams.</p> + +<p>Of the Xth Corps only the head of its infantry reached +Meung, but it sent forward a regiment of Hussars +with eight batteries, which arrived at Grand Chatre +by about three o'clock in the afternoon.</p> + +<p>By order of the Headquarter of the IInd Army the +Bavarian Corps was now to retire to Orleans, to recruit +after its heavy losses. But even after the arrival +of the Xth Corps the Grand Duke had still in his +front an enemy double his strength, and instead of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[241]</a></span> +engaging in a pursuit he had rather to study how to +maintain himself on the defensive.</p> + +<p><i>December 10th.</i>—At dawn General Chanzy renewed +his attack, which even the Bavarians were presently +required to join in repulsing.</p> + +<p>At seven o'clock the French XVIIth Corps rushed +in dense masses on Origny, took there 150 prisoners, +and forced its way into Villejouan. This advance was +met directly in front by the 43rd Brigade at Cernay, +and by the 4th Bavarian Brigade with six batteries +at Villechaumont; while on the right flank General von +Tresckow pushed forward on Villorceau and Villemarceau. +In this latter village two of his battalions, supported +by four batteries, resisted every onslaught of the +French from Origny and Toupenay. At noon the main +body of the 17th Division advanced to the recapture of +Villejouan. Here the French made an obstinate stand. +An embittered and bloody fight in the streets and +houses was prolonged till four o'clock, and then fresh +troops of the enemy came up to recover the post +the Germans still held in one detached farmstead. +The artillery mass of the Prussian Division had, however, +deployed to the south of Villemarceau; it was +joined by two horse batteries of the Xth Corps, and the +batteries of the 22nd Division also came into action from +Cernay. The concentric fire of this body of artillery +wrecked the subsequent attacks of the XVIIth French +Corps.</p> + +<p>Beaugency was now occupied by part of the Xth +Corps. During the previous days the left flank of the +German fighting position had a secure point d'appui +on the Loire, but on the right such a support had been +wholly lacking. The French had nevertheless hitherto +made no attempt to take advantage of their superiority +by a wider extension of their front. For the first +time on this day did they come in on the unprotected +left flank of their enemy. The greater part of the +XXIst Corps deployed opposite to it, between Poisly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[242]</a></span> +and Mézierès, and at half-past ten strong columns advanced +on Villermain. The Bavarians were compelled +to take up with their 2nd Brigade the "hook" formation +from Jouy to Coudray. Seven batteries were +brought up into that line, and on its right flank the 4th +Cavalry Division stood in readiness to act. By two +o'clock two more horse batteries, and from Cravant +four batteries of the Xth Corps arrived, which massed +there with three brigades as a reserve. The fire of over +a hundred German guns compelled the French to hurry +their artillery out of action at three o'clock, and weak +independent attacks by their infantry were repulsed +without difficulty by the Germans persevering staunchly +on the defence.</p> + +<p>The French losses in this four days' battle are +unknown. The Detachment lost 3400 men, of +whom the larger half belonged to the two Bavarian +Divisions.</p> + +<p>The Grand Duke had succeeded in holding his own +against three Corps of the enemy till the arrival of the +first reinforcement, and this he owed to the bravery of +all his troops, and not least to the exertions of the artillery. +This arm alone lost 255 men and 356 horses. +Its material was tasked to the utmost, so that finally +almost all the steel guns of the light batteries of the +22nd Division, and most of the Bavarian, were rendered +useless by the burning out of their vent-pieces.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Corps had on this day just arrived at St. +Denis, and the IXth at Vienne opposite Blois; but +here, too, the bridge over the Loire was found to be +blown up.</p> + +<p>On the French side, General Chanzy had learnt from +the telegraphic correspondence of the Government at +Tours with General Bourbaki, that nothing had come +of that commander's attempt to divert part of the German +IInd Army upon himself. The long delay gave +General Chanzy the daily apprehension of an attack +by it with its full strength; and he therefore decided<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[243]</a></span> +on a retreat, which resulted in the removal of the +Assembly from Tours to Bordeaux.</p> + +<p>In the Grand Duke's Head-quarter the renewed +offensive had been decided on for December 11th. The +villages in his front remained strongly occupied, and +it was only at noon of that day that the enemy's +retreat became known. He was at once pursued on +the left by the Xth Corps, and on the right, south of +the forest of Marchénoir, by the Detachment. On the +north, the 4th Cavalry Division took up the scouting.</p> + +<p>A thaw had followed the hard frost, making the +march equally difficult for friend and foe. The Germans +found the roads littered with abandoned waggons +and cast-away arms; the bodies of men and horses lay +unburied in the fields, and in the villages were hundreds +of wounded uncared for. Several thousands of +stragglers were captured.</p> + +<p>The directions<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> of the Chief of the General Staff from +Versailles suggested an immediate pursuit, which should +render the enemy incapable of further action for some +time to come; but not to be maintained beyond Tours. +The IInd Army was then to assemble at Orleans and +the Detachment at Chartres, and the troops were to +obtain the rest they needed. From the former point +constant and strict watch could be kept on General +Bourbaki's army, and to this end a connection was to +be made with General von Zastrow, who with the +VIIth Corps was to reach Châtillon sur Seine on the +13th. But the operations in this quarter were not to +extend beyond Bourges and Nevers.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[244]</a></span></p> +<p>The IInd Army was accordingly in the first instance +marched toward the Loir, and on the 13th reached +the line Oucques—Conan—Blois, which last town was +found evacuated.</p> + +<p>On the 14th the 17th Division marched to Morée, and +reached the Loir at Fréteval. A fight occurred at both +these points. Though the French had yielded thus far, +they seemed resolved to make a firm stand on the +Loir, and had occupied Cloyes and Vendôme in great +strength.</p> + +<p>In order to attack with success, Prince Frederick +Charles first proceeded to concentrate all his forces. +The IIIrd Corps, which was hurrying after the army +by forced marches, was in the first instance to come +up into the interval between the Detachment and +the Xth Corps, which was to march from Blois and +Herbault on Vendôme.</p> + +<p>But when, on the 15th, the Xth Corps was moving +in the prescribed direction, its main body encountered +so determined a resistance close in front of Vendôme +that it could not be overcome before dark. The troops +therefore retired to quarters in the rear of Ste. Anne. +A left-flank detachment had found St. Amand occupied +by heavy masses, and halted at Gombergean. The IIIrd +Corps had advanced in the course of the day on Coulommiers, +in the vicinity of Vendôme, had fought the French +at Bel Essert, driven them back across the Loir and +established connection with the Xth. The Grand Duke, +in compliance with instructions, stood meanwhile on +the defensive. The IXth Corps, after the restoration +of the bridge of Blois, was at last able to follow the +army, leaving a brigade in occupation of Blois.</p> + +<p>A greatly superior force was now assembled opposite +the enemy's position, and a general attack was decided +on; but to give the wearied troops some rest it was +postponed till the 17th, and meanwhile, on the 16th, +General Chanzy withdrew.</p> + +<p>It had certainly been his intention to make a longer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[245]</a></span> +stand in the Loir angle; but his Generals convinced him +that the condition of the troops did not permit the prolongation +of active hostilities. He accordingly gave +the order for the retreat of the army at daybreak by +way of Montoire, St. Calais, and Vibraye to Le Mans.</p> + +<p>Thus in the early morning (of the 17th) the Xth +Corps found the French position in front of Vendôme +abandoned, and it entered the city without opposition. +On the French left wing only, where the marching +orders had not yet arrived, General Jaurès made an +attack on Fréteval, but in the evening he followed the +other Corps.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> In the 22nd Division of the XIth Corps—a Corps of a curiously +composite character, there were three Thüringian regiments. The +43rd Brigade was wholly Thüringian, consisting as it did of the +32nd and 95th regiments (2nd and 6th Thüringers), and in the +44th Brigade was the 94th (5th Thüringers). It was the 2nd +battalion of this last regiment which is referred to in the text.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> The expression "Directiven" in the text cannot be succinctly +translated. It was rarely, except when actually himself in the +field, that the Chief of the General Staff issued actual "orders" to the +higher commanders. His communications for the most part consisted +of "Directiven"—messages of general suggestions as to the appropriate +line of action to be pursued, leaving a wide discretion to the +commanders to whom they were addressed, and refraining almost entirely +from details. A collection of Moltke's "Directiven" would be +perhaps the finest tribute to his military genius.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Interruption of Important Offensive Operations +in December.</span></h2> + + +<p>On the 17th of December general directions were +issued from Versailles to the Armies both to the north +and south of Paris.</p> + +<p>Now that General von Manteuffel was across the +Somme, and Prince Frederick Charles had advanced to +the Loir, the Germans held possession of almost a third +of France. The enemy was everywhere driven back; +and that the German forces should not be split up, it +was thought advisable that they should be concentrated +into three principal groups. The Ist Army was therefore +to assemble at Beauvais, the Detachment at +Chartres, the IInd Army near Orleans, where the troops +were to have the needful rest, and their full efficiency +was to be re-established by the arrival of reservists and +equipment. If the French should engage in any new +enterprises, they were to be allowed to approach within +striking distance, and then were to be driven back by a +vigorous offensive.</p> + +<p>For the IInd Army there was but little prospect at +present of overtaking the enemy beyond the Loir; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[246]</a></span> +the reports from the Upper Loire now necessitated the +bestowal of increased attention in that direction. News +came from Gien that the posts left there had been +driven back to Ouzouer sur Loire; and it seemed +not unlikely that General Bourbaki would take the +opportunity of advancing by Montargis towards Paris, +or at least towards Orleans, which for the moment was +occupied only by part of the Ist Bavarian Corps.</p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles had got quit of his enemy +probably for some considerable time, and he decided, in +accordance with directions from Versailles, to assemble +his forces at Orleans and maintain a waiting attitude. +Only the Xth Corps was to remain behind in observation +on the Loir. To secure immediate support for the +Bavarian Corps in any event, the IXth Corps, on its +arrival from Blois at La Chapelle Vendômoise on the +16th December, was ordered to march to Beaugency +that same day, and to Orleans on the morrow. It +covered nearly 52 miles in twenty-four hours, notwithstanding +the badness of the weather. The IIIrd Corps +followed it.</p> + +<p>However, it was soon known that the enemy's +detachment which had been seen at Gien did not form +part of a large body of troops, and was intrenching +itself at Briare for its own safety. So the Germans +retired into comfortable rest-quarters, the Ist Bavarian +Corps at Orleans, the IIIrd there and along to Beaugency, +the IXth in the plain of the Loire up as far as +Châteauneuf, with a strong post at Montargis.</p> + +<p>The Bavarian Corps was later transferred to Etampes, +to recover at its leisure, to recruit its numbers, and refit +as to its clothing and equipment. Nor was the Grand +Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment in a condition to +follow General Chanzy beyond the Loir. Six weeks of +daily marching and fighting had tried the troops to the +utmost. The dreadful weather and the state of the +roads had reduced their clothing and foot-gear to a +miserable state. A reconnoissance beyond the Loir<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[247]</a></span> +showed that the French could be overtaken by only +long and rapid marches. So the Grand Duke allowed +his troops a long rest, from the 18th, in the villages on +the left bank of the river.</p> + +<p>Of the IIIrd Army, General von Rheinbaben, on the +other hand, occupied with the three Brigades of the +5th Cavalry Division Courtlain, Brou, and Chartres, +strengthened by five battalions of Guard Landwehr and +four batteries. A letter from the Chief of the General +Staff at Versailles had pointed out that this cavalry +might probably be employed with great success in +attacking the flank and rear of the enemy's retreating +columns, and the Crown Prince had already given +orders that it should push forward by way of Brou in +full strength on the 15th. Contrary to these orders, +the Division obeyed a subsequent order which reached +it on the 16th from the Grand Duke, under whose command +the Division had not been placed, to take up a +position on the Yères.</p> + +<p>On this day patrols had found the roads open to +Montmirail and Mondoubleau, except for French +infantry in front of Cloyes, which retired after a short +fray. On the left, a connection was opened with the +4th Cavalry Division. On the 17th, the 12th Cavalry +Brigade entered Cloyes, already evacuated by the +French; on the 13th it advanced on Arrou, and only +General von Barby (commanding the 11th Cavalry +Brigade) marched on Droue with a force of all arms, +where he surprised the French at their cooking, and +carried off much booty.</p> + +<p>On the 18th, the 12th Brigade did make prisoners of a +few stragglers there, but the other two brigades only +made a short march to the westward to La Bazoche Gouet +and Arville, whence the enemy had quite disappeared. +To the south of Arville a battalion of the Guard Landwehr +drove the French infantry out of St. Agil.</p> + +<p>With this the pursuit ended on the 19th. The Division +retired on Nogent le Rotrou by the Grand Duke's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[248]</a></span> +desire, and subsequently undertook the observation of +the left bank of the Seine at Vernon and Dreux.</p> + +<p>The Grand Duke's Detachment left its quarters on +the Loir on the 21st. The 22nd Division occupied +Nogent le Roi, and the 17th Chartres, till the 24th. +The 4th Bavarian Brigade rejoined its own Corps at +Orleans.</p> + +<p>During the remainder of December only the Xth +Corps had any fighting, it having been detailed to keep +watch beyond the Loir from Blois and Vendôme.</p> + +<p>Two brigades were set on march towards Tours on +the 20th. On the further side of Monnaie they met the +newly-formed troops of General Ferri-Pisani, 10,000 to +15,000 strong, which were advancing from Angers and +had passed through Tours.</p> + +<p>The soaked ground made the deployment of the +artillery and cavalry exceedingly difficult. The +cavalry, indeed, could only pursue the retreating +French in deep columns along the high roads, thus +suffering severely from the enemy's fire delivered at +very short range.</p> + +<p>On the following day General von Woyna (commanding +39th Infantry Brigade) advanced unopposed with +six battalions on the bridge at Tours. A light battery +was brought up on the bank of the river and dispersed +the rabble firing from the opposite shore, but it would +have cost too many lives to storm the city, which, since +the removal of the seat of Government, had ceased to +be of any great importance. The detachment was +withdrawn to Monnaie, and the Xth Corps went into +quarters, the 19th Division at Blois, the 20th at +Herbault and Vendôme.</p> + +<p>From the latter place on the 27th, a detachment of +two battalions, one squadron, and two guns marched +through Montoire on Sougé on the Braye, and there +met a greatly superior force. General Chanzy had in +fact marched a Division of his XVIIth Corps towards +Vendôme in order to draw the Prussians away from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[249]</a></span> +Tours. Behind St. Quentin the weak Prussian detachment +found itself hemmed in between the river and the +cliff, enclosed on every side, and under heavy fire. +Lieutenant-Colonel von Boltenstern succeeded, however, +in cutting his way through. Without firing a +shot the two Hanoverian battalions hurled themselves +on the dense body of tirailleurs blocking their retreat, +and fought their way out fighting hand to hand. +Through the gap thus made the guns dashed after +firing one round of grape-shot, and notwithstanding +losses to the teams they ultimately got back safely to +Montoire. The squadron also charged through two lines +of riflemen and rejoined the infantry.</p> + +<p>As a result of this incident General von Kraatz +Koschlau (commanding 20th Division) brought up +the remainder of his Division from Herbault, determined +to clear up the situation by a fresh reconnoissance. +Four battalions were to advance from +Vendôme, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade from Fréteval +was to scout towards Epuisay. On this same day, however, +General de Jouffroy was marching with two +Divisions to the attack of Vendôme.</p> + +<p>When, at about ten o'clock, the reconnoitring force +from Vendôme reached the Azay, it came under a hot +fire from the further slope of the valley. Soon after +six hostile battalions attacked its flank from the south, +and repeated notice was brought in that considerable +forces of the enemy were marching on Vendôme direct, +from north of Azay by Espéreuse. General von Kraatz +perceived that he would have to face a planned attack +made by very superior numbers, and determined to +restrict himself to the local defence of Vendôme. Under +cover of a battalion firmly maintaining its position at +Huchepie, he accomplished in perfect order the retreat +of the detachment, which then took up a position on the +railway embankment to the west of the city.</p> + +<p>Further to the north the hostile columns, advancing +over Espéreuse, had already reached Bel Air. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[250]</a></span> +battalion hastening up from Vendôme re-occupied the +château, but being outflanked on the right by a superior +force withdrew, and likewise took up a position behind +the railway. At about two o'clock the French attacked +this position in dense swarms of sharpshooters, but came +under the quick-fire of six batteries in position on the +heights behind Vendôme, which caused their right +wing to give way. A column of the enemy advanced +along the left bank of the Loir from Varennes against +this artillery position, but hastily retreated out of range +of the fire from it.</p> + +<p>The attacks directed against the railway from Bel Air +and Tuileries were more serious; but eight companies +posted there repelled them. At four o'clock the French +once more advanced in strength; fortune wavered for +some time, and at length, as darkness fell, they retired.</p> + +<p>The 1st Cavalry Brigade, accompanied by two companies +and a horse battery, marched on this day on +Danzé. Captain Spitz, with a handful of his Westphalian +Fusiliers fell on two batteries halted there, and +captured two guns and three limbers. With these and +fifty prisoners General von Lüderitz (commanding 1st +Cavalry Brigade) returned to Fréteval by about one +o'clock, after pursuing the enemy as far as Epuisay.</p> + +<p>The attempt of the French on Vendôme had utterly +failed, and they now retreated to a greater distance. +General von Kraatz, however, was ordered, in the prospect +of a greater enterprise to be described later, to +remain meanwhile in waiting on the Loir.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The XIVth Corps in December.</span></h2> + + +<p>In the south-eastern theatre of war the French had +at last decided on some definite action.</p> + +<p>Garibaldi's Corps, assembled at Autun, advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[251]</a></span> +toward Dijon on the 24th (November); its detachments +closed up by Sombernon and St. Seine, with various +skirmishes, and subjected to night surprises. Crémer's +Division advanced as far as Gevrey from the south. +But as soon as reinforcements reached Dijon from Gray +and Is sur Tille, the enemy was driven back, and now +General von Werder on his part ordered the 1st +Brigade of his Corps to march on Autun. General +Keller (commanding 3rd Infantry Brigade, Baden +Division), arrived in front of the town on December 1st, +driving the hostile detachments before him. The preparations +had been made to attack on the following day, +when orders came for a rapid retreat. Fresh troops had +become necessary at Châtillon, to replace the posts which +had been stationed to protect the railway and which +had been surprised at Gray, to cope with sorties by the +garrison of Besançon and also to observe Langres.</p> + +<p>The Prussian Brigade (26th) marched on Langres, along +with two cavalry regiments and three batteries, and on +the 16th it met the French in the vicinity of Longeau, +in number about 2000. They were repulsed, losing +200 wounded, fifty prisoners, two guns, and two ammunition +waggons. General von der Goltz (commanding +the Brigade) in the next few days surrounded +Langres, drove the Gardes-Mobiles posted outside into +the fortress, and occupied a position opposite the +northern front for the protection of the railways.</p> + +<p>In the country south of Dijon fresh assemblages of +French troops had also now been observed. To disperse +these General von Werder advanced on the 18th with +two Baden Brigades on Nuits. In Boncourt, close to the +town on the east, the advanced guard met with lively +opposition, but carried the place by noon. The French, +aided by their batteries posted on the heights west of +Nuits, offered an obstinate defence in the deep railway +cutting and at the Meuzin brook. When the main body +of the Brigade came up at two o'clock, General von +Glümer (commanding Baden Division) ordered a general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[252]</a></span> +attack. With heavy losses, especially in superior officers, +the infantry now rushed across the open plain at the +double against the enemy, who was under cover, and +who, after maintaining a fire at short range, was driven +back on Nuits so late as four o'clock in the course of a +hand-to-hand struggle. At five o'clock he abandoned +the place before the on-coming battalions.</p> + +<p>The Germans had had to do with Crémer's Division, +10,000 strong, which lost 1700 men, among them 650 +unwounded prisoners. The Baden Division had lost +900 men. It encamped for the night on the market-place +of the town and in the villages to the eastward. +Next morning the French were found to have retreated +still further, but the Germans were not strong enough +for pursuit. The XIVth Corps had already been +obliged to spare seven battalions for the investment of +Belfort. General von Werder therefore returned to +Dijon, where he assembled all the forces still left to +him with those of General von der Goltz from Langres, +and waited to see whether the enemy would again +advance against him. But the month of December +ended without any further disturbance.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Ist Army in December.</span></h2> + + +<p>While the IInd Army was fighting on the Loire, +General von Manteuffel, after the victory of Amiens, +marched on Rouen.</p> + +<p>General Farre was indeed at Arras, in the rear of +this movement, but the disorder in which his troops +had retired after the battle made it probable that he +would do nothing, at any rate for the present. The +3rd Brigade, too, was left in Amiens, with two cavalry +regiments and three batteries, to occupy the place and +protect the important line of railway to Laon.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[253]</a></span></p> + +<p>The outlook to the west was more serious than to the +north, for from thence at this juncture hostile forces +threatened to interfere with the investment of Paris. +General Briand was at Rouen with some 20,000 men, +and had advanced his leading troops up to the Epte, +where at Beauvais and Gisors he came in contact with +the Guard Dragoon regiment and the Saxon Cavalry +Division detached from the Army of the Meuse. The +detachment of infantry which accompanied the latter +had lost 150 men and a gun in a night surprise.</p> + +<p>When the Ist Army reached the Epte on December +3rd, both bodies of cavalry joined its further march, +and the French retired behind the Andelles. The +VIIIth Corps reached the vicinity of Rouen after petty +skirmishes by the way, and found an intrenched position +abandoned at Isneauville; and on December 5th +General von Goeben entered the chief city of Normandy. +The 29th Brigade advanced on Pont Audemer, +the Ist Corps crossed the Seine higher up at Les Andelys +and Pont de l'Arche. Vernon and Evreux were occupied, +whence numbers of Gardes-Mobiles had retreated +by railway to Liseux. On the northern bank the Guard +Dragoon Regiment reconnoitred as far as Bolbec, and +the Uhlan Brigade found no enemy in Dieppe.</p> + +<p>The French had retired to Havre, and a considerable +force had been conveyed in ships that were in readiness, +to Honfleur on the other bank of the Seine. The 16th +Division continued its march on Havre, reaching Bolbec +and Lillebonne on the 11th.</p> + +<p>The already-mentioned directions from Versailles had +been communicated in advance by the Chief of the +General Staff, and in accordance with them General +Manteuffel now decided on leaving only the Ist Corps +on the Lower Seine, and returning with the VIIIth to +the Somme, where the French in Arras were now becoming +active.</p> + +<p>Besides making this evident by various small encounters, +on December 9th they had attacked a company<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[254]</a></span> +detailed to protect the reconstruction of the railway at +Ham, surprising it at night, and taking most of the men +prisoners; while on the 11th several French battalions +advanced as far as La Fère.</p> + +<p>To check their further progress, the Army of the +Meuse had meantime sent detachments to Soissons and +Compiègne. General Count von der Groeben<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> (commanding +3rd Cavalry Division) took up a position at +Roye with part of the garrison of Amiens, and on +the 16th met the 15th Division at Montdidier, which +immediately moved up to the Somme.</p> + +<p>Only the citadel of Amiens now remained in German +occupation; but General von Manteuffel, who had not +approved of the evacuation of the city, ordered its immediate +reoccupation. The inhabitants had, however, +remained peaceable, and on the 20th the 16th Division, +which had given up the attack on Havre, arrived by +way of Dieppe.</p> + +<p>A reconnoissance fight near Querrieux made it certain +that great numbers of French were drawn up on +the Hallue, and General von Manteuffel now drew in +the whole (VIIIth) Corps on Amiens. Reinforcements +were shortly to be expected, for the 3rd Reserve Division +was on the march, and had already reached St. Quentin. +The Ist Corps was also ordered to send a brigade from +Rouen to Amiens by railway, and the Commanding +General determined to take the offensive at once with +22,600 men, all his available force at the moment.</p> + +<p>General Faidherbe had assembled two Corps, the +XXIInd and XXIIIrd. His advance on Ham and La +Fère, intended to divert the Prussians from attacking +Havre, had succeeded. He next turned toward Amiens, +advanced to within nine miles of the city, and now +stood, with 43,000 men and eighty-two guns, fronting +to the west behind the Hallue. Two Divisions held +the left bank of this stream for about seven miles, from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[255]</a></span> +its confluence at Daours up to Contay, two standing +further back, at Corbie and Fravillers. The Somme +secured the left flank.</p> + +<p>On December 23rd General von Manteuffel, with the +VIIIth Corps, advanced on the road to Albert. The +3rd Brigade of the Ist Corps formed his reserve. His +design was to keep the French engaged by the 15th +Division on their front and left wing, and with the 16th +Division to outflank their right. The unexpected extension +of the French right wing prevented this, and it +became a frontal battle along the whole line. The +greater height of the eastern bank afforded the French +a commanding artillery position, and the villages lying +at the foot had in every instance to be stormed.</p> + +<p>The French had drawn in their advanced posts to this +line when at eleven o'clock the head of the 15th Division +reached the grove of Querrieux, and brought up a +battery. Two battalions of the 29th Brigade took the +village at mid-day at the first onslaught, crossed the +stream, and drove the French on the further bank out +of Noyelles; but they now found themselves overwhelmed +by an artillery and infantry fire from all sides. +The East Prussians<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> stormed the acclivity at about four +o'clock, and took two guns which were in action, but +were forced to fall back into the village before the +advancing French masses.</p> + +<p>Soon after mid-day Féchencourt was won on the left, +and Bussy on the right; and the enemy after a feeble +resistance was driven back across the stream. On the +other hand, the German Artillery could at first do +nothing against the strong and well-posted batteries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[256]</a></span> +of the enemy. Vecquemont, however, was stormed, +though stoutly defended, and a bitter street-fight lasted +till the afternoon.</p> + +<p>The 15th Division, against the intention of General +Manteuffel, had become involved in fighting before the +16th, engaged further to the left, could afford it any +assistance. Not till four o'clock did the 31st Brigade +arrive in front of Béhencourt, when, crossing the river +by flying bridges, it threw the enemy back into the +village, where he maintained a stout resistance, but had +ultimately to give way. The 32nd Brigade, on the +extreme left, crossed the Hallue and entered Bavelincourt.</p> + +<p>Thus all the hamlets on the river were in German +possession; but the short December day was closing in, +and further progress had to be postponed till the +morrow. Even in the dark the French made several +attempts to recover the positions they had lost, especially +about Contay, where they outflanked the German +position. But their attacks were repulsed both there +and at Noyelles. They succeeded, indeed, in getting +into Vecquemont, but were driven out again, and +were lost to the Prussians now following across the +stream, who even seized Daours, so that ultimately +the Germans held dominion over every passage of +the Hallue.</p> + +<p>The battle was over by six o'clock. The troops +moved into alarm-quarters in the captured villages, +their foreposts standing close in front of the outlets.</p> + +<p>The attack had cost the Germans 900 men; the defence +had cost the French about 1000, besides 1000 +unwounded prisoners who were taken into Amiens.</p> + +<p>At daybreak on the 24th the French opened fire on +General Manteuffel's position in the angle bounded by +the Hallue and the Somme.</p> + +<p>It having been ascertained that the enemy's strength +was almost double that of the Germans, it was decided +this day on the latter side to remain on the defensive,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[257]</a></span> +pending the arrival of reinforcements, and to strengthen +the defence of the positions gained. The Army-Reserve +was pushed forward to Corbie to threaten the left flank +of the French.</p> + +<p>But at two o'clock in the afternoon General Faidherbe +took up his retreat. His insufficiently-equipped +troops had suffered fearfully through the bitter winter +night, and were much shaken by the unfavourable issue +of the fighting of the previous day. He therefore drew +them back within the area of the covering fortresses. +When on the 25th the two Prussian Divisions and the +cavalry pursued beyond Albert, and then close up to +Arras and as far as Cambrai, they found no formed +bodies at all in front of those places, and only captured +some hundreds of stragglers.</p> + +<p>When General Manteuffel had thus disposed of the +enemy, he sent General von Mirus (commanding 6th +Cavalry Brigade) to invest Péronne, while he himself +returned to Rouen.</p> + +<p>Since it had detached to Amiens six battalions as a +reinforcement, the Ist Army Corps (at Rouen) now remained +only two brigades strong. The French had +10,000 men on the right bank, and 12,000 on the left +bank of the lower Seine. And these forces had come +very close to Rouen; particularly on the south side +within nine miles. Meanwhile, however, the Commanding-General +had ordered back the 2nd Brigade +from Amiens, and on its arrival the hostile bodies +were once more driven back.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> Lieut.-General, not to be confounded with Major-General of +same name commanding 14th Cavalry Brigade.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Men of the 2nd battalion 33rd Regiment (East Prussian +Fusiliers), belonging to the VIIIth Corps, whose territory is the +Rhine Provinces. It would be interesting to know how an East +Prussian Regiment came to be incorporated into the Rhineland Corps. +The Ist is the East Prussian Corps, and it was also under General v. +Manteuffel, who had been the Corps Commander until the beginning +of December, when its command passed to General v. Bentheim.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Reduction of Mézières.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(1st January, 1871.)</div> + + +<p>In the northern section of hostilities, before the end +of the year, the siege of Mézières was brought to an +end. After the battle of Sedan the Commandant had +contributed supplies from the magazines of the fortress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[258]</a></span> +for the maintenance of the great mass of prisoners, and +it had remained, therefore, for the time exempt from +attack. Later the place precluded the use of the railroad; +still it was only kept under provisional observation +till the 19th of December, when, after the fall +of Montmédy, the 14th Division moved up before +Mézières.</p> + +<p>The garrison numbered only 2000 men, but it was +effectively assisted by bands of volunteers outside, who +displayed extraordinary activity in this broken and +wooded country. The place was not completely invested +till the 25th.</p> + +<p>Mézières stands on a mountain-spur which is surrounded +on three sides by the Moselle,<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> but it is hemmed +by a ring of heights. The character of the defences, +which had been strengthened by Vauban, with their +numerous salient angles, was not calculated to resist +modern long-range artillery. The place exposed an +isolated rampart of masonry in a circumference of +from 2160 to 3250 yards, and although the long +delay had been utilized in repairing the weak points by +throwing up earthworks, a bombardment could not fail +to be destructive to the defenders.</p> + +<p>When Verdun had surrendered, heavy siege guns +were brought by rail from Clermont to a position close +in front of the southern face of the fortress. The only +hindrance to the erection of the batteries was the state +of the soil, frozen to a depth of twenty inches; and at +a quarter past eight on the morning of the 31st of +December 68 siege guns and 8 field-pieces opened fire. +At first the fortress replied vigorously, but by the afternoon +its artillery was utterly silenced, and the white +flag was hoisted next day. The garrison were taken +prisoners; considerable stores and 132 guns fell into +the hands of the besiegers. But the chief advantage +gained was the opening of a new line of railway to +Paris.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[259]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Slip of pen for "Meuse."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Paris in December.</span></h2> + + +<p>In Paris General Ducrot had been busily employed +in making good the losses sustained in the battle of +Villiers. A part of the greatly reduced Ist Corps had +to be consigned to the reserve; the IInd Army was reorganized. +A projected sortie by way of the peninsula +of Gennevillers and the heights of Franconville +had not been approved by the government. There was +the confident expectation of seeing the Army of Orleans +appear within a short time before the capital, and steps +were being taken to reach it the hand, when on +the 6th December a letter from General von Moltke +announced the defeat of General d'Aurelle and the +occupation of Orleans. A sortie to the south would +thenceforth be aimless, and after long deliberation it +was at length decided to break through the enemy's +lines in a northern direction by a sortie in great +force.</p> + +<p>It was true that the Morée brook afforded the besiegers +some cover on that side, but only so long as the ice +would not bear. And there were but three German +corps of the gross strength of 81,200, extended over a +front of about twenty-seven miles.<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> + +<p>By way of preparation earthworks were begun to be +thrown up on the 13th, between Bondy and Courneuve, +the forts of the north front were furnished with a +heavier artillery equipment, and the plateau of Mont +Avron was occupied by batteries. Ninety rounds of +ammunition were served out to each man, with six +days' rations; and four days' fodder for the horses. +Packs were not to be carried, but rolled tent-pieces +were to be worn as breast-protection. December 19th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[260]</a></span> +was the day first set for the enterprise, but there +was a postponement to the 21st.</p> + +<p>Thus, during the larger half of December the investing +army had remained almost wholly undisturbed +by the defenders. Regular food, warm winter clothing, +and abundant supplies of comforts which the exertions +of the postal service afforded, had maintained the troops +in a thoroughly satisfactory condition.</p> + +<p>The preparations which the garrison was making for +a new effort did not escape the notice of the besieging +forces. Deserters brought in reports of an imminent +sortie. On the 20th information came from the posts +of observation that large masses of troops were assembling +about Merlan and Noisy le Sec; and early on the +21st the 2nd Guard Division, by order of the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army of the Meuse, stood in +readiness at the passages of the Morée. Part of the 1st +Division remained in reserve at Gonesse; the other +portion was to be relieved by the 7th Division, and +made available for action. On the right wing the +Guard Landwehr Division occupied the section from +Chatou to Carrières St. Denis; on the left a brigade +of the Saxon Corps held Sévran. The 4th Infantry +Division of the IInd Corps moved to Malnoue to +support, in case of need, the Würtembergers, to whom +was allotted the task of holding resolutely the advanced +position of Joinville opposite the French.</p> + +<p>To divert the attention of the Germans from the +true point of attack, a brisk fire was to be opened in +early morning from Fort Valérien; strong bodies were +to assail the right wing of the Guard Corps, General +Vinoy was to lead the IIIrd Army against the Saxons, +and Admiral de la Roncière was to fall upon Le +Bourget with his Army Corps. This latter post, projecting +as it did so prominently, it was essential to +seize first of all, and not till then was General Ducrot, +with the IInd Paris Army, to cross the Morée near +Blanc Mesnil and Aulnay.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[261]</a></span></p> + +<p>(<span class="smcap">Combat of le Bourget, 21st December.</span>)—Le +Bourget was held by only four companies of the +Queen Elizabeth Regiment, and one Guard Rifle +battalion. When the mist rose at a quarter to eight, +there was rained on the garrison a heavy fire from the +guns of the forts and many batteries, as well as from +armour-clad railway trucks. Half an hour later closed +hostile columns marched on the place from east and +west. In the former direction its outskirts were successfully +defended for some time against seven French +battalions, and on the opposite side five more were +brought to a halt by the quick fire of the defenders in +front of the cemetery<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a>; but a detachment of marine +fusiliers penetrated unhindered into the village by its +northern entrance. Pressed upon on all sides by overwhelming +numbers, the defenders were compelled to +fall back into the southern part of the village. The +garrison of the cemetery also strove to force its way +thither, but part of it fell into the enemy's hands. +The French advanced only step by step, suffering +heavy loss in bloody street-fighting, but they did not +succeed in obtaining possession of the buildings or glass-factory. +Five fresh battalions of the French reserve +marched up from St. Denis on the gas-works, and +battered down the garden-wall with cannon-fire, but +still could not crush there the steady resistance of the +Germans.</p> + +<p>At nine o'clock the latter were reinforced by one +company, and at ten o'clock by seven more companies, +which in a bloody hand-to-hand struggle, fought their +way to the cemetery and glass-factory. By eleven the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[262]</a></span> +last bodies of assailants were driven out, and Le +Bourget, in expectation of a renewed attack, was occupied +by fifteen companies. Two batteries of field +artillery, which had been in brisk action on the Morée, +were brought up to the village.</p> + +<p>General Ducrot had meanwhile waited in vain for the +signal which was to have announced the capture of Le +Bourget. He had pushed forward the heads of his +columns beyond Bondy and Drancy, when he was +warned by the disastrous issue of the struggle on his +left to abandon his intended attack on the line of the +Morée.</p> + +<p>The anticipated important enterprise lapsed into a +mere cannonade, to which the German field-guns did +their best to reply. In the afternoon the French retired +from the field.</p> + +<p>They had lost, by their own account, about 600 men. +The troops of the Prussian Guard Corps lost 400, but +360 prisoners remained in their hands. In the evening +the outposts resumed their previous positions.</p> + +<p>The various feigned attacks of the Parisian garrison +were without effect, and produced no alteration in the +dispositions made on the German side. An advance +from St. Denis against Stains was repulsed, and two +gunboats on the Seine had to go about in consequence +of the fire of four field batteries on Orgemont. The +trivial sortie on Chatou was scarcely heeded. General +Vinoy indeed led forward a large force along the right +bank of the Marne, but that was not till the afternoon, +when the fight at Le Bourget was over. The Saxon +outposts retired into the fighting position near Le +Chenay. One of the battalions massed there drove +the enemy out of Maison Blanche that same evening, +another made a grasp at Ville Evrart, where fighting +went on till midnight; it lost seventy men, but brought +in 600 prisoners. Next morning the French abandoned +Ville Evrart, under heavy fire from the German artillery +on the heights on the opposite side of the river.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[263]</a></span></p> + +<p>Paris had now been invested for three months. The +always distasteful expedient of a bombardment of a +place so extensive could not of itself bring about a +decisive result; and on the German side there was the +full conviction that only a regular siege could accomplish +the wished-for end. But the operations of the +engineers had to be delayed till the artillery should +be in a position to co-operate with them.</p> + +<p>It has already been shown that the siege-artillery +had been first employed against those fortified places +which interrupted the rearward communications of the +army. There were indeed 235 heavy pieces standing +ready at Villacoublay; but it had proved impossible as +yet to bring up the necessary ammunition for the attack +which, once begun, must on no account be interrupted.</p> + +<p>By the end of November, railway communication +had been restored up to Chelles, but the greater part of +the ammunition had meanwhile been deposited at +Lagny, and from thence would now have to be carried +forward by the country roads. The ordinary two-wheeled +country carts proved totally unfit for the +transport of shells, and only 2000 four-wheeled waggons +had been collected by requisitions made over a wide +area. There were brought up from Metz 960 more +with horses sent from Germany, and even the teams of +the IIIrd Army were taken into the service, though +they were almost indispensable just then to contribute +towards the efficiency of the army fighting on the +Loire. Finally, all the draught horses of the pontoon +columns, of the field-bridge trains, and of the trench-tool +columns were brought into the ammunition-transport +service. A new difficulty arose when the breaking-up +of the ice necessitated the removal of the +pontoon bridges over the Seine. The roads were so +bad that it took the waggons nine days to get from +Nanteuil to Villacoublay and back. Many broke +down under their loads, and the drivers constantly +took to flight. And moreover, at the instance of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[264]</a></span> +Chief of the Staff there was now laid upon the artillery +yet an additional task to be carried out forthwith.</p> + +<p>Though the besieged had not hitherto succeeded in +forcing their way through the enemy's lines, they now +set about widening their elbow room, with intent that +by their counter-approaches the ring of investment +should be further and yet further pushed back, until +at last it should reach the breaking point. On the +south side the French entrenchments already extended +beyond Vitry and Villejuif to the Seine; and on the +north, between Drancy and Fort de l'Est, there was an +extensive system of trenches and batteries reaching to +within 1100 yards of Le Bourget, which in part might +in a manner be dignified with the title of a regular +engineer-attack. The hard frost had indeed hindered +the further progress of these works, but they were +armed with artillery and occupied by the IInd Army. +And further, a singularly favourable point of support for +a sortie to the east as well as to the north, was afforded +to the French in the commanding eminence of Mont +Avron, which, armed with seventy heavy guns, projected +into the Marne valley like a wedge between the +northern and southern investing lines.</p> + + +<p>(<span class="smcap">Bombardment of Mont Avron, December 27th.</span>)—In +order to expel the French from this position fifty +heavy guns from Germany, and twenty-six from before +La Fère were brought up under the command of +Colonel Bartsch. By the exertions of a whole battalion +as a working party, two groups of battery emplacements +were erected in spite of the severe frost on the +western slope of the heights behind Raincy and Gagny, +and on the left upland of the Marne Valley near Noisy +le Grand, thus encompassing Mont Avron on two sides +at a distance of from 2160 to 3250 feet.</p> + +<p>At half-past eight on the morning of 27th December +those seventy-six guns opened fire. A heavy snowstorm +interfered with accurate aim, and prevented any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[265]</a></span> +observation of the execution done. Mont Avron and +Forts Nogent and Rosny replied rapidly and heavily.</p> + +<p>The German batteries lost two officers and twenty-five +gunners, several gun-carriages broke down under +their own fire, and everything pointed to the prospect +that no definite result would be obtained on that +day.</p> + +<p>But the batteries had fired more effectually than had +been supposed. The clear weather of the 28th allowed +of greater precision; the Prussian fire proved most +telling, making fearful havoc in the numerous and +exposed French infantry garrison. Mont Avron was +silenced, and only the forts kept up a feeble fire. +General Trochu, who was present in person, ordered +the abandonment of the position, which was so effectually +accomplished in the night by the energetic +commander, Colonel Stoffel, that only one disabled +gun was left behind.</p> + +<p>On the 29th the French fire was silent, and the hill +was found deserted. The Germans had no intention of +continuing to occupy the position. Their batteries +now turned their fire on the forts, which suffered +severely, and on the earthworks near Bondy.</p> + +<p>By the end of the year the besiegers had succeeded +in collecting the most indispensable ammunition in +Villacoublay. The engineer operations were entrusted +to General Kameke; the artillery was under the command +of General Prince Hohenlohe.<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> The battery +emplacements had long been finished, and with +the dawn of the new year 100 guns of the largest +calibres stood ready to open fire on the south front of +Paris.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[266]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Viz., the section of the investment line on the northern side, +from the Marne above, to the Seine below Paris, held by the Army of +the Meuse, consisting of the IVth, the Guard, and XIIth (Saxon) +Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> "Kirchhof" seems to stand in German not only for our "churchyard," +but also for our "graveyard," in which latter there need be no +church. In the case of Le Bourget the church stands in the village +street—the reader will remember de Neuville's striking picture—and +the graveyard lies outside the shabby village, and has the +aspect of the modern "cemetery." That term has therefore been +used.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> Details as to the personnel of the artillery and engineer commands +of the siege operations will be found on a later page.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Army of the East under General Bourbaki.</span></h2> + + +<p>While the French forces were engaged in constant +fighting, in the north on the Seine and the Somme, in +the south on the Loire and the Saône, General Bourbaki's +army had nowhere made itself prominent. Since +the 8th of December, when the 6th Cavalry Division +had reported its presence at Vierzon, all trace of it had +been lost. It was of course of the greatest importance to +the supreme Command that it should know the whereabouts +of so large an army; only the IInd German +Army could acquire this information, and on the 22nd +it received instructions to obtain the required enlightenment +by means of reconnaissances.</p> + +<p>On this errand General von Rantzau (commanding +25th Cavalry Brigade) set out from Montargis by the +right bank of the Loire towards Briare, where he found +that the French had abandoned their position on the +25th; in the course of the next few days he met them, +and was defeated.</p> + +<p>The Hessian detachment was reinforced to a strength +of three battalions, four squadrons and six guns, but +was nevertheless driven back to Gien on the 1st of +January. The French had displayed a force of several +thousand Gardes-Mobiles, twelve guns, and a body of +marine infantry. A noticeable fact was that some of +the prisoners brought in belonged to the XVIIIth +French Corps, which formed part of the Ist Army of +the Loire.</p> + +<p>A regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division sent out to +reconnoitre into the Sologne, returned with the report +that strong hostile columns were marching on Aubigny +Ville. On the other hand, two waggon-drivers who had +been taken prisoners declared that the French troops had +been already moved from Bourges by rail, and the newspaper +reports also pointed to the same conclusion; still, +too much weight could not be attached to mere rumour +as against circumstantial intelligence. It was therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[267]</a></span> +assumed at Versailles that the Ist Army of the Loire +was still about Bourges, and that General Bourbaki, +when again in a condition to fight, would act in +concert with General Chanzy.</p> + +<p>The two armies might attack the Germans at Orleans +from opposite sides, or one might engage and detain +them there, while the other marched to relieve the +capital.</p> + +<p>This, in fact, was what General Chanzy had in view. +Since the 21st of December he had been resting in +quarters in and about Le Mans, where railways from +four directions facilitated the bringing up of new levies. +His troops had no doubt great hardships to contend +with there. In lack of shelter for such great masses +part had to camp out under canvas in the snow, and +suffered severely from the intense cold. The hospitals +were crammed with wounded and small-pox patients. +On the other hand, this close concentration was +favourable to the reorganization of the details and the +restoration of discipline; and the news from Paris +urged the General to renewed action.</p> + +<p>General Trochu had sent word that Paris unaided +could not accomplish her freedom. Even if a sortie +should prove successful, the necessary supplies for the +maintenance of an army could not be carried with it, +and therefore nothing but the simultaneous appearance +of an army from without could meet the case. Now +General Chanzy was quite ready to march on Paris, +but it was indispensable that he should first know +exactly what Generals Bourbaki and Faidherbe were +doing.</p> + +<p>It was clearly evident that concerted action on the +part of three great Army Corps could only be devised +and controlled by the chief power. The General therefore +sent an officer of his Staff on the 23rd of December +to Gambetta at Lyons, to express his conviction that +only a combined and prompt advance could avert the +fall of the capital. But the Minister believed that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[268]</a></span> +knew better. The first news of a quite different disposition +of Bourbaki's army only reached General +Chanzy on the 29th, when it was already entered upon. +Nor in other respects did Gambetta's reply convey +either distinct orders or sufficient information. "You +have decimated the Mecklenburgers," wrote Gambetta, +"the Bavarians no longer exist, the rest of the German +Army is a prey to disquietude and exhaustion. Let +us persevere, and we shall drive these hordes from our +soil with empty hands." The plan of the Provisional +Government was to be the one "which would most +demoralize the German army."<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> + +<p>Under instructions so obscure from the chief authority +General Chanzy, relying on his own strength, +determined to make his way to Paris without other +assistance; but he soon found himself in serious +difficulties.</p> + +<p>On the German side there was no time to be lost in +utilizing their position between the two hostile armies, +advantageous as it was so long as those armies were +not too near. The simultaneous attacks on the 31st +December at Vendôme on the Loir, and at Briare on +the Loire, seemed to indicate that the two were already +acting on a concerted plan.</p> + +<p>On New Year's day Prince Frederick Charles received +telegraphic instructions to re-cross the Loir without +delay, and strike at General Chanzy, as being the +nearest and most imminently dangerous enemy. With +this object the IInd Army was strengthened by the +addition of the XIIIth Corps of the Grand Duke of +Mecklenburg (17th and 22nd Divisions) and the 2nd +and 4th Divisions of Cavalry. And in addition the +5th Cavalry Division was detailed to the duty of +covering the right flank of the advance.</p> + +<p>Only the 25th (Hessian) Division was to be left in +Orleans as a possible check on General Bourbaki, +and to maintain observation on Gien. But as a further<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[269]</a></span> +provision, in case of need against a possible advance +of the IInd Army of the Loire, General von Zastrow +was ordered to the Armançon with the VIIth Corps;<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> +and further the IInd Corps from the besieging lines +was set in march to Montargis.</p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles' arrangement was to have +his three corps assembled on the line Vendôme—Morée +by 6th January, and to order the XIIIth from Chartres +on Brou.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> "Qui démoralisera le plus l'armée Allemande."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> In effect, with only the Corps-headquarter and the 13th Division—the +14th Division being still in the north-east.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans.</span></h2> + + +<p>The Germans had hoped to strike the enemy in his +winter quarters; but General Chanzy had provided +against surprise by a cordon of strong advanced positions. +Nogent le Rotrou on his left was held by Rousseau's +Division, and numerous bands of volunteers; +from thence strong detachments were posted through +Vibraye and St. Calais up to the Braye brook, where +General Jouffroy had made a halt after the last attack +on Vendôme; and on the right were General Barry at La +Chartre and de Curten's Division at Château Renault.</p> + +<p>Both wings of the German army came into collision +with these forces on the 5th of January.</p> + +<p>General Baumgarth (commanding 2nd Cavalry +Brigade), on the German left, had assembled at St. +Amand three battalions, two cavalry regiments and +two batteries. The 57th regiment stormed Villeporcher +in the direction of Château Renault, evacuated it in +face of an attack by four French battalions, and finally +recaptured and held it. This much, at any rate, was +thus ascertained, that a not inconsiderable force of the +enemy was assembled in front of the left wing of the +German army now marching westward. While this +movement was in prosecution General Baumgarth was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[270]</a></span> +thenceforth to undertake its protection, and with this +object he was reinforced by the addition of the 6th +Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade.</p> + +<p>On the right wing the 44th Brigade, in its advance +on Nogent le Rotrou, also had had a sharp encounter. +It carried the enemy's position at La Fourche, and +captured three guns, with a large number of prisoners. +The main body of the Corps (the XIIIth) reached +Beaumont les Autels and Brou, but the cavalry failed +to penetrate the woods to the north of Nogent.</p> + +<p><i>January 6th.</i>—At six in the morning the advanced +guard of General Baumgarth's detachment started on +march to Prunay, but the main body could not follow, +since it was attacked in force at about half-past nine. +With the object of observing the enemy, the infantry +had been scattered in detached posts in a wide extension +from Ambloy to Villeporcher, and only a small +reserve remained at La Noue. The fight soon assumed +greater expansion, and the defence with difficulty maintained +the line Les Haies—Pias, the turning of the +German left flank being seriously threatened, upon +which the 6th Cavalry Division moved up, but could +only enter the fight with one horse battery. The +reserve, however, moved up along the high road to +Château Renault and repulsed the enemy, who had +already forced his way into Les Haies. But when +he renewed the attack in strong columns and developed +four batteries against the place, the reserve was obliged +to retire behind the Brenne.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the 16th Regiment, which had already +reached Ambloy on its march to Vendôme, turned +back to St. Amand in support, and the just assembled +38th Infantry Brigade deployed between Neuve St. +Amand and St. Amand with a strong force of cavalry +on its flanks. But as by some mistake St. Amand was +evacuated, Duke William of Mecklenburg (commanding +6th Cavalry Division) ordered a further retreat. +The infantry, however, had already come to a halt at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[271]</a></span> +Huisseau and took quarters there. The advanced +guard turned into Ambloy; the cavalry fell back +partly on that place and partly on Villeromain.</p> + +<p>During the engagement about St. Amand the Xth +Corps itself advanced on Montoire in two columns +along the left bank of the Loire, leaving on its right a +battalion in front of Vendôme to secure the debouche +of the IIIrd Corps through that place.</p> + +<p>When the 20th Division reached St. Rimay at +about one o'clock, it found the heights on the opposite +side of the Loir occupied by General Barry's troops. +The massed German batteries were brought up to the +southern ridge of the valley and soon drove the French +off the broad flats; but the defile of Les Roches in the +front remained quite unassailable. The broken bridge +at Lavardin, lower down the stream, was therefore +made practicable by the pioneers. The 19th Division +having meanwhile reached that place, several battalions +crossed from the south side to attack Les +Roches, and easily dislodged the French. As darkness +came on, preventing any further advance, the Corps +found quarters in and about Montoire.</p> + +<p>The Commander of the IIIrd Corps had intended to +make a halt on this day before Vendôme, and only push +forward his advanced guard as far as the Azay brook; +but this detachment soon met with so stout opposition, +that the main force was compelled to advance to its +assistance. General de Jouffroy, with intent to disengage +General de Curten, had renewed the attack on +Vendôme, and so the advanced guard of the 5th Division, +approaching Villiers at about half-past one, found +the 10th Jäger Battalion, which had accompanied the +march of its Corps along the right bank of the Loir, +engaged at that place in a sharp fight which had +already lasted four hours. The advanced guard +brought up its two batteries on to the plateau north of +the village, and the 48th Regiment made its way +forward to the slope of the lower Azay valley, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[272]</a></span> +broad flat meadows of which were commanded by the +French long-range rifles and completely swept by the +fire of the artillery. And here then the enemy came +over to the attack in dense swarms of sharp-shooters.</p> + +<p>The 8th Regiment presently came up in support, +and after a short fight took possession of Le Gué du +Loir on its left flank; then the further reinforcement +arrived of the 10th Infantry Brigade, and by degrees +the number of Prussian guns increased to thirty-six. +The French artillery could not endure their fire, and +within half an hour it was possible to turn it on the +hostile infantry. At about half-past four the German +battalions crossed the valley, made themselves masters +of the vineyards and farms on the opposite heights, and +finally stormed Mazange. Under cover of the darkness +the French retired to Lunay.</p> + +<p>Further to the right the advance guard of the 6th +Division, having left Vendôme at eleven o'clock, found +the battalion left by the Xth Corps at Courtiras fighting +hard against a very superior force of the French. +The 11th Brigade advanced on the Azay ravine, +though not without heavy loss, and when at about +half-past three the 12th also came up, and the artillery +went to work vigorously, Azay was successfully stormed +and the force established itself firmly on the heights +beyond. Repeated counterstrokes of the enemy were +repulsed in succession, and by five o'clock the fighting +ended with the retirement of the French.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Army Corps took up quarters between +the Azay stream and the Loir. A detachment +occupied Danzé, higher up the river. The Corps lost +thirty-nine officers and above 400 men, but captured +400 prisoners.</p> + +<p>In the course of the day the IXth Corps crossed +the upper Loir about Fréteval and St. Hilaire, without +opposition, and advanced along the high road to St. +Calais, as far as Busloup. The XIIIth remained at +Unverre, Beaumont, and La Fourche.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[273]</a></span></p> + +<p>Prince Frederick Charles had not been led into any +change of purpose by the attack at St. Amand and the +obstinate resistance at Azay. The XIIIth Corps was +expected to reach Montmirail, and the XIth Epuisay, +both on the 7th; the IIIrd was to continue the attack +on the deep-cut channel of the Braye brook. But after +the reverse experienced at St. Amand, the presence of a +strong hostile force on the left flank could not be suffered +to remain unregarded. Duke William had already been +given verbal orders at the Head-quarter in Vendôme, +to turn back forthwith to St. Amand with the 6th +Cavalry Division, and in addition General von Voigts-Rhetz +was ordered to support General Baumgarth if +necessary with his whole Corps.</p> + +<p>The country between the Loir and the Sarthe +through which the Germans had to march, presents +peculiar difficulties to an invading force, and affords +marked advantages to the defence.</p> + +<p>All the roads leading to Le Mans intersect at right +angles, stream after stream flowing through broad and +deeply cut meadow-valleys. Groves, villages, and +châteaux with walled parks cover the highly cultivated +upland; vineyards, orchards and gardens are enclosed +by hedges, ditches or fences.</p> + +<p>Hence almost the whole burthen of the impending +fighting would have to be borne by the infantry; +nowhere was there space for the deployment of cavalry, +and the use of artillery needs must be extremely +limited, since in a country so greatly enclosed guns +could only singly be brought into action. The enemy's +central position could be approached by only four main +roads, and the communications between the marching +columns, starting at the least some thirty miles apart, +would be confined to the cross roads, almost impassable +from the severity of the season and the hostility of the +inhabitants. Any lateral mutual support was at first +quite out of the question.</p> + +<p>Under such conditions the movements could only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[274]</a></span> +be guided by general instructions, and even the leaders +of lower grades had to be left free to act at their own +individual discretion. Specific orders for each day, +though they would of course be issued, could not in +many cases be possibly carried out. In the Army +Headquarter it could not be foreseen in what situation +each individual corps might find itself after a day's +fighting. Reports could only come in very late at +night, and the orders drawn up however early would +often arrive only after the troops, because of the shortness +of the day, had already set out on the march.</p> + +<p><i>January 7th.</i>—In obedience to orders from the Army +Headquarter, General Voigts-Rhetz on the 7th sent +the part of the 19th Division which had already +reached Vendôme, back to St. Amand in reinforcement. +The 38th Brigade had again entered that +place early in the day, and General von Hartmann, +taking over its command, advanced along the Château +Renault high road, the cavalry moving on both flanks.</p> + +<p>The column first struck the enemy near Villechauve +at mid-day. A thick fog prevented the employment of +the artillery, and it was at the cost of heavy loss that +Villechauve, Pias, and various other farmsteads were +captured. Villeporcher and the adjacent villages +remained in possession of the French, who at about +two o'clock advanced by the high road to the attack +with several battalions. The weather had cleared, and +it was soon evident that this offensive was only intended +to mask the beginning of the enemy's retreat to the +westward. The troops took quarters where they stood, +and the reinforcements forwarded to them remained at +St. Amand.</p> + +<p>The Xth Corps, awaiting the return of the latter, +remained in its quarters about La Chartre; only the +14th Cavalry Brigade went on up to La Richardière to +establish connection with the IIIrd Corps. But it did +not succeed in taking the village with dismounted +troopers.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[275]</a></span></p> + +<p>General von Alvensleben<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> hoped to overtake the +French on the hither side of the glen of Braye, and +by turning their left wing to drive them on to the Xth +Corps, whose co-operation had been promised. The +IIIrd Corps advanced in the direction of Epuisay, +leaving one brigade to garrison Mazange, and when +tidings reached it on the march that the French had +evacuated Lunay and Fortan, that brigade also +followed by way of the latter village.</p> + +<p>Epuisay was found to be strongly held, and in the +meantime the advanced guard of the IXth Corps, +advancing from Busloup, also arrived there. But it was +not till half-past one that the French were expelled from +the little town, which they had strongly barricaded; and +on the hither side of the Braye they renewed their resistance +in the numerous hamlets and farmsteads. A +long fire fight was kept up in the thick fog; but at +length, at about four o'clock, the 12th Brigade pushed +forward to the edge of the valley. The 9th Brigade +took possession of Savigny without meeting any serious +opposition, and Sargé was stormed in the dusk.</p> + +<p>The IIIrd Corps had lost forty-five men and had +taken 200 prisoners. It found quarters behind the +Braye, but threw forward outposts on its western bank. +The IXth Corps found shelter in and about Epuisay, +and thus, as a matter of fact, two corps were now +crowded on one of the few available roads. The 2nd +Cavalry Division went to the right, towards Mondoubleau, +to make connection with the XIIIth Corps. +The French retreated to St. Calais.</p> + +<p>The order from the Army Head-quarter that the +XIIIth Corps was to march to Montmirail, had been +issued on the presumption that it would have reached +Nogent le Rotrou on the 6th, whereas in fact, as has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[276]</a></span> +been shown, it had remained at La Fourche, Beaumont, +and Unverre. The Grand Duke, who expected +to experience a stout resistance, did not pass to the +attack of Nogent till the 7th. When the 22nd Division +arrived there, it found all the villages deserted in the +Upper Huisne valley and was able to enter Nogent without +any fighting at two o'clock. It took up quarters +there, the 4th Cavalry Division at Thirion Gardais; +and only an advanced guard followed the enemy. It +found the wood near Le Gibet strongly occupied, and +did not succeed in forcing it till after nightfall.</p> + +<p>The French had retired to La Ferté Bernard.</p> + +<p>The 17th Division had at first followed in reserve. +But at one o'clock, in consequence of the reports +brought in, the Grand Duke detached it southward to +Authon; and in order to follow the Head-quarter instructions +as closely as possible he did at least push a +detachment of two battalions, two cavalry regiments, +and one battery towards Montmirail, under the command +of General von Rauch.</p> + +<p><i>January 8th.</i>—Finding on the morning of the 8th +that the enemy was not advancing to the attack of St. +Amand, General von Hartmann at nine o'clock sent +back the troops which had crossed the river to his +support. At ten o'clock also he received instructions +to join the Xth Corps; but the French still continued +to hold Villeporcher and the forest lying behind it, and +were also drawn up across the Château Renault high +road in a very advantageous position behind the +Brenne. The General recognized the necessity of +making a decisive stand here, and took the best means +to that end by acting himself on the offensive. Supported +by the fire of his battery, and accompanied by the +cavalry on either flank, six companies of the 60th +Regiment marched on Villeporcher, drove back its +defenders in flight into the forest of Château Renault, +and took 100 prisoners. On the left the 9th Uhlans drove +the Chasseurs d'Afrique before them. Not till darkness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[277]</a></span> +had set in did General von Hartmann proceed in the +direction of Montoire.</p> + +<p>General von Voigts-Rhetz had already set out from +thence very early in the day. The night's frost had +covered the roads with ice, which cruelly impeded all +movements of troops. The road on the right bank of +the Loir was in many places broken up. It passed +through a succession of narrow defiles, and on emerging +from these the advanced guard found itself face to face +with a force of about 1000 Gardes-Mobiles, who had +taken up a position in front of La Chartre. Their +mitrailleuses were soon forced to a hasty retreat by the +fire of two field-guns, but it was only after a prolonged +struggle that the infantry, moving with difficulty, +succeeded at 4 o'clock in entering the town, where it +took up quarters. Two battalions which were sent +further on the road, had to fight for their night's +shelter, and all through the night were exchanging shots +with the enemy at close quarters, of whom 230 were +taken prisoners.</p> + +<p>The 39th Brigade, which left Ambloy in the +morning, could follow the corps only as far as +Sougé.</p> + +<p>General von Schmidt with the 14th Cavalry Brigade +was sent to the right, to try to make connection with +the IIIrd Corps. He was received at Vancé with a +sharp fire. The leading squadron made way for the +horse battery, and a volley of grape-shot from the +foremost gun drove the dismounted hostile Cuirassiers +behind the hedges. When two more guns were brought +up into position, their shell fire dispersed in every +direction a long column of cavalry.</p> + +<p>Colonel von Alvensleben pursued the French cavalry +with the 15th Uhlan Regiment till he came upon a +body of infantry guarding the Etang-fort brook. The +brigade halted at Vancé, after putting about 100 +French <i>hors de combat</i>.</p> + +<p>Of the IIIrd Corps the 6th Division had moved forward<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[278]</a></span> +through St. Calais. The French tried to hold the +cuttings on the greatly broken up roads; but they +nowhere awaited a serious attack, and made off, for +the most part in carts which were in waiting. The +5th Division, proceeding on a parallel front on the left, +met with no opposition; but the state of the roads +made the march extremely difficult. The corps halted +on the hither side of Bouloire. The IXth Corps came +up behind it into St. Calais.</p> + +<p>The Grand Duke had moved both Divisions of the +XIIIth Corps on La Ferté Bernard. On their way +they came across none but stragglers, but they found +the roads so utterly cut up that not till four in the +afternoon did they reach the place, where they took up +quarters. The French had retired to Connerré. The +4th Cavalry Division was to secure the right flank on +the further advance, but could not get as far forward +as Bellême; on the other hand, General von Rauch's +(commanding 15th Cavalry Division) detachment +despatched leftward towards Montmirail, surprised the +French in Vibraye, and took possession of the bridge +over the Braye.</p> + +<p>By the evening of this day the two flank Corps of +the German Army were at an equal distance from +Le Mans, both on the same high road which crosses +the district of the Quere from La Ferté Bernard in +a southerly direction through St. Calais and La +Chartre; the IIIrd Corps was further in advance, +separated from each of them by the interval of a long +march. A closer concentration of the forces could be +attained only by a further advance along the converging +highways. Prince Frederick Charles therefore +issued an order at ten o'clock that evening, for the +Xth Corps to march next day to Parigné l'Evêque, the +IIIrd to Ardenay, and the XIIIth on to the heights of +Montfort, the advanced guard of each to be pushed +forward beyond these respective points. The IXth, +in the centre, was to follow, while General von Hartmann<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[279]</a></span> +was to protect Vendôme with the 38th Brigade +and the 1st Division of Cavalry.</p> + +<p>But the distances prevented the flanking corps +advancing from La Chartre and La Ferté from reaching +their respective destinations, and, on the 9th of January, +snow-storms, ice-bound roads, and thick fog further +combined to make their progress arduous beyond +conception.</p> + +<p><i>January 9th.</i>—General von Hartmann marched the +38th Infantry Brigade on Château Renault, and entered +the town at one o'clock, to find that Curten's French +Division had started early in the morning for St. +Laurent.</p> + +<p>The incomplete Xth Corps moved this day in two +columns; the detachment of General von Woyna (commanding +39th Infantry Brigade) was to march from +Pont de Braye by Vancé, the remainder of the corps +from La Chartre by way of Brives to Grand Lucé.</p> + +<p>The 20th Division had scarcely set out by this route +from L'Homme, when it encountered shell and mitrailleuse-fire. +Here there happened for once to be room +for three batteries to advance, but in the heavy snow-fall +aim was out of the question. The infantry, however, +by degrees drove the enemy out of sundry hamlets +and farmsteads, and back across the Brives. To pursue +him beyond that stream a makeshift bridge needed first +to be thrown across with some loss of time, and then +Chahaignes was to be seized. But in the narrow valley +which had to be now traversed a vigorous resistance +was to be counted on. The state of the road was such +that the artillerymen and cavalry had to dismount and +lead their horses. The General in command rode on +a gun-carriage; his staff went on foot. Some horses +which had fallen in front presently stopped the way +for the whole column; and it therefore became necessary +to send back all the Corps-artillery, which was to +try next day to come on by way of Vancé.</p> + +<p>To facilitate the march of the 20th Division, General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[280]</a></span> +von Woyna had been instructed to deviate from his +direct road and attack the enemy's left. When he approached +the valley the fighting had fallen silent, and +the detachment turned back to Vancé; but at Brives +at about half-past three the main column met with +fresh resistance, being received with a brisk fire from +the heights north-east of the village. Not even the infantry +could move outside of the high road, so there +was no alternative to a frontal advance along it. A +closed attack by the 39th Brigade broke up and routed +the enemy. At half-past six in the evening, when quite +dark, Colonel von Valentini set out for St. Pierre with +four battalions, and took there 100 French prisoners +and a loaded train of 100 waggons. The Xth Corps +spent the night with only its advance in Brives and +Vancé, but its quarters reached back nearly to the valley +of the Loir. Nor had the 14th Brigade of Cavalry +been able to make any further headway.</p> + +<p>Of the IIIrd Corps the 6th Division had marched +by the high road through Bouloire, with the artillery +corps; the 5th on the left along the by-roads. The +advanced guard of the 6th Division, after a lively +fire-fight, expelled the enemy from his positions +in front of Ardenay, but there at two o'clock had to +encounter a determined resistance. After General de +Jouffroy had withdrawn from St. Calais to the southward, +General Chanzy pushed forward Paris' Division to +secure the high road leading from thence to Le Mans. +It had taken up a position near Ardenay, occupying the +château on the right, and on the left posting four guns +and two mitrailleuses near La Butte. To oppose +these there was only room on the road for two German +guns, which, however, in the course of half an hour +silenced the mitrailleuses, and carried on the unequal +contest with the greatest obstinacy. At about four +o'clock five companies of the 12th Brigade stormed the +château of Ardenay, while others, crossing the meadowland +to the right, forced their way through a patch of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[281]</a></span> +wood towards La Butte. As night came on the French +tried to effect a general attack along the chaussée; but +this was repulsed, and the Brandenburgers<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> plunged +through the heavy fire of the defenders, and without +firing a shot took La Butte and Ardenay with a rush +and a cheer. The French were thrown back into the +valley of the Narais, losing many prisoners.</p> + +<p>On the right a detachment of one battalion, two +squadrons, and two guns, accompanied the 6th Division. +It drove before it franctireur bodies, but at La Belle +Inutile met with more serious resistance. The post +was, however, carried by the 24th Regiment, which +made prize of a large ammunition and provision train, +and took above 100 unwounded prisoners. Count zu +Lynar moved into the village for its defence.</p> + +<p>The 5th Division met with no opposition, but the +state of the roads caused extreme delay to its progress. +It was not till the afternoon that its head reached the +Narais at Gué de l'Aune and took up quarters there +and rearward to St. Mars de Locquenay. Its advanced +guard went on, however, to La Buzardière, thus forming +the absolute head of the whole army. Parigné +l'Evêque, on its left flank, was found to be held by the +enemy.</p> + +<p>The IXth Corps followed the IIIrd to Bouloire.</p> + +<p>Orders from head-quarters had not yet reached La +Ferté when, at nine in the morning, the Grand Duke +set the XIIIth Corps in motion on Connerré. Soon +after midday the 17th Division came upon the French +near Sceaux, and in a struggle wherein it slowly +gained ground, drove them first out of the village +precincts and then off the road. The French, who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[282]</a></span> +had retreated to Connerré by a forced night march, +lost above 500 prisoners in this small affair. But the +short day was closing in, and the advanced guard +halted at dusk at Duneau. A detachment going +further forward found Connerré occupied by the +French, and many watch-fires blazing in the valley +of the Due. The main body of the infantry found +quarters in and about Sceaux.</p> + +<p>Rauch's detachment, ordered to rejoin the Corps, +took possession of Le Croset and of the bridge over the +Due in front of that village, and also expelled the +French from Thorigné.</p> + +<p>The French stayed in Connerré only till the evening; +then, leaving a company in occupation, they continued +their retreat. This necessarily led from the left bank +of the Huisne through the quarters taken up by the +IIIrd German Corps, which was disturbed all night by +wandering detachments of the enemy, even at Nuillé, +where the Divisional headquarters lay.</p> + +<p>On the extreme right the 4th Cavalry Division occupied +Bellême, after driving out the French battalion +which had been in occupation there.</p> + +<p>Thus on this day the centre of the IInd Army had +fought its way to within about nine miles of Le Mans; +while the two wings were still some distance behind. +As it was probable that the French would accept battle +in a prepared position behind the Huisne, it seemed +advisable to await the arrival of the Xth and XIIIth +Corps; but on the other hand, this would also give the +enemy time to strengthen himself. Were an immediate +attack determined on, the two Divisions which had +been delayed respectively at Château Renault and Le +Chartre, could scarcely reach Le Mans in time, and +the rest of the army would be involved everywhere in +a disadvantageous contest with the hostile bodies which +were being driven back concentrically on that place. +Prince Frederick Charles therefore ordered the IIIrd +Corps to push on through Ardenay; the Xth was to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[283]</a></span> +advance to Parigné, and the XIIIth on St. Mars la +Bruyère, though these points could scarcely be reached +from the positions actually occupied by the respective +Corps this same evening (9th).</p> + +<p>As we have seen, the French army now assembled +about Le Mans had been acting on the offensive on +January 6th, when General Jouffroy had advanced on +Vendôme, and de Curten on St. Amand. But so early +as the 7th the French found themselves reduced to the +defensive along their whole front, some 50 miles in length. +General Rousseau, on the left wing, had evacuated Nogent +le Rotrou, and, without being pressed, began his retreat +by a night march to Connerré. In the centre, the +trough of the Braye was wrested from General Jouffroy; +he quitted St. Calais, not rearward on Le Mans, but +southward to join General Barry. On the right, General +Curten had abandoned Château Renault, and set out, unpursued, +on the line through Château du Loir. To effect +some concert in the operations of the three Divisions +of his right wing, General Chanzy placed them under +the superior orders of Admiral Jauréguiberry. He +pushed forward the Division Paris on Ardenay by the +high road General Jouffroy had uncovered, and on the +left wing he reinforced General Rousseau by stationing +three Divisions more on either side of his line of +retreat. General Jouffroy was to retire to Parigné +l'Evêque, and a Division was sent to meet him there +and at Changé.</p> + +<p>General de Curten succeeded on the 9th in checking +the progress of the German left wing for some time +about Chahaignes; but the Division Paris was driven +back through Ardenay, and General Rousseau, thus +beset in Connerré, evacuated that village the same +evening. The two Divisions of the right wing were +behind as far as Jupilles and Neuillé Pont Pierre.</p> + +<p>Under these circumstances General Chanzy ordered +that on the 10th the Division Jouffroy should fall back +on Parigné l'Evêque, but that the Division Paris should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[284]</a></span> +once more move forward on Ardenay. He sent the +remaining three Divisions of the XXIst Corps to meet +General Rousseau, with instructions that he was to +retake Connerré and Thorigné.</p> + +<p>The offensive movements thus planned by both sides +developed into the fierce battle which, on the German +side, was fought out single-handed by the IIIrd +Corps.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Lieut.-General Alvensleben II, commanding IIIrd Army Corps, +not to be confounded with Infantry-General Alvensleben I, commanding +IVth Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Brandenburg is the territorial province of the IIIrd Army +Corps. It was the nucleus of the Prussian monarchy, and the Hohenzollerns +were Margraves and then Electors of Brandenburg for 300 +years before they became Kings of Prussia. The IIIrd is unquestionably +the most distinguished Corps of the Prussian line. The late +Prince Frederick Charles long commanded it.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle in Front of le Mans.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(10th, 11th, and 12th of January.)</div> + + +<p><i>January 10th.</i>—<i>The Fighting about Parigné and +Changé.</i>—Owing to the peculiar nature of the country, +deep columns could not deploy without great loss of +time. General von Alvensleben therefore advanced in +the centre with the 9th and 11th Infantry Brigades on +Changé from Gué de l'Aune and Ardenay, moving +on a broad front in comparatively small separate +bodies. On the right the 12th marched by the high +road to Le Mans; on the left the 10th was to start from +Volnay when Parigné should be found abandoned by +the French, and leaving that place on its left, was also +to converge on Changé.</p> + +<p>Parigné had, in fact, been deserted by the French, +but had been reoccupied before daybreak by a brigade +of the Division Deplanque; and even before the German +troops had started, the far-advanced outposts towards +the forest of Loudon were smartly attacked. The +greater part of the 9th Brigade had to be deployed by +degrees between Blinières and the point of the forest, but +only seven guns could be brought into action against the +numerous French artillery. General von Stülpnagel +decided to reserve his strength for the struggle at +Changé, and to carry on merely a stationary fight<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[285]</a></span> +here, which must be inevitably decided as soon as the +10th Brigade should make its appearance on the left.</p> + +<p>That brigade, delayed by the badness of the roads, +did not arrive by way of Challes till noon; but it +brought two batteries to reinforce the German artillery +strength, which now vigorously prepared the infantry +attack on the high-lying Parigné. Half an hour +later the battalions rushed on the place with shouts +of "Hurrah Brandenburg!" taking a gun which the +enemy had abandoned, and two mitrailleuses still in +action. When the French returned to try to recover +them they were again repulsed, and sacrificed another +gun, two colours, and several waggons. After losing +2150 prisoners they fled to the shelter of the forest of +Ruaudin. General von Stülpnagel left two battalions +at Parigné to maintain observation in that quarter, and +hurried on to Changé in two columns. In front of this +village, at about three o'clock, the 11th Brigade met +with a violent resistance at the Gué Perray brook from +the other brigade of Deplanque's Division. The 2nd +Battalion of the 35th Regiment lost nine officers and +above 100 men in a severe struggle at Les Gars. The +General in command, who was on the spot, dislodged +both flanks of the enemy from his strong position, and +on the left two companies succeeded in crossing the +stream at La Goudrière.</p> + +<p>These at four o'clock now fell in with the advanced +guard of the 9th Brigade, which Colonel Count von der +Groeben was bringing up from Parigné, having taken +possession of the Château of Girardrie on the way. +When the companies of the 11th Brigade sent to the +right reached Auvigné simultaneously, the "General +Advance" was sounded. Auvigné was stormed, the +bridge north of Gué la Hart was crossed, and that +village carried after a hard fight. Over 1000 prisoners +more were taken from the flying French.</p> + +<p>It was already dark, but Changé, the goal of the +struggle, was not yet reached. But when a barricade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[286]</a></span> +outside the village had been won it was found that the +10th Brigade was already in possession. This brigade, +on its way along the high road from Parigné, had met +with resistance at the Châteaux Chef Raison and Paillerie. +Having only two guns, it failed to silence the French +artillery, but General von Stülpnagel left there only +a battalion in observation, and hurried forward with +part of the brigade to reinforce the fight at Gué la +Hart; the other portion was directed against Changé. +Here the French had already been for the most part +dismissed to quarters, but they soon assembled and made +a prompt and determined resistance. There ensued an +embittered street-fight, which ended in about an hour's +time in the surrender of the whole garrison of 800 men, +who had been crowded together into the market-place.</p> + +<p>The 12th Brigade had at last left Ardenay at eleven +o'clock; it advanced along the high road without opposition +as far as St. Hubert, where an abandoned +commissariat train was seized. Having there aligned +itself with the rest of the Corps it halted for a while, +but after one o'clock was fired upon by French artillery; +and the enemy again advancing along the highway, +General von Buddenbrock<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> on his part passed to the +attack, and drove back the enemy out of Champagné, +in part across the Huisne, and in part to the heights +behind the village. Two guns successfully dealt with +the fire of the French artillery near Lune d'Auvours, +and then the infantry expelled the French from that +shelter also.</p> + +<p>Further to the right a German battalion had taken +St. Mars la Bruyère after a slight skirmish, and was +subsequently joined there by General Count zu Lynar's +detachment.</p> + +<p>Fighting thus with equal skill and success the IIIrd +Corps had indeed already lost 450 men; but it had +brought in more than 5000 prisoners, and had won +many trophies of which it had a right to be proud.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[287]</a></span></p> +<p>The Xth Corps had started this day from Vancé and +Brives, and unobstructed indeed by the enemy, but +along very heavy roads, reached Grand Lucé at two +o'clock. Here it took up quarters.</p> + +<p>The IXth Corps remained at Nuillé.</p> + +<p>Of the XIIIth Corps the 17th Division had continued +its advance along the left bank of the Huisne, and found +Connerré already deserted by the French. But on the +further side of the river the heights of Cohernières, the +railway station, and the wood to the north, were occupied +by the 2nd Division of the French XXIst Corps. +General von Rauch led two battalions to the attack +from the south, in which shared the 22nd Division from +the east, having crossed the Huisne at Sceaux and taken +the direction of Beillé by the right bank. A stubborn +resistance was encountered, and the fight swayed to and +fro till darkness fell. The Château of Couléon, indeed, +and several villages at the foot of the wooded heights +were taken, but the French maintained their hold on +the heights and their position at Cohernières.</p> + +<p>The 17th Division had meanwhile continued its advance +along roads frozen as smooth as glass, and reached +La Belle Inutile; the 22nd passed the night at Beillé.</p> + +<p>This division had in the morning sent a detachment +sideward to Bonnétable, whither the 4th Cavalry +Division now proceeded. The 12th Cavalry Brigade +followed to Bellême. Colonel von Beckedorff then +continued his advance to Chanteloup, whence he drove +out the French in spite of an obstinate defence.</p> + +<p>General Chanzy had determined to risk a decisive +battle in front of Le Mans. Curten's Division had not +yet reached him, and only a part of Barry's had come up, +but on the other hand the army from the camp of +Conlie, in strength some 10,000 men, had arrived. The +right wing of the French position rested its flank on the +Sarthe near Arnaye<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>; it extended for more than four<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[288]</a></span> +miles along the Chemin aux Bœufs, and continued in a +slight curve leftward to the Huisne. Barry's Division, +already weakened by previous reverses, and General +Lalande's National Guards—undisciplined and badly +armed troops—were posted on the extreme right which +was the least threatened. Deplanque's and Roquebrune's +Divisions, Desmaison's Brigade and Jouffroy's +Division, held the centre and left, the last body in the first +instance opposite to General von Alvensleben. Behind +this line Bouëdec's Division and Colonel Marty's detachment +constituted a reserve. In all from 50,000 to 60,000 +men under the command of Admiral Jauréguiberry, +with full ranks and well commanded, crowded the +entrenched front of the most important section of the +line—that between the two rivers (Sarthe and Huisne). +Five Divisions more, under the command of General +de Colomb, lined the right bank of the Huisne for a +distance of about eight and a half miles, the Division +Paris was at Yvré; Gougeard's Division, also +holding the heights of Auvours on the hither side, was +northward of Champagné; then came Rousseau's Division +at Montfort and Pont de Gesnes, and finally, Collin's +Division in hook-formation about Lombron. Besides +these Villeneuve's Division, quite on the flank, fronted +toward Chanteloup.</p> + +<p><i>January 11th.</i>—On this day the IIIrd German +Army Corps was directly opposed to the main body +of the French forces. It could not for the present +hope for any assistance from the corps of the +flanks, and had before it the certainty of an arduous +struggle.</p> + +<p>On the left, the Xth Corps was still this morning at +Grand Lucé, and on the right the XIIIth Corps had +been detained on the previous day by the obstinate +resistance of the French, who had held their own +between Les Cohernières and La Chapelle, and occupied +Le Chêne in their front.</p> + +<p>The troops of the 22nd Division had necessarily lost<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[289]</a></span> +their formations and become mixed up in the course of +the struggle in the wood, and it was not till they +had been re-formed and the enemy's position had been +reconnoitred by both the Divisional Commanders that +the attack was renewed at about eleven o'clock.</p> + +<p>Two battalions of the 17th Division and one battery +were left in observation in front of Pont de Gesnes, +on the southern bank of the Huisne; on the northern +side, the Mecklenburg battalions stormed Cohernières +in the afternoon after a sharp contest, and in conjunction +with the Hessians forced their way westward +up to the Gué and on towards Lombron about four +o'clock.</p> + +<p>Further to the right two companies of the 90th +Regiment (22nd Division) meanwhile took Le Chêne +by a closed attack on the obstinate defenders; the +83rd Regiment, after a sharp fire fight, stormed the +farmsteads of Flouret and La Grande Métairie. Colonel +von Beckedorff, on being relieved at Chanteloup by the +4th Cavalry Division, had driven the French out of St. +Célerin, and he then advanced to La Chapelle-St. Rémy +on the right of the Division, which occupied wide +quarters behind the points it had seized.</p> + +<p>The Mecklenburg Grenadiers had held their own for +a long time at Le Gué and La Brosse against superior +numbers attacking from Pont de Gesnes; but the +main body of the 17th Division was retired in the +evening further back to Connerré.</p> + +<p>The more completely that General von Alvensleben +had to rely solely on his own command, the more essential +it was to keep the troops composing it closely concentrated. +But a strong force of the enemy was now +on his flank, almost indeed in his rear, on the heights of +Auvours, where it was only kept at bay by his 12th +Brigade, which therefore for the present was not free +to advance.</p> + +<p>And here it was that the battle first really began. +The French had repossessed themselves of Champagné,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[290]</a></span> +and had deployed artillery on the heights behind +it. When their fire had been subdued by four guns +of the brigade, two battalions advanced to an attack +on the village. It was not till after an obstinate +street-fight, that the enemy at eleven o'clock was +driven back to the heights, and the bridge over the +Huisne carried. General von Buddenbrock now let +the two battalions remain in observation, sent a third +to Lune d'Auvours, and at noon started with the rest +of the brigade to rejoin the Corps.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the conflict had been raging with such fury +all along the front of the latter that at twelve o'clock +Prince Frederick Charles sent orders from St. Hubert to +General Voigts-Rhetz, to hurry forward by the shortest +roads to the battle-field with the Xth Corps; and at +the same time General von Manstein was instructed +to seize the heights of Auvours with the IXth.</p> + +<p>It was already one o'clock when the advanced guard +of the IXth climbed up the hollow way, deep in snow, +followed by two battalions of the 12th Brigade, and +by two batteries straining every nerve. The infantry +plunged forward through the wood, strongly held as it +was by the enemy, straight on Villiers; the skirmishers +of the Fusilier battalion of the 11th Regiment seized +three mitrailleuses in action, and when the French had +abandoned the village, turned them against the wood.</p> + +<p>Further to the left, at about three o'clock, two +battalions of the 85th Regiment from the main body +of the 18th Division, were directed on the western +end of the ridge, supported by the Jägers and two +batteries which were brought up near Les Hêtres. To +cover them two companies moved on La Lune, and +baulked for the moment the hostile rush along the high +road. But against these movements the French opened +a heavy fire from their commanding batteries behind +Yvré. Regardless thereof the Holsteiners<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[291]</a></span> +left charged on a hostile battery and seized three of its +guns. On the right they took possession of the neighbouring +farmsteads; and soon after five the French +abandoned the whole plateau as far as its western +edge.</p> + +<p>Over it, however, a strong counter-attack was +delivered in the evening, when part of Gougeard's +Division charged up the slope from Yvré. Its further +advance was arrested; but the French could not be +prevented from remaining there during the evening +and night. Nevertheless, this offensive struggle on the +part of the 18th Division had relieved the pressure on +the rear and flank of the IIIrd Corps. It received +the further order in the evening to secure the +passage over the Huisne for use next day. Three +battalions and one battery immediately crossed over to +the northern bank and drove from the bridge the hostile +detachments in its vicinity. The Division lost 275 +men.</p> + +<p>General von Alvensleben had delayed the advance +of the IIIrd Corps till eleven o'clock, in anticipation of +the arrival of the 12th Brigade.</p> + +<p>During the night (10—11th) the French had completed +their entrenchments on the skirts of the wood and +had taken up their position there; they also lined the +heights on the further side of the river with numerous +batteries. Thus a frontal attack must involve heavy +loss, and it was impossible to out-flank lines so extensive. +General von Alvensleben therefore decided +on advancing at first only against the enemy's left +wing, and assigned to that task the 11th Brigade. +The 10th and 9th remained in reserve for the present +about Changé and Gué la Hart. The 12th, released at +Mont-Auvours, was indeed marching up, but on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[292]</a></span> +circuitous ways, because the high road was everywhere +entirely commanded by the batteries on the +heights.</p> + +<p>The 11th Brigade, scarcely 3000 strong, followed +the course of the Gué Perray streamlet up to the +northern end of the wood. To protect it against +the French columns threatening it from the heights, +the 35th Regiment had to form front towards the brook +and also occupied the Château of Les Arches. The +20th Regiment tried to get forward by the cattle-path, +and while holding firmly the Château of Les Noyers +and the bridge there over the Huisnes, drove back +the enemy by sheer hard fighting to Les Granges. +But he presently returned so considerably reinforced +that the whole brigade had to be gradually +brought up into the fighting line. Les Granges +was lost and retaken several times with heavy loss, +particularly of officers; but the Brandenburgers +fought on staunchly.</p> + +<p>On the left of the 11th the 10th Brigade now made +its appearance, coming up from Changé at one o'clock. +After an hour-long bloody struggle the 52nd Regiment +made itself master of the farm of Le Pavillon, of the +wooded slope in front, and the farm of Grand Anneau. +Strong columns advancing from Pontlieue were driven +back, two batteries dashed up into the Chassepôt fire +to within 800 paces of Le Tertre; yet the 12th Regiment +did not succeed in getting into the farmstead till +two battalions of the 9th Brigade from Changé had +come up to its assistance. The farmstead whose possession +was so obstinately disputed was taken by storm at +about five o'clock, with the co-operation of the Grenadiers +of the 8th Life-Regiment.</p> + +<p>The 52nd Regiment, having expended all its ammunition, +had to retire, but the Grenadier battalions pushed +further forward on the cattle-path, where two French +guns in action were captured after a bloody mêlée; +and the enemy's repeated attempts to recover them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[293]</a></span> +were steadily frustrated. A hostile battery which had +been brought up westward of the wood was driven +back by quick fire.</p> + +<p>As the 35th Regiment had to be brought forward +from the Gué Perray brook to support the 20th, the +French had recovered possession of Les Arches. The +12th Brigade, only three battalions strong, arrived there +from Auvours at two o'clock. The 64th Regiment +recaptured the château after a short fight. The overwhelming +artillery and musketry fire from the heights +on the further side of the river prevented the German +artillery from coming into action, and it was only with +great difficulty and a heavy sacrifice of gunners that +the pieces were brought away again; but every attack +on the château by the French from Yvré was steadily +repulsed.</p> + +<p>It was now quite dark, and only the fire of the +cannon still lasted. The IIIrd Corps had taken 600 +prisoners, but had also lost 500 men. It had fought its +way into the heart of the French position, and its outposts +were in the closest proximity to the enemy's +front. And now strong, though late, reinforcements +arrived.</p> + +<p>The Xth Corps had marched from Grand Lucé to +the westward in the morning, to gain the high road +from Tours to Le Mans, but slippery roads again +delayed its march, so that it only reached Teloche in +the afternoon.</p> + +<p>The cannon thunder heard to the northward left no +doubt that General von Alvensleben was engaged in +arduous fighting. The orders sent at noon from the +Army Headquarter in St. Hubert sped to General +Voigts-Rhetz; but that officer rightly judged that his +appearance would now have a more telling effect on the +enemy's flank than on the field where the IIIrd Corps +was engaged. So in spite of the exhausted state of his +men, who had had no opportunity to cook on the +way, he at once pushed forward without halting.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[294]</a></span></p> + +<p>To protect himself against Curten's Division on +the watch for him from Château du Loir, he despatched +a battalion to Ecommoy. It was received +with firing from the houses, surrounded on all sides in +the darkness, and compelled to withdraw from the +place; but it then kept the road clear in the rear of +the corps.</p> + +<p>The head of the 20th Division found Mulsanne but +feebly defended, and drove the detachment back beyond +the cutting of La Monnerie.</p> + +<p>The nature of the country which here had to be +traversed greatly favoured the enemy. Ditches and +fences afforded his marksmen complete cover, farmsteads +and copses furnished excellent defensive positions. +Only eight guns could at first be brought to bear against +the enemy's artillery; but nevertheless four Westphalian +and Brunswick<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> battalions steadily repelled the French, +and by nightfall reached Point du Jour. The fight +first became stationary on the cattle-path in front of +Les Mortes Aures. Here the French swept the whole +foreground with a continuous rolling fire from tiers of +shelter-trenches rising one above the other.</p> + +<p>The fight swayed to and fro for a long time, but +finally the German left gained ground. The 1st +Battalion of the 17th Regiment rushed on the enemy, +who delivered his fire at point blank range and then +made for the wood. And when now the 1st Battalion of +the 56th Regiment advanced from Point du Jour, its +drums beating the charge, the French carried away +their mitrailleuses and evacuated Les Mortes Aures.</p> + +<p>This battalion had received orders from the Commanding +General to settle the business with the +bayonet. Captain von Monbart led it on locked up close +at the charging pace; all the detachments at hand +joined it, and in spite of a heavy fire from the wood +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[295]</a></span>La Tuilerie was reached by half-past eight; and here +the 40th Brigade deployed, while the 37th stood ready +to support it in front of Mulsanne. The enemy drifted +away in the darkness. The constant roll of wheels, the +noise of departing railway trains and the confusion of +cries indicated a retreat. Yet the prisoners who were +constantly being brought in, with one accord reported +that a strong force was still encamped in the forest. +Numerous watch-fires blazed there through the night, +and instead of resting, it seemed evident that the +hostile troops were preparing to engage in fresh +attempts. At half-past ten the outposts reported the +approach of a strong force from Pontlieue.</p> + +<p>Hitherto it had been only the little-to-be-relied-on +National Guards under General Lalande at this point +with whom the German troops in this quarter of the +field had had to deal; but the Admiral now sent +Bouëdec's Division against La Tuilerie, and ordered +General Roquebrune to support his advance.</p> + +<p>For a full hour the Prussian battalions in first line +were scourged with rifle fire in front and flank, and +pelted by a hail-storm of projectiles, but no serious +attack occurred.</p> + +<p>According to French reports, the officers strove in +vain to bring forward their troops; but the latter constantly +hung back. A later assault made by Gardes-Mobiles +was equally fruitless.</p> + +<p>But still there was to be no rest. At two in the +morning the din of fighting again made itself heard on +the right. Deplanque's Division had been disturbed by +a flank detachment of the 40th Brigade. This body was +advancing by the road from Ruaudin to Pontlieue, to be +at hand in case of need; without returning the enemy's +fire, it had driven out the holders of Epinettes, and had +established itself there close to the cattle-path.</p> + +<p><i>January 12th.</i>—For the impending struggle of the +following day only the IIIrd and Xth Corps could be +counted on. The other two Corps could only co-operate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[296]</a></span> +indirectly by holding engaged a part of the +hostile forces.</p> + +<p>Of the XIIIth Corps the 17th Division was to advance +by Lombron to St. Corneille, without committing +itself to a contest with the enemy still holding +the bank of the Huisne; the 22nd was ordered from +La Chapelle to Savigné. The Gué brook was to be +lightly held, and part of the artillery was to remain at +Connerré with the 7th Brigade of Cavalry.</p> + +<p>On advancing it was found that the enemy had +already abandoned Lombron, Pont de Gesnes, and +Montfort. Arms and equipments thrown away betrayed +how hurried had been the flight. Many stragglers +were brought in prisoners, and it was not till +reaching the Merdereau brook at noon, that the 17th +Division met with opposition. The Château of Hyre +and St. Corneille were won about four o'clock by +an enveloping attack, and 500 French were taken +prisoners. The enemy was then driven back behind +the Parance brook, where the advanced guard halted +at dusk.</p> + +<p>Colonel von Beckedorff's detachment of the 22nd +Division marched through Chanteloup from Sillé, +throwing back the enemy on La Croix, where a large +body of hostile troops made a stand. But when, after +a long halt, the main body of the Division came up, it +at once passed to the attack. Entire formed bodies of +French here laid down their arms, and 3000 men +with many officers became prisoners.</p> + +<p>An attempt of the cavalry to advance across the +Sarthe to break up the railway on the further side of +the river was, however, unsuccessful.</p> + +<p>The whole force occupying the heights of Auvours +surrendered to the IXth Corps. The 35th Brigade +marched up to Villiers, but patrols sent ahead soon +reported that the French had retired across the Huisne. +When the noise of fighting was heard at mid-day +from St. Corneille, the brigade in question was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[297]</a></span> +ordered to proceed northward to support the 17th +Division engaged there. The 84th Regiment, passing +through La Commune, lent efficient assistance in +the attack on Château Hyre. Outposts were left on +the Parance for the night, but the main body of +the 35th Brigade returned to Fatines, and the 36th +took up quarters between Villiers and St. Mars la +Bruyère.</p> + +<p>By the battle of the previous day the position of +the French before Le Mans had been forced; but they +still stood firm behind the Huisnes, and as their left +wing had been driven in on their centre, the latter section +had been considerably strengthened. There still +remained the stream to be crossed, and the steep slope +to be climbed, where every row of the vineyards in +terraced ascent was held by strong firing lines, and the +crest of which was crowned with batteries. The passage +of the Huisnes near Ivré, on the left, was covered by +entrenchments with special carefulness, and the ground +in front of the wood of Pontlieue had been made impassable +in many places by abatis. Against such a +position the artillery could be of little and the cavalry +of no service, while deep snow hampered every movement +of the infantry. General von Alvensleben therefore +decided on standing for the present on the defensive +with his right wing, while he prepared to support +the advance of General von Voigts-Rhetz with his left.</p> + +<p>The troops were roused from their short rest at +six in the morning. Two French companies made +their way towards the bridge at Château Les Noyers +with powder-bags, but they were compelled to retreat, +leaving the explosives behind them. At eight +o'clock the French made a determined attack on the +outposts of the 12th Regiment in the wood, and drove +them in on Le Tertre. Again a combat raged furiously +about this farmstead, which was almost demolished by +shell fire. One by one the last battalions of the 10th +Brigade were drawn into the struggle, to replace<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[298]</a></span> +bodies which, their ammunition exhausted, had to +retire. Only four guns could be used with effect, but +by eleven o'clock the enemy's fire gradually died away, +and he was seen to retire on Pontlieue. The battalions +of the left wing pursued, and came out on the Parigné +road in immediate touch with the Xth Corps.</p> + +<p>General von Voigts-Rhetz had left two battalions at +Mulsanne, for his protection from the direction of Ecommoy; +the whole Corps, after many detachments had been +unavoidably detailed from it, was assembled by about +half-past seven for a further advance on Pontlieue. +The main body of the 20th Division closed up by the +Mulsanne road on La Tuilerie. Three battalions of +the 19th Division massed at Ruaudin to strengthen +the sideward detachments in Epinettes, while two +battalions with the 14th Cavalry Brigade and the +Corps' artillery, which could find no opening in the +region further to the left, moved up by the roads from +Parigné.</p> + +<p>The reinforcement meanwhile arrived from Ruaudin, +and General von Woyna made his way without hindrance +through the forest to La Source, where he +halted at one o'clock, his front parallel with that of the +20th Division. A heavy battery of the latter had +already driven away the French mitrailleuses in front +of Pontlieue. On the right a light battery of the 19th +Division was brought up to La Source, and ten horse-artillery +guns on to the road from Parigné. The +atmosphere was, however, so thick that their fire +could only be directed by the map.</p> + +<p>At two o'clock General von Kraatz advanced in close +column on Pontlieue, whither General von Woyna was +now also marching. The southern part of the village +was taken after a slight resistance; but on the further +side of the Huisne the French held the houses along +the river-bank, and just as the Germans approached +the bridge it was blown up. The demolition, however, +was not complete, and the foremost battalions got across<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[299]</a></span> +over the débris to reach the enemy. Two made their +way into the high street of Pontlieue, one turned left to +the railway station, whence were heard signals for departing +trains. Nothing interposed to hinder the railway +bridge here from being blown up, and thus many +prisoners were taken, besides 150 provision waggons +and 1000 hundred-weight of flour.</p> + +<p>The artillery fire was immediately directed on the +town of Le Mans.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the detachments of the IIIrd Corps, which +had become mixed up in the forest fight, had re-formed. +After a ration of meat, the first for three days, had +been served out to the troops, the 10th Brigade resumed +its march. The Brandenburg Jäger Battalion +crossed the river by the paper-mill of L'Epau, and two +batteries strengthened from Château Funay the artillery +fire directed on Le Mans.</p> + +<p>When presently the infantry entered the town, a +fierce struggle began in the streets, which were entirely +blocked by the French trains. Entrance into individual +houses had to be cleared by artillery fire; a large +number of French were taken prisoners, and a vast +quantity of waggons were seized. The fighting lasted +till nightfall, and then the Xth Corps and half of the +IIIrd took up alarm quarters in the town. The 6th +Division took possession of Yvré, which the enemy +had abandoned, and threw out foreposts to Les Noyers +and Les Arches on the further side of the Huisne.</p> + +<p>The actions fought by the French on this day, had +been engaged in for the sole purpose of gaining time +for the extrication of the army.</p> + +<p>On learning from Admiral Jauréguiberry that every +effort to get the troops to advance had failed, and that +the last reserves were shattered, General Chanzy had +at eight in the morning issued orders for a general +retreat on Alençon, where the Minister of War had +arranged for the arrival of two Divisions of the XIXth +Corps from Carentan.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[300]</a></span></p> + +<p>The advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans had +been a series of seven days' incessant fighting. It was +made at a season when the winter was in extremest +severity. Ice and snow-drifts had rendered every +movement one long struggle. Bivouacking was out of +the question; and the troops had to seek their night +shelter often at a distance of some miles in rear; their +reassembling in the morning cost precious hours, and +the shortness of the day then prevented their taking +full advantage of their successes. Whole battalions were +employed in guarding the prisoners. The roads were +in such a state that the trains of the army could not +be brought up; officers and men alike marched insufficiently +clothed and on scanty rations. But zeal, +endurance, and discipline conquered every difficulty.</p> + +<p>The army had sacrificed in this prolonged struggle +3200 men and 200 officers, the larger half belonging to +the IIIrd Corps alone. Many companies fought under +the command of non-commissioned officers.</p> + +<p>The French estimated their losses at 6200 men, and +20,000 taken prisoners; seventeen guns, two colours, +and an abundant supply of matériel remained as +trophies in the hands of the victors.</p> + +<p>After exertions so severe the troops imperatively +needed some rest. The instructions from the supreme +Headquarter were that the operations were not to be +extended beyond a certain limit; and it was possible +that the services of the IInd Army might almost immediately +be required on the Seine and the Loire. Prince +Frederick Charles therefore determined to follow up +the retreating enemy with only a small force.</p> + +<p>On the French side, that each Corps might have a +separate road for the retreat to Alençon, two Corps had +necessarily to draw out westward in the first instance. +On the evening of the last day's fight the XVIth Corps +reached Chauffour on the Laval road, and the XVIIth +Conlie on the road to Mayenne, each covered by +its rear-guard. The XXIst was assembled at Ballon,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[301]</a></span> +on the left bank of the Sarthe. From these points all +were to march in a northerly direction. General +Chanzy still deluded himself with the hope of coming +up by Evreux to the assistance of the besieged capital. +He would have had thus to make a wide circuit—an +arc by moving on the chord of which the Germans could +easily have anticipated him; and in a country where all +arms were available, his army, in the condition to which +it was now reduced, must have inevitably been destroyed. +Ultimately the defeated French army retired +in the direction to the westward of the Sarthe.</p> + +<p>After the distribution of rations and forage, General +von Schmidt set forth at mid-day on the 13th with four +battalions, eleven squadrons, and ten guns, and reached +Chauffour after some skirmishing. The XIIIth Corps +advanced to the Sarthe, the 17th Division sending its +outposts across the river at Neuville, and the 22nd +drove the French out of Ballon, whence they retired in +full flight to Beaumont. The XXIst French Corps had +taken up quarters this day at Sillé. The National +Guards of Brittany fled wildly to Coron, and thence +made homeward toward their own province. They +were joined by the troops left in camp at Conlie, after +the camp there had been plundered. The XVIIth +Corps also went off, without halting by the Vègre as +it had been ordered to do, but retreating direct on Ste. +Suzanne. The XVIth withdrew on Laval, leaving +Barry's Division at Chassillé as rear-guard. Numbers +of abandoned waggons and cast-away arms, everywhere +testified to the demoralization of the defeated forces.</p> + +<p>On the 14th the French were driven out of Chassillé. +The XVIth Corps had by this time almost entirely lost +its organization; it retired during the night to St. Jean +sur Erve. In the camp at Conlie were found 8000 +stands of arms and 5,000,000 cartridges, as well as +various other war matériel.</p> + +<p>The Grand Duke had marched on Alençon along the +right bank of the Sarthe. The French in Beaumont<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[302]</a></span> +made a feeble resistance to the advanced guard of the +22nd Division, and lost 1400 prisoners.</p> + +<p>On the following day General von Schmidt advanced +further on the road to Laval, but found that the +French had concentrated at St. Jean and posted a +strong force of artillery on the heights behind the +Erve. The Oldenburg Regiment<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> forced its way as far +as the church of the little town, and the Brunswickers +drove the enemy back on Ste. Suzanne, higher up the +river, but there the pursuit ended.</p> + +<p>Barry's and Deplanque's Divisions, according to the +French estimate, had now no more than 6000 fighting +men, and Curten's Division had still not yet come up, +but this strength was considerably superior to that of +the weak German detachment confronting it. The rest +of the Xth Corps was moving up in support, but had +as yet only reached Chasillé. A battalion advancing +from Conlie came into conflict at Sillé with the XXIst +French Corps assembled there, and sustained heavy loss. +The 22nd Division of the XIIIth Corps also met with +serious opposition before reaching Alençon, from the +National Guards and the volunteers under Lipowski; +and the attack on the town was postponed till next +day.</p> + +<p>But on the following morning the French positions +in Alençon as well as in Sillé and St. Jean were abandoned. +Those places were at once occupied by the Germans, +and General von Schmidt marched forward, +close up to Laval. Numerous stragglers from the +retreating army were taken prisoners.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[303]</a></span></p> +<p>Behind the Mayenne, whither now Curten's Division +had arrived, the remnants of the IInd Army of +the Loire re-assembled. Reduced to half its original +strength, and its morale gravely shaken, it could +but be unfit for service for a long time to come, and +the object of the German advance on Le Mans was +fully attained.</p> + +<p>To the north of Paris, however, the French were +meanwhile threatening a renewed offensive. It was +necessary to draw in on the Somme the portions of the +Ist Army which were still on the Lower Seine; and +orders came from the supreme Head-quarter that +the XIIIth Corps of the IInd Army should march on +Rouen.</p> + +<p>On the Upper Loire also French detachments had +advanced against the Hessian posts about Briare, and +had driven them back, on the 14th, to Ouzouer; while +from the Sologne came a report of the advance of a +newly-formed French Army Corps—the XXVth.</p> + +<p>The German IXth Corps, after evacuating and +destroying the camp at Conlie, was therefore sent to +Orleans in support. The remainder of the IInd Army, +the IIIrd and Xth Corps with the three cavalry divisions—in +a strength of about 27,000 foot, 9000 horse, and +186 guns—was assembled by Prince Frederick Charles +round Le Mans. The cavalry in observation on the +front and flanks had several small skirmishes, but no +further serious hostilities were attempted.</p> + +<p>The 4th Cavalry Division held Alençon on the right, +and on the left General von Hartmann entered Tours +without any opposition.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> Commanding 6th Division, IIIrd Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> "Arnage" on the map and in the <i>Staff History</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> The "Holsteiners" mentioned in the text were two battalions +of the 85th Regiment, which belonged to the 36th Brigade, 18th +Division, IXth Army Corps, whose territorial region consists of +Schleswig-Holstein, the Hanse towns, Mecklenburg, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> The 17th and 92nd Regiments comprising the 46th Brigade +commanded by General von Diringshofen.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> The 91st Regiment, 37th Brigade, 10th Army Corps, whose +recruiting ground is Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick. The +Hanoverian Corps consists mainly of the regiments of the old +Hanoverian army of the kingdom long ruled by British sovereigns; +an army whose valour, proved side by side with British troops on +countless battle-fields from Minden and Dettingen to the Peninsula +and Waterloo, culminated in its final battle on the glorious but luckless +field of Langensalza.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>OCCURRENCES NORTHWARD OF PARIS +DURING JANUARY.</h2> + + +<p>At the beginning of the New Year a considerable +part of the Ist German Army was engaged in besieging<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[304]</a></span> +Péronne, which had afforded a safe crossing-point for +the debouche of the French on the southern bank of +the Somme. General Barnekow held the little place +invested with the 3rd Reserve Division and the 31st +Infantry Brigade. Previously it had only been kept +under observation by cavalry, but circumstances had +temporarily given it importance. What of the VIIIth +Corps formerly on the Somme was available formed a +wide curve from Amiens northward as far as Bapaume, +to cover the siege.</p> + +<p>The Ist Corps, posted at Rouen for the time, consisted +only of three brigades; but the 4th was on the +march thither from before Péronne, where it had been +relieved. No reinforcement of the Ist Army had been +effected. The 14th Division, after reducing Mézières +and, soon after, Rocroy, had received fresh orders from +Versailles which transferred it to another part of the +theatre of war.</p> + +<p>General Faidherbe had concentrated his troops behind +the Scarpe, from their resting quarters south of Arras, +and had begun his forward march on January 2nd. +He advanced with the XXIInd Corps to the relief of +Péronne by way of Bucquoy. The XXIIIrd followed +by the high road to Bapaume. About half-past ten +Derroja's Division of the former Corps obliged the 3rd +Cavalry Division, as well as those battalions of the 32nd +Brigade which had been attached to it, to fall back on +Miraumont, followed, however, only as far as Achiet +le Petit.</p> + +<p>The other Division, under General Bessol, did not +advance towards Achiet le Grand till the afternoon. +There it was opposed for several hours by two companies +of the 68th, a sub-division of Hussars, and two +guns, which only retired in the evening on Avesnes. +The French did not follow up the detachment, but +threw out outposts about Bihucourt.</p> + +<p>Payen's Division deployed on the high road at Béhagnies, +and its batteries opened fire on Sapignies, where,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[305]</a></span> +however, General von Strubberg had posted five battalions. +These repulsed the attack, and at two o'clock +entered Béhagnies with a rush, took 240 prisoners, +and prepared the village for defence. The enemy withdrew +to Ervillers, and there once again drew out, but +attempted no further attack.</p> + +<p>The other Division of the French XXIIIrd Corps, +consisting of mobilized National Guards under General +Robin, moved forward on the left on Mory. There were +only one battalion and a squadron of Hussars to oppose +it. By extending their line on the heights of Beugnâtre, +the German detachment succeeded in deceiving +the enemy in regard to its weakness. The latter +marched and counter-marched, and also brought up +artillery, but did not attempt an attack, and remained +at Mory.</p> + +<p>The 30th German Brigade and the 3rd Cavalry Division +assembled for the night in and about Bapaume. +The 29th Brigade occupied the neighbouring villages on +the right and the left of the Arras road.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Battle of Bapaume.</span>—<i>January 3rd.</i>—General Faidherbe +had brought his forces close up to the position +which covered the investment of Péronne. His four +Divisions consisted of fifty-seven battalions, which were +opposed by only seventeen German battalions. He +decided on the 3rd to push on in four columns to +Grévillers and Biefvillers, on the high road, and to +Favreuil on the east.</p> + +<p>But General von Goeben was not inclined to give up +his position at Bapaume. Under cover of a force in occupation +of Favreuil, General von Kummer in the morning +assembled the 30th Brigade in front of Bapaume, and +behind it the 29th, of which, however, three battalions +were left in the villages to left and to right. A +reserve was established further to the rear at Tronsloy, +whither the 8th Rifle Battalion, with two batteries, was +detached; and General von Barnekow received orders to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[306]</a></span> +hold three battalions and the 2nd Foot Detachment in +readiness at Sailly Saillisel, without raising the blockade. +Finally the detachment under Prince Albrecht, jun.—three +battalions, eight squadrons, and three batteries—advanced +on Bertincourt, near to the subsequent battle-field. +In this disposition, in bitterly cold and sullen +weather, the attack of the French was awaited.</p> + +<p>General Count von der Groeben had already sent the +7th Cavalry Brigade against the enemy's right flank, +but it did not succeed in forcing its way through the +villages occupied by the hostile infantry.</p> + +<p>On the right wing the Division Robin was at Beugnâtre +met by so sharp a fire from two battalions of the +65th Regiment and two horse batteries which had joined +them from Transloy, that it withdrew again on Mory. +The garrison of Favreuil was reinforced by two battalions +and two batteries against the approach of the Division +Payen, which was marching by the high road to the +eastward of that place. The first French gun moving +out from Sapignies was immediately destroyed, but +several batteries soon became engaged on both sides, +and the French forced their way into Favreuil and +St. Aubin.</p> + +<p>The 40th Regiment advanced on these places at noon +from Bertincourt, and after a lively action re-occupied +them; but had to evacuate Favreuil again, and took up +a position alongside of the 2nd Guard Uhlan regiment +and a horse battery sideward of Frémicourt, which +secured the right flank of the Division.</p> + +<p>On the left, the Division Bessol had driven the weak +garrison out of Biefvillers. The 1st Battalion of the +33rd Regiment, which moved forward to retake that +place, became hotly engaged; it lost all but three of +its officers, and had to retire upon Avesnes. The Division +Derroja also took part in this fight. The French +now brought up a strong force of artillery, and extended +their firing-line to the south nearly as far as the road +to Albert.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[307]</a></span></p> + +<p>Therefore, at mid-day, General von Kummer decided +to confine himself to the local defence of Bapaume. At +the cost of serious loss, the artillery covered the drawing +in thither of the infantry. The 1st Heavy Battery, +which was the last to withdraw, lost 2 officers, 17 men, +and 36 horses; its guns could only be brought out of +action with the help of the infantry.</p> + +<p>In Bapaume the 29th Brigade now prepared for an +obstinate defence of the old city wall, and the 30th +assembled behind the place. The French advanced +leisurely as far as the suburb. Then ensued a long pause +in the fighting. General Faidherbe hoped to take the +town by further encompassing it, without exposing it +to a bombardment followed by a storm. A brigade of +the Division Derroja endeavoured to advance through +Tilloy, but met there with stubborn resistance from +the Rifle Battalion and two batteries which had come up +from Péronne. At the same time twenty-four guns of +the batteries which had retired behind Bapaume opened +fire on the advancing columns, which then withdrew, at +half-past three, across the road to Albert. They soon +resumed the attack, and succeeded in entering Tilloy. +All the neighbouring batteries now opened fire upon this +village. General von Mirus, who on the advance of the +3rd Cavalry Division had been left behind in Miraumont, +saw no enemy in his front there, but heard the fighting +at Bapaume, and advanced from the west, as did +General von Strubberg from the town, to renew the +attack. The French did not await their arrival, and +were driven back out of the suburb and also Avesnes. +The French Divisions spent the night at Grévillers, +Bihucourt, Favreuil, and Beugnâtre, thus surrounding +Bapaume on three sides. The day had cost the Germans +52 officers and 698 men, and the French 53 officers and +2066 men.</p> + +<p>But only by exerting the whole available strength +of the VIIIth Corps had it been possible to withstand +the preponderating attack of the enemy. It had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[308]</a></span> +not yet been possible to replenish the Corps' supply of +ammunition, and General von Goeben decided to +immediately move back the fighting ground to behind +the Somme. This movement was actually in process +when the patrols brought information that the enemy +was also evacuating the neighbouring villages.</p> + +<p>The French troops, as yet unaccustomed to the +vicissitudes of warfare, had suffered extremely from +the previous day's fighting and the severe cold of the +ensuing night. General Faidherbe could perceive that +the forces before Péronne had been brought forward to +Bapaume, and that the Germans thus reinforced would +take the offensive. His chief object, the interruption +of the siege of Péronne, had been obtained, and the +General thought it best not to endanger that result by +a second encounter. He led his Corps back in the +direction of Arras. Of the German cavalry detachments +following up the retirement the 8th Cuirassiers +succeeded in breaking a French square. The 15th +Division withdrew behind the Somme, immediately +below Péronne, and the Saxon cavalry joined the right +wing at St. Quentin.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Fighting on the Lower Seine.</span>—<i>January 4th.</i>—Exactly +at the same time the other Corps of the Ist +Army was in conflict with the enemy on the Lower +Seine. The French had not undertaken any new enterprise +on the right bank of the river, but on the left bank +they held the wooded heights of Bois de la Londe, +which overhang the southern outlet of the Seine after +its encircling the peninsula of Grand Couronne. Here +General von Bentheim,<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> with a view of gaining room +in this direction, had assembled half the Ist Army +Corps, and advanced on the 4th of January on Les<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[309]</a></span> +Moulineaux. Before daybreak Lieut.-Colonel von +Hüllessem surprised the enemy's outposts there, stormed +the rock-crowned fortalice of Château Robert le Diable, +and took prisoners the defenders who had sought +refuge amid the ruins of the castle. The heights of +Maison Brulet were then scaled under the heavy fire +of the enemy, and two of his guns were taken. After a +renewed resistance at St. Ouen the French withdrew on +Bourgachard in the afternoon, pursued towards six in +the evening by a half squadron of dragoons, two guns, +and a company carried on waggons, which took from +them two 12-pounders posted at the entrance of Rougemontier, +killing the gunners and capturing an ammunition +waggon.</p> + +<p>After a slight skirmish the enemy was also driven +out of Bourgtheroulde and thrown back in the direction +of Brionne. The French right wing at Elbeuf +during the night hastily withdrew from a position +rendered precarious by the wavering of the other detachments. +The affair cost 5 officers and 160 men. +The loss of the French must have been equal, besides +which they lost 300 prisoners and 4 guns.</p> + +<p>General Roye posted his troops behind the Rille on +the line Pont-Audemer—Brionne, but the Germans +now held Bourgachard, Bourgtheroulde, and Elbeuf +strongly garrisoned, with three battalions at Grand-Couronne +in readiness to furnish support. The other +troops returned to Rouen. An attempted advance of +the French on the same day by the northern bank of +the Seine had been arrested in front of Fauville, whence +they again withdrew towards Harfleur.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile it had not escaped the observation of the +VIIIth Army Corps that this time the French did not +seek the cover of the northern fortresses, but that +they had halted south of Arras, thus betraying an intention +shortly to renew the attack on the force investing +Péronne.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[310]</a></span></p> + +<p>General von Goeben therefore decided to return to +the northern bank of the Somme, to cover that operation, +and there to take up a flanking position whose +front the enemy would have to cross in his advance.</p> + +<p>On January 6th, after the troops had been permitted +one day's rest and the ammunition had been replenished, +the 30th Brigade moved to Bray, the 29th to Albert. +In close vicinity to the enemy was the 3rd Cavalry +Division at Bapaume, behind it the Guard Cavalry +Brigade. For the protection of the left flank Lieut.-Colonel +von Pestel<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> occupied Acheux, and from the +investing Corps the 3rd Reserve Division moved westward +of Péronne to Feuillères. The Corps-Artillery +remained for the time on the left bank of the Somme, +since it almost seemed as if the enemy intended to direct +his attack on Amiens.</p> + +<p>But during the next day the French did not undertake +anything of importance, and on the 9th Péronne +fell.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Reduction of Péronne.</span>—<i>January 9th.</i>—For fourteen +days this little place had been invested by eleven battalions, +sixteen squadrons, and ten batteries. Flooded +meadows on one side, and on the other walls with +medieval towers, had secured it against a surprise; +but for the rest it was commanded on all sides by +overhanging heights.</p> + +<p>Although the fire of fifty-eight field guns had not +done it much damage, yet in any case it must have +been very soon discontinued for want of ammunition. +A bombardment with captured French siege-artillery +remained without result. The fortress stoutly maintained +its fire, and its garrison of only 3500 men even +attempted sorties.</p> + +<p>As before mentioned, on the day of the battle of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[311]</a></span> +Bapaume, a portion of the besieging troops had been +necessarily withdrawn to the support of the VIIIth +Army Corps, and in the uncertainty as to the result of +this fight it had been imperative to take precautions for +the safety of the siege material. The troops that remained +behind stood ready to march, and part of the +heavy guns had been withdrawn. But the garrison +maintained a waiting attitude.</p> + +<p>Two days later arrived a siege-train of fifty-five +heavy guns which had been brought together at La +Fère. A second, of twenty-eight French siege-pieces, +was on the way from Mézières. The preliminaries of a +regular siege were undertaken, and when at length on +the 8th of January a large ammunition-convoy arrived, +the commandant was summoned to give up a defence +that had now become hopeless.</p> + +<p>On the 10th of January, General von Barnekow +entered the fortress, which was found amply provided +with arms, ammunition and provisions. The garrison +were made prisoners.</p> + +<p>On the 7th of January, his Majesty the King had +assigned General von Manteuffel to another section of +the theatre of war, and had given the supreme command +of the Ist Army to General von Goeben.</p> + +<p>Freed from concern as to Péronne, that General's +only duty thenceforward was to insure the protection of +the investment of Paris. For this purpose the Somme, +whose passages were all in the hands of the Germans, +formed a natural bulwark, behind which the attack even +of a greatly superior enemy could be awaited. And +some reinforcements now arrived for the VIIIth Army +Corps. The peaceful condition of the Lower Seine +allowed of two infantry regiments and two batteries +being sent from thence to Amiens. By instructions from +the supreme Head-quarter an infantry brigade of the +Meuse Army was held in readiness, which in case of need +was to be sent up by rail to reinforce the Ist Army.</p> + +<p>It was still uncertain whither the enemy would direct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[312]</a></span> +his stroke. General von Goeben, therefore, spread his +forces behind the Somme on a prolonged extension of +some forty-five miles, still holding fast the points gained +in front of the river, to meet the contingency of his +having to renew the offensive. In the middle of the +month, the detachments of the Ist Corps under the command +of General Count von der Groeben occupied +Amiens, Corbie, and the line of the Hallue as a flank +position. The 15th Division, holding Bray firmly, took +up quarters south of that village. Next to it, on the left +of Péronne, was the 3rd Reserve Division, right of it +were the 16th Division and the 3rd Reserve Cavalry +Brigade, holding Roisel and Vermand to the front. +The 12th Cavalry Division was at St. Quentin.</p> + +<p>The French army had already begun to advance on +the Cambrai high-road, and its XXIInd Corps had +pushed back the 3rd Cavalry Division first out of +Bapaume and then out of Albert behind the Hallue. +The XXIIIrd followed by the same road, and their +objective really appears to have been Amiens. But a +reconnaissance had exposed the difficulty of attacking +in that direction, besides which a telegram from the +War Minister announced that the Army of Paris within +the next few days was to make a last supreme effort to +burst the bonds of the investment, and the Army of the +North was enjoined to divert, as far as possible, the +enemy's forces from the capital, and draw them on itself.</p> + +<p>In accordance with these orders General Faidherbe +decided to advance without delay on St. Quentin, +whither the Brigade Isnard was already marching from +Cambrai. An attack on their right wing, consisting +for the time solely of cavalry, directly threatened the +communications of the Germans, while the vicinity of +the northern forts afforded the French army shelter +and also greater liberty of action.</p> + +<p>But General von Goeben had foreseen such a leftward +movement of the enemy, and concentrated all his +forces to meet it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[313]</a></span></p> + +<p>The convalescents who were fit for service joined the +ranks. Only weak detachments were left at Amiens, +and because of the approach of the XIIIth Corps from +the Sarthe to the Lower Seine, it was now safe to transfer +the 3rd Grenadier Regiment and a heavy battery +from thence to the Somme.</p> + +<p>The departure of the French from Albert and the +march of their Corps on Combles and Sailly Saillisel +were soon reported by the cavalry in observation. +The newly-formed Brigade Pauly occupied Bapaume, +and the Brigade Isnard entered St. Quentin, whence +General zur Lippe (commanding the 12th (Saxon) +Cavalry Division detailed from the Army of the Meuse) +retired on Ham in accordance with orders. General +von Goeben now moved eastward, using the roads on +both banks of the Somme so that he might the sooner +reach the enemy.</p> + +<p><i>January 17th.</i>—The 12th Cavalry Brigade moved +further to the right on La Fère, the 16th Division to +Ham. The 3rd Reserve Division and the Guard +Cavalry Brigade arrived at Nesle; the 15th Division and +the Corps Artillery, at Villers Carbonnel. An Army-Reserve +had been formed of the troops last brought up +from Rouen, and it followed to Harbonnières. On the +northern bank, the detachment under Count von der +Groeben moved to the vicinity of Péronne.</p> + +<p>The four French Divisions had so far advanced on +Vermand as to be able to unite next day near St. +Quentin. The XXIIIrd Corps was to move straight +upon the town, the XXIInd to cross the Somme lower +down, and take up a position south of St. Quentin.</p> + +<p><i>January 18th.</i>—On the German side, the 16th and +the 3rd Reserve Division moved by the south bank of +the Somme to Jussy and Flavy, the Army-Reserve to +Ham. The 12th Cavalry Division at Vendeuil found +the country east of the Oise still free from the enemy.</p> + +<p>With the object of obtaining touch of the approaching +enemy, the 15th Division was on its part to cross<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[314]</a></span> +the Somme at Brie, and, together with the troops of +General Count von der Groeben, to advance on Vermand +and Etreillers. General von Kummer was enjoined, in +case he found that the French had taken up a position, +merely to watch them and to follow them should they +retire northward, but should they march towards the +south, to attack them with all his force.</p> + +<p>At half-past ten, the 29th Brigade came up on the +hither side of Tertry with the rear-guard of the XXIInd +Corps and its trains. The Hussars charged one of the +battalions guarding the latter, and drove the waggons +in the greatest disorder back on Caulaincourt, but had +to abandon prisoners and prize under the fire of the +approaching infantry. The French brigade had turned +about, and it advanced to an attack on Trescon. This +was resisted by the 65th Regiment and three batteries +until after two o'clock, when General du Bessol +reached the scene of the fight and ordered the French +brigade to resume its march on St. Quentin.</p> + +<p>The XXIIIrd had also halted and detached a brigade +against the left flank of the 15th Division. This, however, +on reaching Cauvigny Farm, came upon two +German battalions, which after a protracted fire-fight +pursued the retreating enemy and entered Caulaincourt +at half-past three, making 100 prisoners and capturing +fourteen provision-waggons.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Count von der Groeben had hurried +forward at the sound of firing. The General realized +that he could help most efficaciously by marching +straight on Vermand. Four batteries came into action +against Pœuilly, which was occupied by the enemy, and +when the 4th Grenadier Regiment passed to the assault +the French retreated, losing some prisoners. Many +Gardes-Mobiles were dispersed by the Uhlans. About +Vermand the whole of the XXIIIrd Corps was now in +the act of beginning to march off.</p> + +<p>Count von der Groeben therefore posted his troops +behind the Pœuilly bottom, thereby retarding the withdrawal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[315]</a></span> +of the enemy by forcing him to halt and form front +against each display of pressure. The 15th Division +took up quarters about Beauvois and Caulaincourt.</p> + +<p>The sole aim of the French Generals on this day +seemed to be to reach St. Quentin. They neglected +the opportunity of falling with their two Corps upon +the single 15th Division. The XXIIIrd Corps passed +the night in and westward of St. Quentin, and the +XXIInd, after crossing the Somme at Séraucourt, +southward of the town. A further advance either on +Paris or on the German lines of communications depended +now, when the latter had approached so close, +on the issue of a battle; and this General Faidherbe +wished to await at St. Quentin.</p> + +<p>It was important to hold on here in case the sortie of +the Paris Army should result in success. The ground +offered certain advantages—the heights in front of the +town gave a free range of fire and afforded a sheltered +position for the reserves. It was true that the Somme +divided the army in two halves, but the bridge of St. +Quentin made mutual assistance possible. The enemy +also occupied both sides of the river, and including the +Isnard and Pauly Brigades which had come up, he finally +counted 40,000 men, opposed to an enemy numerically +weaker.<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> The Germans, all told, numbered exactly +32,580 combatants, of whom nearly 6000 were cavalry.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[316]</a></span></p> +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Who had succeeded General Manteuffel in the command of the +Ist Corps, when at the beginning of December the latter found +oppressive the command of a Corps along with the Command-in-Chief +of the Ist Army.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Commanding the 7th (Rhineland) Uhlan Regiment, the officer +who so long and so gallantly defended Saarbrücken on his own +responsibility in the earliest days of the war.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Whether the author intends, in the two first sentences of this +paragraph, that the advantages of the St. Quentin position should be +enjoyed by Faidherbe or Goeben, appears somewhat obscure. The +third sentence certainly refers to the German Army, as the succeeding +one clearly shows. But this being so, there is a discrepancy +between the text and the <i>Staff History</i>, as regards the side which +the bridge of St. Quentin would serve in the battle. The following +is quoted from that work: "Moreover, the German troops were separated +by the Somme, whilst the bridges at St. Quentin enabled the +French Corps to afford one another easy support."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of St. Quentin.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(January 19th.)</div> + + +<p>General von Goeben had ordered the general attack +for this day.</p> + +<p>Covered by the occupation of Séraucourt, General +von Barnekow advanced along the southern bank of +the Somme, with the 16th and the 3rd Reserve Divisions +from Jussy through Essigny; the 12th Cavalry +Division advanced on the road leading from La Fère.</p> + +<p>The French columns were still on the march to take +up their position with its rear towards the town; and +Grugies was already occupied by them. While the +32nd German Brigade advanced northward of Essigny +the Reserve Division halted behind the village, and the +31st Brigade at a quarter to ten advanced on Grugies.</p> + +<p>This attack was taken in flank on its left by the +French Brigade Gislain, which had meanwhile occupied +the hamlets of Contescourt and Castres. It was met in +front by the Brigades Foerster and Pittié which had +promptly come into action.</p> + +<p>The fire of the German batteries was at once +returned vigorously from Le Moulin de Tout Vent. +At eleven o'clock the second battalion of the 69th +Regiment marched in company columns across the +entirely open ground against the heights on the hither +side of Grugies; but the attempt, renewed four times, +was frustrated by the destructive cross-fire of the enemy. +The ammunition of the isolated battalion was nearly +exhausted, and only when followed by six fresh companies +of the 29th Regiment did it succeed in forcing +the French back, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight: +but the latter held their ground in front of Grugies +and in the sugar-factory there.</p> + +<p>On the right wing, the 12th Cavalry Division were advancing +on the La Fère road. The French Brigade +Aynès, hitherto held in reserve, rushed forward at the +double to encounter it, and as Count zur Lippe had at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[317]</a></span> +disposition but one battalion of infantry, his advance at +first was arrested at Cornet d'Or. But when at noon the +Division was joined by reinforcements from Tergnier, +the Saxon rifles stormed the park by the high-road, +and the Schleswig-Holstein Fusiliers carried La Neuville. +The French, with the loss of many prisoners, +were vigorously pursued back to the suburb of St. +Quentin, where first they found shelter.</p> + +<p>Meantime, the 31st Brigade was engaged in a hot +fight on both sides of the railway-line in front of Grugies; +behind its right wing was the 32nd in the hollow ground +on the high-road, where it suffered severely from the +enemy's shell-fire; and on the left, the detachment +advancing from Séraucourt did not succeed in entering +Contescourt. And now the French made so determined +and overwhelming an attack from Grugies, that the +16th Division had to be withdrawn as far as Essigny.</p> + +<p>When after noon General Faidherbe joined the +XXIIIrd Corps, he had reason to hope that the XXIInd +Corps would be able to maintain its position. But +certainly the most important result was to be looked +for on the northern section of the battle-field.</p> + +<p>Here the Division Robin had taken up a position between +Fayet and Francilly. The Brigade Isnard had +marched up it on its left, and the Brigade Lagrange of +the Division Payen extended as far as the Somme. The +Brigade Michelet remained in reserve, and the Brigade +Pauly at Gricourt secured the communications rearward.</p> + +<p>On the German left, so early as eight o'clock, General +Count von der Groeben set out from Pœuilly with eight +battalions and twenty-eight guns and advanced along +the Roman road; the Cavalry Brigade accompanied the +march on the left.</p> + +<p>The East-Prussians<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> immediately hurled the French +back from Holnon, cleared them out of Selency, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[318]</a></span> +then advanced against Fayet and on to the heights of +Moulin Coutte. A gun in action, ammunition-waggons, +and many prisoners were there taken from the enemy.</p> + +<p>By degrees the twenty-eight guns were massed on +the Windmill Height and entered into a contest with +the artillery of the Division Robin. But in the course +of half an hour the ammunition failed, since the waggons +which had been sent on the previous day to the +ammunition column of the VIIIth Corps had not yet +come up with the reserve supply. The batteries, which +were moreover suffering from infantry fire, had to +retire to Holnon, and as Francilly, immediately on the +flank and to the rear, was still occupied by the enemy, +a further advance was temporarily postponed.</p> + +<p>On the right, General von Kummer with the 15th +Division, marching from Beauvois, had reached Etreillers +at ten. The King's Hussars cut in upon the +enemy's horse in retreat, and drove them back upon +L'Epine de Dallon, and the 29th Brigade entered Savy. +North of that place three batteries opened fire against +the artillery of the Division Payen, and then the 65th +Regiment passed to the attack of the forward-lying +copses. The smaller one to the south was carried, but +here, as at Francilly, the Brigade Isnard maintained +itself in the larger one to the north.</p> + +<p>At noon the Brigade Lagrange also advanced once +more on the small copse and forced its way into it for a +short time, but was again driven back by the 65th.</p> + +<p>The 33rd Regiment was posted in readiness on the +threatened right flank of the 29th Brigade, and near it +stood in action two heavy batteries of the Corps +Artillery just arrived at Savy. At the same time the +30th Brigade also advanced through Roupy on the right +of the 29th.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Colonel von Massow at one o'clock renewed +the offensive on the much more advanced left wing. +Six companies of the 44th Regiment advanced on +Fayet, and after firing into them at the shortest range,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[319]</a></span> +drove the French from the place. Two batteries followed, +and resumed action against the enemy's great +artillery position at Moulin de Cépy.</p> + +<p>General Paulze D'Ivoy, who saw the communications +of his Corps with Cambrai in such imminent danger, had +already called up the Brigade Michelet from its reserve +post west of the town, and thus reinforced now advanced +on Fayet. The Prussian detachments that were in the +place had to be withdrawn to Moulin Coutte; but the +further advance of the enemy towards these heights +was arrested by a flank attack from Selency, and at +the same time the farmstead of Bois des Roses was +carried. The French again withdrew on Fayet.</p> + +<p>There, at Francilly, and in the northern copses, they +still held their own at half-past one, while at that hour, +on the German side, all three brigades had been +brought up into the fighting-line. The Army-Reserve +had arrived from Ham at Roupy, but General von +Goeben, who from the latter place had been watching +the slow progress of the 16th Division, had already +sent it at eleven o'clock through Séraucourt to the +support of that Division.</p> + +<p>Colonel von Boecking (commanding the Army-Reserve), +with his three battalions, three squadrons, and +two batteries, advanced from Séraucourt against Contescourt. +Hastening forward with the cavalry, he brought +his artillery promptly into action; and then the 41st +Regiment, immediately on its arrival, passed to the +attack. The battalion of the 19th Regiment which was +already on the spot, joined in the fighting, and the +enemy with the loss of many prisoners, was at one o'clock +driven out of Contescourt and of Castres as well, towards +the heights of Grugies. Against these heights the fire +of the artillery, which had gradually been increased to +thirty guns, was now directed.</p> + +<p>Bent on further disputing the position, General +Lecomte brought up several battalions from the brigades +of Pittié and Aynès for the reinforcement of the Brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[320]</a></span> +Gislain. The East-Prussian Regiment (41st) succeeded, +nevertheless, by half-past two o'clock, in hurling the +enemy by an outflanking attack from the heights into +the hollow in front of Grugies. Colonel von Boecking's +vigorous attack made itself felt throughout the whole +front of fight.</p> + +<p>With a view to renewing a general advance, General +von Barnekow had ordered up his last reserves from +Essigny, when towards three o'clock the Brigade Pittié +unexpectedly pushed forward an attack along the railway +line. Its right scourged by artillery fire from +Castres, it found its left taken at unawares by the +charge of five squadrons of reserve cavalry from the +Urvilliers hollow. Simultaneously Colonel von Hartzberg +advanced with the 32nd Brigade, and drove the +enemy back to Moulin de Tout Vent.</p> + +<p>The Brigade Foerster, south of Grugies, had still held +out stubbornly, although now seriously threatened on +the right from Giffécourt, as well as by the 12th Cavalry +Division on its left flank. Its left flank now completely +uncovered by the retreat of the Brigade Pittié, and its +last strength exhausted by a long struggle, the brigade +found itself finally forced to evacuate its long-held +position. The 31st Brigade advanced along the railway-line +as far as the sugar-factory, and Colonel von +Boecking drove the last French detachments out of +Grugies. He then prepared with his artillery the attack +upon Moulin de Tout Vent. Against these heights the +41st Regiment, the battalions already ordered up from +Essigny, and the 32nd Brigade advanced to a concentric +attack. The French did not prolong their resistance, +and indeed were already in retreat. The entire German +fighting line, with the 12th Cavalry Division on its +right, moved forward on the town, which was now +reached by the fire of the artillery posted at +Gauchy. The cavalry repeatedly broke in on the +retreating hostile bodies; and the railway-station and +suburb, in which was found only the rear-guard of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[321]</a></span> +the XXth French Corps, was occupied after a short +struggle.</p> + +<p>Whilst on the southern section of the battle-field the +action took this turn, on the northern side the attacks +were also being pushed.</p> + +<p>By two o'clock the 28th Regiment advancing from +Roupy by the road from Ham had carried the farmstead +of L'Epine de Dallon; and almost simultaneously +Count von der Groeben's infantry came up to renew +the offensive.</p> + +<p>Whilst on the right some companies of the 4th and +44th Regiments opposed the advance of French detachments +from the larger copse, Major von Elpons with +six companies of the Crown Prince Grenadiers, advanced +from Holnon and Selency upon Francilly, and, +notwithstanding the hot fire of the defenders, forced an +entrance into this very straggling village, in which +many prisoners were made. As, however, the East-Prussian +Regiment then advanced further south of the +Roman road, it had in its turn to sustain a formidable +attack.</p> + +<p>To cover its threatened line of retreat, the Brigade +Michelet once more advanced from Fayet, and the +Brigade Pauly also marched from Gricourt upon Moulin +Coutte. This position, which had in the meantime +been strengthened by artillery, was, however, obstinately +held by the 44th Regiment, and when the +Grenadier companies poured in leftward towards the +Roman road, the enemy's attack was here also repulsed.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the 29th Brigade, followed by the 30th, +had already advanced in the direction of St. Quentin, the +33rd Regiment on its right and the 65th Regiment on the +left. The latter regiment now took complete possession +of the larger copse, and forty-eight guns were brought +up on both sides of the road from Savy. The further +advance of the infantry was effected in column of companies +and on an extended line, because of the heavy +shell fire of the French. The Brigades of Lagrange<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[322]</a></span> +and Isnard did not await the shock, but at four o'clock +retired on St. Quentin with the loss of one gun.</p> + +<p>Their artillery once more took up a position at +Rocourt, but at five o'clock had to abandon it abruptly, +and the French now confined themselves to the defence +of the barricaded accesses into the St. Martin suburb of +St. Quentin.</p> + +<p>Six Prussian batteries were brought up against +these, and the 29th Brigade for some time maintained +a stationary fire fight on the strongly held buildings and +gardens; but presently several companies from Rocourt +established themselves in the suburb, in which street-fighting +was still continued, even after Lieutenant-Colonel +von Hüllessem had succeeded in crossing the +canal bridge and entering the town itself.</p> + +<p>By four o'clock, General Faidherbe had already the +conviction that the XXIIIrd Corps would probably be +unable to hold its ground. In this event his choice +was limited to the alternative of a night retreat, or of +being shut up in St. Quentin. He had not yet formed +a decision, when he met in the town General Lecointe, +who reported that he had abandoned the defence of +the left bank of the Somme. Thanks to the resistance +still maintained by the XXIIIrd Corps on the north, +the XXIInd was enabled to retire unmolested on Le +Cateau.</p> + +<p>The Commanding General now ordered General +Paulze d'Ivoy to retire on that place, but the latter +only received the order at six in the evening, when +the brigades of the right wing—Pauly's and Michelet's—had +already started of their own accord for +Cambrai. The more obstinately the two remaining +brigades now defended the suburb of St. Martin, the +more ominous for them must prove the result of the +action. Attacked in rear by the battalions of Colonel +von Boecking, the greater portion were made prisoners. +The 41st Regiment alone took prisoners 54 officers and +2260 men, besides capturing 4 guns. General Faidherbe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[323]</a></span> +himself only escaped the same fate by the help of the +inhabitants.</p> + +<p>The action ended at half-past six in the evening, +and the troops passed the night in the town and in +the captured villages.</p> + +<p>The hard-won victory had cost the Germans 96 +officers and 2304 men; 3000 wounded Frenchmen +were found on the battle-field, and the number of +unwounded prisoners exceeded 9000.</p> + +<p>According to theory, the pursuit should invariably +clinch the victory—a postulate assented to by all, and +particularly by civilians; and yet in practice it is +seldom observed. Military history furnishes but few +instances, such as the famous one of Belle Alliance. +It requires a very strong and pitiless will to impose +fresh exertions and dangers upon troops who have +marched, fought and fasted for ten or twelve hours, +in place of the longed-for rest and food. But even +given the possession of this will, the question of pursuit +will yet depend on the circumstances under which the +victory has been won. It will be difficult of execution +when all the bodies on the field of battle, as at Königgrätz, +have become so intermixed that hours are +required to re-form them into tactical cohesion; or +when, as at St. Quentin, all, even the troops last thrown +into the action, have become so entangled that not one +single tactically complete body of infantry remains at +disposition. Without the support of such a body, +cavalry at night will be seriously detained before every +obstacle and each petty post of the enemy, and thus +alone its exertions will rarely be repaid.<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[324]</a></span></p> +<p>General von Goeben did not pursue the defeated +enemy till the following day. His advanced cavalry +ranged up to the suburb of Cambrai and the glacis +of Landrecies, without meeting with any resistance, +and merely brought in some hundreds of stragglers. +The Infantry Divisions followed to within four miles of +Cambrai. Against this fortress nothing could be undertaken +through want of siege material, and there was +no military advantage to be derived in extending +further north. Among the news to hand it was +reported that a considerable portion of the French +Army of the North had retired upon Lille, Douai and +Valenciennes. As fresh enterprises on its part were +consequently not to be expected, General von Goeben +brought his force back to the Somme, where towards +the end of the month it took up rest quarters between +Amiens and St. Quentin.</p> + +<p>On the Lower Seine, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg +entered Rouen with the XIIIth Corps on the +25th, after having encountered on the march only a +few franctireurs. Although General Loysel had increased +his force to a strength of nearly 30,000 by +reinforcements from Cherbourg, he had remained +entirely inactive.</p> + +<p>General von Goeben had in view the transfer to the +Army of the Somme of that portion of the Ist Corps +still about Rouen; but this was disapproved of by +telegram from the supreme Head-quarter, which on +political grounds ordered its continued retention there.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Companies of the Crown Prince's Grenadier Regiment (the 1st +of the Prussian line), and of the East Prussian Infantry Regiment +No. 44, belonging respectively to the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st +Division, Ist Army Corps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Moltke, although not quite inexperienced in the practical conduct +of war on a large scale, would scarcely have ventured to express +himself as above, if he had studied the teachings of <i>The Soldier's +Pocket-Book</i>. The distinguished author of that profound and +accurate treatise writes of pursuits in quite a different tone. "You +have won a great battle," writes Lord Wolseley, "and the enemy +are in full retreat; run after him; hammer him with guns; charge +him with cavalry; harass him with mounted infantry; pass round +his flanks, and keep pushing him and hitting him from morning until +night. Caution is out of place when you have a beaten army before +you. Wellington never delivered any crushing blow, <i>because he +failed to pursue</i>."</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Occurrences in the South-Eastern Seat of +War up to 17th of January.</span></h2> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Siege of Belfort.</span>—In the south-eastern theatre +of war, the forces detailed to operate against Belfort<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[325]</a></span> +had been only gradually brought together under cover +of the XIVth Army Corps.</p> + +<p>The town is surrounded by a bastioned enceinte. +The citadel has a wide command, built as it is on lofty +rocks, which, to increase the development of fire, are +encircled by successive tiers of works in terrace-formation. +On the left bank of the Savoureuse, newly constructed +lines of defence protected the suburb and railway +station. On the high adjacent ridge to the north-east +the forts of La Miotte and La Justice, with the +enclosing lines connecting them with the main fortress, +formed a spacious intrenched camp. Hostile occupation +of the lofty eminences of the two Perches (Hautes +and Basses) would certainly endanger the whole defensive +position, dominating as they did even the citadel +from the south at a distance of only 1100 yards, and +whence the works on the left bank of the river could +be brought under fire. But two forts of masonry +had been constructed on the Perches before the advent +of the enemy, and further to strengthen the defence +the nearest copses and villages, as for instance Pérouse +and Danjoutin, had been intrenched.</p> + +<p>The fortress was by no means deficient in bomb-proof +accommodation. Its armament consisted of 341 +heavy guns, and it was provisioned for five months.</p> + +<p>When immediately after the opening of the campaign, +the VIIth French Corps vacated Alsace, only about +5000 Gardes-Mobiles remained in Belfort, but its +garrison, increased by calling in National Guards, now +exceeded 17,000.</p> + +<p>The vigilant Commandant, Colonel Denfert, laid +great stress on the maintenance in force of the environs +in his front. The advanced posts were every day +assigned to fresh operations, which the artillery of the +fortress had to cover at extreme ranges.</p> + +<p>On the opposite side, General von Tresckow (commanding +1st Reserve Division) had available at the +outset, a force of not more than twenty weak battalions +of Landwehr, five squadrons and six field-batteries, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[326]</a></span> +all barely 15,000 men. He had at first to confine himself +to a mere investment. The troops, intrenched in +the villages round a wide circumference, had to repel +many sorties.</p> + +<p>Orders were received from the supreme Headquarter +to set about the regular siege of the place. +General von Mertens was charged with the direction +of the engineer operations, and Lieut.-Col. Scheliha +with that of the artillery attack. The difficulties +of the undertaking were obvious. The rocky nature +of the soil could not but increase the labour of +throwing up earthworks, and the cold season was +approaching. The attack could be carried on successfully +only from the south against the main work—the +formidable citadel. Only fifty heavy guns were +available for the time, and the infantry strength was +not sufficient to efficiently invest the place on all +sides.</p> + +<p>In these circumstances, there devolved on General +von Tresckow the task of attempting the reduction +of Belfort by a mere bombardment. Towards +this purpose the attack was chiefly directed from +the west, in which quarter, after the enemy's garrison +had been driven out of Valdoye, the infantry occupied +Essert and Bavilliers, as well as the adjacent wooded +heights. On December 2nd seven batteries were constructed +on the plateau between these two villages by +3000 men, under cover of two battalions. The hard-frozen +ground added to the difficulties of the work; +yet, notwithstanding the moonlight night, the operations +would appear to have escaped the attention of +the besieged. When on the following morning the sun +had dispersed the fog and made visible the objects, fire +was opened.</p> + +<p>The fortress replied at first but feebly, but afterwards +with increasing vigour from the entire line of works, +even from Forts La Miotte and La Justice at a range +of 4700 yards, and the losses in the trenches were +considerable.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[327]</a></span></p> + +<p>Four more batteries in front of Bavilliers were +armed, and on the fall of La Tuilerie the infantry +pressed on to within 170 yards of the enemy's most +advanced trenches. The artillery fire caused a conflagration +in the town; but the ammunition was soon +exhausted, whilst the lofty citadel maintained unchecked +an effective fire, and repeated sorties on the +part of the garrison had to be repelled. It was now +clear, since no decisive result had followed the methods +hitherto resorted to, that only by a regular attack could +that be attained.</p> + +<p>On the south Colonel von Ostrowski on December +13th had carried the French positions of Adelnans and +the wooded heights of Le Bosmont and La Brosse. On +the eastern point of the latter two batteries, and on +its northern skirt four additional batteries had been +thrown up, not without great difficulty arising from +thaw having made the ground a swamp. On January +7th, fifty guns opened fire. The superiority of the +artillery of the attack was soon manifest. Fort +Bellevue suffered severely, and notably the fire from +Basses Perches was entirely silenced.</p> + +<p>But it was of grave importance that the village +of Danjoutin, strongly garrisoned and intrenched by +the enemy, stood in the way of a further advance. +During the night of the 8th January seven companies +attacked this position, and also from the northward at +the same time took possession of the railway-embankment. +With empty rifles the Landwehr hurled themselves +against the enemy in the face of a hot fire, and +charged along the village street up to the church. The +supports hastening from the fortress were driven back +at the railway-embankment, but the fight about the +buildings in the southern quarter of the village lasted +till towards noon. Of the defenders, twenty officers and +700 men were taken prisoners.</p> + +<p>Typhus and small-pox had broken out in Belfort; +and in the besieging force also the number of the sick +reached a considerable figure, caused by arduous work<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[328]</a></span> +in inclement weather. Most of the battalions could +only muster 500 men, and this weakness led General +von Tresckow to devote half his force to the lighter +duty of protecting the investment from without, principally +towards the south.</p> + +<p>Trustworthy intelligence estimated the French +strength at Besançon at 62,000. Although hitherto entirely +inactive, this force now seemed in strong earnest to +press on to the relief of the hard-pressed fortress by the +line of the Doubs. On this line was the fortified château +of Montbéliard, held by one German battalion, and armed +with heavy guns. Between the Doubs and the Swiss +frontier about Delle stood General Debschitz with eight +battalions, two squadrons, and two batteries, and General +von Werder concentrated the XIVth Corps at Noroy, +Aillevans, and Athésans, to oppose with all his strength +any interruption of the siege of Belfort.</p> + +<p>From January 5th onwards there ensued a series of +engagements in front of Vesoul, as the result of which +the enemy advanced from the south and west to within +four miles of that town. There could be no doubt that +very considerable forces were engaged in this advance. +East also of the Ognon, the enemy's posts were advanced +beyond Rougemont, although in lesser force. In these +actions 500 prisoners were made; and it was at once +evident that besides the XVIIIth, the XXIVth and +XXth Corps also formed part of Bourbaki's army; a +circumstance which threw a sudden light upon a totally +changed phase of the war.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Transfer of the French Army of the East to the +South-Eastern Seat of War, end of December.</span>—As +had been expected by the supreme Headquarter at Versailles, +about the beginning of January an attempt had +been made to bring about combined action on the part +of Generals Chanzy and Bourbaki. As we have already +seen, the advance of the former had been thwarted by +Prince Frederick Charles on the Loir, and Bourbaki<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[329]</a></span> +had actually made preparations for an advance by Montargis +to the relief of Paris. But he delayed its execution +until the 19th December, when the IInd German Army +had already returned to Orleans from its expedition to +Le Mans. General Bourbaki had now to realize that +the IInd Army would fall on the flank of his projected +movement, and he thus the more readily concurred in +another plan, devised by the Delegate de Freycinet, +and approved of by the Dictator Gambetta.</p> + +<p>This was for the XVth Corps to remain about Bourges +and to cover that town in intrenched positions about +Vierzon and Nevers; the XVIIIth and XXth were to +proceed to Beaune by railway, and, when raised to a +strength of 70,000 by an union with Garibaldi and +Crémer, to occupy Dijon. The newly-formed XXIVth +Corps was also to be moved by railway from Lyons to +Besançon, where, with the forces already there, a +strength of 50,000 would be attained. In co-operation +with the "invincibles of Dijon," it then would be +easy to raise the siege of Belfort "without even +striking a blow." It was expected that the mere +existence of this mass of considerably above 100,000 +men would avert any attacks upon the Northern +fortresses; in any case, there was the certainty of +severing the enemy's various lines of communication, +and the later prospect also of combined action with +Faidherbe.</p> + +<p>The railway transport of Bourbaki's army from the +Loir to the Saône had already commenced by December +23rd. In the absence of all preparations, many +interruptions and breaks-down in the traffic naturally +occurred, and the troops suffered severely from the +intense cold and from being insufficiently cared for. +When Chagny and Châlons sur Saône had been reached, +and it was ascertained that the Germans had already +evacuated Dijon, it was decided to again entrain the +troops so as to bring them nearer to Besançon; whence +arose a fresh delay, and it was only in the beginning of +the new year that the Army of the East stood in readiness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[330]</a></span> +between Dijon and Besançon. The XVth Corps +was now also ordered thither, but fourteen days were +required for its transportation.</p> + +<p>The comprehensive plan of M. Freycinet, and his +sanguine expectations, were essentially favoured by the +circumstance that the transfer of those great bodies of +troops to a remote section of the field of war had +remained concealed for a fortnight from the IInd +Army, as well as from the XIVth Corps, and consequently +from the chief Head-quarter. Rumours and +newspaper articles had no doubt given somewhat +earlier hints, but General von Werder's telegram of +January 5th was the first really authentic announcement +by which it was known beyond doubt that the +Germans now stood face to face with an entirely altered +aspect of the military situation. In Versailles the appropriate +dispositions and arrangements were promptly +made, and steps taken for the formation of a new Army +of the South.</p> + +<p>There was available for this purpose the IInd Corps +at Montargis, and half of the VIIth under General von +Zastrow at Auxerre, which during this period of uncertainty +had been constantly moving to and fro between +the Saône and Yonne, according as the one or +the other quarter appeared to be threatened. The +chief command of these two Corps, to which was afterwards +added that of the XIVth, was entrusted to +General von Manteuffel. General von Werder could +not be immediately reinforced, and for a time the +XIVth Corps was thrown upon its own resources.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding their superiority of strength, the +French did more manœuvring than fighting. General +Bourbaki aimed at outflanking the left wing of the +XIVth Corps, and thus entirely cutting it off from Belfort. +On January 5th the XVIIIth Corps advanced by +Grandvelle, and the XXth by Echenoz le Sec, on Vesoul; +but, as we have seen, they there met with opposition, +and as the XXIVth Corps sent to the right to Esprels<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[331]</a></span> +learned that Villersexel was occupied by the Germans, +Bourbaki determined upon a still more easterly and +circuitous route. On the 8th the two Corps of the left +wing marched off to the right, the XVIIIth to Montbozon, +the XXth to Rougemont; the XXIVth went +back to Cuse. At the same time General Crémer +received orders to move from Dijon on Vesoul. On +the 9th the XXIVth and XXth Corps were at Vellechevreux +and Villargent on the Arcey-Villersexel road, +while the head of the XVIIIth Corps reached Villersexel +and Esprels.</p> + +<p>General von Werder had no alternative but to +follow this sideward movement in all haste. He ordered +the Baden Division to Athésans, the 4th Reserve +Division to Aillevans, and Von der Goltz's Brigade +to Noroy le Bourg. The trains were put in march to +Lure.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Action of Villersexel</span>, January 9th.—Accordingly +at seven in the morning the Reserve Division was sent +on from Noroy to Aillevans, and began bridging the +Ognon to admit of the continuation of the march. A +flanking detachment of the 25th Regiment sent to the +right, was fired on near Villersexel, and the attempt to +carry the stone bridge at that place failed shortly after. +The French with two and a half battalions occupied +the town, situated on a height on the further bank of +the river. Shortly afterwards reinforcements came up +on the German side. Two batteries opened fire upon the +place and upon the still advancing bodies of the enemy. +The 25th Regiment crossed the river by the suspension +bridge and broke into the walled park and into the +château. At one o'clock the French were driven out +of the town with the loss of many prisoners, and a +pause in the fighting ensued.</p> + +<p>The Prussian force during the fighting had been +seriously threatened on its flank by the advance from +Esprels of the 1st Division of the French XVIIIth Corps,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[332]</a></span> +with the artillery-reserve. General von der Goltz, +however, opposed it by occupying the village of Moimay. +He also sent to Villersexel nine companies of the +30th Regiment, to relieve the 25th Regiment there, so +as to allow the latter to rejoin its own Division in the +further march. His combined brigade was eventually +to form the rear-guard of the whole movement.</p> + +<p>General von Werder, who observed the considerable +force in which the French were advancing on Villersexel +from the south, concluded that there was less to +be gained by forcing his own passage across the +Ognon than by opposing that of the French, since +the river covered his line of approach to Belfort. He +therefore recalled the infantry already issuing to the +southward from the town, and withdrew the batteries +to the northern side of the river. Here the main body +of the 4th Reserve Division took up a defensive position, +and the Baden Division was called in on its +march at Arpenans and Lure, as a much-needed reinforcement +to the former.</p> + +<p>It was already evening when large columns of the +French advanced on Villersexel and shelled the town.</p> + +<p>Favoured by the darkness, they penetrated into the +park and château, from which the German garrison had +already been withdrawn; and as the general condition +of things did not seem to necessitate the occupation of +Villersexel, the responsible officers ordered the evacuation +of the town. Though hard pressed by the enemy, +this movement had been nearly completed, when +orders arrived from General von Werder to hold the +town.</p> + +<p>At once four battalions from the Reserve Division +advanced to the renewed attack. The 25th Regiment +turned about at the bridge over the Ognon and joined +them. The Landwehr rushed into the ground floor of +the straggling château, but the French defended themselves +in the upper floors and the cellars. On the +staircase and in the passages of the already burning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[333]</a></span> +buildings there ensued a hot and changeful combat, and +the fight was maintained in the streets. Not till the +General in command took the matter in hand, and himself +ordered it to be broken off, were dispositions made +at one o'clock in the morning for a gradual retirement, +which was completed by three. The Reserve Division +then recrossed the bridge at Aillevans, and occupied +St. Sulpice on the right.</p> + +<p>General von der Goltz had held Moimay until +evening.</p> + +<p>Of the XIVth Corps only 15,000 had been engaged, +of whom 26 officers and 553 men had fallen. The French +losses amounted to 27 officers and 627 men; and they +also left behind in the hands of the Germans 700 unwounded +prisoners. The French troops which chiefly +took part in the operations were the XVIIIth and +XXth Corps; the XXIVth Corps, on account of the +fighting in its rear, had suspended its march to +Arcey through Sevenans. Detachments of the gradually +incoming XVth Corps advanced from southward in +the direction of Belfort.</p> + +<p>On the morning of January 10th, General von +Werder massed his Corps in the vicinity of Aillevans, +ready to engage the enemy should the latter attempt an +advance through Villersexel. But no attack was made, +and so the march could be resumed that same morning. +As a matter of fact, the French with three Corps were as +near to Belfort as the Germans were with three Divisions. +To cover the departure the Reserve Division +took up a position at Athésans, and on the following +day all the forces reached and occupied the line of +the Lisaine. On the right wing about Frahier and +Chalonvillars stood the Baden Division; in the centre, +the Reserve Brigade between Chagey and Couthenans; +on the left, the Reserve Division at Héricourt and +Tavey. On the south, General von Debschitz stood +in observation at Delle, and Colonel von Bredow at +Arcey; towards the west Colonel von Willisen was at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[334]</a></span> +Lure with the detachment of eight companies, thirteen +squadrons, two batteries, which had come up from +Vesoul.</p> + +<p>General von Werder had in fact, succeeded in interposing +his force between the enemy and Belfort.</p> + +<p>The French commander, under the intoxicating +impression of a victory, had resigned himself to inactivity. +"General Billot," he reported to the Government +at Bordeaux, "has occupied Esprels and maintains +himself there." We know that he was never +attacked there at all, and that he did not succeed in +driving away General von der Goltz from the vicinity +of Moimay. "General Clinchant has carried Villersexel +with extraordinary dash;" but the fight of the 9th +was, as regards the Germans, maintained with only a portion +of the XIVth Corps, to cover the right flank of the +main body on its march. Whilst, then, this movement +of the latter was prosecuted with the utmost energy, +the French army remained passive for two days, ready +for action and in the confident expectation that the +enemy described as beaten, would come on again to fight +for the supremacy. Not until the 13th did the XXIVth +Corps advance on Arcey, the XXth on Saulnot, and +the XVIIIth follow to Sevenans. The XVth was to +support an attack on Arcey by way of Ste. Marie.</p> + +<p>General von Werder had utilized this interval, while +the troops were hastening forward, in ascertaining the +eligibility of the Lisaine position and in a consultation +with General von Tresckow in rear of it.</p> + +<p>A detailed inspection showed that at Frahier the +Lisaine, there but an unimportant streamlet, flows +through a broad grassy hollow, and thence to Chagey +through steep wooded slopes. About Héricourt the +valley opens out into a wide plain, which is however +commanded by the rocky heights of Mont Vaudois. +Lower down the wooded heights line the river as far as +Montbéliard, which with the Allaine brook forms a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[335]</a></span> +strong point of support and the extremity of the +line.</p> + +<p>The wooded character of the plain west of the Lisaine +would necessarily increase the assailants' difficulties in +the deployment of large infantry masses and a strong +artillery line. It is true that during the prevailing +severe cold the river was everywhere frozen over; but +only two high-roads led through the forest into the +valley from the direction by which the French army +was advancing, one to Montbéliard, the other to Héricourt. +The other accesses were narrow, hollow roads +rendered difficult of use by frost.</p> + +<p>General von Tresckow had already armed the most +important points with siege guns, the castle of Montbéliard +with six, and the neighbouring height of La +Grange Dame with five heavy cannon. Seven were +placed on Mont Vaudois and near Héricourt; besides +these, twenty-one others commanded the valley of the +Allaine southward as far as Delle.</p> + +<p>All the troops that could be spared from the investing +force were also withdrawn from before Belfort. Still +there remained the important consideration that the +available forces might not suffice to entirely cover the +whole of the Lisaine line. The right wing was the locally +weakest portion of the whole position, but here there was +the least to be apprehended, the enemy's main attack, +since the many needs of the numerous but inadequately +equipped French army made the nearest possible +vicinity of one of the railroads a necessity. The +Vesoul line by way of Lure was broken in many +places, and the Besançon line led towards the strong +left wing. The country north of Chagey might therefore +more weakly be held, and a reserve was formed of +the largest part of the Baden Division, which was distributed +in rear of the centre and left about Mandrevillars, +Brévilliers and Charmont.</p> + +<p>The respite accorded by the enemy was turned to +account with the utmost zeal in the construction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[336]</a></span> +rifle-pits and of battery emplacements, the establishment +of telegraph and relay lines, the improvement of +roads and the replenishment of supplies and ammunition.</p> + +<p><i>January 13th.</i>—On the morning of the 13th the +advanced posts of the 3rd Reserve Division were now +attacked at Arcey, Ste. Marie and Gonvillars. They +were instructed to withdraw before a superior force, +but to hold their own long enough to compel the deployment +of the hostile columns. The combat with +French artillery coming up at wide intervals was therefore +prolonged for a considerable time; then, after a three +hours' resistance, a new position was taken up behind +the Rupt brook, and the retirement on Tavey delayed +until four in the afternoon. The advanced guard of +General von der Goltz, after a whole brigade had deployed +against it, also took up a position at Chavanni +on a parallel front with that at Couthenans.</p> + +<p>Before the Allaine front the French did not succeed +in driving General von Debschitz's advanced posts out +of Dasle and Croix.</p> + +<p><i>January 14th.</i>—On the 14th General von Willisen +with fifty dismounted Dragoons drove back the enemy +advancing on Lure, and then retired with his detachment +on Ronchamp.</p> + +<p>The French army did not yet on this day undertake +a serious attack. It stood with the XVth, XXIVth, and +XXth Corps, closely concentrated opposite the German +left and centre at a distance of scarcely four-and-a-half +miles. The German right was supposed by General +Bourbaki to rest upon Mont Vaudois. His plan was to +cross the Lisaine in force above this point of support, +and by thus turning the hostile flank to facilitate a +frontal attack. The XVIIIth Army Corps and the +Division Crémer were assigned to this service. A drawback +to this judicious arrangement was, that the two +above-mentioned bodies designed by the officer in +supreme command to open the fight on the 14th, would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[337]</a></span> +have the longest distance to march to their task. On +this day the leading troops of the XVIIIth Army Corps +barely succeeded in reaching the vicinity of Lomont +through difficult hill and woodland region, and +Crémer's Brigade<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> had only then begun to advance +from Vesoul. A postponement to the 15th was thereupon +determined.</p> + +<p>On the German side, a general attack by the greatly +superior enemy was hourly expected, and General von +Werder felt himself bound to send by telegraph to +Versailles a representation of the extreme seriousness +of his position. The rivers, being frozen over, were passable, +and the duty of covering Belfort deprived him of +freedom of movement and endangered the existence of +his corps. He earnestly prayed that the question +should be weighed, whether the investment of Belfort +should continue to be maintained.</p> + +<p>In the supreme Head-quarter it was considered that +any further retirement of the XVth<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> Army Corps +would have the immediate effect of raising the siege of +Belfort, and causing the loss of the considerable +material which had been provided therefor; that it +was impossible to foresee where such further retirement +would end; and that it could but delay the co-operation +of the army advancing by forced marches under General +von Manteuffel. At three o'clock on the afternoon of +15th January a positive order was despatched to General +von Werder to accept battle in front of Belfort. He +was, as was only fair, relieved of the moral responsibility +of the consequences of a possibly disastrous issue. +But before this order reached him, the General had +already come to the same resolution.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[338]</a></span></p><div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Slip of the pen for "Division."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> So in text; a slip of the pen, or printer's error, for the XIVth +Corps, which von Werder commanded. There was no XVth Corps +in 1871.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle on the Lisaine.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(January 15th to 17th.)</div> + + +<p><i>January 15th.</i>—On the morning of the 15th of +January, two Divisions of the French XVth Corps, +strengthened by artillery, advanced on Montbéliard; +a third followed in reserve. The East-Prussian Landwehr +battalions, which had pushed forward to the +Mont Chevis Farm and Ste. Suzanne, held their position +for a long time, advanced on their part to the attack, +and drove the heads of the enemy's columns back upon +the Rupt brook. But when the latter in the afternoon +deployed in greater force along the edge of the wood, the +Landwehr advanced posts were at two o'clock ordered +back to the left bank of the Lisaine. The town of +Montbéliard, entirely commanded by the surrounding +heights, was also voluntarily evacuated, only its fortified +castle being held. But east of Montbéliard General von +Glümer with the 1st Baden Brigade had taken up a position, +and had brought up four field-batteries alongside +the siege guns on the plateau of La Grange Dame.</p> + +<p>Towards the close of the day the French, after a +continuous but ineffective bombardment from eight +batteries, took possession of the town, but did not make +any further advance.</p> + +<p>Neither had they prospered in their attempt to cross +the Lisaine at Béthoncourt. An officer and sixty men, +who had sought cover within a walled graveyard from +the sharp fire of the defenders, were taken prisoners.</p> + +<p>Further to the north the French XXIVth Corps +continued to advance, but it was two o'clock before its +columns were able to deploy from the wood. Four +battalions did, indeed, succeed in taking possession of +the village of Bussurel on the western bank of the +Lisaine, but their further advance was frustrated by +the fire of the defenders in cover behind the railway<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[339]</a></span> +embankment, and by that of the Baden battalions and +batteries brought up from the main reserve.</p> + +<p>Héricourt, on the great high road from Besançon and +only little more than four miles from Belfort, became a +point of special importance in the German fighting line. +Here in front of the Lisaine the right wing of the 4th +Reserve Division struck the enemy.</p> + +<p>The little wooded knoll of Mougnot, which forms a +sort of bridge-head to the narrow gorge through which +the road passes, had been fortified by the pioneers with +abatis, battery emplacements and rifle-pits, the town +in its rear prepared for defence, and the base of the +heights on either of its sides faced with artillery. Four +East-Prussian Landwehr battalions were in touch on +the right with the Reserve Brigade, which held the +slope of Mont Vaudois as far as Luze.</p> + +<p>About ten o'clock the French deployed their artillery +on the bare heights close to the line of approach in +the vicinity of Trémoins. Upon their infantry advancing +leftwards through Byans, the German detachment +which till then had been left in Tavey fell back on +Héricourt in reserve, and the enemy's first attack on +Mougnot was shattered by the resistance of its defenders, +and by the fire of sixty-one guns on the further bank +of the river. The attempt was not repeated that day, +and the French confined themselves to a heavy but +ineffective cannonade.</p> + +<p>According to the instructions issued by General +Bourbaki, the XXth Corps was to await the result of +the great outflanking movement which was to be carried +out by General Billot with the XVIIIth Corps and +Crémer's Division. As, however, these had not yet +put in an appearance, the Army-Reserve had to be +brought up leftward to Coisevaux to protect General +Clinchant's flank.</p> + +<p>The orders from the Army Head-quarter had not +reached the XVIIIth Corps until midnight. It had +moreover to accomplish a difficult march by deeply<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[340]</a></span> +snowed-up woodland paths. This entailed crossings, +not only between the flank columns of its 1st and 3rd +Divisions, but even with the Division Crémer at +Lyoffans. This Division had only by dint of the +greatest exertion reached Lure during the night, and +could not get further on to Béverne until nine in the +morning. A fresh delay was occasioned by the order +to bring up in front of the infantry the artillery—even +the reserve artillery which was marching in the very +rear; and thus it happened that the XVIIIth Corps did +not succeed in deploying two of its Divisions opposite +Luze and Chagey till between 12 and 2 in the afternoon.</p> + +<p>The 1st Division occupied Couthenans with one +battalion, and brought up five batteries on the reverse +slope of the heights to the north of that place. But +the fire from the opposite bank prevented their further +progress, and in a short time several of the batteries +had but two guns left fit for action, although the Germans, +in view of the difficulty of replenishment, used +their ammunition as sparingly as possible. At three +o'clock there was a pause in the artillery fight, which +however was resumed energetically on the arrival of +reinforcements, when the artillery of the XXIVth +Corps coming from Byans took part in it. An +infantry attack on a large scale was not yet attempted.</p> + +<p>There was scarcely more vigour in the advance of +the 3rd Division against Chagey, which was occupied +only by a Baden battalion; yet it was from here that +the outflanking movement of the German right wing by +turning Mont Vaudois was to be gone upon. The +wood reached to the first houses of the village, and the +only difficulty was the climb up the steep face of the +height. Two French battalions suddenly burst from the +gorge south of it, and drove in the Baden outposts; +the further attack was to have been supported from +Couthenans on the south, but the infantry advancing +from thence found itself forced to turn back by the fire +from the opposite bank. Only by a renewed effort did<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[341]</a></span> +the Zouaves succeed in entering Chagey, where a stubborn +fight raged in and around the houses. Meanwhile +two Baden battalions came up, who, at five o'clock, +drove the enemy out of the village back into the wood. +Fresh reinforcements hastened to the support of the +latter from the reserve near by, the short winter's day +was over, and here during the night the French +attempted nothing further. The 2nd Division of the +French Corps had only advanced as far as Béverne, the +cavalry had not moved from Lyoffans.</p> + +<p>The Division Crémer, despite its late arrival at +Lure, had continued the march in the early morning. +After the above-mentioned crossings and resultant +delays the 1st Brigade advanced on Etobon, and there +at noon it engaged in a fight with a Baden detachment +under the command of General von Degenfeld. +When the 2nd Brigade also came up, the 1st moved +forward through the Bois de la Thure, with intent to +cross the Lisaine above Chagey. Parts of the roads +had first to be made practicable by the pioneers, involving +considerable delay. The 2nd Brigade then followed +in the dark, having left a detachment in +observation at Etobon. A fresh collision with some +Baden detachments determined General Crémer to +extinguish all the watch-fires. His troops remained +under arms throughout the hard winter night.</p> + +<p>On the German side, all the troops not on guard +duty found shelter in the neighbouring villages, the +pioneers only being kept at work with their pickaxes. +The actions had cost both sides about 600 men, without +bringing about any decisive result; but every day was +a gain to the defenders.</p> + +<p>General Von Werder, on the heights north of Héricourt, +had received constant reports regarding the +course of the fighting from the General Staff officers +sent out in various directions, by which he was able to +regulate the abstraction from the reserves of reinforcements +to the fighting line. The diminution of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[342]</a></span> +ammunition was a cause of anxiety, since a consignment +announced from Baden had not yet arrived.</p> + +<p>General Bourbaki informed his Government that he +had taken Montbéliard, it was true without the castle, +had occupied the villages on the west bank of the +Lisaine, and that he would attack on the 16th. He +had learned from General Billot that the German right +wing extended considerably beyond Mont Vaudois, +whence he inferred that important reinforcements had +reached the enemy, whose strength he estimated at +80,000 to 100,000 men. Nevertheless he anticipated +a fortunate issue for the outflanking operation by fetching +a yet wider compass to the left.</p> + +<p><i>January 16th.</i>—At half-past six on the morning of +the 16th the Germans again stood to arms in the positions +of the previous day.</p> + +<p>The French again began the attack with their right +wing. From the loopholed houses they fired on the +Landwehr company holding the castle of Montbéliard, +causing some loss among the latter as well as among +the gunners. The summons to surrender was disregarded, +and the fire of the fortress artillery was +used to such good purpose against two batteries which +showed themselves on the neighbouring height, that +these were obliged to retire, leaving behind them two +guns. Neither could they advance from a new position +they had taken up at the farm of Mont Chevis, and +where they had been reinforced by three batteries, +against the fire from La Grange Dame, although the +cannonade continued until dark. No attempt was +made from Montbéliard to pierce the German line.</p> + +<p>Further to the left the reinforced 1st Division of the +French XVth Corps advanced on Béthoncourt. At +one o'clock the fire of its artillery from Mont Chevis +and Byans obliged a Baden battery to limber up, and +it was then directed on the village. Large bodies +had been massed in the neighbouring forest, from +out which at three o'clock they advanced. General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[343]</a></span> +Glümer had meantime despatched reinforcements to the +threatened front. Two determined attempts pushed +close up to the village were frustrated by the destructive +artillery and rifle fire of the defenders. A third +attack made with a whole brigade at four o'clock, was +not permitted even to approach. The losses on the +French side were considerable, and the snowy field was +strewn with the fallen. Some unwounded prisoners +were also taken.</p> + +<p>One Division of the XXIVth French Corps had +taken up a covered position in the woods behind Byans, +and as it had already occupied Bussurel on the previous +day, the German defensive position here in the rear +of the railway embankment appeared to be threatened +from the immediate vicinity. The General in command +therefore sent General Keller with two Baden Fusilier +battalions and one heavy battery from Brévilliers in +this direction. The latter joined the two batteries +which had been engaged on the slope of the hill since +morning. The fire of five of the enemy's batteries was +soon silenced by the unerring projectiles from the +German guns. At noon the French artillery retired +from Byans, leaving there also two guns, which could +only be brought away later. The infantry, one Division +strong, had only threatened to pierce the line, without +proceeding to carry out the attempt.</p> + +<p>The XXth Corps brought up two Divisions against +the line Héricourt—Luze. A thick fog covered the +valley, and the early cannonade was at first scarcely +answered by the Germans. To obtain some insight +into the intentions of the enemy, two companies +advanced to the height west of St. Valbert, and surprised +the enemy moving up from Byans with so rapid a fire +that he turned back. But soon after, at half-past nine, +several battalions burst out from Tavey against the +Mougnot. Two attacks were frustrated by the steady +resistance of the Landwehr battalions, and a third +attempt directed against the southern exit from Héricourt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[344]</a></span> +did not succeed. About four o'clock fresh masses +of infantry again gathered against the Mougnot, but +coming under fire from Mont Salamou, they shrank +from further attacks, and confined themselves till +evening to an ineffective cannonade.</p> + +<p>At Chagey two Divisions of the XVIIIth Corps +found themselves face to face with the Germans. They +did not attempt anything.</p> + +<p>The little spirit with which on January 16th the +action along the whole front from Montbéliard to +Chagey was conducted, pointed to the conclusion that +the French were everywhere awaiting the issue of the +scheme of out-flanking the German right wing.</p> + +<p>This task now devolved on General Crémer. The +2nd Division of the XVIIIth Corps joined him at +Etobon.</p> + +<p>Two Divisions advanced thence on Chenebier, where +General von Degenfeld stood with two battalions, two +batteries, and one squadron. There could be no doubt +as to the result. At eleven o'clock the Division Penhoat +of the XVIIIth Corps advanced to encompass the +place on the west and north, and the Division Crémer, +for the purpose of barring the defenders' line of retreat +on Belfort, advanced on the south, where the wood of +La Thure covered his approach. The batteries of both +Divisions were brought up in the afternoon on its +northern edge, where they opened fire. After they +had been in action for two hours, the infantry masses +advanced from three sides. Under General Crémer's +personal leading the Baden Fusiliers were driven from +the southern to the northern part of the village, and +as his encompassment therein through the wood of +Montedin was practicable, General von Degenfeld, +after an obstinate resistance, at three o'clock was +obliged to take up his retreat in a northerly direction +through Frahier. Thence he again turned south-east +and took up a position in front of Chalonvillars, +about the high-lying windmill of Rougeot, where,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[345]</a></span> +at six o'clock, he was joined by Colonel Bayer with +reinforcements. The French did not pursue; the Division +Crémer, which had lost 1000 men, retired, on the +contrary, into the wood of La Thure, while Penhoat's +Division confined itself to the occupation of Chenebier.</p> + +<p>Thus the German line of defence was nowhere +broken on this day; still, its extreme right wing had +been driven back to within little more than three miles +of Belfort.</p> + +<p>The fortress celebrated the success of the French +arms by a victory-salute, but made no serious sortie on +the investing forces, weakened as they were by the +despatch of reinforcements; and the latter, on their side, +quietly continued the construction of batteries.</p> + +<p>General von Werder, anxious above all things to +re-establish the fighting position on his right wing, +could however only gather in as a general reserve +four battalions, four squadrons, and two batteries, +bringing up these from the least exposed places and +even from Belfort, to Brévilliers and Mandrevillars. +At eight o'clock in the evening General Keller was +ordered to retake Chenebier. On this errand he left +Mandrevillars with two Baden battalions, reached +Moulin Rougeot at midnight, and found Frahier already +occupied by Colonel Bayer.</p> + +<p><i>January 17th.</i>—On this morning eight battalions, two +squadrons, and four batteries were assembled in Frahier. +Three of the battalions advanced on the northern, three +on the southern part of Chenebier; the others remained +in reserve at the windmill, where also three 15 cm. +cannon were to be stationed.</p> + +<p>At half-past four a.m. the first column, advancing in +dead silence, surprised an outpost of the enemy's at +Echevanne, but it was unavoidable that its rifle fire +should make the French in Chenebier aware of the +danger by which they were menaced. In the wood +north of the village, the Germans met with serious +resistance; and the danger that in the darkness and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[346]</a></span> +the dense undergrowth the troops might fall on each +other obliged their withdrawal to the outer edge of the +wood.</p> + +<p>The other column, advancing in the valley of the +Lisaine, had quickened its pace from Moulin Colin +as soon as the first shots were heard. The 2nd +battalion of the 4th Baden Regiment rushed with +cheers into the southern part of Chenebier, where a +great confusion ensued. But daybreak showed that +the heights on the west of the village were strongly +occupied, and that columns of all arms were approaching +from Etobon. At 8.30 Colonel Payen had to resolve +on retirement from the half-conquered village, carrying +with him 400 prisoners, and on taking up a position +at the Bois de Féry, to cover the road to Belfort +through Chalonvillars.</p> + +<p>At the same time the right column, strengthened by +a battalion from the reserve, renewed the attack on the +wood, and after a struggle which lasted for two hours +with heavy losses on both sides, at last took possession of +it. But the attempt to penetrate into the barricaded +and strongly-defended village was vain. A destructive +fire met every attack; a single round of mitrailleuse +fire, for instance, struck down twenty-one men of the +Baden assailants. At three o'clock in the afternoon +General Keller therefore assembled his troops at +Frahier, where they were supported by four batteries.</p> + +<p>With such inferior strength, and after failing in this +attempt, it was useless to think of driving back the +enemy beyond Chenebier; the only course to pursue was +to hinder his further advance on Belfort. And this +object was fully accomplished; the French did not +pursue. Instead of out-flanking the German right, +they seemed chiefly concerned for their own left. +They defended Chenebier stoutly, but gave up all +further offensive movements.</p> + +<p>While awaiting the expected success of the out-flanking +movement, General Bourbaki's intention +seems to have been merely to occupy the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[347]</a></span> +along his front and to hold him fast where he stood. +Even during the night the Germans were alarmed at +Béthoncourt and before Héricourt, while they, on +their part, disturbed the French at Bussurel and in +the Bois de La Thure. The infantry fire went on for +hours, and numerous detachments had to spend the +bitter winter's night under arms. In the morning two +Divisions of the XVIIIth French Corps advanced on +Chagey and Luze, but their batteries, although supported +by the artillery of the Army Reserve, they +could not advance against those of the Germans, and +repeated attacks on those villages were unsuccessful. +After one o'clock a cannonade only was maintained +here. In front of Héricourt also there was an exchange +of shell fire, and Bussurel, held by the French, was +set on fire.</p> + +<p>To drive the French out of Montbéliard, the town +was fired on from La Grange Dame and from the +Château, but ceased when the inhabitants begged forbearance +on the assurance that the place was evacuated, +which subsequently proved not quite true. Ten +battalions of the French XVth Corps advanced from +the woods in the forenoon, and tried to push on past +Montbéliard, but suffered severely from the flanking +fire of the heavy guns at La Grange Dame, and only +a handful got into the valley of the Lisaine. The +western exits from Montbéliard, and the heights immediately +behind it, remained in French possession, but +the offensive movements ceased at about two in the +afternoon.</p> + +<p>Further to the south, General von Debschitz's posts +in front of Allaine had easily repulsed the French +assailants.</p> + +<p>On the German side there was now the conviction +that no further attack would be attempted.</p> + +<p>The condition of the French troops, not yet inured to +war, was, in fact, very critical. They had been obliged +to bivouac in the bitterly cold nights, sometimes under +arms, and for the most part without food. Their losses<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[348]</a></span> +were not inconsiderable, and the superior officers whom +the commanding General assembled at three in the afternoon, +in the neighbourhood of Chagey, expressed their +objections to a yet more extensive outflanking attempt +to the left, since supplies would be utterly impossible, +and the risk would be entailed of the Germans seizing +the line of the communications of the army through +Montbéliard. Then came the news that the heads of +General von Manteuffel's Corps had already reached +Fontaine-Française, and were also approaching Gray.</p> + +<p>In these circumstances General Bourbaki considered +he must resolve on a retreat. He telegraphed +to the Government that by the advice of his generals, +and to his deep regret, he had been compelled to take +up a position further in the rear, and only hoped that +the enemy might follow him. Hence this experienced +general could have felt no doubt that his army, its +attack on the Lisaine, once gone to wreck, could +only escape from a very critical position by an immediate +retreat.</p> + +<p><i>January 18th.</i>—This morning the Germans were +under arms in their positions of the previous day, the +French still in full force before the whole front. It +was significant that they were busy in the construction +of earthworks. They had evacuated Montbéliard the +evening before in disorderly retreat, and now held +the country west of the place in strength and +entrenched.</p> + +<p>During this day nothing occurred but a cannonade +and small skirmishes. General Keller having been +reinforced came up on the right, and as the enemy +retired to Etobon he was able to re-occupy Chenebier +in the afternoon. Further north, Colonel von Willisen +again marched on Ronchamp. In the centre +Coutenans was taken possession of, and the enemy +driven out of Byans by artillery fire; but on the +other hand the Germans could not yet penetrate the +belt of forest. On the southern bank of the Allaine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[349]</a></span> +General von Debschitz's detachments drove the enemy +back beyond the line Exincourt-Croix.</p> + +<p>In the three days' fighting on the Lisaine the Germans +lost 1200, the French from 4000 to 5000 men.</p> + +<p>In spite of much necessary detaching, and of the +threatening proximity of the enemy, the siege-works +against Belfort were uninterruptedly carried on, and as +soon as the complement of the investing forces was +again made up, General von Werder followed the +retiring French to Etobon, Saulnot and Arcey.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Artillery Attack on Paris.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(January, 1871.)</div> + + +<p>In the place of the IInd Corps, which had been +assigned to the German Army of the South, there had +come up into the Paris front the Ist Bavarian Corps, +of which Gambetta had said, "The Bavarians no longer +exist." It had made so good use of its time of rest in +quarters south of Longjumeau that by the beginning of +the New Year it was already restored to a strength of +17,500 men, with 108 guns. It was positioned on both +banks of the Seine between the VIth Prussian Corps +and the Würtemberg Division. The Würtembergers +reached from Ormesson to the Marne, from which river +the Saxons extended rightward to the Sausset brook, +so as to narrow the front of the Guard Corps now that +the Morée was frozen over and afforded no cover.</p> + +<p>The duty of watching so vast a place of arms as +Paris had made great demands on the endurance of the +troops.</p> + +<p>The French had gradually so extended their entrenchments +outwards from Villejuif and Bruyères, +that they threatened to outflank the IInd Bavarian +Corps. To thwart such a flank attack the VIth Corps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[350]</a></span> +was obliged to keep a strong force constantly in +readiness at L'Hay.</p> + +<p>It need not be said that the supporting troops on +the south front could nowhere be safe from the fire +of the heavy fortress guns, nor the foreposts from that +of the Chassepôts. The latter consequently often could +not be relieved for several days, and the relief was +usually effected at night. The less the success of the +French arms in the open field, the more lavish were they +in the expenditure of ammunition from their works. +Mont Valérien hurled its giant shells to a distance +of from four to five miles, but this incessant cannonade, +to the din of which the ear was soon accustomed, did +little damage.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">The Artillery Attack on the Southern Front.</span>—Till +Mont Avron was taken, the Germans had only +been able to oppose field guns to French fortress +artillery. But early in January their preparations were +at last so far forward that seventeen batteries, long +since completed, could be armed with heavy guns against +the south front of Paris. A battery stood apart on +the left flank in the park of St. Cloud to the north of +Sèvres; four were close together on the steep slope +of the height west of the Château Meudon; five on the +edge of the plateau of Moulin de la Tour, where the +mill, serving to guide the aim of the enemy, had +been blown up. Four more batteries occupied a +lower position between Fontenay and Bagneux. Two, +between Chevilly and La Rue, served as protection +against a flank movement from Villejuif, with the field +artillery of the IInd Bavarian and VIth Corps. Dressing-stations +were prepared, and intermediate depôts +were supplied with reserve ammunition from the great +magazines at Villacoublay.</p> + +<p>Under Generals von Kameke<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> and Prince Hohenlohe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[351]</a></span><a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> +Colonels von Rieff and von Ramm conducted the artillery +attack, General Schulz commanded the engineer +attack. The men served twenty-four hours in the +batteries, and then had two days' rest. The officers +had but one day's rest.</p> + +<p>The heavy guns were brought up on January 3rd, +by day, into the batteries which lay covered, without +any interference; into all the others during the night, +after the enemy's outposts had been driven in. Thus +on the morning of the 4th 98 guns were ready to open +fire: of these 28 were directed on Issy, 28 on Vanves, +and 18 on Montrouge, 10 against the emplacements +between the first two forts. But a thick fog hid every +object, and it was not till January 5th at 8.30 in +the morning, that the signal shot was given for opening +fire.</p> + +<p><i>January 5th.</i>—The enemy promptly replied. There +were in Fort Valérien 106 guns, in Issy 90, in Vanves +84, and in Montrouge 52; there were about 70 in the +sectors of the enceinte concerned and at Villejuif, +16-cm. guns for the most part; so the attack at first +was heavily taxed. But when at about noon all its +batteries came into action, the situation gradually +improved and the greater accuracy of the German fire +told. Fort Issy had almost entirely ceased firing by two +o'clock, nine guns were dismounted in Vanves, and its +garrison had lost thirty men; only Montrouge still +replied with vigour. The fire was now taken up by the +guns of the enceinte, but the forts never again gained<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[352]</a></span> +the upper hand of the attack. Some gunboats appearing +about Point du Jour very soon had to retire. The +field artillery of the IInd Bavarian and VIth Corps +also co-operated so energetically that no attack was +attempted from the works at Villejuif, nor was a single +shot fired on the batteries at Bagneux. A number of +wall-pieces and long-range Chassepôts taken from the +enemy did such good service that the French abandoned +more and more of their rayon. The German outposts +took possession of the trenches of Clamart, and +in the course of the night reversed them against the +defence.</p> + +<p>Only a couple of 15-cm. shells were thrown into the +city itself as a serious warning; the first thing to be done +was to batter down the outworks, and for some few +days the firing was exclusively directed on these. A +stubborn return fire came from Montrouge and from a +mortar-battery in a very advantageous position behind +the high railway embankment to the east of Issy; and +especially from the south front of the enceinte, nearly +four and a half miles long in a straight line. Foggy +weather on some days necessitated the suspension or +entire cessation of firing. But meanwhile the foreposts +had advanced to within 815 and 490 yards of Forts +Issy and Vanves respectively. New batteries were +constructed further forward, and armed with thirty-six +guns from those evacuated in rear.</p> + +<p><i>January 10th.</i>—The French garrison meanwhile +was again displaying great activity. On January 10th +it succeeded in the dark hours in surprising the weakly-held +post of Clamart. Three battalions were now +posted in the place, and a shelter-trench some 1300 +yards long was dug connecting Clamart with Châtillon.<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[353]</a></span></p> +<p><i>January 13th.</i>—The IInd Army of Paris was still +outside the city on the east and north fronts from +Nogent to Aubervillers. After some small alarms, on +the evening of the 13th strong bodies advanced from +Courneuve and Drancy against Le Bourget under cover +of a heavy fire from the forts. But the troops in +occupation there were on the alert, and being +soon reinforced by several companies, repulsed the +attempts of the French to storm it, repeated as they +were until two o'clock in the morning.</p> + +<p><i>January 14th.</i>—On this day the French made a +renewed sortie on Clamart with 500 marine infantry +and several battalions of National Guards. These last +assembled at the adjacent railway-station with a great +deal of noise, and their approach was reported about +midnight. The fight lasted a full hour, and ended +with the retreat, or rather flight, of the assailants. +Patrols followed them close up to the trenches of +Issy.</p> + +<p>The ranges were so great that hitherto the fire from +the enceinte was not yet subdued. Battery No. 1, lying +isolated in the Park of St. Cloud, suffered most, being +fired upon from two bastions of the enceinte, from Point +du Jour, and from Mont Valérien. The steep cliff +behind the battery facilitated the aim of the enemy. +Its parapet was repeatedly shattered, and it was only +the most zealous devotion which enabled the struggle +to be continued at this point. The enemy also concentrated +a heavy fire on batteries Nos. 19 and 21, +pushed forward into a position specially threatening +to Fort Vanves. The long-range fire from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[354]</a></span> +enceinte dropped from a high angle close behind the +parapet, breaking through the platforms, and inflicting +serious injuries on a great many gunners. The powder-magazines +blew up in two of the batteries, and both +the battery commanders and several other superior +officers were wounded.</p> + +<p>On the east front of Paris, the fifty-eight German +guns remaining there after the reduction of Mont +Avron were opposed by 151 of the enemy. The +former nevertheless soon proved their superiority; the +forts only occasionally came into action; the +French withdrew their outposts up to the works, and +altogether vacated the peninsula of St. Maur. By +degrees the heavy siege-guns could be removed from +their previous positions to the Morée brook.</p> + +<p>The forts on the south front had meanwhile suffered +severely. The ruin in Issy was visible to the naked +eye; fires broke out there repeatedly, and the powder-magazine +had to be cleared out at great risk in the +night of January 16th. Fort Vanves had lost seventy +men; it opened fire usually every morning, but soon +became silent. Montrouge, on the contrary, on some +days still fired over 500 rounds from eighteen guns. +But here, too, the casemates no longer afforded +any shelter, and one of the bastions lay a heap of +ruins.</p> + +<p>In spite of the steady fire from the enceinte, a +part of Paris itself was disturbed by the 15-cm. shells. +An elevation of 30 degrees, obtained by a special contrivance, +sent the projectiles into the heart of the city. +From 300 to 400 shells were fired daily.</p> + +<p>Under the pressure of "public opinion" the Government, +after repeated deliberations, decided once more +on a new enterprise in force, to be directed this time +against the German batteries about Châtillon. The collective +superior commanders agreed, indeed, that sorties +could promise no success without the co-operation of +a relieving army from the outside; but, on the 8th,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[355]</a></span> +Gambetta had announced the "victory" of the Army +of the North at Bapaume, and further had promised +that both the Armies of the Loire should advance. +Hereupon General Trochu advised that at least the moment +should be awaited when the investing army before +Paris should be weakened by having to detach anew part +of its strength; but he was opposed by the other members +of the Government, especially by Monsieur Jules +Favre. That gentleman declared that the Maires of +Paris were indignant at the bombardment, that the +representatives of the city must be allowed some insight +into the military situation, and, above all, that +negotiations ought long since to have been entered into.</p> + +<p>Finally, on January 15th, it was determined that the +German lines should be broken through at Montretout, +Garches, and Buzanval.</p> + +<p>While confusion and dissensions thus prevailed in +Paris, the unity of the German nation, under the +Emperor William, was solemnly proclaimed at Versailles.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> Previously commanding the XIVth Infantry Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Previously commanding the artillery of the Guard Corps, the well-known +military author, best known in England as "Prince Kraft." +The slight ambiguity in the text may be removed by the more specific +statement that General von Kameke was Chief Director of the +Engineer attack, Prince Kraft Chief Director of the Artillery attack +on Paris as a whole. On the south front Colonel von Rieff commanded +the siege artillery, Major-General Schulz was Engineer-in-chief. On +the north and east fronts within the Army of the Meuse Colonels +Bartsch and Oppermann had the corresponding commands. Colonel +von Ramm is nowhere mentioned in the official distribution of the +respective staffs.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> A casual reader might perhaps infer from these curt sentences, +that the French, having possessed themselves by surprise of +the weak German post of Clamart, placed in it a garrison of +three battalions. The facts were, that the French battalion was +scarcely in possession of Clamart when it abandoned village and +redoubt; whereupon, to guard against any future attempt on the +place on the part of the French, the Germans occupied the village +with three battalions and the redoubt with two companies; +and further to ensure the security of the position, since it was +one of some importance, connected it with Châtillon in the manner +described.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Battle of Mont Valérien.</span></h2> + +<div class="center">(January 19th.)</div> + + +<p>The sortie was planned to take place on January +19th. On that day, as we have seen, General Faidherbe +advanced as far as St. Quentin on the way to Paris, +and the army which was to make the sortie stood on +the eastern and northern fronts of the capital. The +attempt to break through was, however, made in the +opposite direction. But in fact, the peninsula of +Gennevilliers was now the only ground on which large +masses of troops could still be deployed without being +exposed for hours while they were being assembled, to +the fire of the German artillery.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[356]</a></span></p> + +<p>Two days previously the mobilized National Guards +had already relieved the three Divisions of the sortie-Army +from the positions they had held; and those +Divisions, collectively 90,000 strong, were to move to +the attack in three columns simultaneously. General +Vinoy on the left, supported by the fire from the +enceinte, was to carry the height of Montretout; +General Bellemare in the centre was to push forward +through Garches; General Ducrot on the right by way +of the Château of Buzanval.</p> + +<p>The attack was set to begin at six in the morning, but +blocks occurred at the bridges of Asnières and Neuilly, +as no specific orders had been issued for regulating +the crossing. When at seven o'clock the signal to advance +was made from Mont Valérien, only the advance +of General Vinoy's force was ready, the other +columns had not yet deployed, and the last detachments +tailed back as far as Courbevoix. Before they +had reached their rendezvous-points the left wing was +already marching on St. Cloud with fifteen battalions.</p> + +<p>These at first met only isolated posts and patrols, +eighty-nine men in all, who rushed into the open gorge +of the redoubt of Montretout, and there made a stand +for some time; they then fought their way out with +great bravery, but some of them were taken prisoners. +There, and in the northern part of St. Cloud, the +French promptly prepared for defence.</p> + +<p>The centre column under General Bellemare also +took possession without difficulty of the height of +Maison du Curé.</p> + +<p>Not till now, at nearly nine o'clock, did the first supports +of the German forepost line appear on the scene. +Till within a short time the observatories had been +able to report nothing but "thick fog;" but reports +from the right and left wings announced that a serious +attack was threatened on the whole front from St. +Cloud to Bougival. The Vth Corps was now alarmed, +and General von Kirchbach betook himself to the 9th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[357]</a></span> +Division. On the German right, in the park of St. +Cloud, stood the 17th Brigade; on the left, behind the +Porte de Longboyau, the 20th; the other troops of the +Corps marched from their quarters in Versailles and +the villages to its north, to Jardy and Beauregard. +The Crown Prince ordered six battalions of the Guard +Landwehr and a Bavarian Brigade to Versailles, and +himself rode to the Hospice of Brezin; the King went +to Marly.</p> + +<p>The French meanwhile had seized the foremost +houses of Garches, and made their eastward way here +and there through the breaches in the wall into the +park of the Château of Buzanval. The 5th Jäger Battalion, +supported by single companies of the 58th and +59th Regiments, hurried forward and drove the enemy +back out of Garches, occupied the cemetery on its north, +and still reached the advanced post of La Bergerie just +at the right time. The other bodies under General von +Bothmer (commanding 17th Brigade, 9th Division, Vth +Corps), by order from the commanding General, maintained +a stationary fight on the skirts of the park of St. +Cloud, to gain time. About half-past nine they +repulsed an attack by Bellemare's column, arrested +the advance of the enemy along the Rue Impériale of +St. Cloud, and themselves took the offensive from the +Grille d'Orleans and the Porte Jaune. Five French +battalions unsuccessfully assaulted La Bergerie. A +section of Engineers tried with great devotion to +demolish the wall surrounding the court, but the +frozen dynamite did not explode, and the Jägers held +the position steadfastly throughout the day.</p> + +<p>The attacks of the French had hitherto been undertaken +without assistance from their artillery. The +batteries of General Vinoy's advance had been seriously +delayed by crossing with the centre column, and were +now detained at Briqueterie to meet the contingency +of a repulse. General Bellemare's batteries tried to +get up the slope of the height of Garches, but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[358]</a></span> +exhaustion of the teams made it necessary to take up +a position at Fouilleuse. Meanwhile the batteries of +the German 9th Division came up by degrees, and +by noon thirty-six guns had opened fire. In St. Cloud +a hot street-fight was going on.</p> + +<p>Only General Ducrot on the French right wing had +opened the battle with his strong force of artillery, +which came into position on both sides of Rueil. The +tirailleurs then advanced and made their way through +the park of Buzanval to its western boundary-wall, but +were driven back by the 50th Fusilier Regiment which +had hastened forward.</p> + +<p>At half-past ten the chief attack ensued at this +point, supported by part of the central column. It +found only an under-officer's post at Malmaison, but at +the eastern exit from Bougival near La Jouchère and +Porte de Longboyau, it encountered the already reinforced +line of posts of the 20th Infantry Brigade. +General von Schmidt (commanding 10th Infantry +Division) still held back at Beauregard the reserve of +the 10th Division. A murderous fire from the well-covered +German infantry broke the onset of the French, +and converted it by mid-day into a stationary fire fight, +in which the German artillery also took part with great +effect. Two batteries of the 10th Division at St. +Michel were reinforced by two Guard batteries brought +up from St. Germain to Louvenciennes; a third came +into action near Chatou and forced an armour-plated +train halted at the railway station north of Rueil to +retire rapidly to Nanterre. Four batteries of the IVth +Corps finally opened fire from Carrières, heedless of the +fire of Valérien, and shelled the dense masses of hostile +infantry halted in rear of Rueil.</p> + +<p>At two o'clock the French decided on renewing the +attack. When two of their batteries had shelled Porte +de Longboyau a brigade marched on that point, and a +second on the western wall of the park of the Château +Buzanval; a third followed in support. Not less bold<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[359]</a></span> +than unsuccessful was the attempt of a section of +Engineers, one officer and ten men, to blow up part of +the wall; they all fell together. The attacking +columns had advanced to within 200 paces, when +thirteen German companies at the moment met them, +broke and stopped their rush by pouring fire into them +at short range, and presently routed the hostile columns +in disorder, in spite of the devoted exertions of the +officers.</p> + +<p>The French, however, still found a strong protection +in the park-wall, which had been prepared for defence +with great skill and with the utmost rapidity; and +the advance of several companies from Brezin and La +Bergerie on this wall was repulsed with heavy loss.</p> + +<p>But the strength of the French attack was already +broken. So early as three o'clock a movement of +retreat was observable in their left wing, and as dusk +fell the French centre began to withdraw from the +heights of Maison du Curé. When Colonel von Köthen +pursued, with a small force, several battalions indeed +fronted, and even threatened a sharp counter-attack; +but timely support arrived from La Bergerie, Garches, +and Porte Jaune, and, backed by the fire of the batteries, +the pursuit was followed up. The King's Grenadiers +drove back the enemy to the vicinity of +Fouilleuse.</p> + +<p>The Germans, however, had not yet succeeded in +repossessing themselves of the Montretout redoubt. +The chief hindrance arose from their having been +unable to advance through the town of St. Cloud. As, +however, the possession of this position was indispensable +for the protection of the right wing, General von +Kirchbach gave orders that it was to be retaken either +that evening or early next morning.</p> + +<p>General von Sandrart (commanding 9th Infantry +Division) decided on immediate action, and at eight +that evening five battalions went forward on this duty. +Only a few French were found in the redoubt and were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[360]</a></span> +taken prisoners; but in the town the struggle was +severe. Finally the Germans had to restrict themselves +to blockading the houses held temporarily by the +enemy. The French also clung to the outer park-wall +of Buzanval throughout the night. The Guard +Landwehr and the Bavarian Brigade were therefore +assigned quarters in Versailles, to form a strong reserve +at hand in case of need on the following day. The +remainder of the troops withdrew into their former +quarters.</p> + +<p>At half-past five General Trochu had issued the order +for a retreat. He perceived that the prolongation of +the struggle could afford no success, especially as the +National Guards were becoming insubordinate. The +brave defenders of St. Cloud were forgotten in these +directions. They did not surrender till the day after, +when artillery was brought against the houses they +occupied. And the park-wall was not relinquished +till the following morning.</p> + +<p>The French attack of January 19th was wrecked even +before it had reached the main position of the defenders. +The reserves in readiness on the German side had not +needed to be brought into action. The Vth Corps +alone had driven back an enemy of four times its +own strength. It lost 40 officers and 570 men; the +loss of the French in killed and wounded was 145 +officers and 3423 men, besides 44 officers and 458 men +taken prisoners.</p> + +<p>When the fog lifted at about eleven o'clock on the +morning of the 20th, their long columns were seen +retreating on Paris across the peninsula of Gennevilliers.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[361]</a></span></p> +<h2><span class="smcap">Prosecution of the Artillery Attack on Paris +up to the Armistice.</span></h2> + + +<p>After the repulse of this last struggle for release on +the part of the garrison, the extension of the artillery +attack to the north front of the defensive position was +now determined on. The siege guns no longer needed +against the minor French fortresses and on the Marne +had been parked for this object at Villiers le Bel. The +Army of the Meuse had prepared abundant material for +the construction of batteries, and had collected a waggon +park of above 600 vehicles. Twelve batteries had already +been built in the lines between Le Bourget and the Lake +of Enghien, the arming of which followed, for the most +part, under cover of night. On January 21st eighty-one +heavy guns were ready for action, and Colonel +Bartsch opened fire at nine that morning on Forts La +Briche, Double Couronne, and de l'Est.</p> + +<p>The forts, which opposed the attack with 143 heavy +guns, replied vigorously, and on the following day +the thick weather prevented the German batteries from +resuming their fire till the afternoon. But the ground +in front was abandoned by the French, and the outposts +of the Guards and IVth Corps took possession of Villetaneuse +and Temps Perdu. During the nights the fire +was directed on St. Denis, with every endeavour to spare +the Cathedral, and many conflagrations occurred. By +the 23rd the vigorous prosecution of the cannonade had +materially subdued the fire of the defence. La Briche +was wholly silenced, and the other forts only fired +occasional salvos. During the night of the 25th four +batteries were advanced to within 1300 and 950 yards +respectively of the enemy's main works. The engineer +attack also could now be undertaken, and a series of +new batteries was constructed, which, however, were +never used.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[362]</a></span></p> + +<p>The effect of this bombardment of only six days' +duration was decisive. The forts had suffered extraordinarily. +In contrast to those of the south front +they were destitute of the powerful backing of the +enceinte, and they lacked, too, bomb-proof shelter. +The provisional bomb-proofs were pierced by shells, +the powder-magazines were in the greatest danger, +and the garrisons had nowhere any more cover. The +inhabitants of St. Denis fled to Paris in crowds, and +the impaired immunity from storm of the sorely +battered works was an insuperable obstacle to a longer +maintenance of the defence. This northern attack +cost the Germans one officer and 25 men; the French +stated their loss at 180.</p> + +<p>The fire of the forts on the east front was kept +under, and the Würtemberg Field Artillery sufficed to +prevent the enemy from renewing his foothold on the +peninsula of St. Maur.</p> + +<p>The south front meanwhile suffered more and more +from the steady bombardment. The enceinte and the +sunken mortar batteries behind the ceinture railway +were still active, but in the forts the barracks were +reduced to ruins, partly battered in and partly burnt +down, and the garrisons had to take shelter in the emptied +powder-magazines. The covered ways could no longer +be traversed safely, the parapets afforded no protection. +In Vanves the embrasures were filled up with +sandbags; in the southern curtain of Issy five blocks +of casemates had been pierced by shells penetrating +the shielding walls. Even the detached gorge-walls of +Vanves and Montrouge were destroyed, forty guns +were dismounted, and seventy gun carriages wrecked.</p> + +<p>The whole condition of France, political and military, +and above all the situation in Paris, was such as to +cause the Government the gravest anxiety.</p> + +<p>Since the return of Monsieur Thiers from his diplomatic +tour, it was certain that no mediatory interposition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[363]</a></span> +by any foreign power could be expected. The +distress of the capital had become more and more +severe. Scarcity and high prices had long borne +heavily on its population; provisions were exhausted, +and even the stores of the garrison had been seriously +encroached on. Fuel was lacking in the lasting +cold, and petroleum was an inefficient substitute for +gas. When the long-deferred bombardment of the +south side of Paris was had recourse to, the people +took refuge in the cellars or fled to the remoter quarters +of the city; and when it was also begun on the +northern side the inhabitants of St. Denis crowded into +the capital.</p> + +<p>The great sortie of the 19th had proved a total +failure, and no relief was to be hoped for from outside +since Gambetta had sent news of the disaster at Le +Mans. The Paris Army, of whose inactivity he complained, +was reduced to a third of its original strength +by cold, sickness, and desertion, and the heart taken +out of it by repeated miscarriages. Its horses had to +be slaughtered to provide meat for the inhabitants, and +General Trochu declared any further offensive movements +to be quite hopeless; the means even of passive +resistance were exhausted.</p> + +<p>Hitherto the Government had been able to keep the +populace in good humour by highly-coloured reports, +but now the disastrous state of affairs could no longer +be concealed. All its projects were now denounced.</p> + +<p>There was a large class of people in Paris who were +but little affected by the general distress. Numbers of +civilians had been armed for the defence of their +country and were fed and well paid by the authorities, +without having too much to do in return. They were +joined by all the dubious social elements, which found +their reckoning in the disorganized situation. These +had been quite satisfied with the condition which the +4th of September had created, and a little later they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[364]</a></span> +displayed themselves in the hideous form of the Commune. +Already some popular gatherings had been +dispersed only by force of arms, and even a part of the +National Guard were not free from mutinous tendencies. +The revolutionary clubs, too, supported by the press, +clamoured for further enterprises, even a sortie <i>en +masse</i> of all the inhabitants of Paris. Thus the feeble +Government, dependent as it was on popular favour +alone, was under pressure from the impossible demands +of an ignorant mob on the one hand, and, on the +other, the inexorable force of actual facts.</p> + +<p>There was absolutely no expedient possible but the +capitulation of the capital; every delay intensified the +necessity, and enforced the acceptance of harder terms. +Unless all the railways were at once thrown open for +the transport of supplies from a very wide area, the +horrors of famine would inevitably fall on a population +of more than two million souls; and later it might not +be practicable to cope with the emergency. Yet no +one dared utter the fatal word "capitulation," no one +would undertake the responsibility for the inevitable.</p> + +<p>A great council of war was held on the 21st. In it +all the elder Generals pronounced any further offensive +measures to be quite impossible. It was proposed that +a council of the younger officers should also be held, +but no decision was arrived at. As, however, some one +must be made answerable for every misfortune, General +Trochu, originally the most popular member of the +Government, was dismissed from his position as +Governor, and the chief military command was entrusted +to General Vinoy. General Ducrot resigned +his command.</p> + +<p>All this did nothing to improve the situation, so on +the 23rd, Monsieur Jules Favre made his appearance at +Versailles to negotiate in the first instance for an +armistice.</p> + +<p>On the German side there was readiness to meet this +request; but of course some guarantee had to be forthcoming<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[365]</a></span> +that the capital, after having been reprovisioned, +would not renew its resistance. The surrender of the +forts, inclusive of Mont Valérien and the town of St. +Denis, as well as the disarmament of the enceinte was +demanded and acceded to.</p> + +<p>Hostilities were to be suspended on the evening of +the 26th, so far as Paris was concerned, and all supplies +to be freely given. A general armistice of twenty-one +days was then to come in force on the 31st of January, +exclusive, however, of the departments of Doubs, Jura, +and Côte d'Or, and the fortress of Belfort, where for the +time operations were still being carried on, in which +both sides were hopeful of success.</p> + +<p>This armistice gave the Government of National +Defence the time necessary for assembling a freely-elected +National Assembly at Bordeaux, which should +decide whether the war should be continued, or on what +conditions peace should be concluded. The election +of the deputies was unimpeded and uninfluenced even +in the parts of the country occupied by the Germans.</p> + +<p>The regular forces of the Paris garrison, troops of +the line, marines, and Gardes-Mobiles, had to lay down +their arms at once; only 12,000 men and the National +Guard were allowed to retain them for the preservation +of order inside the city. The troops of the garrison +were interned there during the armistice; on its expiry +they were to be regarded as prisoners. As to their +subsequent transfer to Germany, where every available +place was already overflowing with prisoners, the question +was postponed in expectation of a probable peace.</p> + +<p>The forts were occupied on the 29th without opposition.</p> + +<p>There were taken over from the Field Army of Paris +602 guns, 1,770,000 stand of arms, and above 1000 +ammunition waggons; from the fortress 1362 heavy +guns, 1680 gun-carriages, 860 limbers, 3,500,000 cartridges, +4000 hundred-weight of powder, 200,000 shells, +and 100,000 bombs.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[366]</a></span></p> + +<p>The blockade of Paris, which had lasted 132 days, +was over, and the greater part of the German forces +which had so long stood fast under its walls, was +released to end the war in the open field.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Operations of the Army of the South under +General von Manteuffel.</span></h2> + + +<p>The two Army Corps under General von Manteuffel +consisted altogether of fifty-six battalions, twenty +squadrons, and 168 guns. When it arrived at +Châtillon sur Seine on January 12th, the IInd Corps +was on the right, and the VIIth on the left on an +extension from Noyers Montigny of about forty-five +miles. One brigade, under General von Dannenberg, +which had already several times been in contact with +portions of the French Army of the Vosges, was pushed +forward to Vilaines and was charged with the duty of +covering the right flank.</p> + +<p>Several good roads led from the quarters specified in +the direction of Dijon; to Vesoul, on the contrary, +there were only bad tracks deep in snow over the +southern slope of the wild plateau of Langres. The +Commander-in-Chief, nevertheless, chose this direction, +that he might as soon as possible afford General von +Werder at least indirect assistance by approaching in +the rear of the enemy threatening his brother-officer.</p> + +<p>The march had to pass midway between the towns +of Dijon and Langres, both points strongly occupied by +the French. Wooded heights and deep ravines separated +the columns and precluded mutual support; each +body had to provide for its individual safety in every +direction. The troops had previously undergone severe +fatigues, and badly as they needed rest not one halt-day +could be granted, nor could the evil plight of their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[367]</a></span> +boots and the horses' shoes be in any way remedied. +On January 14th the march was begun in a thick +fog and bitter cold, along roads frozen as smooth as +glass.</p> + +<p>The maintenance of supplies required special attention, +and at first the 8th Brigade had to be left behind +to secure the all-important railway-line Tonnerre—Nuits—Châtillon, +until connections could be established +by way of Epinal.</p> + +<p>On the very first day's march the advanced guard +of the VIIth Corps had a fight before Langres. A force +from the garrison of 15,000 men was driven in on the +fortress with the loss of a flag, and a detachment had +to be left behind in observation of the place. Under +cover of it the VIIth Corps marched past the fortress +next day, while the IInd advanced to the Ignon +Brook.</p> + +<p>The weather changed during the night of the 15th. +As a change from fourteen degrees of frost there came +storm and rain. The water lay on the frozen roads, +and it was with the greatest difficulty that the VIIth +Corps reached Prauthoy, and the IInd Moloy, closing in +to the left.</p> + +<p>On the 18th the left wing advanced South-East on +Frettes and Champlitte, the right assembled at Is sur +Tille, and its advanced guard, after a march of thirty-one +miles, reached the bridges at Gray. On the flank +and rear of the Corps there had been some trivial +fighting, but the cruel march across the mountains had +been accomplished, and the cultivated valley of the +Saône was reached.</p> + +<p>General von Manteuffel had already received news of +the satisfactory course of the first day's fighting on the +Lisaine. Later telegrams from General von Werder +reported that the French Army of the East would +probably be obliged to retire under difficulties, and the +German commander at once determined to cut off its +retreat by advancing to the Doubs below Besançon.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[368]</a></span></p> + +<p>The defeated French army was still numerically +greatly superior to the German force. The troops had +to be again called upon for severe exertions. They +were required once more to cross a thinly-populated +mountainous region, where it would be a matter of +great difficulty to procure food and the shelter needful +during the bitter winter nights. Strong hostile forces +had to be left in the rear at Langres, Dijon, and +Auxonne, and that under very insufficient observation. +However, in spite of every obstacle the advance in this +new direction was begun on the 19th.</p> + +<p>The first difficulty would have been the crossing of +the Saône, here very deep and about sixty-six yards +wide, and full of drifting ice, had not the advanced +guard of the IInd Corps found Gray abandoned by the +French and both the bridges uninjured; whereupon it +occupied the town. The head of the VIIth Corps +crossed the river by the intact railway-bridge at +Savayeux, and by a pontoon bridge thrown across by +the pioneers higher up.</p> + +<p>On the following day both Corps advanced in a +southerly direction, the VIIth to Gy, the IInd to +Pesmes. Here the latter also now crossed the Ognon +after driving off by artillery fire a French detachment +which tried to oppose the construction of the +bridges.</p> + +<p>On the 21st, at half past two, the advanced guard +of the IInd Corps found Dôle occupied by the enemy. +General von Koblinski (commanding 5th Infantry Brigade) +attacked at once. In spite of a violent street-fight +in which the townspeople took part, the Grenadiers of +the 2nd Regiment made their way through the town +and on the further side seized a train of 230 waggons +of provisions and military necessaries, intended for +Besançon and left standing in the railway-station.</p> + +<p>While the Doubs was thus crossed by the IInd Corps +at this point, so the VIIth Corps opened itself a passage +across the Ognon at Marmay and Pin.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[369]</a></span></p> + +<p>General von Werder had been instructed to follow +close on the heels of the retreating enemy, and while +the latter still maintained his position on the front of the +XIVth Corps, the 2nd Baden Brigade on the right +wing had advanced to Etobon, while Colonel von +Willisen with his twelve squadrons had moved out +beyond Lure. On the left, Colonel von Zimmermann +with the East-Prussian Landwehr had driven the +French out of Ste. Marie. These detachments everywhere +found cast-away arms and portions of equipment, +and hundreds willingly gave themselves up as +prisoners.</p> + +<p>During the next few days General von Werder +effected a general left-wheel to the south. The right +wing held Villersexel, and it was the left wing only +that met the enemy in great masses at L'Isle sur +le Doubs, and afterwards at Clerval and Baume les +Dames.</p> + +<p>General Bourbaki had withdrawn from the Lisaine on +the 18th. The XXIVth Corps only was left on the left +bank of the Doubs, with orders to defend toward the north +the defiles in the steep mountain-paths of the Lomont +range eastward of Clerval; all the other troops withdrew +between the Doubs and the Ognon, with the Division +Crémer as rearguard. The Ognon might have formed +a natural protection for the right flank of the French +army, and orders had been given for the destruction of +all the bridges over it; but we have seen how little +they had been obeyed.</p> + +<p>On the 21st the XVth and XXth Corps arrived in +the neighbourhood of Baume les Dames, the XVIIIth +at Marchaux; and here, having the stronghold of +Besançon close at his back, General Bourbaki desired +to await for the present the further movements of the +enemy. In order that his forces should still muster in +full strength, the commandant of Besançon was instructed +to send forward to Blamont all the battalions +of Mobiles-Guards he could spare so as to relieve the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[370]</a></span> +XXIVth Corps. Nine battalions of mobilized National +Guards had actually previously reached Besançon, which +might have been substituted as desired, but they came +armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no +ammunition in the fortress. Thus they would there +only have added to the mouths to be filled, and General +Rolland had simply sent them back again. The Intendant-General +declared it impossible any longer to bring +up the supplies ordered by him for the maintenance +of the army; but what proved decisive was the news +received this day that not only was the line of the Ognon +lost, but that the Germans had already crossed the +Doubs.</p> + +<p>Under these circumstances the French Commander-in-Chief +determined to continue his retreat on Besançon +and there cross to the southern bank of the Doubs, so as +not to be compelled to give battle with the river in his +rear. The trains were sent off during the night, but +above all things the XVth Corps was ordered at +once to occupy Quingey with a whole division, +and defend that position to extremity, in order to +keep open the communications of the Corps with the +interior. All the other Corps were to concentrate +round Besançon, even the XXIVth, which consequently +gave up the defence of the Lomont passes.</p> + +<p>General Bourbaki reported his situation to the +Minister of War, who held out hopes of supporting him +with the portion of the XVth Corps still remaining on +the Loire. Assistance could have been more quickly +and effectually given from Dijon.</p> + +<p>The Government had assembled there a very considerable +force to replace the Division Crémer gone to +join the Army of the East, for the defence of the ancient +capital of Burgundy and to constitute a point of support +to the operations of General Bourbaki. A Corps of +20,000 men was assigned to the local defence; a very +inappropriately-named Army of the Vosges, more than +40,000 strong, was to do duty in the field. But this was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[371]</a></span> +of little effect in hindering the toilsome advance of the +Germans over the mountains. The detachments in +observation allowed themselves to be driven in by +General von Kettler (commanding 8th Infantry +Brigade), who followed the movement of both Corps +on the right flank; and they retired on Dijon. Colonel +Bombonnel, stationed at Gray, urgently begged for +reinforcements to enable him to defend the passages +of the Saône; his applications were refused because +Dijon was in too great peril, and it was not till the +Prussians had already crossed the river that "General" +Garibaldi began to move.</p> + +<p>He set out on the 19th in three columns in the +direction of Is sur Tille, where there still remained +only part of the (German) 4th Infantry Division. But +he advanced little more than four miles. Garibaldi subsequently +confined himself to watching reconnoitring +parties which advanced to meet him from the heights +of Messigny, and he then retired on Dijon with his +troops marching to the strains of the Marseillaise.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the enemy was held in too small estimation +in General Manteuffel's headquarter, when General +von Kettler was simply ordered to go and take Dijon.</p> + +<p>The greatest care had been bestowed in strengthening +the place. Numerous earthworks, and other erections +specially constructed for defence protected it to the +northward; more especially had Talant and Fontaine +les Dijon been transformed into two detached forts and +armed with heavy guns which commanded all the approaches +on that side. The whole constituted a position +which could be held against a much larger force than +the five and a half battalions of the 8th Brigade with +which General Kettler advanced to the attack.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Fighting at Dijon, January 21st and 22nd.</span>—This +force had reached Turcey and St. Seine, and on +the 21st advanced in two columns from the west on +Dijon, still distant some fourteen miles. Major von<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[372]</a></span> +Conta from Is sur Tille on the north was approaching +with a small reinforcement. The "Franctireurs de la +Mort," the "Compagnie de la Revanche," and other volunteer +bands as well as Mobiles-Guards were without much +difficulty driven out of the villages on the way, and +beyond the deep ravine of the Suzon; the village of +Plombieres on the right, which was defended with +spirit, was stormed, and Daix was carried on the left; +but in front of the fortified position of the French, and +within reach of the fire of their heavy batteries, the bold +advance was forced to come to a stand. Major von +Conta had also pushed on with continuous fighting, but +failed to effect a junction with the brigade before dark. +General von Kettler, recognizing the overwhelming +superiority of the French, finally restricted himself +to repulsing their sorties.</p> + +<p>The French lost seven officers and 430 men in +prisoners alone; but the fighting also cost the brigade +nineteen officers and 322 men. The troops had performed +a severe march in bad weather along heavy +roads, and had not been able to cook either before or +after the fight; the ammunition could only be replenished +from a convoy which was expected next +day. Nevertheless General von Kettler did not hesitate +to remain for the night in the positions he had gained +immediately in front of the enemy, and then to seek +shelter-quarters in the nearest villages.</p> + +<p>The French allowed him to do so without any serious +opposition. Inactivity so utter caused General von +Kettler the suspicion that the main body of the enemy +had probably withdrawn by Auxonne to the support of +the Army of the East, and he determined to bring it +back on Dijon by a renewed attack.</p> + +<p>On the 23rd at eleven o'clock, by a flank march +along the enemy's front, after his advanced guard had +routed a detachment of Gardes-Mobiles, he reached the +farm of Valmy on the Langres road, and advanced with +his two batteries against the walled and strongly-held<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[373]</a></span> +village of Pouilly. Here, as was almost always the +case when engaged in the defence of buildings, the +French made a stout resistance. The 61st Regiment +had to storm each house in turn, and it was not till the +château was in flames that the strong body of defenders +who had taken refuge in the upper floors, +surrendered.</p> + +<p>Beyond this place the enemy were found deployed in +an entrenched position between Talant, which had been +converted into a fort, and a large factory-building on the +high-road. Here the advance was checked till the +remainder of the regiment came up from Valmy, and +the defenders at various points were driven back on +the suburb.</p> + +<p>It was evident that the French were still at Dijon in +full force, and the object of the undertaking had therefore +been attained. But now unfortunately a tragic +episode occurred, for the storming of the factory was absolutely +insisted on—a great building, almost impregnable +against infantry unaided. When all the senior +officers had been killed, a first-lieutenant, whose horse had +been shot and he himself wounded, took the command +of the 2nd battalion. No sooner had the 5th company, +only forty strong, advanced from the neighbouring +quarry, than it came under a hot fire from all sides. +The leader was at once wounded, and the sergeant +who carried the colour fell dead after a few steps; so +did the second-lieutenant and the battalion adjutant, +who had again raised the standard. It was passed +from hand to hand, carried first by the officers then by +the men; every bearer fell. The brave Pomeranians<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> +nevertheless rushed on the building, but there was no +entrance anywhere on that side, and at last the under-officer +retreated on the quarry with the remnant of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[374]</a></span> +little band. Here, for the first time, the colour was +missed. Volunteers went out again in the darkness to +search for it, but only one man returned unwounded. +It was not till afterwards that the French found the +banner, shot to ribbons, in a pool of blood under the dead. +This was the only German colour lost throughout +the war, and only thus was this one lost.</p> + +<p>The enemy took prisoners eight officers and 150 men, +and the brigade sustained a fresh loss of sixteen officers +and 362 men. It mustered at Pouilly, and remained +under arms till eight o'clock to meet possible pursuit; +only then were quarters taken in the neighbouring +villages.</p> + + +<p><span class="smcap">Operations of the Army of the South.</span>—The +commission to take Dijon could not be executed; +but the bold advance of this weak brigade cowed the +hostile army into inactivity, so that General von +Manteuffel was able to pursue his march unopposed.</p> + +<p>He had given to both his corps as their objective the +enemy's line of retreat south of Besançon.</p> + +<p>From this fortress there were but few roads to the +south of France available for troops, through the +riven and rugged regions of the western Jura. The +most direct connection was by the road and railway to +Lons le Saulnier, on which Quingey and Byans were +the most important barriers. Further to the east, but +by a wide détour, a road runs by Ornans, Salins and +Champagnole to St. Laurent and Morez. Several +ways, however, radiate from Besançon and converge in +Pontarlier, by using the passes peculiar to this range, +called "Cluses," which pierce transversely the mountain +chains and afford the valleys intercommunication. +From Pontarlier one road only runs past Mouthe, and +along the Swiss frontier in awkward proximity thereto.</p> + +<p><i>January 22nd.</i>—On this day the advanced guard of +the 13th Division marched from Audeux to St. Vit, +and after breaking up the railway and plundering<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[375]</a></span> +a number of loaded waggons, down the riverside to +Dampierre. On the way four bridges over the Doubs +were found uninjured and were taken possession of. +The advanced guard of the 14th Division moved from +Emagny to observe Besançon. The IInd Corps closed on +Dôle and pushed reconnoitring parties across the river.</p> + +<p><i>January 23rd.</i>—The concentric movement of all the +bodies of the German army was continued.</p> + +<p>General Debschitz, approaching from the north, in +passing Roches found only the abandoned camping +ground of the French XXIVth Corps. The 4th Reserve +Division occupied L'Isle without opposition, and met +no resistance till it reached Clerval and Baume.</p> + +<p>On the Ognon the Baden Division drove the French +out of Montbozon.</p> + +<p>In the centre of the army the VIIth Corps pushed +the advanced guard of the 14th Division forward on +Dannemarie, near Besançon. A fight ensued there in +the form only of a cannonade which lasted till night. +The 13th Division, again, which had crossed the Doubs +at Dampierre, advanced on Quingey.</p> + +<p>For want of rolling stock it had been possible to forward +only one French brigade by railway, and the last +trains were received at the Byans station with Prussian +shells. These troops were in so bad case that they +were unable even to place outposts. They abandoned +Quingey almost without a struggle, and their hurried +retreat on Besançon and beyond the Loue, stopped the +advance of reinforcements already on the way. Thus +800 prisoners and a train of 400 convalescents fell into +the hands of the Prussian advanced guard, who at +once broke up the railway at Abbans-dessous.</p> + +<p>On the right wing, the head of the IInd Corps +advanced by the valley of the Loue on the southern +bank. Several cuttings on this road had been prepared +for defence, but were found undefended. It was +at Villers Farlay that it first encountered a strong body +of the enemy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[376]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the evening of this day, of the French forces the +XXth Corps was on the north and the XVIIIth on +the west of Besançon, at the distance of about four +miles. Cavalry, artillery and the train were passing +through the town or encamped on the glacis of the +fortress. The XXIVth Corps was on the march thither, +and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XVth were in +possession of the southern bank of the Doubs about +Baume and Larnod; but the 1st Division had not succeeded +in holding Quingey. Thus the most direct and +important line of communications of the French army +was cut, and its position, by this fresh mischance, +seriously compromised. Impracticable projects and +counsels from Bordeaux poured in freely, but did not +mend matters; and on the 24th General Bourbaki +summoned the superior officers to a council of war.</p> + +<p><i>January 24th.</i>—The Generals declared that they had +scarcely more than half their men under arms, and +these were more inclined to fly than to fight. General +Pallu alone thought he might answer for the men of the +army reserve. The Intendant-General reported that, +without trenching on the magazines of the place, the +supplies in hand would last for four days at most. +General Billot was in favour of attempting to fight a way +through to Auxonne, but he declined to take the command +in chief which was offered him. The exhaustion +of the troops and their evidently increasing insubordination +gave little hope of the success of offensive +operations. So there was no alternative but to retire +on Pontarlier, as the Commander-in-Chief had proposed.</p> + +<p>This recourse, even, was seriously threatened. To +relieve himself from pressure on the north, General +Bourbaki ordered the XXIVth Corps to advance +once more and hold the Lomont passes. On the +south the XVth was to defend the deep mountain-ravine +of the Loue, and General Crémer was more +especially to cover the retreat of the army on the right<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[377]</a></span> +flank, which was most seriously threatened. For this +difficult task, in addition to his own Division, a Division +of the XXth Corps and the army reserve as the +most trustworthy troops were placed under his command. +The XVIIIth and the remainder of the XXth +were to await marching-orders at Besançon.</p> + +<p>In the German Head-quarter, where of course the +plans of the French could not be known, various +possibilities had to be reckoned with.</p> + +<p>If the French remained at Besançon there would be +no need to attack them there; the place was not suited +for the accommodation of a large army, and its supplies +could not long hold out. That they would again attempt +to advance northwards was scarcely likely; by +doing so they would be cutting loose from all their +resources, and must encounter the larger part of the +XIVth German Corps on the Ognon.</p> + +<p>An attempt to break through to Dijon seemed more +possible. But this would be opposed at St. Vit by the +13th Division, at Pesmes by Colonel von Willisen's +detachment, and finally by General von Kettler.</p> + +<p>Thus a retreat on Pontarlier seemed the most likely +course; and to hinder their further march from that +place would in the first instance be the duty of the IInd +Corps, while in the meantime the VIIth was observing +the enemy massed in Besançon, and opposing his +sorties on both sides of the river.</p> + +<p>The Commander-in-Chief therefore confined himself +to giving general directions to his Generals, expressly +authorizing them to act on their own judgment in +eventualities which could not be foreseen.</p> + +<p>General von Werder was instructed to advance by +Marnay, and to place the 14th Division in touch with +the Baden Division and Von der Goltz's Brigade, and +then to distribute these bodies along the right bank of +the Doubs. The 4th Reserve Division restored the +bridges at L'Isle and Baume, and crossed over to the +left bank. Colonel von Willisen was to join the VIIth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[378]</a></span> +Corps to supply its lack of cavalry. The IInd Corps +was assembled behind Villers Farlay.</p> + +<p><i>January 25th.</i>—Reconnaissances on a large scale were +arranged for next day. The reconnaissance of the +VIIth Corps resulted in a sharp fight at Vorges. The +head of the IInd Corps met the enemy in front of Salins +and at Arbois, but found that the latter had not yet +reached Poligny.</p> + +<p><i>January 26th.</i>—The advanced guard of the IInd Corps +advanced on Salins. The fronts of the high-perched forts +of St. André and Belin near the town, looked toward +Switzerland, but their fire commanded also on flank +and rear the plain to the south and west on the enemy's +line of march. Salins constituted a strong barrier on +the road to St. Laurent, and as long as it was held +would cover the line of retreat of columns marching +from Besançon to Pontarlier.</p> + +<p>The two field-batteries of the advanced guard could, +of course, do little against the heavy guns of the forts; +but the Fusiliers of the 2nd Regiment advanced in +rushes of small detachments up the narrow ravine, scaled +its rugged faces, and, supported by the two Grenadier +battalions, forced their way, about half-past two, into the +railway-station and suburb of St. Pierre; but with the +loss of 3 officers and 109 men.</p> + +<p>Soon after General von Koblinski arrived by way of +St. Thiébaud with the 42nd Regiment. As in consequence +of the representations of the Mayor the commandant +refrained from bombarding the town, the +advanced guard was able to take up its quarters therein; +the main body of the 3rd Division retreated from under +the fire of the forts on Mouchard, and the defile remained +closed again to further penetration. It was necessary +to turn it by the south.</p> + +<p>In that direction the 4th Division had already marched +to Arbois, its head further forward up to Pont d'Héry; +it found Poligny and Champagnole on the right still +unoccupied.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[379]</a></span></p> + +<p>The VIIth Corps reconnoitred both banks of the +Doubs, and found the enemy in strong positions at +Busy and at Vorges.</p> + +<p>The 4th Reserve Division advanced along the southern +bank as far as St. Juan d'Adam, near Besançon; the +remainder of the XIVth Corps marched on Etuz and +Marnay.</p> + +<p>General von Kettler's report of the fighting on the +21st and 23rd determined General von Manteuffel to +make a renewed attempt on Dijon. He detailed to this +duty General Hann von Weyhern (commanding 4th +Infantry Division, IInd Corps), placing him in command +of the 8th Brigade, with Colonel von Willisen's troops +and Degenfeld's Baden Brigade.</p> + +<p>On the French side, General Bressoles had started on +the 24th, in obedience to orders, to take renewed possession +of the passages of the Doubs and the Lomont +defiles. He had, in the first instance, turned against +Baume with d'Aries' Division; but as he did not succeed +even in driving the German outposts out of Pont les +Moulins, he retired to Vercel. In consequence of this, +on the morning of the 26th, Carré's Division, which had +found the passes of the Lomont unoccupied, also moved +to Pierre Fontaine. Comagny's Division had already +retreated to Morteau, and was making its way unmolested +to Pontarlier.</p> + +<p>General Bourbaki was greatly disturbed by this +failure of his right wing; more perhaps than was needful, +since, in fact, only one German division stood north +of him, which at most could drive his rearguard on +Pontarlier, while the main force of the enemy threatened +him far more seriously on the west. He nevertheless +ordered a renewed advance, on the 26th, of the XXIVth +Corps, which was now to be supported by the XVIIIth. +But the march through Besançon of the latter, through +streets covered with ice, took up the whole of the day +which should have been devoted to the attack, so that +nothing came of the scheme.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[380]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Army Reserve had reached Ornans, and stood +there in readiness. The two other Divisions advanced +on the road to Salins, but heard while on the march +that the Germans had just carried that place. They +then occupied in Déservillers and Villeneuve d'Amont, +the roads leading from thence to Pontarlier.</p> + +<p>The War Minister, meanwhile, had decisively refused +permission for the general retreat of the army, without +any regard to the imperative necessities of the case.</p> + +<p>The military dilettanteism which fancied it could +direct the movements of the army from Bordeaux is +characterized in a telegram of the afternoon of the 25th. +Monsieur de Freycinet gives it as his "firm conviction"<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> +that General Bourbaki, if he would concentrate his +troops, and, if necessary come to an understanding with +Garibaldi, would be strong enough to fight his way out, +"either by Dôle, or by Mouchard, or by Gray, or by +Pontailler" (north of Auxonne). The choice was left +to him.</p> + +<p>Still more amazing was the further suggestion that +if indeed the state of the army prohibited a long march, +it should be embarked on the railway at Chagey, under +the eye, no doubt, of the pursuing enemy.</p> + +<p>Such communications could only avail to shatter the +brave commander's self-confidence. The disastrous +reports which poured in from all sides, and the state +of the troops which he had seen for himself as the +XVIIIth Corps marched through the town, crushed his +last hope and led him to attempt his own life.</p> + +<p>The Commander had of course to bear the blame of +the total failure of a campaign planned by Freycinet; +his dismissal from the command was already on its way. +General Clinchant was appointed in his stead, and under +these disastrous circumstances took the command of the +army.</p> + +<p>All the Generals were, no doubt, extremely reluctant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[381]</a></span> +to bring their weary and dispirited troops into serious +contact with the enemy. Every line of retreat was closely +threatened, excepting only that on Pontarlier. The +new Commander-in-Chief had no choice but to carry +out the plans of his predecessor. He at once ordered +the further march. He himself proceeded to Pontarlier. +In that strong position he hoped to be able at least to +give the troops a short rest. No large bodies of the +Germans had been met with so far, the ammunition +columns had got safely through, and if the defiles of +Vaux, Les Planches, and St. Laurent could be reached +and held in advance of the enemy there was still a +possibility of escape to the southwards.</p> + +<p>On the evening of the 27th, the Division Poullet was at +Levier, nearest to the Germans; the two other Divisions +under General Crémer, with the XVth and XXth Corps, +were écheloned on the road from Ornans to Sombacourt; +the XVIIIth Corps alone was on the eastern road +through Nods. The XXIVth, in a miserable condition, +had reached Montbenoît with its head at Pontarlier; +two Divisions were still in Besançon.</p> + +<p>On this same day General von Fransecky collected +the main body of the IInd Corps at Arbois, and reinforced +General du Trossel's posts at Pont d'Héry.</p> + +<p>The XIVth Corps relieved the 14th Division of the +VIIth Corps at St. Vit; the latter advanced to the +right of the 13th Division into the Loue angle, which +the French had already abandoned.</p> + +<p>On the north, General von Debschitz held Blamont +and Pont du Roide, while General von Schmeling +watched Besançon from St. Juan, and General von der +Goltz marched on Arbois to form a reserve.</p> + +<p><i>January 28th.</i>—Suspecting that the French were +already on the march by Champagnole on St. Laurent, +General Fransecky, to cut off from them that line of +retreat, advanced on the following day in a southerly +direction with the IInd Corps.</p> + +<p>General du Trossel reached Champagnole without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[382]</a></span> +opposition, and thence sent his cavalry along the road to +Pontarlier. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky arrived +at Nozeroy with a squadron of the 11th Dragoons, and +found the place occupied; but he made prize of fifty-six +provision-waggons and the military-chest, taking the +escort prisoners.</p> + +<p>The 5th and 6th Brigades advanced on Poligny and +Pont du Navoy.</p> + +<p>The 13th Division of the VIIth Corps, having been +relieved at Quingey by the Baden troops, assembled at +La Chapelle, while the 14th advanced on Déservillers. +Its head found no enemy in Bolandoz, although his +camp-fires were still smouldering; so that the main +hostile army was not overtaken on that day.</p> + +<p>General Clinchant had in fact moved his Corps closer +on Pontarlier. But it soon became evident that +supplies were not procurable for any long stay there. +General Crémer received orders that night to move +forward at once to Les Planches and St. Laurent with +three cavalry regiments standing already on the road +to Mouthe. The mountain-roads were deep in snow, +but by forced marching he reached the points designated +on the following afternoon. The XXIVth Corps and a +brigade of the Division Poullett followed next day, and +the latter also occupied with two battalions the village +of Bonneveaux at the entrance to the defiles of Vaux. +On the evening of the 28th the rest of the French army +stood as follows: the XVIIIth Corps was behind the +Drugeon at Houtaud close before Pontarlier; the 1st +Division of the XVth had advanced over the brook to +Sombacourt, the 3rd Division was in the town. On +the left the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XXth Corps +held the villages from Chaffois to Frasne, and on the +right the army reserve occupied Byans.</p> + +<p>General von Manteuffel had ordered for the 29th a +general advance on Pontarlier, where at last the French +must certainly be found.</p> + +<p><i>January 29th.</i>—Of the IInd Corps General Koblinsky<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[383]</a></span> +had set out from Poligny in the night. When he reached +Champagnole and had assembled the whole of the 5th +Brigade he moved forward therefrom at about seven +o'clock. General du Trossel with the 7th Brigade also +reached Censeau without finding the enemy.</p> + +<p>On the right Colonel von Wedell marched from Pont +du Navoy on Les Planches with four battalions of the +6th Brigade. He found only dismounted troopers, +posts probably left by General Crémer which were +easily dispersed by the Jägers. Detachments were then +sent out in different directions, and everywhere met +with scattered troops; but at Foncine le Bas the head +of the XXIVth Corps was found, and Colonel von Wedell +now blocked the last line of retreat which had remained +to the French.</p> + +<p>With the rest of the IInd Corps General von Hartmann +marched unopposed on Nozeroy.</p> + +<p>The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps had not received +the order to advance on Pontarlier till somewhat +late; it did not start from Déservillers until noon, +and only reached Levier at three o'clock, where, at the +same hour, the head of the 13th Division also arrived +from Villeneuve d'Amont, the state of the roads having +greatly delayed its march.</p> + +<p>The advanced guard of three battalions, half a +squadron, and one battery, had met only stragglers on +the way, and General von Zastrow commanded it to +push forward to the Drugeon brook. In the forest on +the left of the road closed detachments of the enemy +were retiring on Sombacourt, and Major von Brederlow +with the 1st battalion of the 77th Regiment turned off +to attack that village lying on the flank. The 2nd +company under Captain von Vietinghof dashed into it +through Sept Fontaines with loud cheers, and was at +once closely surrounded by strong bodies of the enemy; +but the other companies soon came to its assistance. +The first Division of the XVth French Corps was +here completely routed without the Army Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[384]</a></span> +close at hand in Byans having come to its support. +Fifty officers, including two generals, and 2700 men +were taken prisoners; ten guns, seven mitrailleuses, +forty-eight waggons, 319 horses and 3500 stand of arms +fell into the hands of the Hanoverian battalion<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> which +was left in occupation of Sombacourt.</p> + +<p>The rest of the advanced guard had meanwhile approached +Chaffois, where the road opens out from the +mountains into the wide valley of the Drugeon. That +village, as we have seen, was occupied by the 2nd +Division of the XXth Corps.</p> + +<p>Colonel von Cosel passed at once to the attack. +Three companies of the 53rd Regiment surprised the +French field-posts and took possession of the first houses +of the village, but then the whole mass of the French +XVIIIth Corps barred his further progress. By degrees +all the available forces had to join in the +fighting, and also reinforcements had to be brought up +from the main body of the 14th Division. The fight +lasted with great obstinacy for an hour and a half, when +suddenly the French ceased firing and laid down their +arms. They claimed that an armistice had already +been agreed on.</p> + +<p>Monsieur Jules Favre had, in fact, telegraphed to +Bordeaux at a quarter-past eleven on the night of the +28th, that an armistice of twenty-one days had been +concluded, without adding, however, that, with his consent, +the three eastern departments had been excluded +from its operations. The information, in this imperfect +form, was transmitted to the civil authorities by the +Delegation at 12.15 of the 29th; but Monsieur Freycinet +did not forward it to the military authorities, whom +the matter principally concerned, till 3.30 in the +afternoon.</p> + +<p>Thus could General Clinchant in all good faith transmit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[385]</a></span> +to General Thornton, in command of the Divisions +at Chaffois, a message which, as regarded the Army of +the East, was altogether incorrect. The latter at once +sent his staff officer to the Prussian advanced guard, +which was still in action, who demanded the cessation +of the firing in recognition of the official communication.</p> + +<p>General von Manteuffel had received in Arbois at +five in the morning, full particulars from the supreme +Head-quarter of the terms of the armistice, according +to which the army of the South was to prosecute its +operations to a final issue. An army order announcing +this to all the troops was at once sent out, but did not +reach the VIIth Corps till evening.</p> + +<p>Nothing was known there of any armistice; however, +the tidings might be on the way, and General von +Zastrow granted the temporary cessation of hostilities, +and even sanctioned the release of his prisoners, but +without their arms.</p> + +<p>Chaffois, with the exception of a couple of farmsteads, +remained in possession of the 14th Division, +which found such quarters there as might be; the +13th occupied the villages from Sept Fontaines back +to Déservillers.</p> + +<p><i>January 30th.</i>—In full confidence in the news from +the seat of Government, General Clinchant, on the 30th, +suspended the movements of his army. The newly-appointed +Commander of the XXIVth Corps, General +Comagny, also gave up his intended attempt to cut his +way with 10,000 men at Foncine through Colonel von +Wedell's weak brigade. The other Corps, after the unfortunate +course of the fighting on the previous evening, +had drawn in close on Pontarlier; but detachments of +cavalry were sent out on the roads to Besançon and St. +Laurent, to establish a line of demarcation and also to +keep up communications with the fortress and with +Southern France.</p> + +<p>On receiving the army order at about eleven o'clock, +General Zastrow gave notice to the enemy in his front<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[386]</a></span> +of the resumption of hostilities, but restricted his immediate +demands to the complete evacuation of Chaffois, +which was complied with. Otherwise the Corps remained +inactive where it was.</p> + +<p>Of the IInd Corps General du Trossel had set out +very early from Censeau, but the appearance of a French +flag of truce, and his fear of offending against the law +of nations, here too occasioned considerable hesitation. +The forest of Frasne was not clear of the French till evening. +Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky made his way +into the village with quite a small force, and took +prisoners twelve officers and 1500 men who held it, with +two colours. The 5th Brigade then also moved up +into Frasne; the rest of the Corps occupied the same +quarters as on the previous day.</p> + +<p>A flag of truce had presented itself at Les Planches, +but Colonel von Wedell had simply dismissed the bearer. +The outposts of the XIVth Corps did the same.</p> + +<p>On the north of Pontarlier, General von Schmeling +advanced to Pierre Fontaine, General von Debschitz +to Maiche.</p> + +<p><i>January 31st.</i>—Early in the morning of this day the +French Colonel Varaigne made his appearance at +General von Manteuffel's head-quarters at Villeneuve, +with the proposal that a cessation of hostilities for thirty-six +hours should be agreed upon, till the existing condition +of uncertainty should be removed; but this +proposal was refused, as on the German side there were +no doubts whatsoever. Permission was granted for the +despatch of an application to Versailles, but it was at the +same time explained that the movements of the Army +of the South would not be suspended pending the arrival +of the answer.</p> + +<p>On this day, however, the IInd Army Corps marched +only to Dompierre on a parallel front with the VIIth, +its advanced guard pushing forward on the Drugeon to +Ste. Colombe and La Rivière. Thence, in the evening, +a company of the Colberg Grenadiers crossed the steep<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[387]</a></span> +mountain ridge and descended on La Planée, where it +took 500 prisoners. A right-flank detachment of two +battalions and one battery under Lieutenant-Colonel +Liebe marched unopposed up the long pass of Bonnevaux +to Vaux, and took prisoners 2 officers and 688 +men. The enemy then abandoned the defile of Granges +Ste. Marie and retired to St. Antoine in the mountains.</p> + +<p>The Corps had found every road strewn with cast-away +arms and camp utensils, and had taken in all +4000 prisoners.</p> + +<p>Of the VIIth Corps, as soon as the enemy had been +informed of the resumption of hostilities, the 14th Division +bent leftward on the Drugeon and up to La Vrine, +whence a connection was effected with the 4th Reserve +Division of the XIVth Corps in St. Gorgon. The 13th +Division advanced to Sept Fontaines. Pontarlier was +now completely surrounded, and General von Manteuffel +fixed February 1st for the general attack thereon. The +IInd Corps was to advance from the south-west, the +VIIth from the north-west; General von der Goltz was +to establish himself in front of Levier in reserve.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the French Commander-in-Chief had conceived +doubts whether everything was quite right with +the communications from his Government. All the +mountain-passes leading to the south were now lost, and +an escape in that direction was no longer to be hoped for. +General Clinchant had already sent rearward the baggage +and ammunition columns, the sick and worn-out men, +through La Cluse under shelter of the forts of Joux +and Neuv. And when in the afternoon a message from +Bordeaux brought the intelligence that in fact the +Army of the East had been excluded from the armistice, +the Commander-in-Chief summoned his generals to a +council of war. Every General present declared that +he could no longer answer for his troops. General +Clinchant himself therefore went out the same evening +to Les Verrières, to conclude negotiations he had already +opened, in virtue of which on the following day,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[388]</a></span> +February 1st, the army was to cross the Swiss frontier +by three roads.</p> + +<p>To cover this retreat, the Army Reserve was to hold +Pontarlier till all the baggage-trains should have passed +La Cluse, while the XVIIIth Corps was to take up a +covering position between the two forts. Defensive +works there were at once set about. What of the XVth +Corps on the way by Morez had failed in getting +through with the cavalry was to try to cross into +Switzerland at any available point.</p> + +<p><i>February 1st.</i>—When the advanced guard of the IInd +Corps now advanced on Pontarlier from Ste. Colombe, +it met with but slight resistance at the railway station. +The Colberg Grenadiers took possession of the town +without a struggle, and captured many prisoners, but +then found the road on the further side entirely blocked +by guns and waggons. They could pass beyond on +either side of the road only with difficulty through +deep snow. Just in front of La Cluse the road winds +between high rocky precipices into the wide basin of the +Doubs, completely commanded by the isolated fortalice +of Joux perched on the solid rock. On debouching into +the open the foremost companies were received by a hot +fire. Four guns, dragged up thither with the greatest +exertions, could make no head against the heavy guns +of the fort, and the French themselves here passed to +the attack.</p> + +<p>The Colberg Fusiliers had meanwhile climbed the +heights to the left, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the +Regiment and a battalion of the 49th Regiment, which +drove the French out of the farmsteads on the rifted +upland. The steep cliff on the right was also scaled, +several rifle sub-divisions of the 49th climbed the +acclivity up to La Cluse, and the Colberg Grenadiers +advanced to the foot of Fort Neuv.</p> + +<p>To take the strong fortalices by storm was obviously +impossible, and furthermore because of the nature of the +ground the fugitive enemy could scarcely be overtaken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[389]</a></span> +in force. Of the French, 23 officers and 1600 men were +taken prisoners, with 400 loaded waggons; of the +Germans, 19 officers and 365 men had fallen, mostly of +the Colberg Regiment. The troops spent the night on +the field of the fighting.</p> + +<p>As no large force could come into action at La Cluse, +General von Fransecky had ordered the main body of +the Corps to march further southward to Ste. Marie. +To avoid the necessity of crossing the steep chain of +the Jura, General von Hartmann first betook himself +to Pontarlier to avail himself of the better roads +from thence, but his progress was stopped, the fight +at La Cluse having assumed unexpected proportions. +The VIIth Corps and the 4th Reserve Division, which +had reached the Doubs at noon, were equally unable to +get at the enemy.</p> + +<p>During the whole day the French columns were +crossing the Swiss frontier. The Army Reserve in +Pontarlier was at the beginning swept away by the +tide of baggage-waggons and drivers, and only joined +the XVIIIth Corps on reaching La Cluse. During the +night they both followed the general line of retreat. +Only the cavalry and the 1st Division of the XXIVth +Corps reached the neighbouring department of l'Ain +to the southward, the latter force reduced to a few +hundred men. There crossed the frontier on to Swiss +soil some 80,000 Frenchmen.</p> + +<p>General Manteuffel had transferred his headquarters +to Pontarlier. There, in the course of the night, he +first heard through Berlin of the convention arranged +between General Clinchant and Colonel Herzog of the +Swiss Confederation.</p> + +<p>General von Manteuffel had achieved the important +success of his three weeks' campaign by hard marching +and constant fighting, although there had been no +pitched battle since that of the Lisaine. These marches, +indeed, had been such as none but well-seasoned troops +could have accomplished under bold and skilful leadership,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[390]</a></span> +under every form of fatigue and hardship, in the +worst season and through a difficult country.</p> + +<p>Thus two French armies were now prisoners in +Germany, a third interned in the capital, and the fourth +disarmed on foreign soil.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> Men of the 2nd Battalion, 61st Regiment, 8th Brigade, 4th +Division, IInd Corps, which Corps consisted exclusively of Pomeranians.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> "Conviction bien arrêtée."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> The 77th Hanoverian Fusilier Regiment, of which this was the +2nd battalion, belonged to the 25th Brigade, 13th Division, VIIth +(Westphalian) Army Corps.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">General Hann von Weyhern's March on Dijon.</span></h2> + + +<p>It only remains to cast a backward glance on the advance +on Dijon, with the conduct of which General Hann +von Weyhern was charged on January 26th.</p> + +<p>On that same day Garibaldi received instructions +there to take energetic measures against Dôle and +Mouchard.</p> + +<p>To support him, the Government, indefatigable in +the evolution of new forces, was to put in march 15,000 +Gardes-Mobiles under General Crouzat from Lyons to +Lons le Saulnier, and a XXVIth Corps in course of +formation at Châtellerault was to be sent from thence +to Beaune. As it was beyond doubt that General von +Manteuffel had moved with a strong force on the communications +of the Army of the East, the specific order +was transmitted on the 27th to the Commander of the +Army of the Vosges, to leave only from 8000 to 10,000 +men in Dijon and to advance at once with his main +force beyond Dôle.</p> + +<p>But the General was always greatly concerned for the +safety of Dijon; he occupied the principal positions on +the slopes of the Côte d'Or and detached a small force +to St. Jean de Losne, behind the canal of Bourgogne. +Of 700 volunteers who had marched on Dôle, no trace +was ever found there.</p> + +<p>Langres had shown more energy; several and +often successful attacks on small outpost companies and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[391]</a></span> +etappen troops had been made from it from time to +time.</p> + +<p>General Hann von Weyhern's purpose of attacking +Dijon from the south had to be abandoned, because the +bridge over the Saône at St. Jean de Losne had been +destroyed. He therefore on the 29th crossed the river +at Apremont, and on the 31st assembled his detachments +at Arc sur Tille. Here again General Bordone, +the Chief of the general staff of the Army of the +Vosges, vainly insisted that an armistice was in force. +On the 31st General von Kettler marched with an +advanced guard on Varois. To cut off the enemy's +communications with Auxonne a left-flank detachment +made itself master of the bridge over the Ouche at +Fauverney. The first shells drove the French back on +their intrenched position on the line St. Apollinaire—Mirande.</p> + +<p>When the attempt to establish an armistice failed, +General Bordone determined to evacuate Dijon in the +course of the night and retire upon assured neutral +ground. Thus, on February 1st, the head of the advanced +guard found the position in front of the city +abandoned, and General von Kettler marched in without +encountering any opposition, just as the last train +of French troops moved out of the railway-station. +Sombernon and Nuits were also occupied on the 2nd.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">Occupation of the Departments of the Doubs, Jura, +and Côte d'Or.</span></h2> + + +<p>Nothing now remained for General von Manteuffel +but to establish the military occupation of the three +Departments which he had won, and to guard them +from without.</p> + +<p>General Pelissier was still in the open field within +their bounds, having reached Lons le Saulnier with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[392]</a></span> +15,000 Gardes-Mobiles who had come up from Lyons +and had been joined by the battalions sent back +from Besançon by General Rolland, by no means an +insignificant force numerically, but practically of no +great efficiency. The commanders were recommended +to retire and avoid further bloodshed; and they did so, +as soon as some detachments of the IInd German Corps +advanced on Lons le Saulnier and St. Laurent. Others +occupied Mouthe and Les Allemands, where were +found twenty-eight field-guns which had been abandoned +by the French. As a measure of precaution, +the Swiss frontier was watched by eight battalions. +The fortalices of Salins, the little fortress of Auxonne, +and Besançon, were kept under observation from the +eastward. Although the Department of Haute-Marne +was included in the armistice, the commandant of +Langres had refused to recognize the authority of his +Government. So this place had to be invested, and +probably besieged. General von der Goltz was +promptly ordered to advance once more on it, and +General von Krenski was already on the march thither +with seven battalions, two squadrons and two batteries, +and a siege train from Longwy, which he had brought +to capitulate on January 25th, after a bombardment of +six days' duration. But it was not called into requisition +at Langres. General von Manteuffel aimed at +no further tactical results; he was anxious to save his +troops from further losses, and to afford them all possible +relief after their exceptional exertions. Not +till now were the baggage-waggons brought up, even +those of the superior staff officers having been necessarily +left behind during the advance into the Jura. +The troops were distributed for the sake of comfort +in roomy quarters, but in readiness for action at any +moment, the IInd Corps in the Jura, the VIIth in the +Côte d'Or, the XIVth in the department of the Doubs. +But the siege of Belfort was still to be vigorously +carried on.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[393]</a></span></p> +<h2><span class="smcap">Prosecution of the Siege of Belfort.</span></h2> + + +<p>Immediately after the battle on the Lisaine the forces +investing Belfort were increased to 27 battalions, 6 +squadrons, 6 field batteries, 24 companies of fortress +artillery, and 6 companies of fortress pioneers; 17,602 +infantry, 4699 artillerymen, and 1166 pioneers, in all +23,467 men, with 707 horses and 34 field-guns.</p> + +<p>The place was invested on the north and west by +only a few battalions, and the main force was assembled +to the south and east.</p> + +<p>On January 20th the eastern batteries opened a +heavy fire on Pérouse. Colonel Denfert concluded that +an attack was imminent, and placed four battalions of +his most trusted troops in the village, which had been +prepared for an obstinate defence.</p> + +<p>At about midnight, two battalions of the 67th Regiment +advanced from Chêvremont on the Haut Taillis +wood without firing a shot. Once inside it there was a +determined struggle, but the French were driven back +on the village, and the pioneers immediately intrenched +the skirt of the wood towards Pérouse under a heavy +fire from the forts. Half an hour later two Landwehr +battalions advanced from Bessoncourt to the copse on +the north of the village. They were received with a +heavy fire, but made their way onward over abatis, +pits and wire-entanglements, driving the enemy back +into the quarries. A stationary fight now ensued, but +the 67th presently renewed the attack, and without +allowing themselves to be checked by the earthworks +forced their way into Pérouse. They took possession +of the eastern half of the straggling village at about +half-past two, and the detachment defending the +quarries, finding itself threatened, retreated. At five +o'clock, Colonel Denfert abandoned the western part of +the village, which was now completely occupied by the +Germans. The losses on the German side were 8 officers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[394]</a></span> +and 178 men; the French left 5 officers and 93 men +prisoners.</p> + +<p><i>January 21st to 27th.</i>—The next day the construction +of the first parallel was undertaken, extending about +2000 yards from Donjoutin to Haut Taillis. Five battalions +and two companies of Sappers were employed in +this work, and were undisturbed by the French; but +the rocky soil prevented its being constructed of the +prescribed width.</p> + +<p>General von Tresckow considered that he might thus +early succeed in carrying both the Perches forts by a +determined assault. Two half redoubts with ditches +more than three yards deep cut perpendicularly in the +solid rock, casemated traverses and bomb-proof blockhouses +in the gorge, afforded protection to the defenders. +Each work was armed with seven 12-cm. cannon, and +they were connected by trenches, behind which reserves +were in readiness. On the right flank this position was +protected by a battalion and a sortie-battery in Le +Fourneau; on the left the adjacent wood was cleared, +cut down to a distance of 650 yards, and wire-entanglements +between the stumps formed an almost impenetrable +obstacle. In front the gentle slope of the ridge +was under the cross-fire of the two forts.</p> + +<p>When on the previous evening of the 26th the construction +of the parallel was sufficiently advanced to +allow of its being occupied by larger detachments, the +assault was fixed for the 27th. Two columns, each of +one battalion, one company of Sappers, and two guns, +passed to the attack at daybreak on that morning. Two +companies of Schneidemühl's Landwehr Battalion advanced +against the front of Basses Perches and threw +themselves on the ground within from 65 to 110 yards +of the work. A sub-division of sharp-shooters and a few +pioneers reached the ditch and unhesitatingly leaped +in; the two other (Landwehr) companies, going round +the fort by the left, got into its rear, and here too the +men jumped into the ditch of the gorge. But the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[395]</a></span> +French who had been driven out of their shelter-trenches +were now assembled, and the battalion from +Le Fourneau came up. All the forts of the place +opened fire on the bare and unprotected space in +front of the parallel, and an attempt of reinforcements +to cross it failed. The 7th Company of the Landwehr +Battalion was surrounded by greatly superior numbers, +and after a brave struggle was for the most part made +captive. Most of the men in the ditch were still able +to escape.</p> + +<p>The advance of the right column against Hautes-Perches +also failed. It had to cross 1100 yards of open +ground. The encompassment of the fort was attempted, +but it was impossible to force through the abatis and +other obstacles under the destructive fire of the enemy.</p> + +<p>This abortive attempt cost 10 officers and 427 men; +and the slower process of an engineer attack had to be +resumed.</p> + +<p><i>January 28th to February 15th.</i>—As the approaches +to the forts progressed the flying sap could be +carried forward about 330 yards every night unopposed +by the enemy. In spite of all the difficulties +caused by the nature of the soil, on February 1st +the second parallel was thrown up at half distance +from the Perches.</p> + +<p>As the Fort of la Justice was a special hindrance to +the operations, two new batteries had to be constructed +to the east of Pérouse against it. Four mortar-batteries +on the flanks of the parallel now directed their +fire on the Perches at very short range. Three batteries +were also constructed in the Bois des Perches to +fire on the citadel, and one on the skirt of the wood +near Bavilliers against the defences of the city. Henceforward +1500 shells a day were fired on the fortress +and its outworks.</p> + +<p>But further the prosecution of the attack became more +and more difficult. The withdrawal of General Debschitz +had seriously reduced the working strength of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[396]</a></span> +besieging force. There were only nine battalions for +the exhausting service in the trenches. Specially serious +was the heavy loss in pioneers, and two fresh companies +had to be brought up from Strasburg. The +bright moonlight illuminating the fields of snow far +and wide made it impossible to proceed with the flying +saps. Sap-rollers had to be used; the heads of the +saps had to be protected by sandbags and the sides by +gabions, while the earth for filling had often to be +brought from a long distance in the rear.</p> + +<p>On the head of all this, on February 3rd, a thaw set +in, and the water from the heights filled the trenches, +so that all communication had to be carried on across +the open ground. Torrents of rain damaged the +finished works; the parapet of the first parallel gave +way altogether in places, and the banquette was washed +away. The bottomless tracks made the arming of the +batteries unspeakably difficult, and the teams of the +columns and field artillery had to be employed in +bringing up the ammunition. Many guns had become +useless by overheating, while the enemy understood, by +rapidly running out their guns, firing, and then running +them back again, how to interrupt the work. Not +merely was it necessary to continue the shelling of the +Perches during the night, but a brisk rifle fire had +to be kept up against them. Only now and then +did the batteries newly placed in the parallels succeed +in entirely silencing the guns of Hautes Perches. +Epaulments had to be erected against Fort Bellevue +and the defences of the railway-station, and Fort +des Barres resumed activity. That under such exertions +and the abominable weather the health of +the troops suffered severely, need not be said; the +battalions could often only muster 300 men for +duty.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, however, the artillery of the attack had +unquestionably become very much superior to that of +the defence, and, in spite of every obstacle, the saps<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[397]</a></span> +were pushed on to the edge of the ditch of Les +Perches.</p> + +<p>On February 8th, at one in the afternoon, Captain +Roese had gabions flung into the ditch of Hautes +Perches, sprang into it with five sappers, and rapidly +scaled the parapet by the steps hewn in the scarp. He +was immediately followed by the trench guard, but only +a few of the French were surprised in the casemated +traverses. The situation of the garrison of the forts had +in fact become extremely difficult. Ammunition had to +be brought up under the enemy's fire, water could only +be had from the pond at Vernier, and cooking could +only be done inside the works. Colonel Denfert had +already given orders to bury the material. Unseen +by the besiegers the guns of which the carriages +could still be moved had been withdrawn, and only +one company left in each fort, which in case of a +surprise was to fire and fly. Nothing was to be found +in the abandoned work but wrecked gun-carriages and +four damaged guns. This fort was at once reversed +so that its front faced the fortress, but at three o'clock +the latter opened so heavy a fire on the lost positions +that the working parties had to take shelter in the +ditches.</p> + +<p>The garrison in Basses Perches attempted some +resistance, but under cover of a reserve it soon +retired to Le Fourneau, leaving five guns and much +shattered material. Here also the fire of the place +at first compelled the working parties to break off, but +four 15-cm. mortars were at length brought into the +fort, and two 9-cm. guns were placed on the spur of +the hill to the westward, which directed their fire on +Le Fourneau and Bellevue. During the night of the +9th the two works were connected by a shelter-trench +680 yards long, and thus the third parallel was +established.</p> + +<p>The position was now such that the attack could +immediately be directed on the citadel, and on it the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[398]</a></span> +batteries in the Bois des Perches and presently those +in the second parallel opened fire. Moitte, Justice, +and Bellevue were shelled simultaneously. General +von Debschitz had returned, so that the investing +corps was thus again brought up to its full strength, +and all the conditions were improved by the return of +the frost. By the 13th ninety-seven guns were ready +in the third parallel.</p> + +<p>The town had suffered terribly from the prolonged +bombardment. Nearly all the buildings were damaged, +fifteen completely burnt down, and in the adjoining +villages 164 houses had been destroyed by the defenders +themselves. The fortifications showed not less visible +indications of serious damage, particularly the citadel. +The hewn-stone facing of its front-wall had crumbled +into the ditch. Half of the mantleted embrasures had +been shattered, the expense powder magazines had been +blown up, and a number of casemated traverses pierced. +The guns in the upper batteries could only be reached +by ladders. The garrison, of its original strength of +372 officers and 17,322 men, had lost 32 officers and +4713 men, besides 336 citizens. The place was no +longer tenable; besides there now came the news that +the army from which alone relief was to be expected, +had laid down its arms.</p> + +<p>Under these circumstances General von Tresckow +summoned the commandant after a defence so brave to +surrender the fortress, with free withdrawal for the +garrison, this concession having the sanction of his +Majesty. The French Government itself authorized +the commandant to accept these terms. Colonel +Denfert, however, insisted that he must be given a +more direct order. To procure this an officer was +sent to Basle, pending whose return there was a provisional +armistice.</p> + +<p>On the 15th a convention was signed at Versailles, +which extended the armistice to the three departments +which till then had been excluded from it, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[399]</a></span> +also to Belfort; but the 1st article demanded the +surrender of that place.</p> + +<p>After the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the +garrison, in the course of the 17th and 18th, with its +arms and trains, left the precincts of the fortress and +withdrew by way of L'Isle sur Doubs and St. Hippolyte +into the country occupied by French troops. The +march was effected in detachments of 1000 men at +intervals of 5 km., the last of which Colonel Denfert +accompanied. The supplies which remained in the fortress +were conveyed in rear of the departing troops in +150 Prussian proviant waggons. At 3 o'clock in the +afternoon of February 18th Lieutenant-General von +Tresckow entered the place at the head of detachments +from all the troops of the investing corps.</p> + +<p>There were found 341 guns, of which 56 were +useless, 356 gun-carriages, of which 119 were shot to +pieces, and 22,000 stand of arms, besides considerable +supplies of ammunition and provisions.</p> + +<p>The siege had cost the Germans 88 officers and +2049 men, 245 of whom were released from imprisonment +by the capitulation. Immediately was set about +the work of restoring and arming the fortress, and of +the levelling of the siege works.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Armistice.</span></h2> + + +<p>On the basis of the agreement of January 28th a line +of demarcation was drawn, from which both parties +were to withdraw their outposts to a distance of 10 km. +The line ran south from the mouth of the Seine as far +as the Sarthe, crossed the Loire at Saumur, followed +the Creuse, turned eastward past Vierzon, Clamécy and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[400]</a></span> +Chagny, and then met the Swiss frontier, after bending +to the north of Châlons sur Saône and south of Lons le +Saulnier and St. Laurent. The two departments of +Pas de Calais and du Nord, as well as the promontory +of Havre, were particularly excluded.</p> + +<p>The fortresses still held by French troops in the +districts occupied by the Germans were assigned a +rayon in proportion to their importance.</p> + +<p>In carrying out the details of the agreement a liberal +interpretation was in most instances allowed. The +arrangements had the sanction of those members of the +Government of National Defence who were in Paris; +while the delegates at Bordeaux, who had hitherto +conducted the war, at first held aloof, and indeed, as +yet had not been made acquainted with the detailed +conditions. Gambetta, it is true, allowed the suspension +of operations, but could not give the commanders more +precise instructions.</p> + +<p>General Faidherbe was thus without orders with +regard to the evacuation of Dieppe and Abbeville. +General von Goeben, however, refrained from taking +immediate possession of these places. On the west of +the Seine, the Grand Duke was forced to proclaim that +the non-recognition of the line of demarcation would +be followed by an immediate recommencement of +hostilities.</p> + +<p>The commandant of the garrison at Langres also +raised difficulties, and only withdrew within his rayon on +February 7th, as did General Rolland later at Besançon. +Auxonne was at first unwilling to give up control of the +railway. Bitsch, which had not been worth the trouble +of a serious attack, repudiated the convention; the +investment had therefore to be strengthened, and only +in March, when threatened with a determined attack, +did the garrison abandon its peak of rock.</p> + +<p>Nor did the volunteers acquiesce at once, and there +were collisions with them at various points. But after +the conditions were finally settled, no more serious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[401]</a></span> +quarrels occurred between the inhabitants and the +German troops during the whole course of the +armistice.</p> + +<p>All the German corps before Paris occupied the forts +lying in their front, more specifically the Vth took over +Mont Valérien, and the IVth the town of St. Denis. +Between the forts and the enceinte there lay a neutral +zone, which civilians were allowed to cross only by +specified roads placed under control of German examining +troops.</p> + +<p>Apprehensive as it was of the indignation of the +populace, the French Government had hesitated so long +to utter the word "capitulation," that now, even with +the resumption of free communication, Paris was +threatened with an outbreak of actual famine. The +superfluous stores in the German magazines were +therefore placed at the disposal of its authorities. The +respective chief-Commands, the local Governments-General, +and the Etappen-Inspections received instructions +to place no difficulties in the way of the +repair of the railways and roads in their districts, and +the French authorities were even allowed to make use, +under German supervision, of the repaired railroads +which the invaders used to supply their own army. +Nevertheless, the first provision-train only arrived in +Paris on February 3rd, and it was the middle of the +month before the French had succeeded in remedying +the prevalent distress in the capital.</p> + +<p>The German prisoners were at once given up. The +surrender of arms and war-material followed by degrees, +also the payment of the 200 million francs war-contribution +imposed on the city.</p> + +<p>But it was still doubtful if the party of "war to the +bitter end" in Bordeaux would fall in with the arrangements +made by the Paris Government, and whether the +National Assembly about to be convened would finally +ratify the conditions of peace imposed by the conquerors. +The necessary measures in case of the resumption of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[402]</a></span> +hostilities were therefore taken on the French as well as +on the German side.</p> + +<p>The distribution of the French forces at the establishment +of the armistice was not favourable.</p> + +<p>By General Faidherbe's advice the Army of the +North was wholly disbanded, as being too weak to face +the strength opposing it. After the XXIInd Corps +had been transported by sea to Cherbourg, the Army +of Brittany under General de Colomb was composed of +it, the XXVIIth and part of the XIXth Corps, and, +including Lipowski's volunteers, Cathelineau's and other +details, its strength was some 150,000 men. General +Loysel with 30,000 ill-armed and raw Gardes-Mobiles +remained in the trenches of Havre.</p> + +<p>General Chanzy, after his retreat on Mayenne, had +made a movement to the left, preparatory to a new +operation with the IInd Army of the Loire from the +Caen base, which, however, was never carried out. +The XVIIIth, XXIst, XVIth, and XXVIth Corps stood +between the lower Loire and the Cher from Angers to +Châteauroux, in a strength of about 160,000 men strong, +the XXVth under General Pourcet was at Bourges, +and General de Pointe's Corps at Nevers. The Army +of the Vosges had withdrawn southward of Châlons sur +Saône, and the remains of the Army of the East +assembled under General Crémer at Chambéry as the +XXIVth Corps.</p> + +<p>The total of all the field-troops amounted to 534,452 +men. The volunteers, even those most to be relied on, +were dismissed, and the National Guard was designated +as for the present "incapable of rendering any military +service." In the depôts, the camps of instruction, and +in Algiers there were still 354,000 men, and 132,000 +recruits were on the lists as the contingent for 1871, +but had not yet been called up.</p> + +<p>In case the war should be persisted in, a plan for +limiting it to the defensive in the south-east of France +was under consideration, for which, however, according<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[403]</a></span> +to the report sent on February 8th by the Committee +of Inquiry to the National Assembly, scarcely more +than 252,000 men in fighting condition were available. +The fleet, besides, had given up so considerable a +number of its men and guns for service on land, that +it was no longer able for any great undertaking at +sea.</p> + +<p>On the German side the first consideration was to +reinforce the troops to their full war-strength, and +replenish the magazines.</p> + +<p>The forts round Paris were at once armed on their +fronts facing the enceinte. In and between these were +680 guns, 145 of which were captured French pieces; +more than enough to keep the restless population under +control. A part of the forces previously occupied +in the siege, being no longer required, were removed, +in order that the remaining troops should have better +accommodation. Besides, it seemed desirable to +strengthen the IInd Army, which had in its front the +enemy's principal force. In consequence the IVth +Corps marched to Nogent le Rotrou, the Vth to Orleans, +and the IXth, relieved there, to Vendôme; so that +now the quarters of this army extended from Alençon +to Tours, and up the Loire as far as Gien and Auxerre.</p> + +<p>The Ist Army was in the north with the VIIIth +Corps on the Somme, and the Ist on both sides of the +Lower Seine; in the south the Army of the South +occupied the line of demarcation from Baume to +Switzerland, and the country in the rear.</p> + +<p>At the end of February the German field-army on +French soil consisted of:—</p> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="left">Infantry</td><td align="right"> 464,221</td><td align="left"> men with 1674 guns.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Cavalry</td><td align="right">55,562</td><td align="left"> horses.</td></tr> +</table> +</div> + +<p>Troops in garrison:—</p> + + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="left">Infantry</td><td align="right"> 105,272</td><td align="left"> men with 68 guns.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Cavalry</td><td align="right">5681</td><td align="left"> horses.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">———</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Total</td><td align="right">630,736</td><td align="left"> men and 1742 guns.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p>Reserve forces remaining in Germany:—</p> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="right">3288</td><td align="left">officers.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">204,684</td><td align="left">men.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="right">26,603</td><td align="left">horses.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p>Arrangements were so made, that in case of a recommencement +of hostilities, the strongest resistance could +be made at all points. The armistice had nearly +reached its end, and the troops had already been more +closely collected to be ready to take the initiative of +the offensive towards the south, when the Chancellor +of the Confederation announced the extension of the +armistice to the 24th, which was again prolonged to +midnight on the 26th.</p> + +<p>Considerable difficulties had arisen from the differences +of opinion with regard to the election of the +National Assembly, between the Government in Paris +and the Delegation at Bordeaux. The Germans wished +to see carried out the choice, not of a party, but of the +whole nation, expressed by a free suffrage. But Gambetta +had ruled, in violation of the conditions of the +armistice, that all who after December 2nd, 1851, had +held any position in the Imperial Government should +be ineligible to vote. It was not till the Parisian +Government had obtained a majority by sending several +of its members to Bordeaux, and after the dictator had +resigned on February 6th, that the elections proceeded +quickly and unhindered.</p> + +<p>The deputies duly assembled in Bordeaux by the +12th, the appointed day. M. Thiers was elected chief +of the executive, and went to Paris on the 19th with +Jules Favre, determined to end the aimless war at any +cost.</p> + +<p>Negotiations for peace were opened, and after five +days' vigorous discussion, when at last on the German +side the concession to restore Belfort was made, the +preliminaries were signed on the afternoon of the 26th.</p> + +<p>France bound herself to give up in favour of Germany +a part of Lorraine, and the province of Alsace with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[405]</a></span> +exception of Belfort, and also to pay a war indemnity +of five milliards of francs.</p> + +<p>The evacuation of the districts in occupation of the +German armies was to begin immediately on the ratification +of the treaty, and be continued by degrees in +proportion as the money was paid. While the German +troops remained on French soil they were to be maintained +at the charge of the country. On the other +hand all requisitioning on the part of the Germans was +to cease. Immediately on the first instalment of +evacuation the French forces were to retire behind the +Loire, with the exception of 20,000 men in Paris and +the necessary garrisons in the fortresses.</p> + +<p>After the ratification of these preliminaries, further +terms were to be discussed in Brussels, and the return +of the French prisoners would begin. The armistice +was prolonged to March 12th; but it was in the option +of either of the belligerent powers to end it after March +3rd by giving three days' notice.</p> + +<p>Finally, it was stipulated that the German Army +should have the satisfaction of marching into Paris, and +remaining there till the ratification of the treaty; but +would be restricted to the section of the city from Point +du Jour to the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré. The +entry was made on March 1st, after a parade at Longchamps +before his Majesty of 30,000 men, consisting +of 11,000 of the VIth, 11,000 of the IInd Bavarian, +and 8000 of the XIth Army Corps. On the 3rd and +5th of March this force was to have been relieved by +successive bodies of the same strength, but M. Thiers +succeeded by March 1st in getting the National +Assembly at Bordeaux to accept the treaty, after the +deposition of the Napoleonic dynasty had been decreed. +The exchange of ratifications took place in the afternoon +of the 2nd, and on the 3rd the first instalment of troops +of occupation marched out of Paris back into its +quarters.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[406]</a></span></p> +<h2><span class="smcap">The Homeward March of the German Army.</span></h2> + + +<p>By the IIIrd Article, the whole territory between +the Seine and the Loire, excepting Paris, was to be +evacuated with as little delay as possible by the troops +of both sides; the right bank of the former river, on +the other hand, was only to be cleared on the conclusion +of the definitive treaty of peace. Even then the six +eastern departments were still to remain in German +possession as a pledge for the last three milliards; not, +however, to be occupied by more than 50,000 men.</p> + +<p>The marching directions were drawn up in the +supreme Headquarter, with a view as well to the comfort +of the troops as to the reconstitution of the +original order of battle, and the possibility of rapid +assembly in case of need.</p> + +<p>The forces detailed for permanent occupation of the +ceded provinces marched thither at once.</p> + +<p>The Reserve and Landwehr troops at home were to +be disbanded, as well as the Baden Division, which, however, +for the present was to remain there as a mobilized +force. The Governments-General in Lorraine, Rheims, +and Versailles were to be done away with, and their +powers taken over by the local Commanding-Generals. +In the maintenance of order in the rear of the army, +the VIth and XIIth Corps, as well as the Würtemberg +Field Division, were placed at the direct disposition of +the supreme Headquarter.</p> + +<p>By March 31st the Army had taken full possession +of the new territory assigned to it, bounded on the +west by the course of the Seine from its source to its +mouth.</p> + +<p>The Ist Army was in the departments of Seine-Inférieure +and Somme, the IInd in front of Paris in +the departments of Oise and Seine et Marne, the IIIrd +in the departments of Aube and Haute Marne, the +Army of the South in the districts most lately hostile. +The forts of Paris on the left bank were given up to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[407]</a></span> +the French authorities; the siege park and the captured +war material had been removed. In consideration +of the desire of the French Government that the +National Assembly might be allowed as early +as possible to sit at Versailles, the supreme Headquarter +was removed to Ferrières, even sooner than +had been agreed. On March 15th his Majesty left +Nancy for Berlin.</p> + +<p>All the troops that were left before Paris were +placed under the command of the Crown Prince of +Saxony, and General von Manteuffel was nominated +Commander of the Army of Occupation.</p> + +<p>At the moment when France had freed herself by a +heavy sacrifice, an enemy of the most dangerous +character appeared from within, in the Commune of +Paris.</p> + +<p>The 40,000 men left there proved themselves unequal +to the task of keeping the rebellious agitation under +control; which even during the siege had on several +occasions betrayed its existence, and now actually +broke out in open civil war. Large masses of people, +fraternizing with the National and Mobile Guards, possessed +themselves of the guns and set themselves in +armed resistance to the Government. M. Thiers had +already, by March 18th, summoned to Versailles such +regiments as could still be trusted, to withdraw them +from the disquieting influence of party impulses, and +for the protection of the National Assembly there. +The French capital was a prey to revolution, and now +became an object of pillage by French troops.</p> + +<p>The Germans could easily have put a speedy end to +the matter, but what Government could allow its rights +to be vindicated by foreign bayonets? The German +Commanders consequently limited themselves to forbidding +at least within their own districts any movement +of disturbance, and to preventing all further +ingress into Paris from outside. The disarmament +operations which had commenced were interrupted; +the troops of the IIIrd Army were drawn closer to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[408]</a></span> +forts, and the outposts were replaced along the line +of demarcation, whereon 200,000 men could now +be collected within two days. The authorities in +Paris were also warned that any attempt to arm +the fronts facing the Germans would be followed +by the immediate bombardment of the city. The +insurgents however, were fully occupied in destroying +and burning, and in executing their commanders in the +interior of Paris. They did not turn against their +foreign enemy, but against the Government chosen by +the nation, and prepared for an attack on Versailles.</p> + +<p>The high officers of State there, bound by the +conditions of the armistice treaty, were almost defenceless; +meanwhile the Germans were prepared and +willing to allow a reinforcement of 80,000 French +troops to be moved up from Besançon, Auxerre and +Cambrai, the transport of whom would be furthered by +the German troops in occupation of the districts +through which they would have to pass.</p> + +<p>The release of the prisoners on the other hand was +temporarily restricted. These were, for the most part, +disciplined regulars; but they might not improbably +join the hostile party, so in the first instance only +20,000 troops of the line were set free.</p> + +<p>On April 4th General MacMahon advanced with +the Government troops against Paris, and entered +the city on the 21st. As he was then engaged for +eight days in barricade fighting, and as great bands of +fugitives threatened to break through the German +lines, the IIIrd Army was ordered to take closer +order. The outposts advanced almost to the gates of +the city, and barred all communication through them +until, at the end of the month, Paris was again in the +control of the French Government.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, the negotiations commenced in +Brussels and continued in Frankfort were making +rapid progress, and on May 10th the definitive treaty +of peace based on the preliminaries was signed. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[409]</a></span> +mutual ratification followed within the appointed time +of ten days.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p>Thus a war, carried on with such a vast expenditure +of force on both sides, was brought to an end by +incessant and restless energy in the short period of +seven months.</p> + +<p>Even in the first four weeks eight battles were +fought, under which the French Empire crumbled, and +the French Army was swept from the field.</p> + +<p>Fresh forces, numerous but incompetent, equalized +the original numerical superiority of the Germans, +and twelve more battles needed to be fought, to safeguard +the decisive siege of the enemy's capital.</p> + +<p>Twenty fortified places were taken, and not a single +day passed on which there was not fighting somewhere, +on a larger or smaller scale.</p> + +<p>The war cost the Germans heavy sacrifice; they +lost 6247 officers, 123,453 men, 1 colour, 6 guns.</p> + +<p>The total losses of the French were incalculable; in +prisoners only they amounted to:—</p> + +<div class="center"> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td align="left">In Germany</td><td align="right">11,860</td><td align="center">officers,</td><td align="right">371,981</td><td align="center">men.</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">In Paris</td><td align="right">7,456</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">241,686</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left">Disarmed in Switzerland.</td><td align="right">2,192</td><td align="center">"</td><td align="right">88,381</td><td align="center">"</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">———</td><td align="center"></td><td align="right">———</td></tr> +<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="right">21,508</td><td align="center">officers,</td><td align="right">702,048</td><td align="center">men.</td></tr> +</table></div> + +<p>There were captured 107 colours and eagles, 1915 +field-guns, 5526 fortress guns.</p> + +<p>Strasburg and Metz, which had been alienated from +the Fatherland in a time of weakness, were recovered, +and the German Empire had risen anew.</p> + + + +<div class="center">THE END.</div> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[410]</a></span></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[411]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX.</h2> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[412]</a></span></p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[413]</a></span></p> +<h2>APPENDIX.</h2> + + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Memorandum on the pretended Council of War in the Wars<br /> +of King William I.</span> +</div> + +<p>In the accounts of historical events, as they are handed down to posterity, +mistakes assume the form of legends which it is not always easy subsequently +to disprove.</p> + +<p>Among others is the fable which ascribes, with particular zest and as +a matter of regular custom, the great decisions taken in the course of our +latest campaigns, to the deliberations of a council of war previously convened.</p> + +<p>For instance, the battle of Königgrätz.</p> + +<p>I can relate in a few lines the circumstances under which an event of +such far-reaching importance had birth.</p> + +<p>Feldzeugmeister Benedek had, in his advance to the northward, to +secure himself against the IInd Prussian Army marching on the east over +the mountains of Silesia. To this end four of his Corps had one after +another been pushed forward on his right flank, and had all been beaten +within three days. They now joined the main body of the Austrian Army, +which had meanwhile reached the vicinity of Dubenetz.</p> + +<p>Here, then, on June 30th, almost the whole of the Austrian forces were +standing actually inside the line of operations between the two Prussian +armies; of which the Ist was already fighting its way to Gitschin, designated +from Berlin as the common point of concentration, and the IInd +had also advanced close on the Upper Elbe; thus they were both so near +that the enemy could not attack the one without the other falling on his +rear. The strategic advantage was nullified by the tactical disadvantage.</p> + +<p>In these circumstances, and having already lost 40,000 men in previous +battles, General Benedek gave up the advance, and during the night of +June 30th began his retreat on Königgrätz.</p> + +<p>The movement of six Army Corps and four Cavalry Divisions, marching +in only four columns, which were necessarily very deep, could not be +accomplished in the course of a single day. They halted very closely +concentrated between Trotina and Lipa; but when on July 2nd they +still remained there, it was owing to the extreme fatigue of the troops, +and the difficulty, nay, impossibility, of withdrawing so large a body of +men beyond the Elbe, under the eyes of an active enemy and by a limited +number of passages. In fact, the Austrian general could no longer +manœuvre; he had no alternative but to fight.</p> + +<p>It is a noteworthy fact that neither his advance on Dubenetz nor his +retreat on Lipa was known to the Prussians. These movements were concealed +from the IInd Army by the Elbe, and the cavalry of the Ist was +a mass of more than 8000 horse collected in one unwieldy Corps. The +four squadrons attached to each Infantry Division were of course not able +to undertake reconnoissances, as subsequently was later done in 1870 by a +more advantageous plan of formation.</p> + +<p>Thus in the Royal head-quarters at Gitschin nothing certain was known. +It was supposed that the main body of the hostile army was still advancing, +and that it would take up a position with the Elbe in its front and its +flanks resting on the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz. There<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[414]</a></span> +were, then, these alternatives—either to turn this extremely strong position, +or attack it in front.</p> + +<p>By the adoption of the first the communications of the Austrian Army with +Pardubitz would be so seriously threatened that it might probably be compelled +to retreat. But to secure the safety of such a movement our IInd +Army must relieve our Ist and cross over to the right bank of the Elbe. +And in this case the flank march of the latter close past the enemy's +front might easily be interfered with, if passages enough across the river +had been prepared by him.</p> + +<p>In the second case, success could only be hoped for if an advance of the +IInd Army on the right flank of the enemy's position could be combined +with the attack in front. For this it must be kept on the left bank.</p> + +<p>The separation of the two armies, which was for the present intentionally +maintained, allowed of either plan being followed; but mine was the +serious responsibility of advising his Majesty which should be chosen.</p> + +<p>To keep both alternatives open for the present, General von Herwarth +was ordered to occupy Pardubitz, and the Crown Prince to remain on the +left bank of the Elbe, to reconnoitre that river as well as the Aupa and +the Metau, and to remove all obstacles which might oppose a crossing in +one or the other direction. At length, on July 2nd, Prince Frederick +Charles was ordered, in the event of his finding a large force in front of +the Elbe, to attack it at once. But, on the evening of that day, it came +to the knowledge of the Prince that the whole Austrian Army had marched +to and was in position on the Bistritz; and in obedience to instructions +received, he at once ordered the Ist Army and the Army of the Elbe to +assemble close in front of the enemy by daybreak next morning.</p> + +<p>General von Voigts-Rhetz brought the news at eleven o'clock in the +evening to the King at Gitschin, and his Majesty sent him over to me.</p> + +<p>This information dispelled all doubts and lifted a weight from my heart. +With a "Thank God!" I sprang out of bed, and hastened across to the +King, who was lodged on the other side of the Market Place.</p> + +<p>His Majesty also had gone to rest in his little camp-bed. After a brief +explanation on my part, he said he fully understood the situation, decided +on giving battle next day with all three armies in co-operation, and desired +me to transmit the necessary orders to the Crown Prince, who was at +once to cross the Elbe.</p> + +<p>The whole interview with his Majesty lasted barely ten minutes. No +one else was present.</p> + +<p>This was the "Council of War" before Königgrätz.</p> + +<p>General von Podbielski and Major Count Wartensleben shared my +quarters. The orders to the IInd Army were drawn up forthwith and +despatched in duplicate by two different routes by midnight. One, carried +by General von Voigts-Rhetz, informed Prince Frederick Charles of all the +dispositions; the other was sent direct to Königinhof.</p> + +<p>In the course of his night-ride of above twenty-eight miles, Lieutenant-Colonel +Count Finckenstein had to pass the rayon of the Ist Army Corps, +which was furthest to the rear. He handed to the officer on duty a special +letter to be forwarded immediately to the general in command, ordering +an immediate assemblage of his troops and an independent advance, +even before orders should reach him from Königinhof.</p> + +<p>The position of the Austrians on July 3rd had a front of not more +than 4-3/4 miles. Our three armies advanced on it in an encompassing arc +of about twenty-four miles in extent. But while in the centre the Ist and +IInd Corps of the Ist Army stood before daylight close in front of the +enemy, on the right wing General von Herwarth had to advance on the +Bistritz from Smidar in the dark, by very bad roads, above nine miles; and +on the left, the orders from the Royal head-quarter could not even reach +the Crown Prince before four in the morning. It was therefore decided +that the centre would have to maintain a detaining engagement for several<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[415]</a></span> +hours. Above all, a possible offensive on the part of the enemy must here +be met, and for this the whole IIIrd Corps and the cavalry corps stood +ready; but the battle could only be decided by the double flank attack by +both the flanking armies.<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p> + +<p>I had ridden out early to the heights in front of Sadowa with my officers, +and at eight o'clock the King also arrived there.</p> + +<p>It was a dull morning, and from time to time a shower fell. The +horizon was dim, yet on the right the white clouds of smoke showed that +the heads of the Ist Army were already fighting some way off, in front of +the villages on the Bistritz. On the left, in the woods of Swip, brisk +rifle-firing was audible. Behind the King, besides his staff, were his royal +guests, with their numerous suites of adjutants, equerries, and led +horses, in number as many as two squadrons. An Austrian battery seemed +to have selected them to aim at, and compelled him to move away with a +smaller following.</p> + +<p>Soon afterwards, with Count Wartensleben, I rode through the village +of Sadowa, which the enemy had already abandoned. The advanced guard +of the 8th Division had massed its guns behind the wood under cover of +the sharpshooters who had been sent forward, but many shells fell there +from a large battery in front of the exits from the copses. As we rode +further along the road we admired the coolness of a huge ox, which went +on its way, heedless of the shot, and seemed determined to charge the +enemy's position.</p> + +<p>The formidable array of the IIIrd and Xth Austrian Corps' Artillery +opposite the wood prevented any attempt to break through it, and I was in +time to countermand an order which had been given to do so.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, further to the left, General von Fransecky had vigorously +passed to the offensive. After a sharp struggle he had driven the +enemy out of the Swip woods, and come through to the further side. +Against him he had the IVth Austrian Corps; but now the IInd and part +of the IIIrd Austrian Corps turned on the 7th Division; 57 battalions +against 14. In the thick brushwood all the bodies had become mixed, personal +command was impossible, and, in spite of our obstinate resistance, +isolated detachments were taken prisoners, and others were dispersed.</p> + +<p>Such a rabble rushed out of the wood at the very moment when the King +and his staff rode up; his Majesty looked on with some displeasure,<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> but the +wounded officer, who was trying to keep his little band together, at once +led it back into the fight. In spite of heavy losses the division got firm +possession of the northern side of the wood. It had drawn on itself very +considerable forces of the enemy, which were subsequently missing from +the positions which it was their duty to have defended.</p> + +<p>It was now eleven o'clock. The heads of the Ist Army had crossed the +Bistritz, and taken most of the villages on its further bank; but these +were only the enemy's advanced posts, which he had no intention of +obstinately holding. His Corps held a position behind, whence their +250 guns commanded the open plain which had to be crossed for the +delivery of a further attack. On the right, General von Herwarth had +reached the Bistritz, but on the left nothing was yet to be seen of the +Crown Prince.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[416]</a></span></p><p>The battle had come to a standstill. In the centre the Ist Army was +still fighting about the villages on the Bistritz; the cavalry could not get +forward, and the artillery found no good position to occupy. The troops +had been for five hours under the enemy's lively fire, without food, +to prepare which there had been no time.</p> + +<p>Some doubt as to the issue of the battle existed probably in many minds; +perhaps in that of Count Bismarck, as he offered me his cigar case. As I +was subsequently informed, he took it for a good sign that of two cigars I +coolly selected the better one.</p> + +<p>The King asked me at about this time what I thought of the prospects of +the battle. I replied, "Your Majesty to-day will not only win the battle, +but decide the war."</p> + +<p>It could not be otherwise.</p> + +<p>We had the advantage in numbers,<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> which in war is never to be +despised; and it was certain that our IInd Army must finally appear on +the flank and rear of the Austrians.</p> + +<p>At about 1.30 a white cloud was seen on the height, crowned with trees, +and visible from afar, on which our field-glasses had been centred. It was +indeed not yet the IInd Army, but the smoke of the fire which, directed +thereon, announced its near approach. The joyful shout, "The Crown +Prince is coming!" ran through the ranks. I sent the wished-for news +to General von Herwarth, who meanwhile had carried Problus, in spite of +the heroic defence of the Saxons.</p> + +<p>The IInd Army had started at 7.30 in the morning; only the Ist Corps +had delayed till about 9.15. The advance by bad roads, in part across the +fields, had taken much time. The hill-road stretching from Horenowes to +Trotina, if efficiently held, could not but be a serious obstacle. But in its +eager pressure on Fransecky's Division the enemy's right wing had made +a wheel to the left, so that it lay open to some extent to the attack on its +rear now impending.</p> + +<p>The Crown Prince's progress was not yet visible to us, but at about half-past +three the King ordered the advance of the Ist Army also.</p> + +<p>As we emerged from the wood of Sadowa into the open we found still a +part of the great battery which had so long prevented us from debouching +here, but the teams and gunners lay stretched by the wrecked guns. +There was nothing else to be seen of the enemy over a wide distance.</p> + +<p>The Austrian retreat from the position grasped by us on two sides, had +become inevitable, and had, in fact, been effected some time before. Their +admirable artillery, firing on to the last moment, had screened their retreat +and given the infantry a long start. The crossing of the Bistritz seriously<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[417]</a></span> +delayed the advance, especially of the cavalry, so that only isolated +detachments of it yet came up with the enemy.</p> + +<p>We rode at a smart gallop across the wide field of battle, without looking +much about us on the scene of horror. Finally, we found our three armies +which had at last pushed on into a circumscribed space from their several +directions, and had got much mixed. It took twenty-four hours to remedy +the confusion and re-form the bodies; an immediate pursuit was impossible, +but the victory was complete.</p> + +<p>The exhausted men now sought resting-places in the villages or the open +field as best they might. Anything that came to hand by way of food +was of course taken; my wandering ox probably among the rest. The +death-cries of pigs and geese were heard; but necessity knows no law, and +the baggage-waggons were naturally not on the spot.</p> + +<p>The King, too, remained at a hamlet on the field. Only I and my two +officers had to journey some twenty-four miles back to Gitschin, where the +bureaux were.</p> + +<p>We had set out thence at four in the morning, and had been fourteen +hours in the saddle. In the hurry of departure no one had thought of +providing himself with food. An Uhlan of the 2nd Regiment had bestowed +on me a slice of sausage, bread he had none himself. On our way back we +met the endless train of provision and ammunition waggons, often extending +all across the road. We did not reach our quarters till midnight. +There was nothing to eat even here at this hour, but I was so exhausted +that I threw myself on my bed in great-coat and sash, and fell asleep +instantly. Next morning new orders had to be prepared and laid before +his Majesty at Horitz.</p> + +<p>The Great King<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> had needed to struggle for seven years to reduce the +might of Austria, which his more fortunate and also more powerful grandson<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> +had achieved in as many weeks. The campaign had proved decisive in the +first eight days from June 27th to July 3rd.</p> + +<p>The war of 1866 was entered on not as a defensive measure to meet a +threat against the existence of Prussia, nor in obedience to public +opinion and the voice of the people: it was a struggle, long foreseen +and calmly prepared for, recognized as a necessity by the Cabinet, not for +territorial aggrandizement or material advantage, but for an ideal end—the +establishment of power. Not a foot of land was exacted from defeated +Austria, but she had to renounce all part in the hegemony of Germany.</p> + +<p>The Princes of the Reich had themselves to blame that the old Empire +had now for centuries allowed domestic politics to override German national +politics. Austria had exhausted her strength in conquests south of the +Alps while she left the western German provinces unprotected, instead +of following the road pointed out by the course of the Danube. Her centre +of gravity lay outside of Germany; Prussia's lay within it. Prussia felt +her strength, and that it behoved her to assume the leadership of the German +races. The regrettable but unavoidable exclusion of one of them from +the new Reich could only be to a small extent remedied by a subsequent +alliance. But Germany has become immeasurably greater without Austria, +than it was before with Austria.</p> + +<p>But all this has nothing to do with the legends of which I am telling.</p> + +<p>One of these has been sung in verse, and in fine verse too.</p> + +<p>The scene is Versailles. The French are making a sortie from Paris, and +the generals, instead of betaking themselves to their fighting troops, are +assembled to consider whether head-quarters may safely remain any longer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[418]</a></span> +at Versailles. Opinions are divided, no one dares speak out. The Chief of +the General Staff, who is above all called on to express his views, remains +silent. The perplexity seems to be great. Only the War Minister rises and +protests with the greatest emphasis against a measure so injurious from a +political and military point of view as a removal. He is warmly thanked +by the King as being the only man who has the courage to speak the truth +freely and fearlessly.</p> + +<p>The truth is that while the King and his whole escort had ridden out to +the Vth Army Corps, the Marshal of the household, in his over-anxiety, +had the horses put to the royal carriages, and this became known in the +town; and indeed may have excited all sorts of hopes in the sanguine +inhabitants.</p> + +<p>Versailles was protected by four Army Corps. It never entered anybody's +head to think of evacuating the town.</p> + +<p>I can positively assert no Council of War was ever held either in 1866 +or 1870—71.</p> + +<p>Excepting on the march and on days of battle, an audience was regularly +held by his Majesty at ten o'clock, at which I, accompanied by the Quartermaster-General, +laid the latest reports and information before him, and made +our suggestions on that basis. The Chief of the Military Cabinet and the +Minister of War were also present, and while the head-quarters of the +IIIrd Army were at Versailles, the Crown Prince also; but all merely as +listeners. The King occasionally required them to give him information +on one point or another; but I do not remember that he ever asked for +advice concerning the operations in the field or the suggestions I made.</p> + +<p>These, which I always discussed beforehand with my staff officers, +were, on the contrary, generally maturely weighed by his Majesty himself. +He always pointed out with a military eye and an invariably correct +estimate of the situation, all the objections that might be raised to their +execution; but as in war every step is beset with danger, the plans laid +before him were invariably adopted.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[419]</a></span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> viz. The IInd Army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, +which was to strike the Austrian right flank and right rear; and the Army +of the Elbe, commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which was to +strike the Austrian left flank.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> I have a history of the war, published at Tokio, in the Japanese +language, with very original illustrations. One of these has for its title, +"The King scolding the Army." [<span class="smcap">Moltke.</span>]</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> During a long peace the sphere of action of the War Minister's +department and the General Staff were not distinctly defined. The providing +for the troops in peace was the function of the former, and in war +time a number of official duties which could be superintended by the central +authorities at home. Thus the place of the Minister of War was not at +head-quarters, but at Berlin. The Chief of the General Staff, on the other +hand, from the moment when the mobilization is ordered, assumes the whole +responsibility for the marching and transport already prepared for during +peace, both for the first assembling of the forces, and for their subsequent +employment, for which he has only to ask the consent of the Commander-in-Chief—always, +with us, the King. +</p><p> +How necessary this disjunction of the two authorities is, I had to experience +in June, 1866. Without my knowledge the order had been given +for the VIIth Corps to remain on the Rhine. It was only by my representations +that the 16th Division was moved up into Bohemia, and our +numerical superiority thus brought up to a decisive strength. [<span class="smcap">Moltke.</span>]</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> Frederick the Great.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Wilhelm was not the grandson, but the great-grand-nephew of +Frederick the Great. The term is very rarely used in the wider sense of +"descendant;" but Frederick was childless.</p></div> +</div> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>ORDERS OF BATTLE</h2> + +<div class="center">OF THE</div> + +<h2>FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES IN THE FIRST +PERIOD OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.</h2> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> +<h3>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES.</h3> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> +<h4>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE "ARMY OF THE RHINE."</h4> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: The Emperor Napoleon III.<br /> +Major-General: Marshal Le Bœuf.<br /> +Aide-Major-General: General Dejean.<br /> +Chiefs of Staff: Generals Jarras and Lebrun.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Soleille.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: General Coffinières de Nordeck.<br /> +Aides-de-camp to the Emperor: Generals Prince de la Moscawa, de<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Castlenau, Count Reille, Viscount Pajol.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">The Imperial Guard.</span></div> + +<p> +General Bourbaki.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General d'Auvergne.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Pé-de-Arros.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Deligny.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Brincourt.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Chasseurs of the Guard.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 2nd Voltigeurs of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Garnier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 4th Voltigeurs of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Picard.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Jeanningros.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Zouaves of the Guard (two battalions).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Grenadiers of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Poitevin de la Croix.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 3rd Grenadiers of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Desvaux.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[420]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Halma du Frétay.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guides.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Chasseurs of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de France.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lancers of the Guard.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Dragoons of the Guard.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General du Preuil.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Cuirassiers of the Guard.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Carabiniers of the Guard.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel Clappier.</div> + +<p> +Four horse-artillery batteries.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">1st Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Marshal MacMahon, afterwards General Ducrot.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Colson.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Forgeot.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Ducrot.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Moreno.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">13th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">18th and 96th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Postis du Houlbec.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">45th and 74th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries and one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Abel Douay, afterwards General Pellé.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Pelletier de Montmarie.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">16th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">50th and 78th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Pellé.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st regiment of Zouaves.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st regiment of Turcos.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Raoult.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General L'Heriller.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Zouave regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">36th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Lefèvre.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd regiment of Turcos.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">48th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: General de Lartigue.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Frabonlet de Kerléadec.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st battalion of Chasseurs.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Zouave regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">56th Line regiment.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[421]</a></span> +2nd Brigade: General Lacretelle.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd regiment of Turcos.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">87th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Duhesme.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Septeuil.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">11th Chasseur regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Nansouty.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 6th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">10th Dragoon regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General Michel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th and 9th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel de Vassart.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four horse-artillery batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">2nd Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Frossard.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Saget.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Gagneux.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Verge.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Letellier-Valazé.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd battalion of Chasseurs.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">32nd and 55th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Jobivet.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">76th and 77th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Bataille.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Pouget.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">12th battalion of Chasseurs.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th and 23rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Fauvart-Bastoul.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">66th and 67th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Laveaucoupet.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Doens.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">10th battalion of Chasseurs.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 63rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Michelet.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">24th and 40th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Lichtlin.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Valabrèque.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th and 5th regiments of Chasseurs.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[422]</a></span> +2nd Brigade: General Bachelier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th and 12th regiments of Dragoons.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel Baudouin.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two mitrailleuse batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">3rd Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Marshal Bazaine, afterwards General Decaen.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Manèque.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General de Rochebouet.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Montaudon.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Aymard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">18th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">51st and 62nd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Clinchant.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">81st and 95th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General de Castagny.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Cambriels.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">15th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">19th and 41st Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Duplessis.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">69th and 90th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Metman.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Potier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th and 29th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Arnaudeau.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">59th and 71st Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: General Decaen.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Brauer.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">11th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">44th and 60th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Sanglé-Ferrières.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">80th and 85th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General de Clérembault.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Bruchard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd, 3rd, and 10th Chasseur regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Maubranches.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 4th Dragoon regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General de Juniac.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 8th Dragoon regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel de Lajaille.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[423]</a></span></div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four horse-artillery batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">4th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General de Ladmirault.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Desaint de Martille.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Laffaile.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General de Cissey.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Count Brayer.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">20th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 6th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Golberg.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">57th and 73rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Rose.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Bellecourt.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">13th and 43rd Line Regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Pradier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">64th and 98th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General de Lorencez.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Pajol.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">15th and 33rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Berger.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">54th and 65th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Legrand.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Montaigu.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 7th Hussar regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Gondrecourt.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 11th Dragoon regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel Soleille.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two horse-artillery batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">5th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General de Failly.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Besson.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Liédot.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Goze.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[424]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Grenier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">11th and 46th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Nicolas.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">61st and 86th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General de l'Abadie d'Aydroin.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Lapasset.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">14th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">49th and 84th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Maussion.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">88th and 97th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Guyot de Lespart.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Abbatucci.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">19th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">17th and 27th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Fontanges de Couzan.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">30th and 68th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Brahaut.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Pierre de Bernis.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 12th Chasseur regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de la Mortière.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 5th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel de Salignac-Fénelon.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two horse-artillery batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">6th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Marshal Canrobert.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Henri.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General de Berkheim.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Tixier.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Péchot.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">9th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th and 10th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Le Roy de Dais.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">12th and 100th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Bisson.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[425]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Noël.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">9th and 14th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Maurice.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">20th and 30th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General La Font de Villiers.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Becquet de Sonnay.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">75th and 91st Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Colin.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">93rd Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: General Levassor-Sorval.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Marguenat.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">25th and 26th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Chanaleilles.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">28th and 70th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General de Salignac-Fénelon.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Tilliard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Chasseur regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Savaresse.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 7th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General de Béville.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 6th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel de Montluisant.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">7th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Félix Douay.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Renson.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Liègard.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Conseil-Dumesnil.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Le Norman de Bretteville.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">17th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 21st Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Maire.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">47th and 99th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, two mitrailleuse batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Liébert.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[426]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Guiomar.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 37th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de la Bastide.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">53rd and 89th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Dumont.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Bordas.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">52nd and 72nd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Bittard des Portes.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">82nd and 83rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Ameil.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Cambriel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Hussar regiments.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th and 8th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Jolif du Coulombier.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Dragoon regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery.</i></div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Reserve Cavalry.</span></div> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Division</i>: General du Barrail.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Margueritte.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 3rd regiments Chasseurs d'Afrique.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Lajaille.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 4th regiments Chasseurs d'Afrique.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Division</i>: General de Bonnemains.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Girard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 2nd Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 4th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Division</i>: General Marquis de Forton.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Prince J. Murat.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 9th Dragoon regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Grammont.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th and 10th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Great Artillery Reserve.</span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[427]</a></span></div> + +<p> +General Cann.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel Laffont de Ladébat.<br /> +13th Field-Artillery regiment.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Eight 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +18th Field-Artillery regiment.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Eight batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +Three mountain batteries.<br /> +</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> + +<p><i>Note</i>.—The 6th Corps (Canrobert), when ordered to Metz from Châlons, +left there three line regiments, its cavalry division, and reserve artillery.</p> + +<p>The battle of Wörth divided the original Army of the Rhine into two parts, +one of which is generally known as "The Army of Metz," and the other, +with additions, became "The Army of Châlons." Their respective "Orders +of Battle" follow:—</p> + + +<h4>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY OF CHÂLONS.</h4> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: Marshal MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, afterwards General de Wimpfen.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Faure.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Forgeot.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: General Dejean.<br /> +Intendant-General: Rousillon.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">1st Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Ducrot.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel Robert.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Frigola.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Wolff.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Moreno.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">13th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">18th and 96th Line regiments.</span><br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Postis du Houlbec.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">45th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">1st Zouave regiment.</span><br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Pellé.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Pelletier de Montmarie.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">16th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">50th and 74th Line regiments.</span><br /> +2nd Brigade: General Gandil.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">78th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">1st regiment of Turcos.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">1st "marching" regiment.</span><br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General L'Heriller.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[428]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Carteret-Trécourt.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Zouave regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">36th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Lefébvre.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd regiment of Turcos.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">48th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st battalion of Franctireurs of Paris.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4 pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: General de Lartigue.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Fraboulet de Kerléadec.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd regiment of Tirailleurs (Turcos).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">56th Line regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Bellemare.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Zouave regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd "marching" regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Duhesme; after August 25, General Michel.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General de Septeuil.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">11th Chasseur regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Nansouty.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 6th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">10th Dragoon regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General Michel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th and 9th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel Grouvell.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">5th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General de Failly.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Besson.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Liédot.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Goze.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Grenier, later General Saurin.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">11th and 46th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Baron Nicolas-Nicolas.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">61st and 86th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General de l'Abadie d'Aydrein.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[429]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Lapasset.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">(With the army of Metz.)</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Maussion.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">88th and 97th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Guyot de Lespart.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Abbatucci.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">19th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">17th and 27th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Fontanges de Couzan.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">30th and 68th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General Brahaut.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Viscount Pierre de Bernis.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 6th Chasseur regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de la Mortière.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 5th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel de Salignac-Fénelon.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">7th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Félix Douay.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Renson.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Liègard.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Conseil-Dumesnil.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Morand, afterwards General la Brettevillois.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">17th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 21st Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General St. Hilaire.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">47th and 99th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, two mitrailleuse batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Liébert.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Guiomar.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 37th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de la Bastide.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">53rd and 89th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General Dumont.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[430]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Bordas.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">52nd and 72nd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Bittard des Portes.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">82nd and 83rd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Brigade</i>: General Ameil.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Cambriel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th and 8th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General du Coulombier (appointed).<br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel Aubac.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">12th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Lebrun.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Gresley.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General d'Ouvrier de Villegly.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: General Grandchamp.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Cambriels.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1 Chasseur marching battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">22nd and 34th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Villeneuve.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">58th and 72nd Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: General Lacretelle.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Bernier Maligny.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">14th, 20th, and 30th Line regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Marquisan.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 4th marching regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, two mitrailleuse batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: General de Vassoigne.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Reboul.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 2nd regiments of marine infantry.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General Martin de Paillières.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd and 4th regiments of marine infantry.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder, one mitrailleuse battery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division</i>: General de Salignac-Fénelon.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[431]</a></span></div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Savaresse.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 7th Lancer regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Béville.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th and 6th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: General Leforestier de Vendeune.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th and 8th Chasseurs.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Reserve Artillery</i>: Colonel Brisac.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 12-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Reserve Cavalry.</span></div> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Reserve Cavalry Division</i>: General Margueritte.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Tillard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 2nd Chasseurs regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Galiffet.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st, 3rd and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique.</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Reserve Cavalry Division</i>: General de Bonnemains.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Girard.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">47th Chasseur regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Brauer.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers.</span><br /> +</p> + + +<h4>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY OF METZ.</h4> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: Marshal Bazaine.<br /> +Chief of Staff: General Jarras.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Soleille.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: General Viala.<br /> +</p> + + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">The Imperial Guard.</span></div> + +<p> +General Bourbaki (afterwards General Desvaux).<br /> +Chief of Staff: General d'Auvergne.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: General Pé-de-Arros.<br /> +</p> +<div class="center">(Detail as above.)<br /><br /></div> + + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">2nd Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Frossard.<br /> +</p> + +<p>(Detail as above with the exception of the 3rd Division (Laveaucoupet's) +detached to garrison duty.)</p> + + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">3rd Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +General Decaen, afterwards Marshal Le Bœuf.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center">(Detail as above.)<br /><br /></div> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">4th Corps.</span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[432]</a></span></div> + +<p> +General de Ladmirault.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center">(Detail as above.)<br /><br /></div> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">6th Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Marshal Canrobert.<br /> +</p> + +<p>(Detail as above, with the exception that the Corps when ordered up to +Metz, left behind at Châlons three infantry regiments, its cavalry division, +its reserve artillery, and division artillery of the 2nd Division.)</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Lapasset's Brigade</span> (from attached 5th Corps).<br /> +<br /> +General Lapasset.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">14th Chasseur battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">49th and 84th Line regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Reserve Cavalry.</span></div> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Reserve Cavalry Division</i>: General du Barrail.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Margueritte.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">(Vide Army of Châlons.)</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Lajaille.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">(The 4th regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique remained at Châlons.)</span><br /> +<br /> +Division-Artillery.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Reserve Cavalry Division</i>: General de Forton.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: General Prince J. Murat.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st and 9th Dragoon regiments.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: General de Grammont.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th and 10th Cuirassier regiments.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Great Artillery Reserve.</span></div> + +<div class="center">(As above, less six batteries detached to the 6th Corps.)</div> + + + +<hr style="width: 45%;" /> +<h2>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES<br /> +ON 1<span class="smcap">ST</span> AUGUST, 1870.</h2> + + +<p>Commander-in-Chief: H.M. the King of Prussia.</p> + +<p>King's aides-de-camp: General von Boyen; Lieut.-General von Treskow; +Major-General von Steinäcker; Colonel Count Lehndorff; Lieut.-Colonel +Prince Radziwill; Lieut.-Colonel Count Waldersee; Major +von Alten.</p> + +<p> +Chief of Staff: General Baron von Moltke.<br /> +Quarter-Master General: Lieut.-General von Podbielski.<br /> +</p> + +<p>Divisional Chiefs of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf; +Lieut.-Colonel von Verdy du Vernois; Lieut.-Colonel von Brandenstein.</p> + +<p> +Inspector-General of Artillery: General von Hindersin.<br /> +Inspector-General of Engineers: Lieut.-General von Kleist.<br /> +Commissary-General: Lieut.-General von Stosch.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center">I. ARMY.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[433]</a></span></div> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: General von Steinmetz, afterwards General von Manteuffel.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Major-General von Sperling.<br /> +Quartermaster-General: Colonel Count von Wartensleben.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Lieut.-General Schwartz.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major-General Biehler.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">7th Corps—Westphalia.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Zastrow.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Unger.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General von Zimmermann.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Treumann.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>13th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Glümer.</div> + +<p> +25th Brigade: Major-General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 13.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hanoverian Fusilier regiment, No. 73.</span><br /> +<br /> +26th Brigade: Major-General Baron v. d. Goltz.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 15.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 55.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Westphalian Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Westphalian Hussar regiment, No. 8.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Five batteries (two heavy, two light, and one horse-artillery) of the</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">7th field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Field-pioneer company, 7th corps, with entrenching tool-column.<br /> +<br /> +3rd Field-pioneer company, 7th corps.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>14th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Kamecke.</div> + +<p> +27th Brigade: Major-General von François.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lower Rhine Fusilier regiment, No. 39.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hanoverian Infantry regiment, No. 74.</span><br /> +<br /> +28th Brigade: Major-General von Woyna.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 53.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Hanoverian Infantry regiment, No. 77.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy and two light) of the 7th Westphalian</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hanoverian Hussar regiment, No. 15.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 7th corps, with light bridging-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel von Helden-Sarnowski.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two Horse artillery, two light, and two heavy field-batteries of the</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">7th Field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Artillery Ammunition columns.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Infantry " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;">" Pontoon "</span><br /> +<br /> +The 7th Westphalian train-battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">8th Corps—Rhine Provinces.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Goeben.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Witzendorff.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Colonel von Kamecke.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Lieut.-Colonel Schulz.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>15th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Weltzien. +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[434]</a></span></div> + +<p> +29th Brigade: Major-General von Wedell.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">East Prussian Fusilier regiment, No. 33.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 60.</span><br /> +<br /> +30th Brigade: Major-General von Strubberg.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Rhine Province Infantry regiment, No. 28.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Magdeburg Infantry regiment, No. 67.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Rhine Province Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">King's Hussar regiment (1st Rhine), No. 7.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 8th Field-Artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 8th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>16th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Barnekow.</div> + +<p> +31st Brigade: Major-General Count Neidhardt v. Gneisenau.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Rhine Province Infantry regiment, No. 29.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Rhine Province Infantry regiment, No. 69.</span><br /> +<br /> +32nd Brigade: Colonel von Rex.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hohenzollern Fusilier regiment, No. 40.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Thüringian Infantry regiment, No. 72.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Rhine Hussar regiment, No. 9.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 8th Field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 8th corps, with light bridging-train.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 8th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps Artillery</i>: Colonel von Broecker.</div> + +<p> +Two batteries of horse-artillery, two heavy and two light field batteries,<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of the 8th Field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery, Infantry, and pontoon columns belonging to the 8th Field-artillery<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +The 8th, Rhenish, train-battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">3rd Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<p>Lieut.-General Count v. d. Gröben.</p> + +<p> +6th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Mirus.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Rhine Prov. Cuirassier regiment, No. 8.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;">" " Uhlan regiment, No. 7.</span><br /> +<br /> +7th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Count zu Dohna.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Westphalian Uhlan regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Hanoverian Uhlan regiment, No. 14.</span><br /> +<br /> +One battery of horse-artillery of the 7th Westphalian Field-artillery<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regiment.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">1st Corps—East Prussia.</span></div> + +<p> +Cavalry-General Baron von Manteuffel.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel v. d. Burg.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General von Bergmann.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Fahland.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Bentheim.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: Major-General von Gayl.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Crown Prince's Grenadier regiment (1st East Prussian), No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th East Prussian Infantry regiment, No. 41.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +2nd Brigade: Major-General von Falkenstein.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[435]</a></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd East Prussian Grenadier regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th " " Infantry regiment, No. 43.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">East Prussian Jäger battalion, No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lithuanian Dragoon regiment, No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 1st East Prussian Field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 1st corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 1st corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: Major-General von Pritzelwitz.</div> + +<p> +3rd Brigade: Major-General von Memerty.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd East Prussian Grenadier regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th " " Infantry regiment, No. 44.</span><br /> +<br /> +4th Brigade: Major-General von Zzlinitzki.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th East Prussian Grenadier regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th " " Infantry regiment, No. 45.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">East Prussian Dragoon regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 1st, East Prussian, Field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 1st corps, with light bridging-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Junge.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of 1st, East Prussian,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } Field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns belonging to 1st<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +The 1st East Prussian train-battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">1st Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<p>Lieut.-General von Hartmann.</p> + +<p> +1st Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Lüderitz.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Queen's Cuirassier regiment (Pomeranian), No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Pomeranian Uhlan regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " " No. 9.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Baumgarth.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">East Prussian Cuirassier regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">" " Uhlan regiment, No. 8.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lithuanian " " No. 12.</span><br /> +<br /> +One battery of horse-artillery of the 1st, East Prussian, Field-artillery<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regiment.</span><br /> +</p> + + +<div class="center">II. ARMY.</div> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: Cavalry-General H.R.H. Prince Frederic Charles<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">of Prussia.</span><br /> +Chief of Staff: Major-General von Stiehle.<br /> +Quartermaster-General: Colonel von Hertzberg.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Lieut.-General von Colomier.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Colonel Leuthaus.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Guard Corps—General.</span> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[436]</a></span></div> + +<p> +Cavalry-General H.R.H. Prince August of Würtemberg.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Major-General von Dannenberg.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General Prince Kraft of Hohenloh<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Ingelsingen.</span><br /> +Commanding Engineer: Lieut.-Colonel Bogun von Wangenheim.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Guard-Infantry Division</i>: Major-General von Pape.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: Major-General von Kessel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st regiment of Foot Guards.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " "</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: Major-General Baron von Medem.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd regiment of Foot Guards.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guard Fusilier regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th regiment of Foot Guards.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guard Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">" Hussar regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Guard field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company of the Guard with light bridging-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Guard-Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Budritzki.</div> + +<p> +3rd Brigade: Colonel Knappe von Knappstaedt.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Guard Grenadier regiment (Emperor Alexander's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " " (Queen Elizabeth's).</span><br /> +<br /> +4th Brigade: Major-General von Berger.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Guard Grenadier regiment (Emperor Francis').</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " " " (Queen's).</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guard Rifle battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Guard Uhlan regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Guard field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company of the Guard with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company of the Guard.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Guard-Cavalry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Count v. d. Goltz.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: Major-General Count von Brandenburg I.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Regiment of the Guard du Corps.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guard Cuirassier regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: Major-General H.R.H. Prince Albert of Prussia.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Guard Uhlan regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " "</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: Major-General Count von Brandenburg II.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Guard Dragoon regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " "</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel von Scherbening.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Three batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of the Guard field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery ammunition, Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of the<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Guard field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Guard train-battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">3rd Corps—Brandenburg.</span> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[437]</a></span></div> + +<p> +Lieut.-General von Alvensleben II.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General von Bülow.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Sabarth.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>5th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Stülpnagel.</div> + +<p> +9th Brigade: Major-General von Döring.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Leib.-Grenadier regiment (1st Brandenburg), No. 8.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 48.</span><br /> +<br /> +10th Brigade: Major-General von Schwerin.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Brandenburg Grenadier regiment, No. 12.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 52.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brandenburg Jäger battalion, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Brandenburg Dragoon regiment, No. 12.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Brandenburg Field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 3rd corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>6th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Baron von Buddenbrock.</div> + +<p> +11th Brigade: Major-General von Rothmaler.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 20.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brandenburg Fusilier regiment, No. 35.</span><br /> +<br /> +12th Brigade: Colonel von Bismarck.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 24.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Brandenburg Infantry regiment, No. 64.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Brandenburg Dragoon regiment, No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Brandenburg field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 3rd corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel von Dresky.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy field-batteries } of the Brandenburg field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light " " } regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 3rd corps, with light bridging-train.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery ammunition, Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of the<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Brandenburg field-artillery regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<br /> +Brandenburg train battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">4th Corps—Saxon Provinces and Anhalt.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Alvensleben I.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Thile.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General von Scherbening.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Lieut.-Colonel von Eltester.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>7th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Grosz von Schwarzhoff.</div> + +<p> +13th Brigade: Major-General von Vorries.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Magdeburg Infantry regiment, No. 26.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Magdeburg Infantry regiment, No. 66.</span><br /> +<br /> +14th Brigade: Major-General von Zychlinski.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Magdeburg Infantry regiment, No. 27.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Anhalt Infantry regiment, No. 93.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[438]</a></span> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Magdeburg Jäger battalion, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Westphalian Dragoon regiment, No. 7.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Magdeburg field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 4th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 4th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>8th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Schöler.</div> + +<p> +15th Brigade: Major-General von Kessler.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Thüringian Infantry regiment, No. 31.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " " No. 71.</span><br /> +<br /> +16th Brigade: Colonel von Scheffler.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Schleswig-Holstein Fusilier regiment, No. 86.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Thüringian Infantry regiment, No. 96.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thüringian Hussar regiment, No. 12.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Magdeburg field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 4th corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Crusius.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of the Magdeburg field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery ammunition, infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns belonging<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">to Magdeburg field-artillery regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<br /> +Magdeburg train-battalion, No. 4.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">9th Corps—Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Manstein.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Major Bronsart von Schellendorf.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General Baron von Puttkammer.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Hutier.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>18th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Baron von Wrangel.</div> + +<p> +35th Brigade: Major-General von Blumenthal.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Magdeburg Fusilier regiment, No. 36.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Schleswig Infantry regiment, No. 84.</span><br /> +<br /> +36th Brigade: Major-General von Below.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Silesian Grenadier regiment, No. 11.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Holstein Infantry regiment, No. 85.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Lauenburg Jäger battalion, No. 9.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Magdeburg Dragoon regiment, No. 6.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Schleswig-Holstein field-artillery regiment, No. 9.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 9th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 9th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Hessian Division</i> (<i>25th</i>): Lieut.-General Prince Louis of Hesse.</div> + +<p> +49th Brigade: Major-General von Wittich.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Infantry regiment (Body Guard).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " (Grand Duke's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st (Guard) Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[439]</a></span> +50th Brigade: Colonel von Lynker.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Infantry regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +(25th) Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Baron von Schlotheim.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Reiter regiment (Guard Cheveauxlegers).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " (Leib Chevauxlegers).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Five field-batteries (two heavy, three light).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pioneer company with light field bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel von Jagemann.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of the Schleswig-Holstein field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } regiment, No. 9.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">10th Corps—Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Voigts-Rhetz.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel von Caprivi.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Colonel Baron v. d. Becke.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Lieut.-Colonel Cramer.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>19th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Schwartzkoppen.</div> + +<p> +37th Brigade: Colonel Lehmann.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">East Frisian Infantry regiment, No. 78.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Oldenburg Infantry regiment, No. 91.</span><br /> +<br /> +38th Brigade: Major-General von Wedell.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 16.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th " " " No. 57.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hanoverian Dragoon regiment, No. 9.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Hanoverian field-artillery regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 10th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 10th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>20th Infantry Division</i>: Major-General von Kraatz-Koschlan.</div> + +<p> +39th Brigade: Major-General von Woyna.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 56.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Hanoverian Infantry regiment, No. 79.</span><br /> +<br /> +40th Brigade: Major-General von Diringshofen.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Westphalian Infantry regiment, No. 17.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brunswick Infantry regiment, No. 92.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hanoverian Jäger battalion, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Hanoverian Dragoon regiment, No. 16.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Hanoverian field-artillery regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 10th corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Baron v. d. Goltz.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery } of Hanoverian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy field-batteries } regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light " " }</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and Infantry ammunition columns belonging to Hanoverian<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">field-artillery regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<br /> +Hanoverian train-battalion, No. 10.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[440]</a></span><span class="smcap">12th Corps—Kingdom of Saxony.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony, afterwards Prince George.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel von Zeschwitz.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General Köhler.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Klemna.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division, No. 23</i>: Lieut.-General H.R.H. Prince George of +Saxony, afterwards Major-General von Montbé.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade, No. 45: Major-General von Craushaar.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st (Leib) Grenadier regiment, No. 100.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd (King William of Prussia) Grenadier regiment, No. 101.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Rifle (Fusilier) regiment, No. 108.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade, No. 46: Colonel von Montbé.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Infantry regiment (Crown Prince's), No. 102.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " " No. 103.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Reiter regiment (Crown Prince's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 12th field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd company of 12th Pioneer battalion with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th company of 12th Pioneer battalion.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division, No. 24</i>: Major-General Nehrhoff von Holderberg.</div> + +<p> +3rd Brigade, No. 47: Major-General Tauscher.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Infantry regiment (Prince Frederic August's), No. 104.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Infantry regiment, No. 105.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Jäger battalion (Crown Prince's), No. 12.</span><br /> +<br /> +4th Brigade, No. 48: Colonel von Schulz.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Infantry regiment (Prince George's), No. 106.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th " " No. 107.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Jäger battalion, No. 13.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Reiter regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of 12th field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd company of 12th Pioneer battalion with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Cavalry Division, No. 12</i>: Major-General Count Lippe.</div> + +<p> +1st Cavalry Brigade, No. 23: Major-General Krug von Nidda.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Guard Reiter regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Uhlan regiment, No. 17.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Cavalry Brigade, No. 24: Major-General Senfft von Pilsach.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Reiter regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Uhlan regiment, No. 18.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery of 12th field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Funcke.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Three light field-batteries } of the 12th field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Three heavy " " }</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of the 12th field-artillery regiment.<br /> +<br /> +12th train-battalion.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[441]</a></span><span class="smcap">5th Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<p>Lieut.-General Baron von Rheinbaben.</p> + +<p> +11th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Barby.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Westphalian Cuirassier regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hanoverian Uhlan regiment, No. 13.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Oldenburg Dragoon regiment, No. 19.</span><br /> +<br /> +12th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Bredow.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Magdeburg Cuirassier regiment, No. 7.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Altmark Uhlan regiment, No. 16.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Schleswig-Holstein Dragoon regiment, No. 13.</span><br /> +<br /> +13th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Redern.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Magdeburg Hussar regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Westphalian Hussar regiment, No. 11.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brunswick Hussar regiment, No. 17.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">6th Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<p>Lieut.-General H.S.H. Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.</p> + +<p> +14th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Baron von Diepenbroick-Grüter.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brandenburg Cuirassier regiment, No. 6 (Emp. Nicholas I. of Russia).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Brandenburg Uhlan regiment, No. 3 (Emperor of Russia).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Schleswig-Holstein Uhlan regiment, No. 15.</span><br /> +<br /> +15th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Rauch.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Brandenburg Hussar regiment, No. 3 (Zieten's Hussars).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Schleswig-Holstein Hussar regiment, No. 16.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">2nd Corps—Pomerania.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Fransecky.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Wichmann.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General von Kleist.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Sandkuhl.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: Major-General von Hartmann.</div> + +<p> +5th Brigade: Major-General von Koblinski.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Grenadier regiment: King Frederic William IV. (1st Pomeranian), No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Pomeranian Infantry regiment, No. 42.</span><br /> +<br /> +6th Brigade: Colonel v. d. Decken.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Pomeranian Infantry Regiment, No. 14.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Pomeranian Infantry regiment, No. 54.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pomeranian Jäger battalion, No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Neumark Dragoon regiment, No. 3.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the 2nd Pomeranian field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 2nd corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Hann von Weyhern.</div> + +<p> +7th Brigade: Major-General du Trossel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Colberg Grenadier regiment (2nd Pomeranian), No. 9.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Pomeranian Infantry regiment, No. 49.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[442]</a></span> +8th Brigade: Major-General von Kettler.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Pomeranian Infantry regiment, No. 21.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Pomeranian Infantry regiment, No. 61.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pomeranian Dragoon regiment, No. 11.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Pomeranian field-artillery regiment, No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 2nd corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 2nd corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Petzel.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery } of the Pomeranian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } regiment, No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " }</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and infantry ammunition and pontoon columns of Pomeranian<br /> +field-artillery regiment, No. 2.<br /> +<br /> +Pomeranian train-battalion, No. 2.<br /> +</p> + + +<div class="center">III. ARMY.</div> + +<p> +Commander-in-Chief: Infantry-General H.R.H. the Crown Prince of<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Prussia.</span><br /> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-General von Blumenthal.<br /> +Quartermaster-General: Colonel von Gottberg.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Lieut.-General Herkt.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major-General Schulz.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">5th Corps—Posen and Liegnitz.</span></div> + +<p> +Lieutenant-General von Kirchbach.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel v. d. Esch.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Colonel Gaede.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Owstein.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>9th Infantry Division</i>: Major-General von Sandrart.</div> + +<p> +17th Brigade: Colonel von Bothmer.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Posen Infantry regiment, No. 58.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " " " No. 59.</span><br /> +<br /> +18th Brigade: Major-General von Voigts-Rhetz.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">King's Grenadier regiment (2nd West Prussian), No. 7.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Lower Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 47.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Silesian Jäger battalion, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Silesian Dragoon regiment, No 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Lower Silesian field-artillery regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 5th corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>10th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Schmidt.</div> + +<p> +19th Brigade: Colonel von Henning auf Schönhoff.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st West Prussian Grenadier regiment, No. 6.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Lower Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 46.</span><br /> +<br /> +20th Brigade: Major-General Walther von Montbary.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Westphalian Fusilier regiment, No. 37.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Lower Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 50.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[443]</a></span> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Kurmark Dragoon regiment, No. 14.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of field-artillery regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 5th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " " "</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Lieut.-Colonel Köhler.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of the Lower Silesian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of field-artillery<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<br /> +Lower Silesian train-battalion, No. 5.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">11th Corps—Hesse, Nassau, Saxe-Weimar, &c.</span></div> + +<p> +Lieut.-General von Bose.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Major-General Stein von Kaminski.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Major-General Hausmann.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Crüger.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>21st Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Schachtmeyer.</div> + +<p> +41st Brigade: Colonel von Koblinski.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hessian Fusilier regiment, No. 80.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Nassau Infantry regiment, No. 87.</span><br /> +<br /> +42nd Brigade: Major-General von Thiele.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Hessian Infantry regiment, No. 82.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Nassau Infantry regiment, No. 88.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Hessian Jäger battalion, No. 11.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Hessian Hussar regiment, No. 14.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Hessian field-artillery regiment,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">No. 11.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 11th corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>22nd Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Gersdorff.</div> + +<p> +43rd Brigade: Colonel von Kontzki.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Thüringian Infantry regiment, No. 32.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th " " " No. 95.</span><br /> +<br /> +44th Brigade: Major-General von Schkopp.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Hessian Infantry regiment, No. 83.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Thüringian " " No. 94.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Hessian Hussar regiment, No. 13.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of Hessian field-artillery regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 11th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 11th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowski.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } of Hessian field artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " } regiment, No. 11.</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of 11th field-artillery<br /> +regiment.<br /> +<br /> +Hessian train-battalion, No. 11.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[444]</a></span><span class="smcap">1st Bavarian Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General Baron von der Tann-Rathsamhausen.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel von Heinleth.<br /> +Director of Field-Artillery: Major-General von Malaisé.<br /> +Director of Engineers: Lieut.-Colonel Riem.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>1st Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Stephan.</div> + +<p> +1st Brigade: Major-General Dietl.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Infantry body-guard regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 1st Infantry regiment (King's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: Major-General von Orff.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Infantry regiment (Crown Prince's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 11th Infantry regiment (v. d. Tann).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">9th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Chevauxlegers regiment (Duke Maximilian's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and two 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>2nd Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Count Pappenheim.</div> + +<p> +3rd Brigade: Major-General Schumacher.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Infantry regiment (Prince Charles of Bavaria).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 12th Infantry regiment (Queen Amalie of Greece).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +4th Brigade: Major-General Baron von der Tann.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">10th Infantry regiment (Prince Louis).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 13th Infantry regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Chevauxlegers regiment (King's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and two 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +Cuirassier Brigade: Major-General von Tausch.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Cuirassier regiment (Prince Charles of Bavaria).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " (Prince Adalbert).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Chevauxlegers regiment (Grand Duke Constantine Nicolajusitch).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Brigade of Reserve-Artillery</i>: Colonel Bronzetti.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Division. Two 6-pounder, one 4-pounder battery. }</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " Two 6-pounder batteries. } 42 guns.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " Two 6-pounder batteries. }</span><br /> +<br /> +1st Field-Engineer Division.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">2nd Bavarian Corps.</span></div> + +<p> +Infantry-General von Hartmann.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel Baron von Horn.<br /> +Director of Field-Artillery: Major-General Lutz.<br /> +Director of Field-Engineering: Lieut.-Colonel Fogt.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>3rd Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Walther.</div> + +<p> +5th Brigade: Major-General von Schleich.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Infantry regiment (King William of Prussia).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 7th Infantry regiment (Hohenhausen).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p> +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[445]</a></span> +6th Brigade: Colonel Borries von Wissell.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 14th Infantry regiment (Hartmann).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">15th Infantry regiment (King John of Saxony).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Chevauxlegers regiment (Emperor Alexander of Russia).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and two 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>4th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General Count von Bothmer.</div> + +<p> +7th Brigade: Major-General von Thiereck.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two battalions of 5th Infantry regiments (Grand Duke of Hesse).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">9th Infantry regiment (Werde).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">6th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +8th Brigade: Major-General Maillinger.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd battalion of 1st Infantry regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " 5th " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st " " 7th " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " 11th " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " 14th " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">10th Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Chevauxlegers regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and two 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +Uhlan Brigade: Major-General Baron von Mulzer.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Uhlan regiment (Archduke Nicholas of Russia).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Uhlan regiment (King's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th Chevauxlegers regiment (Prince Otto's).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +<br /> +Brigade of Reserve Artillery: Colonel von Pillement.<br /> +<br /> +1st Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One 4-pounder horse-artillery battery.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 6-pounder field batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 6-pounder field batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 6-pounder field batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Field-Engineer Division.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Würtemberg Division.</span></div> + +<p>Lieut.-General von Obernitz.</p> + +<p> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Friebig.<br /> +<br /> +1st Brigade: Major-General von Reitzenstein.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Infantry regiment (Queen Olga) (two battalions).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">7th " " (two battalions).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Brigade: Major-General von Strakloff.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Infantry regiment (two battalions).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th " " (King Charles's battalion).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +3rd Brigade: Major-General Baron von Hügel.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Infantry regiment (two battalions).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">8th " " "</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Jäger battalion.</span><br /> +<br /> +Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Count von Scheler.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Reiter regiment (King Charles) (four squadrons).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " (King William) (two " ).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " " (Queen Olga) (four " ).</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[446]</a></span><i>Artillery.</i></div> + +<p> +1st Field-artillery Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and one 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<br /> +2nd Field-artillery Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and one 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-artillery Division:</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two 4-pounder and one 6-pounder batteries.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">Baden Division.</span><a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></div> + +<div class="center">Lieut.-General von Beyer.</div> + +<p> +Chief of Staff: Lieut.-Colonel von Leszczynski.<br /> +<br /> +1st Brigade: Lieut.-General du Jarrys Baron La Roche.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Leib Grenadier regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Fusilier battalion of 4th Infantry regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Grenadier regiment (King of Prussia).</span><br /> +<br /> +Combined (3rd) Brigade: Major-General Keller.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Infantry regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">5th " "</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Dragoon regiment (Prince Charles).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Company of pontooners with light bridge-train and entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +<br /> +Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Baron La Roche-Starkenfels.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Leib Dragoon regiment.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Dragoon regiment (Margrave Maximilian).</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">One battery of horse-artillery.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery.</i></div> + +<p> +Two heavy and two light field batteries.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">4th Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<div class="center">Cavalry-General H.R.H. Prince Albert of Prussia.</div> + +<p> +8th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Hontheim.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">West Prussian Cuirassier regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Posen Uhlan regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<br /> +9th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Bernhardi.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">West Prussian Uhlan regiment, No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Thüringian Uhlan regiment, No. 6.</span><br /> +<br /> +10th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Krosigk.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Leib Hussar regiment, No. 2.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Rhine Province Dragoon regiment, No. 5.</span><br /> +<br /> +Two batteries of horse-artillery.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">6th Army Corps—Silesia.</span></div> + +<p> +Cavalry-General von Tümpling.<br /> +Chief of Staff: Colonel von Salviati.<br /> +Commanding Artillery: Colonel von Ramm.<br /> +Commanding Engineer: Major Albrecht.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[447]</a></span> +<i>11th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Gordon.</div> + +<p> +21st Brigade: Major-General von Malachowski.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Silesian Grenadier regiment, No. 10.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Posen Infantry regiment, No. 18.</span><br /> +<br /> +22nd Brigade: Major-General von Eckartsberg.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Silesian Fusilier regiment, No. 38.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th Lower Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 51.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Silesian Jäger battalion, No. 6.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Silesian Dragoon regiment, No. 8.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Silesian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment, No. 6.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Field-pioneer company, 6th corps.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>12th Infantry Division</i>: Lieut.-General von Hoffmann.</div> + +<p> +23rd Brigade: Major-General Gündell.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Upper Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 22.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd " " " " No. 62.</span><br /> +<br /> +24th Brigade: Major-General von Fabeck.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Upper Silesian Infantry regiment, No. 23.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">4th " " " " No. 63.</span><br /> +<br /> +Attached to Division:<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3rd Silesian Dragoon regiment, No. 15.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Four batteries (two heavy, two light) of the Silesian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;">regiment, No. 6.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Field-pioneer company, 6th corps, with light bridge-train.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd Field-pioneer company, 6th corps, with entrenching tool-column.</span><br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><i>Corps-Artillery</i>: Colonel Arnold.</div> + +<p> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two batteries of horse-artillery } of the Silesian field-artillery</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two light field-batteries } regiment, No. 6</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Two heavy " " }</span><br /> +<br /> +Artillery and Infantry ammunition, and pontoon columns of Silesian field-artillery<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regiment.</span><br /> +<br /> +Silesian train battalion, No. 6.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="center"><span class="smcap">2nd Cavalry Division.</span></div> + +<div class="center">Lieut.-General Count Stolberg-Wernigerode.</div> + +<p> +3rd Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Colomb.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Silesian Leib Cuirassier regiment, No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Silesian Uhlan regiment, No. 2.</span><br /> +<br /> +4th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General Baron von Barnekow.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Leib Hussar regiment, No. 1.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Pomeranian Hussar regiment (Blucher's Hussars), No. 5.</span><br /> +<br /> +5th Cavalry Brigade: Major-General von Baumbach.<br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1st Silesian Hussar regiment, No. 4.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2nd " " " No. 6.</span><br /> +<br /> +Two batteries of horse-artillery.<br /> +</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> Subsequently many changes in the commands.</p></div> + +</div> + +<div class="center"> +<br /><br />THE END.<br /> +</div> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<div class="center"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[448]</a></span> +LONDON:<br /> +PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LIMITED,<br /> +ST. JOHN'S HOUSE, CLERKENWELL, E.C.<br /> +</div> + +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 1198px;"> +<br /><br /><br /> +<a href="images/fgw-map-hi.png"> +<img src="images/fgw-map-low.png" width="1198" height="826" alt="Map of the Franco-German War of 1870-71. +Litho. W. Greve, Berlin. +James R. Osgood, McIlvaine & Co., Publishers, 45 Albemarle St., London, W." title="" /></a> +<span class="caption">Map of the Franco-German War of 1870-71.<br /> +Litho. W. Greve, Berlin.<br /> +James R. Osgood, M<sup>c</sup>Ilvaine & Co., Publishers, 45 Albemarle St., London, W.</span> +<br /> +</div> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<div class="tnote"> +<div class="center">Transcriber's Notes</div> + +<p>Click on the map to display a high-resolution image.</p> + +<p>Obvious punctuation and accent errors repaired. +Note that it was customary to write a captial "E" without +an "accent aigu" and this has been retained.</p> + +<p>There are two distinct rivers "Loir" and "Loire" so no attempt has +been made to consider one as a typo of the other.</p> + +<p>Hyphen removed: "left[-]ward" (page 34), +"franc[-]tireur(s)" (pages 70, 281, 428), +"gun[-]boats" (page 121), +"grave[-]yard" (page 110, twice), +"night[-]fall" (pages 276, 294), +"re[-]captured" (page 195), +"re[-]organized" (page 40), +"re[-]organization" (page 25), +"sand[-]bags" (page 362), +"side[-]ward" (page 298), +"St.[-]Menges" (page 92).</p> + +<p>Hyphen added: "battle[-]field" (page 212), "grape[-]shot" (page 53), +re[-]opening (page 208).</p> + +<p>The following words appear both with and without hyphens and have not +been changed: "counter[-]stroke(s)", "mid[-]day", "out[-]flank", +"rear[-]guard", "re[-]cross(ed)", "re[-]provisioned", "sharp[-]shooters".</p> + +<p>Page 29: "committeed" changed to "committed" (already committed themselves).</p> + +<p>Pages 32, 321: "l" changed to "L" (Villers L'Orme, L'Epine de Dallon).</p> + +<p>Page 49: "Pont a Mousson" changed to "Pont à Mousson".</p> + +<p>Page 57: "to" changed to "of" (the small leaderless bodies of).</p> + +<p>Page 71: "of" added to "a halt on this side of the Meuse".</p> + +<p>Page 159: "beleagured" changed to "beleaguered" (had been beleaguered in Metz).</p> + +<p>Page 174: "Wolfganzen" changed to "Wolfgantzen".</p> + +<p>Page 178: "D" changed to "d" (d'Aurelle de Paladines).</p> + +<p>Page 191: "Ist" changed to "1st" (1st Cavalry Division).</p> + +<p>Page 195: Missing "t" added (observe towards Courcelles).</p> + +<p>Page 248: "Chatres" changed to "Chartres".</p> + +<p>Page 291: "Sleswig" changed to "Schleswig".</p> + +<p>Page 304: "Divison" changed to "Division" (The 14th Division).</p> + +<p>Page 315: "Sérancourt" changed to "Séraucourt".</p> + +<p>Page 325: "occupapation" changed to "occupation" (Hostile occupation).</p> + +<p>Page 346: "approach" changed to "approaching" (columns of all arms were approaching).</p> + +<p>Page 351: "Vannes" changed to "Vanves".</p> + +<p>Page 365: "Côte d'or" changed to "Côte d'Or".</p> + +<p>Page 414: "General von Herwath" changed to "General von Herwarth".</p> + +<p>Page 415: "fnrther" changed to "further" (further to the left).</p> + +<p>Page 415: "intentiou" changed to "intention" (which he had no intention).</p> + +<p>Page 417: "soene" changed to "scene" (The scene is Versailles).</p> + +<p>Page 418: "Versailes" changed to "Versailles".</p> + +<p>Page 429: "Guyot de l'Lespart" changed to "Guyot de Lespart".</p> + +<p>Page 436: "Connt" changed to "Count" (Count von Brandenburg).</p> + +<p>Page 442: "Fonr" changed to "Four" (Four batteries).</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Franco-German War of 1870-71, by +Count Helmuth, von Moltke + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71 *** + +***** This file should be named 36209-h.htm or 36209-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/6/2/0/36209/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Moti Ben-Ari and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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