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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/35772-8.txt b/35772-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c806cf --- /dev/null +++ b/35772-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5069 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Religion and Science, by John Charlton Hardwick + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Religion and Science + From Galileo to Bergson + +Author: John Charlton Hardwick + +Release Date: April 5, 2011 [EBook #35772] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + + + + +Produced by David E. Brown, Bryan Ness and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + +FROM GALILEO TO BERGSON + +BY + +JOHN CHARLTON HARDWICK + + "Philosophy will always be hard, and what it promises even in the end + is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its + certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension + of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and + all its unity and worth." + + F. H. BRADLEY, _Essays in Truth and Reality_, p. 106. + + +LONDON + +SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE + +NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO. + +1920 + + + + +TO + +MY FATHER + + + + +PREFACE + + +The chapters which follow are not intended as even a slight sketch of +the history of Thought since the Renaissance. Their object is more +modest, i.e. to illustrate the thesis that mankind, being "incurably +religious," insists (however hopeless the enterprise may sometimes seem) +upon interpreting the universe spiritually. + +Thus it is quite natural that only a few typical names should find their +places here: and often no sufficient reason may appear for one being +included rather than another. For instance, in the tenth chapter, T. H. +Green, F. H. Bradley, and A. J. Balfour are mentioned, while Martineau +and the Cairds are passed over. Needless to say, there was no doctrinal +prejudice here. Again, in the fourth chapter, Pascal is dealt with at +some length, but Boehme, an equally important thinker, is ignored. And +so on. + +I should like to acknowledge here my obligation to Dr. Mercer, Canon of +Chester, for his advice upon books, especially with regard to material +for the final chapters. Also to the Rev. H. D. A. Major, Principal of +Ripon Hall, for suggestions about the general plan of the book; and to +the Rev. E. Harvey (a mathematical graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, +at present studying medicine) for valuable information about the present +position of psychic research. + + J. C. H. + + ALTRINGHAM, _March 23rd, 1920_. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER I + INTRODUCTORY PAGE + + Religion and Science defined. "Accurate and systematic + knowledge" necessarily affects our "attitude to life." Can + our systematised knowledge sanction a religious attitude? + This the "religious problem." Religious harmony of Middle + Ages. Will it return? 1 + + CHAPTER II + THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS + + The old World-Scheme described. Aquinas and Scholasticism. + Cusanus criticises conventional ideas of space. The + New Astronomy of Copernicus. Bruno and an infinite + universe. Galileo's telescope. The New Physics and an + automatic universe. The New Logic 8 + + CHAPTER III + GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY + + The New Science creates a New Philosophy. Universality + of Mechanics. Importance of Harvey's discovery. Descartes + extends the mechanical theory to cover physiology and psychology. + Hobbes and a naturalistic ethic. Newton extends the + operation of law from the earth to the heavens. Religious + attitude of these thinkers. Significance of their thought 18 + + CHAPTER IV + SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS + + A Law of Thought. Spinoza. A Mechanical Universe + spiritually interpreted. _Natura Naturans_, what it means. + The _Ethics_. Spinoza's mysticism. His personality. Leibniz + and a philosophy of personality. His monads. Pascal. His + significance. _The Pensées._ The eternal protest of religion. + Man defies the universe. Results 28 + + CHAPTER V + RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE + + Anti-clericalism in eighteenth-century France. Voltaire's + propaganda. Diderot and the Encyclopædists. Holbach's + _System of Nature_. Laplace's astronomy. Lavoisier and the + New Chemistry. Dalton's atomic theory. Results for religion 42 + + CHAPTER VI + RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM + + Importance, for the mechanical view, of Locke's theory of + knowledge. Weakness of speculative philosophy. Rise of the + "critical" philosophy. Kant. He seeks to solve the problem: + How is knowledge possible? Kant's view of the mind's + function in knowledge. Mechanism a "form of thought," + subjective not objective. Kant's view of reality. Can we + know reality? The two worlds 52 + + CHAPTER VII + THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT + + Kant clears the ground for a new philosophy. Significance + of Rousseau. His attitude to culture. The new philosophy in + Germany, its goal. Fichte. Hegel a rationalistic-romanticist. + His method. Hegelianism. Significance for religious thought + of Schleiermacher. The autonomy of religion and religious + experience 62 + + CHAPTER VIII + MECHANISM AND LIFE + + Rise of bio-chemistry and bio-physics in Germany. Significance + of these movements. The Origin of Species. Lamarck. + The new geology. Darwin. Results of his theory 74 + + CHAPTER IX + MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM + + Early decline of Romanticism in Germany. Comte and the + "positive" philosophy. Materialism in Germany. Darwinism + and the "argument from design." Haeckel. Spencerian + evolutionism. Spencer's moral idealism. His philosophy of + religion. Agnosticism. Rise of philosophic pessimism. + Significance of Nietzsche 84 + + CHAPTER X + REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY + + German idealism naturalised in England by Coleridge and + Carlyle. These writers described. _Sartor Resartus._ Idealism + at Oxford, T. H. Green. F. H. Bradley. Balfour's plea for a + philosophy of science. Revival of Idealism in Germany. + Lotze. His view of "values" and reality 98 + + CHAPTER XI + SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY + + A new philosophy of Science. Mach on "Economy of + Thought." "Abstractness" and artificiality of scientific + method. Boutroux and natural law. James' view of the + mind carried further by Bergson. His view of the intellect. + What it can, and what it cannot, do for us. Intuition. + Indeterminism and Pluralism. Leibniz revived. Ward's + philosophy of personality 110 + + CHAPTER XII + SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE + + The "New" Physics. New theories of matter. The "New" + Biology. Driesch and neo-vitalism. The "New" Psychology. + "Spiritualism." The outlook for the future 125 + + CHAPTER XIII + SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS + + History of Thought supplies no material for dogmatising. + Yet a progress of ideas is evident. Permanency of "spiritual" + view of reality. Its continual revival. Sabatier's saying. + Need of freedom, alike for religion and for science 137 + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY. RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + +Numerous attempts to define religion have made it evident that religion +is indefinable. We may, however, say this much about it, that religion +is _an attitude towards life_: a way of looking at existence. It is +true that this definition is too wide, and includes things which are not +religion--there are certain attitudes to life which are definitely +anti-religious--that of the materialist, for instance. However, it will +serve a purpose, and we can improve upon it as we proceed. It is a +mistake to put too much faith in definitions: at any rate it is better +to have our definitions (if have them we must) too wide than too narrow. + +Science is, fortunately, much easier to define. _Accurate and systematic +knowledge_ is what we mean by science--knowledge about anything, +provided that the facts are (so far as possible) accurately described +and systematically classified. Professor Karl Pearson, the highest +authority on the principles of scientific method and theory, writes: + +"The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their +mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the +scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the +past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, +to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of +a worm, or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus. It is not facts +themselves which make science, but the method by which they are dealt +with. The material of science is co-extensive with the whole physical +universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past +history and the past history of all life therein. When every fact, every +present or past phenomenon of that universe, every phase of present or +past life therein, has been classified, and co-ordinated with the rest, +then the mission of science will be completed."[1] + +Science, then, is systematic and accurate knowledge; and when we have +systematic and accurate knowledge about everything there is to be known, +the programme of science will be complete. This is only to say that the +task it has set itself is one that will never end. + +So much, then, for our definitions. Religion is "an attitude to life": +science is "systematic and accurate knowledge." How does the one affect +the other? What are the relations between the two? That is the topic +which will occupy our attention during the chapters that follow. To +answer the question properly will involve a certain amount of +acquaintance with the history of ideas. We must first put the +preliminary question: How, as a matter of fact, have men's scientific +ideas affected their religious ideas (or _vice versa_) in times past? +Having tried to answer this question, we shall be in a better position +to approach the religious problem as it presents itself to-day. + +Meanwhile a few remarks of a general character will not be out of place. +It is evident that "science" can hardly fail to affect "religion." +Systematised knowledge necessarily affects an individual's (or a +society's) attitude to life--either by broadening and elevating that +attitude, or by debasing it. Our knowledge, or what we believe to be +such, tends to create certain preconceptions which make our minds +hostile to certain beliefs or ideas. A man reared from his cradle on +mechanical science will tend to regard miracles with suspicion; if he be +logical (as he generally is not) freedom of the will, even in the most +limited sense, will appear chimerical. Nor will his general attitude to +life remain unaffected by his views on these points. + +Systematised knowledge may thus conceivably come into conflict with the +presuppositions or the ideals of some particular religion. It is then +that a "religious problem" arises. A religion indissolubly associated +with a geocentric conception of the universe would tend to become +discredited as soon as that conception had been disposed of by +"systematic knowledge." Science may even tend to produce an attitude to +life hostile not only to a particular religion but to _all_ religion. If +materialism should ultimately be found to be consistent with systematic +and accurate knowledge, it is difficult to see how any attitude to life +which could be appropriately described as "religion" could survive. The +religious problem would then, at any rate, cease to trouble us. The +religious apologists would be free to turn their attention to matters of +more moment. But it is not only with the cessation of religion that the +religious problem slumbers. There are certain happy periods when +religion flourishes undisturbed by obstinate questionings. These +classical ages of religion exist when systematised knowledge seems to +support the contemporary religious outlook--when science and religion +speak with one voice. Such unanimity seems to us to-day too good to be +possible, but that is only because our own age is exceptional--not +because those happier ages were exceptional; they, in fact--if we trace +history backwards--would seem rather to have been the rule. + +Primitive man, it would seem, was troubled by no discords of the kind +which disturb our peace. His systematic knowledge--such as it was--was +entirely in accord with his religion, the two were, in fact, in his case +practically one. His science _was_ his religion. It may not have been +very sound science, nor very elevated religion, but it served his +purpose admirably. He was too busy with the struggle for survival to +indulge in speculation. His religion was severely practical, and he was +faithful to it because experience seemed to indicate that it paid. + +But the Stone Age hardly deserves (in spite of its freedom from +religious difficulties) to be described as one of the classical ages of +religion; absence of struggle does not necessarily mean richness of +life. There are ages which better deserve that appellation. There are +times when all existing culture--even of a high level--is closely +associated with the current religion, endorses its ideals, sanctions its +hopes, puts the stamp of finality upon its faith. Such an age cannot +perhaps hope to be permanent; for life means movement, and movement +upsets equilibrium, and human knowledge tends to increase faster than +the human mind can adapt itself to it or digest it. But such ages are +looked back upon with regret when they are past, they shed a golden +radiance over history, their tradition lingers, they even leave behind +them monuments of art and literature which are the wonder, and the +inimitable models, of succeeding generations. + +Such an epoch was that which left to us our Gothic cathedrals. These are +the creation of one of those classic ages "when all existing culture is +cast or bent in obedience to the religious idea." When scientist, +scholar and ecclesiastic spoke with one voice and listened to one +message; when prince and peasant worshipped together the same +divinities; when to be outside the religious community was to be cut off +from the brotherhood of mankind. "The Church" was then co-extensive with +civilisation: those without the fold were barbarians, hardly worthy of +the name of man. + +That time of splendid harmony, however, is now past; no lamentations +will restore it. We have reached another world. + +But it need not remain only a memory; it ought also to serve as an +inspiration. The conditions of affairs during the classic ages of +religion, however impossible at the moment, must remain our ideal. Head +and heart must some day speak again with one voice, our hopes and +beliefs must be consistent with our knowledge. Science must sanction +that attitude towards existence which our highest instincts dictate. + +It is only too likely that this consummation is yet distant. Yet even if +our generation has to reconcile itself to spiritual and moral discord, +it should never overlook the existence of a happier ideal, and even the +possibility of its fulfilment. Fortunately for the interests of +religion, men feel they _must_ effect some kind of a reconciliation +between the opposing demands which proceed from different sides of their +nature. Each for himself tries to approximate science and religion, and +the struggle to do this creates in each individual spiritual life. +Tension sometimes creates light, and struggle engenders life. So long as +there are men sufficiently _interested_ in religion to ask for a +solution of its problems, religion will remain superior to the +disintegration towards which all discord, if unchecked, proceeds. + +It is sometimes said that the religious harmony of the Middle Ages, of +which we have spoken, having been due to imperfect knowledge, is never +likely to repeat itself, unless we sink back into the ignorance of +barbarism: and (it is urged) we know too much to be at peace. Having +tasted of the fruits of knowledge, the human race is cast forth from its +Paradise. This view is unduly pessimistic. There is no valid reason for +excluding the possibility that our knowledge of reality and those ideal +hopes which constitute our religion may actually coincide. Religion and +science, approaching the problem of existence from contrary directions, +may independently arrive at an identical solution. That the two actually +do attack the enigma from different sides has led many people to regard +the two as hostile forces. Such is not the case. Religion and science +regard reality from different angles, but it is the same reality that is +the object of their vision, and the goal of their search. + +Religion looks at existence as a whole, and attempts to determine its +meaning and value for mankind. Religion, we may say, stands at the +centre of existence, and regards reality from a central position. + +The province of science, on the other hand, is not to take so wide a +survey, but to gain knowledge piece-meal: to locate points inductively, +and thus to plot out the curve which we believe existence constitutes. +If the _loci_, as they are successively fixed, seem to indicate that the +curve is identical with the circle which religion has already +intuitively postulated, the problem of existence would have been solved. +Science and religion working by different methods would have described +the same circle. When science has completed its circle, its centre may +be found to stand just at the point where religion has always +confidently declared it to be. Knowledge and faith will then, and not +till then, be one. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS + + +We have seen that there are classic religious periods when faith and +knowledge have seemed to approximate to one another. The Middle Ages in +Europe constituted such a period; no "Religion _v._ Science" controversy +could then be said to exist; the best scientific knowledge of the time +seemed to sanction the popular religious notions. Learned and lay +thought in the same terms; the wolf lay down with the lamb. + +THE OLD WORLD-SCHEME.--It is important to grasp the main features of a +world-scheme which as late as the fifteenth century passed everywhere +without criticism. + +The father of it was Aristotle. His conception of the universe rested +upon the plain contrast, which strikes the unsophisticated observer, +between the unembarrassed and regular movements of the heavenly bodies +and the disordered agitations of sublunary things. Hence the heavenly +region was eternal, and the region of earth transitory: yonder, the +motions that take place are eternal and regular; here, motion and rest +alternate, nothing "continueth in one stay." + +At the centre of the universe stands Earth: hence we mount through three +sublunary strata to the region of the celestial ether, which is purer +as distance from the Earth increases. + +These strata form three concentric "spheres" which, solid yet +transparent (like crystal), revolve around the earth. The first contains +the moon--like a fly in amber; the second, the sun; the third, the fixed +stars; which last sphere is also the first of several successive +heavens, the highest of which is the seat of Deity. + +This Aristotelio-Ptolemaic system[2] formed a coherent framework for +biblical world-notions. Here too, earth stands still while sun and stars +revolve; here, too, the seat of Deity is the highest heaven. This was an +universe where men could feel their feet on firm ground; their minds +found rest in those simple and definite notions which make religious +conceptions easy to understand and accept; their imaginations were not +yet disturbed and disquieted by thoughts of space and time without end +and without beginning. + +AQUINAS.--Such was the "world of nature," the theatre for that "world of +grace" which Revelation spoke of, and which led eventually to the +eternal "world of glory" in which the faithful should have their +portion. _Natura_, _gratia_, _gloria_ was the ascending series (like +another set of celestial spheres), and the whole economy was elaborated +into a logical system, known to the historians of thought as +Scholasticism: a philosophy which found its most perfect and memorable +expression in Thomas Aquinas (1227-74), the _doctor angelicus_ of +Catholic theology, canonised less than fifty years after his death. The +_Summa Philosophica_, where Aquinas deals with the rational foundations +of a Christian Theism, and the _Summa Theologica_, where he erects his +elaborate structure of theology and ethics, together constitute "one of +the most magnificent monuments of the human intellect, dwarfing all +other bodies of theology into insignificance."[3] In him the erudition +of an epoch found its spokesman; he was the personification of an +intellectual ideal. To his contemporaries he stood beyond the range of +criticism. In the _Paradiso_ (x.8.2) it is St. Thomas who speaks in +heaven. + +Nevertheless, the Scholastic world-scheme, though based on "the evidence +of the senses, the investigations of antiquity, and the authority of the +Church," and though Aquinas had set the seal of finality upon it, was +destined to gradual discredit and ultimate extinction. + +DISINTEGRATION BEGINS.--It was open to attack on two sides. _Either_ +observations or calculations might be brought forward, conflicting with +it, or making another conception possible or probable: _Or_ the validity +of conventional ideas of space might be disputed. + +The latter type of criticism was the first to occur. Nicholas Cusanus +(1401-1464), an inhabitant of the Low Countries, subsequently bishop and +cardinal, developed unconventional notions about Space. He suggested +that wherever man finds himself--on earth, sun, or star--he will always +regard himself as standing at the centre of existence. There is, in +fact, no point in the universe which might not appropriately be called +its centre, and to say that the earth stands at the centre is only (what +we should now call it) an anthropomorphism. So much for _place_; and +similarly with _motion_. Here, too, there is no absolute standard to +apply: motion may exist, but be unnoticed if there be no spot at +absolute rest from which to take bearings. + +"We are like a man in a boat sailing with the stream, who does not know +that the water is flowing, and who cannot see the banks: how is he to +discover whether the boat is moving?" Cusanus, in fact, denies the +fundamental Aristotelian dogma that the earth is the central point of +the universe, because, on general grounds, there _can_ be no absolute +central point. This gave a shock to the "geocentric theory" from which +it never recovered. + +Worse shocks, however, were to come. The name of the man who actually +(as Luther complained) turned the world upside down, is notorious +enough. Poles and Germans alike have claimed the nationality of Nicolaus +Copernicus (1473-1543); who, having been a student at Cracow and in +Italy, became a prebendary in Frauenburg Cathedral. + +THE NEW ASTRONOMY.--The general criticisms of Cusanus were elaborated by +Copernicus. The senses cannot inform us (when any motion takes place) +_what_ it is that moves. It may be the thing perceived that moves, or +the percipient--or both. And it would be _possible_ to account for the +movements of celestial bodies by the supposition that it is the earth +that moves, and not they. Copernicus' whole work consisted in the +mathematical demonstration that this hypothesis could account for the +phenomena as we observe them. In fact, when these demonstrations were +eventually published (it was only on his death-bed that Copernicus +received a copy of his book--and he had already lost consciousness) they +were introduced by a discreet preface, which intimated that the whole +thing might safely be regarded as a _jeu d'esprit_ on the part of an +eccentric mathematician. And this editorial _caveto_, though written by +another hand, preserved the Copernican theories from the notoriety that +might otherwise have attended, and afterwards did attend, them. + +Copernican conceptions were semi-traditional. The sun displaces the +earth as the central point of the universe: around it revolve the +planets--including the earth; and, at an immeasurable distance, is the +immovable heaven of the fixed stars. Copernicus left it an open question +whether or no the universe was infinite. It remained for his successor, +the greatest of the Renaissance thinkers, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) to +declare it to be limitless, and to contain an infinity of worlds like +our own. The fixed stars became, for him, suns surrounded by planets. +The traditional distinction between the celestial and sublunary spheres +had vanished. The bewilderment and indignation excited by these ideas, +revolting to the conscience of his time, cost their author his life. + +GALILEO.--The criticism of the old world-conceptions was, however, to be +based on yet more sure ground by one who relied, not on general +considerations, but on observation and experiment. Galileo (1564-1642) +studied philosophy, physics, and mathematics at Pisa; and as professor +expounded the old astronomy long after he had ceased to regard it as +adequate. Not until 1610, after he had constructed a telescope and +observed the satellites of Jupiter, did he openly confess his adherence +to the system of Copernicus. The observation of sun-spots and the phases +of Venus confirmed his opinion. + +Aristotelian astronomers declined to witness these phenomena through his +telescope, and perhaps Galileo was right in observing with a sigh that +were the stars themselves to descend from heaven to bear him witness his +critics would remain obdurate.[4] + +It was not until 1632 that a complete exposition of the conflict between +the two world-systems was produced by Galileo. It took the form of a +dialogue between three speakers--conservative, mediating, and extreme. +The views of the author, however, were not sufficiently concealed, the +book was prohibited, and Galileo summoned to Rome, and upon threat of +torture, subdued into a recantation and a promise not to offend in the +future. That Galileo perjured himself is not open to doubt, nor did he +change his convictions. A subsequent work, surreptitiously printed in +Holland, contained the same heresies expressed with less reserve. + +THE NEW PHYSICS.--It might be said, then, that the fabric of the +universe had been reconstructed by the thinkers whose explorations we +have hitherto followed. This achievement, however, though sufficiently +startling in itself, was not the only, and perhaps not the most +important, of their performances. The question still awaited solution: +_By what forces and laws is the new world-system maintained in +activity?_ + +The traditional reply had been that the universe was kept in motion by +the operation of the Deity. While the truth of this reply was not +questioned by the advocates of the "new" science, it did not seem to +them to dispel the obscurity surrounding certain points about which they +required information. It was Galileo who observed that the appeal to the +divine will explains nothing just because it explains everything. It +takes the inquirer back too far--behind those details of method which +arouse his speculative interest. + +This desire to understand those methods of operation which natural +objects appear to follow, led philosophers to enunciate certain "laws" +about them. These served as "explanations" of particular classes of +phenomena. It was the phenomena of _motion_ that especially attracted +their attention; and many ingenious experiments were performed by +Galileo, in particular, which led him to conclusions which then seemed +paradoxical, but now serve as axioms of physical science; for "the laws +of motion contain the key to all scientific knowledge of material +nature." When Galileo, after careful experiment, established the +proposition that a body can neither change its motion of itself, nor +pass from motion to rest, the fundamental "law of inertia"--of such +incalculable importance to the development of modern physics--had been +established. + +AN AUTOMATIC UNIVERSE.--A proposition of this kind may not at first seem +to involve important philosophical or theological consequences. But we +only have to consider that it provided a natural explanation of the +continued and untiring motion of the heavenly bodies. It did not, it is +true, explain how that motion arose; but the motion being "given," it +had now been shown how it would, in the absence of obstructions, be +perpetual. In fact, speculations of this kind opened up the way to the +_mechanical_ explanation of nature, a theory which had been already +speculatively held by Leonardo da Vinci, who is already convinced that +"necessity is the eternal bond, the eternal rule of Nature." + +SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS.--It was not only, however, the spectacle of a +system running automatically that suggested to observers a mechanical +theory to explain it. There was also the fact that phenomena were +observed to occur in accordance with certain simple mathematical laws. +Galileo's experiments with falling bodies led him to foreshadow +principles which were afterwards elaborated and fully demonstrated by +Newton, who may be said to have been the first to construct a mechanical +universe. The principle had already been formulated by a contemporary of +Galileo--Johannes Kepler--in the axiom _ubi materia, ibi geometria_. + +RESULTS.--The thinkers whose speculations have engaged us were indeed +responsible for creating a revolution in ideas. For a finite universe +whose centre was the earth, and which was kept in motion by the +operation of the Deity, they had substituted the conception of +illimitable space sown with innumerable systems like our own; and had +created the beginning of a mechanical conception of nature. + +THE NEW LOGIC.--But it was not only the scientific dogmas of the old +system that had been so rudely overthrown--the very principles upon +which those dogmas rested had been submitted to a destructive criticism. +The new science produced a new logic. This order of events is not +unusual: first, the new scientific discoveries, and then in the wake of +the discoverers, comes the innovating critic who systematises the +logical or scientific methods to which the new knowledge seems to have +been due. First, Kepler and Galileo, who used the "inductive" method, +and then Lord Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), who discovered the inductive +logic, and established it as a system. + +FRANCIS BACON.--Bacon's doctrine may be summarised by his own epigram, +"If a man begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he be +content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties." Which is +really a criticism of what is known as the a priori method, whereby the +inquirer starts with certain predefined theories to which all phenomena +must conform, and which all experience must verify. If facts will not +suit the particular theory, so much the worse for the facts: one could +always disregard them, and apply a blind eye to Galileo's telescope. +Such is always the procedure of the dogmatic mind, which is already so +certain of the truth of its notions that no evidence can persuade it to +the contrary. But it is not by such means that knowledge is advanced, +and it was for a reversal of these that Bacon pleaded. + +Leonardo da Vinci had already anticipated the Baconian logic (which did +not wait for Bacon until it was applied) when he laid down the +proposition that wisdom was the daughter of experience, and rejected all +speculations which experience, the common mother of all sciences, could +not confirm. Hence, knowledge was the product of time; the process of +collecting material for a judgment must often be slow, but the results +were worth the labour--these would not be speculative, but true. Nor +need it be supposed that Bacon excluded imagination from playing a part +in increasing knowledge, he did not plead _only_ for a mechanical +collection of material. It is imagination which in face of abundant +material creates the hypothesis which accounts for it being what it is. +And he was prepared to admit the value of preliminary hypotheses which +might be replaced as further facts were collected, or as insight became +more clear. Here, too, Bacon describes the method followed by modern +science. + +PRESTIGE OF NEW METHODS.--And so, by the time when Bacon had laid down +his pen after writing the _New Logic_, the work of discrediting the old +system, elaborated with such ingenious industry by Aquinas, was +tolerably complete. The new science had begun already to be fruitful in +results, both practical and speculative. The successors of Galileo and +of Bacon applied the new principles with vigour, and reached astonishing +results. Justified by these, the new methods secured a prestige which +has not decreased for three centuries. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY + + +DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM.--By the time of Lord Bacon, the Scholastic +philosophy might have been described as extinct; it no longer survived +as a living system. The loss was a serious one to mankind, which was +poorer by the discrediting of an authoritative body of thought, a +possession it seems ill able to dispense with. The Baconian philosophy +was an imperfect substitute; it was little more than a system of +enquiry, a manual of scientific procedure, for Bacon himself was not in +the philosophical sense a profound or constructive thinker, though he +was one of those men of talent who can give utterance to the tendencies +of an epoch. + +THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.--The task, however, of constructing a new philosophy +of the universe was courageously taken in hand by a succession of +thinkers, and the energy of thought which the great problem generated is +characteristic of perhaps the most vigorous century of European +history--the seventeenth. + +The tendency of the new discoveries in science had not been obscure, and +Modern Philosophy starts with an attempt to represent the universe as a +self-working machine--a co-ordinated whole, throughout which the +principles of mathematics are universally valid. The trend of ideas set +in motion by the new discoveries in astronomy seemed to point in this +direction. But to introduce mechanics into the celestial regions, though +an important step, was but a beginning. Mechanics must be _universally_ +valid--even in the human body--or the new teaching was vain. Exceptions +may prove a rule, but they destroy a philosophy. + +THE SUBJUGATION OF PHYSIOLOGY.--It was an Englishman who provided the +necessary facts to fill the gravest gap in the mechanical theory. It was +already known in the previous century that the blood of animals +circulated throughout the body; the existence and use of veins and +heart-valves was also known, but it was William Harvey (1578-1657) who +discovered the heart to be the organ responsible for _maintaining_ the +circulation of the blood, by purely mechanical means. This was a fact of +the utmost significance. In the sphere of physiology, where theories +about mysterious powers of blood or soul had been hitherto +authoritative, it effected a revolution. Indeed it is true to say that +Harvey "is to physiology what Galileo was to physics." He proved that +"the general laws of motion are valid within as well as without the +organism"--an important extension of the mechanical theory. + +DESCARTES.--Among the leading men who accepted Harvey's theory, one of +the first was René Descartes (1596-1650). Well might this thinker +welcome it, for it was a most important contribution to the imposing +philosophic fabric for which he was industriously collecting materials. +Descartes, apart from his philosophical speculations, is an interesting +character, being a Frenchman of noble birth who was educated by the +Jesuits, saw something of contemporary life in Paris, served as a +military officer in Holland and Germany, and made some original +discoveries in mathematics. + +The mathematical mind, accustomed as it is to deal with highly abstract +ideas, takes kindly to metaphysics. And it very often solves the mystery +of the universe by expressing all its contents in mathematical terms. +Such, at least, was Descartes' method. The simplest and clearest ideas +which we can have of anything are mathematical, i.e. extension and +mobility. And it is by concentrating our attention upon this simple and +mathematical aspect of things that we shall arrive at a proper +understanding of all that goes on in the material world. + +UNIVERSALITY OF MATHEMATICS.--A phenomenon was, in Descartes' eyes, +"explained" only when a "cause" which is its exact _mathematical +equivalent_, has been indicated. The "cause" and the "effect" are two +sides of a mathematical equation (_Causa aequat effectum_). Anything +that happens in the material world (the fall of a stone, the beat of a +heart, the rising of the sun) is really nothing more than a +redistribution of portions of that sum of motion which, once generated +at the Creation, has remained unaltered, and unalterable, in the +universe ever since. The sum of motion is constant, there can be no +addition to or subtraction from it. In this sense it would be true that +"there is nothing new under the sun": only ever-new distributions of the +old. + +THE UNIVERSE A MACHINE.--Once assume that all phenomena can be +interpreted in terms of motion, and add the proposition (already +enunciated by Galileo) that motion once set going will proceed for ever, +unless some impediment from outside intervenes, and the mechanical view +of the universe is complete. The universe is a machine, i.e. a thing +that works (1) according to mathematical principles, (2) automatically. + +ELABORATIONS OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY.--The importance of Descartes lies +not in his having invented this conception (we have already seen it in +the hands of Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and others), but in his having +elaborated it. This he did in two directions: (1) he attempted to supply +a mechanical theory of the evolution of the world-system; _i.e._ to show +how the heavenly bodies came into being by natural and mechanical +processes; (2) he applied the mechanical theory to organisms; animals +and men were complex machines. (Here, as we have seen, the discovery of +Harvey was of prime importance.) + +It is hardly necessary to describe at length Descartes' mechanical +theory of the evolution of the world-system, though an interest attaches +to it as being the ancestor of the modern "nebular hypothesis." Matter +in whirling motion around fixed centres is the original _datum_ from +which Descartes evokes the universe. With regard to the mechanical +theory of organisms, Descartes developed it at some length in various +treatises. All the functions and actions of animals were regarded by him +as entirely involuntary and mechanical. "That the lamb flees at the +sight of a wolf happens because the rays of light from the body of the +wolf strike the eye of the lamb, and set the muscles in motion by means +of the 'reflex' currents of the animal spirits." + +In the case of human beings, owing to the phenomenon of "consciousness," +Descartes felt compelled to assume a "soul"--a _thinking_ substance in +reciprocal action with the _material_ substance (of the brain). This, +too, is an anticipation of the modern theory of "psycho-physical +parallelism." + +CARTESIANISM.--The ideas of Descartes had considerable influence among +his contemporaries, and Cartesianism, as it was called, became +fashionable in intellectual circles. It developed a tendency towards +free enquiry and independent thought; and it was even more significant +as an atmosphere than as a system of ideas. Though in this respect too, +it was both important and vital; as we have observed, modern mechanical +theories find their parent in Descartes. + +Nor was it only, we may remark, among philosophers and men of science +that Cartesian ideas were popular; they were accepted and elaborated by +the religious thinkers who hoped to harmonise and humanise theology and +science. Pascal, Bossuet and Fénelon, the finest minds in the French +Church, were eager Cartesians.[5] + +This aspect of the matter, i.e. the significance of Cartesianism for +religion, we can for the present postpone. + +RESULTS SO FAR.--Successive breaches in the Scholastic system have now +been noted. Copernicus had introduced a new astronomy, Galileo a new +physics, Descartes (with the help of Harvey) a new physiology, and the +beginnings of a new psychology. + +CONTRIBUTIONS OF HOBBES.--The step that remained was taken by an +Englishman, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who attempted to provide a system +of ethics and a theory of politics upon a purely naturalistic basis. +Hobbes was a particularly energetic thinker. He worked out a psychology +of the feelings, which reduced everything to the impulse of +self-preservation and the instinct for power. Men were induced by these +instincts to agree to certain rules of conduct, for the sake of +expediency. Social life seems essential if men are to live together--the +instinct of self-preservation demands it--and social life in turn +demands certain renunciations: thus fidelity, gratitude, forbearance, +justice, etc., must be practised. + +Thus Hobbes attempted to banish all mysterious or obscure forces from +morality, which was the characteristic and inevitable product of human +nature and human circumstances. This way of looking at things seemed +strange to all, and even revolting to some, of Hobbes' contemporaries. +As the mystical powers of motion which the Scholastics had believed in +were banished by the new physics and the new physiology, so the new +psychology could allow of no mystical faculty which can decide in all +problems of good and evil. + +With Hobbes, then, a naturalistic view of the universe may be said to +have been tolerably complete: it embraces physics, psychology, and +ethics. There still remained, of course, a number of gaps in scientific +knowledge, and consequently any philosophy based thereupon could not yet +be regarded as secure. These gaps, however, as research proceeded and +successive discoveries were made, tended to diminish both in size and +quantity. + +NEWTON.--The seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries were +fruitful in revelations of this kind, and natural knowledge steadily and +even rapidly progressed. And one thinker, who may be regarded as a link +between the seventeenth century and that which succeeded it, may now +claim our attention. + +The name of Newton (1642-1727) is as familiar to Englishmen as that of +Shakespeare, and the discovery by him of the "law of gravitation" is one +of those scraps of information which we acquire, and perhaps fail to +understand, in early childhood. + +Newton's scientific method is a no less important aspect of his work +than its results. The _Principia_, in which he gave his discovery to the +world, is "a model for all scientific investigations which has never +been surpassed." It was, indeed, a brilliant application of the +principle of inferring the unknown from the already known, without any +dogmatic leaps in the dark. The principle with which he began was that +what is true in the narrower spheres of experience (e.g. in the case of +an apple falling) is true also in the wider spheres (e.g. in the +movements of the celestial bodies). He then made a careful mathematical +deduction of what would happen in the case of the planets, assuming that +the laws of falling bodies on the earth were applicable to them also. +And he concluded by showing that what would happen according to +mathematics under this assumption _actually does happen_. The conclusion +follows that the same force, i.e. "attraction," operates in both cases. +It is no wonder that this final and successful operation was performed +by Newton "in a state of excitement so great that he could hardly see +his figures." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS DISCOVERY.--The philosophic importance of the +discovery that the motions of the planets may be explained by the "law +of gravitation" was twofold. In the first place, it now became possible +to understand how the universe held together (a problem which the new +astronomy had not solved); and in the second place, the theory +constituted a large extension of the mechanical view. It demonstrated +that "the physical laws which hold good on the surface of the earth are +valid throughout the universe, so far as we can know anything of it." +Thus the area of existence in which physical law held good was at once +infinitely widened. The mechanical theories of Galileo, Descartes, and +others, not only received confirmation, but became more comprehensive +than before. + +So that Newton may be said to have put the finishing touch upon the +achievements of his predecessors, and to have crowned their labours with +success. And his work has the characteristic of permanency: his +"gravitation formula" has stood the test of time. "It still stands +there," says a careful and authoritative writer, "as almost the only +firmly established mathematical relation, expressive of a property of +all matter, to which the progress of more than two centuries has added +nothing, and from which it has taken nothing away."[6] + +RELIGIOUS COROLLARIES.--It would be a profound mistake to assume that +the creators of the mechanical view, as it has hitherto met us, were +animated by any hostility to religion. Nor did they believe their +theories to involve any disastrous consequences in that sphere. + +The new astronomy of Copernicus had actually been made the basis of a +spiritual view of the universe by the profound genius (both +philosophical and religious) of Giordano Bruno. And the fact that the +ecclesiastical authorities rejected his view need not divest it of +importance or of value in our eyes. Bruno's own faith was not disturbed +by the infidelity of his persecutors. "Ye who pass judgment upon me +feel, maybe, greater fear than I upon whom it is passed," were his last +words to them. Had they _believed_, they need not have been afraid, and +might have been content with the policy of Gamaliel. + +As for Descartes and Hobbes, their notions were no doubt distasteful to +conservative minds (the Jesuits were no friends to either), but +Descartes regarded himself, and would fain have been regarded by others, +as a good Catholic; and Hobbes, theologically, was what in these days we +might call a Liberal Protestant. Cartesianism, as we have seen, came to +be a name for a type of thought which studied to harmonise science and +theology, and one of the most profound religious geniuses of any +age--Pascal, was (as we have seen) a Cartesian. + +As for Newton, his view of the universe was essentially a religious one, +though he did not allow theological speculations to intrude upon his +strictly scientific work. His attitude is indicated by a reply to the +inquiry of a contemporary theologian as to how the movements and +structure of the solar system were to be accounted for. + +"To your query I answer that the motions which the planets now have +could not spring from any natural cause alone.... To compare and adjust +all these things together (i.e. quantities of matter and gravitating +powers, etc.) in so great a variety of bodies, argues the cause to be +not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanism and +geometry."[7] + +Still, the mechanical view contained within it sinister possibilities; +and the instincts of conservative thinkers were not altogether at fault. +The mechanical view in itself need not be hostile to a spiritual and +rational religion (though it is fatal to most forms of superstition); +and yet that view can be used in the interests of anti-religious +prejudice--and, as we shall see, it was so used, and with considerable +effect. + +Meanwhile, however, we shall pass on to consider the work of three +thinkers who are typical of a revolt from what was in danger of becoming +the all-absorbing tyranny of mechanics. This reaction (for so it may be +termed) we shall proceed, in the following chapter, to examine. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS + + +A LAW OF THOUGHT.--Whenever a tendency of thought has been vigorously +prosecuted for any length of time, a reaction invariably displays +itself. This rule is illustrated by the history of thought in the +seventeenth century. Mechanical categories, as we have seen, had been +steadily extending themselves for the better part of two centuries, and +with the materialism of Hobbes the process seemed fairly complete. + +Meanwhile, however, human thought began to explore other avenues. Though +reaction from mechanical ways of thinking did not (at any rate, in the +circles with which we are concerned) take the form of an obscurantist +retreat into prejudice or superstition, the results of the new science +and its attendant mechanistic philosophy served as a base for further +explorations. The principles which Descartes and Hobbes had laid down +were criticised by being carried out to their logical conclusions. + +SPINOZA.--The philosopher with whom we shall first concern ourselves was +a Jew of Spanish extraction, living in what was then the freest country +in Europe--Holland. Spinoza (1632-1677) was undoubtedly the greatest +thinker of his own age, which was highly fertile in that respect, and he +still stands as one of the most notable figures in the long history of +European thought. Not only is his outlook comprehensive, and his thought +many-sided, but his standpoint was "detached" to a degree hitherto +unknown. He was untainted, so far as a human being ever can be, by +"anthropomorphism"; he endeavoured to transcend the merely human +outlook. Here is always the dividing line between the great and the +merely mediocre thinker. + +SPINOZA'S METHOD.--Spinoza's philosophical ancestry may be traced back +to Bruno, whose acquaintance we made in a previous chapter, but in whose +company we did not long remain. This highly original mind had already, +by the doctrine of the infinitude and the divinity of nature, shown how +the concept of God and the concept of nature might be closely bound up +together. By similar means, Spinoza hoped to indicate the reality of the +spiritual, without disturbing the mechanical world-conception which the +new science and new philosophy had created between them. He wished +somehow to find God not outside, but _in_ Nature; not in disturbances of +the order of Nature, but _in that order itself_. + +THE TERM NATURE.--It would be a misapprehension to suppose that the +terms "God" and "Nature" are regarded by Spinoza as interchangeable, +though his numerous critics were accustomed to declare that this was the +case. On the contrary, Spinoza, in order to anticipate the +misunderstanding which he saw might arise on this point, reintroduced +into philosophy a pair of terms which the Scholastics had long before +brought into currency, but which had since fallen out of +fashion--_Natura naturans_ and _Natura naturata_. We might perhaps +translate the former of these, "Creative Nature," and the latter, +"Created Nature." _Natura naturans_ is equivalent to "Nature as a +creative power," or "The creative power immanent in Nature." _Natura +naturata_ is equivalent to "Nature as it is when created," or "The +results of the creative power immanent in Nature." And the _Natura +naturans_ is active in the _Natura naturata_ at all points: the creative +power is immanent in creation. As Spinoza puts it in one of his letters: + +"I assert that God is (as it is called) the immanent, not the external +cause of all things. That is to say, I assert with Paul, that in +God all things live and move.... But if any one thinks that the +_Theologico-Political Treatise_ (one of his works) assumes that God +and Nature are one and the same, he is entirely mistaken."[8] + +Thus, for Spinoza, the order of nature, which had seemed to so many of +his contemporaries, from the religious point of view, such a devastating +conception, as leaving no room for the spiritual, was itself only +explicable if interpreted spiritually. + +"Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without +God" (_Ethics_ i. 15) sums up his attitude. All things may be, as the +new science taught, 'determined' but they are determined "by the +necessity of the divine nature" (_Ethics_ i. 29). + +THE "ETHICS."--Spinoza may rightly be termed a man of one book. In his +_Ethics_ is to be found a complete and final expression of his +philosophy. "How boundless," says Goethe of this great book, "is the +disinterestedness conspicuous in every sentence, how exalted the +resignation which submits itself once for all to the great laws of +existence, instead of trying to get through life with the help of +trivial consolations; and what an atmosphere of peace breathes through +the whole!" + +According to its teaching the true happiness and highest activity of men +is to be found in what Spinoza terms "the intellectual love of God." The +phrase seems to have been used to designate that full and clearer +knowledge which is aware that we ourselves and all the conditions of our +life are determined by the infinite Nature, by God Himself, who moves in +us as well as in all things acting upon us. The initiated no longer +regard themselves as single, isolated, impotent beings, but as included +in the divine nature. Themselves and all things are seen under the form +of eternity. This thought is, according to Spinoza, the fruit of the +highest activity of the human mind; this is the _amor intellectualis +dei_; and the supreme good for man. + +His doctrine of immortality is bound up with this intellectual form of +religious mysticism--knowledge of God involves participation in His +immortality: + +"Death is the less harmful the more the mind's knowledge is clear and +distinct, and the more the mind loves God.... The human mind may be of +such a nature that the part of it which we showed to perish with the +body may be of no moment to it in respect to what remains." + +He who is "affected with love towards God" has a mind "of which the +greater part is eternal." Thus the soul achieves its emancipation by +identifying itself with God--who is the object of its knowledge and +love. The path is arduous, and the closing passage of the _Ethics_ +admits this: + +"If the road I have shown is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. +And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found.... But all +excellent things are as difficult as they are rare." + +SPINOZA AND RELIGION.--It is interesting to note that Spinoza, though a +"free-thinking" Jew, adopts towards the fundamental dogma of +Christianity an attitude which approximates to the classical expression +of it in the Fourth Gospel. He held that "God's eternal wisdom, which +reveals itself in all things, and especially in the human mind, has +given a special revelation of itself in Christ." + +Perhaps his ethic, like that of the Stoics, with whom he had so much in +common, was better adapted to satisfy the needs of the philosopher than +of the ordinary man. But, in the seventeenth century, it was the +philosophers and learned men that were in need of a spiritual +interpretation of the universe; common men had theirs already, in the +traditional pietism which philosophers are often too ready to despise. +To Spinoza--and this is one of the many indications of the genuine +profundity of his thought--the simple believers seemed already to be in +possession of too much of the truth for it to be desirable or profitable +for them to indulge in speculation. To the question of his landlady at +the Hague as to whether she could be saved by the religion which she +professed, his reply was that her religion was good, that she should +seek no other, and that she would certainly be saved by it if she led a +quiet and pious life. + +SPINOZA'S PERSONALITY.--The figure of Spinoza stands as one of the most +imposing and attractive in the whole history of philosophy, and his was +an unworldliness, a simplicity, and a humility purely Franciscan. Like +all Jews then, he knew a trade--that of lens grinding--and by this he +was able to live frugally, while he elaborated his thought. He dedicated +his life to the labour of quiet contemplation; nor was he ambitious of +recognition, which indeed generally came to him in the form of abuse. He +did not escape "the exquisite rancour of theological hatred," but it was +his belief, and the conviction inspired his life, that-- + +"Neither riches, nor sensuous enjoyment, nor honours, can be a true good +for man"; but on the contrary, "that the only thing which is able to +fill the mind with ever-new satisfaction is the striving after +knowledge, by means of which the mind is united with that which remains +constant while all else changes." + +"The God-intoxicated," was the name given to Spinoza long afterwards in +Germany. He died (like St. Francis) at forty-five, worn out with the +toil of thought. And it renews one's faith in the perspicacity of +commonplace people to learn that his barber, sending in a bill after the +death of the philosopher, alluded to his late customer as "Mr. Spinoza +of blessed memory." It was left to a contemporary theologian to describe +him as "an unclean and foul atheist." + +LEIBNIZ.--Spinoza had taken over from Descartes and Hobbes their +mechanical and determinist conception of nature, though he gave to it, +as we have seen, an interpretation of his own. His attitude was a blend +of that rationalism and mysticism which were characteristic of so much +seventeenth century thought. A far more complete reaction, however, +displays itself in the system of a contemporary of Spinoza's--Gottfried +Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716); who, when already a youth, had become an +enthusiastic devotee of the new science; the study of Kepler, Galileo +and Descartes caused him to feel as though "transported into a different +world." Though a German by birth, Leibniz lived continuously in France, +and wrote habitually in the language of that country. + +CONTRAST TO SPINOZA.--Spinoza and Leibniz stand as examples of two +distinct methods of eluding the despotism of mechanics--methods which +will meet us again in the course of our survey. Spinoza accepts the +mechanical view as being inevitable and even desirable, but subjects it +to a spiritual interpretation--he regards it as the way in which the +_Natura naturans_ works.[9] Leibniz, on the other hand, viewed existence +from an entirely different standpoint. He was bold enough to reject the +mechanical view altogether; or rather he preferred to regard it as a +convenient abstraction, or a useful formula, which might reflect certain +aspects of reality, but could not do justice to its concrete richness +and complexity. + +A PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALS.--Leibniz's criticism of Descartes and the +mechanical school proceeded along different lines from that of Spinoza, +who, as we have seen, accepted the mechanical view as the basis of his +speculation. + +An axiom of that view was (as we know) the conservation of motion. For +this conservation of _motion_, Leibniz substitutes the conservation of +_force_ as being logically the more fundamental concept. True reality, +according to him, is not _motion_ itself, but the _force which is its +cause_. Force and existence became for him identical terms; to work and +to exist were the same. That force is the true reality, Leibniz +expressed in the language of his time by saying, "Force is substance, +and all substance is force"--a proposition which would not be repudiated +by modern science--and upon this statement his philosophy is built. + +But it was not "force in general" or some "universal force" that was +regarded by him as the final reality: Leibniz was not a forerunner of +Herbert Spencer. Reality for him consisted in _individual centres of +force_--a multitude of individual and independent beings, each with its +own idiosyncrasy, and following its own lines. Existence was, in fact, +for him, _individual_. It was the _individual_ centres of force--not +_general_ principles, universal substances, laws or forces--that make up +reality. + +DOCTRINE OF MONADS.--This view of reality was formulated by Leibniz in +his famous doctrine of "monads." "Monad" was the technical name applied +by him to those absolute individuals which he regarded as constituting +true reality. The word, meaning "unity," was simple and appropriate. And +he declared that the "monad," to be rightly understood, must be regarded +as analogous to our own souls. This principle of analogy was described +by Leibniz as _mon grand principe des choses naturelles_. Thus reality +was interpreted by him not in physical but in psychical terms, or if the +expression be preferred, in terms of personality.[10] + +Of these "monads" there exist, according to this view, infinitely many +degrees. In fact all existence differs only in degree from our own. +Even between mind and matter there is only a quantitative and not a +qualitative gulf. For there are sleeping, dreaming, and more or less +waking monads; and matter is a form of unconscious mind; the monads +which compose material objects being "minds without memory," "momentary +minds." + +Let Leibniz speak for himself:-- + +"Each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, but is also +actually subdivided without end.... Whence it appears that in the +smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living +beings, animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter may be +conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of +fishes.... Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead +in the universe...."[11] + +Leibniz may indeed be said to have been the first to outline a theory of +"panpsychism" (as it is termed), according to which there is nothing +that is not, in its degree, alive. As we shall have occasion to observe, +Leibniz was here (as elsewhere) a forerunner of much recent philosophy. + +The significance of the Spinozist and Leibnizian systems of thought, +though regarding existence from such diverse standpoints, was, for +practical purposes the same. Both alike led out, though by different +paths, beyond the mechanical theory of the universe. They, indeed, +represent two types of thought which attempt to reach the same end by +different methods. Their counterparts will meet us again as this history +proceeds. + +PASCAL.--But before passing out from the seventeenth century, one +thinker ought to detain us; for from more than one point of view he was +a notable personality, and of first-rate importance in the history of +religious, as distinct from purely philosophical thought. He was indeed +one of those figures who are distinguished among distinguished men of +all times. + +Blaise Pascal was born in 1623, and was a boy of precocious mathematical +ability. By the age of twelve he is said to have worked out +independently most of the first and second books of Euclid; at sixteen +he wrote a treatise on Conics which attracted the attention of +Descartes; at nineteen he completed a calculating machine--a device that +had never been dreamt of before. At this point it is not surprising to +learn that his health broke down. + +Pascal is not a systematic philosopher; but his acute intellect was +united to an inner restlessness of soul. Neither science nor philosophy +could bring him peace, for his needs were far deeper than any merely +rational systematisation of ideas could satisfy. Some have said of him +that he was fundamentally a sceptic, but one for whom religious faith +was essential; certainly in him were united an acute critical faculty +and an intense religious experience. Perhaps the two are not so +incompatible after all. + +THE "PENSÉES."--Pascal is chiefly famous for two works, the _Lettres +Provinciales_ and the _Pensées_. The former is controversial literature, +but yet a classic of the French language: in sum, it is an attack on the +Jesuits; but it need not here detain us, for with theology, as such, we +are not concerned, and still less with ecclesiastical systems. The +_Pensées_ is a collection of fragments, the material for an Apology for +Christianity which was never written. The autograph MS. preserved in +the _Bibliothèque Nationale_ at Paris "is made up of scraps of paper of +all shapes and sizes, written often on both sides ... and dealing with +all sorts of subjects." One is reminded of the mythical scraps of +manuscript from which the genius of Carlyle distilled the philosophy of +the sagacious Teufelsdröch. + +But it is in these detached fragments that Pascal has expressed his +spiritual and intellectual struggles; they contain his philosophy of +life. And, however unsystematic in arrangement, they do reveal a fairly +definite temper and attitude of mind. + +PASCAL'S PHILOSOPHY.--In the first place, the _Thoughts_ voice a +reaction against the "Cartesian intellectualism" which was then the +prevalent tendency in scientific and philosophical circles. "The last +attainment of reason is to recognise that there is an infinity of things +beyond it" might perhaps have been published by Pascal's predecessors. +"To laugh at philosophy is to be a true philosopher" would have seemed +like blasphemy or nonsense to most of his contemporaries, but it was +neither of these. + +Behind sayings of this description lay the strong conviction that mere +logic was incapable of probing the depths of existence. "The heart has +its reasons of which reason knows nothing," is sound psychology, and not +scepticism or obscurantism. Of course it all depends what one means by +"reason." Too many of Pascal's contemporaries applied the word to a more +or less shallow rationalism utterly opposed to a spiritual view of +things, whereas reason properly understood is "the logic of the whole +personality."[12] + +That Pascal was no mere narrow anti-rational obscurantist is evident, +not only from his own extraordinary insight, but from his continual +reiteration of his idea that the essential dignity of man lies in his +thought: + +"All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms, are +not worth the smallest mind, for a mind knows them, and itself, and +bodies know nothing." + +Here lies the true greatness of man. In respect of material bulk he is +nothing, but his thought cannot be measured. "Man is only a reed, the +feeblest reed in nature, _but he is a thinking reed_." The saying has +become famous, and the words that follow are hardly less so; they remove +the overpowering and crushing incubus of man's illimitable material +environment, which, since Copernicus, had weighed upon thinkers like a +nightmare: + +"Were the universe to crush him, man would still be more noble than that +which slays him, because he knows that he dies, and the advantage that +the universe has over him: of this the universe knows nothing. Thus all +man's dignity lies in his thought."[13] + +PASCAL'S PESSIMISM.--It has been said that an unbridgeable gulf lies +between those who believe and those who disbelieve in mankind. It is to +the latter category that Pascal belongs. His faith in the dignity of man +is paradoxically associated with a realisation of his weakness and +imbecility: + +"What a chimera, then, is man! What an oddity, what a monster, what a +chaos, what a subject of contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all +things, senseless earth-worm; depository of truth, cloaca of +uncertainty and error; the glory and the refuse of the universe." + +"We desire truth, and find in ourselves only uncertainty; we seek +happiness, and find only misery and death. We are unable not to wish for +truth and happiness, and incapable either of certainty or felicity." + +In fact, we may say that Pascal was the first, in an age of exaggerated +reverence for logic (the _damnosa hereditas_ of the Scholastic +theologians) to understand that the best arguments for religion are the +facts of human experience, and the conditions of human life. + +"In vain, O men, do ye seek within yourselves the cure for your +troubles! All your knowledge can only teach you that it is not within +yourselves that ye find the true or good!" Here we have the language of +religious experience. The result of Augustine's meditation upon life was +the same: _Inquietum cor nostrum dum requiescat in te._ It is a tongue +that the "psychic man" can never understand; it seems to him +affectation; such language is foreign to the easy optimism of an age of +confidence. Indeed Pascal, though so intensely modern, is a stranger, +and his words often enigmas to our time. + +_Vanitas vanitatum_ is thus the verdict that he passes upon human +experience. "The last act is tragic, however fine the comedy of all the +rest." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF PASCAL.--It is not as a systematic thinker that Pascal +is of importance to the historian of thought. He typifies that more or +less inarticulate and unreasoned revolt which the arrogance and optimism +of a new science or a new philosophy arouse against themselves. He +voices the eternal protest that it is not by bread alone that men live. +As is generally the case with such protests, the pessimism of Pascal +was no doubt exaggerated; but exaggeration is necessary if minds are to +be impressed; and those who feel strongly see only one side of a +question. + +RESULTS.--Thus in the three figures that have passed before us, we see a +threefold protest against that exclusion of the spiritual from the human +view of life. Spinoza, the pantheist, sees God everywhere;[14] Leibniz +finds in every recess of nature the principle of personality; Pascal +finds the only cure for human frailty and misery in religion. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE + + +ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.--As we have seen, a mechanical view of the +universe was not felt by thinkers like Descartes or Newton, or even +Hobbes, to involve any consequences that were necessarily hostile to +religion. The new science sometimes might be anti-theological, because +the current theology still seemed too much infected with Scholasticism, +but it was not, in the hands of its most notable exponents, +anti-religious. Science had no quarrel with religion as such, nor even +with a rational type of theology. + +Of course the new views aroused many suspicions, and did not escape +criticism at the hands of Church authorities, both Protestant and +Catholic. And (as we have seen) some early scientists paid very dearly +for their allegiance to the spirit of scientific enquiry; but as time +went on, actual persecution became impossible, morally and practically. +But theologians were never, during the seventeenth century at least, +quite reconciled to a science and a philosophy which seemed to them to +be leading men towards areas quite uninhabitable for religion. But in +spite of suspicions on either side, and the prevalence of some measure +of intolerance, it cannot be said that relations between the scientists +or philosophers and the theologians were very seriously strained until +well on in the eighteenth century. + +ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA.--That this comparatively pacific state of +affairs came to an end was the fault, primarily, at least, neither of +the theologians nor of the scientists. A different atmosphere gradually +began to envelop and to embitter the controversy. Orthodox religion, +especially in Catholic countries, came to be associated with political +reaction, and the most envenomed onslaughts began to be made upon what +seemed to be the chief stronghold of a discredited regime. Especially +was this the case in France, where corrupt political conditions were +aggravated by the intense social misery which they had created. + +Thus France became the cradle of the phenomenon known as +anti-clericalism, which is the product not so much of disbelief in a +creed as of hatred of a system; it was the correlative of a Church in +which religion was extinct, for genuine Catholicism had been rooted out +of France early in the eighteenth century, just as Protestantism had +been drowned in blood a century before.[15] + +SCIENCE POPULARISED.--In two respects France, during the second half of +the eighteenth century, was far in advance of other countries. No other +literature of that age can be compared with the French for the skill and +charm with which scientific views were expressed. There was no lack of +first-rate propagandists. And not only in the popularisation, but in +the systematic teaching of science, France for a long period led the +way.[16] Whereas the history of English or German literature of the +eighteenth century could be written almost without reference to science, +it is with scientific problems that the names of some of the most +brilliant French _littérateurs_ are associated. And whereas in England, +scientific men worked (in spite of the existence of the Royal Society) +more or less in isolation, in France the savants have always been a +brotherhood.[17] + +VOLTAIRE.--One of the most notorious names associated with the type of +propaganda referred to is that of Voltaire (1694-1778). Voltaire's +polemic cannot be described as anti-religious, for he himself was a +theist. It was, rather, political in character. The object of his attack +was the Catholic Church as existing in France in his day, which he +regarded as the chief surviving obstacle to human progress. _Écrasez +l'infâme_ was his motto; and if this seems a trifle fanatical, let us +not forget, as an acute critic has observed, "that what Catholicism was +accomplishing in France in the first half of the eighteenth century was +not anything less momentous than the slow strangling of French +civilisation."[18] + +Voltaire was an industrious and prolific writer (his works are numbered +by scores), but he was also a master of French prose, and he was +universally read. From the point of view of the history of European +thought his importance lies in his popularisation in France of the +Newtonian physics.[19] _Newtonisme_ was a word coined by him, and became +associated with a mechanical view of nature. He also conducted a +vigorous polemic against certain religious notions, then current, but +now out-of-date, and which need not here detain us. Voltaire was an +anti-clerical, but he was not hostile to religion; he was chiefly +regarded as an exponent of English (i.e. progressive) ideas. + +LA METTRIE.--An advance in the materialistic direction was taken, +however, by La Mettrie (1709-1751), who approached the problem from the +side of physiology (he was a physician by profession). His two important +contributions were _Histoire naturelle de l'âme_ (1745), and _L'Homme +Machine_ (1748). The titles are sufficient to indicate the scope of +these works. That of the latter points back to Descartes, who had +applied the mechanical theory to animals only, and not to man. La +Mettrie extended his application to include man. The implications of +this theory did not escape La Mettrie's contemporaries. + +DIDEROT AND HIS ENCYCLOPÆDIA.--A definite period in the history of +thought is certainly marked by the successful attempt on the part of a +group of progressive thinkers, to extend the circle open to scientific +ideas by the publication of an Encyclopædia which should contain all the +latest knowledge and speculation. The credit for this notable +performance was due to Diderot, who in spite of immense difficulties, +which were aggravated by the ecclesiastical authorities and the +supporters of reaction in general, carried the work through to a +triumphant conclusion. The first volume appeared in 1751. The work was +composed with an eye to current prejudices; the language was guarded, +but the anti-clerical tendency of the whole was by no means obscure. +Diderot, however, did not obtrude in the Encyclopædia the definitely +anti-religious opinions which he had developed and which are revealed in +his correspondence. + +HOLBACH.--A disciple of the Encyclopædist--Holbach, a young German +settled in Paris--was bolder than his master, and published, under the +name of a savant who had recently died, a book which became widely +notorious, and has been called the Bible of materialism--the _Système de +la Nature_ (1770). Like Voltaire's _Élémens_, and La Mettrie's _L'Homme +Machine_, it was published in Holland. "The book is materialism reduced +to a system. It contains no really new thoughts. Its significance lies +in the energy and indignation with which every spiritualistic and +dualistic view was run to earth on account of its injuriousness both in +practice and in theory,"[20] is the estimate of a distinguished and +impartial writer. + +Rumour gave the credit of its authorship to Diderot, who was so +disturbed by the compliment as hastily to leave Paris for the frontier. +His admiration of it is, however, recorded. After proclaiming his +disgust at the contemporary fashion of "mixing up incredulity and +superstition," he observes that no such fault is to be found in the +_System of Nature_. "The author is not an atheist in one page, and a +deist in another. His philosophy is all of a piece." + +Certainly to those with an appetite for negative dogmatism the work left +nothing to be desired. The following passage indicates the attitude and +method of the author, who, in the matter of style, did not fall short of +the French tradition: + +"If we go back to the beginning, we shall always find that ignorance and +fear have created gods; fancy, enthusiasm or deceit has adorned or +disfigured them; weakness worships them; credulity preserves them in +life; custom regards them, and tyranny supports them in order to make +the blindness of men serve its own ends." + +The philosophy of religion which inspired these sentences may appear to +us sufficiently crude. And indeed an impartial reader will have to +confess that much of this eighteenth century polemic against religion, +however well-intentioned, is singularly wide of the mark. It is all +characterised by an imperfect knowledge of the psychological foundations +of religion, and quite devoid of what is now termed the "historic +sense." The faults of Voltaire and Holbach, however, were those of their +age, which was often short-sighted in its recognition of facts, and +superficial in its reasoning from them. Even Dr. Johnson, who found this +section of contemporary French literature so distasteful, never laid his +finger upon its real weakness; the fundamental fallacies upon which it +rested escaped him. He, like Voltaire and the rest, was a child of the +age. + +PROPAGANDA NOT SCIENCE.--It is very doubtful whether the genuine +scientists, who devoted themselves not to propaganda but to research, +could have been ready to sanction the uses to which their own +discoveries were put. From the exhaustive references of Lange in his +_History of Materialism_ (Engl. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 49-123), it is +evident that "the extreme views of La Mettrie, Diderot, and Holbach +cannot be fathered on any of the great scientists or philosophers, but +were an attempt to supply scientific principles to the solution of +philosophical, ethical, or religious questions, frequently for practical +and political purposes."[21] + +There are certainly risks attached to the popularisation of the results +of scientific research. Theories have to be presented with an appearance +of finality which does not legitimately belong to them, and sometimes in +a somewhat startling aspect, otherwise the reader is left cold, for it +is excitement rather than genuine information that attracts the +majority. As a judicious writer has observed: + +"No ideas lend themselves to such easy, but likewise to such shallow +generalisations as those of science. Once let out of the hand which uses +them in the strict and cautious manner by which alone they lead to +valuable results, they are apt to work mischief. Because the tool is so +sharp, the object to which it is applied seems to be so easily handled. +The correct use of scientific ideas is only learnt by patient training, +and should be governed by the not easily acquired habit of +self-restraint."[22] + +SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS.--Alongside of this rigorous propaganda, which +prepared the way for the upheaval of 1789, genuine scientific progress +was being made, especially in the regions of Astronomy, Botany and +Chemistry. The ideas of Newton were taken up and elaborated by means of +more efficient mathematical processes--especially the theory of +infinitesimals--by the distinguished astronomer, Laplace, in his +_Système du Monde_ (1796), and in the successive volumes of his +_Méchanique Céleste_ (1799-1825), which has been called a new +_Principia_. + +Important advances in chemistry are associated with the name of +Lavoisier (1743-1794), who introduced into that science a principle +which has become axiomatic, and which to-day remains the foundation of +all work in the laboratory. To Lavoisier belongs the merit of +introducing what is known as the "quantitative method" into chemistry, +and thus establishing that science upon the exact--that is to say +mathematical--basis, where it now rests and putting exact research in +the place of vague reasoning. His principle was that _in all chemical +combinations and reactions, the total weight of the various ingredients +remains unchanged_; there is (in spite of appearances) neither loss nor +gain of actual matter. "The quantity of matter is the same at the end as +at the beginning of every operation." It was Lavoisier who finally +established the correct theory of combustion; that it consisted in the +combination of a special element called oxygen, with other bodies or +elements. + +THE ATOMIC THEORY.--Lavoisier had opened a door to researches which +naturally led the way to the establishment of the atomic theory of +matter on an experimental, and not merely a theoretical basis. That +theory is indeed nothing more than the elaboration of Lavoisier's own +principle. John Dalton (1766-1844), a Manchester quaker, published in +1810 his _New System of Chemical Philosophy_, where highly important +conclusions are drawn both from Lavoisier's facts and from experimental +results of other chemists. Of these, Dalton gave an account and an +explanation which has ever since been the soul of all chemical +reasoning. This explanation is known as his Atomic theory. + +The two facts of which Dalton's theory is an explanation are as follows. +_First_ (Lavoisier's fact), that the total weight of substances remains +always the same, be they combined in ever so many different ways. +_Second_, that all substances, be they in large or in small quantities, +combine with each other, or separate from each other, in definite and +fixed proportions. The theory of Dalton was that these combinations take +place between independent particles of matter, which are indestructible +and indivisible. These "atoms" of the various elements have definite +weights which are responsible for the proportion in which they are found +to combine. These facts of proportion in combination, or "chemical +affinity," could not be accounted for by the theory which regards matter +as "continuous," but only by the opposite theory that it is "discrete" +(i.e. divided up into particles). + +PHILOSOPHICAL COROLLARIES.--These strictly scientific theories +associated with the name of Laplace, Lavoisier, and Dalton tended to +strengthen in the popular estimation, the philosophical conclusions of +writers like Holbach. The scientists themselves remained "agnostic" with +regard to questions that lay outside their scope: they maintained here +the correct attitude for scientific research. The question put by +Napoleon to Laplace, why he had not introduced the name of God into the +_Méchanique Céleste_, was out of place, and deserved the crushing reply +it received. Scientific research is not concerned with questions of +philosophy. + +Still, it did not escape popular attention that the old pillar of a +mechanistic view of the universe now seemed to be reinforced by another. +The theory of _the conservation of energy_ was now supplemented by that +of the _indestructibility of matter_ (Lavoisier). And to crown all, the +old atomic theory, which Lucretius had made the foundation of his +dogmatic materialism, was now re-established on an experimental basis. + +So far as physical science was concerned, the situation seemed menacing +to a religious view of life. Men felt that they inhabited a world of +indestructible matter, moved by a certain measure of force, unchangeable +and fixed. The prison of determinism and matter was closing around +them. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM + + +AN UNSTEMMED TIDE.--In spite of those important reactions of thought +which we have associated with the name of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Pascal, +the mechanical view had not ceased, as the last chapter has shown us, to +extend itself during the eighteenth century, when it became highly +fashionable in progressive circles. + +COMMON-SENSE PHILOSOPHY.--The strength of this mechanical view lies in +the fact that it stands on the shoulders of a natural science which +itself has its feet firmly planted on the irrefragible rock of +sense-experience. The mechanical view thus rests, in the last resort, +upon the belief (which is held everywhere with confidence by plain men) +that sense-experience is a sound foundation for knowledge. + +The importance of this belief had been recognised by the English +philosopher, Locke (1632-1704), who in his _Essay concerning Human +Understanding_ (1690), lays it down that all human knowledge is based, +ultimately, upon sense-experience. This highly important work had an +immense influence, and, under Locke's tutelage, many thinkers regarded +with suspicion any knowledge which might seem not to be derivable, in +one way or another, from that source. + +As the strength of Samson lay in his unshorn hair, so the strength of +the mechanical theory lay, and still lies, in the acceptance of Locke's +theory of human knowledge, i.e. that it is all derived from the senses. +And the Delilah who can shear away Locke's conclusions, leaves Samson +helpless; mechanical materialism becomes a discredited theory. Hence the +truth of the saying that the problem of knowledge is the preliminary +question for philosophy. + +WEAKNESS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.--Spinoza and Leibniz may be said to +have dispensed with this foundation. Taking the scientific knowledge of +their time for granted, they drew certain conclusions therefrom; but +their results, however imposing, were felt to be the result rather of +speculation than of reason. Such was the more or less unexpressed +estimate of their work. It was undervalued, for both Spinoza and Leibniz +were thinkers of the first calibre; and yet there was some justice in +the charge. By the end of the eighteenth century the days of merely +speculative philosophy were past. + +THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.--The time was ripe for a new metaphysic--for a +fresh step forward in philosophic method. That step was taken by the +celebrated Immanuel Kant, who is the originator of what is known, in the +history of thought, as the Critical Philosophy. + +The word _critical_ signifies a particular method of approaching the +problem of existence, a method which must be contrasted with that of the +_speculative_ philosophy, of which Spinoza and Leibniz are examples. + +The critical philosophy, before attempting (as Spinoza had done) to +tackle the problem of _existence_, first attacked the problem of +_knowledge_. Before asking _What is the truth?_ it put the preliminary +question, _What are the means at man's disposal for reaching the +truth?_ It prefaced all philosophical enquiry by an examination into the +nature and scope of human thought. Such was the preparatory +investigation which was to place metaphysics upon a secure and +scientific foundation. For the new philosophy, the gateway to all sound +knowledge is the reflection of the human mind upon itself. "Know +thyself," is its advice to the inquiring spirit of man. Here, if +anywhere, is to be found the philosopher's stone. + +IMMANUEL KANT.--The celebrated Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg in +1724, and died in his native town in 1804. Between those dates he lived +the industrious and uneventful life of a university professor. The Seven +Years' War and the French Revolution left him undisturbed, though not +unmoved. He was a man of quiet, regular habits, and his fellow-townsmen +would set their clocks by his daily promenade.[23] But the adventurous +originality of his thought serves as a contrast to this peaceful +picture. + +Kant, indeed, laid the foundations of philosophy afresh. With +characteristic insight, he went to the very root problem of all, and +challenged human thought itself. Before we can know anything, we must +first of all demand the credentials of the instrument by which knowledge +is gained. Before asking, _What_ do I know? the preliminary question +should be, _How_ do I know? Otherwise we cannot say whether we are in a +position to give any answer to those ultimate problems, the answers to +which constitute philosophy. + +It is far from easy to present Kant's criticism of knowledge at once +simply and accurately. This philosopher has a not undeserved reputation +for obscurity, and had he written in any other language than German, he +would perhaps have found no readers. + +THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.--It had already been realised by the +predecessors of Kant that what is called "sense-experience" is a less +simple process than it seems, and that our senses cannot be said to +reveal to us any object as it actually _is_. John Locke himself was not +the first to point out that the so-called "secondary qualities" of any +material object (i.e. colour, taste, etc.) are produced just as much by +the person who perceives, as by the object which is perceived. Galileo, +Descartes, and Hobbes, besides others, had been aware of this fact, +which indeed becomes evident to the most superficial analysis of +sense-experience. + +The "primary qualities," i.e. density, extension, etc., continued to be +regarded as subsisting _in_ the objects themselves, and independently of +any perceiving consciousness. But even this view did not prove +permanent, and it was the episcopal philosopher, George Berkeley +(1685-1753) who demonstrated in his _New Theory of Vision_ that not even +_these_ qualities could rightly be regarded as subsisting independently. + +Thus it had already been realised, long before Kant wrote his _Critique +of Pure Reason_ (published, 1781), that our senses are far from +revealing to us things as they _are_; it is only the _appearances_ of +things and not the _things themselves_ that the senses present to us. +Indeed, as is well known, the Scotch philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), +who was a master in the art of raising problems, extended this line of +criticism until it reached to pure scepticism. He put the question, If +all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience, and _if_ +sense-experience only supplies us with appearance and not reality, what +degree of trustworthiness can there be in human knowledge? And he was +not afraid to give the logical answer--None. Hume may thus be said to +have brought things to an impasse. As a matter of fact, what he had done +was to refute Locke's theory of knowledge (i.e. that it is derived +entirely from sense-experience) by means of a _reductio ad absurdum_. + +THE KANTIAN CRITICISM.--Kant says that it was Hume who "awoke him from +his dogmatic slumbers." By this he meant that Hume made him realise that +it was no use indulging in philosophic speculation generally, or +listening to the speculations of others, until "the Problem of +Knowledge" was satisfactorily solved. To this problem Kant applied +himself. And recognising Locke to be the _fons et origo malorum_, he +subjected his theory of human knowledge to a close analysis, and exposed +it as being fallacious. + +Far from sense-experience being responsible for all our knowledge, Kant +proved that important elements of knowledge are quite independent of +sense-experience; especially was this so in the case of certain +mathematical propositions. (Hence the question, How is pure mathematics +possible? was put by Kant at the beginning of his philosophy.) + +But it is neither necessary nor desirable to enter into the arguments by +means of which Kant proved his thesis, which was that the human mind +contains in itself certain principles of knowledge (e.g. the idea of +cause and effect, the ideas of mathematics, and so on) which it does not +owe to sense-experience. + +KANT'S COPERNICAN HYPOTHESIS.--Kant called these principles of +knowledge, _forms of thought_ or _categories_. The name, perhaps, is +irrelevant to our purpose; all that we need to understand is that Kant +turned the tables upon Locke. Locke said that the mind was a _tabula +rasa_ which passively received impressions from outside. Kant said that +the mind is nothing of the kind; it is not passive, but active; it does +not "receive" whatever is offered, it "selects" what it wants; and _it +imposes its own "forms of thought" upon the outside world_. + +Photography had not been invented at the time of this controversy, but +Kant might have said: The mind is not a photographic plate receiving +impressions from without, it rather resembles the lens which impressions +must pass through, and be transformed by, before they can create a +picture. + +Kant had, in fact, by this theory, instituted a revolution. His new +dogma was: _The mind is the mould into which all our knowledge must be +cast; and the constitution of our mind predetermines the shape that our +knowledge takes._ + +Thus Kant had discovered that not only sensuous perception, but rational +understanding also, has its forms and presuppositions. Just as we become +aware of objects only by means of senses which perhaps hide or distort +as much as they reveal; so also our rational knowledge is conditioned by +the nature of our understanding, which dictates to reality the "forms" +under which it can be understood and known. + +MECHANISM UNDERMINED.--How did this affect the mechanical theory? The +connection is obvious. Mechanism is nothing but one of the forms of +thought that the mind imposes on phenomena. Just as Copernicus had +discovered that it is due to our position on the earth that the heavenly +bodies _appear_ to move round us, so Kant had discovered that it is due +to the nature of our senses and understanding that we perceive things in +space and time, and understand them as being mechanically determined. +The space and time, and the mechanical determinism are not in the +things, _but in our minds_. The fact is that we can only grasp things +under these forms. Space, time, mechanical causation are forms and laws, +_not_ of nature, _but of the human intellect_, which is so constituted +as to see things in this way. + +Thus those axioms of science and of mathematics which lie at the base of +all exact knowledge, and which had hitherto been regarded as +_objective_, i.e. as inherent in the nature of things, were shewn by +Kant to be, as a matter of fact, _subjective_, that is (in Kant's own +phrase) "they express the conditions under which alone we are able to +apprehend or understand the object." Thus all knowledge is conditioned +by our nature, by the framework, so to speak, not only of our senses but +of our minds. + +In this way the mechanical view was outflanked; that view certainly +seems to us inevitable and certain, but this is due to the constitution +of our minds; the world seems to us to be determined, just as it seems +blue to a person wearing blue spectacles. But there is no sufficient +reason for supposing that it _is_ either determined or blue. The law of +mechanical causation is an axiom, but it is a subjective axiom. + +APPEARANCE AND REALITY.--This may not seem much of an advance on Hume's +position. Human knowledge still seems precarious, if we assume the mind +to be a kind of dictator which imposes its own laws upon nature. And +Kant indeed frankly admitted that neither our senses nor our reason were +able to reveal to us things as they _are_, but only things as they +_seem_; we grasp _appearance_, not _reality_, and (to use Kant's +phraseology) _phenomena_ not _noumena_. Thus Kant cut away the ground +from under all rationalistic _dogmatism_; he shewed its presumptuous +futility. + +THE PATHWAY TO REALITY.--Kant, however, did not remain satisfied with +the negative results of his critical philosophy, valuable as these were. +Reality, it is true, lies out of range of the human reason, but it is +not entirely inaccessible to us, and scepticism about the ultimate +nature of things is not the necessary corollary of Kant's, as it was of +Hume's, philosophy. + +Kant drew a distinction between the "Theoretical Reason," which his +_Critique of Pure Reason_ had dealt with, and the "Practical Reason," +which he discusses in his _Critique of Practical Reason_ (1788). + +THE "PRACTICAL REASON."--By the "practical reason" Kant meant the moral +consciousness, and the law of the "practical reason" is the moral law, +the fulfilment of which constitutes duty. This law springs neither from +outside authority nor from experience; it is autonomous. And it is upon +the existence of this autonomous moral consciousness that Kant plants +his foothold in his endeavour to find a refuge from the philosophic +agnosticism to which his analysis of the "theoretical reason" had led; +and upon this rock he founded his belief in "God, Freedom, and +Immortality." + +By means of his "practical reason," man gets into touch with that real +world, which his "theoretical reason" is unable to reach. In fact, the +"practical reason" itself (or moral consciousness) is an element in +man's nature which belongs to the _real_, as opposed to the _phenomenal_ +world. For man himself is a citizen of both worlds, and has (so to +speak) a dual nature, a foot on either shore. He is an inhabitant both +of the world of mechanical phenomena, and of the "timeless world of +freedom," which lies altogether outside of all mechanical conceptions. + +KANT AND RELIGION.--"Religion we must seek in ourselves, not outside +ourselves," is a saying of Kant's that gives the clue to his general +attitude. + +It is only in that world which cannot be interpreted mechanically (i.e. +the inner world of freedom of which we never cease to be conscious) that +we may seek, or can hope to find the source of religion. It is not the +spectacle of the mechanically determined world of nature, but the +demands of the moral consciousness that create religion. + +For instance, it is the gulf that yawns between the ideal commands of +the moral law, and the actual possibilities (so poor and meagre) of +fulfilling and satisfying them, that creates, in the view of Kant, the +need of God and immortality. These alone can guarantee the realisation +of the ideal claims of the moral consciousness. + +RELIGIOUS FAITH.--Thus the "practical reason" leads on to convictions +concerning what lies beyond the limits defined by the "theoretical +reason." The nature of the demands of the moral consciousness give us an +insight into the nature of the super-phenomenal (transcendental, +noumenal) world. That world must be of such a kind as to sanction and +guarantee our moral ideals; it must be friendly and not hostile or +indifferent to those ideals which man cherishes, but which his +"phenomenal" experience seems to contradict. Thus we see the truth of +the saying that "The universe as a moral system is the last word of the +Kantian philosophy."[24] + +KANT'S INFLUENCE.--Kant was one of those thinkers who are responsible +for turning the stream of thought into fresh channels. Through his +researches into the nature of human knowledge, he discovered the +conditions upon which it rests, and defined the limits beyond which it +cannot pass. Thus, once for all, he put an end to dogmatism. + +And to Kant also belongs the credit of having established the reality +and validity of _inner_ experience. The rock upon which his philosophy +is built is no external fact or event--nothing in time or space--but the +moral consciousness itself. And thus he restores, as the central +interest of philosophy, the human individual, with all his experiences +of need, of hope, and of insight. Personality is the principle of his +philosophy. In this he is the true successor of the Reformation. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT + + +KANT AND AFTER.--With Kant the hey-day of rationalism terminated. He had +put an end to the superficial psychology upon which it rested. For the +rationalists, the life of the mind had consisted in _intellectual +ideas_; but a more careful analysis indicated the presence of +deeper-lying elements, which had hitherto been disregarded; there +existed other important constituents besides the intellectual. + +Kant's criticism of "pure reason" did much to discredit the old view; +and by founding his philosophy upon the non-intellectual "moral +consciousness," he heightened the prestige of feeling as against reason +(in the narrow and limited sense of that word). + +Thus Kant is not undeservedly called the father of a philosophy which +succeeded him, and which was based upon the idea of the supremacy of +feeling. But, at the same time, that title is more accurate as an +estimate of another philosopher of rather different characteristics. + +ROUSSEAU.--Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a man of unique genius +whose figure occupies a prominent position not only in the annals of +philosophy, but in social, political, and literary history. Even more +than Voltaire was he responsible for sowing seeds of thought which bore +fruit in the events of the Revolution. And indeed, it is as the author +of the notorious _Contrat Social_ that he is most widely known. + +ROUSSEAU'S "SENSIBILITY."--Rousseau was one of those philosophers whose +character is the formative element which gives shape to their doctrines. +His was a profoundly emotional temperament. He left behind him an +invaluable document which lays bare all the psychological sources of his +philosophy. The _Confessions_ reveal to us a man highly sensitive and +morbidly introspective, the slave of unreasoning impulses and passions. +In the eyes of some short-sighted persons, these first-hand revelations +will obscure or cast doubt upon the capacity and genius of the man, for +they do little to prejudice opinion in his favour. + +HE DEFIES THE ZEITGEIST.--Rousseau's profound originality lies in his +having dared to dispute a dogma to which the prestige of an axiom then +attached. He endeavoured to undermine the popular faith in scientific +and philosophic culture. He went right back to Pascal, who, a century +before, had raised the question as to the value of scientific knowledge +for personal life, by proclaiming "The whole of philosophy is not worth +an hour's study." + +Rousseau's first philosophical work was occasioned by the offer of a +prize on the part of a provincial academy for a thesis on the problem +"Whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to +purify manners?" "The question pierced Rousseau's soul like a flash of +lightning." He felt (he tells us) that he saw a new world, and felt a +new man; he saw no longer the world of culture, of science, of +philosophy (which he felt to be as artificial as it was ineffective and +vain), but the _real_ world of personality, of living feeling, of the +inner life. It flashed upon him that it was the primitive and elementary +feelings, the great and simple relations of life, which gave to +existence its value. The rest was superficial and irrelevant. + +ROUSSEAU AND RELIGION.--The intellectualist is ever the aristocrat.[25] +Voltaire and the philosophers of the "enlightenment" spoke of the +unenlightened multitude as _la canaille_. Its beliefs were +superstitions. Rousseau knew that the things which men have in common +are more vital than those in which they differ, and the primitive +instincts of the race which we all share, are the most important part of +our nature. + +Among these primitive instincts, indomitable and irrepressible, is the +instinct of religion. Thus Rousseau transferred the religious problem +from the sphere of external observation and explanation of the world (to +which the rationalists had promoted or degraded it), back to inner +personal feeling. This marked an epoch in the philosophy of religion. + +Moreover, Rousseau was able to write in a convincing fashion of +religion, because (and here he differed from the intellectuals of his +day) he had personal experience of what it meant. Hence wherever he +alludes to religion his language has the ring of sincerity; it is always +spontaneous, and sometimes it is passionate and poetic. His religious +experience took the form of nature-mysticism, undogmatic (because +non-intellectualist), but rich and deep: + +"I can find no more worthy adoration of God than the silent admiration +which the contemplation of His works begets in us, and which cannot be +expressed by any prescribed acts.... In my room I pray seldomer and +more coldly; but the sight of a beautiful landscape moves me, I cannot +tell why. I once read of a certain bishop, who, when visiting in his +diocese, encountered an old woman whose only prayers consisted in a sigh +'Oh!' The bishop said to her, 'Good mother, always pray like that; your +prayer is worth more than ours.' My prayer is of that kind."[26] + +Here we have one form of the religious spirit; for the mystic it is +always true that "there is neither speech nor language." The mystic and +the dogmatist stand at opposite poles, for dogmatism is always an +attempt at definition even when that which is to be defined is +indefinable; and here is to be found the common denominator between Kant +and Rousseau. The former, by his analysis of reason, discredited +dogmatism: the latter, by his apotheosis of feeling, contributed towards +the same result. + +ROMANTICISM IN GERMANY.--This strong movement of feeling, created on the +one hand by Kant's _Critique_, and by the mysticism of Rousseau, took +different forms in the two countries to which these two philosophers +belonged. In France the new philosophy became the hot-bed of +revolutionary ideas; whereas in Germany it found vent in a ferment of +speculative systems, and in an outcrop of artistic production. It +produced the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the prose +and poetry of Goethe and Schiller. + +"It was the age of 'beautiful souls' and of 'noble hearts'; men believed +themselves capable of the highest things; the immediate needs of the +heart were set over against reason ... under many successive forms +Romanticism prevailed in literature, effecting the re-birth of human +fancy after the long labour of intellect."[27] + +THE GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY.--Philosophic young Germany had set itself an +ambitious programme. Kant, indeed, had cleared the ground for them, but +his warnings that an eagle cannot soar beyond the atmosphere which +supports it, were disregarded. + +The philosophy of Kant himself was felt by the successors to be lacking +in the _idea of totality_--in the conception of a whole. His division of +existence into Appearance and Reality seemed to indicate a certain lack +of finish in his philosophy; and they set themselves to explore the root +of reality which to Kant seemed undiscoverable, but in which the +sensuous and super-sensuous worlds are united, and from which they have +emerged. This task became and remained the grand problem of philosophy +for a whole generation of thinkers. All externality, isolation, and +division were to disappear, all existence must be shown to be but +degrees and phases of the one infinite reality. Spinoza's work had to be +done again in the light of increased psychological knowledge. + +FICHTE.--Of the thinkers who addressed themselves to this ambitious +task, only two need be considered here; and these are chosen because +they attacked the problem from different directions. + +In the first place, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), who had been the +first to lay down the programme of thought with explicitness, realised +and admitted that the task which philosophy had set itself was beyond +the powers of any logical train of thought. The "higher unity" of +existence, the demonstration of which was the goal of philosophy, +could be reached only by a process of intellectual intuition,[28] +it must be guessed or divined; for it presents itself (and this is +a characteristically "Romanticist" idea) to the human mind in the +immediacy of feeling, and not by discursive thought. + +It was of the essence of Fichte's philosophy, as it had been of +Spinoza's, that a point may be attained where the mind feels itself to +be at one with the truly real, and only when this point is reached--i.e. +_sub specie aeternitatis_, will it arrive at and retain the conviction +of the universal order and unity of existence. From this standpoint, and +from this alone, does it become possible to grasp "the meaning of those +dualities and contrasts which we find around and in us, the differences +of self and not-self, of mind and matter, of subject and object, of +appearance and reality, of truth and semblance." + +HEGEL.--It has been said, perhaps with justice, that "philosophy is the +finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." The remark +might seem, at least in the eyes of some, to be particularly applicable +to the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Not because +his arguments are bad, but because he attempted to establish by strict +logic the conclusions which Fichte sought to reach by means of +intuition, and which perhaps are only attainable by that method. Hegel +attempted to climb, by a strict process of reasoning, to the position +from which the Fichtean landscape might spread itself below as a +logical whole: he claimed to be a reasoner as well as a seer. And +thereby he may be said to have furnished "the programme of thought for a +certain class of intellects which will never die out." + +Thus Hegel was something of a hybrid, and may be described as a +rationalistic-romanticist. Nor are his arguments the easiest to +understand. "The only thing that is certain," writes a commentator +who stands at an opposite philosophical pole, "is that whatever you +may say of his procedure, some one will accuse you of misunderstanding +it. I make no claim to understanding it; I treat it merely +impressionistically."[29] And this is all we can do here. + +HEGEL'S METHOD.--Hegel proceeds by means of what he calls the +_Dialectical Method_. He understands by "dialectic" (1) a property of +all our _thoughts_ in virtue of which, each particular thought +necessarily passes over into another; and also (2) a property of +_things_, in virtue of which every particular thing necessarily belongs +to, or is related to, all other things. A thing "by itself" is nothing. + +Hence a similarity or parallelism between the _method of thought_ and +the _nature of things_. Logic is of the nature of things. The way in +which thought reaches truth is also the way in which things exist. Hegel +expressed this in his well-known saying "the real is the rational, and +the rational is the real." Perhaps more poetically or obscurely the same +proposition is expressed by declaring: "When we think existence, +existence thinks in us," and "The pulse of existence itself beats in our +thinking." + +Hegel's logic may, in fact, be described as an attempt to conceive the +movement of thought as being at the same time the law of the universe. +Logic (to repeat what we said before) is of the nature of things: +reality is rational, and what is rational is real. + +Thus logic for Hegel did not mean (as it meant for Kant) the forms or +laws of thought: it signified the very core of reality. For all that +Kant knew, reality might or might not be rational: all he asserted was +that the human mind rationalised reality (or parts of it). For Hegel, +logic or reason was the living and moving spirit of the world. The +essence of reality and the essence of thought were one. The absolute +reality was spirit.[30] + +HEGELIANISM.--Hegel's philosophy may be described as an attempt to reach +the standpoint of religious mysticism by means of purely rational +processes. It is the finding of rational grounds for supra-rational +intuitions. The attempt is laudable, and, in the eyes of many, it was +successful. And, as we shall see, Hegelianism had an important future, +especially in England; nor, as a system of thought, is it yet extinct. +Its central conception is that which, in one shape or another, will +never cease to appeal to mankind--that existence is, at bottom, +spiritual in character--that spirit is the only ultimate reality. + +That Hegelianism provides a rational basis for a spiritual religion is +obvious enough; nor is it necessary to indicate the possibilities of +linking up the Christian doctrine of the Logos with a philosophy for +which Reason was the very core and ground of existence. Hegel may indeed +be said to have laid the foundation of Christian theology afresh; or +rather to have restored what was best in the old theology, and given it +the prestige of modernity. + +RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.--In fact, for Hegel as for all rationalists +whose attitude is also religious, religion and philosophy were two forms +of the same thing. Religion contains philosophic truths under the form +of imagination: philosophy contains religious truth under the form of +reason. The difference is one of form only, not of content. This had not +been the view of Rousseau, nor is it the deepest view; and it was not +the view of a thinker of the Romantic school who did more than any +individual among his predecessors to bring the religious problem to the +point where it now stands. + +SCHLEIERMACHER.--While the sun of Romanticism was at its zenith, the +spirit of Kant's critical philosophy was kept alive by a thinker of as +deep spiritual and intellectual insight as Hegel himself. + +Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) brought the religious +problem down from those altitudes to which Romanticist metaphysics had +raised it, to what Kant had called "the fertile bathos of experience." +He approached religion from the side of inner experience, the point of +view of psychology. The profound insight of Kant had already shown that +this was the direction on which future thought would travel, by tracing +back the religious problem to a _personal need_ more clearly and +penetratingly than ever before--a need set up by the incongruity of the +real and the ideal. + +HIS VIEW OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS.--Just as Rousseau, owing to his own +religious experience, was in a better position to attack the religious +problem than the philosophers of the "enlightenment," so Schleiermacher +had the advantage of some Romanticists. As a boy, he had been put to +school with the Moravians, and throughout his own life he never ceased +to declare that the years spent among them had been of vital importance +to the development of his views. In 1801 he writes: + +"My way of thinking has indeed no other foundation than my own peculiar +character, my inborn mysticism, my education as it has been determined +from within." + +And his own experience of religion established in him the conviction +that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this +alone can bring man into immediate relation to the highest. His +acceptance of Kant's criticism of reason led him to understand that +intellectual concepts, in the religious sphere, (i.e. dogmas) must +always be of secondary importance: _experience_ comes first. And his +profound originality lies just here, and it is just here that +Schleiermacher stands out as the forerunner of the modern view. He it +was who first made it evident that religious ideas derive their validity +from that inner experience which they are an attempt to describe. If a +dogma is an expression of an experience felt by man in his innermost +life, it is a _valid_ dogma, even if philosophic criticism hesitates to +sanction it.[31] + +WHAT IS RELIGION?--The distance of this position from that of the +eighteenth century intellectualism which regarded religion either as a +form of philosophy or of superstition, is obvious. Schleiermacher +attacks two intellectualist prejudices in particular: (1) That according +to which religion is conceived of primarily as a doctrine (either +revealed, or grounded on reason), and (2) That which regards religion as +merely a means towards morality. + +Religion, according to Schleiermacher, has an existence independent of +(though, no doubt, associated with) philosophy, superstition, or +morality. Its essence consists neither in speculation nor in action, but +in a certain type of feeling, of inner experience. Schleiermacher +characterised this particular type of feeling as _a feeling of +dependence_: the immediate consciousness that everything finite exists +in and through the infinite, everything temporal in and through the +eternal. + +That Schleiermacher should have described the specifically religious +feeling in this particular way is comparatively irrelevant so far as our +present purpose is concerned. The point of importance is that he was the +first to recognise the _independence_ of religion, to see in it a +legitimate and natural form of human activity, which exists, not for the +sake of knowledge or of morality, but for its own sake, and on its own +account. + +Here, though Hegel took a different view, Schleiermacher is one in +spirit with the Romantic school; indeed, he may be said to have drawn +the logical conclusions of Romanticism. The independence and originality +of religion is the necessary consequence of a philosophy which set +itself against the unbalanced intellectualism of the "enlightenment." + +The permanent significance of Romanticism lies here: That it discredited +once for all the notion that there is only one road to reality--that of +logic. It is not only philosophy, but religion and art that remove the +veil which hides the supra-sensible world from us. And to close our eyes +to the facts of religious experience, or to attempt to discredit them by +the application of irrelevant terms such as "superstition," is not only +to display ourselves as philistines, but also to forsake the highest +traditions of science--veneration for experience, and the realms of +fact. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +MECHANISM AND LIFE + + +RECAPITULATORY.--We have already observed the mechanical theory, in the +hands of Descartes, expanding itself to cover organisms and the +phenomena of life, and in La Mettrie's _L'Homme Machine_, reducing even +human beings to the status of automata. These theories were, however, +known to be insecurely based upon somewhat hasty generalisations, for, +in point of fact, the science of biology was as yet in its infancy; the +_data_ for a complete vindication of the mechanical position were as yet +wanting. + +ADVANCE OF BIOLOGY.--Biological science, however, during the first half +of the nineteenth century made considerable advances, and research +continually kept bringing to light facts which seemed to substantiate +the brilliant, if premature, hypothesis of Descartes. It will not be +necessary for us to do more than take hasty note of certain important +developments. + +It was in 1828 that the German chemist Whöler (1800-1882) for the first +time in biological history prepared an organic compound (urea) from +inorganic materials--an achievement universally recognised to be of the +utmost significance. As a distinguished historian of the science of +chemistry puts it: + +"This discovery destroyed the difference which was then considered to +exist between organic and inorganic bodies, viz. that the former could +only be formed under the influence of vegetable or animal vital forces, +whereas the latter could be artificially produced."[32] + +Ten years later another German, Schleider (1804-1881) propounded the +cellular theory of the structure and growth of plants, a theory which +was soon extended to animal organisms by Schwann (1810-1882). The +publication of this famous theory was described by a contemporary as "a +burst of daylight"; it indeed illuminated what had hitherto been buried +in mystery and mythology--the structure and method of growth of plants +and animals. It seemed to render superfluous any form of the old +conception of a "vital force" to explain the phenomena of growth, if it +could now be assumed that the cells automatically absorbed outside +material, increased in number by the division of individuals, and built +up the organism by continual repetition of this process. + +Schwann was also responsible for initiating a number of minute +physiological investigations which led to a far more intimate knowledge +of the action of nerves and muscles, and interpreted these in mechanical +terms. "Investigations which were carried on with all the resources of +modern physics regarding the phenomena of animal movements, gradually +substituted for the miracles of the 'vital forces' a molecular +mechanism, complicated, indeed, and likely to baffle our efforts for a +long time to come, but intelligible, nevertheless, as a mechanism."[33] + +Subsequent researches, notably of Helmholtz (1821-1895) and Meyer, lent +strong support to this interpretation. The conception of the +conservation of energy (an important axiom of the mechanical theory) was +successfully applied by them to the economy of organisms. The organism +was found not to _create_ energy, but only to contain remarkably +efficient means of deriving it from materials absorbed as food. Thus +animal warmth and the power of motion are originally "sunlight +transformed in the organism of the plant," and afterwards appropriated +by the animal. The power with which we move our limbs is as much the +product of combustion as is the power of a steam engine, the only +difference being that the organism is, of the two, the more efficient +converter of energy. + +THE MECHANICAL THEORY SUBSTANTIATED.--Thus, whether biologists were +considering the _structure_ or the _behaviour_ of organisms, they were +arriving at the same conclusions. The structure was revealed as physical +and chemical structure, and the behaviour as the resultant of familiar +physical and chemical processes. Hence biology came to be regarded as a +compartment of physics and chemistry, for life itself was nothing but a +complex physical or chemical phenomenon. Life could thus be +satisfactorily expressed in terms of matter and energy. The speculations +of Descartes seemed to be established by experimental science. + +THE FINAL OBSTACLE.--The situation, already satisfactory to those whose +hope it was to see the mechanical theory impregnably established, was +marred, however, by one untoward circumstance. The phenomena of organic +structure, growth, and behaviour having been reduced to order, and +expressed in terms of physics and chemistry, certain important facts +still resisted explanation, and stood out as a last stronghold of the +older view. + +THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.--The existence of definite forms of animal and +vegetable life, whose infinite variety and complexity was continually +being increased by research[34]--still remained a mystery. How did these +innumerable species naturally and automatically come into being? was the +question that must be satisfactorily answered before the mechanical view +could be held to cover all the facts. + +The direction in which to look for a reply had been indicated by a +number of thinkers. The French naturalist Buffon, the philosopher Kant, +and the poet Goethe--besides other thinkers--had already in the +eighteenth century familiarised the idea that species are not immutable, +but that, by some means or other, new forms of life are derived from +pre-existing ones. The conception had gained a firm foothold in England, +where it was hospitably entertained by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and where it +formed the staple of a book which caused a good deal of controversy in +its day, and which is not yet forgotten.[35] + +LAMARCK.--The evolutionary idea, however, though attractive to +philosophers, and even to men of science, was insufficient as an +explanation of the origin of species so long as the processes of +transformation remained obscure. Naturalists could not accept an +hypothesis for which there seemed to be such imperfect evidence. An +ingenious French scientist, J. Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) had +indeed, in 1809, propounded the theory--ever since known by his +name--that the use or disuse of particular organs might, after a long +series of generations, result in the formation of new species. (The +ideas denoted by the words "environment," "adaptation," "acquired +habits"--now so familiar--may be said to have been introduced by him). +But the scientific prejudices of the time were against Lamarck's +theories, and he had to lament their inhospitable reception. Indeed +Lamarck's critics did not hesitate to exercise their powers of ridicule, +or to make fun of the giraffe who derived his long neck from the +attempts of his ancestors to browse on high trees. Darwin himself talks +of "Lamarck's nonsense," and of his "veritable rubbish"--language, +however, which he was subsequently able to retract. + +THE NEW GEOLOGY.--Perhaps the most stubborn obstacle which Lamarckian +theories had to meet was the current prejudice as to the age (or youth) +of the earth. Contemporary geologists were by no means prepared to grant +Lamarck the illimitable periods of time which his transformation +processes seemed to require. Consequently it is not surprising that the +new theories, perhaps for the first time, received a measure of justice +at the hands of one who himself became responsible for a revolution in +the science of geology. + +"I devoured Lamarck _en voyage_," writes Charles Lyell, describing a +journey from Oxford in 1827. "His theories delighted me more than any +novel I ever read, and much in the same way, for they address themselves +to the imagination.... That the earth is quite as old as he supposes, +has long been my creed."[36] + +In spite of the fascination of these theories, however, Lyell was not +carried away by them, and it was not for some years that he estimated +them at their true value. Meanwhile the new geology made its appearance +with the publication of the three volumes of his own _Principles of +Geology_, between 1829 and 1833. The significance of the book for +biological speculation--for theories of the origin of species--lay in +its thesis that the present condition of the earth is the product of +geological processes incalculably long. Hitherto the "catastrophic +theory" had been dominant--the notion that a series of immense +catastrophic events (like the Deluge) had been responsible for the +present condition of the earth's surface. For this Lyell substituted his +"Evolutionary Theory," according to which the almost invisibly slow +geological processes which we may now see operating around us, are +typical of the behaviour of the crust of this planet for incalculable +periods of time; for even the slowest changes, if sufficient time is +allowed them, are capable of producing the most stupendous results. +Lyell may be said to have extended the age of the earth _ad infinitum_. +Just as Galileo removed all barriers of space, Lyell removed those of +time. Their joint achievement was to present to humanity a universe +infinite both in space and time--a staggering conception. + +RESULTS OF LYELL'S THEORY.--Though Lyell's boldness disturbed a good +many of his contemporaries, those biologists who were engaged upon +seeking the origin of species were thankful to one who had removed the +chief obstacle to the solution of their difficulties. They were now +relieved of one embarrassment: Lyell gave them the power to draw on the +Bank of Time to any extent; bankruptcy was no longer possible.[37] + +Indeed, Lyell seems himself to have been convinced of the evolutionary +origin of species (though the mode of its operation still remained a +mystery for him no less than for the biologists themselves). In fact, it +became quite evident that the idea of "continuity" which the _Principles +of Geology_ had established in the inorganic world, must be equally +applicable to the organic world. + +DARWIN.--The theory of a common descent of species had occurred, as +early as 1837, to an enthusiastic student of Lyell's writings, who was +also a personal friend. Charles Darwin had collected much geological, +botanical, and zoological matter on his voyage with the _Beagle_ round +the world, and continued for twenty years to accumulate an immense +volume of _data_ to substantiate a theory which had first suddenly +suggested itself to him in 1838 as the result of reading for amusement +Malthus' _Essay on the Principle of Population_. + +This celebrated book, first published in 1798, had attempted to describe +the forces which ensure the multiplication, or check the increase of +population. The proposition laid down by Malthus was that population +tends to vary with the means of subsistence. He had studied his problem +from a social or political point of view, but the same principle was +seen by Darwin to apply to all living creatures. Two forces are seen +everywhere in conflict: (a) the luxuriant powers of reproduction +possessed by and exercised by each species; (b) the difficulties and +obstacles by which the species tend to be eliminated. The contest +between the powers of reproduction and those of elimination--this +"over-production" and "crowding-out"--is what was afterwards termed the +"struggle for existence." + +"NATURAL SELECTION."--Darwin's momentous theory was that this struggle, +proceeding for untold ages, had resulted in the continual formation of +new species. Granted that the numerous offspring of any individual +member of a species tend to vary, those variations survive which happen +to be best fitted to cope with the environment. These in their turn +leave offspring, the variations and the selections are repeated, and so +on _ad infinitum_; and the result is that entirely new species are +formed by a long process of insignificant changes. This, briefly put, is +the celebrated theory of "Natural Selection." + +The habit of scientific caution was characteristic of Darwin, who at +first would not write down "even the briefest sketch" of his hypothesis, +but devoted nearly twenty years to the accumulation of evidential +_data_. His friends continually warned him that he would be forestalled, +and this actually occurred, as is well known, in 1858, when the book +which was to give the new theory to the world was already half written. +The naturalist, Alfred Russell Wallace, on a collecting expedition in +the East Indies, "in a flash of insight" while sick with fever, found +the same solution of the mystery that had puzzled biologists so long. +Wallace's letter to Darwin, containing the abstract of his theory, came +"like a bolt from the blue." + +The behaviour of the two men was worthy of the highest traditions of +scientific research. The matter was put into the hands of Lyell, and +Wallace's paper, together with certain extracts from Darwin's +unpublished notes, were read before the Linnean Society, and the +preparation of Darwin's book was hurried on. In November, 1859, _The +Origin of Species_ was published. + +RESULTS OF DARWIN'S THEORY.--The importance (for the general trend of +thought) of this joint achievement of Darwin and Wallace was +considerable, and could not but be regarded as an extension of the +mechanical theory. The origin of species might still to some extent +remain mysterious (for "natural selection" was soon realised to be only +one of many factors at work in evolution), yet the area of mystery was +patently reduced, and the "inexplicable" driven further back. A formula +had been provided, which seemed to be as valid, and likely to prove as +permanent and fruitful in biological research as Newton's law of gravity +had been in the realm of physics. + +In point of fact, Darwin had only substituted new problems of +"variation" and "heredity" for the old one of the diversity of species; +but an impression was created by the new discoveries that a purely +mechanical explanation of the origin of life and even of mind was within +reach. + +THE DESCENT OF MAN.--With regard to "mind," the impression was +re-inforced by Darwin's next book--the _Descent of Man_, where the gap +between man and the animals was finally bridged. The work was merely an +extension of the principles previously applied by him, and as a theory +it had been present to Darwin's mind as far back as 1837. As soon as he +had become "convinced that species were mutable productions," he could +not "avoid the belief that man must come under the same law."[38] +Indeed the Descent was nothing more than a corollary to the _Origin +of Species_. The earlier work contains the whole of Darwinism. + +THE POSITION REACHED.--And with the full publication of Darwin's +theories a point was reached when a more or less consistently +materialistic position seemed possible. The foundations of such a +position had been strengthened by the scientific atomism of Dalton, and +the results of German research in the field of _organic_ chemistry +seemed to open up possibilities of expressing even life in terms of +matter. And, finally, the evolutionary hypothesis had reduced some of +the most obscure biological problems to manageable proportions. The +prospects for a purely naturalistic philosophy were phenomenally +bright. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM + + +FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY.--The record of certain important scientific +discoveries has occupied us in two recent chapters, and it is now time +to examine the philosophic results that were drawn from them. It is true +that the generalisations drawn from the results of scientific research +were sometimes hasty, and not always sanctioned by the gifted minds to +whom these results were due; yet they were assured a popular reception, +and exercised an immense influence. It is not always the most accurate +thinkers whose ideas gain the widest currency. + +DISCREDIT OF ROMANTICISM.--The Idealistic movement in philosophy which +we have seen flourishing in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth +century, had begun, after the lapse of a generation, to decline.[39] The +causes of decline, as often happens, were in part, at least, other than +intellectual. Hegelianism had become associated with political reaction, +and "a philosophy has lost its charm when it enters the service of +absolutism." And a rising spirit of enterprise in commerce and industry +also contributed to a change of attitude, for as material interests +develop, men have less leisure for speculation, and often lose their +taste for ideals. Probably there should also be taken into account the +sentimentality that had attached itself to Romanticism and with which +men were sated. This revolt has its most pointed expression in the prose +writings of the poet Heine, who attacks with satiric bitterness "the new +troubadours, so morbid and somnambulistic, so high-flown and +aristocratic, and altogether so unnatural." + +METAPHYSICS REJECTED.--The reaction against the philosophy of +Romanticism took the form of a complete revolt against speculative +philosophy. But instead of going back to Kant, and taking up a +vigorously critical attitude, it took refuge in the prejudices of +"common sense." The new movement must be associated in the first place +with a French thinker, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who made the attempt +to substitute scientific and _positive_ knowledge for the vague +speculations which had hitherto passed for philosophy. He was, in fact, +the founder of that system of ideas known as Positivism, which (as we +shall see) gained great vogue later, especially in England. Comte's +doctrine was that, all spheres of Nature now being brought under the +sway of positive science, the time had arrived for men, when +constructing their conceptions of life and the world, to reject all but +such ideas as positive science can accept. The age of theology and +speculation was past; the new age of positive science, where both +imagination and argumentation should be subordinate to observation, was +at hand. Comte, as is well known, became the founder of what he hoped +might develop into a new Catholicism--the "Religion of Humanity," and an +atmosphere of moral idealism permeates his thought. + +GERMAN EXTREMISTS.--In Germany, the home of Romanticism, the revolt took +a radical shape in the hands of writers like Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) +and Büchner. "I unconditionally repudiate absolute, self-sufficing +speculation--speculation which draws its material from within," says the +former, in the Introduction to his _Essence of Christianity_[40] (1841) +and asserts that he "places philosophy in the negation of philosophy." +Büchner, a far less acute thinker than Feuerbach, adopts a similar +attitude, protests against pedantry, and appeals (the appeal is always +dangerous) to common sense: + +"Expositions which are not intelligible to an educated man are scarcely +worth the ink they are printed with. Whatever is clearly conceived can +be clearly expressed." + +It is not surprising that the book _Force and Matter_ (1855)--in the +preface to which these sentiments are expressed--went through sixteen +editions in thirty years and was translated into most European +languages. It is an extreme expression of the most thorough-going +materialism, and the circumstance that its conclusions were acceptable +neither to cautious scientists nor to critical philosophers, did not +compromise its authority with the general public. As was only natural, +for materialism is a creed for which the evidence is all on the surface, +and to which the objections, being less obvious, escape notice. And +Büchner's pleas for intelligibility and clearness, though in some sense +justified by the inconceivable pedantry of much German metaphysics, was, +in point of fact, only a form of cant; for "there are difficulties +lying in the subject-matter itself which cannot be banished from the +sphere of philosophy." Appeals to popular prejudices are not a more +legitimate form of philosophic, than of scientific controversy; serious +thinkers do not thus stoop to the expedients of the politician. + +EFFECTS OF DARWIN'S THEORY.--It would be a serious mistake, then, to +imagine that materialistic naturalism had to wait for the publication of +the _Origin of Species_ (1859) before it could become a formidable +theory. And yet the appearance of Darwin's book had important effects, +and among these is to be reckoned a certain weakening of the old +"Argument from Design," according to which the complexity and delicacy +evident everywhere in the world of nature, could not be attributed to +chance, but pointed to the existence and activity of a divine Designer. +Paley, during the eighteenth century, had elaborated the argument with a +wealth of detailed instances of "contrivance": + +"The pivot upon which the head turns, the ligament within the socket of +the hip-joint, the pulley or trochlear muscles of the eye; the +epiglottis, the bandages which tie down the tendons of the wrist and +instep," and so on. + +And it was not so much the doubt cast by it upon the separate creation +of particular species that was the disturbing element in Darwin's +hypothesis (few men now regarded the book of _Genesis_ as a manual of +natural science, or faith in it, as such, as a matter of religious +obligation); it was rather that the new doctrine of "natural selection" +seemed to invalidate the "argument from design." Design or chance had +been the alternatives offered by Paley, and chance only had to be +mentioned to be rejected; but Darwin made it possible to escape from the +dilemma. He showed how, if certain conditions were granted, the whole +process of the manufacture of species would naturally and inevitably +follow. Neither design nor chance was the explanation: there was another +alternative, _the influence of environment_. Thus Paley's instances of +elaborate "contrivance" were explained by Darwin as instances of +adaptation. The environment under which these organs had developed had +made them what they were; they could not, under the given circumstances, +have been different. As a very lucid writer puts it: + +"Before Darwin's great discovery, those who denied the existence of a +Contriver were hard put to it to explain the appearance of contrivance. +Darwin, within certain limits and on certain suppositions, provided an +explanation. He showed how the most complicated and purposeful organs, +if only they were useful to the species, might gradually arise out of +random variations, continuously weeded by an unthinking process of +elimination."[41] + +DARWINISM EXPLOITED.--In fact, it became evident that popular +materialism had been strongly reinforced by the new biology; and though +Darwin himself was cautious in adding philosophic or religious +corollaries to his own propositions, some of his more eager disciples +did not hesitate to fill in his blanks, and to draw conclusions which +the master was too conservative, too blind, or perhaps too scientific to +sanction. + +The distinguished zoologist Haeckel (1834-1919) may be reckoned the most +notable amongst these. He was one of the first German scientists to give +his adherence to Darwin, who seems to have considered him too zealous a +disciple. "Your boldness sometimes makes me tremble," he wrote (November +19, 1868). It is not every scientist who can perceive the limits of an +hypothesis, or who insists so conscientiously as Darwin did, upon the +necessity for its verification. + +HERBERT SPENCER.--Though there were not wanting in England writers to +exploit Darwinian theories in the interests of a narrow secularism, +their work was not of first-rate importance, and need not detain us. A +new evolutionary philosophy was, however, worked out by a conscientious +thinker of a different calibre--Mr. Herbert Spencer. He indeed may be +described as the Aristotle of a new world-view. He attempted to +co-ordinate and unify all human knowledge, and to present the world with +a final philosophy based upon the _data_ supplied by natural science. To +this ambitious task he devoted a lifetime of patient work, broken by +intervals of ill-health. In 1850 the _System of Synthetic Philosophy_ +was projected; its _First Principles_ were published in 1862, but it was +not until 1896 that the gigantic enterprise was complete. + +Spencer was inspired neither by hostility to religion in general, nor to +Christianity in particular. The motive of his work was a more honourable +one. He felt, with many of his contemporaries, that the foundations of +the old religion were no longer secure, and that the old sanctions of +morality were already gravely compromised; and he wished to supply a new +creed and a new discipline in the place of these. His principal objects +were social and ethical. And in this important respect he may be +associated with Comte. Both were sociologists and moralists before they +were philosophers, which accounts for their overlooking and +underestimating various important philosophic difficulties. + +A few remarks about Spencer's system are here not out of place. He +attempted to reduce experience to a unity by seeking evidence for the +existence of a single and universal _law_. This unifying principle he +found in a general law of evolution. He formulated this law in language +which is perhaps less obscure than it seems, and which practically +amounts to this, that there is a perpetual process going on which +reduces disorder to order, undifferentiated sameness to specialised +variety.[42] + +The _First Principles_ was published before the _Origin of Species_, and +the confirmation which Darwin's work supplied to Spencer's theory must +have recommended the latter to the minds of scientifically trained +thinkers. Moreover, Spencer sanctioned a hopeful outlook; evolutionary +optimism was an attractive and an idealistic, as well as a reasonable +philosophy. It demanded the subordination of the individual to society, +it urged the necessity of self-discipline and of industry, and pointed +(if these conditions were fulfilled) to a brighter future, and to a new +humanity. The generous idealism of the following passage is +characteristic of Spencer's outlook, and of those who thought--and +hoped--with him; it occurs at the end of his _Principles of Ethics_: + +"The highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share--even +though an utterly inappreciable and unknown share--in 'the making of +Man.'... As time goes on, there will be more and more of those whose +unselfish end will be the further evolution of Humanity. While +contemplating from the heights of thought that far-off life of the race +never to be enjoyed by them, but only by a remote posterity, they will +feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance +towards it." + +Spencer, then, evidently deserves the important place that he occupies +in the history of thought. For though he was forced, for lack of those +final scientific results which he vainly hoped might soon be +forthcoming, to leave some vital gaps in his scheme,[43] he had made an +imposing attempt to systematise and unify all human experience. And his +attempt to base an idealistic morality upon sure grounds of natural +science was valuable and important. + +SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--At the same time, Spencer could not +remain satisfied with a mere _description_ of natural phenomena, however +complete and comprehensive such description might seem; he desired to +offer, besides this, an _explanation_ of these phenomena--how did they +come to be, and how do they continue to exist? To provide this +explanation, Spencer postulated the existence of an Unknown Power which +is at once the origin and the sustaining ground of everything. This +power he regarded as lying quite out of range not only of the human +senses, but of the human intellect. It was not only unknown but +_unknowable_. This celebrated doctrine of the Unknowable is not the +least interesting or important part of Spencer's system, and it is +perhaps more germane than any other speculation of his to our present +subject, as this _terra incognita_ was allotted by him to religion as +its peculiar province. He hoped that the undisputed possession and +occupation by religion of this territory might put an end to its +perpetual conflict with science, and substitute for this a reasonable, +if not cordial, understanding. Science might contentedly appropriate the +sphere of the knowable, and leave to religion the undefined and perhaps +infinite area of the unknowable; and he hoped this division of labour +would be both fruitful and permanent. + +THE VICTORIAN AGNOSTICS.--Through this doctrine of the Unknowable, +Herbert Spencer was the father of that form of belief or disbelief which +was pertinently named Agnosticism by the most celebrated of its +exponents--Huxley. This combination of Positivism in science with +Agnosticism in religion and philosophy, became highly popular in a wide +circle in England during the last third of the nineteenth century, +especially among the scientifically educated. Leslie Stephen, with the +pride of a disciple and the pardonable zeal of a propagandist, claimed +for it the distinction of being "the religion of all sensible men." + +This austere faith owed much to the qualities of those who preached it. +Their wide culture, their power of literary expression,[44] their +intellectual vigour, and above all their moral earnestness and social +enthusiasm recommended what had otherwise seemed a barren and +unpromising creed. The generous humanitarian sympathies of Comte +supplied the idealistic elements without which no faith can become +popular, and the apparent stability of its scientific basis seemed to +those impatient of speculative doubt, a great rock in a desert of +shifting sand. This new scientific Humanism had an immense vogue, and +its effects upon national life were, on the whole, of a quite healthy +character. Occasional lapses into intolerance, no doubt, occurred; but +much may be excused in the self-confidence of a new faith, not yet +tested by the experiences and the criticisms of years. + +THEOLOGICAL POLEMICS.--The attacks of orthodox apologists upon this new +orientation, though carried through with the best intentions, were too +often conducted on mistaken lines and certainly on too narrow a front. A +particular theory of scriptural inspiration (now widely abandoned), and +of the miraculous, seemed to obsess the controversialists. Nor were the +Agnostics (it must be confessed) any more alive to the real issues. +Hence, to the modern student, an oppressive atmosphere of deadness and +sterility seems to brood over these vigorous but superannuated polemics; +and hence the complete oblivion into which this literature has fallen. +The saying is profoundly true that "nothing so quickly waxes old as +apologetics." Even the contributions to the subject by so accomplished a +journalist as Huxley--his _Essays on Science and Christian +Tradition_--can only be read by those whom an almost Teutonic industry +characterises. Once so eagerly perused and earnestly pondered, the +controversial literature of this interesting epoch (which now seems so +remote) reposes on the higher shelves of libraries, accumulating the +peaceful dust of oblivion. These projectiles have, in fact, done their +work, and if they have proved less fatal than was hoped by those who +launched them, they were dispatched with good intentions, and their +explosion cleared the air. + +The most effective method of attack would have been to suggest that what +was good in the new system was as old as Christianity, and that the rest +was disputable science and still more disputable philosophy. The latter +half of this task was, as we shall subsequently find, creditably +performed by an important school of critical thinkers. But its former +half, i.e. the task of proving that what was valuable in the new +Humanism, was Christian--might, one would suppose, have been more +successfully performed by the official champions of orthodoxy. These +might have left science to the scientists, to have left off advertising +their own incompetence in that sphere by passages of arms such as took +place between Bishop Wilberforce and Huxley at the Oxford meeting of the +British Association in 1860, which are never very desirable, and always +discreditable to the discomfited party.[45] + +ILLOGICALITY OF NATURALISTIC IDEALISM.--In point of fact, "the religion +of all sensible men" (in spite of its philosophic weakness) was +equivalent to Christian stoicism; its social enthusiasm, its +humanitarianism, its conscientious truthfulness, were the fruit of a +stock grown on Christian soil. Its ethical presuppositions were entirely +Christian, nor were they sanctioned (in spite of Herbert Spencer's +elaborate apologetic) by the new biology. Nietzsche was a far more +legitimate child of Darwinism than was Huxley. Indeed, towards the close +of his life, some doubts invaded the mind of the latter, and he was +constrained by an intellectual sincerity which does him and his school +the highest credit, to utter a word of warning. We refer to his famous +_Romanes Lecture_ of 1894. + +The thesis of this important utterance was that the field of human +interests is a narrow heritage carved out from a hostile environment +into which it is destined one day to relapse. It is a cultivated garden +with the wilderness all around; created only at the cost of infinite +sacrifice and perpetual toil, and preserved only with difficulty. The +implacable jungle seeks everywhere to encroach on the borders of the +clearing, whose ultimate engulfment can only be postponed, not +prevented. Two quotations may suffice: + +"Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society +depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away +from it, but in combating it." + +"The theory of evolution encourages no millennial expectations. If, for +millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, sometime, +the summit will be reached, and the downward route will be commenced. +The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that +the power and intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the +great year."[46] + +PESSIMISM.--Coming, as it did, at the end of a generation of dogmatic +optimism, this pronouncement is symptomatic of a certain disillusionment +which had already begun to mar the fair picture of Positivist prophecy. +The human race seemed destined to an ambiguous future; the parabola of +progress would one day reach its summit, and the fall begin. At last +upon our planet the episode of Life would pass, and be neither forgotten +nor remembered; the world would sink into the eternal silence, from +which for one transitory and insignificant moment, it had awakened.[47] + +NIETZSCHE.--As might have been expected, it was in Germany that the +logical conclusions of a naturalistic outlook were drawn. Here, +philosophic pessimism had already been introduced by Schopenhauer +(1788-1860), and his disciple Nietzsche was not afraid to formulate a +scheme of ethics based on the conception of "the survival of the +fittest," and equivalent to an apotheosis of barbarism. The virtues of +self-assertion, ruthlessness, and pride were to eradicate the vices of +abnegation, pity, and humility. Christian morality was a disease; +Christianity itself was the appropriate product of the degenerate epoch, +and of the loathsome environment that gave it birth. This radical +thinker, free from English "compromise," could be satisfied with no +morality which was parasitic upon Christianity. He had clearness of +vision to see whither the naturalistic road would carry its pious +wayfarers. To him the moral idealism of Spencer was moonshine or +stupidity--"the milk of pious sentiment." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF NIETZSCHE.--Nietzsche has come in for a fair share of +abuse, but it is only just to say that philosophy stands heavily +endebted to this thinker. He was not afraid to draw logical +conclusions, and to put questions which more conventional philosophers +had preferred should remain in the background. + +It is well for a moralist to arise, once in a generation, who will clear +his own mind of cant and, without undue respect for the conventions, +approach the really fundamental questions in a spirit of sincerity. The +extravagant impieties of Nietzsche may have shocked his hearers, but +they have cleared the air. He exposed, perhaps with too little +_finesse_, the nakedness of Naturalism, and tore off that mantle of +idealism under which it had been masquerading. And he may be said, by so +doing, to have written _finis_ at the foot of a chapter in the history +of philosophy. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY + + +VICISSITUDES OF IDEALISM.--At the beginning of the last chapter we +noticed the early collapse of idealism in Germany. But the prophets +of Romanticism, when they were no longer honoured at home, found an +hospitable reception elsewhere, and especially in England. Indeed, +even before the prestige of idealism had begun to decline in Germany, +Englishmen had been introduced to it by the writings and translations +of S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). These +two popularisers of German ideas were _littérateurs_ rather than +professional philosophers, but for that very reason their vogue and +influence were the wider. + +COLERIDGE.--Coleridge was in spirit a genuine Romanticist; being, as +were some of the most notable of the German school--e.g., Goethe and +Schiller--a poet as well as a philosopher. In his _Biographia Literaria_ +he has left behind the story of his intellectual and spiritual +development. He acknowledges his debt to Kant, to the Romanticists, and +in particular to Schelling, whose "intuitionism" was naturally congenial +to him. Coleridge was never able to embody his philosophical creed in +any single work; he does not seem to have possessed the necessary power +of application. He was unfortunate in being a man of weak character, +and his ineffectiveness struck his contemporaries. But in spite of these +disadvantages--his sentimentality, the lack of clearness of his thought, +his weakness for opium--he certainly exercised an important influence, +especially in the realm of theology. His ideas, though vague, were +calculated to awaken the speculative habit, and, introduced as they +were, to a wide circle, were fruitful and stimulating. English theology +had been, in the eighteenth century, of an arid kind, and the English +philosophical tradition lacked, for the most part, appreciation of those +deeper aspects of reality which had appealed to German thinkers. +Coleridge, by introducing German speculation to his countrymen, was able +"to free theology of some of its narrowness, and to deepen and enlarge +the spiritual outlook of his age."[48] + +THOMAS CARLYLE.--Carlyle was a man of a very different temper, whose +attitude towards Coleridge was "half contemptuous, half compassionate." +A typically Carlylean characterisation of him may be found in the _Life +of Sterling_: + +"He was thought to hold--he alone in England--the key of German and +other Transcendentalisms.... A sublime man, who alone in those dark days +escaped from black materialisms and revolutionary deluges with God, +Freedom, Immortality, still his. The practical intellects of the world +did not much heed him, or carelessly reckoned him a metaphysical +dreamer; but to the rising spirits of the young generation he sat there +as a kind of Magus, girt in mystery and enigma...." + +"The good man ... gave you the idea of a life that had been full of +sufferings ... the deep eyes, of a light hazel, were as full of sorrow +as inspiration; confused pain looked mildly from them, as in a kind of +mild astonishment. The whole figure and air, good and amiable otherwise, +might be called flabby and irresolute; expressive of weakness under +possibility of strength.... He spoke as if preaching--preaching +earnestly and hopelessly the weightiest things." + +Carlyle himself had all the character and industry that Coleridge +lacked, and it was another side of German idealism that had appealed to +him. The Scotchman was of the same fibre and stock as that other +half-Scotchman, Kant. Here was the source from which he had drawn his +inspiration. We see in Carlyle the same moral earnestness, the same +"toughness" of thought, the same absence of "sentimental moonshine." +From Kant, too, he derives a vigorous independence of thought, a +religious respect for individuality, a horror of shams and affectation. +Kant was a true child of the Reformation, and Carlyle is a genuine +disciple. + +In a single important respect, however, he differed from (and improved +upon) his master. Kant lacked, or at least did not display, the saving +grace of humour; in Carlyle this quality looks out from every +page--keen, satirical, sometimes bitter, sometimes grotesque; he +ridiculed his own generation, its vices, its prejudices, its +superstitions. + +SARTOR RESARTUS.--For our purpose, _Sartor Resartus_--that profound and +humorous book--is Carlyle's masterpiece: here all the characteristic +Kantian doctrines may be found. + +The "philosophy of clothes"--which is the quaint title behind which +Kantian idealism is made to masquerade--starts from the thought that +just as an acquaintance with his clothes will not reveal to us the man, +so an acquaintance with _phenomena_ (which is all that science can claim +to give us) cannot reveal to us the real ground of existence, which +remains an inscrutable mystery. We must "look on clothes till they +become transparent," if we could understand reality. + +"To the eye of vulgar Logic what is man? An omnivorous biped that wears +breeches. To the eye of pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and +divine Apparition." + +And so with Nature; to science it is a mechanism, to the understanding +heart it is "the living garment of God." + +"It is written, the Heavens and the Earth shall fade away like a +Vesture; which indeed they are: the Time-Vesture of the Eternal.... The +whole External Universe and what it holds is but Clothing...." + +The visible world is but a symbol of a profound and awful reality; and +all Nature's products, in their degree, symbols as well: but of these, +man is the highest. "The true SHEKINAH is Man: where else is the GOD'S +PRESENCE manifested, not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our +fellow-man?" + +This leads up to the essential doctrine of the Kantian system: that man +is a creature of two worlds, who has a foot in either; hence in the +phenomenal world he can never find satisfaction. + +"Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because +there is an infinite in him, which, with all his cunning, he cannot +quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and +Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in +jointstock company, to make one Shoeblack Happy? They cannot accomplish +it, above an hour or two, for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other +than his Stomach...." + +"There is in man a HIGHER than Love of happiness: he can do without +happiness and instead thereof find Blessedness! has it not been to +preach forth this same HIGHER that sages and martyrs ... have spoken and +suffered; bearing testimony to the God-like that is in man?" + +CARLYLE'S INFLUENCE.--In spite of Carlyle's strange literary mannerisms +and his grotesquely Germanic phrases, his writings had great +attractiveness for those of his contemporaries who felt themselves +smothered by the materialism and utilitarianism of early Victorian +England. He was able to re-vitalise idealism amongst them. Moreover he +appealed strongly to those to whom the Coleridgean speculations were +uncongenial. The strongly developed _moral_ element, both in his +writings and in his own somewhat stern and austere personality--what +Taine called his "puritanism"--appealed strongly to a certain side of +English feeling. His countrymen felt that his was a native genius that +they could understand. In fact we may say that the influence of Carlyle, +especially among the young and generous minded, has been incalculable in +extent and invaluable in quality. Spiritual life in England stands under +a deep obligation to him. + +ROMANTICISM AT OXFORD.--Englishmen were thus not entire strangers to +German idealism, which had possessed its interpreters in the earlier +half of the nineteenth century. Not, however, until it had experienced a +decline in Germany (a reaction which occupied our attention in the last +chapter), did Romanticism become naturalised in England by being +adopted in academic circles. + +Among the most notable of English idealists was T. H. Green--fellow and +tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. In this thinker we have a widely +different type of mind from that of either Coleridge or Carlyle. He was +a thinker rather than a poet or a prophet, and he belonged to what we +have noticed as the intellectualist--i.e. Hegelian--wing of Romanticism. + +Green's chief work was his _Prolegomena to Ethics_ (published +posthumously in 1883), where arguments, which were familiar to those +acquainted with Hegel, presented themselves. Green begins with an +analysis of experience, and leads to the conclusion that Nature--if by +it we mean "the connected order of experience"--implies "something other +than itself, as the condition of its being what it is." And "of that +'something' we are entitled to say, positively, that it is a +self-distinguishing consciousness" (section 52). + +If these conclusions be valid, the bottom falls out of Naturalism, for +if nature "implies something other than itself," it does not stand +alone; and that nature _does_ stand alone is the beginning and end of +all naturalist theory. And, furthermore, this "something other than +itself," which Nature involves, is "a self-distinguishing +consciousness"; i.e. something to which we can attribute personality. + +GREEN AND SPENCER CONTRASTED.--This theory has only to be compared with +that of Herbert Spencer for a fundamental difference to declare itself. +The two systems do indeed adopt as axiomatic the conception of the +uniformity and unity of nature, which works in accordance with a single +law. But Spencer saw in that law the expression of a blind force, an +unknowable power, of which it would be no more and no less true to say +that it was "spiritual" than that it was "material." But for Green the +law was the expression of a spiritual principal analogous to our own +intelligence--a manifestation (to use theological language) of God. + +F. H. BRADLEY.--Undoubtedly the most notable of English Hegelians is F. +H. Bradley, whose metaphysical essay, _Appearance and Reality_, was a +work of genuine originality. The book is not of a type to make much +appeal outside academic circles, though it is written in an easy and +attractive style: its results may seem, to the unsophisticated reader, +somewhat too ambiguous. "Ultimate Doubts" is the title of the last +chapter, and "It costs us little to find that in the end Reality is +inscrutable," is a remark not uncharacteristic of the author. Yet this +really profound thinker and acute reasoner played an important part in +helping to discredit that negative dogmatism which was so much in vogue +during his own lifetime. He pointed out the limits beyond which natural +science could not transgress without lapsing into "dogmatic +superstition." + +"Too often the science of mere Nature, forgetting its own limits and +false to its true aims, attempts to speak about first principles. It +becomes transcendent, and offers us a dogmatic and uncritical +metaphysics" (p. 284). + +Though the fault has not always been on the side of the scientists: +"Metaphysics itself, by its interference with physical science, has +induced that to act, as it thinks, in self-defence, and has led it, in +so doing, to become metaphysical. And this interference of metaphysics I +would admit and deplore, as the result and the parent of most injurious +misunderstanding.... So long as natural science keeps merely to the +sphere of phenomena and the laws of their occurrence, metaphysics has no +right to a single word of criticism" (p. 285). + +This critical handling of the problem of the relations of science and +philosophy did much to draw attention to the confusion of thought lying +at the base of much popular materialism. It began to be realised that +the principles of physical science are only fruitful of good results in +the sphere properly belonging to them; and that the uncritical use of +these principles results in a hybrid philosophy, which is neither sound +science nor rational metaphysics. + +A. J. BALFOUR.--Before Bradley's essay was published, a somewhat similar +line of criticism had been developed by Mr. A. J. Balfour in his +_Defence of Philosophic Doubt_ (1879). Its title sounds unpromising, but +the book voiced a demand for a rational philosophy of science which was +practically non-existent at that time; and consequently, in the absence +of any adequate examination of the principles of science, uncritical +dogmatism flourished quite unchallenged. Balfour, elsewhere, indicates +the objects with which he wrote the book--to elicit from the disciples +of natural science a _rationale_ of their method: + +"A full and systematic attempt, first to enumerate, and then to justify, +the presuppositions on which all science finally rests, has, it seems to +me, still to be made. After the critical examination which I desiderate +has been thoroughly carried out, it may appear that at the very root of +our scientific system of belief lie problems of which no satisfactory +solution has yet been devised."[49] Thus Balfour drew attention to the +fact that the common-sense philosophy of naturalism rested upon a tacit +agreement to overlook certain important problems which are the +indispensable preliminaries to any thinking which can be called +critical, or lay claim to be regarded as philosophy in the strict sense. +That some of these problems seem artificial, and the questions raised by +them gratuitous, to the eye of "common sense" is an irrelevant +consideration, for "nothing stands more in need of demonstration than +the obvious." + +NATURALISM CHECKED.--Thus Bradley and Balfour between them, merely by +adopting a critical attitude, created an embarrassing situation for +naturalism. Between them these writers administered a serious check to +that naively uncritical dogmatism which, backed by the prestige of +natural science, had sought to impose itself on the world as a new +orthodoxy less liberal, in some ways, than the old. + +Nor did they stop short at negative criticism, but substituted +(according to the idealistic tradition) a spiritual view of reality for +the mechanistic materialism that had become so popular. _Appearance and +Reality_ is a book of which the trend might seem too obscure, but it +ends with a note that is definite enough: + +"Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality; and, +the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably +real," are Bradley's closing words. + +As for Balfour, he leads his readers up to a point which he describes as +"the threshold of Christian Theology." And having propounded the +perplexities in which the "common sense" philosophy (on which naturalism +depends) is involved, he says: + +"I do not believe that any escape from them (the perplexities) is +possible, unless we are prepared to bring to the study of the world the +presupposition that it was the work of a rational Being, who made _it_ +intelligible, and at the same time made _us_, in however feeble a +fashion, able to understand it."[50] + +REVIVAL OF IDEALISM IN GERMANY. LOTZE.--We have perhaps dwelt at too +great length upon the backwash of the idealistic wave in England, for +idealism is not a native philosophy amongst us; possibly, because we are +not metaphysically-minded in the same sense as are the purer Teutonic +breed. And it is time to pass on to pay a brief tribute to the work of a +German philosopher who accepted the mechanical theory in its totality, +without sacrificing what we may call the spiritual values of existence. + +Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was inclined to feel that the weakness of +Romanticism lay in a tendency to despise or overlook what Kant had +called "the fertile bathos of experience." The Romanticists had too +often neglected natural science, which, in the shape of naturalistic +materialism, had its revenge by destroying them. Büchner was the Nemesis +of an idealism which was at once vague and sentimental. + +LOTZE'S "MICROCOSMOS."--Lotze's attitude and method are conspicuous in +his well-known work, which took him eight years to complete +(1856-1864)--the _Microcosmos_. After guiding his readers "through the +realms of natural phenomena and historical evolution," thus constructing +a sufficiently stable basis out of _facts_--he leads them on to an ideal +world composed of what he calls "values." + +His position may thus be summarised: The world presents itself to the +observer in three aspects--(1) The world of individual "things," which +are bewildering and intricate; (2) the laws (i.e., "laws of nature") +which the human intellect has discovered among them, thus finding +regularity and order; (3) the "values" which the human soul applies to +things, and which it is the human task to cultivate. + +This world of ideals or values (3) is that for the sake of which the +worlds of phenomena and law (1 and 2) exist. These (1 and 2) constitute +respectively the material _in_ which, and the forms _through_ which, the +world of "values" is to be realised.[51] + +Thus phenomena and law are the raw material out of which "values" are +created; and these "values" themselves constitute (in the eyes of Lotze) +a higher reality. Thus the central doctrine of his system is that the +truly Real is what has supreme worth: it is _worth_ that creates +reality. The paradoxicality of this may make it difficult to accept; but +Lotze is only expressing in his own way the fundamental thesis of all +forms of idealism, that "the ideal is the real"; that the world of +phenomena is secondary to and dependent upon a "world of spirit," or an +"ideal world." + +Lotze himself in the introduction to the _Microcosmos_, expresses what +is at once the foundation and the kernel of his system: he says it is +his purpose to show "_how absolutely universal is the extent_, and at +the same time how _completely subordinate the significance, of the +mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world_." +(E.T., p. xvi.) + +Mechanism is universal, _because_ it is the raw material, so to speak, +out of which reality is to be made. That reality can be expressed in +terms of mechanism is true, just as a poem can be described as a scrap +of paper scratched upon with a pen; but this reduction of reality to its +lowest terms, ends by emptying reality of content. Mechanism is a +_universal_ feature, but it is a _subordinate_ feature, of reality. +Nature requires, if we are to arrive at the truth about it, not only to +be described and analysed, but also interpreted in the light of the idea +of _value_ or _worth_. + +LOTZE AND THEOLOGY.--Lotze's theories exercised an important influence +upon the development in Germany and elsewhere of a type of theology +known as Ritschlianism. Albrecht Ritschl, a disciple of Lotze, attempted +to dissociate religion from metaphysics, and to base it upon "judgments +of value." Christian dogma, for instance, is an attempt to express, in +philosophical terms, _the unique value to humanity of the moral and +religious consciousness of Christ_. So far as a dogma is faithful to +that central idea, and makes a genuine attempt to express it, so +far--and so far only--is it true. + +This type of theology, uniting itself with certain philosophical +tendencies which will engage our attention later, became the basis of +what was known as the Modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church. + +CONCLUSIONS.--Thus in the nineteenth century, in England (and indeed on +the continent also) the idealistic attitude, though it sometimes might +seem compromised, was never submerged; in spite of the materialistic +outlook of an age only too preoccupied with scientific discovery and +commercial expansion. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY + + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.--In the last chapter we heard A. J. Balfour +complaining of the absence of "a full and systematic attempt, first to +enumerate, and then to justify, the presuppositions on which all science +finally rests." And Mr. F. H. Bradley also drew attention to the absence +of any critical philosophy of science in England. The need was for +scientific standpoints to be investigated _de novo_; and the process +had, as a matter of fact, already been begun on the Continent. + +MACH.--Ernst Mach, Professor of Physics at Prague, and subsequently +Professor of Physics at Vienna (thus combining the roles of scientist +and metaphysician--always a highly instructive and fruitful combination) +had as early as 1863 laid it down as the task of science to give "an +economic presentation of the facts." By which phrase he meant that +science takes account only of the salient features of phenomena, +selecting only those which seem strictly serviceable to its own purpose. + +SCIENCE "ABSTRACT" OR "SELECTIVE."--Mathematical science (which is the +"pure" science _par excellence_) deals not--as is generally +supposed--with "things," but with _certain selected aspects_ of things. +For example, for purposes of arithmetic, every leaf on a tree is an +"unit" (i.e. all are "identical"); but, in point of fact, there exist no +two leaves that are alike, as Leibniz, long ago, pointed out. Again, for +geometrical purposes two fields may be regarded as of like area; but no +two fields are, or ever have been, so. + +Thus mathematics--where scientific method is seen at its +purest--proceeds by deliberately disregarding individuality; it regards +the differences between individuals as non-essential, and irrelevant to +its purpose. + +ECONOMY OF THOUGHT.--And mathematical science is justified in acting in +this way. This method, highly abstract as it is--in fact, just because +it is highly abstract--leads to invaluable results. It's justification +is that it is _economical of thought_; disregarding all irrelevant +considerations, it is able, by using a short-cut, to reach its goal. Did +the mathematician have to take into consideration all the manifold and +complex aspects of each concrete "thing" (whether it be leaf, or field, +or lever, or what not) with which he deals, he would never be able to +cut his way through the jungle. His method of abstraction carries him at +once to his goal. + +MACH ON THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Mach's criticism of the mechanical view +of nature proceeded upon similar lines. He termed that view +"analogical," by which he meant that mechanical "laws of nature" serve +us as formal patterns to which the processes of nature may (for +convenience sake) be represented as conforming. A clear account, though +not a _complete_ account, of all physical processes may be given in +terms of mechanical "law." + +And in fact it remains a question, Mach observed, "whether the +mechanical view of things, instead of being the profoundest, is not in +point of fact, the shallowest of all."[52] + +SCIENCE NOT INVALID BUT INCOMPLETE.--This line of criticism of +scientific method--i.e. that it deals with abstractions and analogies +rather than with _things_, for the sake of economy and convenience of +thought--does not deprive science of validity, but only invalidates that +superficial dogmatism which had crept into so many investigations. A +critical estimate of scientific methods makes it evident how much and +how little we have the right to expect from them. They will enable us to +give a simple description of _phenomena_ as they are seen when reduced +to their simplest terms of matter and motion; but of ultimate and final +causes they will tell us nothing. + +"The system of conceptions by which the exact sciences try to describe +the phenomena of nature ... is symbolic, a kind of shorthand, +unconsciously invented and perfected for the sake of convenience and for +practical use ... the leading principle is that of Economy of Thought" +(Merz, Vol. III, p. 579). + +BOUTROUX.--This criticism of the mechanical method of dealing with +reality was seconded by Boutroux's criticism of the principle of Natural +Law. Émile Boutroux (1845-1918)--Professor at the Sorbonne--in two +important treatises, examines with great minuteness this aspect of the +scientific method. In the earlier of these works, _The Contingency of +the Laws of Nature_ (1879) he suggests that these laws only give, so to +speak, the _habits_ which things display. They constitute, as it were, +"the bed in which the stream of occurrence flows, which the stream +itself had hollowed out, although its course has come to be determined +by this bed" (Höffding, _Modern Philosophers_, p. 101). + +In his _Natural Law in Science and Philosophy_ (1895), Boutroux lays it +down that the laws of nature, as science describes them, may indeed +represent, but are by no means identical with, the laws of nature as +they really are. The laws of science are true, not absolutely but +relatively, i.e. are not elements in, but symbols of, reality. The +notion that everything is "determined" (i.e. the opposite of +"contingent"), though absolutely indispensable to the mechanical theory, +is nevertheless a way of looking at things rather than a faithful +picture of reality--a way in which we see things rather than the way +things exist in themselves. + +As Boutroux himself puts it in his final chapter: "That which we call +the 'laws of nature' is the sum total of the methods we have discovered +for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by +the will." + +RESULTS.--Here we have Boutroux approaching very closely to the +standpoint of Mach; indeed the theories of the two men are complementary +to one another. For Mach, the mechanical view is a way of looking at +things, distinctly useful for understanding and using them--an "economy +of thought." For Boutroux, the determinist view is also a way of looking +at things that is useful for the same purposes. + +Thus the interpretation of reality in terms of mathematics and +"unalterable law," is artificial; an abstract way of thinking which +deals not with reality itself but with certain deliberately selected +aspects of it. + +RISE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY.--This examination of the principles of natural +science was the beginning of what afterwards proved to be a revolution +in thought. What had been more or less negative criticism in Mach and +Boutroux, became the basis of a new philosophy in the hands of William +James and Bergson. The names, and even the ideas, of these two original +thinkers are familiar far outside strictly philosophical circles, and it +will almost be possible to presume upon a certain acquaintance with them +on the part of our readers. + +WILLIAM JAMES.--James himself, like Mach, was led to philosophy by the +road of scientific investigation. He was a psychologist, and it is as +the author of his _Principles of Psychology_ that his name will be +remembered. This work is notable as containing the first complete +application of the Darwinian theory to the evolution of mind. Mental +action is there represented as a capacity developed by the organism to +enable it to deal with its environment. As an exponent of James puts it: + +"The mind, like an antenna, feels its way for the organism. It gropes +about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many +failures; always urged into taking the initiative and doomed to success +or failure in some hour of trial."[53] + +The corollary which attaches to propositions of this kind is that +knowledge in all its varieties and developments arises from _practical +needs_. And the mind (here is an echo of Mach) _selects_ those aspects +of reality which concern it, and out of that selected material makes up +a new (mental) world of its own. Which world is far from being a +"picture" of reality, but which is "symbolic" of it (here is another +memory of Mach).[54] + +This view obviously cuts the ground from under dogmatic materialism. The +world which that philosophy regards as _reality_, is, to the critical +eye, a collection of abstractions, a mental creation arising out of the +practical needs of life. + +HENRI BERGSON.--This line of criticism, that of the evolutionary +psychologist, opened up by James, has been carried to extreme lengths by +the French philosopher Bergson. "Dig to the very roots of nature and of +mind" is his advice. He begins by asking, How, as a matter of history, +has human intellect developed? He then, and then only, proceeds to put +the question (which uncritical thinkers always put _first_), What can +the intellect do for us? + +His theory of the origin of intellect is the same as that of William +James. Life (through the evolutionary process) has produced it. But the +conclusion that he draws from this hypothesis is that _the intellect, +being itself a product of life, or a form of life, cannot understand the +whole of life_. This thesis is elaborated with a wealth of illustration +and erudition, both scientific and philosophic, and with a literary +grace and charm possible only for a Frenchman, in the famous work +_Évolution Créatrice_ (1907). + +BERGSON'S ADVANCE ON MACH AND JAMES.--Those thinkers who had made a +serious attempt at a philosophy of science, had demonstrated that the +"mechanical view" of nature was a mental abstraction, and not a complete +representation of reality. Such is the debt of philosophy to the +researches of Mach, Boutroux, James, and others who worked along their +lines. + +But it remained for Bergson to demonstrate that the mechanical view was +_the inevitable product of the mental processes which we describe by the +word "intellect."_ + +The path which led Bergson to this goal will have to be briefly +indicated by us. + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTELLECT.--What is the "intellect," to which we +look in vain for any _complete_ explanation of existence? This is the +preliminary question. + +Our intellect is, as James had taught, a faculty developed by the +evolutionary process in our species to enable it to deal with its +_material_ environment. And Bergson was the first to point out that as a +consequence of its having been developed for this particular purpose +(i.e., dealing with a _material_ environment), intellect is "never quite +at its ease, never entirely at home, except when it is working upon +inert matter." If it has to deal with "living" matter, it "treats it as +inert, without troubling about the life that animated it." + +Such is the first characteristic of the intellect: it feels at home in +dealing with dead matter, and living matter it prefers to treat "as +inert." + +Another characteristic of intellect is that, just as it treats the +living as if it were non-living, so it prefers to treat the mobile as +though it were motionless. Motion is a thing which the intellect simply +cannot grasp; it has to treat it artificially, and represent a process +which in reality is continuous and indivisible, as discontinuous and +divisible--a succession of points, out of which no magic can conjure +motion. Philosophy became aware of this as soon as it opened its eyes. +Hence the paradox of Zeno, that Achilles will never overtake the +tortoise, if the latter once gets a start. For if space and time are +infinitely divisible (as intellect holds them to be), by the time +Achilles has reached the tortoise's starting point, the tortoise has +already got ahead of _that_ starting point, and so on _ad infinitum_; +the interval between them being endlessly diminished, but never +disappearing. + +Zeno's paradox arises because of an innate fault in the "intellectual" +method of dealing with motion; a method which Bergson calls +"cinematographical," because it regards a single movement as a +succession of infinitely small motions. That method is hopeless; and if +we expect to understand motion by its means, + +"You will always experience the disappointment of the child, who tries, +by clapping its hands together to crush the smoke. The movement slips +through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out +of states implies the absurd proposition that movement is made up of +immobilities."[55] + +So that the intellect is best fitted to deal, not with living and +moving, but with dead and motionless matter. Of the latter it can form a +clear idea; but in dealing with the former, it finds itself at a loss; +it has to abstract the life and the motion from what lives or moves, and +what it cannot grasp, it must treat as non-existent. + +BERGSON'S ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM.--A penetrating remark of James' will +help us, at this point, to understand the significance for philosophy +of these new theories. + +"In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of Protagoras, Hume, and +James Mill, rationalism has never been seriously questioned, for its +sharpest critics have always had a tender place for it in their hearts, +and have obeyed some of its mandates. They have not been consistent, +they have played fast and loose with the enemy, and Bergson alone has +been radical."[56] + +Bergson's philosophy is, in fact, a reaction against intellectualism or +rationalism; by which is meant the theory that pure reason is competent +by its nature to give a complete and exhaustive account of reality. + +But according to Bergson, intellect, which is a faculty developed to +enable men to subdue and turn to advantage their material environment, +and which is, as it were, "fascinated by the contemplation of inert +matter," will not reveal the true meaning and nature of existence; it +gives us "a translation of life in terms of inertia," and can do no +more. + +This criticism of the intellect (if it be sound), though it does not +invalidate the work of that faculty in its own proper sphere, +necessarily involves its discredit as a key to the unlocking of the +final mysteries of life and of being. These things lie outside its +province. "Whether it wants to treat of the life of the body, or the +life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness, and the +brutality of an instrument not designed for such use."[57] + +INTELLECT AND INSTINCT.--Since intellect, by its methods, has induced +men to turn their backs on reality, and to look on abstractions +instead, the only hope of reaching reality is through an entire change +of method and direction. There is, according to Bergson, a +non-intellectual variety of knowledge, which (from his point of view) it +was a kind of original sin ever to depart from; an original sin which +has vitiated all our philosophic thinking from the days of Plato. + +This variety of knowledge is more original and fundamental than any +which the processes of the intellect, vitiated as these are by certain +inherent perversions, can give us. Intellect cannot correct itself; we +must call in the aid of some other faculty if we would understand +reality. + +Bergson finds this faculty in what he calls "instinct." According to +him, consciousness has developed in two divergent directions--instinct +and intellect; and the difference between these is not one of intensity +or degree, but of _kind_.[58] + +They are two divergent developments of the same original consciousness, +of which common origin they both retain traces, for they are not +entirely dissimilar, nor is either of them ever found in a pure state. + +Intellect is characteristic of man. Instinct is most highly developed +among certain insects, notably the _hymenopterae_ (i.e., bees and +ants).[59] + +BLINDNESS OF INTELLECT.--And the difficulty of the philosophical problem +for man arises from the anomalies of his own constitution (as +interpreted by Bergson in the light of his theory of instinct and +intellect). As he puts it: + +"There are things that Intelligence (or intellect) alone is able to +seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct +alone could find; but it will never seek them." (_Creative Evolution_, +p. 159). + +"If the consciousness which slumbers in instinct were to wake up ... if +we knew how to question it, and if it knew how to reply, it would +deliver to our keeping the most intimate secrets of life." + +Thus Bergson regards it as impossible that intellect should ever supply +us with the complete truth about reality; there are things, e.g. life +itself--which altogether elude its grasp. + +INTUITION.--The situation, however, is not entirely hopeless. Man +possesses some measure of instinct, which, when it has "become +disinterested, self-conscious, and capable of reflecting upon its +object," Bergson calls intuition. By means of this faculty, man is able, +darkly perhaps but not ineffectually, to grope his way towards an +understanding of reality. + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.--Just as the criticisms of +Cusanus and others freed thought from an incubus which seemed likely to +prevent its further development, so the movement initiated by Mach and +culminating (for the present) in Bergson, has done much to discredit "a +certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of +the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old +scholasticism grew up around Aristotle."[60] + +Mechanical determinism was characteristic of much nineteenth-century +thought in Europe, not only amongst materialists, but also, in certain +cases, amongst idealists as well. Against this aspect of contemporary +philosophy, the work of James and Bergson has been a revolt. +"Indeterminism," i.e. a belief in the reality of freedom and +spontaneity, is an essential part of their system. Their indeterminism +is indeed the necessary and logical accompaniment of their +anti-intellectualism. For determinism is "a fabrication of the +_intellect_," a device which makes reality more manageable, more +amenable to logic, more easily systematised. Freedom, like life and +motion, eludes the categories of the intellect. + +THE MECHANICAL VIEW ASSAILED.--Such are the lines upon which the new +criticism of the mechanical view (the most radical criticism it has had +to meet since Kant) proceeds. That view, and the idea of predetermined +human action which it involves, is an inevitable product of an intellect +naturally incapable of understanding freedom and spontaneity. These, as +they destroy its scheme of thought, it casts out as an illusion. +"Incorrigibly presumptuous," it insists on interpreting freedom by means +of those notions which suit inert matter alone, and therefore always +perceives it as necessity. So that all life, far from being subjected to +mechanical necessity, as had seemed the inevitable conclusion of +naturalistic philosophy, was spontaneity (so to speak) materialised and +embodied: + +"All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous +push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, +and the whole of humanity ... is one immense army galloping beside and +before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat +down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps +even death."[61] + +We have indeed travelled a long way from the austere abstractions of Mr. +Herbert Spencer. The new evolutionism is very different from the old. It +substitutes for "mechanism" another conception--that of "dynamism," +according to which the process of evolution is something undetermined +and impredictable--"creative," in fact. The world of organic life is +embodied "creative activity," and what this "creative activity" is, we +ourselves experience every time we act freely. + +PLURALISM.--The philosophy of Bergson is a reaction against the +mechanical evolutionism (i.e. naturalism) of the nineteenth century. +Closely allied with it is another movement of thought, known as +_pluralism_. This, too, is a reaction, not so much against naturalism, +as against certain forms of idealism. + +Idealism, it will be remembered, seeks to interpret reality in terms of +mind or spirit. And it does this in certain cases--notably in the case +of F. H. Bradley--by regarding all _phenomena_ as forms or aspects of +the one absolute mind or spirit. + +This has seemed to many thinkers a philosophy too abstract and too +remote from the world of experience. Hence the question arose whether it +might not be possible to interpret nature in terms of mind without being +compelled to take refuge in the abstractions of "absolutism." And +pluralism is an attempt to solve the problem. + +LEIBNIZ REVIVED.--Leibniz' system of "monads," the nature of which will +hardly have been forgotten, has been the model to which philosophers +have looked in constructing their new system. And the "Monadology" may +be taken as the type to which all modern attempts to construct a +"pluralistic" philosophy more or less conform. + +The essence of "pluralism"--whether Leibnizian or other--lies in the +proposition that there exists an indefinite variety of beings, some +higher, some lower than ourselves. The pluralist agrees with the +idealist in declaring that the essence of reality is _spirit_, but +differs from him in declining to allow independent spirits to be +absorbed by an "all-devouring Absolute." + +PLURALISM AND THEISM.--William James himself, in a work _A Pluralistic +Universe_ (1909) outlined a philosophy of spirit radically opposed to +"Absolute Idealism," which he subjects to a good deal of criticism. +Another important work, written from a similar point of view, is +Professor James Ward's _Pluralism and Theism_ (1911).[62] + +With regard to modern pluralism, the notable features are two. In the +first place, it is a philosophy of _personality_, which it regards as +the most fundamental form of reality; and also, that it is _theistic_ in +a sense peculiar to itself. It believes in a God who may be termed the +supreme monad, i.e. the head of a system of monads; but whose power may +be said, in certain respects, to be limited. And indeed some such +position seems to be the _logical_ conclusion that follows from the +premises with which pluralists start, and also (we may add) from the +facts of experience.[63] + +Pluralists unite in affirming that their God is (what they deny the +idealistic Absolute to be) the God of the religious consciousness. James +elaborates this thesis with his usual resourcefulness and skill. The +controversy, however, is one into which it does not seem necessary for +us to enter. Pluralism and idealism are or may be both definitely +spiritual philosophies, and perhaps they appeal to different types of +mind. We, at any rate, shall not undertake to judge between them. Both +alike are preferable to dogmatic naturalism. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE + + +SCIENTIFIC METHOD.--In the last chapter, attention was drawn to some +important attempts to supply science with a sound philosophy of method, +i.e. to give a critical account of those processes, logical and +otherwise, which issue in what is called "scientific knowledge." + +The general results of these attempts was to re-enforce the validity of +sound scientific method _within its own sphere_. But, at the same time, +it was felt likely to prove an unreliable guide elsewhere. + +THE NEW PHYSICS.--Meanwhile, while the logic of science was being +scrutinised by philosophers, scientific research was itself going +steadily forward, and fresh discoveries of a highly important nature +were coming to light. In the sphere of physical science, more +especially, revolutions of Copernican proportions quietly took place. + +The whole subject of physics is of a highly technical nature, quite +unsuitable for discussion here, and, indeed, entirely beyond the range +of the present writer. + +To indicate the nature of the discoveries which were made, however, +involves few technicalities: though the method by which these were +demonstrated and established must remain obscure to all but mathematical +specialists. + +COLLAPSE OF THE ATOMIC THEORY.--Dalton's theory of atoms was described +in a previous chapter. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the +importance attached by materialists, ever since Lucretius, to the +conception of indivisible and indestructible atoms. It was regarded as +integral to materialism, and never was the prestige of this theory +higher than during the nineteenth century, which "will go down in +scientific history as the era of the atomic theory of matter." + +Towards the close of the century, the theory collapsed. Atoms were found +to be neither indivisible nor indestructible; and the process of the +breaking up of the atom has actually been observed. + +As is very generally known, it is in the case of a particular element, +_radium_, that this phenomenon occurs. That substance, wherever it +occurs, is undergoing a continual process of disintegration; radium +atoms are continually breaking up into more elementary bodies. + +Were it not for the fact that radium itself is the product of the +disintegration of another element, it would be impossible to account for +its survival. It continually evaporates (the life of radium is only 2500 +years) but it is as continually renewed by the infinitely slower +disintegration of uranium. + +ELECTRONS.--The particles into which the radium atom disintegrates are +known as _electrons_. And according to the new theory of matter, not +only radium atoms, but the atoms of all the other elements (hitherto +regarded as irreducible) are composed of electrons, differently grouped. +The radium atom is infinitely more unstable than the atoms of the other +elements; but it is possible to conceive of the disintegration of these +also. They are all alike composed of the same elementary +particles--different compounds of the same primitive substance. + +MATTER A FORM OF ELECTRICITY.--And the most remarkable part of the new +theory is that these primitive particles of which material atoms are +composed, are themselves the units which constitute what we call +"electricity." Thus matter and electricity are now expressed in common +terms--they are regarded as different manifestations of the same +substance. And of the two conceptions--matter and electricity--it is the +latter that is the more simple and fundamental. As a high authority puts +it: + +"Whereas through the greater part of the nineteenth century, 'matter' +was the concept which was looked upon as fundamental in physical +science, and of which there was a curious accidental property called +electricity, it now appears that electricity must be more fundamental +than matter, in the sense that our more elementary matter must now be +conceived as a manifestation of extremely complex electrical +phenomena."[64] + +As to whether the electrons themselves, in their turn, are irreducible +units, there may be room for doubt. According to Professor J. Larmor the +electron is "a nucleus of intrinsic strain in the ether."[65] If this +view be sound, matter may be regarded as a manifestation of the ether; +"a persistent strain-form flitting through an universal sea of ether." +As to the nature of the ether, that is a subject of speculation among +physicists. It is variously described as an "elastic fluid," and as "a +fairly close packed conglomerate of minute grains in continual +oscillation."[66] It may indeed be said that modern physical theories +have succeeded in reducing matter, which seems comparatively knowable, +to a substance of which little is known and, therefore, of which much +can be postulated; it can be called sub-natural, or super-natural, +according to taste. + +We may, perhaps, satisfy ourselves with the words of Professor Tait: "We +do not know, and are probably incapable of discovering, _what_ matter +is"; and "The discovery of the ultimate nature of matter is probably +beyond the range of human intelligence."[67] + +And yet we can agree with Mr. Arthur Balfour when he says[68] "we know +too much about matter to be materialists." That, in itself, a generation +ago would have been regarded as a large admission from the standpoint of +physical science. + +RESULTS OF THE NEW PHYSICS.--The reduction of knowable and tangible +matter to intangible electricity or unknowable ether may not seem to be +much of an advance from the point of view of those who are interested in +establishing a spiritual theory of the universe. But electricity is a +species of energy which can be expressed in terms of will--which is the +only kind of energy that we are acquainted with at first hand. "What is +objectively energy is subjectively will; or, in other words, manifested +energy is the visibility of will."[69] And so far as the "unknowable" +ether is concerned, it gives less scope to those powers of dogmatism, +the exercise of which characterised scientists of the old materialistic +school; and it is the habit of oracular pronouncements which does the +harm, by rendering any intellectual or spiritual progress impossible. In +any case, whatever be the substitute which is to replace the old theory, +we may congratulate ourselves, with Professor J. S. Haldane, that "we +have parted once for all with the notion of a real and self-existent +Material universe; and we must remember where we now are."[70] + +THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if the results of the new physics have been +disturbing to those who had hoped that materialism was a finally +established theory, the results of recent biological research have been +equally embarrassing to them. The anti-mechanistic trend of recent +biological theory is only too evident. The organism is regarded no +longer by the majority of biologists as fully explicable in terms of +mechanics and chemistry. To quote Professor Haldane again, "The main +outstanding fact is that the mechanistic account of the universe breaks +down completely in connection with the phenomena of life.... In the case +of life, the facts are inconsistent with the physical and chemical +account of phenomena."[71] + +The organism can no longer be regarded as even an extremely complex kind +of machine; that word will not cover the facts, and biologists are +compelled to look elsewhere for a less misleading terminology. To +describe the organism as a machine, is to give to that word a very +comprehensive connotation. For the organism is a machine different in +kind from any that has been constructed by man; it is "a self-stoking, +self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, +self-producing engine."[72] + +THE RESEARCHES OF DRIESCH.--Just as modern physics is concerned with the +infinitely small--the ultra-microscopic, in fact--so modern biologists +are concentrating attention upon microscopic organisms, where life is +seen at its lowest terms, and where (if anywhere) they may expect to +discover what are the _differentia_ of life, i.e. what are the qualities +that distinguish living organic from inorganic matter. Perhaps the most +notable of the researches conducted in this sphere, of recent years, +have been those of Professor Driesch, who expounded his results in the +_Gifford Lectures_ for 1907-1908 (_The Science and Philosophy of the +Organism_). + +The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those +which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when +cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued +development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a +fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, +though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided +organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt +themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building +a bridge, all of them _can_ do every single act--if need arise--and the +result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen +fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident. + +Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying: + +"There is something in the organism's behaviour--in the widest sense of +the word--which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e. +to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which +shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its +parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism 'a typically +combined body' (i.e., a machine), without further explanation."[73] + +THE PROBLEM OF LIFE.--The problem is: What is it in an organism which +causes it to behave in a fashion so impossible for any machine? To +answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery +of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what +this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it +_entelechy_, i.e. "purposiveness," and he also speaks of _psychoids_, +i.e. "primitive minds." Names do not carry us very far; but the mere +fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is +important. It constitutes an admission on their part that there is +something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of +modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious +causes if known ones can be found. The _deus ex machina_ method seems to +them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were +considered solved merely by the word "mystery," knowledge would never +advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but +things that are important. But in this particular instance the +application of the name _entelechy_ indicates that, in the opinion of +such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no +merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And Driesch +is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very +extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living +organism in terms of physics and chemistry. + +RESULTS OF THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if life resists all attempts to reduce +it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the +mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but +progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and +applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this +ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even +scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some +indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative attitude, and seek +to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only +vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to +a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena +irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to +be re-interpreted in terms of biology. + +"It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to +the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a +few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and +chemical world as we now conceive it--the world of atoms and +energy--will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will +stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure +mathematicians."[74] + +THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.--Not only physical and biological, but psychological +science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which +is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of +psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with +instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, +and of so-called "spiritualism." In none of these spheres can research +yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of +dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still +exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of +research in psychical regions which is practically a _terra incognita_. +And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in +their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may +bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems +is perhaps the right attitude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations +of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the +strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodés. It is extremely +difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses "mind" +from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a +comparatively insignificant "epiphenomenon" accompanying certain obscure +chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their +simplicity, will no longer cover the facts. + +PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.--One particular branch of experimental psychology, +which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few +remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the +existence of "disembodied spirits," human or otherwise. The whole +subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices +of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is +inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic +statements in any direction. + +What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of +various _phenomena_ which it is extremely difficult to explain in +accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of space, or of mental +action. + +The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over +the _explanation_ of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite +certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new +facts will force from conservative scientists is _a radical revision of +current notions of the range of human mental action_. The mind is +evidently capable of producing certain effects--even upon matter--which +would have seemed incredible a short while ago. + +So much is the least that may be expected. But in the view of many +competent and highly scientific observers, some far more radical +revision of our notions may be necessary. Some scientists of good repute +(e.g. Sir Oliver Lodge, in England, and Flammarion and others on the +Continent) are convinced that the facts can only adequately be explained +by reference to another world--interlocked, as it were, with this.[75] +And it has to be admitted that this, what may be called more "advanced" +explanation, is more in accordance than the other with a rather +universal tradition or assumption of mankind in all ages. + +It will be easily seen that the whole subject is one of the most extreme +difficulty. There is a general hesitancy in accepting what is called the +"spirit hypothesis," so long as any other can be found; a hesitancy +justified in view of the extreme complexity of the world we live in +(where so much is even yet unknown), and in view of the great difficulty +which there seems to be in adducing _exact_ proofs of the "spirit +theory." + +A REASONABLE ATTITUDE.--We shall, no doubt, be wise at present to refuse +to cry "Proven," and whilst admitting that all things are +possible--perhaps even probable--to await with patience the results of +further investigation. + +It has to be admitted that, while many people are superstitious and +easily attracted by picturesque theories, there are others who are as +prejudiced, in their way, against new ideas, as were those astronomers +who, being committed to Ptolemaic views, refused to look through +Galileo's telescope. It is not only theologians who have, in the history +of thought, been guilty of obscurantism. In the early days of hypnotic +experiments the scientific world in general "pooh-poohed" the idea of +hypnotism; and it took a considerable time before it would allow itself +to be convinced that such a thing was possible. Facts, in the end, were +too strong even for prejudice. It is facts, eventually, that decide +matters; and, no doubt, before a very long period has elapsed, +sufficient facts will have accumulated to allow the scientific world to +form more definite and better-grounded opinions than are possible +to-day. + +Meanwhile, the ordinary man will do well to remember that the universe +is really a very wonderful place, and that the knowledge of the wisest +of us about it can only be described as infinitesimal. The traditions of +nineteenth-century materialism are still strong amongst us, even with +those who are least conscious of them. But there are more things in +heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that philosophy. + +RESULTS.--These new conceptions of matter, of life, and of mind, which +are the products of the new physics, the new biology, and the new +psychology respectively, may be confidently left to themselves to work +out their own salvation. They have the strength of youth. What is +evident is that we have crossed the threshold of a new era in the +history of science. The outlook of the future will be as different from +that of the recent past as was the new science of Galileo, Descartes, +and Newton from the dogmatic but fanciful notions which the Scholastic +theologians had borrowed from Aristotle, and sought to impose as a +permanent revelation. + +The current of thought is never stayed. The future is obscure, but one +thing is certain, that the coming generations will see catastrophic +changes in the outlook of science; and the materialistic and mechanistic +_weltanschauung_, which lately seemed so formidable, may soon become as +superannuated as astrology. The theory which overshadowed the religious +life of a century, and which had become more and more menacing as +scientific knowledge increased in extent and popularity, has fallen into +discredit. Its prestige will not revive. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS + + +VALUE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--It may perhaps be felt that our +protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at +which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy +may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who +study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for +dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile +ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet +received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is +only too evident that, as the poet says: + + "Our little systems have their day, + They have their day, and cease to be." + +And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about +philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers, +indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in +the history of philosophy--such as Kant's _Critique of Pure +Reason_--which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress +(assuming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we +have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still +justified in assuming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting +nearer to the goal. + +But surely we are entitled to believe that it is not the crude appetite +for metaphysical dogma that attracts men to the history of philosophy. +Its fascination rather resembles that of the history of religion: both +are, as it were, Odysseys of the human spirit; nor is there any activity +of man that has not its appeal to the human heart: for _cor ad cor +loquitur_. + +And, again, we should reflect that those who ask for final conclusions, +forget that the _search_ for truth may be, in and for itself, of the +highest spiritual value. The best starting-point for the history of +philosophy is a famous passage from Lessing. + +"Not the truth which is at the disposal of every man, but the honest +pains he has taken to come at the truth make the worth of a man. For not +through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth do his powers +increase, and in this alone consists his ever-increasing perfection. +Possession makes us quiet, indolent, proud.... If God with all truth in +His right hand, and in His left the single, unceasing striving after +truth, even though coupled with the condition that I should ever and +always err, came to me and said, 'Choose!' I would in all humility clasp +this left hand and say, 'Father, give me this! Is not pure truth for +Thee alone?'"[76] + +But there is another respect in which some knowledge of the history of +thought may be an important advantage. It may not bestow upon us the +liberty of dogmatising ourselves, but it does bestow upon us a certain +imperturbability in the face of the dogmatisms of others. Airs of +systematic omniscience, "the pride of a pretended knowledge," will leave +us unimpressed and undismayed. The latest pretentious product of +popular philosophy will, in the majority of cases, be recognised as an +old heresy in a new garb; "new" thought will not impress (at least, by +its novelty) those who know that it is old. + +But it is against the crudities of materialistic naturalism that even a +slight acquaintance with the history of ideas will form an antidote. The +various exposures of it, from Hume and Kant to Bergson, will be to some +extent familiar; and it will be a recognised fact that its chief popular +attraction is at the same time its chief philosophic weakness; and this +is that it is nothing more or less than a systematisation of the +prejudices of common sense. "As a theory of first principles, the best +that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."[77] + +SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM HISTORY.--But, it may be asked, what definite +conclusions have the foregoing chapters to offer? Some, if we are not +mistaken, of a genuinely positive character. It will be necessary to +recall certain facts and reflections to the minds of our readers. + +In the early chapters we noted the rise of an independent science, and +the collapse of the medieval world view with which popular religious +notions were associated so closely, that many conservative thinkers +expected to see both involved in a common ruin. Science seemed to +threaten the existence of a religion bound up with conceptions of space +and of force which were being brought into discredit. + +These misgivings turned out, however, to be ill-founded. Certain +advantages, no doubt, of simplicity and definiteness, which had +belonged to the old notions, had been irrecoverably lost; but thinkers +like Giordano Bruno showed that the conception of an infinite universe +was by no means hostile to religion; but that, on the contrary, it might +be a conception of the highest spiritual value. Such are the sentiments +expressed in some sonnets which precede Bruno's dialogue "On the +Infinite Universe." + +"It seemed to Bruno as if he had never breathed freely until the limits +of the universe had been extended to infinity, and the fixed spheres had +disappeared. No longer now was there a limit to the flight of the +spirit, no 'so far and no further'; the narrow prison in which the old +beliefs had confined men's spirits had now to open its gates and let in +the pure air of a new life."[78] + +The scientific did not seem to him incompatible with a fundamentally +religious conception of the world, at least for those who were not +afraid "to take ship upon the seas of the infinite." + +DANGERS OF THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Thus it was not _science_ that was +hostile to religion. This was not the case until science began to be +associated with a certain fairly definite philosophy of a mechanistic, +and later of a materialist, description. Religion could not have +survived the final establishment of such a philosophy as this, for the +indispensable element in a religious attitude of life is the idea that +_somehow there lies behind things a power or essence that has something +in common with our own natures_--something that can, without an abuse of +language, be called personal. Any philosophy that rules out this idea +creates an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe. + +And it was just this atmosphere that the mechanistic view, unless +amplified by considerations of another kind (as it was e.g. in the case +of Spinoza) tended to create. + +THE "MECHANICAL VIEW" NEVER UNCHALLENGED.--And with regard to this +mechanistic philosophy, we have to observe that it never seems to have +commended itself, as a final and complete solution, to the best minds. +In the seventeenth century, it will be remembered, the mechanical +conception was transcended (though in entirely different ways) by +Spinoza and by Leibniz, and the religious consciousness of the age, in +the person of Pascal, protested against it. + +And although, during the eighteenth century, this philosophy persisted, +and was considerably reinforced (with the help of further discoveries in +the realm of physics) by the school of Holbach and Diderot, yet it had +still to face the radical criticism of Kant. This criticism, as we shall +remember, indicated that the mechanical view is a way in which the human +mind--owing to its constitution--regards phenomena. If it is to +understand them, the human mind cannot help viewing them in that +fashion; it must subject things to the mould in which all its thought is +cast. Mechanism is the _medium_ through which the mind understands +phenomena. It belongs not to the things in themselves, but to our way of +understanding them. And attached to this radical criticism of mechanical +notions, was an idealistic philosophy of the most genuinely religious +and spiritual character. Kantian idealism is one of those contributions +to human thought behind which we shall not again regress. It is a +phenomenon of incalculable value and importance. + +The immediate results of Kant's critical idealism was a luxuriant +growth of a spiritual type of philosophy upon the ground he had cleared +and prepared. Romanticism may be regarded as a revolt of those sides of +human nature upon which the tyranny of mechanism pressed +hardest--religion, speculation, poetry, music, art. "You may expel +nature with a pitchfork, but she persists in returning." The Horatian +remark is true also of the human mind; you may try to weed out religion +and poetry, but your success will only be temporary; for nature herself +is more persistent than the most earnest of materialists and (what is +more) she outlives him. + +And with regard to the materialist or mechanistic view, it is highly +interesting to note that its greatest attraction has consisted in +something which, strictly speaking, is not its own property. In the +eighteenth century in France, and in the nineteenth century in Germany +and England, the popularity of this view was derived from its altogether +illegitimate association with a high moral and social idealism, which +(it is only too evident) had been borrowed--without sufficient +acknowledgment--from the Christian tradition. The rather self-conscious +atheism (for instance) of Shelley or Byron--which they had presumably +derived from Diderot and his contemporaries--was less a denial of God +than an affirmation of the rights of humanity. This generous philosophy +of revolt from contemporary tyranny and pharisaism is atheistic only in +name. The callous and cynical powers, both political and ecclesiastical, +that were the object of their bitter attacks were the embodiments of +atheism, for "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the +Divine Being, e.g. love, wisdom, justice, are nothing."[79] + +THE PRESENT SITUATION.--During the nineteenth century the mechanical +view received some accession of strength owing to the reduction of +biology to what seemed like subjection. But, at the same time, an +idealistic philosophy had taken a strong hold in England, and towards +the end of the century critical students of scientific method cast doubt +upon the _finality_ of the mechanical view. They regarded it as +artificial, abstract, and symbolic only of reality. This critical +movement may be associated with the names of Mach, Boutroux, and +(perhaps above all) of Bergson. + +Moreover, towards the end of the century, a number of new facts in +physics, biology, and psychology came to light and tended to discredit +the mechanical view as a final explanation of reality. The +indestructibility of matter, even the conservation of energy and of mass +(corner stones of the mechanico-materialist view) began openly to be +questioned, not by metaphysicians, but by men of science themselves. The +foes of materialism were those of its own household.[80] + +Thus assailed from without by the philosophers, and from within by the +scientists themselves, the mechanical view, after a reign of three +centuries (disturbed though these may have been by successive +rebellions) seems destined to disappear. It may indeed subsist as an +approximate and convenient way of regarding reality, of which it will no +longer pretend to give an absolute and complete account. It will +continue to reign as a constitutional monarch, but the days of its +tyranny are at an end. And it is not unlikely that future generations +will look with surprise upon our respect for a theory which to them will +wear something of the same aspect as medieval astrology now presents to +ourselves. + +SOME DEDUCTIONS.--If the history of thought showed no other results than +the impaired prestige of naturalism, it would be worth attention and +study. The facts undoubtedly compromise that prestige, for history +indicates that at no period has naturalism been able to impose itself +permanently. If there has been a movement in that direction, it has +elicited a corresponding reaction. The human mind seems unable to remain +satisfied with the negations which systematised common sense seeks to +impose upon it. There is an instinctive appetite in humanity for a +spiritual view of things, and Sabatier was undoubtedly right in +observing that mankind is "incurably religious." Neither Hobbes, nor +Holbach, nor Büchner, with the best will in the world, can exorcise from +the human heart that instinct which seeks for itself personal relations +with the universe--which sees a mind behind phenomena. This is one of +those instincts of which it is true that the more you repress them the +more insurgent they become--they will have their way in the end. + +Thus naturalism, blind to the mutilation of our nature of which it is +guilty, is psychologically unsound. And yet, our nature is not so easily +mutilated after all. Naturalistic dogmatism has it in its power to +create an atmosphere which is unhealthy for religion, but that growth +has its roots too deep for it to be easily destroyed. Springing as it +does from the depths of our nature, it will prove as permanent as +humanity itself. + +This is not to deny that this type of dogmatism may do, as it actually +has done, a great deal of harm. A plant may be strong and vigorous, but +under unceasing bitter weather, it will tend to become discouraged. +Otherwise it would not be worth while to write criticisms of naturalism. + +FREEDOM.--Perhaps the best service we can do is to protest against +indulging an appetite for negative dogmatism. Such an attitude is a +negation of the freedom of thought. And it is in an atmosphere of +freedom that both religion and science flourish best. A hard and fast +naturalistic outlook may prove, and actually has proved, an incubus from +which even scientists themselves may pray to be delivered. + +Nor has religion always enjoyed that full measure of freedom which is +indispensable to its vigorous life. The curious and sad fact is that the +human mind seems to delight in creating prisons for itself. The +scientific spirit created a mechanico-materialistic scheme which has +ended by becoming the enemy of scientific research, and which (besides +this) asks, as a sacrifice, the mutilation of our spiritual instincts. + +And so with religion. The religious instinct (like the scientific) tends +to create its prisons. The pride of, a pretended knowledge reduces to a +mechanical scheme the mysteries of life and death; it provides +superficial standardised solutions for the problems of existence. + +Of course, it is clear enough, that in religion as in science, we +cannot, even if we would, start each of us from the beginning. We have +to accept and to revere the riches of knowledge and experience +accumulated by those who have gone before. And yet, in religion as in +science, life consists in movement; we must go forward. The past may be +an inspiration, but it must not be the limit of our thought, or it +becomes an incubus. The glance must be forward not backward; the stream +flows, and we are borne on its bosom. Humanity, like an explorer, has +its face set towards the unknown. Both science and religion are children +of freedom, without which the creative spirit in man is crushed. + +And here, with this note of warning (though perhaps rather of +encouragement) we may close. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] _The Grammar of Science_, pp. 12, 13. + +[2] Ptolemy of Alexandria: 127-151 A.D. + +[3] J. M. Heald in art. "Aquinas" in _Encyclopædia of Religion and +Ethics_. + +[4] Monks and theologians were betrayed into some controversial +asperities. "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven" +formed the appropriate text for a sermon by a Dominican. + +[5] In spite of this, however, Descartes' works, in 1663, appeared in +the Index of forbidden books: and his doctrines were banned by Royal +decree from the French universities. Jesuit influences, which were not +at all favourable to _native_ religion in France (or elsewhere!), may +have been responsible for this obscurantist policy. + +[6] Merz, _History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_, Vol. +I, p. 384. + +[7] Quoted by Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, p. 4. + +[8] Höffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 315. + +It may set the scruples of some at rest to be reminded that Aquinas +himself applied the term _Natura Naturans_ to God as the cause of all +existence. Eckhart and Bruno had made a similar application of it (cf. +Martineau, _Study of Spinoza_, p. 226). + +[9] Here we may note, by way of an anticipation, a truth that Kant +afterwards was the first to grasp clearly: that it is only when the +mechanism of phenomena is proved, that religion can be purged of +materialism. + +[10] Cf. letter to Arnauld, quoted by Höffding, I, p. 347: "The +substantial unity presupposes a complete, indivisible being. Nothing of +this kind is to be found in figure or motion ... but only in a soul or a +substantial form similar to that which we call an 'I.'" + +[11] The _Monadology_ (quoted by Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 180). + +[12] Inge, _Christian Mysticism_, p. 19. + +[13] Cf. "With space the universe encloses me and engulfs me like an +atom, but with thought I enclose the universe." A great saying. + +[14] Novalis called him "the God-intoxicated": a bold phrase. + +[15] We refer, of course, to the promulgation of the Bull _Unigenitus_, +procured from Pope Clement XI by the Jesuits; when their opponents, the +Jansenists "of all professions and classes, were subjected to +imprisonment, confiscation, and every species of oppression" (Jervis, +_Student's History of France_, p. 415). + +The manoeuvre is characterised by another historian as a "struggle of +narrow-minded fanaticism, allied to absolutely unscrupulous political +ambition, against all the learning and virtue which the French clergy +still possessed" (Chamberlain, _Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_, +Vol. II, p. 379). + +[16] Even before the age of the Revolution, Paris possessed many great +schools. The _Collège de France_ was founded in 1530; there was the +_College et École de Chirurgie_, the _Jardin des Plantes_, the _École +royale des Mines_, etc. (cf. Merz, _History of European Thought_, Vol. +I, p. 107). + +[17] Merz says of Newton: "In his own country that fruitful +co-operation which can only be secured by an academic organisation and +by endowment of research was wanting" (I, p. 99). As late as 1740 the +whole revenue of the Royal Society was only £232 _per annum_. + +[18] Morley, _Voltaire_, p. 41. + +[19] He published his _Élémens de la Philosophie de Newton_ in 1738. + +[20] Höffding, Vol. I, p. 481. + +[21] See note in Merz, Vol. I, p. 145. + +[22] Merz, Vol. I, p. 143. + +[23] The receipt and perusal of Rousseau's _Emile_, are said to have +interrupted the walk on one occasion, to the great astonishment of the +Königsbergers. + +[24] Pringle Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 26. + +[25] "Atheism is aristocratic," was the reply of Robespierre to one who +mocked at his _Être Suprême_. + +[26] _Confessions_, Book XII. + +[27] Höffding, Vol. II, p. 9. + +[28] Fichte's word is _Anschauung_, for which the English language +possesses no exact equivalent. It "implies something akin, though +perhaps superior to, seeing or perceiving by means of the senses," and +it approaches less closely to "inspiration" than does the English word +"intuition." The term acquired a meaning somewhat akin to the _amor +intellectualis Dei_ of Spinoza, which we have met before. (See note in +Merz, III, p. 445.) + +[29] William James, _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 92. + +[30] Here again a certain ambiguity surrounds the German word. _Geist_ +is inadequately translated by either "mind" or "spirit": it comprises +the meaning of both words (cf. Merz, III, p. 466). + +[31] This does not mean that what is not good enough for philosophy is +good enough for religion. The idea behind Schleiermacher is that what +philosophy cannot sanction, religious experience _can_ sanction. And it +has to be remembered that, as a follower of Kant, he assigned very +definite limits to the powers of philosophy. He was not an +Hegelian--Hegel's and Schleiermacher's views of the religious problem +are quite incompatible--the one believed, the other did not believe, +that reason could solve that problem. + +[32] Kopp, _Geschichte der Chemie_, Vol. I, p. 442 (quoted by Merz, Vol. +I, p. 191). + +[33] Merz, Vol. I, p. 218. + +[34] According to one authority (Judd, in his _Coming of Evolution_) the +number of known species of plants and animals must be placed at 600,000 +(p. 10). + +[35] _Vestiges of Creation_, published anonymously in 1844, passed +through nine large editions by 1853. The author was Robert Chambers +(1802-71), a geologist. + +[36] _Life and Letters_, Vol. I, p. 168 (_vide_ Judd, _Coming of +Evolution_, p. 89). + +[37] As a matter of fact, biologists soon demanded more than even +Lyell's geology could give them. Recent discoveries about the nature of +matter have, however, further extended the possible age of our planet. + +[38] Darwin, _Life_, Vol. I, p. 93. + +[39] "If we wish to fix a definite point to describe as the end of the +idealistic period in Germany, no such distinctive event offers itself as +the French Revolution of July, 1830" (Lange, _History of Materialism_, +E.T., Vol. II, p. 245). + +[40] A famous book which, though negative in its conclusions, places its +author alongside Schleiermacher as one of the founders of the modern +science of Religious Psychology. + +[41] Balfour, _Theism and Humanism_, p. 36. + +[42] "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation +of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent +homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the +retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." + +[43] Spencer confessed that of the _Synthetic Philosophy_ "two volumes +are missing," the two important volumes on Inorganic Evolution, leading +to the evolution of the living and of the non-living (cf. criticisms by +Professor James Ward in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, Lecture IX). + +[44] For an instance of the masterly work turned out by this school and +of the attractiveness of their propaganda, read Huxley's lecture, "On a +Piece of Chalk," delivered to the working men of Norwich during the +meeting of the British Association in 1868. + +[45] For this famous encounter, see _Life of Huxley_, Vol. I, pp. +179-89, and _Life of J. R. Green_, pp. 44, 45. + +[46] As we shall subsequently find, this cosmic pessimism is less well +grounded than Huxley believed. Still, Spencer's own scientific +presuppositions were the same as Huxley's, so that the passage remains a +pertinent criticism of the Evolutionary Philosophy as elaborated by him. + +[47] It is instructive to observe that a similar note of latent +pessimism is struck by the last notable survivor of the School we have +endeavoured to describe. Viscount Morley at the end of his +_Recollections_ (1917), questioned as to the outcome of those generous +hopes entertained with such confidence by his contemporaries, is +compelled to ejaculate with philosophic brevity, _circumspice_, as he +contemplates a spectacle of unparalleled horror. + +[48] Storr, _Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century_, +p. 329. See which book for a valuable chapter upon Coleridge. + +[49] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 98. + +[50] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 309. + +[51] For this summary of Lotze's doctrine, see Merz, Vol. III, p. 615 +and ff. + +[52] Quoted by Ward in _Pluralism and Theism_, p. 103. For a brief yet +adequate treatment of Mach's criticisms see Höffding's _Modern +Philosophers_, pp. 115-21. + +[53] R. B. Perry, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 351. + +[54] It is impossible to go deeper into James' "theory of knowledge" +without using technical language. A few of his own phrases, however, may +help to elucidate things. "Abstract concepts ... are salient aspects of +our concrete experiences which we find it useful to single out" +(_Meaning of Truth_, p. 246). + +Elsewhere he speaks of them as things we have learned to "cut out" from +experience, as "flowers gathered," and as "moments dipped out from the +stream of time" (_A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 235). + +I owe these quotations to Perry, op. cit. + +[55] _Creative Evolution_, p. 325. + +[56] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 237. + +[57] _Creative Evolution_, p. 174. + +[58] i.e. Intellect is not (as it is generally represented to be) a +developed form of instinct, nor instinct an embryonic form of intellect. + +[59] The extraordinary and miraculous phenomena of instinct--especially +as celebrated by the distinguished French scientist Fabre--cannot be +rightly understood by trying to interpret them in terms of intellect. +This is to misread them completely. + +[60] Bergson's characterisation of Spencerian Evolutionism (_Creative +Evolution_, p. 391). + +[61] _Creative Evolution_, p. 286. + +[62] Other notable pluralists in England are F. C. S. Schiller and Dr. +MacTaggart. + +[63] The _logical_ conclusion, we say, though this may not be the +ultimate truth about the matter. The most attractive theories are often +the most superficial. + +[64] Professor Cunningham in Pearson's _Grammar of Science_, Part I, p. +356. + +[65] Quoted by W. C. D. Whetham in his _Recent Development of Physical +Science_, p. 280. No reference is given by him. + +[66] One theory attributes the existence of matter to occasional misfits +among these grains. + +[67] Quoted by Bishop Mercer. _Problem of Creation_, Appendix B. + +[68] In _Theism and Humanism_. + +[69] Mercer, op. cit., p. 106. + +[70] _Mechanism, Life, and Personality_ (1913), p. 81. + +[71] Op. cit. pp. 64, 66. + +[72] Professor J. Arthur Thomson, in an article entitled, "Is there one +Science of Nature?" (_Hibbert Journal_, Oct., 1911). + +[73] _The Science and Philosophy of the Organism_, Vol. II, p. 338. + +[74] Op. cit. p. 101. + +[75] Other names of distinguished scientists holding this view are: Sir +W. Crookes the Physicist and Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S., in England, Dr. +Hodgson and Prof. James Hyslop in America, Lombroso in Italy, Richet in +France. + +[76] From his _Duplik_. Quoted by Höffding, _History of Philosophy_, +Vol. II, p. 21. + +[77] F. H. Bradley on "Phenomenalism" (_Appearance and Reality_, p. +126). + +[78] Höffding, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 129. + +[79] Feuerbach, _Essence of Christianity_, p. 21. + +[80] We now learn that conceptions of space of a highly unorthodox +character are entertained by physicists and mathematicians, as the +result of recent researches in the sphere of the gravitation of light. + + + + +INDEX + + + Agnosticism, 92 + + Anti-clericalism, 43 + + Aquinas, 9 f., 30 _n._ + + Aristotle, 8, 136 + + Atomic theory, the, 49 + collapse of, 126 + + + Bacon, Lord, 16 f. + + Balfour, A. J., 105 f., 110, 128 + + Bergson, 115-121, 143 + + Berkeley, 55 + + Boutroux, 112 f., 143 + + Bradley, F. H., 104 f., 110, 122, 139 + + Bruno, 12, 25, 29 f., 140 + + Büchner, 86, 144 + + Buffon, 77 + + + Carlyle, Thomas, 38, 99-102 + + Coleridge, S. T., 98 f. + + Comte, 85, 89, 92 + + Copernicus, 11, 22, 25, 58 + + Cunningham, Prof., 127 + + Cusanus, 10 + + + Dalton, 49, 83, 126 + + Darwin, 80-83, 87 f. + + Descartes, 19-22, 26, 37, 43, 55, 74, 136 + + Design, Argument from, 87 f. + + Diderot, 45 f., 48, 141, 144 + + Driesch, 130 f. + + + Eckhart, 30 _n._ + + Encyclopædia, The, 45 + + Electrons, 126 + + + Feuerbach, 85, 95 + + Fichte, 65-67 + + + Galileo, 12-15, 22, 55, 79, 136 + + Goethe, 30, 65 + + Green, T. H., 103 f. + + + Haeckel, 88 + + Haldane, Prof. J. S., 129, 132 + + Harvey, William, 19, 22 + + Hegel, 67-70 + + Heine, 85 + + Helmholtz, 75 + + Hobbes, 22, 26, 43, 55, 144 + + Holbach, 46-48, 141, 144 + + Hume, 55 f., 58 + + Huxley, 92 f., 95 + + + Inge, 38 _n._ + + + James, William, 114 f., 123 + + Jansenists, the, 43 _n._ + + Jesuits, the, 22 _n._, 26, 37, 43 _n._ + + Johnson, Dr., 47 + + + Kant, 53-61, 66, 70, 77, 85, 137, 141 + and Hegel compared, 69 + and Locke compared, 57 + and Rousseau compared, 65 + + Kepler, 15 + + + Lamarck, 77 + + La Mettrie, 45, 48, 74 + + Lange, 47, 84 + + Laplace, 48 f. + + Larmor, Prof. J., 127 + + Lavoisier, 49 f. + + Leibniz, 33-36, 41, 52 f., 122, 141 + + Leonardo da Vinci, 14, 16, 132 + + Lessing, 138 + + Locke, 52 f., 55 f. + + Lodge, Sir O., 134 + + Lotze, 107-109 + + Lyell, 78-80 + + + Mach, 110-114, 143 + + Malthus' _Essay on Population_, 80 + + Meyer, 75 + + McTaggart, 123 _n._ + + Modernism, 109 + + Monads, 35 f., 122 + + + "Natural Selection," 81, 87 + + Newton, 23-26, 43, 44 _n._, 48, 82, 136 + + Nietzsche, 94, 96 f. + + + Paley, 87 + + Pascal, 22, 36-41 + + Pearson, Prof. Karl, 1 + + Pessimism, 95 + + Positivism, 85, 95 + + + Ritschl, 109 + + Rousseau, 54 _n._, 62-65, 80 + + + _Sartor Resartus_, 100 + + Schelling, 65 + + Schiller, 65 + + Schiller, F. C. S., 123 _n._ + + Schleider, 75 + + Schleiermacher, 70-72 + + Spencer, Herbert, 35, 77, 89-92, 122 + + Spinoza, 28-33, 41, 52 f., 67, 141 + + "Spiritualism," 133-136 + + Stephen, Leslie, 92 + + + Tait, Prof., 128 + + Thomson, Prof. J. A., 130 _n._ + + + Voltaire, 44 f. + + + Wallace, Alfred Russell, 81 f. + + Ward, Prof. James, 26 _n._, 91 _n._, 123 + + Whöler, 74 + + + Zeno's paradox, 117 + + + + + Printed in Great Britain at + _The Mayflower Press, Plymouth._ William Brandon & Son, Ltd. + + + + +TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: + + +Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_. + +Punctuation has been corrected without note. + +Spelling, grammatical and typographical errors have been corrected in +the text: + + Page 68: "understand" changed to "understands" + Page 70: "fom" changed to "from" + Page 128: "subjectly" changed to "subjectively" + Page 138: "Odyssies" changed to "Odysseys" + +Inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the +original. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Religion and Science, by John Charlton Hardwick + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + +***** This file should be named 35772-8.txt or 35772-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/7/7/35772/ + +Produced by David E. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Religion and Science + From Galileo to Bergson + +Author: John Charlton Hardwick + +Release Date: April 5, 2011 [EBook #35772] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + + + + +Produced by David E. Brown, Bryan Ness and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><strong>RELIGION AND SCIENCE</strong></span></p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge">RELIGION AND SCIENCE</span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="big">FROM GALILEO TO BERGSON</span></p> +<p> </p> +<p class="center">BY</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="big">JOHN CHARLTON HARDWICK</span></p> + +<p class="blockquot">"Philosophy will always be hard, and what it promises even in the end is +no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its +certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of +the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its +unity and worth."</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">F. H. Bradley</span>, <i>Essays in Truth and Reality</i>, p. 106.<br /></p> +<p> </p> +<p class="center">LONDON</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="big">SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE</span></p> + +<p class="center">NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.</p> + +<p class="center">1920</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> +<p class="center">TO</p> +<p class="center">MY FATHER</p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge">PREFACE</span></p> + + +<p>The chapters which follow are not intended as even a slight sketch of +the history of Thought since the Renaissance. Their object is more +modest, i.e. to illustrate the thesis that mankind, being "incurably +religious," insists (however hopeless the enterprise may sometimes seem) +upon interpreting the universe spiritually.</p> + +<p>Thus it is quite natural that only a few typical names should find their +places here: and often no sufficient reason may appear for one being +included rather than another. For instance, in the tenth chapter, T. H. +Green, F. H. Bradley, and A. J. Balfour are mentioned, while Martineau +and the Cairds are passed over. Needless to say, there was no doctrinal +prejudice here. Again, in the fourth chapter, Pascal is dealt with at +some length, but Boehme, an equally important thinker, is ignored. And +so on.</p> + +<p>I should like to acknowledge here my obligation to Dr. Mercer, Canon of +Chester, for his advice upon books, especially with regard to material +for the final chapters. Also to the Rev. H. D. A. Major, Principal of +Ripon Hall, for suggestions about the general plan of the book; and to +the Rev. E. Harvey (a mathematical graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, +at present studying medicine) for valuable information about the present +position of psychic research.</p> + +<p class="right">J. C. H.<br /></p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 1em;"><span class="smcap">Altringham</span>, <i>March 23rd, 1920</i>.</span><br /></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="5" summary="table"> +<tr><td align="center"><span class="huge"><strong>CONTENTS</strong></span></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_I"><strong>CHAPTER I</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">INTRODUCTORY</td> + <td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Religion and Science defined. "Accurate and systematic knowledge" necessarily affects our "attitude to life." Can +our systematised knowledge sanction a religious attitude? This the "religious problem." Religious harmony of Middle Ages. Will it return?</td> + <td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_II"><strong>CHAPTER II</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">The old World-Scheme described. Aquinas and Scholasticism. +Cusanus criticises conventional ideas of space. The +New Astronomy of Copernicus. Bruno and an infinite +universe. Galileo's telescope. The New Physics and an +automatic universe. The New Logic.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_III"><strong>CHAPTER III</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">The New Science creates a New Philosophy. Universality +of Mechanics. Importance of Harvey's discovery. Descartes +extends the mechanical theory to cover physiology and psychology. +Hobbes and a naturalistic ethic. Newton extends the +operation of law from the earth to the heavens. Religious +attitude of these thinkers. Significance of their thought.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV"><strong>CHAPTER IV</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">A Law of Thought. Spinoza. A Mechanical Universe +spiritually interpreted. <i>Natura Naturans</i>, what it means. +The <i>Ethics</i>. Spinoza's mysticism. His personality. Leibniz +and a philosophy of personality. His monads. Pascal. His +significance. <i>The Pensées.</i> The eternal protest of religion. +Man defies the universe. Results.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_28">28</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_V"><strong>CHAPTER V</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Anti-clericalism in eighteenth-century France. Voltaire's +propaganda. Diderot and the Encyclopædists. Holbach's +<i>System of Nature</i>. Laplace's astronomy. Lavoisier and the +New Chemistry. Dalton's atomic theory. Results for religion.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI"><strong>CHAPTER VI</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Importance, for the mechanical view, of Locke's theory of +knowledge. Weakness of speculative philosophy. Rise of the +"critical" philosophy. Kant. He seeks to solve the problem: +How is knowledge possible? Kant's view of the mind's +function in knowledge. Mechanism a "form of thought," +subjective not objective. Kant's view of reality. Can we +know reality? The two worlds.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII"><strong>CHAPTER VII</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Kant clears the ground for a new philosophy. Significance +of Rousseau. His attitude to culture. The new philosophy in +Germany, its goal. Fichte. Hegel a rationalistic-romanticist. +His method. Hegelianism. Significance for religious thought +of Schleiermacher. The autonomy of religion and religious +experience.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII"><strong>CHAPTER VIII</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">MECHANISM AND LIFE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Rise of bio-chemistry and bio-physics in Germany. Significance +of these movements. The Origin of Species. Lamarck. +The new geology. Darwin. Results of his theory.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_74">74</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX"><strong>CHAPTER IX</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">Early decline of Romanticism in Germany. Comte and the +"positive" philosophy. Materialism in Germany. Darwinism +and the "argument from design." Haeckel. Spencerian +evolutionism. Spencer's moral idealism. His philosophy of +religion. Agnosticism. Rise of philosophic pessimism. +Significance of Nietzsche.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_84">84</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_X"><strong>CHAPTER X</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">German idealism naturalised in England by Coleridge and +Carlyle. These writers described. <i>Sartor Resartus.</i> Idealism +at Oxford, T. H. Green. F. H. Bradley. Balfour's plea for a +philosophy of science. Revival of Idealism in Germany. +Lotze. His view of "values" and reality.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI"><strong>CHAPTER XI</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">A new philosophy of Science. Mach on "Economy of +Thought." "Abstractness" and artificiality of scientific +method. Boutroux and natural law. James' view of the +mind carried further by Bergson. His view of the intellect. +What it can, and what it cannot, do for us. Intuition. +Indeterminism and Pluralism. Leibniz revived. Ward's +philosophy of personality.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_110">110</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII"><strong>CHAPTER XII</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">The "New" Physics. New theories of matter. The "New" +Biology. Driesch and neo-vitalism. The "New" Psychology. +"Spiritualism." The outlook for the future.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> + +<tr><td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII"><strong>CHAPTER XIII</strong></a></td></tr> +<tr><td align="center">SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS</td></tr> +<tr><td class="dent">History of Thought supplies no material for dogmatising. +Yet a progress of ideas is evident. Permanency of "spiritual" +view of reality. Its continual revival. Sabatier's saying. +Need of freedom, alike for religion and for science.</td> +<td valign="bottom" align="right"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td></tr></table> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><strong><a name="RELIGION_AND_SCIENCE" id="RELIGION_AND_SCIENCE"></a>RELIGION AND SCIENCE</strong></span></p> +<p> </p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</span></p> + +<p class="center">INTRODUCTORY. RELIGION AND SCIENCE</p> +<p> </p> + +<p>Numerous attempts to define religion have made it evident that religion +is indefinable. We may, however, say this much about it, that religion +is <i>an attitude towards life</i>: a way of looking at existence. It is +true that this definition is too wide, and includes things which are not +religion—there are certain attitudes to life which are definitely +anti-religious—that of the materialist, for instance. However, it will +serve a purpose, and we can improve upon it as we proceed. It is a +mistake to put too much faith in definitions: at any rate it is better +to have our definitions (if have them we must) too wide than too narrow.</p> + +<p>Science is, fortunately, much easier to define. <i>Accurate and systematic +knowledge</i> is what we mean by science—knowledge about anything, +provided that the facts are (so far as possible) accurately described +and systematically classified. Professor Karl Pearson, the highest +authority on the principles of scientific method and theory, writes:</p> + +<p>"The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their +mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the +past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, +to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of +a worm, or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus. It is not facts +themselves which make science, but the method by which they are dealt +with. The material of science is co-extensive with the whole physical +universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past +history and the past history of all life therein. When every fact, every +present or past phenomenon of that universe, every phase of present or +past life therein, has been classified, and co-ordinated with the rest, +then the mission of science will be completed."<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>Science, then, is systematic and accurate knowledge; and when we have +systematic and accurate knowledge about everything there is to be known, +the programme of science will be complete. This is only to say that the +task it has set itself is one that will never end.</p> + +<p>So much, then, for our definitions. Religion is "an attitude to life": +science is "systematic and accurate knowledge." How does the one affect +the other? What are the relations between the two? That is the topic +which will occupy our attention during the chapters that follow. To +answer the question properly will involve a certain amount of +acquaintance with the history of ideas. We must first put the +preliminary question: How, as a matter of fact, have men's scientific +ideas affected their religious ideas (or <i>vice versa</i>) in times past? +Having tried to answer this question, we shall be in a better position +to approach the religious problem as it presents itself to-day.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile a few remarks of a general character will not be out of place.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +It is evident that "science" can hardly fail to affect "religion." +Systematised knowledge necessarily affects an individual's (or a +society's) attitude to life—either by broadening and elevating that +attitude, or by debasing it. Our knowledge, or what we believe to be +such, tends to create certain preconceptions which make our minds +hostile to certain beliefs or ideas. A man reared from his cradle on +mechanical science will tend to regard miracles with suspicion; if he be +logical (as he generally is not) freedom of the will, even in the most +limited sense, will appear chimerical. Nor will his general attitude to +life remain unaffected by his views on these points.</p> + +<p>Systematised knowledge may thus conceivably come into conflict with the +presuppositions or the ideals of some particular religion. It is then +that a "religious problem" arises. A religion indissolubly associated +with a geocentric conception of the universe would tend to become +discredited as soon as that conception had been disposed of by +"systematic knowledge." Science may even tend to produce an attitude to +life hostile not only to a particular religion but to <i>all</i> religion. If +materialism should ultimately be found to be consistent with systematic +and accurate knowledge, it is difficult to see how any attitude to life +which could be appropriately described as "religion" could survive. The +religious problem would then, at any rate, cease to trouble us. The +religious apologists would be free to turn their attention to matters of +more moment. But it is not only with the cessation of religion that the +religious problem slumbers. There are certain happy periods when +religion flourishes undisturbed by obstinate questionings. These +classical ages of religion exist when systematised knowledge seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +support the contemporary religious outlook—when science and religion +speak with one voice. Such unanimity seems to us to-day too good to be +possible, but that is only because our own age is exceptional—not +because those happier ages were exceptional; they, in fact—if we trace +history backwards—would seem rather to have been the rule.</p> + +<p>Primitive man, it would seem, was troubled by no discords of the kind +which disturb our peace. His systematic knowledge—such as it was—was +entirely in accord with his religion, the two were, in fact, in his case +practically one. His science <i>was</i> his religion. It may not have been +very sound science, nor very elevated religion, but it served his +purpose admirably. He was too busy with the struggle for survival to +indulge in speculation. His religion was severely practical, and he was +faithful to it because experience seemed to indicate that it paid.</p> + +<p>But the Stone Age hardly deserves (in spite of its freedom from +religious difficulties) to be described as one of the classical ages of +religion; absence of struggle does not necessarily mean richness of +life. There are ages which better deserve that appellation. There are +times when all existing culture—even of a high level—is closely +associated with the current religion, endorses its ideals, sanctions its +hopes, puts the stamp of finality upon its faith. Such an age cannot +perhaps hope to be permanent; for life means movement, and movement +upsets equilibrium, and human knowledge tends to increase faster than +the human mind can adapt itself to it or digest it. But such ages are +looked back upon with regret when they are past, they shed a golden +radiance over history, their tradition lingers, they even leave behind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +them monuments of art and literature which are the wonder, and the +inimitable models, of succeeding generations.</p> + +<p>Such an epoch was that which left to us our Gothic cathedrals. These are +the creation of one of those classic ages "when all existing culture is +cast or bent in obedience to the religious idea." When scientist, +scholar and ecclesiastic spoke with one voice and listened to one +message; when prince and peasant worshipped together the same +divinities; when to be outside the religious community was to be cut off +from the brotherhood of mankind. "The Church" was then co-extensive with +civilisation: those without the fold were barbarians, hardly worthy of +the name of man.</p> + +<p>That time of splendid harmony, however, is now past; no lamentations +will restore it. We have reached another world.</p> + +<p>But it need not remain only a memory; it ought also to serve as an +inspiration. The conditions of affairs during the classic ages of +religion, however impossible at the moment, must remain our ideal. Head +and heart must some day speak again with one voice, our hopes and +beliefs must be consistent with our knowledge. Science must sanction +that attitude towards existence which our highest instincts dictate.</p> + +<p>It is only too likely that this consummation is yet distant. Yet even if +our generation has to reconcile itself to spiritual and moral discord, +it should never overlook the existence of a happier ideal, and even the +possibility of its fulfilment. Fortunately for the interests of +religion, men feel they <i>must</i> effect some kind of a reconciliation +between the opposing demands which proceed from different sides of their +nature. Each for himself tries to approximate science and religion, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +the struggle to do this creates in each individual spiritual life. +Tension sometimes creates light, and struggle engenders life. So long as +there are men sufficiently <i>interested</i> in religion to ask for a +solution of its problems, religion will remain superior to the +disintegration towards which all discord, if unchecked, proceeds.</p> + +<p>It is sometimes said that the religious harmony of the Middle Ages, of +which we have spoken, having been due to imperfect knowledge, is never +likely to repeat itself, unless we sink back into the ignorance of +barbarism: and (it is urged) we know too much to be at peace. Having +tasted of the fruits of knowledge, the human race is cast forth from its +Paradise. This view is unduly pessimistic. There is no valid reason for +excluding the possibility that our knowledge of reality and those ideal +hopes which constitute our religion may actually coincide. Religion and +science, approaching the problem of existence from contrary directions, +may independently arrive at an identical solution. That the two actually +do attack the enigma from different sides has led many people to regard +the two as hostile forces. Such is not the case. Religion and science +regard reality from different angles, but it is the same reality that is +the object of their vision, and the goal of their search.</p> + +<p>Religion looks at existence as a whole, and attempts to determine its +meaning and value for mankind. Religion, we may say, stands at the +centre of existence, and regards reality from a central position.</p> + +<p>The province of science, on the other hand, is not to take so wide a +survey, but to gain knowledge piece-meal: to locate points inductively, +and thus to plot out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> the curve which we believe existence constitutes. +If the <i>loci</i>, as they are successively fixed, seem to indicate that the +curve is identical with the circle which religion has already +intuitively postulated, the problem of existence would have been solved. +Science and religion working by different methods would have described +the same circle. When science has completed its circle, its centre may +be found to stand just at the point where religion has always +confidently declared it to be. Knowledge and faith will then, and not +till then, be one.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</span></p> + +<p class="center">THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS</p> +<p> </p> + +<p>We have seen that there are classic religious periods when faith and +knowledge have seemed to approximate to one another. The Middle Ages in +Europe constituted such a period; no "Religion <i>v.</i> Science" controversy +could then be said to exist; the best scientific knowledge of the time +seemed to sanction the popular religious notions. Learned and lay +thought in the same terms; the wolf lay down with the lamb.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Old World-Scheme.</span>—It is important to grasp the main features of a +world-scheme which as late as the fifteenth century passed everywhere +without criticism.</p> + +<p>The father of it was Aristotle. His conception of the universe rested +upon the plain contrast, which strikes the unsophisticated observer, +between the unembarrassed and regular movements of the heavenly bodies +and the disordered agitations of sublunary things. Hence the heavenly +region was eternal, and the region of earth transitory: yonder, the +motions that take place are eternal and regular; here, motion and rest +alternate, nothing "continueth in one stay."</p> + +<p>At the centre of the universe stands Earth: hence we mount through three +sublunary strata to the region of the celestial ether, which is purer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> +as distance from the Earth increases.</p> + +<p>These strata form three concentric "spheres" which, solid yet +transparent (like crystal), revolve around the earth. The first contains +the moon—like a fly in amber; the second, the sun; the third, the fixed +stars; which last sphere is also the first of several successive +heavens, the highest of which is the seat of Deity.</p> + +<p>This Aristotelio-Ptolemaic system<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> formed a coherent framework for +biblical world-notions. Here too, earth stands still while sun and stars +revolve; here, too, the seat of Deity is the highest heaven. This was an +universe where men could feel their feet on firm ground; their minds +found rest in those simple and definite notions which make religious +conceptions easy to understand and accept; their imaginations were not +yet disturbed and disquieted by thoughts of space and time without end +and without beginning.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Aquinas.</span>—Such was the "world of nature," the theatre for that "world of +grace" which Revelation spoke of, and which led eventually to the +eternal "world of glory" in which the faithful should have their +portion. <i>Natura</i>, <i>gratia</i>, <i>gloria</i> was the ascending series (like +another set of celestial spheres), and the whole economy was elaborated +into a logical system, known to the historians of thought as +Scholasticism: a philosophy which found its most perfect and memorable +expression in Thomas Aquinas (1227-74), the <i>doctor angelicus</i> of +Catholic theology, canonised less than fifty years after his death. The +<i>Summa Philosophica</i>, where Aquinas deals with the rational foundations +of a Christian Theism, and the <i>Summa Theologica</i>, where he erects his +elaborate structure of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> theology and ethics, together constitute "one of +the most magnificent monuments of the human intellect, dwarfing all +other bodies of theology into insignificance."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In him the erudition +of an epoch found its spokesman; he was the personification of an +intellectual ideal. To his contemporaries he stood beyond the range of +criticism. In the <i>Paradiso</i> (x.8.2) it is St. Thomas who speaks in +heaven.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the Scholastic world-scheme, though based on "the evidence +of the senses, the investigations of antiquity, and the authority of the +Church," and though Aquinas had set the seal of finality upon it, was +destined to gradual discredit and ultimate extinction.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Disintegration Begins.</span>—It was open to attack on two sides. <i>Either</i> +observations or calculations might be brought forward, conflicting with +it, or making another conception possible or probable: <i>Or</i> the validity +of conventional ideas of space might be disputed.</p> + +<p>The latter type of criticism was the first to occur. Nicholas Cusanus +(1401-1464), an inhabitant of the Low Countries, subsequently bishop and +cardinal, developed unconventional notions about Space. He suggested +that wherever man finds himself—on earth, sun, or star—he will always +regard himself as standing at the centre of existence. There is, in +fact, no point in the universe which might not appropriately be called +its centre, and to say that the earth stands at the centre is only (what +we should now call it) an anthropomorphism. So much for <i>place</i>; and +similarly with <i>motion</i>. Here, too, there is no absolute standard to +apply:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> motion may exist, but be unnoticed if there be no spot at +absolute rest from which to take bearings.</p> + +<p>"We are like a man in a boat sailing with the stream, who does not know +that the water is flowing, and who cannot see the banks: how is he to +discover whether the boat is moving?" Cusanus, in fact, denies the +fundamental Aristotelian dogma that the earth is the central point of +the universe, because, on general grounds, there <i>can</i> be no absolute +central point. This gave a shock to the "geocentric theory" from which +it never recovered.</p> + +<p>Worse shocks, however, were to come. The name of the man who actually +(as Luther complained) turned the world upside down, is notorious +enough. Poles and Germans alike have claimed the nationality of Nicolaus +Copernicus (1473-1543); who, having been a student at Cracow and in +Italy, became a prebendary in Frauenburg Cathedral.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Astronomy.</span>—The general criticisms of Cusanus were elaborated by +Copernicus. The senses cannot inform us (when any motion takes place) +<i>what</i> it is that moves. It may be the thing perceived that moves, or +the percipient—or both. And it would be <i>possible</i> to account for the +movements of celestial bodies by the supposition that it is the earth +that moves, and not they. Copernicus' whole work consisted in the +mathematical demonstration that this hypothesis could account for the +phenomena as we observe them. In fact, when these demonstrations were +eventually published (it was only on his death-bed that Copernicus +received a copy of his book—and he had already lost consciousness) they +were introduced by a discreet preface, which intimated that the whole +thing might safely be regarded as a <i>jeu d'esprit</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> on the part of an +eccentric mathematician. And this editorial <i>caveto</i>, though written by +another hand, preserved the Copernican theories from the notoriety that +might otherwise have attended, and afterwards did attend, them.</p> + +<p>Copernican conceptions were semi-traditional. The sun displaces the +earth as the central point of the universe: around it revolve the +planets—including the earth; and, at an immeasurable distance, is the +immovable heaven of the fixed stars. Copernicus left it an open question +whether or no the universe was infinite. It remained for his successor, +the greatest of the Renaissance thinkers, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) to +declare it to be limitless, and to contain an infinity of worlds like +our own. The fixed stars became, for him, suns surrounded by planets. +The traditional distinction between the celestial and sublunary spheres +had vanished. The bewilderment and indignation excited by these ideas, +revolting to the conscience of his time, cost their author his life.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Galileo.</span>—The criticism of the old world-conceptions was, however, to be +based on yet more sure ground by one who relied, not on general +considerations, but on observation and experiment. Galileo (1564-1642) +studied philosophy, physics, and mathematics at Pisa; and as professor +expounded the old astronomy long after he had ceased to regard it as +adequate. Not until 1610, after he had constructed a telescope and +observed the satellites of Jupiter, did he openly confess his adherence +to the system of Copernicus. The observation of sun-spots and the phases +of Venus confirmed his opinion.</p> + +<p>Aristotelian astronomers declined to witness these phenomena through his +telescope, and perhaps Galileo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> was right in observing with a sigh that +were the stars themselves to descend from heaven to bear him witness his +critics would remain obdurate.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>It was not until 1632 that a complete exposition of the conflict between +the two world-systems was produced by Galileo. It took the form of a +dialogue between three speakers—conservative, mediating, and extreme. +The views of the author, however, were not sufficiently concealed, the +book was prohibited, and Galileo summoned to Rome, and upon threat of +torture, subdued into a recantation and a promise not to offend in the +future. That Galileo perjured himself is not open to doubt, nor did he +change his convictions. A subsequent work, surreptitiously printed in +Holland, contained the same heresies expressed with less reserve.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Physics.</span>—It might be said, then, that the fabric of the +universe had been reconstructed by the thinkers whose explorations we +have hitherto followed. This achievement, however, though sufficiently +startling in itself, was not the only, and perhaps not the most +important, of their performances. The question still awaited solution: +<i>By what forces and laws is the new world-system maintained in +activity?</i></p> + +<p>The traditional reply had been that the universe was kept in motion by +the operation of the Deity. While the truth of this reply was not +questioned by the advocates of the "new" science, it did not seem to +them to dispel the obscurity surrounding certain points about which they +required information. It was Galileo who observed that the appeal to the +divine will <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>explains nothing just because it explains everything. It +takes the inquirer back too far—behind those details of method which +arouse his speculative interest.</p> + +<p>This desire to understand those methods of operation which natural +objects appear to follow, led philosophers to enunciate certain "laws" +about them. These served as "explanations" of particular classes of +phenomena. It was the phenomena of <i>motion</i> that especially attracted +their attention; and many ingenious experiments were performed by +Galileo, in particular, which led him to conclusions which then seemed +paradoxical, but now serve as axioms of physical science; for "the laws +of motion contain the key to all scientific knowledge of material +nature." When Galileo, after careful experiment, established the +proposition that a body can neither change its motion of itself, nor +pass from motion to rest, the fundamental "law of inertia"—of such +incalculable importance to the development of modern physics—had been +established.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">An Automatic Universe.</span>—A proposition of this kind may not at first seem +to involve important philosophical or theological consequences. But we +only have to consider that it provided a natural explanation of the +continued and untiring motion of the heavenly bodies. It did not, it is +true, explain how that motion arose; but the motion being "given," it +had now been shown how it would, in the absence of obstructions, be +perpetual. In fact, speculations of this kind opened up the way to the +<i>mechanical</i> explanation of nature, a theory which had been already +speculatively held by Leonardo da Vinci, who is already convinced that +"necessity is the eternal bond, the eternal rule of Nature."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span><span class="smcap">Science and Mathematics.</span>—It was not only, however, the spectacle of a +system running automatically that suggested to observers a mechanical +theory to explain it. There was also the fact that phenomena were +observed to occur in accordance with certain simple mathematical laws. +Galileo's experiments with falling bodies led him to foreshadow +principles which were afterwards elaborated and fully demonstrated by +Newton, who may be said to have been the first to construct a mechanical +universe. The principle had already been formulated by a contemporary of +Galileo—Johannes Kepler—in the axiom <i>ubi materia, ibi geometria</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results.</span>—The thinkers whose speculations have engaged us were indeed +responsible for creating a revolution in ideas. For a finite universe +whose centre was the earth, and which was kept in motion by the +operation of the Deity, they had substituted the conception of +illimitable space sown with innumerable systems like our own; and had +created the beginning of a mechanical conception of nature.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Logic.</span>—But it was not only the scientific dogmas of the old +system that had been so rudely overthrown—the very principles upon +which those dogmas rested had been submitted to a destructive criticism. +The new science produced a new logic. This order of events is not +unusual: first, the new scientific discoveries, and then in the wake of +the discoverers, comes the innovating critic who systematises the +logical or scientific methods to which the new knowledge seems to have +been due. First, Kepler and Galileo, who used the "inductive" method, +and then Lord Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), who discovered the inductive +logic, and established it as a system.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span><span class="smcap">Francis Bacon.</span>—Bacon's doctrine may be summarised by his own epigram, +"If a man begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he be +content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties." Which is +really a criticism of what is known as the a priori method, whereby the +inquirer starts with certain predefined theories to which all phenomena +must conform, and which all experience must verify. If facts will not +suit the particular theory, so much the worse for the facts: one could +always disregard them, and apply a blind eye to Galileo's telescope. +Such is always the procedure of the dogmatic mind, which is already so +certain of the truth of its notions that no evidence can persuade it to +the contrary. But it is not by such means that knowledge is advanced, +and it was for a reversal of these that Bacon pleaded.</p> + +<p>Leonardo da Vinci had already anticipated the Baconian logic (which did +not wait for Bacon until it was applied) when he laid down the +proposition that wisdom was the daughter of experience, and rejected all +speculations which experience, the common mother of all sciences, could +not confirm. Hence, knowledge was the product of time; the process of +collecting material for a judgment must often be slow, but the results +were worth the labour—these would not be speculative, but true. Nor +need it be supposed that Bacon excluded imagination from playing a part +in increasing knowledge, he did not plead <i>only</i> for a mechanical +collection of material. It is imagination which in face of abundant +material creates the hypothesis which accounts for it being what it is. +And he was prepared to admit the value of preliminary hypotheses which +might be replaced as further facts were collected, or as insight became +more clear. Here,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> too, Bacon describes the method followed by modern +science.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Prestige of New Methods.</span>—And so, by the time when Bacon had laid down +his pen after writing the <i>New Logic</i>, the work of discrediting the old +system, elaborated with such ingenious industry by Aquinas, was +tolerably complete. The new science had begun already to be fruitful in +results, both practical and speculative. The successors of Galileo and +of Bacon applied the new principles with vigour, and reached astonishing +results. Justified by these, the new methods secured a prestige which +has not decreased for three centuries.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</span></p> + +<p class="center">GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Decline of Scholasticism.</span>—By the time of Lord Bacon, the Scholastic +philosophy might have been described as extinct; it no longer survived +as a living system. The loss was a serious one to mankind, which was +poorer by the discrediting of an authoritative body of thought, a +possession it seems ill able to dispense with. The Baconian philosophy +was an imperfect substitute; it was little more than a system of +enquiry, a manual of scientific procedure, for Bacon himself was not in +the philosophical sense a profound or constructive thinker, though he +was one of those men of talent who can give utterance to the tendencies +of an epoch.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Philosophy.</span>—The task, however, of constructing a new philosophy +of the universe was courageously taken in hand by a succession of +thinkers, and the energy of thought which the great problem generated is +characteristic of perhaps the most vigorous century of European +history—the seventeenth.</p> + +<p>The tendency of the new discoveries in science had not been obscure, and +Modern Philosophy starts with an attempt to represent the universe as a +self-working machine—a co-ordinated whole, throughout which the +principles of mathematics are universally valid. The trend of ideas set +in motion by the new discoveries in astronomy seemed to point in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> +direction. But to introduce mechanics into the celestial regions, though +an important step, was but a beginning. Mechanics must be <i>universally</i> +valid—even in the human body—or the new teaching was vain. Exceptions +may prove a rule, but they destroy a philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Subjugation of Physiology.</span>—It was an Englishman who provided the +necessary facts to fill the gravest gap in the mechanical theory. It was +already known in the previous century that the blood of animals +circulated throughout the body; the existence and use of veins and +heart-valves was also known, but it was William Harvey (1578-1657) who +discovered the heart to be the organ responsible for <i>maintaining</i> the +circulation of the blood, by purely mechanical means. This was a fact of +the utmost significance. In the sphere of physiology, where theories +about mysterious powers of blood or soul had been hitherto +authoritative, it effected a revolution. Indeed it is true to say that +Harvey "is to physiology what Galileo was to physics." He proved that +"the general laws of motion are valid within as well as without the +organism"—an important extension of the mechanical theory.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Descartes.</span>—Among the leading men who accepted Harvey's theory, one of +the first was René Descartes (1596-1650). Well might this thinker +welcome it, for it was a most important contribution to the imposing +philosophic fabric for which he was industriously collecting materials. +Descartes, apart from his philosophical speculations, is an interesting +character, being a Frenchman of noble birth who was educated by the +Jesuits, saw something of contemporary life in Paris, served as a +military officer in Holland and Germany, and made some original<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> +discoveries in mathematics.</p> + +<p>The mathematical mind, accustomed as it is to deal with highly abstract +ideas, takes kindly to metaphysics. And it very often solves the mystery +of the universe by expressing all its contents in mathematical terms. +Such, at least, was Descartes' method. The simplest and clearest ideas +which we can have of anything are mathematical, i.e. extension and +mobility. And it is by concentrating our attention upon this simple and +mathematical aspect of things that we shall arrive at a proper +understanding of all that goes on in the material world.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Universality of Mathematics.</span>—A phenomenon was, in Descartes' eyes, +"explained" only when a "cause" which is its exact <i>mathematical +equivalent</i>, has been indicated. The "cause" and the "effect" are two +sides of a mathematical equation (<i>Causa aequat effectum</i>). Anything +that happens in the material world (the fall of a stone, the beat of a +heart, the rising of the sun) is really nothing more than a +redistribution of portions of that sum of motion which, once generated +at the Creation, has remained unaltered, and unalterable, in the +universe ever since. The sum of motion is constant, there can be no +addition to or subtraction from it. In this sense it would be true that +"there is nothing new under the sun": only ever-new distributions of the +old.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Universe a Machine.</span>—Once assume that all phenomena can be +interpreted in terms of motion, and add the proposition (already +enunciated by Galileo) that motion once set going will proceed for ever, +unless some impediment from outside intervenes, and the mechanical view +of the universe is complete. The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>universe is a machine, i.e. a thing +that works (1) according to mathematical principles, (2) automatically.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Elaborations of the Mechanical Theory.</span>—The importance of Descartes lies +not in his having invented this conception (we have already seen it in +the hands of Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and others), but in his having +elaborated it. This he did in two directions: (1) he attempted to supply +a mechanical theory of the evolution of the world-system; <i>i.e.</i> to show +how the heavenly bodies came into being by natural and mechanical +processes; (2) he applied the mechanical theory to organisms; animals +and men were complex machines. (Here, as we have seen, the discovery of +Harvey was of prime importance.)</p> + +<p>It is hardly necessary to describe at length Descartes' mechanical +theory of the evolution of the world-system, though an interest attaches +to it as being the ancestor of the modern "nebular hypothesis." Matter +in whirling motion around fixed centres is the original <i>datum</i> from +which Descartes evokes the universe. With regard to the mechanical +theory of organisms, Descartes developed it at some length in various +treatises. All the functions and actions of animals were regarded by him +as entirely involuntary and mechanical. "That the lamb flees at the +sight of a wolf happens because the rays of light from the body of the +wolf strike the eye of the lamb, and set the muscles in motion by means +of the 'reflex' currents of the animal spirits."</p> + +<p>In the case of human beings, owing to the phenomenon of "consciousness," +Descartes felt compelled to assume a "soul"—a <i>thinking</i> substance in +reciprocal action with the <i>material</i> substance (of the brain). This,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +too, is an anticipation of the modern theory of "psycho-physical +parallelism."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Cartesianism.</span>—The ideas of Descartes had considerable influence among +his contemporaries, and Cartesianism, as it was called, became +fashionable in intellectual circles. It developed a tendency towards +free enquiry and independent thought; and it was even more significant +as an atmosphere than as a system of ideas. Though in this respect too, +it was both important and vital; as we have observed, modern mechanical +theories find their parent in Descartes.</p> + +<p>Nor was it only, we may remark, among philosophers and men of science +that Cartesian ideas were popular; they were accepted and elaborated by +the religious thinkers who hoped to harmonise and humanise theology and +science. Pascal, Bossuet and Fénelon, the finest minds in the French +Church, were eager Cartesians.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<p>This aspect of the matter, i.e. the significance of Cartesianism for +religion, we can for the present postpone.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results so Far.</span>—Successive breaches in the Scholastic system have now +been noted. Copernicus had introduced a new astronomy, Galileo a new +physics, Descartes (with the help of Harvey) a new physiology, and the +beginnings of a new psychology.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Contributions of Hobbes.</span>—The step that remained was taken by an +Englishman, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who attempted to provide a system +of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span>ethics and a theory of politics upon a purely naturalistic basis. +Hobbes was a particularly energetic thinker. He worked out a psychology +of the feelings, which reduced everything to the impulse of +self-preservation and the instinct for power. Men were induced by these +instincts to agree to certain rules of conduct, for the sake of +expediency. Social life seems essential if men are to live together—the +instinct of self-preservation demands it—and social life in turn +demands certain renunciations: thus fidelity, gratitude, forbearance, +justice, etc., must be practised.</p> + +<p>Thus Hobbes attempted to banish all mysterious or obscure forces from +morality, which was the characteristic and inevitable product of human +nature and human circumstances. This way of looking at things seemed +strange to all, and even revolting to some, of Hobbes' contemporaries. +As the mystical powers of motion which the Scholastics had believed in +were banished by the new physics and the new physiology, so the new +psychology could allow of no mystical faculty which can decide in all +problems of good and evil.</p> + +<p>With Hobbes, then, a naturalistic view of the universe may be said to +have been tolerably complete: it embraces physics, psychology, and +ethics. There still remained, of course, a number of gaps in scientific +knowledge, and consequently any philosophy based thereupon could not yet +be regarded as secure. These gaps, however, as research proceeded and +successive discoveries were made, tended to diminish both in size and +quantity.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Newton.</span>—The seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries were +fruitful in revelations of this kind, and natural knowledge steadily and +even rapidly progressed. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>And one thinker, who may be regarded as a link +between the seventeenth century and that which succeeded it, may now +claim our attention.</p> + +<p>The name of Newton (1642-1727) is as familiar to Englishmen as that of +Shakespeare, and the discovery by him of the "law of gravitation" is one +of those scraps of information which we acquire, and perhaps fail to +understand, in early childhood.</p> + +<p>Newton's scientific method is a no less important aspect of his work +than its results. The <i>Principia</i>, in which he gave his discovery to the +world, is "a model for all scientific investigations which has never +been surpassed." It was, indeed, a brilliant application of the +principle of inferring the unknown from the already known, without any +dogmatic leaps in the dark. The principle with which he began was that +what is true in the narrower spheres of experience (e.g. in the case of +an apple falling) is true also in the wider spheres (e.g. in the +movements of the celestial bodies). He then made a careful mathematical +deduction of what would happen in the case of the planets, assuming that +the laws of falling bodies on the earth were applicable to them also. +And he concluded by showing that what would happen according to +mathematics under this assumption <i>actually does happen</i>. The conclusion +follows that the same force, i.e. "attraction," operates in both cases. +It is no wonder that this final and successful operation was performed +by Newton "in a state of excitement so great that he could hardly see +his figures."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Significance of His Discovery.</span>—The philosophic importance of the +discovery that the motions of the planets may be explained by the "law +of gravitation" was twofold. In the first place, it now became possible +<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>to understand how the universe held together (a problem which the new +astronomy had not solved); and in the second place, the theory +constituted a large extension of the mechanical view. It demonstrated +that "the physical laws which hold good on the surface of the earth are +valid throughout the universe, so far as we can know anything of it." +Thus the area of existence in which physical law held good was at once +infinitely widened. The mechanical theories of Galileo, Descartes, and +others, not only received confirmation, but became more comprehensive +than before.</p> + +<p>So that Newton may be said to have put the finishing touch upon the +achievements of his predecessors, and to have crowned their labours with +success. And his work has the characteristic of permanency: his +"gravitation formula" has stood the test of time. "It still stands +there," says a careful and authoritative writer, "as almost the only +firmly established mathematical relation, expressive of a property of +all matter, to which the progress of more than two centuries has added +nothing, and from which it has taken nothing away."<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religious Corollaries.</span>—It would be a profound mistake to assume that +the creators of the mechanical view, as it has hitherto met us, were +animated by any hostility to religion. Nor did they believe their +theories to involve any disastrous consequences in that sphere.</p> + +<p>The new astronomy of Copernicus had actually been made the basis of a +spiritual view of the universe by the profound genius (both +philosophical and religious) of Giordano Bruno. And the fact that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>the +ecclesiastical authorities rejected his view need not divest it of +importance or of value in our eyes. Bruno's own faith was not disturbed +by the infidelity of his persecutors. "Ye who pass judgment upon me +feel, maybe, greater fear than I upon whom it is passed," were his last +words to them. Had they <i>believed</i>, they need not have been afraid, and +might have been content with the policy of Gamaliel.</p> + +<p>As for Descartes and Hobbes, their notions were no doubt distasteful to +conservative minds (the Jesuits were no friends to either), but +Descartes regarded himself, and would fain have been regarded by others, +as a good Catholic; and Hobbes, theologically, was what in these days we +might call a Liberal Protestant. Cartesianism, as we have seen, came to +be a name for a type of thought which studied to harmonise science and +theology, and one of the most profound religious geniuses of any +age—Pascal, was (as we have seen) a Cartesian.</p> + +<p>As for Newton, his view of the universe was essentially a religious one, +though he did not allow theological speculations to intrude upon his +strictly scientific work. His attitude is indicated by a reply to the +inquiry of a contemporary theologian as to how the movements and +structure of the solar system were to be accounted for.</p> + +<p>"To your query I answer that the motions which the planets now have +could not spring from any natural cause alone.... To compare and adjust +all these things together (i.e. quantities of matter and gravitating +powers, etc.) in so great a variety of bodies, argues the cause to be +not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanism and +geometry."<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>Still, the mechanical view contained within it sinister possibilities; +and the instincts of conservative thinkers were not altogether at fault. +The mechanical view in itself need not be hostile to a spiritual and +rational religion (though it is fatal to most forms of superstition); +and yet that view can be used in the interests of anti-religious +prejudice—and, as we shall see, it was so used, and with considerable +effect.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, however, we shall pass on to consider the work of three +thinkers who are typical of a revolt from what was in danger of becoming +the all-absorbing tyranny of mechanics. This reaction (for so it may be +termed) we shall proceed, in the following chapter, to examine.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</span></p> + +<p class="center">SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Law of Thought.</span>—Whenever a tendency of thought has been vigorously +prosecuted for any length of time, a reaction invariably displays +itself. This rule is illustrated by the history of thought in the +seventeenth century. Mechanical categories, as we have seen, had been +steadily extending themselves for the better part of two centuries, and +with the materialism of Hobbes the process seemed fairly complete.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, however, human thought began to explore other avenues. Though +reaction from mechanical ways of thinking did not (at any rate, in the +circles with which we are concerned) take the form of an obscurantist +retreat into prejudice or superstition, the results of the new science +and its attendant mechanistic philosophy served as a base for further +explorations. The principles which Descartes and Hobbes had laid down +were criticised by being carried out to their logical conclusions.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spinoza.</span>—The philosopher with whom we shall first concern ourselves was +a Jew of Spanish extraction, living in what was then the freest country +in Europe—Holland. Spinoza (1632-1677) was undoubtedly the greatest +thinker of his own age, which was highly fertile in that respect, and he +still stands as one of the most notable figures in the long history <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>of +European thought. Not only is his outlook comprehensive, and his thought +many-sided, but his standpoint was "detached" to a degree hitherto +unknown. He was untainted, so far as a human being ever can be, by +"anthropomorphism"; he endeavoured to transcend the merely human +outlook. Here is always the dividing line between the great and the +merely mediocre thinker.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spinoza's Method.</span>—Spinoza's philosophical ancestry may be traced back +to Bruno, whose acquaintance we made in a previous chapter, but in whose +company we did not long remain. This highly original mind had already, +by the doctrine of the infinitude and the divinity of nature, shown how +the concept of God and the concept of nature might be closely bound up +together. By similar means, Spinoza hoped to indicate the reality of the +spiritual, without disturbing the mechanical world-conception which the +new science and new philosophy had created between them. He wished +somehow to find God not outside, but <i>in</i> Nature; not in disturbances of +the order of Nature, but <i>in that order itself</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Term Nature.</span>—It would be a misapprehension to suppose that the +terms "God" and "Nature" are regarded by Spinoza as interchangeable, +though his numerous critics were accustomed to declare that this was the +case. On the contrary, Spinoza, in order to anticipate the +misunderstanding which he saw might arise on this point, reintroduced +into philosophy a pair of terms which the Scholastics had long before +brought into currency, but which had since fallen out of +fashion—<i>Natura naturans</i> and <i>Natura naturata</i>. We might perhaps +translate the former of these, "Creative Nature," and the latter, +"Created <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>Nature." <i>Natura naturans</i> is equivalent to "Nature as a +creative power," or "The creative power immanent in Nature." <i>Natura +naturata</i> is equivalent to "Nature as it is when created," or "The +results of the creative power immanent in Nature." And the <i>Natura +naturans</i> is active in the <i>Natura naturata</i> at all points: the creative +power is immanent in creation. As Spinoza puts it in one of his letters:</p> + +<p>"I assert that God is (as it is called) the immanent, not the external +cause of all things. That is to say, I assert with Paul, that in God all +things live and move.... But if any one thinks that the +<i>Theologico-Political Treatise</i> (one of his works) assumes that God and +Nature are one and the same, he is entirely mistaken."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p>Thus, for Spinoza, the order of nature, which had seemed to so many of +his contemporaries, from the religious point of view, such a devastating +conception, as leaving no room for the spiritual, was itself only +explicable if interpreted spiritually.</p> + +<p>"Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without +God" (<i>Ethics</i> i. 15) sums up his attitude. All things may be, as the +new science taught, 'determined' but they are determined "by the +necessity of the divine nature" (<i>Ethics</i> i. 29).</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The "Ethics."</span>—Spinoza may rightly be termed a man of one book. In his +<i>Ethics</i> is to be found a complete and final expression of his +philosophy. "How boundless," says Goethe of this great book, "is the +disinterestedness conspicuous in every sentence, how exalted the +resignation which submits itself once for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>all to the great laws of +existence, instead of trying to get through life with the help of +trivial consolations; and what an atmosphere of peace breathes through +the whole!"</p> + +<p>According to its teaching the true happiness and highest activity of men +is to be found in what Spinoza terms "the intellectual love of God." The +phrase seems to have been used to designate that full and clearer +knowledge which is aware that we ourselves and all the conditions of our +life are determined by the infinite Nature, by God Himself, who moves in +us as well as in all things acting upon us. The initiated no longer +regard themselves as single, isolated, impotent beings, but as included +in the divine nature. Themselves and all things are seen under the form +of eternity. This thought is, according to Spinoza, the fruit of the +highest activity of the human mind; this is the <i>amor intellectualis +dei</i>; and the supreme good for man.</p> + +<p>His doctrine of immortality is bound up with this intellectual form of +religious mysticism—knowledge of God involves participation in His +immortality:</p> + +<p>"Death is the less harmful the more the mind's knowledge is clear and +distinct, and the more the mind loves God.... The human mind may be of +such a nature that the part of it which we showed to perish with the +body may be of no moment to it in respect to what remains."</p> + +<p>He who is "affected with love towards God" has a mind "of which the +greater part is eternal." Thus the soul achieves its emancipation by +identifying itself with God—who is the object of its knowledge and +love. The path is arduous, and the closing passage of the <i>Ethics</i> +admits this:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>"If the road I have shown is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. +And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found.... But all +excellent things are as difficult as they are rare."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spinoza and Religion.</span>—It is interesting to note that Spinoza, though a +"free-thinking" Jew, adopts towards the fundamental dogma of +Christianity an attitude which approximates to the classical expression +of it in the Fourth Gospel. He held that "God's eternal wisdom, which +reveals itself in all things, and especially in the human mind, has +given a special revelation of itself in Christ."</p> + +<p>Perhaps his ethic, like that of the Stoics, with whom he had so much in +common, was better adapted to satisfy the needs of the philosopher than +of the ordinary man. But, in the seventeenth century, it was the +philosophers and learned men that were in need of a spiritual +interpretation of the universe; common men had theirs already, in the +traditional pietism which philosophers are often too ready to despise. +To Spinoza—and this is one of the many indications of the genuine +profundity of his thought—the simple believers seemed already to be in +possession of too much of the truth for it to be desirable or profitable +for them to indulge in speculation. To the question of his landlady at +the Hague as to whether she could be saved by the religion which she +professed, his reply was that her religion was good, that she should +seek no other, and that she would certainly be saved by it if she led a +quiet and pious life.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spinoza's Personality.</span>—The figure of Spinoza stands as one of the most +imposing and attractive in the whole history of philosophy, and his was +an unworldliness, a simplicity, and a humility purely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> Franciscan. Like +all Jews then, he knew a trade—that of lens grinding—and by this he +was able to live frugally, while he elaborated his thought. He dedicated +his life to the labour of quiet contemplation; nor was he ambitious of +recognition, which indeed generally came to him in the form of abuse. He +did not escape "the exquisite rancour of theological hatred," but it was +his belief, and the conviction inspired his life, that—</p> + +<p>"Neither riches, nor sensuous enjoyment, nor honours, can be a true good +for man"; but on the contrary, "that the only thing which is able to +fill the mind with ever-new satisfaction is the striving after +knowledge, by means of which the mind is united with that which remains +constant while all else changes."</p> + +<p>"The God-intoxicated," was the name given to Spinoza long afterwards in +Germany. He died (like St. Francis) at forty-five, worn out with the +toil of thought. And it renews one's faith in the perspicacity of +commonplace people to learn that his barber, sending in a bill after the +death of the philosopher, alluded to his late customer as "Mr. Spinoza +of blessed memory." It was left to a contemporary theologian to describe +him as "an unclean and foul atheist."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Leibniz.</span>—Spinoza had taken over from Descartes and Hobbes their +mechanical and determinist conception of nature, though he gave to it, +as we have seen, an interpretation of his own. His attitude was a blend +of that rationalism and mysticism which were characteristic of so much +seventeenth century thought. A far more complete reaction, however, +displays itself in the system of a contemporary of Spinoza's—Gottfried +Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716); who, when already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> a youth, had become an +enthusiastic devotee of the new science; the study of Kepler, Galileo +and Descartes caused him to feel as though "transported into a different +world." Though a German by birth, Leibniz lived continuously in France, +and wrote habitually in the language of that country.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Contrast to Spinoza.</span>—Spinoza and Leibniz stand as examples of two +distinct methods of eluding the despotism of mechanics—methods which +will meet us again in the course of our survey. Spinoza accepts the +mechanical view as being inevitable and even desirable, but subjects it +to a spiritual interpretation—he regards it as the way in which the +<i>Natura naturans</i> works.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Leibniz, on the other hand, viewed existence +from an entirely different standpoint. He was bold enough to reject the +mechanical view altogether; or rather he preferred to regard it as a +convenient abstraction, or a useful formula, which might reflect certain +aspects of reality, but could not do justice to its concrete richness +and complexity.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Philosophy of Individuals.</span>—Leibniz's criticism of Descartes and the +mechanical school proceeded along different lines from that of Spinoza, +who, as we have seen, accepted the mechanical view as the basis of his +speculation.</p> + +<p>An axiom of that view was (as we know) the conservation of motion. For +this conservation of <i>motion</i>, Leibniz substitutes the conservation of +<i>force</i> as being logically the more fundamental concept. True reality, +according to him, is not <i>motion</i> itself, but the <i>force which is its +cause</i>. Force and existence became for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> him identical terms; to work and +to exist were the same. That force is the true reality, Leibniz +expressed in the language of his time by saying, "Force is substance, +and all substance is force"—a proposition which would not be repudiated +by modern science—and upon this statement his philosophy is built.</p> + +<p>But it was not "force in general" or some "universal force" that was +regarded by him as the final reality: Leibniz was not a forerunner of +Herbert Spencer. Reality for him consisted in <i>individual centres of +force</i>—a multitude of individual and independent beings, each with its +own idiosyncrasy, and following its own lines. Existence was, in fact, +for him, <i>individual</i>. It was the <i>individual</i> centres of force—not +<i>general</i> principles, universal substances, laws or forces—that make up +reality.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Doctrine of Monads.</span>—This view of reality was formulated by Leibniz in +his famous doctrine of "monads." "Monad" was the technical name applied +by him to those absolute individuals which he regarded as constituting +true reality. The word, meaning "unity," was simple and appropriate. And +he declared that the "monad," to be rightly understood, must be regarded +as analogous to our own souls. This principle of analogy was described +by Leibniz as <i>mon grand principe des choses naturelles</i>. Thus reality +was interpreted by him not in physical but in psychical terms, or if the +expression be preferred, in terms of personality.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>Of these "monads" there exist, according to this view, infinitely many +degrees. In fact all existence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> differs only in degree from our own. +Even between mind and matter there is only a quantitative and not a +qualitative gulf. For there are sleeping, dreaming, and more or less +waking monads; and matter is a form of unconscious mind; the monads +which compose material objects being "minds without memory," "momentary +minds."</p> + +<p>Let Leibniz speak for himself:—</p> + +<p>"Each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, but is also +actually subdivided without end.... Whence it appears that in the +smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living +beings, animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter may be +conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of +fishes.... Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead +in the universe...."<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<p>Leibniz may indeed be said to have been the first to outline a theory of +"panpsychism" (as it is termed), according to which there is nothing +that is not, in its degree, alive. As we shall have occasion to observe, +Leibniz was here (as elsewhere) a forerunner of much recent philosophy.</p> + +<p>The significance of the Spinozist and Leibnizian systems of thought, +though regarding existence from such diverse standpoints, was, for +practical purposes the same. Both alike led out, though by different +paths, beyond the mechanical theory of the universe. They, indeed, +represent two types of thought which attempt to reach the same end by +different methods. Their counterparts will meet us again as this history +proceeds.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pascal.</span>—But before passing out from the seventeenth century, one +thinker ought to detain us; for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> from more than one point of view he was +a notable personality, and of first-rate importance in the history of +religious, as distinct from purely philosophical thought. He was indeed +one of those figures who are distinguished among distinguished men of +all times.</p> + +<p>Blaise Pascal was born in 1623, and was a boy of precocious mathematical +ability. By the age of twelve he is said to have worked out +independently most of the first and second books of Euclid; at sixteen +he wrote a treatise on Conics which attracted the attention of +Descartes; at nineteen he completed a calculating machine—a device that +had never been dreamt of before. At this point it is not surprising to +learn that his health broke down.</p> + +<p>Pascal is not a systematic philosopher; but his acute intellect was +united to an inner restlessness of soul. Neither science nor philosophy +could bring him peace, for his needs were far deeper than any merely +rational systematisation of ideas could satisfy. Some have said of him +that he was fundamentally a sceptic, but one for whom religious faith +was essential; certainly in him were united an acute critical faculty +and an intense religious experience. Perhaps the two are not so +incompatible after all.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The "Pensées."</span>—Pascal is chiefly famous for two works, the <i>Lettres +Provinciales</i> and the <i>Pensées</i>. The former is controversial literature, +but yet a classic of the French language: in sum, it is an attack on the +Jesuits; but it need not here detain us, for with theology, as such, we +are not concerned, and still less with ecclesiastical systems. The +<i>Pensées</i> is a collection of fragments, the material for an Apology for +Christianity which was never written. The autograph<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> MS. preserved in +the <i>Bibliothèque Nationale</i> at Paris "is made up of scraps of paper of +all shapes and sizes, written often on both sides ... and dealing with +all sorts of subjects." One is reminded of the mythical scraps of +manuscript from which the genius of Carlyle distilled the philosophy of +the sagacious Teufelsdröch.</p> + +<p>But it is in these detached fragments that Pascal has expressed his +spiritual and intellectual struggles; they contain his philosophy of +life. And, however unsystematic in arrangement, they do reveal a fairly +definite temper and attitude of mind.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pascal's Philosophy.</span>—In the first place, the <i>Thoughts</i> voice a +reaction against the "Cartesian intellectualism" which was then the +prevalent tendency in scientific and philosophical circles. "The last +attainment of reason is to recognise that there is an infinity of things +beyond it" might perhaps have been published by Pascal's predecessors. +"To laugh at philosophy is to be a true philosopher" would have seemed +like blasphemy or nonsense to most of his contemporaries, but it was +neither of these.</p> + +<p>Behind sayings of this description lay the strong conviction that mere +logic was incapable of probing the depths of existence. "The heart has +its reasons of which reason knows nothing," is sound psychology, and not +scepticism or obscurantism. Of course it all depends what one means by +"reason." Too many of Pascal's contemporaries applied the word to a more +or less shallow rationalism utterly opposed to a spiritual view of +things, whereas reason properly understood is "the logic of the whole +personality."<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> + +<p>That Pascal was no mere narrow anti-rational<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> obscurantist is evident, +not only from his own extraordinary insight, but from his continual +reiteration of his idea that the essential dignity of man lies in his +thought:</p> + +<p>"All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms, are +not worth the smallest mind, for a mind knows them, and itself, and +bodies know nothing."</p> + +<p>Here lies the true greatness of man. In respect of material bulk he is +nothing, but his thought cannot be measured. "Man is only a reed, the +feeblest reed in nature, <i>but he is a thinking reed</i>." The saying has +become famous, and the words that follow are hardly less so; they remove +the overpowering and crushing incubus of man's illimitable material +environment, which, since Copernicus, had weighed upon thinkers like a +nightmare:</p> + +<p>"Were the universe to crush him, man would still be more noble than that +which slays him, because he knows that he dies, and the advantage that +the universe has over him: of this the universe knows nothing. Thus all +man's dignity lies in his thought."<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pascal's Pessimism.</span>—It has been said that an unbridgeable gulf lies +between those who believe and those who disbelieve in mankind. It is to +the latter category that Pascal belongs. His faith in the dignity of man +is paradoxically associated with a realisation of his weakness and +imbecility:</p> + +<p>"What a chimera, then, is man! What an oddity, what a monster, what a +chaos, what a subject of contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all +things, senseless earth-worm; depository of truth, cloaca of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +uncertainty and error; the glory and the refuse of the universe."</p> + +<p>"We desire truth, and find in ourselves only uncertainty; we seek +happiness, and find only misery and death. We are unable not to wish for +truth and happiness, and incapable either of certainty or felicity."</p> + +<p>In fact, we may say that Pascal was the first, in an age of exaggerated +reverence for logic (the <i>damnosa hereditas</i> of the Scholastic +theologians) to understand that the best arguments for religion are the +facts of human experience, and the conditions of human life.</p> + +<p>"In vain, O men, do ye seek within yourselves the cure for your +troubles! All your knowledge can only teach you that it is not within +yourselves that ye find the true or good!" Here we have the language of +religious experience. The result of Augustine's meditation upon life was +the same: <i>Inquietum cor nostrum dum requiescat in te.</i> It is a tongue +that the "psychic man" can never understand; it seems to him +affectation; such language is foreign to the easy optimism of an age of +confidence. Indeed Pascal, though so intensely modern, is a stranger, +and his words often enigmas to our time.</p> + +<p><i>Vanitas vanitatum</i> is thus the verdict that he passes upon human +experience. "The last act is tragic, however fine the comedy of all the +rest."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Significance of Pascal.</span>—It is not as a systematic thinker that Pascal +is of importance to the historian of thought. He typifies that more or +less inarticulate and unreasoned revolt which the arrogance and optimism +of a new science or a new philosophy arouse against themselves. He +voices the eternal protest that it is not by bread alone that men live. +As is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> generally the case with such protests, the pessimism of Pascal +was no doubt exaggerated; but exaggeration is necessary if minds are to +be impressed; and those who feel strongly see only one side of a +question.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results.</span>—Thus in the three figures that have passed before us, we see a +threefold protest against that exclusion of the spiritual from the human +view of life. Spinoza, the pantheist, sees God everywhere;<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Leibniz +finds in every recess of nature the principle of personality; Pascal +finds the only cure for human frailty and misery in religion.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</span></p> + +<p class="center">RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Atmospheric Conditions.</span>—As we have seen, a mechanical view of the +universe was not felt by thinkers like Descartes or Newton, or even +Hobbes, to involve any consequences that were necessarily hostile to +religion. The new science sometimes might be anti-theological, because +the current theology still seemed too much infected with Scholasticism, +but it was not, in the hands of its most notable exponents, +anti-religious. Science had no quarrel with religion as such, nor even +with a rational type of theology.</p> + +<p>Of course the new views aroused many suspicions, and did not escape +criticism at the hands of Church authorities, both Protestant and +Catholic. And (as we have seen) some early scientists paid very dearly +for their allegiance to the spirit of scientific enquiry; but as time +went on, actual persecution became impossible, morally and practically. +But theologians were never, during the seventeenth century at least, +quite reconciled to a science and a philosophy which seemed to them to +be leading men towards areas quite uninhabitable for religion. But in +spite of suspicions on either side, and the prevalence of some measure +of intolerance, it cannot be said that relations between the scientists +or philosophers and the theologians were very seriously strained until +well on in the eighteenth century.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span><span class="smcap">Anti-Religious Propaganda.</span>—That this comparatively pacific state of +affairs came to an end was the fault, primarily, at least, neither of +the theologians nor of the scientists. A different atmosphere gradually +began to envelop and to embitter the controversy. Orthodox religion, +especially in Catholic countries, came to be associated with political +reaction, and the most envenomed onslaughts began to be made upon what +seemed to be the chief stronghold of a discredited regime. Especially +was this the case in France, where corrupt political conditions were +aggravated by the intense social misery which they had created.</p> + +<p>Thus France became the cradle of the phenomenon known as +anti-clericalism, which is the product not so much of disbelief in a +creed as of hatred of a system; it was the correlative of a Church in +which religion was extinct, for genuine Catholicism had been rooted out +of France early in the eighteenth century, just as Protestantism had +been drowned in blood a century before.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Science Popularised.</span>—In two respects France, during the second half of +the eighteenth century, was far in advance of other countries. No other +literature of that age can be compared with the French for the skill and +charm with which scientific views were expressed. There was no lack of +first-rate propagandists.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> And not only in the popularisation, but in +the systematic teaching of science, France for a long period led the +way.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Whereas the history of English or German literature of the +eighteenth century could be written almost without reference to science, +it is with scientific problems that the names of some of the most +brilliant French <i>littérateurs</i> are associated. And whereas in England, +scientific men worked (in spite of the existence of the Royal Society) +more or less in isolation, in France the savants have always been a +brotherhood.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Voltaire.</span>—One of the most notorious names associated with the type of +propaganda referred to is that of Voltaire (1694-1778). Voltaire's +polemic cannot be described as anti-religious, for he himself was a +theist. It was, rather, political in character. The object of his attack +was the Catholic Church as existing in France in his day, which he +regarded as the chief surviving obstacle to human progress. <i>Écrasez +l'infâme</i> was his motto; and if this seems a trifle fanatical, let us +not forget, as an acute critic has observed, "that what Catholicism was +accomplishing in France in the first half of the eighteenth century was +not anything less momentous than the slow strangling of French +civilisation."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> + +<p>Voltaire was an industrious and prolific writer (his works are numbered +by scores), but he was also a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> master of French prose, and he was +universally read. From the point of view of the history of European +thought his importance lies in his popularisation in France of the +Newtonian physics.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> <i>Newtonisme</i> was a word coined by him, and became +associated with a mechanical view of nature. He also conducted a +vigorous polemic against certain religious notions, then current, but +now out-of-date, and which need not here detain us. Voltaire was an +anti-clerical, but he was not hostile to religion; he was chiefly +regarded as an exponent of English (i.e. progressive) ideas.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La Mettrie.</span>—An advance in the materialistic direction was taken, +however, by La Mettrie (1709-1751), who approached the problem from the +side of physiology (he was a physician by profession). His two important +contributions were <i>Histoire naturelle de l'âme</i> (1745), and <i>L'Homme +Machine</i> (1748). The titles are sufficient to indicate the scope of +these works. That of the latter points back to Descartes, who had +applied the mechanical theory to animals only, and not to man. La +Mettrie extended his application to include man. The implications of +this theory did not escape La Mettrie's contemporaries.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Diderot and His Encyclopædia.</span>—A definite period in the history of +thought is certainly marked by the successful attempt on the part of a +group of progressive thinkers, to extend the circle open to scientific +ideas by the publication of an Encyclopædia which should contain all the +latest knowledge and speculation. The credit for this notable +performance was due to Diderot, who in spite of immense difficulties, +which were aggravated by the ecclesiastical authorities and the +supporters of reaction in general,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> carried the work through to a +triumphant conclusion. The first volume appeared in 1751. The work was +composed with an eye to current prejudices; the language was guarded, +but the anti-clerical tendency of the whole was by no means obscure. +Diderot, however, did not obtrude in the Encyclopædia the definitely +anti-religious opinions which he had developed and which are revealed in +his correspondence.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Holbach.</span>—A disciple of the Encyclopædist—Holbach, a young German +settled in Paris—was bolder than his master, and published, under the +name of a savant who had recently died, a book which became widely +notorious, and has been called the Bible of materialism—the <i>Système de +la Nature</i> (1770). Like Voltaire's <i>Élémens</i>, and La Mettrie's <i>L'Homme +Machine</i>, it was published in Holland. "The book is materialism reduced +to a system. It contains no really new thoughts. Its significance lies +in the energy and indignation with which every spiritualistic and +dualistic view was run to earth on account of its injuriousness both in +practice and in theory,"<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> is the estimate of a distinguished and +impartial writer.</p> + +<p>Rumour gave the credit of its authorship to Diderot, who was so +disturbed by the compliment as hastily to leave Paris for the frontier. +His admiration of it is, however, recorded. After proclaiming his +disgust at the contemporary fashion of "mixing up incredulity and +superstition," he observes that no such fault is to be found in the +<i>System of Nature</i>. "The author is not an atheist in one page, and a +deist in another. His philosophy is all of a piece."</p> + +<p>Certainly to those with an appetite for negative dogmatism the work left +nothing to be desired. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> following passage indicates the attitude and +method of the author, who, in the matter of style, did not fall short of +the French tradition:</p> + +<p>"If we go back to the beginning, we shall always find that ignorance and +fear have created gods; fancy, enthusiasm or deceit has adorned or +disfigured them; weakness worships them; credulity preserves them in +life; custom regards them, and tyranny supports them in order to make +the blindness of men serve its own ends."</p> + +<p>The philosophy of religion which inspired these sentences may appear to +us sufficiently crude. And indeed an impartial reader will have to +confess that much of this eighteenth century polemic against religion, +however well-intentioned, is singularly wide of the mark. It is all +characterised by an imperfect knowledge of the psychological foundations +of religion, and quite devoid of what is now termed the "historic +sense." The faults of Voltaire and Holbach, however, were those of their +age, which was often short-sighted in its recognition of facts, and +superficial in its reasoning from them. Even Dr. Johnson, who found this +section of contemporary French literature so distasteful, never laid his +finger upon its real weakness; the fundamental fallacies upon which it +rested escaped him. He, like Voltaire and the rest, was a child of the +age.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Propaganda not Science.</span>—It is very doubtful whether the genuine +scientists, who devoted themselves not to propaganda but to research, +could have been ready to sanction the uses to which their own +discoveries were put. From the exhaustive references of Lange in his +<i>History of Materialism</i> (Engl. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 49-123), it is +evident that "the extreme<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> views of La Mettrie, Diderot, and Holbach +cannot be fathered on any of the great scientists or philosophers, but +were an attempt to supply scientific principles to the solution of +philosophical, ethical, or religious questions, frequently for practical +and political purposes."<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> + +<p>There are certainly risks attached to the popularisation of the results +of scientific research. Theories have to be presented with an appearance +of finality which does not legitimately belong to them, and sometimes in +a somewhat startling aspect, otherwise the reader is left cold, for it +is excitement rather than genuine information that attracts the +majority. As a judicious writer has observed:</p> + +<p>"No ideas lend themselves to such easy, but likewise to such shallow +generalisations as those of science. Once let out of the hand which uses +them in the strict and cautious manner by which alone they lead to +valuable results, they are apt to work mischief. Because the tool is so +sharp, the object to which it is applied seems to be so easily handled. +The correct use of scientific ideas is only learnt by patient training, +and should be governed by the not easily acquired habit of +self-restraint."<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Scientific Progress.</span>—Alongside of this rigorous propaganda, which +prepared the way for the upheaval of 1789, genuine scientific progress +was being made, especially in the regions of Astronomy, Botany and +Chemistry. The ideas of Newton were taken up and elaborated by means of +more efficient mathematical processes—especially the theory of +infinitesimals—by the distinguished astronomer, Laplace, in his +<i>Système du Monde</i> (1796), and in the successive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> volumes of his +<i>Méchanique Céleste</i> (1799-1825), which has been called a new +<i>Principia</i>.</p> + +<p>Important advances in chemistry are associated with the name of +Lavoisier (1743-1794), who introduced into that science a principle +which has become axiomatic, and which to-day remains the foundation of +all work in the laboratory. To Lavoisier belongs the merit of +introducing what is known as the "quantitative method" into chemistry, +and thus establishing that science upon the exact—that is to say +mathematical—basis, where it now rests and putting exact research in +the place of vague reasoning. His principle was that <i>in all chemical +combinations and reactions, the total weight of the various ingredients +remains unchanged</i>; there is (in spite of appearances) neither loss nor +gain of actual matter. "The quantity of matter is the same at the end as +at the beginning of every operation." It was Lavoisier who finally +established the correct theory of combustion; that it consisted in the +combination of a special element called oxygen, with other bodies or +elements.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Atomic Theory.</span>—Lavoisier had opened a door to researches which +naturally led the way to the establishment of the atomic theory of +matter on an experimental, and not merely a theoretical basis. That +theory is indeed nothing more than the elaboration of Lavoisier's own +principle. John Dalton (1766-1844), a Manchester quaker, published in +1810 his <i>New System of Chemical Philosophy</i>, where highly important +conclusions are drawn both from Lavoisier's facts and from experimental +results of other chemists. Of these, Dalton gave an account and an +explanation which has ever since been the soul of all chemical +reasoning. This explanation is known as his Atomic theory.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>The two facts of which Dalton's theory is an explanation are as follows. +<i>First</i> (Lavoisier's fact), that the total weight of substances remains +always the same, be they combined in ever so many different ways. +<i>Second</i>, that all substances, be they in large or in small quantities, +combine with each other, or separate from each other, in definite and +fixed proportions. The theory of Dalton was that these combinations take +place between independent particles of matter, which are indestructible +and indivisible. These "atoms" of the various elements have definite +weights which are responsible for the proportion in which they are found +to combine. These facts of proportion in combination, or "chemical +affinity," could not be accounted for by the theory which regards matter +as "continuous," but only by the opposite theory that it is "discrete" +(i.e. divided up into particles).</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Philosophical Corollaries.</span>—These strictly scientific theories +associated with the name of Laplace, Lavoisier, and Dalton tended to +strengthen in the popular estimation, the philosophical conclusions of +writers like Holbach. The scientists themselves remained "agnostic" with +regard to questions that lay outside their scope: they maintained here +the correct attitude for scientific research. The question put by +Napoleon to Laplace, why he had not introduced the name of God into the +<i>Méchanique Céleste</i>, was out of place, and deserved the crushing reply +it received. Scientific research is not concerned with questions of +philosophy.</p> + +<p>Still, it did not escape popular attention that the old pillar of a +mechanistic view of the universe now seemed to be reinforced by another. +The theory of <i>the conservation of energy</i> was now supplemented by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> that +of the <i>indestructibility of matter</i> (Lavoisier). And to crown all, the +old atomic theory, which Lucretius had made the foundation of his +dogmatic materialism, was now re-established on an experimental basis.</p> + +<p>So far as physical science was concerned, the situation seemed menacing +to a religious view of life. Men felt that they inhabited a world of +indestructible matter, moved by a certain measure of force, unchangeable +and fixed. The prison of determinism and matter was closing around +them.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</span></p> + +<p class="center">RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">An Unstemmed Tide.</span>—In spite of those important reactions of thought +which we have associated with the name of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Pascal, +the mechanical view had not ceased, as the last chapter has shown us, to +extend itself during the eighteenth century, when it became highly +fashionable in progressive circles.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Common-sense Philosophy.</span>—The strength of this mechanical view lies in +the fact that it stands on the shoulders of a natural science which +itself has its feet firmly planted on the irrefragible rock of +sense-experience. The mechanical view thus rests, in the last resort, +upon the belief (which is held everywhere with confidence by plain men) +that sense-experience is a sound foundation for knowledge.</p> + +<p>The importance of this belief had been recognised by the English +philosopher, Locke (1632-1704), who in his <i>Essay concerning Human +Understanding</i> (1690), lays it down that all human knowledge is based, +ultimately, upon sense-experience. This highly important work had an +immense influence, and, under Locke's tutelage, many thinkers regarded +with suspicion any knowledge which might seem not to be derivable, in +one way or another, from that source.</p> + +<p>As the strength of Samson lay in his unshorn hair,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> so the strength of +the mechanical theory lay, and still lies, in the acceptance of Locke's +theory of human knowledge, i.e. that it is all derived from the senses. +And the Delilah who can shear away Locke's conclusions, leaves Samson +helpless; mechanical materialism becomes a discredited theory. Hence the +truth of the saying that the problem of knowledge is the preliminary +question for philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Weakness of Speculative Philosophy.</span>—Spinoza and Leibniz may be said to +have dispensed with this foundation. Taking the scientific knowledge of +their time for granted, they drew certain conclusions therefrom; but +their results, however imposing, were felt to be the result rather of +speculation than of reason. Such was the more or less unexpressed +estimate of their work. It was undervalued, for both Spinoza and Leibniz +were thinkers of the first calibre; and yet there was some justice in +the charge. By the end of the eighteenth century the days of merely +speculative philosophy were past.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Critical Philosophy.</span>—The time was ripe for a new metaphysic—for a +fresh step forward in philosophic method. That step was taken by the +celebrated Immanuel Kant, who is the originator of what is known, in the +history of thought, as the Critical Philosophy.</p> + +<p>The word <i>critical</i> signifies a particular method of approaching the +problem of existence, a method which must be contrasted with that of the +<i>speculative</i> philosophy, of which Spinoza and Leibniz are examples.</p> + +<p>The critical philosophy, before attempting (as Spinoza had done) to +tackle the problem of <i>existence</i>, first attacked the problem of +<i>knowledge</i>. Before asking <i>What is the truth?</i> it put the preliminary +question,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> <i>What are the means at man's disposal for reaching the +truth?</i> It prefaced all philosophical enquiry by an examination into the +nature and scope of human thought. Such was the preparatory +investigation which was to place metaphysics upon a secure and +scientific foundation. For the new philosophy, the gateway to all sound +knowledge is the reflection of the human mind upon itself. "Know +thyself," is its advice to the inquiring spirit of man. Here, if +anywhere, is to be found the philosopher's stone.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Immanuel Kant.</span>—The celebrated Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg in +1724, and died in his native town in 1804. Between those dates he lived +the industrious and uneventful life of a university professor. The Seven +Years' War and the French Revolution left him undisturbed, though not +unmoved. He was a man of quiet, regular habits, and his fellow-townsmen +would set their clocks by his daily promenade.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> But the adventurous +originality of his thought serves as a contrast to this peaceful +picture.</p> + +<p>Kant, indeed, laid the foundations of philosophy afresh. With +characteristic insight, he went to the very root problem of all, and +challenged human thought itself. Before we can know anything, we must +first of all demand the credentials of the instrument by which knowledge +is gained. Before asking, <i>What</i> do I know? the preliminary question +should be, <i>How</i> do I know? Otherwise we cannot say whether we are in a +position to give any answer to those ultimate problems, the answers to +which constitute philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>It is far from easy to present Kant's criticism of knowledge at once +simply and accurately. This philosopher has a not undeserved reputation +for obscurity, and had he written in any other language than German, he +would perhaps have found no readers.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Problem of Knowledge.</span>—It had already been realised by the +predecessors of Kant that what is called "sense-experience" is a less +simple process than it seems, and that our senses cannot be said to +reveal to us any object as it actually <i>is</i>. John Locke himself was not +the first to point out that the so-called "secondary qualities" of any +material object (i.e. colour, taste, etc.) are produced just as much by +the person who perceives, as by the object which is perceived. Galileo, +Descartes, and Hobbes, besides others, had been aware of this fact, +which indeed becomes evident to the most superficial analysis of +sense-experience.</p> + +<p>The "primary qualities," i.e. density, extension, etc., continued to be +regarded as subsisting <i>in</i> the objects themselves, and independently of +any perceiving consciousness. But even this view did not prove +permanent, and it was the episcopal philosopher, George Berkeley +(1685-1753) who demonstrated in his <i>New Theory of Vision</i> that not even +<i>these</i> qualities could rightly be regarded as subsisting independently.</p> + +<p>Thus it had already been realised, long before Kant wrote his <i>Critique +of Pure Reason</i> (published, 1781), that our senses are far from +revealing to us things as they <i>are</i>; it is only the <i>appearances</i> of +things and not the <i>things themselves</i> that the senses present to us. +Indeed, as is well known, the Scotch philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), +who was a master in the art of raising problems, extended this line of +criticism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> until it reached to pure scepticism. He put the question, If +all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience, and <i>if</i> +sense-experience only supplies us with appearance and not reality, what +degree of trustworthiness can there be in human knowledge? And he was +not afraid to give the logical answer—None. Hume may thus be said to +have brought things to an impasse. As a matter of fact, what he had done +was to refute Locke's theory of knowledge (i.e. that it is derived +entirely from sense-experience) by means of a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Kantian Criticism.</span>—Kant says that it was Hume who "awoke him from +his dogmatic slumbers." By this he meant that Hume made him realise that +it was no use indulging in philosophic speculation generally, or +listening to the speculations of others, until "the Problem of +Knowledge" was satisfactorily solved. To this problem Kant applied +himself. And recognising Locke to be the <i>fons et origo malorum</i>, he +subjected his theory of human knowledge to a close analysis, and exposed +it as being fallacious.</p> + +<p>Far from sense-experience being responsible for all our knowledge, Kant +proved that important elements of knowledge are quite independent of +sense-experience; especially was this so in the case of certain +mathematical propositions. (Hence the question, How is pure mathematics +possible? was put by Kant at the beginning of his philosophy.)</p> + +<p>But it is neither necessary nor desirable to enter into the arguments by +means of which Kant proved his thesis, which was that the human mind +contains in itself certain principles of knowledge (e.g. the idea of +cause and effect, the ideas of mathematics, and so on) which it does not +owe to sense-experience.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span><span class="smcap">Kant's Copernican Hypothesis.</span>—Kant called these principles of +knowledge, <i>forms of thought</i> or <i>categories</i>. The name, perhaps, is +irrelevant to our purpose; all that we need to understand is that Kant +turned the tables upon Locke. Locke said that the mind was a <i>tabula +rasa</i> which passively received impressions from outside. Kant said that +the mind is nothing of the kind; it is not passive, but active; it does +not "receive" whatever is offered, it "selects" what it wants; and <i>it +imposes its own "forms of thought" upon the outside world</i>.</p> + +<p>Photography had not been invented at the time of this controversy, but +Kant might have said: The mind is not a photographic plate receiving +impressions from without, it rather resembles the lens which impressions +must pass through, and be transformed by, before they can create a +picture.</p> + +<p>Kant had, in fact, by this theory, instituted a revolution. His new +dogma was: <i>The mind is the mould into which all our knowledge must be +cast; and the constitution of our mind predetermines the shape that our +knowledge takes.</i></p> + +<p>Thus Kant had discovered that not only sensuous perception, but rational +understanding also, has its forms and presuppositions. Just as we become +aware of objects only by means of senses which perhaps hide or distort +as much as they reveal; so also our rational knowledge is conditioned by +the nature of our understanding, which dictates to reality the "forms" +under which it can be understood and known.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mechanism Undermined.</span>—How did this affect the mechanical theory? The +connection is obvious. Mechanism is nothing but one of the forms of +thought that the mind imposes on phenomena. Just as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> Copernicus had +discovered that it is due to our position on the earth that the heavenly +bodies <i>appear</i> to move round us, so Kant had discovered that it is due +to the nature of our senses and understanding that we perceive things in +space and time, and understand them as being mechanically determined. +The space and time, and the mechanical determinism are not in the +things, <i>but in our minds</i>. The fact is that we can only grasp things +under these forms. Space, time, mechanical causation are forms and laws, +<i>not</i> of nature, <i>but of the human intellect</i>, which is so constituted +as to see things in this way.</p> + +<p>Thus those axioms of science and of mathematics which lie at the base of +all exact knowledge, and which had hitherto been regarded as +<i>objective</i>, i.e. as inherent in the nature of things, were shewn by +Kant to be, as a matter of fact, <i>subjective</i>, that is (in Kant's own +phrase) "they express the conditions under which alone we are able to +apprehend or understand the object." Thus all knowledge is conditioned +by our nature, by the framework, so to speak, not only of our senses but +of our minds.</p> + +<p>In this way the mechanical view was outflanked; that view certainly +seems to us inevitable and certain, but this is due to the constitution +of our minds; the world seems to us to be determined, just as it seems +blue to a person wearing blue spectacles. But there is no sufficient +reason for supposing that it <i>is</i> either determined or blue. The law of +mechanical causation is an axiom, but it is a subjective axiom.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Appearance and Reality.</span>—This may not seem much of an advance on Hume's +position. Human knowledge still seems precarious, if we assume the mind +to be a kind of dictator which imposes its own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> laws upon nature. And +Kant indeed frankly admitted that neither our senses nor our reason were +able to reveal to us things as they <i>are</i>, but only things as they +<i>seem</i>; we grasp <i>appearance</i>, not <i>reality</i>, and (to use Kant's +phraseology) <i>phenomena</i> not <i>noumena</i>. Thus Kant cut away the ground +from under all rationalistic <i>dogmatism</i>; he shewed its presumptuous +futility.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Pathway to Reality.</span>—Kant, however, did not remain satisfied with +the negative results of his critical philosophy, valuable as these were. +Reality, it is true, lies out of range of the human reason, but it is +not entirely inaccessible to us, and scepticism about the ultimate +nature of things is not the necessary corollary of Kant's, as it was of +Hume's, philosophy.</p> + +<p>Kant drew a distinction between the "Theoretical Reason," which his +<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> had dealt with, and the "Practical Reason," +which he discusses in his <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i> (1788).</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The "Practical Reason."</span>—By the "practical reason" Kant meant the moral +consciousness, and the law of the "practical reason" is the moral law, +the fulfilment of which constitutes duty. This law springs neither from +outside authority nor from experience; it is autonomous. And it is upon +the existence of this autonomous moral consciousness that Kant plants +his foothold in his endeavour to find a refuge from the philosophic +agnosticism to which his analysis of the "theoretical reason" had led; +and upon this rock he founded his belief in "God, Freedom, and +Immortality."</p> + +<p>By means of his "practical reason," man gets into touch with that real +world, which his "theoretical reason" is unable to reach. In fact, the +"practical reason" itself (or moral consciousness) is an element<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> in +man's nature which belongs to the <i>real</i>, as opposed to the <i>phenomenal</i> +world. For man himself is a citizen of both worlds, and has (so to +speak) a dual nature, a foot on either shore. He is an inhabitant both +of the world of mechanical phenomena, and of the "timeless world of +freedom," which lies altogether outside of all mechanical conceptions.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Kant and Religion.</span>—"Religion we must seek in ourselves, not outside +ourselves," is a saying of Kant's that gives the clue to his general +attitude.</p> + +<p>It is only in that world which cannot be interpreted mechanically (i.e. +the inner world of freedom of which we never cease to be conscious) that +we may seek, or can hope to find the source of religion. It is not the +spectacle of the mechanically determined world of nature, but the +demands of the moral consciousness that create religion.</p> + +<p>For instance, it is the gulf that yawns between the ideal commands of +the moral law, and the actual possibilities (so poor and meagre) of +fulfilling and satisfying them, that creates, in the view of Kant, the +need of God and immortality. These alone can guarantee the realisation +of the ideal claims of the moral consciousness.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religious Faith.</span>—Thus the "practical reason" leads on to convictions +concerning what lies beyond the limits defined by the "theoretical +reason." The nature of the demands of the moral consciousness give us an +insight into the nature of the super-phenomenal (transcendental, +noumenal) world. That world must be of such a kind as to sanction and +guarantee our moral ideals; it must be friendly and not hostile or +indifferent to those ideals which man cherishes, but which his +"phenomenal" experience seems to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> contradict. Thus we see the truth of +the saying that "The universe as a moral system is the last word of the +Kantian philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Kant's Influence.</span>—Kant was one of those thinkers who are responsible +for turning the stream of thought into fresh channels. Through his +researches into the nature of human knowledge, he discovered the +conditions upon which it rests, and defined the limits beyond which it +cannot pass. Thus, once for all, he put an end to dogmatism.</p> + +<p>And to Kant also belongs the credit of having established the reality +and validity of <i>inner</i> experience. The rock upon which his philosophy +is built is no external fact or event—nothing in time or space—but the +moral consciousness itself. And thus he restores, as the central +interest of philosophy, the human individual, with all his experiences +of need, of hope, and of insight. Personality is the principle of his +philosophy. In this he is the true successor of the Reformation.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</span></p> + +<p class="center">THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Kant and After.</span>—With Kant the hey-day of rationalism terminated. He had +put an end to the superficial psychology upon which it rested. For the +rationalists, the life of the mind had consisted in <i>intellectual +ideas</i>; but a more careful analysis indicated the presence of +deeper-lying elements, which had hitherto been disregarded; there +existed other important constituents besides the intellectual.</p> + +<p>Kant's criticism of "pure reason" did much to discredit the old view; +and by founding his philosophy upon the non-intellectual "moral +consciousness," he heightened the prestige of feeling as against reason +(in the narrow and limited sense of that word).</p> + +<p>Thus Kant is not undeservedly called the father of a philosophy which +succeeded him, and which was based upon the idea of the supremacy of +feeling. But, at the same time, that title is more accurate as an +estimate of another philosopher of rather different characteristics.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Rousseau.</span>—Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a man of unique genius +whose figure occupies a prominent position not only in the annals of +philosophy, but in social, political, and literary history. Even more +than Voltaire was he responsible for sowing seeds of thought which bore +fruit in the events of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> Revolution. And indeed, it is as the author +of the notorious <i>Contrat Social</i> that he is most widely known.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Rousseau's "Sensibility."</span>—Rousseau was one of those philosophers whose +character is the formative element which gives shape to their doctrines. +His was a profoundly emotional temperament. He left behind him an +invaluable document which lays bare all the psychological sources of his +philosophy. The <i>Confessions</i> reveal to us a man highly sensitive and +morbidly introspective, the slave of unreasoning impulses and passions. +In the eyes of some short-sighted persons, these first-hand revelations +will obscure or cast doubt upon the capacity and genius of the man, for +they do little to prejudice opinion in his favour.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">He Defies the Zeitgeist.</span>—Rousseau's profound originality lies in his +having dared to dispute a dogma to which the prestige of an axiom then +attached. He endeavoured to undermine the popular faith in scientific +and philosophic culture. He went right back to Pascal, who, a century +before, had raised the question as to the value of scientific knowledge +for personal life, by proclaiming "The whole of philosophy is not worth +an hour's study."</p> + +<p>Rousseau's first philosophical work was occasioned by the offer of a +prize on the part of a provincial academy for a thesis on the problem +"Whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to +purify manners?" "The question pierced Rousseau's soul like a flash of +lightning." He felt (he tells us) that he saw a new world, and felt a +new man; he saw no longer the world of culture, of science, of +philosophy (which he felt to be as artificial as it was ineffective and +vain), but the <i>real</i> world of personality, of living<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> feeling, of the +inner life. It flashed upon him that it was the primitive and elementary +feelings, the great and simple relations of life, which gave to +existence its value. The rest was superficial and irrelevant.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Rousseau and Religion.</span>—The intellectualist is ever the aristocrat.<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> +Voltaire and the philosophers of the "enlightenment" spoke of the +unenlightened multitude as <i>la canaille</i>. Its beliefs were +superstitions. Rousseau knew that the things which men have in common +are more vital than those in which they differ, and the primitive +instincts of the race which we all share, are the most important part of +our nature.</p> + +<p>Among these primitive instincts, indomitable and irrepressible, is the +instinct of religion. Thus Rousseau transferred the religious problem +from the sphere of external observation and explanation of the world (to +which the rationalists had promoted or degraded it), back to inner +personal feeling. This marked an epoch in the philosophy of religion.</p> + +<p>Moreover, Rousseau was able to write in a convincing fashion of +religion, because (and here he differed from the intellectuals of his +day) he had personal experience of what it meant. Hence wherever he +alludes to religion his language has the ring of sincerity; it is always +spontaneous, and sometimes it is passionate and poetic. His religious +experience took the form of nature-mysticism, undogmatic (because +non-intellectualist), but rich and deep:</p> + +<p>"I can find no more worthy adoration of God than the silent admiration +which the contemplation of His works begets in us, and which cannot be +expressed by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> any prescribed acts.... In my room I pray seldomer and +more coldly; but the sight of a beautiful landscape moves me, I cannot +tell why. I once read of a certain bishop, who, when visiting in his +diocese, encountered an old woman whose only prayers consisted in a sigh +'Oh!' The bishop said to her, 'Good mother, always pray like that; your +prayer is worth more than ours.' My prayer is of that kind."<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> + +<p>Here we have one form of the religious spirit; for the mystic it is +always true that "there is neither speech nor language." The mystic and +the dogmatist stand at opposite poles, for dogmatism is always an +attempt at definition even when that which is to be defined is +indefinable; and here is to be found the common denominator between Kant +and Rousseau. The former, by his analysis of reason, discredited +dogmatism: the latter, by his apotheosis of feeling, contributed towards +the same result.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Romanticism in Germany.</span>—This strong movement of feeling, created on the +one hand by Kant's <i>Critique</i>, and by the mysticism of Rousseau, took +different forms in the two countries to which these two philosophers +belonged. In France the new philosophy became the hot-bed of +revolutionary ideas; whereas in Germany it found vent in a ferment of +speculative systems, and in an outcrop of artistic production. It +produced the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the prose +and poetry of Goethe and Schiller.</p> + +<p>"It was the age of 'beautiful souls' and of 'noble hearts'; men believed +themselves capable of the highest things; the immediate needs of the +heart were set over against reason ... under many successive forms +Romanticism prevailed in literature, effecting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> the re-birth of human +fancy after the long labour of intellect."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Goal of Philosophy.</span>—Philosophic young Germany had set itself an +ambitious programme. Kant, indeed, had cleared the ground for them, but +his warnings that an eagle cannot soar beyond the atmosphere which +supports it, were disregarded.</p> + +<p>The philosophy of Kant himself was felt by the successors to be lacking +in the <i>idea of totality</i>—in the conception of a whole. His division of +existence into Appearance and Reality seemed to indicate a certain lack +of finish in his philosophy; and they set themselves to explore the root +of reality which to Kant seemed undiscoverable, but in which the +sensuous and super-sensuous worlds are united, and from which they have +emerged. This task became and remained the grand problem of philosophy +for a whole generation of thinkers. All externality, isolation, and +division were to disappear, all existence must be shown to be but +degrees and phases of the one infinite reality. Spinoza's work had to be +done again in the light of increased psychological knowledge.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Fichte.</span>—Of the thinkers who addressed themselves to this ambitious +task, only two need be considered here; and these are chosen because +they attacked the problem from different directions.</p> + +<p>In the first place, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), who had been the +first to lay down the programme of thought with explicitness, realised +and admitted that the task which philosophy had set itself was beyond +the powers of any logical train of thought. The "higher unity" of +existence, the demonstration of which was the goal of philosophy, could +be reached<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> only by a process of intellectual intuition,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> it must be +guessed or divined; for it presents itself (and this is a +characteristically "Romanticist" idea) to the human mind in the +immediacy of feeling, and not by discursive thought.</p> + +<p>It was of the essence of Fichte's philosophy, as it had been of +Spinoza's, that a point may be attained where the mind feels itself to +be at one with the truly real, and only when this point is reached—i.e. +<i>sub specie aeternitatis</i>, will it arrive at and retain the conviction +of the universal order and unity of existence. From this standpoint, and +from this alone, does it become possible to grasp "the meaning of those +dualities and contrasts which we find around and in us, the differences +of self and not-self, of mind and matter, of subject and object, of +appearance and reality, of truth and semblance."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Hegel.</span>—It has been said, perhaps with justice, that "philosophy is the +finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." The remark +might seem, at least in the eyes of some, to be particularly applicable +to the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Not because +his arguments are bad, but because he attempted to establish by strict +logic the conclusions which Fichte sought to reach by means of +intuition, and which perhaps are only attainable by that method. Hegel +attempted to climb, by a strict process of reasoning, to the position +from which the Fichtean landscape might spread itself below as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +logical whole: he claimed to be a reasoner as well as a seer. And +thereby he may be said to have furnished "the programme of thought for a +certain class of intellects which will never die out."</p> + +<p>Thus Hegel was something of a hybrid, and may be described as a +rationalistic-romanticist. Nor are his arguments the easiest to +understand. "The only thing that is certain," writes a commentator who +stands at an opposite philosophical pole, "is that whatever you may say +of his procedure, some one will accuse you of misunderstanding it. I +make no claim to understanding it; I treat it merely +impressionistically."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> And this is all we can do here.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Hegel's Method.</span>—Hegel proceeds by means of what he calls the +<i>Dialectical Method</i>. He understands by "dialectic" (1) a property of +all our <i>thoughts</i> in virtue of which, each particular thought +necessarily passes over into another; and also (2) a property of +<i>things</i>, in virtue of which every particular thing necessarily belongs +to, or is related to, all other things. A thing "by itself" is nothing.</p> + +<p>Hence a similarity or parallelism between the <i>method of thought</i> and +the <i>nature of things</i>. Logic is of the nature of things. The way in +which thought reaches truth is also the way in which things exist. Hegel +expressed this in his well-known saying "the real is the rational, and +the rational is the real." Perhaps more poetically or obscurely the same +proposition is expressed by declaring: "When we think existence, +existence thinks in us," and "The pulse of existence itself beats in our +thinking."</p> + +<p>Hegel's logic may, in fact, be described as an attempt to conceive the +movement of thought as being at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> same time the law of the universe. +Logic (to repeat what we said before) is of the nature of things: +reality is rational, and what is rational is real.</p> + +<p>Thus logic for Hegel did not mean (as it meant for Kant) the forms or +laws of thought: it signified the very core of reality. For all that +Kant knew, reality might or might not be rational: all he asserted was +that the human mind rationalised reality (or parts of it). For Hegel, +logic or reason was the living and moving spirit of the world. The +essence of reality and the essence of thought were one. The absolute +reality was spirit.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Hegelianism.</span>—Hegel's philosophy may be described as an attempt to reach +the standpoint of religious mysticism by means of purely rational +processes. It is the finding of rational grounds for supra-rational +intuitions. The attempt is laudable, and, in the eyes of many, it was +successful. And, as we shall see, Hegelianism had an important future, +especially in England; nor, as a system of thought, is it yet extinct. +Its central conception is that which, in one shape or another, will +never cease to appeal to mankind—that existence is, at bottom, +spiritual in character—that spirit is the only ultimate reality.</p> + +<p>That Hegelianism provides a rational basis for a spiritual religion is +obvious enough; nor is it necessary to indicate the possibilities of +linking up the Christian doctrine of the Logos with a philosophy for +which Reason was the very core and ground of existence. Hegel may indeed +be said to have laid the foundation of Christian theology afresh; or +rather to have restored<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> what was best in the old theology, and given it +the prestige of modernity.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religion and Philosophy.</span>—In fact, for Hegel as for all rationalists +whose attitude is also religious, religion and philosophy were two forms +of the same thing. Religion contains philosophic truths under the form +of imagination: philosophy contains religious truth under the form of +reason. The difference is one of form only, not of content. This had not +been the view of Rousseau, nor is it the deepest view; and it was not +the view of a thinker of the Romantic school who did more than any +individual among his predecessors to bring the religious problem to the +point where it now stands.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Schleiermacher.</span>—While the sun of Romanticism was at its zenith, the +spirit of Kant's critical philosophy was kept alive by a thinker of as +deep spiritual and intellectual insight as Hegel himself.</p> + +<p>Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) brought the religious +problem down from those altitudes to which Romanticist metaphysics had +raised it, to what Kant had called "the fertile bathos of experience." +He approached religion from the side of inner experience, the point of +view of psychology. The profound insight of Kant had already shown that +this was the direction on which future thought would travel, by tracing +back the religious problem to a <i>personal need</i> more clearly and +penetratingly than ever before—a need set up by the incongruity of the +real and the ideal.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">His View of Religious Ideas.</span>—Just as Rousseau, owing to his own +religious experience, was in a better position to attack the religious +problem than the philosophers of the "enlightenment," so Schleiermacher<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +had the advantage of some Romanticists. As a boy, he had been put to +school with the Moravians, and throughout his own life he never ceased +to declare that the years spent among them had been of vital importance +to the development of his views. In 1801 he writes:</p> + +<p>"My way of thinking has indeed no other foundation than my own peculiar +character, my inborn mysticism, my education as it has been determined +from within."</p> + +<p>And his own experience of religion established in him the conviction +that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this +alone can bring man into immediate relation to the highest. His +acceptance of Kant's criticism of reason led him to understand that +intellectual concepts, in the religious sphere, (i.e. dogmas) must +always be of secondary importance: <i>experience</i> comes first. And his +profound originality lies just here, and it is just here that +Schleiermacher stands out as the forerunner of the modern view. He it +was who first made it evident that religious ideas derive their validity +from that inner experience which they are an attempt to describe. If a +dogma is an expression of an experience felt by man in his innermost +life, it is a <i>valid</i> dogma, even if philosophic criticism hesitates to +sanction it.<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">What Is Religion?</span>—The distance of this position from that of the +eighteenth century intellectualism which regarded religion either as a +form of philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> or of superstition, is obvious. Schleiermacher +attacks two intellectualist prejudices in particular: (1) That according +to which religion is conceived of primarily as a doctrine (either +revealed, or grounded on reason), and (2) That which regards religion as +merely a means towards morality.</p> + +<p>Religion, according to Schleiermacher, has an existence independent of +(though, no doubt, associated with) philosophy, superstition, or +morality. Its essence consists neither in speculation nor in action, but +in a certain type of feeling, of inner experience. Schleiermacher +characterised this particular type of feeling as <i>a feeling of +dependence</i>: the immediate consciousness that everything finite exists +in and through the infinite, everything temporal in and through the +eternal.</p> + +<p>That Schleiermacher should have described the specifically religious +feeling in this particular way is comparatively irrelevant so far as our +present purpose is concerned. The point of importance is that he was the +first to recognise the <i>independence</i> of religion, to see in it a +legitimate and natural form of human activity, which exists, not for the +sake of knowledge or of morality, but for its own sake, and on its own +account.</p> + +<p>Here, though Hegel took a different view, Schleiermacher is one in +spirit with the Romantic school; indeed, he may be said to have drawn +the logical conclusions of Romanticism. The independence and originality +of religion is the necessary consequence of a philosophy which set +itself against the unbalanced intellectualism of the "enlightenment."</p> + +<p>The permanent significance of Romanticism lies here: That it discredited +once for all the notion that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> there is only one road to reality—that of +logic. It is not only philosophy, but religion and art that remove the +veil which hides the supra-sensible world from us. And to close our eyes +to the facts of religious experience, or to attempt to discredit them by +the application of irrelevant terms such as "superstition," is not only +to display ourselves as philistines, but also to forsake the highest +traditions of science—veneration for experience, and the realms of +fact.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</span></p> + +<p class="center">MECHANISM AND LIFE</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recapitulatory.</span>—We have already observed the mechanical theory, in the +hands of Descartes, expanding itself to cover organisms and the +phenomena of life, and in La Mettrie's <i>L'Homme Machine</i>, reducing even +human beings to the status of automata. These theories were, however, +known to be insecurely based upon somewhat hasty generalisations, for, +in point of fact, the science of biology was as yet in its infancy; the +<i>data</i> for a complete vindication of the mechanical position were as yet +wanting.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Advance of Biology.</span>—Biological science, however, during the first half +of the nineteenth century made considerable advances, and research +continually kept bringing to light facts which seemed to substantiate +the brilliant, if premature, hypothesis of Descartes. It will not be +necessary for us to do more than take hasty note of certain important +developments.</p> + +<p>It was in 1828 that the German chemist Whöler (1800-1882) for the first +time in biological history prepared an organic compound (urea) from +inorganic materials—an achievement universally recognised to be of the +utmost significance. As a distinguished historian of the science of +chemistry puts it:</p> + +<p>"This discovery destroyed the difference which was then considered to +exist between organic and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> inorganic bodies, viz. that the former could +only be formed under the influence of vegetable or animal vital forces, +whereas the latter could be artificially produced."<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p>Ten years later another German, Schleider (1804-1881) propounded the +cellular theory of the structure and growth of plants, a theory which +was soon extended to animal organisms by Schwann (1810-1882). The +publication of this famous theory was described by a contemporary as "a +burst of daylight"; it indeed illuminated what had hitherto been buried +in mystery and mythology—the structure and method of growth of plants +and animals. It seemed to render superfluous any form of the old +conception of a "vital force" to explain the phenomena of growth, if it +could now be assumed that the cells automatically absorbed outside +material, increased in number by the division of individuals, and built +up the organism by continual repetition of this process.</p> + +<p>Schwann was also responsible for initiating a number of minute +physiological investigations which led to a far more intimate knowledge +of the action of nerves and muscles, and interpreted these in mechanical +terms. "Investigations which were carried on with all the resources of +modern physics regarding the phenomena of animal movements, gradually +substituted for the miracles of the 'vital forces' a molecular +mechanism, complicated, indeed, and likely to baffle our efforts for a +long time to come, but intelligible, nevertheless, as a mechanism."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> + +<p>Subsequent researches, notably of Helmholtz (1821-1895) and Meyer, lent +strong support to this interpretation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> The conception of the +conservation of energy (an important axiom of the mechanical theory) was +successfully applied by them to the economy of organisms. The organism +was found not to <i>create</i> energy, but only to contain remarkably +efficient means of deriving it from materials absorbed as food. Thus +animal warmth and the power of motion are originally "sunlight +transformed in the organism of the plant," and afterwards appropriated +by the animal. The power with which we move our limbs is as much the +product of combustion as is the power of a steam engine, the only +difference being that the organism is, of the two, the more efficient +converter of energy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Mechanical Theory Substantiated.</span>—Thus, whether biologists were +considering the <i>structure</i> or the <i>behaviour</i> of organisms, they were +arriving at the same conclusions. The structure was revealed as physical +and chemical structure, and the behaviour as the resultant of familiar +physical and chemical processes. Hence biology came to be regarded as a +compartment of physics and chemistry, for life itself was nothing but a +complex physical or chemical phenomenon. Life could thus be +satisfactorily expressed in terms of matter and energy. The speculations +of Descartes seemed to be established by experimental science.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Final Obstacle.</span>—The situation, already satisfactory to those whose +hope it was to see the mechanical theory impregnably established, was +marred, however, by one untoward circumstance. The phenomena of organic +structure, growth, and behaviour having been reduced to order, and +expressed in terms of physics and chemistry, certain important facts +still resisted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +explanation, and stood out as a last stronghold of the older view.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Origin of Species.</span>—The existence of definite forms of animal and +vegetable life, whose infinite variety and complexity was continually +being increased by research<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>—still remained a mystery. How did these +innumerable species naturally and automatically come into being? was the +question that must be satisfactorily answered before the mechanical view +could be held to cover all the facts.</p> + +<p>The direction in which to look for a reply had been indicated by a +number of thinkers. The French naturalist Buffon, the philosopher Kant, +and the poet Goethe—besides other thinkers—had already in the +eighteenth century familiarised the idea that species are not immutable, +but that, by some means or other, new forms of life are derived from +pre-existing ones. The conception had gained a firm foothold in England, +where it was hospitably entertained by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and where it +formed the staple of a book which caused a good deal of controversy in +its day, and which is not yet forgotten.<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lamarck.</span>—The evolutionary idea, however, though attractive to +philosophers, and even to men of science, was insufficient as an +explanation of the origin of species so long as the processes of +transformation remained obscure. Naturalists could not accept an +hypothesis for which there seemed to be such imperfect evidence. An +ingenious French scientist, J. Baptiste<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> de Lamarck (1744-1829) had +indeed, in 1809, propounded the theory—ever since known by his +name—that the use or disuse of particular organs might, after a long +series of generations, result in the formation of new species. (The +ideas denoted by the words "environment," "adaptation," "acquired +habits"—now so familiar—may be said to have been introduced by him). +But the scientific prejudices of the time were against Lamarck's +theories, and he had to lament their inhospitable reception. Indeed +Lamarck's critics did not hesitate to exercise their powers of ridicule, +or to make fun of the giraffe who derived his long neck from the +attempts of his ancestors to browse on high trees. Darwin himself talks +of "Lamarck's nonsense," and of his "veritable rubbish"—language, +however, which he was subsequently able to retract.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Geology.</span>—Perhaps the most stubborn obstacle which Lamarckian +theories had to meet was the current prejudice as to the age (or youth) +of the earth. Contemporary geologists were by no means prepared to grant +Lamarck the illimitable periods of time which his transformation +processes seemed to require. Consequently it is not surprising that the +new theories, perhaps for the first time, received a measure of justice +at the hands of one who himself became responsible for a revolution in +the science of geology.</p> + +<p>"I devoured Lamarck <i>en voyage</i>," writes Charles Lyell, describing a +journey from Oxford in 1827. "His theories delighted me more than any +novel I ever read, and much in the same way, for they address themselves +to the imagination.... That the earth is quite as old as he supposes, +has long been my creed."<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>In spite of the fascination of these theories, however, Lyell was not +carried away by them, and it was not for some years that he estimated +them at their true value. Meanwhile the new geology made its appearance +with the publication of the three volumes of his own <i>Principles of +Geology</i>, between 1829 and 1833. The significance of the book for +biological speculation—for theories of the origin of species—lay in +its thesis that the present condition of the earth is the product of +geological processes incalculably long. Hitherto the "catastrophic +theory" had been dominant—the notion that a series of immense +catastrophic events (like the Deluge) had been responsible for the +present condition of the earth's surface. For this Lyell substituted his +"Evolutionary Theory," according to which the almost invisibly slow +geological processes which we may now see operating around us, are +typical of the behaviour of the crust of this planet for incalculable +periods of time; for even the slowest changes, if sufficient time is +allowed them, are capable of producing the most stupendous results. +Lyell may be said to have extended the age of the earth <i>ad infinitum</i>. +Just as Galileo removed all barriers of space, Lyell removed those of +time. Their joint achievement was to present to humanity a universe +infinite both in space and time—a staggering conception.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results of Lyell's Theory.</span>—Though Lyell's boldness disturbed a good +many of his contemporaries, those biologists who were engaged upon +seeking the origin of species were thankful to one who had removed the +chief obstacle to the solution of their difficulties. They were now +relieved of one embarrassment: Lyell gave them the power to draw on the +Bank <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>of Time to any extent; bankruptcy was no longer possible.<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p> + +<p>Indeed, Lyell seems himself to have been convinced of the evolutionary +origin of species (though the mode of its operation still remained a +mystery for him no less than for the biologists themselves). In fact, it +became quite evident that the idea of "continuity" which the <i>Principles +of Geology</i> had established in the inorganic world, must be equally +applicable to the organic world.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Darwin.</span>—The theory of a common descent of species had occurred, as +early as 1837, to an enthusiastic student of Lyell's writings, who was +also a personal friend. Charles Darwin had collected much geological, +botanical, and zoological matter on his voyage with the <i>Beagle</i> round +the world, and continued for twenty years to accumulate an immense +volume of <i>data</i> to substantiate a theory which had first suddenly +suggested itself to him in 1838 as the result of reading for amusement +Malthus' <i>Essay on the Principle of Population</i>.</p> + +<p>This celebrated book, first published in 1798, had attempted to describe +the forces which ensure the multiplication, or check the increase of +population. The proposition laid down by Malthus was that population +tends to vary with the means of subsistence. He had studied his problem +from a social or political point of view, but the same principle was +seen by Darwin to apply to all living creatures. Two forces are seen +everywhere in conflict: (a) the luxuriant powers of reproduction +possessed by and exercised<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> by each species; (b) the difficulties and +obstacles by which the species tend to be eliminated. The contest +between the powers of reproduction and those of elimination—this +"over-production" and "crowding-out"—is what was afterwards termed the +"struggle for existence."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">"Natural Selection."</span>—Darwin's momentous theory was that this struggle, +proceeding for untold ages, had resulted in the continual formation of +new species. Granted that the numerous offspring of any individual +member of a species tend to vary, those variations survive which happen +to be best fitted to cope with the environment. These in their turn +leave offspring, the variations and the selections are repeated, and so +on <i>ad infinitum</i>; and the result is that entirely new species are +formed by a long process of insignificant changes. This, briefly put, is +the celebrated theory of "Natural Selection."</p> + +<p>The habit of scientific caution was characteristic of Darwin, who at +first would not write down "even the briefest sketch" of his hypothesis, +but devoted nearly twenty years to the accumulation of evidential +<i>data</i>. His friends continually warned him that he would be forestalled, +and this actually occurred, as is well known, in 1858, when the book +which was to give the new theory to the world was already half written. +The naturalist, Alfred Russell Wallace, on a collecting expedition in +the East Indies, "in a flash of insight" while sick with fever, found +the same solution of the mystery that had puzzled biologists so long. +Wallace's letter to Darwin, containing the abstract of his theory, came +"like a bolt from the blue."</p> + +<p>The behaviour of the two men was worthy of the highest traditions of +scientific research. The matter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> was put into the hands of Lyell, and +Wallace's paper, together with certain extracts from Darwin's +unpublished notes, were read before the Linnean Society, and the +preparation of Darwin's book was hurried on. In November, 1859, <i>The +Origin of Species</i> was published.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results of Darwin's Theory.</span>—The importance (for the general trend of +thought) of this joint achievement of Darwin and Wallace was +considerable, and could not but be regarded as an extension of the +mechanical theory. The origin of species might still to some extent +remain mysterious (for "natural selection" was soon realised to be only +one of many factors at work in evolution), yet the area of mystery was +patently reduced, and the "inexplicable" driven further back. A formula +had been provided, which seemed to be as valid, and likely to prove as +permanent and fruitful in biological research as Newton's law of gravity +had been in the realm of physics.</p> + +<p>In point of fact, Darwin had only substituted new problems of +"variation" and "heredity" for the old one of the diversity of species; +but an impression was created by the new discoveries that a purely +mechanical explanation of the origin of life and even of mind was within +reach.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Descent of Man.</span>—With regard to "mind," the impression was +re-inforced by Darwin's next book—the <i>Descent of Man</i>, where the gap +between man and the animals was finally bridged. The work was merely an +extension of the principles previously applied by him, and as a theory +it had been present to Darwin's mind as far back as 1837. As soon as he +had become "convinced that species were mutable productions," he could +not "avoid the belief that man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> must come under the same law."<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> +Indeed the Descent was nothing more than a corollary to the <i>Origin of +Species</i>. The earlier work contains the whole of Darwinism.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Position Reached.</span>—And with the full publication of Darwin's +theories a point was reached when a more or less consistently +materialistic position seemed possible. The foundations of such a +position had been strengthened by the scientific atomism of Dalton, and +the results of German research in the field of <i>organic</i> chemistry +seemed to open up possibilities of expressing even life in terms of +matter. And, finally, the evolutionary hypothesis had reduced some of +the most obscure biological problems to manageable proportions. The +prospects for a purely naturalistic philosophy were phenomenally +bright.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</span></p> + +<p class="center">MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">From Science to Philosophy.</span>—The record of certain important scientific +discoveries has occupied us in two recent chapters, and it is now time +to examine the philosophic results that were drawn from them. It is true +that the generalisations drawn from the results of scientific research +were sometimes hasty, and not always sanctioned by the gifted minds to +whom these results were due; yet they were assured a popular reception, +and exercised an immense influence. It is not always the most accurate +thinkers whose ideas gain the widest currency.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Discredit of Romanticism.</span>—The Idealistic movement in philosophy which +we have seen flourishing in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth +century, had begun, after the lapse of a generation, to decline.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> The +causes of decline, as often happens, were in part, at least, other than +intellectual. Hegelianism had become associated with political reaction, +and "a philosophy has lost its charm when it enters the service of +absolutism." And a rising spirit of enterprise in commerce and industry +also contributed to a change of attitude, for as material interests<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +develop, men have less leisure for speculation, and often lose their +taste for ideals. Probably there should also be taken into account the +sentimentality that had attached itself to Romanticism and with which +men were sated. This revolt has its most pointed expression in the prose +writings of the poet Heine, who attacks with satiric bitterness "the new +troubadours, so morbid and somnambulistic, so high-flown and +aristocratic, and altogether so unnatural."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Metaphysics Rejected.</span>—The reaction against the philosophy of +Romanticism took the form of a complete revolt against speculative +philosophy. But instead of going back to Kant, and taking up a +vigorously critical attitude, it took refuge in the prejudices of +"common sense." The new movement must be associated in the first place +with a French thinker, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who made the attempt +to substitute scientific and <i>positive</i> knowledge for the vague +speculations which had hitherto passed for philosophy. He was, in fact, +the founder of that system of ideas known as Positivism, which (as we +shall see) gained great vogue later, especially in England. Comte's +doctrine was that, all spheres of Nature now being brought under the +sway of positive science, the time had arrived for men, when +constructing their conceptions of life and the world, to reject all but +such ideas as positive science can accept. The age of theology and +speculation was past; the new age of positive science, where both +imagination and argumentation should be subordinate to observation, was +at hand. Comte, as is well known, became the founder of what he hoped +might develop into a new Catholicism—the "Religion of Humanity," and an +atmosphere of moral idealism permeates his thought.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span><span class="smcap">German Extremists.</span>—In Germany, the home of Romanticism, the revolt took +a radical shape in the hands of writers like Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) +and Büchner. "I unconditionally repudiate absolute, self-sufficing +speculation—speculation which draws its material from within," says the +former, in the Introduction to his <i>Essence of Christianity</i><a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> (1841) +and asserts that he "places philosophy in the negation of philosophy." +Büchner, a far less acute thinker than Feuerbach, adopts a similar +attitude, protests against pedantry, and appeals (the appeal is always +dangerous) to common sense:</p> + +<p>"Expositions which are not intelligible to an educated man are scarcely +worth the ink they are printed with. Whatever is clearly conceived can +be clearly expressed."</p> + +<p>It is not surprising that the book <i>Force and Matter</i> (1855)—in the +preface to which these sentiments are expressed—went through sixteen +editions in thirty years and was translated into most European +languages. It is an extreme expression of the most thorough-going +materialism, and the circumstance that its conclusions were acceptable +neither to cautious scientists nor to critical philosophers, did not +compromise its authority with the general public. As was only natural, +for materialism is a creed for which the evidence is all on the surface, +and to which the objections, being less obvious, escape notice. And +Büchner's pleas for intelligibility and clearness, though in some sense +justified by the inconceivable pedantry of much German metaphysics, was, +in point of fact, only a form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> of cant; for "there are difficulties +lying in the subject-matter itself which cannot be banished from the +sphere of philosophy." Appeals to popular prejudices are not a more +legitimate form of philosophic, than of scientific controversy; serious +thinkers do not thus stoop to the expedients of the politician.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Effects of Darwin's Theory.</span>—It would be a serious mistake, then, to +imagine that materialistic naturalism had to wait for the publication of +the <i>Origin of Species</i> (1859) before it could become a formidable +theory. And yet the appearance of Darwin's book had important effects, +and among these is to be reckoned a certain weakening of the old +"Argument from Design," according to which the complexity and delicacy +evident everywhere in the world of nature, could not be attributed to +chance, but pointed to the existence and activity of a divine Designer. +Paley, during the eighteenth century, had elaborated the argument with a +wealth of detailed instances of "contrivance":</p> + +<p>"The pivot upon which the head turns, the ligament within the socket of +the hip-joint, the pulley or trochlear muscles of the eye; the +epiglottis, the bandages which tie down the tendons of the wrist and +instep," and so on.</p> + +<p>And it was not so much the doubt cast by it upon the separate creation +of particular species that was the disturbing element in Darwin's +hypothesis (few men now regarded the book of <i>Genesis</i> as a manual of +natural science, or faith in it, as such, as a matter of religious +obligation); it was rather that the new doctrine of "natural selection" +seemed to invalidate the "argument from design." Design or chance had +been the alternatives offered by Paley, and chance only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> had to be +mentioned to be rejected; but Darwin made it possible to escape from the +dilemma. He showed how, if certain conditions were granted, the whole +process of the manufacture of species would naturally and inevitably +follow. Neither design nor chance was the explanation: there was another +alternative, <i>the influence of environment</i>. Thus Paley's instances of +elaborate "contrivance" were explained by Darwin as instances of +adaptation. The environment under which these organs had developed had +made them what they were; they could not, under the given circumstances, +have been different. As a very lucid writer puts it:</p> + +<p>"Before Darwin's great discovery, those who denied the existence of a +Contriver were hard put to it to explain the appearance of contrivance. +Darwin, within certain limits and on certain suppositions, provided an +explanation. He showed how the most complicated and purposeful organs, +if only they were useful to the species, might gradually arise out of +random variations, continuously weeded by an unthinking process of +elimination."<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Darwinism Exploited.</span>—In fact, it became evident that popular +materialism had been strongly reinforced by the new biology; and though +Darwin himself was cautious in adding philosophic or religious +corollaries to his own propositions, some of his more eager disciples +did not hesitate to fill in his blanks, and to draw conclusions which +the master was too conservative, too blind, or perhaps too scientific to +sanction.</p> + +<p>The distinguished zoologist Haeckel (1834-1919) may be reckoned the most +notable amongst these. He was one of the first German scientists to give +his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> adherence to Darwin, who seems to have considered him too zealous a +disciple. "Your boldness sometimes makes me tremble," he wrote (November +19, 1868). It is not every scientist who can perceive the limits of an +hypothesis, or who insists so conscientiously as Darwin did, upon the +necessity for its verification.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Herbert Spencer.</span>—Though there were not wanting in England writers to +exploit Darwinian theories in the interests of a narrow secularism, +their work was not of first-rate importance, and need not detain us. A +new evolutionary philosophy was, however, worked out by a conscientious +thinker of a different calibre—Mr. Herbert Spencer. He indeed may be +described as the Aristotle of a new world-view. He attempted to +co-ordinate and unify all human knowledge, and to present the world with +a final philosophy based upon the <i>data</i> supplied by natural science. To +this ambitious task he devoted a lifetime of patient work, broken by +intervals of ill-health. In 1850 the <i>System of Synthetic Philosophy</i> +was projected; its <i>First Principles</i> were published in 1862, but it was +not until 1896 that the gigantic enterprise was complete.</p> + +<p>Spencer was inspired neither by hostility to religion in general, nor to +Christianity in particular. The motive of his work was a more honourable +one. He felt, with many of his contemporaries, that the foundations of +the old religion were no longer secure, and that the old sanctions of +morality were already gravely compromised; and he wished to supply a new +creed and a new discipline in the place of these. His principal objects +were social and ethical. And in this important respect he may be +associated with Comte. Both were sociologists and moralists before they +were philosophers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> which accounts for their overlooking and +underestimating various important philosophic difficulties.</p> + +<p>A few remarks about Spencer's system are here not out of place. He +attempted to reduce experience to a unity by seeking evidence for the +existence of a single and universal <i>law</i>. This unifying principle he +found in a general law of evolution. He formulated this law in language +which is perhaps less obscure than it seems, and which practically +amounts to this, that there is a perpetual process going on which +reduces disorder to order, undifferentiated sameness to specialised +variety.<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a></p> + +<p>The <i>First Principles</i> was published before the <i>Origin of Species</i>, and +the confirmation which Darwin's work supplied to Spencer's theory must +have recommended the latter to the minds of scientifically trained +thinkers. Moreover, Spencer sanctioned a hopeful outlook; evolutionary +optimism was an attractive and an idealistic, as well as a reasonable +philosophy. It demanded the subordination of the individual to society, +it urged the necessity of self-discipline and of industry, and pointed +(if these conditions were fulfilled) to a brighter future, and to a new +humanity. The generous idealism of the following passage is +characteristic of Spencer's outlook, and of those who thought—and +hoped—with him; it occurs at the end of his <i>Principles of Ethics</i>:</p> + +<p>"The highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share—even +though an utterly inappreciable and unknown share—in 'the making of +Man.'... As time goes on, there will be more and more of those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> whose +unselfish end will be the further evolution of Humanity. While +contemplating from the heights of thought that far-off life of the race +never to be enjoyed by them, but only by a remote posterity, they will +feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance +towards it."</p> + +<p>Spencer, then, evidently deserves the important place that he occupies +in the history of thought. For though he was forced, for lack of those +final scientific results which he vainly hoped might soon be +forthcoming, to leave some vital gaps in his scheme,<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> he had made an +imposing attempt to systematise and unify all human experience. And his +attempt to base an idealistic morality upon sure grounds of natural +science was valuable and important.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spencer's Philosophy of Religion.</span>—At the same time, Spencer could not +remain satisfied with a mere <i>description</i> of natural phenomena, however +complete and comprehensive such description might seem; he desired to +offer, besides this, an <i>explanation</i> of these phenomena—how did they +come to be, and how do they continue to exist? To provide this +explanation, Spencer postulated the existence of an Unknown Power which +is at once the origin and the sustaining ground of everything. This +power he regarded as lying quite out of range not only of the human +senses, but of the human intellect. It was not only unknown but +<i>unknowable</i>. This celebrated doctrine of the Unknowable is not the +least interesting or important part of Spencer's system, and it is +perhaps more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> germane than any other speculation of his to our present +subject, as this <i>terra incognita</i> was allotted by him to religion as +its peculiar province. He hoped that the undisputed possession and +occupation by religion of this territory might put an end to its +perpetual conflict with science, and substitute for this a reasonable, +if not cordial, understanding. Science might contentedly appropriate the +sphere of the knowable, and leave to religion the undefined and perhaps +infinite area of the unknowable; and he hoped this division of labour +would be both fruitful and permanent.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Victorian Agnostics.</span>—Through this doctrine of the Unknowable, +Herbert Spencer was the father of that form of belief or disbelief which +was pertinently named Agnosticism by the most celebrated of its +exponents—Huxley. This combination of Positivism in science with +Agnosticism in religion and philosophy, became highly popular in a wide +circle in England during the last third of the nineteenth century, +especially among the scientifically educated. Leslie Stephen, with the +pride of a disciple and the pardonable zeal of a propagandist, claimed +for it the distinction of being "the religion of all sensible men."</p> + +<p>This austere faith owed much to the qualities of those who preached it. +Their wide culture, their power of literary expression,<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> their +intellectual vigour, and above all their moral earnestness and social +enthusiasm recommended what had otherwise seemed a barren and +unpromising creed. The generous humanitarian sympathies of Comte +supplied the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> idealistic elements without which no faith can become +popular, and the apparent stability of its scientific basis seemed to +those impatient of speculative doubt, a great rock in a desert of +shifting sand. This new scientific Humanism had an immense vogue, and +its effects upon national life were, on the whole, of a quite healthy +character. Occasional lapses into intolerance, no doubt, occurred; but +much may be excused in the self-confidence of a new faith, not yet +tested by the experiences and the criticisms of years.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Theological Polemics.</span>—The attacks of orthodox apologists upon this new +orientation, though carried through with the best intentions, were too +often conducted on mistaken lines and certainly on too narrow a front. A +particular theory of scriptural inspiration (now widely abandoned), and +of the miraculous, seemed to obsess the controversialists. Nor were the +Agnostics (it must be confessed) any more alive to the real issues. +Hence, to the modern student, an oppressive atmosphere of deadness and +sterility seems to brood over these vigorous but superannuated polemics; +and hence the complete oblivion into which this literature has fallen. +The saying is profoundly true that "nothing so quickly waxes old as +apologetics." Even the contributions to the subject by so accomplished a +journalist as Huxley—his <i>Essays on Science and Christian +Tradition</i>—can only be read by those whom an almost Teutonic industry +characterises. Once so eagerly perused and earnestly pondered, the +controversial literature of this interesting epoch (which now seems so +remote) reposes on the higher shelves of libraries, accumulating the +peaceful dust of oblivion. These projectiles have, in fact, done their +work, and if they have proved less fatal than was hoped by those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> who +launched them, they were dispatched with good intentions, and their +explosion cleared the air.</p> + +<p>The most effective method of attack would have been to suggest that what +was good in the new system was as old as Christianity, and that the rest +was disputable science and still more disputable philosophy. The latter +half of this task was, as we shall subsequently find, creditably +performed by an important school of critical thinkers. But its former +half, i.e. the task of proving that what was valuable in the new +Humanism, was Christian—might, one would suppose, have been more +successfully performed by the official champions of orthodoxy. These +might have left science to the scientists, to have left off advertising +their own incompetence in that sphere by passages of arms such as took +place between Bishop Wilberforce and Huxley at the Oxford meeting of the +British Association in 1860, which are never very desirable, and always +discreditable to the discomfited party.<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Illogicality of Naturalistic Idealism.</span>—In point of fact, "the religion +of all sensible men" (in spite of its philosophic weakness) was +equivalent to Christian stoicism; its social enthusiasm, its +humanitarianism, its conscientious truthfulness, were the fruit of a +stock grown on Christian soil. Its ethical presuppositions were entirely +Christian, nor were they sanctioned (in spite of Herbert Spencer's +elaborate apologetic) by the new biology. Nietzsche was a far more +legitimate child of Darwinism than was Huxley. Indeed, towards the close +of his life, some doubts invaded the mind of the latter, and he was +constrained by an intellectual sincerity which does him and his school +the highest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> credit, to utter a word of warning. We refer to his famous +<i>Romanes Lecture</i> of 1894.</p> + +<p>The thesis of this important utterance was that the field of human +interests is a narrow heritage carved out from a hostile environment +into which it is destined one day to relapse. It is a cultivated garden +with the wilderness all around; created only at the cost of infinite +sacrifice and perpetual toil, and preserved only with difficulty. The +implacable jungle seeks everywhere to encroach on the borders of the +clearing, whose ultimate engulfment can only be postponed, not +prevented. Two quotations may suffice:</p> + +<p>"Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society +depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away +from it, but in combating it."</p> + +<p>"The theory of evolution encourages no millennial expectations. If, for +millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, sometime, +the summit will be reached, and the downward route will be commenced. +The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that +the power and intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the +great year."<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pessimism.</span>—Coming, as it did, at the end of a generation of dogmatic +optimism, this pronouncement is symptomatic of a certain disillusionment +which had already begun to mar the fair picture of Positivist prophecy. +The human race seemed destined to an ambiguous future; the parabola of +progress would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> one day reach its summit, and the fall begin. At last +upon our planet the episode of Life would pass, and be neither forgotten +nor remembered; the world would sink into the eternal silence, from +which for one transitory and insignificant moment, it had awakened.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Nietzsche.</span>—As might have been expected, it was in Germany that the +logical conclusions of a naturalistic outlook were drawn. Here, +philosophic pessimism had already been introduced by Schopenhauer +(1788-1860), and his disciple Nietzsche was not afraid to formulate a +scheme of ethics based on the conception of "the survival of the +fittest," and equivalent to an apotheosis of barbarism. The virtues of +self-assertion, ruthlessness, and pride were to eradicate the vices of +abnegation, pity, and humility. Christian morality was a disease; +Christianity itself was the appropriate product of the degenerate epoch, +and of the loathsome environment that gave it birth. This radical +thinker, free from English "compromise," could be satisfied with no +morality which was parasitic upon Christianity. He had clearness of +vision to see whither the naturalistic road would carry its pious +wayfarers. To him the moral idealism of Spencer was moonshine or +stupidity—"the milk of pious sentiment."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Significance of Nietzsche.</span>—Nietzsche has come in for a fair share of +abuse, but it is only just to say that philosophy stands heavily +endebted to this thinker. He was not afraid to draw logical +conclusions,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> and to put questions which more conventional philosophers +had preferred should remain in the background.</p> + +<p>It is well for a moralist to arise, once in a generation, who will clear +his own mind of cant and, without undue respect for the conventions, +approach the really fundamental questions in a spirit of sincerity. The +extravagant impieties of Nietzsche may have shocked his hearers, but +they have cleared the air. He exposed, perhaps with too little +<i>finesse</i>, the nakedness of Naturalism, and tore off that mantle of +idealism under which it had been masquerading. And he may be said, by so +doing, to have written <i>finis</i> at the foot of a chapter in the history +of philosophy.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X</span></p> + +<p class="center">REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Vicissitudes of Idealism.</span>—At the beginning of the last chapter we +noticed the early collapse of idealism in Germany. But the prophets of +Romanticism, when they were no longer honoured at home, found an +hospitable reception elsewhere, and especially in England. Indeed, even +before the prestige of idealism had begun to decline in Germany, +Englishmen had been introduced to it by the writings and translations of +S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). These two +popularisers of German ideas were <i>littérateurs</i> rather than +professional philosophers, but for that very reason their vogue and +influence were the wider.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Coleridge.</span>—Coleridge was in spirit a genuine Romanticist; being, as +were some of the most notable of the German school—e.g., Goethe and +Schiller—a poet as well as a philosopher. In his <i>Biographia Literaria</i> +he has left behind the story of his intellectual and spiritual +development. He acknowledges his debt to Kant, to the Romanticists, and +in particular to Schelling, whose "intuitionism" was naturally congenial +to him. Coleridge was never able to embody his philosophical creed in +any single work; he does not seem to have possessed the necessary power +of application. He was unfortunate in being a man of weak<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> character, +and his ineffectiveness struck his contemporaries. But in spite of these +disadvantages—his sentimentality, the lack of clearness of his thought, +his weakness for opium—he certainly exercised an important influence, +especially in the realm of theology. His ideas, though vague, were +calculated to awaken the speculative habit, and, introduced as they +were, to a wide circle, were fruitful and stimulating. English theology +had been, in the eighteenth century, of an arid kind, and the English +philosophical tradition lacked, for the most part, appreciation of those +deeper aspects of reality which had appealed to German thinkers. +Coleridge, by introducing German speculation to his countrymen, was able +"to free theology of some of its narrowness, and to deepen and enlarge +the spiritual outlook of his age."<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Thomas Carlyle.</span>—Carlyle was a man of a very different temper, whose +attitude towards Coleridge was "half contemptuous, half compassionate." +A typically Carlylean characterisation of him may be found in the <i>Life +of Sterling</i>:</p> + +<p>"He was thought to hold—he alone in England—the key of German and +other Transcendentalisms.... A sublime man, who alone in those dark days +escaped from black materialisms and revolutionary deluges with God, +Freedom, Immortality, still his. The practical intellects of the world +did not much heed him, or carelessly reckoned him a metaphysical +dreamer; but to the rising spirits of the young generation he sat there +as a kind of Magus, girt in mystery and enigma...."</p> + +<p>"The good man ... gave you the idea of a life<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> that had been full of +sufferings ... the deep eyes, of a light hazel, were as full of sorrow +as inspiration; confused pain looked mildly from them, as in a kind of +mild astonishment. The whole figure and air, good and amiable otherwise, +might be called flabby and irresolute; expressive of weakness under +possibility of strength.... He spoke as if preaching—preaching +earnestly and hopelessly the weightiest things."</p> + +<p>Carlyle himself had all the character and industry that Coleridge +lacked, and it was another side of German idealism that had appealed to +him. The Scotchman was of the same fibre and stock as that other +half-Scotchman, Kant. Here was the source from which he had drawn his +inspiration. We see in Carlyle the same moral earnestness, the same +"toughness" of thought, the same absence of "sentimental moonshine." +From Kant, too, he derives a vigorous independence of thought, a +religious respect for individuality, a horror of shams and affectation. +Kant was a true child of the Reformation, and Carlyle is a genuine +disciple.</p> + +<p>In a single important respect, however, he differed from (and improved +upon) his master. Kant lacked, or at least did not display, the saving +grace of humour; in Carlyle this quality looks out from every +page—keen, satirical, sometimes bitter, sometimes grotesque; he +ridiculed his own generation, its vices, its prejudices, its +superstitions.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sartor Resartus.</span>—For our purpose, <i>Sartor Resartus</i>—that profound and +humorous book—is Carlyle's masterpiece: here all the characteristic +Kantian doctrines may be found.</p> + +<p>The "philosophy of clothes"—which is the quaint title behind which +Kantian idealism is made to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> masquerade—starts from the thought that +just as an acquaintance with his clothes will not reveal to us the man, +so an acquaintance with <i>phenomena</i> (which is all that science can claim +to give us) cannot reveal to us the real ground of existence, which +remains an inscrutable mystery. We must "look on clothes till they +become transparent," if we could understand reality.</p> + +<p>"To the eye of vulgar Logic what is man? An omnivorous biped that wears +breeches. To the eye of pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and +divine Apparition."</p> + +<p>And so with Nature; to science it is a mechanism, to the understanding +heart it is "the living garment of God."</p> + +<p>"It is written, the Heavens and the Earth shall fade away like a +Vesture; which indeed they are: the Time-Vesture of the Eternal.... The +whole External Universe and what it holds is but Clothing...."</p> + +<p>The visible world is but a symbol of a profound and awful reality; and +all Nature's products, in their degree, symbols as well: but of these, +man is the highest. "The true <span class="smcap">Shekinah</span> is Man: where else is the <span class="smcap">God's +Presence</span> manifested, not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our +fellow-man?"</p> + +<p>This leads up to the essential doctrine of the Kantian system: that man +is a creature of two worlds, who has a foot in either; hence in the +phenomenal world he can never find satisfaction.</p> + +<p>"Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because +there is an infinite in him, which, with all his cunning, he cannot +quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and +Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> undertake, in +jointstock company, to make one Shoeblack Happy? They cannot accomplish +it, above an hour or two, for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other +than his Stomach...."</p> + +<p>"There is in man a <span class="smcap">Higher</span> than Love of happiness: he can do without +happiness and instead thereof find Blessedness! has it not been to +preach forth this same <span class="smcap">Higher</span> that sages and martyrs ... have spoken and +suffered; bearing testimony to the God-like that is in man?"</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Carlyle's Influence.</span>—In spite of Carlyle's strange literary mannerisms +and his grotesquely Germanic phrases, his writings had great +attractiveness for those of his contemporaries who felt themselves +smothered by the materialism and utilitarianism of early Victorian +England. He was able to re-vitalise idealism amongst them. Moreover he +appealed strongly to those to whom the Coleridgean speculations were +uncongenial. The strongly developed <i>moral</i> element, both in his +writings and in his own somewhat stern and austere personality—what +Taine called his "puritanism"—appealed strongly to a certain side of +English feeling. His countrymen felt that his was a native genius that +they could understand. In fact we may say that the influence of Carlyle, +especially among the young and generous minded, has been incalculable in +extent and invaluable in quality. Spiritual life in England stands under +a deep obligation to him.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Romanticism at Oxford.</span>—Englishmen were thus not entire strangers to +German idealism, which had possessed its interpreters in the earlier +half of the nineteenth century. Not, however, until it had experienced a +decline in Germany (a reaction which occupied our attention in the last +chapter), did<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> Romanticism become naturalised in England by being +adopted in academic circles.</p> + +<p>Among the most notable of English idealists was T. H. Green—fellow and +tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. In this thinker we have a widely +different type of mind from that of either Coleridge or Carlyle. He was +a thinker rather than a poet or a prophet, and he belonged to what we +have noticed as the intellectualist—i.e. Hegelian—wing of Romanticism.</p> + +<p>Green's chief work was his <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i> (published +posthumously in 1883), where arguments, which were familiar to those +acquainted with Hegel, presented themselves. Green begins with an +analysis of experience, and leads to the conclusion that Nature—if by +it we mean "the connected order of experience"—implies "something other +than itself, as the condition of its being what it is." And "of that +'something' we are entitled to say, positively, that it is a +self-distinguishing consciousness" (section 52).</p> + +<p>If these conclusions be valid, the bottom falls out of Naturalism, for +if nature "implies something other than itself," it does not stand +alone; and that nature <i>does</i> stand alone is the beginning and end of +all naturalist theory. And, furthermore, this "something other than +itself," which Nature involves, is "a self-distinguishing +consciousness"; i.e. something to which we can attribute personality.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Green and Spencer contrasted.</span>—This theory has only to be compared with +that of Herbert Spencer for a fundamental difference to declare itself. +The two systems do indeed adopt as axiomatic the conception of the +uniformity and unity of nature, which works in accordance with a single +law. But Spencer saw in that law the expression of a blind force, an +unknowable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> power, of which it would be no more and no less true to say +that it was "spiritual" than that it was "material." But for Green the +law was the expression of a spiritual principal analogous to our own +intelligence—a manifestation (to use theological language) of God.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">F. H. Bradley.</span>—Undoubtedly the most notable of English Hegelians is F. +H. Bradley, whose metaphysical essay, <i>Appearance and Reality</i>, was a +work of genuine originality. The book is not of a type to make much +appeal outside academic circles, though it is written in an easy and +attractive style: its results may seem, to the unsophisticated reader, +somewhat too ambiguous. "Ultimate Doubts" is the title of the last +chapter, and "It costs us little to find that in the end Reality is +inscrutable," is a remark not uncharacteristic of the author. Yet this +really profound thinker and acute reasoner played an important part in +helping to discredit that negative dogmatism which was so much in vogue +during his own lifetime. He pointed out the limits beyond which natural +science could not transgress without lapsing into "dogmatic +superstition."</p> + +<p>"Too often the science of mere Nature, forgetting its own limits and +false to its true aims, attempts to speak about first principles. It +becomes transcendent, and offers us a dogmatic and uncritical +metaphysics" (p. 284).</p> + +<p>Though the fault has not always been on the side of the scientists: +"Metaphysics itself, by its interference with physical science, has +induced that to act, as it thinks, in self-defence, and has led it, in +so doing, to become metaphysical. And this interference of metaphysics I +would admit and deplore, as the result<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> and the parent of most injurious +misunderstanding.... So long as natural science keeps merely to the +sphere of phenomena and the laws of their occurrence, metaphysics has no +right to a single word of criticism" (p. 285).</p> + +<p>This critical handling of the problem of the relations of science and +philosophy did much to draw attention to the confusion of thought lying +at the base of much popular materialism. It began to be realised that +the principles of physical science are only fruitful of good results in +the sphere properly belonging to them; and that the uncritical use of +these principles results in a hybrid philosophy, which is neither sound +science nor rational metaphysics.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A. J. Balfour.</span>—Before Bradley's essay was published, a somewhat similar +line of criticism had been developed by Mr. A. J. Balfour in his +<i>Defence of Philosophic Doubt</i> (1879). Its title sounds unpromising, but +the book voiced a demand for a rational philosophy of science which was +practically non-existent at that time; and consequently, in the absence +of any adequate examination of the principles of science, uncritical +dogmatism flourished quite unchallenged. Balfour, elsewhere, indicates +the objects with which he wrote the book—to elicit from the disciples +of natural science a <i>rationale</i> of their method:</p> + +<p>"A full and systematic attempt, first to enumerate, and then to justify, +the presuppositions on which all science finally rests, has, it seems to +me, still to be made. After the critical examination which I desiderate +has been thoroughly carried out, it may appear that at the very root of +our scientific system of belief lie problems of which no satisfactory +solution has yet been devised."<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> Thus Balfour drew attention to the +fact that the common-sense philosophy of naturalism rested upon a tacit +agreement to overlook certain important problems which are the +indispensable preliminaries to any thinking which can be called +critical, or lay claim to be regarded as philosophy in the strict sense. +That some of these problems seem artificial, and the questions raised by +them gratuitous, to the eye of "common sense" is an irrelevant +consideration, for "nothing stands more in need of demonstration than +the obvious."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Naturalism Checked.</span>—Thus Bradley and Balfour between them, merely by +adopting a critical attitude, created an embarrassing situation for +naturalism. Between them these writers administered a serious check to +that naively uncritical dogmatism which, backed by the prestige of +natural science, had sought to impose itself on the world as a new +orthodoxy less liberal, in some ways, than the old.</p> + +<p>Nor did they stop short at negative criticism, but substituted +(according to the idealistic tradition) a spiritual view of reality for +the mechanistic materialism that had become so popular. <i>Appearance and +Reality</i> is a book of which the trend might seem too obscure, but it +ends with a note that is definite enough:</p> + +<p>"Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality; and, +the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably +real," are Bradley's closing words.</p> + +<p>As for Balfour, he leads his readers up to a point which he describes as +"the threshold of Christian Theology." And having propounded the +perplexities in which the "common sense" philosophy (on which naturalism +depends) is involved, he says:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>"I do not believe that any escape from them (the perplexities) is +possible, unless we are prepared to bring to the study of the world the +presupposition that it was the work of a rational Being, who made <i>it</i> +intelligible, and at the same time made <i>us</i>, in however feeble a +fashion, able to understand it."<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Revival of Idealism in Germany. Lotze.</span>—We have perhaps dwelt at too +great length upon the backwash of the idealistic wave in England, for +idealism is not a native philosophy amongst us; possibly, because we are +not metaphysically-minded in the same sense as are the purer Teutonic +breed. And it is time to pass on to pay a brief tribute to the work of a +German philosopher who accepted the mechanical theory in its totality, +without sacrificing what we may call the spiritual values of existence.</p> + +<p>Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was inclined to feel that the weakness of +Romanticism lay in a tendency to despise or overlook what Kant had +called "the fertile bathos of experience." The Romanticists had too +often neglected natural science, which, in the shape of naturalistic +materialism, had its revenge by destroying them. Büchner was the Nemesis +of an idealism which was at once vague and sentimental.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lotze's "Microcosmos."</span>—Lotze's attitude and method are conspicuous in +his well-known work, which took him eight years to complete +(1856-1864)—the <i>Microcosmos</i>. After guiding his readers "through the +realms of natural phenomena and historical evolution," thus constructing +a sufficiently stable basis out of <i>facts</i>—he leads them on to an ideal +world composed of what he calls "values."</p> + +<p>His position may thus be summarised: The world<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> presents itself to the +observer in three aspects—(1) The world of individual "things," which +are bewildering and intricate; (2) the laws (i.e., "laws of nature") +which the human intellect has discovered among them, thus finding +regularity and order; (3) the "values" which the human soul applies to +things, and which it is the human task to cultivate.</p> + +<p>This world of ideals or values (3) is that for the sake of which the +worlds of phenomena and law (1 and 2) exist. These (1 and 2) constitute +respectively the material <i>in</i> which, and the forms <i>through</i> which, the +world of "values" is to be realised.<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p> + +<p>Thus phenomena and law are the raw material out of which "values" are +created; and these "values" themselves constitute (in the eyes of Lotze) +a higher reality. Thus the central doctrine of his system is that the +truly Real is what has supreme worth: it is <i>worth</i> that creates +reality. The paradoxicality of this may make it difficult to accept; but +Lotze is only expressing in his own way the fundamental thesis of all +forms of idealism, that "the ideal is the real"; that the world of +phenomena is secondary to and dependent upon a "world of spirit," or an +"ideal world."</p> + +<p>Lotze himself in the introduction to the <i>Microcosmos</i>, expresses what +is at once the foundation and the kernel of his system: he says it is +his purpose to show "<i>how absolutely universal is the extent</i>, and at +the same time how <i>completely subordinate the significance, of the +mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world</i>." +(E.T., p. xvi.)</p> + +<p>Mechanism is universal, <i>because</i> it is the raw material, so to speak, +out of which reality is to be made. That<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> reality can be expressed in +terms of mechanism is true, just as a poem can be described as a scrap +of paper scratched upon with a pen; but this reduction of reality to its +lowest terms, ends by emptying reality of content. Mechanism is a +<i>universal</i> feature, but it is a <i>subordinate</i> feature, of reality. +Nature requires, if we are to arrive at the truth about it, not only to +be described and analysed, but also interpreted in the light of the idea +of <i>value</i> or <i>worth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lotze and Theology.</span>—Lotze's theories exercised an important influence +upon the development in Germany and elsewhere of a type of theology +known as Ritschlianism. Albrecht Ritschl, a disciple of Lotze, attempted +to dissociate religion from metaphysics, and to base it upon "judgments +of value." Christian dogma, for instance, is an attempt to express, in +philosophical terms, <i>the unique value to humanity of the moral and +religious consciousness of Christ</i>. So far as a dogma is faithful to +that central idea, and makes a genuine attempt to express it, so +far—and so far only—is it true.</p> + +<p>This type of theology, uniting itself with certain philosophical +tendencies which will engage our attention later, became the basis of +what was known as the Modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Conclusions.</span>—Thus in the nineteenth century, in England (and indeed on +the continent also) the idealistic attitude, though it sometimes might +seem compromised, was never submerged; in spite of the materialistic +outlook of an age only too preoccupied with scientific discovery and +commercial expansion.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</span></p> + +<p class="center">SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Philosophy of Science.</span>—In the last chapter we heard A. J. Balfour +complaining of the absence of "a full and systematic attempt, first to +enumerate, and then to justify, the presuppositions on which all science +finally rests." And Mr. F. H. Bradley also drew attention to the absence +of any critical philosophy of science in England. The need was for +scientific standpoints to be investigated <i>de novo</i>; and the process +had, as a matter of fact, already been begun on the Continent.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mach.</span>—Ernst Mach, Professor of Physics at Prague, and subsequently +Professor of Physics at Vienna (thus combining the roles of scientist +and metaphysician—always a highly instructive and fruitful combination) +had as early as 1863 laid it down as the task of science to give "an +economic presentation of the facts." By which phrase he meant that +science takes account only of the salient features of phenomena, +selecting only those which seem strictly serviceable to its own purpose.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Science "Abstract" or "Selective."</span>—Mathematical science (which is the +"pure" science <i>par excellence</i>) deals not—as is generally +supposed—with "things," but with <i>certain selected aspects</i> of things. +For example, for purposes of arithmetic, every leaf<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> on a tree is an +"unit" (i.e. all are "identical"); but, in point of fact, there exist no +two leaves that are alike, as Leibniz, long ago, pointed out. Again, for +geometrical purposes two fields may be regarded as of like area; but no +two fields are, or ever have been, so.</p> + +<p>Thus mathematics—where scientific method is seen at its +purest—proceeds by deliberately disregarding individuality; it regards +the differences between individuals as non-essential, and irrelevant to +its purpose.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Economy of Thought.</span>—And mathematical science is justified in acting in +this way. This method, highly abstract as it is—in fact, just because +it is highly abstract—leads to invaluable results. It's justification +is that it is <i>economical of thought</i>; disregarding all irrelevant +considerations, it is able, by using a short-cut, to reach its goal. Did +the mathematician have to take into consideration all the manifold and +complex aspects of each concrete "thing" (whether it be leaf, or field, +or lever, or what not) with which he deals, he would never be able to +cut his way through the jungle. His method of abstraction carries him at +once to his goal.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mach on the "Mechanical View."</span>—Mach's criticism of the mechanical view +of nature proceeded upon similar lines. He termed that view +"analogical," by which he meant that mechanical "laws of nature" serve +us as formal patterns to which the processes of nature may (for +convenience sake) be represented as conforming. A clear account, though +not a <i>complete</i> account, of all physical processes may be given in +terms of mechanical "law."</p> + +<p>And in fact it remains a question, Mach observed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> "whether the +mechanical view of things, instead of being the profoundest, is not in +point of fact, the shallowest of all."<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Science not Invalid but Incomplete.</span>—This line of criticism of +scientific method—i.e. that it deals with abstractions and analogies +rather than with <i>things</i>, for the sake of economy and convenience of +thought—does not deprive science of validity, but only invalidates that +superficial dogmatism which had crept into so many investigations. A +critical estimate of scientific methods makes it evident how much and +how little we have the right to expect from them. They will enable us to +give a simple description of <i>phenomena</i> as they are seen when reduced +to their simplest terms of matter and motion; but of ultimate and final +causes they will tell us nothing.</p> + +<p>"The system of conceptions by which the exact sciences try to describe +the phenomena of nature ... is symbolic, a kind of shorthand, +unconsciously invented and perfected for the sake of convenience and for +practical use ... the leading principle is that of Economy of Thought" +(Merz, Vol. III, p. 579).</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Boutroux.</span>—This criticism of the mechanical method of dealing with +reality was seconded by Boutroux's criticism of the principle of Natural +Law. Émile Boutroux (1845-1918)—Professor at the Sorbonne—in two +important treatises, examines with great minuteness this aspect of the +scientific method. In the earlier of these works, <i>The Contingency of +the Laws of Nature</i> (1879) he suggests that these laws only give, so to +speak, the <i>habits</i> which things display. They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> constitute, as it were, +"the bed in which the stream of occurrence flows, which the stream +itself had hollowed out, although its course has come to be determined +by this bed" (Höffding, <i>Modern Philosophers</i>, p. 101).</p> + +<p>In his <i>Natural Law in Science and Philosophy</i> (1895), Boutroux lays it +down that the laws of nature, as science describes them, may indeed +represent, but are by no means identical with, the laws of nature as +they really are. The laws of science are true, not absolutely but +relatively, i.e. are not elements in, but symbols of, reality. The +notion that everything is "determined" (i.e. the opposite of +"contingent"), though absolutely indispensable to the mechanical theory, +is nevertheless a way of looking at things rather than a faithful +picture of reality—a way in which we see things rather than the way +things exist in themselves.</p> + +<p>As Boutroux himself puts it in his final chapter: "That which we call +the 'laws of nature' is the sum total of the methods we have discovered +for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by +the will."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results.</span>—Here we have Boutroux approaching very closely to the +standpoint of Mach; indeed the theories of the two men are complementary +to one another. For Mach, the mechanical view is a way of looking at +things, distinctly useful for understanding and using them—an "economy +of thought." For Boutroux, the determinist view is also a way of looking +at things that is useful for the same purposes.</p> + +<p>Thus the interpretation of reality in terms of mathematics and +"unalterable law," is artificial; an abstract way of thinking which +deals not with reality itself but with certain deliberately selected +aspects of it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span><span class="smcap">Rise of a New Philosophy.</span>—This examination of the principles of natural +science was the beginning of what afterwards proved to be a revolution +in thought. What had been more or less negative criticism in Mach and +Boutroux, became the basis of a new philosophy in the hands of William +James and Bergson. The names, and even the ideas, of these two original +thinkers are familiar far outside strictly philosophical circles, and it +will almost be possible to presume upon a certain acquaintance with them +on the part of our readers.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">William James.</span>—James himself, like Mach, was led to philosophy by the +road of scientific investigation. He was a psychologist, and it is as +the author of his <i>Principles of Psychology</i> that his name will be +remembered. This work is notable as containing the first complete +application of the Darwinian theory to the evolution of mind. Mental +action is there represented as a capacity developed by the organism to +enable it to deal with its environment. As an exponent of James puts it:</p> + +<p>"The mind, like an antenna, feels its way for the organism. It gropes +about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many +failures; always urged into taking the initiative and doomed to success +or failure in some hour of trial."<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> + +<p>The corollary which attaches to propositions of this kind is that +knowledge in all its varieties and developments arises from <i>practical +needs</i>. And the mind (here is an echo of Mach) <i>selects</i> those aspects +of reality which concern it, and out of that selected material makes up +a new (mental) world of its own. Which world is far from being a +"picture" of reality, but which is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> "symbolic" of it (here is another +memory of Mach).<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> + +<p>This view obviously cuts the ground from under dogmatic materialism. The +world which that philosophy regards as <i>reality</i>, is, to the critical +eye, a collection of abstractions, a mental creation arising out of the +practical needs of life.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Henri Bergson.</span>—This line of criticism, that of the evolutionary +psychologist, opened up by James, has been carried to extreme lengths by +the French philosopher Bergson. "Dig to the very roots of nature and of +mind" is his advice. He begins by asking, How, as a matter of history, +has human intellect developed? He then, and then only, proceeds to put +the question (which uncritical thinkers always put <i>first</i>), What can +the intellect do for us?</p> + +<p>His theory of the origin of intellect is the same as that of William +James. Life (through the evolutionary process) has produced it. But the +conclusion that he draws from this hypothesis is that <i>the intellect, +being itself a product of life, or a form of life, cannot understand the +whole of life</i>. This thesis is elaborated with a wealth of illustration +and erudition, both scientific and philosophic, and with a literary +grace and charm possible only for a Frenchman, in the famous work +<i>Évolution Créatrice</i> (1907).</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Bergson's Advance on Mach and James.</span>—Those thinkers who had made a +serious attempt at a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> philosophy of science, had demonstrated that the +"mechanical view" of nature was a mental abstraction, and not a complete +representation of reality. Such is the debt of philosophy to the +researches of Mach, Boutroux, James, and others who worked along their +lines.</p> + +<p>But it remained for Bergson to demonstrate that the mechanical view was +<i>the inevitable product of the mental processes which we describe by the +word "intellect."</i></p> + +<p>The path which led Bergson to this goal will have to be briefly +indicated by us.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Characteristics of the Intellect.</span>—What is the "intellect," to which we +look in vain for any <i>complete</i> explanation of existence? This is the +preliminary question.</p> + +<p>Our intellect is, as James had taught, a faculty developed by the +evolutionary process in our species to enable it to deal with its +<i>material</i> environment. And Bergson was the first to point out that as a +consequence of its having been developed for this particular purpose +(i.e., dealing with a <i>material</i> environment), intellect is "never quite +at its ease, never entirely at home, except when it is working upon +inert matter." If it has to deal with "living" matter, it "treats it as +inert, without troubling about the life that animated it."</p> + +<p>Such is the first characteristic of the intellect: it feels at home in +dealing with dead matter, and living matter it prefers to treat "as +inert."</p> + +<p>Another characteristic of intellect is that, just as it treats the +living as if it were non-living, so it prefers to treat the mobile as +though it were motionless. Motion is a thing which the intellect simply +cannot grasp; it has to treat it artificially, and represent a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> process +which in reality is continuous and indivisible, as discontinuous and +divisible—a succession of points, out of which no magic can conjure +motion. Philosophy became aware of this as soon as it opened its eyes. +Hence the paradox of Zeno, that Achilles will never overtake the +tortoise, if the latter once gets a start. For if space and time are +infinitely divisible (as intellect holds them to be), by the time +Achilles has reached the tortoise's starting point, the tortoise has +already got ahead of <i>that</i> starting point, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>; +the interval between them being endlessly diminished, but never +disappearing.</p> + +<p>Zeno's paradox arises because of an innate fault in the "intellectual" +method of dealing with motion; a method which Bergson calls +"cinematographical," because it regards a single movement as a +succession of infinitely small motions. That method is hopeless; and if +we expect to understand motion by its means,</p> + +<p>"You will always experience the disappointment of the child, who tries, +by clapping its hands together to crush the smoke. The movement slips +through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out +of states implies the absurd proposition that movement is made up of +immobilities."<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p> + +<p>So that the intellect is best fitted to deal, not with living and +moving, but with dead and motionless matter. Of the latter it can form a +clear idea; but in dealing with the former, it finds itself at a loss; +it has to abstract the life and the motion from what lives or moves, and +what it cannot grasp, it must treat as non-existent.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Bergson's Anti-Intellectualism.</span>—A penetrating remark of James' will +help us, at this point, to understand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> the significance for philosophy +of these new theories.</p> + +<p>"In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of Protagoras, Hume, and +James Mill, rationalism has never been seriously questioned, for its +sharpest critics have always had a tender place for it in their hearts, +and have obeyed some of its mandates. They have not been consistent, +they have played fast and loose with the enemy, and Bergson alone has +been radical."<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> + +<p>Bergson's philosophy is, in fact, a reaction against intellectualism or +rationalism; by which is meant the theory that pure reason is competent +by its nature to give a complete and exhaustive account of reality.</p> + +<p>But according to Bergson, intellect, which is a faculty developed to +enable men to subdue and turn to advantage their material environment, +and which is, as it were, "fascinated by the contemplation of inert +matter," will not reveal the true meaning and nature of existence; it +gives us "a translation of life in terms of inertia," and can do no +more.</p> + +<p>This criticism of the intellect (if it be sound), though it does not +invalidate the work of that faculty in its own proper sphere, +necessarily involves its discredit as a key to the unlocking of the +final mysteries of life and of being. These things lie outside its +province. "Whether it wants to treat of the life of the body, or the +life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness, and the +brutality of an instrument not designed for such use."<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Intellect and Instinct.</span>—Since intellect, by its methods, has induced +men to turn their backs on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> reality, and to look on abstractions +instead, the only hope of reaching reality is through an entire change +of method and direction. There is, according to Bergson, a +non-intellectual variety of knowledge, which (from his point of view) it +was a kind of original sin ever to depart from; an original sin which +has vitiated all our philosophic thinking from the days of Plato.</p> + +<p>This variety of knowledge is more original and fundamental than any +which the processes of the intellect, vitiated as these are by certain +inherent perversions, can give us. Intellect cannot correct itself; we +must call in the aid of some other faculty if we would understand +reality.</p> + +<p>Bergson finds this faculty in what he calls "instinct." According to +him, consciousness has developed in two divergent directions—instinct +and intellect; and the difference between these is not one of intensity +or degree, but of <i>kind</i>.<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> + +<p>They are two divergent developments of the same original consciousness, +of which common origin they both retain traces, for they are not +entirely dissimilar, nor is either of them ever found in a pure state.</p> + +<p>Intellect is characteristic of man. Instinct is most highly developed +among certain insects, notably the <i>hymenopterae</i> (i.e., bees and +ants).<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Blindness of Intellect.</span>—And the difficulty of the philosophical problem +for man arises from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> anomalies of his own constitution (as +interpreted by Bergson in the light of his theory of instinct and +intellect). As he puts it:</p> + +<p>"There are things that Intelligence (or intellect) alone is able to +seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct +alone could find; but it will never seek them." (<i>Creative Evolution</i>, +p. 159).</p> + +<p>"If the consciousness which slumbers in instinct were to wake up ... if +we knew how to question it, and if it knew how to reply, it would +deliver to our keeping the most intimate secrets of life."</p> + +<p>Thus Bergson regards it as impossible that intellect should ever supply +us with the complete truth about reality; there are things, e.g. life +itself—which altogether elude its grasp.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Intuition.</span>—The situation, however, is not entirely hopeless. Man +possesses some measure of instinct, which, when it has "become +disinterested, self-conscious, and capable of reflecting upon its +object," Bergson calls intuition. By means of this faculty, man is able, +darkly perhaps but not ineffectually, to grope his way towards an +understanding of reality.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Characteristics of the New Philosophy.</span>—Just as the criticisms of +Cusanus and others freed thought from an incubus which seemed likely to +prevent its further development, so the movement initiated by Mach and +culminating (for the present) in Bergson, has done much to discredit "a +certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of +the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old +scholasticism grew up around Aristotle."<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> + +<p>Mechanical determinism was characteristic of much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> nineteenth-century +thought in Europe, not only amongst materialists, but also, in certain +cases, amongst idealists as well. Against this aspect of contemporary +philosophy, the work of James and Bergson has been a revolt. +"Indeterminism," i.e. a belief in the reality of freedom and +spontaneity, is an essential part of their system. Their indeterminism +is indeed the necessary and logical accompaniment of their +anti-intellectualism. For determinism is "a fabrication of the +<i>intellect</i>," a device which makes reality more manageable, more +amenable to logic, more easily systematised. Freedom, like life and +motion, eludes the categories of the intellect.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Mechanical View Assailed.</span>—Such are the lines upon which the new +criticism of the mechanical view (the most radical criticism it has had +to meet since Kant) proceeds. That view, and the idea of predetermined +human action which it involves, is an inevitable product of an intellect +naturally incapable of understanding freedom and spontaneity. These, as +they destroy its scheme of thought, it casts out as an illusion. +"Incorrigibly presumptuous," it insists on interpreting freedom by means +of those notions which suit inert matter alone, and therefore always +perceives it as necessity. So that all life, far from being subjected to +mechanical necessity, as had seemed the inevitable conclusion of +naturalistic philosophy, was spontaneity (so to speak) materialised and +embodied:</p> + +<p>"All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous +push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, +and the whole of humanity ... is one immense army galloping beside and +before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat +down every resistance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps +even death."<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> + +<p>We have indeed travelled a long way from the austere abstractions of Mr. +Herbert Spencer. The new evolutionism is very different from the old. It +substitutes for "mechanism" another conception—that of "dynamism," +according to which the process of evolution is something undetermined +and impredictable—"creative," in fact. The world of organic life is +embodied "creative activity," and what this "creative activity" is, we +ourselves experience every time we act freely.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pluralism.</span>—The philosophy of Bergson is a reaction against the +mechanical evolutionism (i.e. naturalism) of the nineteenth century. +Closely allied with it is another movement of thought, known as +<i>pluralism</i>. This, too, is a reaction, not so much against naturalism, +as against certain forms of idealism.</p> + +<p>Idealism, it will be remembered, seeks to interpret reality in terms of +mind or spirit. And it does this in certain cases—notably in the case +of F. H. Bradley—by regarding all <i>phenomena</i> as forms or aspects of +the one absolute mind or spirit.</p> + +<p>This has seemed to many thinkers a philosophy too abstract and too +remote from the world of experience. Hence the question arose whether it +might not be possible to interpret nature in terms of mind without being +compelled to take refuge in the abstractions of "absolutism." And +pluralism is an attempt to solve the problem.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Leibniz Revived.</span>—Leibniz' system of "monads," the nature of which will +hardly have been forgotten, has been the model to which philosophers +have looked<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> in constructing their new system. And the "Monadology" may +be taken as the type to which all modern attempts to construct a +"pluralistic" philosophy more or less conform.</p> + +<p>The essence of "pluralism"—whether Leibnizian or other—lies in the +proposition that there exists an indefinite variety of beings, some +higher, some lower than ourselves. The pluralist agrees with the +idealist in declaring that the essence of reality is <i>spirit</i>, but +differs from him in declining to allow independent spirits to be +absorbed by an "all-devouring Absolute."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pluralism and Theism.</span>—William James himself, in a work <i>A Pluralistic +Universe</i> (1909) outlined a philosophy of spirit radically opposed to +"Absolute Idealism," which he subjects to a good deal of criticism. +Another important work, written from a similar point of view, is +Professor James Ward's <i>Pluralism and Theism</i> (1911).<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> + +<p>With regard to modern pluralism, the notable features are two. In the +first place, it is a philosophy of <i>personality</i>, which it regards as +the most fundamental form of reality; and also, that it is <i>theistic</i> in +a sense peculiar to itself. It believes in a God who may be termed the +supreme monad, i.e. the head of a system of monads; but whose power may +be said, in certain respects, to be limited. And indeed some such +position seems to be the <i>logical</i> conclusion that follows from the +premises with which pluralists start, and also (we may add) from the +facts of experience.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a></p> + +<p>Pluralists unite in affirming that their God is (what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> they deny the +idealistic Absolute to be) the God of the religious consciousness. James +elaborates this thesis with his usual resourcefulness and skill. The +controversy, however, is one into which it does not seem necessary for +us to enter. Pluralism and idealism are or may be both definitely +spiritual philosophies, and perhaps they appeal to different types of +mind. We, at any rate, shall not undertake to judge between them. Both +alike are preferable to dogmatic naturalism.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</span></p> + +<p class="center">SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Scientific Method.</span>—In the last chapter, attention was drawn to some +important attempts to supply science with a sound philosophy of method, +i.e. to give a critical account of those processes, logical and +otherwise, which issue in what is called "scientific knowledge."</p> + +<p>The general results of these attempts was to re-enforce the validity of +sound scientific method <i>within its own sphere</i>. But, at the same time, +it was felt likely to prove an unreliable guide elsewhere.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Physics.</span>—Meanwhile, while the logic of science was being +scrutinised by philosophers, scientific research was itself going +steadily forward, and fresh discoveries of a highly important nature +were coming to light. In the sphere of physical science, more +especially, revolutions of Copernican proportions quietly took place.</p> + +<p>The whole subject of physics is of a highly technical nature, quite +unsuitable for discussion here, and, indeed, entirely beyond the range +of the present writer.</p> + +<p>To indicate the nature of the discoveries which were made, however, +involves few technicalities: though the method by which these were +demonstrated and established must remain obscure to all but mathematical +specialists.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span><span class="smcap">Collapse of the Atomic Theory.</span>—Dalton's theory of atoms was described +in a previous chapter. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the +importance attached by materialists, ever since Lucretius, to the +conception of indivisible and indestructible atoms. It was regarded as +integral to materialism, and never was the prestige of this theory +higher than during the nineteenth century, which "will go down in +scientific history as the era of the atomic theory of matter."</p> + +<p>Towards the close of the century, the theory collapsed. Atoms were found +to be neither indivisible nor indestructible; and the process of the +breaking up of the atom has actually been observed.</p> + +<p>As is very generally known, it is in the case of a particular element, +<i>radium</i>, that this phenomenon occurs. That substance, wherever it +occurs, is undergoing a continual process of disintegration; radium +atoms are continually breaking up into more elementary bodies.</p> + +<p>Were it not for the fact that radium itself is the product of the +disintegration of another element, it would be impossible to account for +its survival. It continually evaporates (the life of radium is only 2500 +years) but it is as continually renewed by the infinitely slower +disintegration of uranium.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Electrons.</span>—The particles into which the radium atom disintegrates are +known as <i>electrons</i>. And according to the new theory of matter, not +only radium atoms, but the atoms of all the other elements (hitherto +regarded as irreducible) are composed of electrons, differently grouped. +The radium atom is infinitely more unstable than the atoms of the other +elements; but it is possible to conceive of the disintegration of these +also. They are all alike composed of the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> elementary +particles—different compounds of the same primitive substance.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Matter a form of Electricity.</span>—And the most remarkable part of the new +theory is that these primitive particles of which material atoms are +composed, are themselves the units which constitute what we call +"electricity." Thus matter and electricity are now expressed in common +terms—they are regarded as different manifestations of the same +substance. And of the two conceptions—matter and electricity—it is the +latter that is the more simple and fundamental. As a high authority puts +it:</p> + +<p>"Whereas through the greater part of the nineteenth century, 'matter' +was the concept which was looked upon as fundamental in physical +science, and of which there was a curious accidental property called +electricity, it now appears that electricity must be more fundamental +than matter, in the sense that our more elementary matter must now be +conceived as a manifestation of extremely complex electrical +phenomena."<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> + +<p>As to whether the electrons themselves, in their turn, are irreducible +units, there may be room for doubt. According to Professor J. Larmor the +electron is "a nucleus of intrinsic strain in the ether."<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> If this +view be sound, matter may be regarded as a manifestation of the ether; +"a persistent strain-form flitting through an universal sea of ether." +As to the nature of the ether, that is a subject of speculation among +physicists. It is variously described as an "elastic fluid," and as "a +fairly close packed conglomerate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> of minute grains in continual +oscillation."<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> It may indeed be said that modern physical theories +have succeeded in reducing matter, which seems comparatively knowable, +to a substance of which little is known and, therefore, of which much +can be postulated; it can be called sub-natural, or super-natural, +according to taste.</p> + +<p>We may, perhaps, satisfy ourselves with the words of Professor Tait: "We +do not know, and are probably incapable of discovering, <i>what</i> matter +is"; and "The discovery of the ultimate nature of matter is probably +beyond the range of human intelligence."<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> + +<p>And yet we can agree with Mr. Arthur Balfour when he says<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> "we know +too much about matter to be materialists." That, in itself, a generation +ago would have been regarded as a large admission from the standpoint of +physical science.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results of the New Physics.</span>—The reduction of knowable and tangible +matter to intangible electricity or unknowable ether may not seem to be +much of an advance from the point of view of those who are interested in +establishing a spiritual theory of the universe. But electricity is a +species of energy which can be expressed in terms of will—which is the +only kind of energy that we are acquainted with at first hand. "What is +objectively energy is subjectively will; or, in other words, manifested +energy is the visibility of will."<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> And so far as the "unknowable" +ether is concerned, it gives less scope to those powers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> of dogmatism, +the exercise of which characterised scientists of the old materialistic +school; and it is the habit of oracular pronouncements which does the +harm, by rendering any intellectual or spiritual progress impossible. In +any case, whatever be the substitute which is to replace the old theory, +we may congratulate ourselves, with Professor J. S. Haldane, that "we +have parted once for all with the notion of a real and self-existent +Material universe; and we must remember where we now are."<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Biology.</span>—But if the results of the new physics have been +disturbing to those who had hoped that materialism was a finally +established theory, the results of recent biological research have been +equally embarrassing to them. The anti-mechanistic trend of recent +biological theory is only too evident. The organism is regarded no +longer by the majority of biologists as fully explicable in terms of +mechanics and chemistry. To quote Professor Haldane again, "The main +outstanding fact is that the mechanistic account of the universe breaks +down completely in connection with the phenomena of life.... In the case +of life, the facts are inconsistent with the physical and chemical +account of phenomena."<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p> + +<p>The organism can no longer be regarded as even an extremely complex kind +of machine; that word will not cover the facts, and biologists are +compelled to look elsewhere for a less misleading terminology. To +describe the organism as a machine, is to give to that word a very +comprehensive connotation. For the organism is a machine different in +kind from any that has been constructed by man; it is "a self-stoking,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, +self-producing engine."<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Researches of Driesch.</span>—Just as modern physics is concerned with the +infinitely small—the ultra-microscopic, in fact—so modern biologists +are concentrating attention upon microscopic organisms, where life is +seen at its lowest terms, and where (if anywhere) they may expect to +discover what are the <i>differentia</i> of life, i.e. what are the qualities +that distinguish living organic from inorganic matter. Perhaps the most +notable of the researches conducted in this sphere, of recent years, +have been those of Professor Driesch, who expounded his results in the +<i>Gifford Lectures</i> for 1907-1908 (<i>The Science and Philosophy of the +Organism</i>).</p> + +<p>The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those +which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when +cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued +development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a +fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, +though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided +organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt +themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building +a bridge, all of them <i>can</i> do every single act—if need arise—and the +result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen +fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident.</p> + +<p>Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>"There is something in the organism's behaviour—in the widest sense of +the word—which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e. +to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which +shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its +parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism 'a typically +combined body' (i.e., a machine), without further explanation."<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Problem of Life.</span>—The problem is: What is it in an organism which +causes it to behave in a fashion so impossible for any machine? To +answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery +of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what +this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it +<i>entelechy</i>, i.e. "purposiveness," and he also speaks of <i>psychoids</i>, +i.e. "primitive minds." Names do not carry us very far; but the mere +fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is +important. It constitutes an admission on their part that there is +something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of +modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious +causes if known ones can be found. The <i>deus ex machina</i> method seems to +them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were +considered solved merely by the word "mystery," knowledge would never +advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but +things that are important. But in this particular instance the +application of the name <i>entelechy</i> indicates that, in the opinion of +such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no +merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> Driesch +is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very +extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living +organism in terms of physics and chemistry.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results of the New Biology.</span>—But if life resists all attempts to reduce +it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the +mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but +progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and +applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this +ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even +scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some +indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative attitude, and seek +to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only +vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to +a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena +irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to +be re-interpreted in terms of biology.</p> + +<p>"It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to +the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a +few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and +chemical world as we now conceive it—the world of atoms and +energy—will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will +stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure +mathematicians."<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The New Psychology.</span>—Not only physical and biological, but psychological +science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which +is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> branches of +psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with +instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, +and of so-called "spiritualism." In none of these spheres can research +yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of +dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still +exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of +research in psychical regions which is practically a <i>terra incognita</i>. +And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in +their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may +bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems +is perhaps the right attitude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations +of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the +strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodés. It is extremely +difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses "mind" from +the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a +comparatively insignificant "epiphenomenon" accompanying certain obscure +chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their +simplicity, will no longer cover the facts.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychical Research.</span>—One particular branch of experimental psychology, +which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few +remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the +existence of "disembodied spirits," human or otherwise. The whole +subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices +of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is +inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic +statements in any direction.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span>What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of +various <i>phenomena</i> which it is extremely difficult to explain in +accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of space, or of mental +action.</p> + +<p>The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over +the <i>explanation</i> of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite +certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new +facts will force from conservative scientists is <i>a radical revision of +current notions of the range of human mental action</i>. The mind is +evidently capable of producing certain effects—even upon matter—which +would have seemed incredible a short while ago.</p> + +<p>So much is the least that may be expected. But in the view of many +competent and highly scientific observers, some far more radical +revision of our notions may be necessary. Some scientists of good repute +(e.g. Sir Oliver Lodge, in England, and Flammarion and others on the +Continent) are convinced that the facts can only adequately be explained +by reference to another world—interlocked, as it were, with this.<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> +And it has to be admitted that this, what may be called more "advanced" +explanation, is more in accordance than the other with a rather +universal tradition or assumption of mankind in all ages.</p> + +<p>It will be easily seen that the whole subject is one of the most extreme +difficulty. There is a general hesitancy in accepting what is called the +"spirit hypothesis," so long as any other can be found; a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> hesitancy +justified in view of the extreme complexity of the world we live in +(where so much is even yet unknown), and in view of the great difficulty +which there seems to be in adducing <i>exact</i> proofs of the "spirit +theory."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Reasonable Attitude.</span>—We shall, no doubt, be wise at present to refuse +to cry "Proven," and whilst admitting that all things are +possible—perhaps even probable—to await with patience the results of +further investigation.</p> + +<p>It has to be admitted that, while many people are superstitious and +easily attracted by picturesque theories, there are others who are as +prejudiced, in their way, against new ideas, as were those astronomers +who, being committed to Ptolemaic views, refused to look through +Galileo's telescope. It is not only theologians who have, in the history +of thought, been guilty of obscurantism. In the early days of hypnotic +experiments the scientific world in general "pooh-poohed" the idea of +hypnotism; and it took a considerable time before it would allow itself +to be convinced that such a thing was possible. Facts, in the end, were +too strong even for prejudice. It is facts, eventually, that decide +matters; and, no doubt, before a very long period has elapsed, +sufficient facts will have accumulated to allow the scientific world to +form more definite and better-grounded opinions than are possible +to-day.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the ordinary man will do well to remember that the universe +is really a very wonderful place, and that the knowledge of the wisest +of us about it can only be described as infinitesimal. The traditions of +nineteenth-century materialism are still strong amongst us, even with +those who are least conscious of them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> But there are more things in +heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Results.</span>—These new conceptions of matter, of life, and of mind, which +are the products of the new physics, the new biology, and the new +psychology respectively, may be confidently left to themselves to work +out their own salvation. They have the strength of youth. What is +evident is that we have crossed the threshold of a new era in the +history of science. The outlook of the future will be as different from +that of the recent past as was the new science of Galileo, Descartes, +and Newton from the dogmatic but fanciful notions which the Scholastic +theologians had borrowed from Aristotle, and sought to impose as a +permanent revelation.</p> + +<p>The current of thought is never stayed. The future is obscure, but one +thing is certain, that the coming generations will see catastrophic +changes in the outlook of science; and the materialistic and mechanistic +<i>weltanschauung</i>, which lately seemed so formidable, may soon become as +superannuated as astrology. The theory which overshadowed the religious +life of a century, and which had become more and more menacing as +scientific knowledge increased in extent and popularity, has fallen into +discredit. Its prestige will not revive.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge"><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII</span></p> + +<p class="center">SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Value of the History of Philosophy.</span>—It may perhaps be felt that our +protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at +which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy +may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who +study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for +dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile +ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet +received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is +only too evident that, as the poet says:</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="table"> +<tr><td>"Our little systems have their day,</td></tr> +<tr><td> They have their day, and cease to be."</td></tr></table> + +<p>And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about +philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers, +indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in +the history of philosophy—such as Kant's <i>Critique of Pure +Reason</i>—which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress +(assuming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we +have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still +justified in assuming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting +nearer to the goal.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>But surely we are entitled to believe that it is not the crude appetite +for metaphysical dogma that attracts men to the history of philosophy. +Its fascination rather resembles that of the history of religion: both +are, as it were, Odysseys of the human spirit; nor is there any activity +of man that has not its appeal to the human heart: for <i>cor ad cor +loquitur</i>.</p> + +<p>And, again, we should reflect that those who ask for final conclusions, +forget that the <i>search</i> for truth may be, in and for itself, of the +highest spiritual value. The best starting-point for the history of +philosophy is a famous passage from Lessing.</p> + +<p>"Not the truth which is at the disposal of every man, but the honest +pains he has taken to come at the truth make the worth of a man. For not +through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth do his powers +increase, and in this alone consists his ever-increasing perfection. +Possession makes us quiet, indolent, proud.... If God with all truth in +His right hand, and in His left the single, unceasing striving after +truth, even though coupled with the condition that I should ever and +always err, came to me and said, 'Choose!' I would in all humility clasp +this left hand and say, 'Father, give me this! Is not pure truth for +Thee alone?'"<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> + +<p>But there is another respect in which some knowledge of the history of +thought may be an important advantage. It may not bestow upon us the +liberty of dogmatising ourselves, but it does bestow upon us a certain +imperturbability in the face of the dogmatisms of others. Airs of +systematic omniscience, "the pride of a pretended knowledge," will leave +us unimpressed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> and undismayed. The latest pretentious product of +popular philosophy will, in the majority of cases, be recognised as an +old heresy in a new garb; "new" thought will not impress (at least, by +its novelty) those who know that it is old.</p> + +<p>But it is against the crudities of materialistic naturalism that even a +slight acquaintance with the history of ideas will form an antidote. The +various exposures of it, from Hume and Kant to Bergson, will be to some +extent familiar; and it will be a recognised fact that its chief popular +attraction is at the same time its chief philosophic weakness; and this +is that it is nothing more or less than a systematisation of the +prejudices of common sense. "As a theory of first principles, the best +that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Some Deductions from History.</span>—But, it may be asked, what definite +conclusions have the foregoing chapters to offer? Some, if we are not +mistaken, of a genuinely positive character. It will be necessary to +recall certain facts and reflections to the minds of our readers.</p> + +<p>In the early chapters we noted the rise of an independent science, and +the collapse of the medieval world view with which popular religious +notions were associated so closely, that many conservative thinkers +expected to see both involved in a common ruin. Science seemed to +threaten the existence of a religion bound up with conceptions of space +and of force which were being brought into discredit.</p> + +<p>These misgivings turned out, however, to be ill-founded. Certain +advantages, no doubt, of simplicity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> and definiteness, which had +belonged to the old notions, had been irrecoverably lost; but thinkers +like Giordano Bruno showed that the conception of an infinite universe +was by no means hostile to religion; but that, on the contrary, it might +be a conception of the highest spiritual value. Such are the sentiments +expressed in some sonnets which precede Bruno's dialogue "On the +Infinite Universe."</p> + +<p>"It seemed to Bruno as if he had never breathed freely until the limits +of the universe had been extended to infinity, and the fixed spheres had +disappeared. No longer now was there a limit to the flight of the +spirit, no 'so far and no further'; the narrow prison in which the old +beliefs had confined men's spirits had now to open its gates and let in +the pure air of a new life."<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> + +<p>The scientific did not seem to him incompatible with a fundamentally +religious conception of the world, at least for those who were not +afraid "to take ship upon the seas of the infinite."</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Dangers of the "Mechanical View."</span>—Thus it was not <i>science</i> that was +hostile to religion. This was not the case until science began to be +associated with a certain fairly definite philosophy of a mechanistic, +and later of a materialist, description. Religion could not have +survived the final establishment of such a philosophy as this, for the +indispensable element in a religious attitude of life is the idea that +<i>somehow there lies behind things a power or essence that has something +in common with our own natures</i>—something that can, without an abuse of +language, be called personal. Any philosophy that rules out this idea +creates an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span>And it was just this atmosphere that the mechanistic view, unless +amplified by considerations of another kind (as it was e.g. in the case +of Spinoza) tended to create.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The "Mechanical View" Never Unchallenged.</span>—And with regard to this +mechanistic philosophy, we have to observe that it never seems to have +commended itself, as a final and complete solution, to the best minds. +In the seventeenth century, it will be remembered, the mechanical +conception was transcended (though in entirely different ways) by +Spinoza and by Leibniz, and the religious consciousness of the age, in +the person of Pascal, protested against it.</p> + +<p>And although, during the eighteenth century, this philosophy persisted, +and was considerably reinforced (with the help of further discoveries in +the realm of physics) by the school of Holbach and Diderot, yet it had +still to face the radical criticism of Kant. This criticism, as we shall +remember, indicated that the mechanical view is a way in which the human +mind—owing to its constitution—regards phenomena. If it is to +understand them, the human mind cannot help viewing them in that +fashion; it must subject things to the mould in which all its thought is +cast. Mechanism is the <i>medium</i> through which the mind understands +phenomena. It belongs not to the things in themselves, but to our way of +understanding them. And attached to this radical criticism of mechanical +notions, was an idealistic philosophy of the most genuinely religious +and spiritual character. Kantian idealism is one of those contributions +to human thought behind which we shall not again regress. It is a +phenomenon of incalculable value and importance.</p> + +<p>The immediate results of Kant's critical idealism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> was a luxuriant +growth of a spiritual type of philosophy upon the ground he had cleared +and prepared. Romanticism may be regarded as a revolt of those sides of +human nature upon which the tyranny of mechanism pressed +hardest—religion, speculation, poetry, music, art. "You may expel +nature with a pitchfork, but she persists in returning." The Horatian +remark is true also of the human mind; you may try to weed out religion +and poetry, but your success will only be temporary; for nature herself +is more persistent than the most earnest of materialists and (what is +more) she outlives him.</p> + +<p>And with regard to the materialist or mechanistic view, it is highly +interesting to note that its greatest attraction has consisted in +something which, strictly speaking, is not its own property. In the +eighteenth century in France, and in the nineteenth century in Germany +and England, the popularity of this view was derived from its altogether +illegitimate association with a high moral and social idealism, which +(it is only too evident) had been borrowed—without sufficient +acknowledgment—from the Christian tradition. The rather self-conscious +atheism (for instance) of Shelley or Byron—which they had presumably +derived from Diderot and his contemporaries—was less a denial of God +than an affirmation of the rights of humanity. This generous philosophy +of revolt from contemporary tyranny and pharisaism is atheistic only in +name. The callous and cynical powers, both political and ecclesiastical, +that were the object of their bitter attacks were the embodiments of +atheism, for "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the +Divine Being, e.g. love, wisdom, justice, are nothing."<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span><span class="smcap">The Present Situation.</span>—During the nineteenth century the mechanical +view received some accession of strength owing to the reduction of +biology to what seemed like subjection. But, at the same time, an +idealistic philosophy had taken a strong hold in England, and towards +the end of the century critical students of scientific method cast doubt +upon the <i>finality</i> of the mechanical view. They regarded it as +artificial, abstract, and symbolic only of reality. This critical +movement may be associated with the names of Mach, Boutroux, and +(perhaps above all) of Bergson.</p> + +<p>Moreover, towards the end of the century, a number of new facts in +physics, biology, and psychology came to light and tended to discredit +the mechanical view as a final explanation of reality. The +indestructibility of matter, even the conservation of energy and of mass +(corner stones of the mechanico-materialist view) began openly to be +questioned, not by metaphysicians, but by men of science themselves. The +foes of materialism were those of its own household.<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> + +<p>Thus assailed from without by the philosophers, and from within by the +scientists themselves, the mechanical view, after a reign of three +centuries (disturbed though these may have been by successive +rebellions) seems destined to disappear. It may indeed subsist as an +approximate and convenient way of regarding reality, of which it will no +longer pretend to give an absolute and complete account. It will +continue to reign as a constitutional monarch, but the days of its +tyranny are at an end. And it is not unlikely that future<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> generations +will look with surprise upon our respect for a theory which to them will +wear something of the same aspect as medieval astrology now presents to +ourselves.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Some Deductions.</span>—If the history of thought showed no other results than +the impaired prestige of naturalism, it would be worth attention and +study. The facts undoubtedly compromise that prestige, for history +indicates that at no period has naturalism been able to impose itself +permanently. If there has been a movement in that direction, it has +elicited a corresponding reaction. The human mind seems unable to remain +satisfied with the negations which systematised common sense seeks to +impose upon it. There is an instinctive appetite in humanity for a +spiritual view of things, and Sabatier was undoubtedly right in +observing that mankind is "incurably religious." Neither Hobbes, nor +Holbach, nor Büchner, with the best will in the world, can exorcise from +the human heart that instinct which seeks for itself personal relations +with the universe—which sees a mind behind phenomena. This is one of +those instincts of which it is true that the more you repress them the +more insurgent they become—they will have their way in the end.</p> + +<p>Thus naturalism, blind to the mutilation of our nature of which it is +guilty, is psychologically unsound. And yet, our nature is not so easily +mutilated after all. Naturalistic dogmatism has it in its power to +create an atmosphere which is unhealthy for religion, but that growth +has its roots too deep for it to be easily destroyed. Springing as it +does from the depths of our nature, it will prove as permanent as +humanity itself.</p> + +<p>This is not to deny that this type of dogmatism may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> do, as it actually +has done, a great deal of harm. A plant may be strong and vigorous, but +under unceasing bitter weather, it will tend to become discouraged. +Otherwise it would not be worth while to write criticisms of naturalism.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Freedom.</span>—Perhaps the best service we can do is to protest against +indulging an appetite for negative dogmatism. Such an attitude is a +negation of the freedom of thought. And it is in an atmosphere of +freedom that both religion and science flourish best. A hard and fast +naturalistic outlook may prove, and actually has proved, an incubus from +which even scientists themselves may pray to be delivered.</p> + +<p>Nor has religion always enjoyed that full measure of freedom which is +indispensable to its vigorous life. The curious and sad fact is that the +human mind seems to delight in creating prisons for itself. The +scientific spirit created a mechanico-materialistic scheme which has +ended by becoming the enemy of scientific research, and which (besides +this) asks, as a sacrifice, the mutilation of our spiritual instincts.</p> + +<p>And so with religion. The religious instinct (like the scientific) tends +to create its prisons. The pride of, a pretended knowledge reduces to a +mechanical scheme the mysteries of life and death; it provides +superficial standardised solutions for the problems of existence.</p> + +<p>Of course, it is clear enough, that in religion as in science, we +cannot, even if we would, start each of us from the beginning. We have +to accept and to revere the riches of knowledge and experience +accumulated by those who have gone before. And yet, in religion as in +science, life consists in movement; we must go forward. The past may be +an inspiration, but it must not be the limit of our thought, or it +becomes an incubus. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> glance must be forward not backward; the stream +flows, and we are borne on its bosom. Humanity, like an explorer, has +its face set towards the unknown. Both science and religion are children +of freedom, without which the creative spirit in man is crushed.</p> + +<p>And here, with this note of warning (though perhaps rather of +encouragement) we may close.</p> + + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<p class="center"><span class="big">FOOTNOTES:</span></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>The Grammar of Science</i>, pp. 12, 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Ptolemy of Alexandria: 127-151 <small>A.D.</small></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> J. M. Heald in art. "Aquinas" in <i>Encyclopædia of Religion +and Ethics</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Monks and theologians were betrayed into some controversial +asperities. "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven" +formed the appropriate text for a sermon by a Dominican.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In spite of this, however, Descartes' works, in 1663, +appeared in the Index of forbidden books: and his doctrines were banned +by Royal decree from the French universities. Jesuit influences, which +were not at all favourable to <i>native</i> religion in France (or +elsewhere!), may have been responsible for this obscurantist policy.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Merz, <i>History of European Thought in the Nineteenth +Century</i>, Vol. I, p. 384.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Quoted by Ward, <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>, p. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Höffding, <i>History of Modern Philosophy</i>, Vol. I, p. 315. +</p><p> +It may set the scruples of some at rest to be reminded that Aquinas +himself applied the term <i>Natura Naturans</i> to God as the cause of all +existence. Eckhart and Bruno had made a similar application of it (cf. +Martineau, <i>Study of Spinoza</i>, p. 226).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Here we may note, by way of an anticipation, a truth that +Kant afterwards was the first to grasp clearly: that it is only when the +mechanism of phenomena is proved, that religion can be purged of +materialism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Cf. letter to Arnauld, quoted by Höffding, I, p. 347: "The +substantial unity presupposes a complete, indivisible being. Nothing of +this kind is to be found in figure or motion ... but only in a soul or a +substantial form similar to that which we call an 'I.'"</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The <i>Monadology</i> (quoted by Pattison, <i>Idea of God</i>, p. +180).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Inge, <i>Christian Mysticism</i>, p. 19.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Cf. "With space the universe encloses me and engulfs me +like an atom, but with thought I enclose the universe." A great saying.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Novalis called him "the God-intoxicated": a bold phrase.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> We refer, of course, to the promulgation of the Bull +<i>Unigenitus</i>, procured from Pope Clement XI by the Jesuits; when their +opponents, the Jansenists "of all professions and classes, were +subjected to imprisonment, confiscation, and every species of +oppression" (Jervis, <i>Student's History of France</i>, p. 415). +</p><p> +The manœuvre is characterised by another historian as a "struggle of +narrow-minded fanaticism, allied to absolutely unscrupulous political +ambition, against all the learning and virtue which the French clergy +still possessed" (Chamberlain, <i>Foundations of the Nineteenth Century</i>, +Vol. II, p. 379).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Even before the age of the Revolution, Paris possessed +many great schools. The <i>Collège de France</i> was founded in 1530; there +was the <i>College et École de Chirurgie</i>, the <i>Jardin des Plantes</i>, the +<i>École royale des Mines</i>, etc. (cf. Merz, <i>History of European Thought</i>, +Vol. I, p. 107).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Merz says of Newton: "In his own country that fruitful +co-operation which can only be secured by an academic organisation and +by endowment of research was wanting" (I, p. 99). As late as 1740 the +whole revenue of the Royal Society was only £232 <i>per annum</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Morley, <i>Voltaire</i>, p. 41.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> He published his <i>Élémens de la Philosophie de Newton</i> in +1738.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Höffding, Vol. I, p. 481.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> See note in Merz, Vol. I, p. 145.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Merz, Vol. I, p. 143.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> The receipt and perusal of Rousseau's <i>Emile</i>, are said to +have interrupted the walk on one occasion, to the great astonishment of +the Königsbergers.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> Pringle Pattison, <i>Idea of God</i>, p. 26.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> "Atheism is aristocratic," was the reply of Robespierre to +one who mocked at his <i>Être Suprême</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Confessions</i>, Book XII.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Höffding, Vol. II, p. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> Fichte's word is <i>Anschauung</i>, for which the English +language possesses no exact equivalent. It "implies something akin, +though perhaps superior to, seeing or perceiving by means of the +senses," and it approaches less closely to "inspiration" than does the +English word "intuition." The term acquired a meaning somewhat akin to +the <i>amor intellectualis Dei</i> of Spinoza, which we have met before. (See +note in Merz, III, p. 445.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> William James, <i>A Pluralistic Universe</i>, p. 92.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Here again a certain ambiguity surrounds the German word. +<i>Geist</i> is inadequately translated by either "mind" or "spirit": it +comprises the meaning of both words (cf. Merz, III, p. 466).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> This does not mean that what is not good enough for +philosophy is good enough for religion. The idea behind Schleiermacher +is that what philosophy cannot sanction, religious experience <i>can</i> +sanction. And it has to be remembered that, as a follower of Kant, he +assigned very definite limits to the powers of philosophy. He was not an +Hegelian—Hegel's and Schleiermacher's views of the religious problem +are quite incompatible—the one believed, the other did not believe, +that reason could solve that problem.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Kopp, <i>Geschichte der Chemie</i>, Vol. I, p. 442 (quoted by +Merz, Vol. I, p. 191).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Merz, Vol. I, p. 218.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> According to one authority (Judd, in his <i>Coming of +Evolution</i>) the number of known species of plants and animals must be +placed at 600,000 (p. 10).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Vestiges of Creation</i>, published anonymously in 1844, +passed through nine large editions by 1853. The author was Robert +Chambers (1802-71), a geologist.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Life and Letters</i>, Vol. I, p. 168 (<i>vide</i> Judd, <i>Coming +of Evolution</i>, p. 89).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> As a matter of fact, biologists soon demanded more than +even Lyell's geology could give them. Recent discoveries about the +nature of matter have, however, further extended the possible age of our +planet.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Darwin, <i>Life</i>, Vol. I, p. 93.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> "If we wish to fix a definite point to describe as the end +of the idealistic period in Germany, no such distinctive event offers +itself as the French Revolution of July, 1830" (Lange, <i>History of +Materialism</i>, E.T., Vol. II, p. 245).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> A famous book which, though negative in its conclusions, +places its author alongside Schleiermacher as one of the founders of the +modern science of Religious Psychology.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> Balfour, <i>Theism and Humanism</i>, p. 36.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant +dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite +incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during +which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Spencer confessed that of the <i>Synthetic Philosophy</i> "two +volumes are missing," the two important volumes on Inorganic Evolution, +leading to the evolution of the living and of the non-living (cf. +criticisms by Professor James Ward in his <i>Naturalism and Agnosticism</i>, +Lecture IX).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> For an instance of the masterly work turned out by this +school and of the attractiveness of their propaganda, read Huxley's +lecture, "On a Piece of Chalk," delivered to the working men of Norwich +during the meeting of the British Association in 1868.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> For this famous encounter, see <i>Life of Huxley</i>, Vol. I, +pp. 179-89, and <i>Life of J. R. Green</i>, pp. 44, 45.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> As we shall subsequently find, this cosmic pessimism is +less well grounded than Huxley believed. Still, Spencer's own scientific +presuppositions were the same as Huxley's, so that the passage remains a +pertinent criticism of the Evolutionary Philosophy as elaborated by +him.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> It is instructive to observe that a similar note of latent +pessimism is struck by the last notable survivor of the School we have +endeavoured to describe. Viscount Morley at the end of his +<i>Recollections</i> (1917), questioned as to the outcome of those generous +hopes entertained with such confidence by his contemporaries, is +compelled to ejaculate with philosophic brevity, <i>circumspice</i>, as he +contemplates a spectacle of unparalleled horror.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Storr, <i>Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth +Century</i>, p. 329. See which book for a valuable chapter upon Coleridge.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, p. 98.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Foundations of Belief</i>, p. 309.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> For this summary of Lotze's doctrine, see Merz, Vol. III, +p. 615 and ff.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> Quoted by Ward in <i>Pluralism and Theism</i>, p. 103. For a +brief yet adequate treatment of Mach's criticisms see Höffding's <i>Modern +Philosophers</i>, pp. 115-21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> R. B. Perry, <i>Present Philosophical Tendencies</i>, p. 351.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> It is impossible to go deeper into James' "theory of +knowledge" without using technical language. A few of his own phrases, +however, may help to elucidate things. "Abstract concepts ... are +salient aspects of our concrete experiences which we find it useful to +single out" (<i>Meaning of Truth</i>, p. 246). +</p><p> +Elsewhere he speaks of them as things we have learned to "cut out" from +experience, as "flowers gathered," and as "moments dipped out from the +stream of time" (<i>A Pluralistic Universe</i>, p. 235). +</p><p> +I owe these quotations to Perry, op. cit.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Creative Evolution</i>, p. 325.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>A Pluralistic Universe</i>, p. 237.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Creative Evolution</i>, p. 174.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> i.e. Intellect is not (as it is generally represented to +be) a developed form of instinct, nor instinct an embryonic form of +intellect.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> The extraordinary and miraculous phenomena of +instinct—especially as celebrated by the distinguished French scientist +Fabre—cannot be rightly understood by trying to interpret them in terms +of intellect. This is to misread them completely.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Bergson's characterisation of Spencerian Evolutionism +(<i>Creative Evolution</i>, p. 391).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Creative Evolution</i>, p. 286.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Other notable pluralists in England are F. C. S. Schiller +and Dr. MacTaggart.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> The <i>logical</i> conclusion, we say, though this may not be +the ultimate truth about the matter. The most attractive theories are +often the most superficial.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> Professor Cunningham in Pearson's <i>Grammar of Science</i>, +Part I, p. 356.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Quoted by W. C. D. Whetham in his <i>Recent Development of +Physical Science</i>, p. 280. No reference is given by him.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> One theory attributes the existence of matter to +occasional misfits among these grains.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> Quoted by Bishop Mercer. <i>Problem of Creation</i>, Appendix +B.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> In <i>Theism and Humanism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Mercer, op. cit., p. 106.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>Mechanism, Life, and Personality</i> (1913), p. 81.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Op. cit. pp. 64, 66.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Professor J. Arthur Thomson, in an article entitled, "Is +there one Science of Nature?" (<i>Hibbert Journal</i>, Oct., 1911).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>The Science and Philosophy of the Organism</i>, Vol. II, p. +338.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Op. cit. p. 101.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Other names of distinguished scientists holding this view +are: Sir W. Crookes the Physicist and Sir W. F. Barrett, <small>F.R.S.</small>, in +England, Dr. Hodgson and Prof. James Hyslop in America, Lombroso in +Italy, Richet in France.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> From his <i>Duplik</i>. Quoted by Höffding, <i>History of +Philosophy</i>, Vol. II, p. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> F. H. Bradley on "Phenomenalism" (<i>Appearance and +Reality</i>, p. 126).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> Höffding, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 129.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Feuerbach, <i>Essence of Christianity</i>, p. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> We now learn that conceptions of space of a highly +unorthodox character are entertained by physicists and mathematicians, +as the result of recent researches in the sphere of the gravitation of +light.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="huge">INDEX</span></p> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Agnosticism, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +<li>Anti-clericalism, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> +<li>Aquinas, <a href="#Page_9">9 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Aristotle, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Atomic theory, the, <a href="#Page_49">49</a> + <ul class="IX"> + <li>collapse of, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + </ul></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Bacon, Lord, <a href="#Page_16">16 f.</a></li> +<li>Balfour, A. J., <a href="#Page_105">105 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li>Bergson, <a href="#Page_115">115-121</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> +<li>Berkeley, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> +<li>Boutroux, <a href="#Page_112">112 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> +<li>Bradley, F. H., <a href="#Page_104">104 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> +<li>Bruno, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> +<li>Büchner, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li>Buffon, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Carlyle, Thomas, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99-102</a></li> +<li>Coleridge, S. T., <a href="#Page_98">98 f.</a></li> +<li>Comte, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +<li>Copernicus, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> +<li>Cunningham, Prof., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> +<li>Cusanus, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Dalton, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> +<li>Darwin, <a href="#Page_80">80-83</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87 f.</a></li> +<li>Descartes, <a href="#Page_19">19-22</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Design, Argument from, <a href="#Page_87">87 f.</a></li> +<li>Diderot, <a href="#Page_45">45 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li>Driesch, <a href="#Page_130">130 f.</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Eckhart, <a href="#Page_30">30 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Encyclopædia, The, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> +<li>Electrons, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Feuerbach, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> +<li>Fichte, <a href="#Page_65">65-67</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Galileo, <a href="#Page_12">12-15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Goethe, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li>Green, T. H., <a href="#Page_103">103 f.</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Haeckel, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li>Haldane, Prof. J. S., <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> +<li>Harvey, William, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> +<li>Hegel, <a href="#Page_67">67-70</a></li> +<li>Heine, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> +<li>Helmholtz, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>Hobbes, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li>Holbach, <a href="#Page_46">46-48</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li>Hume, <a href="#Page_55">55 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> +<li>Huxley, <a href="#Page_92">92 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Inge, <a href="#Page_38">38 <i>n.</i></a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>James, William, <a href="#Page_114">114 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +<li>Jansenists, the, <a href="#Page_43">43 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Jesuits, the, <a href="#Page_22">22 <i>n.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Johnson, Dr., <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Kant, <a href="#Page_53">53-61</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a> + <ul class="IX"> + <li>and Hegel compared, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> + <li>and Locke compared, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + <li>and Rousseau compared, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + </ul></li> +<li>Kepler, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Lamarck, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> +<li>La Mettrie, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> +<li>Lange, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> +<li>Laplace, <a href="#Page_48">48 f.</a></li> +<li>Larmor, Prof. J., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> +<li>Lavoisier, <a href="#Page_49">49 f.</a></li> +<li>Leibniz, <a href="#Page_33">33-36</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li>Leonardo da Vinci, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> +<li>Lessing, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span></li> +<li>Locke, <a href="#Page_52">52 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55 f.</a></li> +<li>Lodge, Sir O., <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> +<li>Lotze, <a href="#Page_107">107-109</a></li> +<li>Lyell, <a href="#Page_78">78-80</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Mach, <a href="#Page_110">110-114</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> +<li>Malthus' <i>Essay on Population</i>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> +<li>Meyer, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>McTaggart, <a href="#Page_123">123 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Modernism, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li>Monads, <a href="#Page_35">35 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>"Natural Selection," <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> +<li>Newton, <a href="#Page_23">23-26</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44 <i>n.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li>Nietzsche, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96 f.</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Paley, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> +<li>Pascal, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36-41</a></li> +<li>Pearson, Prof. Karl, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> +<li>Pessimism, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> +<li>Positivism, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Ritschl, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li>Rousseau, <a href="#Page_54">54 <i>n.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_62">62-65</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li><i>Sartor Resartus</i>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> +<li>Schelling, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li>Schiller, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li>Schiller, F. C. S., <a href="#Page_123">123 <i>n.</i></a></li> +<li>Schleider, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> +<li>Schleiermacher, <a href="#Page_70">70-72</a></li> +<li>Spencer, Herbert, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89-92</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> +<li>Spinoza, <a href="#Page_28">28-33</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52 f.</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li>"Spiritualism," <a href="#Page_133">133-136</a></li> +<li>Stephen, Leslie, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Tait, Prof., <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li>Thomson, Prof. J. A., <a href="#Page_130">130 <i>n.</i></a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Voltaire, <a href="#Page_44">44 f.</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Wallace, Alfred Russell, <a href="#Page_81">81 f.</a></li> +<li>Ward, Prof. James, <a href="#Page_26">26 <i>n.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_91">91 <i>n.</i></a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +<li>Whöler, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> +</ul> + +<ul class="IX"> +<li>Zeno's paradox, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> +</ul> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p class="center">Printed in Great Britain at</p> +<p class="center"><i>The Mayflower Press, Plymouth.</i> William Brandon & Son, Ltd.</p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p> </p> +<h3>Transcriber's Notes:</h3> + +<p>Punctuation has been corrected without note.</p> + +<p>Spelling, grammatical and typographical errors have been corrected in +the text:</p> + + + <p class="blockquot">Page 68: "understand" changed to "understands"<br/> + Page 70: "fom" changed to "from"<br/> + Page 128: "subjectly" changed to "subjectively"<br/> + Page 138: "Odyssies" changed to "Odysseys"</p> + +<p>Inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the +original.</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Religion and Science, by John Charlton Hardwick + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + +***** This file should be named 35772-h.htm or 35772-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/7/7/35772/ + +Produced by David E. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Religion and Science + From Galileo to Bergson + +Author: John Charlton Hardwick + +Release Date: April 5, 2011 [EBook #35772] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + + + + +Produced by David E. Brown, Bryan Ness and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + +FROM GALILEO TO BERGSON + +BY + +JOHN CHARLTON HARDWICK + + "Philosophy will always be hard, and what it promises even in the end + is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its + certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension + of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and + all its unity and worth." + + F. H. BRADLEY, _Essays in Truth and Reality_, p. 106. + + +LONDON + +SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE + +NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO. + +1920 + + + + +TO + +MY FATHER + + + + +PREFACE + + +The chapters which follow are not intended as even a slight sketch of +the history of Thought since the Renaissance. Their object is more +modest, i.e. to illustrate the thesis that mankind, being "incurably +religious," insists (however hopeless the enterprise may sometimes seem) +upon interpreting the universe spiritually. + +Thus it is quite natural that only a few typical names should find their +places here: and often no sufficient reason may appear for one being +included rather than another. For instance, in the tenth chapter, T. H. +Green, F. H. Bradley, and A. J. Balfour are mentioned, while Martineau +and the Cairds are passed over. Needless to say, there was no doctrinal +prejudice here. Again, in the fourth chapter, Pascal is dealt with at +some length, but Boehme, an equally important thinker, is ignored. And +so on. + +I should like to acknowledge here my obligation to Dr. Mercer, Canon of +Chester, for his advice upon books, especially with regard to material +for the final chapters. Also to the Rev. H. D. A. Major, Principal of +Ripon Hall, for suggestions about the general plan of the book; and to +the Rev. E. Harvey (a mathematical graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, +at present studying medicine) for valuable information about the present +position of psychic research. + + J. C. H. + + ALTRINGHAM, _March 23rd, 1920_. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER I + INTRODUCTORY PAGE + + Religion and Science defined. "Accurate and systematic + knowledge" necessarily affects our "attitude to life." Can + our systematised knowledge sanction a religious attitude? + This the "religious problem." Religious harmony of Middle + Ages. Will it return? 1 + + CHAPTER II + THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS + + The old World-Scheme described. Aquinas and Scholasticism. + Cusanus criticises conventional ideas of space. The + New Astronomy of Copernicus. Bruno and an infinite + universe. Galileo's telescope. The New Physics and an + automatic universe. The New Logic 8 + + CHAPTER III + GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY + + The New Science creates a New Philosophy. Universality + of Mechanics. Importance of Harvey's discovery. Descartes + extends the mechanical theory to cover physiology and psychology. + Hobbes and a naturalistic ethic. Newton extends the + operation of law from the earth to the heavens. Religious + attitude of these thinkers. Significance of their thought 18 + + CHAPTER IV + SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS + + A Law of Thought. Spinoza. A Mechanical Universe + spiritually interpreted. _Natura Naturans_, what it means. + The _Ethics_. Spinoza's mysticism. His personality. Leibniz + and a philosophy of personality. His monads. Pascal. His + significance. _The Pensees._ The eternal protest of religion. + Man defies the universe. Results 28 + + CHAPTER V + RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE + + Anti-clericalism in eighteenth-century France. Voltaire's + propaganda. Diderot and the Encyclopaedists. Holbach's + _System of Nature_. Laplace's astronomy. Lavoisier and the + New Chemistry. Dalton's atomic theory. Results for religion 42 + + CHAPTER VI + RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM + + Importance, for the mechanical view, of Locke's theory of + knowledge. Weakness of speculative philosophy. Rise of the + "critical" philosophy. Kant. He seeks to solve the problem: + How is knowledge possible? Kant's view of the mind's + function in knowledge. Mechanism a "form of thought," + subjective not objective. Kant's view of reality. Can we + know reality? The two worlds 52 + + CHAPTER VII + THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT + + Kant clears the ground for a new philosophy. Significance + of Rousseau. His attitude to culture. The new philosophy in + Germany, its goal. Fichte. Hegel a rationalistic-romanticist. + His method. Hegelianism. Significance for religious thought + of Schleiermacher. The autonomy of religion and religious + experience 62 + + CHAPTER VIII + MECHANISM AND LIFE + + Rise of bio-chemistry and bio-physics in Germany. Significance + of these movements. The Origin of Species. Lamarck. + The new geology. Darwin. Results of his theory 74 + + CHAPTER IX + MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM + + Early decline of Romanticism in Germany. Comte and the + "positive" philosophy. Materialism in Germany. Darwinism + and the "argument from design." Haeckel. Spencerian + evolutionism. Spencer's moral idealism. His philosophy of + religion. Agnosticism. Rise of philosophic pessimism. + Significance of Nietzsche 84 + + CHAPTER X + REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY + + German idealism naturalised in England by Coleridge and + Carlyle. These writers described. _Sartor Resartus._ Idealism + at Oxford, T. H. Green. F. H. Bradley. Balfour's plea for a + philosophy of science. Revival of Idealism in Germany. + Lotze. His view of "values" and reality 98 + + CHAPTER XI + SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY + + A new philosophy of Science. Mach on "Economy of + Thought." "Abstractness" and artificiality of scientific + method. Boutroux and natural law. James' view of the + mind carried further by Bergson. His view of the intellect. + What it can, and what it cannot, do for us. Intuition. + Indeterminism and Pluralism. Leibniz revived. Ward's + philosophy of personality 110 + + CHAPTER XII + SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE + + The "New" Physics. New theories of matter. The "New" + Biology. Driesch and neo-vitalism. The "New" Psychology. + "Spiritualism." The outlook for the future 125 + + CHAPTER XIII + SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS + + History of Thought supplies no material for dogmatising. + Yet a progress of ideas is evident. Permanency of "spiritual" + view of reality. Its continual revival. Sabatier's saying. + Need of freedom, alike for religion and for science 137 + + + + +RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +INTRODUCTORY. RELIGION AND SCIENCE + + +Numerous attempts to define religion have made it evident that religion +is indefinable. We may, however, say this much about it, that religion +is _an attitude towards life_: a way of looking at existence. It is +true that this definition is too wide, and includes things which are not +religion--there are certain attitudes to life which are definitely +anti-religious--that of the materialist, for instance. However, it will +serve a purpose, and we can improve upon it as we proceed. It is a +mistake to put too much faith in definitions: at any rate it is better +to have our definitions (if have them we must) too wide than too narrow. + +Science is, fortunately, much easier to define. _Accurate and systematic +knowledge_ is what we mean by science--knowledge about anything, +provided that the facts are (so far as possible) accurately described +and systematically classified. Professor Karl Pearson, the highest +authority on the principles of scientific method and theory, writes: + +"The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their +mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the +scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the +past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, +to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of +a worm, or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus. It is not facts +themselves which make science, but the method by which they are dealt +with. The material of science is co-extensive with the whole physical +universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past +history and the past history of all life therein. When every fact, every +present or past phenomenon of that universe, every phase of present or +past life therein, has been classified, and co-ordinated with the rest, +then the mission of science will be completed."[1] + +Science, then, is systematic and accurate knowledge; and when we have +systematic and accurate knowledge about everything there is to be known, +the programme of science will be complete. This is only to say that the +task it has set itself is one that will never end. + +So much, then, for our definitions. Religion is "an attitude to life": +science is "systematic and accurate knowledge." How does the one affect +the other? What are the relations between the two? That is the topic +which will occupy our attention during the chapters that follow. To +answer the question properly will involve a certain amount of +acquaintance with the history of ideas. We must first put the +preliminary question: How, as a matter of fact, have men's scientific +ideas affected their religious ideas (or _vice versa_) in times past? +Having tried to answer this question, we shall be in a better position +to approach the religious problem as it presents itself to-day. + +Meanwhile a few remarks of a general character will not be out of place. +It is evident that "science" can hardly fail to affect "religion." +Systematised knowledge necessarily affects an individual's (or a +society's) attitude to life--either by broadening and elevating that +attitude, or by debasing it. Our knowledge, or what we believe to be +such, tends to create certain preconceptions which make our minds +hostile to certain beliefs or ideas. A man reared from his cradle on +mechanical science will tend to regard miracles with suspicion; if he be +logical (as he generally is not) freedom of the will, even in the most +limited sense, will appear chimerical. Nor will his general attitude to +life remain unaffected by his views on these points. + +Systematised knowledge may thus conceivably come into conflict with the +presuppositions or the ideals of some particular religion. It is then +that a "religious problem" arises. A religion indissolubly associated +with a geocentric conception of the universe would tend to become +discredited as soon as that conception had been disposed of by +"systematic knowledge." Science may even tend to produce an attitude to +life hostile not only to a particular religion but to _all_ religion. If +materialism should ultimately be found to be consistent with systematic +and accurate knowledge, it is difficult to see how any attitude to life +which could be appropriately described as "religion" could survive. The +religious problem would then, at any rate, cease to trouble us. The +religious apologists would be free to turn their attention to matters of +more moment. But it is not only with the cessation of religion that the +religious problem slumbers. There are certain happy periods when +religion flourishes undisturbed by obstinate questionings. These +classical ages of religion exist when systematised knowledge seems to +support the contemporary religious outlook--when science and religion +speak with one voice. Such unanimity seems to us to-day too good to be +possible, but that is only because our own age is exceptional--not +because those happier ages were exceptional; they, in fact--if we trace +history backwards--would seem rather to have been the rule. + +Primitive man, it would seem, was troubled by no discords of the kind +which disturb our peace. His systematic knowledge--such as it was--was +entirely in accord with his religion, the two were, in fact, in his case +practically one. His science _was_ his religion. It may not have been +very sound science, nor very elevated religion, but it served his +purpose admirably. He was too busy with the struggle for survival to +indulge in speculation. His religion was severely practical, and he was +faithful to it because experience seemed to indicate that it paid. + +But the Stone Age hardly deserves (in spite of its freedom from +religious difficulties) to be described as one of the classical ages of +religion; absence of struggle does not necessarily mean richness of +life. There are ages which better deserve that appellation. There are +times when all existing culture--even of a high level--is closely +associated with the current religion, endorses its ideals, sanctions its +hopes, puts the stamp of finality upon its faith. Such an age cannot +perhaps hope to be permanent; for life means movement, and movement +upsets equilibrium, and human knowledge tends to increase faster than +the human mind can adapt itself to it or digest it. But such ages are +looked back upon with regret when they are past, they shed a golden +radiance over history, their tradition lingers, they even leave behind +them monuments of art and literature which are the wonder, and the +inimitable models, of succeeding generations. + +Such an epoch was that which left to us our Gothic cathedrals. These are +the creation of one of those classic ages "when all existing culture is +cast or bent in obedience to the religious idea." When scientist, +scholar and ecclesiastic spoke with one voice and listened to one +message; when prince and peasant worshipped together the same +divinities; when to be outside the religious community was to be cut off +from the brotherhood of mankind. "The Church" was then co-extensive with +civilisation: those without the fold were barbarians, hardly worthy of +the name of man. + +That time of splendid harmony, however, is now past; no lamentations +will restore it. We have reached another world. + +But it need not remain only a memory; it ought also to serve as an +inspiration. The conditions of affairs during the classic ages of +religion, however impossible at the moment, must remain our ideal. Head +and heart must some day speak again with one voice, our hopes and +beliefs must be consistent with our knowledge. Science must sanction +that attitude towards existence which our highest instincts dictate. + +It is only too likely that this consummation is yet distant. Yet even if +our generation has to reconcile itself to spiritual and moral discord, +it should never overlook the existence of a happier ideal, and even the +possibility of its fulfilment. Fortunately for the interests of +religion, men feel they _must_ effect some kind of a reconciliation +between the opposing demands which proceed from different sides of their +nature. Each for himself tries to approximate science and religion, and +the struggle to do this creates in each individual spiritual life. +Tension sometimes creates light, and struggle engenders life. So long as +there are men sufficiently _interested_ in religion to ask for a +solution of its problems, religion will remain superior to the +disintegration towards which all discord, if unchecked, proceeds. + +It is sometimes said that the religious harmony of the Middle Ages, of +which we have spoken, having been due to imperfect knowledge, is never +likely to repeat itself, unless we sink back into the ignorance of +barbarism: and (it is urged) we know too much to be at peace. Having +tasted of the fruits of knowledge, the human race is cast forth from its +Paradise. This view is unduly pessimistic. There is no valid reason for +excluding the possibility that our knowledge of reality and those ideal +hopes which constitute our religion may actually coincide. Religion and +science, approaching the problem of existence from contrary directions, +may independently arrive at an identical solution. That the two actually +do attack the enigma from different sides has led many people to regard +the two as hostile forces. Such is not the case. Religion and science +regard reality from different angles, but it is the same reality that is +the object of their vision, and the goal of their search. + +Religion looks at existence as a whole, and attempts to determine its +meaning and value for mankind. Religion, we may say, stands at the +centre of existence, and regards reality from a central position. + +The province of science, on the other hand, is not to take so wide a +survey, but to gain knowledge piece-meal: to locate points inductively, +and thus to plot out the curve which we believe existence constitutes. +If the _loci_, as they are successively fixed, seem to indicate that the +curve is identical with the circle which religion has already +intuitively postulated, the problem of existence would have been solved. +Science and religion working by different methods would have described +the same circle. When science has completed its circle, its centre may +be found to stand just at the point where religion has always +confidently declared it to be. Knowledge and faith will then, and not +till then, be one. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD SYNTHESIS + + +We have seen that there are classic religious periods when faith and +knowledge have seemed to approximate to one another. The Middle Ages in +Europe constituted such a period; no "Religion _v._ Science" controversy +could then be said to exist; the best scientific knowledge of the time +seemed to sanction the popular religious notions. Learned and lay +thought in the same terms; the wolf lay down with the lamb. + +THE OLD WORLD-SCHEME.--It is important to grasp the main features of a +world-scheme which as late as the fifteenth century passed everywhere +without criticism. + +The father of it was Aristotle. His conception of the universe rested +upon the plain contrast, which strikes the unsophisticated observer, +between the unembarrassed and regular movements of the heavenly bodies +and the disordered agitations of sublunary things. Hence the heavenly +region was eternal, and the region of earth transitory: yonder, the +motions that take place are eternal and regular; here, motion and rest +alternate, nothing "continueth in one stay." + +At the centre of the universe stands Earth: hence we mount through three +sublunary strata to the region of the celestial ether, which is purer +as distance from the Earth increases. + +These strata form three concentric "spheres" which, solid yet +transparent (like crystal), revolve around the earth. The first contains +the moon--like a fly in amber; the second, the sun; the third, the fixed +stars; which last sphere is also the first of several successive +heavens, the highest of which is the seat of Deity. + +This Aristotelio-Ptolemaic system[2] formed a coherent framework for +biblical world-notions. Here too, earth stands still while sun and stars +revolve; here, too, the seat of Deity is the highest heaven. This was an +universe where men could feel their feet on firm ground; their minds +found rest in those simple and definite notions which make religious +conceptions easy to understand and accept; their imaginations were not +yet disturbed and disquieted by thoughts of space and time without end +and without beginning. + +AQUINAS.--Such was the "world of nature," the theatre for that "world of +grace" which Revelation spoke of, and which led eventually to the +eternal "world of glory" in which the faithful should have their +portion. _Natura_, _gratia_, _gloria_ was the ascending series (like +another set of celestial spheres), and the whole economy was elaborated +into a logical system, known to the historians of thought as +Scholasticism: a philosophy which found its most perfect and memorable +expression in Thomas Aquinas (1227-74), the _doctor angelicus_ of +Catholic theology, canonised less than fifty years after his death. The +_Summa Philosophica_, where Aquinas deals with the rational foundations +of a Christian Theism, and the _Summa Theologica_, where he erects his +elaborate structure of theology and ethics, together constitute "one of +the most magnificent monuments of the human intellect, dwarfing all +other bodies of theology into insignificance."[3] In him the erudition +of an epoch found its spokesman; he was the personification of an +intellectual ideal. To his contemporaries he stood beyond the range of +criticism. In the _Paradiso_ (x.8.2) it is St. Thomas who speaks in +heaven. + +Nevertheless, the Scholastic world-scheme, though based on "the evidence +of the senses, the investigations of antiquity, and the authority of the +Church," and though Aquinas had set the seal of finality upon it, was +destined to gradual discredit and ultimate extinction. + +DISINTEGRATION BEGINS.--It was open to attack on two sides. _Either_ +observations or calculations might be brought forward, conflicting with +it, or making another conception possible or probable: _Or_ the validity +of conventional ideas of space might be disputed. + +The latter type of criticism was the first to occur. Nicholas Cusanus +(1401-1464), an inhabitant of the Low Countries, subsequently bishop and +cardinal, developed unconventional notions about Space. He suggested +that wherever man finds himself--on earth, sun, or star--he will always +regard himself as standing at the centre of existence. There is, in +fact, no point in the universe which might not appropriately be called +its centre, and to say that the earth stands at the centre is only (what +we should now call it) an anthropomorphism. So much for _place_; and +similarly with _motion_. Here, too, there is no absolute standard to +apply: motion may exist, but be unnoticed if there be no spot at +absolute rest from which to take bearings. + +"We are like a man in a boat sailing with the stream, who does not know +that the water is flowing, and who cannot see the banks: how is he to +discover whether the boat is moving?" Cusanus, in fact, denies the +fundamental Aristotelian dogma that the earth is the central point of +the universe, because, on general grounds, there _can_ be no absolute +central point. This gave a shock to the "geocentric theory" from which +it never recovered. + +Worse shocks, however, were to come. The name of the man who actually +(as Luther complained) turned the world upside down, is notorious +enough. Poles and Germans alike have claimed the nationality of Nicolaus +Copernicus (1473-1543); who, having been a student at Cracow and in +Italy, became a prebendary in Frauenburg Cathedral. + +THE NEW ASTRONOMY.--The general criticisms of Cusanus were elaborated by +Copernicus. The senses cannot inform us (when any motion takes place) +_what_ it is that moves. It may be the thing perceived that moves, or +the percipient--or both. And it would be _possible_ to account for the +movements of celestial bodies by the supposition that it is the earth +that moves, and not they. Copernicus' whole work consisted in the +mathematical demonstration that this hypothesis could account for the +phenomena as we observe them. In fact, when these demonstrations were +eventually published (it was only on his death-bed that Copernicus +received a copy of his book--and he had already lost consciousness) they +were introduced by a discreet preface, which intimated that the whole +thing might safely be regarded as a _jeu d'esprit_ on the part of an +eccentric mathematician. And this editorial _caveto_, though written by +another hand, preserved the Copernican theories from the notoriety that +might otherwise have attended, and afterwards did attend, them. + +Copernican conceptions were semi-traditional. The sun displaces the +earth as the central point of the universe: around it revolve the +planets--including the earth; and, at an immeasurable distance, is the +immovable heaven of the fixed stars. Copernicus left it an open question +whether or no the universe was infinite. It remained for his successor, +the greatest of the Renaissance thinkers, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) to +declare it to be limitless, and to contain an infinity of worlds like +our own. The fixed stars became, for him, suns surrounded by planets. +The traditional distinction between the celestial and sublunary spheres +had vanished. The bewilderment and indignation excited by these ideas, +revolting to the conscience of his time, cost their author his life. + +GALILEO.--The criticism of the old world-conceptions was, however, to be +based on yet more sure ground by one who relied, not on general +considerations, but on observation and experiment. Galileo (1564-1642) +studied philosophy, physics, and mathematics at Pisa; and as professor +expounded the old astronomy long after he had ceased to regard it as +adequate. Not until 1610, after he had constructed a telescope and +observed the satellites of Jupiter, did he openly confess his adherence +to the system of Copernicus. The observation of sun-spots and the phases +of Venus confirmed his opinion. + +Aristotelian astronomers declined to witness these phenomena through his +telescope, and perhaps Galileo was right in observing with a sigh that +were the stars themselves to descend from heaven to bear him witness his +critics would remain obdurate.[4] + +It was not until 1632 that a complete exposition of the conflict between +the two world-systems was produced by Galileo. It took the form of a +dialogue between three speakers--conservative, mediating, and extreme. +The views of the author, however, were not sufficiently concealed, the +book was prohibited, and Galileo summoned to Rome, and upon threat of +torture, subdued into a recantation and a promise not to offend in the +future. That Galileo perjured himself is not open to doubt, nor did he +change his convictions. A subsequent work, surreptitiously printed in +Holland, contained the same heresies expressed with less reserve. + +THE NEW PHYSICS.--It might be said, then, that the fabric of the +universe had been reconstructed by the thinkers whose explorations we +have hitherto followed. This achievement, however, though sufficiently +startling in itself, was not the only, and perhaps not the most +important, of their performances. The question still awaited solution: +_By what forces and laws is the new world-system maintained in +activity?_ + +The traditional reply had been that the universe was kept in motion by +the operation of the Deity. While the truth of this reply was not +questioned by the advocates of the "new" science, it did not seem to +them to dispel the obscurity surrounding certain points about which they +required information. It was Galileo who observed that the appeal to the +divine will explains nothing just because it explains everything. It +takes the inquirer back too far--behind those details of method which +arouse his speculative interest. + +This desire to understand those methods of operation which natural +objects appear to follow, led philosophers to enunciate certain "laws" +about them. These served as "explanations" of particular classes of +phenomena. It was the phenomena of _motion_ that especially attracted +their attention; and many ingenious experiments were performed by +Galileo, in particular, which led him to conclusions which then seemed +paradoxical, but now serve as axioms of physical science; for "the laws +of motion contain the key to all scientific knowledge of material +nature." When Galileo, after careful experiment, established the +proposition that a body can neither change its motion of itself, nor +pass from motion to rest, the fundamental "law of inertia"--of such +incalculable importance to the development of modern physics--had been +established. + +AN AUTOMATIC UNIVERSE.--A proposition of this kind may not at first seem +to involve important philosophical or theological consequences. But we +only have to consider that it provided a natural explanation of the +continued and untiring motion of the heavenly bodies. It did not, it is +true, explain how that motion arose; but the motion being "given," it +had now been shown how it would, in the absence of obstructions, be +perpetual. In fact, speculations of this kind opened up the way to the +_mechanical_ explanation of nature, a theory which had been already +speculatively held by Leonardo da Vinci, who is already convinced that +"necessity is the eternal bond, the eternal rule of Nature." + +SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS.--It was not only, however, the spectacle of a +system running automatically that suggested to observers a mechanical +theory to explain it. There was also the fact that phenomena were +observed to occur in accordance with certain simple mathematical laws. +Galileo's experiments with falling bodies led him to foreshadow +principles which were afterwards elaborated and fully demonstrated by +Newton, who may be said to have been the first to construct a mechanical +universe. The principle had already been formulated by a contemporary of +Galileo--Johannes Kepler--in the axiom _ubi materia, ibi geometria_. + +RESULTS.--The thinkers whose speculations have engaged us were indeed +responsible for creating a revolution in ideas. For a finite universe +whose centre was the earth, and which was kept in motion by the +operation of the Deity, they had substituted the conception of +illimitable space sown with innumerable systems like our own; and had +created the beginning of a mechanical conception of nature. + +THE NEW LOGIC.--But it was not only the scientific dogmas of the old +system that had been so rudely overthrown--the very principles upon +which those dogmas rested had been submitted to a destructive criticism. +The new science produced a new logic. This order of events is not +unusual: first, the new scientific discoveries, and then in the wake of +the discoverers, comes the innovating critic who systematises the +logical or scientific methods to which the new knowledge seems to have +been due. First, Kepler and Galileo, who used the "inductive" method, +and then Lord Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), who discovered the inductive +logic, and established it as a system. + +FRANCIS BACON.--Bacon's doctrine may be summarised by his own epigram, +"If a man begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he be +content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties." Which is +really a criticism of what is known as the a priori method, whereby the +inquirer starts with certain predefined theories to which all phenomena +must conform, and which all experience must verify. If facts will not +suit the particular theory, so much the worse for the facts: one could +always disregard them, and apply a blind eye to Galileo's telescope. +Such is always the procedure of the dogmatic mind, which is already so +certain of the truth of its notions that no evidence can persuade it to +the contrary. But it is not by such means that knowledge is advanced, +and it was for a reversal of these that Bacon pleaded. + +Leonardo da Vinci had already anticipated the Baconian logic (which did +not wait for Bacon until it was applied) when he laid down the +proposition that wisdom was the daughter of experience, and rejected all +speculations which experience, the common mother of all sciences, could +not confirm. Hence, knowledge was the product of time; the process of +collecting material for a judgment must often be slow, but the results +were worth the labour--these would not be speculative, but true. Nor +need it be supposed that Bacon excluded imagination from playing a part +in increasing knowledge, he did not plead _only_ for a mechanical +collection of material. It is imagination which in face of abundant +material creates the hypothesis which accounts for it being what it is. +And he was prepared to admit the value of preliminary hypotheses which +might be replaced as further facts were collected, or as insight became +more clear. Here, too, Bacon describes the method followed by modern +science. + +PRESTIGE OF NEW METHODS.--And so, by the time when Bacon had laid down +his pen after writing the _New Logic_, the work of discrediting the old +system, elaborated with such ingenious industry by Aquinas, was +tolerably complete. The new science had begun already to be fruitful in +results, both practical and speculative. The successors of Galileo and +of Bacon applied the new principles with vigour, and reached astonishing +results. Justified by these, the new methods secured a prestige which +has not decreased for three centuries. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +GROWTH OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY + + +DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM.--By the time of Lord Bacon, the Scholastic +philosophy might have been described as extinct; it no longer survived +as a living system. The loss was a serious one to mankind, which was +poorer by the discrediting of an authoritative body of thought, a +possession it seems ill able to dispense with. The Baconian philosophy +was an imperfect substitute; it was little more than a system of +enquiry, a manual of scientific procedure, for Bacon himself was not in +the philosophical sense a profound or constructive thinker, though he +was one of those men of talent who can give utterance to the tendencies +of an epoch. + +THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.--The task, however, of constructing a new philosophy +of the universe was courageously taken in hand by a succession of +thinkers, and the energy of thought which the great problem generated is +characteristic of perhaps the most vigorous century of European +history--the seventeenth. + +The tendency of the new discoveries in science had not been obscure, and +Modern Philosophy starts with an attempt to represent the universe as a +self-working machine--a co-ordinated whole, throughout which the +principles of mathematics are universally valid. The trend of ideas set +in motion by the new discoveries in astronomy seemed to point in this +direction. But to introduce mechanics into the celestial regions, though +an important step, was but a beginning. Mechanics must be _universally_ +valid--even in the human body--or the new teaching was vain. Exceptions +may prove a rule, but they destroy a philosophy. + +THE SUBJUGATION OF PHYSIOLOGY.--It was an Englishman who provided the +necessary facts to fill the gravest gap in the mechanical theory. It was +already known in the previous century that the blood of animals +circulated throughout the body; the existence and use of veins and +heart-valves was also known, but it was William Harvey (1578-1657) who +discovered the heart to be the organ responsible for _maintaining_ the +circulation of the blood, by purely mechanical means. This was a fact of +the utmost significance. In the sphere of physiology, where theories +about mysterious powers of blood or soul had been hitherto +authoritative, it effected a revolution. Indeed it is true to say that +Harvey "is to physiology what Galileo was to physics." He proved that +"the general laws of motion are valid within as well as without the +organism"--an important extension of the mechanical theory. + +DESCARTES.--Among the leading men who accepted Harvey's theory, one of +the first was Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Well might this thinker +welcome it, for it was a most important contribution to the imposing +philosophic fabric for which he was industriously collecting materials. +Descartes, apart from his philosophical speculations, is an interesting +character, being a Frenchman of noble birth who was educated by the +Jesuits, saw something of contemporary life in Paris, served as a +military officer in Holland and Germany, and made some original +discoveries in mathematics. + +The mathematical mind, accustomed as it is to deal with highly abstract +ideas, takes kindly to metaphysics. And it very often solves the mystery +of the universe by expressing all its contents in mathematical terms. +Such, at least, was Descartes' method. The simplest and clearest ideas +which we can have of anything are mathematical, i.e. extension and +mobility. And it is by concentrating our attention upon this simple and +mathematical aspect of things that we shall arrive at a proper +understanding of all that goes on in the material world. + +UNIVERSALITY OF MATHEMATICS.--A phenomenon was, in Descartes' eyes, +"explained" only when a "cause" which is its exact _mathematical +equivalent_, has been indicated. The "cause" and the "effect" are two +sides of a mathematical equation (_Causa aequat effectum_). Anything +that happens in the material world (the fall of a stone, the beat of a +heart, the rising of the sun) is really nothing more than a +redistribution of portions of that sum of motion which, once generated +at the Creation, has remained unaltered, and unalterable, in the +universe ever since. The sum of motion is constant, there can be no +addition to or subtraction from it. In this sense it would be true that +"there is nothing new under the sun": only ever-new distributions of the +old. + +THE UNIVERSE A MACHINE.--Once assume that all phenomena can be +interpreted in terms of motion, and add the proposition (already +enunciated by Galileo) that motion once set going will proceed for ever, +unless some impediment from outside intervenes, and the mechanical view +of the universe is complete. The universe is a machine, i.e. a thing +that works (1) according to mathematical principles, (2) automatically. + +ELABORATIONS OF THE MECHANICAL THEORY.--The importance of Descartes lies +not in his having invented this conception (we have already seen it in +the hands of Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and others), but in his having +elaborated it. This he did in two directions: (1) he attempted to supply +a mechanical theory of the evolution of the world-system; _i.e._ to show +how the heavenly bodies came into being by natural and mechanical +processes; (2) he applied the mechanical theory to organisms; animals +and men were complex machines. (Here, as we have seen, the discovery of +Harvey was of prime importance.) + +It is hardly necessary to describe at length Descartes' mechanical +theory of the evolution of the world-system, though an interest attaches +to it as being the ancestor of the modern "nebular hypothesis." Matter +in whirling motion around fixed centres is the original _datum_ from +which Descartes evokes the universe. With regard to the mechanical +theory of organisms, Descartes developed it at some length in various +treatises. All the functions and actions of animals were regarded by him +as entirely involuntary and mechanical. "That the lamb flees at the +sight of a wolf happens because the rays of light from the body of the +wolf strike the eye of the lamb, and set the muscles in motion by means +of the 'reflex' currents of the animal spirits." + +In the case of human beings, owing to the phenomenon of "consciousness," +Descartes felt compelled to assume a "soul"--a _thinking_ substance in +reciprocal action with the _material_ substance (of the brain). This, +too, is an anticipation of the modern theory of "psycho-physical +parallelism." + +CARTESIANISM.--The ideas of Descartes had considerable influence among +his contemporaries, and Cartesianism, as it was called, became +fashionable in intellectual circles. It developed a tendency towards +free enquiry and independent thought; and it was even more significant +as an atmosphere than as a system of ideas. Though in this respect too, +it was both important and vital; as we have observed, modern mechanical +theories find their parent in Descartes. + +Nor was it only, we may remark, among philosophers and men of science +that Cartesian ideas were popular; they were accepted and elaborated by +the religious thinkers who hoped to harmonise and humanise theology and +science. Pascal, Bossuet and Fenelon, the finest minds in the French +Church, were eager Cartesians.[5] + +This aspect of the matter, i.e. the significance of Cartesianism for +religion, we can for the present postpone. + +RESULTS SO FAR.--Successive breaches in the Scholastic system have now +been noted. Copernicus had introduced a new astronomy, Galileo a new +physics, Descartes (with the help of Harvey) a new physiology, and the +beginnings of a new psychology. + +CONTRIBUTIONS OF HOBBES.--The step that remained was taken by an +Englishman, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who attempted to provide a system +of ethics and a theory of politics upon a purely naturalistic basis. +Hobbes was a particularly energetic thinker. He worked out a psychology +of the feelings, which reduced everything to the impulse of +self-preservation and the instinct for power. Men were induced by these +instincts to agree to certain rules of conduct, for the sake of +expediency. Social life seems essential if men are to live together--the +instinct of self-preservation demands it--and social life in turn +demands certain renunciations: thus fidelity, gratitude, forbearance, +justice, etc., must be practised. + +Thus Hobbes attempted to banish all mysterious or obscure forces from +morality, which was the characteristic and inevitable product of human +nature and human circumstances. This way of looking at things seemed +strange to all, and even revolting to some, of Hobbes' contemporaries. +As the mystical powers of motion which the Scholastics had believed in +were banished by the new physics and the new physiology, so the new +psychology could allow of no mystical faculty which can decide in all +problems of good and evil. + +With Hobbes, then, a naturalistic view of the universe may be said to +have been tolerably complete: it embraces physics, psychology, and +ethics. There still remained, of course, a number of gaps in scientific +knowledge, and consequently any philosophy based thereupon could not yet +be regarded as secure. These gaps, however, as research proceeded and +successive discoveries were made, tended to diminish both in size and +quantity. + +NEWTON.--The seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries were +fruitful in revelations of this kind, and natural knowledge steadily and +even rapidly progressed. And one thinker, who may be regarded as a link +between the seventeenth century and that which succeeded it, may now +claim our attention. + +The name of Newton (1642-1727) is as familiar to Englishmen as that of +Shakespeare, and the discovery by him of the "law of gravitation" is one +of those scraps of information which we acquire, and perhaps fail to +understand, in early childhood. + +Newton's scientific method is a no less important aspect of his work +than its results. The _Principia_, in which he gave his discovery to the +world, is "a model for all scientific investigations which has never +been surpassed." It was, indeed, a brilliant application of the +principle of inferring the unknown from the already known, without any +dogmatic leaps in the dark. The principle with which he began was that +what is true in the narrower spheres of experience (e.g. in the case of +an apple falling) is true also in the wider spheres (e.g. in the +movements of the celestial bodies). He then made a careful mathematical +deduction of what would happen in the case of the planets, assuming that +the laws of falling bodies on the earth were applicable to them also. +And he concluded by showing that what would happen according to +mathematics under this assumption _actually does happen_. The conclusion +follows that the same force, i.e. "attraction," operates in both cases. +It is no wonder that this final and successful operation was performed +by Newton "in a state of excitement so great that he could hardly see +his figures." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS DISCOVERY.--The philosophic importance of the +discovery that the motions of the planets may be explained by the "law +of gravitation" was twofold. In the first place, it now became possible +to understand how the universe held together (a problem which the new +astronomy had not solved); and in the second place, the theory +constituted a large extension of the mechanical view. It demonstrated +that "the physical laws which hold good on the surface of the earth are +valid throughout the universe, so far as we can know anything of it." +Thus the area of existence in which physical law held good was at once +infinitely widened. The mechanical theories of Galileo, Descartes, and +others, not only received confirmation, but became more comprehensive +than before. + +So that Newton may be said to have put the finishing touch upon the +achievements of his predecessors, and to have crowned their labours with +success. And his work has the characteristic of permanency: his +"gravitation formula" has stood the test of time. "It still stands +there," says a careful and authoritative writer, "as almost the only +firmly established mathematical relation, expressive of a property of +all matter, to which the progress of more than two centuries has added +nothing, and from which it has taken nothing away."[6] + +RELIGIOUS COROLLARIES.--It would be a profound mistake to assume that +the creators of the mechanical view, as it has hitherto met us, were +animated by any hostility to religion. Nor did they believe their +theories to involve any disastrous consequences in that sphere. + +The new astronomy of Copernicus had actually been made the basis of a +spiritual view of the universe by the profound genius (both +philosophical and religious) of Giordano Bruno. And the fact that the +ecclesiastical authorities rejected his view need not divest it of +importance or of value in our eyes. Bruno's own faith was not disturbed +by the infidelity of his persecutors. "Ye who pass judgment upon me +feel, maybe, greater fear than I upon whom it is passed," were his last +words to them. Had they _believed_, they need not have been afraid, and +might have been content with the policy of Gamaliel. + +As for Descartes and Hobbes, their notions were no doubt distasteful to +conservative minds (the Jesuits were no friends to either), but +Descartes regarded himself, and would fain have been regarded by others, +as a good Catholic; and Hobbes, theologically, was what in these days we +might call a Liberal Protestant. Cartesianism, as we have seen, came to +be a name for a type of thought which studied to harmonise science and +theology, and one of the most profound religious geniuses of any +age--Pascal, was (as we have seen) a Cartesian. + +As for Newton, his view of the universe was essentially a religious one, +though he did not allow theological speculations to intrude upon his +strictly scientific work. His attitude is indicated by a reply to the +inquiry of a contemporary theologian as to how the movements and +structure of the solar system were to be accounted for. + +"To your query I answer that the motions which the planets now have +could not spring from any natural cause alone.... To compare and adjust +all these things together (i.e. quantities of matter and gravitating +powers, etc.) in so great a variety of bodies, argues the cause to be +not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanism and +geometry."[7] + +Still, the mechanical view contained within it sinister possibilities; +and the instincts of conservative thinkers were not altogether at fault. +The mechanical view in itself need not be hostile to a spiritual and +rational religion (though it is fatal to most forms of superstition); +and yet that view can be used in the interests of anti-religious +prejudice--and, as we shall see, it was so used, and with considerable +effect. + +Meanwhile, however, we shall pass on to consider the work of three +thinkers who are typical of a revolt from what was in danger of becoming +the all-absorbing tyranny of mechanics. This reaction (for so it may be +termed) we shall proceed, in the following chapter, to examine. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REACTIONS + + +A LAW OF THOUGHT.--Whenever a tendency of thought has been vigorously +prosecuted for any length of time, a reaction invariably displays +itself. This rule is illustrated by the history of thought in the +seventeenth century. Mechanical categories, as we have seen, had been +steadily extending themselves for the better part of two centuries, and +with the materialism of Hobbes the process seemed fairly complete. + +Meanwhile, however, human thought began to explore other avenues. Though +reaction from mechanical ways of thinking did not (at any rate, in the +circles with which we are concerned) take the form of an obscurantist +retreat into prejudice or superstition, the results of the new science +and its attendant mechanistic philosophy served as a base for further +explorations. The principles which Descartes and Hobbes had laid down +were criticised by being carried out to their logical conclusions. + +SPINOZA.--The philosopher with whom we shall first concern ourselves was +a Jew of Spanish extraction, living in what was then the freest country +in Europe--Holland. Spinoza (1632-1677) was undoubtedly the greatest +thinker of his own age, which was highly fertile in that respect, and he +still stands as one of the most notable figures in the long history of +European thought. Not only is his outlook comprehensive, and his thought +many-sided, but his standpoint was "detached" to a degree hitherto +unknown. He was untainted, so far as a human being ever can be, by +"anthropomorphism"; he endeavoured to transcend the merely human +outlook. Here is always the dividing line between the great and the +merely mediocre thinker. + +SPINOZA'S METHOD.--Spinoza's philosophical ancestry may be traced back +to Bruno, whose acquaintance we made in a previous chapter, but in whose +company we did not long remain. This highly original mind had already, +by the doctrine of the infinitude and the divinity of nature, shown how +the concept of God and the concept of nature might be closely bound up +together. By similar means, Spinoza hoped to indicate the reality of the +spiritual, without disturbing the mechanical world-conception which the +new science and new philosophy had created between them. He wished +somehow to find God not outside, but _in_ Nature; not in disturbances of +the order of Nature, but _in that order itself_. + +THE TERM NATURE.--It would be a misapprehension to suppose that the +terms "God" and "Nature" are regarded by Spinoza as interchangeable, +though his numerous critics were accustomed to declare that this was the +case. On the contrary, Spinoza, in order to anticipate the +misunderstanding which he saw might arise on this point, reintroduced +into philosophy a pair of terms which the Scholastics had long before +brought into currency, but which had since fallen out of +fashion--_Natura naturans_ and _Natura naturata_. We might perhaps +translate the former of these, "Creative Nature," and the latter, +"Created Nature." _Natura naturans_ is equivalent to "Nature as a +creative power," or "The creative power immanent in Nature." _Natura +naturata_ is equivalent to "Nature as it is when created," or "The +results of the creative power immanent in Nature." And the _Natura +naturans_ is active in the _Natura naturata_ at all points: the creative +power is immanent in creation. As Spinoza puts it in one of his letters: + +"I assert that God is (as it is called) the immanent, not the external +cause of all things. That is to say, I assert with Paul, that in +God all things live and move.... But if any one thinks that the +_Theologico-Political Treatise_ (one of his works) assumes that God +and Nature are one and the same, he is entirely mistaken."[8] + +Thus, for Spinoza, the order of nature, which had seemed to so many of +his contemporaries, from the religious point of view, such a devastating +conception, as leaving no room for the spiritual, was itself only +explicable if interpreted spiritually. + +"Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without +God" (_Ethics_ i. 15) sums up his attitude. All things may be, as the +new science taught, 'determined' but they are determined "by the +necessity of the divine nature" (_Ethics_ i. 29). + +THE "ETHICS."--Spinoza may rightly be termed a man of one book. In his +_Ethics_ is to be found a complete and final expression of his +philosophy. "How boundless," says Goethe of this great book, "is the +disinterestedness conspicuous in every sentence, how exalted the +resignation which submits itself once for all to the great laws of +existence, instead of trying to get through life with the help of +trivial consolations; and what an atmosphere of peace breathes through +the whole!" + +According to its teaching the true happiness and highest activity of men +is to be found in what Spinoza terms "the intellectual love of God." The +phrase seems to have been used to designate that full and clearer +knowledge which is aware that we ourselves and all the conditions of our +life are determined by the infinite Nature, by God Himself, who moves in +us as well as in all things acting upon us. The initiated no longer +regard themselves as single, isolated, impotent beings, but as included +in the divine nature. Themselves and all things are seen under the form +of eternity. This thought is, according to Spinoza, the fruit of the +highest activity of the human mind; this is the _amor intellectualis +dei_; and the supreme good for man. + +His doctrine of immortality is bound up with this intellectual form of +religious mysticism--knowledge of God involves participation in His +immortality: + +"Death is the less harmful the more the mind's knowledge is clear and +distinct, and the more the mind loves God.... The human mind may be of +such a nature that the part of it which we showed to perish with the +body may be of no moment to it in respect to what remains." + +He who is "affected with love towards God" has a mind "of which the +greater part is eternal." Thus the soul achieves its emancipation by +identifying itself with God--who is the object of its knowledge and +love. The path is arduous, and the closing passage of the _Ethics_ +admits this: + +"If the road I have shown is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. +And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found.... But all +excellent things are as difficult as they are rare." + +SPINOZA AND RELIGION.--It is interesting to note that Spinoza, though a +"free-thinking" Jew, adopts towards the fundamental dogma of +Christianity an attitude which approximates to the classical expression +of it in the Fourth Gospel. He held that "God's eternal wisdom, which +reveals itself in all things, and especially in the human mind, has +given a special revelation of itself in Christ." + +Perhaps his ethic, like that of the Stoics, with whom he had so much in +common, was better adapted to satisfy the needs of the philosopher than +of the ordinary man. But, in the seventeenth century, it was the +philosophers and learned men that were in need of a spiritual +interpretation of the universe; common men had theirs already, in the +traditional pietism which philosophers are often too ready to despise. +To Spinoza--and this is one of the many indications of the genuine +profundity of his thought--the simple believers seemed already to be in +possession of too much of the truth for it to be desirable or profitable +for them to indulge in speculation. To the question of his landlady at +the Hague as to whether she could be saved by the religion which she +professed, his reply was that her religion was good, that she should +seek no other, and that she would certainly be saved by it if she led a +quiet and pious life. + +SPINOZA'S PERSONALITY.--The figure of Spinoza stands as one of the most +imposing and attractive in the whole history of philosophy, and his was +an unworldliness, a simplicity, and a humility purely Franciscan. Like +all Jews then, he knew a trade--that of lens grinding--and by this he +was able to live frugally, while he elaborated his thought. He dedicated +his life to the labour of quiet contemplation; nor was he ambitious of +recognition, which indeed generally came to him in the form of abuse. He +did not escape "the exquisite rancour of theological hatred," but it was +his belief, and the conviction inspired his life, that-- + +"Neither riches, nor sensuous enjoyment, nor honours, can be a true good +for man"; but on the contrary, "that the only thing which is able to +fill the mind with ever-new satisfaction is the striving after +knowledge, by means of which the mind is united with that which remains +constant while all else changes." + +"The God-intoxicated," was the name given to Spinoza long afterwards in +Germany. He died (like St. Francis) at forty-five, worn out with the +toil of thought. And it renews one's faith in the perspicacity of +commonplace people to learn that his barber, sending in a bill after the +death of the philosopher, alluded to his late customer as "Mr. Spinoza +of blessed memory." It was left to a contemporary theologian to describe +him as "an unclean and foul atheist." + +LEIBNIZ.--Spinoza had taken over from Descartes and Hobbes their +mechanical and determinist conception of nature, though he gave to it, +as we have seen, an interpretation of his own. His attitude was a blend +of that rationalism and mysticism which were characteristic of so much +seventeenth century thought. A far more complete reaction, however, +displays itself in the system of a contemporary of Spinoza's--Gottfried +Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716); who, when already a youth, had become an +enthusiastic devotee of the new science; the study of Kepler, Galileo +and Descartes caused him to feel as though "transported into a different +world." Though a German by birth, Leibniz lived continuously in France, +and wrote habitually in the language of that country. + +CONTRAST TO SPINOZA.--Spinoza and Leibniz stand as examples of two +distinct methods of eluding the despotism of mechanics--methods which +will meet us again in the course of our survey. Spinoza accepts the +mechanical view as being inevitable and even desirable, but subjects it +to a spiritual interpretation--he regards it as the way in which the +_Natura naturans_ works.[9] Leibniz, on the other hand, viewed existence +from an entirely different standpoint. He was bold enough to reject the +mechanical view altogether; or rather he preferred to regard it as a +convenient abstraction, or a useful formula, which might reflect certain +aspects of reality, but could not do justice to its concrete richness +and complexity. + +A PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALS.--Leibniz's criticism of Descartes and the +mechanical school proceeded along different lines from that of Spinoza, +who, as we have seen, accepted the mechanical view as the basis of his +speculation. + +An axiom of that view was (as we know) the conservation of motion. For +this conservation of _motion_, Leibniz substitutes the conservation of +_force_ as being logically the more fundamental concept. True reality, +according to him, is not _motion_ itself, but the _force which is its +cause_. Force and existence became for him identical terms; to work and +to exist were the same. That force is the true reality, Leibniz +expressed in the language of his time by saying, "Force is substance, +and all substance is force"--a proposition which would not be repudiated +by modern science--and upon this statement his philosophy is built. + +But it was not "force in general" or some "universal force" that was +regarded by him as the final reality: Leibniz was not a forerunner of +Herbert Spencer. Reality for him consisted in _individual centres of +force_--a multitude of individual and independent beings, each with its +own idiosyncrasy, and following its own lines. Existence was, in fact, +for him, _individual_. It was the _individual_ centres of force--not +_general_ principles, universal substances, laws or forces--that make up +reality. + +DOCTRINE OF MONADS.--This view of reality was formulated by Leibniz in +his famous doctrine of "monads." "Monad" was the technical name applied +by him to those absolute individuals which he regarded as constituting +true reality. The word, meaning "unity," was simple and appropriate. And +he declared that the "monad," to be rightly understood, must be regarded +as analogous to our own souls. This principle of analogy was described +by Leibniz as _mon grand principe des choses naturelles_. Thus reality +was interpreted by him not in physical but in psychical terms, or if the +expression be preferred, in terms of personality.[10] + +Of these "monads" there exist, according to this view, infinitely many +degrees. In fact all existence differs only in degree from our own. +Even between mind and matter there is only a quantitative and not a +qualitative gulf. For there are sleeping, dreaming, and more or less +waking monads; and matter is a form of unconscious mind; the monads +which compose material objects being "minds without memory," "momentary +minds." + +Let Leibniz speak for himself:-- + +"Each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, but is also +actually subdivided without end.... Whence it appears that in the +smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living +beings, animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter may be +conceived as like a garden full of plants, or like a pond full of +fishes.... Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead +in the universe...."[11] + +Leibniz may indeed be said to have been the first to outline a theory of +"panpsychism" (as it is termed), according to which there is nothing +that is not, in its degree, alive. As we shall have occasion to observe, +Leibniz was here (as elsewhere) a forerunner of much recent philosophy. + +The significance of the Spinozist and Leibnizian systems of thought, +though regarding existence from such diverse standpoints, was, for +practical purposes the same. Both alike led out, though by different +paths, beyond the mechanical theory of the universe. They, indeed, +represent two types of thought which attempt to reach the same end by +different methods. Their counterparts will meet us again as this history +proceeds. + +PASCAL.--But before passing out from the seventeenth century, one +thinker ought to detain us; for from more than one point of view he was +a notable personality, and of first-rate importance in the history of +religious, as distinct from purely philosophical thought. He was indeed +one of those figures who are distinguished among distinguished men of +all times. + +Blaise Pascal was born in 1623, and was a boy of precocious mathematical +ability. By the age of twelve he is said to have worked out +independently most of the first and second books of Euclid; at sixteen +he wrote a treatise on Conics which attracted the attention of +Descartes; at nineteen he completed a calculating machine--a device that +had never been dreamt of before. At this point it is not surprising to +learn that his health broke down. + +Pascal is not a systematic philosopher; but his acute intellect was +united to an inner restlessness of soul. Neither science nor philosophy +could bring him peace, for his needs were far deeper than any merely +rational systematisation of ideas could satisfy. Some have said of him +that he was fundamentally a sceptic, but one for whom religious faith +was essential; certainly in him were united an acute critical faculty +and an intense religious experience. Perhaps the two are not so +incompatible after all. + +THE "PENSEES."--Pascal is chiefly famous for two works, the _Lettres +Provinciales_ and the _Pensees_. The former is controversial literature, +but yet a classic of the French language: in sum, it is an attack on the +Jesuits; but it need not here detain us, for with theology, as such, we +are not concerned, and still less with ecclesiastical systems. The +_Pensees_ is a collection of fragments, the material for an Apology for +Christianity which was never written. The autograph MS. preserved in +the _Bibliotheque Nationale_ at Paris "is made up of scraps of paper of +all shapes and sizes, written often on both sides ... and dealing with +all sorts of subjects." One is reminded of the mythical scraps of +manuscript from which the genius of Carlyle distilled the philosophy of +the sagacious Teufelsdroech. + +But it is in these detached fragments that Pascal has expressed his +spiritual and intellectual struggles; they contain his philosophy of +life. And, however unsystematic in arrangement, they do reveal a fairly +definite temper and attitude of mind. + +PASCAL'S PHILOSOPHY.--In the first place, the _Thoughts_ voice a +reaction against the "Cartesian intellectualism" which was then the +prevalent tendency in scientific and philosophical circles. "The last +attainment of reason is to recognise that there is an infinity of things +beyond it" might perhaps have been published by Pascal's predecessors. +"To laugh at philosophy is to be a true philosopher" would have seemed +like blasphemy or nonsense to most of his contemporaries, but it was +neither of these. + +Behind sayings of this description lay the strong conviction that mere +logic was incapable of probing the depths of existence. "The heart has +its reasons of which reason knows nothing," is sound psychology, and not +scepticism or obscurantism. Of course it all depends what one means by +"reason." Too many of Pascal's contemporaries applied the word to a more +or less shallow rationalism utterly opposed to a spiritual view of +things, whereas reason properly understood is "the logic of the whole +personality."[12] + +That Pascal was no mere narrow anti-rational obscurantist is evident, +not only from his own extraordinary insight, but from his continual +reiteration of his idea that the essential dignity of man lies in his +thought: + +"All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms, are +not worth the smallest mind, for a mind knows them, and itself, and +bodies know nothing." + +Here lies the true greatness of man. In respect of material bulk he is +nothing, but his thought cannot be measured. "Man is only a reed, the +feeblest reed in nature, _but he is a thinking reed_." The saying has +become famous, and the words that follow are hardly less so; they remove +the overpowering and crushing incubus of man's illimitable material +environment, which, since Copernicus, had weighed upon thinkers like a +nightmare: + +"Were the universe to crush him, man would still be more noble than that +which slays him, because he knows that he dies, and the advantage that +the universe has over him: of this the universe knows nothing. Thus all +man's dignity lies in his thought."[13] + +PASCAL'S PESSIMISM.--It has been said that an unbridgeable gulf lies +between those who believe and those who disbelieve in mankind. It is to +the latter category that Pascal belongs. His faith in the dignity of man +is paradoxically associated with a realisation of his weakness and +imbecility: + +"What a chimera, then, is man! What an oddity, what a monster, what a +chaos, what a subject of contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all +things, senseless earth-worm; depository of truth, cloaca of +uncertainty and error; the glory and the refuse of the universe." + +"We desire truth, and find in ourselves only uncertainty; we seek +happiness, and find only misery and death. We are unable not to wish for +truth and happiness, and incapable either of certainty or felicity." + +In fact, we may say that Pascal was the first, in an age of exaggerated +reverence for logic (the _damnosa hereditas_ of the Scholastic +theologians) to understand that the best arguments for religion are the +facts of human experience, and the conditions of human life. + +"In vain, O men, do ye seek within yourselves the cure for your +troubles! All your knowledge can only teach you that it is not within +yourselves that ye find the true or good!" Here we have the language of +religious experience. The result of Augustine's meditation upon life was +the same: _Inquietum cor nostrum dum requiescat in te._ It is a tongue +that the "psychic man" can never understand; it seems to him +affectation; such language is foreign to the easy optimism of an age of +confidence. Indeed Pascal, though so intensely modern, is a stranger, +and his words often enigmas to our time. + +_Vanitas vanitatum_ is thus the verdict that he passes upon human +experience. "The last act is tragic, however fine the comedy of all the +rest." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF PASCAL.--It is not as a systematic thinker that Pascal +is of importance to the historian of thought. He typifies that more or +less inarticulate and unreasoned revolt which the arrogance and optimism +of a new science or a new philosophy arouse against themselves. He +voices the eternal protest that it is not by bread alone that men live. +As is generally the case with such protests, the pessimism of Pascal +was no doubt exaggerated; but exaggeration is necessary if minds are to +be impressed; and those who feel strongly see only one side of a +question. + +RESULTS.--Thus in the three figures that have passed before us, we see a +threefold protest against that exclusion of the spiritual from the human +view of life. Spinoza, the pantheist, sees God everywhere;[14] Leibniz +finds in every recess of nature the principle of personality; Pascal +finds the only cure for human frailty and misery in religion. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +RISE OF AN ANTI-RELIGIOUS SCIENCE + + +ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.--As we have seen, a mechanical view of the +universe was not felt by thinkers like Descartes or Newton, or even +Hobbes, to involve any consequences that were necessarily hostile to +religion. The new science sometimes might be anti-theological, because +the current theology still seemed too much infected with Scholasticism, +but it was not, in the hands of its most notable exponents, +anti-religious. Science had no quarrel with religion as such, nor even +with a rational type of theology. + +Of course the new views aroused many suspicions, and did not escape +criticism at the hands of Church authorities, both Protestant and +Catholic. And (as we have seen) some early scientists paid very dearly +for their allegiance to the spirit of scientific enquiry; but as time +went on, actual persecution became impossible, morally and practically. +But theologians were never, during the seventeenth century at least, +quite reconciled to a science and a philosophy which seemed to them to +be leading men towards areas quite uninhabitable for religion. But in +spite of suspicions on either side, and the prevalence of some measure +of intolerance, it cannot be said that relations between the scientists +or philosophers and the theologians were very seriously strained until +well on in the eighteenth century. + +ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA.--That this comparatively pacific state of +affairs came to an end was the fault, primarily, at least, neither of +the theologians nor of the scientists. A different atmosphere gradually +began to envelop and to embitter the controversy. Orthodox religion, +especially in Catholic countries, came to be associated with political +reaction, and the most envenomed onslaughts began to be made upon what +seemed to be the chief stronghold of a discredited regime. Especially +was this the case in France, where corrupt political conditions were +aggravated by the intense social misery which they had created. + +Thus France became the cradle of the phenomenon known as +anti-clericalism, which is the product not so much of disbelief in a +creed as of hatred of a system; it was the correlative of a Church in +which religion was extinct, for genuine Catholicism had been rooted out +of France early in the eighteenth century, just as Protestantism had +been drowned in blood a century before.[15] + +SCIENCE POPULARISED.--In two respects France, during the second half of +the eighteenth century, was far in advance of other countries. No other +literature of that age can be compared with the French for the skill and +charm with which scientific views were expressed. There was no lack of +first-rate propagandists. And not only in the popularisation, but in +the systematic teaching of science, France for a long period led the +way.[16] Whereas the history of English or German literature of the +eighteenth century could be written almost without reference to science, +it is with scientific problems that the names of some of the most +brilliant French _litterateurs_ are associated. And whereas in England, +scientific men worked (in spite of the existence of the Royal Society) +more or less in isolation, in France the savants have always been a +brotherhood.[17] + +VOLTAIRE.--One of the most notorious names associated with the type of +propaganda referred to is that of Voltaire (1694-1778). Voltaire's +polemic cannot be described as anti-religious, for he himself was a +theist. It was, rather, political in character. The object of his attack +was the Catholic Church as existing in France in his day, which he +regarded as the chief surviving obstacle to human progress. _Ecrasez +l'infame_ was his motto; and if this seems a trifle fanatical, let us +not forget, as an acute critic has observed, "that what Catholicism was +accomplishing in France in the first half of the eighteenth century was +not anything less momentous than the slow strangling of French +civilisation."[18] + +Voltaire was an industrious and prolific writer (his works are numbered +by scores), but he was also a master of French prose, and he was +universally read. From the point of view of the history of European +thought his importance lies in his popularisation in France of the +Newtonian physics.[19] _Newtonisme_ was a word coined by him, and became +associated with a mechanical view of nature. He also conducted a +vigorous polemic against certain religious notions, then current, but +now out-of-date, and which need not here detain us. Voltaire was an +anti-clerical, but he was not hostile to religion; he was chiefly +regarded as an exponent of English (i.e. progressive) ideas. + +LA METTRIE.--An advance in the materialistic direction was taken, +however, by La Mettrie (1709-1751), who approached the problem from the +side of physiology (he was a physician by profession). His two important +contributions were _Histoire naturelle de l'ame_ (1745), and _L'Homme +Machine_ (1748). The titles are sufficient to indicate the scope of +these works. That of the latter points back to Descartes, who had +applied the mechanical theory to animals only, and not to man. La +Mettrie extended his application to include man. The implications of +this theory did not escape La Mettrie's contemporaries. + +DIDEROT AND HIS ENCYCLOPAEDIA.--A definite period in the history of +thought is certainly marked by the successful attempt on the part of a +group of progressive thinkers, to extend the circle open to scientific +ideas by the publication of an Encyclopaedia which should contain all the +latest knowledge and speculation. The credit for this notable +performance was due to Diderot, who in spite of immense difficulties, +which were aggravated by the ecclesiastical authorities and the +supporters of reaction in general, carried the work through to a +triumphant conclusion. The first volume appeared in 1751. The work was +composed with an eye to current prejudices; the language was guarded, +but the anti-clerical tendency of the whole was by no means obscure. +Diderot, however, did not obtrude in the Encyclopaedia the definitely +anti-religious opinions which he had developed and which are revealed in +his correspondence. + +HOLBACH.--A disciple of the Encyclopaedist--Holbach, a young German +settled in Paris--was bolder than his master, and published, under the +name of a savant who had recently died, a book which became widely +notorious, and has been called the Bible of materialism--the _Systeme de +la Nature_ (1770). Like Voltaire's _Elemens_, and La Mettrie's _L'Homme +Machine_, it was published in Holland. "The book is materialism reduced +to a system. It contains no really new thoughts. Its significance lies +in the energy and indignation with which every spiritualistic and +dualistic view was run to earth on account of its injuriousness both in +practice and in theory,"[20] is the estimate of a distinguished and +impartial writer. + +Rumour gave the credit of its authorship to Diderot, who was so +disturbed by the compliment as hastily to leave Paris for the frontier. +His admiration of it is, however, recorded. After proclaiming his +disgust at the contemporary fashion of "mixing up incredulity and +superstition," he observes that no such fault is to be found in the +_System of Nature_. "The author is not an atheist in one page, and a +deist in another. His philosophy is all of a piece." + +Certainly to those with an appetite for negative dogmatism the work left +nothing to be desired. The following passage indicates the attitude and +method of the author, who, in the matter of style, did not fall short of +the French tradition: + +"If we go back to the beginning, we shall always find that ignorance and +fear have created gods; fancy, enthusiasm or deceit has adorned or +disfigured them; weakness worships them; credulity preserves them in +life; custom regards them, and tyranny supports them in order to make +the blindness of men serve its own ends." + +The philosophy of religion which inspired these sentences may appear to +us sufficiently crude. And indeed an impartial reader will have to +confess that much of this eighteenth century polemic against religion, +however well-intentioned, is singularly wide of the mark. It is all +characterised by an imperfect knowledge of the psychological foundations +of religion, and quite devoid of what is now termed the "historic +sense." The faults of Voltaire and Holbach, however, were those of their +age, which was often short-sighted in its recognition of facts, and +superficial in its reasoning from them. Even Dr. Johnson, who found this +section of contemporary French literature so distasteful, never laid his +finger upon its real weakness; the fundamental fallacies upon which it +rested escaped him. He, like Voltaire and the rest, was a child of the +age. + +PROPAGANDA NOT SCIENCE.--It is very doubtful whether the genuine +scientists, who devoted themselves not to propaganda but to research, +could have been ready to sanction the uses to which their own +discoveries were put. From the exhaustive references of Lange in his +_History of Materialism_ (Engl. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 49-123), it is +evident that "the extreme views of La Mettrie, Diderot, and Holbach +cannot be fathered on any of the great scientists or philosophers, but +were an attempt to supply scientific principles to the solution of +philosophical, ethical, or religious questions, frequently for practical +and political purposes."[21] + +There are certainly risks attached to the popularisation of the results +of scientific research. Theories have to be presented with an appearance +of finality which does not legitimately belong to them, and sometimes in +a somewhat startling aspect, otherwise the reader is left cold, for it +is excitement rather than genuine information that attracts the +majority. As a judicious writer has observed: + +"No ideas lend themselves to such easy, but likewise to such shallow +generalisations as those of science. Once let out of the hand which uses +them in the strict and cautious manner by which alone they lead to +valuable results, they are apt to work mischief. Because the tool is so +sharp, the object to which it is applied seems to be so easily handled. +The correct use of scientific ideas is only learnt by patient training, +and should be governed by the not easily acquired habit of +self-restraint."[22] + +SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS.--Alongside of this rigorous propaganda, which +prepared the way for the upheaval of 1789, genuine scientific progress +was being made, especially in the regions of Astronomy, Botany and +Chemistry. The ideas of Newton were taken up and elaborated by means of +more efficient mathematical processes--especially the theory of +infinitesimals--by the distinguished astronomer, Laplace, in his +_Systeme du Monde_ (1796), and in the successive volumes of his +_Mechanique Celeste_ (1799-1825), which has been called a new +_Principia_. + +Important advances in chemistry are associated with the name of +Lavoisier (1743-1794), who introduced into that science a principle +which has become axiomatic, and which to-day remains the foundation of +all work in the laboratory. To Lavoisier belongs the merit of +introducing what is known as the "quantitative method" into chemistry, +and thus establishing that science upon the exact--that is to say +mathematical--basis, where it now rests and putting exact research in +the place of vague reasoning. His principle was that _in all chemical +combinations and reactions, the total weight of the various ingredients +remains unchanged_; there is (in spite of appearances) neither loss nor +gain of actual matter. "The quantity of matter is the same at the end as +at the beginning of every operation." It was Lavoisier who finally +established the correct theory of combustion; that it consisted in the +combination of a special element called oxygen, with other bodies or +elements. + +THE ATOMIC THEORY.--Lavoisier had opened a door to researches which +naturally led the way to the establishment of the atomic theory of +matter on an experimental, and not merely a theoretical basis. That +theory is indeed nothing more than the elaboration of Lavoisier's own +principle. John Dalton (1766-1844), a Manchester quaker, published in +1810 his _New System of Chemical Philosophy_, where highly important +conclusions are drawn both from Lavoisier's facts and from experimental +results of other chemists. Of these, Dalton gave an account and an +explanation which has ever since been the soul of all chemical +reasoning. This explanation is known as his Atomic theory. + +The two facts of which Dalton's theory is an explanation are as follows. +_First_ (Lavoisier's fact), that the total weight of substances remains +always the same, be they combined in ever so many different ways. +_Second_, that all substances, be they in large or in small quantities, +combine with each other, or separate from each other, in definite and +fixed proportions. The theory of Dalton was that these combinations take +place between independent particles of matter, which are indestructible +and indivisible. These "atoms" of the various elements have definite +weights which are responsible for the proportion in which they are found +to combine. These facts of proportion in combination, or "chemical +affinity," could not be accounted for by the theory which regards matter +as "continuous," but only by the opposite theory that it is "discrete" +(i.e. divided up into particles). + +PHILOSOPHICAL COROLLARIES.--These strictly scientific theories +associated with the name of Laplace, Lavoisier, and Dalton tended to +strengthen in the popular estimation, the philosophical conclusions of +writers like Holbach. The scientists themselves remained "agnostic" with +regard to questions that lay outside their scope: they maintained here +the correct attitude for scientific research. The question put by +Napoleon to Laplace, why he had not introduced the name of God into the +_Mechanique Celeste_, was out of place, and deserved the crushing reply +it received. Scientific research is not concerned with questions of +philosophy. + +Still, it did not escape popular attention that the old pillar of a +mechanistic view of the universe now seemed to be reinforced by another. +The theory of _the conservation of energy_ was now supplemented by that +of the _indestructibility of matter_ (Lavoisier). And to crown all, the +old atomic theory, which Lucretius had made the foundation of his +dogmatic materialism, was now re-established on an experimental basis. + +So far as physical science was concerned, the situation seemed menacing +to a religious view of life. Men felt that they inhabited a world of +indestructible matter, moved by a certain measure of force, unchangeable +and fixed. The prison of determinism and matter was closing around +them. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM + + +AN UNSTEMMED TIDE.--In spite of those important reactions of thought +which we have associated with the name of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Pascal, +the mechanical view had not ceased, as the last chapter has shown us, to +extend itself during the eighteenth century, when it became highly +fashionable in progressive circles. + +COMMON-SENSE PHILOSOPHY.--The strength of this mechanical view lies in +the fact that it stands on the shoulders of a natural science which +itself has its feet firmly planted on the irrefragible rock of +sense-experience. The mechanical view thus rests, in the last resort, +upon the belief (which is held everywhere with confidence by plain men) +that sense-experience is a sound foundation for knowledge. + +The importance of this belief had been recognised by the English +philosopher, Locke (1632-1704), who in his _Essay concerning Human +Understanding_ (1690), lays it down that all human knowledge is based, +ultimately, upon sense-experience. This highly important work had an +immense influence, and, under Locke's tutelage, many thinkers regarded +with suspicion any knowledge which might seem not to be derivable, in +one way or another, from that source. + +As the strength of Samson lay in his unshorn hair, so the strength of +the mechanical theory lay, and still lies, in the acceptance of Locke's +theory of human knowledge, i.e. that it is all derived from the senses. +And the Delilah who can shear away Locke's conclusions, leaves Samson +helpless; mechanical materialism becomes a discredited theory. Hence the +truth of the saying that the problem of knowledge is the preliminary +question for philosophy. + +WEAKNESS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.--Spinoza and Leibniz may be said to +have dispensed with this foundation. Taking the scientific knowledge of +their time for granted, they drew certain conclusions therefrom; but +their results, however imposing, were felt to be the result rather of +speculation than of reason. Such was the more or less unexpressed +estimate of their work. It was undervalued, for both Spinoza and Leibniz +were thinkers of the first calibre; and yet there was some justice in +the charge. By the end of the eighteenth century the days of merely +speculative philosophy were past. + +THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.--The time was ripe for a new metaphysic--for a +fresh step forward in philosophic method. That step was taken by the +celebrated Immanuel Kant, who is the originator of what is known, in the +history of thought, as the Critical Philosophy. + +The word _critical_ signifies a particular method of approaching the +problem of existence, a method which must be contrasted with that of the +_speculative_ philosophy, of which Spinoza and Leibniz are examples. + +The critical philosophy, before attempting (as Spinoza had done) to +tackle the problem of _existence_, first attacked the problem of +_knowledge_. Before asking _What is the truth?_ it put the preliminary +question, _What are the means at man's disposal for reaching the +truth?_ It prefaced all philosophical enquiry by an examination into the +nature and scope of human thought. Such was the preparatory +investigation which was to place metaphysics upon a secure and +scientific foundation. For the new philosophy, the gateway to all sound +knowledge is the reflection of the human mind upon itself. "Know +thyself," is its advice to the inquiring spirit of man. Here, if +anywhere, is to be found the philosopher's stone. + +IMMANUEL KANT.--The celebrated Immanuel Kant was born at Koenigsberg in +1724, and died in his native town in 1804. Between those dates he lived +the industrious and uneventful life of a university professor. The Seven +Years' War and the French Revolution left him undisturbed, though not +unmoved. He was a man of quiet, regular habits, and his fellow-townsmen +would set their clocks by his daily promenade.[23] But the adventurous +originality of his thought serves as a contrast to this peaceful +picture. + +Kant, indeed, laid the foundations of philosophy afresh. With +characteristic insight, he went to the very root problem of all, and +challenged human thought itself. Before we can know anything, we must +first of all demand the credentials of the instrument by which knowledge +is gained. Before asking, _What_ do I know? the preliminary question +should be, _How_ do I know? Otherwise we cannot say whether we are in a +position to give any answer to those ultimate problems, the answers to +which constitute philosophy. + +It is far from easy to present Kant's criticism of knowledge at once +simply and accurately. This philosopher has a not undeserved reputation +for obscurity, and had he written in any other language than German, he +would perhaps have found no readers. + +THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.--It had already been realised by the +predecessors of Kant that what is called "sense-experience" is a less +simple process than it seems, and that our senses cannot be said to +reveal to us any object as it actually _is_. John Locke himself was not +the first to point out that the so-called "secondary qualities" of any +material object (i.e. colour, taste, etc.) are produced just as much by +the person who perceives, as by the object which is perceived. Galileo, +Descartes, and Hobbes, besides others, had been aware of this fact, +which indeed becomes evident to the most superficial analysis of +sense-experience. + +The "primary qualities," i.e. density, extension, etc., continued to be +regarded as subsisting _in_ the objects themselves, and independently of +any perceiving consciousness. But even this view did not prove +permanent, and it was the episcopal philosopher, George Berkeley +(1685-1753) who demonstrated in his _New Theory of Vision_ that not even +_these_ qualities could rightly be regarded as subsisting independently. + +Thus it had already been realised, long before Kant wrote his _Critique +of Pure Reason_ (published, 1781), that our senses are far from +revealing to us things as they _are_; it is only the _appearances_ of +things and not the _things themselves_ that the senses present to us. +Indeed, as is well known, the Scotch philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), +who was a master in the art of raising problems, extended this line of +criticism until it reached to pure scepticism. He put the question, If +all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience, and _if_ +sense-experience only supplies us with appearance and not reality, what +degree of trustworthiness can there be in human knowledge? And he was +not afraid to give the logical answer--None. Hume may thus be said to +have brought things to an impasse. As a matter of fact, what he had done +was to refute Locke's theory of knowledge (i.e. that it is derived +entirely from sense-experience) by means of a _reductio ad absurdum_. + +THE KANTIAN CRITICISM.--Kant says that it was Hume who "awoke him from +his dogmatic slumbers." By this he meant that Hume made him realise that +it was no use indulging in philosophic speculation generally, or +listening to the speculations of others, until "the Problem of +Knowledge" was satisfactorily solved. To this problem Kant applied +himself. And recognising Locke to be the _fons et origo malorum_, he +subjected his theory of human knowledge to a close analysis, and exposed +it as being fallacious. + +Far from sense-experience being responsible for all our knowledge, Kant +proved that important elements of knowledge are quite independent of +sense-experience; especially was this so in the case of certain +mathematical propositions. (Hence the question, How is pure mathematics +possible? was put by Kant at the beginning of his philosophy.) + +But it is neither necessary nor desirable to enter into the arguments by +means of which Kant proved his thesis, which was that the human mind +contains in itself certain principles of knowledge (e.g. the idea of +cause and effect, the ideas of mathematics, and so on) which it does not +owe to sense-experience. + +KANT'S COPERNICAN HYPOTHESIS.--Kant called these principles of +knowledge, _forms of thought_ or _categories_. The name, perhaps, is +irrelevant to our purpose; all that we need to understand is that Kant +turned the tables upon Locke. Locke said that the mind was a _tabula +rasa_ which passively received impressions from outside. Kant said that +the mind is nothing of the kind; it is not passive, but active; it does +not "receive" whatever is offered, it "selects" what it wants; and _it +imposes its own "forms of thought" upon the outside world_. + +Photography had not been invented at the time of this controversy, but +Kant might have said: The mind is not a photographic plate receiving +impressions from without, it rather resembles the lens which impressions +must pass through, and be transformed by, before they can create a +picture. + +Kant had, in fact, by this theory, instituted a revolution. His new +dogma was: _The mind is the mould into which all our knowledge must be +cast; and the constitution of our mind predetermines the shape that our +knowledge takes._ + +Thus Kant had discovered that not only sensuous perception, but rational +understanding also, has its forms and presuppositions. Just as we become +aware of objects only by means of senses which perhaps hide or distort +as much as they reveal; so also our rational knowledge is conditioned by +the nature of our understanding, which dictates to reality the "forms" +under which it can be understood and known. + +MECHANISM UNDERMINED.--How did this affect the mechanical theory? The +connection is obvious. Mechanism is nothing but one of the forms of +thought that the mind imposes on phenomena. Just as Copernicus had +discovered that it is due to our position on the earth that the heavenly +bodies _appear_ to move round us, so Kant had discovered that it is due +to the nature of our senses and understanding that we perceive things in +space and time, and understand them as being mechanically determined. +The space and time, and the mechanical determinism are not in the +things, _but in our minds_. The fact is that we can only grasp things +under these forms. Space, time, mechanical causation are forms and laws, +_not_ of nature, _but of the human intellect_, which is so constituted +as to see things in this way. + +Thus those axioms of science and of mathematics which lie at the base of +all exact knowledge, and which had hitherto been regarded as +_objective_, i.e. as inherent in the nature of things, were shewn by +Kant to be, as a matter of fact, _subjective_, that is (in Kant's own +phrase) "they express the conditions under which alone we are able to +apprehend or understand the object." Thus all knowledge is conditioned +by our nature, by the framework, so to speak, not only of our senses but +of our minds. + +In this way the mechanical view was outflanked; that view certainly +seems to us inevitable and certain, but this is due to the constitution +of our minds; the world seems to us to be determined, just as it seems +blue to a person wearing blue spectacles. But there is no sufficient +reason for supposing that it _is_ either determined or blue. The law of +mechanical causation is an axiom, but it is a subjective axiom. + +APPEARANCE AND REALITY.--This may not seem much of an advance on Hume's +position. Human knowledge still seems precarious, if we assume the mind +to be a kind of dictator which imposes its own laws upon nature. And +Kant indeed frankly admitted that neither our senses nor our reason were +able to reveal to us things as they _are_, but only things as they +_seem_; we grasp _appearance_, not _reality_, and (to use Kant's +phraseology) _phenomena_ not _noumena_. Thus Kant cut away the ground +from under all rationalistic _dogmatism_; he shewed its presumptuous +futility. + +THE PATHWAY TO REALITY.--Kant, however, did not remain satisfied with +the negative results of his critical philosophy, valuable as these were. +Reality, it is true, lies out of range of the human reason, but it is +not entirely inaccessible to us, and scepticism about the ultimate +nature of things is not the necessary corollary of Kant's, as it was of +Hume's, philosophy. + +Kant drew a distinction between the "Theoretical Reason," which his +_Critique of Pure Reason_ had dealt with, and the "Practical Reason," +which he discusses in his _Critique of Practical Reason_ (1788). + +THE "PRACTICAL REASON."--By the "practical reason" Kant meant the moral +consciousness, and the law of the "practical reason" is the moral law, +the fulfilment of which constitutes duty. This law springs neither from +outside authority nor from experience; it is autonomous. And it is upon +the existence of this autonomous moral consciousness that Kant plants +his foothold in his endeavour to find a refuge from the philosophic +agnosticism to which his analysis of the "theoretical reason" had led; +and upon this rock he founded his belief in "God, Freedom, and +Immortality." + +By means of his "practical reason," man gets into touch with that real +world, which his "theoretical reason" is unable to reach. In fact, the +"practical reason" itself (or moral consciousness) is an element in +man's nature which belongs to the _real_, as opposed to the _phenomenal_ +world. For man himself is a citizen of both worlds, and has (so to +speak) a dual nature, a foot on either shore. He is an inhabitant both +of the world of mechanical phenomena, and of the "timeless world of +freedom," which lies altogether outside of all mechanical conceptions. + +KANT AND RELIGION.--"Religion we must seek in ourselves, not outside +ourselves," is a saying of Kant's that gives the clue to his general +attitude. + +It is only in that world which cannot be interpreted mechanically (i.e. +the inner world of freedom of which we never cease to be conscious) that +we may seek, or can hope to find the source of religion. It is not the +spectacle of the mechanically determined world of nature, but the +demands of the moral consciousness that create religion. + +For instance, it is the gulf that yawns between the ideal commands of +the moral law, and the actual possibilities (so poor and meagre) of +fulfilling and satisfying them, that creates, in the view of Kant, the +need of God and immortality. These alone can guarantee the realisation +of the ideal claims of the moral consciousness. + +RELIGIOUS FAITH.--Thus the "practical reason" leads on to convictions +concerning what lies beyond the limits defined by the "theoretical +reason." The nature of the demands of the moral consciousness give us an +insight into the nature of the super-phenomenal (transcendental, +noumenal) world. That world must be of such a kind as to sanction and +guarantee our moral ideals; it must be friendly and not hostile or +indifferent to those ideals which man cherishes, but which his +"phenomenal" experience seems to contradict. Thus we see the truth of +the saying that "The universe as a moral system is the last word of the +Kantian philosophy."[24] + +KANT'S INFLUENCE.--Kant was one of those thinkers who are responsible +for turning the stream of thought into fresh channels. Through his +researches into the nature of human knowledge, he discovered the +conditions upon which it rests, and defined the limits beyond which it +cannot pass. Thus, once for all, he put an end to dogmatism. + +And to Kant also belongs the credit of having established the reality +and validity of _inner_ experience. The rock upon which his philosophy +is built is no external fact or event--nothing in time or space--but the +moral consciousness itself. And thus he restores, as the central +interest of philosophy, the human individual, with all his experiences +of need, of hope, and of insight. Personality is the principle of his +philosophy. In this he is the true successor of the Reformation. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT + + +KANT AND AFTER.--With Kant the hey-day of rationalism terminated. He had +put an end to the superficial psychology upon which it rested. For the +rationalists, the life of the mind had consisted in _intellectual +ideas_; but a more careful analysis indicated the presence of +deeper-lying elements, which had hitherto been disregarded; there +existed other important constituents besides the intellectual. + +Kant's criticism of "pure reason" did much to discredit the old view; +and by founding his philosophy upon the non-intellectual "moral +consciousness," he heightened the prestige of feeling as against reason +(in the narrow and limited sense of that word). + +Thus Kant is not undeservedly called the father of a philosophy which +succeeded him, and which was based upon the idea of the supremacy of +feeling. But, at the same time, that title is more accurate as an +estimate of another philosopher of rather different characteristics. + +ROUSSEAU.--Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a man of unique genius +whose figure occupies a prominent position not only in the annals of +philosophy, but in social, political, and literary history. Even more +than Voltaire was he responsible for sowing seeds of thought which bore +fruit in the events of the Revolution. And indeed, it is as the author +of the notorious _Contrat Social_ that he is most widely known. + +ROUSSEAU'S "SENSIBILITY."--Rousseau was one of those philosophers whose +character is the formative element which gives shape to their doctrines. +His was a profoundly emotional temperament. He left behind him an +invaluable document which lays bare all the psychological sources of his +philosophy. The _Confessions_ reveal to us a man highly sensitive and +morbidly introspective, the slave of unreasoning impulses and passions. +In the eyes of some short-sighted persons, these first-hand revelations +will obscure or cast doubt upon the capacity and genius of the man, for +they do little to prejudice opinion in his favour. + +HE DEFIES THE ZEITGEIST.--Rousseau's profound originality lies in his +having dared to dispute a dogma to which the prestige of an axiom then +attached. He endeavoured to undermine the popular faith in scientific +and philosophic culture. He went right back to Pascal, who, a century +before, had raised the question as to the value of scientific knowledge +for personal life, by proclaiming "The whole of philosophy is not worth +an hour's study." + +Rousseau's first philosophical work was occasioned by the offer of a +prize on the part of a provincial academy for a thesis on the problem +"Whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to +purify manners?" "The question pierced Rousseau's soul like a flash of +lightning." He felt (he tells us) that he saw a new world, and felt a +new man; he saw no longer the world of culture, of science, of +philosophy (which he felt to be as artificial as it was ineffective and +vain), but the _real_ world of personality, of living feeling, of the +inner life. It flashed upon him that it was the primitive and elementary +feelings, the great and simple relations of life, which gave to +existence its value. The rest was superficial and irrelevant. + +ROUSSEAU AND RELIGION.--The intellectualist is ever the aristocrat.[25] +Voltaire and the philosophers of the "enlightenment" spoke of the +unenlightened multitude as _la canaille_. Its beliefs were +superstitions. Rousseau knew that the things which men have in common +are more vital than those in which they differ, and the primitive +instincts of the race which we all share, are the most important part of +our nature. + +Among these primitive instincts, indomitable and irrepressible, is the +instinct of religion. Thus Rousseau transferred the religious problem +from the sphere of external observation and explanation of the world (to +which the rationalists had promoted or degraded it), back to inner +personal feeling. This marked an epoch in the philosophy of religion. + +Moreover, Rousseau was able to write in a convincing fashion of +religion, because (and here he differed from the intellectuals of his +day) he had personal experience of what it meant. Hence wherever he +alludes to religion his language has the ring of sincerity; it is always +spontaneous, and sometimes it is passionate and poetic. His religious +experience took the form of nature-mysticism, undogmatic (because +non-intellectualist), but rich and deep: + +"I can find no more worthy adoration of God than the silent admiration +which the contemplation of His works begets in us, and which cannot be +expressed by any prescribed acts.... In my room I pray seldomer and +more coldly; but the sight of a beautiful landscape moves me, I cannot +tell why. I once read of a certain bishop, who, when visiting in his +diocese, encountered an old woman whose only prayers consisted in a sigh +'Oh!' The bishop said to her, 'Good mother, always pray like that; your +prayer is worth more than ours.' My prayer is of that kind."[26] + +Here we have one form of the religious spirit; for the mystic it is +always true that "there is neither speech nor language." The mystic and +the dogmatist stand at opposite poles, for dogmatism is always an +attempt at definition even when that which is to be defined is +indefinable; and here is to be found the common denominator between Kant +and Rousseau. The former, by his analysis of reason, discredited +dogmatism: the latter, by his apotheosis of feeling, contributed towards +the same result. + +ROMANTICISM IN GERMANY.--This strong movement of feeling, created on the +one hand by Kant's _Critique_, and by the mysticism of Rousseau, took +different forms in the two countries to which these two philosophers +belonged. In France the new philosophy became the hot-bed of +revolutionary ideas; whereas in Germany it found vent in a ferment of +speculative systems, and in an outcrop of artistic production. It +produced the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the prose +and poetry of Goethe and Schiller. + +"It was the age of 'beautiful souls' and of 'noble hearts'; men believed +themselves capable of the highest things; the immediate needs of the +heart were set over against reason ... under many successive forms +Romanticism prevailed in literature, effecting the re-birth of human +fancy after the long labour of intellect."[27] + +THE GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY.--Philosophic young Germany had set itself an +ambitious programme. Kant, indeed, had cleared the ground for them, but +his warnings that an eagle cannot soar beyond the atmosphere which +supports it, were disregarded. + +The philosophy of Kant himself was felt by the successors to be lacking +in the _idea of totality_--in the conception of a whole. His division of +existence into Appearance and Reality seemed to indicate a certain lack +of finish in his philosophy; and they set themselves to explore the root +of reality which to Kant seemed undiscoverable, but in which the +sensuous and super-sensuous worlds are united, and from which they have +emerged. This task became and remained the grand problem of philosophy +for a whole generation of thinkers. All externality, isolation, and +division were to disappear, all existence must be shown to be but +degrees and phases of the one infinite reality. Spinoza's work had to be +done again in the light of increased psychological knowledge. + +FICHTE.--Of the thinkers who addressed themselves to this ambitious +task, only two need be considered here; and these are chosen because +they attacked the problem from different directions. + +In the first place, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), who had been the +first to lay down the programme of thought with explicitness, realised +and admitted that the task which philosophy had set itself was beyond +the powers of any logical train of thought. The "higher unity" of +existence, the demonstration of which was the goal of philosophy, +could be reached only by a process of intellectual intuition,[28] +it must be guessed or divined; for it presents itself (and this is +a characteristically "Romanticist" idea) to the human mind in the +immediacy of feeling, and not by discursive thought. + +It was of the essence of Fichte's philosophy, as it had been of +Spinoza's, that a point may be attained where the mind feels itself to +be at one with the truly real, and only when this point is reached--i.e. +_sub specie aeternitatis_, will it arrive at and retain the conviction +of the universal order and unity of existence. From this standpoint, and +from this alone, does it become possible to grasp "the meaning of those +dualities and contrasts which we find around and in us, the differences +of self and not-self, of mind and matter, of subject and object, of +appearance and reality, of truth and semblance." + +HEGEL.--It has been said, perhaps with justice, that "philosophy is the +finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." The remark +might seem, at least in the eyes of some, to be particularly applicable +to the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Not because +his arguments are bad, but because he attempted to establish by strict +logic the conclusions which Fichte sought to reach by means of +intuition, and which perhaps are only attainable by that method. Hegel +attempted to climb, by a strict process of reasoning, to the position +from which the Fichtean landscape might spread itself below as a +logical whole: he claimed to be a reasoner as well as a seer. And +thereby he may be said to have furnished "the programme of thought for a +certain class of intellects which will never die out." + +Thus Hegel was something of a hybrid, and may be described as a +rationalistic-romanticist. Nor are his arguments the easiest to +understand. "The only thing that is certain," writes a commentator +who stands at an opposite philosophical pole, "is that whatever you +may say of his procedure, some one will accuse you of misunderstanding +it. I make no claim to understanding it; I treat it merely +impressionistically."[29] And this is all we can do here. + +HEGEL'S METHOD.--Hegel proceeds by means of what he calls the +_Dialectical Method_. He understands by "dialectic" (1) a property of +all our _thoughts_ in virtue of which, each particular thought +necessarily passes over into another; and also (2) a property of +_things_, in virtue of which every particular thing necessarily belongs +to, or is related to, all other things. A thing "by itself" is nothing. + +Hence a similarity or parallelism between the _method of thought_ and +the _nature of things_. Logic is of the nature of things. The way in +which thought reaches truth is also the way in which things exist. Hegel +expressed this in his well-known saying "the real is the rational, and +the rational is the real." Perhaps more poetically or obscurely the same +proposition is expressed by declaring: "When we think existence, +existence thinks in us," and "The pulse of existence itself beats in our +thinking." + +Hegel's logic may, in fact, be described as an attempt to conceive the +movement of thought as being at the same time the law of the universe. +Logic (to repeat what we said before) is of the nature of things: +reality is rational, and what is rational is real. + +Thus logic for Hegel did not mean (as it meant for Kant) the forms or +laws of thought: it signified the very core of reality. For all that +Kant knew, reality might or might not be rational: all he asserted was +that the human mind rationalised reality (or parts of it). For Hegel, +logic or reason was the living and moving spirit of the world. The +essence of reality and the essence of thought were one. The absolute +reality was spirit.[30] + +HEGELIANISM.--Hegel's philosophy may be described as an attempt to reach +the standpoint of religious mysticism by means of purely rational +processes. It is the finding of rational grounds for supra-rational +intuitions. The attempt is laudable, and, in the eyes of many, it was +successful. And, as we shall see, Hegelianism had an important future, +especially in England; nor, as a system of thought, is it yet extinct. +Its central conception is that which, in one shape or another, will +never cease to appeal to mankind--that existence is, at bottom, +spiritual in character--that spirit is the only ultimate reality. + +That Hegelianism provides a rational basis for a spiritual religion is +obvious enough; nor is it necessary to indicate the possibilities of +linking up the Christian doctrine of the Logos with a philosophy for +which Reason was the very core and ground of existence. Hegel may indeed +be said to have laid the foundation of Christian theology afresh; or +rather to have restored what was best in the old theology, and given it +the prestige of modernity. + +RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.--In fact, for Hegel as for all rationalists +whose attitude is also religious, religion and philosophy were two forms +of the same thing. Religion contains philosophic truths under the form +of imagination: philosophy contains religious truth under the form of +reason. The difference is one of form only, not of content. This had not +been the view of Rousseau, nor is it the deepest view; and it was not +the view of a thinker of the Romantic school who did more than any +individual among his predecessors to bring the religious problem to the +point where it now stands. + +SCHLEIERMACHER.--While the sun of Romanticism was at its zenith, the +spirit of Kant's critical philosophy was kept alive by a thinker of as +deep spiritual and intellectual insight as Hegel himself. + +Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834) brought the religious +problem down from those altitudes to which Romanticist metaphysics had +raised it, to what Kant had called "the fertile bathos of experience." +He approached religion from the side of inner experience, the point of +view of psychology. The profound insight of Kant had already shown that +this was the direction on which future thought would travel, by tracing +back the religious problem to a _personal need_ more clearly and +penetratingly than ever before--a need set up by the incongruity of the +real and the ideal. + +HIS VIEW OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS.--Just as Rousseau, owing to his own +religious experience, was in a better position to attack the religious +problem than the philosophers of the "enlightenment," so Schleiermacher +had the advantage of some Romanticists. As a boy, he had been put to +school with the Moravians, and throughout his own life he never ceased +to declare that the years spent among them had been of vital importance +to the development of his views. In 1801 he writes: + +"My way of thinking has indeed no other foundation than my own peculiar +character, my inborn mysticism, my education as it has been determined +from within." + +And his own experience of religion established in him the conviction +that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this +alone can bring man into immediate relation to the highest. His +acceptance of Kant's criticism of reason led him to understand that +intellectual concepts, in the religious sphere, (i.e. dogmas) must +always be of secondary importance: _experience_ comes first. And his +profound originality lies just here, and it is just here that +Schleiermacher stands out as the forerunner of the modern view. He it +was who first made it evident that religious ideas derive their validity +from that inner experience which they are an attempt to describe. If a +dogma is an expression of an experience felt by man in his innermost +life, it is a _valid_ dogma, even if philosophic criticism hesitates to +sanction it.[31] + +WHAT IS RELIGION?--The distance of this position from that of the +eighteenth century intellectualism which regarded religion either as a +form of philosophy or of superstition, is obvious. Schleiermacher +attacks two intellectualist prejudices in particular: (1) That according +to which religion is conceived of primarily as a doctrine (either +revealed, or grounded on reason), and (2) That which regards religion as +merely a means towards morality. + +Religion, according to Schleiermacher, has an existence independent of +(though, no doubt, associated with) philosophy, superstition, or +morality. Its essence consists neither in speculation nor in action, but +in a certain type of feeling, of inner experience. Schleiermacher +characterised this particular type of feeling as _a feeling of +dependence_: the immediate consciousness that everything finite exists +in and through the infinite, everything temporal in and through the +eternal. + +That Schleiermacher should have described the specifically religious +feeling in this particular way is comparatively irrelevant so far as our +present purpose is concerned. The point of importance is that he was the +first to recognise the _independence_ of religion, to see in it a +legitimate and natural form of human activity, which exists, not for the +sake of knowledge or of morality, but for its own sake, and on its own +account. + +Here, though Hegel took a different view, Schleiermacher is one in +spirit with the Romantic school; indeed, he may be said to have drawn +the logical conclusions of Romanticism. The independence and originality +of religion is the necessary consequence of a philosophy which set +itself against the unbalanced intellectualism of the "enlightenment." + +The permanent significance of Romanticism lies here: That it discredited +once for all the notion that there is only one road to reality--that of +logic. It is not only philosophy, but religion and art that remove the +veil which hides the supra-sensible world from us. And to close our eyes +to the facts of religious experience, or to attempt to discredit them by +the application of irrelevant terms such as "superstition," is not only +to display ourselves as philistines, but also to forsake the highest +traditions of science--veneration for experience, and the realms of +fact. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +MECHANISM AND LIFE + + +RECAPITULATORY.--We have already observed the mechanical theory, in the +hands of Descartes, expanding itself to cover organisms and the +phenomena of life, and in La Mettrie's _L'Homme Machine_, reducing even +human beings to the status of automata. These theories were, however, +known to be insecurely based upon somewhat hasty generalisations, for, +in point of fact, the science of biology was as yet in its infancy; the +_data_ for a complete vindication of the mechanical position were as yet +wanting. + +ADVANCE OF BIOLOGY.--Biological science, however, during the first half +of the nineteenth century made considerable advances, and research +continually kept bringing to light facts which seemed to substantiate +the brilliant, if premature, hypothesis of Descartes. It will not be +necessary for us to do more than take hasty note of certain important +developments. + +It was in 1828 that the German chemist Whoeler (1800-1882) for the first +time in biological history prepared an organic compound (urea) from +inorganic materials--an achievement universally recognised to be of the +utmost significance. As a distinguished historian of the science of +chemistry puts it: + +"This discovery destroyed the difference which was then considered to +exist between organic and inorganic bodies, viz. that the former could +only be formed under the influence of vegetable or animal vital forces, +whereas the latter could be artificially produced."[32] + +Ten years later another German, Schleider (1804-1881) propounded the +cellular theory of the structure and growth of plants, a theory which +was soon extended to animal organisms by Schwann (1810-1882). The +publication of this famous theory was described by a contemporary as "a +burst of daylight"; it indeed illuminated what had hitherto been buried +in mystery and mythology--the structure and method of growth of plants +and animals. It seemed to render superfluous any form of the old +conception of a "vital force" to explain the phenomena of growth, if it +could now be assumed that the cells automatically absorbed outside +material, increased in number by the division of individuals, and built +up the organism by continual repetition of this process. + +Schwann was also responsible for initiating a number of minute +physiological investigations which led to a far more intimate knowledge +of the action of nerves and muscles, and interpreted these in mechanical +terms. "Investigations which were carried on with all the resources of +modern physics regarding the phenomena of animal movements, gradually +substituted for the miracles of the 'vital forces' a molecular +mechanism, complicated, indeed, and likely to baffle our efforts for a +long time to come, but intelligible, nevertheless, as a mechanism."[33] + +Subsequent researches, notably of Helmholtz (1821-1895) and Meyer, lent +strong support to this interpretation. The conception of the +conservation of energy (an important axiom of the mechanical theory) was +successfully applied by them to the economy of organisms. The organism +was found not to _create_ energy, but only to contain remarkably +efficient means of deriving it from materials absorbed as food. Thus +animal warmth and the power of motion are originally "sunlight +transformed in the organism of the plant," and afterwards appropriated +by the animal. The power with which we move our limbs is as much the +product of combustion as is the power of a steam engine, the only +difference being that the organism is, of the two, the more efficient +converter of energy. + +THE MECHANICAL THEORY SUBSTANTIATED.--Thus, whether biologists were +considering the _structure_ or the _behaviour_ of organisms, they were +arriving at the same conclusions. The structure was revealed as physical +and chemical structure, and the behaviour as the resultant of familiar +physical and chemical processes. Hence biology came to be regarded as a +compartment of physics and chemistry, for life itself was nothing but a +complex physical or chemical phenomenon. Life could thus be +satisfactorily expressed in terms of matter and energy. The speculations +of Descartes seemed to be established by experimental science. + +THE FINAL OBSTACLE.--The situation, already satisfactory to those whose +hope it was to see the mechanical theory impregnably established, was +marred, however, by one untoward circumstance. The phenomena of organic +structure, growth, and behaviour having been reduced to order, and +expressed in terms of physics and chemistry, certain important facts +still resisted explanation, and stood out as a last stronghold of the +older view. + +THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.--The existence of definite forms of animal and +vegetable life, whose infinite variety and complexity was continually +being increased by research[34]--still remained a mystery. How did these +innumerable species naturally and automatically come into being? was the +question that must be satisfactorily answered before the mechanical view +could be held to cover all the facts. + +The direction in which to look for a reply had been indicated by a +number of thinkers. The French naturalist Buffon, the philosopher Kant, +and the poet Goethe--besides other thinkers--had already in the +eighteenth century familiarised the idea that species are not immutable, +but that, by some means or other, new forms of life are derived from +pre-existing ones. The conception had gained a firm foothold in England, +where it was hospitably entertained by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and where it +formed the staple of a book which caused a good deal of controversy in +its day, and which is not yet forgotten.[35] + +LAMARCK.--The evolutionary idea, however, though attractive to +philosophers, and even to men of science, was insufficient as an +explanation of the origin of species so long as the processes of +transformation remained obscure. Naturalists could not accept an +hypothesis for which there seemed to be such imperfect evidence. An +ingenious French scientist, J. Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) had +indeed, in 1809, propounded the theory--ever since known by his +name--that the use or disuse of particular organs might, after a long +series of generations, result in the formation of new species. (The +ideas denoted by the words "environment," "adaptation," "acquired +habits"--now so familiar--may be said to have been introduced by him). +But the scientific prejudices of the time were against Lamarck's +theories, and he had to lament their inhospitable reception. Indeed +Lamarck's critics did not hesitate to exercise their powers of ridicule, +or to make fun of the giraffe who derived his long neck from the +attempts of his ancestors to browse on high trees. Darwin himself talks +of "Lamarck's nonsense," and of his "veritable rubbish"--language, +however, which he was subsequently able to retract. + +THE NEW GEOLOGY.--Perhaps the most stubborn obstacle which Lamarckian +theories had to meet was the current prejudice as to the age (or youth) +of the earth. Contemporary geologists were by no means prepared to grant +Lamarck the illimitable periods of time which his transformation +processes seemed to require. Consequently it is not surprising that the +new theories, perhaps for the first time, received a measure of justice +at the hands of one who himself became responsible for a revolution in +the science of geology. + +"I devoured Lamarck _en voyage_," writes Charles Lyell, describing a +journey from Oxford in 1827. "His theories delighted me more than any +novel I ever read, and much in the same way, for they address themselves +to the imagination.... That the earth is quite as old as he supposes, +has long been my creed."[36] + +In spite of the fascination of these theories, however, Lyell was not +carried away by them, and it was not for some years that he estimated +them at their true value. Meanwhile the new geology made its appearance +with the publication of the three volumes of his own _Principles of +Geology_, between 1829 and 1833. The significance of the book for +biological speculation--for theories of the origin of species--lay in +its thesis that the present condition of the earth is the product of +geological processes incalculably long. Hitherto the "catastrophic +theory" had been dominant--the notion that a series of immense +catastrophic events (like the Deluge) had been responsible for the +present condition of the earth's surface. For this Lyell substituted his +"Evolutionary Theory," according to which the almost invisibly slow +geological processes which we may now see operating around us, are +typical of the behaviour of the crust of this planet for incalculable +periods of time; for even the slowest changes, if sufficient time is +allowed them, are capable of producing the most stupendous results. +Lyell may be said to have extended the age of the earth _ad infinitum_. +Just as Galileo removed all barriers of space, Lyell removed those of +time. Their joint achievement was to present to humanity a universe +infinite both in space and time--a staggering conception. + +RESULTS OF LYELL'S THEORY.--Though Lyell's boldness disturbed a good +many of his contemporaries, those biologists who were engaged upon +seeking the origin of species were thankful to one who had removed the +chief obstacle to the solution of their difficulties. They were now +relieved of one embarrassment: Lyell gave them the power to draw on the +Bank of Time to any extent; bankruptcy was no longer possible.[37] + +Indeed, Lyell seems himself to have been convinced of the evolutionary +origin of species (though the mode of its operation still remained a +mystery for him no less than for the biologists themselves). In fact, it +became quite evident that the idea of "continuity" which the _Principles +of Geology_ had established in the inorganic world, must be equally +applicable to the organic world. + +DARWIN.--The theory of a common descent of species had occurred, as +early as 1837, to an enthusiastic student of Lyell's writings, who was +also a personal friend. Charles Darwin had collected much geological, +botanical, and zoological matter on his voyage with the _Beagle_ round +the world, and continued for twenty years to accumulate an immense +volume of _data_ to substantiate a theory which had first suddenly +suggested itself to him in 1838 as the result of reading for amusement +Malthus' _Essay on the Principle of Population_. + +This celebrated book, first published in 1798, had attempted to describe +the forces which ensure the multiplication, or check the increase of +population. The proposition laid down by Malthus was that population +tends to vary with the means of subsistence. He had studied his problem +from a social or political point of view, but the same principle was +seen by Darwin to apply to all living creatures. Two forces are seen +everywhere in conflict: (a) the luxuriant powers of reproduction +possessed by and exercised by each species; (b) the difficulties and +obstacles by which the species tend to be eliminated. The contest +between the powers of reproduction and those of elimination--this +"over-production" and "crowding-out"--is what was afterwards termed the +"struggle for existence." + +"NATURAL SELECTION."--Darwin's momentous theory was that this struggle, +proceeding for untold ages, had resulted in the continual formation of +new species. Granted that the numerous offspring of any individual +member of a species tend to vary, those variations survive which happen +to be best fitted to cope with the environment. These in their turn +leave offspring, the variations and the selections are repeated, and so +on _ad infinitum_; and the result is that entirely new species are +formed by a long process of insignificant changes. This, briefly put, is +the celebrated theory of "Natural Selection." + +The habit of scientific caution was characteristic of Darwin, who at +first would not write down "even the briefest sketch" of his hypothesis, +but devoted nearly twenty years to the accumulation of evidential +_data_. His friends continually warned him that he would be forestalled, +and this actually occurred, as is well known, in 1858, when the book +which was to give the new theory to the world was already half written. +The naturalist, Alfred Russell Wallace, on a collecting expedition in +the East Indies, "in a flash of insight" while sick with fever, found +the same solution of the mystery that had puzzled biologists so long. +Wallace's letter to Darwin, containing the abstract of his theory, came +"like a bolt from the blue." + +The behaviour of the two men was worthy of the highest traditions of +scientific research. The matter was put into the hands of Lyell, and +Wallace's paper, together with certain extracts from Darwin's +unpublished notes, were read before the Linnean Society, and the +preparation of Darwin's book was hurried on. In November, 1859, _The +Origin of Species_ was published. + +RESULTS OF DARWIN'S THEORY.--The importance (for the general trend of +thought) of this joint achievement of Darwin and Wallace was +considerable, and could not but be regarded as an extension of the +mechanical theory. The origin of species might still to some extent +remain mysterious (for "natural selection" was soon realised to be only +one of many factors at work in evolution), yet the area of mystery was +patently reduced, and the "inexplicable" driven further back. A formula +had been provided, which seemed to be as valid, and likely to prove as +permanent and fruitful in biological research as Newton's law of gravity +had been in the realm of physics. + +In point of fact, Darwin had only substituted new problems of +"variation" and "heredity" for the old one of the diversity of species; +but an impression was created by the new discoveries that a purely +mechanical explanation of the origin of life and even of mind was within +reach. + +THE DESCENT OF MAN.--With regard to "mind," the impression was +re-inforced by Darwin's next book--the _Descent of Man_, where the gap +between man and the animals was finally bridged. The work was merely an +extension of the principles previously applied by him, and as a theory +it had been present to Darwin's mind as far back as 1837. As soon as he +had become "convinced that species were mutable productions," he could +not "avoid the belief that man must come under the same law."[38] +Indeed the Descent was nothing more than a corollary to the _Origin +of Species_. The earlier work contains the whole of Darwinism. + +THE POSITION REACHED.--And with the full publication of Darwin's +theories a point was reached when a more or less consistently +materialistic position seemed possible. The foundations of such a +position had been strengthened by the scientific atomism of Dalton, and +the results of German research in the field of _organic_ chemistry +seemed to open up possibilities of expressing even life in terms of +matter. And, finally, the evolutionary hypothesis had reduced some of +the most obscure biological problems to manageable proportions. The +prospects for a purely naturalistic philosophy were phenomenally +bright. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +MATERIALISM AND AGNOSTICISM + + +FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY.--The record of certain important scientific +discoveries has occupied us in two recent chapters, and it is now time +to examine the philosophic results that were drawn from them. It is true +that the generalisations drawn from the results of scientific research +were sometimes hasty, and not always sanctioned by the gifted minds to +whom these results were due; yet they were assured a popular reception, +and exercised an immense influence. It is not always the most accurate +thinkers whose ideas gain the widest currency. + +DISCREDIT OF ROMANTICISM.--The Idealistic movement in philosophy which +we have seen flourishing in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth +century, had begun, after the lapse of a generation, to decline.[39] The +causes of decline, as often happens, were in part, at least, other than +intellectual. Hegelianism had become associated with political reaction, +and "a philosophy has lost its charm when it enters the service of +absolutism." And a rising spirit of enterprise in commerce and industry +also contributed to a change of attitude, for as material interests +develop, men have less leisure for speculation, and often lose their +taste for ideals. Probably there should also be taken into account the +sentimentality that had attached itself to Romanticism and with which +men were sated. This revolt has its most pointed expression in the prose +writings of the poet Heine, who attacks with satiric bitterness "the new +troubadours, so morbid and somnambulistic, so high-flown and +aristocratic, and altogether so unnatural." + +METAPHYSICS REJECTED.--The reaction against the philosophy of +Romanticism took the form of a complete revolt against speculative +philosophy. But instead of going back to Kant, and taking up a +vigorously critical attitude, it took refuge in the prejudices of +"common sense." The new movement must be associated in the first place +with a French thinker, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who made the attempt +to substitute scientific and _positive_ knowledge for the vague +speculations which had hitherto passed for philosophy. He was, in fact, +the founder of that system of ideas known as Positivism, which (as we +shall see) gained great vogue later, especially in England. Comte's +doctrine was that, all spheres of Nature now being brought under the +sway of positive science, the time had arrived for men, when +constructing their conceptions of life and the world, to reject all but +such ideas as positive science can accept. The age of theology and +speculation was past; the new age of positive science, where both +imagination and argumentation should be subordinate to observation, was +at hand. Comte, as is well known, became the founder of what he hoped +might develop into a new Catholicism--the "Religion of Humanity," and an +atmosphere of moral idealism permeates his thought. + +GERMAN EXTREMISTS.--In Germany, the home of Romanticism, the revolt took +a radical shape in the hands of writers like Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) +and Buechner. "I unconditionally repudiate absolute, self-sufficing +speculation--speculation which draws its material from within," says the +former, in the Introduction to his _Essence of Christianity_[40] (1841) +and asserts that he "places philosophy in the negation of philosophy." +Buechner, a far less acute thinker than Feuerbach, adopts a similar +attitude, protests against pedantry, and appeals (the appeal is always +dangerous) to common sense: + +"Expositions which are not intelligible to an educated man are scarcely +worth the ink they are printed with. Whatever is clearly conceived can +be clearly expressed." + +It is not surprising that the book _Force and Matter_ (1855)--in the +preface to which these sentiments are expressed--went through sixteen +editions in thirty years and was translated into most European +languages. It is an extreme expression of the most thorough-going +materialism, and the circumstance that its conclusions were acceptable +neither to cautious scientists nor to critical philosophers, did not +compromise its authority with the general public. As was only natural, +for materialism is a creed for which the evidence is all on the surface, +and to which the objections, being less obvious, escape notice. And +Buechner's pleas for intelligibility and clearness, though in some sense +justified by the inconceivable pedantry of much German metaphysics, was, +in point of fact, only a form of cant; for "there are difficulties +lying in the subject-matter itself which cannot be banished from the +sphere of philosophy." Appeals to popular prejudices are not a more +legitimate form of philosophic, than of scientific controversy; serious +thinkers do not thus stoop to the expedients of the politician. + +EFFECTS OF DARWIN'S THEORY.--It would be a serious mistake, then, to +imagine that materialistic naturalism had to wait for the publication of +the _Origin of Species_ (1859) before it could become a formidable +theory. And yet the appearance of Darwin's book had important effects, +and among these is to be reckoned a certain weakening of the old +"Argument from Design," according to which the complexity and delicacy +evident everywhere in the world of nature, could not be attributed to +chance, but pointed to the existence and activity of a divine Designer. +Paley, during the eighteenth century, had elaborated the argument with a +wealth of detailed instances of "contrivance": + +"The pivot upon which the head turns, the ligament within the socket of +the hip-joint, the pulley or trochlear muscles of the eye; the +epiglottis, the bandages which tie down the tendons of the wrist and +instep," and so on. + +And it was not so much the doubt cast by it upon the separate creation +of particular species that was the disturbing element in Darwin's +hypothesis (few men now regarded the book of _Genesis_ as a manual of +natural science, or faith in it, as such, as a matter of religious +obligation); it was rather that the new doctrine of "natural selection" +seemed to invalidate the "argument from design." Design or chance had +been the alternatives offered by Paley, and chance only had to be +mentioned to be rejected; but Darwin made it possible to escape from the +dilemma. He showed how, if certain conditions were granted, the whole +process of the manufacture of species would naturally and inevitably +follow. Neither design nor chance was the explanation: there was another +alternative, _the influence of environment_. Thus Paley's instances of +elaborate "contrivance" were explained by Darwin as instances of +adaptation. The environment under which these organs had developed had +made them what they were; they could not, under the given circumstances, +have been different. As a very lucid writer puts it: + +"Before Darwin's great discovery, those who denied the existence of a +Contriver were hard put to it to explain the appearance of contrivance. +Darwin, within certain limits and on certain suppositions, provided an +explanation. He showed how the most complicated and purposeful organs, +if only they were useful to the species, might gradually arise out of +random variations, continuously weeded by an unthinking process of +elimination."[41] + +DARWINISM EXPLOITED.--In fact, it became evident that popular +materialism had been strongly reinforced by the new biology; and though +Darwin himself was cautious in adding philosophic or religious +corollaries to his own propositions, some of his more eager disciples +did not hesitate to fill in his blanks, and to draw conclusions which +the master was too conservative, too blind, or perhaps too scientific to +sanction. + +The distinguished zoologist Haeckel (1834-1919) may be reckoned the most +notable amongst these. He was one of the first German scientists to give +his adherence to Darwin, who seems to have considered him too zealous a +disciple. "Your boldness sometimes makes me tremble," he wrote (November +19, 1868). It is not every scientist who can perceive the limits of an +hypothesis, or who insists so conscientiously as Darwin did, upon the +necessity for its verification. + +HERBERT SPENCER.--Though there were not wanting in England writers to +exploit Darwinian theories in the interests of a narrow secularism, +their work was not of first-rate importance, and need not detain us. A +new evolutionary philosophy was, however, worked out by a conscientious +thinker of a different calibre--Mr. Herbert Spencer. He indeed may be +described as the Aristotle of a new world-view. He attempted to +co-ordinate and unify all human knowledge, and to present the world with +a final philosophy based upon the _data_ supplied by natural science. To +this ambitious task he devoted a lifetime of patient work, broken by +intervals of ill-health. In 1850 the _System of Synthetic Philosophy_ +was projected; its _First Principles_ were published in 1862, but it was +not until 1896 that the gigantic enterprise was complete. + +Spencer was inspired neither by hostility to religion in general, nor to +Christianity in particular. The motive of his work was a more honourable +one. He felt, with many of his contemporaries, that the foundations of +the old religion were no longer secure, and that the old sanctions of +morality were already gravely compromised; and he wished to supply a new +creed and a new discipline in the place of these. His principal objects +were social and ethical. And in this important respect he may be +associated with Comte. Both were sociologists and moralists before they +were philosophers, which accounts for their overlooking and +underestimating various important philosophic difficulties. + +A few remarks about Spencer's system are here not out of place. He +attempted to reduce experience to a unity by seeking evidence for the +existence of a single and universal _law_. This unifying principle he +found in a general law of evolution. He formulated this law in language +which is perhaps less obscure than it seems, and which practically +amounts to this, that there is a perpetual process going on which +reduces disorder to order, undifferentiated sameness to specialised +variety.[42] + +The _First Principles_ was published before the _Origin of Species_, and +the confirmation which Darwin's work supplied to Spencer's theory must +have recommended the latter to the minds of scientifically trained +thinkers. Moreover, Spencer sanctioned a hopeful outlook; evolutionary +optimism was an attractive and an idealistic, as well as a reasonable +philosophy. It demanded the subordination of the individual to society, +it urged the necessity of self-discipline and of industry, and pointed +(if these conditions were fulfilled) to a brighter future, and to a new +humanity. The generous idealism of the following passage is +characteristic of Spencer's outlook, and of those who thought--and +hoped--with him; it occurs at the end of his _Principles of Ethics_: + +"The highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share--even +though an utterly inappreciable and unknown share--in 'the making of +Man.'... As time goes on, there will be more and more of those whose +unselfish end will be the further evolution of Humanity. While +contemplating from the heights of thought that far-off life of the race +never to be enjoyed by them, but only by a remote posterity, they will +feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance +towards it." + +Spencer, then, evidently deserves the important place that he occupies +in the history of thought. For though he was forced, for lack of those +final scientific results which he vainly hoped might soon be +forthcoming, to leave some vital gaps in his scheme,[43] he had made an +imposing attempt to systematise and unify all human experience. And his +attempt to base an idealistic morality upon sure grounds of natural +science was valuable and important. + +SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--At the same time, Spencer could not +remain satisfied with a mere _description_ of natural phenomena, however +complete and comprehensive such description might seem; he desired to +offer, besides this, an _explanation_ of these phenomena--how did they +come to be, and how do they continue to exist? To provide this +explanation, Spencer postulated the existence of an Unknown Power which +is at once the origin and the sustaining ground of everything. This +power he regarded as lying quite out of range not only of the human +senses, but of the human intellect. It was not only unknown but +_unknowable_. This celebrated doctrine of the Unknowable is not the +least interesting or important part of Spencer's system, and it is +perhaps more germane than any other speculation of his to our present +subject, as this _terra incognita_ was allotted by him to religion as +its peculiar province. He hoped that the undisputed possession and +occupation by religion of this territory might put an end to its +perpetual conflict with science, and substitute for this a reasonable, +if not cordial, understanding. Science might contentedly appropriate the +sphere of the knowable, and leave to religion the undefined and perhaps +infinite area of the unknowable; and he hoped this division of labour +would be both fruitful and permanent. + +THE VICTORIAN AGNOSTICS.--Through this doctrine of the Unknowable, +Herbert Spencer was the father of that form of belief or disbelief which +was pertinently named Agnosticism by the most celebrated of its +exponents--Huxley. This combination of Positivism in science with +Agnosticism in religion and philosophy, became highly popular in a wide +circle in England during the last third of the nineteenth century, +especially among the scientifically educated. Leslie Stephen, with the +pride of a disciple and the pardonable zeal of a propagandist, claimed +for it the distinction of being "the religion of all sensible men." + +This austere faith owed much to the qualities of those who preached it. +Their wide culture, their power of literary expression,[44] their +intellectual vigour, and above all their moral earnestness and social +enthusiasm recommended what had otherwise seemed a barren and +unpromising creed. The generous humanitarian sympathies of Comte +supplied the idealistic elements without which no faith can become +popular, and the apparent stability of its scientific basis seemed to +those impatient of speculative doubt, a great rock in a desert of +shifting sand. This new scientific Humanism had an immense vogue, and +its effects upon national life were, on the whole, of a quite healthy +character. Occasional lapses into intolerance, no doubt, occurred; but +much may be excused in the self-confidence of a new faith, not yet +tested by the experiences and the criticisms of years. + +THEOLOGICAL POLEMICS.--The attacks of orthodox apologists upon this new +orientation, though carried through with the best intentions, were too +often conducted on mistaken lines and certainly on too narrow a front. A +particular theory of scriptural inspiration (now widely abandoned), and +of the miraculous, seemed to obsess the controversialists. Nor were the +Agnostics (it must be confessed) any more alive to the real issues. +Hence, to the modern student, an oppressive atmosphere of deadness and +sterility seems to brood over these vigorous but superannuated polemics; +and hence the complete oblivion into which this literature has fallen. +The saying is profoundly true that "nothing so quickly waxes old as +apologetics." Even the contributions to the subject by so accomplished a +journalist as Huxley--his _Essays on Science and Christian +Tradition_--can only be read by those whom an almost Teutonic industry +characterises. Once so eagerly perused and earnestly pondered, the +controversial literature of this interesting epoch (which now seems so +remote) reposes on the higher shelves of libraries, accumulating the +peaceful dust of oblivion. These projectiles have, in fact, done their +work, and if they have proved less fatal than was hoped by those who +launched them, they were dispatched with good intentions, and their +explosion cleared the air. + +The most effective method of attack would have been to suggest that what +was good in the new system was as old as Christianity, and that the rest +was disputable science and still more disputable philosophy. The latter +half of this task was, as we shall subsequently find, creditably +performed by an important school of critical thinkers. But its former +half, i.e. the task of proving that what was valuable in the new +Humanism, was Christian--might, one would suppose, have been more +successfully performed by the official champions of orthodoxy. These +might have left science to the scientists, to have left off advertising +their own incompetence in that sphere by passages of arms such as took +place between Bishop Wilberforce and Huxley at the Oxford meeting of the +British Association in 1860, which are never very desirable, and always +discreditable to the discomfited party.[45] + +ILLOGICALITY OF NATURALISTIC IDEALISM.--In point of fact, "the religion +of all sensible men" (in spite of its philosophic weakness) was +equivalent to Christian stoicism; its social enthusiasm, its +humanitarianism, its conscientious truthfulness, were the fruit of a +stock grown on Christian soil. Its ethical presuppositions were entirely +Christian, nor were they sanctioned (in spite of Herbert Spencer's +elaborate apologetic) by the new biology. Nietzsche was a far more +legitimate child of Darwinism than was Huxley. Indeed, towards the close +of his life, some doubts invaded the mind of the latter, and he was +constrained by an intellectual sincerity which does him and his school +the highest credit, to utter a word of warning. We refer to his famous +_Romanes Lecture_ of 1894. + +The thesis of this important utterance was that the field of human +interests is a narrow heritage carved out from a hostile environment +into which it is destined one day to relapse. It is a cultivated garden +with the wilderness all around; created only at the cost of infinite +sacrifice and perpetual toil, and preserved only with difficulty. The +implacable jungle seeks everywhere to encroach on the borders of the +clearing, whose ultimate engulfment can only be postponed, not +prevented. Two quotations may suffice: + +"Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society +depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away +from it, but in combating it." + +"The theory of evolution encourages no millennial expectations. If, for +millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, sometime, +the summit will be reached, and the downward route will be commenced. +The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that +the power and intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the +great year."[46] + +PESSIMISM.--Coming, as it did, at the end of a generation of dogmatic +optimism, this pronouncement is symptomatic of a certain disillusionment +which had already begun to mar the fair picture of Positivist prophecy. +The human race seemed destined to an ambiguous future; the parabola of +progress would one day reach its summit, and the fall begin. At last +upon our planet the episode of Life would pass, and be neither forgotten +nor remembered; the world would sink into the eternal silence, from +which for one transitory and insignificant moment, it had awakened.[47] + +NIETZSCHE.--As might have been expected, it was in Germany that the +logical conclusions of a naturalistic outlook were drawn. Here, +philosophic pessimism had already been introduced by Schopenhauer +(1788-1860), and his disciple Nietzsche was not afraid to formulate a +scheme of ethics based on the conception of "the survival of the +fittest," and equivalent to an apotheosis of barbarism. The virtues of +self-assertion, ruthlessness, and pride were to eradicate the vices of +abnegation, pity, and humility. Christian morality was a disease; +Christianity itself was the appropriate product of the degenerate epoch, +and of the loathsome environment that gave it birth. This radical +thinker, free from English "compromise," could be satisfied with no +morality which was parasitic upon Christianity. He had clearness of +vision to see whither the naturalistic road would carry its pious +wayfarers. To him the moral idealism of Spencer was moonshine or +stupidity--"the milk of pious sentiment." + +SIGNIFICANCE OF NIETZSCHE.--Nietzsche has come in for a fair share of +abuse, but it is only just to say that philosophy stands heavily +endebted to this thinker. He was not afraid to draw logical +conclusions, and to put questions which more conventional philosophers +had preferred should remain in the background. + +It is well for a moralist to arise, once in a generation, who will clear +his own mind of cant and, without undue respect for the conventions, +approach the really fundamental questions in a spirit of sincerity. The +extravagant impieties of Nietzsche may have shocked his hearers, but +they have cleared the air. He exposed, perhaps with too little +_finesse_, the nakedness of Naturalism, and tore off that mantle of +idealism under which it had been masquerading. And he may be said, by so +doing, to have written _finis_ at the foot of a chapter in the history +of philosophy. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +REACTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY + + +VICISSITUDES OF IDEALISM.--At the beginning of the last chapter we +noticed the early collapse of idealism in Germany. But the prophets +of Romanticism, when they were no longer honoured at home, found an +hospitable reception elsewhere, and especially in England. Indeed, +even before the prestige of idealism had begun to decline in Germany, +Englishmen had been introduced to it by the writings and translations +of S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). These +two popularisers of German ideas were _litterateurs_ rather than +professional philosophers, but for that very reason their vogue and +influence were the wider. + +COLERIDGE.--Coleridge was in spirit a genuine Romanticist; being, as +were some of the most notable of the German school--e.g., Goethe and +Schiller--a poet as well as a philosopher. In his _Biographia Literaria_ +he has left behind the story of his intellectual and spiritual +development. He acknowledges his debt to Kant, to the Romanticists, and +in particular to Schelling, whose "intuitionism" was naturally congenial +to him. Coleridge was never able to embody his philosophical creed in +any single work; he does not seem to have possessed the necessary power +of application. He was unfortunate in being a man of weak character, +and his ineffectiveness struck his contemporaries. But in spite of these +disadvantages--his sentimentality, the lack of clearness of his thought, +his weakness for opium--he certainly exercised an important influence, +especially in the realm of theology. His ideas, though vague, were +calculated to awaken the speculative habit, and, introduced as they +were, to a wide circle, were fruitful and stimulating. English theology +had been, in the eighteenth century, of an arid kind, and the English +philosophical tradition lacked, for the most part, appreciation of those +deeper aspects of reality which had appealed to German thinkers. +Coleridge, by introducing German speculation to his countrymen, was able +"to free theology of some of its narrowness, and to deepen and enlarge +the spiritual outlook of his age."[48] + +THOMAS CARLYLE.--Carlyle was a man of a very different temper, whose +attitude towards Coleridge was "half contemptuous, half compassionate." +A typically Carlylean characterisation of him may be found in the _Life +of Sterling_: + +"He was thought to hold--he alone in England--the key of German and +other Transcendentalisms.... A sublime man, who alone in those dark days +escaped from black materialisms and revolutionary deluges with God, +Freedom, Immortality, still his. The practical intellects of the world +did not much heed him, or carelessly reckoned him a metaphysical +dreamer; but to the rising spirits of the young generation he sat there +as a kind of Magus, girt in mystery and enigma...." + +"The good man ... gave you the idea of a life that had been full of +sufferings ... the deep eyes, of a light hazel, were as full of sorrow +as inspiration; confused pain looked mildly from them, as in a kind of +mild astonishment. The whole figure and air, good and amiable otherwise, +might be called flabby and irresolute; expressive of weakness under +possibility of strength.... He spoke as if preaching--preaching +earnestly and hopelessly the weightiest things." + +Carlyle himself had all the character and industry that Coleridge +lacked, and it was another side of German idealism that had appealed to +him. The Scotchman was of the same fibre and stock as that other +half-Scotchman, Kant. Here was the source from which he had drawn his +inspiration. We see in Carlyle the same moral earnestness, the same +"toughness" of thought, the same absence of "sentimental moonshine." +From Kant, too, he derives a vigorous independence of thought, a +religious respect for individuality, a horror of shams and affectation. +Kant was a true child of the Reformation, and Carlyle is a genuine +disciple. + +In a single important respect, however, he differed from (and improved +upon) his master. Kant lacked, or at least did not display, the saving +grace of humour; in Carlyle this quality looks out from every +page--keen, satirical, sometimes bitter, sometimes grotesque; he +ridiculed his own generation, its vices, its prejudices, its +superstitions. + +SARTOR RESARTUS.--For our purpose, _Sartor Resartus_--that profound and +humorous book--is Carlyle's masterpiece: here all the characteristic +Kantian doctrines may be found. + +The "philosophy of clothes"--which is the quaint title behind which +Kantian idealism is made to masquerade--starts from the thought that +just as an acquaintance with his clothes will not reveal to us the man, +so an acquaintance with _phenomena_ (which is all that science can claim +to give us) cannot reveal to us the real ground of existence, which +remains an inscrutable mystery. We must "look on clothes till they +become transparent," if we could understand reality. + +"To the eye of vulgar Logic what is man? An omnivorous biped that wears +breeches. To the eye of pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and +divine Apparition." + +And so with Nature; to science it is a mechanism, to the understanding +heart it is "the living garment of God." + +"It is written, the Heavens and the Earth shall fade away like a +Vesture; which indeed they are: the Time-Vesture of the Eternal.... The +whole External Universe and what it holds is but Clothing...." + +The visible world is but a symbol of a profound and awful reality; and +all Nature's products, in their degree, symbols as well: but of these, +man is the highest. "The true SHEKINAH is Man: where else is the GOD'S +PRESENCE manifested, not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our +fellow-man?" + +This leads up to the essential doctrine of the Kantian system: that man +is a creature of two worlds, who has a foot in either; hence in the +phenomenal world he can never find satisfaction. + +"Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because +there is an infinite in him, which, with all his cunning, he cannot +quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and +Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in +jointstock company, to make one Shoeblack Happy? They cannot accomplish +it, above an hour or two, for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other +than his Stomach...." + +"There is in man a HIGHER than Love of happiness: he can do without +happiness and instead thereof find Blessedness! has it not been to +preach forth this same HIGHER that sages and martyrs ... have spoken and +suffered; bearing testimony to the God-like that is in man?" + +CARLYLE'S INFLUENCE.--In spite of Carlyle's strange literary mannerisms +and his grotesquely Germanic phrases, his writings had great +attractiveness for those of his contemporaries who felt themselves +smothered by the materialism and utilitarianism of early Victorian +England. He was able to re-vitalise idealism amongst them. Moreover he +appealed strongly to those to whom the Coleridgean speculations were +uncongenial. The strongly developed _moral_ element, both in his +writings and in his own somewhat stern and austere personality--what +Taine called his "puritanism"--appealed strongly to a certain side of +English feeling. His countrymen felt that his was a native genius that +they could understand. In fact we may say that the influence of Carlyle, +especially among the young and generous minded, has been incalculable in +extent and invaluable in quality. Spiritual life in England stands under +a deep obligation to him. + +ROMANTICISM AT OXFORD.--Englishmen were thus not entire strangers to +German idealism, which had possessed its interpreters in the earlier +half of the nineteenth century. Not, however, until it had experienced a +decline in Germany (a reaction which occupied our attention in the last +chapter), did Romanticism become naturalised in England by being +adopted in academic circles. + +Among the most notable of English idealists was T. H. Green--fellow and +tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. In this thinker we have a widely +different type of mind from that of either Coleridge or Carlyle. He was +a thinker rather than a poet or a prophet, and he belonged to what we +have noticed as the intellectualist--i.e. Hegelian--wing of Romanticism. + +Green's chief work was his _Prolegomena to Ethics_ (published +posthumously in 1883), where arguments, which were familiar to those +acquainted with Hegel, presented themselves. Green begins with an +analysis of experience, and leads to the conclusion that Nature--if by +it we mean "the connected order of experience"--implies "something other +than itself, as the condition of its being what it is." And "of that +'something' we are entitled to say, positively, that it is a +self-distinguishing consciousness" (section 52). + +If these conclusions be valid, the bottom falls out of Naturalism, for +if nature "implies something other than itself," it does not stand +alone; and that nature _does_ stand alone is the beginning and end of +all naturalist theory. And, furthermore, this "something other than +itself," which Nature involves, is "a self-distinguishing +consciousness"; i.e. something to which we can attribute personality. + +GREEN AND SPENCER CONTRASTED.--This theory has only to be compared with +that of Herbert Spencer for a fundamental difference to declare itself. +The two systems do indeed adopt as axiomatic the conception of the +uniformity and unity of nature, which works in accordance with a single +law. But Spencer saw in that law the expression of a blind force, an +unknowable power, of which it would be no more and no less true to say +that it was "spiritual" than that it was "material." But for Green the +law was the expression of a spiritual principal analogous to our own +intelligence--a manifestation (to use theological language) of God. + +F. H. BRADLEY.--Undoubtedly the most notable of English Hegelians is F. +H. Bradley, whose metaphysical essay, _Appearance and Reality_, was a +work of genuine originality. The book is not of a type to make much +appeal outside academic circles, though it is written in an easy and +attractive style: its results may seem, to the unsophisticated reader, +somewhat too ambiguous. "Ultimate Doubts" is the title of the last +chapter, and "It costs us little to find that in the end Reality is +inscrutable," is a remark not uncharacteristic of the author. Yet this +really profound thinker and acute reasoner played an important part in +helping to discredit that negative dogmatism which was so much in vogue +during his own lifetime. He pointed out the limits beyond which natural +science could not transgress without lapsing into "dogmatic +superstition." + +"Too often the science of mere Nature, forgetting its own limits and +false to its true aims, attempts to speak about first principles. It +becomes transcendent, and offers us a dogmatic and uncritical +metaphysics" (p. 284). + +Though the fault has not always been on the side of the scientists: +"Metaphysics itself, by its interference with physical science, has +induced that to act, as it thinks, in self-defence, and has led it, in +so doing, to become metaphysical. And this interference of metaphysics I +would admit and deplore, as the result and the parent of most injurious +misunderstanding.... So long as natural science keeps merely to the +sphere of phenomena and the laws of their occurrence, metaphysics has no +right to a single word of criticism" (p. 285). + +This critical handling of the problem of the relations of science and +philosophy did much to draw attention to the confusion of thought lying +at the base of much popular materialism. It began to be realised that +the principles of physical science are only fruitful of good results in +the sphere properly belonging to them; and that the uncritical use of +these principles results in a hybrid philosophy, which is neither sound +science nor rational metaphysics. + +A. J. BALFOUR.--Before Bradley's essay was published, a somewhat similar +line of criticism had been developed by Mr. A. J. Balfour in his +_Defence of Philosophic Doubt_ (1879). Its title sounds unpromising, but +the book voiced a demand for a rational philosophy of science which was +practically non-existent at that time; and consequently, in the absence +of any adequate examination of the principles of science, uncritical +dogmatism flourished quite unchallenged. Balfour, elsewhere, indicates +the objects with which he wrote the book--to elicit from the disciples +of natural science a _rationale_ of their method: + +"A full and systematic attempt, first to enumerate, and then to justify, +the presuppositions on which all science finally rests, has, it seems to +me, still to be made. After the critical examination which I desiderate +has been thoroughly carried out, it may appear that at the very root of +our scientific system of belief lie problems of which no satisfactory +solution has yet been devised."[49] Thus Balfour drew attention to the +fact that the common-sense philosophy of naturalism rested upon a tacit +agreement to overlook certain important problems which are the +indispensable preliminaries to any thinking which can be called +critical, or lay claim to be regarded as philosophy in the strict sense. +That some of these problems seem artificial, and the questions raised by +them gratuitous, to the eye of "common sense" is an irrelevant +consideration, for "nothing stands more in need of demonstration than +the obvious." + +NATURALISM CHECKED.--Thus Bradley and Balfour between them, merely by +adopting a critical attitude, created an embarrassing situation for +naturalism. Between them these writers administered a serious check to +that naively uncritical dogmatism which, backed by the prestige of +natural science, had sought to impose itself on the world as a new +orthodoxy less liberal, in some ways, than the old. + +Nor did they stop short at negative criticism, but substituted +(according to the idealistic tradition) a spiritual view of reality for +the mechanistic materialism that had become so popular. _Appearance and +Reality_ is a book of which the trend might seem too obscure, but it +ends with a note that is definite enough: + +"Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality; and, +the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably +real," are Bradley's closing words. + +As for Balfour, he leads his readers up to a point which he describes as +"the threshold of Christian Theology." And having propounded the +perplexities in which the "common sense" philosophy (on which naturalism +depends) is involved, he says: + +"I do not believe that any escape from them (the perplexities) is +possible, unless we are prepared to bring to the study of the world the +presupposition that it was the work of a rational Being, who made _it_ +intelligible, and at the same time made _us_, in however feeble a +fashion, able to understand it."[50] + +REVIVAL OF IDEALISM IN GERMANY. LOTZE.--We have perhaps dwelt at too +great length upon the backwash of the idealistic wave in England, for +idealism is not a native philosophy amongst us; possibly, because we are +not metaphysically-minded in the same sense as are the purer Teutonic +breed. And it is time to pass on to pay a brief tribute to the work of a +German philosopher who accepted the mechanical theory in its totality, +without sacrificing what we may call the spiritual values of existence. + +Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was inclined to feel that the weakness of +Romanticism lay in a tendency to despise or overlook what Kant had +called "the fertile bathos of experience." The Romanticists had too +often neglected natural science, which, in the shape of naturalistic +materialism, had its revenge by destroying them. Buechner was the Nemesis +of an idealism which was at once vague and sentimental. + +LOTZE'S "MICROCOSMOS."--Lotze's attitude and method are conspicuous in +his well-known work, which took him eight years to complete +(1856-1864)--the _Microcosmos_. After guiding his readers "through the +realms of natural phenomena and historical evolution," thus constructing +a sufficiently stable basis out of _facts_--he leads them on to an ideal +world composed of what he calls "values." + +His position may thus be summarised: The world presents itself to the +observer in three aspects--(1) The world of individual "things," which +are bewildering and intricate; (2) the laws (i.e., "laws of nature") +which the human intellect has discovered among them, thus finding +regularity and order; (3) the "values" which the human soul applies to +things, and which it is the human task to cultivate. + +This world of ideals or values (3) is that for the sake of which the +worlds of phenomena and law (1 and 2) exist. These (1 and 2) constitute +respectively the material _in_ which, and the forms _through_ which, the +world of "values" is to be realised.[51] + +Thus phenomena and law are the raw material out of which "values" are +created; and these "values" themselves constitute (in the eyes of Lotze) +a higher reality. Thus the central doctrine of his system is that the +truly Real is what has supreme worth: it is _worth_ that creates +reality. The paradoxicality of this may make it difficult to accept; but +Lotze is only expressing in his own way the fundamental thesis of all +forms of idealism, that "the ideal is the real"; that the world of +phenomena is secondary to and dependent upon a "world of spirit," or an +"ideal world." + +Lotze himself in the introduction to the _Microcosmos_, expresses what +is at once the foundation and the kernel of his system: he says it is +his purpose to show "_how absolutely universal is the extent_, and at +the same time how _completely subordinate the significance, of the +mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world_." +(E.T., p. xvi.) + +Mechanism is universal, _because_ it is the raw material, so to speak, +out of which reality is to be made. That reality can be expressed in +terms of mechanism is true, just as a poem can be described as a scrap +of paper scratched upon with a pen; but this reduction of reality to its +lowest terms, ends by emptying reality of content. Mechanism is a +_universal_ feature, but it is a _subordinate_ feature, of reality. +Nature requires, if we are to arrive at the truth about it, not only to +be described and analysed, but also interpreted in the light of the idea +of _value_ or _worth_. + +LOTZE AND THEOLOGY.--Lotze's theories exercised an important influence +upon the development in Germany and elsewhere of a type of theology +known as Ritschlianism. Albrecht Ritschl, a disciple of Lotze, attempted +to dissociate religion from metaphysics, and to base it upon "judgments +of value." Christian dogma, for instance, is an attempt to express, in +philosophical terms, _the unique value to humanity of the moral and +religious consciousness of Christ_. So far as a dogma is faithful to +that central idea, and makes a genuine attempt to express it, so +far--and so far only--is it true. + +This type of theology, uniting itself with certain philosophical +tendencies which will engage our attention later, became the basis of +what was known as the Modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church. + +CONCLUSIONS.--Thus in the nineteenth century, in England (and indeed on +the continent also) the idealistic attitude, though it sometimes might +seem compromised, was never submerged; in spite of the materialistic +outlook of an age only too preoccupied with scientific discovery and +commercial expansion. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY + + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.--In the last chapter we heard A. J. Balfour +complaining of the absence of "a full and systematic attempt, first to +enumerate, and then to justify, the presuppositions on which all science +finally rests." And Mr. F. H. Bradley also drew attention to the absence +of any critical philosophy of science in England. The need was for +scientific standpoints to be investigated _de novo_; and the process +had, as a matter of fact, already been begun on the Continent. + +MACH.--Ernst Mach, Professor of Physics at Prague, and subsequently +Professor of Physics at Vienna (thus combining the roles of scientist +and metaphysician--always a highly instructive and fruitful combination) +had as early as 1863 laid it down as the task of science to give "an +economic presentation of the facts." By which phrase he meant that +science takes account only of the salient features of phenomena, +selecting only those which seem strictly serviceable to its own purpose. + +SCIENCE "ABSTRACT" OR "SELECTIVE."--Mathematical science (which is the +"pure" science _par excellence_) deals not--as is generally +supposed--with "things," but with _certain selected aspects_ of things. +For example, for purposes of arithmetic, every leaf on a tree is an +"unit" (i.e. all are "identical"); but, in point of fact, there exist no +two leaves that are alike, as Leibniz, long ago, pointed out. Again, for +geometrical purposes two fields may be regarded as of like area; but no +two fields are, or ever have been, so. + +Thus mathematics--where scientific method is seen at its +purest--proceeds by deliberately disregarding individuality; it regards +the differences between individuals as non-essential, and irrelevant to +its purpose. + +ECONOMY OF THOUGHT.--And mathematical science is justified in acting in +this way. This method, highly abstract as it is--in fact, just because +it is highly abstract--leads to invaluable results. It's justification +is that it is _economical of thought_; disregarding all irrelevant +considerations, it is able, by using a short-cut, to reach its goal. Did +the mathematician have to take into consideration all the manifold and +complex aspects of each concrete "thing" (whether it be leaf, or field, +or lever, or what not) with which he deals, he would never be able to +cut his way through the jungle. His method of abstraction carries him at +once to his goal. + +MACH ON THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Mach's criticism of the mechanical view +of nature proceeded upon similar lines. He termed that view +"analogical," by which he meant that mechanical "laws of nature" serve +us as formal patterns to which the processes of nature may (for +convenience sake) be represented as conforming. A clear account, though +not a _complete_ account, of all physical processes may be given in +terms of mechanical "law." + +And in fact it remains a question, Mach observed, "whether the +mechanical view of things, instead of being the profoundest, is not in +point of fact, the shallowest of all."[52] + +SCIENCE NOT INVALID BUT INCOMPLETE.--This line of criticism of +scientific method--i.e. that it deals with abstractions and analogies +rather than with _things_, for the sake of economy and convenience of +thought--does not deprive science of validity, but only invalidates that +superficial dogmatism which had crept into so many investigations. A +critical estimate of scientific methods makes it evident how much and +how little we have the right to expect from them. They will enable us to +give a simple description of _phenomena_ as they are seen when reduced +to their simplest terms of matter and motion; but of ultimate and final +causes they will tell us nothing. + +"The system of conceptions by which the exact sciences try to describe +the phenomena of nature ... is symbolic, a kind of shorthand, +unconsciously invented and perfected for the sake of convenience and for +practical use ... the leading principle is that of Economy of Thought" +(Merz, Vol. III, p. 579). + +BOUTROUX.--This criticism of the mechanical method of dealing with +reality was seconded by Boutroux's criticism of the principle of Natural +Law. Emile Boutroux (1845-1918)--Professor at the Sorbonne--in two +important treatises, examines with great minuteness this aspect of the +scientific method. In the earlier of these works, _The Contingency of +the Laws of Nature_ (1879) he suggests that these laws only give, so to +speak, the _habits_ which things display. They constitute, as it were, +"the bed in which the stream of occurrence flows, which the stream +itself had hollowed out, although its course has come to be determined +by this bed" (Hoeffding, _Modern Philosophers_, p. 101). + +In his _Natural Law in Science and Philosophy_ (1895), Boutroux lays it +down that the laws of nature, as science describes them, may indeed +represent, but are by no means identical with, the laws of nature as +they really are. The laws of science are true, not absolutely but +relatively, i.e. are not elements in, but symbols of, reality. The +notion that everything is "determined" (i.e. the opposite of +"contingent"), though absolutely indispensable to the mechanical theory, +is nevertheless a way of looking at things rather than a faithful +picture of reality--a way in which we see things rather than the way +things exist in themselves. + +As Boutroux himself puts it in his final chapter: "That which we call +the 'laws of nature' is the sum total of the methods we have discovered +for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by +the will." + +RESULTS.--Here we have Boutroux approaching very closely to the +standpoint of Mach; indeed the theories of the two men are complementary +to one another. For Mach, the mechanical view is a way of looking at +things, distinctly useful for understanding and using them--an "economy +of thought." For Boutroux, the determinist view is also a way of looking +at things that is useful for the same purposes. + +Thus the interpretation of reality in terms of mathematics and +"unalterable law," is artificial; an abstract way of thinking which +deals not with reality itself but with certain deliberately selected +aspects of it. + +RISE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY.--This examination of the principles of natural +science was the beginning of what afterwards proved to be a revolution +in thought. What had been more or less negative criticism in Mach and +Boutroux, became the basis of a new philosophy in the hands of William +James and Bergson. The names, and even the ideas, of these two original +thinkers are familiar far outside strictly philosophical circles, and it +will almost be possible to presume upon a certain acquaintance with them +on the part of our readers. + +WILLIAM JAMES.--James himself, like Mach, was led to philosophy by the +road of scientific investigation. He was a psychologist, and it is as +the author of his _Principles of Psychology_ that his name will be +remembered. This work is notable as containing the first complete +application of the Darwinian theory to the evolution of mind. Mental +action is there represented as a capacity developed by the organism to +enable it to deal with its environment. As an exponent of James puts it: + +"The mind, like an antenna, feels its way for the organism. It gropes +about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many +failures; always urged into taking the initiative and doomed to success +or failure in some hour of trial."[53] + +The corollary which attaches to propositions of this kind is that +knowledge in all its varieties and developments arises from _practical +needs_. And the mind (here is an echo of Mach) _selects_ those aspects +of reality which concern it, and out of that selected material makes up +a new (mental) world of its own. Which world is far from being a +"picture" of reality, but which is "symbolic" of it (here is another +memory of Mach).[54] + +This view obviously cuts the ground from under dogmatic materialism. The +world which that philosophy regards as _reality_, is, to the critical +eye, a collection of abstractions, a mental creation arising out of the +practical needs of life. + +HENRI BERGSON.--This line of criticism, that of the evolutionary +psychologist, opened up by James, has been carried to extreme lengths by +the French philosopher Bergson. "Dig to the very roots of nature and of +mind" is his advice. He begins by asking, How, as a matter of history, +has human intellect developed? He then, and then only, proceeds to put +the question (which uncritical thinkers always put _first_), What can +the intellect do for us? + +His theory of the origin of intellect is the same as that of William +James. Life (through the evolutionary process) has produced it. But the +conclusion that he draws from this hypothesis is that _the intellect, +being itself a product of life, or a form of life, cannot understand the +whole of life_. This thesis is elaborated with a wealth of illustration +and erudition, both scientific and philosophic, and with a literary +grace and charm possible only for a Frenchman, in the famous work +_Evolution Creatrice_ (1907). + +BERGSON'S ADVANCE ON MACH AND JAMES.--Those thinkers who had made a +serious attempt at a philosophy of science, had demonstrated that the +"mechanical view" of nature was a mental abstraction, and not a complete +representation of reality. Such is the debt of philosophy to the +researches of Mach, Boutroux, James, and others who worked along their +lines. + +But it remained for Bergson to demonstrate that the mechanical view was +_the inevitable product of the mental processes which we describe by the +word "intellect."_ + +The path which led Bergson to this goal will have to be briefly +indicated by us. + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTELLECT.--What is the "intellect," to which we +look in vain for any _complete_ explanation of existence? This is the +preliminary question. + +Our intellect is, as James had taught, a faculty developed by the +evolutionary process in our species to enable it to deal with its +_material_ environment. And Bergson was the first to point out that as a +consequence of its having been developed for this particular purpose +(i.e., dealing with a _material_ environment), intellect is "never quite +at its ease, never entirely at home, except when it is working upon +inert matter." If it has to deal with "living" matter, it "treats it as +inert, without troubling about the life that animated it." + +Such is the first characteristic of the intellect: it feels at home in +dealing with dead matter, and living matter it prefers to treat "as +inert." + +Another characteristic of intellect is that, just as it treats the +living as if it were non-living, so it prefers to treat the mobile as +though it were motionless. Motion is a thing which the intellect simply +cannot grasp; it has to treat it artificially, and represent a process +which in reality is continuous and indivisible, as discontinuous and +divisible--a succession of points, out of which no magic can conjure +motion. Philosophy became aware of this as soon as it opened its eyes. +Hence the paradox of Zeno, that Achilles will never overtake the +tortoise, if the latter once gets a start. For if space and time are +infinitely divisible (as intellect holds them to be), by the time +Achilles has reached the tortoise's starting point, the tortoise has +already got ahead of _that_ starting point, and so on _ad infinitum_; +the interval between them being endlessly diminished, but never +disappearing. + +Zeno's paradox arises because of an innate fault in the "intellectual" +method of dealing with motion; a method which Bergson calls +"cinematographical," because it regards a single movement as a +succession of infinitely small motions. That method is hopeless; and if +we expect to understand motion by its means, + +"You will always experience the disappointment of the child, who tries, +by clapping its hands together to crush the smoke. The movement slips +through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out +of states implies the absurd proposition that movement is made up of +immobilities."[55] + +So that the intellect is best fitted to deal, not with living and +moving, but with dead and motionless matter. Of the latter it can form a +clear idea; but in dealing with the former, it finds itself at a loss; +it has to abstract the life and the motion from what lives or moves, and +what it cannot grasp, it must treat as non-existent. + +BERGSON'S ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM.--A penetrating remark of James' will +help us, at this point, to understand the significance for philosophy +of these new theories. + +"In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of Protagoras, Hume, and +James Mill, rationalism has never been seriously questioned, for its +sharpest critics have always had a tender place for it in their hearts, +and have obeyed some of its mandates. They have not been consistent, +they have played fast and loose with the enemy, and Bergson alone has +been radical."[56] + +Bergson's philosophy is, in fact, a reaction against intellectualism or +rationalism; by which is meant the theory that pure reason is competent +by its nature to give a complete and exhaustive account of reality. + +But according to Bergson, intellect, which is a faculty developed to +enable men to subdue and turn to advantage their material environment, +and which is, as it were, "fascinated by the contemplation of inert +matter," will not reveal the true meaning and nature of existence; it +gives us "a translation of life in terms of inertia," and can do no +more. + +This criticism of the intellect (if it be sound), though it does not +invalidate the work of that faculty in its own proper sphere, +necessarily involves its discredit as a key to the unlocking of the +final mysteries of life and of being. These things lie outside its +province. "Whether it wants to treat of the life of the body, or the +life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness, and the +brutality of an instrument not designed for such use."[57] + +INTELLECT AND INSTINCT.--Since intellect, by its methods, has induced +men to turn their backs on reality, and to look on abstractions +instead, the only hope of reaching reality is through an entire change +of method and direction. There is, according to Bergson, a +non-intellectual variety of knowledge, which (from his point of view) it +was a kind of original sin ever to depart from; an original sin which +has vitiated all our philosophic thinking from the days of Plato. + +This variety of knowledge is more original and fundamental than any +which the processes of the intellect, vitiated as these are by certain +inherent perversions, can give us. Intellect cannot correct itself; we +must call in the aid of some other faculty if we would understand +reality. + +Bergson finds this faculty in what he calls "instinct." According to +him, consciousness has developed in two divergent directions--instinct +and intellect; and the difference between these is not one of intensity +or degree, but of _kind_.[58] + +They are two divergent developments of the same original consciousness, +of which common origin they both retain traces, for they are not +entirely dissimilar, nor is either of them ever found in a pure state. + +Intellect is characteristic of man. Instinct is most highly developed +among certain insects, notably the _hymenopterae_ (i.e., bees and +ants).[59] + +BLINDNESS OF INTELLECT.--And the difficulty of the philosophical problem +for man arises from the anomalies of his own constitution (as +interpreted by Bergson in the light of his theory of instinct and +intellect). As he puts it: + +"There are things that Intelligence (or intellect) alone is able to +seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct +alone could find; but it will never seek them." (_Creative Evolution_, +p. 159). + +"If the consciousness which slumbers in instinct were to wake up ... if +we knew how to question it, and if it knew how to reply, it would +deliver to our keeping the most intimate secrets of life." + +Thus Bergson regards it as impossible that intellect should ever supply +us with the complete truth about reality; there are things, e.g. life +itself--which altogether elude its grasp. + +INTUITION.--The situation, however, is not entirely hopeless. Man +possesses some measure of instinct, which, when it has "become +disinterested, self-conscious, and capable of reflecting upon its +object," Bergson calls intuition. By means of this faculty, man is able, +darkly perhaps but not ineffectually, to grope his way towards an +understanding of reality. + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.--Just as the criticisms of +Cusanus and others freed thought from an incubus which seemed likely to +prevent its further development, so the movement initiated by Mach and +culminating (for the present) in Bergson, has done much to discredit "a +certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of +the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old +scholasticism grew up around Aristotle."[60] + +Mechanical determinism was characteristic of much nineteenth-century +thought in Europe, not only amongst materialists, but also, in certain +cases, amongst idealists as well. Against this aspect of contemporary +philosophy, the work of James and Bergson has been a revolt. +"Indeterminism," i.e. a belief in the reality of freedom and +spontaneity, is an essential part of their system. Their indeterminism +is indeed the necessary and logical accompaniment of their +anti-intellectualism. For determinism is "a fabrication of the +_intellect_," a device which makes reality more manageable, more +amenable to logic, more easily systematised. Freedom, like life and +motion, eludes the categories of the intellect. + +THE MECHANICAL VIEW ASSAILED.--Such are the lines upon which the new +criticism of the mechanical view (the most radical criticism it has had +to meet since Kant) proceeds. That view, and the idea of predetermined +human action which it involves, is an inevitable product of an intellect +naturally incapable of understanding freedom and spontaneity. These, as +they destroy its scheme of thought, it casts out as an illusion. +"Incorrigibly presumptuous," it insists on interpreting freedom by means +of those notions which suit inert matter alone, and therefore always +perceives it as necessity. So that all life, far from being subjected to +mechanical necessity, as had seemed the inevitable conclusion of +naturalistic philosophy, was spontaneity (so to speak) materialised and +embodied: + +"All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous +push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, +and the whole of humanity ... is one immense army galloping beside and +before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat +down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps +even death."[61] + +We have indeed travelled a long way from the austere abstractions of Mr. +Herbert Spencer. The new evolutionism is very different from the old. It +substitutes for "mechanism" another conception--that of "dynamism," +according to which the process of evolution is something undetermined +and impredictable--"creative," in fact. The world of organic life is +embodied "creative activity," and what this "creative activity" is, we +ourselves experience every time we act freely. + +PLURALISM.--The philosophy of Bergson is a reaction against the +mechanical evolutionism (i.e. naturalism) of the nineteenth century. +Closely allied with it is another movement of thought, known as +_pluralism_. This, too, is a reaction, not so much against naturalism, +as against certain forms of idealism. + +Idealism, it will be remembered, seeks to interpret reality in terms of +mind or spirit. And it does this in certain cases--notably in the case +of F. H. Bradley--by regarding all _phenomena_ as forms or aspects of +the one absolute mind or spirit. + +This has seemed to many thinkers a philosophy too abstract and too +remote from the world of experience. Hence the question arose whether it +might not be possible to interpret nature in terms of mind without being +compelled to take refuge in the abstractions of "absolutism." And +pluralism is an attempt to solve the problem. + +LEIBNIZ REVIVED.--Leibniz' system of "monads," the nature of which will +hardly have been forgotten, has been the model to which philosophers +have looked in constructing their new system. And the "Monadology" may +be taken as the type to which all modern attempts to construct a +"pluralistic" philosophy more or less conform. + +The essence of "pluralism"--whether Leibnizian or other--lies in the +proposition that there exists an indefinite variety of beings, some +higher, some lower than ourselves. The pluralist agrees with the +idealist in declaring that the essence of reality is _spirit_, but +differs from him in declining to allow independent spirits to be +absorbed by an "all-devouring Absolute." + +PLURALISM AND THEISM.--William James himself, in a work _A Pluralistic +Universe_ (1909) outlined a philosophy of spirit radically opposed to +"Absolute Idealism," which he subjects to a good deal of criticism. +Another important work, written from a similar point of view, is +Professor James Ward's _Pluralism and Theism_ (1911).[62] + +With regard to modern pluralism, the notable features are two. In the +first place, it is a philosophy of _personality_, which it regards as +the most fundamental form of reality; and also, that it is _theistic_ in +a sense peculiar to itself. It believes in a God who may be termed the +supreme monad, i.e. the head of a system of monads; but whose power may +be said, in certain respects, to be limited. And indeed some such +position seems to be the _logical_ conclusion that follows from the +premises with which pluralists start, and also (we may add) from the +facts of experience.[63] + +Pluralists unite in affirming that their God is (what they deny the +idealistic Absolute to be) the God of the religious consciousness. James +elaborates this thesis with his usual resourcefulness and skill. The +controversy, however, is one into which it does not seem necessary for +us to enter. Pluralism and idealism are or may be both definitely +spiritual philosophies, and perhaps they appeal to different types of +mind. We, at any rate, shall not undertake to judge between them. Both +alike are preferable to dogmatic naturalism. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN SCIENCE + + +SCIENTIFIC METHOD.--In the last chapter, attention was drawn to some +important attempts to supply science with a sound philosophy of method, +i.e. to give a critical account of those processes, logical and +otherwise, which issue in what is called "scientific knowledge." + +The general results of these attempts was to re-enforce the validity of +sound scientific method _within its own sphere_. But, at the same time, +it was felt likely to prove an unreliable guide elsewhere. + +THE NEW PHYSICS.--Meanwhile, while the logic of science was being +scrutinised by philosophers, scientific research was itself going +steadily forward, and fresh discoveries of a highly important nature +were coming to light. In the sphere of physical science, more +especially, revolutions of Copernican proportions quietly took place. + +The whole subject of physics is of a highly technical nature, quite +unsuitable for discussion here, and, indeed, entirely beyond the range +of the present writer. + +To indicate the nature of the discoveries which were made, however, +involves few technicalities: though the method by which these were +demonstrated and established must remain obscure to all but mathematical +specialists. + +COLLAPSE OF THE ATOMIC THEORY.--Dalton's theory of atoms was described +in a previous chapter. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the +importance attached by materialists, ever since Lucretius, to the +conception of indivisible and indestructible atoms. It was regarded as +integral to materialism, and never was the prestige of this theory +higher than during the nineteenth century, which "will go down in +scientific history as the era of the atomic theory of matter." + +Towards the close of the century, the theory collapsed. Atoms were found +to be neither indivisible nor indestructible; and the process of the +breaking up of the atom has actually been observed. + +As is very generally known, it is in the case of a particular element, +_radium_, that this phenomenon occurs. That substance, wherever it +occurs, is undergoing a continual process of disintegration; radium +atoms are continually breaking up into more elementary bodies. + +Were it not for the fact that radium itself is the product of the +disintegration of another element, it would be impossible to account for +its survival. It continually evaporates (the life of radium is only 2500 +years) but it is as continually renewed by the infinitely slower +disintegration of uranium. + +ELECTRONS.--The particles into which the radium atom disintegrates are +known as _electrons_. And according to the new theory of matter, not +only radium atoms, but the atoms of all the other elements (hitherto +regarded as irreducible) are composed of electrons, differently grouped. +The radium atom is infinitely more unstable than the atoms of the other +elements; but it is possible to conceive of the disintegration of these +also. They are all alike composed of the same elementary +particles--different compounds of the same primitive substance. + +MATTER A FORM OF ELECTRICITY.--And the most remarkable part of the new +theory is that these primitive particles of which material atoms are +composed, are themselves the units which constitute what we call +"electricity." Thus matter and electricity are now expressed in common +terms--they are regarded as different manifestations of the same +substance. And of the two conceptions--matter and electricity--it is the +latter that is the more simple and fundamental. As a high authority puts +it: + +"Whereas through the greater part of the nineteenth century, 'matter' +was the concept which was looked upon as fundamental in physical +science, and of which there was a curious accidental property called +electricity, it now appears that electricity must be more fundamental +than matter, in the sense that our more elementary matter must now be +conceived as a manifestation of extremely complex electrical +phenomena."[64] + +As to whether the electrons themselves, in their turn, are irreducible +units, there may be room for doubt. According to Professor J. Larmor the +electron is "a nucleus of intrinsic strain in the ether."[65] If this +view be sound, matter may be regarded as a manifestation of the ether; +"a persistent strain-form flitting through an universal sea of ether." +As to the nature of the ether, that is a subject of speculation among +physicists. It is variously described as an "elastic fluid," and as "a +fairly close packed conglomerate of minute grains in continual +oscillation."[66] It may indeed be said that modern physical theories +have succeeded in reducing matter, which seems comparatively knowable, +to a substance of which little is known and, therefore, of which much +can be postulated; it can be called sub-natural, or super-natural, +according to taste. + +We may, perhaps, satisfy ourselves with the words of Professor Tait: "We +do not know, and are probably incapable of discovering, _what_ matter +is"; and "The discovery of the ultimate nature of matter is probably +beyond the range of human intelligence."[67] + +And yet we can agree with Mr. Arthur Balfour when he says[68] "we know +too much about matter to be materialists." That, in itself, a generation +ago would have been regarded as a large admission from the standpoint of +physical science. + +RESULTS OF THE NEW PHYSICS.--The reduction of knowable and tangible +matter to intangible electricity or unknowable ether may not seem to be +much of an advance from the point of view of those who are interested in +establishing a spiritual theory of the universe. But electricity is a +species of energy which can be expressed in terms of will--which is the +only kind of energy that we are acquainted with at first hand. "What is +objectively energy is subjectively will; or, in other words, manifested +energy is the visibility of will."[69] And so far as the "unknowable" +ether is concerned, it gives less scope to those powers of dogmatism, +the exercise of which characterised scientists of the old materialistic +school; and it is the habit of oracular pronouncements which does the +harm, by rendering any intellectual or spiritual progress impossible. In +any case, whatever be the substitute which is to replace the old theory, +we may congratulate ourselves, with Professor J. S. Haldane, that "we +have parted once for all with the notion of a real and self-existent +Material universe; and we must remember where we now are."[70] + +THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if the results of the new physics have been +disturbing to those who had hoped that materialism was a finally +established theory, the results of recent biological research have been +equally embarrassing to them. The anti-mechanistic trend of recent +biological theory is only too evident. The organism is regarded no +longer by the majority of biologists as fully explicable in terms of +mechanics and chemistry. To quote Professor Haldane again, "The main +outstanding fact is that the mechanistic account of the universe breaks +down completely in connection with the phenomena of life.... In the case +of life, the facts are inconsistent with the physical and chemical +account of phenomena."[71] + +The organism can no longer be regarded as even an extremely complex kind +of machine; that word will not cover the facts, and biologists are +compelled to look elsewhere for a less misleading terminology. To +describe the organism as a machine, is to give to that word a very +comprehensive connotation. For the organism is a machine different in +kind from any that has been constructed by man; it is "a self-stoking, +self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, +self-producing engine."[72] + +THE RESEARCHES OF DRIESCH.--Just as modern physics is concerned with the +infinitely small--the ultra-microscopic, in fact--so modern biologists +are concentrating attention upon microscopic organisms, where life is +seen at its lowest terms, and where (if anywhere) they may expect to +discover what are the _differentia_ of life, i.e. what are the qualities +that distinguish living organic from inorganic matter. Perhaps the most +notable of the researches conducted in this sphere, of recent years, +have been those of Professor Driesch, who expounded his results in the +_Gifford Lectures_ for 1907-1908 (_The Science and Philosophy of the +Organism_). + +The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those +which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when +cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued +development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a +fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, +though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided +organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt +themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building +a bridge, all of them _can_ do every single act--if need arise--and the +result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen +fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident. + +Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying: + +"There is something in the organism's behaviour--in the widest sense of +the word--which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e. +to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which +shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its +parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism 'a typically +combined body' (i.e., a machine), without further explanation."[73] + +THE PROBLEM OF LIFE.--The problem is: What is it in an organism which +causes it to behave in a fashion so impossible for any machine? To +answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery +of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what +this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it +_entelechy_, i.e. "purposiveness," and he also speaks of _psychoids_, +i.e. "primitive minds." Names do not carry us very far; but the mere +fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is +important. It constitutes an admission on their part that there is +something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of +modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious +causes if known ones can be found. The _deus ex machina_ method seems to +them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were +considered solved merely by the word "mystery," knowledge would never +advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but +things that are important. But in this particular instance the +application of the name _entelechy_ indicates that, in the opinion of +such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no +merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And Driesch +is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very +extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living +organism in terms of physics and chemistry. + +RESULTS OF THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if life resists all attempts to reduce +it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the +mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but +progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and +applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this +ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even +scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some +indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative attitude, and seek +to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only +vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to +a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena +irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to +be re-interpreted in terms of biology. + +"It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to +the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a +few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and +chemical world as we now conceive it--the world of atoms and +energy--will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will +stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure +mathematicians."[74] + +THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.--Not only physical and biological, but psychological +science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which +is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of +psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with +instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, +and of so-called "spiritualism." In none of these spheres can research +yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of +dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still +exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of +research in psychical regions which is practically a _terra incognita_. +And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in +their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may +bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems +is perhaps the right attitude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations +of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the +strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodes. It is extremely +difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses "mind" +from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a +comparatively insignificant "epiphenomenon" accompanying certain obscure +chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their +simplicity, will no longer cover the facts. + +PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.--One particular branch of experimental psychology, +which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few +remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the +existence of "disembodied spirits," human or otherwise. The whole +subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices +of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is +inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic +statements in any direction. + +What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of +various _phenomena_ which it is extremely difficult to explain in +accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of space, or of mental +action. + +The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over +the _explanation_ of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite +certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new +facts will force from conservative scientists is _a radical revision of +current notions of the range of human mental action_. The mind is +evidently capable of producing certain effects--even upon matter--which +would have seemed incredible a short while ago. + +So much is the least that may be expected. But in the view of many +competent and highly scientific observers, some far more radical +revision of our notions may be necessary. Some scientists of good repute +(e.g. Sir Oliver Lodge, in England, and Flammarion and others on the +Continent) are convinced that the facts can only adequately be explained +by reference to another world--interlocked, as it were, with this.[75] +And it has to be admitted that this, what may be called more "advanced" +explanation, is more in accordance than the other with a rather +universal tradition or assumption of mankind in all ages. + +It will be easily seen that the whole subject is one of the most extreme +difficulty. There is a general hesitancy in accepting what is called the +"spirit hypothesis," so long as any other can be found; a hesitancy +justified in view of the extreme complexity of the world we live in +(where so much is even yet unknown), and in view of the great difficulty +which there seems to be in adducing _exact_ proofs of the "spirit +theory." + +A REASONABLE ATTITUDE.--We shall, no doubt, be wise at present to refuse +to cry "Proven," and whilst admitting that all things are +possible--perhaps even probable--to await with patience the results of +further investigation. + +It has to be admitted that, while many people are superstitious and +easily attracted by picturesque theories, there are others who are as +prejudiced, in their way, against new ideas, as were those astronomers +who, being committed to Ptolemaic views, refused to look through +Galileo's telescope. It is not only theologians who have, in the history +of thought, been guilty of obscurantism. In the early days of hypnotic +experiments the scientific world in general "pooh-poohed" the idea of +hypnotism; and it took a considerable time before it would allow itself +to be convinced that such a thing was possible. Facts, in the end, were +too strong even for prejudice. It is facts, eventually, that decide +matters; and, no doubt, before a very long period has elapsed, +sufficient facts will have accumulated to allow the scientific world to +form more definite and better-grounded opinions than are possible +to-day. + +Meanwhile, the ordinary man will do well to remember that the universe +is really a very wonderful place, and that the knowledge of the wisest +of us about it can only be described as infinitesimal. The traditions of +nineteenth-century materialism are still strong amongst us, even with +those who are least conscious of them. But there are more things in +heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that philosophy. + +RESULTS.--These new conceptions of matter, of life, and of mind, which +are the products of the new physics, the new biology, and the new +psychology respectively, may be confidently left to themselves to work +out their own salvation. They have the strength of youth. What is +evident is that we have crossed the threshold of a new era in the +history of science. The outlook of the future will be as different from +that of the recent past as was the new science of Galileo, Descartes, +and Newton from the dogmatic but fanciful notions which the Scholastic +theologians had borrowed from Aristotle, and sought to impose as a +permanent revelation. + +The current of thought is never stayed. The future is obscure, but one +thing is certain, that the coming generations will see catastrophic +changes in the outlook of science; and the materialistic and mechanistic +_weltanschauung_, which lately seemed so formidable, may soon become as +superannuated as astrology. The theory which overshadowed the religious +life of a century, and which had become more and more menacing as +scientific knowledge increased in extent and popularity, has fallen into +discredit. Its prestige will not revive. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS + + +VALUE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--It may perhaps be felt that our +protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at +which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy +may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who +study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for +dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile +ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet +received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is +only too evident that, as the poet says: + + "Our little systems have their day, + They have their day, and cease to be." + +And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about +philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers, +indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in +the history of philosophy--such as Kant's _Critique of Pure +Reason_--which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress +(assuming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we +have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still +justified in assuming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting +nearer to the goal. + +But surely we are entitled to believe that it is not the crude appetite +for metaphysical dogma that attracts men to the history of philosophy. +Its fascination rather resembles that of the history of religion: both +are, as it were, Odysseys of the human spirit; nor is there any activity +of man that has not its appeal to the human heart: for _cor ad cor +loquitur_. + +And, again, we should reflect that those who ask for final conclusions, +forget that the _search_ for truth may be, in and for itself, of the +highest spiritual value. The best starting-point for the history of +philosophy is a famous passage from Lessing. + +"Not the truth which is at the disposal of every man, but the honest +pains he has taken to come at the truth make the worth of a man. For not +through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth do his powers +increase, and in this alone consists his ever-increasing perfection. +Possession makes us quiet, indolent, proud.... If God with all truth in +His right hand, and in His left the single, unceasing striving after +truth, even though coupled with the condition that I should ever and +always err, came to me and said, 'Choose!' I would in all humility clasp +this left hand and say, 'Father, give me this! Is not pure truth for +Thee alone?'"[76] + +But there is another respect in which some knowledge of the history of +thought may be an important advantage. It may not bestow upon us the +liberty of dogmatising ourselves, but it does bestow upon us a certain +imperturbability in the face of the dogmatisms of others. Airs of +systematic omniscience, "the pride of a pretended knowledge," will leave +us unimpressed and undismayed. The latest pretentious product of +popular philosophy will, in the majority of cases, be recognised as an +old heresy in a new garb; "new" thought will not impress (at least, by +its novelty) those who know that it is old. + +But it is against the crudities of materialistic naturalism that even a +slight acquaintance with the history of ideas will form an antidote. The +various exposures of it, from Hume and Kant to Bergson, will be to some +extent familiar; and it will be a recognised fact that its chief popular +attraction is at the same time its chief philosophic weakness; and this +is that it is nothing more or less than a systematisation of the +prejudices of common sense. "As a theory of first principles, the best +that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."[77] + +SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM HISTORY.--But, it may be asked, what definite +conclusions have the foregoing chapters to offer? Some, if we are not +mistaken, of a genuinely positive character. It will be necessary to +recall certain facts and reflections to the minds of our readers. + +In the early chapters we noted the rise of an independent science, and +the collapse of the medieval world view with which popular religious +notions were associated so closely, that many conservative thinkers +expected to see both involved in a common ruin. Science seemed to +threaten the existence of a religion bound up with conceptions of space +and of force which were being brought into discredit. + +These misgivings turned out, however, to be ill-founded. Certain +advantages, no doubt, of simplicity and definiteness, which had +belonged to the old notions, had been irrecoverably lost; but thinkers +like Giordano Bruno showed that the conception of an infinite universe +was by no means hostile to religion; but that, on the contrary, it might +be a conception of the highest spiritual value. Such are the sentiments +expressed in some sonnets which precede Bruno's dialogue "On the +Infinite Universe." + +"It seemed to Bruno as if he had never breathed freely until the limits +of the universe had been extended to infinity, and the fixed spheres had +disappeared. No longer now was there a limit to the flight of the +spirit, no 'so far and no further'; the narrow prison in which the old +beliefs had confined men's spirits had now to open its gates and let in +the pure air of a new life."[78] + +The scientific did not seem to him incompatible with a fundamentally +religious conception of the world, at least for those who were not +afraid "to take ship upon the seas of the infinite." + +DANGERS OF THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Thus it was not _science_ that was +hostile to religion. This was not the case until science began to be +associated with a certain fairly definite philosophy of a mechanistic, +and later of a materialist, description. Religion could not have +survived the final establishment of such a philosophy as this, for the +indispensable element in a religious attitude of life is the idea that +_somehow there lies behind things a power or essence that has something +in common with our own natures_--something that can, without an abuse of +language, be called personal. Any philosophy that rules out this idea +creates an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe. + +And it was just this atmosphere that the mechanistic view, unless +amplified by considerations of another kind (as it was e.g. in the case +of Spinoza) tended to create. + +THE "MECHANICAL VIEW" NEVER UNCHALLENGED.--And with regard to this +mechanistic philosophy, we have to observe that it never seems to have +commended itself, as a final and complete solution, to the best minds. +In the seventeenth century, it will be remembered, the mechanical +conception was transcended (though in entirely different ways) by +Spinoza and by Leibniz, and the religious consciousness of the age, in +the person of Pascal, protested against it. + +And although, during the eighteenth century, this philosophy persisted, +and was considerably reinforced (with the help of further discoveries in +the realm of physics) by the school of Holbach and Diderot, yet it had +still to face the radical criticism of Kant. This criticism, as we shall +remember, indicated that the mechanical view is a way in which the human +mind--owing to its constitution--regards phenomena. If it is to +understand them, the human mind cannot help viewing them in that +fashion; it must subject things to the mould in which all its thought is +cast. Mechanism is the _medium_ through which the mind understands +phenomena. It belongs not to the things in themselves, but to our way of +understanding them. And attached to this radical criticism of mechanical +notions, was an idealistic philosophy of the most genuinely religious +and spiritual character. Kantian idealism is one of those contributions +to human thought behind which we shall not again regress. It is a +phenomenon of incalculable value and importance. + +The immediate results of Kant's critical idealism was a luxuriant +growth of a spiritual type of philosophy upon the ground he had cleared +and prepared. Romanticism may be regarded as a revolt of those sides of +human nature upon which the tyranny of mechanism pressed +hardest--religion, speculation, poetry, music, art. "You may expel +nature with a pitchfork, but she persists in returning." The Horatian +remark is true also of the human mind; you may try to weed out religion +and poetry, but your success will only be temporary; for nature herself +is more persistent than the most earnest of materialists and (what is +more) she outlives him. + +And with regard to the materialist or mechanistic view, it is highly +interesting to note that its greatest attraction has consisted in +something which, strictly speaking, is not its own property. In the +eighteenth century in France, and in the nineteenth century in Germany +and England, the popularity of this view was derived from its altogether +illegitimate association with a high moral and social idealism, which +(it is only too evident) had been borrowed--without sufficient +acknowledgment--from the Christian tradition. The rather self-conscious +atheism (for instance) of Shelley or Byron--which they had presumably +derived from Diderot and his contemporaries--was less a denial of God +than an affirmation of the rights of humanity. This generous philosophy +of revolt from contemporary tyranny and pharisaism is atheistic only in +name. The callous and cynical powers, both political and ecclesiastical, +that were the object of their bitter attacks were the embodiments of +atheism, for "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the +Divine Being, e.g. love, wisdom, justice, are nothing."[79] + +THE PRESENT SITUATION.--During the nineteenth century the mechanical +view received some accession of strength owing to the reduction of +biology to what seemed like subjection. But, at the same time, an +idealistic philosophy had taken a strong hold in England, and towards +the end of the century critical students of scientific method cast doubt +upon the _finality_ of the mechanical view. They regarded it as +artificial, abstract, and symbolic only of reality. This critical +movement may be associated with the names of Mach, Boutroux, and +(perhaps above all) of Bergson. + +Moreover, towards the end of the century, a number of new facts in +physics, biology, and psychology came to light and tended to discredit +the mechanical view as a final explanation of reality. The +indestructibility of matter, even the conservation of energy and of mass +(corner stones of the mechanico-materialist view) began openly to be +questioned, not by metaphysicians, but by men of science themselves. The +foes of materialism were those of its own household.[80] + +Thus assailed from without by the philosophers, and from within by the +scientists themselves, the mechanical view, after a reign of three +centuries (disturbed though these may have been by successive +rebellions) seems destined to disappear. It may indeed subsist as an +approximate and convenient way of regarding reality, of which it will no +longer pretend to give an absolute and complete account. It will +continue to reign as a constitutional monarch, but the days of its +tyranny are at an end. And it is not unlikely that future generations +will look with surprise upon our respect for a theory which to them will +wear something of the same aspect as medieval astrology now presents to +ourselves. + +SOME DEDUCTIONS.--If the history of thought showed no other results than +the impaired prestige of naturalism, it would be worth attention and +study. The facts undoubtedly compromise that prestige, for history +indicates that at no period has naturalism been able to impose itself +permanently. If there has been a movement in that direction, it has +elicited a corresponding reaction. The human mind seems unable to remain +satisfied with the negations which systematised common sense seeks to +impose upon it. There is an instinctive appetite in humanity for a +spiritual view of things, and Sabatier was undoubtedly right in +observing that mankind is "incurably religious." Neither Hobbes, nor +Holbach, nor Buechner, with the best will in the world, can exorcise from +the human heart that instinct which seeks for itself personal relations +with the universe--which sees a mind behind phenomena. This is one of +those instincts of which it is true that the more you repress them the +more insurgent they become--they will have their way in the end. + +Thus naturalism, blind to the mutilation of our nature of which it is +guilty, is psychologically unsound. And yet, our nature is not so easily +mutilated after all. Naturalistic dogmatism has it in its power to +create an atmosphere which is unhealthy for religion, but that growth +has its roots too deep for it to be easily destroyed. Springing as it +does from the depths of our nature, it will prove as permanent as +humanity itself. + +This is not to deny that this type of dogmatism may do, as it actually +has done, a great deal of harm. A plant may be strong and vigorous, but +under unceasing bitter weather, it will tend to become discouraged. +Otherwise it would not be worth while to write criticisms of naturalism. + +FREEDOM.--Perhaps the best service we can do is to protest against +indulging an appetite for negative dogmatism. Such an attitude is a +negation of the freedom of thought. And it is in an atmosphere of +freedom that both religion and science flourish best. A hard and fast +naturalistic outlook may prove, and actually has proved, an incubus from +which even scientists themselves may pray to be delivered. + +Nor has religion always enjoyed that full measure of freedom which is +indispensable to its vigorous life. The curious and sad fact is that the +human mind seems to delight in creating prisons for itself. The +scientific spirit created a mechanico-materialistic scheme which has +ended by becoming the enemy of scientific research, and which (besides +this) asks, as a sacrifice, the mutilation of our spiritual instincts. + +And so with religion. The religious instinct (like the scientific) tends +to create its prisons. The pride of, a pretended knowledge reduces to a +mechanical scheme the mysteries of life and death; it provides +superficial standardised solutions for the problems of existence. + +Of course, it is clear enough, that in religion as in science, we +cannot, even if we would, start each of us from the beginning. We have +to accept and to revere the riches of knowledge and experience +accumulated by those who have gone before. And yet, in religion as in +science, life consists in movement; we must go forward. The past may be +an inspiration, but it must not be the limit of our thought, or it +becomes an incubus. The glance must be forward not backward; the stream +flows, and we are borne on its bosom. Humanity, like an explorer, has +its face set towards the unknown. Both science and religion are children +of freedom, without which the creative spirit in man is crushed. + +And here, with this note of warning (though perhaps rather of +encouragement) we may close. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] _The Grammar of Science_, pp. 12, 13. + +[2] Ptolemy of Alexandria: 127-151 A.D. + +[3] J. M. Heald in art. "Aquinas" in _Encyclopaedia of Religion and +Ethics_. + +[4] Monks and theologians were betrayed into some controversial +asperities. "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven" +formed the appropriate text for a sermon by a Dominican. + +[5] In spite of this, however, Descartes' works, in 1663, appeared in +the Index of forbidden books: and his doctrines were banned by Royal +decree from the French universities. Jesuit influences, which were not +at all favourable to _native_ religion in France (or elsewhere!), may +have been responsible for this obscurantist policy. + +[6] Merz, _History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_, Vol. +I, p. 384. + +[7] Quoted by Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, p. 4. + +[8] Hoeffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 315. + +It may set the scruples of some at rest to be reminded that Aquinas +himself applied the term _Natura Naturans_ to God as the cause of all +existence. Eckhart and Bruno had made a similar application of it (cf. +Martineau, _Study of Spinoza_, p. 226). + +[9] Here we may note, by way of an anticipation, a truth that Kant +afterwards was the first to grasp clearly: that it is only when the +mechanism of phenomena is proved, that religion can be purged of +materialism. + +[10] Cf. letter to Arnauld, quoted by Hoeffding, I, p. 347: "The +substantial unity presupposes a complete, indivisible being. Nothing of +this kind is to be found in figure or motion ... but only in a soul or a +substantial form similar to that which we call an 'I.'" + +[11] The _Monadology_ (quoted by Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 180). + +[12] Inge, _Christian Mysticism_, p. 19. + +[13] Cf. "With space the universe encloses me and engulfs me like an +atom, but with thought I enclose the universe." A great saying. + +[14] Novalis called him "the God-intoxicated": a bold phrase. + +[15] We refer, of course, to the promulgation of the Bull _Unigenitus_, +procured from Pope Clement XI by the Jesuits; when their opponents, the +Jansenists "of all professions and classes, were subjected to +imprisonment, confiscation, and every species of oppression" (Jervis, +_Student's History of France_, p. 415). + +The manoeuvre is characterised by another historian as a "struggle of +narrow-minded fanaticism, allied to absolutely unscrupulous political +ambition, against all the learning and virtue which the French clergy +still possessed" (Chamberlain, _Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_, +Vol. II, p. 379). + +[16] Even before the age of the Revolution, Paris possessed many great +schools. The _College de France_ was founded in 1530; there was the +_College et Ecole de Chirurgie_, the _Jardin des Plantes_, the _Ecole +royale des Mines_, etc. (cf. Merz, _History of European Thought_, Vol. +I, p. 107). + +[17] Merz says of Newton: "In his own country that fruitful +co-operation which can only be secured by an academic organisation and +by endowment of research was wanting" (I, p. 99). As late as 1740 the +whole revenue of the Royal Society was only L232 _per annum_. + +[18] Morley, _Voltaire_, p. 41. + +[19] He published his _Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton_ in 1738. + +[20] Hoeffding, Vol. I, p. 481. + +[21] See note in Merz, Vol. I, p. 145. + +[22] Merz, Vol. I, p. 143. + +[23] The receipt and perusal of Rousseau's _Emile_, are said to have +interrupted the walk on one occasion, to the great astonishment of the +Koenigsbergers. + +[24] Pringle Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 26. + +[25] "Atheism is aristocratic," was the reply of Robespierre to one who +mocked at his _Etre Supreme_. + +[26] _Confessions_, Book XII. + +[27] Hoeffding, Vol. II, p. 9. + +[28] Fichte's word is _Anschauung_, for which the English language +possesses no exact equivalent. It "implies something akin, though +perhaps superior to, seeing or perceiving by means of the senses," and +it approaches less closely to "inspiration" than does the English word +"intuition." The term acquired a meaning somewhat akin to the _amor +intellectualis Dei_ of Spinoza, which we have met before. (See note in +Merz, III, p. 445.) + +[29] William James, _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 92. + +[30] Here again a certain ambiguity surrounds the German word. _Geist_ +is inadequately translated by either "mind" or "spirit": it comprises +the meaning of both words (cf. Merz, III, p. 466). + +[31] This does not mean that what is not good enough for philosophy is +good enough for religion. The idea behind Schleiermacher is that what +philosophy cannot sanction, religious experience _can_ sanction. And it +has to be remembered that, as a follower of Kant, he assigned very +definite limits to the powers of philosophy. He was not an +Hegelian--Hegel's and Schleiermacher's views of the religious problem +are quite incompatible--the one believed, the other did not believe, +that reason could solve that problem. + +[32] Kopp, _Geschichte der Chemie_, Vol. I, p. 442 (quoted by Merz, Vol. +I, p. 191). + +[33] Merz, Vol. I, p. 218. + +[34] According to one authority (Judd, in his _Coming of Evolution_) the +number of known species of plants and animals must be placed at 600,000 +(p. 10). + +[35] _Vestiges of Creation_, published anonymously in 1844, passed +through nine large editions by 1853. The author was Robert Chambers +(1802-71), a geologist. + +[36] _Life and Letters_, Vol. I, p. 168 (_vide_ Judd, _Coming of +Evolution_, p. 89). + +[37] As a matter of fact, biologists soon demanded more than even +Lyell's geology could give them. Recent discoveries about the nature of +matter have, however, further extended the possible age of our planet. + +[38] Darwin, _Life_, Vol. I, p. 93. + +[39] "If we wish to fix a definite point to describe as the end of the +idealistic period in Germany, no such distinctive event offers itself as +the French Revolution of July, 1830" (Lange, _History of Materialism_, +E.T., Vol. II, p. 245). + +[40] A famous book which, though negative in its conclusions, places its +author alongside Schleiermacher as one of the founders of the modern +science of Religious Psychology. + +[41] Balfour, _Theism and Humanism_, p. 36. + +[42] "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation +of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent +homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the +retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." + +[43] Spencer confessed that of the _Synthetic Philosophy_ "two volumes +are missing," the two important volumes on Inorganic Evolution, leading +to the evolution of the living and of the non-living (cf. criticisms by +Professor James Ward in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, Lecture IX). + +[44] For an instance of the masterly work turned out by this school and +of the attractiveness of their propaganda, read Huxley's lecture, "On a +Piece of Chalk," delivered to the working men of Norwich during the +meeting of the British Association in 1868. + +[45] For this famous encounter, see _Life of Huxley_, Vol. I, pp. +179-89, and _Life of J. R. Green_, pp. 44, 45. + +[46] As we shall subsequently find, this cosmic pessimism is less well +grounded than Huxley believed. Still, Spencer's own scientific +presuppositions were the same as Huxley's, so that the passage remains a +pertinent criticism of the Evolutionary Philosophy as elaborated by him. + +[47] It is instructive to observe that a similar note of latent +pessimism is struck by the last notable survivor of the School we have +endeavoured to describe. Viscount Morley at the end of his +_Recollections_ (1917), questioned as to the outcome of those generous +hopes entertained with such confidence by his contemporaries, is +compelled to ejaculate with philosophic brevity, _circumspice_, as he +contemplates a spectacle of unparalleled horror. + +[48] Storr, _Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century_, +p. 329. See which book for a valuable chapter upon Coleridge. + +[49] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 98. + +[50] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 309. + +[51] For this summary of Lotze's doctrine, see Merz, Vol. III, p. 615 +and ff. + +[52] Quoted by Ward in _Pluralism and Theism_, p. 103. For a brief yet +adequate treatment of Mach's criticisms see Hoeffding's _Modern +Philosophers_, pp. 115-21. + +[53] R. B. Perry, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 351. + +[54] It is impossible to go deeper into James' "theory of knowledge" +without using technical language. A few of his own phrases, however, may +help to elucidate things. "Abstract concepts ... are salient aspects of +our concrete experiences which we find it useful to single out" +(_Meaning of Truth_, p. 246). + +Elsewhere he speaks of them as things we have learned to "cut out" from +experience, as "flowers gathered," and as "moments dipped out from the +stream of time" (_A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 235). + +I owe these quotations to Perry, op. cit. + +[55] _Creative Evolution_, p. 325. + +[56] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 237. + +[57] _Creative Evolution_, p. 174. + +[58] i.e. Intellect is not (as it is generally represented to be) a +developed form of instinct, nor instinct an embryonic form of intellect. + +[59] The extraordinary and miraculous phenomena of instinct--especially +as celebrated by the distinguished French scientist Fabre--cannot be +rightly understood by trying to interpret them in terms of intellect. +This is to misread them completely. + +[60] Bergson's characterisation of Spencerian Evolutionism (_Creative +Evolution_, p. 391). + +[61] _Creative Evolution_, p. 286. + +[62] Other notable pluralists in England are F. C. S. Schiller and Dr. +MacTaggart. + +[63] The _logical_ conclusion, we say, though this may not be the +ultimate truth about the matter. The most attractive theories are often +the most superficial. + +[64] Professor Cunningham in Pearson's _Grammar of Science_, Part I, p. +356. + +[65] Quoted by W. C. D. Whetham in his _Recent Development of Physical +Science_, p. 280. No reference is given by him. + +[66] One theory attributes the existence of matter to occasional misfits +among these grains. + +[67] Quoted by Bishop Mercer. _Problem of Creation_, Appendix B. + +[68] In _Theism and Humanism_. + +[69] Mercer, op. cit., p. 106. + +[70] _Mechanism, Life, and Personality_ (1913), p. 81. + +[71] Op. cit. pp. 64, 66. + +[72] Professor J. Arthur Thomson, in an article entitled, "Is there one +Science of Nature?" (_Hibbert Journal_, Oct., 1911). + +[73] _The Science and Philosophy of the Organism_, Vol. II, p. 338. + +[74] Op. cit. p. 101. + +[75] Other names of distinguished scientists holding this view are: Sir +W. Crookes the Physicist and Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S., in England, Dr. +Hodgson and Prof. James Hyslop in America, Lombroso in Italy, Richet in +France. + +[76] From his _Duplik_. Quoted by Hoeffding, _History of Philosophy_, +Vol. II, p. 21. + +[77] F. H. Bradley on "Phenomenalism" (_Appearance and Reality_, p. +126). + +[78] Hoeffding, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 129. + +[79] Feuerbach, _Essence of Christianity_, p. 21. + +[80] We now learn that conceptions of space of a highly unorthodox +character are entertained by physicists and mathematicians, as the +result of recent researches in the sphere of the gravitation of light. + + + + +INDEX + + + Agnosticism, 92 + + Anti-clericalism, 43 + + Aquinas, 9 f., 30 _n._ + + Aristotle, 8, 136 + + Atomic theory, the, 49 + collapse of, 126 + + + Bacon, Lord, 16 f. + + Balfour, A. J., 105 f., 110, 128 + + Bergson, 115-121, 143 + + Berkeley, 55 + + Boutroux, 112 f., 143 + + Bradley, F. H., 104 f., 110, 122, 139 + + Bruno, 12, 25, 29 f., 140 + + Buechner, 86, 144 + + Buffon, 77 + + + Carlyle, Thomas, 38, 99-102 + + Coleridge, S. T., 98 f. + + Comte, 85, 89, 92 + + Copernicus, 11, 22, 25, 58 + + Cunningham, Prof., 127 + + Cusanus, 10 + + + Dalton, 49, 83, 126 + + Darwin, 80-83, 87 f. + + Descartes, 19-22, 26, 37, 43, 55, 74, 136 + + Design, Argument from, 87 f. + + Diderot, 45 f., 48, 141, 144 + + Driesch, 130 f. + + + Eckhart, 30 _n._ + + Encyclopaedia, The, 45 + + Electrons, 126 + + + Feuerbach, 85, 95 + + Fichte, 65-67 + + + Galileo, 12-15, 22, 55, 79, 136 + + Goethe, 30, 65 + + Green, T. H., 103 f. + + + Haeckel, 88 + + Haldane, Prof. J. S., 129, 132 + + Harvey, William, 19, 22 + + Hegel, 67-70 + + Heine, 85 + + Helmholtz, 75 + + Hobbes, 22, 26, 43, 55, 144 + + Holbach, 46-48, 141, 144 + + Hume, 55 f., 58 + + Huxley, 92 f., 95 + + + Inge, 38 _n._ + + + James, William, 114 f., 123 + + Jansenists, the, 43 _n._ + + Jesuits, the, 22 _n._, 26, 37, 43 _n._ + + Johnson, Dr., 47 + + + Kant, 53-61, 66, 70, 77, 85, 137, 141 + and Hegel compared, 69 + and Locke compared, 57 + and Rousseau compared, 65 + + Kepler, 15 + + + Lamarck, 77 + + La Mettrie, 45, 48, 74 + + Lange, 47, 84 + + Laplace, 48 f. + + Larmor, Prof. J., 127 + + Lavoisier, 49 f. + + Leibniz, 33-36, 41, 52 f., 122, 141 + + Leonardo da Vinci, 14, 16, 132 + + Lessing, 138 + + Locke, 52 f., 55 f. + + Lodge, Sir O., 134 + + Lotze, 107-109 + + Lyell, 78-80 + + + Mach, 110-114, 143 + + Malthus' _Essay on Population_, 80 + + Meyer, 75 + + McTaggart, 123 _n._ + + Modernism, 109 + + Monads, 35 f., 122 + + + "Natural Selection," 81, 87 + + Newton, 23-26, 43, 44 _n._, 48, 82, 136 + + Nietzsche, 94, 96 f. + + + Paley, 87 + + Pascal, 22, 36-41 + + Pearson, Prof. Karl, 1 + + Pessimism, 95 + + Positivism, 85, 95 + + + Ritschl, 109 + + Rousseau, 54 _n._, 62-65, 80 + + + _Sartor Resartus_, 100 + + Schelling, 65 + + Schiller, 65 + + Schiller, F. C. S., 123 _n._ + + Schleider, 75 + + Schleiermacher, 70-72 + + Spencer, Herbert, 35, 77, 89-92, 122 + + Spinoza, 28-33, 41, 52 f., 67, 141 + + "Spiritualism," 133-136 + + Stephen, Leslie, 92 + + + Tait, Prof., 128 + + Thomson, Prof. J. A., 130 _n._ + + + Voltaire, 44 f. + + + Wallace, Alfred Russell, 81 f. + + Ward, Prof. James, 26 _n._, 91 _n._, 123 + + Whoeler, 74 + + + Zeno's paradox, 117 + + + + + Printed in Great Britain at + _The Mayflower Press, Plymouth._ William Brandon & Son, Ltd. + + + + +TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: + + +Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_. + +Punctuation has been corrected without note. + +Spelling, grammatical and typographical errors have been corrected in +the text: + + Page 68: "understand" changed to "understands" + Page 70: "fom" changed to "from" + Page 128: "subjectly" changed to "subjectively" + Page 138: "Odyssies" changed to "Odysseys" + +Inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the +original. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Religion and Science, by John Charlton Hardwick + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RELIGION AND SCIENCE *** + +***** This file should be named 35772.txt or 35772.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/7/7/35772/ + +Produced by David E. 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