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diff --git a/35354-h/35354-h.html b/35354-h/35354-h.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e029d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/35354-h/35354-h.html @@ -0,0 +1,60290 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + <title> + Moral Theology, by John A. Mchugh and Charles J. Callan—A Project Gutenberg eBook + </title> + <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> + <style type="text/css"> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .51em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .49em; + text-indent: 1em; +} + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} +.p0 {text-indent: 0em;} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; +} + +hr.chap {width: 65%; margin-left: 17.5%; margin-right: 17.5%;} +@media print { hr.chap {display: none; visibility: hidden;} } + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:smaller; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; } + +.small {font-size: 0.8em;} + + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook ofMoral Theology, by John A. McHugh and +Charles J. Callan</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Moral Theology<br /> +A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: John A. McHugh<br /> +Charles J. Callan</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: February 22, 2011 [EBook #35354]<br /> +[Last Updated: March 10, 2022]<br /></div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: David McClamrock</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL THEOLOGY ***</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h1 class="nobreak" id="MORAL_THEOLOGY">MORAL THEOLOGY<br /> +<span class="small">A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern +Authorities</span></h1> +</div> +<p class="center p0">BY<br /> +JOHN A. MCHUGH, O.P.<br /> +AND<br /> +CHARLES J. CALLAN, O.P.</p> + +<p class="center p0 p2">REVISED AND ENLARGED BY +EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P.</p> + +<p class="center p0 p2">NEW YORK CITY<br /> +JOSEPH F. WAGNER, INC.<br /> +LONDON: B. HERDER</p> + +<p class="center p0 p2">Nihil Obstat<br /> +ELWOOD FERRER SMITH, O.P., S.T.M.<br /> +BENJAMIN URBAN FAY, O.P., S.T.LR.</p> + +<p class="center p0 p2">Imprimi Potest<br /> +VERY REV. WILLIAM D. MARRIN, O.P., P.G., S.T.M.<br /> +Provincial</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="center p0 p2">Nihil Obstat<br /> +JOHN A. GOODWINE, J.C.D.<br /> +Censor Librorum</p> + +<p class="center p0">Imprimatur<br /> ++ FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN<br /> +Archbishop of New York</p> + +<p class="center p0">New York, May 24, 1958</p> + +<p>The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book +or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is +contained therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and +imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed.</p> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="transnote center p0">[Transcriber’s note: References to the Code of Canon Law in this work +are to the 1917 version of the Code, later superseded by the 1983 +version.]</p> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="center p0 p2">All Rights Reserved by Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York<br /><br /> +PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</h2> +</div> + +<p>The purpose of the present work is to give a complete and comprehensive +treatise on Catholic Moral Theology, that is, on that branch of sacred +learning which treats of the regulation of human conduct in the light +of reason and revealed truth. This new work strives to deal with the +subject as a systematic and orderly whole, and is based throughout on +the principles, teaching and method of St. Thomas Aquinas, while +supplementing that great Doctor of the Church from the best modern +authorities. Needless to say, there are many questions and problems +connected with modern life that did not exist when the great classic +works on Moral Theology were written, and to these naturally special +attention has been given in the treatment that follows.</p> + +<p>Nowadays, since the appearance of the New Code and of many special +works on Canon Law, it would be a mistake to encumber the pages of a +work like the present one with canonical questions of interest only to +the specialist, and which are ably and abundantly treated in fine +commentaries on the Code that are already available. Likewise, it would +be an error to treat here matter pertinent only to Dogmatic Theology or +History. All digressions, therefore, into alien fields have been +avoided in this work, with the result that a greater number of useful +moral questions have been herein considered.</p> + +<p>But not only is it necessary to avoid irrelevant subjects, but it is +also needful not to sacrifice essentials for accidentals in any work of +this kind. It is the fault of too many textbooks on Moral Theology to +stress controversies, cite authors, and quote opinions, at the expense +of the principles and reasons that govern and explain the teaching +given. This work eschews that method, and is at pains everywhere, first +of all, to lay the foundations on which the superstructure is to be +built, namely, the definitions and rules that are presupposed to moral +judgments and conclusions. Obviously, this is a more logical way of +proceeding, and it consequently enables the student much more easily to +understand and retain the matter studied, since he can thus reason +questions out for himself. Moreover, such a method makes for brevity +and renders it possible, as said above, to treat more subjects than +could otherwise be treated; it makes it possible to condense the matter +of many pages of larger and less accessible works into brief and terse +paragraphs. But from this it should not be gathered that the work which +follows aims to present Moral Theology in a dryly scientific fashion. +On the contrary, it has been our endeavor to treat the matter in a way +that is at once clear, solid, comprehensive and interesting. Since the +general and the abstract do not make the same strong impression as the +particular and the concrete, laws and axioms are copiously illustrated +throughout with pertinent and practical examples that often amount to +brief _casus conscientiae_, thus combining the theory and the practice +of Moral Theology.</p> + +<p>It would be a mistake to think that, while Moral Theology is a +technical and scientific treatise on human conduct, it deals +exclusively or primarily with vice and sin, and that it is intended +only to enable the priest rightly to administer the Sacrament of +Penance, distinguishing between the various classes of sins and their +consequences. Of course, it does all this, but it should do much more; +for it has also a much higher purpose, which is to enable man, not only +to know what is forbidden and how he may escape from moral disease and +death, but also to understand what are his duties and how he may live +the life of grace and virtue. The subject is indeed more positive than +negative, and it should be discussed accordingly. Thus, far from being +useful merely to confessors as a guide by which they may detect and +distinguish mortal and venial sins and the higher and lower degrees of +culpability, Moral Theology in its broader aspect should be of the +greatest service likewise to the individual in forming his own habits +and character, and in particular to those who have the guidance of +others, whether in or out of the confessional, such as pastors, +preachers, teachers, and the like. Consequently, the present work has +been written with a view to the homiletic and pastoral functions of the +priest, as well as those that pertain strictly to the administration of +the Sacraments.</p> + +<p>Heretofore works on Moral Theology in English have been altogether too +few or too fragmentary, whereas they have been abundant in the +vernaculars of Continental Europe—German, French, Spanish, Italian, +etc. This does not mean that the present work is intended to replace +the Latin text-books used in our seminaries, but rather that it should +enable students and priests to get a more thorough and ready knowledge +of an all-important subject, and to adapt it more easily to the varying +needs of the ministry.</p> + +<p>The section of this work on Law has been carefully read by two eminent +civil lawyers.</p> + +<p class="right p0">THE AUTHORS. May 10, 1929.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="REVISORS_NOTE">REVISOR’S NOTE</h2> +</div> + +<p>This is a revision, not a rewriting. Various deletions and additions +have been made with the intent of bringing the work up to date within +the scope of the original plan and methods of the authors. In this way +it has been possible to preserve the features that have made this +manual a standard guide for the past thirty years.</p> + +<p class="right p0">EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P., S.T.LR., S.T.D. Washington, D.C., June 8, 1958</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> +</div> + +<p>[Volume I of print edition, through section 1625]</p> + +<p>PREFACE</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION</p> + +<p>Definition of Moral Theology (1-3).—The Objects of Moral Theology +(4-5).—The Sources of Moral Theology (6-12).—The Methods of Moral +Theology (13-14).—The History of Moral Theology (15-16).—The Division +of Moral Theology (17-18).</p> + +<p>PART I. GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY</p> + +<p>Question I</p> + +<p>THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE LAST END OF MAN</p> + +<p>The Existence of the Last End (19).—The Nature of the Last End +(20).—The Attainment of the Last End (21).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. ACTS AS HUMAN</p> + +<p>Introduction (22).—Definition (23).—Knowledge Requisite for a Human +Act (24-33).—Consent Requisite for a Human Act (34-39).—Obstacles to +Consent (40-55).—Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts (56-62).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. ACTS AS MORAL</p> + +<p>Introduction (63).—-Definition (64-69).—The Sources of Morality +(70-75).—Good Acts (76-78).—Bad Acts (79-81).—Indifferent Acts +(82-86).—Perfect and Essential Goodness (87-88).—Morality of the +External Act (89-93).—Morality of the Act Indirectly Willed +(94-95).—Morality of the Consequences of an Act (96).—Imputability +(97-105).</p> + +<p>Art. 4. ACTS AS MERITORIOUS</p> + +<p>Introduction (106).—Definition (107).—Divisions of Merit (108-115).</p> + +<p>Art. 5. THE PASSIONS</p> + +<p>Introduction (116).—Definition (117).—Division (118-120).—Moral +Value of the Passions (121-131).</p> + +<p>Question II</p> + +<p>GOOD AND BAD HABITS</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION (132)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. HABITS IN GENERAL</p> + +<p>Definition (133).—Division (134-136).—Strengthening and Weakening of +Habits (137-139).—Habits and Morality (140-141).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. GOOD HABITS, OR VIRTUES</p> + +<p>Definition (142).—Division (143-152).—Properties of the Virtues +(153-158).—Complements of the Virtues (159-166).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. BAD HABITS, OR VICES</p> + +<p>Definition (167).—Divisions (168).—Mortal Sin (169-179).—Venial Sin +(180-184).—Imperfections (185).—Change in the Gravity of Moral +Defects (186-196).—The Distinctions of Sins (197-219).—Comparison of +Sins (220-229).—The Subjects of Sins (230-245).—The Causes of Sin +(246-267).—The Motives of Sin (268-271).—The Results of Sin (272-283).</p> + +<p>Question III</p> + +<p>LAW</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION</p> + +<p>Art. 1. LAW IN GENERAL</p> + +<p>Definition (285).—Division (286-287).—Collision of Laws +(288-292).—The Basis of All Laws (293-294).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. THE NATURAL LAW</p> + +<p>Meaning (295-296).—Division (297-304).—Properties (305-327).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW</p> + +<p>Meaning (328-330).—Division (331).—The Mosaic Law (332-345).—The Law +of the New Testament (346-369).</p> + +<p>Art. 4. HUMAN LAW</p> + +<p>Definition (370).—Division (371).—Qualities (372-374).—Obligation of +Human Laws (375-384).—Interpretation of Law (385-386).—Those Subject +to Law (387-388).—Change of Law (389-390).—The Law of Custom +(391-400).—Dispensation (401-410).—Epieikeia (411-417).</p> + +<p>Art. 5. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW</p> + +<p>Introduction (418-419).—General Law of the Church (420-422).— +Lawgivers in the Church (423-424).—Subject-Matter of Church Law +(425-426).—Those Bound by General Laws (427-434).—Those Bound by +Particular Laws (435-446).—Promulgation (447-449).—Irritant Laws +(450-458).—Laws Based on Presumption (459-461).—Fulfillment of Law +(462-482).—Interpretation (433-486).—Cessation of Obligation +(487-499).—Cessation of Law (500-505).—Custom (506-513).—Laws in a +Wide Sense (514-541).</p> + +<p>Art. 6. CIVIL LAW</p> + +<p>Meaning (542).—Origin (543-545).—Subject-Matter (546-549).—Those +Subject to Civil Law (550).—The Obligation of Civil Law (551-556).— +Special Kinds of Laws (557-572).—Other Questions (573).</p> + +<p>Question IV</p> + +<p>CONSCIENCE</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION (574)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE</p> + +<p>Definition (575).—Division (576-579).—Obligation of Conscience +(580-587).—Results of Conscience (588-592).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. A GOOD CONSCIENCE</p> + +<p>Introduction (593).—Definitions (594).—Divisions (595-596).—The Lax +Conscience (597-606).—The Scrupulous Conscience (607-613).— +Scrupulosity (614-635).—Practical Conclusions (636-639).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE</p> + +<p>Introduction (640).—Necessity of Certitude (641-642).—Kinds of +Certitude (643-653).—An Uncertain Conscience (654-655).—Doubt and +Suspicion (656-661).—Opinion (662-671).—The Moral Systems +(672-675).—Tutiorism (676-679).—Laxism (680-681).—The Other Systems +(682).-Probabiliorism (683-687).—Equiprobabilism (688-700).— +Probabilism (701-730).—Compensationism (731-738).—Practical +Conclusions (739-742).</p> + +<p>PART II. SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION (743)</p> + +<p>Question I. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN</p> + +<p>THE INFUSED VIRTUES (744-745)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF FAITH</p> + +<p>Introduction (746-749).—The Meaning of Faith (750-753).—The Object of +Faith (754-781).—The Acts of Faith (782-796).—The Habit of Faith +(797-807).—The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge (808-811).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. THE SINS AGAINST FAITH</p> + +<p>Introduction (812).—The Sin of Unbelief (813-825).—Heresy +(826-834).—Apostasy (835-839).—The Sin of Doubt (840-846).—Credulity +and Rationalism (847).—Dangers to Faith (848).—Dangerous Reading +(849-866).—Dangerous Schools (867-874).—Dangerous Marriages +(875-881).—Dangerous Communication (882-888).—The Sin of Blasphemy +(887-903).—Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness (904-912).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH</p> + +<p>Introduction (913).—The Commandment of Knowledge of Faith (914-924).— +The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith (925-937).—The Negative +Commandment of External Profession of Faith (938-943).—Dangers of +Profession of Unbelief (944).—Forbidden Societies (945-955).— +Communication in Worship (956-975).-Cooperation in Religious Activities +(976-986).—The Affirmative Commandment of External Profession of Faith +(987-1008).</p> + +<p>Art. 4. THE VIRTUE OF HOPE</p> + +<p>Definition (1009-1017).—The Object of Hope (1018-1026).—The +Excellence of Hope (1027-1035).—The Subject of Hope (1030-1040).—The +Gift of Fear of the Lord (1041-1058).—The Sins against Hope +(1059-1091).—The Commandments of Hope and of Fear (1092-1104).</p> + +<p>Art. 5. THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY</p> + +<p>Definition (1105-1114).—The Excellence of Charity (1115-1120).— +Production of Charity (1121-1132).—The Object of Charity +(1133-1157).—The Order of Charity (1158-1182).—The Acts of Charity +(1183-1192).</p> + +<p>Art. 6. THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY</p> + +<p>Internal Effects of Charity (1193).—Joy (1194).—Peace (1195-1197).— +Reconciliation (1198-1204).—Mercy (1205-1209).—External Effects of +Charity (1210).—Beneficence (1211-1215).—Almsgiving (1216-1257).— +Fraternal Correction (1258-1294).</p> + +<p>Art. 7. THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY</p> + +<p>Introduction (1295).—Hate (1296).—Hatred of God (1297-1303).—Hatred +of Creatures (1304-1311).—Gravity of the Sin of Hatred (1312-1316). +—Species of the Sin of Hatred (1317-1319).—The Sin of Sloth +(1320-1325).—Laziness (1326).—Lukewarmness (1327).—The Sin of Envy +(1328-1331).—Emulation (1332).—Jealousy (1333).—Fear (1334).— +Indignation (1335-1336).—Gravity of the Sin of Envy (1337-1344).— +Means of Overcoming Envy (1345-1346).</p> + +<p>Art. 8. THE SINS AGAINST PEACE</p> + +<p>Introduction (1347).—Discord (1348-1354).—Contention (1355-1362).— +Acts of Sin against Peace (1363).—Schism (1364-1375).—War +(1376-1427).—Fighting (1428-1434).—Duelling (1435-1439).—Sedition +(1440-1443).</p> + +<p>Art. 9. THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE</p> + +<p>Introduction (1444).—Scandal (1445-1446).—Definition of Scandal +(1447).—Causes of Scandal (1448-1458).—Results of Scandal +(1459-1464).—Sinfulness of Scandal (1465-1474).—Persons Scandalized +(1475-1476).—Duty of Avoiding Scandal (1477-1487).—Duty of Repairing +Scandal (1488-1492).—Denial of Sacraments in Case of Scandal +(1493-1494).—Seduction (1495-1505).—Cooperation in Sin (1506-1508).— +Kinds of Cooperation (1508-1512).—Sinfulness of Cooperation +(1513-1514).—Lawfulness of Material Cooperation (1515-1525).— +Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation (1526-1527).—Special Cases of +Cooperation (1528).-Cooperation in Reading Matter (1529-1530).—In +Dances and Plays (1531-1532).—In Selling (1533-1536).—In Providing +Food and Drink (1537-1539).—In Renting (1540-1541).—In Service +(1542-1544).—Duties of the Confessor as Regards Cooperation +(1545-1546).</p> + +<p>Art 10. THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY</p> + +<p>Introduction (1547-1552).—The Commandment of Love of God +(1553-1560).—The Commandment of Love of Self (1561-1578).—The +Commandment of Love of Neighbor (1579-1584).—Fulfillment of the +Commandments of Charity (1585-1608).</p> + +<p>Art 11. THE GIFT OF WISDOM</p> + +<p>Introduction (1609).—The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom (1610-1614).— +The Persons who Possess Wisdom (1615-1618).—The Beatitude and the +Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom (1619-1620).—The Sins Opposed to +Wisdom (1621-1625).</p> + +<p>[Volume II of print edition, section 1626 to end]</p> + +<p>Question II. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (The Moral Virtues)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE</p> + +<p>Definition (1627).—Objects (1628, 1629).—Certainty of Prudence +(1630).—Excellence (1631, 1632).—Acts (1633).—Qualities (1634).— +Parts (1635, 1636).—Integral Parts (1637, 1638).—Subjective Parts +(1639-1645).—Potential Parts (1646, 1647).—Persons Who Possess +Prudence (1648-1656).—Growth and Decay of Prudence (1657).—The +Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Counsel (1662).—The Sins +Against Prudence (1663).—Imprudence (1664-1666).—Haste (1667).— +Thoughtlessness.—Inconstancy (1669).—Causes of These Sins (1670).— +Negligence (1671-1673).—False Prudence (1674).—The Prudence of the +Flesh (1675, 1676).—Astuteness, Trickery, Fraud (1677-1680).— +Solicitude (1681-1685).—Avarice, a Cause of Sins Against Prudence +(1686).—The Commandments of Prudence (1687).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE</p> + +<p>Introduction (1688).—The Nature of Justice (1689-1700).—Division +(1701-1708).—The Object of Justice (1709-1713).—Comparison of Justice +and Other Virtues (1714-1718).—Injustice (1719-1726).—Judgment +(1727-1744).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE AND COMMUTATIVE +JUSTICE</p> + +<p>Subjective Parts of a Virtue (1745).—Distributive and Commutative +Justice Compared (1746, 1747).—The Objects of Commutative Justice +(1748-1750).—Restitution (1751-1761).-The Roots of Restitution +(1762-1777).—Restitution for Cooperation in Injustice (1778-1785).— +The Circumstances of Restitution (1786-1796).—Causes Excusing from +Restitution (1797-1801).—Some Special Cases of Restitution (1802, +1803).</p> + +<p>Art. 4. THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE</p> + +<p>The Vice against Distributive Justice (1804-1814).-The Vices against +Commutative Justice (1815).—Homicide (1816-1851).-Suicide +(1852-1861).—Accidental Homicide (1862-1865).—Bodily Injury +(1866-1871).—Titles to Property (1872-1876).—Contracts +(1877-1889).—Theft and Robbery (1890-1919).—Lawful Occupation +(1920-1926).—Occult Compensation (1927-1938).-Judicial Injustice +(1939).—In Judges (1940-1963).—In Accusers (1964-1974).—In +Defendants (1975-1983).—In Witnesses (1984-1994).—In Lawyers +(1995-2008).—Unjust Words (2009).—Contumely (2010-2027).—Defamation +(2028-2075).-Cooperation in Defamation (2076-2084).—Restitution for +Defamation (2085-2102).—Whispering (2103-2105).—Derision +(2106-2110).—Cursing (2111-2119).—Murmuring (2120).—Fraud in +Contracts (2121, 2122).—In Sales (2123-2133).—Trading (2134, +2135).—Usury (2136).—Other Frauds (2137, 2138).</p> + +<p>Art. 5. THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE +OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES</p> + +<p>The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice (2139, 2140).—The Potential Parts +of Justice (2141-2144).—The Virtue of Religion (2145-2148).—The +Internal Acts of Religion (2149).—Devotion (2150-2152).—Prayer +(2153-2169).—Distractions (2170-2174).—The External Acts of Religion +(2175).—Adoration (2176, 2177).—Sacrifice (2178-2182).—Offerings +(2183, 2184).—Contributions (2185-2190).—Vows (2191-2225).—Cessation +of Vows (2226-2243).—Other External Acts of Religion (2244).—Oaths +(2245-2262).—Adjuration (2263-2268).—Divine Praises (2269-2272).—The +Sins against Religion (2273).—Superstition (2274-2276).—Idolatry +(2277-2281).—Divination (2282-2289).—Vain Observance (2290-2298).— +Irreligiousness (2299).—Temptation of God (2300-2307).—Sacrilege +(2308-2316).—Simony (2317-2334).—Sinfulness of Simony (2335-2343).</p> + +<p>Art. 6. THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE GIFT OF PIETY; +THE COMMANDMENTS</p> + +<p>Piety (2344-2350).—Reverence (2351-2354).—Obedience (2355-2372).— +Gratitude (2373-2380).—Vengeance (2381-2384).—Truthfulness +(2385-2388).—Lying (2389-2397).—Mental Reservation (2398-2402).— +Simulation (2403, 2404).—Hypocrisy (2405).—Braggadocio and Irony +(2406).—Breach of Promise (2407).—Violation of Secret (2408-2420).— +Affability (2421-2423).—Liberality (2424-2429).—Equity (2430-2432).— +The Gift of Piety (2433).—The Commandments of Justice (2434-2436).</p> + +<p>Art. 7. THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE</p> + +<p>Nature (2437-2441).—Martyrdom (2442-2445).—The Opposite Vices +(2446).—The Parts of Fortitude (2447).—Greatness of Soul (2448, +2449).—Presumption, Ambition and Vanity (2450).—Pusillanimity +(2451).—Greatness of Deed, Meanness and Vulgarity (2452).—Patience +(2453, 2454).—Stolidity and Impatience (2455).—Steadfastness, +Effeminacy and Pertinacity (2456).—The Complements of Fortitude +(2457).—The Commandments of Fortitude (2458-2460).</p> + +<p>Art. 8. THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE</p> + +<p>Nature (2461-2463).—The Opposite Vices (2464).—The Parts of +Temperance (2465).—Abstemiousness (2466, 2467).—Fasting and +Abstinence (2468, 2469).—The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness +(2470).—Gluttony (2471-2473).—Sobriety (2474, 2475).—The Sins +against Sobriety (2476).—Drunkenness (2477-2485).—Purity (2486, +2487).—Virginity (2488-2491).—Impurity (2492-2496).—Temptations to +Impurity (2497-2503).—Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity (2504).—Impure +Thoughts (2505, 2506).—Impure Rejoicing (2507).—Impure Desire (2508, +2509).—Lewdness (2510-2514).—Sinfulness of Lewdness (2515-2518).— +Moral Species of Lewdness (2519).—The Consummated Sins of Impurity +(2520-2522).—Fornication (2523-2528).—Defloration and Rape +(2529).—Adultery (2530).—Incest (2531, 2532).—Carnal Sacrilege +(2533).—Sins against Nature (2534).—Pollution (2535-2538).—The +Sinfulness of Pollution (2539-2541).—Penalties (2542).—The Potential +Parts of Temperance (2543).—Continence (2544).—Meekness (2545).— +Anger (2546-2549).—Sinful Indulgence (2550).—Clemency (2551, +2552).—Humility (2553-2556).—Pride (2557-2560).—Abjectness +(2561).—Studiousness (2562).—Curiosity and Negligence (2563, +2564).—Modesty (2565).—Decorum (2566).—Modest Relaxation (2567, +2568).—Modesty in Style and Dress (2569, 2570).—Complements of +Temperance (2571).—Commandments of Temperance (2572).</p> + +<p>Question III</p> + +<p>THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION (2573)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH</p> + +<p>General Duties of the Faithful (2574).—First Precept of the Church: +Sanctification of the Lord’s Day (2575).—Hearing Mass (2576-2578).— +Servile Works (2579-2582).—Gravity of the First Precept (2583).— +Excuses (2584, 2585).—Second Precept: Abstinence (2586, 2587).— +Fasting (2588, 2589).—Third Precept: Yearly Confession (2590, +2591).—Fourth Precept: Easter Duty (2592, 2593).—Fifth and Sixth +Precepts (2594).—Laws on the Index and Cremation (2595).—The Special +Duties of Clerics (2596).—Vocation (2597, 2598).—Positive Duties of +Clerics (2599).—The Divine Office (2600, 2601).—Celibacy (2602).— +Negative Duties of Clerics (2603).—Trading (2604).—Stocks and Bonds +(2605).—Duties of Clerical Superiors (2606).—Duties of Pastors +(2607).—Charity to the Poor (2608-2610).—Special Duties of Religious +(2611).—The Vows (2612).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY</p> + +<p>Husband and Wife (2613).—The conjugal Debt (2614-2617).—Morality in +Marriage (2618, 2619).—Contraception and Onanism (2620).— +Birth-Control (2621, 2622).—Cooperation with Contraception (2623).— +Recapitulation (2624).—Regulae pro Confessariis (2625).—The Duty of +Conjugal Companionship and Assistance (2626).—The Obligation of +Marrying (2627).—The Duties of Engaged Persons (2628, 2629).—The +Duties of Parents (2630, 2631).—Sex Education (2632).—The Duties of +Children (2633).—The Duties of Other Relatives (2634).—The Duties of +Superiors (2635).—The Duties of Subjects (2636).—Taxes (2637-2642).— +Voting (2643-2645).—The Duties of Employers (2646, 2647).—The Duties +of Employees (2648).—Labor Disputes (2649).—Employment (2650).—The +Duties of Certain Professions (2651).</p> + +<p>Question IV</p> + +<p>THE DUTIES OF MEN IN THE USE OF THE SACRAMENTS</p> + +<p>INTRODUCTION (2652, 2653)</p> + +<p>Art. 1. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL: THE SACRAMENTALS</p> + +<p>Nature of a Sacrament (2654).—Matter and Form (2655-2660).—Necessity +of the Sacraments (2661-2663).—The Minister of the Sacraments +(2664).—Requisites for Valid Ministration (2665-2668).—For Lawful +Ministration (2669, 2670).—The Recipient of the Sacraments; Requisites +for Valid Reception (2671-2674).—Requirements for Lawful Reception +(2675).—Obligations of the Minister in Reference to the Recipient +(2676-2682).—Obligations of the Recipient in Reference to the Minister +(2683).—The Sacramentals (2684).</p> + +<p>Art. 2. BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS</p> + +<p>Introduction (2685).—The Sacrament of Baptism (2686).—Solemn and +Private Baptism (2687).—Duties of Pastors (2685).—Duties of Parents +and Guardians (2689).—Duties of Sponsors (2690, 2691).—Duties of +Adult Recipients (2692).—Duties of the Minister (2693).—The Sacrament +of Confirmation (2694).—The Minister (2695).—The Recipient (2696).— +The Sponsors (2697).—The Pastor (2698).—The Sacrament of the +Eucharist (2699).—Matter and Form of the Eucharist (2700).—The +Minister of Consecration (2701, 2702).—The Minister of Communion +(2703).—The Communicant (2704).—Worthy Communion (2705).—Frequent +Communion (2706).—Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors (2707).—The +Custody and Worship of the Eucharist (2708).—The Sacrifice of the +Mass; the Celebrant (2709).—The Obligation of Saying Mass (2710).— +Dispositions for Celebration of Mass (2711).—The Circumstances of Mass +(2712).—Interruption of Mass (2713).—Application of Mass (2714, +2715).—Stipends (2716).</p> + +<p>Art. 3. REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION</p> + +<p>Introduction (2717).—The Virtue of Repentance (2718-2726).—The +Sacrament of Penance (2727, 2728).—Contrition (2729-2735).—Resolution +of Amendment (2736).—Confession (2737-2744).—Satisfaction +(2745-2749).—The Minister (2750).—Jurisdiction (2751, 2752).— +Reserved Cases (2753, 2754).—Absolution without Jurisdiction (2755).— +Duties of the Confessor before Confession (2756).—Duties of the +Confessor as Judge (2757-2761).—Duties of the Confessor as Physician +(2762).—Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide (2763).—Duties +of the Confessor after Confession (2764).—Reparation of Defects (2765, +2766).—The Seal of Confession (2767, 2768).—Abuses of Confession +(2769-2773).—The Sacrament of Extreme Unction (2774).—Duties of the +Recipient and the Minister of Extreme Unction (2775).</p> + +<p>Art. 4. HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY</p> + +<p>Introduction (2776).—The Sacrament of Orders (2777).—Distinctions of +Orders (2778).—The Hierarchy (2779).—The Matter and Form of Orders +(2780).—The Minister of Ordination (2781, 2782).—The Recipient of +Orders (2783-2785).—Registration of Ordinations (2786).—The Sacrament +of Matrimony (2787, 2788).—The Elements of Matrimony as a Contract +(2789-2793).—The Elements of the Sacrament (2794).—Duties in +Reference to Marriage (2795).—Engagement (2796-2798).—Duties to +Parents and to Children (2799, 2800).—Pre-Nuptial Investigations +(2801).—Examination of the Parties by the Pastor (2802, 2803).— +Matrimonial Impediments (2804, 2805).—Impedient Impediments +(2806-2809).—Diriment Impediments (2810-2819).—Dispensations and +Banns (2820).—After the Examination (2821).—Instruction of the Couple +(2822-2824).—Religious Preparation for Marriage (2825).—The +Celebration of Marriage (2826-2829).—Validation (2830).—Divorce and +Separation (2831).</p> + +<p>APPENDICES [placed at end of Volume I in print edition]</p> + +<p>I. SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS</p> + +<p>II. THE “ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT”</p> + +<p>INDEX TO VOLUMES I AND II</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="MORAL_THEOLOGY2">MORAL THEOLOGY<br />A Complete Course</h2> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION</h2> +</div> + +<p>1. Definition.—Moral Theology is defined: (a) etymologically, as the +study of God, considered as the beginning and the end of man’s moral +life, i.e., of those acts that proceed from reason and will; (b) +scientifically, as that part of Sacred Theology which treats of God as +our Last End, and of the means by which we may tend to Him.</p> + +<p>2. Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or +habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human +conduct as directed by reason to man’s natural end, for Moral Theology +uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man’s supernatural +end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles +revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs +from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of +morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals +also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not +self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions +for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general +conclusions.</p> + +<p>3. Relation of Moral Theology to Dogmatic Theology.—(a) They do not +differ as two distinct sciences, for the main object, in the light of +which all else is studied, is the same in both—viz., God. (b) They do +differ as two quasi-integral parts or branches of the same science, +Dogma being concerned more with the speculative, and Moral with the +practical aspects of theology. Dogmatic Theology is the more important +of the two, as treating more directly on divine things and as being the +basis of Moral Theology.</p> + +<p>In Dogma, God Himself is considered in His own nature and creatures as +they proceed from Him as from an exemplary and efficient cause, or +Creator. Moral Theology continues the pursuit of knowledge of God, +concentrating upon Him as He is the Final Cause of things. Creatures +emanate from God by way of creation, and this is part of the +subject-matter of Dogma; but creatures return to Him, each in its own +proper way by virtue of its nature created by God and directed by His +Providence and Government, and this return of creatures to God +constitutes the general subject-matter of Moral Theology. As Divine +Providence and Government are continuations of His Creation, Moral +Theology continues to study and to unfold the implications of Dogma’s +consideration of God as Creator. God is known to have created as an +Intelligent Being ordering His handiwork to Himself as end. His special +masterpiece, man, special because he is made to the Image of God, +returns to God in a special way proper to him as an Image, i.e., by way +of acts of his intellect and will guided and moved by Divine Providence +and Predestination. It is of this special way of returning to God by +man, His image, that Moral Theology treats. Thus it adds to and +perfects Dogmatic Theology, enriching our knowledge of God by way of +making explicit the implications of Divine Creation and Providence to +His image, man.</p> + +<p>4. The Objects of Moral Theology.—(a) The central theme or object of +Moral Theology, which is considered for its own sake and to which all +else is secondary (_objectum formale quod_), is God as the supernatural +End or Destiny of man.</p> + +<p>(b) The secondary object (_objectum materiale_) is the means by which +one is advanced towards one’s Last End (such as human acts, virtue, +grace, the Sacraments), or the obstacles which hinder one from +attaining that End (such as vice, temptation, etc.).</p> + +<p>(c) The medium through which the above objects are known (_objectum +formale quo_) is the light of natural reason illuminated by faith +studying the sources of divine revelation and deducing conclusions from +doctrines revealed by God.</p> + +<p>5. Hence Moral Theology includes: (a) the revealed doctrines concerning +man’s destiny and duty that are contained in the written and oral Word +of God and as interpreted by their custodian, the Catholic Church; (b) +the conclusions that are contained in revelation; (c) the duties of man +to human laws that are based on the divine natural or positive law; (d) +the opinions of theologians on matters that are disputed, as in the +controversy about the systems of conscience.</p> + +<p>6. The Sources of Moral Theology, therefore, are: (a) Holy scripture; +(b) tradition; (c) the decisions of Popes, Councils, and Congregations, +Laws, etc.; (d) the authority of Doctors and theologians; (e) natural +reason.</p> + +<p>7. Holy scripture.—“All scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to +teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice” (II Tim., iii. +16). (a) Thus, the deeds narrated in scripture contain lessons for our +instruction; but not all of them, even though they be concerned with +holy men, are offered for our imitation. (b) The laws of the Old +Testament known as ceremonial (such as the rite of circumcision), and +those called judicial (such as the prohibition against the taking of +interest), are no longer obligatory; but the moral precepts, such as +those found in the Decalogue, always remain in force. (c) The +ordinances of the New Testament are of three kinds: the Gospel +counsels, which are not laws, but invitations to a higher practice of +virtue than is necessary for salvation (e.g., the advice of our Lord +that one sell all and give to the poor); the laws of the New Testament, +which are the commands that it imposes for all times (such as the +precepts that one believe the Gospel message, receive Baptism, hear the +Church, etc.); temporary regulations, which are those dispositions that +were made only for passing circumstances (such as the prohibition +issued by the Apostles against the eating of animals that had been +suffocated).</p> + +<p>8. Tradition.—Tradition contains those doctrines concerning faith and +morals, not found in scripture, that were given orally by Christ or +inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that have been handed down from one +generation to another in the Catholic Church.</p> + +<p>Tradition becomes known to us: (a) through the teaching of the Church +expressed by her solemn or ordinary magisterium; (b) through the +writings of the Fathers of the Church; (c) through the practice of the +Church expressed in her universal customs and laws; (d) through the +worship of the Church expressed in her universal forms of prayer and +liturgical observance.</p> + +<p>9. Decisions.—In addition to divine tradition just spoken of, Moral +Theology uses: (a) Apostolic tradition, which comes down from the +Apostles, but whose subject-matter is not a teaching revealed to them, +but an ordinance which they themselves made as rulers of the Church +(e.g., the law that Sunday be sanctified as the Lord’s day); (b) +ecclesiastical tradition, which contains regulations made by the +authorities in the Church and handed down to succeeding times (e.g., +the introduction of certain days of feast or fast).</p> + +<p>10. Authority of Doctors and Theologians.—(a) St. Thomas Aquinas has +been recognized by the Church as her highest theological authority, and +the Code of Canon Law (Canons 589, Sec. 1, and 1366, Sec. 2) orders +that in all seminaries and religious houses of study the courses of +theology shall be made according to his method, teaching and principles.</p> + +<p>(b) When the theologians agree with unanimity that a certain doctrine +pertaining to faith or morals is divinely revealed, it would be next +to heresy to hold the opposite; if they agree only that it is certain, +it would be rash to contradict them, unless new and serious objections +unknown to them can be offered; if they are divided between schools +and systems (even though great claims for opinions are made by their +partisans), it is lawful for competent theologians to use their +own judgment and decide for the side that seems to have the better +arguments in its favor.</p> + +<p>11. Reason.—The uses of natural reason in Moral Theology are: (a) it +demonstrates certain preambles to the teachings of Moral Theology, such +as the existence of God, His omniscience and veracity; (b) it +corroborates from philosophy many of the revealed teachings, viz., that +man’s end is not in things finite, that he has duties to God, to +society, to himself, etc.; (e) it affords analogies in the natural +order by which we may illustrate the end and duties of man in the +supernatural order; (d) it supplies the means by which the teachings on +morals may be developed into the conclusions that are contained in +them, by which those teachings may be defended against the fallacious +objections of adversaries, and by which the whole may be arranged +scientifically into a body of doctrine.</p> + +<p>12. Moral Theology is served not only by the various branches of +philosophy (such as Ethics, Theodicy, Psychology, Logic), but also by +many of the natural sciences. Thus: (a) Medicine and Physiology are +useful for understanding the morality and imputability of acts; (b) +Sociology and Economics may throw light on problems concerning justice; +(c) Jurisprudence is, of course, closely related to questions +concerning duties that arise from human laws; (d) History confirms the +teachings of Christian morality by the lessons of experience.</p> + +<p>13. The Method to Be Followed in Moral Theology.-(a) The positive +method is a simple statement of moral principles and doctrines, with +little attention to argument, except such as is found in the positive +sources (e.g., scripture, tradition, the decisions of the Church).</p> + +<p>(b) The Scholastic method is a scientific statement of moral teaching +through accurate definition of terms, systematic coordination of parts, +strict argumentation and defense, attention to controversies, and +recourse to philosophy and other natural knowledge.</p> + +<p>(c) The casuistic method, or case-system, is the application of moral +principles to the solution of concrete problems of lawfulness or +unlawfulness.</p> + +<p>14. The Scholastic method is the one best suited for the study of Moral +Theology, because it is more scientific, and fits one better to +understand, retain, and apply what one learns. But it is not exclusive +of the other methods, since it perfects the positive method, and is the +groundwork for the case method. Each method has a special suitability +for certain ends. Thus: (a) the positive method is well adapted to +preaching, and hence was much in favor with the Fathers of the Church, +as can be seen from their moral homilies and treatises; (b) the +Scholastic method is the best for study, teaching, apologetic, and was +followed by the great classical works of theology in the Middle Ages +and later; (c) the case method is very helpful to the seminarian and +the priest in the exercise of the ministry of the confessional.</p> + +<p>15. The History of Moral Theology.—There are three periods in the +history of Moral Theology: the Patristic, the Medieval, and the Modern.</p> + +<p>(a) The Patristic Period (1st to 12th century).—The moral writings of +the-Fathers are popular, exhortatory, and occasional; and it is not +till the Middle Ages that we meet with works of systematic Moral +Theology. The following are among the most notable moral works of the +Fathers: the _Paedagoga_ of Clement of Alexandria (d. about 217), which +explains what the everyday life of the Christian should be; the +_Catecheses_ of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386); the _De Officiis +Ministrorum_ of St. Ambrose (d. 397), a Christian counterpart of +Cicero’s work _De Officiis_; the _De Civitate Dei_ of St. Augustine (d. +430), which contrasts love of God and love of self; the _Expositio in +Job seu Moralium libri XXV_ of St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), which +consists of moral instructions based on the Book of Job.</p> + +<p>Celebrated among the ascetical and mystical writings are: the _Ladder +of Paradise_ of St. John Climacus (6th century), the Conferences of +Cassian (about 416), the _Libri V de Consideratione_ of St. Bernard (d. +1153). St. Gregory the Great’s _De Cura Pastorali_ is a systematic work +of pastoral theology, and is regarded as a classic.</p> + +<p>(b) The Medieval Period (12th to 16th century).—The method of the +moralists of this period differs from that of the Fathers in that the +former is systematic and philosophical, and more proximately adapted to +the use of confessors. The masterpiece of scientific Moral Theology is +of course found in the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. +1274). Works of casuistry were composed by St. Raymond of Pennafort +(about 1235), by John of Freiburg (d. 1314), by John of Asti (about +1317), by Angelus of Chiavasso (about 1476), by Sylvester Prierias (d. +1523). The _Summa Theologica_ of St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459) +has been called an inexhaustible storehouse for manuals of casuistry.</p> + +<p>Among the ascetical writers are: St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor +(d. 1274), John Gerson (d. 1429), John Tauler (d. 1361), Bl. Henry Suso +(d. 1366), and Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471).</p> + +<p>(c) The Modern Period (16th century to the present).—Characteristic of +this period are the commentaries written on St. Thomas, the +controversies over the systems of conscience, the appearance of +numerous manuals and special treatises, and the attention given to +changed conditions of society and ecclesiastical discipline. Noteworthy +among modern works are: the Commentary on St. Thomas by Cajetan (d. +1534); the writings of Bartholomew de Medina (d. 1581), called the +father of moderate Probabilism; the _De Paenitentia_ of Lugo (d. 1660), +a handbook that combines speculative and casuistical theology; the +_Roman Catechism_, which was issued by the authority of the Council of +Trent in 1566; the _Theologia Moralis_ of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. +1787), a work whose authority is universally recognized; the celebrated +treatise on the virtues by Lessius (d. 1623); the classic work of +Suarez (d. 1617), _De Religione_; the _Summa Casuum Conscientiae_ of +Toletus (d. 1596); the commentaries of Francis de Victoria (d. 1546), +which are writings of extraordinary merit. More recent works are so +numerous that it is impossible to mention them here.</p> + +<p>18. Among the many modern works on Moral Theology which have been +published abroad, not a few are in the vernacular—in German, French, +Italian, Spanish, etc. While they are not intended to replace the Latin +text-books used in seminaries, these are nevertheless a very great help +to a fuller knowledge of the matter treated and to a more ready use of +it in the work of the ministry.</p> + +<p>So far there has been a dearth of works on Moral Theology in English; +and it is this want that has occasioned the present work, which aims at +presenting Moral Theology, not only in its essentials, but even more in +detail and with greater fullness than is done by most of the text-books +commonly in use. And yet, while pursuing this larger and more +comprehensive plan, the authors of this new work have tried to be as +brief and compact as possible. It has been their endeavor especially to +avoid digressions into other fields and to sum up pertinent matter in +as clear and simple a manner as the subjects treated will permit.</p> + +<p>17. The Division and Order of Parts in Moral Theology.—The arrangement +of his matter made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the _Summa Theologica_ is +admittedly unsurpassed and unsurpassable in the qualities that good +distribution should have, viz., clearness, connection between parts, +completeness. Hence, we cannot do better than follow the order he has +used in his treatment of moral subjects. His general division is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(1) The Last End of Man.—From the Last End acts derive their morality, +those being good that advance man towards its attainment, and those +evil that turn him away from its possession. The Last End is +considered; (a) as to its existence; (b) as to its nature (i.e., the +constituents of supreme beatitude).</p> + +<p>(2) The General Means Tending to the Last End.—God is approached, not +by the steps of the body, but by the operations of the soul, and thus +it is human acts that lead one to one’s Last End. These acts are +considered: (a) as they are in themselves or absolutely, and according +to the twofold division of acts proper to man (human acts) and acts +common to man and beast (passions); (b) as to the internal principles +from which they proceed, i.e., habits, whether good (virtues) or bad +(vices); (c) as to the external principles by which they are +influenced. The external principle of evil is the demon, who tempts man +to sin. The external principle of good is God, who instructs us by His +law and the voice of conscience, and assists us by His grace.</p> + +<p>(3) The Special Means Tending to the Last End.—These are our own good +works; hence, here are considered the virtues incumbent on all classes +of men, i.e., the theological and moral virtues.</p> + +<p>18. Some of the topics just mentioned (e.g., divine grace) are +discussed fully in works on Dogmatic Theology, and hence may be omitted +here. Again, since the Last End of man is considered at great length in +dogmatic works on Eschatology, little need be said about it here. +Hence, it will be convenient to divide this work into two parts as +follows: General Moral Theology, in which are treated the more remote +principles on duty, such as the Last End, human acts, good and bad +habits, laws and conscience, grace; (b) Special Moral Theology, in +which are treated the more immediate rules concerning duty, i.e., man’s +obligations as regards the virtues and the Commandments.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PART_I">PART I<br />GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY</h2> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Question_I">Question I<br />THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END</h2> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_THE_LAST_END_OF_MAN">Art. 1: THE LAST END OF MAN</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 1-5; _Contra Gentes_, IV, cc. 1-63.)</p> + +<p>19. Existence of the Last End.—Every deliberate act proceeds from the +will, and, since the will pursues good as its goal, it follows that +every deliberate act is done for some good or end. But, if this end is +an imperfect good, it is desired not for itself but as leading up to a +perfect good, that is, to one which will leave nothing beyond it to be +desired; in other words, the intermediate end is willed on account of a +last end. Hence, all that a man wills, he wills directly or indirectly +on account of a last end. All men desire their own happiness and +perfection; but not all understand in what beatitude consists, since +some aim ultimately at finite goods.</p> + +<p>20. Nature of the Last End.—As man’s Last End is that object which +will make him perfectly happy, it cannot consist: (a) in external +goods, such as wealth, honors, fame, glory and power, since one might +have all these and yet be very unhappy; (b) in goods of the body, such +as health, beauty, pleasure and strength, since all these things are +passing, and moreover satisfy only a part, and that the lower part, of +man; (c) in goods of the soul, such as wisdom or virtue, since man’s +intellect is never content with particular truth, nor his will with +particular good, the former always reaching out for the highest truth, +the latter for the highest good. Hence, the Last End of man is the +Infinite Good, or God “who satisfieth thy desire” (Psalm cii. 5).</p> + +<p>21. Attainment of the Last End.—God being supersensible, the act by +which He is attained cannot be any operation of the senses, but must be +an act of the higher powers. Man possesses his Last End through the +vision of God, from which result beatific love and every good that is +compatible with the glorified state. For “we see now through a glass in +a dark manner, but then face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12); and there +shall be “glory and honor and peace to everyone that worketh good” +(Rom, ii. 10).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_ACTS_AS_HUMAN">Art. 2: ACTS AS HUMAN</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 6-17.)</p> + +<p>22. Human acts are a means to man’s Last End, inasmuch as they are +meritorious—i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8), +struggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not +meritorious unless they are one’s own (human) and good (moral); and, +since the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace. +Hence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human +and free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as +supernaturally meritorious (Art. 4).</p> + +<p>23. Definition.—Those acts are called human of which a man is the +master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his +will, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act +without reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by +a human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the +control of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without +the use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the +insane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence +of hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear, +anger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are +not under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g., +automatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth, +circulation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts +done under external violence).</p> + +<p>24. Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or +voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be +deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge +is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the +language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand +what he is saying.</p> + +<p>25. The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is +defined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing. +Ignorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not +known (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the +substance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For +example, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet +animal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance +of the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his +playmate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical +quality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the +moral quality of an act).</p> + +<p>26. With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three +kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.</p> + +<p>(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), +when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the +act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had +there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a +hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally +while shooting at an animal.</p> + +<p>(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is +voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is +affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about +his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may +not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to +acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a +man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before +firing.</p> + +<p>(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is +not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act +would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a +hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a +man whom he mistook for a deer.</p> + +<p>27. With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, +there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it +cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily +prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, +a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in +vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. +(b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of +ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: +first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, +but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any +diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person +deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.</p> + +<p>28. Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of +Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, +makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as +will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that +is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may +say: “Ignorance excuses.”</p> + +<p>(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless +the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as +will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law +is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the +presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. +Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: +“Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).</p> + +<p>29. Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) +Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does +not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the +act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be +actually desired.</p> + +<p>(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since +such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect +make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been +done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act +entirely involuntary.</p> + +<p>30. Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible +ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act +involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, +no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of +formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice +involved.</p> + +<p>(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the +ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It +does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the +ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a +state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though +he had knowledge.</p> + +<p>31. Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a) +when the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured +by the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the +ignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that +knowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind +seems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge.</p> + +<p>32. Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment +not in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks +stealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing +in the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what +was once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic +when he was young, but at present what he does not know about those +duties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of +attention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded, +sometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes +money that does not belong to him).</p> + +<p>33. The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance +will apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all +these cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done, +is either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is +either voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above, +Balbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but +his elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is +responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through +his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not +responsible. Caius’ inattention is involuntary, if due to mental +concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is +voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not +try to be more attentive to his duties.</p> + +<p>34. Consent Requisite for a Human Act.—To be human, an act must +proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it +must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be +voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in +most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against +one’s will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it +must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be +agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its +cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence, +natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking +one’s beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.</p> + +<p>35. Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary, +according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in +heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly +and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from +that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary, +since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from +God.</p> + +<p>(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the +deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.</p> + +<p>(c) An act is said to be simply—that is, absolutely—voluntary, when +it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in +itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to +be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but +not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to +save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the +preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence, +an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all +things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect, +inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.</p> + +<p>(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in +itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something +else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly, +when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is +foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples: +Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to +quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him; +hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who +dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally, +although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the +influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.</p> + +<p>36. An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly +(physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and +obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of +Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could +and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b) +permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or +not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples: +Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of +quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes. +Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be +bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of +other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or +neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is +edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will +misunderstand it and take scandal.</p> + +<p>37. Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are +directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to +an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in +his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his +theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to +refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is +willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus +does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears +the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If +his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was +approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only +permitted.</p> + +<p>38. The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a) +Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to +the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a +certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss +thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says +nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one +foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees +Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus +will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in +spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius +sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance, +because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.</p> + +<p>39. The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by +the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example: +Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that +he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of +Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away +as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.</p> + +<p>40. Obstacles to Consent.—The obstacles to consent are all those +factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, +the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to +ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and +fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The +habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.</p> + +<p>41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future +danger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a) +it lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or +suspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of +choice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself +agreeable.</p> + +<p>42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a) +involuntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of +one’s mind. Example: Titus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a +wild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every +direction; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking +with calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a +stern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate, +Caius gives what he knows is a “bluffing” answer.</p> + +<p>43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when +it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion +or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of +death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and +which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a +lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought +of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces +Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive +before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by +air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some +apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but +apart from or in spite of their fears.</p> + +<p>(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not +otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or +consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned +above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was +caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow +for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the +punishment of hell.</p> + +<p>44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on +the voluntariness of acts are as follows.</p> + +<p>(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of +the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, +not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called +relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are +comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. +Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted +with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or +not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.</p> + +<p>(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the +act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and +now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and +Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as +best suited to the circumstances.</p> + +<p>(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the +agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and +still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. +Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by +force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although +voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the +money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no +liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the +purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; +hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect +involuntary.</p> + +<p>45. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object +through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It +tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.). +Passion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes +away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal +principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so +intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the +quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many +acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.</p> + +<p>46. Spiritual appetites fortify the reason, but the opposite is true of +sensible appetites; for these latter draw all the attention to things +that are lower and away from those that are higher, and impede the +exercise of imagination and other senses that serve the reason. In +extreme and rare cases passion may be so intense as to distract from or +prevent altogether the exercise of reason, or to produce insanity. +Thus, we sometimes hear of persons losing their minds through affection +for money, or of performing irrational deeds under the excitement of +joy.</p> + +<p>47. With reference to the will, passion is twofold. (a) It is +antecedent, when it precedes the act of the will and causes it. In this +case the passion arises not from the will, but from some other cause +(e.g., the bodily state, as when a sick man longs for food that is +forbidden). (b) Passion is consequent when it follows the act of the +will and results from it. This may happen either without the will +choosing the passion (as when the very vehemence with which the will +desires some object causes a corresponding sensitive emotion to +awaken), or because the will has deliberately aroused the emotion in +order to be able the better to act through its cooperation.</p> + +<p>48. Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the +will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes +an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power +of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays +voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately +inclined that way.</p> + +<p>49. Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of +the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is +not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense, +for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the +will and affects the emotions.</p> + +<p>50. Consequent passion which results from the deliberate choice of the +will increases the voluntariness of the act that follows, since the act +is performed with greater intensity on account of the passion that has +been deliberately excited.</p> + +<p>51. What has been said about the passions that tend to sensible good +can be applied also to the passions that are concerned with sensible +evils, such as hatred, sadness, aversion, boldness, anger. If they are +antecedent, they increase the voluntariness of an act, but diminish its +freedom; and, if they cause a passing frenzy or insanity, they take +away all responsibility. If they are consequent, they either increase +the willingness of the act, or indicate that it is willed with great +intensity.</p> + +<p>52. Violence, or coercion, is the use of force by an external agent to +compel one to do what one does not want to do. Its effects on +voluntariness are: (a) it cannot affect the internal act of the will, +else we should have the contradiction that the act of the will was both +voluntary, as proceeding from the will, and involuntary, as proceeding +from external coercion; (b) it can affect external acts, such as +walking, and so make them involuntary. If a boy is driven to school, +the violence makes his going involuntary, but it does not make his will +not to go to school involuntary.</p> + +<p>53. Habits.—Characteristic of habits is a constant inclination, +resulting from repeated acts, to perform similar acts (see 133 for +definition of habit). Its effect[s] on the voluntariness of acts are:</p> + +<p>(a) if the habit is in a sense involuntary, i.e., caused by free acts +but retracted by a sincere act of contrition, it diminishes or even +takes away voluntariness. If the actual advertence to the act is +imperfect, the voluntariety is diminished; if advertence is totally +absent, all voluntariety is taken away. Thus a drunkard who retracts +his habit and makes an act of true contrition may again fall into sin +because of the acquired dispositions to drink. Then the sins are less +voluntary or at times, owing to total lack of advertence, may be +regarded solely as material sins.</p> + +<p>(b) if the habit is voluntary, i.e., acquired by free acts and not +retracted, it increases the voluntariness in respect to the inclination +to act. Should all advertence and deliberation be taken away, a rare +occurrence, it diminishes the liberty of the act and consequently its +morality as good or bad. Voluntariety, however, is not taken away +entirely, since the habit itself was freely willed and hence acts +flowing from it are voluntary in cause (see 35.). If sufficient +advertence remains, the habit diminishes the freedom of the act owing +to the impeding of reason; but this diminution of liberty is in accord +with the will of the individual who freely contracted and conserves the +habit to have facility in acting. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, a +voluntary habit increases the voluntariety of acts caused by that habit +and consequently increases their goodness or evil. Thus St. Thomas +asserts that one who sins from habit sins from certain malice, i.e., +not from ignorance or passion, but from the will’s own choice.</p> + +<p>54. Natural propensities are inclinations that arise from bodily +constitution or physical condition (e.g., a strong native attraction to +temperance or to intemperance not acquired by frequent acts). Natural +propensities have the same kind of influence on the willingness of an +act as involuntary habits (see 53.).</p> + +<p>55. Pathological states are diseases of the brain or nerves that react +upon the intellect and the will, such as various kinds of neuroses and +psychoses, hysteria and epilepsy. The influence of pathological states +on the voluntariness of acts seems similar in kind to that ascribed to +antecedent passion (see 48.). Caution must be observed in applying +these principles to particular kinds of mental diseases.[1]</p> + +<p>[1] In doubt whether an act associated with a pathological state is +free or not, the rule of moralists is lenient. When the act is sinful, +it is not imputed as gravely sinful, for man is innocent until proven +guilty. If the act is good, it is presumed voluntary and free and, +consequently, meritorious. See Prummer, D.M., O.P., _Manuale Theologiae +Moralis_ (Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I. n.93.</p> + +<p>56. Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.—Having discussed human or voluntary +acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are +of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those +elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.</p> + +<p>57. Acts Elicited by the Will.—The first class of acts under the +control of the will are those that are performed by the will +itself—i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.</p> + +<p>58. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the +will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love +or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the +means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. +Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end +through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it +has been gained: this is the last act of the will.</p> + +<p>59. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and +that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent +follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will +agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election +follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means +consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means +in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the +intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the +other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.</p> + +<p>60. Acts Commanded by the Will.—The second class of acts that are +under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will +itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.</p> + +<p>61. Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual +acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction +of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the +passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as +walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by +the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).</p> + +<p>62. The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the +will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to +self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) +sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily +dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative +life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the +circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_ACTS_AS_MORAL">Art. 3: ACTS AS MORAL</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 18-20.)</p> + +<p>63. In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last +End, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge +and will); it must also be morally good.</p> + +<p>64. Definition.—Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human +act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man’s +Last End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally +good; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act +that neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called +morally indifferent.</p> + +<p>65. The constitutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its +moral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or +disagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its +entirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this +norm is the relation of the act to God, the Last End of man.</p> + +<p>66. Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with +the nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its +promotion of the glory of God, which is the purpose of all creation.</p> + +<p>67. The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral +quality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which +is the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the +divine intellect, from which reason receives its light.</p> + +<p>68. The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with +respect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b) +remotely, it is the law of God.</p> + +<p>69. The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when +it is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g., +prayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of +harmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is +morally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither +agrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.).</p> + +<p>70. The Sources of Morality.—The sources from which the morality of an +act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have +a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals. +These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its +essence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of +the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a +circumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the +agent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the +purpose of a work of charity).</p> + +<p>71. The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally +tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms +is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor +(end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given +it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the +agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).</p> + +<p>72. The circumstances are all those conditions, different from the +object, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral +circumstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of +the day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public +or in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the +advertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quantity or +quality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that +the person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the +purpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor God); (f) +the quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms +is poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor’s own +money is used against himself).</p> + +<p>73. With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts, +circumstances are divided as follows: (a) circumstances that change the +kind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was +indifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what +belonged to one class of mortal sins to take on another character, +etc.; (b) circumstances that change the degree of morality, by making a +good act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad.</p> + +<p>74. The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the +agent to act. It is the chief circumstance of an act, and hence is +treated as a separate source of morality.</p> + +<p>75. The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it +alone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in +mind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total +motive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along +with another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps +the poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by +his charity, the assistance of others is only a partial motive of his +act; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal +advantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive.</p> + +<p>76. Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its +elements—its object, circumstances and purpose—are in conformity with +the standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a +considerate manner, and purely out of love for God, is good in every +respect. Furthermore, the fact that the circumstances and purpose of +the act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the +act.</p> + +<p>77. An act is likewise entirely good when at least one of its elements +is good, the others being indifferent, and none evil; for it is the +good alone that is intended (see 85), and this gives the moral color to +the whole act. This happens as follows: (a) when the object is +indifferent and the purpose good, as when one takes a walk for the +purpose of performing a work of mercy; (b) when the object is +indifferent and a circumstance good, as when one eats a meal with +intentional moderation; (c) when the object is good and a circumstance +indifferent, as when one prays with unintentional stammering.</p> + +<p>78. An act is partly good when, while its object is good, there is some +evil in the circumstances that does not neutralize or transform the +object. This happens in the following cases: (a) when the object is +good and some minor circumstance, not intended as affecting the +substance of the act, is evil, as when a person prays with +distractions; (b) when the object is good and a partial, but not +predominant motive is slightly evil, as when a person prays in public +in order to give edification and also incidentally to help his +reputation. In both these cases the good—i.e., the worship of God—is +desired for itself as good, and the evil that is simultaneously desired +does not change this good object.</p> + +<p>79. Bad Acts.-An act is called entirely evil when all its elements—its +object, circumstances and purpose-are contrary to the moral norms. +Thus, to steal, on a large scale, in order to drive the victim to +desperation is an act that is entirely wrong. The wickedness of the +circumstance and of the motive increases the wickedness of the object +of the act.</p> + +<p>80. An act is likewise called entirely bad, when one or more of its +elements are of themselves good or indifferent, but when there is an +element which is evil and which neutralizes or transforms the good. +This happens in various ways:</p> + +<p>(a) when the object is evil, and the purpose is good, as when one +steals in order to pay one’s debts. The good end is wished only as +obtainable through a wicked means, and thus ceases to be good;</p> + +<p>(b) when the object is good or indifferent, and the total purpose is +evil, as when one talks or prays with no other motive than to annoy +another person. The good is willed, not as good, but only as a means to +evil;</p> + +<p>(c) when the object is good or indifferent, and a partial but ulterior +purpose is evil. For example, if a person extinguishes a fire in order +to save a neighbor’s house and thus be enabled to rob him; if a person +takes physical exercises to develop his strength so as to be enabled to +bully a neighbor. The good act and the immediate end in these cases are +intended not for the sake of their goodness, but as instruments to the +accomplishment of the evil ulterior end;</p> + +<p>(d) when the object is good or indifferent, and an evil circumstance is +intended, not as a circumstance, but as forming a unit with the object +and as affecting the substance of the act—for example, when a person +intends prayer precisely as distracted, thus converting prayer into a +sin. The good object is willed in such cases, not as good, but as +vitiated by an evil circumstance.</p> + +<p>81. Although an act is totally evil when the good in it is absorbed by +the evil, the presence of what is good in itself can diminish, though +it cannot take away, the evil. Thus, to lie in order to help a neighbor +is totally evil; yet, it is not as great an evil as to lie to hurt that +neighbor.</p> + +<p>82. Indifferent Acts.—An act is entirely indifferent if all the +elements in it—its object, circumstances and purpose—are neither +harmonious nor discordant with the standards of morality. Such an act +would be walking home rapidly in order to eat a meal, if besides these +factors, which bear no relation to good morals, there was nothing else +in the act that did bear such a relation.</p> + +<p>83. As to the actual existence of a human or voluntary act that is +morally indifferent, we conclude: (a) Considered in the abstract and +universally, some human acts are morally indifferent; for if acts be +considered with reference to their objects alone and apart from the +circumstances that accompany them, and as they are classified in the +mind, it is clear that many of them have no determinate relations to +moral norms—e.g., reading, writing, walking, etc. (one can read either +good or bad literature); (b) considered in the concrete, and as they +happen in individual cases, no human acts are morally indifferent, +since the purpose of the agent is either according to right reason or +against it, so that, in spite of the indifferent object, the act +becomes either good or bad by reason of the presence or absence of the +good purpose.</p> + +<p>84. Considered even in the concrete and in individual cases, all acts +that are not human, but indeliberate or involuntary (see 23 sqq.), are +morally indifferent—or, more correctly, unmoral, as being outside the +genus of moral acts on account of the absence in them of will, which is +the prerequisite of morality. Thus, absent-minded acts are neither good +nor bad morally.</p> + +<p>85. As to the kind of intention required to make an indifferent act +morally good, or which should be had when the act is objectively good, +we conclude: (a) The good intended must not be solely a sensible good +(i.e., the pleasure that the act gives), but also and chiefly a +rational good (i.e., its conformity to moral standards), since man, +unlike the animals, was made, not for sensible, but for rational good. +Hence, to eat deliberately with no other end than that of gratifying +the palate, is to eat without a moral purpose worthy of a human being, +and is a bad act.</p> + +<p>(b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be +regarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He +alone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation +solely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one +excludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is +morally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts +need not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously +formed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating +intends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends +a moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act +to the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in +the friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil, +has a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he +has chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends +some motive that becomes a rational being.</p> + +<p>86. An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act, +and an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though +not necessary, increase the moral value of what is done.</p> + +<p>87. Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: “That act is good whose causes are +complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.”</p> + +<p>(a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the +meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense +unless all its elements—its object, purpose and circumstances—are +good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its +elements—the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery—are what +they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall +short of perfection.</p> + +<p>(b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning +then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that +contribute to essential goodness—the object of the act and any +circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the +character of object—are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy, +unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are +sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the +object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the +end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.</p> + +<p>88. The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be +essentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad +(see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could +change an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even +by the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for +the service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight +vanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom +does not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good +circumstances that diminish its badness (see 81).</p> + +<p>89. Morality of the External Act.—Having considered the morality of +the internal act, we shall now turn to the external act (such as giving +an alms, stealing, and the like), and inquire whether it has a morality +of its own distinct from that of the internal act (see 56 Sqq.).</p> + +<p>90. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the object, or +effect, of the internal act of the will, it does not add any essential +morality to the internal act, since, having no freedom of its own, it +is moral only in so far as it proceeds from the will. In this sense, +then, he who gives an alms to the poor, and he who would give it if he +could, are equal in goodness of will; and he who wishes to defraud, and +he who actually defrauds, are equal in malice of will.</p> + +<p>91. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the term +towards which the internal act tends, it completes the essential +morality of the internal act by extending and communicating it without. +For, though this external act cannot add a distinct morality of its +own, it does carry the internal morality to its natural conclusion and +diffuses its good or evil. In this sense, he who actually gives an alms +is more deserving than he who really desires to give but is unable; and +he who really defrauds is more reprehensible than he who wishes to +defraud but cannot.</p> + +<p>92. If the external act be considered precisely as something added to +the internal act, it can increase the accidental morality of the +internal act by the reaction of the external circumstances on the will. +This can happen in such ways as the following: (a) the performance of +the external act, being pleasurable or difficult, increases or +decreases the intensity of the will to act; (b) the performance of the +external act, since it requires more time than the internal act, +prolongs the latter; (c) the external act by reason of repetition may +also increase the strength of the internal act.</p> + +<p>93. Furthermore, it is through the external act that edification or +scandal is given, that penalties or rewards for overt action are +deserved, etc. Examples: Titus bears murderous hatred towards Balbus, +but keeps it concealed. Caius also hates Balbus, and first calumniates +him, thus giving scandal, and then kills him, thus making himself +liable before the law.</p> + +<p>94. The Morality of the Act That Is Indirectly Willed.—An act is said +to be willed indirectly, or in its cause, when it is foreseen as the +result of another act which alone is directly intended (see 35 sqq.). +According to the different moral character of the acts, there are four +cases in which the act is willed indirectly:</p> + +<p>(a) when both the act directly willed and the resultant act are bad. +Examples: Titus is heartily opposed to quarreling and blasphemy; but he +makes himself drunk to forget his troubles, foreseeing that he will +quarrel and blaspheme while in that state. Balbus has a real dislike +for uncharitable thoughts; but he chooses the company of a notorious +scandalmonger in order to be amused, knowing that thoughts against +charity will be caused by listening to him;</p> + +<p>(b) when the act directly willed is bad and the resultant act is good. +Example: Caius is very miserly when sober, but liberal when +intoxicated; to vary the monotony of his life, he decides to become +intoxicated, but grieves at the thought of the money he may give away +to some deserving charity before he returns to his senses. Sempronius +decides on an act of injustice with sorrow over the unbidden thoughts +of remorse or repentance that will follow his act;</p> + +<p>(c) when both acts are good. Example: Out of charity Titus makes up his +mind to visit a pious relative who is ill; and he foresees that +thoughts of improving his own conduct—a thing not pleasing to +him—will be occasioned by this visit;</p> + +<p>(d) when the act directly willed is good and the resultant act is bad. +Examples: Balbus takes a drug prescribed for his health, although he +foresees it will make him unable to go to church. Caius gives alms to +the poor, intending only an act of charity, but he knows that thoughts +of vainglory will arise.</p> + +<p>95. The act indirectly willed sometimes gives, sometimes does not give, +a new morality. (a) Thus, if it is good, it adds no internal goodness, +since the will only permits, without intending the good act. Example: +Caius, who does not intend, but regretfully permits his act of charity +which he foresees, does not desire the act of charity. (b) If it is +bad, the act indirectly willed adds a bad act of the will, if the will +desires evil by permitting what it has no right to permit. Example: +Titus who does not prevent, when he should, what will lead to blasphemy +on his part, implicitly desires the act of blasphemy.</p> + +<p>96. The Morality of the Consequences of an Act.—Man’s life receives +its moral character, not only from his internal and external acts which +are done in the present and from those which he knows will result from +them in the future, but also from the influence his acts exercise now +and afterwards upon his fellowman. It is this influence upon others +that we now speak of as the consequences of an act. According to the +case, the consequences sometimes add, sometimes do not add, to the +morality of an act. The good men do lives after them, and also the +evil. There are various kinds of consequences:</p> + +<p>(a) foreseen consequences, which, if intended, add to the morality of +an act, since it is clear that one who wishes the many good or evil +results of his act is better or worse in intention than another who has +no such wish. Thus, one who knows that many will be edified or +scandalized by his conduct, and wills the result, is better or worse +than if he had no such will about those consequences;</p> + +<p>(b) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow naturally and +usually from an act, make the act in itself better or Worse according +to their character. Thus, the teaching of Christian doctrine is good as +conveying a knowledge of truth, but it is made better on account of the +spiritual benefit of others that naturally results from it. Similarly, +the teaching of evil is made worse on account of the evil consequences +it usually produces;</p> + +<p>(c) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow only accidentally +and rarely from an act, do not affect its morality, since an act must +be judged by what belongs to its nature, not by what is merely +occasioned by it. Thus, the fact that an alms is used by the recipient +as a means to intemperance does not detract from the goodness of the +almsgiving done for the sake of charity. Likewise, the fact that an +injury is used by the sufferer as an occasion for spiritual profit does +not lessen the wickedness of the injurious act.</p> + +<p>97. Imputability.—Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e., +higher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not +performed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of +reasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be +moral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right) +and yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or +imprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not +realize the power of a liquor).</p> + +<p>98. Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its +agent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an +effect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his +will, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact +with the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the +brightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable +himself with goodness or badness.</p> + +<p>99. The conditions for the imputability of an act are:</p> + +<p>(a) the act must be human—i.e., it must be performed knowingly and +willingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the +act, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers +such intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he +blasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his +present act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable;</p> + +<p>(b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should +be known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is +responsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his +own. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of +their neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of +virtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks +that some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether +it is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin +of stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the +crowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day’s sport. All +committed theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were +not guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus +committed sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they +had or should have had (see 588 sqq.);</p> + +<p>(c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the +goodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for +what he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and +Caius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a +beggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in +order to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives +credit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is +sufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden +and wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus +implicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that +he does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his +neighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the +less responsible for his calumny.</p> + +<p>100. Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the +moral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should +get the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b) +specifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a +particular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to +degree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades +of the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or +venial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the +virtues and vices (see 186 sqq.).</p> + +<p>101. Goodness is imputable as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the +goodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is +known and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a +penitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence, +he has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his +holy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral +circumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the +credit of mortification;</p> + +<p>(b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater +readiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to +what is good. Example: If Titus prays in the manner above described, +his good will is intensified, and he has the credit of this increase in +the accidental goodness of his act;</p> + +<p>(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is not credited with their +goodness, if this is merely permitted. Example: Sempronius, who is +sorry that thoughts of a better life will go through his mind as a +consequence of going to church, has not the credit of those good +thoughts;</p> + +<p>(d) As regards consequences that were foreseen, or that naturally +result from an act, one is not credited with their goodness, unless it +was wished. Example: Balbus teaches religion to children because he is +paid to do so; Caius does so because it is a good act. The consequence +that these children afterwards live virtuously is not morally +creditable to Balbus, since he thought nothing about it; but it is a +circumstance that increases the goodness of Caius’ act, since he +intended his teaching precisely as it is a good work;</p> + +<p>(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if +they were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent. +Example: Titus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to +Sempronius, but the impression is so great that Sempronius undertakes +and accomplishes extraordinary things, which Titus would not have +deemed possible or advisable.</p> + +<p>102. Evil is imputable as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of +the object, end and circumstances, as far as it is known and willed by +him. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of +Caius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed +theft and murder in his heart;</p> + +<p>(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circumstances +of greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act. +Example: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his +malice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil +consequences of his external acts;</p> + +<p>(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they +entail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is +guilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken +too much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.</p> + +<p>(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one +is responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it. +Examples: Titus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied +an alms, but Titus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for +what happens. Sempronius blasphemes in the company of many, and is +therefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to +blaspheme;</p> + +<p>(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been +foreseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents +from Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide. +Balbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far +from his thoughts when he stole.</p> + +<p>103. It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one +evil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have +been prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once +when the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double +effect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more +particularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do +that from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence +that is evil.</p> + +<p>104. It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is +foreseen when the following conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for +clearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;</p> + +<p>(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be +caused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means. +Thus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give +alms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking) +immediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only +mediately through the theft;</p> + +<p>(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to +wish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one’s virtuous life will cause +the sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one’s virtue must +not be entertained by one as something pleasing;</p> + +<p>(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting +the evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be +permitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is +intended.</p> + +<p>105. To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is +proportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:</p> + +<p>(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good +that is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to +save a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if +this is necessary in order to save one’s life;</p> + +<p>(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one’s act, the +greater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: Titus gives +permission to his class to play a game against another class, +foreseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is +required for granting the permission, if Titus knows that higher +authority will grant it, should he refuse it;</p> + +<p>(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater +must be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct +a person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him +to a bottle of strong drink;</p> + +<p>(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the +greater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one +who speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require +the same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many +other cars are passing;</p> + +<p>(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver +is the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since +parish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their +office to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in +them, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have +an evil consequence.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_4_ACTS_AS_MERITORIOUS">Art. 4: ACTS AS MERITORIOUS</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 21.)</p> + +<p>106. When the morality of an act is attributable to one as one’s own, +one becomes worthy of praise and reward, if the act is good, but +deserving of censure and punishment, if the act is evil.</p> + +<p>107. Definitions.—Merit is the right to a reward arising from works +done for God. Demerit is the debt of punishment incurred on account of +works done against God.</p> + +<p>108. Divisions.—According to the difference of the person who confers +the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim +which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for +the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine +merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the +fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which +God is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God +is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.</p> + +<p>109. According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are +two kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a +reward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a +created being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not +constitute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of +pagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of +their natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy +of the beatitude surpassing mere created power that God has prepared +for those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is +being considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural +reward (viz, the Beatific Vision of God), it follows that the acts by +which he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but +supernaturally meritorious.</p> + +<p>110. There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in +the stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which +presupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ +merited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was +due to Him as the God-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense, +that is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor +on the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before +God, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the +grace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c) +congruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not +from justice (since there is no equality between the work and the +reward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits +is a friend of God. In this way all who are in the state of grace can +merit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide +sense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of God, who +answers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works +done by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.</p> + +<p>111. The second kind of merit mentioned above—i.e., condign merit in +the less strict sense—is that with which we are chiefly concerned +here, since it is the kind of merit that must be found in human acts in +order that they may lead man to a supernatural reward. A fuller +treatment of merit is found in Dogmatic Theology in the Question on +Grace.</p> + +<p>112. The conditions requisite for the kind of merit now in question +are: (a) that the work done be human, that is, free, morally good, and +supernatural (i.e., proceeding from sanctifying grace and divine +charity); (b) that the one who merits be in the wayfaring state (i.e., +that he have not already passed to final reward or punishment), and +that he be in the state of grace; (c) that God has promised a reward +for the work done. From the statements made above, it follows that all +the human and morally good works of those who are in the state of grace +possess condign merit.</p> + +<p>113. The objects of condign merit—i.e., the rewards promised by God +for the good works done for Him in this life—are: (a) an increase of +sanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of +eternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of +glory.</p> + +<p>114. The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as +those given above (112), except the promise made by God, which is not +required. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanctity of the +Blessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the +Mother of God, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St. +Stephen.</p> + +<p>115. For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done +be morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the +ancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just +man can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his +own conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c) +temporal goods.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_5_THE_PASSIONS">Art. 5: THE PASSIONS</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 22-48.)</p> + +<p>116. Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the +passions, which are common to both man and beast.</p> + +<p>117. Definition.—The passions—also called the emotions, affections, +or sentiments—are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will, +they are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power +of the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of +sense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the +sensitive appetite which arise from the representation of some good in +the sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body, +such as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood, +paleness, blushing, etc.</p> + +<p>118. Division.—There are two classes of passions; (a) the +concupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as +delightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are +love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the +irascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil +considered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and +despair, boldness and fear, anger.</p> + +<p>119. The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the +first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to +sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or +absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered +precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; +(b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away +from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection +produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of +the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul +on account of the presence of an evil.</p> + +<p>120. The irascible passions are explained as follows: (a) hope reaches +out towards a future good whose attainment is difficult, but not +impossible; despair turns away from a good that seems impossible of +attainment; (b) bravery goes out to attack an evil that seems difficult +and imminent, but not unconquerable; fear falls back before a future +difficulty that seems irresistible; (e) anger is the desire of +vengeance for an injury received.</p> + +<p>121. Moral Value of the Passions.—The Stoics held that all the +passions are diseases of the soul, and that one is perfect when one +arrives at the condition of being passionless or apathetic. Lucretius, +on the contrary, taught that all the impulses of passion are good. The +truth is that the passions are good or evil according to the way they +are considered. (a) Physically, the passions are good, since they are +the acts of natural powers, or the perfection and complement of +something good in itself. (b) Morally, they are indifferent, if they +are viewed in themselves, as the product of the sensitive appetite. For +this appetite is an irrational power of the soul, similar to that of +the beasts, and acts are not moral unless rational—i.e., an act is +good or evil only from its relation to reason. (c) Morally, the +passions are good or bad, if commanded by reason and will, for thus +they partake of the good or evil that is in the acts from which they +proceed, just as the acts of the external members of the body are moral +in so far as they execute the commands of the will. The passions are +voluntary if commanded by the will, or not forbidden by it. Examples: +Our Lord looked about Him with anger, being grieved at the blindness of +His enemies who watched Him in the synagogue (Mark, iii. 5); He wept +over the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke, xix. 41); He was sad at the +approach of His passion (Mark, xiv. 34).</p> + +<p>122. The passions are morally good: (a) if they are directed by the +will to a morally good object; for example, shame is a praiseworthy +passion, because it is fear of what is dishonorable, and pity is also +good, because it is according to right reason, being sorrow for the +misfortune of another; (b) if they are chosen by the reason for a good +purpose; for example, it is good to excite the emotion of joy that one +may pray with greater fervor, or to arouse the feelings of pity, fear, +or hope, in order that one may be more earnestly moved to acts of +mercy, repentance, courage; (c) if the circumstances are moderated +according to right reason; for example, to grieve over the death of a +friend excessively, so that one is unfitted for duty and suffers in +health, is unreasonable; but to grieve even unto tears, as Christ did +at the tomb of Lazarus, is an act of piety. Similarly, the slight anger +of Heli was blamable and the great anger of Moses was laudable, because +the evils in both instances called for severity (I Kings, ii, iii; +Exod., iii).</p> + +<p>123. The passions can either diminish or increase the goodness of an +act. (a) They diminish its goodness, if they are antecedent—i.e., +prior to the judgment of the reason—for they thus obscure the mind and +make the act that follows less voluntary. For example, there is less +goodness in an alms given under an impulse of sentimentality than in +one given after serious consideration of the matter and from a motive +of charity. (b) They increase its goodness if they are +consequent—i.e., subsequent to the judgment and the result of the +vehemence of the will, or of deliberate encouragement by the will (see +47 sqq.)—for, just as the external act increases the goodness of the +internal act, so is it better that man should tend towards good, not +only with the will, but also with the emotions. Examples: The spiritual +gladness of the Psalmist is seen to have been more than ordinarily +great from the fact that it acted upon his feelings, and both heart and +flesh rejoiced (Ps, lxxxii. 3); to sing a hymn in order to encourage +oneself to greater fervor or devotion adds to the goodness of what is +done, through the greater promptness or ease it causes in the act that +follows.</p> + +<p>124. The passions are morally evil: (a) when they are commanded by the +will and directed to an object, a purpose, or circumstances that are +evil, Thus, envy is an ignoble passion, since it is unreasonable, being +sorrow at another’s success. Examples; Titus drinks to excess for the +delight of intoxication (bad object); Balbus purposely excites his +imagination, that he may hate more bitterly and act more cruelly (bad +end); Sempronius loves his children so immoderately that he grows +morose and jealous (bad circumstance). (b) The passions are also +morally evil when they should be forbidden and are not forbidden by the +will. Example; Caius is surprised by a sudden burst of anger, which, +though he judges to be unreasonable, he does nothing to check.</p> + +<p>125. The passions can remove, diminish or increase the evil of an act. +(a) Thus, antecedent passions take away all evil, if (a thing that is +rare) they prevent entirely the use of reason; they diminish malice if +they obscure the judgment. Examples: Balbus, fearing that he is about +to drown, becomes panic-stricken, seizes Titus and almost drowns him. +Caius, threatened with a black eye if he refuses, calumniates: his +calumny would be worse if he acted coldbloodedly. (b) Consequent +passions increase the evil, for then they manifest a strong intention, +or are the result of direct purpose. Examples: Sempronius attacks the +conduct of an opponent, not with dispassionate argument and from a love +of truth, but with bitter personal feeling and from a desire of +revenge. Titia works herself into a rage that she may be the more ready +for an encounter with a person of whom she is unjustly jealous.</p> + +<p>126. Though the passions are physically good and in their nature +morally indifferent, they may have physical reactions or moral +consequences that are harmful or evil. These dangers may be physical, +mental or moral.</p> + +<p>(a) Physical Dangers of the Passions.—It is a well-known fact that +there is a close connection between the passions and the nerves, heart, +and bodily organism in general, and that strong or persistent emotion +can work great detriment to the health, producing disease, +unconsciousness, or even death.</p> + +<p>(b) Mental Dangers of the Passions.—It is admitted by all that the +passions disturb the judgment, and can even take away the use of +reason. For they act upon the body or the senses, and these in turn +affect the mind in a way similar to what happens in sleep or +intoxication. Thus, love makes one blind to the defects of the object +of one’s love; fear makes one magnify the evil of what is dreaded; +melancholy unbalances the mind, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) Moral Dangers of the Passions.—It is likewise a matter of common +experience that the passions are a source of many temptations and sins. +Often they are antecedent (i.e., not premeditated or willed), as when +they arise from bodily states over which one has no control or from +imaginations strongly fixed in the mind, and at the same time tend to +that which is not according to right reason, rebelling against the law +of the mind. Thus, a person whose health is bad is easily dispirited, +and this feeling occasions temptations to despair; one whose memory is +haunted with the image of a lost parent becomes a prey to sadness, +which makes it difficult to perform duties with zest and diligence.</p> + +<p>127. A passion may become morally bad on account of the physical or +mental evils connected with it. (a) Thus, a person has duties to his +own well-being, and he indirectly wills (see 35 sqq., 94 sqq.) to +neglect these duties, if he indulges harmful passions. Example: +Sempronia grieves immoderately over the death of her mother, with the +result that her health and mental vigor are impaired. (b) A person also +has duties with respect to the life, health, and happiness of his +neighbor, and he chooses to neglect these duties if he unjustly +provokes emotions in others, foreseeing injurious consequences (see 96 +sqq.). Examples: Titus so vexes Balbus by petty annoyances that the +latter loses appetite and sleep, and becomes an invalid. Sempronia so +exasperates her father by long-continued unfilial conduct that the +latter becomes insane. Caius appeals to prejudices in order to have +injustice done to a rival.</p> + +<p>128. As to passions that incite to evil or deter from good, we must +observe the following: (a) if the passion is consequent, one is placing +oneself or others in danger of sin, and one’s conduct must be judged +according to the principles given in 258 sqq. (Examples: Titus likes to +brood over his troubles, although this causes temptations to neglect +duty; Sempronia makes remarks to a hot-headed acquaintance which are a +provocation to great uncharitableness); (b) if the passion is +antecedent, it constitutes a temptation which one is bound to resist +(see 252 sqq.). Example: Balbus has a natural dislike for Caius, and +often feels impelled to judge him rashly or treat him unjustly.</p> + +<p>129. Antecedent or involuntary passions, as well as other involuntary +acts of imagination, thought and will, tending to evil, are sometimes +called “first motions of the soul,” as distinguished from consequent or +voluntary passions and acts, which are known as “second motions of the +soul.” The first motions are of two kinds: (a) those that precede all +deliberation and consent, actual or virtual (_motus primo-primi_), and +these are free from all sin; (b) those that precede full deliberation +and consent, but follow on partial deliberation (_motus +secundo-primi_). These latter are venial sins.</p> + +<p>Most theologians since the Council of Trent maintain that the +inordinate movements of passion which precede the advertence of reason, +such as lust, envy, sloth, etc., are not sins. The Council of Trent +defined that the _fomes peccati_ has never been understood by the +Church to be truly a sin in the baptized, but has been called sin by +St. Paul in the sense that it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council +of Trent, fifth session). On the basis of this text some authors argue +that it is of faith that the inordinate motions called _primo-primi_ +are not sins for the baptized. The condemnation of both the fiftieth +proposition of Baius: _The evil desires to which reason does not +consent, and which man endures unwillingly (_invitus_), are prohibited +by precept_; and his fifty-first: _Lust, or the law of the members, and +evil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience +of the law_; is interpreted as establishing as certain the +non-sinfulness of such movements in infidels. (See Merklebach, O.P., +_Summa Theol_. Mor., Vol. I, n. 448).</p> + +<p>St. Thomas taught otherwise that such inordinate movements of passion +are venial sins (_Summa. Theol_. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2um; _de Malo_ +q. 7, a. 6. ad 4m; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5). Although they precede +the deliberation of reason, they attain to the order of moral acts, +however imperfectly, insofar as sensuality in man by its nature is made +to be subject to reason. Reason can and ought to control these motions, +but fails to do so owing to the great number of them possible to occur. +Hence they are not involuntary, but indirectly voluntary as sins of +omission (_II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5; +_Quodlib_. IV, q. 11, a. 1). Since these movements are indirectly +voluntary, St. Thomas’ teaching does not conflict with the Council of +Trent which speaks of the _fomes_ as habitual dispositions and not of +its acts which St. Thomas considers. Clearly, too, his teaching does +not fall under the condemnation of the propositions of Baius; with +Baius the motions are involuntary, but for St. Thomas indirectly +voluntary.</p> + +<p>St. Thomas distinguishes the motions of sensuality differently from +modern manualists. For him the motions-_primo-primi_ arise from +corporal dispositions which are not under the control of reason and +hence can not be sins. Motions-_secundo-primi_ arise from some +apprehension of the internal senses proper to the passions and can, at +least if taken singly, and ought to be ruled by reason. Thus, they are +moral acts (_de Malo_, q. VII, a. 6, ad 8um; _II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2).</p> + +<p>130. Bodily suffering or sickness is sometimes called a passion of the +body, but, unlike the passions of the soul, it is a physical evil. +Morally considered, it is indifferent in itself, but it has contacts +with morality in various ways. (a) Thus, it may receive morality from +the will. Examples: Sufferings endured with resignation are acts of +virtue; sickness or pain inflicted upon others is imputable to the +unjust cause. (b) It may affect the morality of the act of the will. +Examples: Severe toothache or other exquisite pain is an extenuating +circumstance in sins of grumbling, for the suffering draws so much +attention to itself that deliberation on other things is much +diminished; weakness of stomach may be a moral advantage in freeing one +from temptations to over-eating.</p> + +<p>131. Though the passions are good in themselves, they are often morally +dangerous. The regulation of the passions through the virtues of +fortitude and temperance will be treated later on, but we shall +indicate here some natural means by which, God helping, their first +motions may be controlled. (a) Thus, if a passion is not strong, it may +be repressed directly by command of the will. Example: The impulse to +anger may sometimes be checked by the command of silence. (b) If a +passion is strong, it may be combated through other activities which +are its opposites or which, through the amount of energy they call for, +will diminish proportionately the force of the passion. Examples: In +time of fear one can fall back on thoughts of confidence; in time of +mourning one can seek joy or alleviation in the society of friends or +in the repose of sleep. Study or other strenuous occupation is an +excellent means to overcome impetuous passion.</p> + +<p>(c) If a passion is persistent, it may be diverted to some lawful +object vividly represented and held in the imagination and thoughts. +Examples. Those who are inclined to love immoderately the world or the +things that are in the world should direct their love to divine +goodness. Those who are inclined to be too fearful of men should think +how much more God is to be feared.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Question_II">Question II<br />GOOD AND BAD HABITS</h2> +</div> + + +<p>132. Having considered human acts and the passions, we now pass to a +consideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately. +These principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the +soul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appetite, and vegetative +powers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the +faculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions, +either favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the +stable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the +intellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit +of knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance. +Likewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which +is good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology, +but the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil, +must be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_HABITS_IN_GENERAL">Art. 1: HABITS IN GENERAL</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 49-54.)</p> + +<p>133. Definition.—A habit is a perfect and stable quality by which a +being is well- or ill-affected in itself, or with regard to its +motions. It differs from mere disposition or tendency, which is an +imperfect and transitory quality. Thus, a sallow complexion is a habit; +a blush, a disposition.</p> + +<p>134. Division.—Habits are variously divided, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) From the viewpoint of their subject, they are either entitative or +operative, according as they affect directly the nature or the powers +of a being. Thus, in the soul there are the entitative habit of +sanctifying grace and operative habits like science and virtue; while +in the body are entitative habits of health, beauty, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) From the viewpoint of their object, habits are good (i.e., virtues) +or evil (i.e., vices);</p> + +<p>(c) From the viewpoint of their cause, habits are infused or acquired, +according as they are supernaturally produced by God, or are naturally +obtained by man through repeated acts, or result from nature without +repeated acts. Faith in a baptized infant is an infused habit; +knowledge obtained through study is an acquired habit; the perception +that the first principles of truth are to be granted is natural.</p> + +<p>135. Operative acquired habits are defined as qualities not easily +changed, by which a faculty that is able to act in various ways is +disposed to act in one way with ease, readiness and pleasure. Thus, by +training a man acquires a correct carriage, and is able to walk +straight without difficulty.</p> + +<p>136. Operative infused habits are enduring qualities that give to a +faculty the power to perform acts that are supernatural. Thus, the +infused virtues of faith, hope and charity give to the intellect and +the will the ability to elicit acts with reference to supernatural +truth and good. Facility and promptitude with respect to these acts +come through the use of the infused power.</p> + +<p>137. Strengthening and Weakening of Habits.—Habits are increased: (a) +extensively when they are applied to more objects—thus the habit of +science grows as it is applied to more truths; (b) intensively, when +they are rooted more firmly in their subject and become easier to +exercise. This last comes about when intense acts of a habit are +frequently repeated. Thus, a habit of virtue or vice becomes a second +nature, and it is exercised with ever greater delight and resisted with +ever-increasing difficulty.</p> + +<p>138. The infused habits cannot be diminished, but they can be destroyed +(see 745). As to the acquired habits, they are weakened and destroyed +chiefly in two ways: (a) by acts opposed to them, especially if these +acts are earnest and frequent—thus, evil custom is overcome by good +custom, and vice-versa; (b) by long discontinuance or disuse. Thus, a +person who has learned a foreign language will forget it, if he fails +to speak, read or hear it. The knowledge of first principles, +speculative or moral, is not lost, however, through forgetfulness, as +experience shows.</p> + +<p>139. Accidentally, a habit may be corrupted through injury of an organ +that is necessary for the exercise of the habit. Thus, right moral +judgment may be lost if certain areas of the brain are affected.</p> + +<p>140. Habits and Morality.—The importance of habits in man’s moral life +is very great. (a) Habits are an index to a man’s past career, for the +ease and facility he now possesses through them is the result of many +struggles and efforts and difficulties overcome, or of defeats and +surrenders and neglected opportunities. (b) Habits constitute a man’s +moral character. Morally, a person is the sum of his moral habits and +dispositions grouped around the central interest or idea of his life. +He who would know himself, therefore, cannot do better than to examine +what are his habits, and which is the predominant one among them. (e) +Habits are a prophecy of the future. Habits are not irresistible and do +not destroy freedom, but they produce such ease and readiness for +acting in one particular way that the probabilities are, when habits +are strong, that a person will continue to follow them in the future as +he has done in the past, thus progressing or deteriorating, as the case +may be.</p> + +<p>141. Duties as regards Habits.—(a) Bad habits should be avoided and +those that have been formed should be destroyed (see 138). The means to +accomplish these victories are divine help obtained through prayer and +the other instrumentalities of grace, watchfulness through +self-examination, and the cultivation of a spirit of self-denial, as +well as attack made on the habit that is forming or already formed (see +255 sqq.)</p> + +<p>(b) Good habits should be acquired, and those already possessed should +be exercised and put to the best advantage. The means to this end, in +addition to those that are supernatural, are especially a realization +of the importance of good habits, a great desire to have them, and +constant and regular effort to practise them (see 137).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_GOOD_HABITS_OR_VIRTUES">Art. 2: GOOD HABITS OR VIRTUES</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 55-70.)</p> + +<p>142. Definition.—A virtue is a good habit of the free powers of the +soul, that is a principle of good conduct, and never of conduct that is +evil. Hence, the following are not virtues: (a) an occasional +inclination to good, for this is not a fixed habit; (b) good habits of +the body or of the vegetative powers, etc. (such as beauty and health), +for these are not free; (c) knowledge of the right or affection for it +without any reference to practice, for virtue is a principle of right +living; (d) habits that can be applied indifferently to good or bad +conduct, such as human opinion.</p> + +<p>143. Division.—The virtues are divided: (a) according to their +different causes, into infused and acquired virtues (cfr. 134 sqq.);(b) +according to their different objects, into intellectual, moral and +theological virtues.</p> + +<p>144. The intellectual virtues are those habits that perfect the +intellect with reference to its good—i.e., truth, speculative or +practical.</p> + +<p>145. The speculative virtues are three: understanding, knowledge and +wisdom.</p> + +<p>(a) Understanding or intelligence is the habit of perceiving truths +that are not in need of proof, as being self-evident. Axiomatic truths +or first principles are the object of this virtue.</p> + +<p>(b) Knowledge or science is the habit of perceiving truths that are +learned from other truths by argumentation, and that are ultimate in +some category of being. The object of this virtue embraces the various +sciences (like astronomy) which are conclusions from principles.</p> + +<p>(c) Wisdom is the habit of learning through reasoning the truth that is +absolutely ultimate; it is the knowledge of things in their supreme +cause, God. Examples are theology and philosophy in their highest sense.</p> + +<p>146. The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.</p> + +<p>(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual +cases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one +may act according to the requirements of good morals.</p> + +<p>(b) Art is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases +how one must act in order to produce things that are useful or +beautiful (e.g., music, painting, building, etc.).</p> + +<p>147. The intellectual virtues, except prudence, are not perfect +virtues, since, While they make an act good, they do not necessarily +make the agent good. A man may have great knowledge about morality, or +be able to produce excellent works of art, and at the same time be not +virtuous, or have no love for his work.</p> + +<p>148. Prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it resides in the +intellect; but it is also classed among the moral virtues, since its +object is the direction of human acts to their right end.</p> + +<p>149. The moral virtues are those habits that perfect the will and the +sensitive appetite with reference to their immediate and respective +objects; that is, they are habits concerned with acts as means to the +Last End. They make the act good, and make good also him who performs +it; and they are thus superior as virtues to the intellectual habits.</p> + +<p>150. There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there +is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the +other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the +will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions +accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is +fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw +from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible +appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that +would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.</p> + +<p>These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the +other moral virtues hinge on them.</p> + +<p>151. The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and +the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. +They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the +intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a +divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, +enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by +faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a +virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of +his hope and transforming him into its likeness.</p> + +<p>152. Causes of Virtues.—The causes of virtue are three: (a) nature, +which is the cause of the inchoative intellectual and moral virtues, +that is, of the theoretical and practical principles that are naturally +known, and of the inclinations to virtue that arise from an +individual’s bodily constitution; (b) practice, which is the cause of +perfected intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the good habits +that are formed by repeated acts (e.g., knowledge obtained through +study, temperance fixed in the character through continued effort); (c) +infusion from on high, which is the cause of the virtues that surpass +nature (i.e., of the theological virtues and of the moral virtues that +are concerned with our acts as ordered to the supernatural).</p> + +<p>153. Properties of the Virtues.—From the definition of virtue given +above certain properties result.</p> + +<p>(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard, +it does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden +mean.</p> + +<p>(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the +guidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without +the right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four +moral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be +together. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he +who has charity has also all the other infused virtues.</p> + +<p>(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees +of excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase +and decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different +species, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.</p> + +<p>(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in +the life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat +changed in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion +of the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do +not rebel.</p> + +<p>154. The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.</p> + +<p>(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external +object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, +neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean +is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these +two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions +according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt +of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, +whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which +would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for +him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to +encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.</p> + +<p>(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the +agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false +affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of +prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered +as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and +defect.</p> + +<p>(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is +concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, +cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their +subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for +one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what +is not due to one’s condition.</p> + +<p>155. Without charity one may possess certain other virtues. (a) Thus, +one may have the natural or acquired moral virtues, as is the case with +many pagans, but such virtues are imperfect, since they do not direct +their subject to the Supernatural End of man; (b) one may have the +supernatural or infused virtues of faith and hope, as is the case with +Christians who are not in the state of grace. Even such faith and hope +are imperfect virtues, and are not meritorious.</p> + +<p>156. Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three +groups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most +excellent, since they deal directly with man’s supernatural end; (b) By +reason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are +superior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular +goods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as +virtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the +appetites, they are more properly principles of action.</p> + +<p>157. The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with +its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their +object;</p> + +<p>(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals +with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as +to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right +disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: +prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with +man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to +others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death +are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of +less importance;</p> + +<p>(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers +the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of +the intellect.</p> + +<p>158. In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some +respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral +virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to +overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, +as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life +will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense +images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place +to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.</p> + +<p>159. The Complements of the Virtues.—The virtues are habits that +supply the soul with an internal guide (prudence), and with +inclinations to follow its direction (moral virtues). But there is also +a higher Guide who speaks to the soul, and it is necessary that the +inclinations of virtue be carried out in a suprahuman mode. Hence, the +virtues are completed by certain adjuncts. These are: (a) the Gifts of +the Holy Ghost, which are habits infused into the soul, making it +sensitive to the guidance of the Holy Spirit and docile under His +direction; (b) the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, which are acts that grow +out of the virtues and have a special spiritual sweetness attached to +them; (c) the Beatitudes, which are activities of special excellence +having a corresponding special reward attached to them, The acts are +produced by the infused virtues and the Gifts, especially by the Gifts.</p> + +<p>160. There are seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are divided as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) There are the Intellectual Gifts, which make the soul more +responsive to the light which the Holy Spirit sheds upon truths held by +faith. These Gifts assist the intellect, first, in its apprehension of +the mysteries of faith, that it may be made to grasp more clearly what +it believes (Gift of Understanding); secondly, in its judgments, that +it may be illuminated so as to adhere to the principles of faith and +depart from their opposites, whether there be question of judgments +about divine things (Gift of Wisdom), or created things (Gift of +Knowledge), or human actions (Gift of Counsel);</p> + +<p>(b) There are the Appetitive Gifts, which make the soul more ready to +follow divine motions and inspirations. These Gifts aid the irascible +affections by giving them a confidence of victory over every peril and +by assuring safe arrival at the term of life (Gift of Fortitude); they +aid the will in its social relations by leading to a filial love and +devotion toward God (Gift of Piety); they assist the concupiscible +affections by filling them with a reverence of God’s majesty and a +horror of offending Him (Gift of Fear of the Lord).</p> + +<p>161. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are superior to the moral and +intellectual virtues, for these virtues perfect the powers of the soul +that they may be always ready to follow the guidance of reason, while +the Gifts make the powers of the soul docile to the guidance of the +Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>162. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are inferior to the theological +virtues, for these virtues unite the soul to the Holy Ghost, while the +Gifts only make the soul ready to receive His illuminations and +inspirations.</p> + +<p>163. There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul +(Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling +Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect +the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is +rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that +it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual +delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. +Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; +meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him +deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a +man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as +modesty, continency, chastity.</p> + +<p>164. There are eight Beatitudes enumerated by our Lord. (a) Some of +these are acts that surpass the virtues as regards the use of external +goods and the government of the passions. Thus, it is lawful to have +possessions, but the poor in spirit despise them; it is lawful to +exercise the irascible passions according to reason, but the meek under +divine guidance keep themselves in tranquillity; it is lawful to +rejoice according to moderation, but the mourners, when this is better, +refrain from all rejoicing. (b) Other Beatitudes are acts that surpass +the virtues of justice or liberality to one’s neighbor. Thus, those who +hunger and thirst after justice not only discharge their obligations, +but they do so with the greatest willingness; the merciful bestow their +bounty, not only on their friends and relatives, but on those who are +most in need. (c) Still other Beatitudes are concerned with the acts +that most fit one for the contemplation of divine things, namely, that +in oneself one be pure or heart or free from the defilements of +passion, and that one be peaceful with reference to others. (d) The +final Beatitude is the crown of the others; for one is perfectly +attached to poverty of spirit, meekness, etc., when he is prepared for +their sake to suffer persecution.</p> + +<p>165. The rewards promised to the Beatitudes are conferred, not only in +the life to come, but also in the present life. But they are not +necessarily temporal or corporal rewards (such as riches, pleasure, +ete.), but spiritual beatitude, which is a foretaste and figure of the +eternal joy to come.</p> + +<p>166. All the Beatitudes may be called Fruits of the Holy Ghost, since +they are the outgrowth of the indwelling Spirit and are filled with +spiritual sweetness. But the Beatitudes are really more excellent than +the Fruits, since they are works of more than ordinary excellence; +whereas every work of virtue that gives delight may be called a Fruit +of the Holy Spirit.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_BAD_HABITS_OR_VICES_Summa_Theologica_I-II_qq_71-89">Art. 3: BAD HABITS OR VICES</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 71-89.)</p> + +<p>167. Definition.—A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is +an act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or +it is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.</p> + +<p>168. Divisions.—There are various divisions of sins. Thus:</p> + +<p>(a) according to the kind of delight that is taken in evil, sins are +either spiritual (e.g., vainglory) or carnal (e.g., intemperance);</p> + +<p>(b) according to the person who is more directly offended by evil, sins +are either against God (e.g., heresy, despair, blasphemy), or against +one’s neighbor (e.g., theft, calumny), or against oneself (e.g., +intemperance, suicide);</p> + +<p>(c) according to the greater or less gravity of the evil, sins are +either mortal (e.g., blasphemy) or venial (e.g., idle thoughts);</p> + +<p>(d) according as the evil is done by acting or not acting, sins are +either of commission (e.g., theft) or of omission (e.g., failure to pay +debts);</p> + +<p>(e) according to the progress of a sin, there are three stages: first, +it is a sin of the heart when it exists only in the mind, as when one +entertains a wish for revenge; secondly, it is a sin of the mouth, when +it is manifested in words, as when one uses contumelious language; +thirdly, it is a sin of work when it is carried out in act, as when one +strikes another in the face;</p> + +<p>(f) according to the manner in which they deviate from the golden mean, +sins are either of excess (e.g., extravagance) or of defect (e.g., +miserliness);</p> + +<p>(g) according to the manner in which its guilt is contracted, sin is +either original (i.e., the loss of grace inherited from Adam) or actual +(i.e., the stain derived from one’s own wrongdoing; sec 272 sqq.).</p> + +<p>169. Mortal Sin.—A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns +away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good, +thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.</p> + +<p>170. The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged +mortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in +the opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from +God and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.</p> + +<p>171. The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God +or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or +that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right +reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of +society, of one’s neighbor, or of oneself.</p> + +<p>172. The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the +character of the act and without exception, when the good which is +injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and +indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are +always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while +murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always +grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite +goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is +grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good +that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus, +the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and +hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the +offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence. +Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter +when the amount stolen is small.</p> + +<p>173. The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there +be full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be +said to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount +of deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great +moment.</p> + +<p>174. Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to +something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is +nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in +full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial +advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as +when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or +distracted with many things.</p> + +<p>175. Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter, +a sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When +without one’s will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as +happens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence +of drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain, +etc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there +is no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act. +Those who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is +sinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or +the uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act; +likewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence, +do not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what +they do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have +taken second thought on its immorality).</p> + +<p>176. Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if +afterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly +afterwards one cannot be sure what was one’s state of mind at the time.</p> + +<p>177. Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not +required that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not +necessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for +advertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary, +(b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the +commission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the +beginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the +sin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special +malice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just +what the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of +sacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is +mortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence +for grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that +advertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to +the fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will +the malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is +not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit +(i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense +against God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of +punishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one +perceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the +meaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.</p> + +<p>178. The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full +consent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God +except through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there +has not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under +violent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full +advertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).</p> + +<p>179. Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin +the person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of +grave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the +sinful suggestion—e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was +fully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept +from an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if +after the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to +whether consent was given.</p> + +<p>180. Venial Sin.—A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by +it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however, +as to forsake God as one’s Last End or to prefer self-will to the +divine friendship.</p> + +<p>181. The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that +its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of +him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is +light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).</p> + +<p>182. The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character +of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is +finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of +less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about +some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is +light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light +when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example +here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).</p> + +<p>183. The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some +advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full +when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else +the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full +or partial when the matter is light.</p> + +<p>184. The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent +of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when +the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent +may be either full or partial when the matter is light.</p> + +<p>185. Imperfections.—The description of venial sin just given indicates +that it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of +lighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes +of moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:</p> + +<p>(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of +good acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed. +Since man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in +the good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a +transgression or a sin;</p> + +<p>(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions, +are acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are +contrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass +that is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a +good reason for staying away;</p> + +<p>(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary, +are acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed +to some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary +distractions.</p> + +<p>186. Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a +sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful +(e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt); +(b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was +voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).</p> + +<p>187. Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight +offense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of +some change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose, +circumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).</p> + +<p>188. A change in the object makes venial sin mortal: (a) when that +which is light matter objectively is apprehended subjectively as grave +matter (e.g., a person tells a small lie or commits a trifling theft, +thinking these to be mortal sins); (b) when that which is light matter +by itself becomes knowingly grave matter through the additions that are +made to it (e.g., a thief steals small amounts frequently with the +intention of having a great amount of ill-gotten money after a time).</p> + +<p>189. It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may +coalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as +just explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere +multiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal +and venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts +are slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but +do not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass +every Sunday.</p> + +<p>190. The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held +as of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a) +directly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence +(e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b) +indirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love +for virtue.</p> + +<p>191. The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially +sinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful, +when the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then +intended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80). +Example: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow +hatreds.</p> + +<p>192. The circumstances of an act that is only venially sinful in itself +also make the act mortally sinful, when there is grave malice in such +circumstances. Cases of this kind are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) The circumstance of the person committing the sin sometimes changes +the malice from light to grave. Example: Unbecoming levity in one in +authority may cause serious disrespect for his office and thus be +gravely sinful;</p> + +<p>(b) The circumstance of the manner in which an act is performed may +change it from a venial to a mortal sin, as when the sin is committed +out of contempt, or is so coveted that it would be preferred to a grave +obligation. Examples: One who violates a law of lesser moment, not +because he regards it as bad, but because he wishes to show his +disregard of all law and authority; or one who is so attached to games +of chance that he is prepared to steal a large sum rather than give +them up.</p> + +<p>193. The serious harm that is foreseen as a result of venial sin also +changes the malice from slight to serious. Examples: One who jokingly +annoys another, knowing that this will provoke grave dissensions; or +one who tells small lies to persons who are known for their +uncharitable distortions and exaggerations; or one who agrees to take +too much strong drink knowing from experience that this invariably +leads to serious excess.</p> + +<p>194. Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave +offense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of +full consent in the subject.</p> + +<p>195. A change in the object makes a mortal sin venial: (a) when that +which is grave matter objectively, is apprehended through inculpable, +or only venially culpable ignorance as light matter (e.g., when an +uninstructed child thinks that a serious calumny is only a venial sin); +(b) when a sin whose character is serious but whose matter is divisible +is small as to matter (e.g,, to be absent from a small part of the Mass +on Sunday); (e) when a law whose obligation is grave will cause more +than slight inconvenience in a particular case, and thus becomes of +light obligation for that case (e.g., to miss Mass on Sunday because of +a difficulty that was not unsurmountable, but yet considerable).</p> + +<p>196. Lack of sufficient advertence or of full consent makes a mortal +sin venial; (a) when without serious fault one does not advert to a +gravely sinful act (e.g., a desire of revenge); (b) when without +serious fault one does not know or does not think about the grave +malice of what one is doing (e.g., to repeat a story, not knowing or +not remembering at the time that it is a serious calumny); (c) when on +account of considerable excitement, fear or other disturbance, one +gives only partial consent to an act that is mortally sinful (e.g., +when one, on being suddenly insulted, replies with a serious +imprecation).</p> + +<p>197. The Distinction of Sins.—There are three kinds of distinction of +sins: (a) sins that differ according to theological species, that is, +according as they turn or do not turn the sinner away from God as his +Last End. There are only two theological species of sin, viz., mortal +and venial; (b) sins that differ according to moral species, that is, +according to their essences, or the various kinds of finite good to +which they turn the sinner. There are many moral species of sins, for +example, infidelity, uncharitableness, etc.; (c) sins that differ +according to number, but agree according to moral species (e.g., two +distinct acts of uncharitable hatred).</p> + +<p>198. The criteria for the specific distinction of sins are two:</p> + +<p>(a) that which makes sins to differ specifically is the difference of +the objects to which they tend, inasmuch as these created goods are out +of harmony in specifically different ways with the standards of +morality (e.g., pride and gluttony); (b) that by which we recognize the +specific difference of sins is the opposition they have to virtues or +laws that are specifically different. Thus, pride is opposed to +humility, gluttony to temperance—two different virtues.</p> + +<p>199. The following rules assist us in recognizing specific distinctions +of sins. (a) Those sins are specifically different which are opposed to +virtues that are specifically distinct. Thus, infidelity and despair +are different in species, because opposed to faith and hope, which are +two distinct species of virtue. (b) Those sins are specifically +different that are opposed to specifically different objects of one and +the same virtue—that is, to functions of the virtue, or to laws +concerning it that have intrinsically different motives. Thus, sins of +murder, theft, and false testimony, though opposed to the same virtue +of justice, are specifically distinct, since they contravene +obligations of that virtue whose purposes are morally distinct. (c) +Those sins are specifically different that are opposed in specifically +different ways to the same object of the same virtue, one opposing that +object by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus, +miserliness and extravagance are specifically distinct sins, because +one falls short of, while the other goes beyond, the golden mean that +is found in liberality.</p> + +<p>200. Sins are not specifically distinct: (a) when they are opposed to +the same virtue in ways that are physically, but not morally, contrary. +Thus, sins of omission and sins of commission are physically opposites, +but they are not morally so, unless they offend against different moral +objects in the ways explained in the preceding paragraph. Hence, to +steal and to refuse to pay debts, to take and to keep what belongs to +another, are not specifically different sins; whereas to violate two +distinct precepts about the same virtue, one a command and the other a +prohibition, is to commit two species of sin, one by omission, and the +other by commission;</p> + +<p>(b) when they are opposed to the same virtue with reference to commands +that differ in their lawgivers, but not in their motives. Thus, God, +the Church, and the State all forbid theft; but he who steals is not +therefore guilty of three sins, for each lawgiver forbids theft from +the same intrinsic motive, viz., because it is an injury.</p> + +<p>201. One and the same act contains in itself many sins, when it has +many malices specifically different. Thus, he who kills his parents +violates two commandments relative to the virtue of justice; he who +steals from a church is guilty of theft and of sacrilege.</p> + +<p>202. Sins that are multiplied numerically within the same species are +committed in three ways: (a) by purely internal acts, that is, acts +that are completed within the powers of the soul and do not tend to +execution in some external act (e.g., unbelief, envy, pride, delight in +the thought of sin, etc.); (b) by internal acts that are not completed +in the will, but tend to execution in some external act (e.g., the +purpose or desire to injure another, to lie, etc.); (c) by external +acts that are performed or neglected by the bodily faculties under +command of the will (e.g., theft, quarrels, lies, omissions of duty, +etc.).</p> + +<p>203. Acts may be numerically one or many in two ways.</p> + +<p>(a) Physically, there is one act when the agent moves or puts into +action a power of the soul or body only once (e.g., to steal from a +church). Physically, there are many acts when the agent exercises +different operative faculties, or the same one different times (e.g., +to put one’s hand many times into a money box in order to steal the +entire contents).</p> + +<p>(b) Morally, there is one act when a single physical act does not +contain more than one species of morality, or when several physical +acts are united as parts of one whole by reason of the intention of the +agent, or the nature of the acts themselves. For example, the wish to +steal is morally one act. The intention to steal, the decision to use +certain means to accomplish this intention, the various attempts made, +and finally the carrying out of the plan—all these form morally but +one act, since the acts that follow are only the development of the +original intention. Similarly, several curses hurled at another form +morally one act, if all are uttered under the influence of the same +passion of anger. Finally, acts of spying on another, of entering his +house without permission, and of taking his property unlawfully, are +morally one act, because the first acts are naturally the preparation +for what follows.</p> + +<p>204. Morally, there are several acts when a single physical act +contains several species of malice (as when one steals from a church), +or when there are several physical acts not united by any bond of +common purpose or natural subordination (as when one steals on +different occasions because an opportunity suddenly presented itself, +or as when one misses Mass on different Sundays).</p> + +<p>205. Objects of acts may also be numerically one or many in two ways.</p> + +<p>(a) Physically, an object is one when it has its own proper +individuality different from that of others. Thus, each coin in a +pocket-book is physically one thing, each member of a family is +physically one person. Objects are physically many, when they include +more than one distinct thing or person. Thus, physically a pocket-book +contains many objects, as does also a family.</p> + +<p>(b) Morally, objects that are physically many become one, if they are +not such as to require morally distinct acts in their regard, and if +they form according to prudent judgment parts of an integral or +collective whole. Otherwise, these objects are morally many. Example: +Missing Mass for a whole year constitutes, morally speaking, many +objects, since it implies many independent external omissions, or +morally distinct acts. A box of ordinary coins, though it contains many +individual pieces of money, is commonly regarded as one integral +object; and likewise religious, civil, domestic, and financial bodies, +though each is made up of many members, are each, morally speaking, but +one person. The possessions of different proprietors, however, are not +one moral object; neither do the individual, personal rights of the +members of one group constitute a single object.</p> + +<p>206. It is clear that two sins specifically different in malice are also +numerically different (e.g., a sin of theft and a sin of calumny). The +rules that follow will pertain only to sins that are of the same +species, but that differ numerically within the species (e.g., two +distinct sins of theft, two distinct sins of calumny).</p> + +<p>207. The rules for the numerical distinction of sins within the same +species suppose: (a) that the distinction be not taken from the object, +which gives the specific difference, but from the repetition of acts +with regard to one object, made either actually (by different acts) or +equivalently (by what is equal to different acts); (b) that the +distinction be not taken from a physical but from a moral consideration +of the acts.</p> + +<p>208. Three rules of numerical distinction will be given, one for each +of the three following hypotheses: (a) many distinct acts are concerned +with morally distinct objects of the same species; (b) many distinct +acts are concerned with what is morally one object; (c) one act is +concerned with what are physically many, but morally one object.</p> + +<p>209. First Rule of Numerical Distinction.—Many sinful acts, each of +which is concerned with an object that is distinct in number (morally +speaking) from the objects of the other acts, make as many numerically +distinct sins as there are acts and objects numerically distinct. +Example: He who fires distinct shots and unjustly kills three persons +is guilty of three murders.</p> + +<p>210. Second Rule of Numerical Distinction.—Many sinful acts, all of +which are concerned with an object that is (morally speaking) one and +the same in number, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are +acts numerically distinct according to moral estimation.</p> + +<p>211. When the acts concerned with the same object are purely internal, +they are multiplied numerically, according to moral estimation, in the +following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced by an act of the +will. Example: He who hates in the morning, repents at noon, and +returns to his hate in the afternoon, commits two sins of hatred;</p> + +<p>(b) when they are repeated after having been voluntarily discontinued, +if the interval between the two acts is so considerable that the second +act is not a mere continuation of the first. Example: He who in his +mind reviles an enemy passing by, then turns his attention to his work +and thinks no more about his anger, and later, seeing his enemy again, +reviles him mentally a second time, commits two sins;</p> + +<p>(c) when they are repeated after having been involuntarily +discontinued, if a notable period (say, three hours) intervenes between +the two acts. Example: He who thinks thoughts of hatred until he falls +asleep, or until he is distracted from them by something unusual going +on about him, or by the entrance of a visitor, commits a second sin of +hatred, when he returns to the same thoughts, if the interruption was +so long that there is no moral connection between the two acts.</p> + +<p>212. When acts tending to the same object are internal, but directed +towards completion in some external act, they are multiplied +numerically, in moral estimation, in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced. Example: He who +decides to steal, but repents for his sin, and then again decides to +steal, commits two sins;</p> + +<p>(b) when they are repeated after voluntary discontinuance, if the +interval is not merely momentary. Example: He who thinks over a plan to +acquire money unjustly, and then deliberately turns his thought away +and gives all his attention to lawful affairs, but later resumes the +dishonest planning, commits a new sin;</p> + +<p>(c) when they are repeated after involuntary discontinuance, if the +interval is notable in view of the external act desired, and nothing +external was done that could serve as a link to unify the two acts. +Example: A burglar plans a robbery that could easily be carried out at +once, but he takes no steps to execute his plan, and soon forgets about +it. A month later, passing the house he had intended to rob, he +remembers his plan and carries it out. Two distinct sins were here +committed.</p> + +<p>213. Involuntary discontinuance does not, however, separate the acts +into two distinct sins: (a) if the interval was brief in view of the +external act that was desired (e.g., if the burglar above mentioned had +forgotten his plan for a few days only before he renewed it and carried +it out); (b) if something had already been done by reason of the first +act (e.g., if the burglar, after resolving to rob the house, had +procured keys or tools for the purpose, and had kept them with this in +mind, although he allowed months and years to pass without making any +attempt to fulfill his design).</p> + +<p>214. When the acts tending to the same object are external, they are +multiplied numerically in moral estimation, and make distinct sins as +follows: (a) if the internal acts from which they proceed are +numerically distinct sins (e.g., if a burglar attempts to rob a house, +but leaves his work unfinished because he becomes conscience-stricken +or is interrupted, and later makes another plan and another attempt, +there are two sins); (b) if the external acts are of such a kind that +no internal intention can make them morally one act, even when one +follows directly upon the other (e.g., missing Mass on Sunday and again +on the following day, a holyday, makes one guilty of two distinct +violations of the law).</p> + +<p>215. In the following cases, however, distinct external acts with +reference to the same object do not multiply the number of sins: (a) +when these acts form a part of one moral whole, and are intended as +such by the agent (e.g., one who reads a forbidden book, but divides it +into parts, reading only so many pages a day); (b) when these acts have +to one another the relation of means to a common end, and they are +intended as such by the agent (e.g., various preparations made for +robbery).</p> + +<p>216. Third Rule of Numerical Distinction.—One sinful act, internal or +external, that is concerned with objects that are physically many, but +morally one, makes but one sin in number. Example: He who steals a +purse that contains ten bills commits one sin; he who calumniates a +family of ten persons commits one sin; he who steals what is the common +property of three proprietors commits one sin.</p> + +<p>217. When the objects are not morally one of themselves, they may +become so through the belief of the one who acts, since distinct +malices are not incurred except as apprehended (see 588-592). Example: +He who tells three different lies against a neighbor (e.g., that he is +a thief, a drunkard and a liar), commits one sin of calumny, if he has +in mind general injury to reputation, but does not think at the time of +the special injuries contained in his calumny. Likewise, he who +calumniates before ten persons commits but one sin of calumny, if, +being in a passion, he thinks only of the harm he wishes to cause and +not of the number of persons who are present.</p> + +<p>218. When the objects are morally one, they may become many through the +intention of the one who acts. Example: He who calumniates a family of +three persons by saying they are all dishonest, commits three sins, if +he intends three distinct injuries (e.g., against the business of one, +the religious reputation of another, and the friendship of the third). +So also he who steals part of the money in a purse, and later on, +having another opportunity, decides to steal the rest, commits two sins.</p> + +<p>219. When the objects are not morally one in themselves and cannot be +apprehended as such, distinct sins are committed. Example: He who +intends to miss Mass all year, foresees at least in a confused way many +distinct violations of the law; he who purposes to rob various +proprietors foresees at least in a vague way many separate and complete +external acts of robbery.</p> + +<p>220. Comparison of Sins.—Sins that differ in species differ also in +gravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of +reason and the law of God.</p> + +<p>221. Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against +a more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are +directly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God) +are the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such +as murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as +theft).</p> + +<p>222. Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is +worse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue. +Thus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the +opposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than +its opposite rashness.</p> + +<p>223. The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:</p> + +<p>(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of +malice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the +species (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve +it, or money stolen in a large quantity);</p> + +<p>(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence, +those who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are +less guilty than those who sin in cold blood;</p> + +<p>(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse +according as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his +personal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his +office, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is +greater if done to a priest, a public official or one’s own family, +than if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;</p> + +<p>(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better +instructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give +good example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater +ingratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin +deliberately;</p> + +<p>(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are +willed, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that +are bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).</p> + +<p>224. Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other +things being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of +malice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual +sins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong +passion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits +spiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against +God and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the +fallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their +pride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.</p> + +<p>(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they +liken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.</p> + +<p>225. In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than +non-carnal sins.</p> + +<p>(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other +malice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a +non-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both +lust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin +of theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the +non-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious +conversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is +more harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and +causing him some temporal injury.</p> + +<p>(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater +scandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins. +Example: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and +deliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or +anger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children. +Drunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed +by those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine +religion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same +persons. The results of a man’s pride (such as ambition, arrogance, +luxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the +results of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights, +extravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).</p> + +<p>226. Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said +above, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered +more serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions, +so sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of +human conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured, +therefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin +committed. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse +than sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all +creatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins +committed against things, for persons are the end of things.</p> + +<p>227. Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity +is: (a) sins against the personality of God—that is, against the +divine nature—such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins), +infidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of +God—that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that +belong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ +hypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things +consecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the +sins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy +reception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.</p> + +<p>228. Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank +in gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than +sins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against +personality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against +possessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against +wellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that +causes another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only +diminishes another’s goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take +away life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the +perfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a +greater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less +claim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one’s own salvation +than that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one’s own family, a +benefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or +virtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a +private individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions +that are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal +away the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures; +it is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his +wages.</p> + +<p>229. The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in +the abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have +to their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other +factor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the +circumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable, +and hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these +factors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according +to gravity given above may be changed or reversed.</p> + +<p>(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances, +or in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change +their respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse +than theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft +great harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.</p> + +<p>(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that +change the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is +less guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus +unintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without +malice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a +blow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry +because he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by +defacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the +first two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by +Titus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from +passion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of +Balbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus +is greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).</p> + +<p>230. The Subjects of Sin.—By the subjects of sin we understand the +powers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes +called the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the +sins tend are called their formal causes.</p> + +<p>231. Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g., +justice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive +appetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of +vice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive +appetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily +states, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful +(e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason +proceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction +deliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate +thoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the +other powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed, +etc.</p> + +<p>232. As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the +body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject +to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if +classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins +proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we +treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of +desire and reminiscent approval.</p> + +<p>233. Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one +deliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his +mind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually +present, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who +imagines his neighbor’s house burned down, and rejoices at the mental +picture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any +conflagration in the vicinity.</p> + +<p>234. The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with +thoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a +sinful picture represented in the mind.</p> + +<p>Thoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight +in an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one’s +neighbor’s property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought +forms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in +the mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as +it contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction +between bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A +moralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves +of it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read +detective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to +him, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the +plot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger +in thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere +curiosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction +through them.</p> + +<p>235. The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate +thoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc., +70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the +sin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at +the thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great +theft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the +circumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice +contained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the +thought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and +sacrilege.</p> + +<p>236. The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about +sinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of +their properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful +necessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or +without any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on +them frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever +they are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for +pastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as +heroes or martyrs.</p> + +<p>237. Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in +sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish +between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.</p> + +<p>(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts, +either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it +as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man +rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some +helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy +the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.</p> + +<p>(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not +that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were +good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a +dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner +in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to +witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and +remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that +a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is +confined to the second part of the news.</p> + +<p>238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same +character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to +rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it +in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over +the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those +sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.</p> + +<p>239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to +boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the +sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one +approves of sin rather than virtue.</p> + +<p>240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is +not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive +of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry +that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he +injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves +over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by +his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it +leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.</p> + +<p>241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately +intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz., +absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those +in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come +what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which +the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or +circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.</p> + +<p>242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as +that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the +object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large +sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and +dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of +ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in +his heart.</p> + +<p>243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express +rather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who +makes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who +unthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the +influence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.</p> + +<p>244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a) +There are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this +were not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.) +takes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be +dispensed or changed. Examples: “Would that God had not pronounced +against taking the property of others!” “I would stay away from church, +if this were not Sunday.” Desires of this kind are not sinful on +account of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of +their end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the +conditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which +the condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either +because the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or +because it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make +lawful. Examples: “I would steal, if this could be done safely.” “I +would blaspheme, if God permitted.” These desires partake of the malice +of the things that are wished.</p> + +<p>245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts +on things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and +desires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities +are sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is +physically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake, +but for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred +that a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one +wished this as a means to save the neighbor’s life, while he still +desires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is +intended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.</p> + +<p>246. The Causes of Sin.—The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., +those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which +are without).</p> + +<p>247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; +(b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.</p> + +<p>248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40 +sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material +and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the +law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults. +Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; +breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; +imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) +Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are +voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the +law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against +conscience.</p> + +<p>249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision +as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only +after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is +said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every +sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b +27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a +false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). +else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against +the faith;</p> + +<p>(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is +culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the +pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence +violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not +see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative +ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable +and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child +shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots +a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;</p> + +<p>(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, +leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose +inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory +(I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is +formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of +reason, the sin caused is material;</p> + +<p>(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every +sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here +understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding +ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the +sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious +habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or +presumption which he entertains.</p> + +<p>250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see +40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished +according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:</p> + +<p>(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent +concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the +voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is +especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this +kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;</p> + +<p>(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and +vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second +Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the +Son;</p> + +<p>(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free +will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is +especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this +class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One +whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the +friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the +offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is +so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins +habitually without fear or remorse.</p> + +<p>251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of +weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, +more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and +sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously +wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not +seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is +venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated +or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.</p> + +<p>252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil +spirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of +the soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that +is, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or +by their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice +of virtue.</p> + +<p>253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none +of the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of +the will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction +between temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the +suggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are +temptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but +rather virtue and merit.</p> + +<p>254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful +to remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this +without just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being +overcome by sin.</p> + +<p>255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which +commands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to +the sin suggested. This resistance may be:</p> + +<p>(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what +contains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a +temptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance, +while the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;</p> + +<p>(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is +also exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an +uncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a +book to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;</p> + +<p>(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a +temptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by +thoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in +order to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he +reads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;</p> + +<p>(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not +retracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a +temptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of +rejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is +actual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it +appears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his +resistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.</p> + +<p>256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a +grave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave, +the danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable; +otherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the +resistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example: +If a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had +decided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he +put off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its +appealing features.</p> + +<p>257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the +character and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the +person tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the +temptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who +knows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he +uses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance +also. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation +increases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better +that the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations +against faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away +from the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a +long time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by +worrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is +true as regards temptations against purity.</p> + +<p>258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in +certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a) +Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given +circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of +mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a +particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples: +Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for +anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil +associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate +danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger +of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not +morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded +probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote +danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times +relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.</p> + +<p>259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it +will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to +business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may +degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection +between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and +insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger, +but only accidentally from its possibility.</p> + +<p>260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of +sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss +without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs +according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the +proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become +proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to +which he exposes himself—and this even though the sin does not +actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is +to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote +danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is +venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not +imply affection for grave sin.</p> + +<p>261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can +be done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities +would follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one +feared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence +referred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of +sin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to +avoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the +good he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves +the danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to +the gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be +employed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use +of the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has +confident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.</p> + +<p>262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for, +since almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the +possibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed +in grace.</p> + +<p>263. The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances—persons, places +or things—which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others +to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where +irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.</p> + +<p>264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate +or remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they +will lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one +is able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example, +one who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free +occasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary +occasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the +impossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A +wife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up +an employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great +temporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition. +(c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion +with him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home +are a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an +absent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.</p> + +<p>265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it +be present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the +danger of sin (see 258 sqq.).</p> + +<p>266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to +neglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion +by which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and +protections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252 +sqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but +prayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.</p> + +<p>267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an +occasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a +necessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which +he is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to +which he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins +gravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.</p> + +<p>268. The Motives of Sin.—The purposes that lead men to sin can be +considered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of +individual men, which are for them motives for committing their other +sins (particular motives)—e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief +and who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b) +according to the natural relationship and sequence between sins +themselves, by which some are usually the motives for others _in all +men (general motives)_.</p> + +<p>269. The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as +the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is +impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, +on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that +most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: +(a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued +(the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the +views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved +(the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the +vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the +vices of envy and anger).</p> + +<p>270. The seven vices mentioned above are usually calle the capital, or +head vices, since the other sins are directed by them just as the other +parts of the body are directed by the head.</p> + +<p>271. Among the seven capital vices there are two that have principality +over the others: (a) in the intention of the sinner the motive force +that impels to sin is always some inordinate desire of his own personal +excellence, and hence pride is the beginning of all sin; (b) in the +execution of the sin the opportunity for satisfying every base desire +is afforded by money, and thus avarice is the root of nourishment of +all evils.</p> + +<p>272. The Results of Sin.—There are two kinds of sins from the +viewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by +all his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual +sin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.</p> + +<p>273. The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for +himself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence. +Thus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty +of holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him; +(b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the +higher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and +what are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will +becoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending +inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body +which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from +suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to +pain and death.</p> + +<p>274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and +actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is +opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul +defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner +incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the +internal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.</p> + +<p>275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace, +for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow +over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act +of sin.</p> + +<p>276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of +original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the +subjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation +through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin +is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the +individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial +sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin, +inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace +from appearing in external acts.</p> + +<p>277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it +removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it +takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused +habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of +the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits +already acquired).</p> + +<p>278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a) +it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it +lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice +of the virtues more difficult.</p> + +<p>279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense +of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by +remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical, +civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is +against divine law, it is punished by God.</p> + +<p>280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a) +Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from +his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable +disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave +sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not +inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the +Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs, +not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.</p> + +<p>281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin +by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of +loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This +pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite +Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created +things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through +creatures. This pain is finite.</p> + +<p>282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a +former sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to +become the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is +accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous +indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).</p> + +<p>283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In +the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted +by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of +justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must +distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which +is compensation willingly endured for one’s own sin, or freely offered +for another’s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for +his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human +race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as +reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against +sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the +calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of +the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes +happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the +natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst, +disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original +sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity +and corruption of nature produced by original sin.</p> + + +<p>Question III<br />LAW</p> + + +<p>284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of +human acts—that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now +we shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one +to one’s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon, +who tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is God, +who instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it. +Temptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic +Theology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_LAW_IN_GENERAL">Art. 1: LAW IN GENERAL</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)</p> + +<p>285. Definition.—Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good +promulgated by him who has authority in the community.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has +obligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not +obligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver +or of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.</p> + +<p>(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of +human acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a +ruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather +iniquity.</p> + +<p>(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote, +directly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society. +Hence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of +public peace and prosperity are not truly laws.</p> + +<p>(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or +persons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of +government. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of +a usurper are not laws.</p> + +<p>(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here +understood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for +attaining its end and is independent in its own order of other +societies. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are +not called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.</p> + +<p>(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to +the notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up +but not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of +its existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has +been promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known; +but he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he +breaks the law.</p> + +<p>286. Division.—According as the immediate lawgiver is God or man, laws +are divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is +the ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the +motions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the +universe; (b) the natural law is the light of man’s reason as an +impression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine +law is that which God of His free will has added to the natural law, +viz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel +under the New Testament.</p> + +<p>287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority +from which they originate.</p> + +<p>288. Collision of Laws.—Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws +seem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of +unjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound +not to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations +and rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since God is a +just and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be +held to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to +one that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent +collision of laws is:</p> + +<p>(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior, +he is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after +careful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must +decide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him +safer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide +for either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is +involuntary, and hence not imputable as sin.</p> + +<p>289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of +law, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has +precedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the +natural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of +proposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law +of self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong +to him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The +same law of self-preservation excuses one from assisting at Mass, if +one is very ill.</p> + +<p>(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The +command of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed +rather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19). +(c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end +of the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church’s +judgment about the means to her end should prevail.</p> + +<p>290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that +the Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the +jurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling +every dispute by its own action alone.</p> + +<p>(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in +opposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter, +for, as the Church admits, “whatever is to be ranged under the civil +and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority” (Leo +XIII).</p> + +<p>(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the +Church but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of +negotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a +conflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make +concessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.</p> + +<p>291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more +important, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.</p> + +<p>(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual, +internal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser +goods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law +that one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the +natural law that one must not blaspheme or deny God, and hence one must +prefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose +one’s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be +defended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation +calls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of +pestilence, disaster, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity, +for in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: Titus +is keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money +today; Balbus, who is very poor, asks Titus to give the money to him. +Titus should pay Caius.</p> + +<p>(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or +preceptive laws (see 371). Example: Titus is asked to write out a +testimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent, +etc. Balbus has claims on the help of Titus on account of a promise +made in the past; but Titus knows very well that Balbus is not +competent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the +law that one keep a promise made.</p> + +<p>292. Since rights and duties are correlative—there being a duty that +corresponds to every right, and vice versa—and since both are +regulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of +laws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.</p> + +<p>(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower +kind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the +fact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior +to the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as +inheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example: +Titus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital +without delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus +takes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the +hospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned +safely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his +act would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and +juries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.</p> + +<p>(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because +they are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to +live, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may +renounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc. +Example: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to +serve God or preserve one’s life.</p> + +<p>293. The Basis of All Laws.—Prior to every other law and the ground +and principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the +plan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to +their particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that +all other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of +the divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various +ways:</p> + +<p>(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made, +whereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;</p> + +<p>(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only +contingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as +that man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created, +whether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine +government. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is +necessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must +or must not have souls);</p> + +<p>(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures +(i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter, +plants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which +require that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled +through the inclinations given them by God, which move them to the ends +He desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of +irrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command +as such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would +be foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).</p> + +<p>294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal +and moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time, +either from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural +Law) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they +are laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with +metaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are +laws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with +physical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain +its end through self-government in accordance with law.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_THE_NATURAL_LAW">Art. 2: THE NATURAL LAW</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)</p> + +<p>295. Meaning.—The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons: +(a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along +with his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who +had not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto +themselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b) +it includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very +nature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses +naturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it +can be known from the natural light of reason without instruction, +being a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).</p> + +<p>The Natural Law is defined theologically as a participation of the +Eternal Law in man. Three elements constitute its essence in its +integrity: (a) a passive participation of the Eternal Law consisting in +man’s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts +and ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active +participation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the +activity of man’s intellect through which he shares in God’s providence +and government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others. +Reason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to +their proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the +practical reason. This command constitutes the essence of Natural Law. +“Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the +sacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of +justice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to +which he says: _The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon +us_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason, +whereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the +Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light. +It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the +rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (_Summa Theol_. +I-II, q. 91, a.2).</p> + +<p>296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is +inferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the +mind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all +created things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a +derivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man’s acts only. +(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction +from or a determination of Natural Law.</p> + +<p>297. Division.—Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan +of Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different +species of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The +objects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish +various precepts of Natural Law.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the difference of persons to whom natural duties are +owed, there are natural laws concerning God (e.g., that God must be +honored), natural laws concerning self (e.g., that one must not commit +suicide), and natural laws concerning the neighbor (e.g., that +injustice must not be done).</p> + +<p>(b) According to the difference of natural inclinations in man, there +are, first, natural laws common to him with all beings (e.g., the law +of self-preservation, and hence it is a natural duty of man to take +sleep, food, drink, remedies, etc., as necessary for life); secondly, +natural laws common to him with all sentient beings or animals (e.g., +the law of preservation of the species, and hence it is a natural duty +of man to rear and provide for his children); thirdly, natural laws +proper to man as a rational being (e.g., the laws that he should +cultivate his powers of mind and will, and hence it is a natural duty +of man to further religion and education, and to organize into +societies and to respect the rights of others).</p> + +<p>298. According to their necessity for the primary or the secondary end +of a natural inclination, the laws of nature are divided into primary +and secondary. (a) The primary end of a natural inclination is the +conservation of a natural good; and so it is a primary law of nature +that man should take the food, drink, sleep and exercise necessary for +life, and that he should avoid poison or other things that cause death. +(b) The secondary end of a natural inclination is the betterment of a +natural good, or its easier conservation; thus, it is a secondary law +of nature that man should use those kinds of food or drink that promote +his health, that he should be careful about his diet, practise +moderation, etc.</p> + +<p>299. Primary and secondary laws of nature are also explained as +follows: (a) a primary law is one that expresses the principal purpose +of a natural inclination (e.g., social good, that is, the begetting and +rearing of children, is the primary law of the married state); (b) the +secondary law is one that expresses a less important purpose of a +natural inclination. For example, individual good (i.e., companionship, +mutual assistance, the practice of virtue and freedom from temptation) +is the secondary purpose to be promoted in the married state.</p> + +<p>300. Precepts of the Natural Law may be divided also on account of the +different relations they have to one another or to our knowledge.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the priority they have among themselves, the laws of +nature are divided into the first principle and the secondary +principles. The first principle, which is general, which depends on no +other, and which is the root of all the others, is: “Good must be done, +evil omitted.” The secondary principles are particular, and they apply +this general principle to the natural inclinations of man mentioned +above, which reason indicates as ends of action—i.e., as goods to be +sought.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the priority they have with respect to our knowledge +of them, the laws of nature are divided, first, into axiomatic +precepts, which are evident and are granted by all (e.g., that good is +to be done, that one should follow reason, that one should not do to +others what one does not wish done to oneself etc.), and, secondly, +into inferred precepts (e.g., that one should not steal from others, as +one does not wish others to steal from oneself).</p> + +<p>301. The inferred precepts are also of two kinds, namely, general and +particular. (a) The general precepts are those that are deduced +immediately from the axioms as universal conclusions (e.g., the +commandments of the Decalogue, the principle that one should return +what one borrowed). (b) The particular precepts are those that are +deduced only remotely from the axioms as conclusions about cases in +which many particular conditions and circumstances are involved (e.g., +many conclusions about contracts, the conclusion that a loan is to be +paid in some particular way, at this particular time, etc.).</p> + +<p>302. According to the invariability or permanence of their +subject-matter, the laws of nature are of two kinds, namely, necessary +and contingent. (a) The necessary laws are those whose matter always +bears the same relation of essential conformity to or difformity from +reason. For example, the command, “Thou shalt not take the name of the +Lord in vain,” is necessary, because God remains always worthy of +honor, and there is no conceivable or possible case in which it could +become useful to speak of Him with dishonor. (b) The contingent laws of +nature are those whose matter generally, but not always, bears the same +essential relation to right reason. For example, the command, “Thou +shalt not kill,” is contingent, because, though man generally remains +worthy of having his life respected by others, there are cases when it +might be injurious to the common welfare, and hence to natural law, +that an individual be permitted to live, as when he has committed and +been convicted of a capital crime.</p> + +<p>303. According to the manner in which they oblige, the laws of nature +are twofold, namely, absolute and relative. (a) Absolute laws are those +that oblige for every case and condition, because the matter with which +they are concerned is intrinsically good or bad in every instance +(e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between parent and child, the law +against polyandry). (b) Relative laws of nature are those that oblige +except in case of a most grave public necessity, because the matter +with which they are concerned is generally and of its very nature +becoming or unbecoming (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between +brother and sister, the law forbidding polygamy).</p> + +<p>304. According to the manner in which the obligation is contracted, +laws of nature are of two kinds, viz., those whose obligatory force +depends entirely on the nature of things (e.g., the law that God must +be honored), and those whose obligatory force depends upon, an act of +the will of man freely undertaking an obligation, which the nature of +things then demands that he fulfill (e.g., the laws that those who have +made vows, oaths, contracts, etc., should live up to that which they +have freely promised).</p> + +<p>305. Properties.—Since the Natural Law is the reflection of God’s +Eternal Law impressed on the rational nature of man, it has the +following properties: (a) it is both declarative and imperative; being +immanent in man, it declares to him his duty; being transcendent in its +origin, it speaks with the voice of authority; (b) it is universal, or +for all, for it declares the necessities of nature, which are the same +in all men; (c) it is unchangeable, that is, it admits of neither +abrogation, nor dispensation, nor emendatory interpretation, for the +essences of things, on which it is based, do not change; (d) it is +recognizable and indelible, that is, it cannot fail to be known and +cannot be forgotten by mankind, for it is promulgated through the light +of reason given to man.</p> + +<p>306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all +places, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not +the use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the +Natural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any +transgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses +them from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.). Example: It is sinful to +induce or permit children to blaspheme or become intoxicated, not only +because of scandal or of harm done to them, but also because such +things are necessarily repugnant to their dignity as human beings. (b) +those who have the use of reason are subject to the Natural Law, and +their transgressions are imputable as formal sins and incur the debt of +punishment.</p> + +<p>307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as +regards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law, +for, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary +regulations be made to provide for particular situations. These +additions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications +rather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural +Law. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law—that is, +there can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must +always be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares +that a certain thing must be observed usually.</p> + +<p>308. From the foregoing it follows that no precept of the Natural Law +can be abrogated—that is, repealed and deprived of all force, so that +what was today a precept of nature should no longer be such tomorrow; +for the necessities of nature on which the Natural Law is based do not +change.</p> + +<p>309. As to the question whether any precepts of the Natural Law may be +dispensed or not, distinction must be made between two kinds of +dispensation.</p> + +<p>(a) A dispensation in the strict sense is granted when a legislator +relaxes for a particular case the obligation of a law, although the +subject-matter of the law still remains. Example: Titus is in the class +of those who are bound by the law of fast, but he is exempted by +competent authority from the obligation of the law.</p> + +<p>(b) A dispensation in the wide sense is granted when the subject-matter +of the law is taken away by the legislator himself or by another, so +that it ceases to be comprehended under the law, although the +obligation of the law still remains. Example: Balbus owed money to +Caius, but, as Caius forgave him the debt, he is no longer in the class +of those who are bound by law as debtors to Caius; he is not exempted, +however, from the obligation of the general law that one must pay one’s +debts.</p> + +<p>310. There are various opinions as to the possibility of a dispensation +from the Natural Law granted by God, but the following doctrine seems +the most probable.</p> + +<p>(a) God Himself cannot dispense in any way from those precepts whose +matter is necessary (see 302), such as axiomatic precepts (viz., those +that prohibit malice and those that command duties to be fulfilled at a +proper time and place). For all the subject-matter of these precepts is +intrinsically either consonant with or dissonant from right reason. +Example: God could not by decree abolish the Ten Commandments, for, as +long as God is God, He must remain worthy of worship, praise and love; +and, as long as man is man, it must be against his rational nature to +murder, steal, lie. etc.</p> + +<p>(b) God cannot grant a dispensation in the strict sense from those +precepts of the Natural Law whose matter is contingent, such as the +precepts against the taking of human life, against taking possessions +from others against their will, etc. For, as long as the subject-matter +of these precepts remains what it is supposed to be by the law, +transgression of them is necessarily opposed to reason. Example: God +cannot command the killing of a person who has the right to life, nor +the taking of property that rightly belongs to another.</p> + +<p>(c) God can grant a dispensation in the wide sense from contingent +precepts of the Natural Law—that is, He can make a change as regards +the subject-matter, so that it no longer falls under the law. Thus, +since God is the supreme Lord of life and property, He can without +injury to human rights command that a person be put to death or +deprived of his property by another. These acts would not constitute +murder (i.e., unjust homicide) or stealing (i.e., unlawful taking); for +God has a higher claim on life and possessions than the immediate +owners have. Examples: The command to Abraham to kill his son was not a +dispensation from the law against murder any more than the sending of +death to the first-born of Egypt was the commission of murder by God. +The command given the Israelites to carry away with them the goods of +the Egyptians was not a dispensation from the law against theft, any +more than the destruction of the fruits of the Egyptians by plagues was +the commission of theft by God.</p> + +<p>311. Is God able to make a decree which sets up a most grave public +necessity opposed to the observance of a law of nature?</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question of absolute laws (see 303), this cannot be +done, for God cannot deny Himself by making a disposition contrary to +His Eternal Law. Example: We do not read that God ever sanctioned +polyandry or marriage between parent and child, and it seems that He +could never permit such things as lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of relative laws (see 303), the decree in +question can be made by God; for the unbecomingness of that which is +forbidden by a relative law passes away in the face of a great need. +Example: Since God desired the propagation of the human race from one +man and one woman, marriage between brothers and sisters was not +against the Natural Law at the beginning. Since God desired the speedy +multiplication of the chosen people after the patriarchal era, polygamy +was not repugnant to nature among the Jews of that period.</p> + +<p>312. Is God able to remove a natural obligation in a case of private +necessity, that is, when the fulfillment would be harmful to an +individual?</p> + +<p>(a) Natural obligations that do not depend upon any free consent of the +will given to them (see 304) cannot be removed except by a dispensation +widely so-called and when their matter is contingent (as explained in +309-310). Examples: God could not dispense an individual from the duty +of confessing Him in order to escape death, for the subject-matter of +the law here is necessary. God, could dispense an individual from the +obligation of not taking the property of another, for God is the +principal owner of all things, including those possessed by others.</p> + +<p>(b) Natural obligations that depend upon the act or deed of human +beings consenting to obligation (see 304) can be removed. For since +human beings cannot know all the circumstances existent, or all the +conditions that will arise, it can happen that a thing agreed to or +promised is only seemingly good, or will change from good to bad, so +that while the promise or agreement made is in itself good and +naturally obligatory, its fulfillment would work harm and evil, or be +useless, or would prevent the accomplishment of a greater good. It is +reasonable, therefore, that God should release from obligation here, +thus changing the subject-matter of the law, so that it is no longer +comprehended under the law (see 309-310). Example: Titus vows or swears +that he will give a certain alms or make a certain pilgrimage; but, +when the time for fulfillment arrives, his circumstances have so +changed that it would not be advisable for him to keep the promise +made. The Church, acting in the name of God, can declare that the +subject-matter of this promise has become harmful and is not longer +suitable, and hence that the obligation has ceased.</p> + +<p>313. Human Authority and Modification of the Natural Law.</p> + +<p>(a) Additions to the Natural Law may be made, not only by positive laws +of God, but also by human laws of Church or State, through the +introduction of that which Natural Law permits, or the determination or +confirmation of that which Natural Law contains implicitly or +explicitly. Examples: Division of property rights introduced by the law +of nations; conditions for valid contracts determined by particular +codes; the laws against theft and murder confirmed by definite +penalties prescribed for those crimes.</p> + +<p>(b) Subtractions from Natural Law cannot be made by any human +authority, for God has not delegated His power of dispensing which He +has as supreme owner of all things. Examples: No human authority could +authorize a father to sacrifice his innocent son, nor permit a servant +to carry away the effects that belong to his employer.</p> + +<p>314. Apparent Cases of Dispensation from Natural Law made by Human +Authority. (a) The Church frees from the obligation of vows, contracts +and promissory oaths, from impediments to marriage, from espousals, +etc. In so doing, however, she does not dispense from the Natural Law +that vows, contracts, etc., should be fulfilled, but only declares in +the name of God that the subject-matter of an obligation contracted by +act of man’s will has become unsuitable for vow, contract, etc., and +hence is no longer comprehended under the law.</p> + +<p>(b) Societies or private individuals can free from the obligation of +paying or returning to them what they have a right to, as when a +creditor forgives a debt, or an owner permits a thief to keep what he +stole. In so doing, however, they do not dispense from the law of +nature that one should pay one’s debts and not keep ill-gotten goods; +they only change the quality of the things in question so that they +cease to be due another or ill-gotten, and hence no longer fall under +the law. This differs, too, from the dispensation that God can grant; +for He can transfer rights without the consent of the immediate owner +(see 310).</p> + +<p>315. Interpretation—that is, explanation of the law which indicates +whether or not it obliges in a particular case—may be applied to the +Natural Law as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Interpretation which explains the intention the lawgiver had in +making the law and the sense he gave to the words of the law (verbal +interpretation), may be made when either a law itself is not entirely +clear, or some person is not clever enough to see its meaning. Example: +The commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” needs to be interpreted, for it +does not forbid every kind of killing.</p> + +<p>(b) Interpretation which explains the intention a lawgiver would have +had, had he foreseen a particular case in which his law would be +harmful, and which therefore sets the will of the lawgiver against the +words of the law (emendatory interpretation, _epieikeia_), may not be +applied to the Natural Law; for God, unlike human legislators, foresees +things not only in general, but also in particular, and hence there is +no room for correction or benign interpretation of natural laws. +Example: Titus, who was a chronic invalid, committed suicide in order +that his family might be freed from distress. He argued that the Fifth +Commandment did not foresee the difficulties of earning a living under +modern conditions, and that his sacrifice would be pleasing to God. +Titus did not reason well, for suicide is forbidden for motives that +apply universally (e.g., that society, and especially one’s family, are +injured by the act of suicide).</p> + +<p>316. Verbal interpretation of the Natural Law is made as follows: (a) +by private authority—that is, by those who are competent, on account +of learning and prudence, to understand the meaning of the law, such as +moral theologians; (b) by public authority—that is, by those who are +appointed to rule, with the prerogative of declaring the meaning of the +Natural Law. The Pope, since he must feed the flock of Christ, is +divinely constituted to interpret Natural Law, and does so +authentically and infallibly. Thus, the Church declares that certain +matrimonial impediments are natural, and therefore incapable of being +dispensed.</p> + +<p>On the competence of the Church to give authoritative interpretations +of the natural law in the field of morals, Pius XII has spoken clearly +and forcefully: “... it must openly and firmly be held that the power +of the Church has never been limited to the boundaries of strictly +religious matters’ as they are called; but the whole content of the +natural law, its institution, interpretation and application are within +its power insofar as its moral element is concerned. For the +observation of the natural law, by the ordination of God, is the way by +which man must strive to attain his supernatural end. On the road to +this supernatural end. it is the Church that is his leader and guide. +This is the way the Apostles acted, and from the earliest times the +Church held to this way of acting as it does today—and not in the +manner of a private leader and counselor, but from the command and +authority of God” (AAS 46 [1954] 671-672).</p> + +<p>317. From the foregoing it follows that the Natural Law is so +unchangeable that it cannot be abrogated or properly dispensed, or +given an emendatory interpretation. But, though the law itself remains, +there are cases in which non-observance of it is excused from guilt. +These cases can be reduced to physical and moral impossibility.</p> + +<p>(a) In cases of physical impossibility (i.e., when the powers requisite +for observance are wanting), one is manifestly excused; for law is +reasonable, and it is not reasonable to require impossibilities. +Examples: Infants are not guilty of sin against the Natural Law, when +they do not pray; for they lack the use of reason, which is presupposed +by the notion of prayer. He who is unable to work is not obliged to +earn support for relatives.</p> + +<p>(b) In cases of moral impossibility (i.e., when a law cannot be kept +without the infringement of a higher law or the loss of a higher good), +one is also excused; for it is unreasonable to prefer the less to the +more important. Example: Titus lends a revolver to Balbus. Later he +asks that it be returned to him, as he wishes to kill himself. Now, +property is less valuable than life, and hence Balbus is unable in this +case to observe the law which requires that things borrowed must be +returned.</p> + +<p>318. Moral impossibility is also defined as the inability to observe +the law without serious injury or loss to oneself or a third party. +Serious injuries are such as deprive some one of great goods, such as +the use of reason, life, knowledge, friendship, health, reputation, +property. Serious losses are such as prevent one from obtaining notable +goods, The following rules indicate when grave inconvenience excuses, +and when it does not excuse, from the guilt arising from the +non-observance of Natural Law:</p> + +<p>(a) when the law is negative (i.e., prohibitory), no inconvenience +excuses from sin; for that which is forbidden by the Natural Law is +always morally evil, and hence more to be shunned than even the +greatest physical evil, or death. Example: One is obliged, under grave +or light sin, as the case may be, to forfeit all temporal goods rather +than blaspheme, murder, lie, etc.;</p> + +<p>(b) when the law is affirmative (or mandatory), an inconvenience which, +all things considered, is really and relatively grave, excuses from +sin; for that which is commanded by the Natural Law is not always +morally obligatory, but only at the right time and in the right +circumstances (see 371), and hence its omission is not always morally +evil. Examples: Sempronius vowed that he would go on foot to a place of +pilgrimage, but when the day came he had a sprained ankle that would be +badly injured if he walked. Caius received a jewel stolen from Balbus +and promised that he would return it at once to the owner, but he finds +that he cannot do so now without danger, either of the arrest of +himself or of the one who took the jewel. Titus sees a person who has +been seriously injured lying by the roadside, but he is tired, and +neither gives help himself nor summons aid. In the first two cases the +inconvenience is grave, and hence Sempronius may ride to the place of +pilgrimage, and Caius may return the jewel to Balbus later; but the +inconvenience of Titus is slight, and does not excuse him from sin.</p> + +<p>319. Just as the Natural Law is unchangeable, because based on the +unchangeable Eternal Law instituting the nature of man, so is it easily +knowable, because it is promulgated by the light of reason. Hence: (a) +invincible ignorance of the entire Natural Law is impossible in any +person who has the use of reason; (b) complete forgetfulness of the +Natural Law by mankind is impossible.</p> + +<p>320. Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as +children and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be +invincibly ignorant of the Natural Law—for example, they may be unable +to perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those +who have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law +only as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general +precepts (such as “good is to be done,” “evil is to be avoided”), for +since they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also +perceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong, +viz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be +done, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;</p> + +<p>(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts +that are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most +general precepts (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned”), +for the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that +only in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its +truth;</p> + +<p>(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred +as necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general +precepts, (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned at such a +time or place, or in such a manner or condition”), for this conclusion +is so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be +considered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are +required for a correct judgment—things in which many people are +lacking.</p> + +<p>321. The Commandments of the Decalogue follow directly from the most +general precepts of the Natural Law, and so to them may be applied what +was said in the previous paragraph. Hence: (a) generally speaking, no +person who has the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of the +Commandments. St. Paul blames the pagans as inexcusable in various sins +committed against the Decalogue; (b) in special cases, a person who has +the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of one or more +Commandments; for while the Commandments may be easily inferred by most +persons from the common principles of right and wrong, there are +sometimes involuntary impediments that hinder the right employment of +reason. Thus, children and older persons whose mentality is +undeveloped, although they know the difference between right and wrong, +are frequently unable to draw the conclusion that follows from it +(e.g., that one should not tell lies).</p> + +<p>322. The Commandments regarding which invincible ignorance may most +easily exist are: (a) those that deal with merely internal acts, for +the malice of violating them is less apparent. Hence, many theologians +admit that even among Christians the wickedness of sinful thoughts and +desires may be inculpably unknown, at least when the wickedness of the +corresponding external acts is also not known; (b) those that deal with +the control of sensuality, for the impulse to inordinate acts is at +times most vehement. Unde theologi sunt qui affirmant malitiam +peccatorum externorum contra sextum invincibiliter ignorari posse, non +solum apud infideles, sed etiam apud Christianos, ita quod ab +adolescentibus facile ad tempus ignorari possit malitia mollitiei.</p> + +<p>323. If a Commandment be applied to some particular case in which there +are many circumstances to be considered, or some reason that appears to +change the subject-matter of the law, even adults who have the perfect +use of reason may be invincibly ignorant; for in such instances we are +considering, not an immediate, but a remote conclusion from the general +principles of Natural Law.</p> + +<p>(a) If the case is difficult relatively (i.e., in view of the training +or lack of education of the person studying it), there can be +invincible ignorance, at least for a time. Examples: Jepthe, according +to St. Jerome, appears to have been invincibly ignorant that it was not +lawful for him to slay his daughter. Being a soldier and living in a +rude age, he perhaps did not appreciate the sacredness of human life. +Unlettered persons might conceivably think in good faith that it is not +wrong to commit perjury in order to help one in danger, to steal in +order to pay debts, to think evil if there is no intention to fulfill +it, to do what the majority do or what is tolerated, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) If the case is difficult absolutely (i.e., in view of the matter +itself, which is complicated and obscure), there can be invincible +ignorance, even for a long time. Thus, it is so difficult to settle +many problems pertaining to justice (i.e., to the application of the +Seventh Commandment) that we find professional theologians who take +opposite sides, or admit that, speculatively speaking, they do not know +where the truth lies.</p> + +<p>324. The Natural Law can never be erased from the hearts of men. (a) In +abnormal circumstances only, as when the general power of reasoning has +been weakened or lost, can the Natural Law be forgotten. Thus, to a +degenerate who becomes violently insane murder and other crimes may +appear as good acts. But no community could govern itself by the +standards of madmen and long survive. (b) In normal circumstances +(i.e., as long as the general power of reasoning remains unimpaired), +the Natural Law cannot be forgotten, as far as its general principles +or immediate conclusions are concerned, although it may be overlooked +or lost sight of when it is applied to particular cases, or when remote +conclusions are deduced from it.</p> + +<p>325. As long, therefore, as a body of men remain sane, even though they +be uncivilized or addicted to crime, they cannot become oblivious of +the Natural Law. (a) The general principles (“good is to be done,” +“evil is to be avoided”) cannot vanish from the mind, although, in +particular affairs, anger, pleasure, or some other passion may prevent +men from thinking about them. Thus, when the mob spirit takes hold of a +crowd, it becomes intent only on violence or revenge, and gives no +thought to conscience. (b) The secondary precepts, such as those +contained in the Decalogue, cannot be obliterated from the mind, +although in applying them to concrete situations a people may go astray.</p> + +<p>There are many examples of laws, both ancient and modern, which +permitted or commanded, for particular cases, things contrary to the +current application of natural precepts. Thus, the Spartans and the +Romans ordered the murder of infants who were weakly and of slaves +whose master had been killed. Some ancient races encouraged robberies +committed beyond the boundaries of the states, and savage tribes have +been found who had the practice of putting to death parents who were +aged or infirm.</p> + +<p>326. The causes of wrong applications of the Natural Law are the +following:</p> + +<p>(a) Some causes are involuntary. Thus, the correct application may be +difficult, as when more than one moral principle has to be considered +and applied; or, if the case is not difficult, the person who makes the +application may be mentally undeveloped, or his mind may be blinded on +account of his bad education or environment. Examples: The races who +saw no infamy in robbery committed against their neighbors, lived in a +wild age when such acts of violence seemed necessary as measures of +self-protection. The savage killed his aged parents, because to his +untutored mind this seemed an act of mercy.</p> + +<p>(b) Some causes are voluntary, such as neglect of the truth, vicious +habits, etc. Examples: St. Paul blames the pagans for their idolatry, +because they had darkened their own minds about God. Pirates and +bandits who came to regard violence as necessary for their own defense +were responsible for their state of mind, inasmuch as they had chosen a +life of crime.</p> + +<p>327. Transgression of Natural Law, therefore, is not imputable as +formal sin if it is not voluntary. Hence: (a) lack of knowledge +excuses, when ignorance is involuntary (e.g., those who have not the +use of reason, as infants and the unconscious; children and others +mentally undeveloped who cannot grasp the meaning of some precept; +educated persons who are unable to get a right solution of some knotty +problem of morals, etc.); (b) lack of consent excuses in whole or in +part (as when one acts through fear).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_THE_POSITIVE_DIVINE_LAW">Art. 3: THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 98-108.)</p> + +<p>328. Meaning.—The Positive Divine Law is the law added by God to the +Natural Law, in order to direct the actions of man to his supernatural +End, to assist him to a better observance of the Natural Law, and to +perfect that which is wanting in human law.</p> + +<p>(a) The Last End of man is not natural, but supernatural (see 20), and +hence it was necessary that, in addition to the precepts which guide +man towards his natural beatitude, there should be added precepts that +will guide him towards his supernatural beatitude: “The Law of the Lord +gives wisdom to little ones” (Ps. xviii. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) The light of natural reason was sufficient to instruct man in the +Natural Law, but through sin that light had become obscured, with the +result that evil customs set in, and very many were at a loss how to +apply the Natural Law, or applied it wrongly. Hence, it was most +suitable that the Natural Law should be summed up in brief commandments +and given externally by the authority of God. This was done through the +Decalogue, which is a part of the Positive Divine Law of both the +Mosaic and the Christian dispensations: “The testimony of the Lord is +faithful” (Ps. xviii. 8).</p> + +<p>(c) Human laws are the product of fallible human judgment; they can +direct only such acts as are external, and they are unable to forbid or +punish many evil deeds. Hence, it was necessary that there should be +positive divine laws to supply for what is wanting in human law: “The +law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls” (Ps. xviii. 8).</p> + +<p>329. The Positive Divine Law differs from the Natural Law as to +subject-matter, permanence, and manner of promulgation.</p> + +<p>(a) The precepts of the Natural Law are necessary, since they follow as +necessary consequences from the nature of man, the precepts of the +Positive Law of God, excluding those that are external promulgations of +the Natural Law, are not necessary, since they follow from the free +decree of God raising man to that which is above his nature.</p> + +<p>(b) The precepts of the Natural Law are unchangeable, since the nature +of man always remains the same. Of the precepts of the Positive Law of +God some were changed, because given only for a time (such as the +ceremonial laws of Judaism); others, absolutely speaking, could be +changed, because not necessarily connected with the end God has in view +(e.g., the laws concerning Sacraments).</p> + +<p>(c) The precepts of both kinds of law are immediately from God; but the +Natural Law is promulgated only in a general way, through the light of +reason given to man along with his nature, while the Positive Law of +God is proclaimed by special commands (e.g., “thou shalt not steal”).</p> + +<p>330. The Positive Divine Law contains two kinds of precepts, viz., +natural and supernatural commandments. (a) The natural precepts were +given in order to recall to the minds of men the laws knowable through +reason which had become obscured through passion, custom or example. +The Commandments given to Moses on the tablets of stone renewed the +natural precepts which God had written through reason on the hearts of +men. (b) The supernatural precepts were given in order to point out to +men the duties their supernatural destiny imposed. Example: The +precepts of faith, hope, charity.</p> + +<p>331. Division.—There are four historical states of man with reference +to his Last End, and to each of these correspond positive divine laws.</p> + +<p>(a) The state of Original Innocence is that which existed in Paradise +before the Fall. Man had been raised to the supernatural state, and +hence he was obliged to the supernatural acts of faith, hope, charity, +etc.; he was subject to God, both as to body and soul, and hence he was +obliged to offer some kind of external sacrifice; he was sanctified +immediately by God, and hence was not bound to the use of any +sacraments; but he was still in a state of probation, and was subject +to various special regulations, such as the commands to avoid the fruit +of a certain tree, to labor in Eden, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) The state of the Law of Nature is that which existed from the Fall +to the giving of the written law through Moses. It is called the state +of the Law of Nature, not in the sense that there were no supernatural +precepts then in force, but in the sense that there were as yet no +written precepts. In that period man knew the Natural Law, not from +commandments written on tablets of stone, but from the law of reason +inscribed in his heart; he knew the supernatural precepts, not from +scriptures given him by God, but from tradition or special divine +inspiration. In addition to the inner acts of supernatural worship and +faith in the Messiah to come and the outer sacrifices, there were +during this state certain rites of purification, or sacraments, by +which fallen man was purified from sin. A special precept of the +patriarchial times was the prohibition made to Noe against the eating +of flesh with blood in it.</p> + +<p>(c) The state of the Mosaic Law is that which existed from the giving +of the law on Sinai until the giving of the New Testament law by Christ.</p> + +<p>(d) The state of the Christian Law, or of the New Law, is that which +began with Christ and the Apostles and will continue till the end of +the world.</p> + +<p>332. The Mosaic Law.—This was the special law of God to the Jews, the +people chosen by God as the race from which the Saviour of the world +was to come. It has two periods: the period of preparation and the +period of the Law.</p> + +<p>(a)The period of preparation for the Law began with the Promise or +Covenant given to Abraham. A law is not given except to a people (see +285), and, as the peoples of the world at that time had returned to the +general corruption that reigned before the Deluge, God chose Abraham to +be the father of a new nation in which true religion should be +preserved until the Redeemer of the world had come. The rite of +circumcision was ordered as a mark of the covenant and a sacrament of +remission.</p> + +<p>(b) The period of the Law began with the promulgation of the Decalogue +on Sinai. The descendants of Abraham had grown into a nation and had +been freed from slavery, and they were thus ready to receive a special +law. Their history thereafter shows how God trained them according to +the pattern of the Mosaic Law and prepared them for the providential +mission, which, through the Messiah, should be theirs, of giving to the +world the perfect and universal Law of the Gospel.</p> + +<p>333. The Excellence of the Mosaic Law.—(a) The Law was good (Rom, vii. +12): it commanded what was according to reason and forbade what was +opposed to reason; it had God for its Author and prepared man for the +Law of Christ. (b) The Law was imperfect (Heb., vii. 19); it was given +for a time when men were spiritually but children and not ready as yet +for the teaching and morality of the Gospel; it forbade sin and +provided punishments, but the necessary helps for observing it came +only from faith in Christ, the Author of the New Law.</p> + +<p>334. The Subjects of the Mosaic Law.—(a) The Jewish people were bound +by the Mosaic Law. God had chosen Abraham by gratuitous election to be +the forefather of the Messiah, and it was by gratuitous election that +He gave the Jews a Law which would lend them a special holiness +befitting the promises made their race. The Jews, therefore, were bound +to more things than other nations, as being the Chosen People; just as +clerics are bound to more things than the laity, as being the ministers +of God.</p> + +<p>(b) The Gentiles were not bound by the laws peculiar to the Mosaic +Code, but only by the common precepts, natural and supernatural, that +were in force in the state of the Law of Nature. But it was permitted +to Gentiles to become proselytes, that by observing Mosaic rites they +might more easily and more perfectly work out their salvation.</p> + +<p>335. The Duration of the Mosaic Law.—(a) The Law began when experience +had proved that knowledge is not sufficient to make man virtuous, that +is, at a time when, in spite of the Natural Law, the peoples were +turning to polytheism and vice: “The Law was given on account of +transgression” (Gal, iii. 19).</p> + +<p>(b) The Law ended when experience had shown that external observance is +not sufficient for holiness, that is, at the time when Judaism was +degenerating into formalism, putting the letter before the spirit of +the Law: “What the Law could not do, God sending His own Son, hath +condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be +fulfilled in us” (Rom., viii. 3, 4).</p> + +<p>336. Deuteronomy, vi. 1, describes the Mosaic Law as precepts, +ceremonies and judgments; and the commandments of the Old Testament can +be classified according to this threefold division. (a) The moral +precepts defined the duties to God and man that arise from the dictates +of reason and the Natural Law; (b) the ceremonial prescriptions were +determinations of the religious duties to God contained in the moral +law, and rules concerning the performance of worship based on the +positive ordinance of God; (c) the judgments were determinations of +social duties contained in the moral law; they were the civil or +political code of the theocratic nation which had its force from the +positive ordinance of God.</p> + +<p>337. The moral precepts are contained in the Decalogue, which is a sum +of the whole Natural Law, inasmuch as the general principles of the +Natural Law are implicit therein in their immediate conclusions, while +the remote conclusions are virtually found in the Commandments as in +their principles (see 301).</p> + +<p>338. The Decalogue expresses man’s duties: (a) towards God, viz., +loyalty (First Commandment), reverence (Second), service (Third)—all +of which are Laws of the First Table; (b) towards parents (Fourth), and +all fellow-men, viz., that no injustice be done them by sins of deed +(Fifth, Sixth, Seventh), of mouth (Eighth), or of heart (Ninth, +Tenth)—all of which are Laws of the Second Table.</p> + +<p>339. The further moral precepts which were added after the giving of +the Decalogue can all be reduced to one or the other of the Ten +Commandments. Examples: The prohibition against fortune-telling belongs +to the First; the prohibition against perjury and false teaching, to +the Second; the commandment to honor the aged, to the Fourth; the +prohibition against detraction, to the Eighth.</p> + +<p>340. The ceremonial laws, which prescribed the manner of performing the +divine worship or of acting as befitted the Chosen People, and which +prefigured the worship and people of the New Testament, were numerous, +in order that the Jews might be more easily preserved from pagan rites +and customs. The ceremonies they regulated were of four kinds: (a) the +sacrifices through which God was worshipped and through which the +sacrifice of Christ was prefigured (e.g., the holocausts, +peace-offerings, sin-offerings); (b) the sacred times and places, +things and persons set apart in order to give more dignity to divine +worship and to foreshadow more distinctly the good things to come; (c) +the sacraments by which the people or sacred ministers were consecrated +to the worship of God and were made to prefigure Christ (e.g., +circumcision and the consecration of Levites); (d) the customs which +regulated the details of life so that both priests and people might act +as became their special calling, and might be types and figures of the +Christian people (e.g., the laws about food, dress, etc.).</p> + +<p>341. Unlike the moral laws, which had existed before Moses as the +Natural Law and which continue under the Christian dispensation, the +ceremonial laws were temporary. Thus: (a) before Moses other ceremonies +were observed by the patriarchs (e.g., the sacrifice of Abel, the +altars of Abraham and Jacob, the priesthood of Melchisedech, etc.); (b) +after the coming of Christ, distinctions of food, new moons, sabbaths, +and other Mosaic ceremonies were abrogated, since the figures of future +things had been superseded by rites that commemorated benefits that +were present.</p> + +<p>342. We may distinguish four periods in the history of the Mosaic +ceremonial law: (a) from Moses until Christ, it was the divinely +ordained manner of worshipping God, and was obligatory for the Chosen +People; (b) at the death of Christ, when the New Testament began, the +Mosaic ceremonial ceased to be obligatory; (c) until the Gospel had +been sufficiently promulgated (i.e., until the destruction of the City +and the Temple of Jerusalem), the ceremonial law was permitted to +Jewish converts, not as prefiguring Christ, but as a form of divine +worship; (d) after the Gospel had been sufficiently proclaimed, it was +no longer lawful to conform to the Mosaic observances.</p> + +<p>343. The judgments or judicial laws of the Old Testament were intended; +(a) to regulate the relations of the people of God to one another and +to strangers according to justice and equity, and thus to prepare them +for the coming of the Messiah; (b) to be, consequently, in some sort a +figure of the social constitution of the Christian people.</p> + +<p>344. The judicial laws, like the ceremonial, expired with the New +Testament. But since, unlike the ceremonial laws, they were not +appointed directly as prefigurative of Christianity, their provisions, +if not opposed to Christian law, could be used as part of the civil +code of a Christian State.</p> + +<p>345. There were four kinds of judicial precepts:</p> + +<p>(a) those concerning rulers. The government was monarchical and +aristocratic, as being administered by Moses and his successors with +the assistance of a body of elders; but it was also democratic, +inasmuch as the princes were chosen from the people and by the people;</p> + +<p>(b) those concerning citizens. Excellent laws concerning sales, +contracts, property, and the administration of justice, are laid down +in the Pentateuch;</p> + +<p>(c) those concerning foreigners. The relationship of the Jews to other +nations, whether in peace or in war, was regulated by wise and humane +laws;</p> + +<p>(d) those concerning families. The rights and duties of husband and +wife, parent and child, master and servant, were carefully and +considerately provided for.</p> + +<p>346. The Law of the New Testament.—This is the special law given by +God through Christ to the whole world, and which endures till the end +of time. Its character will be understood most readily from a +comparison of it with the Law of the Old Testament.</p> + +<p>(a) In both Testaments grace and the Holy Spirit are given through +faith in Christ (the internal law), and doctrines, commandments and +ceremonies are prescribed (the external law). But, whereas the Old +Testament is principally a law of works, the New Testament is +principally a law of faith (Rom., iii, 27); the former is concerned +mostly with the external conduct, the latter regulates, not only +actions, but also the internal movements of the soul, of which faith is +the first.</p> + +<p>(b) In both Testaments men are justified and saved through faith and +works (Heb, xi., 39; Rom., i. 16), and not through the external written +law or the letter. But it is only through Christ, the author of the New +Law, that men are enabled to perform what the law requires: “The law +was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” (John, i. 17).</p> + +<p>347. Comparison of the Two Testaments from Other Viewpoints.—(a) The +aim of both Laws is to secure obedience to God and holiness for man. +But the New Testament, since given to those who were better prepared +and more perfect, unveils more clearly the mysteries of faith, enjoins +more perfect works, and supplements the Commandments with counsels of +perfection (cfr. the Sermon on the Mount).</p> + +<p>(b) Both Laws make use of threats, promises and persuasion in order to +move men to obedience. But, as the Old Law was for those who were +spiritually but children, it dwells especially on the punishments to be +meted out to transgressors and the external rewards that will be given +to the obedient (the law of fear); whereas the New Law, being for those +who are spiritually mature, holds out as inducements chiefly the love +of virtue and rewards that are internal and spiritual (the law of love).</p> + +<p>(c) The author of both laws is God. But, while the Old Law was +announced through God’s servants as the preparatory dispensation, the +New Law was proclaimed by the Son of God Himself as the final economy +of human salvation: “God, who at sundry times spoke in times past to +the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to +us by His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of all things” (Heb, ii. 1).</p> + +<p>348. Differences in the Precepts of the Two Laws.—(a) There is no +opposition between the commandments of the two Laws; for the ceremonial +and judicial precepts of the Old Law, which contained figure and +prophecy, are fulfilled in the precepts of Christ, while the moral laws +of the Old Testament are confirmed and perfected by the moral laws of +Christ: “I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill” (Matt., v. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) There is no substantial difference between the faith and works of +the two Testaments. For, that which is now believed explicitly and +clearly, was believed implicitly and in figure in the Old Testament, +and the greater things that now are commanded were contained germinally +in the precepts of the Old Law.</p> + +<p>349. The Old and the New Law Compared as to Difficulty.—(a) If we +consider the difficulty that arises from the fulfillment of external +works, the Old Law was much more difficult. For while the Law of Moses +imposed numerous and complicated ceremonies and observances, the Law of +Christ commands but few and simple rites. Of the Old Law St. Peter says +that it was a yoke, “which neither our fathers nor we have been able to +bear” (Acts, xv. 10)—that is, it was extremely burdensome; but of His +own Law Christ says: “My yoke is sweet, and My burden light” (Matt, xi. +30). Even the additions made by Christ to the Old Law (e.g., the +prohibition against divorce) really facilitate that which the Old Law +itself intended—viz., the perfection of man. Hence, the Old Law is the +law of servitude; the New Law, the law of liberty.</p> + +<p>(b) If we consider the difficulty that arises from internal works, or +the dispositions and motives with which precepts are to be fulfilled, +the New Law is more difficult; for it inculcates a loftier piety and +gives more attention to the spirit with which God is to be worshipped. +But, since love is the all-inclusive commandment of Christ, and since +gladness and fervor are easy to the lover, the commandments of Christ +“are not heavy” (I John, v. 3).</p> + +<p>350. The External Works Commended by Christ.—(a) Since the New Law is +the law of grace, it commands only those things by which we are brought +to grace, or by means of which we make use of grace already received. +We receive grace only through Christ, and hence there are commandments +regarding the Sacraments; we make right use of grace by faith that +worketh through charity, and hence there are the precepts of the +Decalogue to be kept.</p> + +<p>(b) Since the New Law is the law of liberty, it does not determine the +details of the moral law, nor prescribe minutely how we must worship +God and observe justice to others, as was done in the ceremonial and +judicial laws of the Old Testament. Minor dispositions of this kind +have no necessary relation to internal grace, being morally +indifferent. Hence, Christ left many things free, to be determined +later according to conditions, either by the individual (in personal +matters) or by the spiritual or temporal authority (in matters of +public concern). It is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, however, +that mankind should be oppressed with numerous and burdensome +observances.</p> + +<p>351. The Internal Works Commanded by Christ.—In the Sermon on the +Mount were given the commandments of the New Law that summarize the +entire duty of the Christian as to his internal acts: “Everyone that +heareth these My words, and doeth them, shall be likened to a wise man +that built his house upon a rock” (Matt., vii. 24). Thus, there are: +(a) internal acts commanded as regards our own wills and purposes (we +must avoid not only external, but also internal sins and the occasions +of sin; we must not only do good, but we must have a good motive, not +placing our end in human applause or riches); (b) internal acts +commanded as regards our neighbor (we must not judge him rashly, +unjustly, presumptuously; nor must we trust him imprudently); (c) +interior dispositions with which we must perform our duties (we must +avoid inordinate cares, imploring and expecting the divine assistance; +but we must also avoid carelessness, having our minds set on the narrow +way, and eschewing seductions).</p> + +<p>352. The Teaching of Christ on the Three Classes of Precepts: Moral, +Ceremonial and Judicial.—(a) As regards the moral precepts (i.e., the +Decalogue or Natural Law), not one jot or tittle was to pass away. But +so little was the soul of these precepts then recognized that Christ +gave a new commandment of love, by which His followers were to be +known; and He reduced the whole law to the two commandments of love of +God and love of our neighbor.</p> + +<p>(b) As regards the ceremonial precepts (i.e., the forms of Jewish +worship), these were to be superseded. Christ declared the manner in +which God was to be worshipped, namely, in spirit and in truth. He +instituted the Sacrifice of the New Testament, appointed the ritual of +the Sacraments (e.g., of Baptism and the Eucharist), and taught a form +of prayer which was to be used by His disciples. Other things He left +to be determined by the Church.</p> + +<p>(c) As regards the judicial precepts (i.e., the civil laws of the +theocratic nation), these ceased to be necessary with the coming of +Christ, whose Kingdom is spiritual and with whom there is no +distinction of Jew or Gentile, since His law is for all. In fact, with +the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, foretold by Christ, both the +Temple worship and the separate national life of Israel came to an end. +In correcting the false interpretations which the Pharisees put upon +various judicial precepts of their law (e.g., in showing them that the +law of retaliation and the law that public enemies should be put to +death did not authorize revenge and hatred), Christ indicated the +spirit that should animate all civil laws, namely, love of justice. He +left it to the wisdom of future lawgivers to apply the rule of justice +to the relations between man and man, nation and nation, as +circumstances would require.</p> + +<p>353. The precepts by which Christ established the primacy of the Pope +and the hierarchy may be called judicial. But the details of this +constitution He left the Church to determine.</p> + +<p>354. The Duration of the Law of Christ.—(a) The Beginning.—The New +Law was given through the revelation made by Christ and the Holy Ghost +to the Apostles; it was ratified at the Last Supper and in the death of +Christ, when the New Testament was proclaimed and the Old Testament +came to an end; it was promulgated, first at Jerusalem on the day of +Pentecost, and later throughout the world by the preaching of the +Apostles.</p> + +<p>(b) The End.—The Law of Christ continues till the end of time; for +this generation—that is, this last period of world history under the +Christian dispensation—shall not end until Christ returns to judge +mankind; “Behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of +the world” (Matt., xxviii. 20).</p> + +<p>355. The Subjects of the Law of Christ.—(a) The Law of Christ is for +all: “Going, therefore, teach ye all nations. teaching them to observe +all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 19).</p> + +<p>(b) The Law of Christ does not oblige all in the same way. Those +outside Christianity are obliged directly by the commands to believe +and to be baptized. Christians are obliged directly by the laws of +faith and works accepted in Baptism.</p> + +<p>356. Ignorance of the Law of Christ.-(a) Outsiders may be in invincible +ignorance of the Law of Christ. For many persons through no fault of +their own, in times past or even today, have not heard the Gospel +message: “How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard?” +(Rom, x. 14).</p> + +<p>(b) Christians may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ. +For, just as want of a preacher causes a pagan to be invincibly +ignorant of the necessity of Baptism, so a lack of instruction in +Christian doctrine might leave a baptized person inculpably ignorant +(e.g., of the duty of receiving the Eucharist).</p> + +<p>357. Dispensation from the Law of Christ.—(a) Its Possibility.—It +cannot be denied that Christ could have dispensed from the positive +precepts of His law, either directly or through His Church; for those +precepts depend on His will, and, like every other legislator, He can +relax His law or delegate others to do so.</p> + +<p>(b) Its Reality.—Some believe that Christ granted dispensations from +His Law (e.g., that He freed the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles from +the duty of receiving Baptism, that he authorized the Apostles to give +Baptism without mentioning the Trinity), but these opinions seem +unlikely and are not well supported. Some also believe that the power +of loosing granted the Church (Matt., xvi. 19) includes the power of +dispensing from the Law of Christ. The contrary, however, seems more +probable. For the power of loosing is certainly limited to such matters +as the good of the Church and of souls requires, and it is more +advantageous for the Church and its members that the laws given by +Christ Himself should be absolutely unchangeable, in order that the +unity of the Church and its dependence on its Founder may be more +manifest.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the alternate opinion has solid grounds and +arguments, and merits due consideration. Some authors distinguish a +twofold law of Christ; (a) absolute, that which obliges immediately and +of itself independently of any action of man; e.g., the law concerning +the necessity of Baptism or determining bread and wine as the matter of +the Eucharist; (b) hypothetic, which presupposes some human action; +e.g., the law of the indissolubility of matrimony which urges after man +has freely willed to be bound by the laws of matrimony. Similarly, the +binding force of vows presupposes the taking of the vow.</p> + +<p>As to the absolute law, no human authority may dispense from it. As +already indicated, the good of the Church, its unity and stability, +seem to demand an unchangeable law. In regard to the hypothetical law, +many of the more modern authors assert that the Holy Pontiff can at +times dispense. The power of loosing implies a power of dispensing in +the Church which has been used in particular cases; e.g., _ratum et non +consummatum_ matrimony. Moreover, the power to dispense seems extremely +useful and almost necessary for the prudent and wise governing of the +Church. For, with a change of circumstances an individual might be +impeded from doing a greater good because of a preceding act of will; +e.g., one might be impeded from embracing the religious life because of +a prior vow to remain in the world to assist in Catholic Action (see +Fanfani, O.P., _Theol. Moral. Manuale_, Vol. I, n. 134).</p> + +<p>358. Interpretation of the Law of Christ.-(a) Private interpretation +(_epieikeia_ or equity) is used in extraordinary cases, not foreseen by +the lawgiver, and it declares that a particular case does not fall +under the Law. This kind of interpretation applies only to human laws, +since God foresees things not only universally, but also in particular +(cfr. on Natural Law, 315). (b) Public interpretation of the Law of +Christ is made by the Church, in virtue of the commission: “Teach all +things whatsoever I have commanded” (Matt, xxviii. 20).</p> + +<p>359. Public Interpretation of the Law of Christ—(a) The Church is able +to give a declarative interpretation of the Positive Divine Law—that +is, to explain its meaning, to show what cases are comprehended in the +law, what cases are not, when one is obliged, when one is excused, etc. +Example: The Church interprets the doctrine of Christ on the +indissolubility of marriage, explaining when the bond is absolutely +indissoluble, the conditions under which it may sometimes be dissolved, +etc.</p> + +<p>(b) The Church is able to give determinative interpretation of the +Positive Divine Law—that is, to settle in what manner a law must be +fulfilled. Examples: Christ gave the command that the Eucharist should +be received, but it was the Church that determined when and how often +one must receive Communion to comply with the wishes of Christ. Christ +instituted only generically the essential rite of some Sacraments, +leaving it to the Church to determine the rite more specifically.</p> + +<p>360. The Law of Christ and Impossibility.—(a) Impossibility does not +excuse from a law, in which an act is necessary not because it is +prescribed, but is prescribed because it is a necessary means without +which, even if one be not guilty of negligence, salvation cannot be had +(necessity of means). Example: Infants who die without Baptism are not +held guilty of neglecting the Sacraments, but lack of it deprives them +of the supernatural bliss promised by Christ. Only Baptism confers +regeneration, and only the regenerated are capable of the vision of God.</p> + +<p>(b) Impossibility can excuse from a law in which an act is necessary +because it is prescribed, and which therefore makes one guilty of sin, +if one willfully neglects it (necessity of precept). Example: An adult +who dies without the Eucharist cannot be saved if he was guilty of +grave negligence; but he can be saved, if it was not his own fault that +he did not receive Holy Communion. The Eucharist increases supernatural +life, but inculpable lack of it does not exclude from that life.</p> + +<p>361. Impossibility—or what is called impossibility—does not always +excuse even from those divine laws which have only the necessity of +precept.</p> + +<p>(a) Physical impossibility is the lack of power to perform an act; for +example, it is physically impossible for a blind man to read. This kind +of impossibility, of course, excuses from guilt and punishment. +Example: Titus is dying and thinks of the command that he should +receive Viaticum. But he is unable to receive Communion without +vomiting. Hence, in his case the impossibility excuses from the divine +command.</p> + +<p>(b) Moral impossibility is the inability to perform an act without +serious inconvenience; for example, it is morally impossible for one +who has weak eyes to read small print. This kind of impossibility does +not excuse, if a greater evil will result from the non-observance of +the law than the evil of inconvenience that will result from its +observance. Examples: Eleazer would not eat the meats forbidden by the +law of Moses, preferring to die rather than give public scandal (II +Mach., vii. 18). The command of Christ that pastors minister to their +flocks obliges, even if it involves danger of death, when there is a +great public necessity (as in time of pestilence) or an urgent private +necessity (as when an infant is about to die without Baptism).</p> + +<p>362. Moral impossibility excuses from divine laws that have only +necessity of precept, if the inconvenience is serious, even when +compared to the evil of violating the law; for God does not wish +commands freely instituted by His will to oblige more rigorously than +the commands of the Natural Law (see 289, 317). Examples: Christ +excused David for eating the loaves of proposition (which was forbidden +by the law of Moses) on account of urgent necessity. A most grave +external inconvenience excuses from the law of integrity of confession +(see Vol. II).</p> + +<p>363. What is the nature of the Church’s action in dissolving the bond +of marriages that are not ratified, or not consummated after +ratification (see Vol. II), with reference to Christ’s law of +indissolubility? (a) Some see in this an application of other divine +laws that limit the law of indissolubility, and that were enunciated by +Christ Himself in His teaching on the supremacy of faith over other +bonds, the superiority of virginity to marriage, the power of the +Church in loosing, etc. (b) Others see in this an interpretation, +declarative or expansive, of the law of indissolubility. (c) Still +others regard these dissolutions as a removal of the proper matter of +the obligation contracted through the act of the human will (cfr. the +Natural Law, 312). The power of loosing would apply here as in the case +of vows. Some authors call this removal of matter “annulment of act,” +“remission of debt,” “permission”; while others call it “dispensation” +(see 314). Those who consider the dissolution of _ratum non +consummatum_ matrimony as “dispensation” list the law of +indissolubility as hypothetical positive law (see 357).</p> + +<p>364. Counsels.—In addition to its precepts (which are obligatory), the +New Law contains counsels, which are optional, but which are expressly +recommended.</p> + +<p>365. A counsel is a moral direction by which one who is willing is +advised to prefer a higher to a lower good, in order thereby to tend +more efficaciously towards perfection and to merit a greater reward.</p> + +<p>(a) A counsel is not something commanded. Example: Our Lord’s direction +to the disciples on their first mission that they should not carry +their sustenance with them was required as a duty that they might learn +to trust in Providence. Hence, it was not a counsel.</p> + +<p>(b) A counsel is not everything good that is not commanded. Example: +Marriage is not commanded to all, but it is not a counsel, since the +opposite good, viz., celibacy, is better (I Cor., vii. 38).</p> + +<p>366. That which is only counselled as to its actual performance, is +commanded as to its acceptance by the will for a case of necessity. +Example: Our Lord’s direction that good be done to personal enemies +does not command that one actually confer favors on them outside of the +case of necessity (this is only counselled), but only that one be so +charitably inclined that one is ready to help even a personal enemy who +is in serious need.</p> + +<p>367. The superiority of the counsels may be seen from the attitudes men +take to the goods of this world.</p> + +<p>(a) Some are taken up entirely with the things of earth, making +temporal goods the end of life and the standard of action. These do not +keep the Commandments and cannot be saved.</p> + +<p>(b) Some use the goods of this world not as ends, but as subordinate to +things that are higher. These keep the Commandments and will be saved; +but their solicitude about temporal concerns lessens the attention they +could give to things of the spirit.</p> + +<p>(c) Some renounce entirely the goods of this life, in order to give +themselves as completely as possible to the things of God. These +observe the counsels, and can more readily attain to holiness and +salvation; for, being freed from numerous cares about earthly things, +they can devote themselves more easily and earnestly to things that are +heavenly.</p> + +<p>368. The Three Counsels.—There are many counsels given in the Gospels, +but all can be reduced to three, according to the three chief earthly +goods that may be surrendered, and the three kinds of temptation that +come from those goods.</p> + +<p>(a) The counsel of poverty requires that one give up entirely external +goods or wealth, from which comes the concupiscence of the eyes: “If +thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and +thou shalt have treasure in heaven” (Matt, Xix. 21).</p> + +<p>(b) The counsel of chastity requires that one renounce entirely carnal +goods of pleasure, from which arise the concupiscence of the flesh: “He +that giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well; and he that giveth her +not, doth better” (I Cor., vii. 38).</p> + +<p>(c) The counsel of obedience requires that one deny oneself the good of +the soul which is one’s own will, from which comes the pride of life: +“Come follow Me” (Matt, xix. 21).</p> + +<p>369. The counsels can be followed in two ways. (a) They are followed +completely, when one accepts them as a rule for one’s whole life, as is +done by those who embrace the state of perfection in the religious +life, taking by vow the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity +and obedience. (b) They are followed partially when one practises them +in particular instances. Examples: A wealthy man who gives to the poor +when there is no obligation to do so, practises the counsel of poverty +in that case. A person who renounces his own legitimate wishes in some +matter, practises the counsel of obedience in that case, as when he +confers some favor on one who has offended him, or pardons a debt. +Married persons who practise conjugal abstinence for the sake of +religion, follow a counsel of chastity (I Cor., vii. 5).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_4_HUMAN_LAW">Art. 4: HUMAN LAW</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 95-97.)</p> + +<p>370. Definition.—Since human perversity often needs a check in +regulations that are not expressly contained in the Natural or in the +Divine Law, other laws must be made by society, drawn from those higher +laws as conclusions or added to them as determinations, in order to +meet special circumstances and necessities.</p> + +<p>371. Division of Human Laws.-Human laws are variously divided.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the difference of legislators, laws are either +ecclesiastical or civil.</p> + +<p>b) According to their mode of derivation from the Natural Law, laws +belong either to the law of nations (_jus gentium_) or to civil law. To +the _jus gentium_ belong those laws which are derived from the Natural +Law as conclusions from premises, e.g., the right to private property +without which men cannot live peacefully in society. To civil law +belongs whatever is derived from Natural Law by way of positive +determination by a legislator; e.g., Natural Law dictates that the +evil-doer be punished; but that the punishment take a particular form, +imprisonment, exile, death, is a determination depending upon the will +of the legislator.</p> + +<p>The _jus gentium_ is not international law which derives its force and +sanction from the free will of the legislator. The law of nations is +common to all men and derives its force from the conviction of men that +such a law is demanded for the good of mankind. It is not a secondary +precept of the Natural Law which is derived from the primary precepts +necessarily. Rather it is based upon a contingent set of circumstances; +it does not spring from man’s nature absolutely considered, but from +the way in which man acts and reacts in his society.</p> + +<p>(c) According to the difference of their objects, laws are either +affirmative (i.e., preceptive) or negative (i.e., prohibitive). An +affirmative law obliges always, but not for every occasion; a negative +law obliges always, and for every occasion. Example: The Third and +Fourth Commandments are always in force, but it is not necessary to +elicit a positive act of compliance at every instant. The other +Commandments, which are negative, are not only in force always, but it +is necessary at every instant to omit what they forbid.</p> + +<p>(d) According to the obligation which they impose, laws are either +moral, penal, or moral-penal. Moral laws oblige under pain of sin, +penal laws under pain of punishment, moral-penal laws under pain of +both.</p> + +<p>(e) According to their inclusiveness, laws are either personal or +territorial. The former affect the person for whom the law is made, and +oblige him even when he is outside the territory of the lawgiver. The +latter affect the territory, and hence do not oblige a subject when he +is outside the territory affected by the law.</p> + +<p>(f) According to their effect, prohibitive laws are either merely +prohibitive or irritant. The former make what is forbidden illegal, the +latter make it also void.</p> + +<p>372. Qualities.—The objects or content of human law must be of such a +character: (a) that they do not conflict with the Natural or the Divine +Law; (b) that they be beneficial to the community for which they are +made.</p> + +<p>373. Laws fail to be of public benefit in such cases as the following: +(a) if they are made without a broad view of the public good, which has +regard for different classes of people and various interests, and which +provides for the future as well as for the present; (b) if, losing +sight of the fact that the majority are not perfect in virtue, the +lawgivers require so much that the law falls into contempt, and graver +evils result than would have happened otherwise. Hence, it is advisable +that human laws confine their prohibitions to graver misdeeds, +especially those that are harmful to others and to society, and +restrict their commands to such good acts as promote the common weal. +Multiplicity of laws, excessive penalties for minor offenses, cruel and +unusual sanctions, lead to lawlessness.</p> + +<p>374. Human laws should not prescribe what is too difficult.</p> + +<p>(a) They should not prescribe heroic virtue, unless the common safety +demands it, or a subject has voluntarily obliged himself to it. +Example: Soldiers in war and pastors in time of pestilence must expose +themselves to danger of death; but for ordinary occasions the law +should not oblige one to risk one’s life or other great good.</p> + +<p>(b) They should not prescribe agreement with the mind of the legislator +or a virtuous performance of what is prescribed, unless the thing +ordered itself demands this. Examples: The law of annual Confession and +of the Easter Communion requires, not only that these Sacraments be +received, but that they be received worthily, for an unworthy +Confession is no Sacrament, and an unworthy Communion does not satisfy +the command of Christ, of which the Church command is but a +determination. On the other hand, the Lenten fast observed by one who +is not in the state of grace is an act good in itself and satisfies the +law. He who hears Mass on a holyday, not knowing that it is a holyday, +satisfies the obligation, though he had no intention of fulfilling it.</p> + +<p>375. Obligation of Human Laws.—All human laws that are just, whether +they be ecclesiastical or civil, made by believers in God or +unbelievers, are obligatory in conscience, (a) From the beginning the +Church has made laws and imposed them as obligatory (Acts, xv. 29; I +Cor., vi. 4; I Cor., xi. 5; I Tim., v. 9-12), and has recognized as +obligatory the laws of the State, without regard to the moral or +religious qualifications of the rulers (I Peter, ii. 13-16; Rom., xiii. +1-7).</p> + +<p>(b) Human laws are necessary. The Natural Law does not prescribe +definite penalties, while the Positive Divine Law prescribes only such +as are remote and invisible; and hence, if there were no human laws +holding out the threat of determined and present punishments, the +Divine laws would be contemned. Moreover, since the higher laws are +sometimes unknown, or prescribe no time, place or manner of +accomplishment, or do not command things that would be useful for their +observance, it is necessary that there be laws made by man to secure +the better knowledge and fulfillment of the laws given by God Himself.</p> + +<p>376. A human law is unjust in two ways:</p> + +<p>(a) if opposed to the rights of God. Examples: The command of Pharaoh +that the Hebrew male children be murdered (Exod., i. 17), the command +of Antiochus that his subjects sacrifice to idols (I Mach., ii. 16-20), +the command of the Sanhedrin that the Apostles should cease to preach +(Acts, v. 29);</p> + +<p>(b) if opposed to the rights of man. This happens in three ways: First, +when the purpose of the law is not the common good, as when the +lawgiver seeks only his own profit or glory; secondly, when the maker +of the law has not the requisite authority; thirdly, when the law +itself, although for the common good and made by competent authority, +does not distribute burdens equally or reasonably among the people. +Examples: Achab and Jezabel, in the affair of the vineyard of Naboth, +had in view not the public, but their own private benefit (III Kings, +xvi). The sentence of death pronounced on our Lord by the Sanhedrin was +illegal, because, among other reasons, the body was not assembled +according to law, and hence had no authority to give sentence. The +commands given the Israelites by Pharaoh (Exod., v. 18), and to their +subjects by Oriental despots (I Kings, viii), were unjust, because the +former discriminated against the Israelites, and the latter bore down +too heavily on all the people. The former civil laws that prescribed +the same penalty of hanging for a slight misdemeanor (such as the theft +of a loaf of bread by a boy) as for the capital crimes of piracy or +murder, the Stamp Act of George III, and some modern laws that sentence +to life imprisonment those who have been four times convicted of slight +offenses, are more recent examples of unjust laws.</p> + +<p>377. Obedience to unjust laws is not obligatory in the following cases. +(a) If a law is opposed to the rights of God, it is not lawful to do +what that law commands or permits, nor to omit what it forbids. +Examples: If a law permits one to practise polygamy, or commands one to +blaspheme religion, one may not use the permission or obey. If a law +forbids one to give or receive Baptism, it has no force. (b) If a law +is certainly opposed to the rights of man in any of the three ways +mentioned in the previous paragraph (376, b), it does not of itself +oblige in conscience, since it lacks some essential condition of a true +law, and even the consent of the majority or of all does not make it +just. However, it may oblige accidentally, on account of the greater +evils that would follow on disobedience, such as scandal, civil +disturbances, etc. The duty of subjects is to remonstrate against such +a law and to work for its repeal.</p> + +<p>378. The obligation of all laws is not the same in kind, or degree. (a) +Moral laws oblige one to do what is commanded or to omit what is +forbidden, as a duty owed in conscience; hence, he who violates a law +of this kind is guilty of moral fault. Penal laws oblige one to follow +what they prescribe, if one would be free from guilt before the law and +not liable in conscience to the penalty prescribed; hence, he who +violates a penal law is guilty of juridical fault, and, if he further +illegally resists the penalty, he becomes guilty also of moral fault. +(b) Moral laws are not all of the same obligatory force, some of them +obliging under grave sin, others under venial sin.</p> + +<p>379. The following human laws are recognized as moral laws: (a) +ecclesiastical laws, with few exceptions; (b) civil laws that confirm +the Eternal or Divine Law, or that pertain directly to the common +welfare, such as the laws that determine the duties of public +officials, the rights of inheritance, etc.</p> + +<p>380. The following human laws are generally regarded as merely penal: +(a) ecclesiastical laws which expressly state that their observance is +not required under pain of sin (e.g., the statutes of many Religious +Orders); (b) civil laws of minor importance, or which the legislator +imposes as a purely civil duty (e.g., some traffic regulations).</p> + +<p>381. Moral laws oblige under grave sin if the two following conditions +are present: (a) if the thing prescribed by the law is of great +importance, because of its nature or circumstances; (b) if the lawgiver +intended to impose a grave obligation.</p> + +<p>382. A matter of light moment cannot be made the object of a law that +binds under grave sin, for this would impose an intolerable burden, and +would thus be contrary to the common good. What is unimportant in +itself, however, may become important on account of its purpose or +other circumstance.</p> + +<p>383. The intention of the legislator to impose a grave moral obligation +is recognized either: (a) from his own declaration, as when a church +law is commanded under threat of the divine judgment; or (b) from +circumstances that indicate such an intention, such as the gravity of +the subject-matter of the law or the kind of penalty it prescribes, the +general opinion of authorities, or the common practice of the community.</p> + +<p>384. By obliging to the observance of what they command and the +avoidance of what they forbid, laws indirectly oblige to what is +necessary for such obedience. (a) Hence, the law obliges one to make +use of the ordinary means for its fulfillment. Examples: He who has not +used ordinary diligence to know the law, sins against the law if he +violates its prescriptions. He who eats meat on a day of abstinence, +because he neglected to provide himself with other food, is guilty of +sin. (b) The law obliges one to use sufficient diligence in removing +impediments to its fulfillment or dangers of its violation. Examples: +The law of hearing Mass on Sunday obliges one not to stay up so late on +Saturday that fulfillment will be impossible. The law of fasting +obliges one to avoid dangerous occasions of its violation.</p> + +<p>385. Interpretation.—Though laws are carefully framed as to language, +doubts about their meaning will often arise—in ordinary cases, because +of lack of understanding or changes of conditions, and in extraordinary +cases, because from the circumstances the law seems inapplicable. Hence +the need of explaining the law, which is done in ordinary cases by +interpretation, in extraordinary cases by _epieikeia_ (see 411 sqq.).</p> + +<p>386. Interpretation is a genuine explanation of the law, that is, one +that states the meaning of the words of the law according to the +intention the lawgiver had in mind when he chose them. It is of various +kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the author from whom it proceeds, interpretation is +authentic, if it comes from the lawgiver himself or from another +authorized by him; it is usual, if it comes from common usage (i.e., +from the manner in which the law is customarily observed); it is +doctrinal, if it is made by learned men according to the rules of +correct exegesis.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the effect, interpretation is declarative, if it +clears up what was obscure in the law; it is supplementary, if it +extends or limits the law, by adding to or subtracting from the cases +included under it.</p> + +<p>(c) According to the manner in which it is made, interpretation is +strict or wide, Strict interpretation gives to a word of law that least +inclusive and most proper signification it bears (e.g., it understands +“son” to stand for son by birth). Wide interpretation gives to a word a +more inclusive and less proper signification (e.g., it understands +“son” to stand for son by birth or by adoption).</p> + +<p>387. Those Subject to Law.—Only those are morally obliged to observe +human law who are subjects of the lawgiver and who have the use of +reason. (a) Those who are not subjects in any sense are not bound, for +to obligate by law is an act of authority and jurisdiction; (b) those +who have not reached the age of reason, or who are habitually insane, +are not themselves morally bound, since they are incapable of moral +obligation. Of course, they may be restrained as to acts, and their +rights may be determined.</p> + +<p>388. The lawgiver himself, even though not subject, is held to observe +the laws he makes. Thus: (a) if the lawmaking power resides in a +legislative assembly, each legislator is subject to the body and hence +to its laws; (b) if the lawmaking power is vested in an individual, he +is not subject to the coactive force of his own laws, since he cannot +punish himself; but he is subject to their directive force, inasmuch as +the higher law of nature requires that the superior show good example +by observing what he requires of others.</p> + +<p>389. Change of Law.—The growth of knowledge and experience, or the +change of social circumstances, requires now and then that human laws +be improved or adapted to new conditions. But, since laws derive a +great part of their influence from custom, they should not be changed +unless the break with custom is compensated for by the urgent necessity +of the new law, by its manifest advantage, or by the evident iniquity +or harmfulness of the old law, In brief, the common good should be the +norm by which to decide whether a law should be retained or changed.</p> + +<p>390. Constitutional law, as being fundamental and organic, is more +immutable than ordinary law. (a) If given to a society established +according to the positive ordinance of a superior, it cannot be +abrogated or modified by the legislative authority of that society, +since this would be contrary to the will of the founder. Hence, the +Church has no power to change the fundamental constitution given her by +Christ, who prescribed the religious society as established by Him to +be necessary. (b) If a constitutional law is given to a society which +is perfect and necessary from the law of nature, such constitution can +be modified for extraordinary reasons and in the special ways provided +(e.g., by amendments approved by the people).</p> + +<p>391. The Law of Custom.—Custom (i.e., a long-continued practice that +has acquired binding force) is able to establish a new law or to do +away with an old law. For the will of the lawgiver is manifested not +only by words, as happens in the written law, but also and more clearly +by repeated and continued acts, as happens in the case of the unwritten +law of custom. In a democracy it is the consent of the people who +follow the custom as law that imposes the obligation; in a monarchy it +is the consent of the ruler who permits the custom.</p> + +<p>392. With reference to their legal effects, there are three kinds of +customs: (a) customs according to the law, which are those that confirm +by use an existing law; in this way custom interprets law (see 386); +(b) customs beside the law, which are those that introduce a new +obligation that is not prescribed by any written law; in this way +custom establishes law; (c) customs contrary to law, which are those +that remove the obligation of a previous law; in this way custom +repeals, at least in part, the law to which it is opposed.</p> + +<p>393. Custom has not the power to establish or repeal a law, unless it +possesses the requisites of law itself (see 285). Hence arise the +following conditions:</p> + +<p>(a) Since the exercise of the legislative power requires freedom, +customs do not possess legal force unless they have been practised +freely. Hence, a custom that has been established by force does not +suffice;</p> + +<p>(b) Since laws can be made only for perfect societies, customs have not +the force of law, unless they are practised by a perfect society, or by +a majority of its members who are representative. Hence, a custom +observed by a family or by a minority of the voters in a body that has +its own jurisprudence has not the status of law;</p> + +<p>(c) Since laws must proceed from competent authority, customs do not +make or unmake law, unless they have the approval of the ruling power. +In a society where the legislative function rests with the people +(e.g., in the ancient democracy of Athens), the fact that they follow a +custom with the purpose of enacting it into law or of using it against +an existing law is sufficient approval. But if the supreme power is not +with the multitude, their customs do not obtain the force of +legislative acts, unless approved by the constituted authority;</p> + +<p>(d) Since law needs to be promulgated, a custom, to have the effect of +law, must be practised by public acts through which it becomes known to +the people as a whole.</p> + +<p>394. Customs that have the other requisite conditions begin to be +obligatory or derogatory as soon as the approval of competent authority +is had. (a) If the approval is given expressly, the custom has the +force of law at once; (b) if it is given tacitly, inasmuch as the +lawgiver, knowing the custom and being under no restraint, does not +disapprove, the custom has the force of law as soon as tacit consent is +recognized by the learned and prudent; (c) if it is given by the law +itself, which explicitly accepts reasonable customs, the custom has the +force of law when it has lasted for ten years, or other length of time +prescribed.</p> + +<p>395. If the superior disapproves of a custom or maintains diplomatic +silence for fear of greater evils, his consent is withheld, and the +custom cannot be deemed as of legal force.</p> + +<p>396. There are other conditions necessary that a custom may acquire the +force of law. (a) Since a law is an ordinance knowingly imposed by the +will of the legislator, a custom does not constitute a law if it is +followed through the erroneous conviction that it is already a law, or +if there is nothing to indicate a will to make it obligatory. Signs of +the intention to raise a custom to the dignity of a law are the +punishment of transgressors of the custom, the observance of the custom +even at the cost of great inconvenience, the opinion of the good that +it should be followed, etc. (b) Since a law cannot prescribe except +what is reasonable and for the common good, a practice opposed to the +Natural or Divine Law, or expressly reprobated by written law as an +abuse, or one that is injurious to the welfare of the community, cannot +become unwritten law through custom.</p> + +<p>397. There are special conditions in order that a custom may do away +with an existing law. (a) A written law is not repealed unless the +legislator wills to take away its obligation, and hence desuetude or a +custom contrary to law does not abrogate a law unless it manifests a +purpose not to be obligated by what the law prescribes. This it does if +the whole people regard a certain law as a dead letter, or feel that +circumstances or the common welfare require the opposite of what the +law requires, and have no scruple in acting uniformly according to this +conviction.</p> + +<p>(b) A written law is not repealed, if it is immutable, or if a change +would be prejudicial to the common interest; similarly, therefore, a +custom cannot abolish a law, unless this law is one that can be +abrogated by human acts, and that is not essential to the public good. +Hence, customs contrary to the Commandments or to the Law of Christ, +customs that are expressly condemned in Canon Law as corruptions, +customs that encourage lawlessness or afford occasions of sin, can +never do away with a law, no matter how long or by how many they are +practised.</p> + +<p>398. Those who start a custom contrary to law are sometimes in good +faith, and hence are not guilty of disobedience. (a) It may be that +they are in ignorance of the law, but have the interpretative will not +to be bound by it; (b) it may be that they know the law, but sincerely +think that, on account of conditions, it has ceased of itself.</p> + +<p>399. Even when a custom has been started in bad faith, it may continue +through good faith, and so become not a violation, but an abrogation of +the law. Changed conditions may make the law useless or harmful; or the +very fact that it is no longer observed may make it too difficult to +enforce.</p> + +<p>400. Today customs do not so often attain the force of law. Moreover, +so difficult is it to know whether any custom has all the qualities +necessary for establishing, modifying, or abrogating a law that only an +expert is competent to judge in this matter.</p> + +<p>401. Dispensation.—Human law has not the immutability of the Divine +Law. Hence, not only may it be changed, but it may also be dispensed. +Dispensation is a relaxation of the positive law made for a particular +case by him who has the competent authority.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a relaxation of the law—that is, it takes away the +obligation of the law. Thus, it differs from permission, which is +fulfillment of what is conditionally allowed by the law.</p> + +<p>(b) Dispensation is made for a particular case—that is, it is granted +when the provisions of the law, though beneficial to the community as a +whole, are not suitable for a particular person or case. Thus, it +differs, first, from abrogation and derogation, which remove the +obligation of the whole or a part of the law for the entire community; +and, secondly, from privilege, which is granted permanently as a +private law.</p> + +<p>(c) Dispensation is given by competent authority—that is, by the +legislator or others who have the lawful power. Thus, it differs from +_epieikeia_ and private interpretation, which are made by those who +have no power to dispense.</p> + +<p>(d) Dispensation is a relaxation of the positive law, for since the +Natural Law is immutable (see 305), no dispensation can be given from +its requirements. Thus, dispensation differs from the official +declaration or interpretation of the Natural or Divine Law (see 315).</p> + +<p>402. Those who have the power to dispense from a law are the lawgiver +and others duly authorized. (a) The lawgiver himself can dispense as +follows: in his own laws, since he was able to make them; in the laws +of his predecessors, since his authority is equal to theirs; in the +laws of his inferiors, since they are his subordinates. (b) Others can +dispense who have received from the law, from their superior, or from +custom the necessary authority to dispense.</p> + +<p>403. Those Who May Be Dispensed from a Law.—(a) Since dispensation is +an act of jurisdiction, only those can be dispensed who are in some way +subject to the dispenser. Since, however, the jurisdiction used in +dispensing does not impose an obligation but grants a favor, it is held +that he who has the power to dispense others may also dispense himself, +if his power is not restricted. (b) Since dispensation is an act of +authority, it may be exercised even in favor of one who is absent, or +ignorant of the dispensation or unwilling to accept it. But, since as a +rule favors should not be forced, the validity of a dispensation +generally depends upon the consent of the one dispensed.</p> + +<p>404. The power of dispensing has for its end the common good, and +therefore it must be exercised: (a) faith fully, that is, not for +reasons of private interest or friendship; (b) prudently, that is with +knowledge of the case and with judgment that there are sufficient +reasons for dispensation.</p> + +<p>405. In order that the reason for a dispensation be sufficient, it is +not required that it be so grave as to constitute a physical or moral +impossibility of keeping the law, since the obligation of the law +ceases in the face of impossibility (see 317, 487), without the need of +dispensation. Hence, lesser reasons suffice for dispensation.</p> + +<p>406. A dispensation must be granted whenever the law itself or justice +requires it. The following cases are usually given: (a) when there +exists a reason that requires, according to law, that a dispensation be +granted; (b) when the common good, or the spiritual good of an +individual, or his protection from some considerable evil, demands the +concession of a dispensation.</p> + +<p>407. A dispensation may be either granted or denied, when the case does +not demand it and the superior after careful investigation is not +certain whether the reason is sufficient or insufficient; otherwise, a +greater responsibility would rest on the superior than the law can be +thought to impose—viz., that of attaining certainty where it cannot +easily be had.</p> + +<p>408. He who dispenses without a sufficient reason is guilty of the sin +of favoritism, and is responsible for the discontent and quarrels that +result. He is guilty of grave sin thus: (a) if serious scandal or other +inconvenience is caused, even when the dispenser is the lawgiver +himself; (b) if the law obliges under grave sin and the dispensation is +not granted by the lawgiver, but by an inferior who usurps the right to +dispense.</p> + +<p>409. The subject of dispensation is guilty of sin: (a) if he asks a +dispensation when he knows for certain that there is no sufficient +reason for it; (b) if, having been denied a dispensation, even though +unjustly, he acts against the law; or if he knowingly makes use of an +invalid or expired dispensation.</p> + +<p>410. Sufficient reasons for a dispensation can be reduced to two +classes: (a) private welfare (e.g., the difficulty of the law for the +petitioner, a notable benefit he will receive through the dispensation, +etc.); (b) public welfare (e.g., the benefits that are secured to the +community, or the evils that are avoided through the dispensation).</p> + +<p>411. _Epieikeia_.—Since human laws regulate particular and contingent +cases according to what usually happens, and since they must therefore +be expressed in general terms, exceptional cases will occur that fall +under the law, if we consider only the general wording of its text, but +that do not fall under the law, if we consider the purpose of the +lawgiver, who never foresaw the exceptional cases and would have made +different provision for them, had he foreseen them. In such exceptional +cases legalism insists on blind obedience to the law-books, but the +higher justice of _epieikeia_ or equity calls for obedience to the +lawgiver himself as intending the common welfare and fair treatment of +the rights of each person.</p> + +<p>412. _Epieikeia_ may be defined, therefore, as a moderation of the +words of the law where in an extraordinary case, on account of their +generality, they do not represent the mind of the lawgiver; which +moderation must be made in the manner in which the lawgiver himself +would have made it, had he thought of the case, or would make it now, +were he consulted. Hence, _epieikeia_ differs from the various causes +that take away the obligation of a law, for it supposes the +non-existence of obligation from the beginning and non-comprehension in +the law.</p> + +<p>Thus: (a) it is not revocation, desuetude, restrictive interpretation, +or dispensation; (b) it is not cessation on account of impossibility; +(c) it is not presumed permission or self-dispensation.</p> + +<p>413. In its use _epieikeia_ is at once lawful and dangerous.</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful, for it defends the common good, the judgment of +conscience, the rights of individuals from subjection to a written +document, and from oppression by the abuse of power;</p> + +<p>(b) it is dangerous, for it rests on the judgment of the individual, +which is prone to decide in his own favor to the detriment of the +common good as well as of self.</p> + +<p>414. _Epieikeia_ by its very nature imposes certain limits on its use.</p> + +<p>(a) It is based on the fact that a certain case is not comprehended in +a law, because the legislator did not foresee it.</p> + +<p>Hence, _epieikeia_ is not applicable to the Divine Law; for the Divine +Lawgiver foresaw all cases that could arise, and so excluded all +exceptions (see 315). This is clear as regards the Ten Commandments and +other precepts of the Natural Law, since they deal with what is +intrinsically good or bad, and are unchangeable (see 307). But it +applies also to the prescriptions of the Positive Law of God, and +apparent cases of _epieikeia_, such as the eating of the loaves of +proposition by David (I Kings, xxi. 6), can be explained by the +cessation of law or divine dispensation. Examples: One may not excuse +certain modern forms of cheating on the plea that they were not thought +of when the Decalogue was given. One may not omit Baptism on the ground +that Christ Himself would have excused from it, had He foreseen the +circumstances.</p> + +<p>(b) _Epieikeia_ is based on the principle that the words of a law must +be subordinated to the common good and justice. Hence, it is not +applicable to those laws whose universal observance is demanded by the +common good—that is, to irritant laws. Any hardship suffered by an +individual through the effect of such laws is small in comparison with +the injury that would be done to the common welfare if there were any +cases not comprehended in such laws; for irritant laws are the norms +for judging the validity of contracts and other acts, and public; +security demands that they be uniform and certain. Example: One may not +contract marriage with a diriment impediment, on the plea that the +Church would not wish the impediments to oblige under the serious +inconvenience that exists in one’s case.</p> + +<p>415. The dangers of _epieikeia_ also place limitations on its use.</p> + +<p>(a) There is the danger that one may be wrong in judging that the +lawgiver did not wish to include a case under his law. If this is not +certain, one should investigate to the best of one’s ability, and have +recourse, if possible, to the legislator or his representative for a +declaration or dispensation. It is never lawful to use _epieikeia_ +without reasonable certainty that the legislator would not wish the law +to apply here and now.</p> + +<p>(b) There is the danger that one may be in bad faith in deciding that +the common good or justice requires the use of _epieikeia_; the motive +in reality may be self-interest or escape from obligation, Hence, a +person should not use _epieikeia_ except in necessity, when he is +thrown on his own resources and must decide for himself; and, even +then, he must be sure that he acts from sincerity and disinterestedness.</p> + +<p>416. Cases in which the use of _epieikeia_ is lawful are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) Epieikeia in a wide sense—that is, a benign interpretation made by +a private individual that a particular case is not comprehended in the +intention of the lawgiver, because the latter had not the power to +include it—may be used for all cases in which the opposite +interpretation would set the law up in opposition to the common welfare +or would work injustice to individuals. Example: The law that goods +borrowed must be returned to their owners yields to _epieikeia_, if +there is question of putting weapons into the hands of one who would +use them against the public security or for the commission of murder;</p> + +<p>(b) _Epieikeia_ in a strict sense—that is, the judgment that a +particular case is not included in the intention of the lawgiver, +because the latter had not the wish to include it—may be used for all +those cases in which the opposite interpretation would suppose in the +lawgiver a severity that is not likely. “The rigor of the law may be +extreme injustice” (Cicero, _De Officiis_, I, 10). Example: Titus has +the opportunity to make a notable sum of money on a Sunday morning, but +cannot make use of the opportunity without missing Mass that day. Caius +on a fast day feels well, but is tired and will be not a little +inconvenienced if he fasts. Both Titus and Caius may use _epieikeia_, +for the Church does not wish to be unkind, nor, generally speaking, to +have her laws oblige rigorously and for every case.</p> + +<p>417. Though all human law is subject to _epieikeia_, the practice of +the civil law does not always allow it. (a) Action on individual +responsibility makes one guilty of technical violation. Example: +Balbus, fearing that his house may be robbed or he himself assaulted, +borrows a revolver and practises shooting. He had not time to get the +necessary permit, but argued that necessity knows no law. But, if he is +arrested, the court may hold him guilty of violating the law. (b) +Action in a court of equity, however, will give relief for cases not +provided for in law. Example: One may obtain an order from the court +restraining a neighbor from injury, when the law itself gives only the +right to recover damages for injury done.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_5_ECCLESIASTICAL_LAW">Art. 5: ECCLESIASTICAL LAW</h2> +</div> + +<p>418. The Church, being a perfect and independent society, has the power +to make laws for its members in order to promote the common spiritual +welfare. These laws are not an encroachment on the liberty of the +Gospel, for Christ Himself bestowed on the Church legislative and other +governmental powers suitable to her mission. The charter of the +legislative authority of the Church is contained in the words of +Christ to Peter: “I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock +I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against +it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And +whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven; +and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in +heaven” (Matt., xvi. 18, 19; see also Matt., xviii. 17; Luke, x. 16).</p> + +<p>419. The character of laws made by the Church is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) their purpose is to guide and assist the individual that he may +more easily and perfectly fulfill the laws of Christ, and to protect +and promote the welfare of the Church as a whole;</p> + +<p>(b) their contents generally do not impose what is the height of +perfection, but what is the minimum necessary for salvation (see 374);</p> + +<p>(e) their number, unlike that of the laws of the Synagogue, is few. +There are only six precepts of the Church that bind all the faithful; +the other laws of the Church do not all oblige each individual, some +being for prelates, some for priests, some for religious, some for +judges, etc.;</p> + +<p>(d) their obligation is not so strict as that of the laws of the Old +Testament, for they are more easily changed or dispensed.</p> + +<p>420. General Law of the Church.—The general law of the Church is found +in the five books of the Code of Canon Law, promulgated by Benedict XV +on May 27, 1917. It applies only to the Latin Church, except in those +matters that of their nature affect the Oriental Church as well, and it +has been in force from Pentecost Sunday, May 19, 1918.</p> + +<p>421. The effects of the Code on the older legislation are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) it retains in their entirety liturgical laws that are not expressly +corrected; agreements of the Holy See with various nations, even if +they are opposed to the Code; favors, privileges and indults that are +not revoked (Canons 2-4);</p> + +<p>(b) disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin opposed to the Code are +to be held as revoked, even if they are particular, unless the contrary +is provided. Disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin omitted by the +Code are retained in force, if they are particular; they are abrogated, +if they are general and not contained at least implicitly in the +Code; if a general law decreed a penalty, it must be expressly +mentioned in the Code to retain force (Canon 6);</p> + +<p>(c) customs, universal or particular, opposed to the Code, when +expressly disapproved by it, must be corrected, even if immemorial; +when they are not expressly disapproved by the Code, they may or may +not be continued, as a rule, according as they are immemorial—or one +century old—or not (Canon 5).</p> + +<p>422. The rules laid down for the interpretation of the Code are as +follows: (a) in those parts where the Code agrees with the older +legislation, it is to be interpreted by means of the latter; (b) in +those parts where it certainly disagrees with the older legislation, it +is to be interpreted from its own phraseology (Canon 6).</p> + +<p>423. Lawgivers in the Church.—The Pope, as Vicar of Christ and Visible +Head of the Church, has supreme legislative power in the Church (Canon +218): “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church .... +And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc.” +(Matt., xvi. 18, 19). Thus, the Pope can legislate: (a) for the whole +Church, either alone or with the body of the Episcopate subject to him +in an Ecumenical Council, either directly or through Congregations; (b) +for any part of the Church, either directly or through representatives. +Thus also, by Papal concession, legates may legislate for a place to +which they are sent, _Praelati nullius_ for a territory over which they +are placed, General Chapters for a Religious Order, and the like.</p> + +<p>424. The Bishops, “placed by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God” +(Acts, xx. 28), have legislative power within their own territory, +dependently on the Pope (Canon 335). (a) They can make laws, each for +his own diocese, either in or out of a synod; (b) when gathered +together in council, provincial or plenary, they can legislate for +ecclesiastical provinces, or for all the faithful of their country.</p> + +<p>425. Subject-Matter of Church Law.—The end of the Church being the +glory of God and the salvation of souls, she can legislate concerning +all matters that are sacred or that refer, directly or indirectly, to +the satisfaction of man or the worship of God (see Leo XIII, Const. +_Immortale Dei_, d. 1 Nov. 1885).</p> + +<p>(a) The Church can call to mind those things that are already +prescribed by the Divine Law, Natural or Positive; and, although she +cannot dispense in these laws (see 313-814 and exception as to +hypothetical positive law in 357), she can interpret them +authoritatively, and can decide when obligations of the Divine Law, +that depend upon an act of the human will, cease (see 315-316).</p> + +<p>(b) The Church can determine those things that were left undetermined +in the Divine Law. Examples: The manner in which the Lord’s Day is to +be sanctified, the times and frequency with which the Divine law of +Communion is to be fulfilled, the way in which the obligation of +fasting is to be complied with, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) The Church can make laws in matters that were left free by our Lord +whenever this will promote the better observance of His law (e.g., many +church laws for the clergy and religious, for the conduct of worship, +for administration, etc.).</p> + +<p>426. The acts that may be commanded by the Church are of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) The Church may command acts that are purely external (e.g., +fasting) and acts that are partly external and partly internal, that +is, those external acts to which, from the nature of things or from +law, a special moral act of the intellect or will must be joined (e.g., +a true oath, a worthy confession or Communion).</p> + +<p>(b) The Church may command acts that are purely internal, that is, acts +of the intellect or will that are not necessarily connected with any +external act (such as meditation, the intention in applying Mass, +ctc.), whenever she is explaining, applying, or determining the Divine +Law, or acting in virtue of the power of Christ. Examples: The Pope may +define a dogma to be accepted internally. A confessor may impose as +penance a pious meditation. The Church prescribes the days when pastors +must intend to offer Mass for their people. A religious superior may +command a spiritual retreat.</p> + +<p>(c) It is more probable that, apart from instances such as those just +given, the Church cannot legislate regarding acts that are purely +internal. For unlike the divine Legislator, who sees the internal acts +of the soul and who can pass judgment on them, the Church cannot read +the heart or judge the conscience. Hence, it would appear useless for +the Church to give commandments about acts that elude her knowledge, +all the more so since the Divine Law has given commands and +prohibitions regarding internal acts and no one can escape the judgment +of God.</p> + +<p>427. Those Bound by General Laws.—The general laws of the Church +oblige all and only such persons as are at once subjects of the Church +and capable of receiving a law (Canon 12).</p> + +<p>(a) By Baptism one becomes a member of the Church, and hence it is +the baptized who are subject to ecclesiastical laws; (b) by her laws, +the Church commands only human and deliberate acts or omissions, and +hence it is only those who can reason that are subject to those laws. +(c) Moreover, unless the law expressly rules otherwise, those who, +although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed +their seventh year are not bound by purely ecclesiastical law. Specific +exceptions are stated in the law. Thus: (1) Canons 854, Sec.2, and +940, Sec.1, regarding the reception of the sacraments in danger of +death, Canon 859, Sec.1, stating the precepts of Easter Communion, +and Canon 906, containing the precepts of annual confession, declare +that the law in these matters is binding on persons having the use of +reason, regardless of the actual completion of the seventh year, The +law of fasting in Canon 1254, Sec.2 binds after the completion of the +twenty-first year. (2) Canon 1099 explicitly exempts non-Catholics, in +their own marriages, from the ecclesiastical form of marriage; also +Canon 1070 exempts them from the impediment of disparity of cult. (3) +The habitually insane are considered as infants under seven (Canon 88, +Sec.3). Accordingly, although they are bound by the Divine Law during +lucid moments, they are not usually bound by purely ecclesiastical laws +during this period.</p> + +<p>428. By the unbaptized are here understood, not only those who have +never received Baptism (such as infidels, pagans, Mohammedans, Jews, +catechumens), but also those who were baptized invalidly. The divine +law of receiving Baptism and entering the Church applies to these +persons, but, as long as they are unbaptized, they are not subjects of +the Church. Thus: (a) directly they are not obliged by any +ecclesiastical law, and hence it is not sinful in itself to ask them to +do what is forbidden by such laws (e.g., work on a holyday); (b) +indirectly they become subject to ecclesiastical law when they enter +into law-governed relations with the baptized who are subject to church +law. Example: An unbaptized person who marries a Catholic is married +invalidly, unless the law on dispensation has been observed.</p> + +<p>429. Baptized non-Catholics include heretics and schismatics. Thus: (a) +objectively, these persons are obliged by ecclesiastical laws, unless +they are excepted by the law itself, and hence it is not lawful +directly to induce them to transgress a Church law (e.g., to eat meat +on Friday); (b) subjectively, they are generally excused from formal +sin in the non-observance of Church laws, and it is not a sin to +co-operate materially in such non-observance (e.g., by giving meat on +Friday to a Protestant in good faith who requests it or wishes it).</p> + +<p>430. It is held that the Church is more lenient as regards those +baptized as non-Catholics, that is, those who were born and brought up +in some non-Catholic sect. Thus: (a) laws that have for their object +the sanctification of the individual (such as fasting and abstinence, +Sunday Mass, etc.), are not insisted on for them, since this would hurt +rather than help their spiritual interests; (b) laws that have for +their object the protection of the public welfare (such as the laws +regarding mixed marriage), apply also to baptized non-Catholics.</p> + +<p>Other authors do not admit this distinction and hold that these +non-Catholics are bound by the laws of the Church, since Canon 87 +expressly states: By Baptism man is constituted a person in the Church +of Christ with all the rights and duties of Christians.</p> + +<p>Apostates and excommunicated persons are certainly bound by all +ecclesiastical laws.</p> + +<p>431. Oriental Catholics are not bound by pontifical laws (Canon 1) +except in the following cases: (a) when the matter is dogmatic; (b) +when the law implicitly extends to them, since it contains a +declaration of natural or divine law; (c) when the law is explicitly +extended to them. An example of (a) is Canon 218; of (b) Canon 228,2; +of (c) Canons 622, Sec.4 and 1099, Sec.1, 3.</p> + +<p>432. It is a general rule that all persons baptized, as just explained, +are subject to ecclesiastical laws, if they are habitually able to +reason; but that they are not subject to those laws, if they are not +habitually able to reason.</p> + +<p>First Rule.—Persons habitually able to reason are all those who in +their normal state are able to understand the difference between right +and wrong, that is, the majority of those who have completed seven +years of age. Such persons are subject to ecclesiastical laws, even +when actually they are unable to reason on account of temporary +intoxication, delirium, derangement, unconsciousness, etc. Hence, one +who would offer meat on Friday to a person momentarily unbalanced on +the plea that his condition excused him from the law, would do wrong; +for the state of passing irresponsibility excuses from formal sin (see +249), but not from the law.</p> + +<p>Second Rule.—Persons habitually unable to reason are all those who +have not yet learned the difference between right and wrong (e.g., +infants and idiots), or who have permanently lost all knowledge of +right and wrong (e.g., the hopelessly insane). These persons are not +bound by ecclesiastical laws, at least not by those that are directive. +Hence, in itself it is not wrong to give meat on days of abstinence to +such persons, even when they are Catholics.</p> + +<p>433. Exceptions to the first rule just given are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) According to Canon Law, the age of reason comes legally when one +has completed seven years (Canon 12). If a boy or girl is able to +reason before that age, he or she is not obliged by laws that are +purely ecclesiastical, although it is advisable that parents accustom +their children to the hearing of Mass, to abstinence, etc., as soon as +this can be conveniently done. If a child has passed the seventh year +and does not appear able to reason, he is not bound by ecclesiastical +laws.</p> + +<p>(b) According to Canon Law, the age of puberty is fixed for males at +the completion of fourteen years of age, for females at the completion +of twelve years of age (Canon 88, Sec.2). These who have not attained +this age are excused from all penal laws, unless a law expressly states +the contrary; for on account of the want of mature judgment they +deserve leniency (Canon 2230).</p> + +<p>(c) The age of majority in Canon (as in Civil) Law is reached when one +has completed twenty-one years (Canon 88, Sec.1). Minors in the exercise +of rights are subject to the power of parents or guardians, except +where the contrary is declared by the law, as is the case for the +reception of the Sacraments and the choice of a religious life (Canon +89). They are not obliged by the law of fast (Canon 1254, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>434. There are some exceptions to the second rule given in 432. Thus, +those laws of the Church that grant favors or that invalidate acts can +apply even to those who are habitually unable to reason (such as +infants and the perpetually demented); for laws of this kind are not +directive of the acts of subjects.</p> + +<p>435. Those Bound by Particular Laws.—The particular laws of the Church +oblige all those who are subject to her general laws, and who become +subject to the laws of a locality by reason of domicile or personal +presence (Canon 13, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>436. There are two kinds of domicile. (a) A true domicile or home is +acquired in a place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s +abode there, with the intention of remaining permanently or +indefinitely; finally, after ten years, when one has lived there so +long, even though there was no intention of remaining permanently +(Canon 92, Sec.1). (b) A quasi-domicile or residence is acquired in a +place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s abode there +with the intention of remaining there for at least the greater part of +the year; finally, after the greater part of the year, when one has +lived there so long (Canon 92, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>437. With regard to abode, four classes of persons are distinguished in +Canon Law (Canon 91): (a) an inhabitant, who is one that has a domicile +in a place and is present there; (b) a resident, who is one that has +a quasi-domicile in a place and is present there; (c) a stranger, who +is one that is outside the places of his domicile and quasi-domicile; +(d) a _vagus_ or homeless person, who is one that has no domicile or +quasi-domicile anywhere.</p> + +<p>438. The rules as regards those who are not strangers are: (a) +inhabitants and residents are subject to the diocesan, provincial, and +other particular laws of their territory (Canon 13, Sec. 2); (b) the +homeless are subject to the local laws of the territory where they are +present (Canon 14, Sec. 2).</p> + +<p>439. The rules for strangers with reference to general laws (Canon 14, +Sec. 1, n. 3) are; (a) a stranger is obliged to follow these laws, if +they are observed in the place where he is, even though they are not in +force in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile; (b) a stranger +is not obliged to observe general laws, if they are not in force where +he is, even though they are in force in the place of his domicile or +quasi-domicile. Thus, the general law of abstinence on Friday does +not oblige one who is travelling in a place where the law has been +suspended, even though he would be obliged by it at home. The traveller +would do better, however, to keep to the practice of his home.</p> + +<p>440. The rules for strangers with regard to the particular laws of +their own domicile or quasi-domicile (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 1) are; +(a) they are obliged in two cases—first, when those laws are not +territorial but personal and obligatory on them everywhere (as is the +case with the statutes of religious superiors), and secondly, when the +violation of a territorial law would be harmful in its own territory +(as when by fiction of law one must be considered as present on account +of the law of residence); (b) they are not obliged in other cases. +Thus, if one is travelling on a feast-day that is a diocesan holyday +in one’s home diocese, but not in the diocese where one is, one is not +obliged to hear Mass.</p> + +<p>441. The following are the rules for strangers with regard to the +particular laws of the place where they are: (a) they are obliged in +two cases—first, when natural law itself requires that a territorial +law be observed by all, and secondly, when the Church includes +strangers among those who are subject to a territorial law; (b) they +are not obliged in other cases. Thus, if a person is travelling on a +feast-day that is observed as a holyday of obligation both in his home +diocese and in the diocese where he is, but not as a general holyday +of the Church, he is not obliged to hear Mass; for the law of his home +diocese does not bind him, since he is out of its territory, and the +law of the diocese where he is does not bind him, since he is not a +subject of that law.</p> + +<p>442. The natural law requires that strangers should conform themselves +to local laws in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when non-observance would be a cause of scandal, which the natural +law commands one to avoid. In this sense we understand the rule of +St. Ambrose: “When you are at Rome, do as the Romans do.” Hence, if +a stranger would cause real scandal by eating meat on a local day of +abstinence, he would be obliged to abstain from it;</p> + +<p>(b) when a local law deals with the solemnities required for validity +of contracts (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 2). If strangers were not obliged +by laws of this kind, they could take advantage of the inhabitants, a +thing that is contrary to natural justice. Thus, “the place rules the +act”;</p> + +<p>(c) when the local law has for its object the maintenance of public +order (Canon 14, Sec. 1, 11. 2); for the natural law demands that +public safety be guarded. Hence, a stranger who commits a crime is +subject to the penalties of the local law (Canon 1566).</p> + +<p>443. Examples of territorial laws that oblige even strangers according +to the precept of the Church are the laws that require all, even +strangers, to follow the Calendar of the Church where they celebrate +Mass, and to say the _collectae imperatae_ prescribed by the bishop of +the local diocese.</p> + +<p>444. The rules given for strangers can be applied also to those who are +in places exempt from local jurisdiction (e.g., in the monasteries of +exempt regulars). The exempt are those who by fiction of law are held +to be outside the territory of every diocese, and are subject, not to +the local bishop, but directly to the Pope (Canon 515).</p> + +<p>445. There are various cases, however, in which exempt religious are +subject to the territorial laws of the diocese where they are. Thus: +(a) when they accept parishes in a diocese, they are subject to the +Ordinary in those matters that pertain to the parishes; (b) when the +common good or the avoidance of scandal requires it, they should +conform to a diocesan law.</p> + +<p>446. Those who have a personal privilege can use it anywhere, for a +personal privilege, like a personal precept, follows the person, not +the territory.</p> + +<p>447. Promulgation.—Church laws are promulgated as follows: (a) the +laws of the Holy See are promulgated by publication in the official +periodical, _Acta Apostolicae Sedis_. They become effective three +months from the date of publication, unless from the nature of the case +they oblige at once, or it is otherwise provided in the law itself +(Canon 9); (b) the laws of a bishop are promulgated in the manner he +decides, generally by publication in the official periodical of the +diocese. They become effective as soon as published, unless it is +otherwise provided in the law itself (Canon 335, Sec. 2).</p> + +<p>448. When a law has been promulgated and become known, if it begins +to be observed, it is said to be accepted; if it is not observed, it +is said to be not accepted. This acceptance is not essential to law. +Hence: (a) the observance of a law by the people is not necessary for +the obligatory force of the law, for otherwise the lawgiver would be +without real authority; (b) the approval of ecclesiastical laws by the +State is not necessary for their validity, since Church and State are +distinct and independent societies within the proper sphere of each.</p> + +<p>449. A law that has been promulgated may fail to obtain force in the +following ways: (a) through contrary custom, already existing and +not excluded by the law, or then arising to abrogate the law (see +391 Sqq.); (b) through appeal entered with the lawgiver. Thus, if a +bishop deems a law of the Pope unsuited to his diocese, he explains the +reasons to the Holy See, and pending the answer it is considered that +the lawgiver does not wish the law to oblige.</p> + +<p>450. Irritant Laws. Laws Based on Presumption.—There are two classes +of human laws that deserve particular mention on account of special +difficulties regarding them: (a) irritant laws, which would seem to be +unjust, since they declare null what according to natural law would +be valid; (b) laws based on presumption, which would seem to be of +uncertain force, since presumptions are often contrary to fact.</p> + +<p>451. An irritant or inhabilitating law is one that expressly or +equivalently declares that certain defects make an act void or +voidable, or a person incapable. Such laws are just, even when made by +human authority, since it is the common good that makes them necessary, +and the natural law itself requires that the common good be promoted.</p> + +<p>452. Irritant laws are of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) They are morally or juridically irritant, according as that which +is taken from the irritated act is either the natural value it has in +conscience, or the positive value it derives from the law. Hence, an +act may be legally null (i.e., have no value that the law recognizes +or protects) and at the same time morally valid (i.e., of just as much +force in conscience as though no irritant law existed).</p> + +<p>(b) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and prohibitive, +according as they make an act invalid but not illicit, or both invalid +and illicit. Thus, a law that requires certain formalities for making +a will invalidates the act of writing an informal will, but does not +make it an offense; but the church law of diriment impediments makes a +marriage contracted with one of these impediments both null and sinful.</p> + +<p>(c) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and penal, according +as the legislator does not or does intend them as punishments. For +example, the law of clandestinity is merely irritant; the law regarding +the impediment of crime is probably both irritant and penal.</p> + +<p>453. Laws that are merely irritant do not oblige one in conscience to +omit the act, but only to suffer the effect of irritation; but laws +that are both irritant and prohibitive oblige one in conscience to omit +the act. Example: In itself, it is not unlawful to make an informal +will, but it is unlawful to marry with a diriment impediment.</p> + +<p>454. As to the time when irritant laws obtain their effect, the +following points are important.</p> + +<p>(a) Ecclesiastical voiding laws oblige at once in conscience, +although like other laws of the Church they are not retroactive, +unless the contrary is provided, and they do not oblige in case of a +doubt concerning the law. Example: If espousals are made without the +canonical formalities, there is no duty to live up to them as such, +either in conscience or before the law.</p> + +<p>(b) Civil voiding laws are generally only civilly irritant, for as +a rule external means are sufficient for the purpose of those laws; +thus, they produce civil irritation at once, but moral irritation only +after pronouncement by the courts. Hence, after a judicial sentence +the voided act becomes such morally, since the decision is founded on +a presumption of common danger (see below, 459). Examples: One who has +received money through a will which he knows to be informal (i.e., +legally invalid), may retain possession until the civil authority +declares that he has no rights to the money. But, on the other hand, +one who has been disinherited through a will naturally good, but not +made in due form, has the right to contest, if we except the case of +pious bequests (see Vol. II).</p> + +<p>455. Laws that make an act voidable or rescindable do not irritate +before declaration of nullity by a judge. Hence, an act that is +rescindable according to law retains its natural force until the +court has decided against it. Example: Acts that were done under the +influence of grave and unjust fear, or that were induced through +deception, are held as valid until declared null by a judge.</p> + +<p>456. As to the effects of ignorance on acts irritated by law, the Code +states that ignorance of irritating (invalidating) and inhabilitating +(disqualifying) laws does not excuse from their observance, unless the +law expressly states otherwise (Canon 16, Sec. 1). Moralists discuss +the influence of ignorance (as well as force or fear) on such acts as +follows: (a) if the law is irritant and not penal, it has its effect, +in spite of ignorance, oversight, etc.; for this the common good +requires. Example: One who marries his cousin in good faith, being +invincibly ignorant that it is against the law, contracts invalidly; +(b) if the law is irritant and penal, the irritation being decreed +solely as a punishment, ignorance, oversight, etc., sufficient to +excuse from fault, excuse also from the penalty of irritation; for +penalty presupposes fault. Before the law, however, ignorance and +error as to law or penalties are not presumed but must be proved. +(Nevertheless, it must be noted that according to some authors no +penalty is necessarily or primarily intended in ecclesiastical +irritating and inhabilitating laws. Though punishment actually results +from the matrimonial impediment of crime, for example, the impediment +as such primarily is a personal disqualification intended to protect +the dignity of the sacrament and good morals. Ignorance, then, does +not excuse from it. Some authors maintain that this is true of all +ecclesiastical disqualifying laws.)</p> + +<p>457. Generally speaking, _epieikeia_ may not be used in the +interpretation of irritating and inhabilitating laws. Since they +transcend the individual welfare, they demand uniform observance of +all subject to them. Some authors permit the use of _epieikeia_, +however, in particular cases in which the law itself aims to protect +the individual, whereas its observance would tend rather to harm +the individual or at times even the interests of the community. +Accordingly, it seems probable that an irritant law may cease in case +of impossibility or of a most grave inconvenience that is common. +Example: If in a pagan country Christians were so few that they could +marry only infidels, and if distance or other circumstances made it +impossible to seek a dispensation, the diriment impediment of disparity +of worship would seem to cease for those Christians.</p> + +<p>458. Some authors hold that an irritant law may also cease on account +of impossibility, or of a most grave inconvenience that is only +private; but this opinion cannot be deemed certain. An example of +private inconvenience is the case of an invalidly married person who is +near to death and unable to seek the dispensation from the impediment +that has made the marriage null.</p> + +<p>459. A law based on presumption is one in which the lawgiver rules for +certain cases according to what experience shows in their regard—viz., +that such cases are generally dangerous, or indicative of a particular +fact. These laws are not of uncertain force, for the cases in which +they cease to oblige are few and definite.</p> + +<p>460. When a law is based on a presumption of common danger and that +danger does not exist in a particular instance, the law nevertheless +obliges (Canon 21); for the end of the law is the common good, and if +it ceased for an individual whenever its presumption of danger was +not true in his case, everyone could persuade himself that the law +did not apply to him, and thus the common good would be defeated. +Examples: The law against the reading of irreligious books is based on +the presumption of common danger of sin, the law against clandestine +marriages on the presumption of common danger of fraud; hence, they +oblige even in the particular instances where these dangers are absent. +Examples of laws based on the presumption of common danger can be found +in Canons 199; 409, Sec. 1; 420; 422; 1022; 1028; 1114; 1116; 1138; +1396; 1398.</p> + +<p>461. When a law is based on the presumption of a particular fact that +usually happens in the cases with which the law is concerned, and the +fact in an individual instance did not happen, does the law oblige?</p> + +<p>(a) In conscience the law does not oblige of itself, because +presumptions must yield to the truth; but it may oblige accidentally, +if non-observance would cause great public or private harm. Example: +The law presumes that a person born and brought up among Catholics has +been baptized, and is therefore subject to the church laws. But if, in +fact, the person was never baptized, he is not subject to those laws, +as long as he remains unbaptized, unless there be some accidental +necessity of keeping them, such as the danger of scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) Before the public authority the law in question does oblige until +the non-existence of the fact presumed by the law has been proved in +the manner required by law. Example: When parties contract marriage +according to the form prescribed by the Church, the presumption is +that the contract was valid, and, as long as that presumption is not +overcome, the Church will not sanction a new marriage by either of the +parties. But if it can be proved in court that threats or violence +produced lack of consent, the obligation not to contract a new marriage +will terminate before the law.</p> + +<p>462. Fulfillment of Law.—With reference to the manner of fulfilling +a law there are a number of questions to be considered: (a) as to the +external acts, whether or not one can fulfill the law for another, +whether or not the omission of some slight detail renders compliance +insufficient, whether or not he who cannot fulfill the whole law is +bound to fulfill a part of it, whether or not several obligations can +be satisfied at the same time or by the same act, etc.; (b) as to the +internal acts, whether or not one must have the intention of meeting +the wishes of the lawgiver, whether or not one must be in the state of +grace, etc.</p> + +<p>463. Personal fulfillment is not always necessary; for an affirmative +law requires either that some thing be given, or that some personal act +be performed. (a) When the law requires that some thing be given (e.g., +that taxes be paid), the obligation can be satisfied through another, +since a thing can be transferred from one person to another, who agrees +at least interpretatively; (b) when the law requires that a personal +act be performed (e.g., that Mass be heard on Sunday), the obligation +cannot be satisfied through another, for actions cannot be transferred +from one to another.</p> + +<p>464. Minute fulfillment is not always necessary; for sometimes the +minor details of the fulfillment of a law are expressly prescribed, +sometimes they are not.</p> + +<p>(a) If these details are required by the law itself or by the nature +of the case, the law is not satisfied if they are neglected. Example: +Friday abstinence ends exactly at midnight, and hence to eat meat even +one minute before midnight is to break that abstinence.</p> + +<p>(b) If the law does not prescribe minute details, these are not +required for the fulfillment of the obligation; for laws should not be +unduly burdensome. Example: One who is a few minutes late for Mass does +not miss Mass, if he is present for the essential parts of the Mass.</p> + +<p>465. Partial fulfillment is required of him who cannot make complete +fulfillment, only when the part is commanded for its own sake; for that +which is commanded by a law is considered by the lawgiver as either an +indivisible unit, or as a whole composed of parts that have singly an +independent moral value and obligation.</p> + +<p>(a) If the thing commanded is morally an indivisible unit (e.g., a +pilgrimage to a shrine), he who is not able to fulfill the whole law is +bound to nothing. Example: One who has made a vow to go on pilgrimage +to a distant sanctuary, is not bound to go part of the way, if he is +unable to make the entire journey.</p> + +<p>(b) If the thing commanded has parts that contribute to the end of +the law, he who is able to fulfill only one or more such parts is +obliged according to his ability; if it is certain that he can perform +even a part, he is bound to that; if it is not certain that he can +perform even a part, it would seem that generally he is excused from +all. Examples: A cleric who can say some but not all the Hours of his +Office, is obliged to say what he can. A person who can certainly +abstain, but who cannot fast, is bound during Lent to abstain.</p> + +<p>466. Simultaneous fulfillment by one act of several obligations is +lawful, if the obligations differ only materially. They are said to +differ only materially, if the motive of the legislator in giving +different commands about the same thing is the same in each instance; +they differ formally, if the legislator has a different motive in each +instance. The motive is recognized either from the express declaration +of the lawgiver, or from interpretation given through authority or +custom.</p> + +<p>(a) When two commands differ only materially, it can be presumed that +the legislator is not unwilling that they be fulfilled by one and the +same act, unless it is clear that he wishes them to be fulfilled by +distinct acts. Example: If one falls sick at Easter time and receives +the Viaticum, it is not necessary for him to receive Communion again in +order to make his Easter duty; for the divine law of Viaticum and the +church law of Easter Communion have the same motive, and hence can be +fulfilled by one and the same Communion.</p> + +<p>(b) When two commands differ formally, it can be presumed, unless the +opposite is manifest, that the legislator wishes them to be complied +with by distinct acts. Example: If a confessor imposes a fast as a +penance, this penance cannot be performed on a fast day; for the motive +of the law of fast is general, that of the sacramental penance is +particular.</p> + +<p>467. Simultaneous fulfillment by several acts of several obligations +is sometimes possible, sometimes impossible. For the acts prescribed +by different laws are either capable or incapable of being done at the +same time. Thus, it is possible to hear a Mass and to say a penance +of some Hail Marys at the same time. But it does not seem easy for an +ordinary person to give attention to four or more Masses at the same +time.</p> + +<p>(a) If the acts do not impede one another and the legislator is not +unwilling, several laws can be fulfilled at the same time. Example: If +two Masses are being said on adjoining altars, one can hear both—the +one to satisfy the Sunday obligation, the other to perform a penance +received.</p> + +<p>(b) If the acts impede one another, or if the legislator wishes his +laws to be fulfilled at distinct times, the different obligations +cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Examples: If a distracted person +has received a penance to hear six Masses, he cannot hear them all +at once, on account of the division of attention necessary. If the +confessor told a person to hear Mass “three times,” the latter cannot +satisfy by hearing three Masses at one time.</p> + +<p>468. When a law prescribes not only what is to be done, but when it +is to be done, the time must be observed. But the obligation does not +always cease with the expiration of the time.</p> + +<p>(a) If the time set by the law is a limit beyond which the obligation +ceases, he who has not complied within that time has no further +obligation. Examples: He who did not fast on Christmas Eve, would +not be obliged to fast on Christmas Day. He who did not hear Mass on +Sunday, would not be obliged to hear Mass on Monday.</p> + +<p>(b) If the time set by the law is not a limit to terminate the +obligation, but a date fixed in order to insist on the obligation, he +who has not complied within the prescribed period, is nevertheless +still obliged. Examples: He who has not made the Easter duty by Trinity +Sunday, is obliged to receive Communion after Trinity. He who has not +paid a debt on the day required by law, is bound to pay it after that +day.</p> + +<p>469. It depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether the time he +prescribes for fulfillment is a limitation of the obligation or not. +The intention of the lawgiver is known either from the words or purpose +of the law, or from custom.</p> + +<p>470. If the law declares that some duty must be performed within a +determined period, allowing freedom for earlier or later performance +within the period, the following points must be considered. (a) A +person is not obliged to comply early, if he intends to comply before +the period has ended. (b) He is obliged to comply early, if he foresees +that later he will not be able to do what is required. Examples: If a +person who has not made his Easter duty has the opportunity to receive +Communion on Easter Sunday, and will not have another such opportunity +till Christmas, he is obliged to receive on Easter Sunday. But, if he +can communicate any Sunday during the Paschal time, he is not bound to +do so on one of the early Sundays. If one can hear an early Mass, but +not another Mass, on a holyday, one must hear the early Mass.</p> + +<p>471. Just as one may not delay fulfillment until after the time set +by law, so neither may one anticipate fulfillment before the time +determined, unless the law may be considered to allow this. Examples: +If a person has heard Mass on Saturday, he has no right to make this +count for the following day. A rosary said before confession cannot be +considered as performance of the penance, if in confession one is given +the rosary to say.</p> + +<p>472. It is held that a cleric who said the Breviary in the morning, +just before he was ordained subdeacon and undertook the obligation of +the Office, satisfied by that anticipated recitation; likewise, that a +traveller who heard Mass in a place where a holyday of obligation of +the general law was not in force, has satisfied by anticipation, if +later in the morning he reaches as his destination a place where the +holyday is observed. For in both these cases the law intends that the +Office be said, or the Mass be heard within the day.</p> + +<p>473. If a person who is now able to do what the law requires, foresees +that he will not be able to do this when the time set by the law +arrives, he is not obliged to anticipate fulfillment, even when he has +the privilege of anticipation. Examples: A cleric who at 2 p.m. is able +to anticipate Matins for tomorrow, and who knows that later, on account +of an operation, he will not be able to say his Office, is not bound to +anticipate; for no one is obliged to use a privilege. A person who is +able to hear Mass on Saturday, and who knows that all of Sunday must be +spent on the train, is not obliged to hear Mass on Saturday, though of +course this is the better thing to do.</p> + +<p>474. The internal acts concerned in the fulfillment of a law are: (a) +those in the intellect, such as knowledge; (b) those in the will, such +as consent, motive.</p> + +<p>475. Knowledge of what one is doing is sometimes necessary, sometimes +unnecessary for the fulfillment of a law.</p> + +<p>(a) If the law is prohibitive, knowledge is not necessary, since +nothing more is required by the law than the omission of what is +forbidden. Example: He who ate no meat on a day of abstinence has +fulfilled the law, even though he was unconscious all day.</p> + +<p>(b) If the law is preceptive of a payment to be made, knowledge is not +necessary, since the law requires nothing more than the effect of an +external act. Example: He who pays his taxes while intoxicated fulfills +his obligation, even though he does not know what he is doing.</p> + +<p>(c) If the law is preceptive of an act to be performed, knowledge +is required, for it is supposed that the act will be exercised in a +human manner. Example: He who sleeps all during Mass on Sunday does +not fulfill his duty, for the law intends that one assist at Mass in a +human way (i.e., with consciousness of what is being done).</p> + +<p>476. Fulfillment of a law is not morally good and meritorious, unless +it is voluntary (see 97 sqq.); but the legal obligation is sometimes +satisfied even by an unwilling fulfillment.</p> + +<p>(a) When the law commands a payment to be made, one may will the +contrary of what is commanded and yet fulfill one’s obligation. +Example: He who pays his taxes unwillingly and under compulsion +satisfies the law, which requires not an act, but its effect.</p> + +<p>(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not +will the omission commanded and yet fulfills one’s obligation. Example: +He who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is +a meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat, +satisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden +and have no will to violate the law.</p> + +<p>(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform +the act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that +fulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged +to church and forcibly detained there during Mass, does not satisfy +the law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his assistance +at Mass involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to +escape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it +really intends to hear Mass, for fear does not necessarily make an act +involuntary (see 41 sqq.).</p> + +<p>477. As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be +noted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing +what the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of +the preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while +Mass is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music +or of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he +does not at all intend to hear Mass.</p> + +<p>478. The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are +not necessary for the fulfillment of a law.</p> + +<p>(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one’s +obligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the +intention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426). +Examples: He who hears Mass on a holyday not intending to perform his +duty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law. +He who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has +an obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance +received, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in +mind as the purpose of the law; for “the end of the law is not a part +of the law.” Example: A person who takes only one full meal during +Lent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he +eats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the +mortification intended by the law.</p> + +<p>479. If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the +same time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance, +the obligation imposed, one’s act is sufficient or insufficient for +fulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.</p> + +<p>(a) If the obligation arises from the will of the lawgiver, the act +is a sufficient fulfillment, since the human lawgiver, as said in +the previous paragraph, does not concern himself with what is purely +internal. Example: If a person hears Mass on Sunday out of devotion, +intending to hear another Mass in satisfaction of the Sunday duty, he +is not bound to hear a second Mass, as he has already done all that the +law requires.</p> + +<p>(b) If the obligation arises from one’s own will, as in the case +of a promise or a vow, the act above described is not sufficient +fulfillment; for, as the obligation arose from the will, so also the +mode of fulfillment is to be determined by the will. Example: One +who has vowed to hear Mass, and who now while hearing Mass expressly +determines that not this but another Mass will be in satisfaction of +his vow, is bound by his vow to hear another Mass.</p> + +<p>480. As to virtuous dispositions in fulfilling a law, it is to be +observed that, while a good lawgiver always wishes them, he does not +always require them as a duty of obedience. The virtuous dispositions +referred to are of two kinds: (a) habitual, that is, the permanent +spiritual condition of the soul, such as the state of grace, the +habit of charity, etc.; (b) actual, that is, the good manner in which +the commanded act is done, such as devout attention in hearing Mass, +heartfelt contrition in making confession, freedom from vain-glory in +fasting, etc.</p> + +<p>481. Virtuous dispositions are or are not commanded according as that +which is prescribed is or is not a mixed, or a purely external act (see +above, 426).</p> + +<p>(a) When a mixed act is commanded by law, the virtuous disposition that +the nature of the case calls for, but nothing further, is strictly +prescribed. Hence, the law of Easter Communion requires that Communion +be received in the state of grace, the law of yearly confession that +the penitent be truly contrite, the law of Sunday Mass that there be +sufficient attention to the Mass; but more perfect dispositions (such +as freedom from venial sin in the communicant, perfect contrition +in the penitent, the state of grace in him who hears Mass) are not +required for the fulfillment of the laws we are considering.</p> + +<p>(b) When a purely external thing is commanded, the law does not require +internal dispositions, and hence one who performs what is required is +not obliged to repeat it on account of the imperfect way he obeyed. +Example: He who fasts while he is not in the state of grace is not +obliged to fast again to make good what was lacking in his previous +disposition.</p> + +<p>482. Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only +with single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment +of the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he +fulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly, +though not entirely, distracted at Mass, obeys the church law of +assistance at Mass on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he +worship God devoutly);</p> + +<p>(b) he who has less devotion in obeying a law than he might have had, +does not deserve reprehension as a transgressor, but his conduct is +less praiseworthy.</p> + +<p>483. Interpretation.—The meaning of interpretation and its various +species were explained above in 315 sqq.</p> + +<p>484. As to the force of interpretation of church laws, the following +points must be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) Authentic interpretation given in the form of law has the force +of law; if it is merely declarative of words of the law certain in +themselves, it does not need promulgation and is retroactive; if it is +supplementary, it needs promulgation and is not retroactive, since it +is a new law (Canon 17, Sec. 2);</p> + +<p>(b) Authentic interpretation given in the form of judicial sentence or +of rescript in a particular matter has not the force of law; and it +obliges only the persons and affects only the things concerned (Canon +17, Sec. 3);</p> + +<p>(c) Usual interpretation has the force of law when it is given through +a legitimate custom (see above, 391 sqq.), for “custom is the best +interpreter of law”;</p> + +<p>(d) Doctrinal interpretation has not the force of law, since it does +not proceed from the lawgiver. Its value depends on the reasons and the +authority by which it is supported. When all the doctors agree, their +interpretation is morally certain; when they disagree, the various +interpretations have more or less probability.</p> + +<p>485. Rules for Doctrinal Interpretation.—(a) The words must be +understood in their proper sense according to text and context, unless +this be impossible; if doubtful, they must be judged according to +parallel places in the Code, the circumstances, reason of the law, and +the mind of the lawgiver (Canon 18).</p> + +<p>(b) Things that are burdensome should be understood in their most +restricted sense (Canon 19), things that are favorable in their widest +sense. Thus, the censure pronounced against simony is understood in the +narrow sense of simony against the divine law; a privilege granted to +the clergy is understood in the wide sense as given to all the clergy.</p> + +<p>(c) Things that remain obscure should be understood in the sense that +is least burdensome to subjects.</p> + +<p>(d) A particular law derogates from a general law; but a general law +does not derogate from a previous particular law, unless derogation +is expressly mentioned in the general law; for the particular law is +considered an exception to the general law (Canon 22).</p> + +<p>486. Authentic interpretations of ecclesiastical laws are given by the +legislator, his successor, or one delegated by either (Canon 17, Sec. +1). (a) The Pope is the authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical +laws. A special commission appointed by the Pope interprets the general +law of the Code. (b) The bishop is the authentic interpreter of +diocesan laws made by himself or by his predecessors.</p> + +<p>487. Cessation of Obligation.—The ordinary ways in which a law ceases +to be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject, +that he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to +observe it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes +the obligation for the individual (dispensation).</p> + +<p>488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to +be subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of +exemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in +force), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty +of any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law +became effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law +does not oblige that one remain subject to it.</p> + +<p>489. Excuses from the law are reduced to two, namely, ignorance and +impossibility.</p> + +<p>(a) Ignorance excuses from the guilt of non-observance, if it is +inculpable (see 24 sqq.). The question now is whether or not and when +it excuses from legal consequences, such as invalidity, penalty, +reservation of sin, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Impossibility excuses from both obligation and guilt.</p> + +<p>490. Ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of a penalty attached to the +law has the following effects determined in the law: (a) No kind of +ignorance excuses from irritating or inhabilitating laws, unless the +contrary is expressly provided for in the law itself (Canon 16, Sec. +1). Thus a person who contracts marriage, while ignorant that he and +the other person are first cousins, is invalidly married.</p> + +<p>(b) Affected ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of the penalty alone +does not excuse from any penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, +Sec.1).</p> + +<p>(c) If the law contains the following words: _praesumpserit, ausus +fuerit, scienter, studiose, temerarie, consulto egerit_, or others +similar to them which require full knowledge and deliberation, any +diminution of imputability on the part of either the intellect or the +will exempts the delinquent from penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon +2229, Sec.2). (d) If the law does not contain such words, crass or +supine ignorance of the law or even of only the penalty does not exempt +from any penalty _latae sententiae_; ignorance that is not crass or +supine exempts from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative +penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.3, 1).</p> + +<p>491. Other specific determinations of the law include: (a) Inculpable +ignorance of the law itself excludes moral imputability (Canon 2202, +Sec.1); actual inculpable inadvertence or error in regard to the law +has the same effect (Canon 2202, Sec.3). (b) Culpable ignorance, or +culpable inadvertence, or error concerning the law or concerning +the fact diminish imputability more or less in proportion to the +culpability of the ignorance (Canon 2202, Sec.1). (c) If the ignorance, +even inculpable, affects only the fact of the existence of the penalty, +it does not exclude imputability of the delict, but it does diminish it +(Canon 2202, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>492. Absolute or physical impossibility (i.e., the want of the power +or of the means of complying with a law), of course, excuses from its +observance; for no one is bound to what is impossible. This applies to +divine law, and hence much more to human law. Example: He who is unable +to leave the house is not obliged to go to Mass.</p> + +<p>493. Moral impossibility—that is, the inability to comply with the law +without extraordinary labor, or the imminent danger of losing a notable +good or of incurring a great evil—does not excuse from the observance +of ecclesiastical law when this law receives through circumstances +the added force of the negative law of nature. This happens when the +evil that will result through the observance of the law bears no +proportion to the evil that will result from its violation, the former +being private or temporal or human, the latter public or spiritual or +divine; for the law of nature forbids that the common welfare, or the +salvation of a soul, or the honor of God be sacrificed for the benefit +of an individual, or for the life of the body, or for the welfare of a +creature. Example: The command to abstain from meat on Friday obliges, +if one has been ordered to violate it as a sign of contempt of God or +of religion, even though death is threatened for refusal.</p> + +<p>494. Moral impossibility excuses from the observance of a human law in +the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) One is excused when a considerable loss in health, reputation, +spiritual advantage, property, etc., or a grave inconvenience will +result from observing a law which is not a prohibition of nature in +the sense of the previous paragraph; for the legislator cannot impose +obligations that are needlessly heavy, and hence positive law does not +oblige in case of such moral impossibility. Example: Our Lord reproved +the inhuman rigor of the Pharisees, who insisted that their regulations +must be observed, whatever the difficulty or cost.</p> + +<p>(b) One is excused when a lower or less urgent law is in conflict +with a law that is higher or more urgent. In such a case the greater +obligation prevails, and the lesser obligation disappears. Examples: +The divine laws that one must preserve one’s life or administer Baptism +to a dying person prevail over the human law of attendance at church. +The less urgent law of fasting yields to the more urgent law of +devoting oneself to duties required by one’s state of life, if there is +a conflict between the two laws.</p> + +<p>495. The loss, evil or inconvenience that constitutes moral +impossibility with respect to a law, must bear a proportion to the +law itself; and hence the higher or the more imperative the law, the +greater must be the reason that suffices to excuse from it.</p> + +<p>496. Only a learned and prudent man can determine whether moral +impossibility exists with reference to a particular case, and hence it +would be dangerous for those who are not theologians to decide, either +for themselves or for others. The points that have to be considered +in judging are: (a) whether or not the difficulty is of a gravity +proportionate to the importance of the law (e.g., a graver reason is +required to excuse from a law that obliges under mortal sin than to +excuse from a law that binds under light sin); (b) whether or not the +difficulty is grave in relation to the person concerned (e.g., an +obligation that is easy for a healthy person may be very difficult for +one who is infirm).</p> + +<p>497. It is never lawful to bring about either physical or moral +impossibility of observing a law, if this be done with the sole or +principal purpose of escaping one’s duty. Example: To go away on +Saturday in order to avoid Mass on Sunday.</p> + +<p>498. It is lawful to cause impossibility of observing a law, if there +be some sufficient reason for doing this; for it is lawful to do +something from which two effects, one good and the other bad, result, +if the good effect is the one intended, and there is a sufficient +reason for permitting the evil effect (102 sqq.). Example: It is +sometimes lawful to do some extra work that is very useful, even if the +labor makes one unable to observe a fast.</p> + +<p>499. The sufficient reason spoken of in the last paragraph is one that +is proportionate to the urgency and importance of the command and to +the frequency of the non-observance. Examples: A greater reason is +required to take up some work which will make it impossible to keep the +fast, if this be done on the fast day itself, than if it be done the +day before. A far greater reason is required to take up some work that +makes the observance of the fast impossible, if this happens frequently +or habitually, than if it happens only once or twice.</p> + +<p>500. Cessation of Law.—A law ceases in two ways.</p> + +<p>(a) It ceases from without (i.e., from the act of the legislator), +when he abolishes it, by total or partial revocation (abrogation, +derogation), or by the institution of a new law directly contrary to it +(obrogation). In the new Code of Canon Law there are many instances of +revocation or obrogation of older legislation (see Canons 22, 23), as +in the matter of censures and matrimonial impediments. Examples: In the +diocese of X a minor feast was made a holyday of obligation. This law +was abrogated, if later on it was decreed that neither the prohibition +against servile works nor the precept of hearing Mass was obligatory +for that feast; it was derogated from, if later it was decreed that +servile works were permitted, but Mass was obligatory for that day; it +was obrogated, if a later law included the minor feast in a list of +special days of devotion for which the hearing of Mass was recommended.</p> + +<p>(b) A law ceases from within (i.e., of itself), when through change of +conditions the purpose for which it was made no longer exists, or is no +longer served by the law.</p> + +<p>501. The purpose for which a law was made ceases to be served by the +law in two cases.</p> + +<p>(a) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been a benefit, +it has become a detriment, inasmuch as its observance now would be +wicked, or impossible, or too burdensome. In this case the law ceases, +since it is now contrary to the supreme law that the common welfare be +promoted. Example: A particular law forbade the use of fat or grease +in the preparation of food on days of abstinence. Later, it became +impossible to procure the substitutes previously used.</p> + +<p>(b) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been useful, it +has become useless, inasmuch as it is no longer necessary for the end +intended by the lawgiver. In this case the law ceases, for regulations +should not be imposed needlessly. Example: The Council of Jerusalem +made a law that the faithful should abstain from using as food animals +that had been strangled (Acts, xv. 20). The purpose of the law was to +avoid offense to the Jewish converts, who at that time formed a large +part of the Christian community and who had a religious abhorrence for +such food. But shortly afterwards, the Gentile element having become +stronger in the Church, no attention was paid to ceremonial rules of +Judaism.</p> + +<p>502. A law ceases to serve its purpose also as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the purpose +of the lawgiver generally and permanently, if the changed conditions +affect the whole community or the great majority, and are lasting. In +this case the law ceases; for, since it is made for the community as +a whole and as a lasting ordinance, it cannot endure, if it becomes +permanently unserviceable to the community. Examples are given in the +previous paragraph.</p> + +<p>(b) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the lawgiver’s +purpose privately or temporarily, if the harm or uselessness affects +only individuals, or is not lasting. In this case the law continues to +be an instrument of public welfare, or is only momentarily deprived +of its beneficial character. Hence it endures; but for temporary +inconvenience to the public a remedy is had in suspension of the +law, for inconvenience to individuals in dispensation. Example: If +the use of fats or grease were forbidden on days of abstinence, and +if for a time only it were impossible to obtain the substitutes for +the preparation of the food, the law would not cease, but would be +suspended until such time as substitutes could be obtained.</p> + +<p>503. The inconvenience caused to individuals from the fact that a law +does not serve its purpose in a case before them, does not always +justify the use of _epieikeia_.</p> + +<p>(a) If the observance of the law would be detrimental to the purpose +intended by the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ might be used; for the lawgiver +does not intend that his law should be an obstacle to what he has in +view as its end. Example: Caius needs to read a book placed on the +Index in order to defend the Faith against attacks, but he is unable +to request the general faculty to read forbidden works. Obedience to +the law in this case would defeat the purpose of the law, which is the +protection of faith, and hence Caius may use epieikeia.</p> + +<p>(b) If the observance of the law would be unnecessary, but not +detrimental as regards the purpose of the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ may not +be used; else the law would lose its force through the judgments of +individuals in their own favor, and the common welfare would suffer. +Examples: Titus has an opportunity to read a book placed on the Index, +but has not the time to apply for permission. The work was condemned +as dangerous to faith; but Titus is strong in faith, and wishes only +to study the literary qualities of the writer. Sempronius, a parish +priest, is requested to officiate at a marriage immediately, without +proclaiming the banns or seeking a dispensation from proclamation. The +purpose of the law of banns is that impediments may be detected and +invalid marriages avoided, and Sempronius is absolutely certain that +there is no impediment in the case before him. Titus and Sempronius +must observe the law, and the same must be said as regards every actual +case in which there is the possibility of self-deception and peril +to the common good. The theoretical case, in which neither of these +inconveniences would be present, need not be considered.</p> + +<p>504. The purpose of the law ceases to exist as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) adequately, when all the reasons on account of which it was made +are no longer in existence; in such a case the law itself ceases, for +the lawgiver is not considered as intending to oblige when the reason +for obligation has ceased. Example: If the bishop orders prayers to be +said for rain, the prayers cease to be obligatory when rain has come;</p> + +<p>(b) inadequately, when the reason for the law has ceased partially, +but not entirely. In such a case the law does not cease, for it still +remains useful. Example: If the bishop orders prayers for peace and +rain, the prayers are obligatory until both requests have been obtained.</p> + +<p>505. A law ceases, therefore, in greater or less degree, according to +circumstances. (a) It ceases entirely or partially, according as it +is revoked or as it becomes useless as to all its provisions, or only +as to one or more of them; (b) it ceases permanently or temporarily, +according as the revocation or cessation is only for a time, or for +good.</p> + +<p>506. Custom.—In Canon Law custom can interpret, abrogate or introduce +law, provided: (a) it has the qualities of legitimate custom, and (b) +its existence is proved juridically, or is notorious.</p> + +<p>507. According to their extension, customs are of various kinds. +(a) Universal customs are those that prevail in the entire Church; +(b) particular customs are those that are confined to a territorial +portion of the Church (e.g., a province of the Church or of an +Order); (c) special customs are those that are followed in societies +that are smaller, but capable of having their own laws (e.g., +independent monasteries); (d) most special customs are those observed +by individuals, or by communities not capable of having their own +legislation (e.g., parishes). At the most, customs of this last class +have only the force of privilege (Canon 26).</p> + +<p>508. Custom is formed as follows. (a) As to origin, it arises from +the practice of the people, when this practice is followed with the +purpose of making or unmaking a law. Hence, the habitual way of acting +of an individual, even if he be the superior, does not give rise to a +custom. By “people” here is meant a community capable of having its own +law (Canon 26). (b) As to legal force, custom arises solely from the +consent of the Pope or other prelate, when this consent is expressed by +the law or lawgiver, or tacitly admitted by him. Hence, a custom not +approved by the superior has no legal force (Canon 25).</p> + +<p>509. A custom can introduce or abrogate any kind of ecclesiastical law +or other custom—penal, prohibitive, irritant—if it is reasonable and +has lasted the prescribed time (Canons 27, 28). Examples: A law that +forbids contrary customs can be abrogated, according to the Code, by +such customs when they are immemorial, or a century old (Canon 27, Sec. +1). The impediment of disparity of worship became diriment through +custom; it was custom that introduced the obligation of the Divine +Office, and that mitigated the early law of fast.</p> + +<p>510. A custom expressly disapproved of in law is not reasonable or +legitimate, and cannot derogate from an existing law, nor establish a +new law (Canons 27, 28).</p> + +<p>511. The time prescribed by the Code of Canon Law for the acquisition +of legal force by customs that have not the personal consent of the +lawgiver is as follows: (a) forty continuous and complete years are +required to unmake an ordinary law; one hundred years to unmake a law +that forbids future contrary custom (Canon 27, Sec. 1); (b) forty +continuous and complete years are likewise required to make a new law +(Canon 28).</p> + +<p>512. The effect of the Code on customs previously existing was +considered above under 421.</p> + +<p>513. Like the written law, custom ceases: (a) from within, when its +purpose has ceased entirely; (b) from without, when it is abrogated by +desuetude, or by a contrary law or custom (Canon 30).</p> + +<p>514. Laws in a Wide Sense.—In addition to laws strictly so-called, +there are laws in a wide sense, commands or provisions made by +ecclesiastical superiors that have not all the conditions given above +(see 285) for law. Such are: (a) precepts, which differ from law, +because they are given not to the community or permanently, but to +individuals or temporarily; (b) rescripts, which are given with regard +to particular cases and without the solemnity of law; (c) privileges, +which are not obligatory; (d) dispensations, which are relaxations of +law granted to individuals.</p> + +<p>515. A precept is a command given to individuals, or for an individual +case, by a competent superior.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a command obliging in conscience, and so differs from +counsel, desire, exhortation.</p> + +<p>(b) It is given to individuals, and thus differs from law, which has +the character of universality and stability. A precept may be imposed +on a community, but even then it is particular, as being given only for +an individual case or for a certain length of time—for a month or a +year, or during the lifetime of the superior.</p> + +<p>(c) It is given by a competent superior. Even here precept differs +from law, since laws can be made only by one who has jurisdictional or +public authority (see above, 285), while precepts may be given also +by those who have only dominative or private authority (as parents, +heads of families, husbands, employers, abbesses). In canonical matters +precepts may be given by religious superiors, parish priests, rectors +of seminaries, and for the court of conscience by the confessor.</p> + +<p>516. Precept is similar to law: (a) as to its object, which must be +just, good, and possible of observance; (b) as to its binding force, +since it can be imposed even on those who are unwilling.</p> + +<p>517. Precepts are personal (i.e., they affect the person to whom they +are given wherever he may be), unless they are given as territorial +(Canon 24). Hence: (a) a precept given by one who has no territorial +authority (e.g., a religious superior) is personal; (b) a precept +given by the Pope, whose authority includes every territory, is also +personal; (c) a precept given by the bishop is personal, if given to +an individual; it is personal or territorial if given to a community, +according to the nature of the case or the wording of the precept. +Example: The precept not to go to theatres during a journey, imposed by +a bishop under pain of suspension, obliges everywhere, both as to fault +and as to penalty.</p> + +<p>518. As to the force of precepts: (a) morally or as to fault, they +oblige, so that the violator is guilty of disobedience and of sin +against any particular virtue the superior willed to impose under +precept; (b) juridically or as to the penalty prescribed, they do +not oblige, unless the precept was given legally—i.e., by a written +document, or in the presence of two witnesses, etc. (Canon 24). +Example: If a precept was given under the penalty of loss of office, +but without the legal formalities, the canonical process and sentence +of deprivation could not be resorted to.</p> + +<p>519. A precept expires of itself with the expiration of the authority +that gave it (e.g., at the death or cessation of office of the +superior), unless the precept was given by document or before witnesses +(Canon 24).</p> + +<p>520. A rescript is a written reply made by the Holy See or the +Ordinary to a request, statement, or consultation. Replies of this +kind are employed in reference to the concession of benefices and to +dispositions to be made concerning litigation and judicial procedure. +Usually they grant favors, either transitory—e.g., a dispensation—or +permanent—e.g., a privilege (Canons 36-62).</p> + +<p>521. A privilege is a special and permanent right granted by a ruler to +an individual or community to act contrary to or beyond the law.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a permanent right, and so resembles law, which is also stable +and forbids interference with what it grants.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a special right, and so it differs from law, which is general +and imposes obligation. It is sometimes styled “private law.” Moreover, +law requires promulgation, privilege requires only acceptance.</p> + +<p>(c) It is granted by the ruler (i.e., by the Pope, bishop, or other +legislator), and thus it differs from permission granted by a simple +superior.</p> + +<p>(d) It is granted to a person, that is, to an individual (Titus, Caius, +Balbus, etc.) or to a congregation or community; for, if granted to +all, it would not be special.</p> + +<p>(e) A privilege gives the right to act contrary to the general law +(e.g., by exempting from a tax) or beyond the general law (e.g., by +granting the power to dispense). Thus, a privilege differs also from +prerogatives that are set down in the Code itself (e.g., the special +rights and faculties of Cardinals, bishops, regulars, etc.), all of +which are laws and not privileges in the strict sense.</p> + +<p>522. The rules for interpretation of privileges are similar to those +for the interpretation of law (see 483 sqq.). They should be neither +extended nor restricted, but should be understood according to the +meaning of the words themselves (Canon 67), yet so that the party +receiving the privilege will seem to have obtained a favor (Canon 68). +If the meaning intended is doubtful, the following rules of the Code +(Canons 50, 68) should be followed: (a) wide interpretation is to be +given to the privileges that are beyond or outside of the law and that +are not prejudicial to others, as well as to privileges that were +given as a reward of merit; (b) strict interpretation is to be given +to privileges that are contrary to law (saving the cases of privileges +granted to pious causes or in favor of a community), to privileges +granted because of an agreement made, and to privileges that are +prejudicial to third parties.</p> + +<p>523. A privilege is a favor, and hence does not as such impose the duty +of acceptance or use; but obligations owed to others often make it +necessary to avail oneself of a privilege (Canon 69).</p> + +<p>(a) Prerogatives granted in the law cannot be renounced by individuals, +since their preservation is required by the common good. Example: A +cleric has no right to abandon an immunity which the law gives to his +state.</p> + +<p>(b) Privileges granted to a community can be renounced by the +community, but not by its individual members. An individual member is +not bound, however, to use the privilege, unless there be accidental +reasons, such as the command of a superior, that require him to do so.</p> + +<p>(c) Privileges granted to individuals need not be used by them, unless +there be accidental reasons that call on one to use a privilege. +Example: A priest who has the privilege of a private oratory is not +bound to establish such an oratory; but a priest who has the privilege +of absolving from reserved cases is bound in charity to use it, if a +penitent would otherwise suffer.</p> + +<p>524. Dispensation differs from privilege: (a) because the former from +its nature is temporary, the latter permanent; (b) because the former +is always contrary to the law, whereas the latter may be only beyond +the law.</p> + +<p>525. The Pope can dispense as follows: (a) in all ecclesiastical laws +he can grant a dispensation strictly so-called (Canon 81); (b) in +divine laws in which the obligation depends on an act of the human will +(such as the laws of oaths, vows, contracts, etc.), he can grant a +dispensation improperly so-called (see above, 313 sqq., 357), In other +divine laws, he can interpret or declare, but he cannot dispense.</p> + +<p>526. The Ordinary can dispense as follows: (a) in the general law of +the Church when he has an explicit or implicit faculty from the Pope or +from the law (Canon 81); (b) in diocesan laws and, in particular cases, +also in laws of provincial and plenary councils, when there is just +reason (Canon 82); (c) in papal laws made for a particular territory, +when faculty has been given explicitly or implicitly, or recourse to +the Holy See is difficult (Canon 82); (d) in all ecclesiastical laws +that are dispensable, when there is doubt of fact (Canon 15).</p> + +<p>527. The pastor can dispense as follows: (a) from the general law +concerning feasts of obligation and from the laws of fast and +abstinence. The dispensation can be granted either to his own subjects +or to strangers, but only for a just reason, in individual instances +and for particular individuals or families. The bishop may dispense the +whole diocese, but the pastor cannot dispense the whole parish (Canon +1245). (b) When there is danger of death, the pastor can dispense from +matrimonial impediments as provided in Canon 1044.</p> + +<p>528. Religious superiors, local superiors included, can dispense in the +laws and statutes of their own institutes, except where this is +forbidden. In clerical and exempt institutes the superiors can also +dispense the subjects and all who live day and night in the religious +house (such as students, guests and servants) from the general laws of +the Church, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The higher superiors, such as abbots, generals, provincials, have +the same authority in this respect as the bishop has with reference to +his own diocese. Hence, they can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws +in which the Pope dispenses, when there is doubt of fact, or recourse +to the Holy See is difficult (Canons 15, 81); in case of necessity, +they can dispense from the laws of abstinence individuals, or an entire +convent, or an entire province (Canon 1245, Sec. 2); they can dispense +in irregularities as provided in Canon 990, Sec. 1.</p> + +<p>(b) The other superiors, local superiors included, can dispense their +subjects from the laws of fast and abstinence in the same manner as +pastors are able to dispense their parishioners (Canon 1245, Sec. 3), +Religious superiors are also able to dispense the private non-reserved +vows of their subjects (Canons 1313, Sec. 2, 1314).</p> + +<p>529. Confessors, when delegated, can dispense as follows: (a) with +ordinary faculties, from impediments, irregularities and penalties, as +provided in Canons 1044, 1045, 985, 990, 2290; (b) with privileged +faculties, from simple vows not reserved to the Pope, if no injury is +done to the rights of a third party; and from occult irregularity +produced by delinquency, that from homicide excepted. (In the internal +sacramental forum the confessor can dispense from the impediments +indicated in Canons 1043-1045.)</p> + +<p>530. Priests that assist at marriages can dispense from impediments as +provided in Canons 1043-1045.</p> + +<p>531. The manner of seeking dispensations is as follows: (a) for the +usual dispensations (e.g., those from fast, abstinence, observance of +feasts, and the vows that may be dispensed by confessors) no particular +procedure is required; (b) for the dispensation that must be sought +from the Holy See, if the matter belongs to the internal forum, the +petition is sent to the Sacred Penitentiary through the Confessor or +Ordinary; if it belongs to the external forum, it is sent to the +competent Congregation through the parish priest or Ordinary. +Dispensation from public marriage impediments must be sent through the +Ordinary.</p> + +<p>532. The manner of preparing a petition for dispensation is as follows: +(a) the name of the penitent must not be given in petitions to the +Sacred Penitentiary, but the name and address of the party to whom the +reply is to be sent should be clearly given; (b) the petition should be +sent by letter. It may be written in any language, and should state the +case with its circumstances, the favor that is asked, and the true +reason for asking it.</p> + +<p>533. A dispensation is invalidated as follows: (a) through defect of +the petition, if it contains a substantial error, and the dispensation +is given on condition of substantial truth (Canon 40); (b) through +defect of the petitioner, if he is incapable of receiving the favor +asked (Canon 46); (c) through defect of the dispensation, as when the +requisite signature or seal is omitted; (d) through defect of the +dispenser, as when he lacks jurisdiction, or grants without a just and +proportionate reason a dispensation for which he has only delegated +power (Canon 84).</p> + +<p>534. If a dispensation is unjustly refused, note the following: (a) +ordinarily, the subject has not the right to hold himself free from the +law; (b) in extraordinary circumstances, when the law ceases, or no +longer obliges (see 487 sqq.), the subject is free.</p> + +<p>535. The faculty of dispensing should be interpreted as follows: (a) +widely, when it was granted for cases in general (Canon 200, Sec.1); (b) +strictly, when it is granted for a particular case (Canon 85).</p> + +<p>536. A dispensation itself should be interpreted strictly in the +following cases: (a) when the dispensation has an odious side, as when +it is contrary to law and advantageous to private interest or is +detrimental to a third party; (b) when wide interpretation is +dangerous, as favoring injustice, promoting ambition, etc. (Canons 50, +85).</p> + +<p>537. A dispensation ceases intrinsically in the following ways: (a) by +the lapse of the period of time for which it was granted; (b) by the +entire and certain cessation of the motive of the dispensation, if the +effect of the dispensation is divisible—that is, if the motive for +dispensation has to be existent each time that the law calls for an act +or omission (Canon 86). Example: If one is dispensed from the fast or +Office on account of ill-health, and later recovers, the dispensation +ceases.</p> + +<p>538. A dispensation ceases extrinsically in the following ways: (a) by +the act of the one who dispensed, if he validly recalls the +dispensation, or by his cessation from office, if he limited the +dispensation to his own term of authority (Canons 86, 73); (b) by the +act of the one who was dispensed, if he renounces the dispensation +without detriment to any third party, and with the consent of the +superior (Canons 86, 72).</p> + +<p>539. A dispensation does not cease in the following cases through the +cessation of the motive for which it was given:</p> + +<p>(a) If the motive ceases only partially or doubtfully, even though the +effect of the dispensation be divisible—that is, requiring the +existence of the motive for the grant each time the dispensation is +used. For, if the dispensation ceased in such cases, its benefit would +frequently be in great part lost on account of the worry and scruple to +which the persons dispensed would be exposed. Example: Balbus has been +dispensed from fast on account of poor health. Later on he improves, +but has not recovered his strength entirely, or at least is not certain +of his recovery. He may continue still to use the dispensation.</p> + +<p>(b) A dispensation does not cease if the motive ceases entirely and +certainly, but the effect of the dispensation is indivisible—that is, +removing the entire obligation once for all.</p> + +<p>Example: Titus is a widower with several young children. He wishes to +marry in order to have a home for the children, and this wish is the +motive of a dispensation given him from an impediment of affinity to +the marriage he contemplates. But before the marriage takes place, the +children die, The dispensation still holds good.</p> + +<p>540. A dispensation does not cease by reason of the grantor in the +following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) It does not cease through the grantor’s cessation from authority, +if it was given independently of his term of office. Example: +Sempronius received a dispensation “valid until recall,” but never made +use of it. Although now the grantor has died, the dispensation +continues in force.</p> + +<p>(b) It does not cease, if the grantor invalidly recalls the +dispensation, as when he dispenses from delegated power and his +authority ceases with the act of dispensation. Example: Balbus, a +confessor, dispensed Caius from the law of abstinence, but now wishes +to recall the dispensation. The dispensation remains.</p> + +<p>541. A dispensation does not cease on account of the person dispensed +in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) It does not cease when he leaves the territory of the dispenser, if +the dispensation was personal. Example: A person dispensed from the +general law of fast by indult granted to his diocese cannot use that +dispensation outside the diocese; but if he has a personal +dispensation, he is dispensed everywhere.</p> + +<p>(b) It does not cease when the grantee fails to use it, or acts +contrary to it, if there is no renunciation on his part. Examples: +Sempronius has been dispensed from the fast of Lent, but he fasts on +some days. This non-use of the dispensation on some days does not renew +the obligation. Balbus has received a dispensation to marry Sempronia, +but he changes his mind and marries Claudia. This act contrary to the +dispensation does not take away its force, and, if Claudia dies, he +will be free to marry Sempronia.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_6_CIVIL_LAW">Art. 6: CIVIL LAW</h2> +</div> + +<p>542. Meaning.—Just as the Church has the right and duty to make laws +which will promote the spiritual welfare of her members, so has the +State the power and obligation to legislate for the temporal happiness +of its citizens: “There is no power but from God and those that are, +are ordained of God. He (the ruler) is God’s minister to thee for good” +(Rom., xiii. 1, 4).</p> + +<p>543. Origin.—The authority to make civil laws resides in that person +or body to whom according to the constitution of the State the +legislative function belongs. (a) In an absolute monarchy, the +legislative authority is vested in the prince; (b) in a state that has +an appointed or hereditary aristocracy, the legislative power may be +entrusted, at least in part, to a body of nobles; (c) in a limited +monarchy or republic the lawmaking function belongs to the people, who +exercise it either directly or (as is the case in most modern states) +indirectly through elected representatives.</p> + +<p>544. The acceptance of civil law by the people is not necessary for its +obligation, for obedience to higher powers is commanded (Rom., xiii, +5), and, if law has no authority, the common welfare is defeated. +Several points must, however, be noted.</p> + +<p>(a) The foregoing principle is to be understood of law in itself, for, +if there is question of the form of government or of him who exercises +the powers of sovereignty, acceptance by the people may be said to be +necessary in the sense that the multitude may set up the particular +system of rule which it prefers, and may designate the individuals who +are to wield authority under the constitution adopted.</p> + +<p>(b) The principle given above is to be accepted regularly speaking, for +there may be cases in which the acceptance of the people is required by +law itself. Example: Under former civil constitutions, if in a certain +place a lawful custom was in force, a contrary law which did not +expressly abolish the custom did not oblige unless accepted. But this +example is theoretical, for modern civil codes do not recognize the +derogatory force of custom. If the constitution of the state calls for +a referendum or plebiscite (i.e., submission to the electors for +ratification), then the bill passed by the legislature or a measure +proposed by the initiative body lacks force until accepted. This +illustrates acceptance of a proposed law, but the acceptance is +supplemented by some ministerial act.</p> + +<p>(c) The principle given above is to be understood of the taking effect +of a law, for the continuance of a law may depend on the acceptance of +the people in the sense that a contrary custom of the people is able to +abrogate law, if the superior consents (see 500 sqq.). Few codes of +modern states give legal force to popular custom; they suppose that, if +a law is not satisfactory to the people, the way is open to its repeal +through exercise of the suffrage. But, morally speaking, there is no +obligation to obey a law that has fallen into desuetude.</p> + +<p>545. As to laws made by one who has no lawful authority, we should +note: (a) of themselves, they have no binding force, since law is an +act of authority; (b) from the necessities of the case, they are +obligatory, if, being otherwise just, they are accepted by the great +body of the people; for to resist them then would be prejudicial to +public order.</p> + +<p>546. Subject-Matter.—The objects or classes of temporal goods that +fall under the regulation of civil law are many:</p> + +<p>(a) external goods, or goods of fortune, which should have the +protection of the State; and the laws regarding them should promote +agriculture, commerce, industry, the arts, etc.;</p> + +<p>(b) the goods of the body, which are more important still, and hence +the law should favor the family and the increase of its members, and +should provide for the health and well-being of the citizens by +sanitary regulations and measures of relief for the needy, the +unemployed, the orphans, and the aged;</p> + +<p>(c) the goods of the mind, which are necessary for progress and +happiness, and hence the law should provide the means for instruction +in the secular arts and sciences and for the general diffusion of +useful knowledge;</p> + +<p>(d) the goods of the will (i.e., virtue and morality), which are most +important both to the individual and the community, and hence the law +must safeguard public decency and sobriety, and restrain and punish the +opposite crimes and vices;</p> + +<p>(e) the social goods of the people, which are promoted by wise +legislation concerning the form and administration of government, the +mutual duties and rights of citizens, the protection of the State and +of its members, etc.</p> + +<p>547. The relation of civil law to natural law is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The State has no power to make laws that are opposed to nature, +for, since law is an ordinance according to reason, any human command +that is contrary to nature and therefore to reason is not law, but the +corruption of law. No sin, not even a venial sin, can be made +obligatory by law. Example: The rule of Sparta that sickly infants were +to be put to death was not law but legalized murder.</p> + +<p>(b) The State has the power to declare and enforce by suitable +sanctions the conclusions that are derived from the general principles +of the law of nature; for many people might be ignorant of these +conclusions or inclined to disregard them, unless they were promulgated +and confirmed by human law. Example: The natural law requires that +parents provide for their young children, and that children assist +their needy parents; the civil law adopts these natural principles, +compels their observance, and punishes transgressors.</p> + +<p>(c) The State has the power to make concrete and to determine the +provisions of the natural law that are abstract or general. Example: +The natural law decrees that some form of government be set up, that +the people contribute to the support of the government, that crimes be +punished, that the general welfare be served, etc.; the civil law +determines the special form of government, the manner in which the +revenues are to be obtained, the specific penalties for each crime, the +public measures that are best suited to the circumstances, etc.</p> + +<p>548. The relation of the civil law to divine and ecclesiastical law is +as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) In matters purely spiritual the State has no power to legislate, +since its end and authority are confined to things temporal; and hence +the State has no right to interfere with the faith, worship and +government of the Church. But, since morality promotes the prosperity +of the State, and since the end of the individual is spiritual, the +civil law should respect and favor religion.</p> + +<p>(b) In matters that are partly spiritual, partly temporal, the State +has the power to legislate on those aspects that are temporal, yet so +as not to infringe on divine or ecclesiastical right. Example: Civil +laws on education have the right to regulate non-religious subjects, +courses, standards, etc.; but they have no right to proscribe religious +training, or to prescribe the teaching of irreligion or immorality, +State laws on marriage may require registration, settle the civil +effects of marriage, etc., but they have no right to interfere with the +unity of marriage or the sanctity of the marriage bond.</p> + +<p>549. The State is for the individual, and not the individual for the +State; hence, civil law should not interfere with human liberties, +except where this is necessary for the common peace and safety or the +lawful opportunity of the people as a whole. Hence:</p> + +<p>(a) Human liberties that are not inalienable may be limited by the law, +when the public good or the welfare of individuals requires this (see +292). Examples: The State has the right to regulate the acts of those +who are unable to take care of themselves in matters of importance; to +forbid what is detrimental to the common interest (such as hunting and +fishing at certain seasons), to protect the public when it neglects to +protect itself, etc. Uncalled-for interference by government with the +personal and private affairs of individuals—paternalism in +government—is of course to be avoided, for restriction of liberty is +something disagreeable and should not be resorted to without necessity.</p> + +<p>(b) Human rights that are fundamental (such as the rights to live, to +marry, to rear a family, to be free, to pursue happiness) should not be +trespassed on by civil law. Thus, the State has no right to forbid +marriage to the poor, but on the contrary it has the duty to remove +conditions that cause poverty. But, when the common welfare demands the +sacrifice, the State has the right to call on citizens to expose even +life and fortune in its defense.</p> + +<p>550. Those Subject to Civil Law.—Civil laws oblige all those who are +in any way subject to their authority.</p> + +<p>(a) Citizens, when in the country, are bound by all the laws that +pertain to them; when outside the country, they are bound by some laws, +such as those that regulate their personal status and office, but not +by others, in particular such as are of a territorial character.</p> + +<p>(b) Aliens are bound by the laws of the country that include them, such +as those that regulate public order and the making of contracts.</p> + +<p>551. The Obligation of Civil Law.—Civil law, when it has all the +conditions of valid law, even if the legislator is non-religious or +anti-religious, is obligatory not only before the State, but also +before God (i.e., in conscience). This is; (a) by reason of the natural +law, of which it is a derivation (see above, 313); (b) by reason of +divine positive law, for it is frequently declared in scripture and in +the Church’s teaching and practice that lawful authority represents God +and must be obeyed for conscience’ sake: “Render to Caesar the things +that are Caesar’s” (Matt, xxii 21), “Be subject of necessity, not only +for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake” (Rom, xiii. 5).</p> + +<p>552. Are subjects obliged to offer themselves for punishment prescribed +by law?</p> + +<p>(a) If the fault committed was merely juridical (i.e., before the law), +the penalty is certainly not obligatory before sentence. Example: +Balbus through sheer accident, and without design or negligence, kills +a man. If involuntary homicide is punished by imprisonment, Balbus is +not bound to give himself up. English common law, it should be noted, +presumes a man innocent until proved guilty, and a man cannot be +convicted of any degree of homicide on his own confession alone. But he +may plead guilty to minor offenses.</p> + +<p>(b) If the fault committed was theological (i.e., before God) and the +penalty is primitive (i.e., the loss of some right or privilege), the +penalty is obligatory in conscience. In Canon Law such penalties are +sometimes _ipso facto_, that is, before sentence (e.g., suspension of a +cleric); but the civil law, it seems, imposes penalties only after +judicial declaration. Example: Titus on account of bribery has +forfeited the right to vote; but he has not been declared guilty by +court, and hence may continue to use the right of suffrage.</p> + +<p>(c) If the fault was theological and the penalty incurred is active +(e.g., exile, imprisonment, fine), the penalty is not obligatory before +sentence; for it would demand too much of human nature to require that +one deliver oneself up to exile, accept confiscation, etc. The +apprehension and detention of the guilty is imposed by law as a duty on +the police and other officers, not on the guilty.</p> + +<p>553. The kind of obligation imposed depends on the will of the +lawgiver: (a) he can oblige under pain of sin, or under pain of nullity +or punishment; (b) he can oblige under pain of grave sin, or under pain +of venial sin.</p> + +<p>554. Generally speaking, the legislator is held to oblige under pain of +sin in the following cases: (a) when the law is a just determination of +the natural law (e.g., the laws that determine ownership); (b) when the +law is directly concerned with and necessary to the public good (e.g., +laws on national defense in time of war, laws that impose necessary +taxation, etc.; see above, 379).</p> + +<p>555. The legislator is held not to oblige under sin in the following +cases: (a) when the law is enacted as penal, or is prudently regarded +as such—as is the case with laws that are of minor importance or that +can be enforced without a moral obligation—laws useful rather than +necessary; (b) when the law is merely irritant or inhabilitating, the +subject is not obliged to omit the act invalidated, but only to suffer +the consequence of nullity before the law.</p> + +<p>556. In doubt as to the obligation of a law, what is the duty of the +subject? (a) If there is doubt concerning its justice, the subject can +always observe it with a safe conscience. One may obey an unjust law, +until it is judicially declared unjust, if it is not manifestly opposed +to divine or human rights. (b) If there is doubt whether a law obliges +under sin or not, the subject does not sin directly by non-observance +(see 375, 376, 377, 561).</p> + +<p>557. Special Kinds of Laws.—Laws that determine ownership are those +that define in distinct and explicit terms the rights of citizens as to +property, in such matters as goods lost or found, prescription, +inheritance, copyright, distribution of property of intestates, rights +of wives, capacity of minors, contracts, etc. It is commonly held that +these laws are obligatory under sin, even before judicial decision: (a) +because they are determinations of the natural law made by the +authority that represents God in matters temporal; (b) because they are +necessary for the peaceful existence of society.</p> + +<p>558. Irritant or voiding laws are those that deprive certain acts of +legal value. The common welfare requires that certain acts, even if +valid naturally, may be made invalid by the State (e.g., contracts +entered into by minors, donations made under fear, wills devised +irregularly), and hence there is no doubt that the effect of +invalidation can be imposed under pain of sin.</p> + +<p>(a) This holds even before judicial decision, if it is clear that the +lawgiver ought to intend and does intend to deprive an act of its moral +validity from the beginning. Example: If a lawsuit would put one party +(e.g., a minor) under great disadvantage, the law can irritate a +contract in conscience and before judgment is rendered.</p> + +<p>(b) An irritant law does not oblige under sin before declaration of +nullity, if it is not clear that the legislator intended this; for it +can be presumed that the State is content with external means as long +as these are sufficient for its ends; and, since invalidation of acts +is odious, it calls for certain expression of his intention by the +lawgiver. But after sentence has been given, that which is civilly null +is also null morally. Hence, if the courts declare a will to be of no +effect, because it was not drawn legally, the decision is binding under +sin.</p> + +<p>559. Civil lawgivers in modern times do not, as a rule, concern +themselves with moral or natural obligation as such, but rather +consider only what regulations will best promote the peaceful +intercourse of society. Hence, the question whether a civil irritation +obliges in conscience ipso facto (i.e., before judicial declaration of +a case) has to be decided generally, not from the words, but from the +purpose of the law.</p> + +<p>(a) An irritant law should be regarded as obligatory _ipso facto_, when +the general purpose of law (viz., the common good) or the specific +purpose of this law requires that there should be obligation in +conscience even before a court decision. Examples are laws irritating +agreements to do what is illegal, laws whose purpose is to protect +minors or others who would be at a disadvantage in case of litigation, +or to lessen the number of cases before the courts.</p> + +<p>(b) An irritant law should be regarded as not obligatory _ipso facto_, +when the end of the law does not clearly demand obligation before +judicial declaration; for, as remarked above, the invalidation of an +act is something odious, and hence not to be taken for granted. Thus, +laws that void an act, contract or instrument on account of lack of +some legal form, do not affect the natural rights or obligations before +sentence.</p> + +<p>560. Though the civil lawgiver has the right to annul certain acts, and +thus to extinguish moral rights or obligations that would otherwise +exist, laws seemingly irritant frequently have a different intention.</p> + +<p>(a) Laws that make a claim unenforceable in court do not destroy the +natural right of the claimant. Example: The Statute of Limitations in +modern states generally bars the right to pursue a debtor in court +after six years; nevertheless, the moral obligation of the debtor +remains.</p> + +<p>(b) Laws that make an act or contract voidable do not nullify, but only +grant to the person concerned the right to attack validity before the +courts. Hence, if the conditions for valid contract required by natural +law are present (knowledge, consent, etc.), moral rights and +obligations are not voided. Example: Under the civil law some contracts +made by minors may be retracted by them. But, as long as such a +contract is not disavowed, the other party has a moral right to insist +on its execution; if it has been ratified after majority, the former +minor has no moral right to seek the benefit of the law by asking for +rescindment.</p> + +<p>561. With reference to penalty, four kinds of laws can be distinguished.</p> + +<p>(a) Purely preceptive laws are such as oblige under pain of sin, but +not under pain of punishment. There are church laws of this kind (such +as the command to assist at Mass on Sunday), and there are also some +civil laws that do not oblige under penalty (e.g., statutes governing +the age for legal marriage, for, if a couple misrepresented their age, +they might be prosecuted for the misrepresentation, but not for the act +of marriage).</p> + +<p>(b) Purely penal laws are such as oblige under pain of juridical fault +and punishment, but not under pain of sin (e.g., a law that punishes +negligence in driving as defined by itself, even though there be no +moral culpability involved).</p> + +<p>(c) Mixed laws disjunctively are such as oblige under sin either to +obey the law or to suffer the penalty (e.g., a law that commands one +either to get a license before fishing or hunting, or to pay a fine if +caught doing these things without a license).</p> + +<p>(d) Mixed laws conjunctively are such as oblige under pain of both sin +and punishment (e.g., the laws that forbid injustice and command the +punishment of transgressors).</p> + +<p>562. There is no question about the existence of laws of the first and +fourth classes just described, but some authorities argue against the +existence of the other two classes, maintaining that a law that does +not oblige in conscience is an impossibility. They argue: (a) the +teaching of scripture and of the Church supposes that all just laws +oblige in conscience; (b) the lawgiver holds the place of God, and +hence one cannot offend against the law of man without offending God; +(c) human law, being only a reaffirmation or determination of the +higher law, obliges in conscience like the law on which it is based; +(d) directions of a superior that do not oblige under sin are counsels +rather than laws.</p> + +<p>563. To these and similar arguments the defenders of the existence of +penal laws reply: (a) such laws do not oblige in conscience, under pain +of sin and of offense to God, to do or to omit as the law prescribes, +just as a vow which gives one the option of not playing cards, or else +of giving each time an alms, does not bind one in conscience not to +play cards; (b) but those laws do oblige one in conscience to respect +their juridical value, not to resist their enforcement, and to pay the +penalty of violation, just as the vow mentioned obliges one in +conscience to give an alms each time one plays cards. The Church +recognizes penal laws (see 450), and there is no reason why civil law +may not be penal.</p> + +<p>564. Even when the transgression of a purely penal law is not sinful by +reason of the civil law, it will frequently, if not usually, be sinful +by reason of repugnance to the law of God. Thus: (a) the transgression +will be sinful, if there is a wrong intention (such as contempt for the +law) or wrong circumstances (such as culpable neglect or some +inordinate passion); (b) the transgression will be sinful, if one +foresees or should foresee evil consequences, such as scandal (see 96).</p> + +<p>565. It is generally admitted that some civil laws are purely penal, +since they impose penalties for fault, negligence, or responsibility +that is only juridical at times. Examples: A law that imposes a fine on +all motorists caught driving over a certain speed limit, even though +they be free of moral guilt; or that makes the owner of a car pay +damages for injuries caused while it was used by his chauffeur.</p> + +<p>566. Even these laws oblige under sin to some extent. (a) The +transgressor is morally bound to the penalty prescribed by law, after +sentence has been passed; and such penalties are just, for the common +good requires them. Example: The speed violator is held to pay the +lawful fine when it has been imposed. He may have been guiltless of +sin, but the fine makes him more careful the next time. (b) The +officers of the law are morally bound to apprehend and convict +transgressors.</p> + +<p>567. Many civil laws are commonly regarded nowadays as disjunctively +preceptive or penal; and, since the custom of the prudent affords a +good norm of interpretation (see above, 484 sqq., 506 sqq.), this +common view is a safe guide, Example: Even conscientious persons do not +feel that they have committed a sin if now and then they run a car +without a license, or fish in a government reservation without the +permit required by law, when there is no danger or damage to anyone.</p> + +<p>568. Whether most modern legislatures intend practically all or the +great majority of their laws that are not declarations of natural law +or provisions essential to public welfare to be purely penal or only +disjunctively preceptive, is a disputed question. For the affirmative +view it is argued:</p> + +<p>(a) Moral obligation is not necessary, since the enforcement of the law +is well taken care of by the judiciary and the police;</p> + +<p>(b) Moral obligation would be harmful, for the laws that are put on the +statute books every year, along with those already there, are so +numerous that, if all these obliged in conscience, an intolerable +burden would be placed on the people;</p> + +<p>(c) Moral obligation is not intended, for legislatures as bodies either +despise or disregard religious motives when framing laws; and so many +jurists today believe that the danger of incurring the penalty +prescribed by the law is the only obligation the lawgiver intends to +impose, or that moral obligation must come from conscience (i.e., be +self-imposed);</p> + +<p>(d) Moral obligation is not admitted by custom, the best interpreter of +law, for most citizens today regard civil legislation as not binding +under sin.</p> + +<p>569. Opponents of the view just explained answer:</p> + +<p>(a) The prevalence of crime and the ineffectiveness of the courts in so +many places prove the need of moral obligation of civil laws; and, even +if the laws are well enforced, this will scarcely continue, if respect +for them is lowered;</p> + +<p>(b) Though there is an excess of legislation, it is not generally true +that the individual citizen is burdened in his daily life by a +multitude of laws;</p> + +<p>(c) Lawmakers today are not more irreligious than the pagan rulers to +whom the scriptures commanded obedience; and, even though they do not +themselves believe in religion or the obligation of conscience, they do +intend to give their laws every sanction that the common good requires, +and thus implicitly they impose a moral obligation wherever the +contrary is not manifest;</p> + +<p>(d) The statement that the majority of the people in modern states +regard the civil legislation as a whole as not obligatory in conscience +may be passed over, as there is no proof for it. Moreover, the +customary interpretation of the citizens does not make penal the laws +which the elected representatives intended as preceptive, without the +consent of the latter (see 394).</p> + +<p>570. Signs that a law is merely penal are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) The express declaration of the lawgiver that it obliges only under +penalty. Examples: In the Dominican Constitutions it is declared that +they oblige, not under fault, but only under penalty (No. 32). The same +is true of the Franciscan, Redemptorist and most recent religious +Constitutions. Some civil laws, it is said, are formulated thus: +“Either do this, or pay the penalty on conviction.” Other laws define +punishable negligence in such a way that it does not ultimately suppose +sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Another sign of a penal law is the implicit declaration of the +lawgiver. If a heavy penalty is prescribed for a transgression regarded +by all as very slight proportionately, the government implicitly +declares that it imposes no other obligation than that of penalty. +Blackstone, in his “Commentary on the Laws of England” (1769), +considers as purely penal all those laws in which the penalty inflicted +is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to +arise from the offense, such as the statutes for preserving game and +those forbidding the exercise of trades without serving an +apprenticeship thereto (Vol. I, Sect. 58).</p> + +<p>(c) A third sign is the interpretation of competent authorities. +Example: Practically all Catholic moralists, and the opinion of the +people generally, consider as penal some laws that are merely useful, +but not necessary (e.g., prohibitions against smoking or spitting in +certain public places, laws on permits for fishing, hunting, etc.).</p> + +<p>571. Whatever may be said about legislatures in general, it cannot be +argued that in the United States they are indifferent or contemptuous +as regards the moral obligation of law; the public acts and speeches of +Congress and of the State Assemblies show that the elected +representatives of the people respect religion, and do not wish to +deprive themselves of its help in their deliberations and decisions. +Nevertheless, the opinion is very prevalent among lawyers that purely +positive law in the United States is not intended to oblige under sin.</p> + +<p>572. In practice, the attitude of the citizen to civil law should be +one of respect and loyalty.</p> + +<p>(a) If a law is good, even though the legislator did not impose a moral +obligation, it should be obeyed; for reason and experience show that +disregard for law is a source of scandal and of many public and private +evils.</p> + +<p>(b) If a law is not good, every lawful means should be used to have it +repealed as soon as possible. But the principle that a bad law is +always best overcome by being rigidly enforced, is not borne out by +history, and sometimes the public good demands disregard for +unreasonable ordinances. The so-called “Blue Laws” are a case in point.</p> + +<p>573. Other questions pertaining to civil law that will be found +elsewhere are: (a) the obligation of customs, taxation and military +duty; (b) the power of the State to inflict capital punishment.</p> + + +<p>Question IV<br />CONSCIENCE</p> + +<p></p> + +<p>574. In order that man many tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient +that the way be pointed out in a general manner (as is done by the +natural and positive laws), but these laws must be applied to each act +in particular by the practical reason or conscience, as it passes +judgment on the right or wrong of an action in the light of all the +circumstances.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_THE_LAW_OF_CONSCIENCE">Art. 1: THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)</p> + +<p>575. Definition.—Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the +practical reason deciding by inference from general principles the +moral goodness or malice of a particular act.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and +intellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral +understanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the +truth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral +science, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of +conclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the +virtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to +individual cases—all these are permanent states and are preparatory to +the act of conscience, in which one makes use of one’s knowledge to +judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete, +as attended by all its circumstances.</p> + +<p>(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the +other acts employed by prudence—from counsel about the right means or +ways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what +is the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the +moral command moves to action.</p> + +<p>(c) Conscience is in the reason—that is, it is a subjective guide, and +thus it differs from law, which is objective.</p> + +<p>(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments, +which are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical +aspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the +active faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is +concerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.</p> + +<p>(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it +differs from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit +by which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without +argument that certain more general propositions of morality must be +true, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.); +conscience draws conclusions from those axioms.</p> + +<p>(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the +difference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a +psychological faculty whose function is to perceive one’s own states +and acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or +unlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies +that one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience +judges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies +that a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience +declares the morality—condemning, excusing, or approving what took +place.</p> + +<p>(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act—that is, it +considers an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with +all the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral +science, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn +from the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the +applications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works +containing moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do +not take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the +individual who judges about those solutions or about their +applicability to his particular circumstances.</p> + +<p>576. Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the +act judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or +consequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a +future act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a +judge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past. +(b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent +conscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while +consequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii. +15).</p> + +<p>577. According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or +human law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges +that to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded. +Example: According to law, one may use money of which one has the +disposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal. +Hence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.</p> + +<p>(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa: +“The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a +service to God” (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false +conscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before +him. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle, +or about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a +wrong inference from the premises.</p> + +<p>578. According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct, +conscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the +intellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good +(right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a +well-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one’s end and +duties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money +was at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had +investigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good. +But, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only +because he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.</p> + +<p>(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or +uncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or +with fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right +to use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true +that he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if +there remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment +which he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view +only with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.</p> + +<p>579. A conscience may have some and lack others of the qualities just +mentioned.</p> + +<p>(a) The same conscience may be true and bad, or false and good—that +is, the judgment of the intellect may be in agreement with objective +facts, but at the same time it may be directed by a wrong will and +intention, or vice versa. Examples: Caius, through no fault of his own, +is convinced that he is bound to tell a lie to help Sempronius, because +Sempronius once helped him by lying. His conscience is false, but good. +Titus is really not bound to pay a sum of money demanded of him. But +the arguments by which he persuades himself that he is not bound are +not honest, since he has recourse to what he knows are hair-splitting +distinctions, quibbles and sophistical reasonings. His conscience is +true, but bad.</p> + +<p>(b) The same conscience may be good and uncertain, or bad and certain. +Examples: If the Caius above-mentioned believes he is bound to lie, but +has some qualms or suspicions that such conduct might not be right +after all, his conscience would be good, seeing that he meant to do +what is right; but it would be uncertain, seeing that he is not sure he +is right. If the Titus above-mentioned had so habituated himself to +insincerity and illogical reasoning that he no longer had any fears +about his own judgments, and gave firm and unhesitating assent to his +decision that he was not bound to pay the money demanded, his +conscience, though bad, would be certain subjectively.</p> + +<p>580. Obligation of Conscience.—Man is bound to be guided by +conscience, both negatively and positively—that is, he must neither +disobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.</p> + +<p>(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice +or witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law. +Hence “all that is not from conscience is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23).</p> + +<p>(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will +is a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the +intellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law. +Apart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God +wishes one to do here and now.</p> + +<p>581. The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.</p> + +<p>(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is +not autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration +or interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass +judgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a +present case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true—that is, to agree +with and express the objective law.</p> + +<p>(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It +is not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement +between the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of +pure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man’s +conduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it +selects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence, +conscience must be good—that is, a judgment dictated by a will well +disposed towards the true end of life.</p> + +<p>(c) Conscience is not independent of the certainty of the intellect. It +is a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one’s own wishes, +but by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man +reliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be +certain—that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its +unhesitating assent.</p> + +<p>582. In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and +moderator of man’s moral life, it must have the following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) It must be good, and practically true—that is, in agreement with +the Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can +attain to such agreement, with the objective law—for the standard of +moral good is not each one’s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End +and the external natural and positive law as means to that End.</p> + +<p>(b) It must be certain—that is, without fear that one is wrong; at +least, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral +matters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be +willing to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.</p> + +<p>583. Since conscience that has the requisite conditions is our +immediate guide in moral matters, it follows: (a) that a conscience +which is true objectively, good, and certain must be followed, whenever +it commands or forbids; (b) that a conscience which is in invincible +error (see 30), but seems to him who has it to be not only true but +certain, must also be followed when it forbids or commands. Examples: +If a child were told and believed that he was obliged to tell a lie to +prevent an evil, he would be bound to do this. If a person eats what he +wrongly thinks to be forbidden food, he is guilty of the violation he +apprehends.</p> + +<p>584. Exception.—If invincible error results from lack of sufficient +intelligence to be capable of sin (see above, 249, 387), then the +failure to follow one’s conscience in such error does not make one +guilty. Example: If a person unable to walk were persuaded that he was +bound nevertheless to walk to church for Mass, his conscience would not +make his omission sinful. Conscience supposes sane judgment, but the +judgment we are now considering is not sane.</p> + +<p>585. A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe +guide, and hence it cannot be followed.</p> + +<p>(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is +vincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if +there be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what +is wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous +conscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one’s judgment, +wrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right +(i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who +has made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but +who realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against +sincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he +does not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own +sophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be +honest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.</p> + +<p>(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such +that one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example: +If a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or +seriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the +lawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If +in spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm +he foresaw, even though it does not happen.</p> + +<p>586. Exception.—It is lawful to follow a vincibly erroneous +conscience, if there is no danger of sin in this. Example: If a person +has neglected inquiry about holydays of obligation, and through his own +neglect believes that Good Friday is a holyday, he does not sin by +attending the services that day.</p> + +<p>587. The signs of a vincibly erroneous conscience are: (a) that in the +past one did not use the same diligence to inform oneself about one’s +religious duties as is employed by conscientious persons; (b) that in +the present one has fears, doubts or suspicions as to one’s own +sincerity of judgment.</p> + +<p>588. Results of Conscience.—The results of following an erroneous +conscience are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or +permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible. +Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been +told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.</p> + +<p>(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting +evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person +who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or +advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know +better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>589. The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty. +Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to +do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.</p> + +<p>(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty. +Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt +occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle +it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the +time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest +he get into trouble. He is guilty.</p> + +<p>590. If a conscience which was vincibly erroneous in its origin is here +and now invincibly erroneous, the acts that result from following such +a conscience are to be judged as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) They are materially evil in themselves and formally evil in their +cause. Example: Titus, who intends to take a position in which he will +have to advise others, foresees that later on he may make mistakes +costly to others, as a result of his present lack of sufficient study. +He secures the position, and tries to make up for former neglect of +study, but on one occasion injures a patron by wrong advice which he +would not have given, had he worked more faithfully as a younger +student. The wrong advice is objectively sinful in itself, as being an +injury; it is subjectively sinful in its cause, as being the result of +negligence which foresaw what might happen.</p> + +<p>(b) The acts in question are not formally evil in themselves. Example: +Titus was formally guilty of injury to others at the time he foresaw +what would happen on account of his negligence; he was not formally +guilty at the time he did the injury, because he had tried meanwhile to +repair his negligence and was not conscious of his ignorance.</p> + +<p>591. The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous +conscience are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of +the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is +responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example: +He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave +calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty +than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.</p> + +<p>(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is +of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A +person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity, +is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.</p> + +<p>(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of +the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to +his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his +word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As +to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is +always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is +seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong. +Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his +friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person +who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication +does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless +guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state; +for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable +ignorance cannot excuse him.</p> + +<p>592. An erroneous conscience may apprehend something not wrong as +wrong, but in an indeterminate manner.</p> + +<p>(a) If the species of evil is not determinate before the conscience, +but an indifferent act is thought to be sinful without any definite +species of sin being thought of, he who acts against such a conscience +seems to commit a sin of disobedience. Example: A person who thinks +that smoking is a sin, of what kind he does not know, must have at +least vaguely the opinion that it is forbidden by the divine law; and +hence, if he smokes, he is guilty of disobedience.</p> + +<p>(b) If the gravity of the putative sin is not determinate before the +conscience, but an act is thought to be sinful without the degree of +sinfulness being at all known or thought of, he who acts against such a +conscience commits a mortal or a venial sin according to his own +disposition with respect to sin. If he is so attached to the sin he +apprehends that he intends to commit it, whether it be great or small, +he is guilty of mortal sin, at least in so far as he exposes himself to +it. But if he is habitually resolved not to commit grave sin, it can be +presumed that he would not do that which he apprehends as sinful, if he +thought it was a grave offense, Example: If a person erroneously thinks +that it is a sin to read a certain book, and then reads it without +adverting at all to the gravity of the sin he apprehends, his greater +or less guilt will have to be judged by his character. If he is so +conscientious that he would stop reading at once if he feared the book +was seriously harmful, he sins only venially; but if he knows that he +is lax and is yet resolved to read the book at all costs, it seems that +he is guilty of grave sin.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_A_GOOD_CONSCIENCE">Art. 2: A GOOD CONSCIENCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)</p> + +<p>593. As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a +proper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the +good conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.</p> + +<p>594. Definition.—The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied +both to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).</p> + +<p>(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good +conscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that +past sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.; +“The end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience” (I Tim., +i. 5); “War a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience” (ibid., +19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary +way: “Let us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled +from an evil conscience” (Heb., x. 22).</p> + +<p>(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges +about the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the +future. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good +faith—that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides +according to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called +bad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith—that is, one who +is in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by +reasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example: +Speaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden, +yet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: “There +is not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with +conscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their +conscience being weak is defiled” (I Cor., viii. 7).</p> + +<p>595. Divisions.—By training and care a good conscience is developed +and becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts +itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender +conscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the +Commandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A +possessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A +timorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the +slightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to +avoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of +conscience is called God-fearing.</p> + +<p>596. A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to +its effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax +conscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons +to judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only +slightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.</p> + +<p>(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is +moved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something +lawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in +something that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where +these do not exist, and so on.</p> + +<p>597. The Lax Conscience.—According to the more or less control it has +over one, the lax conscience may be divided into the incipient and the +habitual. (a) It is incipient when one is becoming familiar with +careless decisions and less responsive to remorse about evil done. In +this state the conscience is said to be sleeping. (b) It is habitual +when through long-continued habit one has become enamored of a worldly, +frivolous conception of life, and is rarely visited by compunction. In +its worst state, when there is little hope of cure, a lax conscience is +said to be seared or cauterized (I Tim., iv. 2).</p> + +<p>598. According to the greater or less responsibility of the one in +error, a lax conscience is either malicious or not malicious. (a) It is +malicious when it results from one’s own disregard for religious truth, +as in the case of the pagans who did not care to know God, and were +thus led into perverse conceptions of morality. St. Paul calls such a +conscience a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 28). (b) It is not malicious +when it results from some less blamable reason, as in the case of the +Christians at Corinth who thought that the eating of idol meats was +sinful, but that it was to be practised on account of the example of +others. St. Paul calls this a weak conscience (I Cor., viii. 10).</p> + +<p>599. Laxity of conscience is either partial or entire. (a) A conscience +entirely lax takes an easy and indulgent view in all things. It is +careless both in little and great matters, both in directing self and +in directing others. (b) A conscience partially lax is too liberal in +some things, but not in others. Examples: Titus is very exacting with +his girls, and wishes to have them models of virtue; but he is too easy +with himself and his boys. Balbus is very loyal to friends, but has no +sense of justice as regards those who do not agree with him. Sempronius +tries to serve both God and mammon, being very faithful to church +duties, but at the same time dishonest in business matters.</p> + +<p>600. A conscience partially lax may even combine scrupulosity and +laxism (see 610), becoming like a mirror that reflects large objects as +small and vice versa; or like a color-blind eye: “Woe to you that call +evil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for +darkness” (Is., V. 20). This kind of conscience is called pharisaical.</p> + +<p>(a) One may be lax and scrupulous about the same kind of things. +Examples: Caius regards great disobedience in himself as a mote which +he doesn’t need to worry about, but small disobedience in his children +as a beam in the eye which he is seriously bound to extract (Matt, vii. +3-5). Titus is lax about almsgiving to those from whom he can expect +nothing, but scrupulous about almsgiving to those from whom he expects +a return later on.</p> + +<p>(b) One may be scrupulous and lax about different things, straining at +gnats and swallowing camels. Example: The Pharisees were scrupulous +about external observances and minor things of the law, such as tithes; +but they were lax about inward justice and the weightier things of the +law, judgment, mercy and faith (Matt, xxiii. 13-31).</p> + +<p>601. Causes of a Lax Conscience.—(a) If the laxity is inculpable but +habitual, it is caused generally by lack of Christian training in +childhood and the influence of evil principles and practices that are +widespread. In particular cases a lax decision of conscience may be due +to want of sufficient consideration or to a sudden storm of passion +that obscures the reason, when one has no time for deliberation; and +thus it is inculpable.</p> + +<p>(b) If the laxity is culpable, its usual causes are an easy-going view +of God’s law and its obligation (Is, xliii. 24); or a self-love that +sees in one’s vices nothing but virtue or amiable weakness; or a +long-continued indulgence of sin that has destroyed all refinement of +conscience.</p> + +<p>602. Special Dangers of a Lax Conscience.—(a) If the laxity is +inculpable, it is an occasion of demoralization to others and a +preparation for formal sin in him who has the conscience;</p> + +<p>(b) if the laxity is culpable, it is the cause of formal sin; and if it +is not corrected, it naturally leads to moral blindness, hardness of +heart and impenitence: “There is a way that seemeth to man right, and +the ends thereof lead to death” (Proverbs, xvi. 25).</p> + +<p>603. Since a lax conscience is a species of erroneous conscience, the +rules given above as to the kind of sins committed in consequence of an +erroneous conscience, apply also to the lax conscience (see above, 588 +Sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) When the laxity is concerned with the existence of sin, the +conscience taking what is sinful for something lawful, he who follows +such a conscience is guilty or not guilty according as his ignorance is +culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good +conscience). Examples: The man who practises dishonesty, because he has +cheated his conscience by sophistry into deciding that dishonesty is +lawful; the child who uses profane language without realization of sin, +because he hears his elders use it. But if the lax conscience takes +what is sinful for a duty, he who disobeys it is guilty of sin. +Example: The person who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought +to lie on account of a promise made.</p> + +<p>(b) When the laxity is concerned with the gravity of sin, the +conscience taking what is mortal for venial sin, he who disobeys such a +conscience is guilty of mortal or venial sin, according as his +ignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a +good conscience). Examples: A child who thinks that calumny or missing +Mass is only a venial sin, because he sees grown up persons treat these +things lightly; a person that, to solace his conscience, advises with +lax associates who always approve of what he wishes to do or has done.</p> + +<p>604. He who knows, or who has good reason to think, that his conscience +is lax, should guide himself by the following rules: (a) with reference +to the past, if there is a doubt whether or not sin was consented to or +was grave, the presumption is against him, for laxity willingly +contracted makes one responsible for what ensues; (b) with reference to +the future, a person must make use of the means prescribed for one who +is in danger of sin (see above, 258 sqq.), for a lax conscience places +one in danger of sin.</p> + +<p>605. Remedies Recommended for a Lax Conscience.—(a) The defect of will +or character should be corrected. Example: The presumptuous should +reflect on the justice of God, and recall that the broad way leads to +perdition. Those in whom the wish is father to the lax judgment should +make war on the passion that leads them astray. Those who have become +lax through bad habits, should set about acquiring good habits, like +that of going to the Sacraments frequently. (b) The error of the +intellect should be corrected. Example: If a person’s religious +training has been neglected, he should do what he can to get correct +information and advice as to his duties. If one has been influenced by +lax ideas or conduct, one should change one’s reading or associations.</p> + +<p>606. Is a lax person held responsible, if he does not know that he is +lax? (a) If his conscience is invincibly erroneous, he cannot know that +it is lax, and hence he is not responsible; (b) if his conscience is +vincibly erroneous, he ought to know that he is lax, and hence he is +responsible. Examples: The boy Caius keeps whatever he finds, because +he thinks he has a right to do this. The man Titus does not like +cheating, but he cheats habitually, because he thinks he has as much +right to do so as others. Both the boy and the man are lax, but neither +considers himself lax; the difference is that Titus can and ought to +know that he is lax.</p> + +<p>607. The scrupulous Conscience.—This is a species of erroneous +judgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there +is only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It +differs, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it +does not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even +slight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and +a scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are +sometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact +than the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious +or God-fearing.</p> + +<p>(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a +state of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is +nevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.</p> + +<p>608. The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience +apply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a +scrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly +in error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required. +Example: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious +duties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges +under pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience, +for grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a +scrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends. +Example: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.</p> + +<p>609. Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.—(a) As to himself, +the scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty +of sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness +it often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others, +the scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to +impose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear +forbidding.</p> + +<p>610. It is possible for a conscience to be scrupulous and lax at the +same time, over-indulgent on some points, over-severe on others (see +600). (a) It may be scrupulous as regards others, and lax as regards +self, or vice versa. Example; Parents sometimes are too lenient with +themselves, but rule their children with extreme severity; in other +cases they are meticulous as to their own conduct, but think they must +allow their children every indulgence.</p> + +<p>(b) A conscience may be scrupulous in minor matters and lax in major +matters. Example: The Jewish leaders scrupled to take the money from +Judas or to enter the house of Pilate, but they did not hesitate to +condemn our Lord unjustly.</p> + +<p>(c) A conscience may be scrupulous as to externals, lax as to +internals. Example: The Pharisees made much of bodily purifications, +but gave little thought to purity of mind and heart.</p> + +<p>611. The Perplexed Conscience.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is +the perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance +one cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus +fears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his +health, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin +by disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod, +who thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder +when the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).</p> + +<p>612. St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is +perplexed in conscience:</p> + +<p>(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable +advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).</p> + +<p>(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the +lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that +Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive +law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less +evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit +what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he +is not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.</p> + +<p>(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the +lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to +the impossible.</p> + +<p>613. If, in the supposition last mentioned, the perplexed person acts +with the feeling that he is committing sin through necessity, is he +really guilty or not?</p> + +<p>(a) If by the feeling of guilt is meant, not a judgment of the mind, +but a scruple or doubt, he is not guilty, as we shall see below when we +speak of scrupulosity.</p> + +<p>(b) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment of the mind that he +has to sin and an intention to welcome the opportunity, he is guilty; +but his guilt is considerably diminished by the error and his difficult +circumstances. Example: Titus thinks that he sins whether he obeys or +disobeys an order to take a good dose of whiskey. He decides to take +the dose, and feels rather pleased at the thought that he will become +intoxicated.</p> + +<p>(c) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment that one has to sin, +accompanied by sorrow at the necessity, one is not guilty, if one +thinks the matter over to the best of one’s ability before acting; +there is some guilt, if the perplexity arises from previous culpable +negligence and no effort whatever is made to remedy this before acting. +Example: Gaia asks her mother if she may go for a ride. The mother +fears that, if she refuses, Gaia will become desperate; if she permits, +Gaia will meet unsuitable companions. If the mother’s perplexity is due +to the fact that she has never taken any interest in Gaia, she is +responsible if she carelessly makes a wrong decision; but if the +perplexity arises only from the difficult character of Gaia, the mother +is not responsible.</p> + +<p>614. Scrupulosity.—Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of +scrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a +vain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in +one’s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a +form of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul, +inability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy. +Clinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following +characteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2) +intellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to +concentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an +introvert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and +activities.</p> + +<p>The more common manifestations of the psychasthenic’s difficulties +include: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and +scruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as +an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a +special type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.</p> + +<p>(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous +conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that +accompanies one’s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very +well that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with +some voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they +were sins, or grave sins.</p> + +<p>(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience, +inasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A +person of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a +quiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all +excitement and distraction.</p> + +<p>(c) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the anxious or doubtful or +guilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or +phobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years, +has good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that +restitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who +did all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is +constantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A +person who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful, +because good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful +conscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of +the fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for +doubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the +time of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on +account of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who +worries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be +scrupulous.</p> + +<p>615. Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division +seems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of +object, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral +activities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they +may embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of +extension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend +to external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be +classified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is +characteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical +and psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.</p> + +<p>616. The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been +variously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or +cognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our +present purpose.</p> + +<p>(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide, +coupled with and interacting with constant doubt.</p> + +<p>(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling +of insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual’s own +personality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc. +This fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears, +anxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense +of inadequacy.</p> + +<p>(c) Compulsive: numerous compulsion factors are present in more serious +cases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions +properly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.</p> + +<p>Obsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas +accompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague +the individual are “discordant,” that is, out of harmony with his +habitual attitude, and “impulsive,” tending to reduce themselves +spontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and +flustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive +abhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.</p> + +<p>Phobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity +associated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective +reality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to +their causes or objects.</p> + +<p>Finally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible, +unreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an +obsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or +external ritual is not performed.</p> + +<p>For the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too +difficult. The penitent’s own difficulties present the first and most +obvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as +to the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances. +Concomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous +include:</p> + +<p>(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice, +frequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment. +He is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that +he has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the +consequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.</p> + +<p>(c) Irrelevant accusations of multiple circumstances that tend to lose +the sin in the maze of circumstances.</p> + +<p>(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the +fear, sin, or other difficulty.</p> + +<p>617. Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.—Although the signs of +scrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly +defined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing +of probable causes would include internal causes:</p> + +<p>(a) physical—the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors +admit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is +one to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve +disorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the +neuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical—the cause is attributed to too +low a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the +attacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral—perhaps +a suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly +impressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature, +overconfident of its own ability.</p> + +<p>618. The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who +excites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use +of prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b) +the neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example; +association with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual +books of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid +character at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly +protective and overly rigorous education.</p> + +<p>619. Though God cannot be the cause of scrupulosity in the same way as +the evil spirits (who use it for man’s destruction), nor in the same +way as human agencies (which are unable to bring good out of the evil +they cause), He does in exceptional cases directly permit even saintly +persons to be vexed by scrupulosity that they may thereby satisfy for +sin, or exercise themselves in humility and patience, or shake off +spiritual torpor.</p> + +<p>Scrupulosity that is supernatural in origin is much rarer than that +which has a natural source, and it can be usually recognized by certain +signs, like the following; (a) when it cannot be accounted for by +natural causes, and is generally short in duration; (b) if it is from +the evil spirits, it leaves the soul shaken or dismayed, if from God, +it is followed by light and peace.</p> + +<p>620. Dangers of scrupulosity.—The evil results of indulged +scrupulosity are as follows: (a) temporal evils—the constant fears and +worries of the scrupulous affect the brain and nerves, break down the +bodily vigor, and lead to neurasthenia, hysteria, insanity or +monomania; (b) spiritual evils—time is wasted in useless regrets and +anxieties, prayer becomes a torture, confidence in God decreases, and, +seeing they do not find consolation in virtue, the scrupulous often end +in vice and despair.</p> + +<p>621. Rules to be observed by the scrupulous.—(a) They must not yield +to their scruples. As was said above, scrupulosity is not a conscience, +but only the counterfeit appearance of a conscience; not a help to the +soul, but a grave drawback and danger. Hence, the scrupulous must learn +to despise their foolish fears and imaginations. (b) They must follow +blindly the commands of a prudent spiritual director. To attempt to +make decisions for themselves is a harrowing experience for scrupulous +persons, and one fraught with great peril. They must protect +themselves, therefore, by following the decisions made for them by one +who will guide them aright. Gradually, as their condition improves, +however, they must learn to take the initiative and thus prepare +themselves to act as responsible persons capable of forming a correct +judgment.</p> + +<p>622. Not to follow their scruples means: (a) that scrupulous persons +should recognize their scruples for what they really are (i.e., for a +spiritual disorder), and that they should firmly resolve to use the +means to get rid of them; (b) that they will prevent scruples from +arising by keeping themselves occupied with external things, or by +interesting themselves with matters that will exclude the worrisome +thoughts; (c) that they will banish scruples at once, as they would a +temptation. The two key aims of the scrupulous individual is to +counteract his introversion by greater social activity and to re-train +his faculty so that he will be in control at all times.</p> + +<p>623. Though the scrupulous are obliged not to heed their scruples, they +rarely sin by heeding them, because their condition is such that they +are not responsible. For, as was said above (40 sqq.), fear and other +passions lessen or remove deliberation and the voluntariness of acts.</p> + +<p>624. To give absolute obedience to the spiritual director means: (a) +that scrupulous persons should recognize that it is wrong for them to +depend on their own prudence, whereas they are absolutely safe in +following the advice and precepts of the spiritual father who holds the +place of God; (b) that they should avoid changing directors, and should +adhere strictly to the rules prescribed for them.</p> + +<p>625. Qualities required for a successful direction of the scrupulous +are:</p> + +<p>(a) Knowledge. The spiritual physician must be able to distinguish +scrupulosity from spiritual diseases or conditions that are similar, +lest he prescribe what is not suitable for the case. Example: A person +of tender conscience should continue in that state, a person of +scrupulous conscience needs instruction that he may put aside his +erroneous views; a scrupulous person stands in need of special +guidance. He must also recognize that scrupulosity is a mental illness +that at times requires the expert treatment of a psychiatrist. Knowing +his own limitations and the need of expert therapy, he should not +hesitate to send the penitent to a competent doctor.</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence. Some persons pretend scrupulosity in order to get a name +for holiness, or to make a good impression; needless to say, they must +be dealt with cautiously, as they often prove very unscrupulous. With a +person who is really scrupulous, the spiritual director must carefully +obtain all the knowledge necessary to ascertain the true state of soul, +prudently bring the individual to recognize that he is a sick person, +help to restore his confidence in himself, in his confessor, in God, +etc.</p> + +<p>(c) Patience. The scrupulous are almost as troublesome to their +directors as they are to themselves; but they are heavily burdened and +are unable to help themselves. The law of charity applies. They have +the same right to charitable treatment as others who are physically +suffering and needy.</p> + +<p>(d) Firmness. Disobedience will defeat every effort of a director to +help a scrupulous person. On this point, therefore, there must be no +leniency: the rules laid down must be insisted on, the reasons should +not be given, and no argument or discussion should be allowed. The +director should speak with certainty and authority; he should be brief, +and, if he must repeat, he will do well to use the same words.</p> + +<p>(e) Good judgment. After deciding that a person is scrupulous, the +director must discover what is the particular form of scrupulosity in +the case, and must apply remedies that are suitable.</p> + +<p>626. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about Past Confessions.—(a) +For the first time the confessor may permit a general confession of the +past life, if the scrupulous penitent has fears about previous +confessions and has not already made such a general confession. Let the +individual relate his whole story at once, with all its details and +complications. This might perhaps take more than one confession to +complete, but the full recital is necessary if the scrupulous person is +to have confidence in his director’s knowledge of his exact state of +soul. (b) After this general confession, no mention of past confession +must be permitted, unless the scrupulous person is ready to swear +without hesitation that he is sure that a sin certainly grave was +committed by him and never rightly confessed.</p> + +<p>627. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about Present +Confessions.—(a) Before confession, the penitent must be content with +a certain brief space of time appointed by the confessor for making his +examination of conscience and act of contrition. A longer time spent in +these preparations is useful to other penitents, but harmful to the +scrupulous.</p> + +<p>(b) During confession only those sins need be mentioned which are seen +from a brief examen to be both certain and grave, and only those +circumstances whose declaration is absolutely necessary. If the +scrupulous penitent begins to speak of doubtful sins or irrelevant +details, the confessor must forbid him to go on; for though confessions +must be complete, whenever possible, doubts and details must not be +permitted in the case of such scrupulous persons (see Vol. II).</p> + +<p>(c) After confession, if the confessor judges that there is not +sufficient matter for absolution, he must not yield to the penitent’s +fears, but must assure him that he does not need absolution and that he +may go to the Sacraments Without it.</p> + +<p>628. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about the Performance of +Duties.—(a) The scrupulous person should be instructed that positive +laws, divine as well as human, do not oblige in case of moral +impossibility (i.e., when their observance is too burdensome); that the +matter about which he has scruples has become too difficult for him, +and hence that he is not obliged to it as others are.</p> + +<p>(b) The scrupulous person should be commanded to leave undone what his +vain fear calls on him to do; and, if this does not suffice, he should +be told that he is not bound by the duty which causes him such anxiety. +Example: Titus is scrupulous about the performance of obligatory +prayers, so much so that he is not satisfied until he has repeated them +several times, lest some syllable may have been omitted or hurried +over, or the intention or attention may have been lost sight of at some +part of the prayer, or the devotional posture may not have been +observed throughout. If Titus cannot learn to say these prayers without +making senseless repetitions, he should be told that the obligation has +ceased until such time as he is able to fulfill it without torture to +himself or others.</p> + +<p>629. Of course, if harm is done to another by the incomplete +performance of a duty, even a scrupulous person cannot be dispensed +from repetition. Example: If a priest has not pronounced a sacramental +form correctly, the fact that he is scrupulous does not excuse him from +repeating the form correctly.</p> + +<p>630. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about the Commission Of +Sin.—(a) The scrupulous person should be told that he is scrupulous, +that his scrupulosity is not a conscience that he is obliged to follow, +but a vain fear which he is obliged to struggle against by observing +the directions given him.</p> + +<p>(b) He should be directed not to deliberate long before acting, but to +do what seems right to him at first; not to conclude after acting that +he has committed sin, unless this appears certain and evident. Since +the scrupulous are over-careful, the presumption is in their favor, and +they can act and judge prudently by disregarding their fears and +doubts. If by deciding offhand they sometimes sin or fail to recognize +sin in a past act, this will come from invincible ignorance, and they +will be excused from responsibility.</p> + +<p>631. Since a disease is best cured by removing its cause, the +confessor, when he has diagnosed a case of scruples, should prescribe +remedies that are opposed to the source of the trouble.</p> + +<p>(a) If scrupulosity seems to come from God, the penitent should be +encouraged to regard it as a means of satisfaction for past negligences +or as an occasion of virtue and progress, to pray incessantly for light +and assistance, and to follow the guidance which God has provided. (b) +If scrupulosity appears to be the result of diabolical obsession, and +exorcism seems to be called for, the sufferer should not be told this. +(c) If scrupulosity comes from associations or reading, the sufferer +should avoid these occasions, and cultivate the companionship of +persons or books that are cheerful and that give a hopeful outlook on +one’s duty and destiny.</p> + +<p>632. Remedies for Scruples That Are Mental in Origin.—(a) Those who +suffer from fixed ideas, phobias, and delusions, should not be reproved +harshly and told that their fears are insane, but should be treated +with kindness and firmness. In ministering to these troubled minds, the +best course seems to be kind assurance that they have nothing to fear, +along with insistence that they imitate the example of the generality +of good people, avoid singular practices of piety, discuss their +anxieties only with their director, and give themselves to some +occupation that will distract their attention from their manias.</p> + +<p>(b) Those whose minds are over-active and given to doubts and +objections must avoid introspection and the study of moral problems +that are too difficult for them; they must take a proper amount of +suitable recreation, think and plan how they may help others who are in +need, and avoid idleness.</p> + +<p>633. Remedies for Scruples Whose Origin is Moral.—(a) If scruples +arise from a stubbornness of character, the penitent must be told that +the confessor is better fitted to judge the case, and that it is the +height of rashness and presumption for a scrupulous person to prefer +his ideas to those of the priest.</p> + +<p>(b) If a melancholy or timid nature accounts for the existence of +scruples, confidence and cheerfulness should be inculcated, and the +penitent should be encouraged to meditate frequently on the goodness of +God, and to remember always that God is not a harsh taskmaster, but a +kind Father.</p> + +<p>(c) Those who are scrupulous because their character is fickle and +easily moved by every suggestion or imagination, need to cultivate +seriousness, and to hold strongly to their judgments and resolves +deliberately formed. Obedience to their director will be of more +lasting benefit to these and other psychical scrupulants than +psychiatric treatments through hypnotism, mental suggestion, and +psychoanalysis; observance of the rules prescribed is an excellent +cultivation of will-power, and it is sustained and perfected by the +motives and helps which religion alone can supply.</p> + +<p>634. Remedies for scrupulosity Whose Cause Is Physical.—(a) The +physician is the proper person to care for bodily ills; hence, a +scrupulous person who is troubled with headaches, dizziness, +sleeplessness, loss of appetite, nervousness, hallucinations, etc., +should go to a competent and conscientious specialist in the healing +art. Removal of the causes of hurry and worry, moderate but sufficient +diet, fresh air and exercise, and especially congenial occupation and +surroundings are by general consent included among the best natural +cures.</p> + +<p>(b) The confessor, if he perceives that illness is the cause of +scruples, should forbid any spiritual practices that cause or aggravate +the malady. Example: scrupulous penitents should not be permitted to +practise mortification by depriving themselves of necessary sleep, +food, exercise or fresh air, or to use devotions or austerities for +which they are physically unfit.</p> + +<p>635. Persons who are scrupulous and lax at the same time need to be +directed so as to overcome both spiritual maladies.</p> + +<p>(a) If they are more scrupulous than lax, the case is less difficult, +as they incline rather to the safer side, and it will suffice to apply +the remedies indicated above for laxity and scrupulosity, as they are +needed. Example: Titus, on account of scrupulosity, spends too much +time at his prayers, and thus neglects the exercise and recreation +which are necessary for his health. He should be instructed to limit +his devotions, to have a regular time for them each day, and to realize +that he has an obligation to take proper care of his health.</p> + +<p>(b) If persons are more lax than scrupulous, the case is difficult, as +they incline more to evil; indeed, if the trouble is Pharisaism, it is +well-nigh incurable, on account of the pride and blindness that oppose +resistance to every effort to cure. These persons need to be treated +with severity, since nothing else will make any impression; they should +be told in plain language how they stand and what is in store for them, +unless they repent. Examples: Caius is extremely careful not to be +guilty of sins of commission, but he thinks nothing of sins of +omission; he would not take a postage stamp without express permission +of the owner, but he neglects from year to year to pay bills, and sees +nothing wrong in this. Titus thinks himself a saint because he worships +the letter of the law, when it is to be applied to others; but he cares +nothing about its spirit, and, though indulgent to self, is a tyrant +with others. Both these men need to be told that, far from being good, +they are very bad; that, far from being secure, they are in great +danger. If insensible to reproofs, they should be reminded of the woes +that await the wilfully blind (Matt., xxiii. 13 sqq.).</p> + +<p>636. Practical Conclusions.—An instrument is called good when it +produces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was +intended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a +timepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates +accurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be +harmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch +with a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally +corrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now, +from what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience +can be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved. +Hence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a +good conscience.</p> + +<p>637. Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good +conscience are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A +person judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in +his intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in +his attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of +sincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere +love of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest +examination of motives and actions: “The sensual man perceiveth not the +things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all +things” (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).</p> + +<p>(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One +judges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas +or principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light +through prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models, +to consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience +says to God: “Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways” +(Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: “Teach me Thy justifications. +Thy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel” (Ps. +cxviii. 12, 24).</p> + +<p>638. Signs of a Good Conscience.—(a) Extraordinary holiness is not +necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are +degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is +directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as +he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and +hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he +sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but +because he does not always follow it.</p> + +<p>(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary +before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier +burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who +is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are +used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely +regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges +wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad +conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error +may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because +he does not follow it.</p> + +<p>639. The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good +conscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the +severity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and +as before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not +by the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of +Christ (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_A_CERTAIN_CONSCIENCE">Art. 3: A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)</p> + +<p>640. As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is +not only good—that is, in agreement, as far as one’s efforts can +secure this, with the external law—but also certain. A certain +conscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges +that a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now +to be done or omitted.</p> + +<p>641. Necessity of Certitude.—We must be sure we are right before we +act; otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of sinning, and +therefore commit sin (see 582). Hence, it is necessary to act with a +certain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience. +“If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to +the battle?” (I Cor., xiv. 8) may be accommodated to conscience. In +Rom., xiv. 22, 23, the Apostle declares that he who acts with +conviction is blessed, whereas he who acts in uncertainty is condemned. +Examples: Sempronia doubts whether it is sinful to sew on Sunday; she +is not sure, but has grave suspicions that sewing is servile work; if +she goes ahead, she will be guilty of violating the law, as being +willing to take the risk, and therefore the responsibility. Titus +offers another a drink, being uncertain whether it has poison in it or +not; he is guilty of sin, since he has no right to expose himself to +sin and his neighbor to the danger of death.</p> + +<p>642. Those persons who act with a doubtful conscience, and later +discover that what they feared might be wrong was not wrong, or not so +bad as they suspected, must bear in mind: (a) that their past conduct +is not to be judged by their newly acquired knowledge, for that conduct +must be judged by the knowledge had at the time. Example: Sempronia +does some work on Sunday, doubting whether she is committing a grave or +a slight sin. Later she discovers that it was really only a venial sin, +and she congratulates herself that she did not sin seriously. Her +judgment is wrong, because she did not know at the time of the work +that it was not a grave sin; (b) that they must guide themselves in +future acts by their newly acquired knowledge.</p> + +<p>643. Kinds of Certitude.—Judgments may be certain in a greater or less +degree.</p> + +<p>(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely +impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a +contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true. +Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good +and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to +be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately +from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.</p> + +<p>(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible +according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the +mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause. +Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that +he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically +certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly +when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left +to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.</p> + +<p>(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according +to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the +mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it. +Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and +competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain +that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance +is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching +the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and +fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have +the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part +reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.</p> + +<p>644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of +conscience, the following points must be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not +deal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular +acts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis, +and at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of +moral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they +are based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which +are the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the +individual.</p> + +<p>(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience, +since conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural +agents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom +and responsibility.</p> + +<p>(c) Moral certitude, therefore, is sufficient for the conclusions drawn +by conscience. That a higher kind of certitude is not necessary should +not surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same +degree of assent be given to judgments that are concerned with +particular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with +universal and necessary principles.</p> + +<p>645. Moral certitude is of two kinds: (a) certitude in the strict +sense, which excludes not only the fear of error, but every doubt, +prudent and imprudent, great and small, Example: Titus thinks of a way +in which he could easily make money dishonestly; but his conscience +sees that the thing is manifestly wrong and decides without the +slightest fear or doubt that it must not be done; (b) certitude in the +wide sense, which excludes all fear of error and every serious or +prudent doubt, but not one or other slight and imprudent doubt. +Example: Caius was baptized by an excellent priest, but the date was +omitted in the register. The doubt occurs to Caius that perhaps +something essential was also omitted, and that it may be his duty to +seek another Baptism. His doubt is unreasonable.</p> + +<p>646. Moral certitude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe +conscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently +the only kind of certitude one can have, and he who would strive to be +free from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in +a maze of scruples and perplexities. Example: If the Caius above +referred to were to yield to his doubt and be rebaptized, a similar +doubt about the second Baptism might easily arise in his mind, and he +would be no more contented than before.</p> + +<p>647. From the point of view of its object, certitude is twofold. (a) +Speculative certitude refers to a judgment considered as a general law, +abstraction being made from particular circumstances. Example: It is +speculatively certain that farm work on a holyday is a forbidden kind +of work, and that clerics are obliged to say the Divine Office. (b) +Practical certitude refers to a judgment which is an application of a +general law to a particular case, consideration being given to all the +pertinent circumstances. Example: It is practically certain that Titus +may make hay on a holyday, if otherwise he will suffer great loss; and +that a cleric is excused from the Divine Office, if his physician has +warned him that he is physically or mentally unable to perform it.</p> + +<p>648. Speculative certainty is not sufficient for conscience, but +practical certitude is required, since conscience refers not to +abstract laws but to concrete cases—not to what is right if only the +object of the act is considered, but to what is right when one +considers the object, the motive, and all the circumstances here and +now present.</p> + +<p>649. From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based, +certitude is of two kinds. (a) Demonstrative certitude is the assent +that rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true +premises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Mass on +Sunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law +applies to him. (b) Probable certitude, which is the assent that rests +on a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true, +and against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot +be readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is +seriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the +possibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the +fact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he +may hold himself excused from attendance at Mass.</p> + +<p>650. Probable certitude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral +matters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a +demonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a +decision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious +probability. What is called “probable certitude” here is very different +from probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662 +sqq.)</p> + +<p>651. From the point of view of the manner in which it is obtained, +certitude is again twofold. (a) Direct certitude is that which is +obtained from principles that are intrinsic to the case by applying to +the matter the law concerning it. Examples: A judge who decides +according to the evidence and proofs given in court that an accused is +guilty, and a son who concludes from the Fourth Commandment that he is +bound to help his parents in necessity, have direct certainty in their +judgments, because they argued from principles that deal with the +question before them. (b) Indirect certitude is that which is obtained +from principles that are extrinsic to the case by applying to the +matter in hand reflex principles (i.e., rules that direct how one +should act in doubt) or the principle of authority (i.e., the argument +drawn from the opinion of those who are acknowledged as competent to +decide). Examples; If a judge is not able to form a certain judgment +from intrinsic reasons concerning an accused, because strong arguments +have been given both for guilt and for innocence, he has recourse to +principles that have reference to his own state of doubt, and which +declare that he must acquit when he is not certain of guilt. If a man +is not able to decide whether the Fourth Commandment obliges him to +keep his grandparents or mother-in-law in his home, when they upset his +family and are able to take care of themselves, he can have recourse to +the external principle of authority by consulting his confessor.</p> + +<p>652. Direct certitude is not necessary for the judgment of conscience, +for often, as in the cases just mentioned, it is not possible. +Moreover, indirect certitude suffices to give one who is in doubt such +practical assurance that one’s fears become unimportant and one is able +to act prudently in spite of them.</p> + +<p>(a) The principle of authority—that “in doubt we can safely follow the +advice of those who are experts and truthful”—is reliable, as both the +conditions required for authority (viz., knowledge and truthfulness) +and also daily experience show.</p> + +<p>(b) Reflex principles likewise, although they do not prove what is +deduced from them, are well founded, and point so clearly the side to +be taken when judgment is suspended between alternatives that they +enable one to act with all the certitude that prudence demands. +Example: The principle that “in doubt decision should be given in favor +of the accused,” is based on the fact that a man’s right to his life +and liberty is so certain that he does not forfeit that right unless it +is proved convincingly that he is guilty.</p> + +<p>653. Examples of uncertain and certain consciences are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) Uncertain conscience: It is lawful to make a just contract (major +premise certain); but this contract is just (minor premise a matter of +doubt or opinion); therefore, this contract is lawful (conclusion a +matter of doubt or opinion).</p> + +<p>(b) Conscience directly certain: It is lawful to make a just contract +(certain); but this contract is just (certain); therefore, I may make +this contract (certain).</p> + +<p>(c) Conscience indirectly certain: It is lawful to follow competent +advice or a moral system approved by the Church (certain); but a +competent spiritual adviser or an approved system of Moral Theology +holds that this kind of contract is lawful (certain); therefore, it is +lawful for me to make this contract (certain).</p> + +<p>654. An Uncertain Conscience.—Uncertainty of conscience can be +understood in two senses.</p> + +<p>(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of +the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that +no decision can be given either way, either because there are no +reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the +opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose +between them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some +drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not +knowing the definition of “servile,” he can only reply to his doubt +that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius +reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to +him so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.</p> + +<p>(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of +the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that +the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in +its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while +perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised +(opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking +photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is +lawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better +pleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either +opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels +that the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one +of opinion.</p> + +<p>655. From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for +conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind +is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person +who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between +opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts +blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to +act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e) +when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act, +according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for +certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).</p> + +<p>656. Doubt and Suspicion.—The following are the duties of a person +whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:</p> + +<p>(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at +once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see +above, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on +an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he +should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the +errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius’ impromptu +decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and +as certain as he is able to make it.</p> + +<p>(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust +to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent +to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor, +if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be +proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance +for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is +uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest, +he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer +to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a +well-founded, morally certain judgment.</p> + +<p>657. Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be +solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of +some fact connected with obligation, are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from +general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the +principle: “In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.” +Examples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use +of reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain +discretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to +Mass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience +is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the +past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.</p> + +<p>(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded, +either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the +principle: “A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be +proved.” Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the +Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or +circumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice +originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes +him for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the +alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word +of the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.</p> + +<p>658. Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:</p> + +<p>(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or +numerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of +presumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example: +Caius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid Titus in a certain +business transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he +remembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the +office of Titus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter, +up to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if +full settlement had been made.</p> + +<p>(b) Strong presumption is based on circumstances or signs so moving +that they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual +accompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving +the doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has +no individual recollection of any circumstances bearing on the payment +of his debt to Titus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to +pay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is +strong.</p> + +<p>(c) Light presumption occurs when the reasons are so slight, that they +hardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them. +Example: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and +that he has no better indication of payment having been made than the +fact that Titus gave him a cigar about the time of their business +transaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.</p> + +<p>659. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about +the quality of an act performed are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may +be inferred from what usually happens. Example: Sempronius cannot +remember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal +or ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may +be concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be +settled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was +according to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency, +one may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that +he who complies with the substance, also complies with what is +accessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals +require that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as +rightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules: +“In doubt decide for the validity of what was done”; “What has been +done is presumed to have been rightly done.” Examples: Caia cannot +remember whether she really consented when she married Titus. +Sempronius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in +hearing Mass on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly +and that Sempronius heard Mass properly, if they acted in good faith.</p> + +<p>660. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and +invincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove the +existence of a law, or its gravity or application to a present case, +use may be made of the principle: “Invincible ignorance of the law +excuses from sin.” Example: Titus on an ember day consults all the +sources of information he has to discover whether it is a fast day; but +all he can learn is that some vigils are fast days, others are not.</p> + +<p>(b) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove that a law +bears a certain meaning, recourse may be had to such principles as the +following: “A law obliges only in so far as it is knowable”; “The +interpretation may be made against the legislator who could have spoken +more clearly”; “Things burdensome to the subjects of the law should be +construed narrowly; things favorable, broadly.” Example: Caius, who +supervises workingmen, has no notion regarding the meaning of the word +“workingman” as used in an indult on fasting—viz., whether it applies +to supervisors of work or exclusively to laborers.</p> + +<p>(c) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or directly disprove +that a certain law has ceased or been abrogated, the principle to be +followed is: “In doubt decide for that which has the presumption.” In +this case the presumption is for the continuance of the law, since it +was certainly made, and there is no probability for its +non-continuance. Example: Sempronius learns that certain mitigations +have been made in the law of fasting, and wonders whether the same is +true as regards the law of abstinence; but he has no reason to think +that any change has been made on this latter point.</p> + +<p>661. In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of +non-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which +negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the +rule: “In doubt follow that which is safer.” The two cases are:</p> + +<p>(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the +doubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the +taking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws +that safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the +essentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example: +Sempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there +is nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not, +Sempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.</p> + +<p>(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it +persists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be +suitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties +about the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con, +and he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his +difficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the +law were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act +as if the law did exist.</p> + +<p>662. Opinion.—The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to +make unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion +has become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it +as a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his +parents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his +promise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him +that the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at +rest the difficulties of Caius.</p> + +<p>(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections +against his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and +he may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius’ pastor holds +that the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage +with Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his +promise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man +should not follow his own view.</p> + +<p>663. Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or +uncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good +faith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger +(Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which +they fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to +which they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing +that his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even +though what he says is true.</p> + +<p>664. Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows: +(a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he +is not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he +began them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be +obliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the +lessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are +improbable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although +he recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)</p> + +<p>665. Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely +possible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man +would consider them as worthy of support.</p> + +<p>(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by +which the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus +after careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged +to mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his +last confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not +remember having thought of restitution.</p> + +<p>(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by +whom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines +that he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain +that it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St. +Alphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a +grave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been +confessed already.</p> + +<p>666. He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is +scrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important +difficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because +he left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in +his absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound +to restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of +livelihood (disturbed conscience).</p> + +<p>667. What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may +or may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion +is wrong?</p> + +<p>(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such +as consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he +should delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay +is not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he +cannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks +he is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain +about this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The +thing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was +perhaps unconfessed before.</p> + +<p>(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such +as theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means +(such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may +be followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his +confessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not +obliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in +following this decision.</p> + +<p>668. The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who +holds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of +anyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is +impossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to +remain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in +other important affairs by consulting those who are expert and +reliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable +adviser should be conferred with to make it certain.</p> + +<p>(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least +advisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and +especially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are +inclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.</p> + +<p>(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary +that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents +or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or +other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a +glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right +to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and +sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.</p> + +<p>669. The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other +priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all +of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for +surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really +formidable.</p> + +<p>(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number +(say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral +Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may +be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and +the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who +has not the same authority.</p> + +<p>(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian, +it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received +special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus, +the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus +may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St. +Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than +a contrary argument based on one’s own reasoning. Of course, this does +not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in +their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a +point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a +manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so +conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that +one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known +to him.</p> + +<p>670. But one may be unable to settle one’s difficulty by appeal to +authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the +particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books, +or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the +authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the +opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities +are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to +many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge +so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting +authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be +included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an +individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in +favor of what he holds.</p> + +<p>671. When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology +is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or +doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain +certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and +with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough +to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by +submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that +really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the +opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.</p> + +<p>672. The Moral Systems.—There are two general systems regarding reflex +moral principles:</p> + +<p>(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change +uncertainty into certainty is: “When one is undecided between the safer +and the less safe, he must always choose the safer,” because only what +is safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;</p> + +<p>(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is +true in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but +untrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that +of Tutiorism is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less +safe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain.”</p> + +<p>673. Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by +deciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists, +whether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave, +the safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;</p> + +<p>(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger +arguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a +certain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if +the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.</p> + +<p>674. Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely. +Example: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain +of new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely +than the opposite opinion.</p> + +<p>675. Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258) +is a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful, +but that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat, +doubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged +to abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the +danger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its +performance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable +to discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the +opinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this +may be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since +he feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.</p> + +<p>676. Tutiorism.—This system has been condemned by the Church, and with +good reason, for the following motives:</p> + +<p>(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better, +it contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and +precept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending +what is better.</p> + +<p>(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law +against liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of +men; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and +known, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known +to be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.</p> + +<p>677. A modified form of Tutiorism taught: “When one is undecided +between the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless +the less safe is most probable.” This system has not been censured by +the Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have +rejected it, for the following reasons:</p> + +<p>(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is +that which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to +remove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality +this system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous +tenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law +may not be followed.</p> + +<p>(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question +which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any +of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be +answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the +impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at +times with less.</p> + +<p>678. We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to +expose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but +Tutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to +follow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves +even to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we +are obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course, +that is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we +must follow the safer side in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the +salvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids +that any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example: +Titus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God +and of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity +and the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more +probable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition +of salvation;</p> + +<p>(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for +ourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take +chances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is +excused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of +sin if she eats meat. Caius doubts whether attendance at a certain +school will do harm to the religion of his son. Balba doubts whether +she is bound to inquire about the truth of her sect. As long as their +serious doubts remain, these persons should follow the safer course;</p> + +<p>(c) when there is question of the validity or invalidity of a +Sacrament, for the virtue of religion requires that the Sacraments be +administered with fidelity, and be not exposed to the peril of nullity. +Example: It is not lawful to consecrate matter that has probably been +substantially adulterated;</p> + +<p>(d) when there is question of some temporal good or evil to oneself or +another, and one is certainly obliged to promote the former or prevent +the latter. Examples: Caius suspects that a drink before him is deadly +poison; Titus suspects that an object at which he is preparing to shoot +is a human being. Neither may disregard his suspicion, even if its +contrary is more probable, because the safer side must here be taken. +The Fifth Commandment forbids one needlessly to imperil one’s own or +another’s life.</p> + +<p>679. In emergency one may expose a Sacrament to nullity by taking a +course that is less safe for the Sacrament, but safer for the subject, +relying on the axiom that the Sacraments are for men, and not men for +the Sacraments. Example: Titus is called to baptize the dying Caius. No +water can be procured except rose water, whose sufficiency is doubtful. +Titus not only may, but should, use the doubtful matter, since no other +can be had.</p> + +<p>680. Laxism.—The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose +principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less +safe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or +uncertainly probable,” because whatever seems at all probable may be +prudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example: +According to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion, +because it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little +authority.</p> + +<p>681. This system has been condemned by the Church for the following +reasons:</p> + +<p>(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers, +which requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and +diligence;</p> + +<p>(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth +century were called in derision those “who take away the sins of the +world,” and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;</p> + +<p>(c) Its argument is of no value, for no prudent person would feel that +he should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a +law should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain +probability could be quoted against it.</p> + +<p>682. The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes +of Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been +censured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate, +and that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These +systems are:</p> + +<p>(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between +the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it +is more probable”;</p> + +<p>(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between +the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it +affirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable +with the opposite”;</p> + +<p>(c) Probabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the +safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is +certainly and solidly probable”;</p> + +<p>(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between +the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it +is certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason +to compensate for the risk taken.”</p> + +<p>683. Probabiliorism.—The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when +the controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was +the one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;</p> + +<p>(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it +should exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only +opinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the +arguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter +(i.e., unless one has greater probability on one’s side). Hence, he who +acts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own +opinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;</p> + +<p>(c) intrinsic and indirect. In all other matters a man is not prudent +if he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in +things speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which +to his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things +practical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less +likely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent +about the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in +doubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments +for liberty are more convincing.</p> + +<p>684. The answers given to the above arguments are:</p> + +<p>(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the +moral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if +Patristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases +probabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who +decided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited +are frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic +sense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the +controversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less +identified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied +thoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.</p> + +<p>(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome +all doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require +the more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists +spoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable +extent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more +probable is “that judgment which appears more likely to be true than +another, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be +true.” Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it +does not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more +probable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the +opposite side.</p> + +<p>(c) The true is that which is in harmony with facts, the useful that +which conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in +conformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth +if he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a +prudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of +obtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of +the good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when +the law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence, +one who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems +does not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less +probable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain; +not that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.</p> + +<p>685. Arguments against Probabiliorism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—The +principle of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer +side when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified +except on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists, +and hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be +used in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only +probable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence, +the basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.</p> + +<p>(b) Practical Objection.—A system for the direction of conscience +should be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday +affairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from +moralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as +a rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system +that it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he +found by the experience of many years that this system cannot be +profitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable +burden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as +to be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the +relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!</p> + +<p>686. Answers of the Probabiliorists.—(a) A probable opinion against +the existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but +only doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create +invincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for +obligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even +though erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.</p> + +<p>(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to +decide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is +the same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but +each person must judge according to the best light he has, and each +case must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If +Probabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?</p> + +<p>687. The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often +heard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to +Equiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.</p> + +<p>688. Equiprobabilism.—The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way +between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with +Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less +safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally +probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it +agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less +safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about +the existence of the law.</p> + +<p>689. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if +the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation +of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:</p> + +<p>(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is +possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is +in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in +such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law +has not ceased.</p> + +<p>(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful +fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law +usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the +law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been +fulfilled—that is, that its obligation has not ceased.</p> + +<p>690. The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in +equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession; +for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in +doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been +complied with or removed is certain.</p> + +<p>691. The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until +it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that +certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the +contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation, +or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.</p> + +<p>692. The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if +the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the +existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:</p> + +<p>(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But +when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession; +for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide +that there is no obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of +its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the +existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. +Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.</p> + +<p>693. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side +if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by +Equiprobabilists:</p> + +<p>(a) In doubt improperly so called—that is, in that condition of mind +in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some +indecision between the more and the less probable—we should decide in +favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not +lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.</p> + +<p>(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more +probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently +promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed, +if it is more probable.</p> + +<p>694. Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.</p> + +<p>(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so +great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more +probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without +fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would +be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess +is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly +probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is, +assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of +greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when +they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).</p> + +<p>(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the +law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice +that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to +oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to +be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound +by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows +that it seems to exist.</p> + +<p>695. Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always +removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who +recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any +fear of error.</p> + +<p>(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain +law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that +law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a +higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that +nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law +loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound +even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.</p> + +<p>696. General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.—(a) From +Authority.—St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the +Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral +system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation, +the Redemptorists, but by many others.</p> + +<p>(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.—Truth lies midway between +extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But +Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to +Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation +of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.</p> + +<p>(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.—According to principles of +justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence +in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight +and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of +equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal +application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the +guiding principles for the court of conscience.</p> + +<p>697. Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.—(a) St. Alphonsus is +one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his +later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of +dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no +doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral +Theology, he was a Probabilist.</p> + +<p>(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the +extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and +Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.</p> + +<p>(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to +matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds +property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him +who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and +disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply, +however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can +that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good +reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human +ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may +award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have +never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for +solving all difficulties about duty.</p> + +<p>The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim +the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal +cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not +to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges +apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that +conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The +judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely +claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger +evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is +certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for +obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.</p> + +<p>698. Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.—(a) Granted that +St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically, +and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the +only thing that gave him anxiety.</p> + +<p>(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism +is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question—that for liberty +and that for law—before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear +one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two +sides.</p> + +<p>(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of +justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more +rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of +justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his +due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice +should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of +Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of +conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to +get the truth as nearly as possible.</p> + +<p>699. General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.—(a) Theoretical +Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it +unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that +which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for +Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the +last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side +of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that +equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since +one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the +principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in +possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.—all of which +principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.</p> + +<p>(b) Practical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its +adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one +that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable +and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that +even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how +to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it +be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the +law or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on +one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the +question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?</p> + +<p>700. Replies of the Equiprobabilists.—(a) The old (i.e., +probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the +new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its +equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by +the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two +opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but +certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and +doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor +Probabilism, if one is impartial in one’s use of them, and willing to +use them against as well as for liberty.</p> + +<p>(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than +Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and +exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and +for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution +of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter +seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to +the best of one’s ability which side appears to be more probable or to +have the presumption in its favor.</p> + +<p>701. Probabilism.—The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a +comparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and +Equiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal +probability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b) +unlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or +uncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.</p> + +<p>702. A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make +it seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are +conclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others, +or on the calculus of probabilities.</p> + +<p>703. Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative, +according as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered +alone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists +admit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is +solidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We +have solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives +are or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man—that +is, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain +or uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after +reasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion +likely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the +arguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its +nature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the +doctors who have defended an opinion.</p> + +<p>704. Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a +lesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing +arguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not +attack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability. +Example: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to +authority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does +not diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn +from the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is +direct opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less +probable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one +side, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side +may be true.</p> + +<p>705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions +are present:</p> + +<p>(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument +that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion +that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is +strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure +writer, it is only slightly probable.</p> + +<p>(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from +authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of +action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily +solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St. +Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic +baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses +(e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in +theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.</p> + +<p>(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if +they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly, +if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side, +the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth. +Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative +degrees of probability in opposite opinions.</p> + +<p>706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be +certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows +the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.</p> + +<p>707. Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion +solidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:</p> + +<p>(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as +would appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by +quality rather than quantity—by the learning, prudence, impartiality, +and independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If +five distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same +conclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special +reputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an +opinion, the argument from authority is strong;</p> + +<p>(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as +suffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an +uneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one +person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent, +confessor, or teacher.</p> + +<p>708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as +truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow +such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.</p> + +<p>(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on +either side—that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.), +whether the doubt be of law or of fact.</p> + +<p>(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight +or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has +heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but +he is uncertain of the author’s standing as a theologian, and he +realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his +ideas solidly probable.</p> + +<p>(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid +probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can +lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful +conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work +of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own, +is probably excused from Mass. But the word “probably” makes him +uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.</p> + +<p>709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not +apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see +656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative +doubt:</p> + +<p>(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for +it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long +as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes +out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish +presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is +not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either +side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is +not forbidden is lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is +involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that +legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of +liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is +eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As +he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday +or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal, +making no undue delays.</p> + +<p>(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question, +one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the +lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of +the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see +above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of +liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not +intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example: +Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the +obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age; +but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of +sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications +that he is of that age.</p> + +<p>710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that +there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of +deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one +must decide against liberty:</p> + +<p>(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example: +Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a +valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen +years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the +law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if +necessary he must secure a dispensation.</p> + +<p>(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to +take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for +work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.</p> + +<p>711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of +the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty. +But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable, +one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the +nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.</p> + +<p>(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those +matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to +follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example: +The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the +Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that +rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would +be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in +cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.</p> + +<p>(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long +as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the +will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation +change one’s relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it +does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish +before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its +appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr. +Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers. +Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be +celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said +Compline.</p> + +<p>712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not +apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:</p> + +<p>(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on +obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as +declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples: +While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction +has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but, +thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not +arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209) +supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia +wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins, +but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is +solved by obtaining a dispensation.</p> + +<p>(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a +probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that +under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law +to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before +him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to +put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order +other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that +theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for +thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that +the Church does not require more.</p> + +<p>713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot +be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the +lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then, +though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not +probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while +hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are +that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius +has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.</p> + +<p>714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of +the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different +principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other +decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give +such rules as the following:</p> + +<p>(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use +the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one +or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only +slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave +obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against +the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has +been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must +decide for obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use +the principle _that what was done is to be held as rightly done_. +Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking +that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly, +should decide for validity.</p> + +<p>(c) In negative doubts of fact, use the principles that one should +judge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be +taken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors +that which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to +think that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may +decide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is +no good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the +negative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a +question about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a +person has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced, +the presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in +possession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age +of sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the +negative, since the law has been in possession.</p> + +<p>715. Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended, +we pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in +any and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or +unlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability +against an opposite probability.</p> + +<p>(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in +probability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was +explained above (see 712).</p> + +<p>(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the +question be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is +probability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think +that a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it +goes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain +persons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of +law, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason +to think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or +dispensed from it.</p> + +<p>(c) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether the law in +question be natural, divine or human—that is, in every case of law +where invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).</p> + +<p>716. The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he +who follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a +practically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the +opinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this +thesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given +Probabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists; +(b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the +superiority of Probabilism in practice.</p> + +<p>717. Extrinsic Arguments.—(a) The Church gave explicit approval to +Probabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which +Probabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit +approval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system +from the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527-1581), +down to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of +Probabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules +of law as the following in the Decretals: “Things that are odious +should be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely” (Rule +15); “Where the law is doubtful, follow the minimum” (Rule 30); “Where +the lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should +be against him” (Rule 57); “The kinder interpretation should be given +penal laws” (Rule 89).</p> + +<p>(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been +scientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors +solved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the +great theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same +principles as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was +formulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among +Catholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle +of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been +growing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today +to have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some +of the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not +confined to any particular school or body.</p> + +<p>718. Objections of Equiprobabilists.—(a) The praise given to St. +Alphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the +Saint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more +than one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676-1689), has expressed a +dislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more +than toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the +external forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience. +(b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been +formulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more +ancient system that is represented today in a milder form as +Equiprobabilism.</p> + +<p>719. Answer of the Probabilists.—(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism +in his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old +age, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not +free, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope +who expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from +any official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by +Probabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or +forbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere +toleration.</p> + +<p>(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a +systematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the +16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither +can make much of the argument of priority in time. As for +Equiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher +Rassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775).</p> + +<p>720. Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.—(a) Theoretical +Argument.—An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if +there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its +cessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable. +Therefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any +obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) Practical Argument.—Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on +confessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained +above (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh +probabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by +liberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied, +requiring only that one be convinced that one’s opinion is really +probable, and that one use it in good faith.</p> + +<p>721. The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving +cases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not +been clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the +proposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be +brought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).</p> + +<p>(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who +is subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one +is a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law +unwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is +lawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.</p> + +<p>722. The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:</p> + +<p>(a) As to the proposition that “an uncertain law does not oblige,” the +use of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of +the whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is +uncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide +for obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher +law; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the +mercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise, +and God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should +expose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears +to them to be of doubtful obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an +incomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of +vincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will +maintain that vincible ignorance excuses.</p> + +<p>723. The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that “an uncertain law +does not oblige,” cannot render law nugatory, since there is question +here only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance. +Neither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see +249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it +is true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It +does expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law +about which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not +obliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under +the intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all +uncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided +by any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more +probable opinions may be false.</p> + +<p>(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as +just remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is +judging about one’s duty in good faith.</p> + +<p>724. The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for +Probabilism—that “a law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly +probable opinion against its existence or for its cessation”—is +defended by the very definition of the term “uncertain.”</p> + +<p>A thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm +assent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the +uncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or +that which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of +opinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but +against which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so +firmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words, +such a law is uncertain.</p> + +<p>725. Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The +supposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the +interpretation of the legal axiom that “a doubtful law does not +oblige,” should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the +terms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other +rules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in +doubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems +more probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only +to cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt +in the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to +admit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other. +Thus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to +solve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the +system deals with.</p> + +<p>(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that +an opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no +opposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its +opposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability +on the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion +held, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable; +while greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make +one’s own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being, +and therefore not solidly probable.</p> + +<p>726. The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to +doubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of +the notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence +they apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable +lawfulness or unlawfulness.</p> + +<p>The rules quoted against Probabilism—there are some that might also be +quoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism—are opposed to it +only in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its +sphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and +possession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more +probable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to +be true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed, +unfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as +it is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can +receive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the +doubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be +refuted.</p> + +<p>(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the +opinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability; +for truth is the agreement of one’s judgment with the facts, +probability the appearance of such agreement on account of the +arguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater +probability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is +for liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less +probable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for +even the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of +moralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.</p> + +<p>727. Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by +Probabilists.—Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used +(see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater +still.</p> + +<p>(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if +they make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find +every sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and +dignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow, +now one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their +interests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling +to change or accept instruction.</p> + +<p>(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles, +will soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content +themselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty +Probabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.</p> + +<p>728. General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the +Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these +objections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended +and followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others, +but were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter +systems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no +detriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.</p> + +<p>(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There +is no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil, +and stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism. +But the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of +moral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is +not rightly understood or not rightly applied.</p> + +<p>729. The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:</p> + +<p>(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of +internal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must +seek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent +knowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their +opinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they +are wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.</p> + +<p>(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in +different instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion +that informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion +that informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit +contrary opinions to be used in the same case for one’s advantage +(e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to +secure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it +is invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).</p> + +<p>(c) Probabilism does not sanction the use of a probable opinion, unless +it has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to +be of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve +of the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of +doubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as +gravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently. +Example; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion +time, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful +whether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a +doubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion, +but it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without +cause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.</p> + +<p>730. The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus +answered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is +better; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one +ought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is +question of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain +course is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by +exceeding one’s authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used +when there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for +here all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.</p> + +<p>731. Compensationism.—Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians, +feeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up +to then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism, +which would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary +Probabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it +preferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called +Compensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion +against the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to +compensate for this course of action.</p> + +<p>732. The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the +use of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the +doubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting +against it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the +exercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that +suffices for exercising freedom.</p> + +<p>733. Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.—(a) Titus, a poor +man, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts. +He thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents +to Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both +debts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will +be subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very +bad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius, +the latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are +proportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less +probable opinion.</p> + +<p>(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask +pardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes +the obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed +to bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus +decides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if +the less probable opinion—that there is no obligation—be followed.</p> + +<p>734. The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the +two chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:</p> + +<p>(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it. +If one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one +knows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds +it as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now, +since one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason +proportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under +probable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for +using freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism), +but he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain +obligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a +probable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that +compensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.</p> + +<p>(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will +result, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the +evil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty +against a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs +an act from which will probably result the evil of a material +transgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by +so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of +material sin to which one exposes oneself.</p> + +<p>735. Criticisms from the Probabilists.—(a) The dictum that a doubtful +law obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is +no middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty, +unless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean, +then, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is +Tutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in +doubt).</p> + +<p>(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of +good to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct. +For there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger, +namely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance +of the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.</p> + +<p>736. Reply of the Compensationists.—(a) The principle that a doubtful +law obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law +deserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has +some better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention +to take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism +or hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that +there are two sides to one’s doubt.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the +burden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation +for the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in +itself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and +great evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits +acquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should +not become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so +great an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then +in order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.</p> + +<p>737. Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.</p> + +<p>(a) From Authority.—Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it +cannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was +unknown before this new system appeared.</p> + +<p>(b) From Reason.—It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in +the controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as +to obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor, +that of sufficient reason or compensation.</p> + +<p>(c) From Serviceability.—It is easy to say in the abstract that one +should always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in +favor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual +cases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison +of probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use +Compensationism is impossible, or impracticable.</p> + +<p>738. Reply of Compensationists.—(a) Compensationism is an example of +doctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles +on which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most +ancient authorities.</p> + +<p>(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by +all moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its +application to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an +innovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.</p> + +<p>(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those +who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for +moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear +from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted +principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend +it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized +its necessity.</p> + +<p>739. Practical Conclusions.—From the foregoing discussions one may +deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert +theologians:</p> + +<p>(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly +convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous +doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you +need not hesitate to follow your conscience.</p> + +<p>(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the +acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended +assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but +seek truth and decision.</p> + +<p>(c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of +what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or +another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for +any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience, +611 sqq.).</p> + +<p>740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems +of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a +“Meliorist,” for the better and more perfect is more advisable than +what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to +aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it +should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in +higher station higher things are required.</p> + +<p>(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a +“Certitudinist,” that is, one must resolve doubts or slight +probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above +in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a +Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in +661).</p> + +<p>(c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist, +when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme +rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).</p> + +<p>(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a +Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil +suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).</p> + +<p>(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general +moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).</p> + +<p>(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary +probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is +free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.</p> + +<p>(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is +less, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the +principles of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or +Compensationism, according to conviction.</p> + +<p>741. As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following +rules are generally admitted:</p> + +<p>(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral +system, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a +different moral system; for the Church allows liberty.</p> + +<p>(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral +system and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should +decide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but +for what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most +advantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a +Probabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that +are less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always +requires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act +unwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more +profitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation; +for those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be +recommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be +entirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an +obligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral +Theology, would see is controverted.</p> + +<p>742. In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to +whether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If +the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor +himself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the +requisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor +must prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided +therefore by his own conviction.</p> + +<p>(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the +confessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and +theologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a +well-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the +opinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent’s +opinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it +seems more prudent to leave him in good faith.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PART_II">PART II<br />SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY</h2> +</div> + + +<p>743. In the First Part of this work, the means to man’s Last End were +spoken of in a general way; the features that are common to all good +acts—that they be human, morally deserving, directed according to law +and conscience—were treated. In the present Part the means to the Last +End will be discussed in particular, and we shall consider in turn the +kinds of duties that are owed by all men and those owed by persons in +special states of life.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2>Question I<br />THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN</h2> +</div> + +<p>744. Good habits, specifically different, are all reducible to seven +most general virtues (see 150, 151), and hence in studying these seven +virtues, we shall at the same time study all the common duties of man.</p> + +<p>745. The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:</p> + +<p>(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: “This I pray, +that your charity may more and more abound” (Phil, i. 9). The increase +takes place _ex opere operato_ through the Sacraments, or _ex opere +operantis_ through meritorious works—that is, whenever sanctifying +grace, their root, is increased.</p> + +<p>(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost: +“I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first +charity” (Apoc., ii. 4); “Some have made shipwreck concerning the +faith” (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the +virtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the +moral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on +sanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.</p> + +<p>(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be +diminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites +(which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing +else that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them +cannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by +human exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen +grace on which they depend.</p> + +<p>(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are +diminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does +diminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are +exercised; and thus indirectly—that is, by preparing the way for acts +that are directly contrary—neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits +themselves.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_THE_VIRTUE_OF_FAITH">Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF FAITH</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 1-9.)</p> + +<p>746. The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given +by St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13—viz., faith, hope, charity. The order +of these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is +charity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I +Cor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same +time (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are +not simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.</p> + +<p>747. Excellence of the Virtue of Faith.—(a) Faith is the beginning of +the supernatural life, the foundation and the root of justification, +without which it is impossible to please God and arrive at fellowship +with Him. (b) It is an anticipation of the end of the supernatural +life, for by faith we believe that which we shall behold in the +beatific vision: “All these died according to faith, not having +received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them +and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth” +(Heb., xi. 13).</p> + +<p>748. Utility of Faith for the Individual.—(a) Through faith the +intellect receives a new light, which discloses to it a higher +world—“the wisdom of God in a mystery” (I Cor., ii. 7)—and which +illuminates even this lower world with a heavenly brightness, that man +may know more quickly, more surely, and more perfectly the natural +truths that pertain to God and duty. (b) The will is strengthened to +perform duties valiantly through the motives and examples which faith +offers: the patriarchs of old “by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought +justice, obtained promises, recovered strength from weakness” (Heb., +xi. 33). In adversity faith is a stay and a consolation: “For what +things soever were written, were written for our learning, that through +patience and the comfort of the scriptures, we might have hope” (Rom., +xv. 4).</p> + +<p>749. Utility of Faith for Society.—(a) Domestic society is defended in +its security and happiness by faith, which teaches the sacramental +character of marriage, which offers the model of the Holy Family to +Christian homes, which never ceases to declare in the name of God the +duties of husbands and wives, parents and children. (b) Without faith +and religion civil society cannot be maintained in strength and +prosperity. It is faith in God more than laws or armies that gives +security to life, reputation, and property, with order and peace at +home and abroad.</p> + +<p>750. The Meaning of Faith.—In Holy Scripture and other religious +writings the word _faith_ has various meanings.</p> + +<p>(a) Sometimes it stands for a promise, or for the quality of being true +to one’s promises. Examples: St. Paul condemns widows who remarry +against their word, “because they have made void their first faith +(promise)” (I Tim., v. 12). Speaking of the unbelief of the Jews, he +says: “Shall their unbelief make the faith (i.e., fidelity to promise +or faithfulness) of God without effect? God forbid. But God is true” +(Rom, iii. 3, 4).</p> + +<p>(b) Sometimes the term _faith_ stands for good reputation, or for +confidence in another. Examples: “He that discloseth the secret of a +friend loseth his faith (credit, reputation), and shall never find a +friend to his mind” (Ecclus., xxvii. 17); “O thou of little faith +(trust, confidence), why didst thou doubt?” (Matt., xiv. 31).</p> + +<p>(c) Sometimes _faith_ stands for truths or doctrines offered for one’s +belief, or for the assent of the mind to the judgment of conscience or +to the revelation of God. Examples: “Thou has not denied My faith” +(that is, “the truths revealed by Me,” Apoc. ii. 13); “All that is not +of faith (i.e., from the firm conviction of conscience) is sin” (Rom, +xiv. 23); “Without faith (i.e., assent to the unseen on the word of +God) it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must +believe” (Heb., xi. 6).</p> + +<p>751. It is faith only in the last sense that is known as the +theological virtue of faith, and hence with it alone we are here +concerned. St. Paul describes this faith as follows: “Faith is the +substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear +not” (Heb., xi. 1). This verse is variously interpreted. (a) According +to St. Chrysostom, the meaning is: Faith is the subsistence or +anticipated existence in the soul of future blessings that are hoped +for, through the firm confidence it gives; it is the conviction of the +reality of the unseen. (b) According to St. Thomas, the meaning is: +Faith is the substance or basis on which is built the hope of +blessedness, or on which rests as on its foundation the whole work of +justification; it is an argument producing certainty of that which is +not seen. The elements of St. Thomas’ interpretation have been +incorporated into the Vatican Council’s definition: “The Catholic +Church professes that this faith which is the beginning of human +salvation is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and +inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by +Him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of these things has been +perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority +of God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived” +(Sess. 3, chap. 3, Denz. 1789).</p> + +<p>752. Thus, faith is an intellectual habit and act, but it differs from +all other intellectual habits and acts as follows: (a) it differs from +science, vision, understanding, for its object is “the things that +appear not”; (b) it differs from opinion, doubt, suspicion, for it is a +firm “substance,” a certain “evidence”; (c) it differs from human faith +or belief resting on man’s word and promises, for it is the pledge, +beginning and cornerstone of the happiness promised by God Himself.</p> + +<p>753. Faith will now be considered according to two aspects: (a) +objectively, as regards the things that are believed by him who has +faith; (b) subjectively, as regards the habit and act of the believer +which put him in contact with these truths of the unseen world.</p> + +<p>754. The Object of Faith.—There is a twofold object of faith, viz., +material and formal.</p> + +<p>(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all +that is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by +tradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity, +or Supreme Truth in Being (_prima veritas in essendo_); the secondary +material object embraces all other revealed truths.</p> + +<p>(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give +assent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme +Truth in Knowing and Speaking (_prima veritas in cognoscendo et +dicendo_), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.</p> + +<p>755. The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God; +but, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a +distinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the +Church, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church +as revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that +has not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and +Catholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as +such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas +contained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The +Vatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and +Catholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in +the written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the +Church, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and +universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz. +1792).</p> + +<p>756. The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been +revealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain +truths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is +guaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special +difficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is, +definitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g., +that Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a +sense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately +elected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently +infallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from +revealed truth.</p> + +<p>Many theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological +conclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of +faith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical +faith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal +assent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the +Church as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the +Church in her teaching office.</p> + +<p>Others deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic +facts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in +universals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith +implicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that +theological conclusions before definition are held by theological +assent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have +maintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine +faith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see +Reginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., _Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum_, +pp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., _L’Evolution homogene du Dogme +Catholique_).</p> + +<p>757. Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an +object of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the +revelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death +of the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are +negatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such +revelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are +useful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the +case with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St. +Catherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true +divine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.</p> + +<p>758. The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it +is certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for +whom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens, +however, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically +established, and the Church does not require that such revelations be +accepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private +revelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.</p> + +<p>(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith, +since, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a +part of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from +them, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in +rejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying +the possibility of revelation).</p> + +<p>(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of +ecclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not +propose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching +office or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them, +therefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other +errors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected +with revelation) are also involved.</p> + +<p>(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith, +since the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters +of pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly +probable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable +testimony and documents (Benedict XIV, _De Canonizatione Sanctorum_, +lib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n. +3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these +revelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them +through pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.</p> + +<p>759. Similarly, although the Church offers for human faith alone +certain particular facts of history, one who rejects them may easily be +guilty of contempt or temerity. Such particular facts are: (a) +apparitions of heavenly beings in post-Biblical times, such as the +appearance of the Archangel Michael in Monte Gargano about 525 and the +appearance of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes in 1858, for which the +Church has instituted feasts; (b) deeds related in the legends of the +Saints, such as the victory of St. Catherine of Alexandria over the +pagan philosophers and the carrying of her body to Mt. Sinai by Angels, +which the Church inserts in the Breviary lessons; (c) the authenticity +of relics. In granting certificates of genuineness, the Church +guarantees only that there is sufficient historical evidence or +probability for the belief that particular bones or other objects +belonged to a particular Saint.</p> + +<p>760. Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of +infallibility—for example, decrees of the Popes not given _ex +cathedra_, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval, +teachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines +commonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain +conclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of +Catholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two +things, viz., external and internal assent.</p> + +<p>(a) External assent should be given such teachings—that is, the homage +of respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the +submission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific +examination of objections that seem very strong.</p> + +<p>(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching—that is, the +submission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the +teacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy +Spirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of +faith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the +possibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into +doubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his _Motu proprio_, “Praestantia +scripturae Sacrae” (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the +decrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal +decrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the +Biblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall +be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which +appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved +by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of +disobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as +they impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over +and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be +the cause before God by making other statements on these matters which +are very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical +Commission on Feb. 27, 1934.)</p> + +<p>761. The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to +the virtue of faith, are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as +contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in +the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit +and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in +exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.</p> + +<p>(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed +in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the +Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those +given in the Creeds, _ex cathedra_ definitions of the Popes, decisions +of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the +universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical +letters [see _Humani Generis_, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are +the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.</p> + +<p>(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its +object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not +revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise +of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that +is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic +facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of +the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special +recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of +private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that +is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical, +near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account +of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious, +suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of +their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc. +Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book +_Augustinus_, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and +“transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original +scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the _Filioque_.</p> + +<p>(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of +the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and +authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations +given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of +Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or +definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are +contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to +be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets +are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses, +and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are +in this class.</p> + +<p>(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal +matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her +position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It +would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief +which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.</p> + +<p>762. Though the truths of faiths are many, the duty of believing +imposes no great burden on the believer. Thus: (a) it is not required +that explicit belief be given to all the teachings of faith; (b) it is +not required that one distinguish the particular kind of assent in case +of uncertainty, but it suffices to yield assent according to the mind +and intention of the Church. Example: When a group of propositions is +condemned under various censures, no indication being made of the +censure that applies to particular propositions, it suffices to hold +that all of them are false, and that to each of them applies one or +more of the censures listed.</p> + +<p>763. Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the +object believed is unfolded or not to the mind.</p> + +<p>(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that +truth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself. +Example: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed +concerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according +to that distinct knowledge.</p> + +<p>(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known +or not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example: +He has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but +who accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not +know.</p> + +<p>764. Faith is implicit as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Improperly, faith is implicit, if one does not give assent, but is +prepared to give it, if necessary, or wishes to give it. These pious +dispositions are not the act of faith itself, but they are its +beginnings, or preparations leading up to it; they are good, but not +sufficient. Example: A pagan who says he would accept the Christian +creed, if he thought it were true, or who wishes that he could believe +it.</p> + +<p>(b) Properly, faith is implicit, if one gives assent to a truth by +accepting another in which it is contained, as a particular is +contained in a universal (e.g., he who explicitly accepts all the +truths of Christianity, implicitly accepts the Eucharist, even when in +good faith he thinks it is not revealed), or as an instrument is +involved in its principal cause (e.g., he who explicitly believes in +the Redemption implicity believes in Baptism, which is the instrument +by which Redemption is applied), or as means are contained in their end +(e.g., he who explicitly believes that eternal life is a reward, +implicitly believes that good works must be performed as a means to +that end), or as the reality is expressed in the figure (e.g., those in +the Old Testament who explicitly believed in the Paschal Lamb, +implicitly believed in the sacrifice of Christ of which the Paschal +Lamb was the figure), or as the assent of the disciple is bound up with +the assent of the teacher (e.g., the child who explicitly accepts as +true the doctrines of faith taught by his pastor, implicitly believes +the sense and implications contained in the latter’s instructions).</p> + +<p>765. The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced +to four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:</p> + +<p>(a) The things to be believed: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He +that believeth shall be saved” (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is +summarized in the Apostles’ Creed;</p> + +<p>(b) The things to be done: “Teach them to observe all things whatsoever +I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see +Vol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;</p> + +<p>(c) The ordinances to be observed; “Baptize them in the name of the +Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt, xxviii. 19). The +Seven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of +the Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;</p> + +<p>(d) The petitions to be made to God: “Thus shall you pray: Our Father, +etc.” (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ +teaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be +offered.</p> + +<p>766. Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation +(Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or +safeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.</p> + +<p>(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its +doctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all +scripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of +short and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that +the faith may be proposed and accepted.</p> + +<p>(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being +unchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines +would be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard +(Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I +Cor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).</p> + +<p>767. The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds, +since they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and +connected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity +being the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in +them as articles, but only those that have the following +characteristics:</p> + +<p>(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of +belief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and +the means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things, +which are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on +account of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the +wandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys +of St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.</p> + +<p>(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning +eternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or +difficult, for faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb., +xi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own +are considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries, +and hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the +Trinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the +Triune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the +Eucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in +the articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man +through Christ.</p> + +<p>768. Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?</p> + +<p>(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main +beliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been +an increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made +known His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the +end or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the +temporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man +(Heb., xi. 6).</p> + +<p>(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that +brought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous +revelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the +beginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus, +the nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity +were brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old +Testament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete +form by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii. +27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).</p> + +<p>(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the +revelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can +be an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the +Apostles’ Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the +Creed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope +could add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new +heresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation +already given should be brought out more clearly or fully.</p> + +<p>769. There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:</p> + +<p>(a) the Apostles’ Creed, which according to an early tradition was +composed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the +Gospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church, +which required that the catechumens learn and recite it before +receiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;</p> + +<p>(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the +Council of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of +Christ, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against +the Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy +Ghost;</p> + +<p>(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a +resume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and +Incarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning +of the fifth century.</p> + +<p>770. Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: “I +believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.”—(a) +“I believe,” i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His +mysterious truths; (b) “in God,” i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature +and three in persons; (c) “the Father,” i.e., our Maker and Provider, +from whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d) +“almighty,” i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with +every other perfection in the highest degree; (e) “Creator,” i.e., who +freely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or +effort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures; +(f) “of heaven and earth,” i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of +matter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit—in +other words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.</p> + +<p>771. Summary of the Second Article: “And in Jesus Christ, His only Son, +our Lord.”—(a) “Jesus,” a name given by command of God and meaning +“Saviour”; (b) “Christ,” i.e., “the anointed,” because He was King, +Priest, and Prophet; (c) “His only Son,” i.e., born of the Father before +all ages, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten +not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made; +(d) “our Lord,” for as God He shares all the perfections of the divine +nature, as man He has redeemed us and thus deservedly acquired the +title of Lord over us, while as the God-man He is the Lord of all +created things. It should be noted that there is nothing imperfect or +carnal in the generation of the Son, or in the procession of the Holy +Ghost, for God is a spirit and all-perfect.</p> + +<p>772. Summary of the Third Article: “Who was conceived by the Holy +Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.”—(a) “Who was conceived.” The +Only-begotten Son, the second Person of the Trinity, for us men and for +our salvation, became incarnate and was made man. Thus, the same Divine +Person is in both the divine and human natures, and the union preserves +the properties and the actions of both natures. (b) “By the Holy +Ghost.” At the moment when Mary consented to the announcement of the +angel, the body of Christ was formed in her womb from her flesh, the +rational soul was infused, and the divine and human natures were united +in the Person of the Word. Thus, Mary is truly the Mother of God. This +conception was miraculous, accomplished without the aid of man, through +the sole operation of the three Persons of the Trinity. Being an +external work of God in which love towards us is especially manifested, +the Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Ghost, who in the internal +life of the Deity proceeds as the mutual love of Father and Son. (c) +“Born of the Virgin Mary.” Mary was ever a virgin, before, during, and +after childbirth; immaculate and holy in soul; the spiritual Mother of +whom Christians are born in holiness.</p> + +<p>773. Summary of the Fourth Article: “Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was +crucified, dead and buried.”—(a) The effect of that which is contained +in this article is expressed in the words of the Nicene Creed, “for +us.” The passion and death of Christ, willed by Himself, accomplished +our salvation, as satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption; (b) The +manner in which this was brought about is declared in the words above +quoted. In His human nature Christ suffered agony and pain of body; He +was sentenced to death by the Roman governor and nailed to the cross. +His soul and body were separated in death, although the Divinity never +departed from either, and His dead body was laid in the tomb.</p> + +<p>774. Summary of the Fifth Article: “He descended into hell; the third +day He rose again from the dead.”—(a) “He descended.” After His death +the soul of Christ went to the abode of the departed, to liberate those +who were there. (b) “Into hell.” The name hell is applied in a wide +sense to all those secret abodes in which are detained the souls of +those who have not obtained the happiness of heaven—viz., the hell of +the damned, in which the impenitent suffer eternal pain of loss and +sense; purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by +temporary punishments; limbo, where the fathers of the Old Testament +awaited in peaceful repose the coming of Christ. It was this last abode +into which the soul of Christ entered. (c) “The third day”—i.e., on +Sunday morning, the third day after His burial. (d) “He rose again.” As +He had laid down His life by His own power, so He took it up again by +His own power. (e) “From the dead.” Christ not only returned to life, +He also conquered death; He rose to die no more, and thus He is first +in the final resurrection. (f) “According to the scriptures.” These +words are added in the Creed of Constantinople, to call attention to +the fact that the resurrection is the attestation of the truth of our +Lord’s claims and doctrine (I Cor., xv. 14, 17; Matt., xii. 39, 40).</p> + +<p>775. Summary of the Sixth Article: “He ascended into heaven, sitteth at +the right hand of God, the Father almighty.”—(a) “He ascended.” By His +own power as God and man Christ ascended into heaven. (b) “Into +heaven.” As God, He never forsook heaven, the Divinity being +omnipresent; but as man, body and soul, He ascended to the abode of +glory forty days after the resurrection. (c) “Sitteth at the right hand +of God the Father Almighty.” Christ is said to stand at the right hand +of God, inasmuch as He is our Mediator with the Father (Acts, vii. 55; +Heb., vii. 25; John, xiv. 2); He is said to sit at the right hand of +the Father to express the permanent possession of royal and supreme +power and glory (Eph., i. 20-22; Heb., i. 13).</p> + +<p>776. Summary of the Seventh Article: “From thence He shall come to +judge the living and the dead.”—There is a particular judgment at +death; at the end of the World, of which the time is uncertain, there +will be a general judgment, both of the living and the dead. Christ +will come a second time, and as Judge will pass sentence either of +eternal loss and pain or of eternal happiness.</p> + +<p>777. Summary of the Eighth Article: “I believe in the Holy Ghost.”—The +Third Person of the Trinity is equal to the Father and the Son, +proceeds from them both as their mutual love, and is spoken of, +therefore, by appropriation, as the Author of works of grace and +sanctification, in which especially the charity of God is manifested: +“The Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the +Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored +and glorified, who spoke by the prophets” (Creed of Constantinople).</p> + +<p>778. Summary of the Ninth Article: “I believe the Holy Catholic Church; +the Communion of Saints.”—(a) The Church pertains to the material, not +the formal object of divine faith (see 754), and hence it is not said: +“I believe in the Church.” We believe of the Church that she is the +visible society made up of the faithful scattered throughout the world, +called also the house of God (I Tim., iii. 15), the flock of Christ, +the spouse of Christ (II Cor., xi. 2), the body of Christ (Eph., i. 23; +Col., i. 24); that besides the Church militant on earth, composed of +both the good and the bad, and outside of which are unbelievers and the +excommunicated, there is the Church triumphant in heaven and the Church +suffering in purgatory; that there are four marks by which the true +Church may be recognized—viz., that she is one, holy, Catholic, and +Apostolic; that she is divine in her origin and possesses divinely +given powers. (b) “The Communion of Saints.” The members of the Church +have different offices, but there is among them a community of +spiritual goods, the Sacraments being a bond of union, and each one +profiting according to his condition in the good works done by others, +The Church suffering is assisted by our suffrages, while we in turn are +helped by the intercessions of the Church triumphant.</p> + +<p>779. Summary of the Tenth Article: “The forgiveness of sins.”—God +forgives all sins, when they are truly repented of, either through +Baptism (in case of sins before Baptism) or through the due exercise of +the power of the keys given the Church (in case of sins after Baptism). +Venial sins may be forgiven by private repentance.</p> + +<p>780. Summary of the Eleventh Article: “The resurrection of the +body.”—The soul is immortal, the body mortal. But at the end of the +world the bodies of all the dead, even though corrupted, shall be +restored and reunited with their principle of life—i.e., the soul to +which they belonged. Substantially, the risen body will be identical +with the mortal body, but it will have certain new qualities +corresponding to its new state.</p> + +<p>781. Summary of the Twelfth Article: “Life everlasting.”—Those who die +in the friendship of God will be received into unending happiness, in +which they will be exempted from all evil and enjoy the beatific vision +and other divine gifts.</p> + +<p>782. The Acts of Faith.—According to St. Paul, there are two acts of +faith, one internal, the other external: “With the heart we believe +unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation” +(Rom., x. 10). (a) The internal act of faith is the firm and constant +judgment of the intellect assenting to divine revelation (II Cor., x. +5), but freely and under the command of the will (Mark, xvi. 16), being +moved thereto by divine grace (Eph., ii. 5). (b) The external act of +faith is the profession before the world by signs, such as words or +deeds, of the internal assent given to divine revelation.</p> + +<p>783. The internal act of faith is one, but it has a threefold +relationship: (a) it believes about God, if we consider the intellect +as assenting to the material object; (b) it believes God, if we +consider the intellect as assenting to the formal object; (c) it +believes in God, if we consider the will as moving the intellect to +assent, and tending towards God as the Last End.</p> + +<p>784. The truths to which the assent of faith is given are either +supernatural or natural. (a) Supernatural truths or mysteries (e.g., +the Trinity of Persons in God) are revealed for faith, that man may +know, desire and work for the supernatural destiny to which he has been +raised. (b) Natural truths (e.g., the Oneness of God) are revealed for +faith, so that mankind may obtain more quickly, more generally, and +more certainly the knowledge of divine things which reason can afford. +It is impossible, however, that an act of faith and an act of knowledge +should coexist in the same individual about the same truth, for faith +is of things that appear not.</p> + +<p>785. The act of faith is a necessary preliminary to other supernatural +acts, for we do not tend towards the supernatural, unless we first +accept it by belief; hence, faith is necessary. But the act of faith +may also be made after other supernatural acts, like those of hope and +charity; and so it may be meritorious. (a) The act of faith is +necessary, both as a means and as a precept (see 360). The necessity of +means will be treated now, the necessity of precept later, when we +speak of the commandments of faith (see 913 sqq.). (b) The act of faith +before justification is meritorious congruously and in a wide sense; +but after justification it has condign merit (see 110).</p> + +<p>786. For all adults the act of faith is necessary for salvation as a +necessity of means (see 360), for the Apostle says: “Without faith it +is impossible to please God” (Heb., xi. 6). The truths which must be +believed under necessity of means are of two kinds. (a) One must +believe with implicit faith all revealed truths which one does not know +and is not bound to know. An act of implicit faith is contained in the +formula: “O my God, I firmly believe all the truths the Catholic Church +teaches, because Thou hast revealed them.” (b) One must believe with +explicit faith all the truths which one is bound to know. An act of +explicit faith in all the truths necessary by necessity of means is +contained in the Apostles’ Creed. Other truths that must be explicitly +believed on account of a necessity of precept will be discussed in 918, +920.</p> + +<p>787. What specifically are the truths just referred to that all are +bound to know as a necessary means? (a) Theologians generally agree +that it has always been necessary for adults to know and accept two +basic mysteries—God’s existence, as the supernatural End or happiness +of man, and His providence as exercised in supplying the means +necessary for supernatural salvation (see 768). Without such belief, +supernatural hope and charity, at all times necessary, are impossible. +(b) A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it +seems, that since the promulgation of the Gospel it is necessary for +adults to know and accept the two basic mysteries of Chrisitanity— +viz., that in God, who is our beatitude, there are three persons (the +Trinity), and that the way to our beatitude is through Christ our +Redeemer (the Incarnation).</p> + +<p>788. Even before the Gospel, it was always necessary as a means that +one believe explicitly in God as our supernatural happiness and as the +provider of the means thereto. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the +ancient patriarchs, says: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He +is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him” (Heb., xi. 6). He that +would come to God (i.e., be saved), must believe in God as the Author +of glory and of grace. Hence, one must believe: (a) that God exists, +who is not ashamed to be called our God, and who prepares for us a +better, that is, a heavenly country (Heb., xi. 6); (b) that God is a +remunerator, from whom must be expected the working out of His promises +and the helps to attain the reward, as well as the meting out of +justice. In this faith is included implicitly a faith in Christ, and +thus in the Old Testament a belief, at least implicit, in the Messiah +to come was always necessary: “Man is not justified by the works of the +law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ” (Gal., ii. 16).</p> + +<p>789. Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also +necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of +the Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not +accept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: “Go ye into the whole world, +and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be +condemned” (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).</p> + +<p>(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite +opinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative +infidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination +and Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that +belief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a +precept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those +who say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means +for justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that +regularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is +allowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation +of the Gospel in many regions).</p> + +<p>(b) Practically, this opinion is safer, and hence all theologians, even +Probabilists, hold that one must act as if it were true and certain, +whenever it is possible to give instruction on the Trinity and +Incarnation.</p> + +<p>790. Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by +which one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which +one knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a +more profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on +account of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but +substantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be +saved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about +the four great mysteries:</p> + +<p>(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will +take us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one +understand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the +definition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of +beatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.</p> + +<p>(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three +divine Persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct +and equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction +between nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions +and properties.</p> + +<p>(c) God provides for us, giving us the helps we need, and also, if we +serve Him, the reward He has promised. It is not necessary that one +understand the theology of providence, grace, and merit.</p> + +<p>(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for +us, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to +heaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in +Christ there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of +the Word.</p> + +<p>791. Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it +is not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge +of the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death, +it is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in +substantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person +must first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when +instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about +the Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it +is probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a +necessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>792. Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of +receiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries +are an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to +one who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries +above mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be. +Absolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably +valid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration, +and as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be +distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is +in substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a +person should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief +instruction then and there, if there is time.</p> + +<p>(b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in +substantial ignorance about the Trinity and Incarnation may be absolved +conditionally, for the reason given in the similar case of Baptism.</p> + +<p>(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial +ignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid, +since the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a +necessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the +principles of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While +ignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his +confessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.</p> + +<p>793. In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or +absolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to +receive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is +substantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace +and glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is +substantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own +fault, and is unwilling to hear about them.</p> + +<p>794. Practical rules for granting the Sacraments in case of doubt or +urgency to those who seem to be indisposed on account of substantial +ignorance are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) In danger of death, when instruction is out of the question, if +there is doubt about his ignorance, the dying person should be given +the benefit of the doubt.</p> + +<p>(b) In danger of death, and when instruction is impossible, if there is +doubt about the mental ability of the dying person and his obligation +to have explicit faith, he should receive the benefit of the doubt.</p> + +<p>(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is +needed and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: “Let us say +the act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, +who has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love +Him, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being +received into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the +Son of God, who became man and died for my salvation.” This or a +similar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present +in baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate +danger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short +instruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty +of receiving fuller instruction later on.</p> + +<p>795. Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect +to the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human +nature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and +is meritorious: “By faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises” +(Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of +faith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of +God in giving one’s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of +faith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent +of credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only +the part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact +that a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the +doctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which +one assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments, +such as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are +miracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of +those who delivered the revelation, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human +arguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths +that can be established by natural reason (such as the existence +of God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who +demonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge, +not belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if, +while knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the +authority of revelation.</p> + +<p>(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments +for the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation +that are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation), +provided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for +the confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as +he is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is +a sign, not of little, but of great faith. “Be ready always,” says St. +Peter (I Peter, iii. 15), “to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason +of that hope which is in you.” And St. Anselm says: “It appears to me a +sign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not +take pains to understand what we believe.” St. Thomas writes: “When a +man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and +takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and +with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith, +but is a sign of greater merit.”</p> + +<p>(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the +formal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for +then one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the +word of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to +support it.</p> + +<p>The attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural +reason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: “He that is a +searcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory” (Prov., xxv. 27); +“Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into +things above thy ability” (Ecclus., iii. 22); “Faith loses its merit, +if it is put to the test of reason” (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).</p> + +<p>796. Besides the internal act of acceptance of revealed truth, faith +has also external acts. (a) It commands the external acts of the other +virtues, that is, acts directed to the specific ends of those virtues. +Hence, one who fasts exercises an external act of the virtue of +temperance, but it is his faith in the virtue that commands the fast. +(b) Faith elicits the external act of profession of faith as its own +proper external act directed to its own specific end: “I believed, for +which cause I have spoken” (Ps. cxv. 10; II Cor., iv. 13). External +profession of faith, therefore, is not an act proceeding from faith; it +is an act of faith. The necessity of this act will be considered below +in the article about the commandments of faith.</p> + +<p>797. The Habit of Faith.—Faith is not only an act that passes, but it +is also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the “most +great and perfect promises” which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3 +sqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just +like hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things +sweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures +internal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the +ends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to +a supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along +with grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council +of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).</p> + +<p>798. The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican: +“Faith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God’s +grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an +intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural +reason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.”</p> + +<p>799. Hence, the virtue of faith has the following properties:</p> + +<p>(a) It is supernatural, not only because its object and motive are +supernatural, but because it proceeds from a supernatural principle, +i.e., grace (John, vi, 29; Eph., ii. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no +intrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed +see God, for “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then +face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he +knows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is +about truths that surpass reason—things “that appear not.” This, of +course, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light +added to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance +of faith are not evidently credible.</p> + +<p>(c) It is free, because, although one cannot dissent from that which is +evident intrinsically (e.g., that two and two make four), one is able +to dissent from that which is obscure.</p> + +<p>(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in +which one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and +the truth of His revelation. “Jesus said to her (Martha): I am the +resurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him: +Yea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.” (John, xi. +25-27).</p> + +<p>(e) It is firm and unshaken in a far higher degree than the assent of +understanding and science, since it rests on the infallible authority +of God (I Thess., ii. 13).</p> + +<p>800. Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act +performed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the +infusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But +there are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and +hence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii. +26).</p> + +<p>(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This +latter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as +it directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives +meritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join +to belief a life in agreement with belief—that is, the state of grace, +love of God and good works.</p> + +<p>(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true +virtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper +end; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed +to the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who +believe, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of +importance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead +faith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect +attendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.</p> + +<p>801. Those who have, or who had faith, are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in +Paradise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of +the beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in +the friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the +friendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith +(see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.</p> + +<p>802. Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have +vision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ +while on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately +even one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above +the authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of +faith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the +lost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue +infused by God. “The devils believe and tremble” (James, ii. 19), but +their belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.</p> + +<p>803. Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith. +Thus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv. +31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv. +28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to +accept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?</p> + +<p>(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the +formal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other +motive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence +than any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the +exclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not +be supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect +should feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural +truth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion +and confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more +vehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect +the faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another, +according as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his +acceptance of God’s Word than another.</p> + +<p>(b) Faith must be universal, that is, we must accept the entire +material object of revelation, and none may pick and choose according +to his likes or fancies, for all of revelation has God for its Author. +In this respect the faith of all is equal, all believers accepting +twelve articles, while those who accept eleven or six or one or none, +are not believers. But faith need not be explicit as to all its +doctrines, and hence, while one believer who is not thoroughly +instructed may know only the twelve articles of the Creed, another +believer who is better instructed may know the hundreds of other truths +that are contained in the articles. In this way the faith of one is +greater extensively.</p> + +<p>804. Can faith grow or decline in the same person? (a) If there is +question of acts of faith, the later acts can be more or less firm or +fervent than those that preceded, in the way explained in the previous +paragraph. In this sense we may understand the Apostles to have asked +of our Lord a higher degree of faith, that they might work miracles in +His name (Luke, xvii. 5). (b) If there is question of the habit of +faith, it itself is increased at every increase of sanctifying grace +(see 745). St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (II Cor., x. 15) that he +has hope of their “increasing faith.” Moreover, by repeated acts of +faith the ease and delight with which the habit is exercised increases, +as is the case with acquired habits. But the habit of faith is not +diminished directly as was explained regarding the infused virtues in +general (see 745).</p> + +<p>805. The means of growing in faith are: (a) prayer to the Father of +lights: “Lord, increase our faith” (Luke, xvii. 5); (b) reading of the +scriptures, the Lives of the Saints and other similar works, and +attendance at spiritual instructions; (c) frequent acts of faith in the +world we see not and its coming rewards; (d) exercise of faith, by +directing our thoughts, words, and actions according to the teaching of +faith, rather than according to the maxims of the world; for “the just +man liveth by faith” (Heb., x. 38), and “faith without works is dead” +(James, ii. 20).</p> + +<p>806. The cause of faith is God. (a) It is God who directly through +revelation, or indirectly through the Church, the evangelists, +preachers, etc., “brings the message before man” (Rom., x. 15); (b) it +is God who “causes the mind of man to assent” to His message. No matter +how persuasive the teacher or how well disposed or learned the hearer +may be, faith will not come unless the light of grace leads the way +(Eph., ii. 8).</p> + +<p>807. The effects of faith are fear of God and purification of the +heart. (a) Dead faith causes one to fear the penalties of divine +justice, that is, to have servile fear (James, ii. 19): living faith +causes one to fear sin itself, that is, to have filial fear. (b) Faith, +by elevating man to higher things, purifies his soul from the +defilements of lower things (Acts, xv. 9): if faith is dead, it at +least purifies the intellect from error; if it is living, it also +purifies the will from evil.</p> + +<p>808. The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.—As was said above (see +159), the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are intended as means for perfecting +the theological virtues. There are two Gifts that serve the virtue of +faith, namely, the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.</p> + +<p>(a) Faith, being assent, must have a right idea of what is proposed for +acceptance; but, as it is obscure (see 799), and as there are things +apart from faith that may corrupt our notion of it, the Gift of +Understanding is conferred, a simple perception and divine intuition +through which one receives a correct notion of the mysteries of faith.</p> + +<p>(b) Faith, being the starting point of all supernatural activities, +must be the norm by which we judge of what we should think and do in +the affairs of life; but, as it is a simple act of assent (see 799) and +as the creatures of the world are a temptation and a snare (Wis., xiv. +11), the Gift of Knowledge is given, through which one receives a +correct judgment about the things of this world. These then take on a +new and fuller significance in the light of the teachings of faith.</p> + +<p>809. The Gift of Understanding must not be confused with the Beatific +Vision. (a) A perfect penetration of the mysteries, which enables one +to perceive their essence and causes (e.g., the how and the why of the +Trinity), is given by the Beatific Vision; but such understanding +removes all obscurity, and is therefore insociable with faith. (b) An +imperfect penetration of the teachings of faith, which does not take +away the obscurity and mysteriousness, is given by the Gift of +Understanding, and is therefore sociable with faith. The effects of +this Gift are: it distinguishes the truths of faith from false +doctrines; it conveys a clear view of the credibility of the mystery of +faith against all difficulties and objections; it gives knowledge of +the supernatural import of the secondary truths of faith, that is, of +those revealed happenings and facts that are not themselves +supernatural (Luke, xxiv. 32); it gives understanding of the practical +aspect of a mystery—for example, that the intratrinitarian relations +of the Divine Persons are a model for the regulation of the Christian +life, in knowledge and love of divine things.</p> + +<p>810. The Gift of Knowledge, which like the other Gifts is had by all +the just, must not be confused with sacred knowledge or theology, nor +with the extraordinary gifts of infused knowledge and the charism of +knowledge.</p> + +<p>(a) The Gift of Knowledge resembles theology in that it reproduces +objectively what reason does when it argues from the visible world to +the invisible Creator; but, while subjectively theology is the result +of study in which one passes successively from premise to conclusion. +Knowledge is the result of a divine light that may be found even in the +illiterate, and it takes in at a glance all that is contained in a +process of argumentation. Through this Gift the wonders of nature, the +events of history, the arguments of philosophy, lead one firmly and +spontaneously to the Last End and the supernatural realities of faith.</p> + +<p>(b) Infused knowledge may have for its object things purely natural +(such as truths of philosophy and the ability to speak foreign +languages), while the Gift of Knowledge is concerned only with faith, +judging what is to be believed or done according to faith.</p> + +<p>(c) The charism of knowledge (I Cor., xii. 8) is a grace given one for +the benefit of others, by which one is able to communicate to them +successfully the teachings of faith; the Gift of Knowledge, on the +contrary, proceeds from the habit of sanctifying grace, and is intended +for the benefit of its recipient.</p> + +<p>811. To each of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost correspond Beatitudes and +Fruits (see 159).</p> + +<p>(a) To the Gift of Understanding corresponds the Sixth Beatitude: +“Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.” For by +Understanding the mind is pure from wrong ideas of truth, and sees that +God is above all that the intellect can comprehend. The two fruits that +proceed from Understanding are faith (i.e., conviction about revealed +truth) and ultimately joy, in union with God through charity. (b) To +the Gift of Knowledge corresponds the Third Beatitude: “Blessed are +they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” For by Knowledge one +judges rightly about created things, grieves over the wrong use made of +them, and is comforted when they are turned to their proper end.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_THE_SINS_AGAINST_FAITH">Art. 2: THE SINS AGAINST FAITH</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 10-15.)</p> + +<p>812. The sins against faith can all be reduced to four heads: (a) sins +of unbelief (see 813-886), which are opposed to the internal act of +faith; (b) sins of blasphemy (see 887-903), which are opposed to the +external act of faith; (c) sins of ignorance (see 904-911), which are +opposed to the Gift of Knowledge; (d) sins of blindness and dullness +(912), which are opposed to the Gift of Understanding.</p> + +<p>813. The Sin of Unbelief.—Unbelief in general is a want of faith. It +is of two kinds, negative and positive.</p> + +<p>(a) Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in a person who has never +heard of it at all, or only insufficiently. Thus, the Indians in +America before the coming of Christian missionaries were negative +unbelievers. This kind of unbelief is a punishment, since it results +from original sin; but it is not a sin itself, and those who die in +negative unbelief are lost, not on account of this, but on account of +sins against the natural law (John, xv. 22; Rom., x. 14). With this +kind of unbelief we are not here concerned.</p> + +<p>(b) Positive unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard it +sufficiently, so that the lack of it is due to his own fault. This kind +of unbelief is, of course, a sin, for it supposes that one is acting +against the light one has received.</p> + +<p>814. Positive unbelief is either a refusal or a renouncement of faith. +(a) Ordinary unbelief is a refusal of faith, that is, non-acceptance of +faith by one who has never had faith; (b) apostasy, or desertion, is +the abandonment of faith by one who formerly accepted it. This is not a +distinct kind of unbelief, since, like ordinary unbelief, it has for +its object or term the denial of revealed truth; but it is an +aggravating circumstance of unbelief (II Peter, ii. 21).</p> + +<p>815. The sin of unbelief is, committed either directly or indirectly. +(a) It is committed directly, when one rejects what pertains to faith +(its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed indirectly, when one +guiltily places oneself or others in the occasion or danger of +unbelief. The dangers against faith will be considered after the sins +of unbelief (see 848-886).</p> + +<p>816. Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that +belong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition +(see 751, 798). (a) Opposed to the act of assent are sins of non-assent +or dissent (see 817-839); (b) opposed to the certitude and firmness of +assent are sins of doubt (840-846); (c) opposed to the right object of +faith are sins of credulity (847); (d) opposed to the motive of faith +is rationalism (847).</p> + +<p>817. Sins of non-assent are those by which one omits to make an act of +faith when one should. This kind of sin will be treated when we come to +the commandments of faith as to its internal and external acts (see 925 +sqq.)</p> + +<p>818. Sins of dissent are sins of commission, and are of two kinds: (a) +privative unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the +faith sufficiently and should realize the obligation of embracing it, +but who refuses to believe, although he makes no opposition to faith; +(b) contrary unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard +the faith and its motives of credibility sufficiently to know the duty +of embracing it, and who not only refuses to believe, but even accepts +the errors opposed to faith.</p> + +<p>819. What is the gravity of sins of dissent, doubt, and rationalism? +(a) From their nature, these sins are always mortal, for they refuse to +God the homage of the intellect and will that is due Him, deprive man +of the beginning of spiritual life, and lead to eternal condemnation +(Mark, xvi. 16). (b) From their circumstances, these and other sins +against faith may be venial (see 180-184). Thus, if a man refuses to +believe or accepts error, not having sufficient knowledge of his +obligation or not fully consenting to the sin, his fault is venial +subjectively or formally.</p> + +<p>820. Are sins against faith more serious than all other kinds of sin? +(a) From their nature, sins against faith are worse than sins against +the moral virtues, for the former offend directly against God Himself, +but not so the latter. Hatred of God, however, is a greater sin than +sins of unbelief, as will be shown when we treat of sins against +charity. (b) From their circumstances, sins against faith may be less +serious than sins against the moral virtues. Example: A venial sin +against faith is less serious than a mortal sin against justice.</p> + +<p>821. With regard to the effect of sins against faith on good acts it +should be noted: (a) an unbeliever is able to perform works that are +ethically or naturally good (Rom., ii. 14), and the Church has +condemned the opposite teaching of Baius (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n. +1025). (b) an unbeliever is not able to perform works that are +supernaturally good and meritorious (see 112).</p> + +<p>822. Contrary unbelief (see 818), which not only refuses to believe but +also assents to contrary errors, has three degrees according to the +greater or less number of truths denied or errors admitted in these +three degrees. Some theologians see different species of unbelief, +while other theologians regard them as only accidental modes or +circumstances of the one species of sin.</p> + +<p>(a) The most extensive denial of faith is found in infidelity, which +rejects both Christ and His revelation. To this form of unbelief belong +atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, paganism, polytheism, animism, and +denials of Christ and Christianity. The chief religious bodies today +that profess such errors are: Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism +(founded in China and Japan), which are polytheistic and practise +idolatry and ancestor worship; Brahmanism (founded about 14 centuries +before Christ), which is polytheistic or animistic: Buddhism (founded +6th century B.C. in India), which is polytheistic and practises +idolatry; Zoroastrianism (founded in Persia about the 7th century +B.C.), which is dualistic; Mohammedanism (founded in Arabia in the +6th century A.D.), which makes Mohammed and his religion superior to +Christ and Christianity, and rejects the Trinity and the Incarnation. +(b) A less complete departure from faith is found when Christ and His +revelation are accepted as contained in the figures and prophecies of +the Old Testament, but rejected in their fulfillment and development in +Jesus and the New Testament. This is the error of Judaism, which today +has about 15 million adherents.</p> + +<p>(c) A still smaller degree of rejection of faith exists when Christ +is recognized as leader and teacher, but not all of His revelation +is accepted. This kind of error is called heresy, and those bodies +which profess it are known as sects. The chief heresies in times past +were Gnosticism and Manicheism in the first centuries; Arianism and +Macedonianism in the fourth century; Nestorianism, Monophysism and +Pelagianism in the fifth century; Monothelism in the seventh century; +Iconoclasm in the eighth century; Photianism in the ninth century; +Albigensianism in the eleventh century; Waldensianism in the twelfth +century; Wicliffism in the fourteenth century; Hussism in the fifteenth +century; Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Modernism in the +twentieth century. Today, the erring Christian groups outside the +Church are the Orientals, called Orthodox, and the Protestants.</p> + +<p>823. Since error is not consistent, false teachings are found that +accept all the above-mentioned degrees of unbelief, or borrow +impartially from all.</p> + +<p>(a) Indifferentism or Latitudinarianism holds that all forms of +religion are equally true, and that it makes no difference whether +one is Buddhist, Jew or Christian. In a modified form, Indifferentism +teaches that any form of Christian belief, provided it suits the +inclinations of the individual concerned, may be followed, and hence it +is left to each one to decide whether he prefers Catholicism or one of +the bodies of the Orthodox Church or of Protestantism. Many who profess +a denominational creed or confession are Indifferentists in belief.</p> + +<p>(b) Syncretism holds that there are truths in all separate religions, +but that none of them has all the truth, and hence that one must select +what is good from each, rejecting the evil. Thus, the Judaizers of the +first century borrowed from Judaism, the Gnostics and Manicheans from +paganism, while today Freemasonry, Theosophy, Christian Science and +Spiritism accept, along with the Gospel, ancient pagan, Buddhistic, +Brahmanistic and Mohammedan theories; finally, Mormonism endeavors to +unite characteristics of the Old and the New Testament dispensations. +In a restricted form, religious Syncretism teaches the doctrine of +Pan-Christianism—that is, that truth is scattered among the various +Christian denominations, and that all should confederate as equals on +the basis of more important doctrines to be agreed on by all.</p> + +<p>824. What is the order of gravity in unbelief, as between infidelity, +Judaism, heresy?</p> + +<p>(a) The gravity of a sin against faith is to be determined primarily +from the subjective resistance made to faith, so that he sins more +against the light to whom greater light was given. The sin of unbelief +in one who has received the Gospel (heresy), is greater than the same +sin in one who has accepted only the Old Testament (Judaism); in one +who has received the revelation of the Old Testament (Judaism) the +sin of unbelief is more serious than the same sin in one who has not +received that revelation (infidelity).</p> + +<p>(b) The gravity of unbelief is measured secondarily from the objective +opposition of error to truth, so that he is farther away from faith who +is farther away from Christ and the Gospel. Thus, a Buddhist denies +Christian truths more radically than a Jew, and a Jew more radically +than a Protestant. Hence, of three apostates, one to Protestantism, +another to Judaism and a third to Buddhism, the second sins more +grievously than the first, the third more grievously than the second.</p> + +<p>825. If we leave out of consideration the radical truth of divine +revelation (formal object of faith), it is possible that a heretic, +in spite of his acceptance of Christ and the scriptures, should be +farther away objectively from faith than an infidel—that is, that he +should deny more revealed truths (material objects of faith). Thus, the +Manicheans called themselves followers and disciples of Christ, but +their teaching on God contains more errors than does the doctrine of +many pagans.</p> + +<p>826. Heresy.—Heresy is defined as “an error manifestly opposed to +faith and assented to obstinately by one who had sincerely embraced the +faith of Christ.”</p> + +<p>(a) It is called “error,” that is, positive assent given to error, or +dissent from truth. Hence, those who merely act or speak as if they do +not believe, but who internally do believe, are not heretics, although +in the external forum they may fall under the presumption of heresy. +Similarly, those who have doubts or difficulties in matters of faith, +but who do not allow these to sway their judgment, are not guilty of +heresy, since they give no positive assent to error (see 842 sqq.). +Examples: Titus is internally convinced of the truth of the Church’s +teaching; but he attends Protestant services, says he does not believe +the Trinity, refuses to make a profession of faith required by the +Church, separates himself from obedience to the authorities of the +Church, and calls himself an independent. By his former external acts +he makes himself guilty of disobedience and falls under the suspicion +of heresy, and by his last external act he incurs the guilt of schism; +but, since internally he does not disbelieve, he is not a heretic. +Balbus has doubts before his mind from his reading or conversation, but +he must immediately give his whole attention to a very pressing matter +of business, and so gives neither assent nor dissent to the doubts. He +is not guilty of heresy, since he formed no positive erroneous judgment.</p> + +<p>(b) Heresy is “opposed to faith.” By faith here is understood divine +faith, especially divine and Catholic faith (see 755). Hence, an error +opposed to what one held to be a genuine private revelation, or to the +public revelation, especially when dogmatically defined by the Church, +is heretical. On the contrary, an error opposed to ecclesiastical faith +alone, to human faith, or to human science, is not of itself heretical. +Examples: The Saints who received special private revelations from +Christ with proofs of their genuineness would have been guilty of +heresy, had they refused to believe. Sempronius refuses to believe some +Biblical teachings about things not pertaining to faith and morals and +not expressly defined by the Church (e.g., chronological, physical, +geographical, statistical data). If he really believes that what he +denies is contained in the Bible, he is guilty of heresy. Balbus admits +the infallibility and authority of the Church, but he does not believe +that a certain Saint solemnly canonized is in heaven, that a certain +non-infallible decision of a Roman Congregation is true, that certain +second lessons of the Breviary or certain relics are genuine. He is +not a heretic, since, as supposed, he denies no revealed truth; but +in his first unbelief he sins against ecclesiastical faith; in his +second unbelief, if the contrary of the decision has not been clearly +established, he sins against the duty of religious assent; in his +third unbelief, he sins against prudence, if he has no good grounds +for his opinion, or against the respect due the Church, if he is moved +by contempt for its judgment. In a conversation between A, B, C, D +and E, the following opinions are defended. A thinks that any use of +natural knowledge with reference to matters of faith is wrong; B, that +the theologian should employ mathematics and physical science, but +avoid reasoning and philosophy; C, that the method and principles of +Scholasticism are not suited to our ago or to all peoples; D, that the +psychology and cosmology of the Scholastics should be remade entirely; +E, that many hypotheses of Aristotle in physics have been proved false. +The opinion of A contains heresies condemned in the Vatican Council +regarding the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. The +opinions of B and C are at least contrary to the religious assent due +the authority of the Church (see Denzinger, Enchiridion, nn. 1652, +1680, 1713, Code of Canon Law, Canon 1366, Sec.2, _Humani Generis_, n. +11-14). The opinion of D, as it stands, contains a denial of several +doctrines of faith, such as the immortality of the soul and the +creation of the world, and is thus implicitly heretical. The opinion of +E is true and admitted by all.</p> + +<p>(c) By “opposed” to faith is meant any judgment which, according to the +logical rules of opposition between propositions, is irreconcilable +with the truth of a formula of dogma or of a censure of heresy. +Examples: The Council of Trent defined that “all sins committed after +Baptism can be forgiven in the Sacrament of Penance.” It would be +heretical, therefore, to hold that “no sins committed after Baptism can +be pardoned in the Sacrament of Penance” (contrary opposition), or that +“some sins committed after Baptism cannot be absolved” (contradictory +opposition), Similarly, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 7) +rejected the proposition that “all Works done before justification are +sinful,” and hence according to Logic the contradictory—viz., that +“some works before justification are not sinful”—is of faith, for two +contradictories cannot both be false; the contrary—viz., that “no +works before justification are sinful”—is not, however, defined, for +two contraries can both be false.</p> + +<p>(d) Heresy is “manifestly opposed to faith.” He who denies what is +only probably a matter of faith, is not guilty of heresy. Example: The +Instruction of Eugenius IV on the matter of the Sacraments is held by +some authorities of note not to be a definition, and hence those who +accept opposite theories are not on that account heretical.</p> + +<p>(e) Heresy is “assented to obstinately,” This is the distinctive note +of heresy, and hence those who assent to error through ignorance, +whether vincible or invincible, are not heretics, if they are willing +to accept the truth when known. A heretic, therefore, is one who +knowingly refuses to admit a truth proposed by the Church, whether his +motive be pride, desire of contradicting, or any other vice.</p> + +<p>(f) Heresy is held “by one who had sincerely embraced the faith of +Christ.” This includes only catechumens and the baptized, for others +who deny the truths of faith are Jews or infidels, not heretics.</p> + +<p>827. The sin of heresy (heresy before God), as just defined, differs +from the canonical crime of heresy (heresy before the Church), since +it is more inclusive. (a) These two differ as regards the error in the +intellect, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, even +without error—that is, if one denies what is really false, thinking +it to be defined doctrine; (b) they differ as regards the obstinacy in +the will, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one +is prepared in mind and purpose to deny a truth not yet defined, if it +is ever defined; (c) they differ as regards the truths rejected, for +one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one rejects divinely +revealed truths not defined as such by the Church; (d) they differ as +regards the person who denies, for not everyone who merely accepted the +faith of Christ can be guilty of the crime of heresy, but only those +who after Baptism retain the name of Christian (Canon 1325, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>828. Various Kinds of Heresy.—(a) Heresy is positive when error is +accepted (e.g., the doctrine of consubstantiation); it is negative when +truth is denied (e.g., the doctrine of transubstantiation).</p> + +<p>(b) Heresy is internal, when it is in the mind alone and not externally +professed. It is external, when expressed in an external way (i.e., +by words, signs, acts or circumstances that clearly indicate present +heresy), if this is done not for a good purpose, such as that of asking +advice, but for the purpose of professing error.</p> + +<p>(c) External heresy is occult, when it is made known to no one, or only +to a few; it is public or notorious, when it is made known before a +large number and cannot be concealed. Example: One who calls himself +a Catholic and is known as such, but who in conversation with a few +intimate friends declares himself a Modernist, is an occult heretic. +One who declares in public addresses or articles that he agrees with +Modernism, or who joins openly an heretical sect or has always belonged +to one, is a public heretic.</p> + +<p>(d) Occult and public heresy may be either formal or material, +according as one is in good or bad faith. Heresy is formal, if its +malice is known and willed by the one in error; if its malice is not +known by him, it is material.</p> + +<p>829. Heresy is not formal unless one pertinaciously rejects the truth, +knowing his error and consenting to it.</p> + +<p>(a) One must know that one’s belief is opposed to divine revelation +or to Catholic faith. Hence, those who were born and brought up in +Protestantism, and who in good faith accept the confession of their +denomination, are not formal but material heretics. Even those who +are ignorant of their errors through grave fault and who hold to them +firmly, are guilty, not of formal heresy, but of sinful ignorance (see +904 sqq.)</p> + +<p>(b) One must willingly consent to the error. But for formal heresy it +is not required that a person give his assent out of malice, or that +he continue in obstinate rejection for a long time, or that he refuse +to heed admonitions given him. Pertinacity here means true consent +to recognized error, and this can proceed from weakness (e.g., from +anger or other passion); it can be given in an instant, and does not +presuppose an admonition disregarded. Hence, if one sees the truth +of the Catholic Church, but fears that assent will involve many +obligations and out of weakness turns away from the truth, one then and +there pertinaciously consents to error.</p> + +<p>830. Examples of material heresy are: (a) Catholics who deny certain +dogmas of faith, because they have not been well instructed, but who +are ready to correct their errors, whenever the Church’s teaching is +brought home to them; (b) non-Catholics who do not accept the Catholic +Church, but who have never had any misgivings about the tenets of their +own denomination, or who in doubts have searched for the truth to the +best of their ability.</p> + +<p>831. The sinfulness of heresy is as follows: (a) formal heresy is a +grave sin, as was said above regarding unbelief in general (see 819; +Tit., iii. 10); (b) material heresy is no sin at all, if the ignorance +is invincible; it is a grave or a venial sin, according to the amount +of negligence, if the ignorance is vincible.</p> + +<p>832. Circumstances of the sin of heresy are of various kinds. (a) +Circumstances that change the species. Most theologians hold that +the particular article denied, or the particular sect adhered to, +does not constitute a particular species of heresy, and hence that +in confession it suffices for one to accuse oneself generically of +heresy. (b) Circumstances that aggravate the sin. The facts that heresy +is external, that it is manifested to a large number, that it is +joined with apostasy and adhesion to an heretical sect, etc., increase +the accidental malice of this sin. (c) Circumstances that multiply +the number of sins. It seems that when several articles or defined +truths are denied at the same time, so many numerically distinct sins +are committed (see 219). Example: Titus says: “I do not accept the +Resurrection, either of Christ or of the dead.” The act is one, but two +sins are committed.</p> + +<p>833. Various penalties and inhabilities are incurred through heresy, +for example, excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Pope +(Canon 2314), loss of the power of suffrage (Canon 167, Sec.1, n.4), +irregularity (Canon 984, n. 5; 985), inhability for the office of +sponsor (Canons 765, 795), deprivation of ecclesiastical burial (Canon +1240, Sec.1, n. 1). The excommunication which perhaps had been incurred +by those who now wish to join the Church is absolved according to the +form for the reception of converts prescribed by the Congregation of +the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, and found in rituals. Rituals published +after March, 1942, contain the formula of profession of faith and +abjuration approved by the Holy Office.</p> + +<p>834. If a confessor should meet with a case of heresy, his procedure +will be as follows: (a) If the heresy was merely internal, no censure +was incurred, and every confessor has power to absolve from the sin, +no matter how serious it was. (b) If the heresy was external, but the +person was in good faith, or even in affected ignorance of the sin, or +inculpably ignorant of the penalty, no censure was incurred; for the +excommunication attaches only to formal heresy, and contumacity (Canon +2242). (c) If the heresy was external and formal, but not notorious +(i.e., the party did not publicly join an heretical sect), ordinarily +the case should be brought before the bishop for absolution in the +external or internal forum. But in urgent cases every confessor has +power to absolve as prescribed in Canon 2254. (d) If the heresy was +public and notorious (i.e., if the party joined officially an heretical +sect), absolution is regularly to be given in both the external and +internal forums. The case should be submitted first to the Ordinary, +unless there is urgency (Cfr. Canon 2254), or the confessor has special +powers from Rome. The Ordinary can absolve in the external forum. +Afterwards, the heretic can be absolved by any confessor in the forum +of conscience (see Canon 2314, Sec.2.)</p> + +<p>835. Apostasy.—Apostasy (etymologically, desertion) has various +meanings in theology.</p> + +<p>(a) In a special sense, it means the abandonment of the religious or +clerical state; but in its usual sense it means the abandonment of the +Christian religion.</p> + +<p>(b) Apostasy from faith in a wide sense includes both partial +abandonment (heresy) and total abandonment; but, in the strict sense, +it means only total abandonment of Christianity.</p> + +<p>Example: A Christian who denies one article of the Creed becomes a +heretic and an apostate in a wide sense; if he rejects the entire +Creed, he becomes an infidel and an apostate in the strict sense.</p> + +<p>(c) Apostasy which extends to infidelity is also twofold: before God +and before the Church. The first kind is committed by any person +who really had faith, even though unbaptized or not a Catholic; the +second kind is committed only by those who were baptized and were +Catholics. Examples: A catechumen who accepted Christianity and asked +for Baptism, becomes an apostate before God if he abandons his belief +and purpose and goes back to paganism. Similarly, a person brought up +as a Lutheran becomes an apostate before God, if he abandons all belief +in Christianity. But the crime of apostasy of which the Church takes +cognizance is the desertion of Christianity by a baptized Catholic.</p> + +<p>(d) A Catholic apostatizes from Christianity, either privatively (by +merely renouncing all belief in Christ), or contrarily (by taking up +some form of unbelief, such as indifferentism or free thought, or by +joining some infidel sect, such as Mohammedanism or Confucianism).</p> + +<p>836. What was said above regarding the gravity, divisions, penalties +and absolution of heresy, can be applied also to apostasy.</p> + +<p>887. As to the comparative gravity of sins of apostasy, the following +should be noted. (a) Apostasy is not a species of sin distinct from +heresy, since both are essentially the same in malice, being rejections +of the authority of divine revelation; but it is a circumstance that +aggravates the malice of unbelief, since it is more sweeping than +heresy (see 822, 824). (b) Apostasy into one form of infidelity is +not specifically different from apostasy into another, but the form +of infidelity is an aggravating or extenuating circumstance. Example: +Paganism is further from faith than Mohammedanism; atheism further than +paganism.</p> + +<p>838. Could one ever have a just reason for abandoning the Catholic +Church or remaining outside its faith? (a) Objectively speaking, there +can never be a just cause for giving up Catholicism or for refusing +to embrace it. For the Catholic Church is the only true Church, and +it is the will of Christ that all should join it. (b) Subjectively +speaking, there may be a just cause for leaving or not entering the +Church, namely, the fact that a person, ignorant in this matter but +in good faith, believes that the Catholic Church is not the true +Church. For one is obliged to follow an erroneous conscience, and, +if the error is invincible, one is excused from sin (see 581-583). +Examples: A Protestant taught to believe that the teachings of the +Church are idolatrous, superstitious and absurd, is not blamed for not +accepting them. A Catholic, poorly instructed in religion and thrown +in with non-Catholic and anti-Catholic associates, might become really +persuaded, and without sinning against faith itself, that it was his +duty to become a Protestant.</p> + +<p>839. Apostasy is committed not only by those who leave the Church and +join some contrary religion (e.g., Mormonism), but also by those who, +while professing to be Catholics, assent to the non-Catholic principles +of some society that claims to be philosophical, charitable, economic, +patriotic, etc. Much more are those apostates who join societies that +openly conspire against the Church. Such are: (a) Societies that are +really non-Catholic sects, because they have an infidel or heretical +creed—e.g., Freemasonry (which, according to its own authorities, is +a brotherhood based on Egyptian mysteries and claiming superiority to +Christianity), Theosophy (which is a conglomeration of nonsensical +ideas about the Deity, Christ and Redemption), the Red International, +whose aims are the destruction of property rights, etc; (b) Societies +that are anti-Catholic sects, because their creed is hatred of the +Church—e.g., the Orangemen’s Society, the Grand Orient, the Ku Klux +Klan, Junior Order, etc.</p> + +<p>840. The Sin of Doubt.—Faith as explained above must be firm assent, +excluding doubt (see 752, 799), and hence the saying: “He who doubts +is an unbeliever.” The word “doubt,” however, has many meanings, and +in some of those meanings it is not opposed to firm assent, or has not +the voluntariness or acceptance of error that the unbelief of heresy or +infidelity includes. To begin with, doubt is either methodical or real.</p> + +<p>(a) Methodical doubt in matters of faith is an inquiry into the motives +of credibility of religion and the reasons that support dogma, made +by one who has not the slightest fear that reason or science can ever +contradict faith, but who consults them for the purpose of clarifying +his knowledge and of strengthening his own faith or that of others. +This kind of doubt is employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who questions +about each dogma in turn (e.g., “Whether God is good”), and examines +the objections of unbelievers against it; but unlike his namesake, the +doubting Apostle, he does not withhold assent until reason has answered +the objectors, but answers his own questions by an act of faith: “In +spite of all difficulties, God is good, for His Word says: ‘The Lord is +good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him’ (Lament, +iii. 25).”</p> + +<p>(b) Real doubt, on the contrary, entertains fears that the teachings +of revelation or of the Church may be untrue, or that the opposite +teachings may be true.</p> + +<p>841. Real doubt in matters of faith is always unjustifiable in itself, +for there is never any just reason for doubting God’s word; but it +is not always a sin of heresy or of infidelity. There are two kinds +of real doubt, viz., the involuntary and the voluntary. (a) Doubt is +involuntary, when it is without or contrary to the inclination of the +will, or when it proceeds from lack of knowledge (see 40-55 on the +Impediments to Voluntariness). Example: Indeliberate doubts, and doubts +that persist in spite of one, lack the inclination of the will, while +doubts that proceed from invincible ignorance lack knowledge. (b) Doubt +is voluntary, when it is according to inclination and with sufficient +knowledge.</p> + +<p>842. Involuntary doubt in matters of faith is neither heretical nor +sinful, for an act is not sinful, unless it is willed (see 99).</p> + +<p>(a) Indeliberate doubts arise in the mind before they are adverted to +and without any responsibility of one’s own for their appearance. From +what was said above on first motions of the soul (see 129), it is clear +that such doubts are not sinful.</p> + +<p>(b) Unwelcome doubts persist in the mind after they have been adverted +to, and, since faith is obscure (see 752, 799), it is not possible to +exclude all conscious doubts, or even to prevent them from occurring +often or lasting a considerable time. From what was said above on +temptation (see 253 sqq.), it is clear that, if the person troubled +with unwished doubts makes prompt and sufficient resistance, he not +only does not sin, but gains merit. But, if his resistance is not all +it should be, and there is no danger of consent to the temptation, he +sins venially.</p> + +<p>(c) Ignorant doubts occur in persons who have not received sufficient +religious instruction, through no fault of their own, and who therefore +regard the doctrines of faith as matters of opinion, or at least look +upon doubts as not sinful. From what was said above on invincible +ignorance (see 30), it is clear that such persons do not sin by their +doubts.</p> + +<p>843. Voluntary doubt is entertained either in ignorance for which +one is responsible, or in full knowledge; in the former case it is +indirectly voluntary, in the latter, directly voluntary.</p> + +<p>(a) The doubts of one who is responsible for them because he did not +use the means to instruct himself in the faith, are a sin of willful +ignorance proportionate to the negligence of which he was guilty; but, +if he is willing on better knowledge to put aside his doubts and accept +the teaching of the Church, he is not pertinacious, and hence not +guilty of heresy or infidelity.</p> + +<p>(b) The doubts of one who is responsible for them, and not uninstructed +or ignorant in faith, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative. +Neither of these kinds of doubt is equivalent to heresy or infidelity +in every case.</p> + +<p>844. Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended +between the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite, +without forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent +from the article, or its certainty or uncertainty.</p> + +<p>(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of +the will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the +intellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that +deception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of +implicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of +heresy.</p> + +<p>(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of +the will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other +matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment +is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent +to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept +of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters +of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples: +Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics, +is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to +the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really +doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to +hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit +judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of +the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same +difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of +faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent +business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he +does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an +important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a +temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see +257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection +of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt, +since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there +may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his +suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive +doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight +carelessness.</p> + +<p>845. Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on +account of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really +doubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either +side. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment +is formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows +and admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely +certain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively +judge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the +Church as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is +pertinacious error.</p> + +<p>(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise +heretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith, +for we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a +non-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the +doctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect +as divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the +official confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept +his church as an infallible interpreter.</p> + +<p>846. The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts +that come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves +believers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held +by those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or +agnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding +that it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to +infidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess +Fundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the +others as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized +amid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since +it accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.</p> + +<p>847. Credulity and Rationalism.—Opposed in special ways to the +material and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the +existence and nature of revelation.</p> + +<p>(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e., +the articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying +this or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material +object of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no +prudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture +that “he who is hasty to believe is light of heart” (Ecclus., xix. 4). +This sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to +neglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment +rests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith. +It is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity +into contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church, +and leads to superstition, the “twin-sister of unbelief.” Examples: +Sempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every +pious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what +source it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds +many views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or +as at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the +Church that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching. +The credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her +ignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is +blameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to +instruct others.</p> + +<p>(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith +(i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for +implicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The +various systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly +attack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these +systems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character +(e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal +experience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism). +These heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism), +some to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants +nowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since +they deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks +like faith is mere hereditary persuasion.</p> + +<p>848. Dangers to Faith.—One becomes guilty of heresy, infidelity, +doubts against faith, etc., indirectly, by placing oneself in the +danger of those sins (see 258 sqq., on the Dangers of Sin). Dangers of +this kind are partly internal, partly external.</p> + +<p>(a) Internal dangers to faith are especially the following: +intellectual pride or an excessive spirit of independence, which +makes one unwilling to accept authority; love of pleasure, which sets +one at odds with the precepts of faith; neglect of prayer and piety, +particularly in time of temptation.</p> + +<p>(b) External dangers to faith are especially as follows: literature +opposed to religion; schools where unbelief is defended; mixed +marriages; association with unbelievers in religious matters; certain +societies.</p> + +<p>849. Dangerous Reading.—There is a threefold prohibition against the +reading of literature dangerous to faith.</p> + +<p>(a) The natural law forbids one to read or hear read written matter +of any description which one knows is dangerous to one’s faith, even +though it is not dangerous to others and not forbidden by the law of +the Church. For a similar reason one may not keep such material in +one’s possession. Example: Titus and Balbus read the letters of a +friend on Evolution. Titus finds nothing unsound in the letters, and +is not troubled by reading them; but they fill the mind of Balbus with +doubts and perplexities, as the subject is above him. This reading is +naturally dangerous for Balbus, but not for Titus.</p> + +<p>(b) The law of the Church forbids the use of certain kinds of writings +or representations dangerous to faith (Canon 1399), as well as of those +individual writings that have been denounced to the Holy See and placed +on the Index, or forbidden by other ecclestiastical authorities. (See +Appendix I for Summary of Common Law on Prohibition of Books.)</p> + +<p>(c) The law of the Church also pronounces ipso facto excommunication +against those who make use of works written by unbelievers in favor of +their errors (Canon 2318).</p> + +<p>850. As regards the kind of sin committed by using writings dangerous +to faith, the following points must be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) If a writing is dangerous and forbidden under natural law, the sin +committed is of itself grave whenever the danger itself is serious and +proximate; it is venial, when the danger is slight or remote. The sin +committed depends, therefore, not on the time spent in reading or the +number of pages covered, but on the danger (see 260-261, on the Dangers +of Sin). No sin at all is committed, if the danger is slight or remote, +and there is reason for reading the writing in question (e.g., the +defense of truth).</p> + +<p>(b) If the writing is forbidden under ecclesiastical law, the sin +committed is of itself grave, even though the danger to an individual +is not serious or proximate, for the law is based on the presumption +of a common and great danger (see 460). The sin is not grave, however, +when the prohibition is generally regarded as not binding under grave +sin, or when the use made of the writing is inconsiderable. No sin at +all is committed, if one has obtained the necessary permission to read +forbidden works, and is not exposed to spiritual danger in using the +permission.</p> + +<p>851. There are two cases in which the use of writings forbidden by the +Church is only a venial sin. (a) When a writing, which in itself is +not dangerous or only slightly dangerous, is forbidden, not on account +of its contents, but only on account of its lack of ecclesiastical +approval, it is not ordinarily regarded as forbidden under grave sin +(e.g., Catholic Translations of scripture that have not received the +Imprimatur). (b) When a writing has been condemned on account of its +contents or manner of presentation, one does not sin mortally, if the +use one makes of it is only slight.</p> + +<p>852. What constitutes notable use of forbidden matter is not determined +by law, but recent moralists, bearing in mind the character of the law +and what would prove proximately dangerous to faith for the generality +today, offer the following rules: (a) notable matter in reading a book +is three or four pages from the more dangerous parts, from thirty to +sixty pages from the slightly dangerous parts; (b) notable matter in +reading a paper or periodical is habitual use of it, or even one very +bitter article; (c) notable matter in retention of forbidden writings +is a period in excess of the reasonable time (say, a month) for +securing permission or for delivering the writings to those who have a +right to have them.</p> + +<p>853. It is more difficult to decide what is notable matter, when a book +has been condemned on account of its general tendency. (a) Under the +natural law, of course, even a page or less is notable matter, if it +places an individual in proximate danger; (b) under the positive law, +perhaps anything in excess of one-tenth of the book would place one in +proximate danger. But, as we are dealing now with the general tendency +of a writing, this may have its effect on the reader before he has read +one-tenth, if the book is large, or the treatment is very seductive. +Hence, “one-tenth” is an approximation, rather than a rule.</p> + +<p>854. The kinds of printed matter forbidden by the Code (Canon 1399) are +as follows: (a) the prohibition extends to books, to other published +matter (such as magazines and newspapers), and to illustrations that +attack religion and what are called “holy pictures” (i.e., images of +our Lord and the Saints), if opposed to the mind of the Church; (b) +the prohibition extends to published matter dangerous to faith, and +therefore to the following; to writings or caricatures that attack the +existence of God, miracles or other foundations of natural or revealed +religion, Catholic dogma, worship or discipline, the ecclesiastical +hierarchy as such, or the clerical or religious state; to those that +defend heresy, schism, superstition, condemned errors, subversive +societies, or suicide, duelling, divorce; to non-Catholic publications +of the Bible and to non-Catholic works on religion that are not clearly +free from opposition to Catholic faith; to liturgical works that do +not agree with the authentic texts; to books that publish apocryphal +indulgences and to printed images of holy persons that would be the +occasion of error (e.g., the representation of the Holy Ghost in human +form).</p> + +<p>855. The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does +not cause it to fall under prohibition.</p> + +<p>(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author’s purpose to teach +error or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written +by non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are +not forbidden, unless they deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., not +incidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching). +It is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the +book, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when +attacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely; +and the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state. +The purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the +nature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency +of argumentation or attack, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only +agreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus, +books in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce, +Freemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by +disputing in their behalf.</p> + +<p>(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because +they approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the +foundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage +worship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend +proscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.</p> + +<p>856. Books that deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., of set +purpose), or _obiter_ (i.e., incidentally), are as follows: (a) Books +that are _ex professo_ religious are manuals of theology, works of +sermons, treatises on the Bible, instructions on religious duties, +works of piety, text-books of church history. Works of a profane +character, such as scientific books, may also teach religion _ex +professo_, but it is not easy as a rule to perceive the intention of +teaching religion in works of this kind. (b) Books that deal with +religion only _obiter_ are works of a profane character, in which +the subject of religion is introduced only briefly (e.g., by way of +illustration).</p> + +<p>857. Books dealing _ex professo_ with religion and written by +non-Catholics are: (a) forbidden, if they contain matter contrary to +Catholic faith; (b) not forbidden, if it is clear to one (e.g., from a +competent review) that they contain nothing contrary to Catholic faith.</p> + +<p>858. How is one to know in a particular case whether a book falls under +one of the foregoing classes forbidden by the Code? (a) If the Holy +See has made a declaration, the matter is of course clear; (b) if no +declaration has been made, and one is competent to judge for oneself, +one may read as much as is necessary to decide whether the book is one +of those proscribed by the Code; but if a person has not received the +education that would fit him for judging, he should consult some person +more skilled than himself, such as his parish priest or confessor.</p> + +<p>859. Is it lawful to read newspapers, magazines, or reference works +(such as encyclopedias), which contain some articles contrary to faith, +and others that are good or indifferent, if these papers or books have +not been condemned? (a) If the reading or consultation, on account of +one’s individual character, will subject one to grave temptations, +then according to natural law it should be avoided. (b) If there is no +serious danger or temptation, but the policy of the works or journals +in question is anti-religious or anti-Catholic, as appears from the +space given to hostile attack, their frequency or bitterness of spirit, +then, according to the law of the Code just mentioned, one should avoid +such reading matter. Examples of this kind of literature are papers +devoted to atheistic or bolshevistic propaganda, anti-Catholic sheets, +etc. (c) If there is no danger to the individual, and the editorial +policy is not hostile, one may use such matter as is good and useful, +while passing over any elaborate or systematic attack on truth or +defense of error.</p> + +<p>860. Individual books are forbidden by name to all Catholics by the +Holy See and to their own subjects by Ordinaries and other local or +particular councils (Canon 1395). Books condemned by the Apostolic See +must be considered as forbidden everywhere and in whatsoever language +they may be translated into (Canon 1396).</p> + +<p>(a) If a book is forbidden, one may not read even the harmless parts of +it, for there is the danger that, if one part is read, the other parts +will also be read. But, if the part that occasioned the prohibition be +removed, the prohibition ceases as regards the remainder of the book.</p> + +<p>(b) If a work is forbidden, one may not read any volume, if all the +volumes deal with the same subject. But, if the volumes treat of +different subjects or of one subject that is divisible (e.g., universal +history), one may read such volumes as do not contain the danger that +occasioned the prohibition.</p> + +<p>(c) If all the works of an author are condemned, the prohibition is +understood to apply only to books (i.e., not to smaller works), and +only to books dealing with religion, unless it appears that the other +kinds of writings are also included; but the prohibition is to be +presumed to include works that appear after the condemnation, unless +the contrary is manifest.</p> + +<p>861. Some outstanding works that have been condemned are the following: +(a) In English: _Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire_ (Gibbons); +_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_ (Andrew Lang); _History of England_ +(Goldsmith); _The Roman Popes_ (Ranke); _The Life and Pontificate +of Leo X_ (Roscoe); _Constitutional History of England_ (Hallam); +_Political Economy_ (Mill); _Happiness in Hell_ (Mivart); _History +of English Literature_ (Taine); _Reign of Charles V_ (Robertson); +_Zoonomia_, or The Laws of Organic Life (Darwin).</p> + +<p>(b) In French: _Notre Dame de Paris_ (Hugo); _Life of Jesus_ and +eighteen other works of Renan; all the works of Anatole France; _The +Social Contract_ and four works of Rousseau; nearly all the works +of Voltaire; _The Gospel and the Church, Gospel Studies, The Fourth +Gospel, Apropos of a Little Book, The Religion of Israel_ (Loisy); all +the works of Jean Paul Sartre; _La Deuxieme Sexe_ and _Les Mandarins_ +by Simone de Beauvoir.</p> + +<p>862. What is meant by “use” of forbidden writings? (a) In the first +place, those “use” a writing who read it—that is, who go over it +with their eyes, understanding the meaning therein contained. Hence, +a person does not violate the church law against forbidden books if +he merely listens to another read; although he might sin against the +natural law, and even against the church law, if he induced the other +to read to him; neither does a person violate the church law, if he +merely glances at the characters, without understanding the sense +expressed. Example: Titus, a professor of theology, has permission to +read forbidden books, and he sometimes reads to his class doctrinal +passages from works on the Index in order to explain and refute errors. +Balbus examines very carefully the pages of a beautifully printed copy +of a forbidden work, but he understands hardly a word of it, since it +is in a foreign language. Neither Titus’ class nor Balbus are guilty of +reading as forbidden by the Church, for strict interpretation is given +to penal laws (see 485).</p> + +<p>(b) In the second place, those “use” a forbidden writing who retain +it—that is, who keep it in their home as belonging to themselves or +borrowed from another, or who give it for safekeeping to another, +even though they are not able to read it. Hence, a librarian who has +forbidden books on his shelves does not break the law, since the books +are not his property, nor are they kept in his home. A bookbinder +also who receives forbidden books is considered as excused through +_epieikeia_ for the time the books are in his shop, especially if his +customer has the permission to read those books. Example: Sempronius +bought an expensive work and then discovered that it is on the Index. +Is he obliged to destroy it? No, if he does not wish to destroy it, he +may, if he does not delay beyond a month, either give it to someone who +has permission to keep it, or obtain that permission for himself.</p> + +<p>(c) In the third place, those “use” a forbidden writing who communicate +it to others—for example, those who make presents of works that are on +the Index, who lend such books to others, or place them where others +will read them, who read to others passages or write out excerpts for +them. It is lawful, however, for professors in theological and other +classes of sacred science to read from forbidden works to their student +body, if a suitable explanation and refutation exclude all danger.</p> + +<p>(d) Lastly, those fall under the law as violators who co-operate in +the production or distribution of forbidden literature—for example, +publishers, owners, authors, translators, booksellers, printers, etc. +(cfr. 976 sqq., on cooperation in Worship).</p> + +<p>863. The church law on forbidden literature affects all Catholics not +excepted by law, no matter how learned they may be, what position they +may hold, or how immune from danger they may seem, unless they obtain +permission to read such literature from the Holy See, the Ordinary, +or their regular Superior (Canon 1402). Those excepted by law and +who do not need to seek such permission are certain prelates and +students. (a) Cardinals, Bishops, and other Ordinaries (Canon 1401), +and likewise major superiors in exempt clerical orders (Canon 198, +Sec. 1) are not bound by the church prohibition of books dangerous to +faith; (b) those who are pursuing theological or biblical studies may +use forbidden editions of scripture, provided these are correct and +complete as to the text, and contain no attacks on Catholic teaching in +the introductions and annotations (Canon 1400). This permission extends +not only to seminarians, but also to lay students; not only to those +who are at school, but also to those who are really studying outside +of school, such as professors, writers and those who are preparing +lectures or dissertations.</p> + +<p>864. When the necessity of reading a forbidden book is urgent, and +the opportunity of asking permission from the Holy See or Ordinary +is lacking, a person whose duties call for acquaintance with such a +book may consider that the law does not bind in his particular case +(see 411-417 on _epieikeia_). (a) A professor, editor, critic, etc., +who had not yet received permission might read a forbidden book, if, +being called upon to criticize it, he could not await the permission; +(b) a confessor, pastor, etc., in similar circumstances could read a +forbidden book in order to be able to refute it.</p> + +<p>865. Those who have received permission to read books forbidden as +generally dangerous to faith, may also read papers and periodicals +of the same character, and they may use the permission given them +anywhere, since it is a personal indult (see 446). The following +restrictions, however, are understood in the grant of permission:</p> + +<p>(a) Permission to read, no matter by whom granted, does not make it +lawful to read what is really a danger to one’s faith, for this (as +explained above in 849-850) is contrary to natural law. Moreover, those +who have received an apostolic indult may not read or retain books +proscribed by their Ordinaries, unless the indult extends even to this.</p> + +<p>(b) Permission to retain does not make it lawful to keep forbidden +books in such a way that they will fall into the hands of those +who have no right to read them. On the contrary, there is a grave +obligation arising from the natural law to prevent such a thing from +happening. Hence, those who have permission to keep writings dangerous +to faith should not place them on shelves to which there is general +access, or else they should label them as dangerous and forbidden (see +Canons 1405, Sec.1, and 1403, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>866. According to Canon 2318, the following censures are incurred +through the use of forbidden books:</p> + +<p>(a) Excommunication specially reserved to the Apostolic See is incurred +_ipso facto_ by those who offer to the public books, even of a +non-religious character, written by apostates, schismatics, or heretics +in systematic defense of heresy or schism. This censure applies, first, +to the chief causes of publicity of the work—i.e., to the author who +offers it for publication, and to the publisher and printer (owner or +manager of the press) who accept it for that purpose—not, however, +to remote cooperators or helpers; secondly, to such chief causes as +understand the character of the book, either from the word of the +author or from the contents. It is not incurred, if the work is not +published (i.e., if it remains in manuscript, or is circulated only +privately), or if it is published in other than book form (e.g., as a +pamphlet, leaflet or article). Ignorance, if not crass or supine (see +27), excuses from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.3, n. 1).</p> + +<p>(b) The same censure is incurred by those who defend the aforementioned +books, either materially (e.g., by saving them from destruction) or +morally (e.g., by defending, praising, or recommending them). Ignorance +excuses here as in the case of publishers.</p> + +<p>(c) The same censure is incurred by those who defend books of any +author condemned by name through Apostolic letters. Hence, the censure +does not apply to books condemned by a pontifical congregation nor to +books condemned in a Papal Letter, if their title is not mentioned. +Ignorance excuses here as in the previous case.</p> + +<p>(d) The same censure is incurred by those who knowingly keep or read +any of the forbidden books mentioned so far in this paragraph. The +sense to be attached to the words “keep or read” has been given above +(see 862). Even crass and supine ignorance of law or penalty, provided +it be not affected, as well as other causes that lessen imputability +(see 40), excuse from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.Sec.1, 2).</p> + +<p>(e) Excommunication not reserved is incurred _ipso facto_ by authors +and publishers who are responsible for the printing without due +authorization of books of Holy Writ, or of notes or commentaries on the +Bible, even though the text be correct and the explanation orthodox. +This censure is not incurred by those who are not responsible for the +printing done, such as typesetters and readers. Ignorance, if not crass +and supine, excuses here (Canon 2229, Sec.3).</p> + +<p>867. Dangerous Schools.—With reference to their danger to faith, +schools are of three kinds:</p> + +<p>(a) sectarian schools, in which heresy or infidelity is prescribed +as part of the curriculum, and assistance at non-Catholic rites +is required. Examples are colleges and universities supported by +Protestant denominations, sectarian Sunday schools, Bible classes;</p> + +<p>(b) neutral schools (i.e., schools in which all religious teaching +is forbidden and no recognition given to any denomination) whose +spirit and teaching in secular branches is anti-religious or +anti-Catholic. Examples are non-sectarian colleges or universities in +which materialism is incidentally taught, or in which the faculty are +freethinkers or bigots;</p> + +<p>(c) neutral schools in which no positive offense is given to religion +or the Church. Examples are public schools in which only the profane +sciences are taught, and care is exercised that neither the text-books +nor the teachers shall be irreligious or interfere with the religious +beliefs of others. Reducible to this category are mixed schools, that +is, those which are open also to non-Catholics (Canon 1374).</p> + +<p>868. The danger of the foregoing kinds of schools to the faith of +pupils is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) in the sectarian schools there is danger of heresy or infidelity, +since the pupils are obliged to hear the defense of false doctrine and +to join in the services of a false religion;</p> + +<p>(b) in the neutral schools of an anti-religious spirit the danger +is the same, for the pupils must attend courses in which the +interpretations given to history, science, philosophy, letters, etc., +are unfriendly to the faith;</p> + +<p>(c) in the neutral schools whose spirit is not anti-religious, there +is a danger of Indifferentism that arises from the system itself; for +the very fact that religion is slighted tends to impress the students +with the idea that it is unimportant or unrelated to other matters of +life, and this prepares the way for doubt and scepticism. Moreover, +since example teaches more effectively than the printed or spoken word, +the neglect or contempt of religion by professors and fellow-pupils in +mixed schools is a danger to faith.</p> + +<p>869. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of attending or patronizing schools +dangerous to faith must be decided according to the principles given +above on the occasions of sin (see 263 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) If the danger to faith is voluntary, the use of such schools is not +lawful, for those who are able are bound to seek or provide religious +education both in elementary and higher schooling (see Canon 1373). +Example: In the town of X there are good parochial and Catholic high +schools. Sempronius could easily send his children to these schools, +but he thinks that certain select schools offer greater social and +financial advantages, and so he chooses them. His conduct is not lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) If the danger to faith is necessary, the use of such schools is +lawful, provided the needed precautions are duly observed. Example: In +the country district of Y there is no school except the public school, +and therefore Balbus sends his children to that school. His conduct is +lawful, but he must see that his children receive religious instruction +outside of school.</p> + +<p>870. The danger to faith is necessary when there is no Catholic school, +or none that is sufficient for the needs of individual students, and +their parents are unable to send them elsewhere. In such a case it +is lawful to attend a school that is neutral, but means must be used +to make the proximate danger remote. Such means are the following: +(a) religious instruction must be taken outside of school, as in +special week-day classes, Sunday school, home study, etc.; (b) special +attention must be given to the strengthening of faith on those points +that are attacked or slighted in the neutral school; (c) parents, +guardians, or others responsible must see that the reading and the +associates of their wards in the neutral schools are good, and that +they are faithful to their religious duties.</p> + +<p>871. Is attendance at non-Catholic schools sometimes unlawful, even +when there are serious reasons in its favor?</p> + +<p>(a) It is unlawful, if the schools are sectarian, and then no +excuse can justify such attendance; for, in addition to scandal and +cooperation in false worship, there is present a proximate danger to +faith that is not made remote. Parents or guardians who knowingly send +their children to schools for education in a non-Catholic religion are +suspected of heresy and incur excommunication _ipso facto_, reserved +to the Ordinary (see Canon 2319). Example: Titus sends his daughter to +a sectarian academy because it is nearer and cheaper than the Catholic +academy. He claims that she is old enough not to lose her religion, +that opposition will make her faith stronger, etc. Titus’ arguments are +fallacious and his conduct gravely sinful.</p> + +<p>(b) Attendance at non-Catholic schools is unlawful, if the schools are +neutral in theory, but so dangerous in practice that loss of faith is +practically certain if one attends. Example: Balbus sends his son to an +undenominational university which is regarded as a hotbed of atheism, +and whose students practically to a man lose all religion.</p> + +<p>872. Absolution should be denied in some cases to those who send their +children to non-Catholic schools, if they refuse to change.</p> + +<p>(a) Absolution should be denied on account of lack of faith in the +parents themselves, if they send their children to non-Catholic schools +on account of their own ideas that are contrary to the teachings of the +Church. Example: Sempronius refuses to send his children to parochial +schools, because he thinks each one should judge about religion for +himself, and not receive it from instructors.</p> + +<p>(b) Absolution should be denied on account of the danger caused to the +faith of the children, when the children are sent to sectarian schools, +or when they are sent to neutral schools and sufficient efforts are not +used to counteract the evil influence there felt.</p> + +<p>(c) Absolution should be refused on account of scandal or cooperation +in evil, if, while the parents themselves are sound in faith and +prevent all danger of perversion of their children, they send them +to non-Catholic schools without sufficient reason, to the grave +disedification of others, or the great assistance of unchristian +education.</p> + +<p>873. Absolution should not be denied in the following cases: (a) when +the parents have a sufficient reason for sending their children to +non-Catholic schools (i.e., a reason approved by the local Ordinary +as sufficient). It belongs only to the Ordinary to decide in what +circumstances and with what precautions attendance at such schools is +allowable (Canon 1374; for application to the United States, see Holy +Office, 24 Nov., 1875; Council of Baltimore, III, n. 199, in regard +to elementary and high schools. As to colleges and universities, see +_S.C.Prop.Fid_., 7 Apr., 1860; _Fontes_, n. 4649, Vol VII, p. 381; +n.4868, Vol. VII, p.405; also S.C.Prop.Fid., 6 Aug., 1867); (b) when +the parents have no sufficient reason, but there is no lack of faith on +their part, no danger of perversion of the children, no grave scandal +or sinful co-operation in evil.</p> + +<p>874. The presence of Catholics as teachers in non-Catholic schools +is beneficial, since it lessens to some extent the evil influence of +such schools; but there is also the danger that it may cause scandal +or create the impression that attendance at Catholic schools is not +necessary. Hence, it has been permitted by the Church in certain cases +but only when danger of scandal or wrong impression is absent. (a) +The secular sciences may be taught by laymen in non-Catholic schools +of higher or lower education, if there is no scandal, no unlawful +cooperation, and no immediate danger of perversion. (b) Christian +doctrine may be taught by priests to Catholic students of neutral +schools, either in the school building or elsewhere (as in a church), +and certain priests may be appointed as chaplains for this work (Sacred +Congregation of the Holy Office to Bishops of Switzerland, March 26, +1866).</p> + +<p>875. Dangerous Marriages.—The following kinds of marriage are +dangerous to the faith of Catholics: (a) marriage with non-Catholics, +unbaptized or bigoted persons (mixed marriages); (b) marriage with +fallen-away Catholics (that is, with those who have given up the +Catholic religion, although they have not joined another), or with +those who belong to societies forbidden by the Church.</p> + +<p>876. The danger to faith in the aforesaid kinds of marriage are serious +and proximate, and hence such unions are forbidden by divine law, as +long as the danger is not removed or made remote through the use of +precautions. The dangers are for the Catholic party and the children.</p> + +<p>(a) The Catholic party is in serious danger of losing the faith +(i.e., of joining the religion or sharing the ideas of the other +party), or of doubting the truth of the Church, or of taking refuge in +Indifferentism. For, if domestic life is peaceful, the Catholic may +easily be led in time to regard with favor the other party’s religion +or views; if it is not peaceful, the Catholic through fear or annoyance +may make compromises or sacrifices in matters of faith, or else suffer +temptations that could have been avoided.</p> + +<p>(b) The children born are in serious danger of being deprived of the +faith (i.e., of not being brought up as Catholics), or of having their +faith weakened by the example of parents who do not agree in the matter +of religion. If the non-Catholic or fallen-away Catholic interferes +with the religion of the children, their baptism, religious education, +attendance at church, etc., will be forbidden or impeded; if that +party does not interfere, there will be at least the example during +impressionable years of one parent who does not accept the Catholic +faith or who disregards its requirements. Statistics indicate that one +of the chief sources of leakage in the Church today is mixed marriages.</p> + +<p>877. Dangerous marriages are also forbidden by the law of the Church. +(a) Lack of baptism in the non-Catholic party causes the diriment +impediment of disparity of worship (Canon 1070); (b) membership of the +non-Catholic party in an heretical or schismatical sect causes the +prohibitive impediment of mixed religion (Canon 1060); (c) unworthiness +of one of the parties, on account of notorious apostasy or affiliation +with forbidden societies (see 945 sqq.), prevents the pastor from +assisting at the marriage without permission from the Ordinary (Canon +1065).</p> + +<p>878. No one may enter into any of the dangerous marriages here +considered, unless the requirements of the natural and ecclesiastical +laws be complied with. (a) The natural law requires under pain of grave +sin that the danger of perversion be removed, that no non-Catholic +ceremony take place, and that the Catholic spouse work prudently for +the conversion of the other party. (b) The ecclesiastical law requires +under grave sin that guarantees be given that the requirements of the +natural law shall be fulfilled (Canons 1061, 1071); that there be grave +and urgent reasons for the marriage (ibid.); that dispensations from +the impediments be obtained, or permission, in the case of unworthiness +of one of the parties, to assist at the marriage be granted by the +Ordinary (Canons 1036, 1065).</p> + +<p>879. The canonical consequences of dangerous marriages illegally +contracted are as follows: (a) Those who knowingly contract a mixed +marriage without dispensation are _ipso facto_ excluded from legitimate +ecclesiastical acts, (e.g., the office of godparent), and from the +use of sacramentals, until a dispensation has been obtained from the +Ordinary (Canon 2375). Marriage contracted with the impediment of +disparity of worship is invalid, whether the parties are in ignorance +or not (Canon 1070, Sec.16). (b) Catholics who enter into marriage +before a non-Catholic minister acting in a religious capacity or who +contract marriage with the implicit or explicit understanding that +any or all of the children will be educated outside the Church incur +excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Ordinary (Canon +2319).</p> + +<p>880. The prenuptial guarantees required by church law in case of mixed +or other dangerous marriages are as follows: (a) According to the +Code, no dispensation for mixed marriages will be granted unless the +non-Catholic party gives a guarantee that the danger of perversion +for the Catholic party shall be removed, and both parties promise +that all the children shall be baptized and brought up only in the +Catholic faith. There must be moral certainty that the promises will be +kept, and as a rule they should be demanded in writing (Canons 1061, +1071). The permission for marriage with fallen-away Catholics is not +granted until the Ordinary has satisfied himself that the danger to the +Catholic and the children has been removed (Canon 1065, Sec.2). (b) The +pre-Code legislation further required that both parties promise that +there would be no non-Catholic ceremony and that the Catholic promise +to work for the conversion of the other party. Canons 1062-1063 speak +of these obligations, but do not exact promises.</p> + +<p>881. Remedies against mixed and other dangerous marriages are the +following: (a) Before engagement Catholics should be instructed and +encouraged to marry those of their own faith. Thus, confessors can +discourage company-keeping with non-Catholics, parents can provide +their children with opportunities for meeting suitable Catholics, and, +above all, pastors should frequently speak and preach to old and young +on the evils of mixed marriages. (b) After engagement to a non-Catholic +has been made, the non-Catholic should be persuaded to accept the +Catholic religion, if he or she can do this with sincerity; otherwise, +the Catholic should be warned of the danger of the marriage, and the +pastor should refuse to seek a dispensation unless there is a really +serious cause (see Canon 1064; II Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 336; +III Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 133).</p> + +<p>882. Dangerous Communication.—Mixed marriages are mentioned specially +among the communications with non-Catholic that are dangerous to faith, +because marriage is a lifelong and intimate association. But there +are other communications with unbelievers that can easily corrupt +faith, the less dangerous being communication in matters that are not +religious, and the more dangerous being communication in religious +matters. (a) Non-religious or civil communication is association with +non-Catholics in secular affairs, such as business, social life, +education, politics. (b) Religious communication is association with +non-Catholics in sacred services or divine worship.</p> + +<p>883. Non-religious communication is sinful as follows: (a) It is sinful +according to natural law, when in a particular case it would be a +proximate danger of perversion freely chosen, or an involuntary danger +against which one does not employ sufficient precaution. Examples: +Titus chooses infidels and freethinkers for his friends and intimates, +understanding their character and bad influence. Balba on account of +her poverty is obliged to work in a place where all her companions are +unbelievers who scoff at religion and try in every way to win her over +to their errors; yet she is not concerned to arm herself more strongly +in faith.</p> + +<p>(b) According to ecclesiastical law, civil communication is forbidden +with those who have been excommunicated as persons to be avoided (Canon +2267). Such persons are those who lay violent hands on the Roman +Pontiff (Canon 2343), or who have been excommunicated by individual +name and as persons to be avoided through public decree or sentence of +the Apostolic See (Canon 2258). Exception is made, however, for husband +and wife, children, servants, subjects, and for others in case of +necessity.</p> + +<p>884. Religious communication is sinful on account of danger in the +following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) If it is a proximate and voluntary occasion of sin against faith. +Examples: Sempronius goes to a non-Catholic church to hear a minister +who attacks the divinity of Christ and other articles of the Creed. +The purpose of Sempronius is to benefit himself as a public speaker, +but he knows that his faith suffers, because he admires the orator. +Balbus chooses to listen over the radio to attacks on religion and +Christianity, which cause serious temptations to him.</p> + +<p>(b) If it is a necessary occasion of sin and one does not employ +sufficient precautions against it, religious communication becomes +sinful. Example: Titus, a prisoner, has to listen at times to a jail +chaplain, who teaches that there are errors in the Bible, that man +evolved from the ape, etc. Titus feels himself drawn sympathetically to +these teachings, but makes no effort to strengthen his faith.</p> + +<p>885. Communication with unbelievers that is a remote occasion of sin, +is not sinful, for “otherwise one must needs go out of this world” (I +Cor., v. 9). On the contrary, reasons of justice or charity frequently +make it necessary and commendable to have friendly dealings with +those of other or no religious conviction. (a) Reasons of justice. +It is necessary to cooperate with non-Catholic fellow-citizens in +what pertains to the welfare of our common country, state, city, and +neighborhood; to be just and fair in business relations with those +outside the Church, etc. (b) Reasons of charity. Catholics should be +courteous and kind to all (Heb., xii. 14), and be willing to assist, +temporarily and spiritually, those outside the Church. Thus, St. Paul, +without sacrificing principle or doctrine, made himself all things to +all men, in order to gain all (I Cor., ix. 19). Indeed, the mission +of the Church would suffer, if Catholics today kept aloof from all +that goes on about them. The Church must teach, by example as well as +precept, must be a salt, a light, a leaven, an example of the Gospel in +practice; and surely this ministry will be weakened if her children aim +at complete isolation and exclusivism.</p> + +<p>886. Societies that are purely civil or profane—e.g., social clubs, +charitable organizations, temperance societies, labor unions, that +are not identified with any church and are neutral in religion—may +be dangerous to faith. (a) There may be danger on account of the +membership, even when the nature of the society is purely indifferent +or good. Example: It would be dangerous to faith to join a convivial +society whose members were mostly aggressive infidels, even though +the purpose of the organization was only recreation. (b) There may be +danger to faith on account of certain methods or principles of the +society. Example: A Boys’ or Girls’ Club whose purpose is to train +young people for good citizenship is dangerous to faith, if it acts +as though the natural virtues were sufficient, or as though moral +education belonged to itself exclusively or principally.</p> + +<p>887. The Sin of Blasphemy.—So far we have spoken of the sins of +unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come +to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of +faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of +ordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article +of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will +be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more +serious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that +is His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of +this sin we shall speak now.</p> + +<p>888. Blasphemy etymologically is from the Greek, and signifies damage +done to reputation or character; theologically, it is applied only to +insults or calumnies offered to God, and is threefold according to +the three stages of sin described above (see 168). (a) Blasphemy of +the heart is internal, committed only in thought and will. So “the +wicked man said in his heart: There is no God” (Ps. xviii. 1), and the +demons and lost souls blasphemed God without words (Apoc., xvi. 9). +(b) Blasphemy of the mouth is external, committed in spoken words, or +in their written or printed representations. (c) Blasphemy of deeds is +also external, committed by acts or gestures. The action of Julian the +Apostate in casting his blood towards heaven was intended as a sign of +contempt for Christ.</p> + +<p>889. Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for +God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy, +which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External +blasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of +faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and +hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.</p> + +<p>(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies +about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when +some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when +some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is +heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin, +or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to +deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true, +etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God +according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is +opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be +treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol. +II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: “God is good!”</p> + +<p>890. The nature of heretical blasphemy will better appear, if we +compare it with other kinds of speech disrespectful to God.</p> + +<p>(a) It differs from maledictions or curses, (e.g., “May God destroy +you!”), because the one directly offended in blasphemy is God Himself, +while in a curse it is some creature of God.</p> + +<p>(b) It differs from non-heretical blasphemy, from perjury and disregard +of vow, from vain use of the name of God, because none of these +necessarily proceeds from a lack of faith, as does heretical blasphemy. +Non-heretical blasphemy proceeds from hatred or contempt of God, +perjury from presumption, disregard of vow from disobedience, vain use +of the Divine Name from irreverence.</p> + +<p>(c) Heretical blasphemy differs from temptation of God (e.g., “God +must help me now if He can,” said by one who exposes himself rashly to +danger), for, while temptation of God implies doubt, it is directly an +act of irreverence by which one presumes to put God Himself to proof, +whereas heretical blasphemy is directly an act of denial of truth.</p> + +<p>891. Heretical blasphemy calumniates God, either in His own attributes +and perfections, or in those created persons or things that are +specially His by reason of friendship or consecration. Thus, we have: +(a) blasphemy that attacks the Divine Being Himself, as was explained +above; (b) blasphemy that attacks what is especially dear to God, which +consists in remarks or acts derogatory to the Blessed Virgin, the +Saints, the Sacraments, the crucifix, the Bible, etc.</p> + +<p>892. Unlike God, creatures are subject to imperfections, moral or +physical, and thus it is not always erroneous or blasphemous to +attribute imperfections to the Saints or sacred things.</p> + +<p>(a) If sacred persons or things are spoken ill of precisely on account +of their relation to God, or in such a way that the evil said of +them reverts on God Himself, blasphemy is committed. Example: It is +blasphemous to say that the Mother of God was not a Virgin, that St. +Peter was a reprobate, that St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites were +snobbish or eccentric, that the Sacraments are nonsense, that relics +are an imposture, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) If sacred persons or things are criticized precisely on account +of their human or finite imperfections, real or alleged, the sin of +irreverence is committed, when the criticism is prompted by malice +or levity. No sin at all is committed, if one is stating facts with +due respect for the character of the persons or things spoken of. +Examples: To call a Doctor of the Church an ignoramus out of anger at a +theological opinion defended by him, would be of itself a serious sin +of disrespect. To speak of a Saint as a dirty tramp or idle visionary, +if the intention is to insult, is also a serious sin of disrespect. +But, if one were to say in joke that St. Peter was a baldhead, St. +Charles Borromeo a big nose, the sin of irreverence would be only +slight. No sin would be committed, if one, describing a religious +painting from the artistic standpoint, called it an abomination.</p> + +<p>893. Heretical blasphemy is expressed not only by sentences that +are complete and in the indicative mood, but also by phrases or +interjections, by wishes, commands, or even signs.</p> + +<p>(a) Blasphemy is expressed optatively, imperatively, or +interrogatively. Examples: “Away with God!” is equivalent to the +assertion that God is not eternal. “Come down from the cross, if Thou +be the Son of God” (Matt., xxvii. 40), is equivalent to the statement +that Christ is not the Son of God. The question put to the Psalmist, +“Where is thy God?” (Ps. xli. 4.), meant in the mouth of the Psalmist’s +enemies that Jehovah did not exist, or was powerless.</p> + +<p>(b) Blasphemy is expressed even by short words, or by a grunt or snort +of contempt. Example: To utter the name of our Lord in a contumelious +way signifies that one regards Him as of no account. The word +“hocus-pocus” is sometimes used in derision of the Mass or other sacred +rites.</p> + +<p>(c) Blasphemy is expressed by acts that signify disbelief and dishonor, +for example, to spit or shake one’s fist at heaven, to turn up the nose +or make a wry face at the mention of God, to trample in the dust a +crucifix, etc.</p> + +<p>894. Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.—(a) +Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in +discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain +common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to +signification the phrase, “Sacred Name of God,” is harmless and might +be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken +in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification, +the expression “Ye gods” in English, “Thousand names of God” in French, +“Thousand Sacraments” in German, are blasphemous; but according to +the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express +surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English +language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions, +just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from +obscenity.</p> + +<p>(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the +presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter +are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an +ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that +no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed +trying to correct his children that he exclaims: “Why did the Lord +ever send me such pests?” Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers +him: “Who is to blame if they are pests?” Since Titus is habitually +religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former +sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy. +Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series +of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: “I must be only a +step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever +create me?” The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather +than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often +addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that +she is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude, +etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by +Balbus they are harmless.</p> + +<p>895. The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.—(a) From its very nature (i.e., from +the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures), +blasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and +destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith +itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15 +sqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished +as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and +generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a +public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society; +when printed, it is a libel.</p> + +<p>(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But +blasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner +unbelief it adds external denial and insult.</p> + +<p>(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness +of the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great +when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say +that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show +contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.</p> + +<p>(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation, +if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as +murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a +sudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his +refractory mules of shouting at them: “You creatures of the devil!” A +priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is +blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules +irritate him, making no effort to improve.</p> + +<p>896. There are some cases in which blasphemy is only a venial sin or no +sin on account of the lack of deliberation.</p> + +<p>(a) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the act +itself, the blasphemy pronounced, unless it be voluntary in its cause +(see 102, 196), is not a mortal sin. In the former case, there is no +sin at all, for the act is not human (see 33); in the latter case +there cannot be mortal sin, for there is no full reflection on the +deed (see 175). Example: Balbus now and then catches himself humming +blasphemous songs that he heard years ago, but he always stops as soon +as he thinks of what he is saying. Titus, coming out of the ether after +an operation, makes a few blasphemous remarks, but he is so dazed +that he hardly knows who is speaking. Sempronius makes himself drunk, +foreseeing that he will blaspheme while out of his senses. Balbus +commits no sin, Titus may be guilty of venial sin, but Sempronius is +guilty of mortal sin in blaspheming.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the malice of +the act, the blasphemy pronounced, if it is not voluntary in its cause, +is not a mortal sin; for one is not responsible for more than one +knows or should know (see 99-100, on imputability). Examples: Titus, a +foreigner, has been taught to repeat certain blasphemous phrases, whose +real meaning he does not suspect. Balbus has the habit when angry of +blaspheming at his mules, but he is doing his best to use more suitable +language. Sempronius unawares gets into a tipsy condition in which he +realizes his acts, but is confused about moral distinctions, and hence +uses blasphemous expressions which he would abhor if he were in his +normal state. Caius, a boy, blasphemes, thinking that he is committing +only a venial sin of “cussing.”</p> + +<p>897. Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the +duty of confession.</p> + +<p>[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy—non-heretical, which +is opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to +religion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith +and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished +in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did +not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint’s picture to +the wall, saying: “You have great influence with God!” (non-heretical +blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: “I have lost all +faith in Saints” (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just +died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical +blasphemy).</p> + +<p>(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that +is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the +Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy +against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is +greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy +that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more +concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver +than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require +that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others +say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).</p> + +<p>898. According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250), +blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the +Father, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or +weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy; +(b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken +out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a +blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained +mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13); +(c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against +God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who +attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt, +xii. 31).</p> + +<p>899. To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of +God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six, +there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of +contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner +contempt is a blasphemy.</p> + +<p>(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the +thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence, +despair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin +are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the +truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence, +resistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God’s +kingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.</p> + +<p>(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the +nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former +inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the +latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve +not to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are +also sins against the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>900. There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this +life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy +Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to +come (Matt., xii. 31)?</p> + +<p>(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to +their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their +nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they +also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus, +if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines +not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance, +which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or +ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.</p> + +<p>(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we +consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously +a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which, +according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope +and repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we +repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in +this life.</p> + +<p>901. Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy +suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of +evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes +due to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination +towards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It +is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly, +Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This +argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong +attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to +the fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and +hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the +Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God’s gifts +contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but +follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3); +but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that +one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been +careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however, +that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or +malicious sinner.</p> + +<p>902. Remedies Against Blasphemy.—(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously +should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the +absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and +ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b) +Those who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion +should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make +themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden +outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be +performed each time blasphemy is uttered.</p> + +<p>903. Absolution of Blasphemers.—(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no +censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every +confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication +is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may +be granted as explained there.</p> + +<p>904. Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.—After the sins against +faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that +serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin +of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of +blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.</p> + +<p>905. Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin—of +material sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the +ignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the +sense now to be explained.</p> + +<p>(a) Ignorance may be considered in itself (i.e., precisely as it is the +absence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since +under this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge, +the perfection of the intellect.</p> + +<p>(b) Ignorance may be considered in relation to the will (i.e., +precisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin, +since under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity +(i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning +and keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This +sin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold; it is called +affected ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of +due knowledge, and is called careless ignorance, if the will is remiss +in desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission, +careless ignorance a sin of omission.</p> + +<p>(c) Ignorance may be considered in relation to obligatory acts (i.e., +precisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one’s +duties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness, +inasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible +for the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in +matters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who +does not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc., +requires, will fail against justice; he who does not know what charity +demands of him, will sin against charity.</p> + +<p>906. The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as +follows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know, +whether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.), +is a grave sin, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of +losing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but +one sin, regardless of length of time, and is incurred at the time +one omits due diligence in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with +other sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of +Christian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time +is an aggravating circumstance.</p> + +<p>907. Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin, +is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for +ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from +negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the +sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of +ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from +a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is +ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that +must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is +required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence, +ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from +the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not +take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he +is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another, +and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on +fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware +that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed +one sin apiece.</p> + +<p>(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one +is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case +one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing +something which one should know habitually, and also against some other +virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance. +Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of +faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church, +and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own +carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a +result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin, +and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin +of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.</p> + +<p>908. Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are +the following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire +knowledge, one is not responsible for one’s ignorance; (b) if one +has not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not +responsible for one’s ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one’s +fault.</p> + +<p>909. Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with +relation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and +difficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in +an illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance, +would be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater +importance. However, the following general rules can be given:</p> + +<p>(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule supreme (i.e., +it is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire +instruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have +used sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for +obtaining religious instruction;</p> + +<p>(b) To be sufficient, diligence should equal that which is employed by +good people in similar circumstances. Thus, the unlearned who consult +the learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned +who devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in +doubts, are sufficiently diligent.</p> + +<p>910. One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes +responsible, sometimes not responsible.</p> + +<p>(a) A person is not responsible for his ignorance and lack of +sufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper +amount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies +and knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through +a very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine +sufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later +he discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important +matters, and had entirely misunderstood others.</p> + +<p>(b) A person is responsible for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if +at heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about +his ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a +bore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday +he falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but +doesn’t know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself +an office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance. +But he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its +responsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and +would not try to change things if he did.</p> + +<p>911. Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is +negligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is +guilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light +and to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion, +revelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if +he fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much +in the company of objectors.</p> + +<p>912. Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift +of Understanding. (a) Dullness of understanding is a weakness of mind +as regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to +consider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from +over-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating +and drinking. (b) Blindness of mind is a complete lack of knowledge of +divine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest +one feel obligated to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to +passion that one gives it all one’s attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness +is sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when +it is voluntary—that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make +one disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and +chastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is +seen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_THE_COMMANDMENTS_OF_FAITH">Art. 3: THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 16.)</p> + +<p>913. Unlike the commandments of justice, which are summed up in the +Decalogue, the commandments of faith are not given in any one place +of scripture; but they may be reduced to three: (a) one must acquire +knowledge and understanding of one’s faith according to one’s state in +life and duties; (b) one must believe internally the truths of faith; +(c) one must profess externally one’s belief.</p> + +<p>914. The Commandment of Knowledge.—The first of the foregoing +commandments includes three things. (a) The doctrines of faith must be +taught and must be listened to—“These words thou shalt tell to thy +children” (Deut., vi. 6), “Teach ye all nations” (Matt, xxviii. 19), +“He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth +Me” (Luke, x. 16). (b) One must apply oneself to understand what one +hears—“Thou shalt meditate on these words, sitting in thy house, and +walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising” (Deut., vi. 7), “Meditate +upon these things, be wholly in these things. Take heed to thyself +and doctrine” (I Tim., iv, 15, 16). (c) One must retain what one has +learned—“Thou shalt bind the words of the law as a sign on thy hand, +and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write +them in the entry and on the doors of thy house” (Deut., vi. 8, 9); +“Have in mind in what manner thou hast received and heard” (Apoc., iii. +3).</p> + +<p>915. The means of communicating a knowledge of the faith to unbelievers +are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The remote means is to get a hearing from those who have not the +true faith, and this supposes that one secure their good will through +edifying example and charity towards them: “Be without offense to the +Jews and the Gentiles, and to the church of God; as I also in all +things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself, +but to many that they may be saved” (I Cor., x. 32, 33); “Let us work +good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10).</p> + +<p>(b) The proximate means of communicating a knowledge of faith is the +declaration of the faith to non-Catholics who are willing to hear, +through missionaries sent to foreign countries, Catholic literature +given to those who are well-disposed, invitations to Catholic +instructions, public lectures on the faith, the question box at +missions, etc. (see Canons 1350, 1351). cooperation with Catholic +schools and publications, foreign and home missions, etc., makes one a +sharer in the work of the apostles who are bearing the burden of the +day.</p> + +<p>916. The means appointed by the Church for communicating the doctrines +of faith to Catholics are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) For the Laity.—From childhood religious and moral training +should have the first place in education, and should not be confined +to elementary schools, but continued in secondary and higher schools +(Canons 1372, 1373). Pastors are obliged to give catechetical +instructions, and parents must see that their children attend them +(Canons 1329-1336).</p> + +<p>(b) For the Clergy.—Aspirants to the priesthood must follow the +courses prescribed for preparatory and higher seminaries or houses +of studies (Canons 1352-1371, 587-592), and no one is admitted to +Orders who has not passed canonical examinations (Canons 996, 997, +389, Sec.2). The faculties for hearing confessions and preaching +also presuppose examinations (Canons 1340, 877), and no one is to be +promoted to ecclesiastical offices, such as that of parish priest, +unless he is judged competent in knowledge (Canons 459, 149). The +clergy are encouraged to take university studies and degrees (Canons +1380, 1378).</p> + +<p>917. A person applies himself sufficiently to the understanding of +the teaching of faith when he takes care that, both extensively or in +quantity and intensively or in quality, his knowledge is all that is +required of him.</p> + +<p>(a) Extensively, the knowledge should be such as to include at least +all those truths that have to be known, because explicit faith in +them is necessary; (b) intensively, the knowledge should be more or +less perfect according to the greater or less intelligence, rank or +responsibility of the person.</p> + +<p>918. The truths that have to be known by all capable of the knowledge +are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) All must know, from the necessity of the case (necessity of means), +that they have a supernatural destiny and that Christ is the Way that +leads to it; for one cannot tend to a destination, if one is unaware +of its existence and of the road that will bring one there. Hence, all +must know the four basic truths: God our Last End, the Trinity, the +Incarnation, God the Remunerator (see 787).</p> + +<p>(b) All must know, from the will of Christ (necessity of precept), +the other truths to which He wishes them expressly to assent, and the +duties, general or particular, that He wishes them to fulfill (Mark, +xvi. 16); that is, they must know the doctrine contained in the Creed, +the commandments and ordinances of Christ concerning the Sacraments and +prayer, and the special obligations of each one’s particular state or +office.</p> + +<p>919. As to the degree of knowledge that one must possess intensively +(i.e., as to its quality and perfection), it is clear that knowledge +ought to be more perfect in those who are more intelligent or whose +duties call for a more excellent learning.</p> + +<p>(a) Knowledge of the truths that should be known by all the faithful +ought to be of a more developed kind in those whose minds are more +mature. A scientific and theological understanding of religion is not +required in any lay person; nor should we expect the same knowledge +in a child as in an adult, or in a subnormal person as in one who is +normal mentally. Examples: No religious instruction is necessary for +an idiot (i.e., a grown-up person who has the mind of a two-year-old +child), for such a one cannot reason. A child of seven or an imbecile +(i.e., a grown-up person whose mentality is on a par with that of a +child of seven) may be received to Communion, after such a child or +imbecile has learned in a simple way that the God-Man is received in +the Eucharist and that it is not common food. A child who is between +ten and twelve and a moron (i.e., a grown-up who is not mentally such a +child’s superior) should receive more instruction than an imbecile.</p> + +<p>(b) Knowledge of sacred doctrine naturally should be greater in priests +than in the laity; for in religious things priests are the teachers, +the people their pupils (Mal., ii. 7). A mediocre knowledge of theology +in a priest is not sufficient, especially in these days when the laity +are educated, when theological questions are debated on all sides, and +when so many outside the Church as well as in it are looking for help +and light. A profound knowledge of abstruse questions, however, is +not demanded of all priests in an equal degree: more is expected of a +bishop than of his parish priests, more of a parish priest than of one +who has not the care of souls or office of teaching, more of one who +has to speak to or write for the better educated than of one who has to +do these things for those who are less educated, etc. Knowledge should +include not only learning, but also prudence (i.e., good judgment and +practical ability to use learning well), for a priest learns, not for +his own sake alone, but also for the benefit of others.</p> + +<p>920. Scientific or complete knowledge is not required of those who are +not theologians, as was said about the four basic truths (see 790). It +suffices for lay persons that they know in a simple way, according to +their age and capacity, the substance of the truths they must believe. +Thus, they should know:</p> + +<p>(a) The Creed.—One should know about God, that He is but one and that +there are three divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that God is +the maker of the world, and that He will reward everyone according to +his deeds. One should know about Christ, that He is the Son of God and +God Himself; that He was miraculously born of the Blessed Virgin Mary; +that He suffered and died for our salvation; that He rose from the dead +and by His own power ascended into glory and will come again after the +general resurrection to judge all. One should know about the Church, +that it is the one true Church founded by Christ, in which are found +the communication of spiritual goods and the forgiveness of sins.</p> + +<p>(b) The Decalogue.—One should know the general meaning of the +Commandments so as to be able to regulate one’s own conduct by them. +It is not necessary that a child should know all the kinds of crimes +and vices that are forbidden by the Commandments. In fact, it is better +for such not to know much about evil. Nor is it required that a layman +should know how to make correct applications of the Commandments to +complicated situations that require much previous study.</p> + +<p>(c) The Virtues.—One should know enough to be able to apply to one’s +own life, for ordinary cases, what a virtuous life demands. It is not +necessary that a child should know the requirements of prudence as well +as an experienced person, or that a layman should be able to settle +doubts of conscience as well as a priest. But each should know enough +to fulfill what is required of one of his age and condition. Both old +and young should know in substance the acts of faith, hope, charity and +contrition; for to these all are bound. The young should know the laws +of the Church that apply to them (e.g., the law of abstinence); the +older people should understand the law of fasting which they are bound +to observe, etc.</p> + +<p>(d) The Sacraments.—One should know substantially the doctrine of +the Sacraments that are necessary for all, namely, Baptism, Penance +and the Eucharist. Since all the faithful have the duty of baptizing +in case of necessity, all should know how to administer lay Baptism +properly and fruitfully. When the time comes for receiving a Sacrament, +the recipient should know enough to receive it validly, licitly, and +devoutly, although less knowledge is required in children and in the +dying who cannot be fully instructed (see Canons 752, 854, 1330, 1331, +1020).</p> + +<p>(e) Special Duties.—One should know the essentials of one’s +condition or state of life and the right way to perform its ordinary +duties. Children should understand the obligations of pupils and +of subjects; the married, religious and priests should know the +duties of their respective states; citizens, the loyalty owed to the +community; officials, judges, lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc., the +responsibilities to the public which their own professions imply.</p> + +<p>(f) The Lord’s Prayer.—The substance of this form of prayer should be +known by all, namely, that God is to be glorified, and that we should +ask of Him with confidence goods of soul and body and deliverance from +evil. Though Christ is the only necessary Mediator (I Tim., ii. 5), +it is most suitable that all should know substantially the Hail Mary, +namely, that we should ask the intercession of her who is the Mother of +God and our Mother (John, xix, 27).</p> + +<p>921. Is a person guilty of sin who does not know what to do in some +manner that pertains to his state of life? (a) If he is blamably +ignorant of the nature of a state he has undertaken or of the ordinary +duties that it imposes, he is guilty of sin; for he is, in a sense, +unjust to himself by obligating himself to what he does not understand, +and to others by promising what he cannot fulfill. Examples: A young +person who marries without understanding the meaning of the contract, +or becomes a religious without knowing the meaning of the vows, would +be ignorant of the nature of the state embraced. A priest occupied +in the ministry, who does not know how to administer the Sacraments +validly, how to explain the Gospels correctly, how to judge usual +cases in confession rightly, etc., would be ignorant of the ordinary +duties of his office. A ruler who habitually acts beyond his authority, +a lawyer who regularly gives wrong advice, and a teacher who makes +mistakes in the elements of his specialty, would also be ignorant of +their ordinary duties.</p> + +<p>(b) If a person understands the nature of his state and his everyday +duties, but is ignorant of recondite points or extraordinary cases, he +is not guilty; otherwise, no one could undertake with a safe conscience +the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.; for, even when a person +has devoted a lifetime to a calling, he has to admit that he finds +difficulties or problems that he cannot solve offhand. Example: Father +Titus gave an incorrect solution about a case of restitution, because +he had to express an opinion at once, and there were so many angles and +circumstances that some of them were overlooked.</p> + +<p>922. The means appointed by the Church for the retention of knowledge +in matters of faith are:</p> + +<p>(a) For the Laity.—The course of Christian doctrine should not be +discontinued with the parochial school or Sunday school, but should +be continued in the higher schools (Canon 1373). Moreover, for adults +catechetical instruction is given on Sundays and feast days (Canon +1332), and the people are exhorted to attend sermons on matters +of faith and morals that are preached at parochial Masses (Canons +1337-1348).</p> + +<p>(b) For the Clergy.—The clergy are admonished not to give up study +after ordination (Canon 129), and the law requires that the junior +clergy should take examinations annually during the first three or five +years after ordination to the priesthood (Canons 130, 590), and that +all the clergy should take part in theological conferences several +times a year (Canon 131).</p> + +<p>923. What has been learned by heart is more easily retained in the +memory, and hence the common practice of committing the Catechism to +memory is to be recommended. Some believe that it is obligatory to +memorize the Creed and other points mentioned above (see 920); but this +is unlikely, since even the form of the Decalogue and of the Lord’s +Prayer is not identical in different parts of scripture. In the early +centuries the catechumens were obliged to learn the Creed and the +Lord’s Prayer by heart before Baptism, but there is no general law that +requires this at the present time.</p> + +<p>(a) According to positive law, one is not obliged to memorize the words +and order of the Creed and other formulas, and it may be considered an +indication that a person has retained sufficiently what was learned, +if he is able to reply correctly to questions put to him (e.g., to +explain the first article of the Creed by stating the direct and simple +signification of its terms, and so on with the rest).</p> + +<p>(b) According to natural law, one is obliged to learn by rote ithe +formulas of faith, if this is possible and there is danger of spiritual +detriment when it is not done. There is hardly anyone who cannot by +practice commit to memory the Our Father, the Apostles’ Creed, and +short forms of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; and, if +none of them is thus known, it is practically certain that the grave +duty of prayer will be neglected. Hence, it seems that there is a +serious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father. Feebleminded +persons are not obliged to memorize, or even to know, the truths of +faith, if they are incapable.</p> + +<p>924. Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of +ignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should +grant or deny absolution according to the case.</p> + +<p>(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means +of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as +explained in 792.</p> + +<p>(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because +commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of +mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly +contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his +religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded, +and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be +sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins +to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or +other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism, +should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and +return when they know them better.</p> + +<p>925. The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith.—The second commandment +of faith mentioned above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative. +(a) As negative, it forbids at any time disbelief or doubt concerning +that which God proposes for faith. This aspect has been treated above +in discussing the sins against faith (see 813 sqq., 840 sqq.). (b) As +affirmative, it commands that one at certain times should give assent +to the truths revealed by God. This aspect of the commandment will be +considered now.</p> + +<p>926. The existence of the command that one should elicit a positive act +of assent to divine truth is taught in both Testaments. (a) In the Old +Testament, implicit faith in all scripture was required; for lawgivers, +prophets, and inspired writers spoke as delivering a message from God. +Moreover, explicit faith in God and His Providence was commanded (see +788). (b) In the New Testament, implicit faith in all revealed doctrine +is required, whether delivered in writing or as tradition (II Thess., +ii. 15). Moreover, there is a command of explicit faith in the Gospel: +“This is His commandment that we should believe in the name of His Son, +Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He hath given commandment unto +us” (I John, iii. 23).</p> + +<p>927. This commandment obliges adults under grave sin as to all revealed +truths. (a) The primary truths of revelation, truths of faith and +morals to which all are commanded to give assent (i.e., to believe +explicitly), are so important that those who refuse to believe them +merit condemnation (Mark, xvi. 16). (b) The secondary truths of +revelation—i.e., those that were made known by God, not for their own +sake, but on account of their relation to the primary truths (e.g., the +names of the patriarchs, the size of Saul, the complexion of David and +thousands of similar facts)—need not be known by all, for that is +impossible. But all are seriously obliged to believe that everything +contained in the Word of God is true, and to be ready to give assent +even to the truths that are not known. Hence, the minor truths of +revelation must be believed under pain of grave sin—implicitly, if +they are not known, explicitly, when they become known.</p> + +<p>928. The obligation of explicit faith in the primary truths or articles +of faith is not grave with reference to every detail contained in those +truths. (a) Some details, on account of their difficulty, oblige to +explicit faith only under venial sin. Such are (in the Creed) the +descent into Limbo, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the mode of the +Communion of Saints. (b) Other details, on account of less importance, +do not oblige to explicit faith under any sin. Such are the facts that +it was Pilate under whom Christ suffered, that it was the third day +when Christ rose from the dead.</p> + +<p>929. An affirmative commandment “obliges at all times, but not for all +times” (see 371). Hence, the question: How often or when must one give +internal assent to the teachings of faith, in order to fulfill the law? +Before answering this question, let us distinguish three kinds of laws +that may oblige one to an act of faith: (a) the divine law expressly +prescribing an act of faith; (b) the divine law prescribing an act of +some other virtue, which presupposes an act of faith; (e) human law +prescribing something that at least presupposes or includes an act of +faith.</p> + +<p>930. The divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith (about which +we spoke in 925), obliges in the following cases: (a) at the time when +the commandment is first presented to one, and one recognizes its +obligation: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and +is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned” +(Mark, xvi. 16); (b) it also obliges at other times during life; for +“the just man liveth by faith” (Rom, i. 17). The Church has rejected +the Jansenistic teaching that an act of faith once in a lifetime +suffices (see Denzinger-Banwart, nn. 1101, 1167, 1215).</p> + +<p>931. The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the +first time, either of one’s whole life or for the first time after loss +of faith, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) It is brought before a person for the first time in his life, when +he first hears the truths of faith, or first realizes his duty of +accepting them. Examples: A Catholic child who has just reached the age +of reason and has been told in Sunday school that he must believe the +Creed and other truths he has been taught; an adult Catholic who hears +for the first time of transubstantiation, or of some other dogma just +defined by the Church; a non-Catholic who has just perceived the truth +of the Catholic Church.</p> + +<p>(b) The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the +first time after loss of faith, as soon as the duty of returning to +belief occurs to the mind.</p> + +<p>932. Does this commandment require that, as soon as the obligation of +faith dawns on one, one is obliged without an instant’s delay to make a +formal and explicit act of faith?</p> + +<p>(a) As regards children, on account of the imperfection of their +understanding, it can easily happen that they do not perceive that the +obligation binds them there and then, or that it binds under sin, and +thus some time may elapse after the use of reason, or after knowledge +of the command of faith, before the omission of the act of belief would +become a sin. Practically every child of Catholic education complies +with the command when, having learned the truths that must be known, he +says devoutly the act of faith, either in his own words or according to +the form given in the Catechism.</p> + +<p>(b) As regards adults, while the entrance of converts into the Church +admits of some delay for necessary preparation, the act of faith itself +should not be postponed for an instant, once the necessity of making it +is perceived as certain.</p> + +<p>933. As to its frequency or the times when the act of faith should be +renewed, there are various opinions, but in actual life the question +presents no difficulty.</p> + +<p>(a) As to theory, the theologians are divided, some holding that the +act of faith should be made at least once a year, others holding for +once a month, still others for all Sundays and holydays. There is no +solid support for any of these opinions, and it seems that the time and +frequency of acts of faith are not determined by divine law.</p> + +<p>(b) As to practice, the theologians agree that one who fulfills the +usual religious duties of a Catholic, has also fulfilled the command to +renew the act of faith. Thus, those who attend Mass and receive the +Sacraments, as the law of the Church prescribes, make acts of faith in +doing so, which satisfy the divine law of faith.</p> + +<p>934. Those who omit to make an act of faith in time of temptation +against faith, are also guilty of sin, if the omission is through +sinful neglect.</p> + +<p>(a) If the act of faith is the only means by which the temptation can +be overcome (a rare contingency, outside the danger of death), one is +of course gravely bound to elicit the act. The sin committed by one who +would neglect the act of faith in such a circumstance is by some +considered as opposed to the negative command, that one do not dissent; +by others as opposed to the affirmative command, that one assent to +faith. Example: Caius is very much tempted to blasphemy, and finds that +the best remedy is an act of faith in the Majesty of God.</p> + +<p>(b) If the act of faith would be harmful, as prolonging or intensifying +the temptation (a thing that is not infrequent), it is better to +struggle against the temptation indirectly by turning the attention to +other matters (see 257, 844).</p> + +<p>935. Other cases in which one is obliged to make an internal act of +faith are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) By reason of a divine commandment of some virtue other than faith, +it is sometimes necessary to make an act of faith also. Examples: When +a sinner is preparing himself for the state of grace, of which faith is +the prerequisite; when one is tempted against hope, justice, etc., and +needs to call on faith to resist the tempter; when one is near to death +and must make an act of charity in preparing to meet God. In these +cases there are divine precepts of repentance, hope, justice, charity, +and virtually of faith, which is presupposed.</p> + +<p>(b) One must at times make an internal act of faith by reason of a +human commandment enjoining some external act or virtue which supposes +faith. Examples: The command to swear on the Bible, or by some mystery +of religion, supposes an act of faith. The commands to receive +Communion at Easter (Canon 859), to make meditation and spiritual +retreats (Canons 125, 126, 595, 1001), to apply the intention of Mass +(Canons 339, Sec. 1, 466, Sec. 1), all include virtually the command +of an act of faith, for the things required (Communion, retreat, Mass) +cannot be rightly performed without such an act.</p> + +<p>936. The act of faith is either formal or virtual, according as it is +made in itself, or in the act of another virtue that supposes it.</p> + +<p>(a) The act of faith is formal, when one mentally accepts the truths +of revelation on account of divine authority, even though one does +not express the assent in words or according to any set formula. This +kind of act of faith is necessary when one passes from non-belief +or unbelief to belief, for none of the acts prior to faith contains +supernatural assent to revelation. Hence, the commandment of faith +requires in children or in converts from unbelief a formal act.</p> + +<p>(b) The act of faith is virtual, when one elicits the act of some other +supernatural virtue without thinking expressly about faith; for faith +is presupposed by all other supernatural virtues, since one cannot +wish what one does not believe. Thus, the acts of hope, charity, and +contrition are virtually acts of faith. It seems that commandments of +other virtues and of the renewal of faith itself do not require that +one make a formal act of faith, although of course this would be the +better thing to do. Thus, to fulfill the Easter precept of yearly +Confession and Communion well, it is not required that one make a +formal act of faith before Confession, since faith is included in the +act of contrition. It is not necessary, then, that the penitent should +say: “I believe in the forgiveness of sins, etc.,” for in his purpose +to receive forgiveness he makes a virtual act of faith in the tenth +article of the Creed and in the Sacrament of Penance, as well as in the +other mysteries of faith.</p> + +<p>937. Practically, there is no difficulty for confessors about the +violation of the commandment regarding internal acts of faith.</p> + +<p>(a) If penitents are instructed and practical Catholics, they have made +at some time a formal act of faith, even though they do not remember +the time, for the act of faith precedes the acts of other virtues they +are exercising. True, this act of faith may not have been made as soon +as the age of reason was attained or the duty of faith perceived, but +invincible ignorance excuses those who were in good faith about the +matter. Regularity in prayer and other duties is an index that the act +of faith is being renewed in such a way as to comply with the +commandment. Hence, there is no necessity of questioning this class of +penitents about the act of faith.</p> + +<p>(b) If penitents are very ignorant Catholics (e.g., young children), it +is clear that they have not made an act of faith as they should, for no +one believes what he does not know. They should, therefore, be +instructed that it is their duty to acquire more knowledge, and to make +an act of faith along with their other prayers. Regarding absolution, +see 924.</p> + +<p>(c) If penitents are instructed but not practical, the confession that +they have neglected prayer, Mass, and the Sacraments, means that they +have also neglected the command of making acts of faith. It is not +necessary, therefore, that the confessor interrogate or instruct them +about this command, and he may absolve them, if they are resolved to +amend. It is well, however, to recommend daily acts of faith, hope, +charity and contrition to careless Catholics, especially to those who +cannot attend Mass or receive the Sacraments often.</p> + +<p>938. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.—The third +commandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and +affirmative: (a) as negative, it forbids denial of the faith or +profession of error opposed to faith; (b) as affirmative, it commands +that one make open profession of one’s faith.</p> + +<p>939. The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or +profession of error is taught in scripture and the sinfulness of such +denial is clear from its nature. (a) “He that shall deny Me before men, +I will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven” (Matt., x. 33). +Denial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ. +(b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what +he says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a +grave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against +the neighbor, who is scandalized.</p> + +<p>940. With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either +direct or indirect. (a) It is direct, when one intends to deny the +faith; (b) it is indirect, when one does not intend to deny the faith, +but wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their +signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given +them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the +faith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the +idol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of +reverence, while intending only adoration to Christ crucified and +detesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as +a mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from +Nestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass, +intending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.</p> + +<p>941. There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by words, spoken or +written, as when one says: “I am not a Catholic,” “I do not believe in +miracles”; (b) by acts, as when one dissuades persons of good faith +from entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to +genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes +scapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by omission, as when +one fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably +answer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a +non-Catholic.</p> + +<p>942. There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is +professed: (a) by words, as when one says that one is a freethinker or +Christian Scientist; (b) by acts, as when one offers incense to an +idol, or receives the Lord’s Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an +anti-religious address; (c) by signs, as when one uses the Masonic +grip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan +name, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by +omission, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or +makes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one’s +companions.</p> + +<p>943. The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:</p> + +<p>(a) Words that deny, not one’s allegiance to religion, but one’s +acceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples: +Titus denies that he is a “Papist,” because he wishes his questioner to +use a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a +pagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or +enemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times, +says to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of +Jesus and a Catholic.</p> + +<p>(b) Words that conceal one’s rank or state in the Church, are not +against faith, because one can hold the faith without being in a +certain rank or state in the Church, Thus, St. Peter’s denial that he +was a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was, +according to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or +of the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies +his character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic +family, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.</p> + +<p>(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the +profession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much +attached to one’s religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing +to follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church +duties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the +Sacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be +considered one.</p> + +<p>(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do +not necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves +and have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not +used as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs +that are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a +denial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient, +makes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he +lives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from +pagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where +it is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises +circumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at +meals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing +at the seashore.</p> + +<p>(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not +a denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and +convictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office +where most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks +about religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.</p> + +<p>944. Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.—The principal dangers of +making external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith +itself, are the following: (a) membership in forbidden societies; (b) +communication in sectarian services; (c) cooperation in activities +whose tendency or principles are erroneous.</p> + +<p>945. Forbidden Societies.—Societies are forbidden by the Church when +they are intrinsically or extrinsically evil. (a) A society is +intrinsically evil, when it has an evil purpose, or uses evil means to +obtain even an honest end. Thus, societies or parties that conspire +against Church or State, or that seek to undermine Christian doctrines +or morals, have an evil purpose; while those that demand absolute +secrecy or oaths of blind obedience to unknown persons, that favor +cremation, use a sectarian ritual, promote evil literature, etc., are +employing evil means, no matter what may be the end in view. (b) A +society is extrinsically evil, when its end and means are good, but +membership in it is dangerous to faith or morals on account of +circumstances (e.g., on account of the bad type of individuals who make +up the society or control it).</p> + +<p>946. The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as +banned for Catholics:</p> + +<p>(a) secret societies, that is, those which demand of members that +certain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely +to no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not +even to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the +bishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to +their children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal +forum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute +obedience to unknown leaders;</p> + +<p>(b) condemned societies, that is, such as have been censured by the +Church, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees _ipso facto_ +excommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join +Masonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful +civil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are: +various Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation, +the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the +Independent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the +Y.M.C.A. Female societies affiliated with these are also condemned, +since they are branches of the main society—for example, the Rebeccas, +the Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters.</p> + +<p>Worthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist +Party and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or +propagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the +Holy Office:</p> + +<p>1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it.</p> + +<p>Reply: In the negative; for Communism is materialistic and +anti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they +sometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in +fact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be +enemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.</p> + +<p>2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books, +periodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or +action of Communists, or to write in them.</p> + +<p>Reply: In the negative: for they are forbidden _ipso iure_ (see Canon +1399).</p> + +<p>3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned +in 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.</p> + +<p>Reply: In the negative, according to the ordinary principles governing +the refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.</p> + +<p>4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and +anti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend +or propagate it, incur _ipso facto_ as apostates from the Catholic +faith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.</p> + +<p>Reply: In the affirmative (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).</p> + +<p>The sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was +imposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up +by the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are +materialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The +associations themselves are subject to the sanctions of the decree of +July 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to +such associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have +part in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the +sacraments (Monitum of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).</p> + +<p>(c) seditious societies, that is, those organizations, even though not +secret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;</p> + +<p>(d) suspect societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have +the appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in +response to the question: “Whether Catholics may join the ‘Rotary +Club’?” issued the following decree: “It is not licit for clerics to +join the Association ‘Rotary Club’ or to be present at its meetings; +the laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684.” +The decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by +surprise, one paper describing it as “a bewildering document.” The +surprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social +clubs dedicated to bonhomie and community improvement. Nevertheless, +the decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in +regard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are +not condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position? +The response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is +indicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies. +The canon instructs them to “beware of secret, condemned, seditious and +suspect societies.” Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be +secret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that +they are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in +the _Osservatore Romano_ of Jan. 27, 1951.</p> + +<p>In regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what +was formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied +on February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to +permit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings. +Moreover, as the _Osservatore_ article indicates, the prohibition is +limited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at +which non-members may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings +befits priestly activity.</p> + +<p>The exhortation to layfolk in regard to “Rotary” simply reaffirms the +Church’s general attitude to all secular associations. As early as +November 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A., +warned the Ordinaries that the note of “suspicion” attaches to all +secular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral +standards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit +of religious indifferentism and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish +hierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary. +However, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is +a question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper +local Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortatious +not to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the +ordinaries may maintain discreet silence.</p> + +<p>(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious +authority.</p> + +<p>947. The following organizations fall under the censure against Masonic +societies:</p> + +<p>(a) all varieties and degrees of Freemasonry, for all the Masonic sects +are included in the Canon. The fact that American, English and Irish +Masons have many excellent individuals in their ranks, and lack the +irreligious and revolutionary character of the Masonry of Continental +Europe or Latin countries, does not exempt them from the censure.</p> + +<p>(b) all organizations similar to Masonry, that is, secret societies +that conspire against lawful authority. Such are societies like the +Carbonari, the Fenians, anarchists and nihilists.</p> + +<p>948. The sin committed by membership in forbidden societies is grave, +since the purpose of the law—viz., the safeguarding of faith against +serious danger—is itself grave. Such membership is interpreted also as +a profession of false religion, when one joins oneself to a body which +in its branches or degrees has a false creed of its own. (a) Even +though the branch or degree to which one belongs does not require +assent to such a creed, membership expresses a fellowship with those +who do accept it; (b) similarly, participation in the ritual of the +lodges is a communication in ceremonies expressive of false religion; +for, though their externals may appear good or even Christian, the +internal meaning known to the adepts is anti-Catholic or anti-Christian.</p> + +<p>949. Absolution of Those Who Belong to Forbidden Societies.—(a) The +sin cannot be absolved unless there is repentance, and hence absolution +cannot be granted those who without sufficient reason refuse to +withdraw from membership, or who refuse to discontinue participation in +false rites.</p> + +<p>(b) The excommunication is not incurred by those who joined forbidden +societies in ignorance of the law or of the penalty, provided the +ignorance was not crass or supine. If the censure was actually +incurred, the mode of absolution will depend on the nature of the case: +if the case is occult (i.e., if it is not known and not likely to +become known that the penitent belonged to a society forbidden under +pain of excommunication), the Ordinary may absolve or grant faculties +to absolve (Canon 2237); if the case is a public one, and it would be +very inconvenient to await faculties from Rome, absolution is given +under the condition of recourse to the proper authority within a month +(Canon 2254). Many Ordinaries have by Indult faculties to absolve +members of secret societies.</p> + +<p>950. Nominal membership and temporary attendance at meetings may be +permitted as an exception when there are sufficient reasons.</p> + +<p>(a) Nominal membership means that one leaves one’s name on the roster +of the society and continues to pay its assessments, but does not +communicate with the society or attend its meetings. In 1896 the Holy +Office replied to the American Bishops that this kind of membership in +the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Knights of Pythias might be +permitted under certain conditions, if there was a sufficient reason +(viz., that grave material loss would be incurred by withdrawal). (b) +Temporary attendance at meetings means that for a short time, and not +for longer than absolutely necessary, one is present at gatherings of +the society, but takes no active part in its false cult.</p> + +<p>951. The following conditions were laid down for permission of nominal +membership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, etc.: (a) that the +penitent joined the society in good faith, before knowing that it was +condemned; (b) that there be no danger of scandal, or that it be +removed by the declaration that membership is only nominal and only for +the purpose of avoiding temporal losses; (c) that there be no danger of +perversion of the party himself or of his family, in case of sickness +or of death, and no danger of a non-Catholic funeral.</p> + +<p>952. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who has incurred +excommunication on account of membership in the Masons or other like +society should be as follows: (a) the faculty to absolve must be +obtained (see 949), (b) the following promises must be exacted from the +penitent—that he will withdraw entirely from the sect and that he will +repair, as well as he can, the scandal he may have caused; (c) the +penitent must be required to renounce the sect, at least in the +presence of the confessor, and to deliver over to him the books, +manuscripts, insignia, and other objects that are distinctive of it +(the confessor should give these objects to the Ordinary as soon as he +prudently can, but, if grave reasons prevent this, he should burn +them); (d) a salutary penance should be given and frequent confession +urged.</p> + +<p>953. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to the Odd +Fellows or other society forbidden by name, but without censure, should +be as follows: (a) if the penitent is contrite and promises to leave +the society, he can be absolved without special faculties; (b) if the +penitent is contrite but wishes to retain nominal membership, the case +must be referred to the Archbishop of the Province or to the Apostolic +Delegate; (c) if the penitent wishes to retain full membership, he is +not repentant and cannot be absolved.</p> + +<p>954. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to a +society not condemned by name, but which the confessor himself regards +as evil should be as follows: (a) if the confessor is certain that the +society is one of those condemned implicitly by the Church, because it +exacts inviolable secrecy or blind obedience to its leaders, or has +Masonic characteristics, etc., he should treat it in the same way as +the societies condemned by name; (b) if the confessor is certain that +the society is condemned by natural law for the penitent before him +(e.g., on account of the evil associates and moral dangers it +contains), he should treat it as any other occasion of sin, but it +should be noted that no priest or local Ordinary has authority to +condemn publicly and by name any society not condemned by the Church; +(c) if the confessor is in doubt, he should proceed according to the +rules for an uncertain conscience (see 678, 679, 742), and for the +prudent administration of the Sacraments (see Vol. II).</p> + +<p>955. As one of the chief remedies against evil societies is the +formation of Catholic societies, the Code (Canon 684) praises those of +the faithful who enroll as members in associations established or +recommended by the Church. Catholic societies distinct from religious +Orders or Congregations are of two kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) Distinctly religious societies are those instituted for the purpose +of promoting a more Christian life among their members, or of fostering +works of piety and charity, or of contributing to the solemnity of +public worship. Such are the Secular Third Orders, Confraternities of +the Blessed Sacrament and of Christian Doctrine, and other pious unions.</p> + +<p>(b) Societies that are not distinctly religious, but whose membership +and spirit are Catholic, are of many kinds. Such are the Knights of +Columbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Catholic Daughters of America, +Volksverein, Young Men’s Institute, etc.</p> + +<p>956. Communication in Worship.—Communication with non-Catholics (as +was said above in 882) is either religious or non-religious. It is +clear that communication in non-religious matters does not contain a +profession of error, but the same cannot be said of communication in +religious services, since these are not only acts of worship, but also +expressions of faith in the creed of a certain religion. We must +distinguish, however, between private and public communication.</p> + +<p>(a) Communication is private, when a Catholic and non-Catholic offer +together the Lord’s Prayer or other similar prayer as a private +devotion, not as an act of official worship. Private devotion is not +the expression of a sectarian creed, and, if there is nothing false in +it and no danger of scandal or perversion from communication between +Catholic and non-Catholic in such devotion, this kind of communication +is not unlawful. In the following paragraphs there will be question of +public communication.</p> + +<p>(b) Communication is public, when the rites performed are the official +services of the Catholic Church or of some non-Catholic sect (e.g., the +Mass, the Lord’s Supper of the Lutherans, the Evensong of the +Anglicans, the prayer-meeting of other sects). Thus, public +communication takes place either when non-Catholics take part in +Catholic worship, or Catholics take part in non-Catholic worship.</p> + +<p>957. Participation of non-Catholics in Catholic services is either by +mere presence, or by reception or performance of Catholic rites.</p> + +<p>(a) Mere presence consists in a purely material attendance at a +service, as when non-Catholics assist at Mass and sit, rise and kneel +with the congregation or remain seated throughout. There is no +objection whatever to this kind of participation; on the contrary, +non-Catholics should be invited to Catholic sermons and services, and +made to feel welcome, for in what better way can the divine command of +working for their conversion be complied with? Only excommunicated +persons are excluded from the offices of the Church (Canon 2269, Sec.1). +It is also allowed that Catholic bishops and clergy accompany a +non-Catholic ruler to the church, and assign him and his escort an +honorable place therein.</p> + +<p>(b) Reception of Catholic rites is had when non-Catholics, without +performing any liturgical function, receive some spiritual favor +through the rites of the Church, as when a non-Catholic receives a +priest’s blessing.</p> + +<p>(c) Performance of Catholic rites exists when a non-Catholic exercises +some office in a liturgical function of the Catholic Church, as when a +Protestant acts as sponsor at a Catholic Baptism.</p> + +<p>958. Cases of reception of Catholic rites by non-Catholics permitted by +law are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) Reception of Sacramentals.—Since the purpose of these rites and +objects is to implore graces and temporal favors with a view to the +illumination and salvation of the recipient, and since our Lord Himself +blessed and cured even the pagans, the Church permits blessings and +exorcisms to be conferred on non-Catholics (Canons 1149, 1152). +Similarly, blessed candles, palms, ashes and other real sacramentals +may be given to them. Examples: The Church has permitted priests to +visit the homes of Mohammedans to bless and pray over the sick, and +also to bless the houses of schismatics, provided they were summoned +and avoided all communication in prayer.</p> + +<p>(b) Reception of Sacraments.-Since it is possible that the salvation of +a dying person may depend on absolution, good moralists, relying on +decisions of Roman Congregations, hold that conditional absolution may +be given to a heretic or schismatic who is dying and unconscious, or +even to one such who is dying and conscious, provided he is in good +faith and contrite, and danger of scandal has been removed.</p> + +<p>(c) Reception of Fruits of the Mass.—Since Christ died for all, there +is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the application of Mass +to any persons who are living or in Purgatory; and from Canon 809 it +appears that Mass may be offered for any living person, and also for +any deceased person about whose salvation we may entertain hope. Hence, +neither the divine nor the ecclesiastical law forbids the application +of Mass for heretics, schismatics, or infidels. The Church also permits +Mass to be said privately, all scandal removed, for excommunicated +persons. Under these same conditions, then, Mass may be said for +non-Catholics, both living and dead (Canon 2262, Sec.2, n. 2).</p> + +<p>(d) Reception of the Suffrages of the Church.—Since God wishes all to +be saved and public peace to be maintained (I Tim., ii), and since the +Church desires that Ordinaries and pastors should have at heart the +conversion of non-Catholics (Canon 1350), public prayers for the +prosperity of non-Catholic rulers and officials—likewise sermons, +missions and other works for the conversion of unbelievers—are not +only allowed, but recommended and required.</p> + +<p>959. Non-Catholics have not the same right as Catholics to receive the +rites of the Church, and hence when they are admitted to them, there +are certain restrictions to be observed.</p> + +<p>(a) Restrictions as to Sacred Things.—As admission of non-Catholics to +sacramentals, etc., is a favor, not a right, it should be confined to +cases allowed by the Church. Thus, it is forbidden to grant indulgences +or to give the nuptial blessing to non-Catholics, and only in very +exceptional cases may any ceremonies be permitted at mixed marriages +(Canons 1102, 1109). Non-Catholics may not receive the Pax; may not be +invited to take part in the solemn services of receiving ashes on Ash +Wednesday, palms on Palm Sunday and candles on Candlemas Day; may not +receive ecclesiastical burial (Holy Office, June 8, 1859). Children +sent by their parents to non-Catholic services may not be confirmed +(Holy Office, August 28, 1780); a Catholic priest is not allowed to +supply for a non-Catholic minister, by accompanying the body of a +non-Catholic from the home to the graveyard, even though the body be +not brought to Church, nor the bell tolled (Holy Office, January 26, +1886). It is not permissible to lend a Catholic church to non-Catholics +for their services.</p> + +<p>(b) Restrictions as to Persons.—As superstition and irreverence have +to be avoided, the sacramentals may not be administered or given at all +to non-Catholics about whose good faith and purpose there is doubt.</p> + +<p>(c) Restrictions as to Mode.—The Church, while she wishes to help and +benefit non-Catholics, must avoid anything that would cause scandal or +have the appearance of equal recognition of believers and unbelievers. +Thus, when Mass is offered for outsiders, the same publicity and pomp +is not permitted as when there is question of Catholics.</p> + +<p>960. As regards the performance of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, the +Church disapproves of every kind of such participation, but does not +refuse to tolerate the more remote kind, when there is grave necessity +and no scandal is caused.</p> + +<p>(a) By more remote participation we understand such as scarcely differs +from passive assistance (e.g., to act as witness at a marriage), or +such as carries with it no recognition as an official of the Church +(e.g., to act as substitute or temporary organist). Hence, the Church +has permitted this kind of participation in particular cases, when the +authorities decided that there was urgent necessity and no scandal. +Examples: Moralists hold that, when a heretic or schismatic has been +designated as sponsor at Baptism and cannot be refused without grave +offense, he may be allowed to act as witness. The Holy Office has also +declared that heretics should not be used as witnesses at marriage, but +may be tolerated as such by the Ordinary, when there is a grave reason +and no scandal (August 18, 1891); that a non-Catholic organist may be +employed temporarily, if it is impossible to secure one who is a +Catholic, and no scandal is caused (February 23, 1820); that in certain +special circumstances girls belonging to a schismatical sect might be +allowed to sing with the Catholics at church functions, especially at +Exposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (January 25, 1906).</p> + +<p>(b) Proximate participation is the exercise of functions connected with +a sacred rite (e.g., to act as server at Mass), or that imply a +recognition of the religion of the one who participates (e.g., to act +as representative of some sect at a funeral and receive liturgical +honors). The Church has always refused to tolerate this kind of +participation. Examples: Non-Catholics may not act as sponsors at +Baptism or Confirmation under pain of invalidity of sponsorship (Canons +765, 795), nor chant the Office in choir (Holy Office, June 8, 1859), +nor be employed as singers of the liturgical music (Holy Office, May 1, +1889), nor carry torches or lights in church ceremonies (Holy Office, +November 20, 1850). Likewise, non-Catholics may not become members of +Catholic confraternities, nor assist at Catholic services as official +representatives of some sect or sectarian society.</p> + +<p>961. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services may happen +today in so many ways, and it is so difficult at times to draw the line +between lawful and unlawful communication, that it is well before +considering these cases to state the general rules that apply here.</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, one +good and the other bad, if the act in itself is good or indifferent, if +there is a sufficiently grave reason for performing it, if the evil +effect is not intended, and if the evil effect be not prior to the good +effect (see 104).</p> + +<p>(b) Circumstances vary in different localities and countries, and +communication that would signify unity of belief in a place where +Catholics and non-Catholics are very unequal numerically might be very +harmless in a place where there is no great numerical difference. +Offense to non-Catholics should not be given needlessly.</p> + +<p>(c) In doubtful cases the decision whether or not a particular kind of +communication is lawful or unlawful pertains to the Ordinary (Canon +1258).</p> + +<p>962. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services is either +active or passive. (a) Participation is active when one takes a part or +fulfills some function in an act that is an official expression of the +worship and belief of a sect, even though this takes place outside a +church, or is not open to the general public.</p> + +<p>(b) Participation is passive, if one merely assists as a spectator, and +not as a worshipper, at something pertaining to non-Catholic worship.</p> + +<p>963. Sacred things in which communication is possible are of three +classes:</p> + +<p>(a) the chief acts of divine worship (i.e., Sacrifices, Sacraments, +sacramentals);</p> + +<p>(b) the secondary acts of divine worship (such as prayers, processions, +vows, oaths, the Divine Office, hymn singing, scripture reading, etc.). +In the Protestant denominations some one or other of these is, as a +rule, the central or distinctive service, although some have other +proper features of their own, such as the silent meeting of the +Quakers, the seance of the Spiritualists, the march of the Salvation +Army, the charity kiss of the Dunkards;</p> + +<p>(c) places (e.g., churches, lodge rooms, cemeteries), times (e.g., days +of feast or fast), and objects (e.g., images, badges, aprons, banners, +robes), pertaining to divine worship.</p> + +<p>964. It is unlawful for Catholics in any way to assist actively at or +take part in the worship of non-Catholics (Canon 1258). Such assistance +is intrinsically and gravely evil; for (a) if the worship is +non-Catholic in its form (e.g., Mohammedan ablutions, the Jewish +paschal meal, revivalistic “hitting the trail,” the right hand of +fellowship, etc.), it expresses a belief in the false creed symbolized; +(b) if the worship is Catholic in form, but is under the auspices of a +non-Catholic body (e.g., Baptism as administered by a Protestant +minister, or Mass as celebrated by a schismatical priest), it expresses +either faith in a false religious body or rebellion against the true +Church.</p> + +<p>965. It is unlawful for Catholics to simulate active assistance in the +worship of non-Catholics, for, while the non-Catholic rite would be +avoided, something which appeared to be that rite would be done, and +thus profession of faith in it would be given.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, it is not lawful to do an indifferent act which bystanders +from the circumstances will have to conclude is an act of false +worship. Thus, Eleazar would not eat lawful meat which was put before +him in order that he might pretend to eat the meat of sacrifice after +the manner of the heathen (II Mach., vi).</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lawful to accept a false certificate of participation in +false worship. Hence, the early Church condemned as apostates the +Libellatics (i.e., those Christians, who, to protect themselves in time +of persecution, obtained by bribery or otherwise a forged or genuine +magistrate’s certificate that they had sacrificed to the heathen gods).</p> + +<p>966. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic +worship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for +performing an act that has two results, one good and the other evil +(see 104); for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really indifferent, that is, +it must be a merely passive presence without any active participation +in the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker +meeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits +quietly among the others present, as if in meditation, assists +actively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see +what is going on, assists passively; but, if he joins with the +congregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.</p> + +<p>(b) The evil effect that may result from assistance (such as scandal +and danger of perversion) must not be prior to the good effect; +otherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: Titus, a +non-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend +Balbus. He then asks Balbus to assist as a spectator at the services of +his denomination, and thus see for himself that the latter is better. +Balbus, in order to be courteous, consents. Here Balbus aims to show +politeness, which is good, but the means he uses—namely, the +impression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his +own religion—is bad.</p> + +<p>(c) The evil effect (i.e., remote danger of perversion, unavoidable +scandal) must not be intended or approved, but only permitted. Example: +Caius, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings +in Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable +persons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he +wishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone +(see on Scandal).</p> + +<p>(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of +assistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on +several occasions than on one, for assistance at infidel than at +heretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary +act of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a +layman, etc. Example: Graver reason would be necessary to justify +assistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of +anti-Catholicism manifested (e.g., flower designs and regalia of a +hostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained +nothing offensive.</p> + +<p>967. Cases of communication in false sacrificial rites are as follows: +(a) Active participation is had in such acts as the slaying and +offering of victims, the burning of incense before idols, the eating of +sacrificial banquets; (b) Passive participation is had when one merely +watches the rite of sacrifice without taking any part therein.</p> + +<p>968. Cases of communication in the Sacrifice of the Mass are as +follows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as taking the +part of deacon in a schismatical Mass, assisting at a schismatical Mass +with the intention of hearing Mass formally (i.e., of offering it with +the priest). If on Sunday, one is where there is only a schismatical +church, one is excused from the obligation of hearing Mass, and may not +hear Mass in that church (Holy Office, December 5, 1608; August 7, +1704). (b) Passive participation is had when one is present merely as a +spectator, kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, but giving no other +signs of religious devotion. This is permissible under the conditions +mentioned above (see 966), if there is no scandal, or danger of +perversion (Holy Office, April 24, 1894).</p> + +<p>969. Cases of participation in the Sacraments or sacramentals, real or +reputed, are as follows: (a) Active participation takes place when one +receives a Sacrament from a non-Catholic minister, or offers one’s +child to receive a Sacrament from such a minister, or contracts +marriage in the presence of such a minister, or acts as sponsor at a +non-Catholic baptism or confirmation or as the religious witness at a +non-Catholic marriage, or answers in public non-Catholic prayers, or +takes ashes blessed by schismatics. (b) Passive participation is had +when one merely looks on at the administration of a Sacrament or +sacramental by a non-Catholic minister, without signs of approval or +union in what is being done.</p> + +<p>970. There are certain cases that seem to be active participations in +Sacraments with non-Catholics, and yet are permitted by the Code. In +reality, however, there is no active communication in those cases.</p> + +<p>(a) Canons 886 and 905 allow the faithful to receive communion and +absolution according to a Rite different from their own, so that one +who belongs to the Latin Rite may lawfully receive in Communion a Host +consecrated according to the Greek Rite, or go to confession to an +Oriental priest. But in these Canons there is question of different +Rites within the Catholic Church, not of those of non-Catholics.</p> + +<p>(b) Canons 742 and 882 allow those who are in danger of death to +receive Baptism and absolution from an heretical or schismatical +minister, and theologians apply the same principle to Extreme Unction +and the Viaticum. But there is no communication in non-Catholic +ceremonies in these cases, for the Sacraments belong to the Catholic +Church, and for the sake of the dying she authorizes non-Catholic +ministers to act as her representatives, provided there is no scandal +or danger of perversion.</p> + +<p>971. Cases of participation in non-sacramental rites are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Oaths and Vows.—Participation is active when one swears in words +or by other signs which, according to local usage, manifest belief in +the creed of some sect; it is not active, when the manner of the oath +does not signify adherence to a false creed; Example: If one is +required to swear, by touching or kissing the non-Catholic Bible, as a +sign of approval of Protestantism or Masonry, one may not consent. But, +if the Government presents a non-Catholic Bible with no thought of +Protestantism, there is no approval of Protestantism in the one who +swears on that Bible, although, if the custom is not general, there +might be scandal if no protest were made. A Catholic may bring his own +Bible with him, or ask for a copy of the Catholic Bible.</p> + +<p>(b) Services—Participation is active when one marches in an Anglican +procession, plays the organ or sings at Y.M.C.A. services, joins in the +prayers or responses offered in a Protestant church, etc. (Holy Office, +July 6, 1889). Participation is passive if one looks on during a rare +visit, or listens by radio to the musical program broadcast from +Protestant services, or if one is obliged to attend non-Catholic +services habitually, not as a profession of faith, but as a matter of +civil duty or of domestic discipline, as happens with soldiers or with +inmates of public institutions. Participation is not active if one +adores the Blessed Sacrament carried in a schismatical procession which +one meets by chance and unavoidably. Examples: Titus belongs to the +honorary guard of a state ruler, and has to accompany the latter to +non-Catholic services on certain state occasions. Balbus is tutor in a +non-Catholic family, and is expected to take his charges to their +church and back home on Sundays. Claudia is a maid in a non-Catholic +family, and is ordered to hold one of the children while it is being +baptized by the non-Catholic minister. In all these cases the presence +at the services is purely passive, since the intention of the Catholic +present is not to perform any religious duty, but only some civil or +domestic service (see IV Kings, v. 18). But, on the other hand, the +martyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors refused to +attend the Anglican services, because this was required by law as a +sign of conformity to the Established Church—that is, an active +presence was prescribed.</p> + +<p>972. Cases of participation in religious places, times and objects are +as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Places.—Participation is active when one orders one’s body to be +buried in a sectarian graveyard, when one enters a schismatical or +heretical church privately in order to visit the Blessed Sacrament or +pray, when one offers up Catholic services in a non-Catholic temple, if +these things are looked upon by the public as indications of identity +of belief between Catholics and non-Catholics. Participation is merely +passive, if one visits non-Catholic places of worship out of curiosity +in order to look at the pictures, hear the music or listen to or take +part in a political lecture or debate. In case of necessity, the Church +permits Catholic services to be performed in the same building as that +wherein non-Catholic rites are held, e.g., the Church of the Holy +Sepulchre at Jerusalem which is used by various denominations (Holy +Office, 12 April, 1704).</p> + +<p>(b) Times.—Participation is active if one observes new moons, +sabbaths, and days of fast as prescribed in the Old Law.</p> + +<p>(c) Objects.—Participation is active if one wears the uniform of a +condemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or +makes use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate +membership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for +some other purpose (e.g., in order to act a certain part in a play).</p> + +<p>973. Cases of participation through attendance at non-Catholic +religious instructions are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Active participation in worship is had when one listens to a +preacher, Sunday school teacher, etc., and signifies approval by +joining in “Amens” or other acclamations.</p> + +<p>(b) Participation is merely passive, if at church or over the radio, +one listens out of curiosity, or in order to be able to refute errors, +or for the sake of perfecting oneself in diction or eloquence, or of +showing respect to a person whose funeral oration is being delivered, +etc. But, even though there be no active participation, it will usually +be unlawful to listen to these sectarian discourses on account of the +danger of perversion to the listener or of scandal to others. Catholics +who are scientifically trained and staunch in faith may for good +reasons hear sectarian sermons, but the greater number would be +disturbed or unsettled (see the principles given above on dangerous +books and schools, 854-857, 868). Moreover, even those who have a right +to listen to non-Catholic religious talks have to be on their guard +against scandal, for outsiders may regard their attention as approval +of doctrine or participation in cult, and Catholics not sufficiently +instructed may regard their example as an encouragement to imitate +(cfr. 979, 981).</p> + +<p>974. Participation in non-Catholic assemblages or occasions whose +character is of a mixed kind (partly religious and partly +non-religious) are permitted by the Church, when due regard is had for +avoidance of scandal, perversion, denial of faith, etc.</p> + +<p>(a) Some of these occasions are chiefly religious, but are also looked +on as family or civic solemnities, such as christenings, weddings, +funerals. Hence, it is allowed to assist at the religious part of the +occasion in a passive way for the sake of courtesy, or to exercise some +function which is looked upon as belonging to the non-religious part +of the occasion. Caution must be taken to ensure that the particular +sect involved does not consider the exercise of the particular function +as participating in the religious aspect of the ceremony. Likewise, +on condition that the possibility of scandal, perversion, etc., has +been removed, the following functions may be performed. One may act +as a witness at the christening of a near relative who is not a +Catholic; however, it is forbidden to be a sponsor, even by proxy, +at baptisms performed by a heretical minister (Holy Office, decr., +May 10, 1770). To be pallbearer or undertaker at a funeral, to be an +usher at a wedding, to be an extra bridesmaid, etc., may be permitted. +(If the function of best man or maid of honor be considered as merely +attendants to the bride or groom, such participation in itself would +not be illicit; but since the danger of scandal might often be present, +such participation is dangerous. It is lawful for a Catholic pastor +to attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided +he does not wear his sacred garb and takes no part in the ceremonies. +Canon 1258, Sec.2 establishes the general norm regulative of these +cases: a passive or merely material presence may be, for a serious +reason, tolerated as a mark of esteem or social courtesy at funerals, +weddings, and similar functions, provided there is involved no danger +of perversion or scandal; in a doubtful case, the serious reason for +this presence must be approved by the local Ordinary.</p> + +<p>(b) Other occasions are chiefly non-religious in character, but are +also partly religious, or have the appearance of being religious. Such +are, for example, the coronation, birthday, wedding, or funeral of a +ruler, school commencements, political conventions, patriotic meetings, +civil marriage before a magistrate who is also a non-Catholic minister. +When these exercises are chiefly non-religious or entirely civil, even +though conducted in non-Catholic churches or by non-Catholic ministers, +the Church grants permission to participate in them to some extent, if +there is sufficient reason.</p> + +<p>975. Among the mixed occasions just mentioned are not included such +as have an anti-Catholic or anti-religious spirit, such as funerals +from which all manifestations of religion are excluded on account of +hatred of religion, entertainments held by forbidden societies in which +the members are present in regalia, picnics under the auspices of the +Orangemen, etc.</p> + +<p>976. Cooperation in Religious Activities.—A third danger of making +external profession of a false religion is cooperation in activities +whose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Cooperation in a +false religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Cooperation +is immediate, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion +itself (e.g., by worshipping an idol). This kind of cooperation was +discussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b) +Cooperation is mediate, when one takes part, not in an act of a false +religion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to +the act of a false religion. This is the kind of cooperation we are now +considering.</p> + +<p>977. Mediate cooperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate +or remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to false +religion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready +the lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is proximate +cooperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is remote +cooperation. (b) Mediate cooperation is material or formal, according +as the intention of the cooperator is to share in or help error itself, +or merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their +error. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes +money towards its maintenance because one’s sympathies are with its +idolatry, one’s cooperation is formal; if one does these things only in +order to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan, +one’s cooperation is material. It is clear that formal cooperation is a +grave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material +cooperation.</p> + +<p>978. The principles governing the lawfulness of material cooperation +will be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins +opposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of +society today, there are innumerable cases of material cooperation +in religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the +principles bearing on material cooperation and their application to +cases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those +given for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad. +Hence, material cooperation is not lawful, except when the following +conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) The action of him who cooperates must be good in itself or at least +indifferent, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if +a person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from +another temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of +the theft. Similarly, if a person were to contribute to a collection +list as “sympathizer” with a school for the propagation of atheism +or as “beneficiary” from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his +act would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or +superstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism +or a believer in idols.</p> + +<p>(b) The intention of him who cooperates must be good; for, if he wills +to help a false religion, he is guilty of formal cooperation; if he +wills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of +sin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it +on account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of +enmity to the truth.</p> + +<p>(c) There must be a reason for the cooperation proportionate to the +gravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity +and necessity of the cooperation, and to the obligation which one has +of preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect +which plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful, +for there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a +compensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute +to the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a +reason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques +are not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing +the bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false +worship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before +the service, for in the former case the cooperation is closer. A +greater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when +there is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who +will gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one’s +cooperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot +take place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason +would be required to justify parents conducting their children to a +place of false worship than would be required to justify a public +chauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special +duty to guard the religion of their children.</p> + +<p>979. The above principles on mediate cooperation are clear enough, but +it is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the +uncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of cooperation is +indifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for cooperation +is sufficient. But the following rules will help:</p> + +<p>(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from +its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not +bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or +extrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil. +Examples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult +are intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or +immorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian +country would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of +idolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country +where the lending of one’s labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of +paganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the +overthrow of government or religion—all these acts are indifferent in +themselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or +indifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the +cases given.</p> + +<p>(b) Reasons for cooperation may be ranked as great, greater and +greatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their +sufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with +the gravity of the cooperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear +of serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or +of loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater +reasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to +reputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest +reasons for cooperation in the worship of a false religion are the +following: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment, +of great dishonor, of loss of all one’s earthly possessions, of +disturbance of the public peace.</p> + +<p>980. Cases of cooperation in false religion that occur most frequently +are: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b) +labor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c) +labor given to acts of worship or instruction.</p> + +<p>981. Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from +scandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the cooperator +in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are signs of +sympathy with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for +Masses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes +liberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of +atheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards +the erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the +treasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious, +and promises to support their ticket.</p> + +<p>(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious +error, are unlawful, when there is no reason for the cooperation, or +only an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan +temple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse +anyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order +to help his business (cfr. 1530).</p> + +<p>982. If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and +if the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are +permitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:</p> + +<p>(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious +error. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of +mixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long +associated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged +in many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as +works of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the +building or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and +schools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a +contribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian +purposes.</p> + +<p>(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such +as the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius +contributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that +Catholics may thus obtain exclusive use of a church till then used by +Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn +fetes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held +for the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do +this, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.</p> + +<p>983. The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale +of articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of +the false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the +Church to cooperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even +if threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition +seems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and +demanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the +construction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan +temple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs +of approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols +to those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor +to false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of +great harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under +compulsion;</p> + +<p>(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for cooperation +with false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places +of worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that +he receives good pay.</p> + +<p>984. Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of +worship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two +conditions as above:</p> + +<p>(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false +worship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the +construction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by +them and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of +other idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these +objects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art +galleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a +non-Catholic sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an +indifferent sect, on account of the various uses to which such objects +may be put;</p> + +<p>(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of +work. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a +Mohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an +heretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to +cooperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater +reason to cooperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter, +bricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than +making idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads +for the Lord’s Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows. +Examples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not +necessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient +reason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that +will be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to +worship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than +business gains.</p> + +<p>985. Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful +in the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or +insufficient reason. (a) If the work manifests an approval of the +services, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher, +beadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship +or membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to +be true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of +external offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples: +Balba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her +communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone +the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an +altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles, +making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate +cooperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites. +Claudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church +to take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage. +Sometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church +tower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is +indifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful +cooperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful. +Examples: Gaia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a +schismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members +of the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a +Catholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only +because he makes considerable profit.</p> + +<p>986. Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other +danger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above +are present. (a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication +of approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned +in the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and +fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself +approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself. +If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious +consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba +wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the +table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling +the minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the +table would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that +followed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up +the clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to +indicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they +have no necessary reference to worship.</p> + +<p>(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the +work that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in +the preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other +employment, this would be a sufficient reason for her cooperation. +Likewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to +whatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let +them off at the church without being dismissed or causing other like +inconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his cooperation.</p> + +<p>987. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.—The third +commandment of faith (mentioned in 918) has been considered so far in +its negative aspect—that is, as a prohibition against the denial of +truth or the profession of error. It remains to consider it in its +affirmative aspect—that is, as a precept of profession of faith or of +denial of error.</p> + +<p>988. The ways of making profession of faith are various: (a) It is made +implicitly, if one performs acts that suppose faith; explicitly, if one +declares in words one’s internal belief. Thus, a Catholic professes his +faith implicitly by observing the precepts of the Church; explicitly, +by reciting before others an act of faith or the Creed.</p> + +<p>(b) The declaration of one’s faith in words is made in ordinary ways, +if one affirms it to others, privately or publicly, or if one teaches +it or defends it in debate; it is made solemnly, if it is recited +according to a prescribed form as a ceremony. Thus, a Catholic who +answers to a questioner that he is a Catholic, or who explains the +truths of faith to an inquirer, or who replies to the objections of +an unbeliever, makes an ordinary profession of faith; one who reads +before the bishop or other designated authority a formula prescribed by +the Church, makes solemn profession of faith. The solemn profession of +faith is usually made before the altar, on which candles are lighted; +and he who makes profession of faith kneels before the authority who +receives it. Sometimes witnesses are present and the profession is +signed.</p> + +<p>(c) The solemn profession of faith is sometimes an abjuration (i.e., +a declaration of one’s adherence to the faith of the Church and a +recantation of previous errors); sometimes it is a declaration or +oath that one rejects errors or accepts truths. Thus, converts before +reception into the Church abjure the errors they formerly held; +officials in the Church before assuming authority make a profession of +faith in which they reprobate Modernism and express their belief in the +Creed and the teachings of the Church.</p> + +<p>989. The existence of a divine precept of profession of faith is proved +from revelation and intrinsic reasons, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) “If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in +thy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be +saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth +confession is made unto salvation” (Rom., x. 9, 10). This precept +obliges under grave sin, since it is required for salvation.</p> + +<p>(b) The first reason for external profession of faith is the honor of +God; for it is a mark of disrespect to God to be ashamed or afraid +to acknowledge oneself as a believer in His Word or a witness to its +truth, on account of what others may think or say or do.</p> + +<p>(c) A second reason for the external profession of faith is one’s own +good. It is well known that faith is strengthened by external acts, and +that it grows weak and decays among Catholics who have no priests or +churches or means of practising their faith.</p> + +<p>(d) A third reason for profession of faith is the good of others, for +the confession of faith is an encouragement to those who are strong in +faith, an example to those whose faith is weak, and a light to those +who have not the faith.</p> + +<p>990. The divine precept of profession of faith, since it is +affirmative, does not call for fulfillment at every moment. It obliges +only at those times when the honor of God, the Revealer of Truth, or +the needs of our neighbor, who is called to the truth, demand that one +declare externally one’s internal belief. (a) The honor of God demands +a confession of faith, when a refusal to give it signifies that one +does not accept the truths revealed by God, that revelation contains +error, etc. (b) The needs of our neighbor demand a confession of faith, +when a refusal to give it will prevent another from embracing the +faith, or will cause him to lose it or give up its practices, etc.</p> + +<p>991. The honor of God or the good of the neighbor calls for an external +profession of faith at the following times: (a) when a person is +joining the Church or returning to it, for the Church is a visible +society and membership in it should be visible; (b) when a Catholic is +interrogated about his faith, for here the honor of God and the good of +others require that he be not ashamed of Christ or His Words (Luke, ix. +26), and that he should cause his light to shine before men (Matt., v. +16); (c) when a Catholic is in the company of others who are ridiculing +or calumniating the faith, and a protest is looked for from him on +account of his authority, knowledge, etc.</p> + +<p>992. The profession of faith made by one who is joining the Church must +be external, but the same publicity is not necessary for every case.</p> + +<p>(a) Secret profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert +is known only to himself and the priest who received him. This is +permitted only in grave necessity, when the spiritual good of the +convert requires it, and no injury is done to the honor of God or the +Welfare of the neighbor. Example: Titus is dying and wishes to be +baptized, but for an important reason he is unwilling to have the fact +of his conversion disclosed. Father Balbus, therefore, baptizes without +witnesses.</p> + +<p>(b) Private profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert +is made before the priest and two witnesses, but the fact of the +conversion is not made known to others on account of circumstances. +This is permitted only for a short time and for serious reasons (see +932, 993), as the task of concealing one’s faith for a long time is +most difficult and is dangerous to faith itself. Example: Caius is a +pagan who wishes to become a Catholic, but is kept back on account of +dangers from his fellow-pagans, who will persecute him as an apostate. +He, therefore, asks to be received as a secret Christian, with liberty +to profess no religion externally. This may be permitted for a time, +until Caius can move to some other place, but it cannot be permitted +permanently.</p> + +<p>(c) Public profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert +is made before the priest and two witnesses, and the convert thereafter +makes it known that he is a Catholic by attending Mass, receiving +the Sacraments, etc. This kind of profession of faith is ordinarily +required, but there is no law making it necessary for a convert to +publish the news of his conversion.</p> + +<p>993. A difficult case occurs when one who wishes to become a convert +is unable to make public profession of Catholicity without suffering +very great detriment, and is unable to make private profession without +continuing in external practices of the non-Catholic religion. An +example of this would be a non-Catholic girl who is threatened with +destitution by her parents if she becomes a Catholic openly, and who +knows that she will be forced to go to church with them if she becomes +a Catholic privately. There are three courses in such a case: (a) +public profession of Catholicism at once could be advised if the party +showed signs of a special divine call and of a heroism equal to the +difficulties the public profession would entail; (b) private profession +of Catholicism could be tolerated for a time, if the party was of such +age and circumstances as to appear able to cope successfully with the +temptations and perplexities that beset this course; (c) delay of +Baptism until things take a better turn would be the most prudent plan, +if the deprivation of spiritual advantages would in the long run prove +a lesser evil than the inconveniences of public or private profession +of Catholicism.</p> + +<p>994. Examination about one’s religious status refers either to one’s +faith, or to something not necessarily connected with faith. (a) When +a person is examined about his faith (e.g., whether he is a Catholic, +whether he believes in the doctrine of the Real Presence, or in Papal +Infallibility), profession of faith is obligatory, if its omission +is equivalent to denial. (b) When he is examined about something +not necessarily connected with faith, denial or concealment of the +truth would not be denial of faith, and concealment might be lawful, +if the question were unfair. Evasion would be sinful, if the denial +or concealment contained a lie or caused scandal. Examples: If a +missionary in England or Ireland in the sixteenth century had refused +to admit that he was a priest or religious, or a layman had refused to +confess that he had harbored a priest in his house or had assisted at +Mass, these denials would not necessarily contain a denial of the faith.</p> + +<p>995. Examination about one’s faith is made either by a private person +or by public authority.</p> + +<p>(a) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by a private +person, he is not bound by reason of the question itself to make a +profession of his faith, for a private person has no authority to +call upon one in the capacity of a solemn and public witness; but he +is bound to make a profession of faith by reason of circumstances, if +the honor of God or the good of his neighbor requires that he declare +his belief. Examples: Titius is known as a very iniquisitive and +meddlesome character, who is continually asking others about their +personal affairs and putting silly questions. Wherefore, those who know +him are accustomed to pay no attention to his questions, or to tell +him to mind his business, or to give him some humorous reply. One day +Titius asked Balbus, whom he knew very well to be a Catholic: “What +is your religion?” Balbus retorted: “What is yours?” and left him. +Caius is studying Christianity with a view to embracing it, and asks +Sempronius’ opinion on miracles. Sempronius, fearing the ridicule of +some others present if he admits belief in miracles, says that he knows +nothing about that subject. Balbus had a right to deny an answer to his +questioner; but Sempronius should have replied for the edification of +Caius and the honor of God.</p> + +<p>(b) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by public +authority, his obligation to make a profession of faith is certain, if +the questioner has the right according to law to ask the question, and +if it is made to one individually and out of hatred of the faith; for +to this case apply the words of Christ: “You shall be brought before +governors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the +Gentiles” (Matt., x. 18).</p> + +<p>996. In the following cases, one is not bound to confession of faith on +account of the public authority that puts the question, although one +may be bound on account of the circumstances:</p> + +<p>(a) When the question is not put to an individual, but to a whole +community, by a law which requires them in time of persecution +to deliver themselves up as Christians or Catholics, there is no +obligation to comply with this law, since it is unjust, and neither the +honor of God nor the good of others requires one to make the profession +of faith it demands (see 377, 552).</p> + +<p>(b) When the question is put to an individual by one in authority but +contrary to the law of the land, there is no obligation to answer. +Thus, if according to civil law the magistrates have no right to +examine about matters of conscience and one of them should nevertheless +do so, the party questioned could treat the question as out of order +and deny any answer.</p> + +<p>(c) When the question is made according to law, but does not proceed +from hatred of the faith, one is not obliged positively to profess +one’s faith, unless the omission would seem to those present to be a +denial of faith. Thus, a person might remain silent, or say that he +did not wish to answer, that he did not wish to say what his belief +was, etc., and in the circumstances it would seem that he would not be +denying his faith, but merely for some reason refusing to discuss it +when he thought there was no necessity.</p> + +<p>997. The third case mentioned above (see 991), in which one is obliged +to profess one’s faith publicly, is when the faith is. being attacked +in one’s presence. The honor of God and the good of the neighbor then +require one to speak out. (a) Thus, if the doctrines of the faith are +being blasphemed or ridiculed, one should defend them, if one is able. +Otherwise, one should protest or leave the company, if this will be +advantageous to religion. (b) If sacred things are being profaned, one +should resist physically, if one is able to prevent what is going on.</p> + +<p>998. Debates on religion between Catholics and non-Catholics are not in +themselves wrong, but as a rule they are useless and inexpedient.</p> + +<p>(a) That such debates are not essentially wrong, is clear from the +fact that a suitable defender of the faith is able by argumentation +to show the misconceptions that are entertained about the faith and +the fallacious objections that are made against it. This is honorable +to God and profitable to the neighbor: “Saul confounded the Jews that +dwelt at Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ .... He spoke also +to the Gentiles and disputed with the Greeks” (Acts, ix. 22, 29).</p> + +<p>(b) That controversy is generally unprofitable is a matter of +experience. Religious debates often lead to bitterness, and seldom +effect conversions. There is, moreover, an ever-present danger that the +sophistry or eloquence of an adversary may give him the appearance of +victory to the discredit of the faith, for even a foolish person can +raise difficulties which only a wise man can answer.</p> + +<p>999. Consequently the rule governing religious disputations is that +they should be avoided, unless ecclesiastical authority deems them +useful at times. (a) If no provocation is offered, or if no good seems +likely to result from a debate, it should be avoided. (b) If one is +attacked and it seems that the honor of God and the good of souls will +be served by a debate, then capable and prudent speakers are permitted +by the Church to defend the faith, provided permission is secured from +the Holy See, or, in case of urgency, from the local Ordinary (Canon +1325, Sec.3). The prescriptions of this Canon were reaffirmed recently +by the Holy Office and applied especially to “ecumenical” conventions +convoked to promote church unity. Catholics, both lay and clerical, may +in no way be present at such meetings without the previous consent of +the Holy See (Holy Office, Monitum, June 5, 1948). See Appendix II.</p> + +<p>1000. The divine precept of profession of faith so far considered +obliges on account of the virtue of faith itself, that is, on account +of the external honor or service due to the Word of God. There is +also a divine precept of profession of faith which obliges on account +of other virtues that may require such a profession of faith to be +made (e.g., on account of charity or justice). The omission of the +profession of faith in these cases, however, is not a sin against +faith, but against the other virtues, and should be confessed as such.</p> + +<p>(a) Justice requires a profession of faith when, by reason of his +office, a person has the duty of teaching others in the faith, for to +teach the faith is to manifest one’s own belief in it. Hence, bishops +and other pastors are obliged to preach: “Woe is unto me, if I preach +not the Gospel” (I Cor., ix. 16); and their teaching is a manifestation +of faith: “Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I +believed, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, and therefore +we speak also” (II Cor., iv., 13).</p> + +<p>(b) Charity requires a profession of faith when a person has not the +office of teacher, but has a suitable opportunity to impart instruction +to one who is in great ignorance about religion. For, as charity +requires one to perform corporal works of mercy for the suffering and +destitute, so it requires one to perform spiritual works of mercy +for the spiritually indigent, such as to instruct the ignorant, to +counsel the doubtful. Thus, a lay person who can prudently do so (the +circumstances of time, place, person, etc., being duly considered), +ought in charity to instruct in faith and morals the neglected children +around him.</p> + +<p>1001. One is not bound to give instruction about matters of +faith or morals when this would lead to more harm than good; but +misrepresentation must be avoided.</p> + +<p>(a) The purpose of instruction is to fulfill the will of God and +to benefit others; therefore, if these ends are not obtained but +rather defeated by an instruction, it should be omitted. The truth +is always good in itself, but its communication may not be expedient +on account of the recipient, who, being immature, may be harmed by +the wrong impression he will receive, or who, being badly disposed, +may use knowledge as a means to wrongdoing. Strong meat should not be +given to infants (Heb., vi. 11-14); pearls should not be cast before +swine (Matt., vii. 6). Examples: The mysteries of the faith (e.g., +transubstantiation), should be explained with caution to those who are +not well instructed, lest they be overwhelmed with the brightness and +misunderstand. Difficult matters (such as predestination) or dangerous +subjects (such as sex duties) should not be discussed indiscriminately +with all kinds of persons. It is not right to instruct those who are in +ignorance of their duty, if this is not absolutely necessary and one +foresees that instruction will not prevent them from continuing in evil +ways but will only add to their guilt. It is wrong to put the Bible +into the hands of those who will use it for bad purposes.</p> + +<p>(b) Misrepresentation or suppression is a lie, and in matters of +doctrine a denial of faith; hence, it is never lawful. The rule to be +followed, therefore, in teaching the faith is that one communicate the +same doctrine to all, but according to the capacity of his hearers—to +some in outline and to others more fully. This was the method of +Christ, who “with many parables spoke to them the word, according as +they were able to hear” (Mark, iv. 33).</p> + +<p>1002. The Church has the duty not only of keeping the faith untarnished +among Catholics, but also of spreading it among non-Catholics, +Protestants, Jews and infidels, as far as circumstances will allow. +For God “Will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge +of the truth” (I Tim., ii. 4). Those, therefore, who assist missionary +work for unbelievers at home or abroad, do a work thrice blest, for +(a) it is a thanksgiving offering to God, testifying our appreciation +of the gift of faith which we have received from Him, (b) it is a work +of charity to ourselves, for by helping others to receive the faith +we strengthen our own faith, and (c) it is an act of supreme mercy to +those who are sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.</p> + +<p>1003, In addition to the divine precepts, there are also ecclesiastical +laws prescribing profession of faith.</p> + +<p>(a) Ecclesiastical precepts of profession of faith for various +officials are contained in Canon 1406 and in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_ +of Pius X (September 1, 1910), and Canon 2403 decrees that those who +contumaciously refuse to make the profession of faith of Canon 1406 may +be deprived of their office. Converts to the faith who are received +without absolute Baptism make an abjuration (Holy Office, July 20, +1859), and persons who have incurred excommunication on account of +apostasy, heresy or schism are absolved in the external forum after +juridical abjuration (Canon 2314).</p> + +<p>(b) The purpose of these ecclesiastical laws is to prevent the +acceptance of spiritual or temporal jurisdiction or authority in the +Church, or the commission of teaching or the benefits of membership by +those who are unbelievers. Hence, the purpose is grave, and the laws +themselves are held to bind under grave sin.</p> + +<p>(c) The persons bound by these ecclesiastical laws are both +ecclesiastics and laymen, namely, those who are about to be received +into or reconciled with the Church, and those who are about to be +admitted to some dignity, order, office or function (such as candidates +for the ranks of Cardinal, bishop, canon, parish priest, religious +superior, professor, preacher, confessor, doctor, etc).</p> + +<p>(d) The form of the profession of faith is the Tridentine or Pian given +in the Bull of Pius IV, _Injunctum Nobis_, of November 13, 1564, with +additions referring to the Vatican Council. The oath against Modernism +prescribed in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_ of Pius X, of September 1, +1910, is also obligatory.</p> + +<p>(e) The times when these professions of faith must be made are at +admission into the Church and at the reception or renewal of an office.</p> + +<p>1004. The affirmative precepts of profession of faith, divine and +ecclesiastical, oblige only at the proper time and place, and therefore +on other occasions one is not obliged to make profession of faith. (a) +Hence, one may avoid a profession of faith by evading interrogation in +time of persecution—for example, through the payment of money to be +exempted from examination, or through flight. As these acts indicate +that the person is unwilling to deny his faith, but has reasons for +wishing to preserve his life or to avoid the danger of apostasy, they +are not of themselves unlawful, and may be a duty. (b) One may omit a +profession of faith by concealing one’s religion, when prudence calls +for concealment rather than publication.</p> + +<p>1005. Flight in time of persecution is lawful or unlawful according +to circumstances, since in itself it is something indifferent, being +simply the act of moving from one place to another.</p> + +<p>(a) Flight is unlawful, if one’s circumstances are such that one will +do an injury to justice or charity by departure. Hence, a pastor would +sin against justice if he fled in time of persecution, leaving his +flock who stood in need of his presence: “The good shepherd giveth his +life for his sheep. But the hireling and he that is not the shepherd, +seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth” (John, x. 11, +12). Hence also, one who has no care of souls but whose presence is +necessary to a persecuted community should prefer out of charity their +spiritual good to his own bodily safety: “We ought to lay down our +lives for the brethren” (I John, iii. 16).</p> + +<p>(b) Flight is necessary, if one’s circumstances are such that one will +do an injury to justice or charity by remaining. Hence, if a pastor’s +life is necessary for his flock, while his absence can be supplied by +others who will take his place, justice to his subjects requires that +he save his life for their sake. Thus, for the good of souls St. Peter +escaped from prison (Acts, xii. 17 sqq.); St. Paul fled from Damascus +(Acts, ix. 24, 25); our Lord Himself hid when the Jews took up stones +to cast at Him (John, viii. 59). Similarly, if a person is very fearful +lest his courage may fail him if he is brought before the persecutors, +charity to self requires that he take flight so as to escape the danger +of apostasy.</p> + +<p>(c) Flight is permissible, if there is no duty to remain and no duty to +depart: “When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another” +(Matt., x. 23). Hence, if one’s presence is useful but not necessary +in time of persecution, it is lawful for one to flee. Some authorities +hold that the desertion of Jesus by the disciples during the Passion +was not sinful flight.</p> + +<p>1006. To refuse to flee when flight is permissible, is usually not +advisable, for this is dangerous for most persons. It would be +advisable, however, if a person had strong and prudent confidence of +his victory, had the right intention, and used the means to prepare +himself for the struggle.</p> + +<p>1007. Concealment of one’s faith is lawful, if the requisite conditions +are present.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is not lawful to conceal one’s faith at times when a +profession of it is called for by divine or ecclesiastical law (see +991, 1003); at other times it is lawful. Example: Titus is travelling +in a country where there are no Catholic churches, and where no one +ever asks him about his religion. He never tells anyone what he is.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lawful to conceal one’s faith from a dishonest motive. +Example: If Titus conceals his religion in order not to be unjustly +discriminated against, his motive is good; but if he wishes to be taken +for a non-Catholic, his motive is evil.</p> + +<p>(c) It is not lawful to conceal one’s faith in a sinful way. Example: +If the means of concealment employed by Titus imply deception or denial +of the faith (such as lying about his origin and active participation +in non-Catholic worship), he is guilty of sinful concealment. But, if +the means employed are permissible (such as silence about himself, +omission of grace before and after meals, eating meat on Fridays in +virtue of dispensation, etc.), his method of concealment is not sinful.</p> + +<p>1008. Generally speaking, concealment of one’s religion is not +advisable. (a) The reasons for concealment are often imaginary, rather +than real. We see that Catholics who are not ashamed of their religion, +or afraid to have it known that they practise it, are respected for +their sincerity and conscientiousness even in bigoted regions, while on +the contrary those who are apologetic or who do not live up to their +religion are looked down on as cowards or hypocrites. (b) The means +employed for concealment will cause endless doubts and scruples, for it +is often difficult to decide what means are lawful and what unlawful.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_4_THE_VIRTUE_OF_HOPE">Art. 4: THE VIRTUE OF HOPE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 17-22.)</p> + +<p>1009. Definition.—The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and +improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil, +or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for +misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has +succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that +some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b) +In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some +desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or +to recover from illness.</p> + +<p>1010. Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an +emotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or +the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the +irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and +apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the +brutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to +good as known through the reason.</p> + +<p>(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends +either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to +acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of +creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.</p> + +<p>1011. Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense, +sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used +objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus, +St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the +things hoped for), when he says: “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom., +viii. 24), “Looking for the blessed hope” (Tit., ii. 13); while the +Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of +hope), when he says: “Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength +against the face of the enemy” (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope +is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of +hope is spoken of in the following texts: “We are saved by hope” (Rom., +viii. 24); “Rejoicing in hope” (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is +indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: “This my hope is laid +up in my bosom” (Job, xix. 27); “There remain faith, hope, charity, +these three” (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense, +as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.</p> + +<p>1012. The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we +confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of +everlasting life.”</p> + +<p>(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which +hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection +of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely +natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with +reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man, +fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded +virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere +of action.</p> + +<p>(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the +specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul +in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.</p> + +<p>(c) “Through the help of God.” These words express the formal object or +motive of hope.</p> + +<p>(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material +object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.</p> + +<p>1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and +natural hope as regards their objects and acts.</p> + +<p>(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs +from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of +hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).</p> + +<p>(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is +therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks +forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see +not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).</p> + +<p>(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is +not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the +virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your +heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).</p> + +<p>(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is +not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object +of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The +virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence +of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).</p> + +<p>1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a +supernatural virtue.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it +the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing +its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy +justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in +the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).</p> + +<p>(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is +sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus., +xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3); +“We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope +in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).</p> + +<p>1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary +or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and +self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things +of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just +man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all, +and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy +justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope +of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire +charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the +Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).</p> + +<p>1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is +divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to +which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby +perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we +hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more +perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not +so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God +performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some +other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that +to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which +therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.</p> + +<p>1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not +admissible:</p> + +<p>(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, +and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope +(which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the +perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail +towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without +disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could +an act be meritorious.</p> + +<p>(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one +disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) +and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the +advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong +to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).</p> + +<p>1018. The Object of Hope.—By the object of hope we mean three things: +(a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is +intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for +whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).</p> + +<p>1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary +object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is +desired on account of the primary object.</p> + +<p>(a) The primary object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good, +considered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in +this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which +the creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of +our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i. +27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I +Thess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of +holies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled +that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God +(I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes +supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). “From God,” says St. +Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), “we should expect nothing less than God +Himself.”</p> + +<p>(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that +assist one to attain one’s Last End. We may hope for all those things +for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.</p> + +<p>1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude, +that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all +resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of +the Saints, security from harm, and the like.</p> + +<p>1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such +as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will +enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and +acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual +goods; (d) all that promotes one’s salvation, such as labors for God.</p> + +<p>1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself +or one’s neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the +supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only +for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by +them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in +him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b) +Accidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards +others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good +of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of +the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that +his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).</p> + +<p>1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, +which is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the +secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of +salvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of +salvation, and hence it is said: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in +man” (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by +whom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the +Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the _Salve +Regina_, our Lady is addressed as “our hope.” The merits of Christ and +our own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of +hope.</p> + +<p>1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?</p> + +<p>(a) Essentially, hope is based on God’s character of omnipotent helper; +for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its +courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one +expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely +on the assistance of One who is equal to the task: “The Lord is my rock +and my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust” (II Kings, +xxii. 2, 3); “You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever” (Is., xxvi. +4); “The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and +shall be exalted” (Prov. xviii. 10).</p> + +<p>(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are +connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes. +Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has +promised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he +regards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has +placed his dependence on the loyalty of God to His given word, and on +the desirability of God as the prize of life’s efforts: “Let us hold +fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful +that hath promised” (Heb., x. 23); “Unto the hope of life everlasting, +which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world” +(Tit., i. 2); “The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him” +(Lam., iii. 24); “Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great” (Gen., +xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious +inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of +God, as He is our beatitude.</p> + +<p>1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be +understood in two senses:</p> + +<p>(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of +God possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues, +etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of +hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man’s merits, +while they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause +that will conduct him to it.</p> + +<p>(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the +act by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is +divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is +confident of salvation, he will not answer, “Because I am in the state +of grace and do good works,” but “Because I know that God will help me.”</p> + +<p>1026. The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given +to God are:</p> + +<p>(a) essentially, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate +and sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at +last possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and +more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be +the resources on which one counts for success;</p> + +<p>(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of +God; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His +omnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has +hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on +supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it +is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: “I +have trusted in Thy mercy” (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests +proximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of +being, so hope rests proximately on God’s almighty power and radically +on His goodness and perfection.</p> + +<p>1027. The Excellence of Hope.—Hope is a theological virtue, and is +therefore superior to the moral virtues.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God +Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we +hope in God: “In God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my +help, and my hope is in God” (Ps. lxi. 8); “What is my hope? Is it not +the Lord?” (Ps. xxxviii. 8); “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped” (Ps. xxx. +1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological +virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). “By faith the house of God receives its +foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed” (St. +Augustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).</p> + +<p>(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and +magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant, +while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the +quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather +than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty +they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks +is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.</p> + +<p>1028. There are various points of view from which virtues may be +compared one with another.</p> + +<p>(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the +latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their +conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are +received in Baptism.</p> + +<p>(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of +generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for +that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual +virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give +others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.</p> + +<p>(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit, +when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when +it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of +comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend, +and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus, +the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of +accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.</p> + +<p>(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the +general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For +the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence +exercised on one’s acts (as the word “virtue” or “power” intimates), +and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in +motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give +his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of +scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.</p> + +<p>1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.—(a) These virtues are not the +same, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and +assent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the +author of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.</p> + +<p>(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they +are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however, +faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope +on account of despair, and later recovers it.</p> + +<p>(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to +hope, since both glory and grace—the objects of hope—must be known +through faith (Heb., xi. 6).</p> + +<p>(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being +superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral; +for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more +abstract and universal.</p> + +<p>(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general +concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues +are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a +rightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept +of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves +the other powers to action.</p> + +<p>1030. Comparison of Hope with Charity.—(a) These virtues are not the +same, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from +which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own +sake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the +means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that +we live for God rather than for self.</p> + +<p>(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but +accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal +sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity. +There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the +sinner leading up to charity—faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.—are +for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may +be virtually included in charity.</p> + +<p>(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to +charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as +is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a +higher love that is disinterested: “The end of the commandment is +charity from a pure heart” (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope +unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a +friend, and hence presupposes charity.</p> + +<p>(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect +love, which desires God for the sake of the one who loves, while +charity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.</p> + +<p>1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even +when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual +motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be +confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of +hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such +as look for all beatitude in something different from God (e.g., in +secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of +hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope +which puts self above God or delight above virtue).</p> + +<p>1082. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be +distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beatitude +is hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is +beatitude (i.e., God the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which +places subjective beatitude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which +beatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (i.e., God as the +object in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error +when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in +disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is +nothing inordinate in a man’s hoping for food on account of eating and +in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the +purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely +inordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on +account of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision +is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely +the subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its +perfection through them.</p> + +<p>(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other +elements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness +of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly +human—namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively; +hence, pleasure—even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed +as something secondary and consequent.</p> + +<p>(c) Utilitarian hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if +the latter were merely a means, as when one says: “If there were no +heaven, I would practise no virtue.” There are three kinds of good: (i) +useful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a +means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not +for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that +which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational +nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the +repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is +desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard +virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in +itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It +is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from +virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the +moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The +things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its +climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of +that vision, not its end.</p> + +<p>1033. Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not +prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good +only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as +its own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order +to be a true virtue.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in +the impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the +reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider +chimerical cases.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity +(i.e., that one always direct one’s desire of salvation to the end that +God may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be +active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.</p> + +<p>(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity +(i.e., that one hope for salvation as one’s own good, only when a +previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love +towards God), for to desire that which God wishes one to desire is in +itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify +it.</p> + +<p>1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great +Saints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost +impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and +spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the +spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of +tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi. +19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope +gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it +presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx. +15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).</p> + +<p>1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to +ask this from God: “Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and +charity” (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the +rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding +acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God +in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to +work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience +(Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).</p> + +<p>1036. The Subject of Hope.—By the subject of hope we mean the power of +the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are +capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is +the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons +capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final +reward or punishment.</p> + +<p>1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They +cannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy +it: “Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he +hope for?” (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary +objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of +their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but +this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed +there is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is +contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other +than God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which +tends directly to God.</p> + +<p>1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish +between those in hell and those in purgatory.</p> + +<p>(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it +is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt., +xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on +the gates of hell it is written: “Hope abandon ye that enter here.” +Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as +they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants +either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought +that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has +resulted from no personal fault of their own.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are +certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend +through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church +prays for the departed “who sleep the sleep of peace”—that is, who are +secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before +their introduction into heaven: “All these died according to faith, +not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and +saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on +the earth.... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country” +( Heb., xi. 13, 16).</p> + +<p>1039. As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some +have hope, others have it not.</p> + +<p>(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have +rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is +“the substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for” (Heb., xi. 1). +Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, “I look for +the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come,” one’s +hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then +one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers +who despair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not +the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive +is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or +its motive is not relied on.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary +to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but +they can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to +merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes +their salvation and to hope for it.</p> + +<p>1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear; +on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.</p> + +<p>(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., God’s power and +mercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to +attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken +hope: “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to +keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day” (II Tim., +i. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)</p> + +<p>(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others +have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will +cooperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1 +sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one +can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere +(Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: “He that thinketh +himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall” (I Cor., x. 12); +“With fear and trembling, work out your salvation” (Phil., ii. 12).</p> + +<p>1041. The Gift of Fear of the Lord.—The Gift of the Holy Ghost that +perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a) +hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope +joins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus +tending towards its beatitude—we fear to lose what we hope for; (b) +fear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude +or of divine help, but the lack of cooperation on our own part with the +assistance given by God.</p> + +<p>1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of +the Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical +and moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion +treated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion, +bashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like +the other passions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b) +Fear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to +God or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.</p> + +<p>1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not +repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good; +for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or +retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two +moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.</p> + +<p>(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God, +because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of +eternity. Thus, St. Peter’s denial of Christ was prompted by fear of +the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men, +it is called human respect.</p> + +<p>(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures, +because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter’s death for Christ +proceeded from his fear of God.</p> + +<p>1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend, +or be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal +evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: “Fear ye not them that kill the body +and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy +both body and soul in hell” (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is +praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: “In his days he +feared not the prince” (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however, +the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or +virtual fear, on the other hand.</p> + +<p>(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act—that is, the +condition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred +self to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that +not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able +to seek certain particular or natural goods.</p> + +<p>(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear +of some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from +such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both +these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil, +virtual fear executes it. Examples: Sempronius internally resolves to +be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God +against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself, +adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear +(virtual fear).</p> + +<p>1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of +the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to +offend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is +prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to +escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been +absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape +reproof for this misdemeanor. Titus’ fear is a grave sin, that of +Balbus a venial sin.</p> + +<p>(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the +species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed +and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear +is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it +is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using +sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft. +To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that +appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in +itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.</p> + +<p>1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the +sin to which it leads.</p> + +<p>(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is +prepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason +of this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed—one against +charity, because a temporal good was preferred to God, and the other +against religion, because God was called on to witness to falsehood.</p> + +<p>(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin, +and this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins +are committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not +able to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he +steals money and offers it to Sempronius as an inducement to calumniate +Caius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.</p> + +<p>1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and +sinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he +represents the authority of God is a duty: “Render to all men their +dues ... fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor” (Rom., xiii. 7). (b) +To fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty, +property) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord +bids us pray for deliverance from evil.</p> + +<p>1048. Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as +the object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a) +Servile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin +because of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son +with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God +that is contained in it.</p> + +<p>1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as +to its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is +derived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty +which it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its +circumstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the +fear, the manner in which he fears, etc.</p> + +<p>1050. Servile fear in itself is good and supernatural.</p> + +<p>(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the +Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord +recommends this fear when he says: “I will show you whom ye shall fear. +Fear ye Him who after He hath killed, hath power to cast into hell. +Yea, I say to you, fear Him” (Luke, xii. 5). the object of this fear is +penalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be +dreaded.</p> + +<p>(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its +acts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may +prepare himself for grace; it is “the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cx. +10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as +a rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the +justice of God which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far +superior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.</p> + +<p>1051. Though servile fear is good, useful and praiseworthy, it is not +perfect. (a) It is inferior to filial fear; for, while servile fear +looks upon God as a powerful master who cannot be offended with +impunity, filial fear regards Him as a loving Father whom one does not +wish to offend. Hence, the Old Law, given amid the thunder of Sinai and +with many threats against transgressions, is less perfect than the New +Law, which relies more on love than on fear (Rom., viii. 15; Heb., xii. +18-25; Gal., iv. 22 sqq.). (b) Servile fear, although it is regarded by +some theologians as an infused habit, is not a Gift of the Holy Ghost, +since it may coexist with mortal sin. It seems that it is not even a +virtue, since it turns man away, not from moral, but from physical +evil; but a number of authorities consider it as a secondary act of the +virtue of hope.</p> + +<p>1052. Servile fear, as to its circumstances, may be evil. (a) The +circumstance of the state of the person who has servile fear is good, +when the person is a friend of God; it is evil, when that person is an +enemy of God. (b) The circumstance of the manner in which servile fear +is elic[i]ted is good, if punishment is not feared as the greatest evil; +it is bad, if punishment is feared as the greatest evil, for then one +makes self the principal end of life, and would be disposed to sin +without restraint, were there no punishment.</p> + +<p>1053. The effect of evil circumstances on servile fear itself is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Servile fear is not rendered evil because of the evil state of the +person who fears. Just as a person who is habitually foolish may +actually say or do something wise, so a person who is habitually wicked +may perform virtuous acts. Mortal sin is no more a defect of servile +fear in a sinner than it is a defect of faith or hope in one who has +faith or hope without works; neither faith nor hope nor fear is to be +blamed for the state of mortal sin, but the person who has those gifts +of God is at fault. True, the sinner, by reason of his lack of love of +God, does not put fear of sin above fear of punishment. But from this +it does not follow that he puts fear of punishment above fear of sin, +for he may fear punishment absolutely (i.e., without making any +comparison between the evil of sin and the evil of punishment). The +fear which makes no comparisons is good, or else we must say that only +filial fear avails, which, as said above, is not true.</p> + +<p>(b) Servile fear is rendered evil as to the manner in which it is +performed, when one compares sin and punishment, dislikes only the +latter, and avoids sin only to escape punishment. This kind of fear is +slavish, for it makes one do something good unwillingly, like a slave +forced to labor against his wishes, whereas God is pleased only with +service that comes from a willing spirit (I Par., xxviii. 9).</p> + +<p>1054. Hence, we must distinguish the following cases of servile fear:</p> + +<p>(a) Fear of punishment is purely servile when it makes a person avoid +sin, but does not make him put away his love of God.</p> + +<p>(b) Fear of punishment is not purely servile, when it causes a sinner +not only to cease from sin, but to give up his affection for sin; this +fear is distinct from charity, but prepares for it: “The fear of the +Lord driveth out sin” (Ecclus., i. 27).</p> + +<p>(c) Still less is the fear of punishment purely servile, when it leads +a just man, who already detests sin as an offense against God, to +detest it as involving punishment from God. This fear exists along with +charity, for the love of God and the right love of self are not +exclusive. But, as charity increases, servile fear must decrease; the +more a person loves God, the less is he concerned about his own good, +the more confidently does he hope in God, and hence the less does he +fear penalty.</p> + +<p>1055. There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) Initial fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past +sins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love +of God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear +is stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused +to hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love. +Of this fear it is said: “The fear of God is the beginning of His love” +(Ecclus., xxv. 16).</p> + +<p>(b) Perfected fear is that of those who are established in charity. The +more the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love, +that of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is +one troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in +this present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all +servile fear disappears: “I am sure that neither death nor life ... +shall be able to separate us from the love of God” (Rom., viii. 38, +39); “Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he +that feareth is not perfected in charity” (I John, iv. 18).</p> + +<p>1056. The perfected fear of God has two acts:</p> + +<p>(a) In the present life, where it is possible that one may offend God +and lose His friendship, one dreads the commission of offense and the +loss of friendship. This fear should be always with us: “Keep His fear +and grow old therein” (Ecclus., ii. 6). With the growth of charity +there is a corresponding growth in the fear of separation from God, +because the more ardently God is loved, the more one realizes the +greatness of the loss sustained through sin.</p> + +<p>(b) In eternal life, where sin and separation from God are impossible, +the blessed do not fear these evils: “He that shall hear Me, shall rest +without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils” +(Prov., i. 33). But in the presence of the Divine Majesty the Angels +and Saints are filled with awe and reverence: “I saw them that had +overcome the beast, singing: Who shall not fear Thee, O Lord, and +magnify Thy name?” (Apoc., xv. 3, 4); “The pillars of heaven tremble +and dread at His beck” (Job, xxvi. 11); “Through whom (Christ) the +Angels praise Thy majesty, the Dominations worship it, the Powers are +in awe” (Preface of the Mass). This holy fear is unending, for the +infinite distance between God and His creatures, His +incomprehensibility to them, will never cease: “The fear of the Lord is +holy, enduring forever and ever” (Ps. xviii. 10).</p> + +<p>1057. The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of fear of the +Lord, spoken of in scripture: “He shall be filled with the spirit of +the fear of the Lord” (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to +make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to +supplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are +conferred by filial fear.</p> + +<p>(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God, +for through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His +wondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the +first of the Gifts, for the realization of one’s nothingness before God +is the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and +guidance.</p> + +<p>(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral +virtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God’s surpassing majesty and +respect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside +pride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are +pleasing to Him: “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the +branches thereof are long-lived” (Ecclus., i. 27).</p> + +<p>(c) Filial fear is especially and primarily related to the virtue of +hope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope +and fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that +God is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the +dangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the +other: “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them +that hope in His mercy” (Ps. cxlvi. 11).</p> + +<p>1058. To the Gift of Fear correspond the first Beatitude and the fruits +of modesty, continency and chastity. (a) Filial fear makes one realize +that all but God is as nothing, and hence that true greatness must be +sought, not in the self-esteem of pride, nor in the external pomp of +riches and honors, but in God alone: “Some trust in chariots, and some +in horses; but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God” (Ps. +xix. 8). This is the disposition of soul to which is promised the First +Beatitude: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom +of heaven” (Matt, v. 3). To the first of the Gifts, in the order of +preparation, corresponds the first of the Beatitudes. (b) Filial fear +makes one dread the thought of separation from God, and hence it leads +one to use temporal things with moderation, or to abstain from them +entirely, To it, then, pertain the Fruits of the Spirit, which St. Paul +names “modesty, continency, chastity” (Gal, v. 23).</p> + +<p>1059. The Sins Against Hope.—There are two sins contrary to hope: (a) +despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption, +which is the opposite of hope by excess.</p> + +<p>1060. Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair—or +the falling short of hope—may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a +turning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act +of hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards +beatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called +despair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is +difficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is +said to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached, +and hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of +heaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering +into eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that +salvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should +expect it.</p> + +<p>1061. Definition of Despair.—Leaving out of consideration negative +despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now +considering may be defined as follows: “Despair is an act of the will +by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the +aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as +impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this +aspect as evil.”</p> + +<p>(a) Despair is an “act of the will,” and as such it differs from the +intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the +forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are +guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who +disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).</p> + +<p>(b) Despair is a positive “turning away from beatitude.” It differs, +therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of +feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which +consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.</p> + +<p>(c) Despair turns away “from God,” and thus it differs from despondency +about other things.</p> + +<p>(d) Despair turns away from God “apprehended as good and desired as the +beatitude of man,” for no one is said to despair of what he considers +evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears; +such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which +thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).</p> + +<p>(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and +desirable, but because He is apprehended as a “beatitude that is +impossible,” or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never +attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards +as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some +inconvenience in seeking after it.</p> + +<p>1062. Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the +sin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something +which he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when +students, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a +certain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated +in the section on Fortitude.</p> + +<p>(b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something +about which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to +hope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education, +because he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for +health, because he thinks it is not God’s will to grant that request. +Titus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes +for death.</p> + +<p>1063. To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.</p> + +<p>(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence +(as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked +for, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such +expressions as, “Would that I had never been born!” “Would that I were +out of existence!” often signify nothing more than weariness of life on +earth, or disgust with conditions.</p> + +<p>(b)If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death, +it is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other +species of sin is committed—for example, if the person wishing to die +is not resigned or submissive to God’s will in the matter, he is guilty +of rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is +sufficient reflection and consent.</p> + +<p>(c) If the wish is merely for death and is not inordinate, it may be an +act of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately +desires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus, +St. Paul said that he desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ” +(Philip., i. 23).</p> + +<p>1064. Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair: +(a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of +above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial +from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about +forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or +the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of +God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death +or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they +may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of +pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are +guilty of spiritual sloth.</p> + +<p>1065. There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief +and the despair that is found even in those that have faith.</p> + +<p>(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith, +as when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible, +that God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins +cannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the pagans who do not +accept the Final Resurrection as those “who have no hope” (I Thess., +iv. 12).</p> + +<p>(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them +which is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is +induced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very +disorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that +he is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and +perseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by +his judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one +which he has no right to form or act on.</p> + +<p>1066. Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not +been guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not +abandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains +the faith, but has given up some of its practices through +discouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or +cowardice or attachment to some vice.</p> + +<p>1067. Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to +that which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically +erroneous, though not always speculatively so.</p> + +<p>(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one +decides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice +versa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear +that this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would +err against the faith.</p> + +<p>(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides +that here and now he should do something which in fact he should not +do, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet +makes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie. +It is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one +wills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to +will it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should +prefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he +first neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act: +“They err that work evil” (Prov., xiv. 22).</p> + +<p>1068. The Malice of Despair.—(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture +declares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience +(Ecclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas +for reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is +based on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation +in confident expectation, despite God’s promise and command to the +contrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it +destroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his +Last End, and leads to irreparable loss.</p> + +<p>1069. In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times +even a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair +is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness +of despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not +fully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair +is often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of +the will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account +of a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc., +are tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin, +provided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or +imagination.</p> + +<p>1070. The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues, +for the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the +chief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards +creatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily +intend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from +certain worries.</p> + +<p>(b) Despair in itself is less serious than the sins of unbelief and +hatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good, +the other two sins are opposed to God’s own truth and goodness.</p> + +<p>(c) Despair is more serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God +with reference to the danger it contains for the sinner; for it +paralyzes effort and resists remedies: “Why is my sorrow become +perpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?” (Jer., +xv. 18) “If thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy +strength shall be diminished” (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore, +a sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide. +But (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine +grace.</p> + +<p>1071. It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge +enables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as “the dark +night of the soul,” and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes +from one’s own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a +preparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair +can be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.</p> + +<p>(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is +courage, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the +sake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the +vice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or +underestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well +as of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its +cheerful confidence of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is +sadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly +or to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).</p> + +<p>1072. The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be +distinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two +signs: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in +religious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for +consolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though +overcome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of +God’s holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their +exercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, _The Dark Night_, Bk. I, +e. 9 ff.).</p> + +<p>1073. Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of +spiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should understand that +the deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God’s love and +has been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess +their souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His +heavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and +heavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but +should go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though +bitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God +(Ibid., c. 10).</p> + +<p>1074. Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.—(a) If the cause is lust, +one should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than +the joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower +in favor of the higher.</p> + +<p>(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on +the greatness of God’s power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever +fosters undue sadness, “lest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow” +(II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past +sins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction, +and remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other +penitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual +books of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to +attempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent +instruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy, +should employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful +or necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the +more, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election +(II Pet., i. 10).</p> + +<p>1075. Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect. +(a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant +person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b) +Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or +out of fear: “A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things” +(Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable +evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak +presumption according to the evidence (see 658).</p> + +<p>1076. Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a) +It is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or +hope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well +founded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus, +Judith prayed: “O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of +the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee, +and presuming on Thy mercy” (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped +against hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word +“presumption” is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and +indicates the purpose to do what exceeds one’s powers.</p> + +<p>1077. Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of +the will choosing to do what exceeds one’s power. “Power” may he +understood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all +bearing the name of presumption.</p> + +<p>(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (i.e., his right of +action), he is guilty of the general sin of presumption, which is not a +special category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin +in which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any +fear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: “If +anyone shall presume to transgress” (i.e., if anyone shall +coldbloodedly transgress).</p> + +<p>(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so +great and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty +of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue +of magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for +which it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a +profession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (cf. +Luke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the moral sin of presumption.</p> + +<p>(c) If one wishes to obtain through divine aid something that surpasses +even the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of +presumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which +expects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has +promised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal +bliss, without repentance or obedience, does injury both to the +character of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of +presumption that we are now considering. It may be called the +theological sin of presumption.</p> + +<p>1078. Definition of Presumption.—The theological sin of presumption +may be defined as follows: “An act of the will by which one rashly +expects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto.” (a) It is an +act of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as +disbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It +is an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from +fear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash +expectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is +well-founded expectation.</p> + +<p>1079. The objects of presumption are material and formal.</p> + +<p>(a) The material object is eternal happiness and the means thereto, +such as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This +object by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural +gifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of +God, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has +made unique privileges.</p> + +<p>(b) The formal object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not +joined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when +one hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be +a just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the +unaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working +out salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and +his security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with +prayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul. +Similarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely +impossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other +Sacraments.</p> + +<p>1080. Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a) +because it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the +absolute or ordinary power of God (e.g., to share in some divine +attribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because +it makes one expect to obtain supernatural goods in ways other than +those ordained by God (e.g., to obtain forgiveness without repentance, +to obtain glory without merits or grace).</p> + +<p>1081. The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and +blasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all +three wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for +presumption looks towards salvation and one’s own happiness, whereas +temptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is +wise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc., +and blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge +or committing other sin.</p> + +<p>1082. The Malice of Presumption.-(a) It is a sin, because it is an act +of the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God +will pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not +labored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to +the divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can +expect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect—that +is, in its contempt of God’s majesty and justice—consists the offense +of presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it +makes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were +not necessary.</p> + +<p>1083. The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is +directly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to +the power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption, +which is an exaggeration of the power of man.</p> + +<p>(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a +disregard of God’s vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His +mercy, and God’s vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His +mercy to His own goodness.</p> + +<p>(c) Presumption is less grave, therefore, than unbelief and hatred of +God, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).</p> + +<p>1084. Presumption and Unbelief.—(a) Presumption is joined with +unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about +matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians, +Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless +of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven +by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be +equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of +Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran +presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing +scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he +wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic +presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are +predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments, +being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic +presumption).</p> + +<p>(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a +practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable +without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone +sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see +1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to +consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining +salvation.</p> + +<p>1085. Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.—(a) Presumption +properly so-called (i.e., hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue +of hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue; +now, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the +essence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects +future blessedness unreasonably (i.e., through his own efforts alone or +through exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but +presumptuous.</p> + +<p>(b) Presumption improperly so-called (i.e., hope of the uncertain) does +not take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive +of hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to +make restitution after he has enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is +presumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for +it is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him. +However, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man +during life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He +is guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his +neighbor, rather than of a want of hope.</p> + +<p>1086. Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by +Catholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their +faith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good +works; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous +doctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with +the expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose +of repenting at some future date.</p> + +<p>1087. Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will +be pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention +to continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of +presumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of +sinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a +means to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to +continue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so +strongly attached to evil.</p> + +<p>1088. The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice +according to circumstances.</p> + +<p>(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the +sin now committed—that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because +of the hope of pardon-one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a +tour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and +is not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.</p> + +<p>(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the +sin—that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon—one is more +guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he +reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain +pardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a +simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius +goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is +just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a +hundred sins as of ten.</p> + +<p>1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no +mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for +example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of +presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of +his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God’s mercy or +his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full +consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence +is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation +without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous +thought as soon as he takes notice of it.</p> + +<p>1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed +into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent +of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter +involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly +so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the +matter, for the matter, man’s eternal destiny, must always be an affair +of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and +despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of +smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to +things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in +overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too +much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly +in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.</p> + +<p>1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption +which depends too much on one’s own powers arises from vainglory, for, +the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things +that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract +applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance +seems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon +without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very +exaggerated opinion of his own importance.</p> + +<p>1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.—Since hope is a necessary +preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the +supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised +that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.</p> + +<p>(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor +hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already +believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments +from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith +being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins +with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being +prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in +the First and Fourth Commandments.</p> + +<p>(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope, +in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also +that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye +congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world +not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in +the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).</p> + +<p>1093. Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life, +the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and +absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence, +man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not +thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition +that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure +love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be +admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the +happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be +indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto. +Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.</p> + +<p>1094. Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of +another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself, +this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s +book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of +Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical +expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is +question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it +(such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its +possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit +of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his +entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip., +i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain +uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain +of salvation and die at once.</p> + +<p>1095. At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its +negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times +and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even +when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest. +(b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges +for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains +always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts +of hope.</p> + +<p>1096. By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the +response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal +life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:</p> + +<p>(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that +is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between +God and creatures as the object of one’s happiness. This moment occurs +for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in +this connection the words of Christ: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God +and His justice” (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are +in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning +from creatures towards God: “Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and +defer it not from day to day” (Ecclus, v. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the +act of hope: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, +instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in +this world, looking for the blessed hope” (Titus, ii. 11, 12), “Serving +the Lord, rejoicing in hope” (Rom., xii. 11, 12); “He that plougheth, +should plough in hope” (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more +perfect must have on “the helmet of hope” (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope +all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).</p> + +<p>(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit +an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi). +But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well +prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is +no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).</p> + +<p>1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About +the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as +with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there +is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all +those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the +virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply +with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the +reception of the Sacraments.</p> + +<p>1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made +explicitly, when one expresses one’s confident expectation, the objects +expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according +to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: “O my God, relying on +Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to +obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life +everlasting.” This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it +expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is +made implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the +confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of +hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, “Thy Kingdom come,” +utter the soul’s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The +implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who +comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.</p> + +<p>1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also +arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another +virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one +is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by +the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he +stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of +aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the +motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another +commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of +hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being +contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of +sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes +hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve +over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.</p> + +<p>1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could +remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?</p> + +<p>(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego +heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope +(I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our +desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019, +1031).</p> + +<p>(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their +wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or +its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but +they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of +inordinate love of creatures.</p> + +<p>(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much +attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God +will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated +or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live +forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.</p> + +<p>1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of +hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about +faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.</p> + +<p>(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all +adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he +hopes in God’s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he +relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven +by his works and must pray to God in his necessities—things that are +impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).</p> + +<p>(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for +all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul +and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is +elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific +vision.</p> + +<p>1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.</p> + +<p>(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine +infusion, not on human acts (see 745).</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal +object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues. +For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same +time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one’s conduct +conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to +believe and yet not practise one’s belief (see 1016, 1030).</p> + +<p>(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or +its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the +foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they +take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It +should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are +named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor +consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a +future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a +future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all +expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is +living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he +hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who +is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and +restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by +reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an +expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is +presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is +not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through +divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not +contrary to, but beyond theological hope.</p> + +<p>1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.—(a) Servile fear was not +commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of +punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, +commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to +transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law +already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear +were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou +didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: +“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments” +(Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both +soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).</p> + +<p>(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since +it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and +homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first +law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that +thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and +serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).</p> + +<p>1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and +conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_5_THE_VIRTUE_OF_CHARITY">Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)</p> + +<p>1105. Definition.—The word “charity” (_carum_, what is held dear, +highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular +sense.</p> + +<p>(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of +a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in +them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments +about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to +gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts +for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes +applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with +charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to +the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are +considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for +His own sake, and others on account of God.</p> + +<p>1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or +what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of +the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true +good.</p> + +<p>(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in +a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love +may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of +the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the +desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish +for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him +towards its possession.</p> + +<p>(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is +opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from +love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A +because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always +the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or +destroy what one loves.</p> + +<p>(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of +something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A +particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person +because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the +love one has of being entertained.</p> + +<p>1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the +lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its +presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) +separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the +object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it +from him.</p> + +<p>1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, +not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the +irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we +may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own +existence;</p> + +<p>(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge +obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as +in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a +species of sense love;</p> + +<p>(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind, +and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the +worth of the beloved object.</p> + +<p>1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor +concupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires +for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for +the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else +(thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one +does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence +(_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes +good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when +one wishes to give him food or money).</p> + +<p>1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following +conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who +is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are +not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity +which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties +have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company, +which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus, +there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, +of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong +to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to +the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as +when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the +other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, +and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always +quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away +profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to +personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who +are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing +special in common.</p> + +<p>1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship +of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s +friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or +gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of +benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of +this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the +truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus, +because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, +on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his +prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and +Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the +only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of +each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).</p> + +<p>(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for +another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the +friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the +highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral +goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). +Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the +other’s virtue.</p> + +<p>1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual +creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God +(John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of +true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is +a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them +that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved +of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a +common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely +distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir +to glory in which he will share happiness with God.</p> + +<p>1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated +charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as +It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that +abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost +especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as +love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as “Fount of life, +fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a +supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of +love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The +charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is +given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created +charity.</p> + +<p>1114. Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by +God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our +beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account +of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, +inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, +whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.</p> + +<p>1115. The Excellence of Charity.—Human friendship of the lower kind +is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension +or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship, +however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated +by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine +goodness.</p> + +<p>(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is +distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the +divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and +charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).</p> + +<p>(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the +objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e., +the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the +beatific vision to be bestowed by God).</p> + +<p>1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which +God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent +among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the +normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule +of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God +Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it +tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is +the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of +these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).</p> + +<p>1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.</p> + +<p>(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true +but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal +and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end. +Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute +all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be +burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii. +3).</p> + +<p>(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues. +Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to +infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he +dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money +(false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his +family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to +his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).</p> + +<p>1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by +various titles.</p> + +<p>(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues. +This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues +are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are; +otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of +charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of +perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the +Last End.</p> + +<p>(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii. +17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the +sense that it supports and nourishes them.</p> + +<p>(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other +virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and +produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the +commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).</p> + +<p>1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil, +affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).</p> + +<p>(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in +deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”</p> + +<p>(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such +as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not +ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”</p> + +<p>(c) It forbids that one harm one’s own soul by thoughts or desires of +wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”</p> + +<p>(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects, +rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is +patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”</p> + +<p>(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the +theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them: +“Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”</p> + +<p>1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes +them perfect and meritorious.</p> + +<p>(a) Actual direction—that is, the intention here and now to believe, +or hope, etc., out of love for God—though more perfect, is not +required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit +would become extremely difficult and rare.</p> + +<p>(b) Habitual direction—that is, the mere fact that one has the habit +of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope, +etc, now made—does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act +of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now +unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.</p> + +<p>(c) Virtual direction—that is, the influence of an intention, once +made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which +continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes, +etc.—at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself +deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the +other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice, +however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform +all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of +charity, actual or virtual.</p> + +<p>1121. Production of Charity.—The virtue of charity belongs to the +appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its +exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which +charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the +intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human +reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph., +iii. 19).</p> + +<p>1122. The Origin of Charity.—(a) Charity is not caused by nature, +nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed, +is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship +based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced +or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to +receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).</p> + +<p>1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul: +“The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, +who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God +infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.</p> + +<p>(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their +natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were +lower, both in nature and in grace.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according +“to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii. +8; I Cor., xii. 2).</p> + +<p>(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone +according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according +to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the +preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).</p> + +<p>1124. Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and +more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the +increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is +supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity, +for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things +that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the +manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more +deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love +become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge +grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress +to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.</p> + +<p>1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of +two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the +degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those +that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten +degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an +act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.</p> + +<p>1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an +increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the +act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded +by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for +God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of +charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold +water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward +(Matt., X. 42).</p> + +<p>1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place, +there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems +more probable:</p> + +<p>(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act +is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed +for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of +charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby +merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.</p> + +<p>(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts +is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory, +for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition +equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as +just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that +corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an +increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one +enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude +one merited during life. Hence, those who make many—even though less +fervent—acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree +of reward for them hereafter.</p> + +<p>1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life, +when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was +predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives +here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes +him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further +participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II +Cor., vi. 11).</p> + +<p>1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same +degree in which He is lovable—that is, infinitely; but it is clear +that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively +perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect +charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17); +but it has three degrees:</p> + +<p>(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life, +consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God +and loving Him.</p> + +<p>(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just, +consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as +far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.</p> + +<p>(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just, +consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God, +permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.</p> + +<p>1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes: +(a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and +resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or +those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief +attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the +perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief +desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of +their love (Philip., i. 13).</p> + +<p>1131. The Decline of Charity.—(a) Actual charity can decline, in the +sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded +(Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The +only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are +omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the +former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being +infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder +about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the +right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity +differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or +slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to +the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when +one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with +reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than +he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical +habit decrease.</p> + +<p>1132. The Loss of Charity.—(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be +lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in +loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less +perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s +free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23). +(b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love +of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see +Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning +away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a +turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth +them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes +the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.</p> + +<p>1133. The Object of Charity.—There is a threefold object of charity: +(a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the +infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural +illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the +chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine +Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love +the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment” +(Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the +thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the +second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid, +39).</p> + +<p>1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of +charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more +than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St. +John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world” +(I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves +them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits +one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity, +even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a +benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit, +and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from +charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of +creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in +them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of +one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for +in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God +Himself).</p> + +<p>1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its +objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109), +that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved +not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The +same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.</p> + +<p>(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship +with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is +impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we +desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with +charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or +the use of man).</p> + +<p>1136. Love of self is of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according +to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or +rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others. +Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall +come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii. +1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the +things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” +(Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.) +to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of +the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).</p> + +<p>(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for +his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire +for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural +love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it +implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root +of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one +holds him as another self.</p> + +<p>(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for God, and +consequently for self as a friend of God.</p> + +<p>1137. If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as +composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the +meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean +principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., +iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true +love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For +the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the +good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for +the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good +desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for +the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the +wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to +converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and +future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract +themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at +peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.</p> + +<p>1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not +only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its +nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for +His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity +with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and +the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the +body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through +glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and +with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in +beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that +which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e) +according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag +on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather +desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be +freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints +have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications +to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).</p> + +<p>1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all +love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in +others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some +excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) +supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another +on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of +heavenly calling.</p> + +<p>1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and +distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility +or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by +attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the +consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has +for one’s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in +him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of +passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural +friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts +and graces which evoke them are participations of God’s goodness, which +is the object of charity.</p> + +<p>1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all +those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship, +that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of +this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with +them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for +they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).</p> + +<p>1142. Charity for Sinners.—Should we love with charity those who are +sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as +enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an +offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should +hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of +God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures +of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are +demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude +is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of +charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His +glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may +love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present +life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their +conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not +restricted to loving the just.</p> + +<p>1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is +it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate +the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their +sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In +this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32). +(b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is +actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps. +lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the +sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may +be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that +are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a +criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he +wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.</p> + +<p>1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader +view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be +desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell, +for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that +a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He +who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem +unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means +to a spiritual awakening.</p> + +<p>1145. Association with Sinners.—(a) It is never lawful to associate +with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their +guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: “Go out from among them and be ye +separate” (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with +sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to +be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to +associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not +endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our +Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance +(Matt., ix. 10-13).</p> + +<p>1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and +dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and +it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the +sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains +to charity (Jer, xv. 19).</p> + +<p>1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend +who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of +betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship. +If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from +starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was +perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one +should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party, +and may prove harmful.</p> + +<p>1148. Charity towards Enemies.—Enemies can be considered in two +senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for +beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with +charity—that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies +and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a +neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings, +enemies should be loved with charity—that is, their nature created by +God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us, +for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that +which is not well disposed towards ourselves.</p> + +<p>1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of +Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the +natural principle: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” +and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew +it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second +great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in +various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5; +Prov., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the +false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and +Pharisees, who taught: “Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy.” +In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: “I say to you: Love your +enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of +your Father who is in heaven” (Matt., v. 44, 45).</p> + +<p>1150. The following examples of love of one’s enemies are found in the +Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had +sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and +wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who +had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned +over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His +enemies.</p> + +<p>1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?</p> + +<p>(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors +for the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This +kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which +he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus +makes this act of love: “I love all except Caius.” The act of love made +by Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.</p> + +<p>(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in +particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as +individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his +act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.</p> + +<p>1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases +of necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on +hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity, +one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the +necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to +love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such +attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy +more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.</p> + +<p>1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply +also to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is +manifested. For St. John says: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, +but in deed, and in truth” (I John, iii. 18).</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of +charity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class +as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge +(Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers +offered for his neighbor sins against charity.</p> + +<p>(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to +life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of +charity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we +are told: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty, +give him to drink” (Prov., xxv. 21).</p> + +<p>(c) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be ready to assist +an enemy, should there be need.</p> + +<p>(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest +particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him, +visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom, +would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on +an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: “Do +good to those that hate you” (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire +upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of +repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).</p> + +<p>1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are +shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one +Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by +a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it +would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative, +might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that +are customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and +therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations, +speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not +even answer if Balbus addresses him.</p> + +<p>(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are +commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples: +Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents, +but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and +poor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his +house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.</p> + +<p>(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly +shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to +which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity +becomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring +institution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he +dislikes.</p> + +<p>1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not +apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be +omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests +of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity. +Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because +he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus +has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does +not answer until he has spoken civilly.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be +denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when +they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the +other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter +who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when +this is required for the protection of one’s own rights. Example: Titus +goes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable +when he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very +cool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.</p> + +<p>1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from +scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs +of charity:</p> + +<p>(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one’s neighbor, +as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will +to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness, +unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.</p> + +<p>(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of +a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives +this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is +committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends +on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and +Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius +sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not +to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this, +or does not care, no sin—or at most only a venial sin—is committed; +but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct, +Claudius sins seriously against charity.</p> + +<p>1157. Refusal of Greetings.—(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or +salutation (such as “Good morning”) indicates a want of charity, when +such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however, +when custom does not require it, Example: In Balba’s office the girls +employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba +never salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius’ +street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary +to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain +neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on +his part.</p> + +<p>(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a +mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples: +Claudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much +his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus +refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in +the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that +he does not care to notice Titus.</p> + +<p>(c) To refuse to return a salutation sincerely given indicates a want +of charity.</p> + +<p>1158. The Order of Charity.—Charity not only requires that we love +God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these +objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.</p> + +<p>(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more +than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the +common good of all, and the source of all good.</p> + +<p>(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one’s +neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor +(Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance +with the saying: “Charity begins at home.”</p> + +<p>(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim +on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.</p> + +<p>1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the +person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to +affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively, +when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even +though the object be not more amiable in itself.</p> + +<p>1160. The Character of our Love of God.—(a) It must be supreme +objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all +claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss +rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our +desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at +least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need +not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of +our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than +those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not +against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought +of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will +places God above all.</p> + +<p>1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note: +(a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve +God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of +one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end +of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be +preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with +charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same +time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of +benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal +reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in +the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things +their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be +so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as +to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.</p> + +<p>1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our +spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others +who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as +more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity +such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now +better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may +perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer +than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.</p> + +<p>1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the +benefit of a neighbor?</p> + +<p>(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, +spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in +so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of +others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish +to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to +prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and +proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.</p> + +<p>(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual +goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by +doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not +lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should +interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a +daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her +parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if +an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it +is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers +the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory; +one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a +great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account +of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s +entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls +(Philip., i. 23, 24).</p> + +<p>1164. The Love of the Body.—(a) One should prefer the spiritual +welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor +is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the +body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s +own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal, +for it has more of a claim on one.</p> + +<p>1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor +may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s +bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a) +extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish +eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die +without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor +runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a +dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is +scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary +spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of +damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, +as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.</p> + +<p>1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk +death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions +are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the +needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation +dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if +it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is +no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no +reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one +in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid +a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help +the many rather than the one.</p> + +<p>1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk +is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of +pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to +this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of +pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend +against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying +person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person +can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not +bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal +evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even +by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one +else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to +visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.</p> + +<p>1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity +requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not +require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in +danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary +that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger +one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places. +(b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily +inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of +a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep +him away from bad company.</p> + +<p>1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared +with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should +prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to +offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s +family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if +a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected +with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of +another.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a +lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s +health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a +transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.</p> + +<p>(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal +corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the +good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may +expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public +person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and +firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety +for the safety of the public.</p> + +<p>(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a +private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to +practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At +least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue +is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy +men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as +hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold +up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for +the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump +into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person, +for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary +charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough +provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his +rations to the other, that both may not be lost.</p> + +<p>1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person +should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers +his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot +reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is +admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life +with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of +charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a +multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of +another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married +man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life +for the sake of a friend.</p> + +<p>1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows: +(a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we +should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for +all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we +should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher +degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.</p> + +<p>1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be +reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and +hence more deserving of love—for example, a saintly acquaintance may +be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer +to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage, +friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer +by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.</p> + +<p>1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those +nearer to self is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire +for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their +merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will +finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus +attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect +(i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer +in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship, +gratitude) another who is less holy.</p> + +<p>(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that +is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer +to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere +natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will +that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any +man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he +hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8). +Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and +it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.</p> + +<p>1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will +correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom +greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more +respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom +greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have +shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given +spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between +helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one +would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom +greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as +visits) should be given.</p> + +<p>1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the +good of the better person should be preferred:</p> + +<p>(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public +interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or +voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or +private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should +decide in favor of the better man;</p> + +<p>(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to +preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is +a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of +strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.</p> + +<p>1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural +relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from +consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature +itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since +it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be +preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and +companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).</p> + +<p>1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more +love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.</p> + +<p>(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance +is more due. If one has to choose between helping one’s indigent +parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one’s parents.</p> + +<p>(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner, +director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual +assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is +supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than +his relatives who belong to another congregation.</p> + +<p>(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military, +religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious, +etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer, +and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest +owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not +to his parents.</p> + +<p>1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship, +should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private +relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as +regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution), +if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity, +one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal +matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and +remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one +should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is +allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.</p> + +<p>1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of +course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these +nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a) +objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect +and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b) +subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of +affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.</p> + +<p>1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference +between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given +is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change +the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and +honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no +notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of +another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given +are not guilty of serious sin.</p> + +<p>1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when +several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need +the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his +wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must +provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14), +third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other +relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country, +all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be +preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one +receives life from parents.</p> + +<p>1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is +loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His +amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b) +Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more, +objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the +blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But, +subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity +itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish +the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be +entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence +of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in +holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than +those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.</p> + +<p>1183. The Acts of Charity.—The principal act of the virtue of charity +is love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the +love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus, +benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and +so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and +wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with +another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains +to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can +be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is +intimate and lasting, from its nature.</p> + +<p>1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.—(a) From benevolence proceed +gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His +external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him +(Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23). +(b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a +personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the +divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty, +but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains +to God.</p> + +<p>1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c) +entirely; (d) without measure.</p> + +<p>1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing +distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no +ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of +all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes +Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of +His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal +Source.</p> + +<p>1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of +benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the +eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: “Receiving the +end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls” (I Pet., i. 9); +but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is +God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to +avoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to +progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.</p> + +<p>1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love +of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom +we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge +rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary, +tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its +love.</p> + +<p>1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the +creature’s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is +infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b) +It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves +everything that pertains to God—each of the Divine Persons, all of the +divine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who +loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating +all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth, +charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also +gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): “Thou shalt love the +Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart” (Deut., vi. 5).</p> + +<p>1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De +diligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in +charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a +limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured, +but is the measure of all things.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of +excess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and +so the greater the charity, the better it is.</p> + +<p>(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a +possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have +to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to +give more to strangers than to one’s needy parents, for this act would +not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to +perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household +duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time +and place.</p> + +<p>1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a +friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are +not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered, +is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason +objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the +parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account +of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the +friend on account of natural affection: “If you love them that love +you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?” +(Matt, v. 46).</p> + +<p>1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is +essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor +respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the +friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also +an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self. +Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The +love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing +sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more +difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we +should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than +the love of God.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_6_THE_EFFECTS_OF_CHARITY">Art. 6: THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 28-33.)</p> + +<p>1193. Internal Effects of Charity.—There are three acts of the soul +that result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity +is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the +union of self and the neighbor with Him: “The fruit of the Spirit is +charity, joy” (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of +man with God, self and the neighbor: “There is much peace to those that +love Thy law” (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the +will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for +love of the brotherhood “weeps with them that weep” (Rom., xii. 10, 15).</p> + +<p>1194. Joy.—The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence +the Apostle says: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice” +(Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties: +(a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained; +it rejoices “in the Lord”; (b) it should not be discontinued or +interrupted by sin, but should rejoice “always.” It may, however, be +mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence +of God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be +filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as “sorrowful, yet +always rejoicing” (II Cor., vi. 10).</p> + +<p>1195. Peace.—The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace, +and our Lord commands: “Have peace among yourselves” (Mark, ix. 49). +Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it +should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a +false peace, of which Christ says: “I am not come to bring peace” +(Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which +does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is +constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations +with God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect +tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth, +disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without, +but the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).</p> + +<p>1196. Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of +perfect charity: “He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I +will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even +before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of +God joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament +of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final +disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is +forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of +love of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of +the charity.</p> + +<p>1197. Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?</p> + +<p>(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in +judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the +same things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In +necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: “I +beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that +you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, +but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (I +Cor., i. 10).</p> + +<p>(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not +remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better +serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy +men have disagreed on matters of opinion—for example, Paul and +Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the +second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the +status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may +offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too +heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly +things (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).</p> + +<p>1198. Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may +be maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of +thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of +renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.</p> + +<p>1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness +of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy—that is, it does not +always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy’s acts. +There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such +contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any +strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great +distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus +could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are +violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example: +Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses +are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is +his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or +his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.</p> + +<p>1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive +the offense—that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and +hatred: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass +against us” (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation +for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and +is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one +so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special +friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury +so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against +charity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the +disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce +restitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to +give to another what is one’s own, and, if there is no other way of +securing one’s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of +prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution +(as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute +the offender, if one’s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the +prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one’s family +(Lev., xix. 17).</p> + +<p>1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to +forgive a debt of satisfaction or restitution, namely, when this would +impose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit +that would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, restitution should not be +insisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay +the debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the +payment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the +offender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may +result. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably +adjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).</p> + +<p>1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a +rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the +offender, he should normally make the first move towards +reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent +party ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he +should do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the +advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will +become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does +not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who +offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended +equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to +work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the +parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are +equally bound.</p> + +<p>1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a) +Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an +intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought +either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or +implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally +speaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request +reconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice +for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.</p> + +<p>1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible +moment: “If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember +that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering +before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and +then coming thou shalt offer thy gift” (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus, +internal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender +and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed, +and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God, +if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External +reconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the +manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the +circumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled +externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence +dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation +make matters worse.</p> + +<p>1205. Mercy.—From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor +as a friend in God, must grieve over the latter’s sorrows as if they +were his own. Our Lord commands: “Be ye merciful, as your Heavenly +Father is also merciful” (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true +mercy or supernatural.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves +over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness, +failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil, +such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one +may compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on +them (Matt., ix. 36).</p> + +<p>(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural +mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural +mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself, +or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another’s misfortune.</p> + +<p>(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds +from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by +reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person +experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself, +may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs +from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness +indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result; +it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other +emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care +for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the +mind to what is true and right.</p> + +<p>1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity +towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which +makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their +condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have +hardened one’s disposition, or made one self-centered.</p> + +<p>1207. Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.—(a) Mercy, if taken +for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to +prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the +soul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act +of the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove +that misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said +to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is +the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of +its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that +defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while +prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do +not of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.</p> + +<p>1208. Mercy Compared with Charity.—(a) In itself (i.e., considered +precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief +given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For, +carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite +perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of +infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His +creatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has +towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater +than charity: “The mercy of God is above all His works” (Ps. cxliv. 9).</p> + +<p>(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it +brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity. +For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to +remove evil in a creature: “Above all these things have charity” (Col, +iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external +works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards +internal acts.</p> + +<p>1209. The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates +mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly +esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might +be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of +wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that +compassion has no place in the morality of the superman.</p> + +<p>(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament. +Assistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the +captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on: +“I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do +justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God” +(Mich., vi. 8).</p> + +<p>1210. External Effects of Charity.—Three external effects of charity +will now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal +correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts +pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding—like love, joy and +peace—from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence +naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is +to do good to one’s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways +in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a +species of spiritual almsgiving.</p> + +<p>1211. Beneficence.—Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is +all virtuous assistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to assist others +in evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil +purpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the +law is participation in crime. To give presents to others in order to +receive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To +assist others or to give to them out of compassion for misery, is +mercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out +of love of God, is beneficence.</p> + +<p>1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal: +“While we have time, let us work good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10); “Do +good to them that hate you” (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that +no discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities +are required.</p> + +<p>(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving +of assistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed. +Examples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be assisted in +their wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct; +one who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape, +but he may be visited and consoled and given religious assistance.</p> + +<p>(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most +generous person can benefit only a small percentage of those who are +deserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one +would help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does +help all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.</p> + +<p>1213. Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence +should be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and +particular good should be done to those with whom on account of +conditions of time or place one is more closely associated. Hence, the +following general rules are given:</p> + +<p>(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship; one +should give the preference, other things being equal, to those with +whom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another +is a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one +who is a friend, rather than to one who is a business associate, but +not an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to +kinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a +stranger.</p> + +<p>(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of +relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal, +to those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one +should help one’s own family rather than distant relatives.</p> + +<p>1214. If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes +be reversed.</p> + +<p>(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those +who represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards +private good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted +country rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one +should aid rather one’s comrades than one’s kinsmen who are on the +opposite side.</p> + +<p>(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should +prefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a +friend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One +should give one’s loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to +one’s own father, who is hungry but not starving.</p> + +<p>(c) When the means with which a benefit is bestowable belong to +another, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even +if this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a +friend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed +money from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make +a present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in +which the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but +the duty of restitution would remain for the future.</p> + +<p>1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party +is nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases +have to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the +circumstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are +nearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity +when they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme +benefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather +to provide for one’s children (II Cor., xii. 14).</p> + +<p>1216. Almsgiving.—Almsgiving is defined: “Assistance to one who is in +need, given out of compassion and for the love of God.” Hence, this act +pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy, +which means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which +produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity, +which means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms, +for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I +John, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other +virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he +performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he +performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the +loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.</p> + +<p>1217. Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.—(a) Alms should not be +given ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying +that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given +cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).</p> + +<p>1218. Forms of Almsgiving.—(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift +made without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense, +almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a +loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in +securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by +the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.</p> + +<p>1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a) +Thus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them +away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b) +assistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g., +pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor., +xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.</p> + +<p>1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in +themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there +are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink, +clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to +those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b) +Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external +(such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged +by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the +body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the +memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is +numbered among the corporal alms.</p> + +<p>1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that +pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord +in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in +scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i, +ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer +want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is +asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These +acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of +mercy.</p> + +<p>(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral, +include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment, +and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for +such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.</p> + +<p>(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its +consequences—that is, the offense given and the burdens that result +for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are +admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in +bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err +through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the +consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).</p> + +<p>1223. The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority +in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed; +hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of +time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the +instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is +a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not +every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the +correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be +used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where +possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).</p> + +<p>1224. Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.—(a) Spiritual alms +are better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater +benefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus, +it is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (h) +Corporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and +hence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from +hunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).</p> + +<p>1225. Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they +give, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the +recipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they +bless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity +(Ecclus., xxiv, 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his +benefactor (ibid., 15).</p> + +<p>1226. The Duty of Giving Alms.—(a) The natural law requires that we do +to others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish +that help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common +welfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there +will be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt +from the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and +New Testaments, commands almsgiving: “Give alms out of thy substance, +and turn not away thy face from any poor person” (Tob., iv. 7); “Depart +from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you +gave Me not to eat” (Matt., xxv. 41-42); “Let us love, not in word, nor +in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Dorcas, +Cornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.</p> + +<p>1227. Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for +every moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on +account of the state of the giver or of the receiver.</p> + +<p>(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a +superfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is +necessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to +the people: “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath +none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner” (Luke, iii. +11). “That which remaineth,” says our Lord, “give as alms” (Luke, xi. +41).</p> + +<p>(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is +in necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to +the will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and, +while the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful +possessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in +need, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it +necessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when +one knows that one’s neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to +beg for help.</p> + +<p>1228. It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give +alms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and +has no superfluous goods, one may give to another; (b) when one’s +neighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give +to him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).</p> + +<p>1229. Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are +necessary for life, or the maintenance of one’s state of life justly +acquired and socially useful.</p> + +<p>(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food, +clothing and home for oneself and one’s family. Among necessaries of +life we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness, +increase of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will +need it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include +imaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may +arise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated +solicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt, vi. 34).</p> + +<p>(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up +his position and that of his family according to the standard of living +of his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement +of one’s children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and +improvement of one’s business; but it does not include provision for +excessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of +bettering one’s condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might +say that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.</p> + +<p>1230. What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life? +(a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when +considerable additions to or subtractions from a person’s wealth have +been made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It +consists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain, +according to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his +class. Thus, one’s position may require that one do much entertaining +or keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live +moderately.</p> + +<p>1231. The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need +is governed by the following rules:</p> + +<p>(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of +precept, if the common good is bound up with the life of that other, +but not with one’s own life; they may be given away to another, as a +matter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the +higher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one’s life for one’s +neighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one’s last +loaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people +depends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without +dependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one +may not give away what is necessary for the life of one’s family (I +Tim., v. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given +away to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life +of a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms +can be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity; +they may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of +virtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: “If thou wouldst be +perfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor” (Matt., xix. +21). Examples: One should offer one’s fortunes in support of one’s +government, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One +may give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the +religious life.</p> + +<p>1232. Superfluities of one’s state are the goods from which the precept +of almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the +mere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms. +As in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only +an object according to reason, but also circumstances according to +reason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only +when the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present. +(a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving +the time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person +is not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.</p> + +<p>1233. As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:</p> + +<p>(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or +misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g., +professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind, +since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy. +Rather they should be exposed and punished.</p> + +<p>(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they +take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it +profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being +able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in +idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those +who are voluntarily poor for Christ’s sake, whether they belong to a +religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to +assist them.</p> + +<p>(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted; +for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they +are in fact unable to help themselves now.</p> + +<p>1234. Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and +the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a +person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled, +in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give +back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor, +since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b) +If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty, +some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may +be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums; +likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does +not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect +a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional +beggars.</p> + +<p>1235. What is one’s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute +inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often +unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases +where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow, +since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a +worthy one be refused.</p> + +<p>1236. There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A +person is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of +losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean, +however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his +last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid. +(b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death, +or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as +severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter +imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to +poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common +need, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being +obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes +or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.</p> + +<p>1237. Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One’s State.—(a) +To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in +each individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need +have a personal claim on one’s charity when this is the sole means of +saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus +saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his +money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the +duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.</p> + +<p>(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time +to time—now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates—but there is +no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not +give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing +that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.</p> + +<p>1238. Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.—(a) For cases of +extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave. +There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the +loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help +indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and +the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were +guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.</p> + +<p>(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it +appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to +assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving +is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in +Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms +in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is +only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are +numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a +rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common +necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this +point.</p> + +<p>1239. From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn +about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a +mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably +also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need, +(b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if +one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one’s +ability to give the alms or the other’s need), or if it seems that +others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that +one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.</p> + +<p>1240. Refusal of Alms and Restitution.—(a) The mere refusal of an alms +does not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving +back to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said +that a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A +violation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to +restitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does +oblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one +prevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him, +injustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict +right to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this +is prevented.</p> + +<p>1241. Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes +unlawful.</p> + +<p>(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to +another and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not +lawful to give them as alms, for they must be returned to the owner. An +exception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme +necessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have +a right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful +to give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to +restore it to the rightful owner.</p> + +<p>(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and +receiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession, +the former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention, +and the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal +transaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and +received, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.</p> + +<p>(c) If the acquisition was not unlawful, but the manner through which +it was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to +the one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus +hired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a +sin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to +Balbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may +keep it and use it for a good purpose.</p> + +<p>1242. Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be +devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be +irreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the +“blood money” of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6), +because the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination +to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Ecclus., xxxiv. 23).</p> + +<p>1243. The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.—(a) Profits made from +gambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to +the loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or +similar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to +dispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the +winnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil +law makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this. +(b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when according +to law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation, +with moderation and with fairness to the loser.</p> + +<p>1244. Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to +dispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (e.g., +religious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as +follows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and +of which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money +which is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms +from such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus, +the procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with +permission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon +537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense +parish alms (Canon 630, Sec.4). (c) They may give alms with express or +implied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the +poor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without +permission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of +her husband’s money without his consent, if this should be necessary to +save a life.</p> + +<p>1245. The right of a wife to give alms from her husband’s earnings is +as follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and +the family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common +money of the family she may give alms with her husband’s express or +presumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she +may nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family +resources for almsgiving (e.g., in helping her impoverished parents).</p> + +<p>1246. The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their +employer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to +give away anything that belongs to their employer without his express +permission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of +employers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for +such things as are to be thrown away (e.g., leavings of the table), +since if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.</p> + +<p>1247. Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as +strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of +almsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and +hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to +oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on +one’s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.</p> + +<p>(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on +the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order +of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between +helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible, +and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was +not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was +most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the +community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.</p> + +<p>(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first +the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a +person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who +gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings +of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.</p> + +<p>1248. Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep +some himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated +to whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to +them; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may +keep a reasonable alms for himself.</p> + +<p>1249. The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured +according to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.</p> + +<p>(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his +income: “According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give +abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly +a little” (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop +on cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives +more towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving +according to their means.</p> + +<p>(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share +towards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one +else who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a +charitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good +Samaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street +beggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices. +Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as +it gives permanent assistance.</p> + +<p>1250. Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When, +outside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries +of one’s life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke, +xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain +enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one +gives from one’s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled +and encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of +almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others +enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering +and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).</p> + +<p>1251. Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one’s station +in life or of one’s superfluities, the following points should be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is +bound to give all the goods necessary to one’s state of life, since a +neighbor’s life is a more important good than one’s own position in +life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for +preserving one’s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and +so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting +workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order +to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not +obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed +for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for +ransom by bandits.</p> + +<p>(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all +one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or +grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is +not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently +relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities. +Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the +promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing +national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.</p> + +<p>1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a +benefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of +the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent +maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as +grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of +the clergy.</p> + +<p>1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be +contributed to alms?</p> + +<p>(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute +enough, according to one’s ability, either in conjunction with others +or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor +is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of +charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable +lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary +that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps—for example, that one +pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health +would be benefitted by the travel.</p> + +<p>(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should +give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the +necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other +moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically, +and that only the general direction can be given that one should be +generous according to one’s means, and regulate one’s yearly alms +according to the prevalence of poverty.</p> + +<p>1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in +need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in +slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If +one has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat +for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar +bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is +equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is +alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty +is avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are +three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are +in great need—a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to +divide his money between the three.</p> + +<p>1255. The Time for Giving Alms.-(a) One should give at one time all the +amount of one’s alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this, +and there is a need that calls for it—“He gives twice who gives +quickly” (Prov., iii. 28)—for the poor may perish or may be driven to +acts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may +distribute one’s almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it—that is, +one may make partial contributions at various times, retaining +meanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future +charities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.</p> + +<p>1256. The Manner of Giving Alms.—(a) One gives alms directly when one +ministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving +and medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives +alms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses, +public hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.; +when one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to +organizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society); +when one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those +who cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of +laborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the +aged, etc.</p> + +<p>1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under +the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the +place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.</p> + +<p>(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most +deserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes for the +support of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation +of contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave +necessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so +it also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.</p> + +<p>(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and +it is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the +place of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for +both soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received +gratefully.</p> + +<p>1258. Fraternal Correction.—Fraternal correction is defined: “An act +of charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in +order to convert one’s neighbor from sin to virtue.”</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is an act of charity, for it is a love of our neighbor and +the desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction. +Hence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a +correction administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of +the public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of +charity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of +justice.</p> + +<p>(b) Fraternal correction is an act of mercy, for, just as feeding the +hungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition +of sinners remove spiritual misery.</p> + +<p>(c) Fraternal correction uses suitable words or other means, for while +it proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence. +It is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the +need of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they +shall be words or equivalent signs (e.g., sad looks, a gesture of +disapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal +of help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or +warning.</p> + +<p>(d) Fraternal correction aims at turning a neighbor from sin to virtue. +It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction +is for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin +that has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to +include the prevention of sin in the future, since there is no less an +obligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in +dangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable +warning is given.</p> + +<p>(e) Fraternal correction is given to a neighbor (i.e., to an +individual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is +given by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are +prevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect +good and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a +preacher from the duty of correction.</p> + +<p>1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than +that of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should +do unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone +ought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even +the pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a +monitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers +of evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who +refuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame.</p> + +<p>(b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one’s +brother in order to save him from another offense (Ecclus., xix. 13, +14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual +should instruct with mildness those who have committed some +transgression (Gal, vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an +enemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).</p> + +<p>1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and +seek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under +one’s care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek +him as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes +after the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and +superiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b) +If the sinner is not under one’s care, there is no duty to seek him +out; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not +to any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for +the persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet. +Hence, a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice +and crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at +large has duties regarding such cases.</p> + +<p>1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does +not oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so +performed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but +the circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of +correction (viz., the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the +circumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a) +Hence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or +improve a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some +of the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it +will not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances +would seem to call for it (Ecclus., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person +ought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the +influence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is +said of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other +superior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in +order to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the +protection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.</p> + +<p>1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own +purpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction, +for his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his +rejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened +and embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or +more serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made +worse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct +him as to those ways: “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee” (Prov., +ix. 8).</p> + +<p>1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the +knowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the +following cases may occur: (a) If one is certain that the correction +will be beneficial, one should give it; if one is certain it will not +be beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is likely that the +admonition will be profitable, and certain that it will not be +positively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to +help a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though +only probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done. +(c) If it is doubtful whether the admonition will do any good, and also +doubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a +stranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good +and the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next +paragraph.</p> + +<p>1264. Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction +may occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil +that is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems +that a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a +time estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of +conversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or +estrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt +a dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good +of freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared +are about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative +precept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of +doing him a service.</p> + +<p>1265. When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If +the correction is omitted out of charity, the omission is good and +meritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he +thinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because +he awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted +contrary to charity (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or +disregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin. +Example: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to +see Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his +enmity. (c) If the correction is omitted in spite of charity, the +omission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails +to correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give +offense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter’s +spiritual welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give +the correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.</p> + +<p>1266. The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be +judged according to the rules just given about omission of correction. +But is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner, +through experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more +tractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through +correction, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless +about the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible +hardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If +there is no probability of present amendment through correction, one +can only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may +bring the prodigal back to God.</p> + +<p>1267. It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make +fraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist +before one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be +attained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances, +which are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known +and serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one +who has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the +correction should be such as will promote the end in view.</p> + +<p>1268. One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally +sure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For +this reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil +where there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making +corrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not +suffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and, +if his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the +corrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids +us to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not +done, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the +corrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.</p> + +<p>1269. Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of +those whom one suspects of wrongdoing?</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority +is bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before +acting.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other +superior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the +conduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his +children ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so +neither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his +attention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on +the one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the +hatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand, +which will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he +should not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will +be harmful to the latter’s reputation.</p> + +<p>(c) If there is question of fraternal correction, private individuals +should not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about +spying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are +acting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to +improve; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need +reformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be +annoyed or otherwise injured: “Lie not in wait, nor seek after +wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest” (Prov., xxiv. +15).</p> + +<p>1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as +follows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a +soul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15), (b) +slight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when +they are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and +superiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight +sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for +these faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an +intolerable burden would be laid on everyone, Persons who scold and +lecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more +harm than good.</p> + +<p>1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who is in +danger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those +sins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to +sins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.</p> + +<p>1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting +a sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one’s +neighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed. +Thus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a) +when a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin; +(b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old +ways.</p> + +<p>1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected +unless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope +of amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the +sinner’s guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from +the admonition and correction.</p> + +<p>1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of +formal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal +correction. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially +by superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of +various evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to +God, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions +that are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not +understanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to +the neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day +causes scandal by not keeping the fast.</p> + +<p>1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result, +one should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury +to God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an +instruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be +omitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as +parents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various +cases as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through +inadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal; +Balbus did the same thing, and this caused considerable scandal. Now, +there might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to +repair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of +Titus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good +faith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily +rectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will +abandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious +discords and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.</p> + +<p>(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or +divine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned +and useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of +art belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married; +Claudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot +make it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus +should be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.</p> + +<p>(c) Material sin may be about to be committed against human law. +Sempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence, +which they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has +forgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say +Mass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the +day of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the +attention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.</p> + +<p>1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those +sins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a +relapse (e.g., a wife should not be always reminding her now sober +husband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those +sins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one’s +intervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he +drank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon +approach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to +make the correction and will not fail to do so.</p> + +<p>1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction +can be given only to one’s subjects, since it supposes authority; (b) +fraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals, +but also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are +in need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the +danger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should +be remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their +subjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially +advantageous.</p> + +<p>1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the +superior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility, +imitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the +inferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but +respectfully and mildly: “An elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as +a father” (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the +correction be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed +from contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault. +Example: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or +neglect religion, to mend their ways.</p> + +<p>1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction +as just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction +may be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction +from him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required, +however, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were +necessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?</p> + +<p>1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the +state of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproves, does not +unfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his +own sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to +correct wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by +a sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that +of the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the +sinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to +conceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the +mode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride, +as if he himself were above correction: “Wherein thou judgest another +thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou +judgest” (Rom, ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a +sinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a +person who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this +has a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words +rather than good deeds are important.</p> + +<p>1281. One who prefers his neighbor’s conversion to his own deviates +from the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But +a person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal +correction seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions +of the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of +correcting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made +by a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others, +or by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be +just as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But +it is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better +correction of another.</p> + +<p>(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to +correct himself before he attempts to correct another, as when +self-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end. +Thus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is +unobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the +latter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who +cannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests +repentance—all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should +take the beam out of one’s own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the +mote from a neighbor’s eye (Matt, vii. 5).</p> + +<p>1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal +correction: “He gave to every one of them commandment concerning his +neighbor” (Ecclus., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some +than on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of +justice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b) +Other prelates, confessors, parents, husbands, masters, teachers and +guardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason +of their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave +personal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of +charity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose +office requires them to make corrections.</p> + +<p>1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason +that he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if +correction by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better +able than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will +bring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.</p> + +<p>1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an +injury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the +correction is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e., +damnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life +itself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a +contagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to +advise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual +evil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person +should be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to +health. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this +will bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to +correct, for this would cause him worries and suffering.</p> + +<p>1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one +corrected and humility as regards one’s own fitness. For fraternal +correction is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the +weaknesses of others (Gal, vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self +to others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally, +equals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there +should be seriousness mingled with mildness.</p> + +<p>(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in +Matt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be +given privately, and that one should not proceed to accusation before +superiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have +proved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is +not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law. +For the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done +for ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction +be given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to +his feelings and to his good name.</p> + +<p>1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?</p> + +<p>(a) For public sins (i.e., real sins known or soon to be known to the +larger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since +the guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the +contrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: “Them that sin reprove +before all, that the rest also may have fear” (I Tim., v. 20).</p> + +<p>(b) For occult sins that are against the common good or the good of a +third person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce +them immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the +multitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than +the reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however, +for the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one +can correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others. +Examples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of +Balbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring +him into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If +Claudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the +other boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and +hence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the +confessional must be observed.</p> + +<p>(c) For occult sins that are not against the common good or that of a +third person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before +making the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of +reputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save +others from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by +publicity.</p> + +<p>1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing +harm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for +telling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from +silence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to +speak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a +bad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them +into stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted +and the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm +to himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers +are regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will +result from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great +inconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two +are being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur +the ignominy of being regarded as a spy.</p> + +<p>1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious +to others, are reproved publicly, without previous private admonition. +(a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins, +although He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or +through external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known +the sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God’s +justice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b) +Members of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of +transgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of +fraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in +these reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of +faults in religious orders.</p> + +<p>1289. May a prelate (e.g., in a visitation) oblige his subjects to +carry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be +accused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are +not harmful to others?</p> + +<p>(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced +their right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has +no right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule +given by Christ requires that a fraternal correction be first given. A +subject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey +the divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4, +9).</p> + +<p>(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their +right to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that +information be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain +religious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to +the prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher +superior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the +matter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.</p> + +<p>(e) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications +(such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require +that information be brought to him immediately.</p> + +<p>1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no +hope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears +that the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they +should be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when +old ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will +do harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that +harms only the sinner should be given up.</p> + +<p>1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal +reproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in +making the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more +important than his reputation with these others; whereas their +knowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of +being a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should +arouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case +is brought before the superior for correction.</p> + +<p>(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the +superior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove +successful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known +to dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be +enraged by a reproof from this superior, charity would urge one to say +nothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from +time to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to +correct Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks +Caius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three +of them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no +effect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the +parents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep +him away from occasions of drink.</p> + +<p>1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been +reported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the +truth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the +character and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes +in his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser +and accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5). +Those who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are +disturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their +accusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own +business.</p> + +<p>(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in +question is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at +the same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected. +For the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as +father of the person accused, and hence public punishments or +corrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an +office, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this +can be done prudently.</p> + +<p>1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for +fraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible; +for the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is +affirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a) +Thus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition +by the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to +the superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more +advantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the +superior is more revered by the person to be corrected and will be +listened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making +previous admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before +the superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also +to some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be +better received.</p> + +<p>1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may +be summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is +certain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by +oneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will +be profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the +corrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present +are meddlesome or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound +to report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is +harmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by +private admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except +by oneself, and that one’s report will be for the good of others and +not an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice +when these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or +rash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_7_THE_SINS_AGAINST_LOVE_AND_JOY">Art. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 34-36.)</p> + +<p>1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be +reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b) +sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord +and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal, +which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.</p> + +<p>1296. Hate.—Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the +intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two +kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of +dislike (_odium abominationis_) is the opposite of love of desire, for, +as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for +self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being +considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (_odium +inimicitiae_) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love +wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes +evil to the object of its dislike.</p> + +<p>1297. Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon +as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him +as evil to themselves.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot +hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the +blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God +obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth), +cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way +displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but +they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will, +such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has +given him being, for existence of itself is something good and +desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin, +or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to +accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere +possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them +that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen +and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).</p> + +<p>1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is +not God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a +sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the +hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can +produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in +the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given +above from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on +account of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the +defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.</p> + +<p>(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements +sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us +to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even +murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience, +not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God +Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of +God.</p> + +<p>1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it +is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion +that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly +and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred +is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every +mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin +consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship +of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that +constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not +directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned +murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly +dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal +hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of +those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the +sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately +wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute +of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and +His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.</p> + +<p>1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.—(a) Interpretative hatred of God +is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin; +but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is +comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession. +This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the +other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the +sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the +neighbor).</p> + +<p>(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost +(see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a +general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a +dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation +through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known +truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.</p> + +<p>1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its +nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the +injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike +of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything +pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God +is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the +supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), +whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.</p> + +<p>1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins +supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is +clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious +than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest +internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is +worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without +hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without +hatred of God.</p> + +<p>1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.—(a) A new species of sin is +added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against +creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example: +Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and +also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of +God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances +of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred +of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of +God that is concealed.</p> + +<p>1304. Hatred of Creatures.—All dislike of God is sinful, because there +is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections +are found as well as perfections.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all +that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against +charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike +another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate +detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His +followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their +progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents +(Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it +sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so +much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the +alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.</p> + +<p>(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor +(i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to +charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should +children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship +he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St. +Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”</p> + +<p>1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one +should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of +one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of +one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One +should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is +associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even +if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of +money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been +unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.</p> + +<p>1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself? +(a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then +a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self +requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b) +If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in +them and beneficial to himself: “Better are the wounds of a friend than +the deceitful kisses of an enemy” (Prov., xxvii. 6).</p> + +<p>1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each +one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to +wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v. +29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as +he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, +commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John, +xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate +self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two +ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but +only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge +rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses +what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he +decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.</p> + +<p>1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is +not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the +lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it +contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish +that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the +sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful +to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are +blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, +if this is necessary to save his life.</p> + +<p>1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one’s neighbor +under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true +intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions +must be present when one wishes evil as good:</p> + +<p>(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the +evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a +desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that +a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss, +but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul +rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their +sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the +desire of a neighbor’s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for +the end does not justify the means.</p> + +<p>(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to +another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It +is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property +one expects to inherit, for the neighbor’s life is more important than +private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common +welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by +the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal., +v. 12).</p> + +<p>1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some +private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a +spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in +the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to +wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from +the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful +to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they +take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of +edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one +but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death. +Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and +incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, +if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of +death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But +lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason +for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to +others.</p> + +<p>1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual +evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or +venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for +charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, +therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God, +diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we +are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The +good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are +permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more +humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the +permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of +God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of +greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that +God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if +God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.</p> + +<p>1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.—(a) Hatred, whether of +dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is +directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the +soul.</p> + +<p>(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal +sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either +indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in +others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much +that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance +in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to +inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of +charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)</p> + +<p>(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one +wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or +because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of +mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, +however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or +the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.</p> + +<p>1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.—(a) Hatred +is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as +envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular +kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be +directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is +directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while +hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed +to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an +obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good +absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived +for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is +wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, +other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is +contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the +same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s +temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred +of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against +him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin +takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15). +The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is +not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less +harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, +internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may +happen from a severe blow.</p> + +<p>1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said +above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually +other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the +neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but +rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This +will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:</p> + +<p>(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of +man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, +since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its +evil (see 1106).</p> + +<p>(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor), +is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already +corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that +the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before +hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the +freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.</p> + +<p>1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of +the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as +was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, interpretative hate—i.e., a feeling against another that +makes one act in effect as if there were hatred—does precede the other +sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged +against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but +this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of +Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.</p> + +<p>(b) Formal hate—i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not +modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over +one’s own inferiority—does not precede, but rather follows the other +sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin +of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered +Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the +thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.</p> + +<p>1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that +dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, +for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to +desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes +to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes +evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred +look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause +that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate +that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, +and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good +as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy, +for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor +breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of +God.</p> + +<p>1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.—(a) Hatred of God and +hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be +declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same +virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin +against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as +different species of sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since +all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is +wished to a neighbor as evil—that is, one wishes another evil in +general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, +such as damnation or death.</p> + +<p>(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results +may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his +neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he +who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of +murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s +property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his +parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on +another, adds malediction to hate.</p> + +<p>1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a +sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful +at all.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of +resignation to the divine will.</p> + +<p>(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify +uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive +disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, +a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on +account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he +himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose +manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse +himself of sinful dislike.</p> + +<p>(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s +desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be +observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a +criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would +defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he +wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his +friend.</p> + +<p>1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as +follows: (a) when they add a new species—thus, the person hated (e.g., +one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of +reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when +they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when +one hates a large number of persons (see 219).</p> + +<p>1320. The Sin of Sloth.—Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will +about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem +for one’s Last End and the means thereto.</p> + +<p>(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs +from the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The +passions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil +when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or +weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of +sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed +to God are to be attended to.</p> + +<p>(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about +the smallness of one’s good. Humility demands that one be sensible of +one’s own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are +better. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate +and grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the +gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity. +Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is +found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or +disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of +moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated +with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth +is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity +rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.</p> + +<p>(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that +is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as +eternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the +Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be +esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of +God, which is a sadness over God’s own goodness; and from envy, which +is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.</p> + +<p>(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one +as an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the +practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy +of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or +idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not +because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the +labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with +repose and ease.</p> + +<p>1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: “Bow down thy +shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., +vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has +evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with +overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).</p> + +<p>1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.—(a) Sloth is a special sin, +since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from +the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from +hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely +committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a +horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden +in the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice +naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils +as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.</p> + +<p>1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a +mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is +grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good +which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for +one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking, +however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the +divine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a +mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or +full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at +all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to, +is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a +venial sin.</p> + +<p>1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.—(a) To escape his sadness about +divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden +him—his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of +cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his +grief—the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the +spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for +the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden +things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not +concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, +and he must be continually moving from place to place.</p> + +<p>1325. The Conquest of Sloth.—(a) Flight is a suitable form of +resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by +thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against +purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance, +when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see +257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to +the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.</p> + +<p>1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a +generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and +hence it will be treated in several places.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be +performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, +which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among +the sins against prudence.</p> + +<p>(b) Sluggishness (_pigritia_) is a tardy performance of duty, and will +be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.</p> + +<p>(c) Carelessness (_torpor_) is a perfunctory discharge of duties, +without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given +above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.</p> + +<p>(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by +an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered +when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to +fortitude.</p> + +<p>(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of +indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the +various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice +will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.</p> + +<p>1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as +tepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes +one to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live +holily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and +generosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against +evil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.</p> + +<p>(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one +concerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a +sinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to +grave sin. Thus, we read: “I know thy works, that thou art neither +cold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art +lukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of +my mouth” (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).</p> + +<p>(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the +disrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to +God.</p> + +<p>1328. The Sin of Envy.—Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor, +which one considers as a detriment to one’s own excellence or glory, +and therefore as an evil to self.</p> + +<p>(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the +will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy +differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as +will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy, +although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from +pride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and +from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).</p> + +<p>(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which +men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability, +rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or +the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one’s sins, regret that +one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make +of health or wealth.</p> + +<p>(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person +would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a +contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of +God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A +person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is +mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an +antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the +attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote +impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is +discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.</p> + +<p>(d) The envious man considers his neighbor’s good as a detriment to his +own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart +from other forms of repining at another’s good fortune. Thus, +displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to +detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the +unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.</p> + +<p>(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor’s prosperity as a calamity to +self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one’s own +desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the +merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of +themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own +misfortune.</p> + +<p>1329. The Objects of Envy.—(a) The material objects are many, but they +are reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of +desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on +public knowledge of one’s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with +the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective +excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will +perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is +an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause +received by his less able opponent.</p> + +<p>(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the +excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the +excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood +absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to +obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood +relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the +situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same, +that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened +his excellence.</p> + +<p>1330. The Subjects of Envy.—(a) The persons most inclined to envy are +of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the +pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is +correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he +already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his +desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small +advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He +is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would +see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who +recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who +are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, +however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in +some form.</p> + +<p>(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some +way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one +is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by +those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will +envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those +acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate +persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his +brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are +only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above +them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a +poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons +are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but +it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what +they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes +envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison +from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man +envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, +or the present promotion that surpasses his own.</p> + +<p>1331. It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins +against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly, +whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. +Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. +It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of +others, because the qualification in each case is different.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s +prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it +dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he +thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.</p> + +<p>(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on +account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of +the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is +displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is +his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite +of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence +possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.</p> + +<p>(c) Indignation (_nemesis_) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain +good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because +Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.</p> + +<p>(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks +this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of +self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in +itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s +relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the +glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of +Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame +him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as +a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus +fears, Caius envies.</p> + +<p>1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things, +it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry +among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31). +St. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with +other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the +praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be +outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another +does not take away or lessen the other’s good, but improves his own +good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual +matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful +to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then +emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to +Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking +competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in +business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in +character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is +discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius, +or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable, +that of Balbus is unreasonable.</p> + +<p>1333. Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so +ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved. +This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves +has or has not exclusive rights.</p> + +<p>(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child +loves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both +parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when +the child does this.</p> + +<p>(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives +to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture +speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and +declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over +the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians +that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have +not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false +teachers (II Cor., xi).</p> + +<p>1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by +fear of the harm he will do?</p> + +<p>(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act +against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over +the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the +means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to +wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over +the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute +the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice; +when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix. +2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to +rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be +saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the +oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.</p> + +<p>(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other +goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to +be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong +to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election +of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers. +It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself +at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.</p> + +<p>(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do +injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s +guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the +prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive +the other of his prosperity.</p> + +<p>1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused +by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be +about spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not +possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that +make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which +are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is +about temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they +have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the +undeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that +these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked; +those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact +that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to +be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: “Be not emulous of +evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly +wither away as grass” (Ps. xxxvi. 1).</p> + +<p>1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked +must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity +is had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine +cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins; +for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an +unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is +something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation +for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be +shunned: “My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in +anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners” (Ps. lxxii. 2, +3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his +prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur +chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.</p> + +<p>1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative +loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good +that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a +sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: “Let us not be made +desirous of vainglory, envying one another” (Gal, v. 26); “The +patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt” (Acts, vii. 9), +“Charity envieth not” (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be +grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good +and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.</p> + +<p>1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly +opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the +neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity +is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity, +such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of +love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to +mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at +their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful +envious.</p> + +<p>1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a +neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even +if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good; +(b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the +consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of +one who is unworthy.</p> + +<p>1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the +object is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as +good looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or +full consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults +feel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first +movements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts +are not mortal, because not fully adverted to.</p> + +<p>1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.—(a) There are no different +species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one +essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another, +viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of +one’s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is +a sin against God (viz., envy at another’s spiritual good, or sorrow at +the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the +neighbor.</p> + +<p>(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according +to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it +is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another’s +influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another’s ability +to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of +the body than about dress, style, etc.</p> + +<p>1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree +which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The +fruits of envy are progressive in evil.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of +the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly +(sin of detraction).</p> + +<p>(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if +its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued +prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a +neighbor’s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the +affliction over the neighbor’s prosperity now spoken of is of the same +species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if +the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the +failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.</p> + +<p>(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the +causes of hate (see 1316).</p> + +<p>1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is +caused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence +will easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that +excellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory, +for one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be +grieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.</p> + +<p>1344. In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the +most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is +from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of +envy—namely, envy of a brother’s spiritual good—which has a place +among those gravest offenses called “sins against the Holy Ghost” (see +899).</p> + +<p>(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world, +for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world” (Wis., ii. 24). +It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved +the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and +to the loss of original justice by the Whole race.</p> + +<p>1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.—(a) Envy is useless, since +it does not obtain that on which one’s heart is set, or obtains it only +by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is +harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis., +vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor. +Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was +envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).</p> + +<p>1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its +causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish +charity and of emulation of what is best in others: “So that by all +means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I +rejoice, yea, and will rejoice” (Philip., i. 18); “Let us consider one +another, to provoke unto charity and to good works” (Heb., x. 24).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_8_THE_SINS_AGAINST_PEACE">Art. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 37-42.)</p> + +<p>1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) +discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or +quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights +and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.</p> + +<p>1348. Discord.—As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the +wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, +or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that +they be in agreement.</p> + +<p>(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires. +Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is +a disagreement in judgments.</p> + +<p>(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in +which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have +but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about +matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at +variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his +wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more +than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but +not in the second.</p> + +<p>(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor. +Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the +divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the +divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who +is not in harmony with the divine will.</p> + +<p>(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for +agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g., +justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now +employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a +superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a +creditor is dishonest.</p> + +<p>1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is +the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter +about which charity requires that he agree;</p> + +<p>(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who +both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are +divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.</p> + +<p>1350. Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this +species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. +Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of +heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or +consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.</p> + +<p>1351. Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.—(a) From its nature, this +kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the +concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of +opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John +Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment +indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this +kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable +ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.</p> + +<p>1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed +sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of +another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is +committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his +own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.</p> + +<p>1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the +result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the +concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six +things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of +discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division +that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, +St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the +Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). +But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the +defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees +to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his +using evil means for a good end.</p> + +<p>1354. The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a +neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his +neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to +contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as +good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are +due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own +excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his +purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not +take what he regards as a position of inferiority.</p> + +<p>1355. Contention.—Contention is discord carried into words or +equivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies +what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the +intention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the +truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which +it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and +the matter in question.</p> + +<p>1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as +follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is +a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a +question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error. +Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific +journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological +disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary. +Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion +or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from +danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.</p> + +<p>(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue +according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an +insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.</p> + +<p>1357. The Sin of Contention.—Contention is a sin when its aim is the +concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind +of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of +internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and +the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works +of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b) +From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent, +this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial +sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows +is true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is +distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.</p> + +<p>1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the +truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths +are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the +doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a +universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection +of the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a +particular character in which important rights are involved. Example: +An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the +past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he +knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.</p> + +<p>1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending +against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly, +makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity +and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.). +(a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as +a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention +when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus, +while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies +preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods +against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the +bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to +make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from +contention.</p> + +<p>1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a) +when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows +the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one +contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on +carrying one’s point that one does not care whether it is true or +false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.</p> + +<p>1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in +itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times +necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a +mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as +which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with +greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal +or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii. +14).</p> + +<p>1362. The Causes of Sinful Contention.—(a) The cause of that which is +principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by +another and the stand made for error—is envy, pride and vainglory, as +said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which +is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and +the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.</p> + +<p>1363. The sins in act against the peace of charity are the following: +(a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the +Church; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition, +which is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to +peace between individuals.</p> + +<p>1364. Schism.—Schism (etymologically, a split, rent) is defined: “A +voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church.”</p> + +<p>(a) Schism is a voluntary separation, that is, a separation intended +for its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity, +for sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the +schismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners +expressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not +the same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated +themselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church +herself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.</p> + +<p>(b) Schism is a separation from unity, and so it differs from disbelief +in unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate +oneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity, +and yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not +necessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the +setting up of such a body.</p> + +<p>(c) Schism is a separation of oneself from unity—that is, schism does +not deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the +schismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The +schismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he +accomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.</p> + +<p>(d) Schism is a separation from unity, that is, from fellowship in the +mystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the +authority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those +subject to him. Thus, schism differs from disobedience to the head of +the Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey +orders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.</p> + +<p>(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the Church, that is, of +the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters +purely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not +schism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the +Church Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church +Triumphant cannot fall away from unity.</p> + +<p>1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.—(a) In Apostolic times +there were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at +Corinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b) +In post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that +of the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in +Egypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the +fourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century. +The most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those +whom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius +in the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Caerularius in the +eleventh century.</p> + +<p>1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) directly, when one intends +schism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of +the Church; (b) indirectly, when one intends to do that from which +schism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a +member of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or +presiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even +though he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case +is similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and +yet is determined to do something from which the neighbor’s death will +surely result.</p> + +<p>1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity +in the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have +the same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of +similarity; (b) unity between head and members. There is but one head +of the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ an earth. Thus, +there is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the +Church. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one +great whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.</p> + +<p>1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2). +(a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth +and the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii. 18, 19). The +mere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make +him a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy +See. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The +sin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the +Church. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters +of faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things, +is a schismatic.</p> + +<p>1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in +three ways:</p> + +<p>(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the thing commanded, +and not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep +a fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he +considers it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of +disobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his +refusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of +the Church.</p> + +<p>(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the +command, considered as a private individual. As the Pope in his +personal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by +hatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming +judgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is +reasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and +that the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is +concerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither +schism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the +person should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.</p> + +<p>(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope’s judgment may be the one who +gave the command considered in his official capacity as Pope. In this +case the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the +thing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will +be unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of +Pope in him who issued the judgment.</p> + +<p>1370. Comparison of Heresy and Schism.—(a) These sins are not the +same, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who +really believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may +nevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest, +self-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the +head, or not to communicate with the body. (b) There is an intimate +union between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself +from the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some +heresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the +Eastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church, +and history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of +papal primacy.</p> + +<p>1371. The Opposition between Schism and Charity.—(a) Charity in itself +is a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is +unitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his +neighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an +individual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) Charity in its +effect is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of +Christ, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals, +but also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire +world. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a +schismatic.</p> + +<p>1372. The Sinfulness of Schism.—(a) Schism has a special seriousness, +since it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the +universal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the +greatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the +individual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin +is against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I +Cor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of +Antioch, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn +the sin of schism.</p> + +<p>(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is +against God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its +consequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic +sins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of +more danger to others.</p> + +<p>1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828). +(a) Formal schism is that described above, in which one wishes to +separate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable +revolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) Material schism is that in which one is +in fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith. +An example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were +rival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the +people as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal +sin.</p> + +<p>1374. The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.—(a) The power of Orders is +not lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a +consecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence, +a schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the +power of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of +the Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the +Church permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an +inferior except as permitted by the superior.</p> + +<p>(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that +power depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be +withdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction +could not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other +acts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.</p> + +<p>1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) All schismatics incur _ipso facto_ excommunication, as well as +various inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that +those who separate themselves should be declared outside the communion +of the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the +time of the schism of Core: “Depart from the tent of these wicked men +and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin” (Num., +xvi. 26).</p> + +<p>(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the +active use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals, +except when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of +death, as declared in Canon 2261.</p> + +<p>(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in +certain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common +good. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or +in common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not _vitandi_ +or sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities +that the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical +jurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the +conferring of the Sacraments.</p> + +<p>1376. War.—War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more +sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, +such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only +those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with +them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war, +sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, +not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a +nation.</p> + +<p>(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war, +rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of +diplomatic relations, etc.</p> + +<p>1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when +undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation); +(b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the +enslavement of a nation).</p> + +<p>1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is +attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right +(e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for +damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust +attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of +one’s country).</p> + +<p>1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict +sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly +attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or +begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the +nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, +if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war +against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it +declared war.</p> + +<p>1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature +Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings +(Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered +or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in +numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged +the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion +was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the +officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of +the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34). +Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>1381. Certain sayings of our Lord—for example, that those who take the +sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should +not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)—are not an endorsement of extreme +pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due +authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when +this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor. +Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which +are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals. +The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace, +but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot +be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.</p> + +<p>1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has +never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion +of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be +prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the +Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by +nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval +on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which +the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the +Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were +instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar +soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.</p> + +<p>1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature +allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust +aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to +defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature +allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution +for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when +another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by +force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation +would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus +a premium would be set on iniquity.</p> + +<p>1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, +its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not +lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:</p> + +<p>(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the +care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been +committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual +or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to +the higher authority.</p> + +<p>(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side +of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own +subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against +those who are not its subjects.</p> + +<p>(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some +good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper +authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part +in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the +exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war +because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get +promotion, is not a right frame of mind.</p> + +<p>1385. What public authority has the right to declare war? (a) +Ordinarily, only the sovereign power—that is, the person or body in +whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the +nation—can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the +authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies +in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if +custom or law allows it.</p> + +<p>(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize +war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a +declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly +invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on +the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province +could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect +such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do +nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.</p> + +<p>1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the +enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired +without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less +than that of toleration.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another +nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes +war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these +are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.</p> + +<p>(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause +for war, because a state has no right to use force against another +sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault +has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war +should not be declared.</p> + +<p>(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of +war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good +and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave +reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It +would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at +the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern +warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to +society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb +may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of +a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to +outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with +justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless +not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of +modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all +warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to +worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed +so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property +involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. +“A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it +desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in +passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).</p> + +<p>1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should +take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but +also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy +nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right, +charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in +general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or +spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some +non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of +war.</p> + +<p>1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed +on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, +there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to +accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or +one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less +guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself +of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.</p> + +<p>1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the +honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II +Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence, +self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a +people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to +recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of +neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and +commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law. +Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international +agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.</p> + +<p>1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third +nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of +justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to +help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is +only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of +intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against +a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly +attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are +tyrannized over by their government.</p> + +<p>1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?</p> + +<p>(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another +people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be +forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no +one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without +conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority +to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be +right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or +polygamous.</p> + +<p>(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or +sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason +for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades, +which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the +unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a +war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.</p> + +<p>1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to +it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation +lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity +for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for +the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war +on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the +uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at +peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of +introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a +sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.</p> + +<p>1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:</p> + +<p>(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done +by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, +jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not +lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the +enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained +over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, +or for the prevention of difficulties at home.</p> + +<p>(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by +another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext +for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks +made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s +own citizens.</p> + +<p>(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as +motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, +but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, +the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the +tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a _casus belli_; for +in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or +title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.</p> + +<p>1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The +government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right +is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of +force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one +should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is +uncertain.</p> + +<p>(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a +belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. +They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves +that their choice is correct.</p> + +<p>(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even +if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the +presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, +however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right +or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly +unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.</p> + +<p>1395. What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous +paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability +of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may +take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however, +hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons +must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not +entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we +prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as +there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to +pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of +citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for +such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has +only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have +certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.</p> + +<p>1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both +sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on +one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or +restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or +resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on +one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, +for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes +it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause +of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the +wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even +though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in +good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the +controversy.</p> + +<p>1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and +injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards +the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on +account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of +a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the +original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that +appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory, +but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the +legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the +beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds +are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if +causes are traced farther back.</p> + +<p>1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to +natural law?</p> + +<p>(a) Examination of the Cause of War.—It is clear that those charged +with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and +prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and +asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, +not of a few, but of many—not merely among those who are experts in +the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, +but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side +and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who +have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past +would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.</p> + +<p>(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.—It is also clear +that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in +their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, +yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist +or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They +should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, +unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; +but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive +war.</p> + +<p>(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.—Prudence demands that, even +when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it +should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded +expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). +Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot +at all foresee, are criminals.</p> + +<p>(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.—Even if the cause is just and the +war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last +means. Hence, pacific means—such as direct negotiation, mediation, +arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, +boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.—should be tried in +the first place.</p> + +<p>1399. The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International +Law.—(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the +other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make +apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory +should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the +country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other +representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.</p> + +<p>1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. +But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of +circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever +justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake +(such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its +existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can +still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to +self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense. +(b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems +unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests +of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern +war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen +to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of +national policy, indicates progress for this view.</p> + +<p>1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful +means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s +country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral. +(b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or +international law.</p> + +<p>1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause +cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of +nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of +acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are +the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of +churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the +obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the +direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses +quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing +a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war, +massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a +defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as +soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels +for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town +or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith +with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false +stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.</p> + +<p>1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same +means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) +Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in +themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by +making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any +means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other +obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really +necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to +kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of +one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or +depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the +enemy of his weapons.</p> + +<p>1404. The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint +are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with +religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence +against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.</p> + +<p>1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.—(a) It is lawful to carry on +warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, +just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of +necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of +hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater +ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at +those times.</p> + +<p>1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.—(a) It is lawful to attack a +church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. +It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to +harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these +reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.</p> + +<p>1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.—(a) It is lawful for clerics to +cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, +and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel +during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue +around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other +holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity +(as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual +fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for +a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, +shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the +Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).</p> + +<p>1408. The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a) +Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion +of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers +and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the +unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of +munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication +service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters +nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of +the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, +old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not +subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in +the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.</p> + +<p>1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.—(a) According to +natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to +starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or +wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was +expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without +hastening the decision.</p> + +<p>1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.—(a) The indirect +killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and +unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect +(see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, +arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger +liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food +supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, +although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as +well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be +made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning +of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a +question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or +cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, +where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or +severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out +the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil +effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called +incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable +results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, +if not as an end, at least as a means.</p> + +<p>(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is +intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. +Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a +residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of +this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued +that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the +citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make +peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based +on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.</p> + +<p>Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all +citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is +a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic +doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and +accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented +article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford, +S.J. (_Theological Studies_, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the +distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the +condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an +industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the +population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than +a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, +exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks +on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or +wounding of non-combatants.</p> + +<p>1411. The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.—(a) It is lawful to +sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those +who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, +guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to +sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a +private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a +non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not +be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel +or break faith.</p> + +<p>1412. Imprisonment and Restraint.—(a) Combatants may be made prisoners +of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military +rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases +they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of +war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human +beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may +not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to +death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.</p> + +<p>1413. The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.—(a) The +military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be +confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to +destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may +demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and +artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, +food or drink.</p> + +<p>(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a +successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and +some others are excepted by international law), and he may use +immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted +by law).</p> + +<p>(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law +requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be +seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and +contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes +of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army +maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or +a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against +private persons, but against the state.</p> + +<p>(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant +ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.</p> + +<p>(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is +not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards +the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to +the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval +powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and +freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, +seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband +or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.</p> + +<p>1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the +private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: +Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without +authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If +they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against +military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to +restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, +since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if +neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of +restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.</p> + +<p>1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery? +(a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when +compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In +modern times and according to present international law, looting is +strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no +right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, +and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the +rights of the inhabitants to their goods.</p> + +<p>1416. Stratagems in War.—(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for +concealing one’s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke +screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command +of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2). +(b) It is lawful also to conceal one’s identity by wearing the uniforms +of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord +commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num., +xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is +lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.</p> + +<p>1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to +unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against +him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of +the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to +use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the +treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the +enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful +to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however, +without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the +enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by +the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may +retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await +compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders +the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy +citizens who are in one’s power.</p> + +<p>1418. Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.—(a) The victorious +nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after +the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must +not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.</p> + +<p>1419. The Rights of the Victor.—(a) If the cause of the victorious +nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not +make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to +the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of +the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things: +(i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war +was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy +during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the +former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal +has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity +and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him +forced agreements.</p> + +<p>1420. The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.—(a) If the +victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the +injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which +it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before +the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory +does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It +does not make a bad cause good.</p> + +<p>1421. The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, +or with a Wrong Purpose.—(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy +against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings, +robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution +for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b) +Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not +obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for +similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his +motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.</p> + +<p>1422. What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?—(a) According +to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one +has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for +these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part +of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a +debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay +at present.</p> + +<p>1423. In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither +party is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its +ability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of +settlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual +condonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the +war, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission +to an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as +well as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the +advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and +productivity.</p> + +<p>1424. Guarantees for the Future.—(a) One may insist on such guarantees +as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by +the conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver +over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its +military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.</p> + +<p>(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war +by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said +above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against +aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or +competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to +demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the +management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the +territory taken during war, if one’s rights or reasonable security does +not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are +lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or +securities.</p> + +<p>1425. Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during +War.—(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of +non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited +on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The +crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for +it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and +rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The +Nurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for +crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.</p> + +<p>1426. Preparation for Future Wars.—(a) Reasonable preparedness is not +only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should +have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard +its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is +unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war. +Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy +far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military +expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too +dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.</p> + +<p>1427. Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory +than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for +peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.</p> + +<p>(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their +people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness +and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has +not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for +peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.</p> + +<p>(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical +plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world +amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute +moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments, +to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to +make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify +international law. History bears witness to the many and great services +to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between +nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement +among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless +continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their +wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray: +“From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.”</p> + +<p>1428. Fighting.—Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more +persons carried on by means of physical violence.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is an angry conflict, and so differs from contests of +strength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation, +health, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches, +football games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair +play and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here +understood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were +sports or spectacles, rather than fights.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a conflict, and so differs from punishment inflicted by +lawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a +crime, a parent or teacher chastises insubordinate children, or a sober +man scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic +to deprive him of a weapon.</p> + +<p>(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs +from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of +a multitude.</p> + +<p>(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the +infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from +quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether +the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or +missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye) +or indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).</p> + +<p>1429. Kinds of Fighting.—(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or +unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or +defending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an +ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with +previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject, +the civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a +show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one’s +fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily +harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when +one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.</p> + +<p>1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.—(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its +nature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that +exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is +essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently +only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate, +as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a +trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another’s hair or throw +snowballs.</p> + +<p>(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only +to defend one’s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for +lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to +enter one’s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin, +when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight +degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than +is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was +attacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and +needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.</p> + +<p>1431. Causes of Fighting.—The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal +of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.</p> + +<p>(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., +xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content +to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him—that is, to +injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and +will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the +foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into +quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).</p> + +<p>(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal +things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes +among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your +members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their +own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or +insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at +once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed +and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug +by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>1432. Hatred and Fighting.—(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of +fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but +absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable +than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time +patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to +the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if +the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling +and fighting as a means to his purpose.</p> + +<p>1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.—(a) Boasting about +self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take +offense occasions fights, for “he that boasteth and puffeth himself up +stirreth up quarrels” (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the +respective merits of nations or political parties often bring on bloody +encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the +mind that one minimizes one’s danger and exaggerates one’s own +strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).</p> + +<p>1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.—(a) Charity is wounded by +fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords, +scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly +maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to +the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.</p> + +<p>1435. Duelling.—A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons +fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private +quarrel.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the “suicide duel,” in which the +contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill +himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.</p> + +<p>(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are +determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and +proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is +not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter +of acceptance precede the fight.</p> + +<p>(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is +matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be +carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between +the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings, +ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a +duel.</p> + +<p>(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as +are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious +danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel, +therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such +as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous +weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of +one’s sword, loading one’s revolver with blanks, firing into the air, +as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to +stab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for, +while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or +fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of +fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought +on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or +that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.</p> + +<p>(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A +hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending +armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no +private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their +countries.</p> + +<p>1436. The Morality of Duelling.—(a) Generally, the duel is mortally +sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition +it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one’s +own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State. +This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one +can decline the combat to which one is dared.</p> + +<p>(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the +character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor. +Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be +lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the +commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the +case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a +practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between +certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he +consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one +attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a +case as happening in normal conditions.</p> + +<p>1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.—(a) The amusement of +the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in +ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the +butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is +savagery.</p> + +<p>(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of +the judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early +Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since +they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the +litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of +the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in +the right.</p> + +<p>(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is +the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill, +cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the +substitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an +encouragement to crime.</p> + +<p>(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the +reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs +of honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to +think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a +person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act +against the wrong opinions of the multitude?</p> + +<p>1438. Penalties against Duelling.—(a) Church law deprives of +ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if +unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved +simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers +(Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes +duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the +seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.</p> + +<p>1439. What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries +caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to +restitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right +to restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the +cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave +compulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the +aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs +should be compensated.</p> + +<p>1440. Sedition.—Sedition is a discord between different factions of the +same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the +destruction of the unity of the State.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it +resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the +political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity +of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good +and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a +democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties +has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest +of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.</p> + +<p>(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that +is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic. +Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting +(which is between individuals).</p> + +<p>(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its +character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions +in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities, +it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection +or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is +civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome +the other.</p> + +<p>(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that +is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to +the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than +riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which +are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of +the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful +separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the +people against a tyrannical government.</p> + +<p>1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a +special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord, +for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to +the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal +discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace +between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the +same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes +away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or +persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.</p> + +<p>1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful. +(a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to +what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the +unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the +bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on +law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c) +Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral +causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote +disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry +out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on +the amount of damage that is due to one’s influence or acts.</p> + +<p>1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of +sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such +as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no +sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed +aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is +not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad +ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good, +whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus, +the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not +seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression +will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of +sedition.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_9_THE_SINS_AGAINST_BENEFICENCE">Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)</p> + +<p>1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to +the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to +treat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts +of charity—beneficence and brotherly correction.</p> + +<p>1445. Scandal.—Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare +or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road +that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or +general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense, +it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral +nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers +to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.</p> + +<p>1446. The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed +in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural +injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the +plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the +Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against +his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are +called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or +disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a +scandal to the crown. (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify +moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and +offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in +their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent +another from following some more perfect course or practice to which +there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at +meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.</p> + +<p>1447. Definition of Scandal.—In the strict sense, scandal is defined +as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that +offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”</p> + +<p>(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in +the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is +committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by +internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.</p> + +<p>(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is, +sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not +scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is +perceivable as being such.</p> + +<p>(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great +or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the +wide senses given in the previous paragraph.</p> + +<p>(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an +example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that +the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, +for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion +offered by scandal.</p> + +<p>(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself +in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion +of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts +of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly +understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.</p> + +<p>1448. Causes of Scandal.—There are various divisions of scandal +according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words, +as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b) +There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in +a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are +the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, +pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on +display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements +or announcements on one’s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in +omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.</p> + +<p>1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they +are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts, +such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed +from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable +by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no +knowledge.</p> + +<p>1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to +the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly +intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to +the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes +religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious, +and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b) +Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer +is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others +to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action, +although not directly willing the neighbor’s guilt that will result. +Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to +get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example +encourages them to drink.</p> + +<p>1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when +one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither +directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to +anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he +knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in +Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but +is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius +and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently +think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and +Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.</p> + +<p>1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly, +the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the +act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur +spiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal +are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active +and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his +neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not +passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, +but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but +not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by +another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our +Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I +Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.</p> + +<p>1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it +must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous +act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin—for example, +offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal +use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in +appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act +forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan +temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor., +viii. 10), to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might +have the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21). +Hence, St. Paul directs; “From all appearance of evil refrain +yourselves” (I Thess., v. 22).</p> + +<p>1454. The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are +innumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v. +19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially +mentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other +acts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as +atheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b) +occasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures, +plays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now +in separate paragraphs.</p> + +<p>1455. Obscenity.—Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by +which impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions +suggested. We may consider it either internally (i.e., in the intention +of the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (i.e., +in the nature of the things themselves which are used).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, internal obscenity, or the will to use what will corrupt the +minds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention +is to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the +intention is only to satisfy one’s own wish to use the sinful words, +acts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman +who dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of +direct scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love, +but to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) External obscenity is the tendency of words, acts or objects +themselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure +desires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such +words, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or +done is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous +sin against purity, if it is wrong on account of those who will be +influenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons), +it is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as +instruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse +the employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify +the means.</p> + +<p>1456. It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a +thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules +can be given:</p> + +<p>(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent +scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures; +also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando +depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae +mulierum.</p> + +<p>(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable +display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves; +or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a +closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or +in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the +wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.</p> + +<p>(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason +of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned), +by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity, +or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual +passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are +noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their +language objectionable).</p> + +<p>(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or +contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the +dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls, +cabarets, road houses, and night clubs—where there is no supervision +and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men +unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and +boisterousness—are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may +be found even in more respectable places.</p> + +<p>(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or +recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they +treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a +manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended +reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details, +sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.</p> + +<p>1457. As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given +unless the persons affected by one’s conduct are susceptible to evil +influence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of +circumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under +other conditions would be immoral and seductive.</p> + +<p>(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical +charts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction +of medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom +they are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the +esthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm +will be taken.</p> + +<p>(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for +things that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can +see from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have +been extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries, +the dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate decollete tolerated in +private gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.</p> + +<p>(c) Plays which contain gross or unseemly expressions or passages are +not therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality; +otherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama. +Newman says of Shakespeare: “Often as he may offend against modesty, he +is clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be +instanced in all that he has written to seduce the imagination or to +excite the passions.” It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this +kind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the +innocence of youth.</p> + +<p>(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus +to impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some +types of dance, it is true, might be rightly called “the devil’s +march”; other dances, named after various animals, may also be +suggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many +experience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also +physical, esthetic and social values.</p> + +<p>(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about +plays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of +isolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other +susceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the +Bible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go +through its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent +matter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person +who would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.</p> + +<p>1458. Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.—(a) In case of +obscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters, +sculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons +who place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which +there is general admission.</p> + +<p>(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the +wearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders +who impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing +one extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.</p> + +<p>(e) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights, +managers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud +them. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt, +when they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the +corruption of morals.</p> + +<p>(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are the +proprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and +singers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the +dancers, spectators and other patrons.</p> + +<p>(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors, +publishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share +responsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is +not desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been +the policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then, +is not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of +indecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the +newsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend, +or keep books that deal _ex professo_ with obscenity, though there is +no objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.</p> + +<p>1459. Results of Scandal.—The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is +sin.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example: +Titus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the +word and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both +repeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced +material sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.</p> + +<p>(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a +stone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.</p> + +<p>(c) Sin of the same species or sin of a different species from that +committed by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a +calumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat +the calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to +give up religion.</p> + +<p>(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new +to him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not +contemplated—any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It +is scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had +reformed, or by bad example to bring back to another’s mind and desire +a sin on which he was once resolved.</p> + +<p>1460. Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it +exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with +them.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel, +persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil +either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not +necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal. +Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined +to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin, +and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the +demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to +drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him +in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting +that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or +praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by +these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he +intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants. +Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.</p> + +<p>1461. The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are +done, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those +who are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the +disedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite +virtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus, +young persons Whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and +well-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led +astray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who +are habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before +them is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.</p> + +<p>1462. May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore, +because his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be +scandalized?</p> + +<p>(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened morally on +his account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the +guilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady +renowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is +interspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal +is given.</p> + +<p>(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral +harm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of +scandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to +him, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his +misconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or +of a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this +uncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of +character is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.</p> + +<p>1463. There are two cases especially, when even the very good may +become bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example: +(a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic +auctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriae malum exemplum +peccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the +one who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or +seems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the +wicked in wrongdoing.</p> + +<p>1464. Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall +consequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal +given, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really +disedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his +elders intoxicated; (b) scandal taken, which is a fall into sin +occasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly +interpreted, either out of malice (Pharisaic scandal), or out of +ignorance or frailty (scandal of little ones). The Pharisees were +scandalized at our Lord’s dining with sinners, because they themselves +were unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth +were scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their +consciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1465. Sinfulness of Scandal.—(a) Scandal in the wide sense is not +necessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master +when he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order +to correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a +scandal (Matt., xvi. 23).</p> + +<p>(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the +conduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct +which occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made +above on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.</p> + +<p>(c) Active scandal is always a sin in the one whose conduct occasions +the fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such +an appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not +always suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he +may proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.</p> + +<p>1466. Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that +may happen to any kind of sin?</p> + +<p>(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized +person may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that +example occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition +to the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast +because he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of +intemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be +an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the +scandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.</p> + +<p>(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and +is offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason +is that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual +ruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one’s own desire. +Thus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite, +does not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his +sin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.</p> + +<p>(c) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional and is offered +by conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the special sin +of scandal, For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case +there is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in +itself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who +is dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of +abstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do +not know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against +edification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does +not directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance +that the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.</p> + +<p>(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is +directly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal +directly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly +opposed to a special good of another person and to the special +charitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the +fast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression is guilty +of both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin +appears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of +intemperance.</p> + +<p>1467. Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to +Confession.—(a) Species of Sins.—In case of passive scandal there is +only one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance +occasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly +intended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin, +namely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad +example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by +evil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely, +scandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the +species of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only +evil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is +really evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.</p> + +<p>(b) Number of Sins.—As many sins of scandal are committed as there are +persons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those +present as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one +commits more scandals by being drunk on a public street than by being +drunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a +large assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.</p> + +<p>(c) Circumstances of Intention and Conduct.—Those who give bad example +should confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these +depends the important distinction between directly intentional and +indirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin +committed, as explained in the preceding paragraph.</p> + +<p>(d) Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.—This should be +mentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the +fact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give +good example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice; +the fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God, +or married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal +against chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely +against his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.</p> + +<p>(e) Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.—The results of scandal +should be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an +obligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three +following paragraphs.</p> + +<p>1468. Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his +conduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is +directly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some +special sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the +former is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter +shall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating +clerics or religious or church members one intends that one’s listeners +shall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the +calumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is +guilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.</p> + +<p>(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the +scandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the +scandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calumniated +and not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and +authorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the +scandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it +interpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he +is not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it, +either in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he +is not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in +others); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.</p> + +<p>1469. A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession +may be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must +confess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct +leads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are +not obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess +the species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and +hence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to +confess that they gave scandal.</p> + +<p>1470. Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties +resulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?</p> + +<p>(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of +restitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because +it is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example +is more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from +his employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of +stealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took +himself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in +the present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own +ill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly +intended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice +committed by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is +only the occasion, not the cause or cooperator in that injustice.</p> + +<p>1471. If scandal amounts to incitation or cooperation, the guilt of the +neighbor’s sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are +incurred by the scandalizer.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person +knows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them +bad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into +sin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is +attached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and +hence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.</p> + +<p>(b) Bad example may amount to cooperation in sin, as when a person by +his bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could +not have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe +to steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order +to learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he +shares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn +from him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation, +not only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who +have listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he +virtually authorized them to spread his words.</p> + +<p>1472. The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.—(a) From its nature all +active scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor., +viii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others, +and so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by +charity (Rom, xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt., +xviii. 6), and on one’s family, friends and profession obloquy and +disgrace.</p> + +<p>(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the +matter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following +paragraph.</p> + +<p>1473. Mortal and Venial Scandal.—(a) Passive scandal is always a sin, +mortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct +witnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an +inferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used +profane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as +when the blasphemy of an infidel provokes his neighbor to use profane +language against the blasphemer.</p> + +<p>(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as +when the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has +the appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when +the scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises +the spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an +evil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.</p> + +<p>(c) Active scandal directly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when +a person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into +venial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead +one’s neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to +lead one’s neighbor into venial sin.</p> + +<p>1474. Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the +internal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence +he has on the person scandalized. (a) The internal factors on which the +quantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the +degree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with +premeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous +to speak it when the hearer’s spiritual ruin is directly intended, than +when that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on +which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the +bad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is +more serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted, +than to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one’s bad +example; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than +to cause him to commit venial sin.</p> + +<p>1475. Persons Scandalized.—Is it possible to scandalize people who are +firmly rooted in virtue?</p> + +<p>(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the +perfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the +evil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the +external good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But +these things do not hinder them internally, or separate them from the +love of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).</p> + +<p>(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense, +even the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be +influenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are +not confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they +commit sin and lose grace.</p> + +<p>(c) If the question be understood of possibility in a relative +sense—that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the +character of perfect men, and what does usually happen—the perfect +cannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the +sayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps. +cxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps. +lxxii. 2).</p> + +<p>1476. Is it possible that the perfect should give scandal?</p> + +<p>(a) If the question be understood of absolute possibility, even the +perfect may give scandal, since they are not immune from defect (I +John, i. 8). (b) If the question be understood of relative possibility, +as explained above, the perfect cannot scandalize, for their sins are +mostly internal acts not entirely deliberate, while the external words +or acts in which they fall short deviate so slightly from right as to +offer no occasion of sinning to another. The perfect man is one who is +on his guard, especially that he become not a stumbling-block to +others, and it is therefore a rare exception when he causes scandal.</p> + +<p>1477. Duty of Avoiding Scandal.—At times it is impossible to avoid +giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. +Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When +is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding +scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the +sake of avoiding scandal?</p> + +<p>1478. The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.—(a) +Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up +without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the +order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin +than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify +sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial +sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down +the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from +blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking +undeserved offense.</p> + +<p>(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be +neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as +there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who +takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty +through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable +that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others. +Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal +which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).</p> + +<p>(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be +neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason +for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning, +even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our +Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be +omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt, vii. 6). Example: A +wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to +mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.</p> + +<p>(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be +omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains +scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one +assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger +of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own, +are in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the +performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would +scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the +righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works +before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await +such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad +faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he +performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake +their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present. +If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in +order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a +while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.</p> + +<p>1479. As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law +has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself +requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following +cases:</p> + +<p>(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in +order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is +necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent +scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in +order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a +greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should +omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would +be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not +neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.</p> + +<p>(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of +scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil +than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is +commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal +(Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et +tamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium +cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum. +But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those +who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.</p> + +<p>(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when +otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil +than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should +say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in +order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or +a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies +or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella +quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro +omisso domi manere.</p> + +<p>1480. In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater +evil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the +following conditions be verified:</p> + +<p>(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain +or slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a +grave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be +given, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that +someone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention +of the precept.</p> + +<p>(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable +hardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to +attempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal. +Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never +read the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest +scandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife +absent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be +provoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and +exercise, lest an old relative be disedified. If we have to choose +between occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and +occasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we +should rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold +that scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass +oftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require +absence from Mass at all.</p> + +<p>1481. Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical +poverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions +(such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid +scandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons +these works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards +those persons, according to the rules given for contravention of +precepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have +vowed them (e.g., religious).</p> + +<p>(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates +and other clerics because of their office.</p> + +<p>1482. Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are +not to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be +Pharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for +others, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in +a way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is +danger of scandal: (a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to +Mass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion +blasphemy in one’s neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one +puts off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of +mind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be +explained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a +notorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders +the reason of his visit.</p> + +<p>1483. When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of +Avoiding Scandal.—(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner, +but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will +on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the +property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not +arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the +property of their charges.</p> + +<p>(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on +account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results +from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be +willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one’s +neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from +a certain food, if one’s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some +innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).</p> + +<p>(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic +scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would +encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be +injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by +keeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even +if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.</p> + +<p>1484. The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous +paragraph may be understood in a number of senses.</p> + +<p>(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is +held by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another +to keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may +call for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of +scandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a +friendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other +man keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is +also in good faith.</p> + +<p>(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of +the internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things +spiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external +sacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not +always demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice +would be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals. +Thus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor +who wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak +as well (Matt, v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians +should prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits +against fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a +willingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal, +when a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean +that it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other +times.</p> + +<p>(c) The surrender of temporal goods may be understood either of a +giving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding +to them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring +temporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of +scandal of the weak, that one should surrender one’s goods without any +effort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because +his priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him +a service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and +the duty of the members to contribute.</p> + +<p>1485. Temporal goods may be understood here either of things of great +value (e.g., necessaries of life) or of things of minor value (e.g., +luxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme +spiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if +this is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him +in extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of +minor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his +converts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but +only such food as they can get along without (Rom, xiv. 15; I Cor., +viii. 13).</p> + +<p>1486. Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal +of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special +sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual +purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an +unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such +as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who +would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the +temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the +spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the +chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in +churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common), +especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the +people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or +priest ought to forego something really due the Church.</p> + +<p>1487. Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.—(a) If there +is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the +goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as +far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to +the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not +neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the +church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither +should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who +will be scandalized because more is not paid.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should +be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal. +Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons +newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the +preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant +or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other +payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning +their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the +pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and +obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time, +place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of +the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not +realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond +his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and +never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections +instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making +enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal +both to Catholics and non-Catholics.</p> + +<p>1488. Duty of Repairing Scandal.-The paragraphs immediately preceding +have spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of +repairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of +charity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required +to practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this +who are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a +duty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their +office to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There +is sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has +employed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead +another into scandal.</p> + +<p>1489. Ways of Repairing Scandal.—(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or +privately. Reparation is public, when it is made before the community, +and private, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is +repaired explicitly or implicitly. Explicit reparation is made by +retractation of one’s words, by condemnation of one’s acts, by the +destruction of one’s scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to +virtue those whom one has misled, etc. Implicit reparation is made by +reformation of one’s conduct, the abandonment of that which gave +scandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person +scandalized, etc.</p> + +<p>1490. Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.—(a) Scandal is +public or private. Public scandal is given before the community at +large, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the +whole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring +atheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people. +Scandal is private, when it is given before a few persons, and when it +does not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife +quarrel before their domestic circle.</p> + +<p>(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary scandal is given by +bad example alone; extraordinary scandal adds to bad example injury or +injustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes +slightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who +by trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be +effectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who +spreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.</p> + +<p>1491. It rests with the prudent judgment of the confessor or +ecclesiastical authority to decide in particular instances the way in +which scandals are to be repaired. But in general the following rules +may be given:</p> + +<p>(a) Public scandal should be repaired publicly, even though it has not +actually seduced those who are aware of it; for otherwise the evil +influence remains. Thus, a drunkard should take the pledge of total +abstinence, or else give an example of sobriety; an apostate should +renounce his errors as openly as he defended them.</p> + +<p>(b) Private scandal may be repaired privately, that is, before the few +persons who were scandalized. Thus, the husband and wife who quarrelled +before their children make reparation when they tell the children not +to quarrel, and when they strengthen this advice by good example.</p> + +<p>(c) Ordinary scandal may be repaired implicitly, that is, by turning +over a new leaf. Thus, one who has been away from Mass and the +Sacraments for a long time makes reparation when he appears at church, +goes to confession, and receives Communion; one who has been keeping +bad company makes reparation when he separates from his former +associates.</p> + +<p>(d) Extraordinary scandal is repaired explicitly, that is, by making +the restitution or satisfaction which justice demands, or by performing +the penalty required by the law. Thus, if through treachery a person +has seduced another from virtue, he must either himself or through +others endeavor to recall the scandalized person to his former virtue; +if a person has been guilty of laying violent hands on a cleric, he +must perform the penance prescribed; if a person has distributed +scandalous literature, he must try to stop its circulation, or to +distribute contrary literature.</p> + +<p>1492. When satisfaction requires public apology or retraction, this can +be made in various ways. (a) Thus, one may withdraw through the press +false statements publicly made; (b) one may apologize before a number +of witnesses authorized to make this known; (c) one may retract before +the pastor or confessor, with the understanding that the priest will +later declare that all due satisfaction has been made.</p> + +<p>1493. Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.—Is it lawful to +administer the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for +public scandal?</p> + +<p>(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to +administer the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not +subject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission +to them will not be a new scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the +party in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly +disposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave +scandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given +on condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.</p> + +<p>(c) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is not lawful as a +rule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation has been +actually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain +individual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been +circulating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or +the doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to +Communion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful +from the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the +Sacrament received.</p> + +<p>1494. In certain cases, however, the Sacraments other than Penance may +also be given before reparation for grave scandal has been made, +namely, when the circumstances are such that the administration of the +Sacraments will offer no scandal. (a) Thus, a dying person who is +penitent but unable to perform some satisfaction for scandal given is +granted the Sacraments. (b) A person who is well disposed, but who has +not yet made satisfaction for scandal, may sometimes be given Communion +privately. (c) A person who is not well disposed, and who will not make +satisfaction for scandal, is sometimes permitted to contract marriage +before the priest, namely, when there is a grave reason for marriage +and scandal is precluded.</p> + +<p>1495. Seduction.—Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin +by bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or +seduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and, +secondly, cooperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).</p> + +<p>1496. Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture) +by which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of +another to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.</p> + +<p>(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to +commit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given +expressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as +when he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.</p> + +<p>(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made +through argument that sin is lawful, or through instruction on the ways +of committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc., +as when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very +discouraged, and recommends it.</p> + +<p>(c) There is enticement which is an indirect persuasion to sin made +through flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom +worked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against +his father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so +lead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who +offers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of +abstinence.</p> + +<p>1497. The Malice of Solicitation.—(a) The gravity of this sin +according to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of +imperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a +mortal sin to command one’s son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a +venial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie. +(b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the +greater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less +evil of the sin to which one induces one’s neighbors, etc. (see 1473, +1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold; there is +the sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led +to sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to +commit (see 1468 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1498. Applications to Confession and Satisfaction.—(a) Since the +seducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it +does not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to +sin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he +induced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty +of injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps, +violence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess +that he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce. +(c) Since the seducer is guilty of spiritual damage, he is bound to +make reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the +seducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his +influence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he +is held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).</p> + +<p>1499. In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (e.g., +obscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that +one seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special +malice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned. +Thus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or +was trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If +the seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it +seems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party +solicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the +solicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no +scandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far +as that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the +circumstance of seduction must be confessed.</p> + +<p>1500. Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere +permission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but +it is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was +said above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483). +But, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes +difficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We +shall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs: +(a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a +sin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than +a greater evil; (e) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is +not removed, or is prepared.</p> + +<p>1501. Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that +he will not consent without sinning?</p> + +<p>(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also +sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has +stolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks +jurisdiction.</p> + +<p>(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no +sufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other +will sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful +to ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can +easily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.</p> + +<p>(c) If the thing requested is lawful, and there is a sufficient reason +for the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is +lawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses +take an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit +perjury.</p> + +<p>1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in +preference to a greater evil?</p> + +<p>(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is +not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to +steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a +species of seduction.</p> + +<p>(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and +the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to +advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one +prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it +is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had +already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is +not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are +supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is +out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.</p> + +<p>(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the +lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to +recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For, +if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt +of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the +lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius, +it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill +Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from +murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus +planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to +point out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to +advise accordingly.</p> + +<p>1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given. (a) Some +reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually +contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue +that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce +it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm +that will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture +(Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good +authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order +to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify +the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is +lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not +attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.</p> + +<p>1504. Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of +sin will seem to offer itself to another?</p> + +<p>(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there +is no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted +for a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that +someone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the +thief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see +whether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal. +Claudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he +needs evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from +future stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with +witnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.</p> + +<p>(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an +opportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something +sinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been +unfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a +countercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word, +hires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends. +Claudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he +therefore employs agents to provoke Caius into something criminal in +word or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that +Mercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which +Mercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be +captured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong; +Balbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of +seduction, at least in intention.</p> + +<p>1505. Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin +through such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But +there is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal +directly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by +acting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning, +but none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the +following:</p> + +<p>(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who +minister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce +emotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more +susceptible to temptation.</p> + +<p>(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround +others with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that +continually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of +virtue.</p> + +<p>(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or +suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of +something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity +which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where +there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than +commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to +drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.</p> + +<p>1506. Cooperation in Sin.—Cooperation or participation in sin, +strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not +seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these +lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation +supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The +scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the +cooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.</p> + +<p>(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as +regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who +had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that +his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some +authority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to +Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin +to others.</p> + +<p>1507. Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The +cooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who +commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying +him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose +services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen +goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or +obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is +a cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate +agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his +own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists +as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at +the time of “hold-ups,” or who fights a duel, or who carries on an +obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an +accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be +guiltless.</p> + +<p>1508. Kinds of Cooperation.—Divisions of Cooperation according to +Different Kinds of Acts.—(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act, +cooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does +not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples: +Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a +second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no +resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer’s office. +Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his +guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only +a material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals +intend.</p> + +<p>(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or +negative, according as one does something to help the principal agent, +or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a +positive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given +in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or +cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps +bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows +unfastened for the convenience of thieves.</p> + +<p>1509. Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of +Influence.—(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is +either occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood +that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin, +but does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example, +failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective +cooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to +carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had +resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506), +there is question here only of effective cooperation.</p> + +<p>(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal +agent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one +shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that +preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away +stolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the +thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge +to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are +mediate cooperators.</p> + +<p>(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done, +cooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as +the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus +supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate. +Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can +secure them elsewhere. Balbus’ cooperation is indispensable for Titus, +but not for Sempronius.</p> + +<p>1510. Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility +or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and +merely unlawful cooperation.</p> + +<p>(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done +to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict +reparation. Thus, those who act as “fences” or receivers of stolen +goods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the +rightful owners.</p> + +<p>(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no +injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of +repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends +for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission +to penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by +providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on +having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments +prescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be +treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are +concerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against +charity.</p> + +<p>1511. Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is +explicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (_finis operantis_) +is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money +to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see +idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because +he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.</p> + +<p>(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not +directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal +agent, but the end of the external act (_finis operis_), which for the +sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes +from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the +principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to +show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he +assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on +as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because +he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through +membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot +obtain in any other way.</p> + +<p>1512. Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote. +(a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the +act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation. +Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote +preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up +cooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is +proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation +points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate +cooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is +regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal +agent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral +connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a +revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates +proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon +cooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a “jimmy,” a +dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is +definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is +contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes, +the cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order +to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no +attention in the homes of others.</p> + +<p>1513. The Sinfulness of Cooperation.—The Sinfulness of Formal +Cooperation.—(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes +the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the +guilt of that sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for +charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them, +while formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the +sins of others.</p> + +<p>(c) Formal cooperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the +sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator +delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of +the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one +suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with +the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.</p> + +<p>(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue +violated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its +own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a +burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys +the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of +disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin, +one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of +injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that +one has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and +the necessary circumstances.</p> + +<p>1514. The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.—(a) Material +cooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive +to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid +one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of +great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under +serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate +by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater +evil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through +necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad +will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).</p> + +<p>1515. Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.—The conditions necessary in +order that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other +act that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow +two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and +one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of +good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result +need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly +assured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a) +Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through +the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other +party as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if +Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to +confession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of +Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not +intended is also verified; for the very definition of material +cooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other +party.</p> + +<p>1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining +conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that +material cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is +itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty +for permitting the sin of the other party.</p> + +<p>1517. The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of +the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is +evil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often +difficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is +intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature +and circumstances of the act.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is +intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is +indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is +now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the +manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs +or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only +use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically +wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any +immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the +Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the +manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to +act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.</p> + +<p>(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if +by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of +evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the +cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the +nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one’s car; +but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be +taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong +intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the +circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of +adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see +983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools +afford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of +circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance, +scandal, danger, etc.</p> + +<p>1518. But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that +the principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or +will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil +designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make +cooperation evil.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal +agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur +in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to +help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, +but he certainly does not approve of it.</p> + +<p>(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the +cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may +have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if +the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at +the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if +he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to +avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if +possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of +some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of +sympathy for the principles of the deceased.</p> + +<p>1519. The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the +cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the +evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether +a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on +permission of an evil effect (see 105).</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the +reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for +cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.</p> + +<p>(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the +reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the +publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or +reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason +is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.</p> + +<p>(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation, +the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious +reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses +liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can +easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants +or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not +of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.</p> + +<p>(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for +cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals. +Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to +Balbus.</p> + +<p>(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or +to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for +cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful +cooperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice, +to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) +than on the part of those who are not so bound.</p> + +<p>1520. Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance +of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses +it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages +or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, +great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on +notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.</p> + +<p>(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a +very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable +percentage of the goods of one’s station in life should be considered +as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment +on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to +one’s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very +great evils.</p> + +<p>(c) Graver reasons for cooperation are those that surpass the very +grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one’s station in life, +incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or +perpetual imprisonment.</p> + +<p>(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church +or State, loss of all one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the +like.</p> + +<p>1521. When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but +contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation +need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order +to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from +an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more +quickly.</p> + +<p>(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and +indispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to +avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an +unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently. +One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if +there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the +drunkard.</p> + +<p>(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified even by +avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday +to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the +cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go +elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.</p> + +<p>1522. When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave +injustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be +so serious as when the sin is against the public good.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if +without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of +a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that +which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be +unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to +spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant +death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain +papers, and deliver them to a burglar.</p> + +<p>(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and +indispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of +an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow +open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to +this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the +papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way +through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by +surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of +papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure. +Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the +assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of +Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius +will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as +the robbery would do to the owner of the house.</p> + +<p>(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified by the +avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party, +but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today +he is going out to “fleece” a number of unsuspecting victims, and he +gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the +door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place. +Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus’ plans, but no proofs. If +they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the +swindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius +thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.</p> + +<p>1523. When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some +good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still +greater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above. +(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a +greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to +self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater +evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public +tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious +disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm +to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the +family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.</p> + +<p>(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and +indispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid +an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate +according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor +who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time, +if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily +obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of +the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be +able to refuse it to another company that is worse.</p> + +<p>(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation may be allowed when there +is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented +except by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no +present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are +earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being +shown is not morally unobjectionable.</p> + +<p>1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the +necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or +State), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a) +cooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify +it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance +should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to +suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the +Church or of the State.</p> + +<p>1525. In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious +to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm +or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But +the good of others may also suffice for cooperation.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as +when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil. +It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself +drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.</p> + +<p>(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one +assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a +major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being +robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.</p> + +<p>(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in +political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to +compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve, +in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good +laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is +lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to +avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.</p> + +<p>1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.—(a) If one cannot cooperate +immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see +1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one +helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to +death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted +a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an +accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately +without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is +held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all +immediate cooperation is sinful.</p> + +<p>1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate +Cooperation.—(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate +cooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from +complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft +is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the +owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by +carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that +the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot +change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that +the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said +likewise of other species of sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain +cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of +assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or +good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against +the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable +if he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods, +if one had to do so in order to protect one’s life, at least if one had +not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one’s life +in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a +loaf of bread without the owner’s consent, why may not one save one’s +life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it +is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a +Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by +conferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy +administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of +the circumstances.</p> + +<p>1528. Special Cases of Cooperation.—The cases of cooperation, like +those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases +which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of +cooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of +the cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and +workingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice +are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak +of these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many +difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the +general principles on cooperation just given. However, the following +points should be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to +particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology, +and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among +theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of +the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some +of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but +whose opposites are also likely.</p> + +<p>(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of +cooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors +to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to +others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of +material cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood +as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be +circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it +unlawful—a thing that often happens.</p> + +<p>1529. Formal Cooperation with Evil Reading Matter.—(a) Cases of formal +cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of +the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of +periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed _ex professo_ +to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct +and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are +creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except +evil.</p> + +<p>(b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do +harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms +and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written +matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell +it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in +question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.</p> + +<p>1530. Cooperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is +material and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is, +if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for +cooperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of cooperation. +The following are examples of cooperation that may be merely material +and lawful:</p> + +<p>(a) Moral cooperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as +collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by +readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good +matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute +in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation, +and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or +volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize. +Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are +the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such +as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other +way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the +opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see +Canon 1386, Sec. 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave, +such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot +be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as +entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small +advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by +laudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to +buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than +cooperation (see 1495).</p> + +<p>(b) Financial cooperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a +publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers, +etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for +the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the +buyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason; +for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual +reading.</p> + +<p>(c) Material assistance is given by those who produce or distribute a +publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the +producers, the proximate cooperators are, first, the managers of the +printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the “readers” and the +correctors; the remote cooperators are the typesetters, arrangers of +ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate +cooperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a +printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote +cooperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are +degrees of proximity in cooperation as follows: first, those who put +the reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the +tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for +purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as +keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason +sufficient to excuse the first kind of cooperation, since there is no +lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can +provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind +of cooperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by +a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular +books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of +cooperation, a grave reason suffices.</p> + +<p>Among the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type, +machinery, etc. These cooperate only remotely, and it is held that +profit is a sufficient reason for their cooperation. This we admit, if +the cooperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit +alone would uniformly justify voluntary cooperation upon which depended +the publication of pernicious matter.</p> + +<p>1531. Formal Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—(a) Cases of +formal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are +those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent +plays. (b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention +to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows, +organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations +for these affairs.</p> + +<p>1532. Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—Material +cooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically +wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.</p> + +<p>(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and +dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave +reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse +here, at least for a time.</p> + +<p>(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or +singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show +no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do +not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the +dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the +dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more +serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one’s +patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one +attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one’s +presence or patronage.</p> + +<p>(c) Cases of remote material cooperation are those of the owners who +rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards, +box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a +sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the +theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in +case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused, +if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify +gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene +jokes.</p> + +<p>1533. Formal Cooperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose +Sole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.—(a) Cases of explicit +cooperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of +instruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous +representations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of +somewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of +implicit cooperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or +sell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the +purpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.</p> + +<p>1534. Material cooperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that +are used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the +conditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first place, the cooperation +itself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or +sold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two classes of +objects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good +uses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (e.g., +idols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude, +ultra-fashionable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and +pistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in +themselves, although often employed for sinful uses (e.g., dice, +playing cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine +adornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).</p> + +<p>1535. The rules about proportionate cause for cooperation by the +manufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are +those given above in 1519.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more +harmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the +greater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In +some instances only a most grave reason will excuse, such as peril of +instant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a +person who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell +narcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot +obtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are +given him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is +already a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a +very grave reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will +lead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards +in some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without grave reason to +a customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the +neglect of serious duties, nor without a very grave reason to a +customer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent +victims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and +family.</p> + +<p>(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver +must be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an +ordinary reason (e.g., profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a +pagan or attractive ornaments of dress to a woman, where only a very +grave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan +or ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally +speaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell +articles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.</p> + +<p>(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or +merchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason +for making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss, +is sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious +“vampire” (i.e., a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order +to get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other +dressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be +required, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In +the former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of +this woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some +extent.</p> + +<p>(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully, +the greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it. +Examples: Sempronius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a +statue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer +says he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second +will not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the +articles to a museum. Sempronius may not sell to the first customer +except for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he +may not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such +as a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third +customer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the +sale. Titus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers, +though he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons +unlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to +be presumed of any particular individual, Titus has the right to sell to +all for the usual reason of business profit.</p> + +<p>1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make +of an article that is often employed for sin?</p> + +<p>(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform himself, he +is bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information. +Thus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or +of poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the +customer’s authorization to buy.</p> + +<p>(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish +between articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are +generally used for sin. When an article of the former class is +requested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an +obligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter +class is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally +certain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very +grave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of +cards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a +confidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an +entire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for +medical or other lawful purposes.</p> + +<p>1537. Sinful Cooperation in Providers of Food and Drink.—(a) There is +explicit formal cooperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness, +violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means +for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host +supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the +latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself +drunk, there is explicit cooperation. There is implicit formal +cooperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly +intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the +circumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal +which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a +malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to +show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is +unlawful material cooperation when one does not approve of the sin that +will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies +the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful cooperation when a restaurant +owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason +than the profit he himself will make.</p> + +<p>1538. Material cooperation in providing food or drink to those who ask +it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to +provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for +cooperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as +explained in 1519.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other +person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as +indignation of a customer, might suffice for cooperation with a venial +violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a +serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful. +A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more +harmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of +one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g., +the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).</p> + +<p>(b) A greater reason is required when the cooperation is closer. Thus, +in supplying meat the butcher cooperates only remotely, while the cook +who prepares it and the waiter who serves it cooperate proximately.</p> + +<p>(c) A greater reason is necessary when one’s cooperation is essential +to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are +many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat +on a day of abstinence would excuse cooperation, whereas in a small +village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a +more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against +one’s business which the refusal of meat might evoke.</p> + +<p>(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is +more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by +strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and +non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and +provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are +not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform +himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law +of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent +to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of +those present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree +to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from +abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this +boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover, +since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but +not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the +intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a +great quantity of liquor to be brought to one’s table. Drunkenness is +also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat +under its influence.</p> + +<p>1539. The sins with which one cooperates by supplying food or drink to +others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as +they violate the natural law or only positive human law.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural +law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One +may not cooperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is +manifestly of this character.</p> + +<p>(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly +so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders, +blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to cooperate with intemperance, +unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a +greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it +is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk, +if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or +serious injury to oneself.</p> + +<p>(c) Violation of a fast or abstinence in itself is opposed only to +positive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one +is more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that +of the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a +right to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can +decide more readily in the customer’s favor if there is question of +fast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more +readily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of +abstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on +Friday to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food +indicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that +as well as meat.</p> + +<p>1540. Renting of Houses or Rooms and cooperation in Sin.—(a) He who +rents to persons who wish to carry on disorderly, immoral, idolatrous, +unlawful, or other sinful occupations or practices, is guilty of formal +or unlawful material cooperation, if he approves of the conduct of the +renters or has no sufficient reason for renting to them. The same is +true if in a similar way one permits persons bent on evil (e.g., +pickpockets) to lounge in one’s offices, hotels, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) He who gives the use of his house, room, hall, field, etc., to +persons who will employ them for evil, is only a material and not a +guilty cooperator, if there is no prohibition of his act, and he has a +sufficient reason for it.</p> + +<p>1541. Examples of reasons sufficient for cooperation in renting are as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) A very grave reason.—In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi +causa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non +sequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob +domus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii +locatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non +occupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint. +Hodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem +exercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque praematura affligi, +meretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil) +inferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab +administratoribus lupanarium oblato.</p> + +<p>(b) A more grave reason.—Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the +common good (e.g., anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by +civil law, should not be given the use of one’s premises except in a +rare case of the greatest necessity.</p> + +<p>1542. Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.—(a) +Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with +which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself +intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping +a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of +great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in +order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a +formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records +in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement +of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his +motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are +those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains +blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his +passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get +away by driving him through dark streets.</p> + +<p>(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the +act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the +cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent +XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris +scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam +virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo +januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat +metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis +oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the +acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically +evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the +wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of +death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.</p> + +<p>1543. Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.—(a) If +cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be +committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause +will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer +about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the +intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned +to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held +permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor +or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the +fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read, +giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out +to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress +of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his +patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if +he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval +of it, and they can go just as well without him.</p> + +<p>(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is +not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other +reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin +and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place +where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under +threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius +evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam +cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae +nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called +on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another +position, if possible.</p> + +<p>1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to +other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the +difference of circumstances.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in +cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position +to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the +house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his +demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order +was given the wife.</p> + +<p>(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike +the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to +work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer +understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who +habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called +“dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can +secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so +dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation +without serious consequences to themselves.</p> + +<p>1545. Duties of Confessors.—Instruction should be given to penitents +who are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct +ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there +is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be +instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness +of the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the +penitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in +serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant +penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation—at least, not for a +time—if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from +the instruction than from silence.</p> + +<p>1546. Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful +cooperation.—(a) Some cases of cooperation cause the culprit to fall +under ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds +or spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of +reparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of +irreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c) +Some kinds of cooperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one +is bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated +wares or gets money under false pretenses.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_10_THE_COMMANDMENTS_OF_CHARITY">Art. 10: THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 44.)</p> + +<p>1547. There is no commandment concerning charity in the Decalogue, but +charity is implicitly contained in all the commandments of other +virtues; for charity is the end of every commandment (I Tim., i. 5). +Thus, the commandments of the first table of the Law tend to the love +of God; the commandments of the second table to the love of neighbor. +On account of its supreme importance, however, charity was made the +object of special commandments in both the Old and the New Testament.</p> + +<p>(a) In the Old Testament, at the second giving of the tables of the +Law, it is declared: “Now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require +of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in his ways, and +love him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all +thy soul?” (Deut., x. 12).</p> + +<p>(b) In the New Testament, our Lord, being asked which is the great +commandment in the law, replied: “Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, +with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. +This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like +to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two +commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets” (Matt, xxii. +37-40).</p> + +<p>1548. Charity must come “from a pure heart, and a good conscience and +faith unfeigned” (I Tim., i. 5), and these words may be used to +indicate how all other commandments have charity for their purpose.</p> + +<p>(a) “A pure heart” is had by the observance of the negative +commandments of the natural law, which forbid evil, or of the +commandments about the virtues regulative of the passions; and it is a +disposition preparatory for the love of God, since an impure heart will +be taken up with evil or with earthly things, and so turned away from +the goodness of God.</p> + +<p>(b) “A good conscience” is had by the observance of the affirmative +commandments of the natural law, or of the commandments regulative of +actions; and it too tends to charity as its goal, for a bad conscience +fills one with dread and horror of the justice of God.</p> + +<p>(c) “Faith unfeigned” is had by the observance of the supernatural law, +or of the commandments about worship of the true God; and it leads up +to charity, for a feigned faith, or false worship, separates one from +the truth of God.</p> + +<p>1549. Though charity is but one virtue (see 1115), it has two acts: one +about love of God, which is the end, and another about love of +neighbor, which is a means to that end.</p> + +<p>(a) If all understood that the end includes the means and the means +supposes the end, there would be no necessity for two distinct +commandments; for there is no love of God without love of neighbor (I +John, iv. 20), and he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law +(Rom., xiii. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) But since many would not perceive that one of the commandments of +charity contains the other, it was necessary to propose these +commandments separately: “We have this command from God that he who +loves God love also his brother” (I John, iv. 21).</p> + +<p>1550. Charity extends to other objects than God and the neighbor, +namely, to self and one’s own body (see 1133 sqq.); it also has other +acts than that of love, such as the acts of joy, peace, beneficence +(see 1193 sqq.), and the suppression of uncharitable hatred, sloth, +envy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, on the two commandments of +love of God and love of neighbor depend the whole law and the prophets +(Matt., xxii. 40), and other commandments about charity are not +necessary.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the objects of love are either the end or the means to the +end, and, as the two commandments of charity refer to both of these, +they omit nothing that is to be loved. It was not necessary to make +express command of love of self, for nature inclines to that +sufficiently, and the duty of keeping love of self within bounds is +provided for in the commandments that God be loved above all and the +neighbor as oneself.</p> + +<p>(b) The acts of charity distinct from love result from love, and the +acts opposed to charity are virtually forbidden in the commandments of +their opposites. Hence, there was no need of explicit precepts about +the secondary acts of charity or of explicit prohibitions of the sins +against charity. But for the sake of those who might not perceive that +the minor functions of charity are commanded and acts of +uncharitableness forbidden in the two great commandments, special and +explicit laws were given which enjoin peace, joy, etc., and forbid +hatred, envy, etc.</p> + +<p>1551. The precepts of the secondary acts of charity are: (a) joy: +“Rejoice in the Lord always” (Phillip., iv. 4); (b) peace: “Follow +peace with all men” (Heb., xii. 14); and (c) beneficence: “While we +have time, let us do good to all” (Gal., vi. 10).</p> + +<p>1552. The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against +hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); +(b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be +not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us +not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one +another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and +let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against +scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” +(Rom., xiv. 13).</p> + +<p>1553. The Commandment of Love of God.—In the commandment of love of +God two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God, +the object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be +loved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be +subordinated.</p> + +<p>1554. There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:</p> + +<p>(a) The intrinsic mode is that which comes from the nature of the +virtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only +the substance of an act (viz., that honor be shown), but also the mode +of the act (i.e., that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed +to a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a +commandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The extrinsic mode is that which belongs to some virtue different +from the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment. +Thus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love +of God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is +concerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act +pertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.</p> + +<p>1555. The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:</p> + +<p>(a) The essential mode is that without which an act is not virtuous. +Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and +their needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for, +if he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act +would not come up to the requirements of the commandment.</p> + +<p>(b) The ideal mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to +the virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a +lawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who +gives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a +great willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment +with greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less +alacrity.</p> + +<p>1556. The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great +commandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But “to +love with the whole heart, etc.,” can be understood in various senses.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or +intensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and +affection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God +is to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the +commandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is +required with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the +commandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it +would be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love +creatures (see 1160).</p> + +<p>(b) “To love with the whole heart” may be understood to mean a love +that is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and +loves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and +hence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one +loves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not +love Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is +commanded.</p> + +<p>1557. Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively +understood, is either actual or habitual.</p> + +<p>(a) Actually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when there is never +any interruption or distraction to one’s love, and one is continually +engaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode +of fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which +the commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where +God will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment +will take place.</p> + +<p>(b) Habitually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when one is in the +state of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love, +although it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love. +This is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on +earth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love +for any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.</p> + +<p>1558. The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in +scripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27), +and there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by +which it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions +“heart,” “soul,” “mind,” “strength,” synonymous significations of the +one thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that +different words are used only in order to give greater clearness and +energy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable +explanation: (a) God must be loved with one’s whole heart, that is, the +will must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved +with one’s whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by +the will—intellect, appetites and executive faculties—must be subject +to God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His +commandments.</p> + +<p>1559. Love of God with one’s whole heart excludes, then, opposite +loves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or +other dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with +one’s whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b) +Love of God with one’s whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in +reference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love, +such as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).</p> + +<p>1560. There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the +commandment of love of God.</p> + +<p>(a) The most perfect fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no +turning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its +exercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other +occupations.</p> + +<p>(b) The more perfect fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is +modelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the +nearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the +commandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity +(i.e., mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from +charity (i.e., venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is +careless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful +that are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the +exercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than +another who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied +with lawful temporal matters.</p> + +<p>(c) The ordinarily perfect fulfillment of the commandment is found in +all those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid +all that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial +sin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs. Thus is charity the +bond of perfection (Col, iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his +highest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are +followers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are +in the state of perfection.</p> + +<p>1561. The Commandment of Love of Self.—Love of self is understood in +many senses. (a) According to its moral character, love of self is +either sinful or virtuous, and virtuous self-love is either natural or +supernatural (as was explained in 1136). (b) According to its physical +character, love of self is either innate or elicited. Innate love of +self is the tendency of nature to desire what pertains to the +perfection of self, such as existence and its preservation (see 1108). +Elicited love of self is the choice on the part of the reason and will +of an ultimate happiness for self and of the means thereto.</p> + +<p>1562. Charity obliges each one capable of precept to an elicited +supernatural love of self. The obligation is grave for the following +reasons: (a) the love of God includes love of self, for we cannot love +God truly unless we also love those things that are His, especially His +rational creatures made to His image and destined for His society; (b) +the love of neighbor supposes love of self, for the commandment of love +(Matt., xxii. 39) offers love of self as the model for love of others.</p> + +<p>1563. The goods which the law of charity to self requires one to desire +and seek after, are all those things that are necessary for the +attainment of one’s happiness and due perfection.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, as to supernatural goods, one is bound to obtain for oneself +things necessary for salvation. One is obliged, then, to acquire a +sufficient knowledge of the faith; to enter into a state of life for +which one is suited (e.g., matrimony or religion); to avoid sin and the +occasions of sin; not to delay conversion for a notable length of time; +to put oneself in the state of grace, especially at the hour of death. +But one is not obliged to perform these duties with the motive of +charity in mind, nor to elect for self works of supererogation or +counsels of perfection.</p> + +<p>(b) As to intellectual goods, one is bound to seek what is necessary +for a proper fulfillment of the duties of one’s station in life. Thus, +one owes it in charity to oneself to seek the education and training +that are presupposed in one’s profession or occupation, and to bestow +the necessary study and attention. See above, on the intellectual +virtues (144 sqq.) and on the sin of ignorance (904 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(c) As to corporal goods, one is obliged to use the ordinary means for +preserving life and health (on the desire of death, see 1063). Hence, +in matters of food, drink, clothing, and recreation, each one is in +duty bound to follow the laws of hygiene.</p> + +<p>(d) As to the external goods of person (i.e., honor and reputation), +there is a strict duty of guarding them or of recovering them, as far +as possible.</p> + +<p>(e) As to external goods of fortune (i.e., wealth and possessions), one +must aim to acquire as much as is necessary for one’s subsistence and +the fulfillment of duties to others. Hence the duty of labor for those +who do not possess the necessary means. But charity to self does not +demand that one aspire to reach the top of the ladder in the financial +world or to accumulate a very large surplus. One may indeed lawfully +seek to become a millionaire, or to become so wealthy as to be able to +retire with leisure, if one goes about this lawfully; but there is no +obligation to strive after more than is reasonably necessary.</p> + +<p>1564. Man owes it to himself to put to good use the talents God has +bestowed upon him for his self-improvement and self-development. It is +a sin, therefore, greater or less according to circumstances, to +neglect the care of the mind or of the mental culture one should +possess.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, reason is the faculty that elevates man above the irrational +world, and knowledge is the perfection and excellence of that faculty. +What life or health is to the body, reason or knowledge is to the mind; +and so, just as it is a sin against the body to neglect life or health, +it is also a sin against the mind to neglect reason or knowledge. +Persons predisposed to insanity who expose themselves to alienation of +mind by the use of drugs or strong spirits or by practices or +occupations that expose them to shocks (such as gambling), and others +who value ignorance, scepticism, and error as if these infirmities were +goods, sin against the mind, at least materially.</p> + +<p>(b) Reason and knowledge are also necessary in numberless ways to man’s +bodily, social, cultural, and religious life. Without the elements of a +general education in reading, writing and arithmetic, one is very +seriously handicapped in making a bare living; and without the +education of the high school, college or university, one is frequently +under a disadvantage in seeking to better oneself or improve one’s +position. Besides these utilities for practical affairs, education has +advantages of a loftier kind: it makes its possessor a more capable +citizen, a more pleasant companion and friend, a more influential +exponent of good causes, and a greater credit to the religion he +practises; it gives enjoyment to leisure, comfort to rest, and dignity +to success; the labor of acquiring it is a discipline of the will; the +taste for higher things it imparts is a natural protection against much +that is evil; the mental power and knowledge that are its gifts enable +one to expose error and fallacy and to uphold the truth and the right. +It is of precept, therefore, that one acquire the moral and mental +training which one’s salvation and calling in life make necessary; it +is of counsel—and the counsel is one that should be much urged in our +times—that one who has the opportunity of attaining to a higher +proficiency, to the advantage of self and society, should avail himself +of that opportunity.</p> + +<p>1565. Examples of Sins Committed by Neglect of Necessary Education—(a) +Directly, one sins against the duty of cultivation of the mind when +through laziness or malice one slights the means of acquiring necessary +knowledge—as when pupils absent themselves from school, or give no +attention to the teacher or no preparation to their lessons; or when +collegians sacrifice study to athletics and amusements.</p> + +<p>(b) Indirectly one sins against the duty of knowledge, when one is +responsible for habits that impede or prevent necessary concentration +of mind, as when one goes about so much socially that the mind is +always in a whirl, or reads so much light literature that everything +serious becomes a bore, or overeats so much that the brain becomes +sluggish, or pays no attention to the wise rule that a sound mind needs +a sound body.</p> + +<p>1566. The proper care of the body and of health is not merely a thing +next to godliness; it is a moral duty, and so a part of godliness. God +Himself on Sinai gave to the Chosen People of old a sanitary code, and +the faithful observance by orthodox Jews of those regulations has had +much to do with the superior health and longevity of their race. Moral +Theology, therefore, is not digressing from its proper subject-matter, +if it gives some attention to rules of health. The duties owed to +physical well-being can be reduced to the following: (a) to secure for +the body the things needed for the maintenance and replenishment of its +substance and vigor, such as food, air, sleep and exercise; (b) to ward +off or remove those things that are injurious to or destructive of +health, such as excessive heat or cold, waste matter, poisons, and +disease; (c) to assist these physical means by psychical or spiritual +ones, such as cheerfulness and the will to keep well and fit.</p> + +<p>1567. Food and drink are naturally a prime requisite for life, since +they furnish the material from which the body is built and renewed. +They should be used, however, in such a way as to serve their purpose.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the quantity and quality have to be regulated according to +the needs of the individual and circumstances, and so will vary with +climate, age, health, and occupation. The distinction of clean and +unclean foods does not exist in the New Law (Rom., xiv. 14; Matt., xv. +17-20), but it is clear that the same kinds or amounts of food and +drink do not agree with all constitutions; that overeating, +undereating, and want of variety in diet are not conducive to good +health. Physicians recommend that something raw be eaten every day and +something indigestible at every meal, and that a person watch his +weight, keeping a little overweight up to middle life and a little +underweight after that age.</p> + +<p>(b) The manner of eating is of first-rate importance, since the +digestion is harmed if one eats without appetite or with mental +preoccupation on deep subjects, or bolts the food, or makes excessive +use of relishes or condiments.</p> + +<p>1568. Fresh air, on which the production of pure blood and the +continuance of vitality depend, is another necessity of life. Hence, we +may well heed the following rules which hygienists lay down on this +point: (a) let in fresh air and sunshine to the places where you live +and work, and exclude dust and smoke; (b) wear light, loose and porous +clothing, so that the skin may have air; (c) get out of doors in the +open air part of the time every day, even though the weather is +uninviting, for sunshine or natural light is also a requisite of good +health; (d) breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth. +Breathing should be deep, slow and regular, and one should take +deep-breathing exercises several times a day; (e) sleep in a +well-ventilated room, or out-of-doors if possible.</p> + +<p>1569. Rest and relaxation are needful for body and mind alike, that the +burdens of life may not bear too heavily, and nature may be allowed to +exercise her ministries of renewal and restoration. But here, as in +other things, the guiding rule must be moderation.</p> + +<p>(a) Through excess, some harm their health by indulging in too much +repose. A strong, healthy individual who remains in bed from midnight +till noon, or who gives most of the afternoon to a prolonged nap, is +storing up more energy than he or she needs, and will feel the worse +for it. Similarly, persons whose life is one round of vacations or +diversions pay for their aimless existence in various kinds of mental +or nervous disorders, to say nothing of the moral dangers to which they +are exposed (Ecclus., xxxiii. 29).</p> + +<p>(b) Through defect, on the other hand, some injure their health by +depriving themselves of the sleep or rest they ought to take. The time +that should be given to repose differs with the individual. The young, +brain-workers and the feeble are in greater need than others; but there +is no one who can dispense with his proper share of rest. It is sinful, +therefore, to reduce needed sleep by late retiring or early rising, or +to work unremittingly to such an extent that the bodily powers and +resistance become unequal to the demands made on them and unfitted for +duties. According to physicians, seven hours out of every twenty-four +should be spent in bed, and the hours before midnight are much more +precious for rest than the early morning hours. Some holidays and +vacations are a necessity in these days of rapid and strenuous life.</p> + +<p>1570. Physical exercise is a factor of good health, for it stirs up the +circulation of the blood, assists digestion, and rids the body of +surplus weight. Moreover, it has great value for the mind (to which it +gives diversion and refreshment) and for the soul (since it promotes +temperance and chastity). If taken in the form of sports, physical +exercise is a training in cooperation with others, in loyalty, +discipline, and fairness. But health is impaired by excess as well as +by defect in exercise.</p> + +<p>(a) Examples of over-exercise are athletes who carry on endurance tests +to the point of exhaustion, devotees of violent forms of contests or +matches that overtax the heart, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Examples of under-exercise are ablebodied persons who prefer to +lounge about the house all day rather than bestir themselves; also +those who work indoors all day and who from choice ride rather than +walk, no matter how short the distance they have to go, etc. Persons of +sedentary life who can do so, should exercise every day, preferably +out-of-doors, playing at some game like golf, taking a brisk walk of +about five miles, or doing some manual labor, such as gardening or +sawing wood. Regular gymnastics or setting-up exercises, and the habit +of sitting, standing, and walking erect at all times are prescribed by +experts on health as very important.</p> + +<p>1571. Under the head of preventive or curative measures that ought to +be attended to for the sake of bodily well-being are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) In time of health sickness has to be guarded against. Suitable +clothing and shelter must be used as protection against injurious +effects of heat or cold; cleanliness must be cultivated by such means +as daily baths, frequent ablutions, washing of teeth, tongue and gums; +infections must be avoided; drugs or stimulants hurtful to one’s health +must not be indulged in, and attention must be given to daily, regular +and natural elimination and to the exclusion of poisons from the +system. According to authorities, one should drink at least six glasses +of water a day, but warm water is often preferable to cold or hot.</p> + +<p>(b) In time of sickness efforts must be made at restoration of health, +if this is possible. It is of obligation to use the ordinary means to +recover physical fitness, that is, to take remedies and medicines that +are suitable, not on the advice of acquaintances or advertisements, but +on the recommendation of a competent physician in whose knowledge and +skill one has perfect confidence (Ecclus., xxxviii. 1 sqq.). But there +is no obligation to have recourse to extraordinary means of recovery, +such as a trip to a more balmy climate when one’s purse cannot afford +it. Similarly, a very painful and uncertain operation or mutilation is +not obligatory, unless one has dependents, and the danger to life from +the operation is slight. In time of sickness, as well as in health, we +should not omit to implore the divine aid.</p> + +<p>1572. The state of mind has very much to do with good or bad health. It +is well known, for instance, that a happy, cheerful attitude helps +digestion and sleep; whereas worry, fear, anger or other emotional +stress will bring on dyspepsia, insomnia, disease, and perhaps +insanity. We should not overlook, therefore, the importance of the +mental factor in our efforts to maintain good health.</p> + +<p>(a) Natural means of cultivating an even temper and a buoyant +disposition are: some kind of labor or occupation, avoidance of hurry +and worry in one’s affairs, cultivation of some interesting hobby or +avocation that will vary the monotony of business or work, use of +congenial recreations, whether of a more refined (e.g., conversation +with friends, literature, music, art, the drama, travel to historic or +beautiful scenes, etc.) or of a more material kind (e.g., reading tales +of mystery or adventure, raising pet animals, witnessing baseball +games, races, etc., playing billiards, cards, etc., smoking, attending +banquets, picnics, etc.). A sense of humor and laughter in moderation +are good for the health and not opposed to spirituality.</p> + +<p>(b) Religious practices are all-important for cheerfulness of spirit. +Christian Science, indeed, is in error when it holds that faith thinks +or wills sorrow and disease and death out of existence, for evil is a +reality; but virtue and a good conscience rid one of many enemies to +peace, and there exist in the Church many supernatural and miraculous +means that benefit body, mind and spirit.</p> + +<p>1573. Persons who give exaggerated attention to their health cannot +justify themselves by the commandment of charity to self; for this +commandment has to be interpreted according to the order of charity as +explained above (see 1164 sqq.). The bodily good has to be cared for, +but with due subordination to higher goods (Matt, vi. 25; Rom., xiv. +16).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, spiritual goods are more important than those of the body, +and it is lawful to practise mortifications by fastings, vigils, +hair-shirts, and the like, which, though afflictive to the flesh, are +refreshing to the spirit, provided all be done according to holy +prudence.</p> + +<p>(b) Intellectual goods are better than those of the body, and it is not +sinful to devote oneself to studies, researches and other mental +occupations in preference to manual labor or athletic exercises which +would improve one’s physique, but not one’s mind. It is even lawful for +the sake of mental improvement to suffer some slight detriment to +health.</p> + +<p>(c) Public good is greater than private good, and hence it is not only +lawful but laudable to expose health, or even life, for the advancement +of science or the welfare of the community. Many men and women in daily +life do this as part of the day’s work.</p> + +<p>1574. Does charity to self oblige one to desire honors, such as +dignities, titles, positions or rank, precedence, testimonials, +eulogies, medals, decorations, monuments, and the like?</p> + +<p>(a) Charity to self demands that one strive to acquire the excellence +that is expected of one, and so to be deserving of honor. For we must +let our light shine before men (Matt., v. 16; Rom., xii. 17; II Cor., +vii. 21).</p> + +<p>(b) Charity to self does not require that one actually secure honors. +For one cannot force another to declare one’s praises, since he may be +prejudiced or ignorant, and it is not seemly to sing one’s own +greatness or merit (II Cor., x. 18), except in self-defense (II Cor., +xii. 11).</p> + +<p>(c) Charity to self would require one to seek after an honor, if the +honor were necessary and the manner of seeking it honorable. Thus, it +is a duty to self to seek to obtain a diploma or certificate of good +character or proficiency, if this document is needed to exercise the +profession for which one has trained.</p> + +<p>(d) Charity to self would forbid one to seek after an honor, if the +honor would prove harmful, or if it could not be obtained in a +respectable way. Thus, if an honor rightfully belonged to another, or +if it were bestowed in recognition of evil done, or if it would impose +obligations for which one knows oneself to be unsuited, or if it could +not be attained except by dishonesty, charity to self would urge one to +fly from the honor.</p> + +<p>(e) Charity to self in other cases would permit one either to seek an +honor (as when a dignity will be useful and will be employed for good, +and is not sought out of vainglory or hypocrisy) or to forego it (as +when it is not necessary and one is moved to shun it, not out of +contempt, but out of some virtuous motive).</p> + +<p>1575. Does charity to self require one to desire a good name?</p> + +<p>(a) Charity to self does require that one desire to be worthy of a good +name, for one owes it to oneself as well as to others to be blameless +(Phil., ii. 14-16) and to provide good things in the sight of men +(Rom., xii. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) Charity to self does require that one desire to have a good name. +Spiritually, a good name is an advantage, for many a one is encouraged +to continue in virtue by the good opinion which others have of him, +while many another is discouraged from attempting or continuing a good +life because he has a bad reputation. Temporally also, a good name is +useful or necessary, for, if others do not trust us or respect us, we +shall find it difficult to secure employment or position, or to +exercise our office fruitfully. Hence, scripture admonishes: “Take care +of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand +treasures precious and great” (Ecclus., xli. 15).</p> + +<p>(c) Charity to self does not require that one actually have a good +name, since reputation may be lost through the work of detractors or +through one’s own unintentional imprudence, or through circumstances +over which one has no control.</p> + +<p>(d) Charity to self ordinarily requires that one seek to acquire a good +name, if it has not yet been earned, also to preserve it, when gained, +to recover it, when lost; for, as a rule, there is no greater good for +which the good of reputation should be sacrificed. The means to be +employed, however, should not be evil, as when one uses hypocritical +pretense in order to pass as a man of piety, or has recourse to lying +or duelling, to undermining or attacking another in order to recover +one’s reputation. A good name is built up by fidelity to the duties of +one’s calling and the avoidance of what may be offensive or scandalous +to others; it is preserved or rebuilt by good deeds, especially those +one is known or supposed to have lacked, and in case of need by words +of self-defense, vindicating one’s conduct, or refuting aspersions or +false charges.</p> + +<p>(e) Charity does not require one to seek after a good name, when this +should or may be sacrificed for the sake of some higher good. St. Paul +faithfully practised what he preached, that no dishonor might be +reflected on the Gospel; and yet his enemies looked on him as a seducer +and a nobody, as a melancholy and avaricious man. But the Apostle +answered his traducers that neither honor nor dishonor, neither evil +report nor good report, would move him from the exercise of his +ministry (II Cor., vi. 4 sqq).</p> + +<p>1576. Sacrifice of reputation is not lawful, however, unless there is a +proportionately grave reason and the means are good.</p> + +<p>(a) The end must be good and relatively important, not only if compared +with the good of personal reputation, but also if compared with the +public good and the rights of third parties. Examples: It would not be +right to allow oneself to be defamed in order to cover up the tracks of +a rascal who deserved punishment, or to distract attention from an evil +that is being done; for the purpose would then be the defeat of justice +or the success of some sinful plan. In such cases the end would not be +good. Neither would it be right to allow the sacrifice of a good name +for the notoriety and money profits to be gained in stage or book +royalties. The practice of many young men of accepting imputed faults, +of which they are not guilty, in order to be popular, or interesting, +or attractive, is also sinful. Money cannot buy back a lost reputation, +and popularity with the thoughtless is no compensation for disgrace +before the judicious and loss of self-respect. In these cases the end +is not important, if compared with the advantage of a good name. And +even when an end is good and more important than one’s fame, there will +frequently be rights of others involved that forbid a sacrifice of +reputation, as when a passive attitude in the face of calumny would +give scandal or cast discredit on one’s profession, office, work, +religion, family, or friends.</p> + +<p>(b) The means must be good. Examples: Even if the ambition to be “a +good fellow” is praiseworthy, drunkenness and profanity are not +suitable ways of winning esteem, and the same applies to pretending +wickedness or accusing oneself of imaginary escapades and vices to +please a circle which admires wildness in youth. The means used in +these cases (drunkenness, profanity, lying) are evil in themselves. +Again, the wish to cultivate humility does not justify one in giving +scandal by consorting with evildoers as intimates, or by conducting +oneself in such a way as to lower the esteem or respect that is +entertained for one’s position. The means used in those cases are at +least evil-seeming and disedifying.</p> + +<p>1577. Is self-detraction, that is, the revelation of some real fault or +defect, lawful?</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question of faults or defects that are of a public +nature and generally known, a disclosure made in a good spirit and in a +proper manner, and from which beneficial and not harmful results can be +foreseen, is lawful, and sometimes obligatory. Example: Balbus has +calumniated his neighbors, and he now admits the fact, not to boast +about or excuse it, but to make satisfaction; he does not repeat the +details of his defamatory remarks, but merely states that he wishes to +retract what he had no right to say; he has every reason to think that +his present course will undo the harm caused by the defamation. Balbus +does right in thus acknowledging his mistake.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of faults or defects not generally known, the +reasons for mentioning them should be more serious, unless the sins are +of a trifling nature. Examples: Caius once served a term in jail for +dishonesty, but he is now a decent citizen. His family would be +scandalized and would feel disgraced, if they knew this. But Caius +thinks it would be a suitable reparation to tell them of his former +guilt. Caius is wrong. To speak of his past experience would only add +the sin of scandal to the old one, and there are other ways in which he +can do penance in further expiation of dishonesty. Claudius wishes to +marry Sempronia, but the latter insists that there must be no secrets +between husband and wife, and that he must give her complete and +accurate answers on certain questions about his past career—for +example, whether he has ever been drunk, whether he has ever wished to +be drunk, whether he has ever had questionable relations with other +women, etc. Claudius should not deceive Sempronia, nor leave her in +ignorance of any serious objection to the marriage, even if she forgot +to mention it in her questions; but he owes it to himself not to put +himself in her power by giving her information which she would probably +use against him then or later. Titus has stolen a considerable sum, +and, for the sake of getting advice and direction on how to make +restitution, he consults a prudent friend who will regard his +communication as confidential, just as if he were a confessor. Titus +does not act against his own reputation by telling his case to this +friend.</p> + +<p>1578. Confession of Sins against Charity Owed to Self.—(a) It is not +necessary to declare in confession that one has acted against the +charity due to self, if there is question only of sins in which +transgression of that charity was not directly intended; for to say +that one has sinned against God by blasphemy, or against self by +intemperance, or against the neighbor by injustice, is equivalent to +saying that one has hurt one’s own soul by sin. (b) It is necessary to +declare a want of charity to self, if one has expressly intended such a +sin. Thus, if a person who has been admonished to have care for his own +soul is so enraged thereat that he vows to deliver his soul over to +evil, and thereupon proceeds to commit various kinds of sin, he does +not declare his true state of conscience by merely mentioning these +latter sins. A case of this kind, however, is not usual (see 1307).</p> + +<p>1579. The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.—Charity to +fellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was +commanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory. +The Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix. +17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (ibid.) and kindness to +foreigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was +also obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii. +1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii. +19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the +crippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was +to be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years +special assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv. +2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).</p> + +<p>1580. In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of +charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection. +(a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love +which Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as +friends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well +as Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new +commandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an +imitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External +charity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John, +iii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt., +xxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the +judgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).</p> + +<p>1581. In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our +Lord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the +love should be exercised: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” +(Matt, xxii. 39).</p> + +<p>(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor, +or, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our +friend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God +and is destined for the same beatitude.</p> + +<p>(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not +equal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our +neighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be +followed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good, +but not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him +should be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or +advantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of +self must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in +love of the neighbor.</p> + +<p>1582. The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of +neighbor which charity commands:</p> + +<p>(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but +must be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish +to retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this +redounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc., +while harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor. +Nor is love of neighbor genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or +if it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love +includes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the +occasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons +who are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are +most profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most +unwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.</p> + +<p>(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or +beneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real, +and not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves +(Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary +goods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting +wealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have +not the love of charity, for “what does it profit a man to gain the +whole world, and lose his soul?” (Matt., viii. 36).</p> + +<p>(c) The love of the neighbor must not be purely natural, but must wish +for him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This +motive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved +because God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the +divine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent, +therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to +others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good +qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or +humanitarianism.</p> + +<p>1583. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with +as to its acts by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a) +Thus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are +exercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation +of the Lord’s Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal +mercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means +and the necessities they meet.</p> + +<p>1584. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with +as to its motive, even though the supernatural motive is not actually +present before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present. +(a) Thus, the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it +is present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives +of love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or +nationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or +ability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturality of love, +provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and +the desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of +natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary, +charity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to +implacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome +disease.</p> + +<p>1585. Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity.—We speak now only of +the commandment of love, in which the other commandments of charity are +contained (see 1550 b). The love which is commanded must have the +following qualities: (a) on the side of the subject who loves, it must +be internal and made at the proper times—that is, one must love from +the heart and affection, as well as in works and manifestations, and +must make and renew the act of love as the law requires; (b) on the +side of the object loved, it must be both universal and well-ordered; +one must not only love all to whom charity is due (see 1133 sqq.), but +one must also bestow love according to the rank of precedence in which +charity is due (see 1158 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1586. The act of charity can be made in various ways.</p> + +<p>(a) It is made in itself, when one elicits or expresses love; it is +made in its manifestations, when one performs an act of virtue distinct +from charity. One who sincerely loves God with his whole heart will +keep the commandments (John, xiv. 21), and hence acts of temperance, +justice, fortitude, etc., may be called acts of love, in the sense that +they are indications of love.</p> + +<p>(b) The act of charity may be made internally or externally. Thus, +affection for another as a friend in God, and a sincere desire of his +good, are internal acts of love; while spiritual or temporal alms +bestowed upon him, such as instruction or aid in time of sickness, are +external acts of love.</p> + +<p>(c) The act of charity may be made explicitly or implicitly. Charity is +called explicit with reference to a person or object which is loved in +itself, and not as included in another; it is called implicit with +reference to a person or object loved as included in another, as when +means and end involve each other, or a part is contained in the whole. +Thus, he who loves God above all things loves God explicitly and his +neighbor implicitly; he who loves his neighbor as a future co-sharer in +bliss loves his neighbor explicitly and God implicitly (see 1549); he +who includes all mankind in a common act of love, gives explicit love +to the race collectively, and implicit love to individual members of +the race not mentioned (e.g., enemies or strangers).</p> + +<p>1587. For the fulfillment of the commandment of charity other acts of +virtue are not enough. There must also be love. (a) Thus, as to charity +towards God, our Lord declares that love of God is the great +commandment on which the others depend, and St. Paul makes salvation +depend on love: “If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be +anathema” (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) As to charity towards the neighbor, +the fulfillment of other commandments in his regard is inferior to the +fulfillment of the commandment of fraternal love, and thus the +commandments of justice to others are distinct from the commandment of +love. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we are not obliged to +love our neighbor by a formal act of love (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n. +1160).</p> + +<p>1588. For the fulfillment of the law of charity, external acts of love +are not enough; there must also be internal love or affection.</p> + +<p>(a) With regard to charity towards God, there can be no question of +external charity through acts of beneficence, as is clear; but one is +obliged to signify one’s love of God, if silence would cause scandal or +convey an expression of hatred of God. Mere lip-service, however, will +not do, for God must be loved and served from the heart (Matt., xxii. +37; Eph., vi, 6; II Thess. iii., 5; etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) With regard to charity towards the neighbor, external charity is +commanded (see 1210 sqq. and 1551). But there must also be internal +charity, for we are bidden to love our neighbor as we love ourselves +(Matt, xxii. 39), as Christ loved us (John, xv. 12), from the heart (I +Pet., i. 22). If a man distributed his goods to feed the poor, not out +of love, but out of vanity or other sinful motives, his act would not +be an exercise of charity. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that +we may satisfy through external acts alone the precept of loving our +neighbor (Denzinger, n. 1161).</p> + +<p>1589. Must the internal act of love be explicit? (a) Love of God should +be explicit, for the commandment of charity is that God be loved as the +Last End, and the other commandments are to be observed as means to +that End (see 1120, 1547). The Last End is that which is loved for its +own sake, and hence distinctly, while the means are loved for the sake +of the Last End. (b) Love of the neighbor is required to be explicit as +regards all neighbors in general, when this is necessary for the +preservation of charity towards God, or the fulfillment of obligations +of charity towards man; it should be explicit as regards an individual, +when this is necessary for the proper discharge of external works or +other duties of charity, as when one will not be able to overcome a +temptation to hatred unless one makes an act of charity which expressly +includes the person one is tempted to hate. But one who loves his +neighbor implicitly through an act of supernatural love of God, and +neglects no external duty of charity towards others, is considered to +have sufficiently complied with the law in ordinary circumstances.</p> + +<p>1590. The Intention of Performing All Good Works out of Love for +God.—(a) This intention is actual, when one expressly wills God as the +Last End of one’s actions. The commandment of loving God above all +things does not require an actual reference of each good work to His +love (see 1120, 85, 86).</p> + +<p>(b) This intention is virtual but explicit, when previously a person +had the actual intention and never retracted it, and now acts under the +influence of that explicit and unretracted intention, though he does +not advert to the Last End as he now acts. Thus, if an act of love of +God above all things is made supernaturally by a Christian or naturally +by a non-Christian, and later on by reason of the acts of love these +persons give alms to the poor and do not think of God as they give the +alms, their works are not actually, but virtually and explicitly done +for His love. The commandment of love of God, as we shall see (1593 +sqq.), obliges one at certain times to elicit an act of love of God as +the Last End, loved above all things else (in unbelievers it must be an +act of natural benevolence, and in believers an act of supernatural +charity); and, since such an act includes a consecration of one’s works +to God, the commandment requires likewise at certain times a virtual +and explicit reference of good works to the love of God.</p> + +<p>(c) The intention is virtual and implicit, when there is no previous +act of love of God influencing a present act, but this act itself is +good, tending from its character and object to the Last End, and it is +precisely its character and object that cause it to be chosen by the +agent. Thus, if an infidel, who has made no offering of his works to +God, gives an alms out of love of mercy, or honors his parents out of +love of piety, or pays his debts out of love of justice, he has +explicit love for virtue and implicit love for the Author and End of +virtue. The commandment of love of God, being affirmative, does not +oblige one at all times to elicit acts of love of God as the Supreme +Good, and hence, apart from the occasions when that affirmative +commandment calls for exercise, a virtual and implicit intention of +acting for the sake of God suffices to excuse from sin.</p> + +<p>1591. Applications of the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) A Christian who +makes acts of love of God at the necessary times fulfills the +commandment of loving God with his whole heart and the precepts of +doing all things for the glory of God (I Cor., x. 31), and in charity +(I Cor., xvi. 14), and in the name of Christ (Col., iii. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) An infidel invincibly ignorant of the supernatural law, who makes +acts of natural benevolence with reference to God when he should, does +not sin against the precept of charity, and observes the law of natural +love.</p> + +<p>(c) A person who in no way refers a deliberate act to love of God, +natural or supernatural, sins in that act. His sin is venial, if the +evil intended is small (e.g., an alms given purely out of vainglory); +it is mortal, if the evil is grave (e.g., an alms given for the purpose +of seduction into serious sin).</p> + +<p>1592. It should not be inferred from what has been said on the +qualities which charity must have, or the influence it must exercise, +that the duty of love of God is only for the perfect, or that it is +with difficulty accomplished. (a) On the contrary, charity is a +universal obligation, for it is the first commandment (Matt., xxii. 38), +and he who does not love is accursed (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) Neither is +the commandment hard (I John, v. 3), for nature itself inclines one to +love the Supreme Good, and grace helps one to remove the impediments to +a love of friendship that will cling to God above all. The observance +of the commandments indicates that one is guided habitually by love, +while a devout recitation of the Lord’s Prayer is an actual expression +of that love; and hence conscientious persons should not worry lest +they may have been wanting in God’s love.</p> + +<p>1593. With reference to the times when the precepts of charity oblige, +we should distinguish three kinds of precepts: (a) the negative +precepts forbid sins against charity (such as hatred, envy, scandal, +etc.), and they oblige at all times; (b) the positive precepts of +external beneficence oblige when occasion requires, as was said above +(see 1210 sqq.); (c) the positive precepts of internal love oblige at +certain special times, as will now be explained.</p> + +<p>1594. The precept of love of God obliges directly—that is, by reason +of the virtue of charity itself—at the following times: (a) at the +beginning of the moral life, that is, of the use of reason; (b) during +life; (c) at the close of life, or when one is about to die (Denzinger, +nn. 1101, 1289).</p> + +<p>1595. The Obligation of an Act of Love of God at the Beginning of the +Moral Life.—(a) The beginning of the moral life here signifies the +moment when a child arrives at a full use of reason, and is able to +deliberate on things of grave importance, such as the duty of having a +supreme purpose in life and of doing good and avoiding evil. This +moment does not coincide necessarily with any fixed period of the +child’s age (e.g., the seventh year), but depends on the gradual +development of the moral conscience and may be earlier or later +according to intelligence, surroundings, education, etc, (see 932).</p> + +<p>(b) The act of love of God here signifies the turning to God as one’s +Last End, but it may be made either formally or virtually, according to +the knowledge had. A formal act of love of God is made, when one has +explicit knowledge, either through faith or through natural reason, +concerning God as the Supreme Good and Last End, and when one loves Him +as such. A virtual act of love of God consists in a resolution to +direct one’s life according to reason, or in a love of the goodness of +virtue; for in such an act there is implied a love of the Author and +End of moral good. The faithful who cannot remember having made this +first act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not +disturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any +service they freely offered to God.</p> + +<p>(c) The reason for requiring an act of love at the beginning of the +moral life is, that in that moment one has the choice placed before one +of good or evil, and that faith, hope and charity, being fundamental +precepts, should precede the other virtues of the law.</p> + +<p>1596. Ignorance as Excusing from the Act of Love of God.—(a) Ignorance +of God as the Author of the supernatural order excuses from the precept +of supernatural love or charity, if it is invincible ignorance. Thus, a +pagan who knows nothing of revelation does not sin by omitting an act +of charity towards God.</p> + +<p>(b) Ignorance of God as the Author of the order of nature does not +excuse from a natural act of benevolence towards God, if the person in +ignorance, though an infidel, has sufficient use of reason, for +ignorance of God is then inexcusable (Rom., i. 20).</p> + +<p>1597. The Obligation of the Act of Love of God throughout Life.—(a) +The existence of an obligation to make frequent acts of love of God +during life is a consequence of the preponderant part played by charity +among the virtues (see 1115 sqq.), for how is one to regulate one’s +life according to the virtues, if one does not frequently renew that +virtue which is the inspiration and direction of all the others? The +Old Testament requires that one have the commandment of love of God +frequently in one’s thoughts (Deut., vi. 5-7), and in the New Testament +it is called the commandment on which all the others depend (Matt., +xxii. 37-40). The Church has condemned propositions that made +infrequent performance of the act of love—such as once in a lifetime, +once in five years—sufficient (Denzinger, nn. 1155-1157).</p> + +<p>(b) The details of this obligation—that is, the frequency with which +and the times at which the act of love of God must be made under pain +of grave sin—is a matter of dispute among authorities. Some think once +in three years sufficient; others, guided perhaps by the analogy of the +precept of yearly Communion, regard once a year as sufficient; others, +with St. Alphonsus, hold for once a month, basing their opinion on the +difficulty of overcoming temptations if acts of love of God are omitted +for more than a month; others, with Scotus, think the act of love of +God should be made once a week, for, since the Sundays are set aside +for the worship of God, the Church seems to have thereby determined +with regard to the act of divine charity that which the law of God had +left undetermined; finally, some teach that an act of love of God must +be made daily, arguing that Christ commanded the Lord’s Prayer to be +said daily, and that its first petitions contain formal acts of love of +God.</p> + +<p>1598. None of the opposed opinions just given can be considered as +demonstrated and theoretically certain. But in actual life this offers +no difficulty, and the following are accepted as practical rules that +may be acted on:</p> + +<p>(a) Those who live habitually in the state of grace may be regarded as +having fulfilled sufficiently the commandment of love of God, for “if +any man love Me, he will keep My word” (John, xiv. 23).</p> + +<p>(b) Those who live habitually in an occasion of sin or in sin itself, +no doubt neglect the commandment of love of God; but it is not +necessary that they accuse themselves of the omission to their +confessor, since it is understood in the mention of the occasion of sin +or bad habit. The confessor, however, ought to admonish careless +penitents about the obligation of love of God, of recitation of the Our +Father, etc. Mortal sin revokes the direction of one’s works towards +God, and, though one is not obliged to renew that direction immediately +after repentance, a delay beyond four or five months according to some +authors would be notable.</p> + +<p>1599. Obligation of the Act of Love of God at the Close of Life.—The +duty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death +is admitted by all for the following cases: (a) the dying person is +directly obliged to make an act of love of God when this is the only +way in which he can secure justification, as when he is not in the +state of grace and cannot receive the Sacraments; (b) the dying person +is indirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when otherwise he +cannot securely struggle against temptations to despair, doubt, etc.</p> + +<p>1600. The duty of making an act of love of God at the time when death +is near is considered as doubtful by some authorities when the +following points are morally certain: (a) when the dying person has +already sufficiently complied with the duty of making an act of love +(e.g., when he made such an act just before he fell into danger of +death), or is now in the state of grace (e.g., when he has received +absolution with attrition just before or after the danger); and also +(b) when the dying person will not expose himself on account of +omission of the act of charity to the violation of any serious +commandment.</p> + +<p>1601. In practice, the priest who is attending the dying person should +act as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) He should remind the dying person of the obligation, if it appears +certain, and should suggest to him the motives and assist him in +pronouncing the form. In many manuals of the Ritual exhortations and +aspirations suitable for this purpose are given.</p> + +<p>(b) The priest should recommend the act of love of God, even though the +obligation does not appear certain, if no harm will result from his +doing so. For this will better prepare the dying person for entrance +into eternity.</p> + +<p>(c) He should not speak of the act of love of God, if the obligation is +uncertain and harm would result from his doing so (e.g., if the dying +person is in good faith, and would be much disturbed if told about the +act of love to be made).</p> + +<p>1602. Thus far we have spoken of the obligation which the precept of +love of God imposes directly, or by reason of charity itself. There is +also an obligation that is indirect, or by reason of some virtue or +commandment distinct from charity.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, by reason of a virtue distinct from charity, one is bound to +make an act of love of God, if this act is the only means of avoiding +sin against that virtue. Example: Titus suffers severe temptations to +injustice, and finds that only the love of God keeps him from +injustice. In temptation, therefore, he should make an act of love of +God.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of a commandment distinct from that of charity, one is +bound to make an act of love of God, if otherwise one cannot fulfill +rightly the commandment in question. Thus, if a person has to receive +or administer a Sacrament of the living, or solemnly to administer a +Sacrament, when he is not in the state of grace and has not the +opportunity of receiving absolution, he is obliged to make an act of +perfect contrition, which includes an act of love of God.</p> + +<p>1603. An implicit love of neighbor is contained in every true act of +love of God (see 1549, 1586). But in some cases love of neighbor must +be explicit (see 1589).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, one is bound to explicit love directly (or by reason of +charity itself), when the law of charity requires this. _Per accidens_, +charity requires an internal act of love, when without this act some +good commanded by charity (e.g., reconciliation with an enemy, alms to +one in distress) will not be done, or some evil forbidden by charity +(e.g., hatred, revenge) will not be overcome. _Per se_, it does not seem +that charity requires explicit acts of love towards the neighbor, but +only those implicit acts contained in the love of God; in practice, +however, conscientious persons frequently make explicit acts of +fraternal charity, as when they pray for the living and the dead, or +say the Our Father with due attention and devotion.</p> + +<p>(b) One is bound to explicit love indirectly (or by reason of some +other virtue than charity), when apart from such explicit love that +other virtue cannot be exercised as commanded. Example: Balbus is often +tempted to defraud Caius, and does not resist the temptation +successfully, unless he puts himself into a charitable disposition +towards Caius.</p> + +<p>1604. The Necessity of Charity.—(a) The habit of charity is necessary +as a means (see 360, 785) for all persons, infants included, so that +without it no one can be saved. For it is only with this virtue that +one possesses the divine indwelling (I John, iv. 16), and is made a +friend of God. Those who have not the wedding garment of charity are +cast into the outer darkness (Matt., xxii. 13).</p> + +<p>(b) The act of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all +adults, for it is only by actual charity that they turn towards their +Last End, and without actual charity they are in death (I John, iii. +14). A person who is justified through attrition joined with a +Sacrament receives grace and the habit of charity, and by his voluntary +acceptance he consents to the divine friendship and thus makes an act +of charity.</p> + +<p>(c) The act of charity is obligatory under grave precept at the +beginning of the moral life, frequently during life, and at the hour of +death (see 1594 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1605. Is it possible that a sin against the love of God be only venial? +(a) The imperfection of the act makes such a sin only venial, as when +without full deliberation one wishes to omit an obligatory act of love. +(b) The slightness of the matter makes such a sin venial, when it is +aside from, but not contrary to, the love of God, as when one makes an +act of love of God with culpable lukewarmness. Venial sin is not, +strictly speaking, opposed to the commandment of love, since it does +not destroy love.</p> + +<p>1606. As the order of charity is commanded as a part of the law of +charity, one is obliged not only to love those to whom love is +commanded, but also to give greater love to those to whom greater love +is due.</p> + +<p>(a) God must be loved above all creatures, since He is to be loved with +the whole heart (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., x. 37).</p> + +<p>(b) Self must be loved more than the neighbor, for love of neighbor is +commanded only as like to that of self (Matt., xxii. 9).</p> + +<p>(c) One should love one’s neighbor more than one’s own body, since we +ought to lay down our lives for the brethren (I John, iii. 16). The +claims of self and of the neighbor to love are in the following order: +the spiritual goods of self, the spiritual goods of the neighbor, the +bodily goods of self, the bodily goods of the neighbor, the external +goods of self, the external goods of the neighbor.</p> + +<p>(d) Among neighbors, those who are better or more nearly related to +self should be given the preference in love; for we should do good to +all, but especially to those who are of the household of the faith +(Gal, vi. 10), and those persons are specially blamed who have no care +for their own and for those of their own house (I Tim., v. 8). The +claims of neighbors on our help (as was explained in 1176 sqq.) rank in +the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, +other relatives, friends, domestics, citizens of the same town, state, +and country, and, finally, all others.</p> + +<p>1607. The order of charity is commanded, because it is a mode intrinsic +to the performance of the act of charity (see 1554); it is a +circumstance without which the act of love is not in proportion to the +person to whom it is shown. Thus, love given to God is not in +proportion to His lovableness, if it is exceeded by the love given to a +creature; love given to the members of one’s family is not in +proportion to their claims, if it is less than the love given to +strangers.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, outside cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity +requires that one give him the amount of internal love that corresponds +with the external charity due to him. Thus, love for a father should be +in proportion to the external honor one is bound to show one’s parent; +love for a brother in proportion to the external marks of friendship +that are due a brother. He who has no filial love for his parents, or +fraternal love for his brethren, does not fulfill the law of charity.</p> + +<p>(b) In cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity requires that the +internal love be in proportion to the external charitable assistance +one should give. Thus, if a parent and a stranger are in equal +necessity, more help and more love are due the parent; but if a +stranger is in need, and a parent is not in need, more help and more +corresponding love, as to that particular case, are due the stranger.</p> + +<p>1608. It should be noted, however, that there is a twofold love of the +neighbor.</p> + +<p>(a) Obligatory love is that which is commanded, and which is due another +as a debt, such as love for God, for a parent, for all neighbors in +general, etc. The amount of love for fellow-creatures that is +obligatory is, of course, not infinite, for no creature is infinitely +lovable; neither is it mathematically fixed, for, as said above, it may +be greater or less according to circumstances; but it is comparative or +relative—that is, it should agree with the higher or lower claim to +external charity that a neighbor has on one.</p> + +<p>(b) Optional love, or love of supererogation, is that which is not +commanded, but which may be given lawfully, such as special friendship +outside a case of need for an enemy or stranger. As there is no precept +regarding this kind of love, neither is there any precept regarding the +order of love as between those to whom it is given, and one may invert +the order that is obligatory as regards commanded love. Thus, if a +brother and a cousin are both well-to-do, and one has property to +bequeath to which neither of them has any right, it is not against +charity to leave more to the cousin and less to the brother, or some to +the cousin and none to the brother. This supposes, however, that in the +matter of obligatory love the preference in order of charity has been +shown the brother (as explained in 1158-1182).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_11_THE_GIFT_OF_WISDOM">Art. 11: THE GIFT OF WISDOM</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 45, 46.)</p> + +<p>1609. Wisdom is the Gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds with and +serves the virtue of charity (see 159 sqq., 808 sqq., 1041 sqq.), and +hence it is discussed in this place.</p> + +<p>The following points concerning Wisdom will be treated: (a) the Nature +of the Gift of Wisdom; (b) the Persons who Possess the Gift of Wisdom; +(c) the Beatitude of the Peacemakers, which pertains especially to +Wisdom; (d) the Sin of Foolishness, which is opposed to Wisdom.</p> + +<p>So far is it from being improper to give some space in Moral Theology +to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (as if they pertained only to higher +mysticism), that it is even necessary to emphasize them. The Gifts are +essential to salvation, and play a most important part in the daily +spiritual life, whether in correcting or reinforcing the virtues, or in +giving immediate direction from the Holy Spirit. Man, it is true, does +not set them into action, but it is man’s part to value them, to hold +himself in readiness for them, and to hearken to their whispered +enlightenment and counsel. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are the very +soul of Theology and of the Christian life.</p> + +<p>1610. The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom.—Wisdom is defined as “a habit +for judging things in the light of their First Cause, the Supreme Good, +which is infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace.”</p> + +<p>(a) Wisdom is a habit, and so it differs from passing acts. Thus, a man +in the state of sin who avoids idolatry, judges in the light of the +highest cause that worship is not to be given to creatures; but he +lacks the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and therefore does not judge in +virtue of that special instinct or power which originates from the +abiding presence of the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>(b) Wisdom judges, and this sets it apart from habits that belong to +the will (e.g., the Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear), as well as +from habits whose chief act is assent (e.g., the virtue of Faith) or +penetration (e.g., the Gift of Understanding).</p> + +<p>(c) The standard by which Wisdom judges things is the First Cause of +all, or the Supreme Good, as when our Lord explained that the condition +of the man born blind was due to the purpose of God to be glorified +through that blindness (John, ix. 3). The wise man is he who goes back +to first principles, to the origins of things, to ultimate purposes; +but it is not every wisdom that estimates things according to the +Supreme Good, and there is a false wisdom (see 1623) whose canon of +excellence is the imperfect good opposed to Supreme Good. The Gift of +Wisdom, therefore, is distinct from sinful wisdom, which is wise at +doing evil (Jer., iv. 22); from particular wisdom, which understands +well the theory and practice of some science, art, or profession, and +is able therefore to decide correctly and to arrange successfully such +matters as fall under a special kind of activity, as in medicine or +architecture or strategy (I Cor., iii. 10).</p> + +<p>(d) The things that make up the object of Wisdom are, in the first +place, divine things (e.g., the attributes, plans, government, +operations of God); and, in the second place, created things, whether +in the speculative order (e.g., mind and matter, good and evil, +science, religion, history), or in the practical order (i.e., human +actions). Wisdom contemplates the divine as known from faith or the +beatific vision, and then, with the things of God as its rule, it +judges the things of earth and directs the conduct of men: “The +spiritual man judgeth all things” (I Cor, ii, 15). Thus does Wisdom +differ from the Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel; for Knowledge is +concerned directly with secondary causes and rises from the creature to +the Creator, While Counsel is not a speculative but a practical Gift, +and is a response to direction given by the Holy Spirit for the +guidance of conduct.</p> + +<p>(e) The Gift of Wisdom is an infused perfection of the intellect, “a +wisdom descending from on high” (James, iii. 15). Hence, while it +resembles the virtue of Wisdom, which also judges human and divine +things through first causes (see 145), it differs from that virtue, +even with reference to the same objects, on account of its different +way of approach. Theology and philosophy judge correctly because they +employ study and the investigation of reason; but the Gift of Wisdom +has a right judgment because it depends, not on analysis or +argumentation, but on a supernatural knowledge had through faith (or +vision in case of the blessed) and a supernatural experience of God +through charity. Wisdom may express itself, indeed, in the concepts and +language of philosophy or theology, but it is not through scientific +processes that it knows and judges.</p> + +<p>(f) The Gift of Wisdom is infused into the soul along with sanctifying +grace; for, like the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, it is intended to +supplement through the action of the Holy Spirit the control exercised +by grace, which is imperfect on account of the limitations of the +virtues. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is an ordinary and normal fact +in the spiritual life, and must not be confused with rare and +extraordinary phenomena—with the “word of wisdom” (I Cor., xii. 8), +which was granted to the Apostles and at times to other preachers of +the faith, nor with the clear contemplation of God bestowed in the +state of innocence, nor with the infused knowledge or light of glory +enjoyed by Christ and some of the Saints while on earth. Thus, while +all who are in the state of grace possess the Gift of Wisdom, +comparatively only a few have received the “word of wisdom”—that is, +the ability to instruct others in the higher mysteries of faith and to +explain to them with ease and in suitable language the meaning of these +mysteries and their relation to supreme causes. Both these graces are +supernatural, but, while the Gift of Wisdom is needed by each +individual for his own sanctification, the word of wisdom is needed +only in certain cases for the sanctification of others.</p> + +<p>1611. From the foregoing definition it is seen that Wisdom belongs both +to the will and to the intellect.</p> + +<p>(a) In its cause, Wisdom belongs to the will. The cause of right +judgment by means of divine things is either the suitability of the +intellect, which knows well how to judge, or the suitability of the +will, which is inclined towards divine things. Thus, he who is well +versed in moral science will give a correct decision about a case of +chastity as it falls under the inquiry of reason, and he who is chaste +will judge correctly about the same case, even without moral science, +but from the sympathy he has for the virtue. The intellectual virtue of +Wisdom, then, judges aright because the intellect is sound in its +procedures; but the Gift of Wisdom is right in its judgments, because +the will has been united to God through charity, so that there has +resulted in one a suitability for judging about the things of God: +“Give me one who loves, and he will understand what I say” (Augustine, +_Tract. xxvi. in Joan_.).</p> + +<p>(b) In its essence, Wisdom belongs to the intellect, for it consists in +judgment, and this is an act that is exercised, not by the affections, +but by the reason. Through love the soul becomes one spirit with God (I +Cor., vi. 17), and the will experiences the sweetness of this union +(Ps. xxxiii. 9); the intellect then judges concerning the divine which +has been the object of its mystical communion. The Gift of Wisdom, +built as it is on faith and charity, differs utterly from private +interpretation of revelation (which is subversive of faith) and from +the Modernistic experience of the divine (which is explained as a +natural intuition had by a special religious sense of a reality that is +divine and yet only subjective and unknowable).</p> + +<p>1612. From the definition and explanation of the Gift of Wisdom it also +follows that this Gift is practical as well as speculative.</p> + +<p>(a) Primarily, Wisdom is speculative, for one must consider divine +things in themselves before one applies them to other things; and, +moreover, the object of Wisdom is God, who is the first truth in the +order of knowledge or speculation. It is by Wisdom, then, as well as by +the other intellectual Gifts or extraordinary graces, that the act of +supernatural contemplation is exercised; but Wisdom, more perfect than +the other Gifts, ascends at once to things that are heavenly, divine +and eternal, and thinks of God as transcending in perfection every +known or knowable degree of created excellence, and as being most true, +most beautiful, most lovable (Eph., iii. 17-19).</p> + +<p>(b) Secondarily, Wisdom is practical, for God whom it contemplates is +the supreme rule of action, as well as the first truth. Thus does the +higher Gift of Wisdom unite in itself what are found separate in lower +virtues—the speculative quality of the virtue of Wisdom and the +practical quality of Prudence (see 1620).</p> + +<p>1613. The practical uses of the Gift of Wisdom are indicated in +Coloss., iii. 16-17, iv. 6: “Let the word of Christ dwell in you +abundantly, in all Wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in +psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts +to God. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of +the Lord Jesus Christ.... Walk with Wisdom towards them that are +without, redeeming the time. Let your speech be always with grace, +seasoned with salt.”</p> + +<p>(a) The contemplation of divine things is useful for instruction in the +truths of faith and the duties of religion (“teaching and admonishing +one another”); for the mind becomes in a way divine, like the things on +which it dwells, filled with knowledge of God and of Christ and of the +means of holiness.</p> + +<p>(b) Wisdom helps one to fulfill the duty of praying to God with +reverence and interior devotion (“singing in your hearts to God”); for +Wisdom makes one perceive and feel the sweetness and attraction of the +things of God.</p> + +<p>(c) It directs one in both words and works (“do all in the name of +Christ”); for the intellect which judges things in the light of +eternity and with the fervor of divine charity will not mislead in +matters of salvation.</p> + +<p>(d) It enables one to profit by opportunities of edification +(“redeeming the time”); for the example of a life directed by tender +love of God and by kindness and courtesy to all is a recommendation of +virtue and religion in the sight of the world.</p> + +<p>1614. Wisdom is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, and is numbered with the +other six communications of the Spirit: “And the Spirit of the Lord +shall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom, etc.” (Is., xi. 2).</p> + +<p>(a) Likeness to the Other Gifts.—The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are +energies diffused in the powers of the soul as instruments of the +supernatural governance of the indwelling Spirit, just as the moral +virtues are the instruments of the natural governance of reason. The +infused virtues (e.g., faith or charity), unlike the acquired virtues +(e.g., temperance or fortitude), do not suffice for the government of +the soul; for, while these latter are according to nature, the former +surpass nature, and are received by it imperfectly. Hence the need of +the Gifts, which on earth supplement the infused virtues, strengthening +them against contrary vices, developing secondary acts of the virtues +which the virtues only initiate, and in heaven perfecting the blessed +in good.</p> + +<p>(b) Unlikeness to the Other Gifts.—Wisdom, which is enumerated by +Isaias in the first place, is also given the highest rank among the +Gifts by theologians, on account of its greater elevation, more +universal scope, and the directive power it exercises. Fittingly, then, +is Wisdom assigned as the Gift that serves Charity, the queen of the +virtues: Charity loves God above all things; Wisdom dwells with delight +upon the object of this love (Wis., viii. 16), looks upon life with the +eyes of love, and in directing its human actions communicates to them +something of the savor and sweetness of divine charity.</p> + +<p>1615. The Persons Who Possess Wisdom.—The Gift of Wisdom, as said +above (see 1610), is given with sanctifying grace, and hence only those +and all those who are in God’s friendship have this supernatural +endowment.</p> + +<p>(a) Only those in the state of grace have divine Wisdom, for without +love of God it is impossible to have that right judgment of things that +is consequent on the relish for and connaturality with divine things. +Hence, it is said: “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor +dwell in a body subject to sins” (Wis., i. 4).</p> + +<p>(b) All those who are in the state of grace have the Gift of Wisdom, +for man is so weak and the supernatural virtues are so far above him +that, even when he has received these virtues, he is unable to make +proper use of them or to preserve them in time of temptation, unless he +has received the supplementary forces that will enable him to obey more +easily and promptly the voice and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus, +Charity destines man to beatitude, but, unless he has Wisdom to value +this virtue and privilege, to spurn the false wisdom of the world, to +think on the love of God with delight and to make it the norm of his +judgments and decisions, he will not progress in Charity, nor retain +it, nor arrive at the beatitude to which it destines him.</p> + +<p>1616. Though all who are in the state of grace possess all the Gifts of +the Holy Ghost, these Gifts are not had in the same way by all their +possessors. Thus, the following points should be noted with reference +to the Gift of Wisdom:</p> + +<p>(a) The Gifts, like the infused virtues, are possessed habitually by +baptized children and insane persons, and actually by adults. Just as +infants have the possession but not the use of certain natural gifts +(such as reason and responsibility), so likewise supernatural life and +powers are granted them through baptismal regeneration, but the +exercise of this life and of these powers is prevented by their +inability to realize what they possess and to make use of it. The lack +of bodily development, which impedes the use of natural reason, also +impedes the use of supernatural Wisdom.</p> + +<p>(b) The Gift of Wisdom is had in itself by all who are in the state of +grace; but in its extension, which is the “word of Wisdom,” it is +possessed only by highly gifted souls who have a special mission from +God (see above, 1610 sqq.). With sanctifying grace, each one receives +the supernatural Gift of judging rightly about heavenly things and of +regulating his conduct by them in so far as is necessary for the +attainment of salvation; otherwise, we should have to say that grace is +inferior to nature, and does not provide what is necessary for its end. +But the ability to explain heavenly things so as to draw others to the +truth, and to apply heavenly doctrines to the guidance of others so as +to lead them to good, is one of the gifts freely given, which the +Spirit divides according as He wills (I Cor., xii. 11): “To one by the +Spirit is given the word of Wisdom, to another the word of Knowledge, +etc.” (ibid, 8).</p> + +<p>1617. The Gift of Wisdom in itself (i.e., as intended directly for the +benefit of the recipient and not for the benefit of others) is also had +in varying degrees. (a) Thus, different persons do not possess this +Gift in equal measure; for to some is granted the contemplation of +loftier mysteries not granted to others, and suprahuman Wisdom plays a +greater part in the direction of some lives than in that of others. (b) +The same persons do not possess Wisdom in an equal degree at all times. +Thus, in Baptism all the Seven Gifts are received, but in Confirmation +they are in some way perfected, either in themselves by a greater +refinement or sensibility to the action of the Holy Spirit, or as +regards their possession by their subject through a firmer hold of them.</p> + +<p>1618. The Exercise of the Gift of Wisdom.—(a) The external magisterium +(i.e., revelation and the teaching Church) conveys the truths of faith +to the mind of the believer. (b) The internal Teacher, the Holy Ghost, +illuminates the soul with Wisdom, so that it ponders on the first +principles of faith and makes the love of them control its judgments, +Words, and actions: “You have the unction from the Holy One and know +all things” (I John, ii. 20), that is, all that is needed for salvation.</p> + +<p>1619. The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom.—The +Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by supplying for what is imperfect in the +habits of virtue (e.g., by protecting faith against dullness of +perception, hope against presumption, charity against distaste for +divine things), give to these virtues a perfectionment like to that +which they will have in the state of beatitude, and to their exercise a +corresponding enjoyment. Hence, to the Gifts, which are most excellent +habits, correspond those most perfect or most delightful acts of virtue +known as Beatitudes and Fruits (see 159 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) There appears a special correspondence of the seventh beatitude +(“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of +God,” Matt., v. 9) with Wisdom, both as regards their merit, and as +regards their reward. The work of Wisdom is to reduce all things to +unity, to see life and the world as a whole, to look upon creatures as +parts of one great divine plan. Similarly, the work of the peacemakers +is to put an end to dissension and division and to reconcile the +warring powers of the soul, or to introduce harmony between those that +are at enmity: “The Wisdom that is from above is peaceable” (James, +iii. 17). Again, the reward promised the peacemakers is that they shall +be called the sons of God, and of Wisdom it may be said that it makes +one the image of the Son of God, who is Eternal Wisdom.</p> + +<p>(b) The Fruits of the Holy Ghost that are assigned to Wisdom are, with +regard to God: charity, or a tender love of God (“The charity of God is +poured out in our hearts,” Rom., v. 5.), joy, or delight at union with +God (“Rejoice in the Lord always,” Phillip., iv. 4), peace, or security +in the enjoyment of God (“There is much peace to them that love Thy +law,” Ps. cxviii. 165). The Fruits that have reference to the love of +neighbor are: goodness, or an internal benevolence characterized by +sweetness (“The fruit of the light is in all goodness,” Eph., v. 9), +and kindness, or a beneficence accompanied by cheerfulness (“The Lord +loves the cheerful giver,” II Cor., ix. 7).</p> + +<p>1620. St. James (iii. 17, 18) describes the direction which Wisdom +gives to human actions (see 1612, 1613) and the fruit of peace to which +it conducts them, as follows: “The Wisdom that is from above, first +indeed is chaste, then peaceable; modest, easy to be persuaded; +consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging, +without dissimulation. And the fruit of justice is sown in peace to +them that make peace.”</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, first, Wisdom directs one to be free from sin (“chaste”), for +the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom (Ps. cx. 110).</p> + +<p>(b) Next, Wisdom directs one to work for peace within one’s own soul, +by following moderation where one can decide for oneself (“modest”), by +seeking advice where one is in doubt (“easy to be persuaded”).</p> + +<p>(c) Further, Wisdom directs one to be peaceful towards others, to be +well disposed towards their good or benefit (“consenting to the good”), +compassionate and helpful in their distress (“full of mercy and good +fruits”), not partial or hypocritical in criticizing their defects +(“without judging, without dissimulation”).</p> + +<p>(d) Finally, Wisdom, having sown in peace, reaps the peace of +righteousness. False wisdom leads to wrangling and disorder, true +Wisdom to concord and harmony.</p> + +<p>1621. The Sins Opposed to Wisdom.—Just as blindness and dullness-that +is, the want of all or of sufficient perceptiveness in spiritual +things—are opposed to the Gift of Understanding (see 912), so +stupidity and foolishness—that is, the want of all or of sufficient +good judgment about spiritual things—are opposed to the Gift of Wisdom.</p> + +<p>1622. Foolishness is defined as “a slowness and darkness of mind that +is due to some moral defect, and that makes it difficult for one to +judge rightly about the Last End of things and the Chief Good.”</p> + +<p>(a) Foolishness is slow and darksome, and thus the contrary of Wisdom, +which is alert and discerning.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a defect of judgment, and so differs from the sins of +blindness and dullness of heart.</p> + +<p>(c) It is an error of judgment about the chief concern of life and the +things of greatest value, and thus it is different from the innocent +simplicity of many good persons, whose judgment is not sound in affairs +of this world.</p> + +<p>(d) It is brought on by moral fault, and is therefore not to be +identified with invincible ignorance, which is a physical imperfection +caused by nature, as in the weak-minded and the insane.</p> + +<p>1623. Just as true Wisdom seems foolishness to the world, so does true +foolishness seem wisdom to the world (I Cor., iii. 18 sqq.). There is a +counterfeit wisdom, which places its last end in some created good, and +which is therefore foolishness before God. St. James (iii. 15) +describes false wisdom as “earthly, sensual, devilish”; and these words +express very well three chief classes of worldly wisdom. (a) Some of +the worldly-wise aim above all things at amassing and increasing wealth +or other external possessions (earthly wisdom). (b) Others seek chiefly +pleasure, health, comfort, or other bodily goods (animal wisdom). (c) +Others imitating Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride (Job, +xli. 25), devote their whole lives solely to the pursuit of inordinate +excellence of some kind—that is, of selfish domination or honors or +glory, etc. (devilish wisdom).</p> + +<p>1624. The foolishness we are now considering is sinful, for it is a +voluntary choice of evil, a violation of commandments, and the +ruination of man. In scripture the term “fool” is applied to the +wicked, the impious, the objects of divine anger (Ps. xiii. 1), and +hence it was that our Lord declared severe penalty against those who +call another a fool (Matt., v. 22).</p> + +<p>(a) Foolishness is a voluntary choice of evil, for it consists in a +turning away from spiritual things or an entire absorption in the +things of this world, with the result that one becomes unfitted to +judge aright concerning the values of human existence: “The animal man +does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God” (I Cor., ii. 14). +But the fact that his taste is perverted, and that he has no relish for +the spiritual, is due to his own deliberate rejection of good and the +cultivation of evil.</p> + +<p>(b) Foolishness is a violation of commandments about the knowledge and +employment of truth (see 914 sqq.): “See how you walk, not as unwise, +but as wise” (Eph., v. 15, 16).</p> + +<p>(c) Foolishness leads to perdition, for, being defective in its +judgment, it barters away the future for present satisfaction and sells +its birthright for a mess of pottage: “The prosperity of fools destroys +them” (Prov., i. 32); “Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required +of thee” (Luke, xii. 20).</p> + +<p>1625. The causes of the sin of foolishness, as was said above (see +1623), are the wrong and sinful views taken of life, which make men +judge all things by the standards of gain or pleasure or power, rather +than by the standard of the First Cause, in comparison with whom all +these lower goods are but trivial. But, among all the vices that lead +mankind astray from Wisdom, the preeminence is held by lust, for its +attraction is greater and its hold on the soul more complete. As +chastity especially disposes for heavenly contemplation and Wisdom (see +912) by the refinement and elevation and spirituality it gives the +mind, so does sensuality especially indispose for these goods by the +coarseness and degradation and materialism that follow in its wake.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PART_II2">PART II<br />SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued)</h2> +</div> + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Question_II2">Question II<br />THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (THE MORAL VIRTUES)</h2> +</div> + + +<p>1626. After the theological virtues, which offer to God the services of +faith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow +the cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and passions +of man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these +four virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), prudence is +ranked first, as being the director of the others.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_THE_VIRTUE_OF_PRUDENCE">Art. 1: THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 47-56.)</p> + +<p>1627. Definition.—All the definitions of prudence are in substantial +agreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as +follows: “Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to +be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired +through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.”</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and +means to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of +various uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues +of the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the +application of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most +part, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view +(e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or +sculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right +reason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not +certain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of +lawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and +particular situations).</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not +consider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or +that particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good +life. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for +prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.</p> + +<p>(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the +purpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the +activities and productions of man according to the light of right +reason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of +knowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for +prudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to +goodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in +his profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it +badly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if +voluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin +against art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to +know what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.</p> + +<p>1628. The Objects of the Act of Prudence.—(a) Prudence is concerned, +not with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for +the sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those +things that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate +and discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he +may become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however, +that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to +prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of +prudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good +judgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner, +etc., of study.</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first +principles of morality, but with their application to contingent and +particular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a +universal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before +him. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the +prudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right +living and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be +applied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does +not know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a +case to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quantity +of drink before one is too much).</p> + +<p>1629. It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue, +namely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue +perfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of +production) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of +goodness from which the material object is considered).</p> + +<p>(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions +performed under choice and freely (_agibilia_). (b) The formal object +of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (_recta +ratio_) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of +the golden mean.</p> + +<p>1630. Necessity of Certitude.—Prudence, being an intellectual virtue, +must have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with +regard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry +Caia) there are various kinds of certainty.</p> + +<p>(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from +experience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons +well mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry +successfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.</p> + +<p>(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in +a particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial +dispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a +success). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as +a rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events +do not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: “The thoughts +of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain” (Wis., ix. 14).</p> + +<p>(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists +in harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to +prudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even +though a matter properly decided on should not take place or should +fail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia +is prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not +deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to +right reason and a good will (see 578).</p> + +<p>1631. Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.—(a) Prudence +does not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the +knowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding +(i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and +wrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues +themselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an +inclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual +virtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate +that right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed, +that the passions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so +regulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which +their ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular +and variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis +is concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a +uniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but +neither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be +applied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the +work of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure, +sorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to +decide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience, +575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance +degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.</p> + +<p>1632. Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the +virtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving +the virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual +virtues and the theological virtues).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study, +contemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not +consult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these +acts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would +neglect her domestic duties.</p> + +<p>(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope, +and charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to +continue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when +other acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose. +Thus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he +is supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in +his charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.</p> + +<p>1633. The Exercise of Prudence.—The acts that belong to prudence are +those that one needs in order to direct one’s conduct to that +moderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation, +decision, direction.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and +deliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have +been discovered, it passes judgment (see 575) on their suitability +(e.g., that restitution should be made at such a time, in such a way, +in such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking +requires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of +food be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the +command that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be +the quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of +certain things that are dangerous.</p> + +<p>1634. Qualities of Prudence.—The qualities that should characterize +prudence are carefulness and confidence.</p> + +<p>(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and +judgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the +moment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for +one does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is +anxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and +vigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay +instead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a +word, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence +the admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to +prayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter, +iv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about +all his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their +condition, their progress, their needs, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments +carefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is +necessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that +absolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about +courses of action (the future event and also many present things +bearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that +overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the +character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent +through excess of caution.</p> + +<p>1635. The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.—As the divisions of parts +correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are +three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative +whole.</p> + +<p>(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence +and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in +the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and +energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and +of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats, +horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.</p> + +<p>(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness +either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole +is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such +as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other +single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses +of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral +or complete.</p> + +<p>(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but +not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is +exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse +faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, +accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul +is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple +substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different +power, in none of them all its powers.</p> + +<p>1636. It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and +potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts +of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly +performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts +are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The +quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which +have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having +the full efficacy of the latter.</p> + +<p>1637. Integral Parts of Prudence.—The integral parts of prudence, +considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are +those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge. +(a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways +and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the +present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new +knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness +of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.</p> + +<p>1638. The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a +preceptive virtue—that is, as the counsellor and director of life and +behavior—are the acts without which one cannot make good use of +knowledge as applied to conduct.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular +affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how +to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together. +Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of +natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in +drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent +application of what they know.</p> + +<p>(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made +use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed, +must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose +the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so +direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they +will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their +circumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against +external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both +Scylla and Charybdis (caution): “The prudent man considereth his steps” +(Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides +on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and +disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and +therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts +of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only +haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification, +resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends +who will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to +provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities, +but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to +make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are +provided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not +circumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.</p> + +<p>1639. The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.—Prudence in general +is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there +will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different +kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into +the particular good of the individual and the common good of the +multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal +prudence and social prudence.</p> + +<p>(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the +individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.</p> + +<p>(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of +self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.</p> + +<p>1640. Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two +classes of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and +domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration +of the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic +prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.</p> + +<p>1641. Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an +unfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now +the virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here +is something very different from political methods or practices that +are wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see +1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as +tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of +political prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do +not rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is +the very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices +in the regulation of government or of political parties—such as +employment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State, +corruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the +election of a ticket or candidate—cannot be honored with the name of +prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest +politics.</p> + +<p>1642. Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole +should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We +may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:</p> + +<p>(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be +governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the +highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to +direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own +actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence +and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince +(Jer., xxiii. 5);</p> + +<p>(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies +there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by +wisdom: “A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant, +because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where +there are many counsels” (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);</p> + +<p>(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they +are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule +their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular +offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the +good of the whole community.</p> + +<p>1643. Utility of Prudence for Society.—Hence, we see that none of the +virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of +individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and +domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards +society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even +temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense +of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws +of the State.</p> + +<p>1644. Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to +other goods that benefit human life.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue, +but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as +are embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to +avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the +dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably, +etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the +unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).</p> + +<p>(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the +members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food +and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii. +42).</p> + +<p>(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the +conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of +their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.</p> + +<p>(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by +appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises, +insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks +after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all +branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.</p> + +<p>1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the +knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material +pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from +the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from +the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics +and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are +practical students and church people who do their own work well and get +good results.</p> + +<p>1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.—As was explained in 1636, the +potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually +inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to +which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is +direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633). +Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:</p> + +<p>(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with +oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for +virtuous choice;</p> + +<p>(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes +it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for +virtuous conduct.</p> + +<p>1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which +is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are +subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to +exist apart?</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues, +they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an +imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so +inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most +suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue +that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first +class are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in +decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters +that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in +dispensing alms).</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist +apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should +(e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if +he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil +means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does +not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out +what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless +or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in +decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not +resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one +who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.</p> + +<p>1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.—Political prudence, if +understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons, +not even in all the good.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted +to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly, +lacks political prudence: “If one knows not how to govern his own +house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?” said St. +Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He +who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace +are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace +of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of +saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus, +Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy, +because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous +times.</p> + +<p>(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and +who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted +in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is +prepared to learn to rule well.</p> + +<p>1649. Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers, +although not in the same manner.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence +in a supreme degree, or statesmanship, so that they may be able to +discharge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether +as legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as +judges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives +by maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.</p> + +<p>(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted +with no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the +institutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good +judgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and +ready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal +interest.</p> + +<p>(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the +laws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not +unwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and +enlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they +may cooperate for the common good and directing their acts according to +law.</p> + +<p>1650. The principles just given concerning political prudence will +apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or +a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they +cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent, +rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need +especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly +grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the +teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence +in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great +variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be +most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.</p> + +<p>(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of +authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent, +etc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as +regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those +whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and +experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.</p> + +<p>1651. Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.—In the preceding +paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral +virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the +moral virtues possess prudence?</p> + +<p>(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some +nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well +but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil +prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the +latter’s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning. +Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares +that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also +sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is +thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust +steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to +cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who +know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection. +Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the +means to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin, +but whose resolutions never last.</p> + +<p>(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish +purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral +aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or +industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting +at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of +science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing +the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination, +tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But, +morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for +example, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of +the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good, +sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.</p> + +<p>(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well +with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this +prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from +its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the +virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore, +that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most +skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal +most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.</p> + +<p>1652. Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.—(a) +Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether +the sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had +through reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of +mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one +sole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become +prudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards +the lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of +mortal sin (see 138).</p> + +<p>1653. We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of +the virtue of prudence:</p> + +<p>(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also +the habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own +efforts;</p> + +<p>(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g., +those who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of +prudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;</p> + +<p>(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g., +those who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have +neither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one +mortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit +of prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of +prudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a +judgment agreeable to a good will.</p> + +<p>1654. The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of +Grace.—(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this +virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner—that is, on account +of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their +want of reason they have not the use of the power.</p> + +<p>(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually +and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise. +Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well, +or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish +between good and bad advice.</p> + +<p>(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior +degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to +deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for +salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of +human life.</p> + +<p>1655. Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?—(a) +If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not +in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence +is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and +these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to +be looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb +calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their +years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to +acquire fixed ways of acting: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length +of days prudence” (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the +young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and +firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will +eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary, +therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that +instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other +guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are +in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the +admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to +act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.</p> + +<p>1656. Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?—(a) +If we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong +which are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general +are known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but +not so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320 +sqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is +natural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural +evidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first +principles belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also +called synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which +is a gift of nature.</p> + +<p>(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is +presupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment +about those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are +not variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of +attraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate, +as is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by +nature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form +accurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking +again, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature +disposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.</p> + +<p>(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means +to fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this +kind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied +according to the differences of affairs, persons, and circumstances. +And since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal +principles or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the +particular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense +prudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better +fitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also +some persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about +practical cases and the means conducive to morality.</p> + +<p>1657. The Growth and Decay of Prudence.—(a) As repeated acts form a +habit of prudence, so do repeated acts strengthen prudence already +formed, especially when the chief act of prudence (i.e., the command +that things wisely deliberated on be performed) is often brought into +play. Even infused prudence is augmented and perfected by use and +practice: “Strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have +their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil” (Heb., v. +14).</p> + +<p>(b) As prudence consists primarily in a dictate which applies the +reason’s knowledge to the control of will and conduct, this virtue is +corrupted chiefly by passion. We see that those who are swayed by +pleasure or pain lose sight of the true motive of choice and action, +and do not issue to themselves the order which prudence and their +better judgment inspire. Thus, lust deceived even the elders of the +people (Dan., xiii. 56), and bribes blind even the prudent (Exod., +xxiii. 8). Nature enables a man to judge rightly about the universal +principles of right and wrong; but, when judgment is to be given about +particular lines of action, “as a man is, so he judges,” the licentious +man judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty. Hence, +the moral virtues must be united with prudence, else it perishes.</p> + +<p>(c) As prudence presupposes a fund of general moral principles, +forgetfulness is an impediment to this virtue; yet not so that every +loss of memory which deprives one of arts and sciences will also take +away prudence. For, while art and science consist entirely of +knowledge, prudence has also a moral element derived from a right +inclination of the will towards goodness, and its chief office is the +utilization of principles in practice. The virtuous man will continue +to follow prudence, even though he has forgotten its theory or rules, +guiding himself by good habits formed or by the counsel of those wiser +than himself.</p> + +<p>1658. The Gift of Counsel.—The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the +theological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the +moral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting +them. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for +both are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing +by the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.</p> + +<p>1659. Definition.—Counsel is defined as “an infused habit which makes +the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by +the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own +eternal salvation.”</p> + +<p>(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of +in 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner +and from one’s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making +inquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman +manner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to +the advice offered by God).</p> + +<p>(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which +makes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus, +Mathathias when dying said to his sons: “I know that your brother Simon +is a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father +to you” (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful +in guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was +called “Antoninus of the Counsels.” The Gift is intended to benefit its +possessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is +for the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will +of God only on certain individuals who have a special mission of +directing or assisting their neighbors.</p> + +<p>1660. Subject-Matter of Counsel.—The subject-matter of the Gift of +Counsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that +are necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary +and are only counselled.</p> + +<p>1661. The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are +singular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one +should not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether +they are from God (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel +called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the +judgment of the Church: “Arise and go into the city, and there it shall +be told thee what thou must do” (Acts, ix. 7).</p> + +<p>1662. The Beatitude and Fruits that Correspond to the Gift of +Counsel.—(a) Counsel directs one to all the means that are useful for +the attainment of life eternal, but especially to acts of mercy, for, +as St. Augustine remarks, without mercy shown to others we cannot be +freed from our own evils. Cognate to Counsel, therefore, is the Fifth +Beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy” +(Matt., v. 7).</p> + +<p>(b) Counsel is practical, and hence its ultimate result will be action +of some kind. The acts which its farseeing view puts especially into +exercise are acts of mercy, and acts of mercy have sweetness and +agreeableness when accompanied by a sympathetic love of the afflicted +and a cheerful and generous service of their needs. There belong to +mercy, then, the two delightful acts or fruits of the Spirit mentioned +in Gal., v, 22, and called goodness (i.e., internal benevolence) and +kindness (i.e., external beneficence).</p> + +<p>1663. The Sins Against Prudence.—There are two classes of sins opposed +to prudence. (a) Manifestly opposed to it are those sins that consist +in a want of the acts or conditions requisite for prudence. These may +be called sins of imprudence or sins that offend prudence by way of +non-use. (b) Seemingly allied with prudence are those sins that consist +in a wrong application of the acts or conditions of the virtue. These +may be called sins of pseudo-prudence, or sins that offend against +prudence by way of abuse. We shall speak first of imprudence and then +of pseudo-prudence.</p> + +<p>1664. Kinds of Imprudence.—There are three kinds of imprudence. (a) +Negatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of +prudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young +people through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though +of course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the +habitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure +is due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself +through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act +prudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore +reducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as +being opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we +shall see.</p> + +<p>(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some +act or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with +amusements that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important +matter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of +an act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one +expressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of +prudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away +from things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.</p> + +<p>1665. Sinfulness of Imprudence.—Is imprudence a general sin, that is, +a sin which is included in every kind of sin?</p> + +<p>(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that +it forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as +prudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to +reason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its +own special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that +everyone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does +not act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act +sinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision, +or direction given by reason.</p> + +<p>1666. It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation, +decision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they +do not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are +all directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated +badly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a +priest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying +sacrilegious hands on a cleric.</p> + +<p>1667. The Sin of Haste.—The sin of haste or precipitancy passes over +or hurries over the processes of deliberation that ought to precede +action; it devotes little or no attention to memory of past +experiences, understanding of present conditions, or conjecture of +future possibilities; it does not give to a question the proper amount +of study or of consultation. It is of two kinds, ordinary and rash.</p> + +<p>(a) Ordinary precipitancy results from a strong inclination of the will +or of the passions, as when a person speaks in anger before he has +thought of the serious consequences of his words, or marries without +reflection, or purchases an article the worth of which he does not +know, or agrees to something about which he is in the dark, etc. Both +Holy Writ and popular proverbs strongly condemn this sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Rash precipitancy results from contempt of the law, as when one so +despises an ordinance as to violate it without the slightest hesitation +or reflection. This sin pertains to pride as well as to imprudence. In +various censures the word “rashness” or “temerity” is used as here +given, as when excommunication is pronounced against rash violators of +the law.</p> + +<p>1668. The Sin of Thoughtlessness.—The sin of thoughtlessness or +inconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a +wise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right +understanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and +studies and measures it in the light of first principles.</p> + +<p>(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can +to judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the +whole matter to God, for it is temptation of God to expect that He will +provide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).</p> + +<p>(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of +judging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares; +nor is he guilty of temptation of God, if in such difficulties he +commits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered +together to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: “As we know not +what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Par., xx. 12). And +Our Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when +they were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).</p> + +<p>1669. The Sin of Inconstancy.—The sin of changeableness or inconstancy +is committed when, owing to anger, jealousy or other inordinate +passion, the reason repudiates things that had been rightly decided on +and fails to act on judgments that had been rightly made (Is., xxxvii. +3). From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face +of pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).</p> + +<p>1670. Causes of the Sins of Haste, Thoughtlessness, and +Inconstancy.—(a) Every inordinate desire brings on these sins by +diverting the mind from a good to an evil object. Experience shows that +the avaricious, the ambitious, the angry, the jealous, etc., do not +listen to reason, but act imprudently: “Where envying and contention +is, there is inconstancy” (James, iii. 16).</p> + +<p>(b) Desire of pleasure, especially of venereal pleasure, is most fatal +to prudence by extinguishing the judgment of reason. The intellect is +immaterial and is occupied with abstract truth, whereas sensual +delights are immersed in the material and sensible. Hence, carnal sins +are more injurious to prudence than spiritual sins. The sensual man not +merely does not listen to reason, but he does not even hear it. Venus +steals away the reason, said Aristotle, and this truth is well +exemplified in King Solomon.</p> + +<p>1671. The Sin of Negligence.—The sin of negligence is opposed to +carefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to +direct properly an act, or some circumstance of an act, to which one is +obliged.</p> + +<p>(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special +matter of its own, such as a passion to be moderated (as is the case +with temperance and fortitude) or an action to be regulated (as is the +case with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of +matter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant, +thoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or passion.</p> + +<p>(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness, +which is a special act of prudence.</p> + +<p>1672. Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness +and lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while +negligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from +sins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of +negligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g., +negligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy, +which fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were +impeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness +in the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the +negligent man is slow in getting under way.</p> + +<p>1673. The Sinfulness of Negligence.—(a) It is a mortal sin when some +act or circumstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account +(e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill, +and in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from +contempt or preference of the creature to God. (b) It is a venial sin +when the act or circumstance omitted is not necessary for salvation +(e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his +procrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.</p> + +<p>1674. False Prudence.—So far we have considered the sins of +imprudence; now we shall speak of the sins of false prudence, which +turn to wrong objects the acts that prudence employs for good, or which +use inordinately the care that prudence employs in moderation. Thus, +there are several kinds of imitation-prudence.</p> + +<p>(a) Prudence is in love with the good of virtue as the end of life; the +prudence of the flesh is in love with some pleasure or utility, and +makes this good the center of attraction for all its acts.</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence deliberates and judges about good and lawful means for its +end; astuteness deliberates and judges how it may make use of evil +means, and it employs trickery and fraud to perform what it decides on.</p> + +<p>(c) Prudence is chiefly concerned about the spiritual, but its concern +is not excessive; solicitude for temporal things or for the morrow is +more anxious about the things of this world, or is unduly anxious about +spiritual things.</p> + +<p>1675. The prudence whose end is bad is the sin of those Who counsel, +judge, and direct well as to the means for securing temporal goods +which they have made the supreme purpose of their lives. This sin is +given the one general name, “prudence of the flesh,” from Rom., viii. +6, where the aspirations of the flesh are contrasted with the +aspirations of the spirit. But it is also sometimes distinguished +according to the different kinds of created things in which false +prudence puts its desire, or according to the different kinds of +allurements to such created goods.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, those who aim chiefly at internal goods (i.e., bodily +pleasures, health, etc.) are said to have the prudence of the flesh, +while those who long mostly after externals (such as fine clothes, +jewelry, estates, etc.) are said to have the prudence of this world: +“The children of this world are more prudent in their generation than +the children of light” (Luke, xvi. 8).</p> + +<p>(b) We may also divide prudence about a wrong end into earthly, animal +and devilish, according to the threefold source of temptation, as was +explained above in 1623.</p> + +<p>1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.—(a) If prudence of the +fiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the +condition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the +end-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one +should have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are +opposite: “The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not +subject to the law of God, neither can it be” (Rom., viii. 7).</p> + +<p>(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as +signifying the behavior of those who make God the supreme end of their +lives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that +does not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An +example is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making +all the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct +themselves with too much hilarity.</p> + +<p>(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as +signifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake +of a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is +careful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be +enabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent. +The use of the term “prudence of the flesh,” for these last two cases +is inaccurate and misleading.</p> + +<p>1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.—The prudence whose means are bad +is the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and +methods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.</p> + +<p>(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be +successfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are +well-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The +counsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery +of the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of +astuteness.</p> + +<p>(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or +by stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest +its success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and +fraud. Lord Bacon’s essay on “Dissimulation” is a good description of +the method of worldly policy.</p> + +<p>1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with +the view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in +mind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as +other uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from +fraud as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to +deceive or circumvent another person. Words are the chief means of +communication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud. +Examples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the +Pharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the +condemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of +tribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that +He spoke against the Law;</p> + +<p>(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest +actions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game, +or defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by passing +himself off as their friend, etc.</p> + +<p>1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St. +Paul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by +appealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: “We +renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, +nor adulterating the word of God; but by manifestation of the truth +commending ourselves to every man’s consciousness in the sight of God” +(II Cor., iv. 2).</p> + +<p>1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends +on the character of the object, end and circumstances. (a) Thus, on +account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very +bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil +(e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the +sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g., +clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the +purpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small +sum); (c) on account of the circumstances the sin is made mortal by +some grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition +of time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal +if a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his +interests.</p> + +<p>1681. Solicitude.—Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude, +that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the +future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.</p> + +<p>(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: “Be not solicitous therefore saying: +‘What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be +clothed?’ ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will +be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof” +(Matt, vi. 31, 34).</p> + +<p>(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason +requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in +Divine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift +of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole +inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume +over the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or +unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.—(a) Solicitude +is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things +the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business +matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.</p> + +<p>(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of +obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity +that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much +time and thought to business, politics, society or science that +religion is more and more set aside in his life: “The cares of this +world choked up the word” (Matt., xiii. 22).</p> + +<p>(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a +temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that +fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life. +Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend +church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who +practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.</p> + +<p>1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.—(a) When the end is a genuine +temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty +dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who +saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his +dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the +true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in +money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: “Work must be +attended to, but worry must be banished” (St. Jerome).</p> + +<p>(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a +duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28), +Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as +almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.</p> + +<p>1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.—(a) Solicitude is +unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes +temporal things one’s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future, +as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair +means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.</p> + +<p>(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one +seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient +means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of +peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.</p> + +<p>(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time, +when one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries +during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about +the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves +with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the +imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented +(e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.</p> + +<p>1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.—(a) When the end is +a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good, +for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654). +Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against +the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen., +xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself +and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses +offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the +end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen +in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance +that they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine +which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1686. False Prudence and Avarice.—The sins of false prudence are +caused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a +great part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not +naturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason. +Avarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it +is shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that +have recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride, +vainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But +avarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and +prefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose +profits.</p> + +<p>1687. Commandments of Prudence.—Prudence is not expressly commanded in +the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other +parts of Scripture.</p> + +<p>(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten +commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest +to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.</p> + +<p>(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: “Get wisdom and +with all thy possession purchase prudence” (Prov., iv. 7); “Walk in the +ways of prudence” (ibid, ix. 6); “Purchase prudence, for it is more +precious than silver” (ibid, xvi. 16); “Be ye prudent as serpents” +(Matt., x, 16); “Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the +aged men be sober, chaste, prudent” (Tit., ii. 1, 2); “Be prudent and +Watch in prayers” (I Peter, iv. 7).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_THE_VIRTUE_OF_JUSTICE">Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)</p> + +<p>1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human +actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over +fortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man +virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor. +The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and +temperance.</p> + +<p>1689. Nature of Justice.—In God justice is an attribute in virtue of +which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded +complaint against Him: “His own justice supported Him. He put on +justice as a breastplate” (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness +towards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by +various names, such as “justice,” “equity,” “truth,” “righteousness.”</p> + +<p>(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness, +or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: “Blessed +are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)” (Matt., +v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is +also called justice or justification: “The justice of God by faith of +Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him” (Rom., +iii. 22).</p> + +<p>(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that +consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or +right: “Love justice, you that are judges of the earth” (Wis., i. 1); +“If in every deed you speak justice” (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense +the word “justice” is hereafter used.</p> + +<p>1690. Definition of Right.—Right signifies originally that which +follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard, +as in the expressions “right ahead,” “to be in the right.” But in moral +matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper, +suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective, +the former being the foundation of the latter.</p> + +<p>(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the +law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done, +especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense +there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason +itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).</p> + +<p>(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by +reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives +to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right, +right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of +respecting that authority (passive right, duty).</p> + +<p>1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing +or possessing something.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law +giving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its +enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make +right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered +from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere +legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an +ethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own +land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action +(e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what +he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property); +while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to +transfer, etc.</p> + +<p>1692. Divisions of Right.—(a) By reason of its source, or of the law +from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to +life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right +to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of +parishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of +citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of +the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict +(moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it +is one’s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life +and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one, +only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one +is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an +appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to +receive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue +(e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or +friendship by others) requires it.</p> + +<p>1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being +based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its +parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being +based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g., +the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the +nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent +fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);</p> + +<p>(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they +are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of +life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in +course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of +fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are +obtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from +others (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription, +inheritance, contract;</p> + +<p>(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is, +they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they +are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink +alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to +renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to +repel temptation, the right to serve God).</p> + +<p>1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be +Distinguished.—(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one +as one’s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The +right of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a +strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or +any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right, +since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.</p> + +<p>(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence +it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical +force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of +presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a +falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a +reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries +show signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be +enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his +employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means. +It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a +proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or +positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right +(e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally +not defensible, the right of a parent to his child’s respect) does not +prove that the right is not strict.</p> + +<p>1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_. +(a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which +one already lawfully has as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has +to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or +inchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as +one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised +him by Balbus).</p> + +<p>1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.—(a) The right _in re_ +authorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a +suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be +held, as when one sues to recover one’s property through the ejectment +of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically +bound to him who has the right, as being his own.</p> + +<p>(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one’s claim by a personal +action (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a +definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic +relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery +on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.</p> + +<p>1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.</p> + +<p>(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one +to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at +will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it +(e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down, +etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one’s property +to exclude the public).</p> + +<p>(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is +restricted as to the right of the disposition of one’s goods, for +example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of +disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is +forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns +(radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right +of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent +alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful +dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the +right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor’s +flock from grazing in one’s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).</p> + +<p>1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It +Exists.—(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called +just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b) +nor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not +apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice +is in the rational appetite or will.</p> + +<p>1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.—(a) The material +object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is +remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and +distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are +exchanged or distributed.</p> + +<p>(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally +intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of +others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring, +may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is +owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the +neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self, +while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and +gives him what belongs to him.</p> + +<p>1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so +fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.</p> + +<p>(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the +parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that +spring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial +and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more +strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations +that spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract +between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these +relationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but +as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one, +inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and +the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.</p> + +<p>(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and +than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and +neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal +society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another +stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another, +although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of +justice.</p> + +<p>1701. Division of Justice.—Justice is divided according to the rights +it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of +law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or +subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law +and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice +(fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.</p> + +<p>1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a +general condition found in all virtues?</p> + +<p>(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch +as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe +all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as +fortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of +the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence, +as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often +regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more +glorious than the star of eve or dawn.</p> + +<p>(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man +primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as +being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It +differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by +one’s own debt to the source of one’s life) and from obedience (for +legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that +are not commanded).</p> + +<p>1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.—(a) Particular +justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater +distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and +the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when +the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive +characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account +of the independence or “otherness” of those between whom it exists, so +much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when +only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man +and his soul, body, powers).</p> + +<p>(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or +filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good +as such) and is more voluntary.</p> + +<p>1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of +its members one of legal or one of particular justice?</p> + +<p>(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has +over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the +common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion +the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the +community of which he is part.</p> + +<p>(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation +for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an +implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will +serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the +expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals +(see 1708).</p> + +<p>1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.—On account of the +inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists, +particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative, +which are distinct species of justice.</p> + +<p>(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that +this justice—that is, relations towards particular persons—is either +the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations +are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue +that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to +portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens +(e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but +according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by +commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the +individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the +rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the +right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from +the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in +exchanges, such as buying and selling).</p> + +<p>(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and +commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main +characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality +between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice +in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when +a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it +is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice, +when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it +and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or +abilities.</p> + +<p>1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is +arithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is +just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice +is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of +90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90, +it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays +$80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and +commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private +matters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder, +pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends, +whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.</p> + +<p>1707. Corrective Justice.—Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive) +justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a +ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties +adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance +or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person +the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not +justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only +a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a +punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality +between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to +another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness +by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the +party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If +the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also +practises commutative justice.</p> + +<p>(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge +may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as +of the individual who has been injured.</p> + +<p>1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.—Different species of +justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be +elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of +justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of +vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of +justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of +distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the +payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution +from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services +contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say +that wages for services given the community are due in commutative +justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice +equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter +between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by +another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value +received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).</p> + +<p>1709. The Object of Justice.—The function of a moral virtue is to +direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the +free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions +of man and the external things of which he makes use.</p> + +<p>(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as +to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by +notable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and +those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations). +Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is +defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but +not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since +the virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations, +but the passions.</p> + +<p>(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not +communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and +external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter +either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money, +produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease +and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have +such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues +have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good +election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and +the other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose +the intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give +to the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to +choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for +external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but +not of the other two moral virtues.</p> + +<p>1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in +himself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and +temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and +not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to +regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and +things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But +both the passions and external operations have effects and consequent +ends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish +between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the +secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the +effects of the primary object.</p> + +<p>(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external +things; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions, +for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance +seek the good of the agent.</p> + +<p>(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its +principal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the +passions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice +to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue +of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the +passion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and +temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the +subject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in +reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and +desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as +combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to +others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and +if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food +or drink.</p> + +<p>1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.—The golden mean of virtue is not the +same in all the moral virtues (see 154).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the +benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of +excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined +by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances +(the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with +individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying +that what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. It would be absurd +to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and +that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and +quantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the +contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be +moderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of +life, etc., of the person.</p> + +<p>(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the +benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in +order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality, +which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the +middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of +external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and +of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the +subject. If the real value of a horse is $100—it makes no difference +whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich +or poor—the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the +buyer, deficiency to the seller.</p> + +<p>1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the +person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be +that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of +the person to whom justice is owed.</p> + +<p>(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of +the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative +proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of +persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice +must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as +compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe +equality by giving proper shares to all.</p> + +<p>(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when +the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a +ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the +mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the +payment and the debt.</p> + +<p>1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act +just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?</p> + +<p>(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the +affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its +mean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be +observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is +not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength); +but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last +penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a +sacrifice).</p> + +<p>(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the +negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a +virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances +are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely +out of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and +likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the +penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.</p> + +<p>1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.—The differences +between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore, +the following:</p> + +<p>(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good +of the agent himself;</p> + +<p>(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the +passions;</p> + +<p>(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;</p> + +<p>(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the +circumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.</p> + +<p>1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual +virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral +virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The +superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed +virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.</p> + +<p>(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they +pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good. +“Great is the splendor of justice,” says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_, +lib. I, cap. 28), “which is born for others rather than for itself, and +which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all +may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not +refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.” +Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the +courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal +justice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often +regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more +glorious than the star of eve or dawn.</p> + +<p>(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it +perfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the +good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is +impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even +though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an +injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An +indication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is +seen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is +more difficult and rarer: “Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue +at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor. +Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that +‘office will reveal a man,’ for one who is in office is at once brought +into relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is +he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to +his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his +own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.”</p> + +<p>1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent +than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is +nobler than they.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to +the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more +useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, +it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and +promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.</p> + +<p>(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more +than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other +hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity +liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, +while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; +justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be +liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless +he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives +more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice +without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than +liberality without justice.</p> + +<p>1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more +important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.</p> + +<p>(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the +worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man; +and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.</p> + +<p>(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to +relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater +than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an +individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due +to another.</p> + +<p>1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the +objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby +they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects), +but also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in +the souls of their possessors.</p> + +<p>(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor, +since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see +1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with +the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).</p> + +<p>(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from +the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and +promptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally +on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as +natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135, +136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and +enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus, +Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery, +David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is +praised as “a just man” (Matt., i. 19).</p> + +<p>1719. Injustice.—Just as the word “justice” is taken in a wide sense +for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict +sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word “injustice” +is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin +(“He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,” Matt., v. 45), but +strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (“Hear what the +unjust judge saith,” Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice +that we now speak.</p> + +<p>1720. Species of Injustice.—Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal +injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good +or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats +merely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain +condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if +one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there +is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b) +Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of +others that moves one to seek for more than is one’s share, or to +desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality +appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just +price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution +of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers +public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens +with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).</p> + +<p>1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.—(a) +From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a +very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very +foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done +either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice +(unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against +charity, the life of the soul; for charity “envieth not, dealeth not +perversely” (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and +leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of +injustice: “Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous, +nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God” (I Cor., vi. 10); +and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: “If you would enter into life, +keep the commandments” (Matt, xix. 18).</p> + +<p>(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.), +or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice +may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on +account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes +only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is +venial.</p> + +<p>1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.—The rule +for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small, +is the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable +unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins +against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in +proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice +offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts +of injustice are gravely sinful:</p> + +<p>(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a +matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and +gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny, +adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the +party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only +venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin +done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing +that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will +almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity, +etc.;</p> + +<p>(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right +in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely +averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common +good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful +government, or when the peace and security of the community is +imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one +steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though +the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a +private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the +community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous +consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were +not gravely forbidden.</p> + +<p>1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.—These are +distinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that +are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four +kinds of injustice:</p> + +<p>(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or +supernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);</p> + +<p>(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g., +murder, mutilation);</p> + +<p>(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or +corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).</p> + +<p>1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.—There are also many accidental +forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves +change the moral species (see 200).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by +action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission +(e.g., by allowing another to steal from one’s employer). In both cases +the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits +theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.</p> + +<p>(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either +merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right +is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born), +or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is +born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the +latter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_damnum_) +that results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in +internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in +external goods (such as reputation, money, property).</p> + +<p>(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice +is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or +unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is +the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by +his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he +does not gain does not make the injury less.</p> + +<p>1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is +done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one +cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while +neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this +as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal +maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are +necessary in order that there be a surrender of right:</p> + +<p>(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since, +if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who +kills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one +who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is +unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a +cleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is +unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with +the latter’s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no +authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to +lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that +they consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own +murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter +dominion over their lives;</p> + +<p>(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and +hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no +effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article +or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts +less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at +the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true +consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ +not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person +rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to +surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to +practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.</p> + +<p>1726. Internal Injustice.—Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention +of injuring another) make an external action unjust?</p> + +<p>(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a +strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a +book from another’s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there +may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow), +or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).</p> + +<p>(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of +strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it +does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no +strict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of +Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus’ property, +and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the +agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a +judge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention +is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does +not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even +grave sin, is committed against charity.</p> + +<p>1727. Judgment.—Judgment, or the right determination of what is just +and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and +hence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take +their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either +public or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the +authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b) +Private judgment is passed by individuals without public authority +concerning the morals or conduct of others.</p> + +<p>1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find +that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with +authority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in +all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the +judge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times +tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are +required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in +those who pass judgment.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives +and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v, +teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to +contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one’s +spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave +scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had +recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed +according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first +condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according +as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some +human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second +condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if +the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be +noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office +and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).</p> + +<p>1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.—The first condition of +righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and +sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge +is a bad man—that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?</p> + +<p>(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a +sin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence +on another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited +and an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness. +But if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g., +if a notorious thief passes sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not +grave in so far as justice is concerned.</p> + +<p>(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and +if the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice +to condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he +commits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of +hypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal +righteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord +reprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave +crimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they +themselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, “Let him that is +without sin among you cast the first stone” (John, viii. 7), condemn +hypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free +from all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers, +prosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished +by their office to reform themselves according to the words of St. +Paul: “In judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the +same things which thou judgest” (Rom., ii. 1).</p> + +<p>1730. Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is +legality, if there is question of judgment in court.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws +cannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be +interpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence, +proceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time, +or in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a +court has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter +in controversy.</p> + +<p>(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the +usual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not +to make law or custom (_jus dicere, non facere_). His opinions as +precedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he +is especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are +binding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the +just disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by +indicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If +the application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in +conscience pronounce sentence according to that law; but there are many +cases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford +relief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law, +and in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized +principles of natural justice and the rules of his court.</p> + +<p>1731. Third Condition.—The third condition of righteous judgment is +that the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a +judicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of +evidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash +judgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but +also and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about +the character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest +of sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against +the neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its +outward expressions.</p> + +<p>(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is +affirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a +mere representation or thought. This distinction is important for +scrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that +flash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a +very common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit; +they become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.</p> + +<p>(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of +character or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when +without reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary +merit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character +or honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or +physically deficient, and these defects are not connected with +depravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable +decisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks +that an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but passes +no judgment on the state of conscience of the man).</p> + +<p>(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere +supposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential attitude by which one +assumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted, +since he may be dishonest.</p> + +<p>(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one +which holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the +opposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from +doubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the +unfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more +than the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind +inclines to the unfavorable view, but does not assent to it as being +either probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in +which the mind assents to the unfavorable view as being probably true, +but admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental +reaction were treated in 654 sqq.</p> + +<p>(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient +authority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn +from premises. Thus, if one judges that one’s neighbor is a thief, +because this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the +judgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person +who is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is +imprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one’s neighbor +is a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the +judgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion +based on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is +not rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the +present generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if +one has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive +pessimism in such matters is unwarranted.</p> + +<p>1732. The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else, +but insufficient for the judgment actually formed.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or +degree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another +kind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another’s +desk, there is an argument for willful trespass, but this alone does +not prove larceny or the intent to steal.</p> + +<p>(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion, +sufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient +for opinion and insufficient for judgment.</p> + +<p>1733. Rash Judgment.—Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if +there is no sufficient reason to warrant them.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion, +it is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two +men have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it +likely that they are plotting evil.</p> + +<p>(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an +unfavorable opinion or for suspending all assent, suspicion and doubt +are rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the +owners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or +even to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house +in daylight and in a usual way.</p> + +<p>1734. Sinfulness of Rash Judgment.—Rash judgment strictly understood, +then, is a firm assent of the mind, based on insufficient data, and +given to the view that a neighbor is or has been guilty of sin.</p> + +<p>(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, for it consists in a contempt +for, and an injury to, what is regarded as one of the chief goods of +man, namely, the favorable opinion of him that is entertained by +others. It is denounced in Scripture as an injury to the law itself +(“He that judgeth his brother judgeth the law,” James, iv. 11), and as +meriting condemnation (“Judge not, and you will not be judged, condemn +not and you will not be condemned,” Luke, vi. 37).</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act or from the lightness of the +matter rash judgment may be only a venial sin, as when unfounded +suspicions arise in the mind without advertence to their sinfulness, or +when one rashly judges in some small matter (e.g., that another person +stole a pin or a cent).</p> + +<p>1735. Rash judgment is not mortally sinful in an individual case unless +the following conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) there must be perfect deliberation, that is, full advertence to the +judgment itself and to its sinfulness and gravity (see 175). There is +no full advertence to the sinfulness and gravity of the judgment, +however, if one does not perceive at least in a confused manner that +one is deciding in one’s mind without sufficient reason that one’s +neighbor is guilty of serious sin, and is thereby doing the latter a +great injury. But it is not necessary that the rash judgment continue +for a considerable time, for the malice depends on the evil done, not +on the length of time it has lasted;</p> + +<p>(b) there must be serious rashness, for the sinfulness of the judgment +rests on its rashness. Hence, if one judges a sin to be certain which +is very probable or almost certain, there is no great imprudence and +therefore no serious sin;</p> + +<p>(c) there must be grave injury and contempt, for in these the malice of +rash judgment consists. Hence, if one judges that another is a drunkard +and neither the latter person nor others in the same place regard +drunkenness as very dishonorable, there is no great harm done. +Similarly, if one judges that some indeterminate individual of a +multitude or group is a rascal, or that a stranger whom one sees on the +street late at night is out on an evil errand, or that an unknown party +seen from a distance is on his way to a disreputable meeting, it does +not seem that there is great injury done; for one does not greatly +resent lack of esteem in others to whom one is not known.</p> + +<p>1736. Rules on Perfect Advertence to Rashness of Judgment.—(a) There +is perfect advertence when one actually perceives that the reasons for +one’s unfavorable judgment are very insufficient; (b) there is perfect +advertence when one virtually perceives the serious insufficiency of +the reasons, that is, when one could and should perceive it, but is +vincibly blind to it (see 30, 31) on account of some passion wilfully +indulged, such as hatred or envy of the person judged. In these cases +one judges with negligence and precipitancy in a serious matter (see +Imprudence).</p> + +<p>1737. Rules on Insufficiency of Reasons for Unfavorable Judgments.—(a) +Those authorities for sin are not sufficiently trustworthy whose +reliability is of inferior worth (e.g., because they are enemies of the +person against whom they speak, or calumniators, or gossipers, or of +bad reputation, etc.), or whose story does not merit the credence they +claim for it (e.g., because the person against whom they speak is known +as upright). If both the authorities for a story and the person against +whom they speak are equal in good qualities, there is sufficient reason +for doubts, but nothing more.</p> + +<p>(b) Those arguments for sin are not sufficient which create for what is +concluded only a slight presumption (see 658), that is, which offer +facts that are never, or seldom, or not necessarily causes or effects +or indications of sin. Thus, it is rash to judge that a mature man and +woman conversing together in a dignified manner and in a public and +open place are discussing obscene matters; or that a respectable person +whose face is flushed, or whose hand trembles, or who slips on the +street, has been imbibing too freely; or that a man climbing into a +second story on a frequented highway and in broad daylight is a +burglar. This rule may be expressed in other words by saying that +reasons for drawing unfavorable conclusions are insufficient when in +view of the circumstances and time, place, persons, deed, etc., no +prudent person would consider the conclusions as warranted.</p> + +<p>1738. Rules on Gravity of Matter in Rash Judgments.—(a) From the +nature of the thing ascribed to the other person, only judgments that +mortal sin has been committed are grave matter; for only mortal sin is +in itself a grave reproach.</p> + +<p>(b) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgment of mortal +sin may be only venial; for it sometimes happens that certain kinds of +serious sins are not considered very ignominious in certain persons or +conditions. Thus, in some places it is considered honorable for +soldiers or students to have wounded adversaries in duels; some persons +of a rough kind are proud of their proficiency in blasphemy or +obscenity; where drunkenness is common, it is not considered as very +disgraceful.</p> + +<p>(c) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgments of venial +sin or of what is not sin at all may be mortal; for to those from whom +much is expected slighter defects may be causes of great disgrace. +Thus, it is very dishonoring to the parties concerned to think that a +prelate is an habitual liar, that a nun visits too often, that a public +official is illegitimate or stupid or afflicted with syphilis, and +therefore unworthy of his position.</p> + +<p>1739. The Moral Species of the Sin of Rash Judgment.—(a) It is a sin +against justice, because it infringes the strict right of the neighbor +that he be not judged guilty of evil without sufficient reason, and +that he be not held worthy of contempt until he has clearly forfeited +the right to respect. It is true that judgment as here taken is an +internal act, and that it was said above that only external acts form +the subject-matter of justice; but internal acts that are referred +immediately to external acts, as concupiscence tends to lust and anger +to injury, may be classed with these external acts. Hence, internal +judgment naturally leads up to external judgment, and so it pertains to +justice, just as the desire to steal is unjust and the desire to make +restitution is just.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a sin against charity, because it does not practise +benevolence (“Charity thinketh no evil,” I Cor., xiii. 5), and is +usually associated with ill-will or envy. He who judges rashly does not +love his neighbor as himself, for he does not observe the rule not to +do to others what he would not have done to himself.</p> + +<p>1740. The moral species of rash judgment is not changed according to +the species of sin attributed to another (such as heresy, dishonesty, +impurity), and these circumstances of the rash judgment need not be +mentioned in confession.</p> + +<p>1741. The Moral Species of Rash Opinion, Suspicion and Doubt.—Do the +conclusions given above on the theological species of rash judgment +apply also to rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt?</p> + +<p>(a) Some theologians answer in the affirmative, and argue that the same +grave injury and contempt of the neighbor is found in these sins as in +rash judgment, and that Scripture makes no distinction between the one +and the other. On the contrary, they say, murmurings, detractions, and +hatreds are caused oftener by doubts, suspicions, and opinions, since +firm and certain judgments are not so often formed; and moreover there +is no one who would not prefer to be judged certainly guilty of +fornication than to be doubted or suspected of more heinous crimes, +such as incest or sodomy.</p> + +<p>(b) Other theologians answer in the negative, and argue that suspicion +and doubt do not inflict a severe harm, since they stop short of firm +decision of the mind and so are incomplete injuries which diminish +rather than take away the esteem due to another. But the defenders of +the affirmative reply that, while opinion, suspicion and doubt are +incomplete as regards assent, they are not incomplete as regards +deliberation and consent, and so can be mortally sinful, as is seen in +the case of doubts against faith (see 840 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(c) Still other theologians hold that rash opinions, suspicions and +doubts are from their nature mortal sins on account of the arguments +for the first opinion, but that in actual experience they are usually +venial on account of the imperfection of the act (since on account of +human frailty doubts, suspicions, or evil opinions of others can easily +arise before they are noticed), or the lightness of the matter (for +there is rarely one of these mental states without some reason that +seems to be at least approximately a justification). But it seems +likely that rash judgments themselves are seldom mortal sins, since the +conditions for mortal sin are not often realized in them.</p> + +<p>1742. The Chief Reasons for Rash Conclusions about the Character of +Others.—(a) A first reason is that the person who draws the conclusion +is bad himself. Evil-doers are very prone to suspect others of evil, +for sin seems so delightful to them that they think others must find +the same pleasure in it: “The fool when he walketh in the way, since he +himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools” (Eccles., x. 3).</p> + +<p>(b) A second reason is that the wish is often father to the thought. +Thus, if one hates or envies another or is angered against him, even +trifles light as air will suffice to make one judge him guilty of sin. +Just as love blinds an infatuated lover to the sins or crimes of the +object of his affection, so does prejudice give a distorted vision that +can see nothing but evil in the object of its dislike.</p> + +<p>(c) A third reason for rash views unfavorable to others is long +experience in dealing with human nature. Thus, old men sometimes become +not merely cautious, which is reasonable, but unduly suspicious. +Similarly, those who have encountered many trials or disappointments in +life often become cynical and misanthropic, and to them the actions of +all their fellowmen appear either evil or at least spoiled by an evil +purpose.</p> + +<p>1743. Rash Doubts.—Doubt about the probity of others is sinful, when +there are no sufficient reason for it; for example, it would be +unreasonable to suspend judgment about a man of excellent reputation +because a well-known calumniator had spoken against him. But a doubt +may be reasonable, as when a person has had a good reputation for +honesty but a reliable witness declares that he is dishonest. In such a +case should one decide for the innocence or for the guilt of the party +called into doubt, or should one suspend judgment on the matter?</p> + +<p>(a) It is not lawful to interpret reasonable doubts in a sense +unfavorable to another person, for this would amount to rash judgment, +since the reasons are sufficient for doubt but not for decision. Hence, +it would be wrong to believe that a person of good repute was a thief, +because another person of good repute said so.</p> + +<p>(b) It is lawful to suspend judgment in case of reasonable doubts, if +there is no obligation of deciding one way or the other, for in so +doing one does no injury either to one’s own intelligence (since the +doubt is reasonable) or to the honor of another person (since, as +supposed, there is no obligation of judging positively in his favor). +Just as there is no duty of making acts of love of our neighbor on +every occasion, neither is there a duty of deciding doubts to his +advantage on every occasion, or of having any opinion about him +whatever. Some authors do not admit this, but the common teaching is +against them.</p> + +<p>(c) It is not lawful to suspend judgment, but the reasonable doubt must +be resolved in a favorable sense, if there is an obligation or a wish +to decide one way or the other; otherwise one would decide in an +unfavorable sense and be guilty of rash judgment. This is what is meant +by the well-known maxim that doubts about the character of a neighbor +should be settled in favor of the neighbor. Hence, if one were in +serious danger of forming a rash judgment and could not otherwise +overcome the temptation, a suspension of judgment should give place to +favorable judgment. It is true that one may be frequently in error by +thus judging well of mankind, since man is inclined to evil from his +youth (Gen., viii. 21) and the number of fools is infinite (Eccles., i. +15). But it is a less evil to fall into the speculative error of taking +a bad man for good than by adopting another course to fall into the +practical error of becoming bad oneself by violating a law of prudence, +justice and charity; and it is less harmful that many sinners should +receive more credit than they deserve, than that one just man should be +deprived of the good opinion that belongs to him. Pseudo-Ambrose (Apol. +ii, David, c. 2, n. 5) says that those who judge others rashly often +become worse by this act than the persons they judge; and St. Thomas +remarks that favorable opinions of others harm no one, whereas +unfavorable opinions are a wrong to innocent persons.</p> + +<p>1744. The interpretation of doubts in a favorable sense does not mean +that one may not take into consideration the possibility of danger or +deception and use remedies or precautions. This course is not rash +judgment, for even when one judges that another person is good, one +knows that the judgment is possibly wrong, and therefore cannot be +entirely relied on for external guidance.</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful, therefore, to act as if one did have a bad opinion of +another when there is a possibility of harm that must be guarded +against. Thus, a father may forbid his children to keep company with +other children, for these latter may be corrupt; an employer may keep +his money under lock and key, because servants may be dishonest; a +traveller may carry weapons, because the inhabitants among whom he +travels may be treacherous. Even though appearances are favorable, one +may be on one’s guard, for appearances are often deceptive.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lawful, however, to protect oneself or others in such a +needlessly conspicuous or offensive manner as to sadden or defame the +other party against whom one takes the precautions. Thus, it would be +unjust and uncharitable to go about ostentatiously locking safes and +drawers whenever a certain person appeared, for this would be +equivalent to saying that he was a thief.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_THE_SUBJECTIVE_PARTS_OF_JUSTICE_COMMUTATIVE_AND_DISTRIBUTIVE">Art. 3: THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE +JUSTICE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 61, 62.)</p> + +<p>1745. The Three Species of Justice.—The subjective parts of a virtue +are those that partake of its essence and that are the subordinate +species into which it may be distinguished, as prudence is divided into +individual, domestic and political (see 1639). There are three species +of justice, and their division is taken from the threefold relation +that exists in a whole.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, legal justice directs the parts to respect the rights of the +whole, and it is exercised by all those who promote the common good of +a society by fulfilling well the duties which pertain to their position +and rank in the society.</p> + +<p>(b) Distributive justice regulates the whole in reference to the parts, +and it is exercised by all those who seek for such a distribution of +the common things of a society as accords with the inequalities of +merit and ability of the members. Hence, distributive justice is found +not only in the heads of a state, or family, or other body, but also in +the subordinates who are content with the fair distributions made by +the heads.</p> + +<p>(c) Commutative justice orders the relations between the parts, and it +is exercised by all who practise fair dealing with their equals, that +is, by states with states, families with families, societies with like +societies, individuals with individuals; or with those who act as their +equals, as when a society acting as a moral person makes a contract +with one of its members as another moral person.</p> + +<p>1746. Resemblance between Distributive and Commutative Justice.—The +general likeness between distributive and commutative justice may be +summed up as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) they have the same remote matter, since both alike are concerned +with external things, persons or works. Thus, things such as goods of +fortune may be distributed by the community to its members, or may be +exchanged by individuals between them; labors to be performed may be +assigned by the community or may be agreed on by private persons +through contract;</p> + +<p>(b) they have the same general form, since both alike seek to impress +equality on the matter with which they deal, by rendering in these +things to every one his due, and by making man’s actions towards his +neighbor to follow the mean of reason and of the thing (see 1711).</p> + +<p>1747. The Special Differences between Distributive and Commutative +Justice.—(a) They differ in their proximate matter, that is, in the +operations by which use is made of external things, persons or works; +for while distributive justice acts through distribution (or division), +appointment, or assignment among many, commutative justice acts through +exchange, or transfer from one to another between two persons.</p> + +<p>(b) They differ in their special form; for distributive justice seeks +equality and the golden mean, according to proportion, while +commutative justice seeks the same according to quantity (see 1712). +Distributive justice does not treat parties as equals, but gives to +each one according to his personal worth—to the more deserving the +superior positions and high salaries, to the less deserving the +inferior positions and lower salaries. Commutative justice, on the +other hand, treats the parties as equal, and decrees that debts must be +paid and injuries repaired, even though payment or reparation must be +made by a good man to a bad man, and that the recompense must equal the +difference created between the parties by the debt or the injury.</p> + +<p>1748. Commutations of Commutative Justice.—There are various kinds of +commutations or exchanges used by commutative justice, but they do not +create new species of justice, since they are only accidental modes of +the act of giving the equivalent of what one receives. They are +classified as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) involuntary commutations, which are those in which reparation is +made for the use against the will of another of the things, persons, or +works that pertain to him. Thus, the property of another is used +unlawfully by secret theft and by open robbery; the person of another +is injured by murder and wounds; the honor of another by secret calumny +and detraction, by open false testimony and contumely; the rights of +another to persons are used unlawfully by adultery with his wife, by +seduction of his servant, and the like;</p> + +<p>(b) voluntary commutations, which are those in which compensation is +made for a benefit that one derived with the owner’s consent from +something that was his, or in which one gives or returns to another +what is his. They include the various forms of contracts, or agreements +between two parties in which the consent of both to the same proposal +is externally manifested and obligation is produced to abide by the +terms of agreement.</p> + +<p>1749. Forms of Contract.—The chief forms of contract are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) gratuitous contracts, which are those that confer advantage on only +one of the contractants, or those in which no payment or compensation +for his acts or goods is made to one party by the other party. They +include unilateral contracts, which produce obligation on one side only +(e.g., a promise, gift, testament), and bilateral contracts, which +produce obligation on both sides. The bilateral contracts are also +known as bailments, or understandings whereby a thing or business is +transferred from one person to another in trust, on condition that a +return will be made to the owner, They include the following contracts: +loans, in which return must be made of the identical things borrowed +(_commodatum_), or of a thing similar in kind (_mutuum_); deposit, in +which a thing must be returned after safekeeping (_depositum_); an +agency, in which one conducts the business of another with the +obligation of making returns, either from express contract (_mandatum_) +or from imputed agreement (_negotiorum gestio_). In _commodatum_ and +_mutuum_ the advantage is had by the bailee, in the other three by the +bailor;</p> + +<p>(b) onerous contracts of certain event, which are those that confer an +advantage on both parties, and in which the thing agreed on is certain +and definite. They include contracts in which one party transfers +ownership to the other (e.g., buying and selling, barter, loan at +interest, contracts for annuities, stocks and bonds) or useful dominion +(e.g., lease of property, contractor’s agreement, hire of labor), and +contracts in which both parties transfer rights to a moral person of +which they are the members (partnership);</p> + +<p>(c) onerous contracts of uncertain event, which are those that confer +advantage on both parties, but in which the thing agreed on is +contingent and uncertain. Examples are insurance, wager, gaming +contracts, lottery, and stock market speculation;</p> + +<p>(d) subsidiary contracts, which are those that are made in order to +give security to principal contracts to which they are annexed or for +whose sake they are made. Such are guaranty and surety, pledge and +pawn, and mortgage.</p> + +<p>1750. The Equality Sought by Commutative Justice.—The equality in +quantity sought by commutative justice means that in involuntary +transactions the offender must suffer a punishment equal to the injury +he offered or must pay a recompense equal to the damage he caused, and +that in voluntary transactions one must give the equal of what one +receives. But this can be understood in two ways.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, equality may be taken for identity in species, in the sense +that the same kind of thing must be taken or returned (e.g., a life for +a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). This kind of equality +will do in some instances, as in cases of exchange of goods, but as a +rule it would not be fair to both parties. Thus, if a subject strikes a +ruler, he is not sufficiently punished if he receives the same kind of +blow, for the injury to the ruler is greater on account of his office; +when a man steals a cow or a sheep, he is not sufficiently punished if +he restores what he took, for he would suffer no loss and the community +whose peace he had offended would go without satisfaction (Exod., xxii. +1); if one gives one’s cow for another’s cow, or if a shoemaker trades +his products for the clothes made by a tailor, the exchange may be +unfair, since the thing given on one side may be better than that given +on the other side.</p> + +<p>(b) Equality may be understood as identity in value, in the sense that +the thing taken or returned has the same quantity of goodness or +excellence as the thing received, no matter how they differ in species. +This kind of equality must be observed as a rule both in involuntary +and voluntary transactions. Thus, for injury done to merchandise +payment is made in money, or vice versa. If equality in value is not +possible, because the good for which one owes is on a higher plane than +the good which one is able to give, it seems that justice requires one +to approximate equality as far as possible, and hence mayhem or +defamation should be compensated for by the goods of fortune (see 1802 +and 2090).</p> + +<p>1751. Restitution.—Justice not only commands that one pay or give back +what is due in voluntary transactions, but also that one repair injury +which one has caused in involuntary transactions. But the four acts of +payment, restoration, satisfaction, and restitution must not be +confused.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, payment is the lawful bestowal by one person on another +person of something of value in return for some other thing of value. +It is clear that payment differs from satisfaction and restitution, +since it supposes no act of injustice done.</p> + +<p>(b) Restoration is the return to another of his property of which one +had just possession, as when a borrower gives back to the lender, or a +depositee to the depositor. This also differs from satisfaction and +restitution, since it is a voluntary transaction (see 1792, 1796).</p> + +<p>1752. Differences between Satisfaction and Restitution.—(a) They +differ as to their principle or cause, since satisfaction is due for +injury to honor, restitution for injury to goods by unjust detention or +unjust damage. Hence, a person who has dishonored another (e.g., by +disrespect) is bound to satisfaction; a person who has injured another +(e.g., by destroying his goods) is bound to restitution; a person who +has both injured and dishonored another (e.g., by adding insults to +robbery) is bound to restitution and satisfaction.</p> + +<p>(b) Satisfaction and restitution differ as to their term or object, +since satisfaction is chiefly concerned with the person to whom amends +must be made (as by apology), while restitution is chiefly concerned +with the thing which must be given back in itself or in its equivalent.</p> + +<p>1753. When Restitution Is Due.—Restitution is the act by which one +places another in renewed possession or ownership or chance of +ownership of that which is owed to him because it is his by reason of a +strict right _in re_ or _ad rem_; in other words, it restores the +equality that existed before an injury was done to the goods of another.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, restitution is not due for violation of virtues other than +justice, because these virtues are not concerned with strict +obligations and rights. Repentance and satisfaction are due for all +sins, but they are not the same thing as restitution. Hence, one is not +bound to restitution if one refused to help with alms a person in +extreme need, or if, not being obliged to it by office, one neglected +to extinguish a fire or to prevent a robbery. These are sins against +charity, not against justice.</p> + +<p>(b) Restitution is not due for violations of virtues that pertain to +justice but do not confer strict rights, and hence it is only a +violation of commutative justice that entails the obligation of +restitution. Thus, if one has been surly or ungrateful, no legal right +has been violated and no restitution is due.</p> + +<p>1754. Does Distributive Injustice Oblige to Restitution?—(a) If only +distributive injustice is committed (e. g., if a parent gives his +children all necessaries but shows special favor to those that are less +deserving), there is no duty of restitution, for there is no strict +claim to special favors. (b) If commutative injustice accompanies the +distributive injustice (e.g., if a ruler acts against his agreement to +give the best position to the person who passes the best examination), +there is a duty of restitution, for there is a strict claim to rights +under contract.</p> + +<p>1755. Distributive Justice and the Violation of Strict +Rights.—Injustice in distribution is frequently accompanied by +injustice in transaction on account of some strict right violated, and +hence by reason of the latter injustice there will be a duty of +restitution (see 1708, 1808).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a +strict right of society when an unfair distribution is contrary to +agreement made with the community (e.g., when one is appointed or paid +especially to make fair distributions, or the law or contract expressly +imposes this obligation), or when it causes harm to the community which +one is bound _ex officio_ to prevent (e.g., when one appoints as public +physician or surgeon a person who is entirely unfitted for the post).</p> + +<p>(b) Distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a strict +right of an individual when it is against contract (e.g., when a person +undertakes to select the best statue or portrait presented in a +contest, but chooses one that is inferior), or when it inflicts loss on +a private person (e.g., when a tax assessor requires more than is due +from some persons, or an examiner admits to a school which receives +only a limited number an unworthy candidate and thus excludes a worthy +one, or a board rejects a worthy candidate as unworthy).</p> + +<p>1756. Commutative Justice and Unfair Awards of Prizes.—Unfair awards +of prizes in competitions are not violations of commutative justice +unless the following conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) the promise of award must be given as a contract binding in +justice, for if the promisor intends only to bind himself in fidelity, +the promisee obtains no strict right. Hence, an unfair distribution is +not against commutative justice if a competition has not the character +of a real contest or of an onerous compact to reward the person who +surpasses his rivals, but is rather an opportunity to compete for the +free bounty of the promisor (e.g., if the organizer of an entertainment +offers a prize for the prettiest baby), or an encouragement to useful +industry (e.g., a first prize for the best garden in a neighborhood). +On the contrary, if the promise is part of an onerous contract, the +promisor is bound in justice and the promisee obtains a strict right. +This is the case when the competition has the character of a real +contest, in which the contestants must undergo special labor, +preparation, expense or trouble, etc., in order that the award be given +to the most meritorious;</p> + +<p>(b) the thing promised as subject of award must be the prize, and not +merely a claim or right to be considered for the prize. Hence, if an +examination is held in order that a number of worthy persons may be +listed for future vacancies in offices or dignities, the person who +passes as most worthy has no strict right to be given an office or +dignity, but only to be considered for it.</p> + +<p>1757. Has a person who passes as most worthy in an examination held in +order to fill a vacant post a strict right to receive the post?</p> + +<p>(a) According to the common opinion he has a strict right, because +there is at least an implicit contract to the effect that the position +will be given to the most worthy, since the examination is competitive.</p> + +<p>(b) According to some authorities he has no strict right, because +public positions are not to be regarded as rewards of merit, and the +examination is not part of a contract but is only a means used by a +superior to assist him in acting according to distributive justice. +Nevertheless, even in this opinion an unjust award is a sin, and at +times a grave sin, against distributive justice, and may accidentally +be joined with commutative injustice (see 1755).</p> + +<p>(c) Under the civil service method, or merit system, of appointment, +the appointing official is bound by law to observe the rules of the +civil service commission. The usual procedure is for the commission to +submit the names of the three persons highest on the examination list. +Position on the list is determined by competitive examination plus +preferential points for veterans, experience in jobs, etc. (On the +whole the preferential system does not seem to involve any injustice to +those who do not receive the preference.) One of the three must be +chosen for the first vacancy; for the second vacancy the remaining two, +together with the next highest eligible, are proposed. Grave injustice +against distributive justice would be done in not proceeding according +to the legal method, and some degree of injustice might be done to an +eligible who is illegally removed from a list, passed over, etc. Of the +three highest eligibles no one has a strict right to the vacant post, +but solely the right to be seriously considered.</p> + +<p>1758. What should be said of a superior who would promote undeserving +persons to ecclesiastical benefices?</p> + +<p>(a) As regards guilt, it is a mortal sin to confer a benefice on one +who is unworthy, or even (when there is question of a benefice to which +the care of souls is attached) on one who is less worthy (see Canon +459, Sec. 1).</p> + +<p>(b) As regards restitution, there is an obligation of reparation to the +community, when it is made to suffer loss, and of compensation to an +individual who is passed over in spite of his strict right (see three +preceding paragraphs).</p> + +<p>1759. The Obligation of Restitution.—(a) The obligation is both of +natural and divine law. Reason itself dictates that everyone should +receive his due, and revelation expressly commands restitution, as when +it declares that he who has injured his neighbor’s field or vineyard +must restore according to the damage done (Exod., xxii. 5).</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation is both of means and of precept, for without +restitution the offender does not obtain pardon from God (Ezech., +xxxiii. 13 sqq,; Tob., ii. 20 sqq.). Hence, one who has seriously +injured his neighbor cannot be saved unless he actually makes +restitution, if he is able, or intends to make restitution when +possible, if here and now he is not able to do so. A debtor who makes +no effort to make restitution (e.g., one who refuses to deny himself +luxuries, to curtail his expenses, to leave restitution money in his +will), cannot be said to have a sincere intention of fulfilling his +duty. But it is not true that a person who dies in venial sin on +account of restitution neglected must remain in Purgatory till all the +restitution is made; for this would make the punishment depend on the +negligence of the heirs or on accident.</p> + +<p>(c) The obligation is grave if the damage (absolute or relative) and +the fault were both grave, for restitution is an obligation of strict +justice (see 1753); the obligation is light if both the damage and the +fault were light, for the injury then is light.</p> + +<p>1760. Duties of Confessors about the Obligation of Restitution.—(a) As +to confession, the penitent is obliged to mention the number of sins +committed against the duty of restitution, if there have been many acts +of intention not to pay (see 202 sqq.); but as a rule those who have +for a long time continued in sinful neglect of the duty of restitution +have committed only one sin thereby, or else they do not apprehend +their duty of mentioning the distinct internal acts, and hence +confessors are advised not to question overmuch about this.</p> + +<p>(b) As to absolution, the penitent lacks true contrition if he is under +a serious obligation to make restitution and is wilfully opposed to the +performance of this duty at all or at the proper time. Such a one may +not be absolved. But the confessor should not admonish a penitent of +the duty of restitution, if the penitent is in good faith and the +admonition would only do harm. If the obligation of restitution is only +light, absolution may not be refused, and prudence will often advise +that no admonition about the obligation be given.</p> + +<p>1761. There are a number of situations possible when damage done is +grave and culpability slight.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the damage may be entirely involuntary, as when the offender +could not foresee it and did not wish it (e.g., Sempronius commits a +venial sin by speaking harshly to Claudius, whom he likes, but the +latter is so depressed at this that he commits suicide). In this case +there is clearly no obligation of restitution.</p> + +<p>(b) The damage may be voluntary only interpretatively, as when the +offender could not foresee it, but would have willed it had he foreseen +it (e.g., Sempronius is glad when he learns that Claudius committed +suicide, but would be much surprised if he knew that a harsh word of +his caused it). In this case according to some there is a grave duty of +restitution, because internal guilt and external damage are present; +but others, with greater probability, deny the duty of restitution, for +the damage was not caused by the internal sin of hate, which is not +effective of itself, nor by the external harsh word, which was an +occasion rather than a cause (see 1447, 1763).</p> + +<p>(c) The damage may be voluntary directly, as when the offender wills it +in itself (e.g., Titus steals a considerable sum from Balbus, but he is +invincibly ignorant and thinks that the wealth of Balbus makes the sin +only venial), or the damage done is voluntary indirectly (e.g., Caius +is guilty of slight carelessness in guarding his cattle, and they get +into a neighbor’s garden and cause great damage to crops; Caius foresaw +some damage, but he could not have foreseen the actual grave damage +that was done). About these cases there are various opinions, which +will be given in 1765.</p> + +<p>1762. The Roots of Restitution.—The roots or sources of restitution +are usually reduced to two, according to the following two general +kinds of injury inflicted on others:</p> + +<p>(a) unjust damage, which is the loss inflicted, on the goods of +another, without advantage to the offender, as in murder or +incendiarism;</p> + +<p>(b) unjust possession, which is the loss inflicted on another by the +possession of his goods without his consent or against his will, to the +advantage of the offender, as when a murderer steals from his victim, +or an incendiary gets the insurance from the house he destroyed.</p> + +<p>1763. Unjust damage that obliges to restitution is only an act (or +omission) that is both injurious (being a guilty violation of another’s +strict right) and productive of loss. Hence the following conditions:</p> + +<p>(a) the act must be objectively unjust, a contravention of a strict +right _in re_ or _ad rem_ (see 1695 sqq.), for example, stealing or +keeping back the wages due an employee. But it is objectively unjust to +deprive another of a non-strict right (e.g., the right of a beggar to +an alms) by unjust means, such as force, fraud, calumny, etc. If a +neighbor is not hindered from his strict right and unfair means are not +employed, there is no objective injustice (e.g., when a merchant +improves his place of business and thus draws away customers from a +rival merchant);</p> + +<p>(b) the act must be efficaciously unjust or the true cause of the loss +which another suffers, for one is not responsible for what does not +proceed from one’s act. An act is not efficaciously unjust, therefore, +if it is only the occasion of damage (e.g., Titus steals and Balbus +imitates him; Claudius steals, and on account of circumstantial +evidence not arranged by Claudius, Sempronius is arrested and sentenced +to prison), or if it is only a _conditio sine qua non_ (e.g., Caius +gives whisky to Julius, who needs its stimulation to nerve himself for +a crime), or if it is only an accidental cause (e.g., Titus steals a +small sum of money from a miser, and the latter, to the great surprise +of Titus, becomes insane);</p> + +<p>(c) the act must be subjectively unjust, that is, culpable and +imputable; for one is not bound to satisfy for acts that are inculpable +or not imputable (see 97 sqq.). There must be either theological +culpability, that is, the intention to harm another, which is sinful +before God (e.g., he who purposely sets fire to his neighbor’s barn), +or juridical culpability, that is, carelessness which causes injury to +the legal right of another (e.g., he who lights a fire near his +neighbor’s buildings and by his absent-mindedness permits the buildings +to catch fire).</p> + +<p>1764. Some Causes That Remove or Diminish Theological Culpability.—(a) +Mental derangement or passion (e.g., great fear or anger) may make an +injurious act unintentional and so take away natural liability for +restitution (see 40 sqq.), but the civil law does not always admit the +excuse, and after sentence the offender is bound to pay.</p> + +<p>(b) According to some authorities, error about the extent of the harm +that is being done, if invincible, excuses from restitution for damage +that was not apprehended, as when a thief throws a gem into the ocean, +thinking that it is only an imitation gem. But the offender would be +held for the entire loss, if sentenced.</p> + +<p>(e) Error about the person injured, even though invincible, probably +does not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to harm a class +(e.g., Sempronius intends to kill Balbus, because the latter is a +policeman, but by accident he kills another policeman) or an individual +(e.g., Caius intends to kill Titus and by mistake kills Claudius, the +twin-brother of Titus).</p> + +<p>(d) Error about the thing injured, even though invincible, probably +does not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to do damage +(e.g., Julius puts poison in a plate in order to kill his neighbor’s +dog, but the cat takes the poison and is killed).</p> + +<p>1765. Restitution for Damages That Are Only Venially Sinful but +Seriously Harmful.—(a) When one injurious act is committed (as when +through slight carelessness one sets fire to one’s neighbor’s chicken +coop), some deny, but others affirm, the duty of restitution, while +still others distinguish according to the full or only partial +advertence to the sinfulness of what is done. Of those who hold for +restitution, some think that all the damage should be repaired, since +all was caused; but others think that it suffices to repair part, since +the culpability was limited.</p> + +<p>(b) If several injurious acts, which taken singly are slight but taken +together are serious, were done to the same person (e.g., a waiter +breaking dishes at various times while working for the same +proprietor), restitution is due as soon as the sinner realizes the +amount of harm he has caused; but it is disputed whether the obligation +is grave or light. If the injuries were done to different persons +(e.g., a boy breaking windows in many houses in the neighborhood), +there is more probably only a light obligation.</p> + +<p>1766. Restitution on Account of Law for Damages That Are Only +Juridically Culpable.—(a) Before sentence of court there is no +obligation of restitution, for it would be too heavy a burden to impose +this in view of the absentmindedness of so many persons and the +numerous distractions one encounters.</p> + +<p>(b) After sentence of court there is an obligation of restitution, for +the law which gives the court a right to impose it is reasonable, since +juridical fault is often accompanied by theological fault, and moreover +men will thus be led to a greater prudence in the care of their own +goods and in respect for those of others.</p> + +<p>1767. Restitution on Account of Contract for Damages That Are Only +Juridically Culpable.—(a) Express contract obliges to restitution even +for light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken by the more +prudent), or most light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken +by the most prudent only), or, if so stipulated, for no fault at all.</p> + +<p>(b) Implied contract perhaps also obliges to restitution for juridical +fault, for it seems that equity requires one to make good the losses +caused by the absence of a care which the contract took for granted. +Thus, if the advantage is with the bailor alone (e.g., gratuitous +deposit), ordinary care is expected and the bailee is not held in +danger to prefer the bailor’s goods to his own; if the advantage is +with both parties (e.g., onerous deposit or loan), it seems that more +than ordinary care is demanded and that usually the obligor may give +preference to his own goods.</p> + +<p>1768. Restitution for Careless Discharge of Fiduciary Duties, as in the +Case of Physicians, Lawyers, Spiritual Advisers.—(a) If there was +theological fault, restitution is due, unless the injured party took +the risk upon himself. (b) If there was only juridical fault, it seems +there is no natural duty of restitution, since no injustice was done; +but a court may oblige to damages.</p> + +<p>1769. Two Cases in Which Culpability Seems Doubtful.—(a) When one has +inculpably done or omitted something from which damage to another can +be foreseen, and one has now become aware of the danger (as when Balbus +lights a fire on his own property and sees that a change of the wind +makes this fire dangerous for his neighbor’s barn), one must prevent +the damage, if this can be done without equal or greater damage to +oneself; otherwise one must make restitution.</p> + +<p>(b) When one has culpably done or omitted something from which damage +to another was foreseen, but has tried, though in vain, to prevent the +damage after the cause was placed, restitution is due if the cause was +physical (e.g., Claudius gave poison to Titus, and then moved by +remorse gave an antidote, but Titus died), since the party who set the +cause in operation is responsible; but if the cause was moral (e.g., +Balbus ordered a gunman to beat up Caius, but withdrew the order, and +the gunman on his own responsibility then assaulted Caius), restitution +is not due when the revocation ends one’s influence upon the damage +that ensues.</p> + +<p>1770. Three Kinds of Unlawful Possessors.—The second root of +restitution mentioned above (1762) is unjust possession, which includes +the acceptance or the retention of another person’s goods against the +latter’s will. There are three kinds of unlawful possessors:</p> + +<p>(a) the possessor in good faith, who is one that has been invincibly +ignorant of the unlawfulness of his possession, but now learns his +error (e.g., a buyer who discovers that the horse he purchased did not +belong to the seller but was stolen property);</p> + +<p>(b) the possessor in doubtful faith, who is one that has serious +reasons for fearing his possession is unlawful (e.g., the buyer of a +horse learns that the seller is known to have sold some stolen +property, or that the price he charged for the horse was remarkably +small);</p> + +<p>(c) the possessor in bad faith, who is one that knows his possession is +unjust (e.g., a buyer who purchases a horse which he knew had been +stolen by the seller).</p> + +<p>1771. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the +Property Itself.—(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he is +generally obliged to return it to the owner, for a thing calls for its +owner. An exception would be the case in which the possessor can not +return the property to the owner without a greater loss to his own +property.</p> + +<p>(b) If the property has perished, the possessor is generally obliged or +not to restitution according as he has been enriched or not by the +property; for one person should not be enriched at the expense of +another, but property perishes to its owner.</p> + +<p>(c) If the property is in possession of a third party to whom the +possessor transferred it, he is generally obliged or not to restitution +to the third party, on the latter’s dispossession, according as he has +been enriched or not by the third party’s goods; for if he received +nothing for the goods, he is clearly bound to nothing, but if he +received payment, he must indemnify the buyer who is evicted for lack +of title.</p> + +<p>1772. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the +Fruits of the Property.—(a) He must restore the fruits of the thing +itself that are in existence, for the thing fructifies to its owner. +Hence, he should restore to the owner the natural fruits (e.g., the +fruit on the owner’s trees) and the civil fruits (e.g., the money +received from hire of the owner’s horse).</p> + +<p>(b) He must restore the fruits of the thing itself which are not in +existence, but from which he has been enriched (e.g., the net profit +from last year’s crops which the possessor has in the bank).</p> + +<p>(c) He is not obliged to restore the fruits of his own labor or +industrial fruits (e.g., the extraordinary interest derived from the +owner’s money through the good judgment and energy of the possessor), +nor the fruits that he consumed without enrichment (e.g., the +vegetables he gave away or wasted).</p> + +<p>1773. Rights of the Possessor in Good Faith in Deducting Expenses.—(a) +He may deduct for all expenses that have benefited the owner, that is, +for all the money he spent in necessary or useful ways in preserving or +caring for the property. (b) He may not deduct for expenses that have +not benefited the owner, or which the owner would not have reasonably +authorized, such as special beautification of the property. But he may +take away such adornments added by him as can be removed without injury +to the property.</p> + +<p>1774. Obligations of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the +Property Itself.—(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he must +return it to the owner, for a thing calls for its owner. But if the +actual possessor had the property from the thief and could not restore +it to the owner without serious loss to himself, it is held by some +that he could return it to the thief in order to recover his money.</p> + +<p>(b) If the property has perished or restitution of it has become +impossible, he must compensate the owner, even though he has not been +enriched, unless the goods would have perished equally with the owner; +for he is then the efficacious cause of the loss. The same principle +may be applied to damages through deterioration. The civil law often +holds the thief responsible, no matter how the goods perished in his +hands.</p> + +<p>(c) If the property is in possession of a third party who bought it in +bad faith from the possessor in bad faith, the seller is not bound to +restitution to his purchaser on the purchaser’s eviction, unless there +was agreement to that effect; for he who buys, knowing that there is no +good title, buys at his own risk.</p> + +<p>1775. Obligation of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the +Fruits of the Property.—(a) He must restore the natural and civil +fruits, even though the owner would not have obtained them from the +thing, but he may keep the industrial fruits.</p> + +<p>(b) He must make restitution for the profits lost and the losses +suffered by the owner through the unjust deprivation of his property, +for these are damages of which the possessor was the unjust and +efficacious cause.</p> + +<p>1776. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began +Possession in Good Faith (Supervening Doubt).—(a) If he does not +culpably neglect attempts to settle his doubt, he becomes a possessor +in good faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must restore +(1771); if the doubt continues, he may retain possession and prescribe +(i.e., acquire ownership through long exercise of ownership rights), +for presumption favors the possessor, but he must he willing to +restore, should another appear as the rightful owner.</p> + +<p>(b) If he culpably neglects attempts to settle the doubt, he becomes a +possessor in bad faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must +restore (1800), at least for the time during which his culpability was +grave; if the doubt continues and its settlement is impossible through +his fault, it seems that he should share ratably with another claimant +according to the strength of the respective claims; if the doubt +continues and there is no other claimant, it seems that he may act on +the principle that presumption favors the possessor.</p> + +<p>1777. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began in Bad +Faith (Antecedent Doubt).—(a) If the property came to the possessor in +doubtful faith without legal title (e.g., by violence), he has the +obligations of one in bad faith, for presumption favors the former +possessor.</p> + +<p>(b) If the property came to him by legal title (e.g., by gift or sale), +but from a former possessor of doubtful or suspected faith (e.g., one +who seemed to have the property through theft), he must attempt to +settle the doubt. Should the doubt nevertheless continue, some think he +should divide it with another probable claimant, but others believe he +may retain all.</p> + +<p>(e) If the property came to him by legal title and from a former +possessor in good faith, he must attempt to settle the doubt; but if +the doubt remains in spite of his inquiries, he may retain the property +in good faith, as long as matters continue in the same state.</p> + +<p>1778. Cooperators and Restitution.—Restitution is owed for cooperation +in injustice when the cooperator becomes at least partially an unjust +and efficacious cause of damage to another. It should be noted that +this cooperation may be of a limited kind, as when it extends only to +the mode of the damage, or when it is not indispensable to the +commission of the injury.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, he who cooperates only as to the mode of injury is probably +liable only for that damage which he added to the substantial damage. +Thus, if Balbus intended to steal $10, and Claudius persuaded him to +steal $20, it seems that the influence of Claudius extended only to the +amount of $10.</p> + +<p>(b) He who cooperates, but whose assistance is not necessary, is bound +to restitution as a cooperator, since he is an unjust and efficacious +cause of damage. Thus, if Caius steals for Sempronius, knowing that, +should he refuse, Mercurius would carry out the orders of Sempronius, +the readiness to steal on the part of Mercurius does not excuse Caius +or make his act any less harmful.</p> + +<p>1779. Positive cooperators in injury are bound to restitution when +their act is the unjust and efficacious cause of the damage. The +principal cases of positive cooperation are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) a mandator is a superior who explicitly or implicitly commands an +inferior subject to commit an act of injustice, as when a father bids +his son to steal. The mandator bids another to act in his name, and +therefore he is the principal and not the accessory or secondary cause +of injury. He must indemnify both the victim and the agent for losses +he caused them; but he is not liable if he effectively recalled his +mandate before the damage was done;</p> + +<p>(b) an advisor is one who through instruction or persuasion induces +another person to commit an injury which is not done in the name of or +for the benefit of the advisor himself. He must make restitution both +to the person whose injury he recommended and to the person to whom he +gave the advice for the damages he brought upon them. Those who give +wrong advice in good faith, or who recall their advice before the +damage is done, are generally excused from responsibility. Bad example +does not seem to be equivalent to bad advice, and he who recommends a +lesser evil only because he wishes to prevent a greater one is not an +efficacious cause of the lesser evil (see 1502, 1503);</p> + +<p>(c) an implicit advisor (_palpo_) is one who by flattery, excuse, +blame, ridicule or other such indirect means leads another to commit +injustice against a third party. The implicit advisor is bound to +restitution for damages caused or reparation denied through his fault;</p> + +<p>(d) a protector or encourager (_receptans_) is one who knowingly and +willingly bestows upon a malefactor, as such, security or comfort, in +order that the latter may do injury with greater confidence or omit +restitution for evil already done. He is bound to restitution for the +unjust damage or retention of property caused by him;</p> + +<p>(e) a consenter is one who gives his vote, decision, or approval to +injustice, or denies it to justice. He must recall his consent to +iniquity before evil results from it, and he must make restitution for +damages that depend on his conduct;</p> + +<p>(f) a partaker in injustice is one who gives assistance in the +commission of injustice, positively and physically, by sharing in the +injury or in some previous or subsequent act naturally connected with +it. If he is a cooperator in unjust damage, he must indemnify the +injured party; if he is a cooperator in unjust retention of property, +he must give back to the owner the stolen goods received by him (1774).</p> + +<p>1780. Negative cooperators are those who by their silence or inaction +permit an injury to be done or to go unrepaired. They are bound to +restitution for the damages caused by them; but it seems that _per se_ +at least they are not bound to restitution for bribes taken by them or +fines lost through their fault. Their responsibility for damages +supposes the usual conditions, namely: (a) they must be the efficacious +causes of damage, and hence if their silence or inaction is +involuntary, or if outcry or resistance would be useless they are not +responsible; (b) they must be unjust causes, that is, there must be an +obligation to act owed by reason of strict right, contract, or implied +contract. Examples are confessors who culpably neglect to give +penitents needed spiritual advice, parents who permit damage to be done +by their children who have not the use of reason, voters who absent +themselves and thus cause damage they were bound by contract to +prevent, owners of animals who sinfully permit their beasts to ravage +the fields of another person, doorkeepers who allow thieves to enter a +house under their charge, collectors who permit bills to go unpaid. But +if the obligation is owed by reason of some other virtue than +commutative justice (e.g., one is bound only in charity to turn in a +fire alarm when one notices a fire, if one is not the custodian of the +house), one sins, and at times gravely, by inaction; but there is no +duty of restitution.</p> + +<p>1781. The Circumstances of Restitution.—By the circumstances of +restitution are understood the persons by whom and to whom compensation +is to be made, the things to be restored, the manner, time and place of +restitution.</p> + +<p>1782. The persons bound to make restitution are all those who singly or +cooperatively commit injustice. But when several commit injustice +together, the following kinds of causes of the injustice must be +distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) the causes are equal when there is no subordination among the +cooperators; they are unequal when one is a principal upon whom the +others depend as secondary causes or instruments (e.g., when one hires +thieves to steal for one);</p> + +<p>(b) the causes are considered as total causes of the injury when they +are principal causes, or equal but indispensable cooperators, or +conspirators; and perhaps also if they are sufficient causes (e.g., +Caius and Sempronius each fire at a neighbor’s cow and each inflicts a +mortal wound), or if the thing damaged is either not divided (such as a +vineyard) or indivisible (such as a painting). In other causes +cooperators are considered as partial causes of the injury.</p> + +<p>1783. Cooperators in damage are bound to restitution either _in +solidum_ or _pro rata_.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, they are bound _in solidum_ (i.e., jointly and severally) for +all the loss when they are total causes of the damage, But the +principal cause is bound absolutely, the secondary or equal cause only +conditionally, that is, the principal must pay all the restitution +himself, the others must pay all only when the principal or other +associates fail to do their duty.</p> + +<p>(b) They are bound _pro rata_ (i.e., each one according to his share) +when they are only partial causes of the damage. The obligation of +restitution _in solidum_ should not be imposed, if it is uncertain, or +if the cooperator is in good faith and the admonition would only +produce harm.</p> + +<p>1784. The order of restitution among cooperators in injury is according +to the priority of the obligation of one to that of another, in the +sense that one is obliged to pay all and the other is obliged only in +the former’s default. This order of priority in obligation is in force +when many cooperators are bound _in solidum_ and when they cooperated +in different ways (e.g., one as possessor, another as advisor, another +as performer, etc.). The order generally given by moralists is as +follows:</p> + +<p>(a) the possessor is bound first of all, since he has the goods of +another and the goods call for their owner;</p> + +<p>(b) the cooperators are bound next in the following order: the +originator (such as a perpetrator acting in his own name, or a +mandator); the perpetrator acting in the name of another; the others +who aided the commission of the act (such as advisors, flatterers, +etc.); those who did not prevent or resist injustice.</p> + +<p>1785. The obligations of cooperators when restitution in full is made +by one of their number, or when condonation of debt is made to one of +their number, are as follows: (a) if restitution was due _pro rata_, +the other cooperators must indemnify their associate who paid all, or +must pay their shares to the injured party who gave condonation only to +one of their group;</p> + +<p>(b) if restitution was due _in solidum_, payment by or condonation to a +principal cause frees the secondary causes; but payment by or +condonation to a secondary cause does not exempt a principal cause, and +the latter is still held either to the secondary cause or to the +injured party, as the case may be; payment by or condonation to an +equal cause does not exempt the other equal causes.</p> + +<p>1786. The person to whom restitution must be made is the person whose +strict right has been violated, or, in his absence, it is society. But +the following cases should be distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) when the injured person is known for certain and his right is +certain, restitution should be made to the injured person or his +representatives or successors, or, if this is not possible, to +charitable or pious causes;</p> + +<p>(b) when the injured person is entirely unknown, if the one who is the +cause of the loss is in good faith, his obligations are those of a +possessor in good faith; but if he is in bad faith, the common opinion +is that he is bound, at least from customary law, to make restitution +by giving to the poor or to religion;</p> + +<p>(c) when the injured person is partly unknown, the person who is the +cause of the loss should make restitution to the best of his ability. +If the doubt extends to only a few persons (say four or five), any one +of whom may be the injured person, restitution should be divided in the +best way possible among these persons; if the doubt extends to many, +but the injured persons were only a few, it seems that restitution may +be made by giving to charity or religion either in the place of the +injury or elsewhere; if the doubt extends to many, and the injured +persons were many inhabitants of the locality, restitution must be made +if possible to the injured parties themselves, otherwise to some public +cause of the local community.</p> + +<p>1787. Order of Preference Among Creditors.—The natural order of +preference is to be shown to creditors when the debtor is unable to pay +them all.</p> + +<p>(a) Those who have a right _in re_ (e.g., those whose property is held +by the debtor) have precedence over those who have only a right _ad +rem_ (e.g., those who are creditors from contract).</p> + +<p>(b) Creditors from onerous contract or delinquency, it is generally +admitted, have priority over creditors from gratuitous contract.</p> + +<p>(c) Creditors from delinquency and creditors from onerous contract, +according to what seems to be the common opinion, are equal in rights +and should be settled with _pro rata_.</p> + +<p>(d) Debts that are certain have priority over debts that are uncertain, +according to some; others deny this, but admit that the uncertain debts +need be paid only in proportion to their probability.</p> + +<p>(e) Creditors who are certain are by some preferred to creditors who +are uncertain; but others think that payment to the poor, in place of +the unknown creditor, is the latter’s presumed will, and that it has an +equal standing with debts owed to known creditors.</p> + +<p>(f) Poor creditors have no just claim to preference over rich +creditors; but charity dictates that, when the poor creditor is in +distress, he should be given the preference.</p> + +<p>(g) Earlier creditors have a preference over later creditors in a real +claim, but it is disputed whether this holds also in a personal claim.</p> + +<p>(h) The creditor who asks for a settlement sooner has a preference, if +the petition is made juridically, and perhaps also if it is made +privately.</p> + +<p>1788. The order of preference among creditors according to civil law is +generally as follows: (a) proprietary creditors (i.e., those whose +property is held by the debtor); (b) privileged creditors (i.e., those +whose debts have a special urgency, such as judicial expenses, doctors’ +bills, wages for hired help, living costs, etc.); (c) hypothecatory +creditors (i.e., those who have claims against the property of the +debtor, in the form of liens, mortgages, etc.); (d) common creditors +(i.e., all those who are paid after the previous creditors have been +satisfied). American law contains provisions in regard to dispositions +of property made during the four months before bankruptcy is tiled, so +as to protect the creditors of a person who is insolvent. The property +of a bankrupt is placed in the hands of an assignee and allowance is +made for the debtor’s needs and perfected liens (i.e., charges legally +made upon property for debt). The property is then subject to levy by +the creditors as follows: maintenance expenses, legal fees, costs of +administration, wages of workmen, taxes, debts having priority under +Federal or State law.</p> + +<p>1789. The “Thing” to Be Restored.—(a) In case of unjust possession, +the identical object must be restored, if it has an individual value; +otherwise it may be restored in its equivalent. (b) In case of +contract, the identical object must be restored, if that is the +agreement (e.g., in loan of a chattel, or deposit), otherwise it may be +restored in its equivalent (e.g., in loan of money).</p> + +<p>1790. The “Amount” of Restitution in Certain Cases.—(a) When an Object +Had Various Values During the Time of Its Possession in Bad Faith.—If +the change was from an internal cause and was for the better (e.g., the +calf stolen by a thief has become a cow), the return must be made in +the improved state; if the change was from an internal cause, and was +for the worse but would have happened in any case (e.g., the cow taken +by the thief has become old), return must be made in the actual state; +if the change was from an internal cause and for the worse, which would +not have happened had the object remained with the owner (e.g., a cow +taken by a thief has become lame on account of the thief’s +carelessness), return must be made also for the deterioration. If the +change was from an external cause (e.g., the wine taken by a thief has +risen and declined in value several times), it seems that practically +nothing more can be imposed by way of restitution than the value the +object had when taken.</p> + +<p>(b) When Unjust Damage has been Done.—If the damage was caused +positively, the injured person must be indemnified entirely, if the +damage was caused negatively, the injured party should be indemnified +more or less according to the reasonable expectation he had of the gain +of which he was deprived.</p> + +<p>1791. The “Manner” of Making Restitution.—The general rule is that it +should be made in such a way that the injury will be repaired and the +injured person indemnified for his loss. Generally speaking, there is +freedom of choice as to various forms in the modes of restitution. +Thus, it may be made publicly or secretly, directly or through an +intermediary, positively (by payment) or negatively (by cancellation of +a debt). It may even be made without the knowledge and intention of the +parties. (a) Thus, the injured party may be compensated, even though he +is unaware that he was cheated or that he is being paid back; (b) the +offender may restore, even though he does not know he is doing so +(e.g., if he pays while intoxicated), and probably even though he has +no express intention of doing so (e.g., if he makes a present of $10, +and then remembers that he owed damages to the amount of $10).</p> + +<p>1792. Second Restitution.—Natural law must be applied to certain cases +in which restitution sent through an intermediary perishes on the way +through no fault of the debtor. (a) If the debt is owed on account of +possession in good faith, the debtor is not bound to a second +restitution. (b) If the debt is owed on account of contract, the goods +perish to the owner. Thus, if the contract was one of loan, the loss +must be borne by the lender; if it was one of sale, by the seller. (e) +If the debt is owed on account of delinquency, there is an obligation +to a second restitution, unless the injured party assumed the risk of +transmission. It is held as probable that the choice of the confessor +as intermediary for restitution has the consent of the injured party, +and hence that, if the restitution perishes on the way through chance +or the fault of a third party, there is no duty of second restitution.</p> + +<p>1793. The “Time” When Restitution Must Be Made.—(a) Internal +restitution, or the purpose of restoring, must be made at once, that +is, as soon as one adverts to the necessity of this resolve. (b) +External restitution, or the fulfillment of the resolution, must be +made at the first suitable opportunity.</p> + +<p>1794. Unjust Refusal to Make Restitution or Pay Bills.—(a) Those who +unjustly refuse to make restitution or to pay their bills at the proper +time are guilty of mortal or venial sin according to the damage their +refusal causes to the creditor. (b) They are not worthy of absolution +if there is serious bad faith on their part, as when they have many +times broken their promises, or when they refuse to pay even the part +or installment which is within their power. (c) They are bound to +additional damages for the losses caused by the unjustifiable delay.</p> + +<p>1795. The “Place” Where Restitution Must Be Made.—(a) He who is a +debtor on account of injury must make restitution at the place where +the thing would be were it not for the injury. (b) He who is a debtor +on account of possession in good faith should notify the owner where +the property is, but he is not obliged to bring it to the owner. (c) He +who is a debtor on account of contract must abide by the agreement, or +by the statutes that regulate the contract. Thus, in this country the +place of delivery in sales is according to law the seller’s place of +business or his residence.</p> + +<p>1796. Burden of Expense or Loss When Restitution Is Sent to the Place +of the Creditor.—(a) If the obligation of restitution arises from +injury, the debtor is generally bound to pay the transportation and to +stand the loss when the goods perish in transit. (b) If the obligation +arises from contract, the expenses and losses must be borne according +to the agreement.</p> + +<p>If nothing was stipulated, it seems equitable that the expenses of +transportation be borne by the party who benefits or who requested the +contract. According to the Sales Act in the United States, the seller +is the loser when goods perish in transit, if a place of delivery had +been agreed on; but the buyer is the loser when in pursuance of the +contract the goods had been delivered to a carrier for transmission to +the buyer (see 1888 d).</p> + +<p>1797. The Causes That Excuse Temporarily from Restitution.—These +causes can be reduced to two, namely, physical and moral impossibility. +(a) Physical impossibility exists when the debtor has not the means to +pay and cannot secure them; and it excuses as long as it continues. One +who is bankrupt is excused from restitution during the continuance of +his insolvency; if he later becomes able to pay, it seems to some that +the civil declaration of bankruptcy according to the law of the country +releases him from further payment, unless his bankruptcy was fraudulent +or due to culpable neglect. (b) Moral impossibility exists when the +debtor has the means, but cannot pay immediately without incurring a +loss of a higher order (e.g., if he pays the small sum of money, he +will lose his own excellent reputation), or without suffering a greater +loss in his own goods of the same order (e.g., if he pays the money, he +will be reduced to starvation), or without surely bringing on a far +greater evil than delay of restitution to the creditor or a third party +(e.g., if a stolen weapon is returned to its owner, he will commit +suicide or murder).</p> + +<p>1798. The Causes That Excuse Permanently from Restitution.—These +causes can also be reduced to two general ones, namely, the cessation +of the object and the termination of the obligation through the act of +the creditor, or of the debtor, or of authority.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the cessation of the object releases from the duty of +restitution whenever the object perishes to its owner, as when it is +lost by a possessor in good faith who has not been enriched by it, or +even by a possessor in bad faith, if it would have been lost equally by +the owner (see 1771, 1774).</p> + +<p>(b) The termination of obligation through the act of the creditor +occurs when the creditor freely and lawfully excused the debtor from +payment. In some cases condonation may ordinarily be presumed, either +on account of the affection of the creditor for the debtor (e.g., in +case of debts owed by children to their parents) or on account of the +familiar relationship between the parties and the smallness of the debt +(e.g., in case of appropriation by servants or employees of some +unimportant articles not kept under lock and key), or on account of the +indigence of the debtor and the smallness of the damage (e.g., in case +of trifling harm to goods of a wealthy person, if there was no great +malice and the debtor is very poor).</p> + +<p>(c) The termination of obligation is also effected by equivalent +payment, which in certain cases is made by payment of the creditor’s +creditor, or the cancellation of an equal debt owed the debtor by the +creditor, and perhaps also by a gift made the creditor by the debtor +and equal in value to the debt. Occult compensation by the creditor is +the secret taking by him of what he is entitled to when the debtor will +not give it of his own accord. This is lawful when the debt is certain, +other means of recovery impossible, and the compensation not injurious; +but it covers restitution, and hence the creditor cannot accept another +payment from the debtor.</p> + +<p>(d) The termination of obligation is also effected by the act of +competent authority. Thus, judicial declaration frees from the duty of +restitution a person who has lawfully and in good faith received +certain goods as damages or award; prescription (see 1875) gives a +clear title to property held by adverse possession over a certain +number of years, and it frees from the duty of payment, at least in +certain cases (though not in the United States); papal composition for +good reasons exempts from their obligation those who owe restitution to +pious causes or to church property injured by them.</p> + +<p>1799. Condonation of the domestic thefts of wives and children of the +family cannot be presumed in all cases (see 1903).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if the things stolen are articles of food and drink (or +tobacco), and were consumed by the members of the family, there is no +duty of restitution, since the father or husband is then unwilling, not +so much that these things should be taken, as that they should be taken +furtively.</p> + +<p>(b) If the things taken do not fall under the class of eatables and are +still in the possession of the thief, they should be restored. Hence, +if a son steals money from his father in order to have the means for +debauchery, he must give back that money.</p> + +<p>(c) If the things taken were not eatables, but were of great value and +have been consumed or alienated, it will depend on circumstances +whether restitution is obligatory or not. Thus, if the father thinks +much of the son who took the money and the family does not miss it +much, condonation may perhaps be taken for granted; but if the son is +not on good terms with his father, or if the theft is very harmful to +the family, restitution may be due.</p> + +<p>1800. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Doubtfulness of +Obligation.—(a) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether or +not he did damage to another is excused from restitution if the doubt +is about the fact of the damage (e.g., whether his competitor lost +business) or about his own culpability (e.g., whether he circulated a +calumny about his competitor); he is probably held to restitution _pro +rata_ of the doubt, if the doubt is about the responsibility of his +culpable act for the damage that followed (e.g., whether his calumny or +the poorness of the competitor’s wares caused the falling off in +business); he is probably held to only his share, if the doubt is +whether his culpable act was responsible for the whole or only a part +of the damage (e.g., whether his calumny caused all the damage, in view +of the fact that others were also spreading calumnies).</p> + +<p>(b) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether the restitution +owed by him has been paid (e.g., whether his fellows in calumny have +paid their portions of restitution, whether he has paid a bill for +goods or services received) is held to full payment by some, to part +(_pro rata_) payment by others, to nothing by others. Some moralists +think the presumption favors the creditor, others that it favors the +debtor, others that it favors neither and that a compromise is the +right solution.</p> + +<p>1801. Doubt does not excuse restitution in the following cases: (a) +when it is merely negative and the presumption is against the doubter +(e.g., when a person knows that he purchased and received goods, but +does not know whether or not he paid for them, and has no reason to +think he did pay); (b) when it is in bad faith, that is, knowingly or +intentionally produced (e.g., when two men simultaneously fire at a +neighbor’s cow, knowing that it will thus become impossible to +determine the author of the damage).</p> + +<p>1802. Special Cases.—There are some special cases of restitution for +negative injury in thwarting another’s prospects, or for positive +injury to goods of fortune, of body, of soul, or of spirit.</p> + +<p>(a) For Frustration of Another’s Good.—Restitution is due for keeping +another from a good to which he has a strict right (e.g., an office to +which he has been chosen, property for which he has paid), or for using +force, fraud, bribes, or other unjust means to keep another from a good +to which he has a non-strict right (e.g., a position for which he has +made application, a gift which another contemplates bestowing on him). +The amount of restitution should be calculated according to the +previous probability of success on the part of the injured party and +the permanent results of the injury.</p> + +<p>(b) For Injury Done to Goods of Fortune.—Private injuries are spoken +of elsewhere (see 1762 sqq.), and now we consider only injuries that +are in some way public. Commutative injustice entailing restitution to +the community is committed by damage to public property, breach of +contract made with the community, unjust means employed to prevent the +government from obtaining its dues, unjust cooperation in any of the +aforementioned acts; commutative injustice entailing reparation to +individuals is committed when the transgression of a law places an +undue burden on a fellow-citizen (e.g., when one unjustly escapes +military or jury service and causes a substitute to be called who would +not have been called otherwise, or when one unjustly evades one’s taxes +and thereby certainly causes the taxes of others to be raised). If a +tax law is just, it obliges in conscience, but whether as penal or +preceptive, whether in virtue of legal or commutative justice, is a +much debated question; and hence the question of sin and of restitution +due is not easily settled. Impossibility or a general and admitted +custom excuse from restitution (see 2637 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(c) For Injury Done to Goods of Body or Personal Goods.—According to +one view no restitution is due for merely personal injuries, since the +damage cannot be repaired by a good of the same kind as that which was +taken away (e.g., the murderer cannot give back life to his victim); +but according to another view restitution is due for these injuries, +since justice requires that every kind of damage be repaired as far as +possible (see 1751 and 2090).</p> + +<p>1803. Restitution for Various Kinds of Damage Done to Persons.—(a) For +Bodily Injury by Unjust Homicide or Mutilation.—The offender (or his +heirs) is obliged to restitution to the victim (or his heirs or +dependents) for spiritual loss (such as death without the Sacraments), +probably for personal loss (such as pain, facial disfigurement), and +for real losses due to the injury (such as hospital expenses, loss of +support by the widow and orphans). The spiritual loss is compensated by +spiritual goods, such as suffrages for the departed, the personal loss +by compensation suited to the circumstances (e.g., money employment), +the real loss by payment of medical expenses, loss of time, support +lost by dependents, etc. The offender is not liable for damages of +which he is not the unjust cause (e.g., the alms that will be lost by +poor persons on account of homicide, since they have no strict right to +the alms), or the efficacious cause (e.g., the pay that will be lost by +creditors on account of homicide, for as a rule the slayer cannot +foresee this), nor for damages which the injured person clearly +condones.</p> + +<p>(b) For Bodily Injuries by Fornication or Adultery.—In case of +fornication the offender owes restitution to the person seduced and +also at times to the latter’s parents, and both sinners are bound to +support their illegitimate child. The form of the compensation will +depend much on circumstances, but in general it should be either +marriage with the person seduced or some kind of pecuniary +compensation. It should be noted that a promise to marry, even though +it is canonically valid, gives no action to enforce marriage, but even +an invalid engagement gives rise to action for unjust material damages, +such as loss of chance to marry or loss of money spent in view of the +marriage (see Canon 1017). In case of adultery the guilty party or +parties are bound to make restitution to the injured husband if an +illegitimate child is being reared at his expense, and also to the +legitimate children for injuries to their strict rights, as in the +diminished inheritance received from their parents on account of the +illegitimate child. A child is not obliged to accept the word of his +mother that he is illegitimate, but if he is certain about his +illegitimacy, he may not take that to which he is not entitled. In +restitution for fornication or adultery, care must be taken to preserve +the good names of all the parties concerned.</p> + +<p>(c) For Injuries of Soul.—In case of unjust and efficacious damage to +physical goods (e.g., when one by fraud or force administers to another +drugs or intoxicants that take away the use of reason or self-control, +when a professor neglects his office of teaching or teaches error), +restitution is certainly due for any material damages that result, and +probably for the personal injury alone. In case of damage to spiritual +goods, by inducement to commit sin or by dissuasion from good, +restitution is due when the influence exerted was unjust (e.g., by +fraud, force, threats), not when it was merely uncharitable (e.g., by +advice, persuasion, request, example). Restitution for spiritual damage +may be made negatively, that is, by removal of the unjust influence; +but if a person who was seduced has in consequence become a hardened +sinner, it seems that restitution should be made positively, that is, +by counsels, requests, prayers to God, and other prudent means +calculated to recall the injured party to a life of virtue.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_4_THE_VICES_OPPOSED_TO_COMMUTATIVE_AND_DISTRIBUTIVE_JUSTICE">Art. 4: THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 63-78.)</p> + +<p>1804. The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.—Favoritism (i.e., +acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as “a species of +injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of +society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other +and impertinent standard.”</p> + +<p>(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the +common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.</p> + +<p>(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to +society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence, +there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the +owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of +charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of +persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or +less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust +when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt., +xx. 14, 15).</p> + +<p>(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as +when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on +account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which +leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a +public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have +worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have +more money or who are related to himself.</p> + +<p>1805. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.—In Holy Scripture +favoritism is reproved (“How long will you judge unjustly and accept +the persons of the wicked?” Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised +(“Thou art a true speaker and teachest the way of God in truth, neither +carest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,” +Matt., xxii. 16; “Masters, know that the Lord both of servants and you +is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him,” Eph., vi. +9). Distributive justice is commanded in many passages of Holy Writ +(“Consider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the +mighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice,” Levit. xix. 15; +“There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as +well as the great, neither shall you respect any man’s person,” Deut., +i. 17; “Thou shalt not accept persons nor gifts,” Deut., xvi. 19; cfr. +James, ii. 1 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1806. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.—Favoritism +transgresses a divine command and substitutes personal will for right +in the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil, +for disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and +violation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or +of the individual.</p> + +<p>1807. The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.—(a) From its nature, +favoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746), +and indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g., +theft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and +from the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if +favoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post +that is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in +preferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is +only venial injustice.</p> + +<p>1808. Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by +commutative injustice.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a first class of common goods that are distributed are those +intended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and +secondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices, +dignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by +appointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he +is under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative +justice and is held to restitution to the community; but the worthy or +more worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no +restitution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust +means were used to exclude them (see 1755).</p> + +<p>(b) A second class of common goods are those that are intended +primarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for +the relief of the destitute or afflicted or pensions set aside for +those who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods +unfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons, +since the goods were destined for them, and they had a right _ad rem_ +to the goods, and hence to these persons restitution is owed.</p> + +<p>1809. Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.—(a) Partiality in granting +favors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples +are the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of +jurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one’s +friends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens +is also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants +exemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory +already by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the +favoritism of the prelate.</p> + +<p>1810. Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in +spiritual matters?</p> + +<p>(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common +good in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is +not necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry, +influence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc., +and so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be +considered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is +good, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for +negligence in spiritual matters.</p> + +<p>(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the +appointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the +office is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better +known and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons +at the moment.</p> + +<p>1811. Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.—(a) +The applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy; +indeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to +think so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It +suffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the +office, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.</p> + +<p>(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not +guilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and +may rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can +trust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency +or inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the +appointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he +would be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.</p> + +<p>1812. Favoritism in Secular Matters.—Do the conclusions in reference +to ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?</p> + +<p>(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for +the standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy +persons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of +public offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will, +without regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not +probable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider +themselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even +if they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that +power for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.</p> + +<p>(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some +instances, the offense being either against society or against +individuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a +subordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and +bound to restitution to the victims as being a cooperator in injustice.</p> + +<p>1813. Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.—(a) +There is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who +deserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not +unjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons, +and even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves +respect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).</p> + +<p>(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have +no genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy +men are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they +employ their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the +community in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special +courtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a +respector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful +favoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a +worthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted +honorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire +is poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).</p> + +<p>1814. Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.—(a) In +the course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the +judge’s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the +discretionary power is intended for the judge’s own benefit (e.g., when +on a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but +when it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants +to one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other +side and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).</p> + +<p>(b) In the sentence pronounced there is favoritism, if the decision is +not based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous +considerations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or +relative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political +party or business, etc.: “It is not good to accept the person of the +wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment” (Prov., xviii. 5). If +the arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be +favoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII +condemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of +doubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).</p> + +<p>1815. The Vices against Commutative Justice.—These vices can be +classified under two general heads: (a) the vices committed in +involuntary commutations (see 1748), which include deeds against the +person (such as homicide, mutilation, imprisonment) and against +property (such as theft and rapine), and unjust words, whether spoken +during judicial process (by judges, advocates, witnesses, etc.), or +outside of judicial process (such as contumely, detraction, etc); (b) +vices committed in voluntary commutations (see 1748), which include +fraud and usury.</p> + +<p>1816. Homicide.—Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being +(i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case +we have homicide, which is defined as follows: “an act or omission of a +human being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a +human being.” A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or +climate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by +omission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act. +The following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its +substantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):</p> + +<p>(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or +involuntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment +or as a defense;</p> + +<p>(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public +or of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;</p> + +<p>(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of +one who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a +neighbor or of self (suicide);</p> + +<p>(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect, +according as the action from which death results is from its nature +(_finis operis_) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it +is directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of +the vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus +at a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the +mother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman +remedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the +object or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.</p> + +<p>1817. Other distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its added or +accidental malice.</p> + +<p>(a) A new species of sin is added to that of injustice when other +virtues are offended against. Thus, the virtue of piety is violated +when the victim is a person to whom the slayer owed special respect and +devotedness, as in parricide, regicide, fratricide, uxoricide; the +virtue of religion is offended when murder is committed in a church.</p> + +<p>(b) An aggravating circumstance is added by the greater deliberation +with which the homicide is planned, or the greater treachery or cruelty +with which it is executed (e.g., assassination, death by starvation). +Some circumstances, however, may be morally indifferent, such as the +fact that the victim is killed by one kind of poison rather than +another.</p> + +<p>1818. The Killing of Animals (or Vegetation).—(a) In itself, the +killing of animals is not sinful; for animals are made for the use of +man. Hence, it is lawful to kill, not only harmful animals, such as +those that prey on human beings or breed pestilence or destroy +property, etc., but also other animals, when their death is necessary +for some good purpose, such as the provision of food, clothing or +medicine for man.</p> + +<p>(b) In its circumstances, the killing of animals may be sinful, and +even gravely sinful, as when one kills the animals of one’s neighbor +(Exod, xxii. 10, 11), or hunts against the law, or injures society by +prodigal destruction of animal or plant life, or kills animals in cruel +ways. The skinning of animals alive, in order to secure finer-looking +furs to satisfy the vanity of women, is an inhuman barbarism of the +worst type that should be reprobated by everybody.</p> + +<p>1819. When Homicide Is Lawful.—Killing of human beings is lawful in +two cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the +State inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is +lawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the +body, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an +individual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful +when the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust +aggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life +in such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily +assumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say +here that it is lawful to defend one’s life with resultant death to the +offender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).</p> + +<p>1820. Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.—(a) +Scripture.—In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for +certain more serious crimes, such as murder (“whosoever shall shed +man’s blood, his blood shall be shed,” Gen., ix. 6); in the New +Testament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to +death comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that +princes do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of +God when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).</p> + +<p>(b) Tradition.—The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital +punishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the +Waldensians condemned by Innocent III.</p> + +<p>(c) Reason.—The State has both the duty and the right to promote the +common good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war +against external foes or by coercive measures against internal +disturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and +of all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of +law-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently +protected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.</p> + +<p>1821. Though lawful, capital punishment is not always necessary; for it +is a means to an end, and it may be omitted, therefore, when the end +can be obtained by the use of other and less severe means.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a general suspension of the capital punishment is lawful in a +community whose members are peaceful and not inclined to violence or +other crimes subversive of law and order. Whether such ideal conditions +exist today may be doubted, and indeed some countries that abolished +the death penalty have found that this proved an incentive to crime and +they were forced to restore the former laws.</p> + +<p>(b) A particular exemption from capital punishment is lawful, when +there are good reasons recognized by law for commutation or clemency. +This has been the practice of governments throughout history, and is +justified when it furthers the common welfare, or at least shows mercy +to a deserving individual without harm to society. But a judge has to +condemn when the law and the facts call for condemnation, and the +authority in whom the pardoning power is vested has to use his power +prudently, lest he encourage lawlessness.</p> + +<p>1822. It is not morally lawful to put criminals to death unless the +following conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) the crime must be external and of such a character that the public +welfare requires the supreme punishment, either on account of the +enormity of the act (e.g., murder), or on account of its danger (e.g., +sleeping at one’s post in time of war). Further, the crime must be +certain and sufficiently established, for, since the punishment should +fit the offense and the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved, +no one should be sentenced to death except for a serious and certain +crime. The Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution declares that +no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due +process of law;</p> + +<p>(b) the sentence of death and its execution should be performed by +those who have public authority for these acts and in the manner +required by law. For capital punishment is a means of self-defense used +by society, and its use pertains there fore to the representatives of +society. Moreover, if private individuals exercised this function, +accused persons would not receive the consideration of their rights or +the opportunity of defense due them, and the public peace would be +overthrown by murders of revenge committed in the name of justice.</p> + +<p>(c) the penalty should be carried out in a humane and Christian manner, +as is manifest. The convicted man should be allowed time and +opportunity to make his peace with God and, if possible, to say +farewell to relatives. Slow and agonizing forms of killing are of +course entirely wrong, no matter how wicked the criminal who is being +executed. The American law and other laws do not permit a pregnant +woman to be executed until she has delivered her child.</p> + +<p>1823. Unlawful Killing of Offenders.—The killing of offenders is, +therefore, unlawful in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when the offense is not serious or fully deliberate (e.g., +involuntary manslaughter), or when it has not been sufficiently +established (e.g., if it is not certain that the supposed victim of +murder is dead or that he died from a homicidal act). In civilized +countries today the law inflicts capital punishment only for the most +serious crimes, and the State has to prove its case beyond reasonable +doubt before the punishment can be decreed. But in the past death was +often the penalty for horse- or sheep-stealing, or even smaller +offenses, and in times of excitement men have sometimes been sentenced +to death without a fair trial;</p> + +<p>(b) when the sentence of death is not pronounced or executed legally. +Those who lynch the perpetrators of heinous crimes are often in good +faith, especially if the processes of the law are too slow or +uncertain, but since they act without authority, their deed is really +murder. The same is true of a husband who kills his wife taken in +adultery, of the relative of a seduced girl who kills the seducer, of +an officer of the law who unnecessarily or without authorization kills +a man sentenced to death when the latter is trying to escape. The State +has the right, though, to declare a notorious malefactor outlawed, and +thus to give to private citizens the right to take him dead or alive, +or to kill him on sight; but it is clear that the exercise of this +right is a dangerous remedy and one to be used sparingly;</p> + +<p>(c) when the mode of killing or the circumstances are repugnant to +Christian feeling. Today capital punishment is generally inflicted in a +humane manner, but history records many cruel forms of execution, as +when men were hanged, drawn and quartered, or burned at the stake, or +put to death amid the jeers and curses of the populace.</p> + +<p>1824. Is Tyrannicide Lawful?—(a) If the ruler is a tyrant in act (that +is, one who has a lawful title to rule but who abuses his authority), +it is not lawful to kill him on account of his misdeeds or crimes, +since the subject has not the authority to act in the name of the +nation (Rom., xiii. 1 sqq.; I Peter, ii. 18). In case of self-defense, +however, as when the tyrant unjustly makes a personal attempt on the +life of a citizen, the latter has the right to kill. The Council of +Constance condemned the doctrine of Wycliff that every subject has the +right to assassinate a tyrannical prince, a doctrine that would make +the position of every ruler unsafe, since there are always persons who +think they are victims of persecution. The nation, however, has the +right to depose or even to execute a wicked ruler, for government is +given to rulers for the benefit, not for the destruction, of the common +good.</p> + +<p>(b) If the ruler is a tyrant in title (that is, a usurper), it is not +lawful to kill him, when he has already obtained peaceful possession; +for here again it cannot be said that the killer would have the +authorization of the nation. If, however, the tyrant has not obtained +possession but is struggling for it, his status will not be that of +ruler but of public enemy, and it will be lawful to kill him as an act +of war, provided the conditions of a just war are present (see 1384).</p> + +<p>1825. Judges and Executioners in Canon Law.—According to the law of +the Church (Canon 984, nn. 6, 7), those who pass the death sentence as +judges and the executioners and their immediate and voluntary helpers +become irregular (i.e., incapable of lawfully receiving Orders or of +exercising their powers). The reasons for this ancient discipline are +chiefly two:</p> + +<p>(a) clerics are the ministers of Christ, and therefore they should be +like their High Priest, whose sacrifice they offer at the altar. Now +Christ “when He was reviled, did not revile, when He suffered, He +threatened not, but delivered Himself to him that judged Him unjustly” +(I Peter, ii. 23). Hence, it is unbecoming that clerics should condemn +to death or kill their fellow-men, even criminals;</p> + +<p>(b) clerics are the ministers of the New Testament, and therefore they +should conform themselves to its spirit of mildness. The divine law +itself declares that a bishop should not have private quarrels or +inflict blows (I Tim., iii. 3), but the church law goes further and +declares that a cleric should not even act as public judge or +executioner in capital cases. The Old Testament inflicted corporal +punishments and death, and hence we read that its priests and levites +put sinners to death with their own hands (Exod., xxxii. 28; Num., xxv. +7, 8; I Kings, xv. 33; III Kings, xviii. 40; I Mach., ii. 24), but the +law of Christ contains no sentences of death or of bodily chastisement.</p> + +<p>1826. The Right of Self-Defense.—The second case of lawful homicide +mentioned above (1819) is the killing of an unjust aggressor, not +intended by the slayer, but consequent on his defense of his life +against the aggressor. This right of self-defense is granted by natural +law itself, and has been denied by but few moralists.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, nature inclines man to prefer his own life to that of +another, other things being equal, and therefore it authorizes him to +defend his life even at the cost of an aggressor’s life. Even the brute +animals are armed by nature to defend themselves against attack.</p> + +<p>(b) The natural law also permits one to perform an act from which two +effects will follow, one good and the other bad, provided the good +effect alone is intended and there is a sufficient reason for +permitting the evil effect (see 104). In the present case the killing +of the aggressor is an evil, while the protection of the innocent party +is a good; but it is only the protection that is intended, and the +killing is not an extreme measure in view of the greatness of the good +that is at stake.</p> + +<p>1827. The right of self-defense is also sanctioned by human laws. (a) +Thus, church law recognizes this right in the words of Innocent III: +“All laws permit one to repel force by force, but the defense must not +be immoderate, nor exercised from desire of revenge.” According to the +Code (Canon 985, n. 4) irregularity arises from voluntary homicide, but +this does not include the case of lawful self-defense, although a +provisional dispensation must be asked for. A cleric has the right of +self-defense, as well as a layman. (b) Civil law also has always +admitted the right of a person assailed by another to defend himself, +even by killing the assailant, if there is no other alternative.</p> + +<p>1828. Conditions for the Exercise of This Right.—(a) The assault must +be a true aggression (i.e., an act of violence threatening the life of +the person assaulted) and unjust (i.e., an attack made without public +authority); (b) the resistance must be true self-defense (i.e., an act +used to ward off attack or to make the assailant powerless) and +moderate (i.e., the person attacked must not use more force than +necessary and he must not intend to kill the assailant).</p> + +<p>1829. The person who is killed must be a true aggressor, for otherwise +the slayer is himself the aggressor and guilty of unjustifiable +homicide. Killing is therefore unjust in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when the opponent is not using true violence, as when he merely +prays and hopes that you may die or be killed;</p> + +<p>(b) when he is not using actual violence, as when he is disarmed or +helpless, or when he has only threatened to kill you in the future, or +to bring you to the gallows by his testimony or vote.</p> + +<p>1830. Must one wait, then, until the aggressor has actually attacked, +before using self-defense? (a) One need not wait until physical +aggression has started (e.g., until the adversary has fired a shot or +struck a blow); otherwise self-defense would very often be futile. (b) +One should wait until moral aggression has been shown before proceeding +to defense; that is, the other party must perform some external act +which according to the judgment of a prudent person at the time and +place is one with the act of physical aggression, as when an angry man +reaches for a gun or knife, or a desperado advances in a threatening +manner.</p> + +<p>1831. The aggression must also be unjust or contrary to the right of +the person attacked. (a) Thus, if the aggression is just, it is not +lawful to kill the aggressor. Hence, it is not lawful to kill an +officer of the law who is making an arrest, or guarding a prisoner, or +leading him to execution. (b) If the aggression is not just, +self-defense is lawful. It makes no difference whether the aggression +is formally unjust (e.g., when the aggressor attacks you because he +wishes to wreak revenge, or because he fears you), or only materially +unjust (e.g., when you are a stranger to the aggressor, but he is +drunk, or a dope fiend, or a maniac). Similarly, a son may defend +himself against his parent, a subject against his superior, a layman +against a cleric, an adulterer against the injured husband, a +calumniator against the person calumniated; for authority or personal +injury suffered does not give these persons the right to inflict by +private authority the punishment of death.</p> + +<p>1832. Self-defense must be merely a protection of self against future +evil and not a punishment of the aggressor for past attacks, for +capital punishment belongs to society, not to private persons. Hence, +if an aggressor has taken to flight, or has been disarmed, or knocked +senseless, or has begged for mercy, it is not permissible to kill him.</p> + +<p>1833. Self-defense must be moderate, for injury or the death of a human +being is a thing that should be avoided when possible. (a) Thus, the +person attacked must not reply with force at all, if this is possible. +He should escape, or call a policeman, or throw the weapon out of the +window, etc., if these means will suffice. Some authors excuse from +flight those who would suffer disgrace if they ran away from danger, +such as those who are pugilists or professional fighting men. (b) The +person attacked should use only such force as is necessary, if force +must be employed. Thus, if the aggressor can be made helpless by the +use of gas, permanent bodily harm should not be done him; if he can be +subdued with the fists, knife or pistol wounds should not be resorted +to; if wounds will suffice to hold him at bay (e.g., by blackjacking), +killing should not be resorted to. In the heat of a fight, however, the +person assailed sometimes unintentionally goes beyond what moderation +requires.</p> + +<p>1834. The intention of the person who uses force to repel an unjust +aggressor must be good. (a) Thus, as his end he must intend only the +preservation of his own life and look upon the death of his neighbor as +a misfortune. (b) As the means to this end he must intend only to stop +the attack that is being made, not to bring on the death of the +aggrcssor. Those who are commissioned by public authority to put a +human being to death (e.g., the public executioner or soldiers in time +of war) may intend these homicides, since they are means to the common +good; but the death of one private person is not a means to the good of +another private person, and hence it should not be directly aimed at.</p> + +<p>1835. The mind of the person who defends himself against the unjust +aggressor must also be free from sinful dispositions, such as hatred +and revenge; otherwise he sins against charity. Our Lord reprobated the +teaching of the Scribes that it is lawful to return injury for injury +in a revengeful spirit, and declared that one should prefer to receive +a second blow rather than return a blow for the sake of revenge (Matt., +v. 38 sqq.; cfr. also Rom., xii. 19).</p> + +<p>1836. When Self-Defense Is Obligatory.—Self-defense is sometimes an +obligation. (a) Thus, it is an obligation, if the only factors +considered are the life of the guilty aggressor and the life of the +innocent person who is assailed; for the life of the innocent should +not be sacrificed for the guilty, and charity indicates that the first +duty of the person attacked is to himself. (b) It is an obligation, if, +on account of circumstances, the person attacked owes it to others to +preserve his life—for example, if he is the father of a dependent +family, or a public official whose life is very necessary for the +welfare of the community, or whose office it is to resist those who +menace public security. This is true from the viewpoint of society +also, for the world needs the good men it has, while there are too many +wicked men already.</p> + +<p>1837. Sometimes self-defense is not obligatory. (a) Thus, it is merely +optional, when no duty to others commands self-defense and a divine +counsel invites one to omit it (see 1169). Hence, if the assailant is +certainly in mortal sin, while the person assailed is certainly in the +state of grace, it would be very commendable to die rather than kill +the assailant, in order to grant him time for repentance. But a case of +this kind is rather theoretical than practical, for how could one be +sure that the assailant would profit by the opportunity allowed him of +doing penance? At any rate, the sacrifice is optional, for the +aggressor is either formally unjust, and hence not in extreme spiritual +need, or only materially unjust, and it will be uncertain whether he is +in spiritual need or whether, if he is in such need, the respite will +be used by him (see 1165 sqq.). (b) Self-defense is unlawful according +to some, if the life of the assailant is necessary for the common good, +and the life of the person assailed is not necessary. But this would be +a very rare case.</p> + +<p>1838. Defense of Neighbor’s Life.—The principles on defense of one’s +own life against an unjust aggressor, even at cost of the latter’s +life, may be applied to the life of an innocent third party.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is necessary to defend the innocent person, even if the +aggressor has to be killed, when one is bound to give this protection +by natural duty (e.g., because the innocent person is one’s child or +father and the aggressor is not a relative), or by contract (e.g., +because one is a hired bodyguard or policeman).</p> + +<p>(b) It is lawful to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor +has to be killed, and even though there is no duty of nature or +contract to give this protection (Exod., ii, 12). But it is disputed +whether it is also necessary to do this. The affirmative opinion calls +attention to the extreme bodily need of the innocent party, the +negative to the extreme spiritual need of the aggressor. It is not +necessary to risk one’s life in order to protect the life of the +innocent party, unless the public safety is in peril, or one has +undertaken this obligation (see 1169).</p> + +<p>1839. A private individual may defend life at the cost of the life of +an unjust aggressor, because he is obliged or permitted to protect the +life that has more of a claim on him. He may also defend certain other +most important goods that belong to him or to his neighbor, even if +need be at the cost of the unjust aggressor’s life, because the common +good is more valuable than the life of the aggressor, and the defense +of those goods is bound up with the common good. Thus, if it were not +permissible to defend valuable property even to the extent of killing a +burglar, criminals would be encouraged, peaceful citizens would be at a +disadvantage, and the public security would greatly suffer. Among the +goods now spoken of are goods of fortune and goods of body. It is not +always obligatory, however, to exercise the right of extreme +self-defense (e.g., in case of violation, provided no consent is given +the deed).</p> + +<p>1840. Defense of Goods of Fortune Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If +the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., the aggressor +wishes to take the last loaf from a starving man or the plank from a +drowning man), or if it seems to be an attack on life (e.g., the +burglar enters a room as if he meant to kill), the killing of the +unjust aggressor is not unlawful, as is clear from the previous +paragraphs.</p> + +<p>(b) If the attack is made on goods of fortune only, but they are of +great value and actually possessed, the question is disputed. According +to some, killing in this case is unlawful, because life is more +valuable than property; but the common opinion is that killing is +lawful, both because Scripture excuses the person who kills the +nocturnal robber (Exod., xxii. 2), and because the public safety is at +stake and therefore justifies extreme measures.</p> + +<p>(c) If the attack is made only on goods of fortune, and they are not +yet possessed (e.g., a legacy one hopes to obtain) or have only a small +value (e.g., one gold piece), killing is unlawful; for there is no +proportion between external goods that are only hoped for or that are +of minor importance and the life of a human being. Pope Innocent XI +condemned the teaching that one may use homicidal defense to protect a +coin or the prospect of receiving an office.</p> + +<p>1841. Defense of Bodily Purity Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If the +attack is equivalent to an attack on life, or seems to be an attack on +life, self-defense even by killing is lawful, and hence it may be +permissible to kill one who is attempting rape.</p> + +<p>(b) If the attack is on bodily purity only, but _per actum consummatum +luxuriae_, the question is controverted. One opinion is that killing may +not be resorted to, for the aggressor cannot take away purity of soul, +and the purity of body that he violates is less good than life. The +opposite opinion holds that killing may be employed in self-defense, +since bodily purity has a higher value than even notable goods of +fortune, especially as violation is usually accompanied by spiritual +damage or disgrace of family, etc.; and the public interest demands +that such outrages be sternly suppressed on account of the strong +inclination of many persons to commit them.</p> + +<p>(c) If the attack is on bodily purity only, and _per actum +non-consummatum luxuriae_ (e.g., _per osculum vel amplexum_), killing is +not justified, but other means of defense, such as blows or wounds, may +be used.</p> + +<p>1842. Defense of Bodily Integrity Against an Unjust Aggressor.—(a) If +the attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., if the aggressor +intends to mutilate or wound, but there is danger that he will kill), +defense even with resultant killing is lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) If the attack is not equivalent to an attack on life, but is very +notable (as when a principal member will be lost or the person horribly +disfigured), some authorities claim that defense which would cause the +aggressor’s death is unlawful, because death is too heavy a price to +pay for wounds. But against this it may be argued that the loss of +limbs or organs is more serious than the loss of money, and, in some +respects, is more damaging than violation. The civil law gives a person +the right to protect himself in body and limbs, even by killing the +assailant when absolutely necessary.</p> + +<p>(c) If the attack menaces only a minor detriment (e.g., a black eye or +bloody nose), certainly killing is unjustified. But the person attacked +may hit harder and oftener than the assailant, if he is able, so that +the latter may beware of him another time.</p> + +<p>1843. Defense of Honor or Reputation.—When honor or reputation is +unjustly attacked, the more perfect course is to bear the injury +patiently and to pardon the offense, according to the teaching of +Christ. But it is not sinful to defend honor and reputation, just as it +is not sinful to defend life, limbs and property. How far may one go in +defense of honor or reputation against an unjust aggressor?</p> + +<p>(a) If the aggression is merely in words (as when the offender calls +the other party a liar, or says that he is illegitimate), it is not +lawful to use violence, at least such as would cause death; for there +are other and less drastic means of defense that suffice (e.g., to +answer the allegations, or even to retort the same epithets against the +aggressor), and, unless the violence of even justifiable resentment +were restrained, the world would be filled with disorder and homicidal +violence. Innocent XI and Alexander VII condemned the doctrine that one +may kill in order to prevent the spread of calumny.</p> + +<p>(b) If the aggression is in deeds (as when the offender slaps the other +person or throws mud or rotten eggs at him), it is not lawful to kill; +for here also defense can be made in other ways (e.g., by bringing the +aggressor before the court for punishment, or, if this cannot be done, +by returning slap for slap, etc.). Innocent XI rejected the proposition +that it is lawful to kill the aggressor who gave one a blow and then +fled. It is only when the aggressor is continuing his attack, and +imperilling the innocent party in life or limb, that the latter may +repel the extreme force by extreme force.</p> + +<p>1844. Killing of the Innocent.—So far we have spoken of the killing of +malefactors and unjust aggressors, which under certain conditions is +not sinful. The next subject is the killing of the innocent, that is, +of those who are neither malefactors nor unjust aggressors worthy of +death.</p> + +<p>(a) The killing of the innocent by human authority, if it is done +directly and intentionally, is always sinful, whether the cause be a +private individual or society. But since God is the Master of life and +death, He could command the death of an innocent person, as was done +when he bade Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen., xxii. 12).</p> + +<p>(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional, +is not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from +which the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from +which two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only +permitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1845. Unlawful killing of the innocent is a most heinous crime.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an injury to the rights of God over human life, and is +forbidden in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not +kill” (Exod., xx. 13). To judges the special command was given: “The +innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death” (Exod., xxiii. +7). The man-slayer destroys the image of God, a crime so detestable +that in Scripture God declares that He will revenge the blood of man, +even though shed by a beast (Gen., ix. 5; Exod., xxi. 28).</p> + +<p>(b) It is a most grave sin against the individual, for it deprives him +of his chief natural good and the means of securing and enjoying many +great spiritual goods. If the person killed desired or asked for death, +no injustice is done to him, since he waived his right, but +uncharitableness is committed, since the neighbor’s life should be +loved, and the uncharitableness is greater according as the person is +more worthy of love. Scripture numbers murder among the sins that cry +to heaven for vengeance (Gen., iv. 10, ix. 5).</p> + +<p>(c) It is an outrage against society, for such killing unduly deprives +the community of one of its members, causes scandal and disturbs the +peace. Hence, the law has always inflicted the severest punishment on +slayers of the innocent.</p> + +<p>1846. Since the end does not justify the means, the following ends do +not justify the direct and intentional killing of innocent persons:</p> + +<p>(a) the public good does not excuse, for example, if an enemy were to +threaten destruction against a city unless it put to death an innocent +person who dwelt in its borders. The criminal on account of his +lawlessness is an obstacle to the common good, but the law-abiding +citizen promotes the common good and it would be harmful to the public +peace if he could be put to death without any fault of his own. The +State is for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. But if the +common safety depended on the sacrifice of one man’s life, charity and +patriotism would require this man to make the sacrifice spontaneously +(see 1169); that is, he should deliver himself to the enemy, and were +he to refuse, it seems the community would have the right to deliver +him. Similarly, it is not lawful to kill hostages, even though the +enemy has broken faith, or killed one’s subjects;</p> + +<p>(b) the private good of other individuals does not excuse; for example, +it is not lawful to kill a maniac lest he do harm to those around him, +at least unless the conditions of unjust aggression are fulfilled. +Similarly, it is not lawful to kill a woman with child, in order to +baptize the child;</p> + +<p>(c) the private good of the individual himself does not excuse; for +example, it is not lawful to shoot or poison those who are mortally +wounded or suffering from an incurable disease, or who are old and +helpless, in order to spare them suffering. But one may give a person +at the point of death a medicine that may hasten the end, if there is +good hope that it will cure him and other remedies are futile, for the +purpose is not to kill but to cure (see 2485). It is lawful also for +embalmers to puncture the heart or sever an artery of a person who +seems to be dead, if there are certain signs of his death, for the +purpose is not to kill this person, but to free his friends from fear +that he is buried alive.</p> + +<p>1847. Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.—Indirect and +unintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there +is a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate +to the life of the innocent person).</p> + +<p>(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war +it is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many +non-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though +innocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his +front ranks.</p> + +<p>(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does +not compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104). +Thus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running +down and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very +necessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not +compensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance, +and the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public +good sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape +from drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only +plank which is insufficient for both, or if Sempronius who has been +sentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills +his guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.</p> + +<p>(c) Private safety from death is a sufficient reason, if it compensates +for the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the +innocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an +unjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent +person’s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., Titus is +speeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he +cannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If +self-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence +against the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent +person whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against +the innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in +order to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the +innocent person before one in order that he receive the assailant’s +bullet).</p> + +<p>1848. Destruction of the Unborn.—(a) Direct and intentional +destruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the +fetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus +is expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a +viable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can +live outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave +reasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the +child’s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion. +Every direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and +is penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, Sec. 1). +It might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human +being is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The +ancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval +authors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some +time after conception, an opinion that still has great probability +physically. Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with +conception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the +moment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of +human life. Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no +doubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what +is probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be +murder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped—although +it is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the semen +from-her body—it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which +would abort an impregnated ovum.</p> + +<p>(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death, +is not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave +reason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to +give the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g., +medicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even +though this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the +mother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to +her own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for +its salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the +child is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the +conditions of 1166 are verified.</p> + +<p>(c) Contemporary moral opinion considers that in tubal pregnancies +(ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long +before rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence +can be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the +excision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act +and, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle +of double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the +moral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X +of _Medical Ethics_ by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians, +however, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be +proved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman +in danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently +safe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., +_Morals in Politics and Professions_, p. 118.)</p> + +<p>1849. It is unlawful positively to kill the mother in order that the +unborn child may be saved or baptized. When a caesarean section offers +the sole chance of saving the mother’s life, it is permitted. It is +seriously doubtful whether a mother is morally obliged to undergo the +operation in situations where a threat to her life exists. In this +case, if baptism in the uterus is possible without increasing the +danger to the mother’s life, it should be attempted. When a caesarean +section does not offer any chance of saving the mother’s life, but will +directly contribute to her death, the operation should not be +performed. One must await the death of the mother and then observe the +norm of Canon 746; “Immediately after the death of a pregnant woman, a +caesarean section should be done in order that the fetus may be +baptized.” The procedure to be followed is outlined in medical-ethics +books. (See McFadden op. cit., pp. 244 ff.)</p> + +<p>1850. Direction in Cases of Doubt, Ignorance, or Error.—(a) In case of +doubt, if there are positive and solid reasons for believing that an +operation performed to save a woman’s life will not be destructive of +the life of a fetus, the operation seems lawful; for in doubt, the +woman, as the certain possessor of life, has the presumption.</p> + +<p>(b) In case of ignorance or error (e.g., when a penitent asks whether a +certain operation is permissible, or a surgeon in good faith performs +an operation that is not lawful), either a truthful answer should be +given to questions, or silence should be observed when an admonition +would only be harmful (e.g., if to require the Caesarean operation from +a dying mother would have no other result than to make her die in bad +faith instead of good faith).</p> + +<p>1851. Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.—(a) Homicide, if +voluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the +guilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to +degradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a +church is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion +of a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on +those who procure it and also on the cooperators (Canon 985, n. 4). +Moreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not +excepted, incur excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the +Ordinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).</p> + +<p>1852. Suicide.—Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide +in general, of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or +involuntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as +it is committed without realization of what is done or without the +intention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a +person who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and +drowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by +pretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a +mistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt +a large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for +their act.</p> + +<p>(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done +tends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g., +firing a pistol into one’s brain); it is indirect, if that which is +done tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a +criminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many +ways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or +drinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or +drink anything).</p> + +<p>1853. The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also +explained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has +but one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b) +indirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of +which is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death +always follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skyscraper); +proximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or +fourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g., +jumping from a second-story window).</p> + +<p>1854. Sinfulness of Suicide.—Voluntary and direct suicide is always a +most grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command +of God).</p> + +<p>(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of God, for it usurps His +authority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has +bestowed, dishonors the image of God (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the +property of God: “Thou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death” +(Wis., xvi. 13).</p> + +<p>(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to +be benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for +the protection and assistance it affords them. Moreover, death by +suicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives +of the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of +suggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not +felt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no +argument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal +mistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would +rashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were +worthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would +destroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of +fortitude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy +to the needy.</p> + +<p>(c) Direct and voluntary suicide is a sin against the deepest natural +inclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature +(see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires +(see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity +to the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of +homicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The +suicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not +fulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life? +He escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations, +but he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral +cowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.</p> + +<p>1855. Cooperation in Suicide.—Cooperation in suicide has the guilt of +unlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or +assist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those +who carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of +moral murder.</p> + +<p>1856. Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.—(a) Divine +authority could command or permit suicide, since God has the power over +life and death. But whether God has ever done this is uncertain. Some +argue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down +the house upon himself saying: “Let me die with the Philistines” +(Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage +(II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs +who from love of God or from the desire to preserve chastity rushed to +their deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain +these cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect +suicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.</p> + +<p>(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a +condemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute +himself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening +one’s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking +it with one’s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that God +has given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare +that it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be +his own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command +self-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so +strange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is +shocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would +it be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which +says that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death, +but which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening +the mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which +inflicts death (such as taking the poison).</p> + +<p>1857. Indirect Suicide.—Indirect suicide is committed when one is the +cause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one +foresees as a result that one’s life will be lost or notably shortened, +This kind of “suicide” is lawful when and if the conditions for a case +of double effect are present—in other words, if there is a +proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103 +sqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:</p> + +<p>(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than +the life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed +himself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.). +It is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance +against the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be +certain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to +go about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be +certain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and +experimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;</p> + +<p>(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in +extreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity +to risk one’s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is +lawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying +that strangers die there after a few years;</p> + +<p>(c) the higher good of self (i.e., the good of virtue) justifies +indirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a +virtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a +shipwrecked passenger may yield his place in the life-boat to his +parent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may +refuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and +should refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for +the sake of chastity a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from +a high window or resist the assailant, although it does not seem that +this is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape; +for the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an +opportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be +executed, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to +take food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may +practise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings, +hair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they +lengthen it;</p> + +<p>(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may +risk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely +to happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap +from a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain, +for death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be +tortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of +escape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle, +one may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on +high buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a +shorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of +service to the public, than to live a longer time without these +advantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which +he is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard +the lives of the workers.</p> + +<p>1858. The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the +greater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence, +to save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a +second-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would +most likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the +more serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might +lawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted +if the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the +shortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus, +if the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the +expectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it +reduces the expectancy for ten or more years.</p> + +<p>1859. Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder +when the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or +sinful.</p> + +<p>(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons +who engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or +limb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of +performing a feat a man walks a tight-rope, pricks himself with pins +and needles, or puts his head into a lion’s mouth. But if the performer +is very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he +may exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.</p> + +<p>(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons +who abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual +indulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate passion of any kind; and +also in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the +preservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies +against disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to +live long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for +the preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are +guilty of indirect suicide.</p> + +<p>1860. Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation pronounced +necessary for life?</p> + +<p>(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good +reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the +guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of +good faith.</p> + +<p>(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good +reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among +the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling +into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers) +and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the +patient’s family or the hardship that would result for the patient +himself).</p> + +<p>1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.—(a) Those who attempt suicide +are irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are +not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance +before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject +to various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful +whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is +decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.</p> + +<p>1862. Accidental Homicide.—Accidental homicide is that which happens +without any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be +distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its +cause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill +and could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;</p> + +<p>(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the +person who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of +something unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that +which is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.</p> + +<p>1863. The Case of One From Whose Lawful Act or Omission Homicide +Accidentally Results.—(a) If this person was not guilty of negligence, +he is not responsible for the resultant homicide, since it was not +voluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a man who was said +to be dead, but who knows nothing about the report, calls at his home +and his wife drops dead on seeing him, he is not responsible for her +death.</p> + +<p>(b) If the person in question was negligent, he is guilty of homicide +in a greater or less degree according to the seriousness of his +neglect. Thus, a sane man who flourishes a loaded revolver in a crowded +room is responsible if the revolver goes off and kills someone present; +but a nurse who leaves a sick room for just a moment with the result +that her patient falls out of bed and is killed, is only slightly +responsible at the most, if there was little reason to expect what +happened.</p> + +<p>1864. The Case of One From Whose Unlawful Act or Omission Homicide +Accidentally Results.—(a) If this person was not negligent and his +conduct was not dangerous to the lives of others, he is not guilty of +homicide; for the death that ensued was not voluntary, either directly +or indirectly. Thus, if a thief is driving away carefully with a stolen +automobile and a reckless pedestrian gets in front of the car and is +killed, the driver is guilty of theft, but not of homicide.</p> + +<p>(b) If the person in question was not negligent but his conduct was +nevertheless dangerous to the lives of others, he is guilty of +homicide; for the death that followed was voluntary indirectly, since +he could have foreseen the homicide and should have avoided the +conduct. Thus, if a person strikes lightly a pregnant woman and she +suffers an abortion, or if one who is not a surgeon tries to mutilate +an innocent person and kills him, he is responsible for the death, +since the acts committed remained dangerous to life, no matter how +careful the offender may have been to avoid killing.</p> + +<p>1865. Moral and Legal Guilt.—The law may hold one responsible for +homicide, even though there is no theological guilt (see 1766 sqq.). +(a) Thus, one may be held responsible for the consequence of acts only +juridically negligent, as when an automobilist while driving at a speed +unreasonable in law, but not in fact, kills a pedestrian. (b) One may +be held responsible for acts committed by those subject to one’s care +or control, as when a man keeps a dog loose not knowing that it is +vicious and it kills a neighbor’s child, or when he illegally lends his +car to a minor, thinking the latter is a good driver, and the minor +carelessly runs down a person in the road.</p> + +<p>1866. Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the +life of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily +integrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without +inflicting death;</p> + +<p>(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow) +breaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;</p> + +<p>(c) enfeeblement, which impairs or destroys the health, strength, or +comfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary +food, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating, +hazing, etc.);</p> + +<p>(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers +(e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post, +by locking him in a room).</p> + +<p>1867. Mutilation. In general, any kind of act which injures or impairs +bodily integrity is called mutilation. In the strict sense, mutilation +is any cutting off, or some equivalent action, through which an organic +function or a distinct use of a member is suppressed or directly +diminished. Accordingly, three distinct types of mutilation are +possible: (a) when a part of the body with a distinct function is +excised; (b) when a distinct organic function is totally suppressed, +without excision of the organ; (c) when the function is directly +lessened or partially suppressed.</p> + +<p>1868. Morality. (a) Liceity. The basic principle governing the morality +of mutilation is: Man is not the master of his own life, but only the +custodian. Accordingly, neither is he master of his own body. Thus, +Pope Pius XII, speaking of the “Surgeon’s Noble Vocation” (_The +Catholic Mind_, Aug. 1948, pp. 490 ff.), declared: “God alone is Lord +of the life and integrity of man, Lord of his members, his organs, his +potencies, particularly of those which make him an associate in the +work of creation. Neither parents, nor spouse, nor the individual in +question may dispose of them at will.”</p> + +<p>As steward, man has duties toward his body, its health and welfare, +according to the norms of reason and the divine law, so that it may be +a means of his attaining life with God. Acting in accord with these +norms and the end of life, it may become necessary and licit for man to +mutilate his body in order to safeguard health or to save his life. The +principle expressing the morality of mutilation, known as the principle +of totality (Pius XII, _Nous vous saluons_, AAS 45-674), may be +formulated: Man may licitly mutilate his body only insofar as this is +expedient for the good of the whole. In fact, such mutilation is often +obligatory, since one must use ordinary means to protect his life and +health, and since the part is for the whole. Thus, one would be bound +to undergo an operation for appendicitis in order to save one’s life.</p> + +<p>Although an organ be not diseased, it may under certain circumstances +be removed. Thus, a surgeon operating for hernia may remove a healthy +appendix, should the danger of adhesions be foreseen that would require +a later operation. Nor is it necessary that there be a “present” +danger. The words of Pope Pius XII, that mutilations are permissible +when required “to avoid ... serious and lasting damage” (AAS 44-782), +are suggestive of the liceity of prophylactic operations. (See +medical-ethics texts for special cases, such as lobotomy, thalamotomy, +experimentation, etc.)</p> + +<p>The problem of mutilation involved in organic transplantation for the +benefit of a neighbor is highly controverted at the present time, Pope +Pius XII discussed the legality of corneal transplants from the dead to +the living (_The Pope Speaks_, Autumn, 1956, pp. 198 ff.), but he did +not touch the matter of transplants from living bodies. In this +controversial matter, the following principles seem to be clear:</p> + +<p>1) Mutilation for the good of the neighbor cannot be justified by the +principle of totality, for the subordination implied in the principle +is characteristic of a physical, not a moral, not even the Mystical, +body.</p> + +<p>2) Minor mutilations, such as skin grafts or blood transfusions, are +certainly permissible. The speculative basis is still a matter of +dispute.</p> + +<p>3) It is solidly probable extrinsically that organic transplantations +may be permitted, possibly out of charity and for a proportionate +reason. Some contend, however, that the act of mutilation involved is +intrinsically evil and can not be justified by the extrinsic motive of +charity.</p> + +<p>Mutilation is lawful by public authority in punishment of a criminal; +for if the state has the right to inflict death for serious crime, much +more has it the right to indict the lesser punishment of mutilation. +The expediency, however, of exercising the right must be judged in +terms not only of punishment, but also of prevention of crime. +Mutilation has no necessary connection (apart from special +circumstances) with deterring criminals from further crime.</p> + +<p>(b) In other cases mutilation is unlawful; for just as man is not the +master of his life, neither is he the master of his limbs, and he +commits a wrong against God, society, and the individual if he destroys +parts of his body when neither public good nor private safety demands +that this can be done. Thus, mutilation of a criminal performed by +private authority is unlawful. Hence, a husband may not mutilate a man +who has broken up his home.</p> + +<p>Mutilation of an innocent person that it not necessary for his bodily +safety is unlawful. Even spiritual good is not a sufficient reason; for +example, one may not castrate oneself in order to escape temptation, +for this operation does not take away passion, and, moreover, there are +spiritual means which suffice against temptation. When Our Lord says +that one should cut off a hand or foot that causes scandal (Matt., +xviii. 8), He is speaking metaphorically of the avoidance of the +occasions of sin. Much less is temporal good a sufficient reason for +mutilation. Hence, a youth may not have his teeth pulled in order to +escape military service; a pauper may not have his arm amputated in +order to get larger alms; a boy may not be castrated in order to give +him a better singing voice; a woman may not have the hysterectomy or +other similar operations performed merely to prevent conception; a man +may not have the operation of vasectomy performed on him in order to +prevent generation.</p> + +<p>1869. Morality of Sterilization. Mutilations which frustrate the power +of procreation in men and women are called sterilization. Two kinds are +distinguished; indirect, to remove diseased organs; direct, to prevent +conception.</p> + +<p>(a) Indirect sterilization (also called by many therapeutic) is lawful +when it is necessary to save life or health. The ethical principle +involved is the indirect voluntary or the principle of double effect. +Hence, vasectomy may be used to prevent idiocy or death, or to remove +or allay physiological abnormalities that bring on certain sexual +perversities or disturbances, if it is likely that these evils are +imminent or present and that the operation will be beneficial.</p> + +<p>(b) Direct sterilization by public authority includes both punitive and +eugenical sterilization. The latter was condemned by Pope Pius XI in +_Casti Connubii_. In context the Holy Father was dealing with the false +claims made in the name of eugenics that the State might legitimately +sterilize those who by reason of hereditary defect might be considered +likely to generate defective offspring. This position is vehemently +rejected: “Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of +their subjects. Therefore where no crime has taken place and there is +no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or +tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of +eugenics or for any other reason. St. Thomas teaches this when, +inquiring whether human judges for the sake of preventing future evils +can inflict punishment, he admits that the power indeed exists as +regards certain other forms of punishment, but justly and properly +denies it as regards the maiming of the body.”</p> + +<p>In the same context, punitive sterilization, whether as punishment for +crime or as deterrent, was also declared to be unlawful. However, +fasciole 14 of the AAS for 1930 emended the text and seems to have +withdrawn the formal condemnation of punitive sterilization. a subject +of theological discussion at the time. The matter had not been closed +and the emendation had the force of reopening the question.</p> + +<p>Theological opinion is still divided as to the liceity of punitive +sterilization. Some still maintain that since the state can inflict the +superior penalty of death for serious crime, _a fortiori_ also the +lesser punishment of sterilization. Others deny the liceity, for +sterilization does not achieve the essential purposes of punishment; it +is not corrective, preventive, retributive, or emendatory. Accordingly +punitive sterilization is unreasonable and inconvenient. This latter +view prevails among most modern moral theologians. Confirmation for the +view is sought in the response of the Holy Office (AAS 32-73) that +direct sterilization is prohibited by the law of nature. Since punitive +sterilization has as its immediate effect, whether as an end or as a +means, sterility of the generative potency, it may well fall under the +category of direct and hence also under condemnation of the Holy Office.</p> + +<p>1870. Other Bodily Punishments.—Other bodily harms (wounds, blows, +restraint) may not be inflicted except under the following conditions:</p> + +<p>(a) there must be sufficient authority. The State, being a perfect +society, has greater coercive power, and may inflict penalties that are +of a permanent character, such as death or mutilation or wounds (e.g., +by branding); and it may impose restraint, not only from unlawful, but +also from lawful acts. The family, being an imperfect society, has a +limited coercive power, and hence the father, or those who hold his +place (e.g., teachers), may administer corporal chastisements that are +not of an irreparable kind to his children (such as beatings, +whippings). Other persons may punish or restrain only in case of urgent +necessity (e.g., one may hold a stranger who is about to commit murder; +one may chastize a neighboring boy who cannot be kept from depredations +on one’s property in any other way). It is not wrong, however, to +inflict moderate bodily hurts, if the other person is not unwilling and +there is a reasonable purpose, such as exercise, training in the art of +boxing or wrestling, recreation, or mortification;</p> + +<p>(b) there must be a sufficient reason for the harm done. The good of +the public is a sufficient reason; for example, when a criminal is +incorrigible and it is dangerous for him to be at large, it is not +unreasonable to give him a life sentence. The good of the individual is +also sufficient; for example, when a surgeon has to wound in order to +cure, when a father has to use the rod in order to improve the child or +to uphold discipline (Prov., xiii. 24, xxiii. 13);</p> + +<p>(c) there must be moderation in the harm or pain inflicted. Thus, while +children should not be spoiled, nor prisoners pampered, the other +extreme of maltreatment or torture must be avoided. It is cruel to box +children soundly on the ears, or to push them roughly about, or to tie +them up in the dark, as they may suffer permanent injury from such +methods. Likewise, it is barbarous to send convicts to a place or +prison so horrible that they lose their minds or fall victims to +lingering disease, or to inflict excruciating punishments by rack, +thumb-screw, prolonged scourgings, etc.</p> + +<p>1871. Injury to Health.—Harm unjustly done to the health of others is +sinful, and, if the harm is great, the sin is mortal. Examples: (a) +Harm to health is done negatively by omission of duty, as when a +medical man or physical director does not use sufficient care and a +patient thereby suffers detriment to health, or an employer does not +see that his factory or place of business is sanitary, or that the work +is not too exhausting with the result that employees lose their vigor. +(b) Harm to health is done positively by acts or objects that tend to +deprive another of the means to physical well-being (e.g., annoyances, +noises that prevent sleep, adulterated food, maintenance of a nuisance +which creates suffocating smells or harmful vapors, etc.), or that +bring to another the infection of disease (e.g., when a well person is +made to live or room with one who has tuberculosis).</p> + +<p>1872. Theft and Robbery.—Having considered the injuries to person +committed by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now +take up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery. +Private ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and +it is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well +managed under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is +subordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who +have the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see +1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and +dominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and +these are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking +possession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a +material thing with one’s property);</p> + +<p>(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion, +through transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These +titles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the +law and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from +intestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).</p> + +<p>1873. The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.—(a) Animals.—Domestic +animals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have +strayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons, +songbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty; +wild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may +not be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which +they cannot escape.</p> + +<p>(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no +present owner.</p> + +<p>(c) Treasure-trove.—This is a deposit of precious movables hidden away +so long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to +natural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law +sometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the +place or with the government.</p> + +<p>(d) Lost Property.—This embraces those movables which an owner has +recently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any +intention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily +findable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to +make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these +efforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is +convinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some +theologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the +article for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes. +Having made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may +use the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the +time interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.</p> + +<p>(e) Abandoned Goods.—According to natural law one may occupy goods +voluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by +the roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of +goods (e.g., immovables) to the State.</p> + +<p>(f) Vacant Goods.—According to natural law the goods of one who died +without heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually +devolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.</p> + +<p>1874. Principles on Accession.—(a) According to natural law, if the +two things united are separable, then each owner should be given his +own property; but if the things are inseparable and one is more +valuable, the owner of the more valuable part keeps all, but +compensates the owner of the less valuable part; if the things are +inseparable and of equal value, there is joint ownership.</p> + +<p>(b) According to positive law, these natural principles are applied to +various cases of accession, whether it be natural (as through growth of +plants or deposit of land by rivers) or artificial (as through change +made in a material by labor, or addition of one substance to another). +These details are treated in books on law.</p> + +<p>1875. Prescription.—Prescription laws (see 1798) are valid in +conscience, since they are determinations about property rights made in +the interest of the common welfare. But the following conditions are +required for acquisition of property through prescription:</p> + +<p>(a) the object of prescription must be a thing prescriptible according +to natural and positive law. Thus, natural rights and public property +may not be prescribed against;</p> + +<p>(b) the subject of prescription must be a person capable of possessing, +and he must be honestly convinced that he has a right to what he +possesses;</p> + +<p>(c) the claim of the subject to the object must rest on possession, on +apparent title to the property, and on the lapse of the legal time +during which possession has been held or ownership has remained +undisputed.</p> + +<p>1876. Wills.—A will is a declaration made in legal form (i.e., with +the solemnities required by law) of the disposal to be made of one’s +property after one’s death. Defects in a will or legacy sometimes +operate to take away the moral obligations of observing it.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if the defect is one of natural law (e.g., a will made under +duress), there is no moral right or obligation produced by reason of +the gift.</p> + +<p>(b) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will +rescindable (e.g., a will not subscribed, as by law required, in +presence of the testator), the gift is good in conscience until adverse +decision of court.</p> + +<p>(c) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will _ipso +facto_ invalid (e.g., a legatee acts as witness to a will), the gift is +good in conscience, if there is question of pious causes, since +property donated to God may not be alienated by human laws. But the +Church desires civil formalities to be observed in the making of wills +(Canon 1513).</p> + +<p>(d) If the defect is positive and _ipso facto_ invalidating, and there +is question of profane causes, the will is not good in conscience, even +before declaration of court.</p> + +<p>1877. Contracts.—A contract may be deined as a mutual agreement +concerning the transfer of a right.</p> + +<p>1. A contract is a mutual agreement, i.e., there must be consent of at +least two parties to the same object. An offer made but not accepted is +not a contract, for only one party consents.</p> + +<p>2. The contractants transfer a right which produces in most instances +under justice a corresponding obligation of doing or omitting +something. Promises, pledges, pacts, etc., while they impose +obligations based on truthfulness, loyalty, etc., are not contracts. +See 1888 (a).</p> + +<p>3. The obligation in justice may be on both sides (bilateral) or only +on one side (unilateral), but consent must be on both sides.</p> + +<p>The elements of a contract are made up of essentials and accidentals. +(a) The essentials include the subject-matter, the parties contractant, +their agreement, and the external form that manifests the agreement. +(b) The accidentals include bonds, oaths, conditions and modes.</p> + +<p>1878. The subject-matter of a contract—that is, the thing or action or +forbearance with which the agreement is concerned—must have the +following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) it must be something possible, for one may not undertake what one +cannot perform. Thus, one cannot bind oneself by an accessory contract +(such as suretyship), if the principal contract itself is _ipso facto_ +invalid. But if the impossibility is only moral (i.e., great +difficulty), one who knowingly undertakes the arduous is bound to +fulfill his promise; if it is only partial, one is held to the part +that is possible; if it is culpable, one is bound to repair damage +caused the other party through non-fulfillment;</p> + +<p>(b) it must be something disposable, for one may not transfer that over +which one has no right of control or transfer. Thus, one may not +contract to sell public property that is _extra commercium_, or +property of which one has only the possession, or goods over which +others have a claim (e.g., a debtor may not bestow gifts to the +detriment of creditors’ rights), or goods not transferable for pay +(e.g., payment for a favorable decision by a judge, or property owed to +a third party) or for money (e.g., academic degrees, public offices, +Sacraments, indulgences);</p> + +<p>(c) it must be something existent and determinable, for no one wishes +to contract for a right that is valueless and illusory. Thus, one may +not sell shares of a stock company that has no assets, or an indefinite +house or lot or chattel;</p> + +<p>(d) it must be something good and lawful, for one may not bind oneself +to iniquity. If it is sinful (e.g., a contract to sell a house in order +to spite a third party), the agreement is _per se_ valid. But if the +substance is evil (e.g., a contract for fornication made with a +prostitute), the agreement is null before the performance of the +promised sin; but it seems to many that after performance of the sin +the promisor is obliged to pay the money promised, unless the law makes +the contract void (see 1886 c). If the law merely denies protection to +a sinful engagement, or forbids it under penalty, it would seem that +after performance of the sin one may follow, as far as strict justice +is concerned, the rule that right is with the possessor. In the United +States immoral and illegal contracts and those that are opposed to +public policy are generally regarded as null, but in some cases the law +declares immoral conditions _de futuro_ non-existent and considers the +agreement to which they are added as valid (e.g., wills and gifts +_inter vivos_ in some codes).</p> + +<p>1879. Sinful Contracts.—There is no form of contract that may not be +made sinful as to its substance on account of the wicked offer or +consideration (e.g., sale may deal with immoral objects, labor may be +given to criminal projects), but there are certain forms of contract +that are particularly open to abuse and hence are frequently associated +with evil circumstances or results. Some contracts are often illicit +according to natural law.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a gift is sinful, on the part of the donor, when it is made +by an employer for the purpose of seducing a servant, and on the part +of the servant, when it is accepted for the purpose of encouraging the +unlawful attentions of the employer; but if the gift is unconditional, +there is no obligation in justice to return it.</p> + +<p>(b) Borrowing is sinful, when the lender is in greater need, or when +one becomes unduly obligated to the lender; lending is sinful when the +lender cannot afford to part with the thing loaned, or when the +borrower is encouraged in thriftlessness, or when he will make evil use +of the thing borrowed, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) Wagers are frequently sinful, since many of them are incitements to +sin (e.g., a bet that another is afraid to get drunk), or results of +sinful motives (e.g., bets made in order to deceive, or to satisfy +avarice, or to live without work), or causes of great evils (e.g., +destitution of families, frauds, scandal, and corruption).</p> + +<p>(d) Gaming is sinful when the form of the sport is objectionable (e.g., +the ancient gladiatorial fights in which the combatants killed each +other), or when the motives or circumstances are wrong (e.g., to play +as a professional gambler so as to avoid work, to play cards all day +Sunday, to play for higher stakes than one can afford, to spend time in +“gambling hells”).</p> + +<p>(e) Lottery is sinful when the object is bad (e.g., the raffle of an +important office with the risk that incompetent persons may be chosen), +or when the circumstances are bad (e.g., if persons are led into +superstition or idleness and prodigality).</p> + +<p>(f) Speculation is sinful in many instances, since it often brings on a +gambling fever that makes the speculator useless to himself and his +dependents, and causes poverty and crime.</p> + +<p>(g) Pawning of property is often unjustifiable, since it makes persons +deprive themselves of necessary property in order to indulge in some +useless or extravagant whim with borrowed money.</p> + +<p>1880. Illegal Contracts.—For reasons of public policy the positive law +puts its disapproval on many of the above-mentioned contracts, at least +in certain instances.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, sometimes the law makes a contract unenforceable in court, +though the natural obligation is not affected. Hence, if a wager is +only denied a hearing before a judge, the winner may keep his gains, +and the loser should pay.</p> + +<p>(b) If the law merely declares that a contract is illegal, the effect +seems to be that the contract retains its natural validity unless the +party who has suffered by it wishes to disavow it. As to the sinfulness +of such a contract, that depends on whether or not the law is penal or +preceptive in intent. Thus, many regard laws that make betting illegal +as preceptive under venial sin, while others regard them as punitive +only. Other examples of illegal contracts are: gifts made to a judge in +connection with a trial; lottery, in Great Britain and the United +States; certain games of chance, in some States; and in Canon Law, as +regards the clergy, alcatory games for money, speculation and trading +(Canons 138, 142).</p> + +<p>(c) If the law makes a contract voidable, the effect is that the +contract possesses its natural force until adverse decision is given by +court. Hence, if a wager is voidable in law, the winner may keep his +gains until obliged by a judge to give them up, but the loser is not +bound to pay, unless he confirms the wager.</p> + +<p>(d) If the law makes the contract ipso facto void, the agreement loses +its natural force (see 558-560). In most of our States, wagering +contracts are illegal and void whether by statute or by judicial +decision. In many of these States the statute permits the recovery of +the money from the winner or the stakeholder. Gifts offered as bribes +are invalid, and those who give or take such gifts are guilty of +serious sin and of a criminal offense. In some of our States, certain +gaming contracts are also null.</p> + +<p>1881. Qualities Necessary in the Parties Contractant.—The parties +contractant must have the following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) from natural law it is necessary that they have the use of reason +sufficient to understand what they are doing. Incompetent are babies +and the insane, and also those who are totally drunk or otherwise +temporarily deranged. Less competent are the half-witted and those who +need a guardian in important matters;</p> + +<p>(b) from positive law it is necessary that they be not legally +excluded. In Canon Law administrators of church property and solemnly +professed religious are unable to make certain contracts (Canons 1527, +536). In civil law there are restrictions on the contractual powers of +minors, wives, aliens, guardians and corporations. Persons not yet +conceived are not capable in civil law of receiving a donation, and +there are many prohibitions against the tender or acceptance of gifts +by those who can reasonably be suspected of exercising undue influence +or of being subject to undue influence.</p> + +<p>1882. Legal Privileges of Minors.—The law grants certain benefits to +minors and the like; for example, in some cases they are not bound by a +non-executed agreement, while the other party is bound, or in an +executed contract they may recover property without restoring or +offering to restore the consideration, if they have nothing with which +to replace it.</p> + +<p>(a) Minors and other persons who are legally incompetent to contract, +may avail themselves of the benefits of the law with a good conscience, +if they are in good faith; for it is just that the law should protect +those who are unable to protect themselves, and those who make +contracts with such persons should know that they (the competent +parties) act at their own risk.</p> + +<p>(b) Minors and other persons legally incompetent may not avail +themselves of the benefit of the law if they have acted in bad faith +(e.g., if a minor by deceit induced the other party to sell to him).</p> + +<p>1883. Qualities Necessary for Valid Consent.—The agreement or consent +of the contracting parties must have the following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) it must be internal, that is, one must accept in will and not +merely in words the proposal or consideration offered by the other +party. If one consents only to the form of the contract, the contract +is null, and the same is probably true if one does not accept +internally the obligations of the contract; if one consents to the +obligations, but does not intend to fulfill them, the contract is +valid, but unlawful. One who contracts invalidly sins, and is bound in +the external forum to keep the contract seriously made, and in the +internal forum to repair the damage to the other party by giving true +consent or making restitution. One who contracts unlawfully also sins, +and is bound to the engagement;</p> + +<p>(b) it must be external, that is, one must manifest in some sensible +way one’s agreement to the proposition contained in an offered +contract. Silence gives consent only when the contract is favorable to +the party who is silent, or when that party should and easily could +manifest his lack of consent, if the proposal did not please him. In +the case of contracts between parties who are not in each other’s +presence, the intimation to the offerer of the offeree’s acceptance +is not necessary for validity, if the contract is gratuitous; but +the contrary seems to be true, at least _per se_, if the contract is +onerous. We shall speak later (1885) on the legal formalities required +in contracts;</p> + +<p>(c) it must be mutual, that is, there must be a meeting of minds in the +same sense, or agreement of both parties to the same thing. Mutuality +requires that consent be contemporaneous, that is, that the acceptance +of one be given while the offer of the other still holds good. But +it does not require that the parties be in each other’s presence, or +that they contract through direct personal communication, or (at least +according to natural law) that the knowledge of the accomplishment +of mutual agreement be known to the offerer. The law in the United +States generally is that an offer may be withdrawn immediately or after +a reasonable time, unless it was made on time for a consideration; +and that a contract between the absent begins only on receipt by the +offerer of the acceptance of the offeree, if the former stipulated for +this, or if the offerer uses one means of communication as his agency +and the offeree another. In other cases it begins the moment that +acceptance is entrusted to the agent of the offerer;</p> + +<p>(d) it must be free, that is, it must have the advertence and +voluntariness necessary for a human act. If the contract is of grave +import, there should be the same kind of deliberation as is necessary +for commission of a mortal sin (see 173 sqq.); if it is of lesser +import, the deliberation should correspond with the seriousness of +the case. But some authors think there should be perfect deliberation +in every contract, since the contractants are assuming obligations of +justice.</p> + +<p>1884. Defects that Invalidate Consent.—The defects that vitiate +consent by taking away knowledge or choice render contracts either void +or voidable (see 40-55). These impediments are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) error, which is a judgment of fact or of law in reference to the +contract, not in harmony with the truth, but not maliciously caused +by other persons. If error is substantial (that is, about the nature +of the contract or the nature of the subject-matter of the contract), +the agreement is naturally void; if error is only accidental (that is, +about features of the contract, subject-matter or co-contractant, that +are only incidentally intended), an onerous agreement is naturally +valid, but positive law in the interest of freedom will often grant the +privilege of rescindment (see Canon 1684, n. 2). But if error cannot be +proved, courts will stand for the validity of a contract;</p> + +<p>(b) fraud, which is error or mistake about a contract caused in one +of the parties by the dishonest representations of the other party or +of a third person (e.g., when an insurance agent deceives about the +benefits, or a policy-taker deceives about his age or health). Fraud +exists, then, when there is intention, at least indirect, to mislead, +and statements, acts or omissions calculated to mislead; but the usual +boasts of vendors and advertisers about the wonderful excellence of +their wares are not fraudulent, since the public understands that such +talk must be taken _cum grano salis_. The effects of fraud on the value +of contracts are the same as those produced by error; but it should be +noted that the person guilty of the fraud is bound to make good the +losses of the injured party, even though the contract be valid and not +rescindable, or though the guilty person be not a party to the contract;</p> + +<p>(c) fear, which is a disturbance of mind caused by the belief that some +danger is impending on oneself or others (see 41 sqq.). It makes a +contract invalid in natural law, when it takes away all consent (e.g., +when it overpowers the reason, or makes one dissent internally from +what is agreed to externally), and probably also when it takes away +perfect freedom in a gratuitous contract, or makes one enter into a +contract for immunity from an unjust vexation; it renders an act or +engagement invalid according to positive law in many special cases +(e.g., the Canons declare null elections, resignations, marriages, +vows, etc., which are made under the influence of fear). Contracts are +considered naturally voidable if one of the parties unjustly extorts +the consent of the other by grave fear, or if a third party intimidates +a person into bestowing something through gratuitous contract; and the +positive law generally treats agreements entered into under grave fear +as rescindible (see Canon 103, n. 2). Fear unjustly caused, even though +it does not make a contract void or voidable, is at times a reason for +the duty of restitution, as when a third party by his unjust threats +forces an innocent person to make expensive contracts as a measure of +protection, and probably also when a third party directly constrains +one to make an onerous contract with a person who knows nothing about +the coercion. Fear, no matter how great, does not in any way weaken +a contract, if there is consent and the fear is induced by a natural +cause (e.g., a storm), or by a human cause acting justly (e.g., an +injured man threatening a lawsuit);</p> + +<p>(d) violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral +force and the former physical force (see 52). According to natural +law, violence invalidates a contract, unless we suppose that it is +only concomitant, as when Sempronius uses coercion to make Balbus sign +a contract which Balbus is really willing to sign. Positive law does +not recognize, or will set aside, agreements made under overpowering +constraint (see Canon 103, n. 1).</p> + +<p>1885. Form of Contract.—The form of a contract is the external manner +in which, according to the positive law, the internal consent of the +parties must be expressed and manifested.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, Canon Law in certain contracts (e.g., engagement of marriage, +marriage, alienation of church property) requires specified solemnities +under pain of nullity of act.</p> + +<p>(b) Civil law in the United States designates various formalities to +be used in transfers of property (e.g., that a deed for real estate be +written, signed, sealed and attested; that a gift be made by delivery +or equivalent act; that certain contracts be in writing; that no +contract be of worth unless it be for a consideration, or else be on +paper with seal attached). The law has the right to annul informal +contracts _ipso facto_, but whether this is the intention in modern +codes is a matter of dispute. The practical rule to be followed, +then, is that the possessor is to be favored, unless there has been a +court decision against his claim. It should be noted, too, that some +legal conditions, such as valuable consideration in simple contracts, +are required for enforceability, not for validity, and hence a good +contract wanting some such condition, though indefensible before the +courts, is obligatory in conscience.</p> + +<p>1886. The Accidentals of a Contract.—(a) Bond is the agreement by the +obligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the +former does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a +certain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was +seriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of +agreement is culpable.</p> + +<p>(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts +themselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract, +an oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the +contract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that +it strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an +obligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or +rescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege; +but an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid +or rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards +acts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was +confirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but +not invalid nor unjust (see 2260).</p> + +<p>(c) Conditions are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract +that the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence +or fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the +contract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that +are not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled, +it seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration +promised (see 1878 d).</p> + +<p>(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as +to qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose, +matter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent +dependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus +leaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and +secondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the +money for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also +the obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not +complied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g., +that the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose +is regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an +agent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to +pay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a +house), the contract stands.</p> + +<p>1887. The Moral Obligation of Entering into a Contract.—(a) There is +a duty of justice when one is under public or private engagement to +make a contract. Examples are a merchant who opens a store for public +patronage, or an auctioneer who holds a sale before invited patrons, or +an owner who makes with another person a contract to sell, or a man and +woman who make solemn espousals.</p> + +<p>(b) There is a duty of charity when a neighbor is in such need that he +deserves to be helped, for example, by a loan or by assistance to make +a loan: “From him that would borrow of thee turn not away” (Matt., v. +42); “A good man is surety for his neighbor” (Ecclus., xxix. 18).</p> + +<p>1888. Every valid contract obliges to faithful performance as a duty +of conscience, even though it be unenforceable and without civil +obligation. We shall discuss the properties of this obligation.</p> + +<p>(a) Quality of the Obligation.—Onerous contracts oblige in virtue of +commutative justice and under pain of restitution; gratuitous contracts +oblige according to some from justice, according to others from +fidelity, according to others from fidelity or justice as the obligor +intends (see 1692, 1753). In practice one may follow the rule that a +liberal promise or wager or other gratuitous contract obliges only +from fidelity with no duty of restitution, unless it be certain that +the promisor intended to bind himself in justice. One is responsible, +however, for damages resultant on breach of promise. The obligation +seems to be one of legal justice only when the thing promised is +something on which a pecuniary value cannot be set and consists in +compliance with law (e.g., in suretyship or bail for keeping the peace +or appearing in court).</p> + +<p>(b) Quantity of Obligation.—In onerous contracts the degree of +obligation depends on the importance of the subject matter, and hence +it is a mortal sin to violate a contract in which a grave right is +concerned; in gratuitous contracts the degree of obligation depends +entirely, according to some, on the will of the person who liberally +binds himself, but others hold that it depends on the importance of the +subject-matter.</p> + +<p>(c) Subjects of Obligation.—The parties to the contracts and those +who take their place (e.g., heirs, executors) or who are responsible +for the contract (e.g., those who commanded the agreement) are morally +bound to fulfill the agreement, while others are bound not to interfere +with the fulfillment.</p> + +<p>(d) Objects of Obligation.—Directly, there is the duty of observing +what is contained explicitly or implicitly in the agreement, and +indirectly of making good any losses caused by breach of contract. A +rescindable contract obliges until it is lawfully disaffirmed by the +party who has the right to break it; a quasi-contract imposes on the +party who has benefited by the services or expenses of another a moral +obligation of making compensation. If a contract transfers ownership +(e.g., contract of sale passing title to buyer, _mutuum_), the +transferee must bear the risks and expenses of the thing transferred; +but if it does not transfer ownership (e.g., contract to sell, +_commodatum_) or has not yet done so (e.g., contract of sale in which +title will pass later, on delivery or payment), the transferer has the +risk and expense (see 1796).</p> + +<p>1889. Cessation of Obligation.—The obligation of a contract ceases in +various ways: (a) by action of the contractants, as when a promisee +renounces his right, or each of the parties to a promise has made a +gratuitous promise in favor of the other and one refuses to keep his +word; (b) by action of law, for example, by prescription, by annulment; +(c) by impossibility, as when a thing freely promised has become +unlawful or useless, or when the donee of a gift _mortis causae_ dies +before the donor.</p> + +<p>1890. Theft.—Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another, +with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the +reasonable wishes of the owner.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also +includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is +the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not +restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay +back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without +the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be +present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.</p> + +<p>(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal +things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal +things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if +they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement +of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of +another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.</p> + +<p>(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of +goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as +usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from +oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the +design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use +to which he has a right.</p> + +<p>(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating +them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the +rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away +property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying +it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It +is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to +prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun +with which another intends to kill).</p> + +<p>(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance +(that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the +mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is +unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of +theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling +that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way +sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.</p> + +<p>(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for +no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner +does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a +general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left +over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does +not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that +he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from +one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give +the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets +the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have +the right to receive from the head of the house support according to +their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the +loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own +spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it +is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or +to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money +from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.</p> + +<p>1891. Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.—What is the guilt of one +who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for +other purposes?</p> + +<p>(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user +is to make only a temporary loan of the money.</p> + +<p>(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot +be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts +his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that +the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by +the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in +intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin, +or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing +the amount for the company’s benefit).</p> + +<p>(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably +presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus, +if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a +large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot +get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if +he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his +funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is +ordinarily present, this case would be rare.</p> + +<p>1892. Comparison of Theft and Robbery.—(a) They differ in species, +for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery, +which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another, +contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of +the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in +the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ +in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind +of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s +unwillingness to be robbed is greater.</p> + +<p>1893. Kinds of Theft and Robbery.—(a) There are many varieties of +theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the +stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of +sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends +commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic +thievery.</p> + +<p>(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed. +The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits, +highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful +creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape +payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort +unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and +blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as +sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of +their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens +especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to +defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves: +pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers, +and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.</p> + +<p>In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the +unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its +owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:</p> + +<p>(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when +the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had +no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is +embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred +temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between +them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent +possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;</p> + +<p>(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit +larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand +larceny when it exceeds that sum.</p> + +<p>1894. The Sinfulness of Theft.—(a) From its nature theft—and, much +more, robbery—is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues +of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh +Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes +from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the +kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of +the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability +of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed +by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight +habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov., +xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts +at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI +(Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from +acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin, +for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without +advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is +not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter +involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is +opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or +is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).</p> + +<p>1895. Theft of a small amount may be a mortal sin (see 187). This may +happen: (a) on account of the internal or subjective circumstances, as +when the thief intends to steal as much as he can or a large amount +here and now, or when he intends to steal a small amount here and +new but to keep this up every day until he has stolen a considerable +amount, or when a child steals a small sum from its parents and falsely +thinks that the theft is gravely sinful in itself; (b) on account of +external or objective circumstances, as when the amount taken today is +small but constitutes, with amounts previously taken, a large sum, or +when the thief foresees serious consequences from his act (e.g., that +the person from whom the goods are taken will fall under suspicion +and be discharged or arrested). It should be noted, however, that +the consequences of the theft do not necessarily make the sin grave +precisely as it is a sin of theft (e.g., in the case just given the +theft was a venial sin, but the unjust damage was a mortal sin), or +even precisely as it is a sin of injustice (e.g., if one steals a +picture of small value, foreseeing that the owner will be afflicted +beyond measure at the loss, the sin against justice is small, but the +sin against charity is mortal).</p> + +<p>1896. The determination of the amount that constitutes grave matter +in theft or robbery (or in unjust damage) is a very difficult task, +because the factors upon which the injury depends are to some extent +doubtful and vary in particular cases. Hence, there is a great +diversity of opinion among moralists on this subject, and it will +frequently be uncertain in an individual case whether a theft is +mortally or only venially sinful in itself. But on account of the +spiritual and temporal interests that are concerned it is necessary +to give at least general rules for direction that will enable one to +distinguish between grave and venial theft, and to know when the duty +of restitution is serious, when light.</p> + +<p>1897. Moralists are in agreement on the following points:</p> + +<p>(a) the standard for measuring gravity of matter is not an invariable +one, but will differ according to circumstances of times and places. +Thus, money has much less purchasing power today than it had before the +Civil War, and the same amount will not go so far nor last so long in +the United States as in some countries of Europe. Hence, other things +being equal, it is less harmful to steal the sum of $10 in 1958 than it +was to steal the same sum in 1858, less harmful to steal that amount +from an American than to steal its equivalent from a European;</p> + +<p>(b) the standard for a particular country and period is to be +interpreted morally, not mathematically; for it depends on the opinions +or estimates of the prudent, which after all are only approximations +and subject to revisions. Hence, it would be absurd to draw such a hard +and fast distinction between grave and venial theft—for example, to +decide from the amounts alone that he who stole $50 is certainly guilty +of mortal sin and fit for hell, while he who stole $49.99 is guilty of +venial sin only and not fit for hell. The figures given by moralists +for grave matter are averages, and hence they cannot be expected to +suit each individual locality or moment or injured person. But, being +based on actual conditions, they are serviceable. If a sum stolen is +much above or below them, they indicate truly the theological species +of the sin; if it is only a little above or below them, they afford a +basis for probability, or at least show that there is room for doubt.</p> + +<p>1898. Moralists are also at one in measuring the injury of theft by the +following considerations:</p> + +<p>(a) it should be estimated by the property loss, that is, that theft +should be deemed a grave sin which in view of all the circumstances and +the common opinion indicts a notable loss on the owner in his property +rights. This is a matter of common sense, for every one can see that it +is a very different thing to steal a cent and to steal $100.</p> + +<p>(b) it should be estimated by the personal injury, that is, by the +unwillingness of the proprietor to suffer the loss. This is also clear, +since the unwillingness of the proprietor is one of the ingredients +of theft, as was explained above in the definition, and everyone will +readily grant that an amount which would be notable if stolen from a +stranger, would not be notable if stolen from an indulgent parent.</p> + +<p>1899. There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute +one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the +wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation +of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The +rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his +$10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the +sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case +is a mortal theft in every case.</p> + +<p>(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today, +distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest +amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however +wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale +of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic +condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative +standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt +more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute +standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich +would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of +society would be endangered.</p> + +<p>1900. Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.—(a) The older +opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard +for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount +necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations, +a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty; +for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious +loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This +daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages +or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was +between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in +moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would +be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or +if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given +by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately +$30 or $35.</p> + +<p>(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave +matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the +equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly +good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As +to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell, +C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in _American Ecclesiastical Review_ (p. 69): +“To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of +money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about +$40.” In 1946, writing in the _Homiletic and Pastoral Review_ (p. 694), +Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than +$100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount +being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and +did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page +127 of the third printing of his _Outlines of Moral Theology_ (1955), +Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable +absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a +practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and +authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to +support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the +amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave +matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through +$20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances, +to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute +standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter, +then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or +expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who +just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.</p> + +<p>[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s +pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the +absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if +it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a +wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing +the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various +times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount +suggested.</p> + +<p>1901. What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these +objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or +jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the +material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have +no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from +the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to +steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.</p> + +<p>1902. It was said above (1898) that the gravity of theft is estimated, +not only by the property loss, but also by the personal loss, that is, +the reluctance, unwillingness or sorrow of the owner at the deprivation +of his goods. This does not mean that a greater unwillingness on the +part of the owner increases the gravity of the theft, if the owner’s +unwillingness is excessive or unreasonable (e.g., it is not a mortal +sin of theft to steal a dollar from a miser, if the miser on account +of his love of money feels the loss as keenly as another person in his +place would feel the loss of $40). But a less unwillingness of the +owner diminishes the injury, and hence increases the amount necessary +for grave matter. There are three reasons especially that diminish the +unwillingess of the owner at the loss of his property.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, by reason of the persons who steal, the owner is less +unwilling when these persons have a greater claim on his affection +(e.g., his children or wife), or when custom permits them to some +extent a greater freedom than is granted to others (e.g., servants, +employees).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the things stolen, the owner is less unwilling when +these are things of less value, like crops, that are produced mostly by +nature and are left exposed, such as fruits growing by the wayside, +branches and pieces of fallen timber lying on uncultivated land.</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of the manner of the theft, the owner is usually less +unwilling when goods are taken gradually and on several occasions, or +piecemeal, than when they are taken all at once.</p> + +<p>1903. The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.—(a) In +theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required. +But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and +with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by +outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in +considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the +family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to +which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the +parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child +who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every +way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a +serious matter.</p> + +<p>(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But +there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to +have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she +takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful +purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the +husband or family (see 1799).</p> + +<p>1904. Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.—(a) According to the +law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor +the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the +common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson, +_Elementary Law_, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their +own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of +injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the +other.</p> + +<p>(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings +of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance +from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real +or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty +of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his +child.</p> + +<p>1905. The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.—(a) If +the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily +supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants, +pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule. +But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others +these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that +the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider +such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by +the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings +of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery +of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or +expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as +when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the +employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or +violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to +constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than +outsiders.</p> + +<p>1906. Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less +Concerned.—(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left +Unprotected.—If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild +fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands), +it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is +poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are +generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely, +when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down +trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left +Unprotected.—If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a +bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it +seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But +it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry +person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value +is equal to grave matter.</p> + +<p>1907. Travelling Without Paying Fare.—Is it theft to ride in public +conveyances without paying the fare?</p> + +<p>(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is +committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be +said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who +has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and +the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But +since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who +takes it without pay is guilty of theft.</p> + +<p>(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there +is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys +a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is +fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser +make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket +which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).</p> + +<p>1908. Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.—Small amounts stolen +may accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following +ways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the +same person or from different persons, and continues at this until he +has stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other +thieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several +persons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the +whole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations +may accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to +break down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of +Balbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries +daily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of +serious damage.</p> + +<p>1909. Small thefts that grow into a large theft are mortally sinful in +the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) they are mortally sinful by reason of the previous intention when +one steals a little now and a little again, but has it in mind from +the outset to steal a total sum that will be grave matter, or when one +conspires with others to steal a notable sum although one’s own share +will not be a notable amount. In these cases the purpose is to commit +a grave injustice, either against an individual (if all is taken from +one person) or against society (if portions are taken from various +persons), and hence one is internally guilty of grave sin, even though +one has not yet performed it externally. Examples are merchants who use +false weights and measures, or who adulterate their commodities with +small portions of water, etc., and thus make large profits by minute +cheating;</p> + +<p>(b) they are mortally sinful by reason of the subsequent intention when +one had no purpose to steal a large amount, but adverts to the fact +that a small theft here and now committed will constitute grave matter +if added to previous petty thefts, or that the amount of stolen goods +now possessed is large, and nevertheless resolves to go ahead with the +theft or to retain the stolen goods. This does not mean that a number +of venial sins coalesce into a mortal sin (see 189), but only that the +object of a sin which is slight in itself becomes serious on account +of the circumstance that it is morally connected with previous sins. +The last act in a connected series must not be taken singly, but in +connection with the acts that precede, as is seen in the violation of a +fast or in omission of parts of an hour. In the cases now considered, +therefore, grave injustice is actually and purposely done, and mortal +sin is committed, even though there was no thought of this in advance.</p> + +<p>1910. The case of young men who are educated free of charge in the +expectation that they will go on to the priesthood and who do not +persevere.—(a) If they act in bad faith (i.e., if they enter the +college or seminary merely to get their education, or to avoid work, +or if they remain after they have abandoned thought of the clerical +state), they are guilty of theft and bound to restitution.</p> + +<p>(b) If they are not in bad faith (i.e., if they wish to try out their +vocation, or if they begin with the intention to persevere), they are +not guilty of injustice. This is true, even though they are rejected on +account of idleness or other faults, provided there was no intention to +defraud.</p> + +<p>1911. In the following cases small thefts which added to others make +a large sum seem not to be the cause of grave loss, and hence not +mortally sinful:</p> + +<p>(a) the small theft of one person following on the small thefts of +others, when there is no bond of example, advice, conspiracy, etc., +to unite the various thefts; for none of the thieves can be held +responsible for the part of the loss caused by the others. Example: +Titus, knowing that Balbus has been cheated by various persons to the +amount of $9 and that $10 will be a serious loss to Balbus, proceeds to +steal $1 from Balbus:</p> + +<p>(b) the small thefts of several persons who steal together, and who +influence one another only by example; for example is an occasion, +not a true cause of the imitator’s act (see 1447, 1763). Example: +Sempronius and Claudius go into a store together and find that there +is no one around. Sempronius thereupon steals a number of articles and +leaves. Claudius notices this and steals other things, which will make +the total loss serious.</p> + +<p>1912. Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.—The moral +connection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary, +as was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This +moral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by +interruption or revocation.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a +long interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and +infrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This +supposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small +thievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one +steals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according +to some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long +intervals.</p> + +<p>(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is +clear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should +not be computed with later thefts; and it seems also—though some do +not admit this—that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things +taken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no +moral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing +now.</p> + +<p>1913. Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.—The interval of time +that breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined +with mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be +accurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when +considerable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief +period of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of +notable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six +months is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts, +but that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others, +on the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into +consideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts +separate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:</p> + +<p>(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts +to grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who +has kept not a little of her patron’s material of a twelvemonth ago +does the same thing again this year);</p> + +<p>(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the +property is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of +the price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the +same thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one +could have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention +of stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost +grave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly +be enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover, +the interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding +suspicion;</p> + +<p>(c) a period of one month, when the thing stolen falls far short of +grave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);</p> + +<p>(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g., +when a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his +fortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling +object as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents +a month;</p> + +<p>(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will +prevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there +are some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump +of coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even +after many years have passed.</p> + +<p>1914. Species and Number of Petty Thefts that Coalesce into Grave +Matter.—(a) If the thefts proceed from a previously formed purpose of +stealing by installments a large sum, each of them is a mortal sin, +but they do not form numerically distinct sins, unless there was a +revocation of the intent (see 214, 215).</p> + +<p>(b) If the thefts did not proceed from a previously formed plan, those +that preceded the culminating theft (i.e., the one whose addition makes +the quantity grave) are so many separate venial sins of theft. The +culminating theft is a mortal sin, if the thief adverts to the fact +that he has now stolen a notable sum; otherwise it is a venial sin. The +act, after the gravity of the matter has been noticed, is the initial +mortal sin, if it means consent to the grave injustice done (e.g., +retention of the ill-gotten goods, intention not to make restitution); +it is an additional mortal sin, if it means a renewal of consent to the +grave injustice previously done (e.g., the theft of a new small amount +with the purpose of keeping it as well as the rest).</p> + +<p>1915. Sum Required for Grave Matter in Petty Thefts that Coalesce.—(a) +According to one opinion, it is always larger than the sum required for +grave matter in a theft of the same amount on a single occasion; for +the owner does not feel the loss so much when his goods are stolen in +small amounts and at different times. Thus, a man is less unwilling to +have $100 stolen from him through pilferings of cents and dollars over +a period of a year or two than to have it all stolen from him on one +day.</p> + +<p>(b) According to another opinion, grave matter for petty thefts is not +larger than grave matter for large thefts of the same amount, if the +petty thief had the intention all along to accumulate a notable sum. +But some who are of this opinion make an exception for the case when +the petty thief steals not from one but from several owners, for in +this way the loss is distributed and less harm done. Grave matter in +this case, they say, is the same as absolutely grave matter.</p> + +<p>1916. There are various opinions on the amounts required for grave +matter in the case of petty thefts that coalesce. (a) If all the thefts +are against the same person, the usual opinion fixes grave matter at +one and one-half times or twice the amount fixed for large thefts. +Some authors limit this to cases wherein the thief had not the purpose +from the beginning to steal a great amount (see 1915), and some state +that the amount for large thefts which is considered is the relative, +not the absolute sum. (b) If the thefts are against different persons, +some think that grave matter is the same as the absolute matter of one +large theft, while others make it one and one-half times or twice that +amount. Here again some moralists limit these increases in the sum for +grave matter to cases wherein there was no purpose from the beginning +to steal a notable amount.</p> + +<p>1917. Theft from Joint Owners.—Is it a grave sin to steal a +considerable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a) +If the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the +reasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave +(e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only +two or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious; +(c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an +organization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will +be so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them +individually, the sin is not serious.</p> + +<p>1918. Restitution in Cases of Theft.—(a) Restitution is owed for the +property stolen. He who stole a serious amount but gave back part, +retaining only what is light matter, is bound under venial sin to +restore the rest. Confessors should urge restitution even of small +amounts, when possible, in order to deter men from theft, and it may +sometimes be useful to require children to seek a condonation from +their parents for a similar reason. (b) Restitution is owed also for +damage caused by the theft (see 1895). Thus, if one steals the tool of +a poor farmer, which is of little value in itself but which brings on +him a serious loss, one is responsible for the loss as well as for the +tool.</p> + +<p>1919. Cases of Doubt.—(a) Doubts of Law.—The rules given by moralists +on grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and +authentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have +no obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well +founded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein +it is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is +no disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine +himself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line. +Hence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in +every instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light; +on the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite +answer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the +duty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be +imposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.</p> + +<p>(b) Doubts of Fact.—The application of the rules for grave matter +will also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties +about circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have +recourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful +conscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be +doubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the +presumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means. +Again, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly +unwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but +one cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know +how much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person, +or whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or +whether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the +confessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on +the time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the +general frequency of the thefts, etc.</p> + +<p>1920. Conversion of Others’ Property.—The conversion of property owned +by others or held by them may be permitted, or at least tolerated, when +the owner or possessor would be unreasonable if he objected as in the +following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) in extreme necessity, for according to natural law each one has the +right to preserve his life by using the temporal things of the earth +(see 1571). In danger of death things necessary for escaping the danger +become common property, and no injury is done by the person in danger +if he uses the goods of another person to save his own life;</p> + +<p>(b) in certain cases when occult compensation is the only way in which +one can defend or secure one’s right to property, for it is not wrong +to take what is one’s due, if this is done without harm to the rights +of others.</p> + +<p>1921. Conditions for Lawful Occupation of the Goods of Others in +Extreme Need.—(a) The occupation must be necessary for securing one’s +own or another’s natural right to some supreme good, such as life +or what is almost the equivalent of life (e.g., freedom from cruel +restraint, escape from fearful disease). A supreme good is at stake, +then, when one is in extreme, quasi-extreme, or most grave need (see +1236), that is, exposed to the certain or very probable peril of losing +life, limbs, liberty, sight, chastity, etc.; occupation is necessary +when there is no other way (e.g., by begging) to avert the danger.</p> + +<p>(b) The occupation must be made without detriment to the rights of +others. Hence, one may not occupy more than is really necessary to +escape the danger; one may not occupy at all if the owner is situated +in an equal danger (e.g., one may not take the plank from a man in +danger of drowning in order to save oneself); one may not retain the +thing taken, if the danger has passed (e.g., one who commandeered his +neighbor’s car in order to escape from a thug must return the car). The +neglect to ask permission, however, does not exceed a venial sin and +does not impose the duty of restitution, if there is a real reason for +occupation. One may not take the goods without permission, if this can +be obtained without too much difficulty; nor forcibly, if possession +can be had peaceably.</p> + +<p>1922. Restitution for Occupied Goods.—Is the occupier bound to +restitution for occupied goods that were consumed (e.g., food and +drink), if he afterwards becomes able to pay for them?</p> + +<p>(a) If the occupier had no prospect at the time of ever being able +to pay for what he took, he is not bound to restitution—not because +of possession, since the thing has perished, nor because of the +taking, since there was no onerous contract, nor because of injury, +since he acted within his rights. The owner cannot complain at this, +since charity obliges him to give of his own free will to one who is +in supreme need and not to expect that the alms be paid back, while +justice forbids that he impede the appropriation of what is needed +by the person in distress. It seems, however, that a case of this +character would rarely happen, and, if it did happen, the more decent +thing would be to pay for what was used. Some moralists think that more +probably there would be an obligation of justice to do this, since +occupation is lawful only in so far as it is necessary.</p> + +<p>(b) If the occupier had the prospect at the time of being able to +pay for what he took, he is bound to restitution; for one should not +occupy more than is necessary, and, if a loan suffices to tide one over +a difficulty, it is not right to expect a gift. Hence, men who raid +bakery shops in times of food shortage, are bound to make restitution +to the bakers when able.</p> + +<p>1923. Occupation in the Case of Merely Grave Necessity.—Is it lawful +to occupy in merely grave or ordinary necessity?</p> + +<p>(a) This is not lawful, for otherwise the doors would be opened to +thefts without number, and both the security of property and the peace +of the public would be at an end. Innocent XI condemned the proposition +that it is permissible to steal in great need (Denzinger, n. 1186). (b) +Such occupation is less sinful than to occupy without necessity, and +indeed the theft may be only venial if one is in grave need and has +vainly sought work or charity to relieve the difficulty, as when a poor +man who is not able to give his children all the food they need steals +provisions now and then.</p> + +<p>1924. Occupation of a Large Sum by One in Dire Need.—(a) One opinion +holds that even for the sake of avoiding death this is not permissible, +for one has no right to extraordinary means for the protection of one’s +life.</p> + +<p>(b) A second opinion maintains that this occupation is lawful, under +the conditions given in 1921; for life is more precious than even a +large sum of money, and in such extreme need property right yields to +the right to life.</p> + +<p>(c) A third opinion distinguishes between the case in which extreme +necessity is proximate or urgent (e.g., an unarmed Watchman is +threatened with instant death if he does not hand over at once the +money he has in charge) and the case in which it is only remote (e.g., +the doctor tells a poor man that he will die shortly from tuberculosis +unless he goes to a more healthy altitude, but the patient is too poor +to follow these instructions). In the former case the person in need +may take what is necessary (on account of the reasons for the second +opinion and also because the civil laws allow this), but he is not +bound to do so (on account of the reasons for the first opinion); in +the latter case, more probably he has no right to occupation, for this +would be prejudicial to the public welfare and is moreover strictly +forbidden by civil laws (see 1571, 1253).</p> + +<p>1925. Duty of the Owner towards One in Dire Need.—(a) In charity +the owner is bound to come to the aid of the needy person; but, if +he neglects this duty, he does not offend justice and is not held to +restitution (see 1240, 1753). (b) In justice the owner is bound not +to prevent the needy person from taking or using what he is entitled +to; but should the owner do this and the necessity cease, there is no +duty of restitution, for the right of the needy person ends with the +necessity.</p> + +<p>1926. Lawfulness of Receiving Support from a Thief.—Is it lawful for +the wife and family to receive support from the head of the family, +when he is a thief?</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are not thus deprived of +their goods or of the prospect of restitution. This happens when the +actual support does not come from the stolen property, and the thief is +able to make restitution from other property that belongs to him, or +the wife and children earn as much for the family by their work as they +receive in support. In this case the family may take from the thief +even things that are not necessary for their support.</p> + +<p>(b) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of +restitution, but the obligation of restitution has ceased on account +of grave necessity (see 1797). This happens when the support does not +actually come from the stolen property, but the thief is unable to make +restitution from his own property without depriving his own family who +are in grave need. In this case the family may take from the thief only +such things as are necessary for them according to their station in +life.</p> + +<p>(c) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of their +goods, but the right to occupy these goods has arisen on account of the +extreme necessity of the family (see 1920 sqq.). This happens when the +support comes from the stolen property itself. But the family may use +only what is really necessary for the relief of their dire distress.</p> + +<p>1927. Compensation.-Compensation is of two kinds, strict or legal and +wide or extra-legal.</p> + +<p>(a) In a strict sense, compensation is counterclaim, or the comparison +of the debts of two persons to one another with a view to the +cancellation of one or of both debts. This method of extinction of +debt is allowed by law in order to reduce the amount and expenses of +litigation. It is known as recoupment or offset when a defendant brings +a cross-action against a plaintiff for non-fulfillment by the latter +of some part of the contract in controversy, and as set-off when the +defendant introduces the debt owed to him over against the debts sued +for by the plaintiff. Counterclaim is just when no injury is done to +one party (e.g., it would be unjust to keep the horse of Titus which +you had borrowed, simply because Titus owed you a debt equal to the +value of the horse, for the horse might be worth more to Titus); it is +legal when recognized by the law (cfr. 1797, 1798).</p> + +<p>(b) In a wide sense, compensation is the summary recovery by a creditor +of the thing or the debt owed him by the debtor. The recovery is +summary in the sense that the creditor does not go to law, or proceed +according to law, but takes from the debtor either openly (open +compensation) or secretly (occult compensation) what is owed.</p> + +<p>1928. Lawfulness of Occult Compensation.—(a) Ordinarily, or _per +se_, it is not lawful; for it contains such evils as disregard of due +process of law, scandal, infamy, public disturbance, the menace that +the common good will be harmed by frequent abuse, the danger that the +debtor will suffer loss through a second payment of the same debt, +etc. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that domestic servants may +practise occult compensation when they decide that their services are +worth more than the salary they are receiving (Denzinger, n. 1187). +(b) Exceptionally, or _per accidens_, it is lawful; for under certain +conditions it offends neither public nor private welfare and it is +necessary for the vindication of a right. Just as the natural law gives +authority to occupy the goods of another in case of extreme need, so +does it justify occult compensation in the special cases just mentioned.</p> + +<p>1929. Unlawful Occult Compensation and Restitution.—Does unlawful +occult compensation oblige one to restitution?</p> + +<p>(a) If the compensation is not only unlawful but also injurious +(e.g., a servant takes what is not due her under the pretext of +compensation), it is not rightly called compensation, but is really +theft, and restitution is due. (b) If the compensation is unlawful but +not injurious (e.g., a servant takes what is really due her, but she +could have obtained it by asking for it), there is no theft or duty of +restitution, since the property of another was not stolen.</p> + +<p>1930. Conditions Required by Commutative Justice for Occult +Compensation.—(a) Before the Compensation.—There must be a strict +right to the thing taken; for, if there is no such right, one takes +what belongs to another against his will, or commits theft. Hence, if +an employer has freely promised to make a gift to his servant and then +fails to keep the promise, the servant has no right to take what was +promised, since it is owed from liberality or fidelity or gratitude, +but not from commutative justice. The same applies to a non-necessary +heir who has been left nothing in a will, since he had no strict right. +It is also unjust to take secret compensation for a debt that has not +yet fallen due.</p> + +<p>(b) During the Compensation.—No wrong must be done to the debtor +(e.g., by taking more than is due, by taking an article which the +debtor needs for earning his living) or to third parties (e.g., +by taking goods deposited by them with the debtor). If possible, +compensation should be made from goods of the same nature and kind as +those that were taken or damaged, for the debtor should not be forced +to part with things he wishes to retain and which are not necessary for +the creditor’s satisfaction.</p> + +<p>(c) After the Compensation.—One must avoid injury to the debtor (e.g., +the keeping of a payment which is now not owed by him and which one can +refuse or return to him) and to third parties (e.g., the casting of +suspicion on a servant in order to divert attention from one’s act of +occult compensation).</p> + +<p>1931. Must the strictness of the right be morally certain, or, in other +words, must reasonable doubt of fact and of law be excluded?</p> + +<p>(a) As to doubt of fact, it must be excluded; for in such doubt the +presumption is with the possessor, or at least it is certainly wrong +to perform an act that will probably be injurious to another person +(see 713). Moreover, everyone can see that the public good would suffer +greatly, if occult compensation were permissible when the existence of +a debt is uncertain. Hence, if it is only probable that one sold goods +to another person or that another person has not yet paid for services +received by him, occult compensation must be avoided.</p> + +<p>(b) As to pure doubt of law, the question is controverted. Some think +that it also must be excluded, since the possessor should not be +deprived of possession unless it is certain that there is a right +to do this. Others think that occult compensation may be used in +spite of a mere doubt of law, if the doubt concerns only the mode +of making the compensation, or if the probability in favor of the +creditor is so strong that a judge could conscientiously decide for +him against the possessor. Examples of doubts of law here are three +cases that are in dispute among authors, namely, whether one may take +money as compensation for defamation that will not be repaired by +restoration of fame (see 1802, 1803), whether one may deny reparation +for defamation when one has been defamed by the other party and has +not received restitution, whether one has rights to a legacy of which +one is deprived on account of a mere informality in the document. In +these cases the right is held by some authorities to be probable, +but the decision in a particular instance should be made only on the +advice of a learned and conscientious person, since the matter is very +complicated and there is great danger of self-deception.</p> + +<p>1932. Some Cases in Which There Is a Strict Right to Compensation.—(a) +Employees (i.e., servants, workingmen, artisans, officials, etc.) have +a strict right when they are injured by the employer’s non-observance +of the contract (e.g., the stipulated salary is not paid; unjust +subtractions are made from the salary, as by fines for the inadvertent +and infrequent breaking of tools, etc., about which there was no +agreement in the contract; labors not contracted for are exacted), or +when an unjust contract is imposed on them (e.g., they are induced by +force or threats to accept less than a living wage; advantage is taken +of their grave necessity to wring from them agreement to such a wage).</p> + +<p>(b) Merchants have a strict right when a debt which they cannot collect +is certainly owed them, or when they sold below the minimum just price, +because forced to this unjustly, or because they made a mistake in +charging. They may compensate themselves by diminishing weights or +measurements.</p> + +<p>(c) One has a right to compensation who has been condemned under a +sentence manifestly unjust, because the law is certainly unjust or +because the judge clearly gave a wrong decision in a matter of fact +(e.g., he erroneously presumed that a debt had been contracted, or that +it had not been paid).</p> + +<p>1933. Some Cases in Which There Is No Right to Compensation.—(a) +Employees have no right to compensation for subtractions from their +salary, if they culpably injure the property of their employer, or +if they agreed to such subtractions; nor for the smallness of their +wage, if they freely accepted it (e.g., if they regarded it as a favor +to be employed, and the employer did not really need them), or if it +is made up for by presents, board or lodging, opportunity for good +tips, etc.; nor for unusual labors, if they hired themselves out for +general service (unless they are asked to perform work of an entirely +unforeseen kind, such as a very perilous mission), or if they undertook +these labors freely without the knowledge or wish (express or tacit) of +the employer.</p> + +<p>(b) Merchants have no right to compensation for goods sold by them +below the minimum just price, if they freely agreed to sell at that +price.</p> + +<p>1934. Children and Employees and Compensation.—Some special questions +arise for consideration in case of parents who employ their own +children, and of employers who are forced to underpay on account of the +dishonesty of their help.</p> + +<p>(a) Children who work for their parents and who are entitled to a +salary, by agreement or from the law, have the same rights as other +employees, but injustice against them would be less frequent. In +this country the father has a right to the services and wages of his +unemancipated child, but the child becomes independent of the father +when it reaches the age of majority or when the father relinquishes his +right.</p> + +<p>(b) Employees who are underpaid because the employer is cheated by his +help have the right to occult compensation, if they are forced to take +less than a living wage (1932); otherwise this is not permissible, +unless it be certain that the employer is not unwilling that the honest +employees receive more than their pay. In practice, on account of the +great peril of injustice, it is advisable that such workers seek better +pay through their organizations or else look for employment elsewhere.</p> + +<p>1935. Conditions Required by Legal Justice for Occult +Compensation.—(a) Occult compensation must not be used if payment can +easily be obtained through suit at law or agreement; for the order of +law and the public welfare require that one should not have recourse +to the extraordinary means of occult compensation if ordinary means +will suffice and not cause notable difficulties. But as a rule it seems +this obliges only under venial sin, since ordinarily the departure from +normal procedure in this matter is not seriously detrimental to public +morals or order; and it does not impose a duty of restitution, since he +who takes only what belongs to him does not offend against commutative +justice. Indeed, if it is certain that other means will be futile +(e.g., because one has not sufficient evidence to win or because the +decision would he biased) or harmful (e.g., because great dissensions +will be aroused, or heavy expenses incurred in litigation), occult +compensation is not even venially unlawful.</p> + +<p>(b) Occult compensation, according to law, should not be used by a +bailee, for he has a lien for his services and proper expenditures in +caring for the object bailed, but not for any other debt the bailor may +owe him (Bolles, _Handy Law Book_). This is obligatory at least for the +external forum.</p> + +<p>1936. Some Conditions Required by Charity for Occult Compensation (see +1165, 1236, 1483).—(a) Charity towards the Debtor.—The creditor +should see, when possible, that the debtor suffers no loss by occasion +of the compensation. Hence, in order to spare the debtor the evils of a +bad conscience in reference to the debt or of a second payment of the +debt, the creditor should, if possible, inform the debtor that the debt +is cancelled or that payment is not expected.</p> + +<p>(b) Charity towards Third Parties.-The creditor should, if possible, +prevent any trouble or loss to others that might be occasioned by the +compensation, such as suspicion of theft that might fall on servants.</p> + +<p>1937. The Lawfulness of Open Compensation.—(a) If one’s property is +being stolen or carried away, it is lawful to protect or recover it by +force; for this is only just defense.</p> + +<p>(b) If one’s property has already been carried away but is still in +being and in a safe place, legal justice requires that one seek redress +from the courts. But it does not seem a serious fault if one recovers +goods by using moderate force, since the property is one’s own and the +public manner of seizing it enables the law to take cognizance of the +case. American law recognizes with certain restrictions the rights of +recaption and of entry whereby a person takes possession without legal +process of goods unlawfully taken or withheld from him (Robinson, +_Elementary Law_, Sec.239, 240).</p> + +<p>(c) If a debt owed to one is denied by the debtor, it is not lawful +to take payment from him by force, since this is against the law and +productive of scandal and disturbance, and moreover one is not the +owner of the goods which one thus takes by force.</p> + +<p>1938. Notanda pro Confessariis.—(a) Ante factum, rarissime consulenda +est occulta compensatio, tum quia ut plurimum illicita est (1928) +utpote periculo injustitiae, scandali, perturbationis plena, tum quia +lex civilis non solet eam ut remedium agnoscere sed potius ut furtum +habet. Publice de occulta compensatione non expedit loqui, et praestat +ut qui privatim de ea interrogentur, etiam datis conditionibus ad +liceitatem necessariis, per modum tolerationis tantum annuant.</p> + +<p>(b) Post factum, facilius in favorem utentis compensatione judicari +potest, in ordine ad restitutionem, sed prudenter, et quasi evasive +loquendum, ne praxis ita agendi ut per se et generaliter licita +approbari videatur.</p> + +<p>1939. Judicial Injustice.—We pass now from injustices committed by +deed to those committed by words, and shall consider first unjust +words spoken in courts of law and next unjust words spoken in private +or outside of legal processes. Judicial injustice will be treated +under the following heads: (a) injustice in judges; (b) injustice in +plaintiffs or accusers; (c) injustice in defendants; (d) injustice in +witnesses; (e) injustice in lawyers.</p> + +<p>1940. The Office of Judge.—Judgment is the proper act of justice +(1727) and therefore when exercised under due conditions it is not +only lawful, but virtuous. The exercise of public judgment belongs to +the judge, who is a person vested with authority to decide litigated +questions in civil or criminal cases.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in the strict sense, a judge is the official who has public +authority to preside over tribunals of justice, in which major matters +are tried and a formal procedure is followed, and whose function it is +to direct the course of the proceedings and to settle questions of fact +or of law that arise.</p> + +<p>(b) In the wide sense, a judge is any person who has lawful authority +to pass an obligatory sentence in criminal or civil matters. The +name may be applied, then, to those who preside over a tribunal in +which minor or urgent questions are considered and treated summarily +(justices of the peace, police magistrates, etc.); to those who do +not preside over a tribunal, but who are attorneys at law appointed +as officers of a court to pass on some issue of a pending proceeding +or suit (referees); to those who act as assistants of the presiding +judge, by determining the truth of alleged facts in civil cases, +or the innocence or guilt of an accused in criminal cases (trial +jurymen); to those who are chosen, by the parties to the dispute or by +a court, as substitutes for the ordinary courts provided by law, to +hear and settle, without legal formalities, the matter in controversy +(arbitrators).</p> + +<p>1941. Classes of Courts.—There are various classes of courts and +therefore various kinds of judges.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, according to their relative dignity and jurisdiction there +are higher and lower courts, courts of the first, second and last +instance.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the cases they try, courts are either civil (in which +redress of private injuries is sought) or criminal (in which the +community prosecutes public wrongs).</p> + +<p>(c) According to the law which they use courts are ecclesiastical or +secular.</p> + +<p>(d) According to the form of procedure used and the remedies applied, +courts in the United States are divided into courts of common law, +courts of equity, probate, admiralty, and military courts.</p> + +<p>1942. Jurisdiction.—Authority is necessary in a judge, for judgment +is a binding decision that may be executed by force, and this supposes +that he who pronounces the judgment is the superior of the person on +whom the judgment is passed, Hence, he who acts as judge when he lacks +jurisdiction acts invalidly (unless jurisdiction is supplied, as in +common error for an ecclesiastical judge, in Canon 209), and offends +against the rights of another judge and of the person on whom he passes +sentence. Examples would be secular judges acting in ecclesiastical +cases or ecclesiastical judges acting in temporal cases.</p> + +<p>1943. The Qualifications of a Judge.—(a) Mentally, he must be endowed +with knowledge of the law and with prudence, so as to be competent +to pronounce correctly on the questions that are brought to him for +decision; for, as being the authorized interpreter and custodian of the +law, he is bound by quasi-contract with the community and with those +who appear before him to be competent for these offices. If a judge +realizes that he is incompetent in these ways, he must either resign +his office, or make up for his deficiency by study or consultation with +those who are more learned than himself. A juryman, being a layman to +the law, is not expected to have the mental equipment of a lawyer; but +it is his duty to give his attention to the statements, arguments and +testimony and to the instructions of the judge.</p> + +<p>(b) Morally, the judge must be a lover of justice, whether commutative, +distributive or legal; for the proper office of the judge is to apply +the law to particular cases and to declare officially the mutual +rights and obligations of litigants who are before him. He must not +be a respecter of persons, one who is moved for or against a man on +account of rank, position or wealth, nor one who is swayed by fear or +favor, by popular outcry or personal ambition. Not only legal but also +commutative justice obliges him to perform his duties conscientiously; +for in taking his office he enters into a quasi-contract with the +community to execute his functions faithfully and well, and similarly +by trying a case he engages that those before him will receive +evenhanded justice. A juror should be a conscientious person who is +openminded and free from prejudice for or against those on whom he has +to vote.</p> + +<p>1944. Conduct of a Judge.—A judge must be above suspicion, since +respect for the courts is the very life of the State. But there is good +reason to suspect a judge who judges in his own case, or in a case in +which he will be naturally inclined to favor one side. Hence the duty +of abstaining from certain things.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, he should avoid business, social and political activities +that will give ground for belief that he uses his office for the +promotion of private interests.</p> + +<p>(b) He should not act in a case in which his own advantage or the +advantage of his friends might appear to conflict with the duty of +strict impartiality, as when he has personal litigation in the court, +or when a near relative of his is party in a controversy, or when one +of the contestants is his personal or political friend or enemy, etc. +Canon 1613 of the Code forbids a church judge to act in the case of a +person related by blood or marriage in the direct line or in the first +and second degrees of the collateral line, or of a person for whom he +is guardian or administrator, or in cases in which he had previously +acted as advocate or proxy, or from which he stands to profit or lose.</p> + +<p>(c) He should refrain from conduct that would tend to arouse doubts of +his impartial attitude, such as incivility to counsel or witnesses, +unexplained rulings that have the appearance of arbitrariness, private +interviews or dealings with one of the parties before him in ways +calculated to influence his action.</p> + +<p>1945. Accepting Gifts from Litigants or Others.—May a judge take money +or other goods from those whose interests are submitted to him, such as +litigants or lawyers in his court or their friends?</p> + +<p>(a) If the goods are extorted by threats or pressure or unjust +vexation, the judge is guilty of robbery, since he forcibly takes that +to which he has no right.</p> + +<p>(b) If the goods are given as payment for the judge’s services during +the trial, the judge sins against commutative justice in receiving +payment for services already due, since his salary comes from the +community and obliges him to administer justice without charge to +those who seek it. Neither is it lawful to take money as compensation +for trying one case before another, or for hastening a case, or for +giving unusual diligence to a complicated case, or for deciding for +one side when the evidence is equal on both sides. But the law could +permit a judge to collect his expenses from both parties if the trial +necessitated a personal outlay of money (e.g., for travel or hire of +assistants) and there was no public fund to defray these costs.</p> + +<p>(c) If the goods are offered as bribes, in order that the judge may be +influenced to act against justice, it is clear that grave injustice is +done both to the community and to the party who is injured.</p> + +<p>(d) If the goods are given as free gifts, with no condition attached, +some think they may be lawfully accepted, if there is little +probability that they will influence the judge (e.g., because they +are small or given after the trial has ended). But others hold, and +it seems more correctly, that both natural and positive law forbids +this. Natural law forbids because of the danger (“Presents and gifts +blind the eyes of judges, and make them dumb in the mouth, so that they +cannot correct,” Ecclus., xx. 31), and because of the mistrust and +scandal that will result. It is incorrect to suppose that small gifts +and gifts offered after sentence would not have influence, for the +contending parties would soon come to vie with one another in making +gifts, while judges would begin to think about the gratuities that +might be looked for at the conclusion of a trial. Canon Law forbids all +ecclesiastical judges and all who assist in court to accept any gifts +whatever that are offered in connection with the trial (Canon 1624), +and the civil law provides severe penalties for bribes offered as gifts.</p> + +<p>(e) If goods are given as a mere alms or from civility or hospitality +(e.g., food and drink such as is usually offered to a guest or +visitor), it does not seem unlawful in itself to accept them, but, +since there is a danger of suspicion and scandal, even this should be +avoided.</p> + +<p>1946. Obligation of a Judge to Restore Goods Received in the +Above-Mentioned Ways.—(a) If retention of the goods is contrary to +the reasonable wishes of the person who gave them, restitution is +necessary. Hence, the judge must give back money that was extorted and +the payments made by private parties for the exercise of his official +duties.</p> + +<p>(b) If retention of the goods is contrary to law, restitution is also +necessary. Hence, if a judge has taken a bribe, he must give it back, +because the agreement is null, and he cannot lawfully keep his part of +the compact by acting contrary to justice. The same is true when the +law voids the contract whereby he received the goods, or when a court +decree obliges him to return a free gift bestowed upon him.</p> + +<p>(c) If retention of the goods is not contrary to the will of the giver +nor to the law, restitution is not necessary. Hence, if a judge has +received a pure gift and no corruption was intended or practised, +he sinned in taking it, but the donation was valid and there is no +obligation to return it. And even though he has taken a bribe, and in +consideration of it has acted against justice, it seems there is no +natural obligation to make restitution to the party who gave the bribe, +since the latter has received a consideration for his payment, but the +judge is held to indemnify the injured party.</p> + +<p>1947. Duties of a Judge in the Course of a Trial.—(a) The purpose of +the investigation is to discover the truth in the matter before the +court, and consequently it is the duty of a judge to give a case the +study and attention it deserves.</p> + +<p>(b) The method of procedure is intended to secure a fair hearing for +both parties and so to expedite business that the litigants will not +be harmed by needless delays. The judge should therefore observe the +necessary and customary forms of law, while avoiding waste of time +and unnecessary interruptions. “It is not the custom of the Romans,” +said Festus to the Jews who asked him to condemn Paul, “to condemn any +man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have +liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the things laid to his +charge” (Acts, xxv. 15).</p> + +<p>1948. Duties of a Judge at the Conclusion of a Trial.—(a) The sentence +must be just, that is, it must be based on the law and the evidence. +Even though a judge does not personally approve of a law, thinking it +unwise or unnecessary or over-severe, he should nevertheless enforce +it; for he is appointed, not to change or reform, but to apply the law, +yet so, however, that the spirit is not sacrificed.</p> + +<p>(b) Sentence must not be relaxed as a rule, for otherwise the rights of +the State or of the party winning the case will be harmed. But there +are times when the public good or some other sufficient reason calls +for relaxation, and in such cases judges have the power to refrain from +passing sentence or to suspend or respite a sentence already announced. +The defeated party should be allowed the opportunity which the law +grants him for seeking a reversal of the judgment.</p> + +<p>1949. Sentence Passed under a Law Manifestly Unjust.—(a) If the law is +manifestly opposed to divine or natural law and sentence under it would +command the commission of an act intrinsically evil (e.g., cohabitation +of those who are not really married, “mercy killing” of the physically +or mentally incapacitated, eugenic sterilization of defectives or +criminals), the judge should resign rather than give such a sentence.</p> + +<p>(b) If the law is manifestly opposed to divine or natural law and +sentence under it would inflict a grievous penalty (e.g., death or +long imprisonment) on the transgressor of the law, sentence would be +unlawful. But if only a light penalty would be inflicted (e.g., a small +fine or short confinement), it seems that sentence might be tolerated; +for the person condemned might be considered to yield his rights in +such a case for the sake of the public good, which suffers from the +loss of conscientious officials. The act of the judge in giving the +sentence would be only material cooperation, which is lawful for grave +reasons (see 1515 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(c) If the law is manifestly opposed to ecclesiastical law, sentence +may be given lawfully, if scandal is avoided and the Church yields her +right in the case, as is sometimes done in favor of Catholic judges, +lest they be deprived of their positions.</p> + +<p>1950. May a Catholic Judge Grant a Decree of Divorce?—-Apart from +scandal or a positive ecclesiastical prohibition:</p> + +<p>(a) The judge may grant a divorce to a couple not married validly +although they have had a marriage ceremony recognized by civil law. +This would occur in the case of Catholics married before a civil +magistrate or non-Catholic minister. Also, when the Church has +pronounced a marriage invalid, civil divorce may be granted for the +sake of civil effects.</p> + +<p>(b) Divorce may be granted if the judge knows that one of the parties +will invoke the Pauline privilege.</p> + +<p>(c) If the judge is morally certain that neither party will attempt +remarriage and that the divorce is being sought merely for the sake of +civil effects, he may grant the divorce. In the case of Catholics the +consent of Church authorities would be required for this procedure.</p> + +<p>(d) If the marriage is valid and it is known that the parties will +attempt a new marriage, some consider that a decree of divorce is +intrinsically evil, since it but applies a law that attempts, contrary +to divine right, to dissolve the marriage bond. Others (and this is +the more common view today) distinguish and think that the decree of +divorce does not concern the religious obligation of the petitioners, +but is simply an official declaration that the state regards the +civil effects of the marriage as no longer existing. Under certain +circumstances, (e. g., loss of office for refusal to accept a divorce +case, loss of prestige, antagonism, etc.), such a decree, in itself +morally indifferent, may be permitted.</p> + +<p>(e) If there is question of partial divorce (i.e., separation from +bed and board) of Catholic spouses, a decree is lawful, the Church +consenting, for a reason recognized by ecclesiastical authority, such +as adultery.</p> + +<p>1951. When Evidence Is Contrary to Personal Knowledge of Judge.—(a) +In a civil case, the judge should follow the public evidence rather +than his private knowledge; for he acts as a public, not as a private, +person. Moreover, the State has the power to transfer property from one +to another, when the common good requires this, and the common good +requires that civil decisions be based on public evidence rather than +on private information. Some moralists deny this conclusion on the +ground that it is intrinsically wrong to force a person to pay who does +not owe, even though the evidence is against him.</p> + +<p>(b) In a criminal case, the judge should follow the evidence rather +than his own knowledge, if the evidence calls for acquittal of the +accused; for it is better for the public welfare that a guilty man +escape than that the judicial order be neglected and a rule admitted +that might convict the innocent as well as the guilty.</p> + +<p>(c) In a criminal case in which the evidence points to guilt while the +judge’s private knowledge assures him of the innocence of the accused, +the judge must not condemn, if there is any legal way to avoid it. But +if the evidence stands and the judge has to pronounce sentence, it is +not easy to determine the course that should be followed. According to +St. Thomas, the judge should condemn, since he is a public official and +must therefore be guided by the allegations and proofs offered during +the trial, especially since public order and respect for law depend on +the good reputation of the courts. If judges could disregard at will +the evidence offered on account of private knowledge they claimed to +have, the confidence of the public in the integrity of courts would +be shaken, men would take the law into their own hands, and peace and +order on which the happiness of the community depend would be at an +end. Moreover, the judge is not guilty in sentencing in this case, +since he does not intend evil and acts according to the principle of +double effect (see 103 sqq.). According to a second opinion attributed +to St. Bonaventure, the judge should acquit, since it is intrinsically +wrong to condemn to death a person about whose innocence one is +certain. According to a third opinion, which St. Alphonsus considers +as probable, the judge should condemn in minor criminal cases in which +only pecuniary penalties are imposed (for the State has the right to +exercise eminent domain in order to safeguard an important public good +like that of respect for the law and the courts); but he should acquit +in major cases in which personal punishments are inflicted, for society +has no right to deprive an innocent person of life or liberty.</p> + +<p>1952. When the Judge Is the Unjust Cause of Damaging Evidence.—In some +cases the judge may be the unjust cause of the evidence that convicts +an innocent man, as when the judge has committed a crime and thrown +suspicion on the accused (Dan, xiii), or when the judge has moved +others to testify falsely against a man he knows to be innocent.</p> + +<p>(a) One opinion holds that the judge would be obliged to condemn, on +account of the reasons just given for the opinion of St. Thomas, if the +judge were unable to overcome the evidence. But those who hold this add +that this is purely speculative, for in a concrete case there would +be many ways by which the judge could extricate both himself and the +accused from the difficulty.</p> + +<p>(b) Another opinion says that in no case could the judge of the present +hypothesis condemn. Those who favor this opinion declare that St. +Thomas is to be understood only of the case in which the judge is not +the cause of the unjust accusation; for one who has culpably placed +a cause of damage is bound to remove that cause before it acts, if +this is possible, and in the present instance it is possible for the +judge, if all other things have failed, to free the innocent person by +testifying for him, or even by acknowledging his own guilt.</p> + +<p>1953. Practical Conclusions about the Three Controverted Opinions Given +Above in 1951.—(a) In a case tried according to Canon Law, it seems +that the opinion of St. Thomas should be followed, since Canon 1869, n. +2, declares that the ecclesiastical judge must not give sentence unless +he is certain about the matter of the sentence, and that his certainty +must be derived from the acts and proofs of the trial.</p> + +<p>(b) In a case tried according to civil law, it seems that the whole +controversy is today very often of little practical importance; for +court decisions are now frequently left to jurymen, and these men +must either have no private certainty before they are admitted to +their office (as is the case in the United States), or they have the +obligation of using private knowledge in casting their vote and of +communicating it to fellow-jurors during the deliberations (as is +the case in some other countries). Hence, the moral question whether +it is lawful to decide according to private knowledge against the +public evidence largely disappears. But when a case of the kind now +considered does occur, the position of the civil law also agrees, it +seems, with that of St. Thomas: “Neither the judge nor the jury can +consider a private fact of which they have a merely personal knowledge, +however important may be its bearing on the issue, unless it has been +brought to their attention by evidence properly produced in open +court” (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 334). But the lightest penalty +allowed by the law should be imposed in such a case. If a judge were +privately certain that a jury verdict was unjust, he could offer his +own testimony or appeal to the pardoning power.</p> + +<p>1954. The principle that a judge must be guided only by his public +knowledge applies also to other officials who are required to follow +the results of a public investigation, but not to those who are +required to act according to their best knowledge, whether public or +private.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, public knowledge must be the guide of those who are ministers +of a court and on whom it falls to execute its decrees; for they are +the instruments and subjects of the president of the court. If they +have private information of a material and relevant kind, they should +disclose it as witnesses.</p> + +<p>(b) Private knowledge that is opposed to and more reliable than public +knowledge must be the guide of those who are supposed to act according +to the most trustworthy knowledge they have. Hence, a superior who has +the power to make appointments to office should disregard the votes of +his advisors, if he can prove that they are wrong in their opinions +about a nominee for office. He may confirm or annul their choice +according to his honest conscience.</p> + +<p>1955. When Guilt Is Doubtful in Criminal Cases.—In a criminal case or +a case in which punishment is inflicted, if the guilt of the accused is +doubtful, the sentence should be for acquittal; for no one should be +condemned unless his guilt is morally certain (see 1728 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, according to Canon Law, an ecclesiastical judge who is not +certain that sentence for the plaintiff will be just, must declare that +the latter has not established his case and must dismiss the defendant, +though exception is made for cases that have the favor of law (such +as marriage, liberty, testaments, Canon 1869, n. 4). Canon Law places +the burden of proof on him who makes an assertion, and it rules that +the defendant is to be acquitted if the plaintiff or accuser fails to +prove, even though the person on trial says nothing (Canon 1748).</p> + +<p>(b) According to the civil law the rules on evidence also favor the +accused in cases of doubt. He must not be held guilty unless the State +has proved affirmatively and beyond reasonable doubt every material +allegation in the indictment. In capital cases the evidence of guilt +must be equivalent in weight and conclusiveness to the direct testimony +of two competent and reliable witnesses. A reasonable doubt in the +mind of a juryman is one for which he can give himself an adequate and +satisfactory reason (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 608).</p> + +<p>1956. Doubt in Civil Cases.—In civil cases, if it is uncertain after +the investigation for whom the decision should be given, the following +rules seem to be just:</p> + +<p>(a) if the parties are unequal in claim, the decision should be for the +one whose claim is more weighty; for the judge is appointed by society +to investigate the truth of a controversy and to decide according to +the merits of the case. Thus, decision should be for the party Whose +arguments are of at least equal strength—but who has legitimate +possession (for “possession is nine points in law”), or whose case +enjoys the favor of the law (e.g., in Canon Law, the cases of widows, +wards, minors), or for the party whose case is stronger and more +probable. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a judge may decide +for the side whose arguments are less probable (Denzinger, n. 1152);</p> + +<p>(b) if the parties are equal in their claims, some think that property +in dispute should be equally divided between the contestants, others +that the parties should be persuaded to compromise, or, if this is +impossible, that the decision may be given for either one of them. But +if positive law regulates the manner of proceeding in such a case, its +provisions should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law, if a judge is in +doubt as to which one of two competitors has possession, he may grant +it to both of them indivisibly, or he may command them to deposit it +with a sequester, pending the settlement of the dispute (Canon 1697).</p> + +<p>1957. What should be decided when the defendant has possession with +probable title and the plaintiff has more probable title?—(a) If the +possession is not certain, or not certainly legitimate, decision should +be for the plaintiff, for uncertain possession does not create any +presumption of right and hence the more probable case prevails.</p> + +<p>(b) If the possession is certainly legitimate, the common opinion is +that decision should be for the defendant; for certain possession is +not overcome by more probable, but only by certain arguments for the +plaintiff. Some authors, however, believe that the judge should decide +for the plaintiff, since possession prevails only when the arguments +are of equal strength on both sides; or at least that he could decide +for him, since it is probable that the plaintiff by presenting a more +convincing case has sufficiently established his right to eject the +defendant.</p> + +<p>1958. The Standard by Which a Judge Should Weigh the Evidence.—(a) +When the proving force of an argument is settled by the law itself, +the legal rule should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law certain kinds +of proofs are expressly declared to be demonstrative (e.g., a public +instrument not contested, Canon 1816), while other proofs are held +to be insufficient or only of partial value (e.g., certain kinds of +testimony, Canon 1756). Likewise in civil law public documents are +prima facie evidence, oral interpretation of a written document which +contradicts its language is not admitted, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) When the proving force of an argument is left to the discretion of +the judge, he must follow his conscience, that is, he must sincerely +and impartially decide to the best of his ability the value of the +argument, whether it is decisive, or likely, or Weak. Thus, in judging +circumstantial evidence a juryman must use his own common sense and +intelligence in determining whether the premises are doubtful or the +inference illogical; in estimating testimony a judge must bear in mind +the quality of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.</p> + +<p>1959. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly +Just.—(a) It is binding in conscience; for it is merely the +application of law to a particular case, and law obliges (see 377). (b) +It obliges in virtue of legal justice when the case is only penal, and +hence he who is fined by court is held as a duty of obedience to pay +the fine; it obliges in virtue of commutative justice when the case is +about a strict right, and hence if the court requires an heir to pay a +legacy, the latter must make restitution for neglect of this duty (see +1728).</p> + +<p>1960. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly +Unjust.—(a) If the sentence is unjust because it is the application +of an unjust law, it produces no obligation in those cases in which +the judge cannot lawfully apply the law (see 1949); for an unjust law +does not oblige in conscience _per se_, but only _per accidens_ (see +377, 461). (b) If the sentence is unjust because it is not based on the +law or the evidence, or because the trial was not conducted fairly, it +produces no obligation _per se_, but there may be an obligation _per +accidens_, as when scandal or great public disturbance will otherwise +result. Hence, one who through plain injustice is deprived of an +inheritance has the right to occult compensation (see 1928), while the +other party is bound to restitution of the inheritance (unless he is in +good faith or has prescribed) and also to damages, if he went to law in +bad faith.</p> + +<p>1961. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence in Case of +Doubt.—(a) If the doubt is about fact or law, not about the right +of the judge to give sentence (see 1955 sqq.), the sentence may be +safely followed; for it is the office of the judge to settle doubtful +matters, and to promote the common welfare by ending litigation. Thus, +in doubtful criminal cases the judge sometimes acquits a guilty man, +and in doubtful civil cases he sometimes awards property to one who +has no right to it; but these sentences are not unjust, since they are +based on rules which long experience has shown to be necessary for the +public welfare. (b) If the doubt is about the justice of the sentence, +there is an obligation of conscience to observe the judgment, since +the presumption favors the judge. Were this not so, the authority of +tribunals of justice would be at an end, for almost everyone who loses +a case thinks that he has been treated unjustly. But one may enter an +appeal, where this is allowed by law.</p> + +<p>1962. When a Judge Is Bound to Restitution.—A judge is bound to +restitution when he causes unjust damage to the community or to +litigants (see 1762 sqq.), and hence he must either recall his unjust +act, or repair to the best of his ability the harm done. But the +conditions for unjust damage must be verified (see 1763).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the judge’s act must be objectively unjust, that is, in +violation of a strict right under commutative justice. This happens +when he conducts the trial unjustly (e.g., when he neglects the +essential procedure, tries without an accuser, and the like) or when +he passes unjust sentence (e.g., condemns without proof of fact or +crime, or in spite of evidence for innocence, votes for acquittal when +there is no reasonable doubt of guilt, imposes penalties that are +insufficient or excessively severe, or awards property to one who to +his knowledge has no right to it).</p> + +<p>(b) The judge’s act must be efficaciously unjust, that is, it must be +the real cause of the loss sustained by the other person. Hence, there +is no duty of restitution if loss does not result (e.g., if the party +who is in the right wins in spite of unfairness on the part of the +judge), or if loss cannot be traced to the judge’s action (e.g., when +a judge is not entirely impartial in his charge to the jury, but his +words do not influence them, as they would have given an unfair verdict +anyway).</p> + +<p>(c) The judge’s act must be subjectively unjust, that is, the judge +must be seriously responsible for the damage on account of his +culpable ignorance, negligence, or malice. Even though he has made +mistakes through excusable inadvertence or error, he becomes seriously +responsible for damage, if, foreseeing it, he does not do what is in +his power to avert it (see 1769).</p> + +<p>1963. When a Judge Is Not Bound to Restitution. A judge is not bound to +restitution, however, for violations of virtues other than commutative +justice.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, charity is offended, but not justice, if the judge has +personal hatred against a person before him, but does not permit this +to influence his conduct or decisions.</p> + +<p>(b) Legal, but not commutative, justice is offended, if the judge is +negligent about exemplary damages, provided the common good does not +suffer; for there does not seem to be any strict right to the fine +before sentence has been given. This is disputed, however, by some +moralists, who hold that the judge is under contract with the community +in this matter, and hence that he offends commutative justice, if he is +habitually and to notable amounts indulgent about fines.</p> + +<p>1964. Kinds of Accusation.—From injustice committed by judges we pass +now to that committed by accusers. It should be noted that there are +two kinds of accusation: (a) extrajudicial accusation is that which is +brought before a superior in order that he may correct or restrain, +without recourse to judicial process, a subject who is delinquent. This +is evangelical or canonical correction, which was discussed in 1293, +1289; (b) judicial accusation, with which we are now concerned, is that +which is brought before a judge, in order that redress may be obtained +through judicial process against an accused person.</p> + +<p>1965. Judicial accusation is also made in two ways. (a) The accuser +sometimes does not act as one of the two antagonistic parties, and does +not assume the burden of proving his accusation. He makes an official +complaint or denunciation, and then drops out of the case, leaving it +to the magistrate or other officer to examine whether a process should +be instituted and the informer summoned as a witness. (b) The accuser +is sometimes one of the two antagonistic parties during the process, +and he then assumes the burden of proving his accusation. In Canon Law +there are two kinds of processual accusers, the actor in civil cases +and the accuser (an official known as the _promotor justitiae_) in +criminal cases. In American law, the accuser in cases of private wrong +is known as the plaintiff; in cases of public wrong he is the District +Attorney or public prosecutor.</p> + +<p>1966. The Duty of Judicial Accusation or Denunciation.—(a) If a wrong +has been committed which is directly prejudicial to the common welfare +(e.g., treason, counterfeiting, banditry), there is an obligation to +make accusation, for each member of society is held to come to its +assistance when its peace and order are endangered, and this is done by +cooperating with the tribunals of justice. Duty to one’s family also +requires that one prosecute, when this is necessary in order to protect +its members against some great evil.</p> + +<p>(b) If a wrong has been committed which is not immediately prejudicial +to the common welfare, there is not _per se_ an obligation of +accusation; for the purpose of accusation is to obtain punishment or +the correction of a wrong—an end that should not be waived when the +common good is at stake, but which may be waived when private interests +are concerned. But _per accidens_, or by reason of circumstances, there +is often an obligation of denouncing or accusing private wrongs.</p> + +<p>1967. Cases in Which There Is a Duty of Making Complaint about Private +Wrongs.—(a) Such complaint is obligatory in virtue of commutative +justice, when by reason of his office, oath, or function a person +is under contract to accuse violators of the law; and hence serious +negligence in such a person entails the duty of restitution for any +damage caused through his fault. Examples here would be a watchman who +fails to report thefts, a man serving on the grand jury who does not +vote for an indictment when he should, a prosecutor who is careless. +The obligation is grave when the danger or injury to the common good is +serious.</p> + +<p>(b) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of legal justice, when there +is a positive precept of the law which requires that accusation be +made. The civil law rarely obliges to this as a duty of conscience, +but there are a number of cases in Canon Law in which it is a duty of +conscience to denounce (e.g., when there has been a _sollicitatio ad +turpia_).</p> + +<p>(c) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of charity, when without +serious inconvenience one can thereby save a neighbor from a grave +evil, such as unjust sentence of death or infamy: “Deliver them that +are led to death” (Prov., xxiv. 11); “Rescue the poor, and deliver the +needy out of the hand of the sinner” (Psalm lxxxi. 4).</p> + +<p>1968. Is a Malefactor Bound to Accuse Himself?—(a) As a rule, he is +not bound to confess guilt, either explicitly or implicitly, for this +is too much opposed to natural inclination, and hence is not demanded +by law (see 552). This seems to be true even though an accused has +unjustly declared himself innocent, and has not been questioned further +or has been acquitted; for legal justice obliges the accused to give a +true answer only when he is being questioned (see 1978). In Canon Law +those who would sustain damage from their own testimony are not bound +to take the witness stand, and hence persons who reasonably fear that +their evidence will subject themselves or their relatives to infamy, +vexation or other disadvantage cannot be forced to testify (Canon 1755, +n. 2). In civil law one may not be convicted on one’s own testimony +alone, unless the confession was voluntary, that is, made neither under +fear, nor with the hope of favor, nor as the result of any species of +coercion (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.608).</p> + +<p>(b) In exceptional cases, one would be bound to accuse oneself, namely, +if there were a grave and urgent necessity of the community which +outweighed the loss that would follow from self-accusation (see 1576, +1577). Self-accusation is also a duty when one is the gravely culpable +cause of the punishment of an innocent person, if there is no other +lawful way of freeing him, and the self-accusation will not bring +on one a much more serious evil than that which the innocent person +suffers.</p> + +<p>1969. Ethical Conditions for Lawful Accusation or Denunciation.—(a) +There must be no injury to the common welfare. Hence, if the order and +peace of society would be disturbed by the accusation of a crime which +was private and from which no further damage could be anticipated, it +would be better to leave this occult crime unpunished rather than bring +on greater evils to the public.</p> + +<p>(b) There must be no injury to private welfare. Hence, if the accuser +does not believe that his accusation is just, or if he knows that +there is no suitable evidence for his charges, or if he is excluded +by law from making an accusation (e.g., when his knowledge has been +derived from the confessional or in other confidential ways), it would +be unjust to accuse; if the offender offers to make full satisfaction +for a private wrong and has already amended, or was not accustomed +to commit such wrongs, or if the loss he will suffer from the +accusation will be far in excess of the wrong he has done, it would be +uncharitable to make formal accusation (see 1200, 1201).</p> + +<p>1970. Persons Who May Not Act as Accusers.—Generally speaking, the +following persons are naturally incapable of acting as accusers: (a) +those who are guilty of greater misdeeds or who are infamous, since +it is unbecoming for them to accuse; (b) those who are enemies of the +other party, since they are swayed by spite or revengefulness; (c) +those who are near relatives of the other party, since it is unnatural +for them to attack their own flesh and blood.</p> + +<p>1971. In Whose Favor May One Denounce a Private Wrong?—(a) One may +denounce it in one’s own favor, for one is not obliged to sacrifice +one’s right to redress, and hence accusation is permissible (see 1199). +Those who are considered as one person with the injured party may +accuse for him, such as parents, husband, wife, children.</p> + +<p>(b) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of an innocent third +party, as when an innocent person is being harassed by oppression, even +though one can defend him only with notable inconvenience to oneself +(see 1967).</p> + +<p>(c) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of the guilty party +himself, as when he is guilty of offenses that are harmful only to +himself (e.g., drunkenness, impurities), if he has a bad reputation +already or his delinquencies are manifest.</p> + +<p>1972. Accusation and Fraternal Correction.—Whether obligatory or +permissible accusation should be preceded by a fraternal correction is +controverted among moralists. But perhaps the two opposite views may be +reconciled as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) _per se_, that is, in view of the purpose of accusation +(punishment, vindication of justice, example), there is no duty of +previous fraternal admonition, since the purpose of the admonition is +the amendment of the wrongdoer (see above, 1289, 1293);</p> + +<p>(b) _per accidens_, that is, in view of the circumstance that there +may be hope of correcting the wrongdoer and of averting evil, and that +punishment may not be very necessary to the public welfare, previous +fraternal correction for secret delinquencies may sometimes be a duty +of charity.</p> + +<p>1973. Unjust Accusation.—Injustice in accusation is committed in +the following ways: (a) injury is done the accused when a crime is +falsely imputed to him through malice (calumny), or through a too +great readiness to believe rumors (rashness); (b) injury is done the +community if one whose duty it is to conduct a prosecution makes only a +sham attack or colludes with the defense (prevarication), or if without +good reason he abandons the prosecution (tergiversation).</p> + +<p>1974. Cessation of Duty of Accusation.—The duty of accusation ceases: +(a) when accusation is found to be unjust, for example, when the +prosecutor discovers the accused is really innocent, etc. (see 1969); +(b) when accusation is found to be useless, for example, when one +discovers that the authorities are already aware of the fact about +which one intended to give information, or when one perceives that the +charge cannot be substantiated.</p> + +<p>1975. The Defendant.—The party who is required to make answer to the +charges of the plaintiff or prosecutor is known as the defendant or the +accused. We shall now speak of the ways in which he may be guilty of +injustice, and shall consider the following cases: (a) the defendant in +civil cases; (b) the accused in criminal cases who is innocent; (c) the +accused in criminal cases who is guilty.</p> + +<p>1976. The Duties of the Defendant in Civil Cases.—(a) Before +Sentence.—If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just, the defendant +as a matter of justice should recognize the claim and withdraw from the +case. But a defendant may take exception to arguments offered by the +plaintiff which, though actually valid, are not juridically made.</p> + +<p>(b) After Sentence.—If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just +but loses in court, the defendant is obliged in conscience to pay the +claim, even though the plaintiff does not appeal the case; he is also +obliged in conscience to indemnify the plaintiff for the expenses of +litigation, if the latter lost the case on account of unjust means +employed by the defendant.</p> + +<p>1977. The Duties of One Who Has Been Arrested on a Criminal +Charge.—(a) If the accused person is innocent, he may take to flight +or even offer positive resistance, provided he does no injury to those +who attack him, and public scandal or disorder does not result from +the resistance. This is according to natural law, which permits one +to use self-defense against unjust aggression; but since the positive +law requires the accused to submit to arrest that is not manifestly +unlawful and empowers the officers to employ force against those who +resist, it seems that generally the accused should permit himself to be +taken under protest, if he cannot escape.</p> + +<p>(b) If the accused person is guilty, he may take to flight, since he +has not yet been sentenced as guilty nor officially deprived of his +liberty; but he may not offer resistance to those who are sent to +apprehend him, since their aggression against him is not unjust. The +accused person, if not yet convicted, may even use indifferent means to +escape from prison, such as sawing his way out or eluding the vigilance +of the guards; but he may not employ sinful means, such as bribery of +officials.</p> + +<p>1978. Duty of the Accused to Plead Guilty, if Questioned by the +Judge.—(a) If the accused is innocent, he may not plead guilty, +as is clear. If to escape most grave evils he did plead guilty, he +would be guilty of lying (if under oath, of perjury), but not of +self-defamation; for, as the owner of his reputation, he has the right +to sacrifice it in order to escape greater evils. Neither would he be +guilty of suicide, according to some, if the death penalty were the +consequence of the confession; for his purpose would be to avoid what +he dreaded more than death.</p> + +<p>(b) If the accused is guilty, he must reply truthfully, if the judge +has the right to ask the question; for if the judge has the right +to question, the accused has the obligation to answer, even though +unpleasant things will befall him in consequence.</p> + +<p>(c) If the accused is guilty, but the judge has no right to ask about +his guilt (that is, if the judge does not question juridically or +according to law, or if he questions from a false presumption of +guilt), or if the accusation cannot be proved juridically, the accused +is not obliged to answer. He may keep silence or evade the truth, but +it is not lawful to lie.</p> + +<p>1979. Legal Right of a Judge to Question a Prisoner about His +Guilt.—(a) According to older legislation a judge had this right, and +could enforce it by torture, when the common good was involved and +the guilt of the prisoner was likely on account of infamy or manifest +indications of crime or half-proof of guilt. In itself, this practice +was not opposed to natural law and had some good results; but it was +open also to many abuses. Some moralists teach that a judge cannot +impose a grave obligation of confessing guilt in capital or similar +cases, if the accused has otherwise a hope of escape and no great evil +is likely to befall the common interests by reason of an acquittal. +They argue that human law cannot oblige so rigorously as a rule.</p> + +<p>(b) According to modern civil legislation the right of exacting a +confession is denied to a judge. Thus, according to American law no +person may be compelled “in any criminal case to be a witness against +himself” (Constitution, Article V). In American law the plea of not +guilty is not a lie, even though the accused knows that he is guilty, +for, as everyone understands, the plea means either that one is +innocent or that one is using the privilege of not confessing. Neither +is it considered a lie to say that an unprovable charge is a calumny, +for an accusation that cannot be proved juridically is juridically a +calumny.</p> + +<p>(c) The general law of the Church rules for ecclesiastical processes +that, when the judge questions the parties-litigant, they are obliged +to answer and to confess the truth, unless the question is not +legitimate (e.g., questions about irrelevant or privileged matters, +or questions made in a captious or leading manner), or the answer +would incriminate the parties themselves (Canon 1743). Neither is +an ecclesiastical judge permitted to put an accused in a criminal +case under oath to tell the truth (Canon 1744). An instruction of +the Holy Office of 1866 required that the guilty party in a case of +solicitation should confess, but the instruction was directive rather +than preceptive. Particular law (e.g., the statutes of a Religious +Institute) might perhaps prescribe confession by an accused, but most +Constitutions of Religious Institutes bind only under penalty, and, +as for the rest, an ecclesiastical superior could at most advise, but +could not impose, confession by an accused.</p> + +<p>1980. Rights and Duties of Accused in Conducting His Own Defense.—(a) +In Reference to Judge or Attorneys.—The accused, if questioned, may +not conceal the truth by lies, ambiguities, or half-truths, since these +are evil means, nor may he use evasion if he is lawfully interrogated. +But if the question put to him is unlawful, he may evade an answer. It +is commonly held that lies told in giving testimony or evidence are +not necessarily mortal sins, as there may be no perjury committed or +grave harm done another by reason of them (e.g., when an innocent man +“doctors” a paper and thereby without harming anyone escapes from an +unjust sentence).</p> + +<p>(b) In Reference to the Opponent or His Witnesses.—The accused has the +right to disclose secret but real crimes of the accusers, when this is +an exercise of his legal right of taking exception to the witnesses +as incompetent, or of his natural right of clearing himself of the +charge against him. It makes no difference whether the evidence of the +accusers is true or false, whether given according to the order of law +or not. But he must not go beyond the limits of moderate self-defense +(see 1826). Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is probable +that calumny may be used without mortal sin as a defense of one’s +justice or honor (Denzinger, n. 1194).</p> + +<p>1981. If the accused objects secret crimes of the opposition, he must +beware of injustice or uncharitableness. (a) Thus, it is unjust to +disclose crimes that cannot be proved, or that are irrelevant (e.g., +it may be irrelevant to prove that the person who testifies that the +accused committed murder is himself a fornicator, but it would be +relevant to show that this witness is a liar, or dishonest, or an enemy +of the accused), or that need not be revealed (e.g., if the witness’s +testimony can be overcome by showing that the witness is weak-minded or +under obligations to the opposition, it is not necessary to defame him).</p> + +<p>(b) It is uncharitable to disclose a crime, if the witness will suffer +far more from this defamation than the accused would suffer from the +testimony. If, however, the witnesses are giving false evidence of +their own accord, they take the risk of revelations by the defense.</p> + +<p>1982. Rights and Duties of an Accused Who Has Been Found Guilty.—(a) +Appeals.—It is lawful to appeal from a sentence that is unjust +(whether because of the innocence of the accused, or of the illegality +of the process), because appeal is a means of self-defense granted +to the innocent. It is not lawful to appeal from a sentence that +is certainly just, merely in order to cause delay or to defeat an +adversary; but one may make an appeal when there are just reasons +(e.g., in criminal cases the hope of getting an easier sentence or of +prolonging life, in civil cases the discovery of new proofs, or of +probable arguments against the sentence given). But one who has pledged +his word not to appeal from the decision of an arbitrator should abide +by his promise, and there is no appeal from the final decision of the +highest court, which in the Church is the Roman Pontiff (Canon 1880), +and in the State the Supreme Court.</p> + +<p>(b) Escape from Prison.—If the sentence was unjust, it is lawful to +escape, unless the means employed are intrinsically evil (e.g., killing +of guards), or the results will be more harmful than continuance in +prison (e.g., the overthrow of public order, the too great risk of +the attempt to escape). If the sentence was just, there are various +opinions on the lawfulness of flight. Some think it is never lawful, +because a just sentence is a precept of authority and should be obeyed; +others think that flight is lawful in grave cases (e.g., when the +prisoner has been sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, or when +the conditions of prison life are unbearable, because human law cannot +impose as a normal regulation what is too difficult for human nature); +still others think that flight is always lawful, because the court +sentence is that the prisoner be forcibly confined, not that he remain +in prison voluntarily. But one is not necessarily bound to escape (see +1857).</p> + +<p>(c) Resistance to Sentence.—If the sentence is unjust, resistance +is not unlawful _per se_, because one has the right of self-defense +against unjust aggression (Ezech. xxii. 27). Hence, if one were +condemned to execute oneself (e.g., by taking poison), the common +opinion is that the sentence would be unjust (see 1856), and therefore +not obligatory. If the sentence is just, even though it be a capital +sentence, resistance is not lawful, for the judge who duly pronounces +sentence on a guilty man has the right to obedience (Rom., xiii. 1-5).</p> + +<p>1983. Jail-Breaking and Restitution.—If one does not sin by +jail-breaking, is one bound to restitution for the damages connected +with the escape?</p> + +<p>(a) If the damages are not caused by, but only follow accidentally on +the flight (e.g., escape of other prisoners, dismissal of guards), +there is no obligation to make restitution for them; for the flight +would not be the efficacious or the unjust cause of such damages.</p> + +<p>(b) If the damages result from the flight as from their efficacious and +unjust cause, there is an obligation of restitution (see 1763), as when +a prisoner, in order to escape, does needless damage, or damage out of +all proportion to the evil from which he seeks to escape. But ordinary +property damage, such as a hole cut in a wall, does not seem unjust, if +there is no other way to get out.</p> + +<p>1984. Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony.—A witness in court is +a person who declares during a judicial proceeding that he knows some +statement, deed or omission in reference to the matters at issue. +The testimony of witnesses has proving force only in so far as these +persons appear to have knowledge of the matters on which they testify +and appear to be truthful. Hence, certain kinds of witnesses and +certain kinds of testimony are unreliable.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a witness is unreliable either through his own fault +(e.g., if he is regarded in his community as below the standard in +truthfulness, or has the reputation of being a calumniator) or without +his own fault (e.g., if his powers of observation or his memory are +subnormal, or he is devoted or hostile to or dependent on one of the +contending parties). It is a duty, indeed, to presume good of a person +in whom the opposite does not appear, if he is the only one whose +interests are concerned; but when there is danger to a third party, one +must be on one’s guard (see 1744). Hence, St. John admonishes not to +believe every spirit (I John, iv. 1).</p> + +<p>(b) Testimony is unreliable because of the number of the witnesses +(e.g., one witness is often legally insufficient to prove, especially +in graver matters), or the quality of their evidence (e.g., because in +substantial points a witness contradicts himself or is contradicted +by his co-witnesses, or because there are signs of collusion or +conspiracy), or the counter-evidence of the opposition.</p> + +<p>1985. Obligation of Freely Appearing as a Witness.—(a) There is an +obligation of commutative justice to offer testimony, if one is under +contract to do this, as when one is hired as a detective or agent to +gather evidence against lawbreakers.</p> + +<p>(b) There is an obligation of legal justice to testify, even at the +cost of serious inconvenience, if the testimony is necessary for +averting a serious evil that threatens the common welfare. A person who +knows of a plot against the peace of the State should bring this to the +notice of the authorities, even at the risk of his life. But a person +who knows that a crime has been committed, is not bound to give witness +about it, if the escape of its author will not be a serious detriment +to public or private welfare (e.g., if one knows that an apparent case +of suicide was really a homicide committed by accident).</p> + +<p>(c) There is an obligation of charity to testify (but not at the cost +of serious inconvenience), if the testimony is necessary for averting a +serious evil that threatens a private person. A person who can prove +that the evidence which is about to hang an innocent man is false +should testify for the accused, unless the testimony will bring an +equal evil upon himself.</p> + +<p>1986. Obligation of Appearing under Lawful Citation to Give +Testimony.—(a) He who avoids citation (e.g., by flight into another +jurisdiction, by concealment of his person when the subpoena is being +served), more probably does not violate legal justice by this act, +since a precept that has not been received cannot be violated. (b) He +who disregards citation offends legal justice, since the summons to +appear has a claim on his obedience. But it does not seem that he +violates commutative justice, unless the party for whom he could +testify has a strict right to the testimony.</p> + +<p>1987. Obligation of Witness to Answer Truthfully.—A witness who is +questioned legitimately (i.e., by one who has the authority to question +him) and juridically (i.e., according to the form and order prescribed +in law) is obliged _per se_ to answer according to the truth as he +knows it, for one is bound to obey a superior when he gives a lawful +command. But there are exceptions to this rule _per accidens_, that +is, when a higher law exempts one from the necessity of divulging a +certain matter, or when the question asked refers only to what one +knows juridically. In all these cases the witness may answer that he +does not know, for he has no knowledge that he may, or should, or must +use.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the natural law permits reticence when a revelation would +work notable damage to the witness or those closely related to him, for +the command of a superior does not oblige under such great +inconvenience. This supposes, of course, that the revelation is not +required in order to prevent a great harm to the commonwealth or a far +greater harm to a private person than that which threatens the witness. +A person who knows that he will be assassinated if he testifies against +a powerful criminal is not ordinarily bound to make the sacrifice. +Canon and civil law excuse witnesses from making disclosures that would +expose them to prosecution or penalties (see Canon 1755, Sec. 2, n. 2).</p> + +<p>(b) The natural law commands reticence when a revelation would be +injurious to divine, public or private rights.</p> + +<p>1988. Matters Regarding Which a Witness Should Not Testify.—There are +certain cases in which natural law forbids a witness to make known a +fact about which he is questioned.</p> + +<p>(a) A witness may never testify to matters known to him only from +Sacramental Confession, for to break the seal of confession is an +injury to the rights of God. In an ecclesiastical process a priest may +not testify from Sacramental knowledge, even though he has the +penitent’s permission (Canon 1757, Sec. 3, n. 2).</p> + +<p>(b) A witness may not testify as a rule to matters that are known to +him only in a confidential way, such as the communications between +lawyer and client, physician and patient; for the public interest as +well as the interest of individuals requires that generally there +be security against defamation for those who give their confidence +to others, especially if they are in great need of professional +assistance. Privileged communications are recognized both in Canon +Law (Canon 1755, Sec. 2) and in civil law. But knowledge obtained as +a secret may be used when this is necessary in order to avert a great +evil that threatens the public welfare or the welfare of an innocent +person, whether this person be the giver of the secret, or a third +party, or oneself; for to oblige to secrecy in these cases would be to +throw protection around crime. Thus, a lawyer may make disclosures of +confidential knowledge, if this is necessary in order to defend himself +against the false accusations of a client, or to prevent a crime which +the client intends to commit.</p> + +<p>(c) A witness may not testify to matters about which he has unjust +knowledge (e.g., by wire-tapping, by unjust coercion, by intoxicating +another person, by reading private papers without permission), for, +as the knowledge was unjustly acquired, it cannot be justly used (see +2420).</p> + +<p>1989. There are also certain cases in which a question refers only to +what the witness knows juridically, or in which he is called upon to +answer according to the mind of the questioner.</p> + +<p>(a) If the witness is asked to state what he knows about a case, he is +not obliged to mention what he merely thinks or what he is uncertain +about; and if he is asked what he has heard, he is not obliged to state +what was told him by persons of poor authority.</p> + +<p>(b) If he is asked whether the accused was to his knowledge guilty of +a crime, he is not obliged to mention an act of the accused that was +unlawful but done in good faith. But in a civil case, in which inquiry +is made about juridical faults, the witness should testify even to the +existence of delinquencies in which there was no element of theological +fault.</p> + +<p>(c) If he is the only one who has knowledge of a delinquency and it +will be certainly useless for him to testify about the matter without +corroboratory evidence, it seems that he may keep silence about what he +knows. But if the testimony of one witness is sufficient according to +law, then the witness should speak of the facts known to him.</p> + +<p>1990. Sinfulness of False Testimony.—When we speak of false testimony, +we mean testimony which the witness knows to be false.</p> + +<p>(a) By reason of his false oath, the witness is guilty of perjury, +which is a grave sin against the virtue of religion.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the injury done by the testimony, the witness is +guilty of injustice, which from its nature is a grave sin. In the +Decalogue (Exod., xx. 16) false testimony is forbidden among the sins +against justice: “Thou shalt not bear false testimony against thy +neighbor.” Legal justice is offended, since false testimony is an act +of disobedience to lawful authority, and usually commutative justice is +also violated, since by false testimony one of the litigants as a rule +suffers loss.</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of the deliberate falsehood, the witness is guilty of +lying, which, however, is not always a grave sin.</p> + +<p>1991. It may happen then, though rarely, that false testimony is only +a venial sin, for example, when the witness is not under oath and he +gives false testimony in a matter of small importance, or without full +deliberation on what he is saying, or when he forges or corrupts a +document to supply for another that has been lost and from which his +certain right could be proved.</p> + +<p>1992. Obligation of Witness to Make Restitution.—The obligations of +restitution by a witness on account of failure to perform his duties +properly are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) if the witness has not sinned against commutative justice, there +is no obligation of restitution (see 1753). Hence, if he has evaded +testimony to which he was bound in legal justice or charity alone, he +is guilty of sin, but he is not held to restitution. Similarly, if he +has given false testimony and thereby deprived the State of a fine +under a penal law, or saved a guilty party from punishment, he has +sinned against legal justice, but is not obliged to make good the fine +or pay damages;</p> + +<p>(b) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice, materially +but not formally, he is not the gravely guilty cause of damage, and +hence is not obliged from justice (but there may be an obligation +from charity) to make restitution (see 1764). But if he perceives +that his testimony was materially or venially unjust and will cause +serious damage, he is obliged to recall his testimony, or in some other +suitable way prevent the damage, if this is possible (see 1769);</p> + +<p>(c) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice formally, he +is the efficacious and culpable cause of the damage that results, and +hence is bound to restitution, unless there is an excusing cause (see +1797 sqq.). Thus, if false testimony, or testimony about matters which +the witness had no right to disclose, has led to the death sentence +for an innocent man, the witness who gave that testimony must retract, +even at the risk of his own life; for in equal danger the rights of the +innocent have the preference. Again, if Titus by false testimony has +saved Balbus from paying damages for injury done to public property, +Titus must make restitution for the loss caused, if Balbus will not +make reparation.</p> + +<p>1993. Is a witness guilty against commutative justice when he +unlawfully conceals facts and damage results thereby to another person? +(a) If by concealment is meant the destruction of evidence (e.g., the +burning of a will or letter or forging), the witness or other person +responsible is guilty of a positive act of commutative injustice and +is bound to restitution. (b) If by concealment is meant silence about +material facts that the witness is lawfully called on to disclose, +distinction has to be made between the witness who is not obliged from +contract to give evidence and the witness who is so bound. The former +witness is a negative cooperator and sins against legal justice and +charity; the latter witness is a negative cooperator and sins against +commutative justice (see 1780).</p> + +<p>1994. Payment of Witnesses.—Is a witness permitted to accept pay for +giving true and lawful testimony?</p> + +<p>(a) For the testimony itself a witness may not accept pay, for he is +bound to tell the truth freely, just as the judge is bound to dispense +justice freely.</p> + +<p>(b) For the expenses he incurs and the time he loses by reason of his +assistance in court, he may accept pay; since, as St. Paul says, he +who does a service for another is not required to meet the expenses of +the service (I Cor., ix. 7). Both Canon and civil law make allowances +for suitable compensation to be granted to witnesses (see Canons 1787, +1788). But if a witness receives compensation in excess of what is +allowed by law, the court and the adverse party have a right to be +informed of this.</p> + +<p>1995. Lawyers.—Lawyer is the general term used to designate all those +who are versed in the law and who give assistance to others in legal +ways during lawsuits or apart from them.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, apart from lawsuits a lawyer may act as legal adviser, giving +instruction, information or direction on rights and duties under the +law.</p> + +<p>(b) During a lawsuit he advises about the case (jurisconsult) or +carries on for clients the prosecution or defense in a court of +justice. The lawyers who attend to only the more mechanical parts of a +suit are sometimes called attorneys, in distinction from counsellors +or counsel, who argue and plead in the courtroom, but generally +“attorney-at-law” and “lawyer” are synonymous terms. The counsellors +are known in England as barristers when they conduct cases in superior +courts; they are called solicitors in chancery, and advocates in Roman +law. Canon Law distinguishes between the advocate who defends, and +the procurator who represents, a litigant; the former argues for his +client by invoking the law in his favor; the latter acts merely as the +representative of his client and is restricted by his commission.</p> + +<p>1996. The Qualifications of Lawyers.—(a) The mental and moral +requisites are competency in the knowledge of their profession and +devotion to justice, morality, the constitution, and law (see 1943). A +lawyer should be zealous for the dignity and reputation of the bar and +loyal to associates, but not afraid to take action against practices +that are detrimental to his honorable profession.</p> + +<p>(b) The legal requisites for practising as a lawyer vary with the place +or government. In Canon Law, it is necessary that an advocate be a +doctor or expert in ecclesiastical jurisprudence, that he be twenty-one +years of age, duly approved, etc. (see Canons 1657 sqq.).</p> + +<p>1997. The Duties of a Lawyer in Introducing Cases.—(a) He may not stir +up litigation, as a means of bringing himself occupation and gain. The +Catechism of the Council of Trent, Translated into English with Notes +(Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York City, 1923), p. 475, denounces this +practice as among the chief violations of the Tenth Commandment. Among +lawyers it is regarded as unprofessional, and at common law it is an +indictable offense.</p> + +<p>(b) A lawyer may not take or assist an unjust cause—one, namely, that +is in opposition to moral or positive law, as when a party comes to +him with the request that he conduct a spite case whose purpose is to +harass or oppress an innocent person. He who defends injustice is a +cooperator, and is therefore guilty (see 1779). But if a case has a +good foundation in law, the lawyer is not bound to inquire into the +subjective dispositions or the conscience of the client in the matter, +and he may take the case even though he does not know that the client +is in good faith.</p> + +<p>(c) A lawyer should not refuse a just cause, merely because the person +he is asked to assist is indigent or not in favor. Commutative justice +does not oblige him to offer his services to one in need of them; but +there is a duty of legal justice to give his best efforts if he is +appointed as counsel for a poor person, and also at times a duty of +charity to do this if he is asked for legal help by one who is in need.</p> + +<p>1998. The precept about works of mercy, being affirmative, does not +oblige for every instance, but only when the due circumstances of time, +place, opportunity, etc., are present. Hence, a lawyer is not obliged +by charity to devote himself to every deserving case that is presented +to him (see 1227). (a) Thus, as to place, charity does not require that +one go about looking for the needy, but that one help those who are +at hand. (b) As to time, charity does not require that one take care +of future needs, but that one help those who are in present distress. +(c) As to persons, charity does not require that help be given to all +alike, for some have a greater claim on one’s charity than others (I +Tim., v. 8). (d) As to need, charity does not command that help be +given those who can easily help themselves, or who can obtain it from +third parties who are better fitted to bestow it.</p> + +<p>1999. Charity does not oblige to works of almsgiving, if the +inconvenience to the donor is out of proportion to the distress +from which the donee is rescued (see 1158). The inconveniences that +correspond with the various degrees of distress are thus explained by +theologians:</p> + +<p>(a) if distress is extreme (e.g., a prisoner is about to be sentenced +to death unjustly), a proportionate inconvenience is, according to +some, a grave loss, or, according to others, the loss of at least a +part of the necessaries of one’s state (see 1231, 1251);</p> + +<p>(b) if distress is very grave or grave (e.g., an accused man will be +sentenced unjustly to a long and harsh imprisonment), the loss of goods +without which one’s state of life cannot be maintained so becomingly +is, according to one opinion, not excessive; but, according to another +view, any notable loss or inconvenience is excessive;</p> + +<p>(c) if distress is ordinary (e.g., an accused will be unjustly +sentenced to a small fine), the loss of goods that are purely +superfluous is, according to some, a proportionate inconvenience, but +others think that only such assistance need be given as will cause no +inconvenience whatever, such as advice or other service given during +spare times.</p> + +<p>2000. When Is a Cause to Be Regarded as Unjust?—(a) In civil cases +the suit or defense is unjust when it clearly has no moral right. A +lawyer who recommends litigation in a case of this kind is unjust to +the adverse party, if that party loses; he is unjust to his client, +if the client loses and is thus put to unnecessary expense. Generally +speaking, a Catholic lawyer ought not to accept a divorce case. The +lawyer’s position is different from that of a judge. Occasionally a +judge cannot refuse a case without serious inconvenience to himself +(see 1949, 1997); the lawyer, however, is free to accept or refuse +these cases. The general prohibition is founded on the fact that in +this country most divorce cases are means to an invalid remarriage. +Some theologians argue that since it is the remarriage, not the +divorce, that is intrinsically evil, a lawyer might accept a divorce +case for a very grave reason, e.g., to relieve desperate financial +conditions. In practice, however, owing to the danger of scandal, +the exception would be rare. Exceptions which are possible include +cases where divorce is sought for a marriage that is invalid _coram +ecclesiam_, e.g., civil marriage of Catholics, or simply for the +settlement of civil effects Where no danger of remarriage is involved. +In all cases involving Catholics, the lawyer should bear in mind the +necessity imposed upon Catholics by the Third Council of Baltimore to +consult ecclesiastical authorities before seeking civil separation from +bed [and board.]</p> + +<p>(b) In criminal cases the prosecution is unjust if the accused is +clearly innocent. But the defense is not unjust, even though the +accused is known to be guilty, for both natural and positive law give +the accused a right of defense, and hence he may choose or may be given +an advocate, in spite of his guilt.</p> + +<p>2001. Duty of a Lawyer When the Justice of a Cause Is Doubtful.—(a) In +a civil cause, the lawyer may act, whether for the plaintiff or for the +defendant. He may even take a case whose justice seems less probable, +for the purpose of the trial is to settle the doubt, and not +infrequently the cause that seemed doubtful or less probable at the +outset is vindicated by the examination. Some moralists distinguish for +cases in which the doubt is one of fact between the defendant and the +plaintiff: if the former’s case is less or equally probable, they say, +one may take it, but not so if this is true of the latter’s case.</p> + +<p>(b) In a criminal case, when life, reputation or other grave issue is +involved, the common opinion is that a lawyer may not prosecute if the +case of the people is doubtful or less probable, but he may defend, as +was just said, even though he is certain that the accused is guilty. +The office of the prosecutor is not necessarily to secure a conviction, +but to see that justice is upheld, while the office of the defender is +to take care that an accused person is deprived of no right or +protection that he should have under the law.</p> + +<p>2002. If a lawyer through ignorance takes an unjust case, thinking it +just, he is excused or not excused according to the character of his +ignorance (see 28, 249). (a) Thus, antecedent ignorance excuses from +sin and restitution; (b) concomitant ignorance excuses from +restitution, but not from sin; (e) consequent ignorance excuses from +neither sin nor restitution, if it is crass or affected, but it +diminishes responsibility, if it is only slightly sinful.</p> + +<p>2003. Duty of a Lawyer Who Discovers that a Case Is Really Unjust.—(a) +A lawyer who took a case in the belief that it was just, but discovers +that it is really unjust, owes it to himself to abandon the case, for +he cannot honorably cooperate with iniquity. The same principle +applies, if a client insists upon unjust courses in the support of his +case, even though the cause itself be just.</p> + +<p>(b) The lawyer owes it to his client in the hypothesis we are +considering to preserve the latter’s confidence inviolate (see 1988). +He should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon the case; but +since the client’s case is unjust, he may not recommend a compromise, +except perhaps in reference to expenses.</p> + +<p>2004. Lawyer’s Duties towards Client.—Since every contract depends on +the mutual consent of the contractants, and since the purpose of the +person who retains a lawyer is to receive honest advice and assistance +and to give in return a fair compensation, it follows that the lawyer’s +duty to a client is to give what is thus expected and not to exact more +than this deserves.</p> + +<p>(a) Before the case the lawyer should be perfectly candid with the +client as to the advisability of litigation or of the employment of +himself as counsel in the case. If there is a reason why he would be a +less desirable advocate in the case, he should speak of this, so that +his consultant may have freedom of choice. He should also study the +question presented to him, and give his honest opinion on the strength +of the case. If a fair and amicable adjustment outside of court can be +made, the lawyer should recommend that this be done, and if it is not +clear which party is right, he should advise a compromise.</p> + +<p>(b) During the case the lawyer should be faithful to the interests of +his client and diligent in the affairs for which he is engaged. Loyalty +demands that the advocate give his undivided devotion to his client +(e.g., he may not give assistance to the adverse party, he may not +receive gifts or compensations from that party; see Code, Canons 1666, +2407), and that he respect the client’s confidences (e.g., he may not +use to the client’s disadvantage the information given him). Diligence +requires that the lawyer use his best ability and efforts to the end +that the client, no matter how poor or unpopular or persecuted, may +receive all the remedies or defenses that the law grants him, and that +his case may be terminated with all possible speed.</p> + +<p>(c) After the case he should be honest in his charges and true to the +confidence that was reposed in him. The compensation for the lawyer’s +services should be just, that is, a fair return for what he gave. The +amount of the fee should be fixed, therefore, by such standards as the +law or custom, or by the value of that which the lawyer devotes to the +case (e.g., his time and labor, his loss of other employment or +prospects, the risk he takes in undertaking the case), or of that which +the client receives (e.g., the amount which he gains, the benefit he +receives). The wealth of a client does not justify an excessive charge, +but the poverty of the client makes it a duty of charity at times to +lessen the charges or to make no charges at all (see 1236-1239). It is +clear that a lawyer should not compensate himself from the client’s +business contrary to the latter’s just wishes.</p> + +<p>2005. Lawyer’s Duties towards Other Parties.—The duties of the lawyer +to his client do not exempt him from certain duties to other persons +who have a part in the trial; for he is responsible to his own +conscience and cannot act on the principle that he must win at any +cost, or that the client takes all the blame for anything dishonorable +that is done.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, respect is due to the judge and politeness to the opposite +party, his lawyers and witnesses. Abusive language and improper +personalities, therefore, should not be resorted to, and customary +courtesies should be shown.</p> + +<p>(b) Truth and fair dealing are due to those to whom or against whom the +pleading is directed. It is contrary to truthfulness to cite statutes +or decisions that are no longer in force, to misquote laws, testimony +or the language of opponents, to assert as a fact what has not been +proved, to introduce false witnesses or documents, to coach clients or +witnesses in untrue stories, to resort to quibbles or sophistry, etc.; +it is unfair to attempt to gain special favor from a judge or a jury, +to make improper statements or remarks with a view to influencing the +jury or the bystanders or the public; to conceal the arguments upon +which one relies until the opposition has no opportunity to reply; in a +word, to practise any of the tricks of pettifoggery.</p> + +<p>2006. Concealment of Truth in Presenting a Case.—Is concealment of the +truth in the presentation or defense of a case sinful?</p> + +<p>(a) If concealment is not unjust or mendacious, it is lawful. Indeed, a +lawyer should conceal such facts as would be harmful to his own case +(e.g., incidents that are really of no moment, but that would create +prejudice against his client), or as he has learned in confidence. This +is not unjust, since the opposite party has no right to the knowledge, +and it is not deception, since it does not cause but merely permits +others to draw erroneous conclusions. Neither is an advocate bound in +justice to point out to the opposition matters favorable to their case, +of which they are ignorant or which they do not notice.</p> + +<p>(b) If concealment is unjust or mendacious, it is unlawful. Thus, if a +lawyer discovers that serious fraud has been practised or that the +court or the opposition has been harmfully imposed upon, he is unjust +if he takes advantage of this through silence. Similarly, a prosecutor +is unjust if he suppresses facts or testimony or papers that would +establish the innocence of an accused person.</p> + +<p>2007. The Sinfulness of Introducing False or Corrupted Documents.—(a) +Truthfulness is sinned against by this practice, whether the document +be entirely fictitious or a copy substituted for an original that has +been lost, or an authentic instrument has been changed or interpolated +(see 1980 a, 1991).</p> + +<p>(b) This practice is also against legal justice, since the law requires +that no misrepresentations be made about the evidence produced. Indeed, +this is a very serious matter, for, if it were ever permissible to +tamper with documentary evidence, a way would be opened to frauds +innumerable to the great detriment of the public.</p> + +<p>(c) Commutative justice is offended by this form of dishonesty, if the +cause defended is not certainly just; for the opposite party, since +justice is perhaps on his side, has the right that he be not defeated +by untruthful means. But if the cause defended is certainly just, there +is not _per se_ any violation of commutative justice, since the adverse +party is not deprived of anything that is his, but is rather prevented +from doing injustice; _per accidens_, though, there might be +commutative injustice (e.g., if the use of a forged exhibit was known +to be risky and did actually lose the case for a client).</p> + +<p>(d) Charity to self is violated by this deception, since a lawyer +should not value his client’s interests above his own conscience, +reputation and prospects.</p> + +<p>2008. When a Lawyer Is Bound to Restitution.—(a) Unjust damage obliges +to restitution (see 1763), and hence a lawyer must indemnify his client +or the opposite party for the losses either one suffers through his +unjust conduct. The client has a right to restitution if he was put to +unnecessary expense because his lawyer did not tell him the case was +hopeless or too risky, or if he lost a case because the lawyer was very +incompetent or negligent or helped the opposite party, or if he was +injured in his reputation or prospects by the violation of his +confidences. The opposite party is entitled to restitution if he lost a +right or was condemned because the lawyer unjustly took the case +against him, or if he suffered other injuries because the lawyer +employed foul means to his disadvantage. If a lawyer acts as the +mandatary of his client in the use of injustice, the duty of +restitution rests primarily on the client and secondarily on the lawyer +(see 1783); if the lawyer alone is guilty, he is responsible for all +the damage done. There is no duty of restitution if only legal justice +is violated (e.g., if some deception is practised in order to win for +the side that is in the right), or if charity is wronged (e.g., if one +refuses to take the case of a person who is in need).</p> + +<p>(b) Unjust possession also obliges to restitution (see 1770), and hence +a lawyer who appropriates goods of his client against the latter’s +right, or who charges exorbitant rates for his services, or who drags +out a case for lucre’s sake, or who has not refunded when he withdrew +from a case, should restore his ill-gotten goods. If the amount of a +fee is settled by law, an attorney who takes more than the legal sum +does not necessarily incur the duty of restitution. All will depend on +the character of the law, whether it is penal or preceptive, and if +preceptive, whether it obliges in virtue of legal or of commutative +justice.</p> + +<p>2009. Unjust Words.—We shall now take up the injustice that is done +through words spoken outside of a judicial process, or the classes of +verbal injustice that are not peculiar to courts, but are committed on +all sorts of occasions, public and private. The principal sins here are +distinguished according to the different injuries intended by the +sinful speaker, and are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) sinful words that signify or effect in another person the evil of +guilt, thereby depriving him of benefits that are connected with +virtue. Some evil speakers deprive their neighbor of tributes that are +paid to virtue by others, such as honor (injury by contumely), fame +(injury by defamation), friendship (injury by whispering); while other +evil speakers deprive a person of the tribute of virtue paid by his own +conscience, namely, self-respect and peace of mind (injury by +derision);</p> + +<p>(b) sinful words that signify or effect against another person the evil +of punishment. The words are known under the general name of cursing.</p> + +<p>2010. Contumely.—Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his +presence.</p> + +<p>(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak +words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in +Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples “foolish and slow of +heart”; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as +“senseless”). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person +by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter +or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no +harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule +some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since +most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken +seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in +serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine +declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms +sparingly and only in case of great necessity.</p> + +<p>(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious +words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends +reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for +another’s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural +perfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank, +wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one +ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the +salute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as +when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to +virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile +and contemptible).</p> + +<p>(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an +affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of +Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or +mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David’s ambassadors by the Ammonites, +in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St. +Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation +that their words would be carried to him).</p> + +<p>2011. Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its +strictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one’s superior +in some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of +mankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who +are more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If +honor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good +quality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more +worthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every +rational creature (except the damned, who are irretrievably wicked and +outside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or +lowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul +exhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii. +10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself +(Philip., ii. 3).</p> + +<p>2012. Various Forms of Contumely.—(a) By reason of the signs used or +the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the +names “thief,” “lunatic,” “bastard”) or in deeds that are equivalent to +word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or +postcards, “poisoned pen” letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious +gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that +it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach, +which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement +(_convicium_), which ascribes to another either a fault or its +consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of +alcoholism), taunting (_improperium_), which twits another with +misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the +favors one formerly showed him).</p> + +<p>2013. Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.—(a) +Circumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change +the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact +that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed +against a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely +accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be +mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin +of contumely.</p> + +<p>2014. The Sinfulness of Contumely.—(a) From its nature contumely is a +grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized +than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue +and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often +sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls +his brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the +contumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a +reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable +only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious +words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose +to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet +that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest +his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this +(e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful +title, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will +feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be +greatly dishonored).</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter, +contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried +away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another +person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave +offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses +another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not +sufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.</p> + +<p>2015. The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the +character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended +party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his +superior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior +to give the name to his subordinate.</p> + +<p>(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely, +or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the +dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for +vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words. +A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a +very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would +sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or +teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc., +there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence +the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is +not being made.</p> + +<p>2016. Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the +offended person feels the injury less?</p> + +<p>(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less, +the gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the +person offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not +taken seriously (see 2015).</p> + +<p>(b) If the contumely is felt less only because the person dishonored is +very meek and patient, the gravity is not lessened, but is rather +increased (see 1725). If the person offended does not feel the injury +at all (e.g., because he is very thick-skinned or is very fortunate), +less damage is done, but the wrong remains, otherwise, theft from the +rich could be excused on the plea that they will not miss what is +stolen.</p> + +<p>2017. The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, +inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick +to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this +will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will +just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.</p> + +<p>(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the +foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what +damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak +abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the +bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse +themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.</p> + +<p>(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to +show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier +or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. +Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The +subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the +superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, +on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on +account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).</p> + +<p>2018. The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.—(a) As to the internal +disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without +making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of +patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and +to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for +such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one +turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His +teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were +implacable or who only sought material for accusations.</p> + +<p>(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are +good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord +protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and +which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also +refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac, +or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by +self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should +be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and +fame—viz., virtue and a worthy life—than to possess honor and fame +themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not +unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be +persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the +good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).</p> + +<p>2019. The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.—(a) +The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and +that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient +reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a +fool, lest he think himself wise.</p> + +<p>(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not +demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as +an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of +weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that +preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without +fruit.</p> + +<p>(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for +to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to +act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many +a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is +guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good +name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.</p> + +<p>2020. The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.—(a) The +spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or +of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame; +otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person +would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit +behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage +the other party the more by disregarding the attack).</p> + +<p>(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should +not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is +lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the +assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to +challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).</p> + +<p>2021. The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.—(a) If contumely +is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of +restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the +refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make +restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance +or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be +different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable +as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of +a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who +remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.</p> + +<p>(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is +due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely +becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of +onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem +contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case +when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there +are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person +appear vile in his own eyes.</p> + +<p>2022. Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.—(a) One +opinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that +satisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that +satisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity) +before judicial sentence.</p> + +<p>(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since +men regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust +deprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind, +such as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can +await an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation, +such as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made +without any such order (Matt., v. 24).</p> + +<p>2023. What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?—(a) In +general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of +the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was +deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by +respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being +made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of +contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if +one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities, +quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses +also.</p> + +<p>(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is +generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done +and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required, +for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps +not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the +indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is +sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of +restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings, +a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or +toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.</p> + +<p>2024. The Manner of Making Apologies.—(a) They should be made with at +least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury +was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They +may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person +cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his +regrets by letter or through a representative.</p> + +<p>2025. Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between +the parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should +be made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists +on it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile +name applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through +ignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing +respect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).</p> + +<p>(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest +by abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have. +Hence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not +be seemly for him to ask the child’s pardon, but he should show some +mark of kindness to heal the wound.</p> + +<p>2026. Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of +restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a) +Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without +renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b) +Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives +the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have +an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally +injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his +adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.</p> + +<p>2027. A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain +cases.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as +when a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the +admonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted, +as when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In +the case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders, +it may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the +parents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect. +But, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such +children to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.</p> + +<p>2028. Defamation.—Defamation (backbiting) is the unjust blackening of +the reputation of another person by secret words.</p> + +<p>(a) It is unjust, that is, it has no reasonable motive to justify it. +Defamation differs from just revelation of secret faults.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a blackening or besmirching, that is, a taking away or +lessening of fame. Defamation casts a shadow over or totally obscures +the brilliance of a good reputation.</p> + +<p>(c) It is against reputation, that is, against the favorable opinion +and report of the public on the virtue and character or other good +qualities of a person, Thus, it is defamation to say that an individual +is a drunkard, or that a professional man is incompetent, if these +persons are not known to have such defects. If a person has no +reputation here and now, except a bad one (e.g., a criminal who has +just been convicted and sentenced to prison, a loafer who is often seen +intoxicated on the streets, a woman who is often heard peddling +scandals), it is not defamation to speak about the true and public +faults of this person; nor is it sinful to speak thus if there is some +suitable reason (e.g., to discuss a murder trial that is being reported +in the papers, or to tell a humorous incident that will do no harm). +But those who uselessly or harmfully discuss the known weaknesses of +their neighbors are sinners called gossipers or fault-finders.</p> + +<p>(d) It is against the reputation of a person, that is, of an individual +possessed of right. The party offended by defamation can be a natural +person (i.e., a rational being, whether infant or adult, high or low, +rich or poor) or an artificial person (i.e., a society, group or +collection of individuals endowed with reason); he can be either a +living or a deceased person, for death does not destroy the soul nor +take away the right to reputation.</p> + +<p>(e) It is against the reputation of another, that is, defamation as now +used is a sin of injustice, and one cannot be strictly unjust to +oneself; but “self-defamation” may be used in a wider sense to +designate a sin opposed to charity (see 1575 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(f) It is accomplished by means of words, that is, by oral +communication or its equivalent. One can defame, therefore, by word of +mouth, by deaf and dumb language, by writing, by a gesture, by silence, +or by a look.</p> + +<p>(g) It is done by words or signs that are secret, that is, by words or +signs expressed before others but in the absence of the person who is +defamed, or at least when he is thought to be absent (backbiting). The +defamer is like the thief who wishes to do harm but does not wish the +victim to know the author of the harm.</p> + +<p>2029. The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.—(a) They +differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in +his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to +hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of +others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is +behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is +injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to +face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner +despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.</p> + +<p>2030. Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.—(a) By reason of the +intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things +are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when +derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence, +there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the +secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be +contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus +as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already +that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation +(e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he +was a sober man).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or +implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the +blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends +something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or +talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen. +Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation +a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the +former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or +calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or +defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories +that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and +falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to +real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of +half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a +historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not +give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation, +challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his +subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his +amendment).</p> + +<p>(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or +indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect +defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the +distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or +printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not +found in spoken words.</p> + +<p>2031. Examples of Indirect Defamation.—(a) Faint praise is a subtle +mode of defamation, as when one says of an absent person that he has +not committed murder yet, or that like everyone he has some good +points, for to the listeners this indicates that the speaker does no +hold a high opinion of the person discussed.</p> + +<p>(b) Silence is also at times a hidden form of defamation, as when Titus +says to Balbus that the absent Caius is good and Balbus out of malice +answers: “Let’s talk about something else; we must be charitable”, or +when Sempronius falsely declares in company that the absent Claudius is +to the knowledge of Julius a depraved character and Julius, who is +present, makes no protest against the misrepresentation.</p> + +<p>(c) Depreciation is defamatory, as when one says that a person who is +being discussed is not as pious or reliable as is commonly believed, or +that there is great room for improvement, or that he is much better now +than in times past, or that there is another side to the picture, or +that he is good, but....</p> + +<p>(d) Denial of good qualities is defamatory, when it lessens the esteem +in which a person is held. The good qualities here referred to are +those that render a person distinguished or commendable among his +fellows: chiefly these are moral qualities (viz., virtuous habits, +dispositions and acts); secondarily, natural and internal qualities +(such as learning, quickness of mind, experience, strength and health +of body, and in women, beauty); finally, natural and external goods +(such as wealth, famous ancestry, able assistants in business, or the +excellent merchandise supplied, etc.).</p> + +<p>2032. Examples of Direct Defamation.—The following are examples of +direct defamation:</p> + +<p>(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a +neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were +dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;</p> + +<p>(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults +or crimes;</p> + +<p>(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an +exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin; +or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far +more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because +one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail +or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are +proverbial examples of exaggeration: “_Fama crescit eundo_”;</p> + +<p>(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation. +Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny +without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see +Denzinger, n. 1194).</p> + +<p>2033. Direct defamation is committed either by plain words or by +insinuation. (a) Examples of defamation by innuendo are those ambiguous +expressions or half-veiled accusations that arouse suspicion and often +do more injury than plain accusations. Thus, to say with a laugh or in +an ironical tone that a certain person is human, or broadminded, or +prudent may be equal to volumes of abuse, since the words can have a +bad meaning as well as a good one. Similarly, such expressions as, +“What I know about him is not to be told,” “I know what no one would +believe,” etc., may be taken for slurs on character.</p> + +<p>(b) Examples of defamation by plain speech are all those innumerable +statements which, either in general terms (e.g., that another person is +a scoundrel, a villain, a reprobate) or in specific ones (e.g., that +another person is a blasphemer, a thief, a liar), tend to blacken the +good name of a neighbor.</p> + +<p>2034. Good Repute or Fame.—Good repute or fame is of various kinds. +(a) Thus, by reason of its object, good reputation is either negative +or positive. A negatively good reputation consists in the absence of +any unfavorable opinion or belief about a person, while a positively +good reputation is the common judgment in favor of a person’s worth. +(b) By reason of its relation to the real character of a person, it is +either true or false. Thus, if a man is regarded by the community as +honest, his reputation is true when he is really honest, but it is +false when he is in fact dishonest. (c) By reason of its degree, it is +either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary good repute is that which +every person needs, and it consists in the public belief that an +individual is trustworthy and competent in the affairs and duties that +pertain to his state or occupation. Extraordinary fame is that which is +not necessary, such as the celebrity which a person enjoys for unusual +ability as a statesman, orator, financial expert, mathematician, or for +virtue that is far above the average.</p> + +<p>2035. The Right to Good Reputation.—(a) Those who are absolutely +unknown (i.e., both as to their identity and their character) have no +right to reputation, since reputation attaches to one who can be named +or described, and hence it is not defamation (though it might be rash +judgment) to say that a stranger who passed on the street and was lost +in the darkness must have been a criminal.</p> + +<p>(b) Those who are known by sight or name, but who have not as yet shown +what they are, have a right to a negatively good reputation, for a man +should not be considered evil until his conduct has given ground for +unfavorable judgment (see 1727 sqq.). It is not defamation to say about +an unknown family that has moved into a locality that we do not know +what kind of people they are, but it is defamation to say that they are +likely undesirable.</p> + +<p>(c) Those who are known in a place and who have already acquired a good +name there have a right to a positively good reputation; for, if the +reputation is true, it is a good which they have honestly acquired; if +it is false, it is a good of which they are in possession, and +possession itself is entitled to respect.</p> + +<p>2036. Sinfulness of Detraction.—The civil law does not generally +punish slander if the slanderer can prove that his statements are true, +but this does not make veracious defamation morally lawful. God detests +and punishes crimes (e.g., fornication) of which human law sometimes +takes no account. The harmfulness of veracious defamation is both +public and private.</p> + +<p>(a) Defamation Does Public Harm.—The peace and order of the community +would be seriously disturbed, if it were lawful to attack reputations +simply because one was persuaded that they were unfounded: the person +detracted would be hampered in his official business and social +relations, innocent persons would be blackened as well as the guilty, +and the friends and relatives would suffer with the person detracted.</p> + +<p>(b) Defamation Does Private Harm.—The peace and security of the +individual would be uselessly assailed. Reputation is profitable both +in spiritual and temporal ways, and it is therefore a ruthless act to +rob a person of it, when he has done nothing in public to forfeit it +and its possession by him is harmful to no one.</p> + +<p>2037. Right to True and False Reputation. There is, nevertheless, a +difference between the right to a true and the right to a false +reputation.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the right to a true reputation is an absolute and universal +right, one which does not cease in any case, for truth and justice +demand that one should not represent as evil a person who is really +good. This right applies to an extraordinary, as well as to an ordinary +reputation.</p> + +<p>(b) The right to a false reputation is a relative and limited right, +one which ceases when the common good on which it rests no longer +supports it (e.g., when it cannot be maintained without injustice). +Moreover, there is no right to an extraordinary reputation, if it is +based on false premises, for the common good does not require such a +right, and hence it is not detraction to show that the renown of an +individual for superior skill or success is built up on advertising +alone or merely on uninformed rumor.</p> + +<p>2038. Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known +Defects.—(a) It is not unjust, _per se_, since it does not take away +fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no +sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful _per se_, since grave +harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already +bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of +uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the +listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that +is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it +prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for +calumny.</p> + +<p>2039. Moral Species of Defamation.—(a) Moralists agree that wrongful +defamation is a sin against justice and charity. It violates justice, +since it infringes a right which is not less strict than that of +proprietorship over goods of fortune; it violates charity, since it is +opposed to friendship and love of neighbor. They also agree that other +species of sin can be added to defamation (e.g., infidelity, as when +one denies that Christ was sinless, or blasphemy, as when one defames a +Saint).</p> + +<p>(b) Moralists disagree on the question whether certain forms of +defamation are distinct sub-species or only degrees of one lowest +species. Some hold that detraction and calumny are distinct species, +because calumny adds mendacity to defamation; others say that +detractions about specifically different sins are distinct kinds of +detraction (e.g., that it is one species of sin to say that a neighbor +is a drunkard, and another species to say that he is a thief, and the +reason is that the reputation for temperance is a different thing from +the reputation for honesty, etc.); still others hold that defamation of +parents and other immediate relations is a special form of defamation, +as being contrary to piety. There are, on the contrary, theologians who +reject all these distinctions and hold that the difference between +defamations is only one of more or less, since all of them have the +characteristic note of attack on reputation, which is one right. Hence, +just as the stealing of a cow and the stealing of a cat are only +greater and lesser forms of the sin of theft, so likewise calumny and +detraction, etc., are only major and minor degrees of the sin of +defamation (see 2012, 2013, 2115).</p> + +<p>2040. Species of Sins of Defamation.—Since the species of sins must be +particularized in confessions, the question of the distinction between +defamations has practical importance. The common opinion on the line of +action to be observed seems to be as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) the penitent is obliged as a rule in serious matters to tell +whether his defamation was simple detraction or calumny. The reason for +this, according to some, is the specific difference between these two +sins; according to others, the reason is that otherwise the confessor +cannot know whether the sin was mortal or venial, or what restitution +is to be imposed. As to detraction of parents or superiors, it seems +that the quality of the person detracted should be mentioned, if there +was any incitement to disrespect or disobedience;</p> + +<p>(b) the penitent is not obliged to mention the sins or defects he +ascribed to the person he defamed. Nor should the confessor inquire +about this unless it is necessary in order to know what was the gravity +of the sin or what kind of reparation should be enjoined (cfr. 2013). +Moreover, questions about what was said might easily lead to a +disclosure of the name of the person defamed, and thus the confessional +would be turned into a place of defamation.</p> + +<p>2041. The Numerical Multiplication of Defamations.—(a) They are +multiplied when there are many sinful acts about distinct objects; for +example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and Claudius +tomorrow as another thief, there are two calumnies (see 209).</p> + +<p>(b) Defamations are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about +the same object; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a +thief and repeats the same calumny tomorrow, there are two calumnies. +But if Balbus begins his story today and does not finish it till +tomorrow, there is one calumny (see 214, 215).</p> + +<p>(c) Defamations are multiplied when there is one sinful act about many +distinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates by saying that +the two worst thieves he knows are Caius and Claudius, there are two +sins. But if Caius and Claudius are regarded as a unit (e.g., if they +are the firm of Caius and Claudius), there is one sin. A like calumny +would be that Caius came from a dishonest family (see 216-219). If +Balbus calumniates Caius before ten persons, he does not commit ten +defamations, it seems, but ten scandals, since the ten form a body in +the matter of fame, but are individuals in the matter of example. If +Balbus calumniates by saying that Caius has broken all of the ten +commandments, there may be ten calumnies or but one calumny, according +to the intention and the effect (see 217, 218).</p> + +<p>2042. The Theological Species of Defamation.—(a) From its nature +defamation is a mortal sin, and hence the Apostle declares (Rom, i. 29, +30) that detractors are hateful to God. In the first place, it inflicts +an atrocious injury on the public welfare, sowing everywhere hatreds, +dissensions and disorders—so much so that detractors are rightly +called an abomination to mankind (Prov., xxiv. 9).</p> + +<p>(b) From the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act +defamation may be only a venial sin. Criticism of others is a vice so +widespread that almost all mankind (even pious persons) would be +involved in continual mortal sins, were it not for the fact that sins +of speech are frequently the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or +sudden passion (James, iii. 2 sqq.), and that the things said are +frequently of no great harm to the person criticized.</p> + +<p>2043. The gravity of the harm done by defamation is well expressed by +St. Bernard when he says that defamation at one blow inflicts a mortal +Wound on the person defamed, on the defamer himself, and on the +listener.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the person defamed is robbed and often irreparably of a good +name, one of the most esteemed of possessions; he is deprived of many +spiritual and temporal opportunities, and is frequently dragged down to +social and moral ruin, and even to suicide. Scripture says that the +tongue of the detractor has the sharpness of a razor, and it compares +him to an arrow dipped in poison, and to a biting serpent.</p> + +<p>(b) The defamer destroys his own good name, at least in the sight of +God, for he defiles his own soul with guilt; he disgraces himself +before others, since it is well known that defamation is the vice of +those who feel themselves inferior or guilty. And, worst of all, his +sin is seldom repented of or repaired by satisfaction, since the +defamer is generally too proud, hateful, jealous or revengeful to +acknowledge his error, or is so blind that the thought of the harm he +has done and of the grave obligation of satisfaction never crosses his +mind.</p> + +<p>(c) The listener is scandalized and contaminated by what he hears, his +ideals are shattered, his respect for virtue or religion is destroyed, +and he is encouraged to continue the work of the defamer.</p> + +<p>2044. Comparison of Defamation with Other Injuries against the +Neighbor.—(a) Defamation is less sinful than injuries to internal +goods, and hence homicide and adultery, which are opposed to the good +of the body and of life itself, are graver sins than defamation.</p> + +<p>(b) Defamation is less sinful than injury to higher external goods +perpetrated in a contemptuous manner, for defamation being secret does +not add insult to injury. Hence, just as robbery is more offensive than +theft, so is contumely more sinful than defamation.</p> + +<p>(c) Defamation is more sinful than injury to lower external goods, such +as lands and money, for fame along with honor approaches spiritual +things on account of their relation to virtue, whereas wealth is of the +order of corporeal things. Hence, the Scriptures teach that a good name +is more important than great riches (Prov., xxii. 1), more enduring +than thousands of vast and precious treasures (Ecclus., xli, 15).</p> + +<p>2045. It should be noted that the foregoing comparison is based on the +nature of the sins compared, for by reason of circumstances the order +given may be reversed; for example, a slight indignity is less serious +than an outrageous calumny, the theft of thousands of dollars is far +more sinful than the circulation of a ludicrous story that is harmful, +but only in a slight degree, to the reputation of a neighbor (cfr. 220 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>2046. Rule for Determining the Seriousness of Defamation.—The rule for +determining whether the matter of defamation is serious or not is the +amount of harm done by the defamation, and hence not one but several +factors have to be considered.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the defect ascribed to the neighbor has to be considered, for +some kinds of defects (e.g., littleness of body or prodigality) are +less disgraceful than others (e.g., dwarfishness of mind or soul or +niggardliness), and it is more harmful to reveal one mortal sin than to +reveal a hundred venial sins.</p> + +<p>(b) The person defamed is to be considered, for imputed defects that +are not harmful to one person may be harmful to another (e.g., the +charge of being a toper might be considered praise among persons of gay +or rough habits, but it would be regarded as disgraceful among serious +and refined persons).</p> + +<p>(c) The person who defames is also to be considered, for little +attention is paid to the talk of some, but much weight is given to the +slightest words of others. Indeed, some persons’ condemnation is +equivalent to praise.</p> + +<p>(d) Finally, the persons before whom the defamation is spoken are to be +considered, for everyone knows that it is much more harmful and +dangerous to speak ill of others before certain ones than before others +(cfr. 1461, 1462).</p> + +<p>2047. The Harm Done by Reason of the Defects Revealed.—(a) If the +defects are natural imperfections of soul or body that do not connote +moral stain or turpitude, and if no great detriment is caused by +revelation (e.g., to say that another person is deaf, hunchbacked, a +beggar, or dense), disclosure is not in itself serious, or even sinful; +for little or no harm is done, and the defects are of such a character +that they can be readily discovered by observation. But if the defects +are very ignominious or harmful, defamation is a grave sin (e.g., to +say that a very distinguished person is illegitimate, or of a mixed +race, or that his immediate relative was a criminal).</p> + +<p>(b) If the defects are related to moral stain, but do not imply it, +revelation of them is not a grave sin, provided no great loss is caused +by it (e.g., to say that a person is scrupulous about himself, or has +certain peccadillos or human imperfections). If a shortcoming is +usually understood as a propensity rather than as a fault (e.g., quick +temper, high-strung disposition, pride, closeness with money), there is +little if any harm done by speaking of it. But if the defects mentioned +are such as imply or insinuate actual moral lapses (e.g., to say that a +person has a venereal disease and the cause is unknown, or that he has +delirium tremens or morphinism, or is of a very passionate nature), the +revelation is defamatory and more or less sinful.</p> + +<p>(c) If the defects are moral, he who reveals them is guilty of sinful +defamation. But the harm done by the imputation of moral guilt is +greater in some cases and less in others. Some sins are more +disgraceful from their degradation (e.g., carnal sins, see 224), and +from this point of view it is worse to accuse a neighbor of gluttony or +sexual irregularity than of pride. Some sins (e.g., solicitation, +sodomy) are especially heinous in the eyes of the law and produce legal +infamy, because they are more harmful to the public or more subject to +public contempt (see Canons 2320, 2328, 2343, 2351, 2356, 2357). There +are also some defamations that are less harmful to reputation, but more +damaging to material prosperity (e.g., it is usually more hurtful to +the prospects of a person in business to be charged with incompetency, +dishonesty, or carelessness than to be charged with religious +indifference or impurity). Finally, there are gradations in the malice +of the same kinds of sin (see 197), as in the angry thought, the angry +word, the angry deed, in tipsiness and drunkenness, in occasional and +habitual lying, etc.</p> + +<p>2048. Is it sinful to narrate the secret faults of another, if at the +same time one tells of his repentance and amendment?</p> + +<p>(a) If the infamy remains in spite of the remarks about a change of +life for the better (as is generally the case), the narrator is guilty +of sinful detraction. Thus, it is very harmful to one in an exalted +position if it is given out that he was at one time bibacious, but +succeeded in thoroughly curing his appetite. The same principle applies +to those who praise in one matter and detract in another (e.g., by +stating that a person is very learned, but also very dishonest).</p> + +<p>(b) If the infamy does not remain, because the atonement is so +extraordinary as to make the hearers think little or nothing about the +fault, the narrator is not guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is not +detraction to narrate that a saint was so grieved over a lie he told +that he did lifelong penance for it, or that a person who was once +lukewarm—a thing that is quite common—has in later years become +fervent in an uncommon degree. But the stigma that attaches to uncommon +sins or carnal sins is hardly overcome by the mention of repentance, +unless the person spoken of is already long dead or is one from whom +very little is expected.</p> + +<p>2049. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person Defamed.—(a) Serious +faults are sometimes attributed to certain persons without serious sin, +because, on account of the life led by these persons or the notoriety +they have already achieved, they suffer no serious detriment when +defects like to those already known are charged against them. Thus, if +it is well known that a person keeps company with a fast set or +consorts with a tough gang, he suffers little if one reveals that he +uses profanity, gambles, drinks to excess, etc.; and if it is known +that a person has these vices, he is not harmed much by mention of a +particular instance or by the additional report that he has been +arrested for cheating and disorderly conduct. But the case is different +if defects unlike those already known are charged (e.g., if one says of +a person known as a liar that he is also a thief), unless the person +spoken of has so black a name as an all-around cheat that no new crime +charged to his account can give a deeper dye to his reputation.</p> + +<p>(b) Light faults or acts that are not sinful in themselves are +sometimes matter of grave defamation when spoken of certain persons, +namely, when so much is expected from these persons that even minor +defects are serious blots on their fame. Thus, to say that a layman is +a confirmed liar or loves the opposite sex might be only a venial sin +or no sin at all, but the same statements about a grave cleric would be +seriously defamatory.</p> + +<p>2050. Defamation supposes that the party who is injured is in +possession of a good name. But it is possible that the same individual +who enjoys a good name in one place or time, has a bad name in another +place or time. Hence, a number of special cases on defamation present +themselves for consideration.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, there is the case in which a person who has a good name here +is juridically infamous elsewhere; that is, he has lost his good name +elsewhere through a final and valid sentence, conviction, or confession +made in a public trial (see Canon 2197).</p> + +<p>(b) There is the case in which a person who has a good name here is +actually infamous elsewhere, that is, his crime is known to so many +persons there that it is morally impossible to keep it secret or excuse +it.</p> + +<p>(c) There is the case in which a person who has a good name now was in +bad repute formerly; that is, his bad name of the past has been +forgotten or has been obliterated by many years of good living.</p> + +<p>2051. Meaning of the Expression “Infamous in a Certain Place.”—(a) The +place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a +college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a +neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to +is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general +(i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient +(i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole +community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to +one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not +notorious.</p> + +<p>2052. Number of Persons Who Are Required for Sufficient Notoriety.—(a) +Some authors assign certain definite figures for this purpose—for +example, in a closed community of thirty or a hundred members a fact is +notorious if known to seven or fifteen; in a neighborhood of forty +persons, if it is known to eight individuals from different families; +in a village whose population is one thousand, if it is known to twenty +here and there; in a town of five thousand people, if it is known to +forty here and there.</p> + +<p>(b) Other authors hold that no invariable rule can be given, but that +in each case the matter has to be determined by a prudent judgment +based on the character of the crime, the quality of the guilty person +and of the persons present at the time, the publicity of the place, +etc. Thus, if the crime was committed in some central spot from which +news was quickly disseminated, a smaller number of spectators would +make a deed notorious in the surrounding territory.</p> + +<p>2053. Publicity of Commission or Report.-Actual infamy or disrepute is +produced either by the publicity of the crime or by the publicity of +the report.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a crime has publicity in its commission when it was done in a +public place (e.g., on the street, in a public room) or in a private +place but before a considerable number of persons, or when its +indications were publicly given (e.g., by a confession, by maintenance +of a suspected woman in one’s home), or when it was submitted to public +notice or judgment (e.g., the acts of one in public office, the words +of one who delivers a public address, the deeds of one who boasts about +them).</p> + +<p>(b) A crime has publicity in its report, when it is widely known, +whether due to the talk of the people, or to presumptions or suspicions.</p> + +<p>2054. Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute +Elsewhere.—(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice, +according to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the +criminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is +found guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the +public to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception +should be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in +order to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation +expels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see +2057).</p> + +<p>(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person +without reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would +not otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves. +Example: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of +drunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good +conduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and +maliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail +for drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.</p> + +<p>2055. Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute +Elsewhere.—If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose +the reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:</p> + +<p>(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the +revelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins +publicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those +persons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to +arrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no +sufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought +hither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin +committed by the revelation;</p> + +<p>(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust, +revelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since +it is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury. +Others hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is +not unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not +the author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned +it shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the +revelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the +early loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation +unnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be +represented as an established fact.</p> + +<p>2056. If the revelation is made about one who is actually in disrepute +elsewhere, but who is in little danger on that account of losing the +good name which he has here, opinions differ regarding the extent of +the guilt.</p> + +<p>(a) Some hold that revelation in this case is a grave sin against +charity, since in a serious matter it saddens a neighbor, and thus +violates the rule of love to do unto others as we would have them do +unto us; and others add that it is also a grave sin against justice, if +the party spoken against is solicitous about his fame, since it +deprives him without reason of a great good to which he is entitled on +account of undisturbed possession.</p> + +<p>(b) Others hold that this revelation is not a grave sin, either against +justice (since the right of the community to know about crimes that +were committed elsewhere prevails over the right of the individual) or +against charity (since charity does not oblige under grave +inconvenience).</p> + +<p>(c) Others again distinguish between different cases, Thus, some say +that, if the crime in question is one that is very detrimental to the +public (e.g., murder, treason, white slave traffic, scandalous +impurity), the opinion under (b) is true; whereas, if it is one that is +not of that character (e.g., drunkenness in a private person), the +opinions under (a) are true. Some also distinguish in the case of +non-pernicious delinquencies between those that are notorious elsewhere +by reason of the public way in which sin was committed and those that +are notorious only on account of rumor; in the former case, they say, +the manifestation is not unjust, for, although public good does not +call for it, the guilty person himself has forfeited his right by the +public manner in which he sinned; but in the latter case it may easily +be unjust (see previous paragraph). The mere fact, however, that a +fault which contains no threat to the public welfare was committed in a +public manner does not seem to be a sufficient reason for manifestation +(e.g., when it will injure a man in earning a living or in supporting +his family), and we believe that one who speaks of such a fault without +necessity sins against charity, if not against justice, and that the +sin is often mortal.</p> + +<p>2057. Notoriety in a Closed Community.—Notoriety in a closed community +is not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on +absolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the +members may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient +reason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious +house know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be +divulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or +warning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about +faults which are commonly known in the house.</p> + +<p>(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the +members as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without +injustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from +necessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community +itself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be +impressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is +lax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories +from one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a +form of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.</p> + +<p>2058. Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.—When the +revelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a +good name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because +he has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and +actual notoriety.</p> + +<p>(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of +it is not unjust, since condemnation pronounced in a court of law gives +the right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any +time; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without +necessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the +reputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a +good most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.</p> + +<p>(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation +is uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden +rule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is +also unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime, +which cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the +person who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it, +and by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed, +inasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It +should be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and +thus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about +happenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or +earlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).</p> + +<p>2059. Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.—(a) +If there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is +cast on a body to which he belongs, _per se_ no sin is committed. +Hence, if one says, “A certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a +sheep,” there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real +happening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where +he is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his +numerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal +sin, there is no defamation.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if +reflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is +committed by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the +stolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could +easily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person +would be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain +city which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to +drunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act +was a member of a Religious Institute, harm is brought directly upon +individuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an +organization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its +members, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the +disgrace of all.</p> + +<p>2060. Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.—(a) Defamation of the +dead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful _per se_, +since the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and +it is reasonable that one should wish one’s good name to be respected +after one’s death, both for one’s own sake and for the sake of others. +Hence the saying, “_De mortuis nil nisi bonum_.” But _per accidens_ it +is not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary +for historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself +is less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less +need of a good reputation; but circumstances may be such that one who +defames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful _per se_, since these +bodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to +a good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are +protected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious +to state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is +relaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed. +But _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about +organizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation +(see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the +citizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common +good would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful +to mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a +certain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that +a certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (Tit., +i. 12).</p> + +<p>2061. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.—(a) The +person of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater. +A person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports +that he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a +better reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position, +or who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by +defamation than another whose authority is weak.</p> + +<p>(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is +less. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with +reservations (such as “perhaps,” “it is not impossible,” “it seems so, +but I would not swear to it,” etc.), and also those whose weight as +authorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy, +or untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in +higher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily, +however, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is +thrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.</p> + +<p>2062. One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some +crime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his +remarks as follows: “They say,” or, “It is reported,” or, “I hear,” etc.</p> + +<p>(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the +effect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk +of the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners +gather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be +traced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore +unreliable, the harm is less.</p> + +<p>(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does +not weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases +the sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that +Claudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing +the listeners will understand that the report originated with very good +authorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public, +the harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself +inclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the +narrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only +the character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous +minds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then +the narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).</p> + +<p>2063. The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.—(a) The quality of the +listeners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to +suffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are +suspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they +will more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others +(e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person +defamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss +itself may be greater or less on account of the character or position +of the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous +person is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is +more damaging, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) The quantity of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is +more harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several +than before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the +defamation is uttered is an aggravating circumstance of the sin. +Whether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many +sins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is +a disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the +defamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person +present; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to +reputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of +others, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more +common, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention +the number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).</p> + +<p>2064. Is the malice of defamation aggravated by the fact that the +listeners are peculiar and think the defect mentioned is far more +serious than it really is?</p> + +<p>(a) If only the harm to reputation is considered, it does not seem that +the over-strict notions of the listeners increase the sinfulness of +defamation; for the harm to reputation is to be measured by the common +opinion, not by the singular ideas of certain persons. Example: +Sempronius tells that Balbus wastes a little time in telling humorous +incidents and reading detective stories. The small group of auditors +think that this is one of the blackest of crimes.</p> + +<p>(b) If other harms are taken into account, the peculiar ideas of the +listener may add to the sinfulness of defamation. Thus, if a young +person of delicate conscience will be scandalized at hearing that Caius +plays cards, or if older listeners will be led by this remark to take +their trade away from Caius, the sins of scandal and of unjust damage +are added to defamation. Defamation often destroys in the listener all +faith in humanity, or all belief in religion.</p> + +<p>2065. Detraction to One Discreet Person.—Is detraction a mortal sin, +if the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason +but to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge +the information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party +spoken against?</p> + +<p>(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his +neighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is +measured by the malevolence of the will.</p> + +<p>(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but +only to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of +the sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills +indirectly the harm connected with one’s acts, even when one does not +desire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious, +mortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it +by the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm, +then, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm +is done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally +more distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some +moralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done +is small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person +(exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose +esteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed +is an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to +reputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons, +and since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one +who has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first +opinion appeal also to the analogy of contumely and rash judgment, for +these two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion +is in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the +assumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and +rash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which +he is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now +considered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both +opinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more +likely.</p> + +<p>2066. Belittling a Person to Himself.—It is not impossible to belittle +a person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is +illegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his +ability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this +defamation, or is it sinful?</p> + +<p>(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the +strict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the +reputation that one has with one’s neighbors or with the public, not to +the opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision +(see 2106).</p> + +<p>(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according +to the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent, +wishing to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the +latter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of +virtuous correction. But if an envious person, wishing to produce a +sense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace +of mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are +violated and there is a duty of restitution.</p> + +<p>2067. Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.—In what cases is +it lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the +reputation of a third party?</p> + +<p>(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how +important the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is +sinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one’s own +reputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).</p> + +<p>(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well +known to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the +communication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had +been rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail +about which they had been in ignorance.</p> + +<p>(c) If the communication is truthful, but the defects are secret and +unknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the +person whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on +account of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot +otherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no +obligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser +right must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this +virtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our +Lord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites +(Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander +and Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).</p> + +<p>2068. Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.—(a) The +public good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public +welfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject +himself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is +right, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper +authorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to +discuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that +interfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about +which they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college +should give information about companions who are depraving the morals +of the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other +residents, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) The private good of innocent parties may be preferred to the fame +of one who enjoys a false reputation. One may reveal secret defects for +one’s own defense; for example, a person whose life, honor or property +is being unjustly attacked may reveal sins of the guilty in order to +deter them or weaken their authority; a person who has been injured by +his superior or another party may speak of this to a friend for the +sake of obtaining consolation, or to a confessor, a lawyer or other +adviser for the sake of obtaining counsel or assistance. One may also +reveal secret defects for the protection of others; for example, one +should put unsuspecting persons on their guard against seducers, +impostors, quacks; one should reveal impediments that stand in the way +of a marriage, or should warn a young woman that the man to whom she is +engaged is a criminal or diseased; one should make known the true +author of a crime for which an innocent person is about to suffer; one +should tell the truth to inquirers about the incompetency of servants +or other persons whom one has employed.</p> + +<p>(c) The higher good of the person whose faults are revealed may also be +preferred to the lower good of his false reputation; for it is to his +interest that his higher good be promoted, even at the expense of an +inferior good. It is lawful to tell parents about the misdeeds of their +children (e.g., that a daughter is involved in a scandalous liaison), +in order that the latter may be corrected; or to speak to the friends +of wayward persons about the misconduct of the latter in order that +prayers may be said for their conversion.</p> + +<p>2069. Unlawful Attack on Another’s False Reputation.—If the false +reputation of another is not the unjust cause of a loss that is feared, +it is not right to deprive him of his good name. Examples: (a) It is +not lawful to accuse a person who is about to be promoted to some +office or dignity of which he is worthy, if the motive of the +accusation is to secure the honor for oneself or one’s friend; +otherwise ambitious persons would be encouraged to practise spying, +manufacturing of evidence, etc., and the public peace would be greatly +disturbed. (b) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is giving one no +offense, if the motive of the accusation is to distract attention from +oneself or to make oneself shine by the comparison.</p> + +<p>2070. Conditions that Justify Revelation of Another’s Defects.—In +revealing defects on account of some necessary good, one must observe +the conditions for an act of double result (see 103).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the action itself must not be evil, and hence one may not +break the seal of secrecy to which one is bound (as will be said in the +next Article in discussing violations of secrets), nor make use of +knowledge unjustly acquired, nor reveal more or to more persons than +the case demands, nor reveal anything, if a warning to the offender +will suffice (see 1286).</p> + +<p>(b) The good result must be intended, and the evil result of detriment +to fame must be only permitted. Those who assign pious motives (pity, +zeal, sincerity) for talk against a neighbor, but who are really +actuated by hatred, revenge, ambition to defeat a rival, or other like +passion, sin on account of their wrong intention. A hypocritical form +of defamation is practised by some persons exteriorly devout, who under +the pretext of asking prayers for their neighbor’s conversion spread +stories about those whom they dislike.</p> + +<p>(c) The reason for permitting the evil must be sufficiently weighty. +Hence, the good result intended must be one that is likely to follow on +the revelation, and it must be of some importance; for it would be +cruel to throw away a neighbor’s good name on the mere possibility that +a considerable good would be secured, or on the certainty that only a +slight benefit would be obtained. It does seem, however, that the good +which is hoped for must be of an equal dignity with the good of fame, +since the innocent and the guilty party are not on the same footing, +and furthermore all admit, for example, that the fame of an employee +who is stealing from his employer is not to be preferred to the goods +of the employer. In doubt about the seriousness of the evil following +on revelation, the innocent party is to be favored.</p> + +<p>2071. Revelations about Public Officials or Candidates for Public +Office.—(a) These are lawful when the public good calls for them +(e.g., when a man has used corrupt practices in order to be elected, or +when he is incompetent, or when he has been guilty of malfeasance in +office), and the conditions of the previous paragraph are observed.</p> + +<p>(b) These revelations are unlawful when the public good suffers from +them (e.g., when the safety or dignity of society itself would be +injured by attacks on the head of government), or when the due +conditions are not observed (e.g., when one resorts to personalities +about a deserving public official, or practises muckraking because of +mere prejudice or partisanship). The law permits fair comment on public +persons or works, but it also grants an action for criticism that +contains unfair aspersions of personal character or unjust accusations +about public conduct.</p> + +<p>2072. Revelations about Historical Personages.—(a) These revelations +are not lawful unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies +them. For historians there are sufficient reasons to narrate +impartially the crimes as well as the virtues of those who appear in +their pages. These reasons are: the nature of history as a record of +facts and causes (“the first law of history is that it dare not tell +any untruth, that it fear not to tell any truth,” Leo XIII); the rights +of the persons who are treated in the annals (e.g., it is often +impossible to understand the deeds of one character in history or to do +him justice unless the secret crime of another character is revealed); +the rights of the readers (e.g., the reader has the right to know that +the persecutors of religion have been wicked in their personal lives). +The historian, therefore, may search for material bearing on the lives +and deeds of historical personages of the past, he may collect similar +material relating to current events, he may narrate defects or +delinquencies of the past that were unknown or forgotten. But matters +of a purely private character that have no bearing on public events do +not belong, according to some moralists, to the legitimate province of +the historian; for otherwise there would be an end to the rights of the +dead over their fame. Moreover, there is the risk of calumny and of +violation of elementary justice, since the historian is a +self-appointed judge and the person condemned is not able to defend +himself.</p> + +<p>(b) These historical revelations are not lawful unless the conditions +mentioned in 2070 are observed. Thus, a historian should not write down +details that were told him in confidence by a person long since dead; +he should not be swayed either by unreasonable likes or unreasonable +dislikes in the expression of his views; he should not publish what +will cause harm rather than good, such as circumstances in the lives of +persons recently deceased which, if revealed, will be detrimental to +living persons.</p> + +<p>2073. It is not always easy to determine whether more harm is likely to +result if the persons whose glory is dimmed are high in public esteem +on account of the prestige of their office or their great exploits. +Much will depend on circumstances and on the author’s manner of +treatment.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, _per se_, or from the nature of things, it does not cause +greater harm to narrate truth about the imperfections of great men, for +only error or prejudice or evil has reason to fear the truth. The +inspired Scriptures themselves deal candidly with the public failings +of personages who were high in religious or civil position, for +example, the hesitation of Moses, the infidelity of Aaron, the fall of +King David, the disobedience of the prophet Jonas, the denials of +Peter, the doubts of Thomas, the treason of Judas. These histories are +not harmful, but, on the contrary, contain most useful lessons of +instruction, warning and direction.</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, or on account of special conditions, it may be more +harmful to write of the failings of the great (cfr. 1001). Thus, the +class of persons for whom one is writing may be immature (e.g., a +textbook of history for children would give scandal if it spoke openly +of sexual crimes), the conditions of the time may be unfavorable (e.g., +a new historical production might lead to injury to some class of +persons at a time of great prejudice against them), the total effect of +a book may be bad (e.g., chronicles of scandals, historical biographies +or novels or plays written in a seductive manner). The class of modern +writers known as “debunkers,” whose aim it is to destroy all +hero-worship, offend against truth and ideals by the prominence they +give to evil, while the so-called psychological historians are +frequently purely subjective as well as immoral.</p> + +<p>2074. Revelations about Persons Who Figure in the News of the Day.—(a) +If the matters revealed are of a public nature, the lawfulness or +unlawfulness of the revelation will depend on the reasons for it and +the manner in which it is given. In discussing political affairs, a +newspaper has the right to call attention to mistakes and faults of +public men, since the freedom of the press in this respect is a +protection to liberty and to progress, and those who enter public life +implicitly consent to criticism of their conduct; in reporting the +news, a newspaper has the right to speak of murders, robberies and +other public crimes that have been committed, since the common good +requires that the authors of public offenses be known as such. But if +this kind of news is disserviceable in any instance to the order, +peace or dignity of the community, or if the news is obtained in +unjust or dishonorable ways, or if the motive is merely to gratify +curiosity, to indulge prejudice, or to make money, the newspaper +management is morally guilty, even though it may be legally within its +right. Yellow journalism and “tabloidism” are reprehensible because +they are injurious to the minds and morals of their readers on account +of the undue prominence given to crime, even of the most disgusting +sort, and the appeal made to sense and emotion rather than to thought.</p> + +<p>(b) It the matters revealed are of a private nature, the morality of +the revelation has to be judged by the principles given in 2067 sqq. It +would be wrong to make a practice of spying into the private life and +affairs even of public persons merely to add interest to one’s columns; +but if there is some really important advantage to the public or to a +private person that will be served, and if the other conditions are +observed (see 2070), one may publish even private defects that are real +and certain.</p> + +<p>2075. Injustice in Professional Critics.—(a) Injustice is done by +professional critics (such as book reviewers, dramatic and art critics, +and the like) to the persons who rely upon their opinion, if there is a +compact with them to give a competent and unbiased judgment and the +compact is not lived up to by the critic with resultant damage to the +client (see 1793). If there is no compact, the critic is nevertheless +guilty of deception and uncharitableness, if he performs his office +carelessly (e.g., by eulogizing a worthless book or play or picture).</p> + +<p>(b) Injustice is done the person criticized, if his work is undervalued +purposely (e.g., because the critic is jealous, or in an ill humor or +is hired by others to dispraise), or if uncalled-for personalities are +indulged in at the expense of the person’s fame. A carping critic may +by the stroke of the pen spoil the work of years, and hence ignorance +does not excuse those censors who practise wholesale and unfair +denunciations (see 905).</p> + +<p>2076. Cooperation in Defamation.—Not only the defamer sins, but also +those who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are +those who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be +done, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in +defamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by +joining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in +defamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully +unless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in +such a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the +detraction. This happens as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the +speaker on (e.g., by saying, “Tell us about So-and-So,” by insincerely +praising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding +approvingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to +those who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who +refuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he +hears, because he hates the victim:</p> + +<p>(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not +spur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the +defamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or +the other of these things.</p> + +<p>2077. Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.—The listener who +consents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the +words of St. Paul: “They who do such things (detractors, etc.) are +worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that +consent to them that do them” (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says +that it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to +defame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This +listener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to +sin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he +is both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and +is the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);</p> + +<p>(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally +than the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of +injustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since, +as is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does +not give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against +justice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word +or deed).</p> + +<p>2078. Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.—What of those listeners who +hear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil +that is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the +speaker is unusually interesting?</p> + +<p>(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they +consent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr. +2079).</p> + +<p>(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the +defamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin, +since they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give +them pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had +except at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But +the general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the +listener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in +the graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the +strangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the +latest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering +of his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the +listener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound +to stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however, +a venial sin.</p> + +<p>2079. Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.—The listener who +consents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is +also guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden: +“Have nothing to do with detractors” (Prov., xxiv. 21); “Hedge in thy +ears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue” (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).</p> + +<p>(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly +against charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful; +for he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly +correction (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted +by refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot +defend himself.</p> + +<p>(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior +of the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he +is specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his +presence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the +listener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person’s +reputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to +the defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely +sin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.</p> + +<p>2080. Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.—Is the superior +who indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject +guilty thereby of injustice?</p> + +<p>(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by +the defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject, +if by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults +and neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his +people, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct +them in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems +that a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to +correct a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.</p> + +<p>(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame +incurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior +is bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to +non-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises +his authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not +subject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he +is bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion +is that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible _ex +officio_ for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to +him.</p> + +<p>2081. Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a +subject guilty thereby of injustice?</p> + +<p>(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust +by his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to +prevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with +the care of his ward’s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to +prevent defamation of the latter.</p> + +<p>(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is +unjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual +goods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for +personal perseverance in virtue. But others—and it seems more +commonly—deny this, and state that the relation between fame and +spiritual goods is only accidental.</p> + +<p>2082. Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.—Indirect +consent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason +of the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are +mentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as +when the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to +the sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient +consent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation +is due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker, +at least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other +good, or gravely slanderous.</p> + +<p>2083. Inaction in the Face of Defamation.—Inaction in the face of +defamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a +slanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will +not suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any +success (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse +defamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or +remonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since +they are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person +would generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the +person whom they suspected of defamation.</p> + +<p>(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when +interference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation +is not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is +uncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether +he himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt +a defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire +disclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be +an affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or +startling or credible.</p> + +<p>2084. Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One’s Presence.—(a) Positive +resistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by +refutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words +are true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener +is the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the +latter’s equal.</p> + +<p>(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no +share in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing +displeasure or at least gravity in one’s looks or acts: “The north wind +driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue” +(Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for +an inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between +equals (see 1267).</p> + +<p>2085. Restitution for Defamation.—Restitution for injuries committed +is necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In +the language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his +neighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be +repaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has +deprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to +fame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure +to obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were +foreseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty +of restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no +loss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).</p> + +<p>2086. Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of +restitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of +injury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of +serious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small +inconvenience. But the following points should be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to +another is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g., +blasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a +man publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);</p> + +<p>(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is +slight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is +not very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to +speak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost +the woman a very lucrative position as secretary).</p> + +<p>2087. Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.—Restitution is not +obligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the +damage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of +others entail the duty of restitution only when the following +conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and +hence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are +not held to restitution;</p> + +<p>(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in +good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and +public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if +he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been +removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the +neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from +that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take +steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);</p> + +<p>(c) the detriment must be due to oue’s act as to its efficacious +cause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener +understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.</p> + +<p>2088. Cooperators and Restitution.—Those who cooperate in injustice +are also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following +are bound to indemnify a defamed person:</p> + +<p>(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who +command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those +who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by +their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to +continue, or to speak with more assurance;</p> + +<p>(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were +bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply +chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the +defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a +non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2089. Circumstances of Restitution.—We shall now speak of the +circumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to +restitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners, +etc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner +of making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>2090. Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the +Defamer.—(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not +bound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that +is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an +obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation +may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that, +if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the +infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.</p> + +<p>(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound, +since restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property +or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are +sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.</p> + +<p>2091. The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be +Made.—(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this +is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors +the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their +memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their +reputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in +conscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot +condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.</p> + +<p>(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was +done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory. +And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other +reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to +whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the +honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with +the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.</p> + +<p>2092. Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.—Is the +defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned +them from his first listeners?</p> + +<p>(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond +the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon +his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his +remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the +common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the +subsequent listeners.</p> + +<p>(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if +he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well +that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to +reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible, +especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners +have the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in +their cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should +admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.</p> + +<p>2093. The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.—(a) If the +defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must +take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If +necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit +that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right +to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to +confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice +to say merely that his former statement was not correct.</p> + +<p>(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully +say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or +indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the +person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their +belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his +statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he +wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct +revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by +strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true, +the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should +so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to +believe, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good +opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect +revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has +reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now +has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be +excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does +possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the +listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the +defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter, +etc.</p> + +<p>2094. Other Methods of Making Restitution.—If the listeners will not +be impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what +should be done?</p> + +<p>(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept +the formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is +obliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is +possible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad +opinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the +defamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.</p> + +<p>(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or +indirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make +honorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable +compensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be +commensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other +party. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something +measurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind +of compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of +honor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should +be given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a +prudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has +been deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of +pardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally +advisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly +defaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds +rather than to forgiveness and peace.</p> + +<p>2095. Legal Reparation for Defamation.—One who has been sentenced by a +lawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is +obliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is +excessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law +(Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced: +(a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to +suspension or removal from office or benefice.</p> + +<p>2096. The Time When Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.—(a) It +should be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the +greater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to +correct as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not +corrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a +psychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Restitution +should be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a +well-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may +delay absolution until restitution has been made.</p> + +<p>2097. Cessation of Duty of Restitution.—The duty of restitution +ceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and +hence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is +sometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily +on account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account +of the cessation of the other party’s good name or the termination of +one’s own obligation.</p> + +<p>2098. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Impossibility.—(a) +Physical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who +the persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the +person was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at +least make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or +by having Masses offered for him.</p> + +<p>(b) Moral impossibility excuses from restitution, as when the defamer +will suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed +(e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a +reputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person +who was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to +the peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must +make satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of +his own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the +guilty defamer.</p> + +<p>2099. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Cessation of Other Party’s +Good Name.—The defamer may also be excused from restitution on account +of cessation of the other party’s good name through another cause, as +when the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public +from another source.</p> + +<p>(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation, +since the person he defamed has now independently of the first +defamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages +which the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for +expenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also +for some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became +public through others.</p> + +<p>2100. Excuse from Restitution on Account of the Termination of +Obligation.—(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation, +when, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the +offense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own +money or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook +the restitution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the +latter.</p> + +<p>(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according +to the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming +his defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for +though it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage +does not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot +insist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if Titus has +burned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of Titus, +and neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the +losses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory +recriminations.</p> + +<p>2101. Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.—The person defamed +has the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself, +but he has not always the right to condone the injury when the +defamation causes harm to others.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act +would be invalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the +fact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when +a monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was +necessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to +others (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good +name, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is +ended). This conclusion is probable.</p> + +<p>(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be +valid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his +fame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to +others, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great +scandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not +move, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity +by instructing the ignorant, etc.).</p> + +<p>2102. Excuse from Restitution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.—The +obligation of restitution for defamation also ceases when reputation +has been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it +is clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had. +But restitution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and +some think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be +made for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was +regained.</p> + +<p>The usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the +defamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts +against it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or +when a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when +a misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If +the defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been +forgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes +inquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he +says nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted, +may break out anew. He should consider the circumstances, therefore, +and treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in +a like case.</p> + +<p>2103. Whispering or Tale-Bearing.—Whispering (_susurratio_), also +called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to +another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous +friendship.</p> + +<p>(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to +his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about. +The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil +or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be +something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not +necessarily include defamation.</p> + +<p>(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually +in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress. +Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another, +speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly +effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The +whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).</p> + +<p>(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the +whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which +his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the +listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent +person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship, +and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and +sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a +sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst +of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer +is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering, +then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away +fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.</p> + +<p>(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin +but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful +friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a +wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a +disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).</p> + +<p>2104. The Sinfulness of Whispering.—(a) Theological +Species.—Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is +hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord +among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a +virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend +is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure. +Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and +silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful +friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). +Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor +is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to +friendship.</p> + +<p>(b) Moral Species.—Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on +account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to +which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity, +for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a +free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the +parties.</p> + +<p>2105. Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.—Is the +species of whispering changed by circumstances?</p> + +<p>(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect +in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil +that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g., +when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong +or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to +destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship +between husband and wife, between parent and child.</p> + +<p>(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are +different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed +against the special features, but against the general character common +to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the +whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the +friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It +is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus, +he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for +himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man +and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty +also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering, +is also guilty of sedition, etc.</p> + +<p>2106. Derision.—Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some +defect or evil in order to put him to confusion.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making +the defects of another person the object of laughter or amusement. +Thus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering, +which are spoken seriously.</p> + +<p>(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it +intends to take from him the good opinion that he is entitled to have +of himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs +in object and purpose from the other injurious words hitherto +considered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of +countenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the +purpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have +one’s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for +the victim of the joke.</p> + +<p>2107. Distinction between Derision and Jesting.—Moderate jesting at +another’s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a +reasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is +fraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of +himself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less +moved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a +satirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted +opinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of +charity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is +recreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects +between persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of +amusement in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as +_eutrapelia_. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of +another are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun +is poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is +laughing at them.</p> + +<p>2108. Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of +the offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010). +There are three general forms of jest, but they do not constitute +distinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference +between them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.</p> + +<p>(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance +(e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).</p> + +<p>(c) A jest of act, or practical joke, is some trick played on another, +horseplay, and the like.</p> + +<p>2109. The Sinfulness of Derision.—(a) When the derider makes light of +a grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt +towards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely +worthless—one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed, +derision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious +person treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas +the derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture +grave punishment is threatened to deriders: “God shall scorn the +scorners” (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly +looked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person +who has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there +is no grave sin of contempt.</p> + +<p>(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there +is no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarrassment caused to +the person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great +blessing (“Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience,” II +Cor., i. 12; “A secure mind is like a continual feast,” Prov., xv. 15), +and that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the +butt of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is +venial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on +account of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think +that mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil +that will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is +the over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his +great discomfiture of mind.</p> + +<p>2110. The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object +against whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a +person, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against +God, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings, +xix. 6) calls the deriders of the God of Israel blasphemers, and St. +Luke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock +coronation spoke in blasphemy.</p> + +<p>(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the +special horror of this sin: “The eye that mocketh at his father, let +the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it” +(Prov., xxx, 17).</p> + +<p>(c) Finally, there is a special enormity in derision of saintly +persons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter +men, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.</p> + +<p>2111. Cursing.—Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some +person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him +or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the +speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which +are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different +from prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms, +though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future, +rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate +of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:</p> + +<p>(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is +to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way +God decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges +sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;</p> + +<p>(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command +punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may +overtake a person or thing. Examples are: “Bad luck to you,” “May you +break your leg,” “The devil take you,” “God damn you.” A curse made in +the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.</p> + +<p>2112. When Cursing Is Not Sinful.—Cursing a person is not sinful when +the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that +is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to +good, not to evil.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is +in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its +physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice +and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible +are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when +Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i), +and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they +express the submission of the human will to the just decree of God: +“And the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, ‘Cursed be he that +abideth not in the words of this law,’ and all the people shall say, +‘Amen’” (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).</p> + +<p>(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of +public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes +a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not +the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the +community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the +enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one’s country; it is lawful +to pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be +reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one +must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may +happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil +as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2113. Sinfulness of Cursing.—Cursing a person is sinful when the evil +ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of +this person.</p> + +<p>(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser +from heaven (“Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the +kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to +charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other +things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation, +for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be +defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, +cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly +deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly +intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really +wish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, “Go to +hell,” “God damn you,” are usually not meant or understood to express a +wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment. +Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should +be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by +reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to +their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason +of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of +a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree +(e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).</p> + +<p>2114. Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.—Persons who have +expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt +whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin. +For such doubts theologians give the following rules:</p> + +<p>(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off +and hoped that no evil would happen to one’s neighbor, mortal sin was +committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;</p> + +<p>(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state +of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind +will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if +one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the +curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is +hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the +curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person +whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to +desire in one’s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to +displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.</p> + +<p>2115. Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.—There +are certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral +species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is +changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is +committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against +God, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness +is the curse against one’s parents, which is a sin of impiety.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species +is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the +deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from +contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not +pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he +who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who +wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a +neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one +sins by hatred.</p> + +<p>2116. Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.—(a) By reason of +the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace, +poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for, +though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in +the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is +committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions +of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see +217).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of +several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin +that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group, +formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs +from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual +injuries (see 218).</p> + +<p>2117. The Cursing of Evil.—(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such, +that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful +to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is +sinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost, +for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a +creature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause +(e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils), +or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and +Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these +creatures of God in themselves.</p> + +<p>2118. It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of +its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man +himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g., +when God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed +the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the +good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a +drunkard may be lost).</p> + +<p>2119. Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.—(a) It is unlawful +to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of +God, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt +of blasphemy.</p> + +<p>(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered +precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man. +Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor’s cattle may die, intending only +the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful +cursing (see 2113).</p> + +<p>(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered +precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who +curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the +stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool, +etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend +only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.</p> + +<p>2120. Murmuring.—Murmuring is the expression of unjust discontent or +complaint by inarticulate sounds or by secret words.</p> + +<p>(a) It is unjust, and so it does not differ essentially from the sins +of speech given above. If it is an injustice to honor, it is reducible +to contumely; if it is an injury to fame, it pertains to defamation, +etc. The injustice of murmuring results either from the thing +complained of (e.g., a child murmurs against the just orders of its +parents), or from the manner of the complaint (e.g., a subordinate +complains against an unjust order, but angrily, contemptuously, or +uselessly).</p> + +<p>(b) It is made by inarticulate sounds (e.g., by whistling, grunting), +or by secret words (e.g., in whispered, inaudible manner). This is an +accidental difference between murmuring and other vocal sins.</p> + +<p>2121. Fraud.—Having discussed the various kinds of injustice that are +committed in involuntary commutations, we now pass on to the study of +those injustices that are done in voluntary transactions (see 1748). +These vices can be reduced to the following:</p> + +<p>(a) injustices perpetrated against a person who is entirely unwilling +(viz., theft and robbery), as when one steals an object that had been +entrusted to one as a pledge or loan, or compels another, by fear or +violence, to sign a contract unfavorable to himself and which he does +not wish to agree to. It is unnecessary to speak of theft and robbery +in contracts, since the same principles apply to them as to theft and +robbery outside of contracts (see 1890 sqq.);</p> + +<p>(b) injustices perpetrated against a person who is partly willing, +since he consents to a contract, but is also partly unwilling, since +unfairness or fraud is used against him. These injuries are of two +general kinds: fraud, a sin committed in buying and selling and other +contracts in which payment is made for some valuable consideration; +usury, a sin committed in the loan of money in which payment is made +for something that is nonexistent.</p> + +<p>2122. Definition of Fraud.—By fraud (see 1677-1679) we here understand +any unlawful conduct on the part of one party to a contract that puts +the other party under a disadvantage in agreeing to the contract (e.g., +misrepresentations about the excellence of merchandise), or that takes +away the equality that should exist between the parties (e.g., an +excessive price charged for merchandise; see 1750). The contract of +sale is the type of all onerous contracts (see 1749), and to it all the +others, whether certain or aleatory, can be reduced, for in every one +of them there is a thing that is purchased (e.g., in aleatory contracts +the hope of securing some prize), and a price that is paid for the +object of purchase. Hence, it will suffice to speak of the frauds that +are committed in sales, and the same principles that govern these can +be applied to other kinds of contract.</p> + +<p>2123. Two Kinds of Injustices in Sales.—Equality between the buyer and +the seller requires that each give the other a good equivalent for what +he receives. Hence, the injustices committed in sales are reducible to +two kinds: (a) injustices in the prices charged or paid; (b) injustices +as to the goods furnished or taken.</p> + +<p>2124. Injustice Regarding the Price.—Sin is committed in reference to +the price charged as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) by fraud, when one of the parties uses deception against the other +party in order to charge more or pay less than is fair; for one who is +party to a contract has the right that no lying or trickery be used +against him, a contract being an agreement to which knowledge and +consent are requisite;</p> + +<p>(b) by overcharge or underpayment; for sale has for its purpose the +mutual advantage of the buyer and seller, and hence one of them should +not be overburdened for the advantage of the other, but the burdens and +benefits should be equally distributed. Hence, it is unjust to sell an +object for more than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is +worth.</p> + +<p>2125. The Criteria of a Just Price.—(a) The constitutive norm of a +just price is not merely subjective, that is, the fairness does not +depend on the arbitrary wishes or on the special needs of the +contractants, or on some monopoly which controls the prices; it is +objective, that is, founded on the value of the thing sold, its +capacity to be of benefit and satisfaction to its possessor, its +rarity, the amount of labor put into its production and care, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) The manifestative norm for commodities that are in common use (such +as the necessities of life and the more usual luxuries) is the common +judgment expressed either in law (legal price) or in the free custom of +buyers and sellers at a particular place and time (market price); for +objects that are not in common use and that have no settled price +(e.g., rare archeological finds, ancient documents or paintings) the +norm is the prudent and free judgment of the parties, or the decision +of an expert chosen by them.</p> + +<p>2126. The Obligation of Observing Prices Settled by Law Or Custom.—(a) +The legal price (e.g., in some countries the prices on government +monopolies, such as tobacco and salt), which in modern times is rare, +is ordinarily obligatory in virtue of commutative justice, since its +disregard harms one of the parties to the sale. But in exceptional +cases the price may for reasons of equity be no longer obligatory +(e.g., when the lawgiver does not insist on its observance).</p> + +<p>(b) The market price is ordinarily of like obligation, and for the same +reason. But it should be noted that the current price allows of some +latitude, since the common estimate does not agree on exactly the same +figure, and hence there is a highest, a lowest, and an average price. +Injustice is done when one sells above the highest market price, that +is, when one charges a sum notably in excess of that charged by others +at the same place and time; or when one buys below the lowest market +price, that is, when one pays a sum notably less than that paid by +other buyers. St. Alphonsus gives as a rule that when a commodity is +valued at 5, it may be sold for 6 or bought for 4; when valued at 10, +it may be transferred or acquired for 12 or 8; when valued at 100, it +may be exchanged for 105 or 95.</p> + +<p>2127. When the Market Price May Be Disregarded Without Injustice.—In +some exceptional cases one may disregard the market price without +injustice, if there are reasons that justify this.</p> + +<p>(a) Reasons that rest on the matter of the contract are that the thing +on sale has increased or decreased in value (e.g., the merchandise is +of extraordinary excellence or rarity), or that the contractant would +lose or risk loss from the sale itself by keeping to the market price +(e.g., the buyer would by his purchase deprive himself of money that +could be used more profitably in another transaction; the article if +sold would have to be replaced by the seller at a higher price; the +vendor by waiting can make a better sale later; the object which a +person wishes to purchase is especially prized by the owner and cannot +be duplicated). In these cases, however, the vendor should give notice +to the buyer that for special reasons a higher price is being asked, so +that the latter may have the choice of going elsewhere, if he prefers.</p> + +<p>(b) Reasons that rest on the manner of the contract are that certain +exceptional forms of sales are justified by law or custom and do not +violate basic justice. Auction sales are of this kind, and, if the +conditions of aleatory contracts are observed so that the risk will be +equal on both sides, it is not unfair to take a price above the highest +current price or to bid and buy below the minimum price.</p> + +<p>2128. If the reason for the increase is the accommodation of the sale +itself to the purchaser, because he specially prizes the article, does +it justify an increase above the market price?</p> + +<p>(a) If the article has become of greater value to many because of its +own worth, the market value has also risen, and one may raise one’s +price; but if its greater value to many is due only to public distress, +as in time of war, it would be a cruel form of injustice known as +profiteering to raise the price exorbitantly.</p> + +<p>(b) If the article has become of greater value to one person only, the +seller may not raise his price for that reason, since the special worth +the article has is not inherent in it, and hence it may not be sold by +the owner as if it were his own possession. If, however, the purchaser +wished to add something as a free gift, there would be no objection to +his doing so. The same principles apply to the purchase of an article +at less than its value, for the sole reason that ready money has +special value for the seller.</p> + +<p>2129. Unjust Sales Based on Ignorance of Real Value.—There are also +cases in which an object is purchased at an unjust price because its +true value was unknown to the contractants or was hidden.</p> + +<p>(a) If the value was unknown on account of substantial error (e.g., a +woman buys paste ornaments, thinking they are genuine diamonds), the +contract is invalid; if it was unknown on account of the individual +error of a contractant (e.g., a woman buys a diamond of great value for +a few dollars, because the seller did not know the value of the jewel), +the contract is unjust; if it was unknown on account of public error +reflected in the current price (e.g., an art dealer buys at a low price +a masterly painting, because his superior judgment enables him to +recognize in it qualities which others did not perceive), the contract +is both valid and just. It is also lawful to buy at the present prices +when one knows from sources that one can honorably use that the objects +purchased will soon rise greatly in value, for one is not bound to +share with others one’s personal knowledge.</p> + +<p>(b) If the hidden value is no man’s property or is abandoned (e.g., a +man buys a field in which he, but not the owner, knows that a treasure +is concealed, or he buys a goose and finds gold pieces in its stomach +and cannot discover how they got there), the buyer is entitled to +acquisition; but if it has an owner who can be discovered (e.g., a man +buys a coat in a second-hand store and discovers a large quantity of +money in bills sewed inside the lining, and is able to trace back the +coat to its former wearer, if he tries), the buyer is bound to +restitution.</p> + +<p>2130. Obligation of Restitution on Account of Unjust Prices.—(a) +Unjust Possession.—If there was bad faith without fraud, the seller +should restore the difference between what he received and the highest +current price, the buyer the difference between what he paid and the +lowest current price. Overcharges or underpayments in conventional +prices should be compensated for according to a reasonable standard, +such as the decision of the experts.</p> + +<p>(b) Unjust Damage.—If there was bad faith and fraud with resultant +damages to one of the parties, the losses should be made good, even +though the just price itself was not violated by excess or defect (see +1762).</p> + +<p>(c) Nullity.—If there was good faith on both sides, there is no +obligation of restoration, unless we suppose substantial error, lack of +proper consent, conditional agreement, etc., which make the sale null +or rescindable (see 1725).</p> + +<p>2131. Injustice Regarding the Thing Sold.—Having spoken of the +injustices committed in reference to the price, we shall now treat of +the injustices committed in reference to the thing sold. The contract +supposes that the thing sold be of a certain character, and hence +injustice is done if one of the parties wilfully misleads the other +about that character.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the species of the thing sold enters into the contract, and +so it is unjust to deceive another person about the nature of the thing +that is being sold (e.g., if the seller gives inferior substitutes or +adulterated goods to those who desire the genuine and pure article, or +if the buyer deceives an inexperienced merchant into thinking that the +high-grade clothing material he has for sale is low grade).</p> + +<p>(b) The quantity of the thing sold is also a part of the contract, and +it is unjust to take advantage by giving less or taking more than is +agreed on: “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater +and a less, neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a +less” (Deut., xxv. 13, 14).</p> + +<p>(c) The quality of the thing sold belongs to the contract, and hence +there is fraud if one of the parties deceives the other about it (e.g., +if the horse sold is sickly or slow, when he is supposed to be healthy +and speedy).</p> + +<p>2132. Defects in the Thing Sold.—If there are defects in an article +sold, but a fair reduction in the price is made on account of the +imperfection of the article, there is no injustice in the price. But +the seller is unjust, nevertheless, if he conceals the defects in spite +of a contrary condition in the contract, for he injures the buyer by +leading him into an agreement against his will.</p> + +<p>(a) There is an indicated condition when the buyer inquires whether +there are defects in the article, having the intention to take nothing +that has any considerable defect. In such a case if the seller conceals +even an accidental defect (i.e., one that makes the article less +suitable for the buyer), the contract is null on account of lack of +consent, or at least, as others think, it is rescindable on account of +the fraud practised. But if a defect is inconsiderable, the contract, +unless it is expressly stipulated to the contrary, is good and lawful, +for there is hardly anything that has not some small defects.</p> + +<p>(b) There is an implied condition when the buyer makes no inquiry, but +there is a substantial defect (i.e., one that makes the article +dangerous or unsuitable for the purchaser), and this defect is hidden, +either because it is of a kind that would escape most persons, or +because the purchaser is inexperienced or unable to perceive it for +himself. Since every person who buys intends to get something useful, +there is no consent and the contract is invalid, if one is given +something harmful (e.g., corrupted or poisonous food instead of good +food), or something entirely useless to him either for service or for +sale (e.g., a lame horse instead of a sound horse for one who deals in +race-horses).</p> + +<p>2133. Circumstances in Which Defects Need Not Be Revealed.—Fairness of +price being supposed, the seller is not unjust in not calling attention +to defects in the thing he sells, if the buyer does not ask about +defects and there is no implied condition that the seller should +volunteer the information. This happens as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) if the defect is hidden, but only accidental, there is no condition +that the seller shall point out the defect, for the understanding is +only that the buyer shall receive something serviceable at a fair +return for his money, Nevertheless, most merchants wish to please the +public and will take back or exchange an article that is not +satisfactory;</p> + +<p>(b) if the defect is open, but accidental, there is no condition that +the seller shall instruct the buyer about things that the latter can +and should observe for himself; for it is supposed that the buyer will +exercise ordinary care and prudence in making purchases, nor is the +seller paid for supplying this, nor for assisting the buyer to make +good bargains. Thus, if a man were to buy a one-eyed horse, because he +had not examined the horse, he should blame his own negligence, not the +silence of the seller, for his bad bargain.</p> + +<p>2134. Definition of Trading.—Trading (_negotiatio_) in the strict +sense is the purchase of an object with the intention of selling it +unchanged at a profit. If any one of the conditions mentioned in this +definition are lacking, there is trading in a wide sense. (a) Thus, +trading includes purchase, and hence he who sells the produce of his +own farm or vineyard is not strictly a trader; (b) there must be an +intention of reselling the thing bought, and hence there is trading +only in a wide sense if one buys an article for one’s own use but, +finding it unsuitable to that use, sells it to another person; (c) the +object must be sold unchanged, that is, in the same form in which it +was received, otherwise there is not strict negotiation, as when one +buys colors and canvas and makes them into a picture; (d) the object +must be sold at a higher price than was paid for it, and hence it is +not trading in the strict sense to let a customer have an article for +just what it has cost oneself.</p> + +<p>2135. The Morality of Trading in the Strict Sense.—(a) In itself, +trading has the appearance of evil, inasmuch as money-making may be an +encouragement to avarice. But in reality profit as an end is morally +indifferent, neither good nor bad, and all will depend on the ultimate +reason for which one engages in business. He who makes the whole +purpose of his existence the acquisition of gain is a materialist, but +he who has some higher end, such as public benefit or private +maintenance, is virtuous in his aims. (b) For clerics, trading is +forbidden by Canon Law (Canon 142), and the reason is that clerics +should be free from the distractions and dangers of commerce, so as to +devote themselves entirely to their own spiritual duties (II Tim., ii. +4).</p> + +<p>2136. Usury.—The sin of usury is committed in two ways.</p> + +<p>(a) Usury in the strict sense is the taking of interest by reason of +intrinsic title (i.e., on account of the use) for money or other +fungible loaned on condition that it be restored in kind (_mutuum_). +This is unjust since it exacts payment for that which is nonexistent, +that is, for use, as a distinct value, of a fungible whose only value +is in its use (see Aristotle, _Politics_, Bk. I, Ch. 10, 1258b 2-8; St. +Thomas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 78, a. 1). This was the opinion of +most medieval theologians based on the fact that money was solely a +medium of exchange. Interest was permitted, however, on the grounds of +extrinsic titles, e.g., compensation for the expense of a transaction +(_damnum emergens_), the loss of opportunity to make good bargains +(_lucrum cessans_).</p> + +<p>(b) Usury in the wide sense, which is all too common, is the taking of +interest for a fungible loaned at _mutuum_, where there is an extrinsic +title (e.g., the loss or inconvenience suffered by the lender) for the +interest, but the rate charged is unjust, exceeding that fixed by law +or that which is fair and reasonable (see Canon 1543). This is unjust +when the lender takes more than his loan is worth; it is uncharitable +when the lender does not demand more than the worth of his loan, but +does exact what is due in a heartless manner. Examples of usury in the +wide sense are the acts of loan sharks who take advantage of the +distress of the poor to make them pay enormous interest for small +loans, or who hold the debtor to the strict letter of the agreement at +a great loss to him.</p> + +<p>In recent years a new concept of usury in the wide sense has emerged. +It is based upon the fact that in modern times the function of money +has changed. In ancient times it was solely a medium or measure of +exchange that could not be turned easily into capital. With the +emergence of the capitalistic system, opportunities for investment +increased, and money assumed the role of a factor of production. Money +assumed a new value and function: it became virtually productive, and +so today money does fructify. To place money, then, at the disposal of +another to be employed in profitable ventures constitutes an economic +service and, as such, is worth its price as any other service. This +price of money constitutes modern interest, which seems to differ +radically from the old contract of interest and to be more one of hire +or lease. So viewed, interest, or the price of money, is determined in +the same way as the price of any other service; the unjust price, or +usury, is an excessive price. This is the modern concept of usury.</p> + +<p>2137. Principles Obligatory in All Forms of Contract.—The principles +of equality and honesty that are morally obligatory in sales and loans +at interest are also obligatory in other forms of contract. The +following are examples of equality.</p> + +<p>(a) Gratuitous Contracts.—Obviously these contracts do not require +equality in respect to recompense, since their nature is that no +recompense is given for what is received. But in other ways equality +must be observed. Thus, there must be mutual consent, offer on one side +and acceptance on the other; there must be mutual respect, for each +must honor the gratuitous promises made to the other; there must be a +return of the same thing in quality and quantity as was borrowed, +unless this would mean (as in _mutuum_) a loss to the borrower, etc. +Moreover, the fact that all the advantage is received by one party is +balanced by the fact that this party must bear the ordinary expenses +and is held to special care himself, but cannot exact special care in +the other party. Thus, a borrower has all the advantage from a loan, +and he is obliged to use extreme care in using the lender’s property, +while a depositor has all the advantage from the contract of deposit +and cannot demand more than ordinary diligence of the depositary in +guarding the goods left with him.</p> + +<p>(b) Aleatory Contracts.—Aleatory contracts, or contracts of chance, +are concerned with some uncertain event whose outcome depends upon luck +or skill or a combination of both. The chief forms are betting, lottery +and gaming (all are considered as gambling), to which must be added +insurance and market speculations. All of these are indifferent in +themselves and obtain their morality from circumstances. However, +gambling, besides conforming to the requirements of contracts in +general, must observe some special conditions to guarantee its +lawfulness:</p> + +<p>1) The outcome should be objectively uncertain and not a “sure thing” +to be truly a contract of chance. While the contractants may be +subjectively certain of winning, neither may so manipulate the matter +as to exclude the other’s chance of winning. Should one insist upon +betting against another’s assurance of a certain outcome, he is making +a gift, hardly a bet.</p> + +<p>2) Each must stake what belongs to himself and is not needed for +satisfying other obligations, e.g., supporting one’s family, paying +creditors, etc. Failure to observe this condition leads to many sins of +theft or negligence. Should a person gamble with money belonging to +another, _per se_ he has a right to the winnings under the title of +industrial fruits. However, if it would be impossible for him to +restore in the event of a loss, the wager is void and the winnings must +be restored to the other player, since the amount bet could not be +lawfully won by the other contestant.</p> + +<p>3) A reasonable proportion should be observed between what is bet and +the probable winnings, and all betting should offer a fair chance of +winning. Equality is not necessary, but odds and handicaps should be +offered by the favored side. However, the odds may be waived by other +bettors.</p> + +<p>4) Honesty must prevail to exclude fixing the outcome or an unlawful +style of play. The conventions of each bet or game establish the norms +of cheating. Thus, hidden cards, marked cards, false dice void a bet. +But running a horse solely to “tighten him” or “round him into shape” +without full effort to win is expected in horse racing. Winnings +through cheating must be refunded.</p> + +<p>5) The loser must pay. Since civil law forbids many forms of organized +gambling, the question arises whether a wager that has been outlawed +constitutes matter for a valid contract that must be fulfilled. If the +law is purely penal, the contract is valid and the obligations ensue; +if it is a law that binds morally, then the contract is invalid, and +the loser probably need not pay, but has acted sinfully in gambling.</p> + +<p>Although not sinful in itself, gambling is so open to serious abuse +that it has been strictly regulated by civil laws which bind in +conscience.</p> + +<p>Insurance is reduced to the category of contracts of chance, although +its purpose is different from gambling, for it is concerned not with an +uncertain good, i.e., to make money quickly, but with an uncertain evil, +i.e., to avoid loss. In many instances an individual who does not take +out insurance gambles more than one who does.</p> + +<p>Conditions Requisite for Validity. The special conditions requisite for +the validity of an insurance contract are founded upon its aleatory +nature. This involves especially that the matter of the contract is in +some way outside the control of both insured and insurer and beyond +their power, both legal and moral, to govern beforehand. From this +follows the second essential condition, that there be some risk for +both parties. Some moralists today maintain that many insurance +contracts are unjust to the insured by reason of defect of +proportionate risk on the part of the insurer. They argue that the +insurer avoids all risks and makes increasing profits annually whenever +insurance is on such a large scale that the use of statistical tables +favors the insurer. The fact that insurance companies are listed among +the most wealthy corporations lends credence to the argument and +explains why some moralists favor the insured in cases of restitution +not involving fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Other moralists +insist that such injustice can not be proved, that high profits are +owing to increased efficiency and better service, that premiums are +adjusted when it becomes apparent that they are out of proportion to +the risks involved by the insurers.</p> + +<p>On the part of the insurer is required the ability to pay indemnities +occurring at the normal rate, but not to cover all at once. His right +to the premiums is correlative to the obligation to pay the stipulated +indemnities, while his liabilities are based upon probable losses +occurring successively. In regard to the insured, his basic obligation +is to make an honest and complete disclosure of the risk involved. +Moral cases, for the most part, are concerned with error, innocent +misrepresentation, and fraud on the part of the insured. Both the +natural and civil law indicate the effect of these elements on an +insurance contract.</p> + +<p>The natural law invalidates a contract in which consent of one or both +parties arises from substantial error concerning the nature or the +matter of the contract—in insurance, the risk involved. In general, +then, whenever the error of the insured is such that he would not have +contracted had he known the facts, the contract is invalid, even if the +error was due to innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the +part of the insured. In such cases, the innocent insured has no right +to the indemnity owing to the invalidity of the contract; he has, +however, a natural right to all premiums paid out, since no contract is +involved and the insurer has no claim to them. In case of fraud, at +least after judicial decision, the insured would have no right to the +premiums and must also recompense the insurer for expenses sustained.</p> + +<p>Error is considered accidental and as not invalidating in natural law +when the insurer, knowing the facts, would have issued a policy, but at +a higher premium. In this case the beneficiary may accept the +indemnity, but must return the difference in the amount owed in +premiums.</p> + +<p>A special case of substantial error involving a disease unknown to the +insured and undiscovered or undiscoverable by the insurance company +doctors is considered by moralists as not invalidating a contract in +natural law. It is argued that the insurer must assume such risks and +that the insured intends to cover such unknown conditions. Moreover, an +invalidating clause concerning such a contingency may be considered +penal in nature and obligatory only after the sentence of a judge.</p> + +<p>Insurance contracts and the civil laws governing them are so +complicated that expert legal knowledge is required to understand the +legal status of many insurance cases. However, a few dispositions of +the civil law which differ from the tenets of the natural law should be +kept in mind by the priest or confessor in dealing with the matters. +Two favor the insurance companies over the insured:</p> + +<p>1) when fraud or misrepresentation lead to accidental error, the +contract is declared void or voidable;</p> + +<p>2) innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in good faith leading +to accidental error also render the insurance contract voidable or +perhaps even void. It is probable that the beneficiary in such cases +might be permitted to claim the benefits due him according to the +naturally valid contract, since these civil law dispositions are +contrary to the conclusions of the natural law. He would be obliged, +however, to restitution for damages caused by his fraud or +misrepresentation committed with grave theological fault.</p> + +<p>One prescription recognized by civil law and in some places made +mandatory favors the insured, the convalidating or incontestability +clause. The insurance company recognizes the validity of the policy +after a specified period of time has elapsed, even in cases involving +fraud on the part of the insured. If the contract prior to the time was +voidable, the company loses its right to contest its validity; if the +contract was void, it becomes convalidated. By terms of this clause, +the natural-law obligation to restore by reason of fraud ceases and the +beneficiary may lawfully keep the insurance money.</p> + +<p>Obligations Arising after the Policy Is Issued. 1) The insured must pay +the premiums at the times and according to the terms stated in the +policy.</p> + +<p>2) The insured must not increase the risk assumed by the company. +Concretely, in cases of property insured, the insured is bound in +commutative justice not to deliberately destroy or damage the property +covered by the policy under penalty of losing all rights to +compensation. Compensation could be claimed, however, if the damaging +or destructive action was only theologically right.</p> + +<p>3) He must not claim or accept indemnity for articles not damaged; he +must not submit a claim beyond a just estimate of the real damage. Some +moralists maintain that a claim may be made for a higher amount with +the intention of getting a just value after the insurance adjustor has +made his investigation and lowered the estimated value. The adjustor’s +estimate, even if higher than the insured estimate, may be accepted +provided no means have been taken to prevent a full and free +examination of damage.</p> + +<p>Operations on the stock market and similar markets are primarily +contracts of buying and selling; they become contracts of chance when +they assume the quality of speculation, i.e., gambling on future +changes of prices. It is generally conceded that such contracts are not +morally wrong in themselves and follow the laws of betting. Additional +justification is added on the ground that such transactions in many +instances supply the capital required for large-scale operations, +future deliveries, etc. Occasional dissenting voices insist that +certain aspects of such transactions, e.g., dealing in future values of +wheat, rye, and other commodities, are immoral since they tend to +determine prices independent of the real value of the products, the +laws of supply and demand, etc. However, the arguments seem to involve +more abuses controllable, if not actually controlled, by marketing laws +and civil laws rather than any immorality in the operations themselves.</p> + +<p>(c) Onerous Contracts.—These contracts require that there be equality +between the recompense and the thing received. Thus, in a lease the +lessor must not charge excessive rent, and the lessee must pay the rent +faithfully; in a contract of labor, the employer must pay a fair wage +(that is, one that at the minimum will meet the primary needs of the +worker and his family to live in frugal comfort, and which will +moreover equal the special value of the service given; for a complete +treatment of the theology of the just wage, see Fr. Jeremiah Newman, +“The Just Wage,” _Theology Digest_, Vol. 2, Spring 1957, pp. 120-126, +and “A Note on the Living Wage,” by Edward Dui, S.J., in the same +issue), and the laborer on his part must give a fair day’s work as to +quantity and quality; in partnership, the members must divide the +profits and loss according to a reasonable distribution; in guaranty, +pledge, and mortgage, justice requires that the burden assumed be not +out of proportion to the benefit that is received.</p> + +<p>2138. Fraudulent Contracts.—Examples of fraud in contracts are the +following:</p> + +<p>(a) in gratuitous contracts, a donee who by false representations +obtains a gift, a lender who fails to make known to the borrower +defects or dangers in the thing loaned;</p> + +<p>(b) in onerous contracts, a landlord who conceals defects from one who +is renting a house, members of a business concern who keep back +information from partners or who give out false statements in order to +entice investors, creditors who conceal their knowledge about the +unreliability of a man for whom surety is given them;</p> + +<p>(c) in aleatory contracts, in a pure wager, a person who bets on a +thing supposed to be uncertain but about which he has certain +information, or who knows that he will be unable to pay should he lose, +or who will allow no odds though he knows that the probabilities are in +his favor; in gaming, a player who pretends to be ignorant in order to +inveigle another person into a game of skill, or who does not observe +the rules of the game, or who fixes the cards or dice for himself in a +game of chance; in lottery, a drawer who manipulates the lots so as to +favor some of the players, etc.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_5_THE_QUASI-INTEGRAL_AND_POTENTIAL_PARTS_OF_JUSTICE_THE_VIRTUE">Art. 5: THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE +OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 79-100.)</p> + +<p>2139. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.—The integral parts of a +virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the +virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are +needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These +parts are called here “quasi-integral,” so as not to be confused with +the properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material +composite. In its first use “integral part” is spoken of bodily things; +in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two +previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present +article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the +opposite sins.</p> + +<p>2140. The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm +xxxiii. 15—“Turn away from evil, and do good”—for the perfectly just +man will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their +dues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the +avoidance of evil here is not a purely negative attitude; it includes a +positive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is +exercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to +injustice.</p> + +<p>(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the +other. The other moral virtues regulate the passions by bringing them +to the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence +in respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as +to do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things +both by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which +upsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing +to do good, another thing to avoid evil.</p> + +<p>(c) These integral parts of justice are also special, that is, they are +distinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from +evil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things +with the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes +the commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to God and +the common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he +who gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing +them injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral +parts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission +(see 35-39).</p> + +<p>2141. The Potential Parts of Justice.—The potential parts of justice, +that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary +to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature +or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise +decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the +government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its +principal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as +potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which +must be assigned to justice, since they regulate man’s will towards +others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because +they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential +notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal +to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal +right (see 1692).</p> + +<p>2142. In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts +of justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, to God man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests, +but with all his efforts man can never pay to God a worship that is +equal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank God for His +benefits: “What return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done +for me?” (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a +potential part of justice.</p> + +<p>(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of +life and upbringing, and the same may be said of one’s country: “A due +return is out of the question in honors paid to the gods and to parents +... but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard +as lies within his power” (Aristotle, _Ethics_, lib. VIII, cap. 16). +Hence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In +exceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater +return to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example, +by saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the +benefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives +them spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he +received from them.</p> + +<p>(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the +good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor +we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue +of reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.</p> + +<p>2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice +are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some +law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the +greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.</p> + +<p>(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one +cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the +character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from +the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and +deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue +of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor +to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him +for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of +gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are +readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular +justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on +the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions +has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social +intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral +obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation +for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the +debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other +benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account +of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an +act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private +person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but +lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.</p> + +<p>(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can +preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of +virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or +affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and +to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because +of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better +for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. +Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to +money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to +others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the +peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with +them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and +distinction.</p> + +<p>2144. Epieikeia.—The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are +adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be +noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice. +This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function +of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and +preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict +interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the +crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to +a close.</p> + +<p>2145. The Virtue of Religion.—We shall now proceed to treat of the +various parts of justice in the order in which they were given above +(2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to God His due. +Religion (holiness) is defined as “a moral virtue that disposes us to +offer to God the worship and honor that belong to Him as the supreme +Author of all things.”</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards God, +it is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral +virtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.</p> + +<p>(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the +exercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either +elicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper +activities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to +God (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some +other virtue employed by religion for the honor of God; for example, to +visit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy, +to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but +when used for the honor and glory of God these acts are also acts of +religion (James, i. 27).</p> + +<p>(e) It is paid to God, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to +another what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred +images refers to God, for whose sake they are venerated.</p> + +<p>(d) It is paid to God as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are +bound to tend to God and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so +are we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.</p> + +<p>(e) It offers to God the tribute of worship, that is, some internal or +external work done in acknowledgment of God’s Majesty and with the +purpose of impressing the worshipper or others with the sense of His +greatness, or it is the sense of that greatness.</p> + +<p>2146. Religion as a Moral Virtue.—(a) Religion takes its rank among +the moral, not among the theological, virtues. A theological virtue has +the Last End for its immediate object or subject-matter (e.g., faith is +concerned directly with God, since it believes Him and in Him), and has +no mean of virtue (e.g., faith cannot go to extremes by believing God +too much); whereas a moral virtue has the means to God for its +immediate object (e.g., justice is concerned directly with the actions +we owe to others) and it must observe the golden mean (e.g., justice +must pay the just price, neither more nor less, and at the proper time, +place, and to the proper person, etc.). Now, it is clear that religion +has for its immediate object the due performance of worship, although +God is the person for whose sake it is offered and His excellence the +foundation of its necessity; and also that one must observe moderation +in worship as to circumstances of place, time, etc., although it is +impossible to be extreme in the quantity or fervor one gives to +worship, since even the best efforts will fall short of the honor God +deserves (Ecclus., xliii. 33).</p> + +<p>(b) Religion is the greatest of the moral virtues, since the person in +whose favor it is exercised is God Himself, and its obligation is +correspondingly stricter than that of the other virtues. General and +particular justice are owed to creatures, but the claim of a creature +is much less than that of God. There is no contradiction in making +religion a part of justice and then preferring it to justice, for it is +more correct to speak of the integral and potential parts of virtues as +quasi-parts, since they are called parts only from analogy to parts +that are found in material or living things, though they are not +similar to those parts in all respects (see 1647, 1648, 2139). Neither +does the fact that religion cannot pay in full make it inferior to +justice, since in matters of virtue good will take precedence over the +ability to pay. Since religion is the supreme moral virtue, irreligion +is the chief offense against the moral virtues (e.g., malicious +blasphemy is worse than injustice or intemperance).</p> + +<p>2147. Superiority of Religion as a Virtue.—Religion, therefore, is +superior to the following virtues: (a) it is superior to legal justice, +the chief of the moral virtues that deal with human and natural good; +(b) it is superior to humility, the chief of the moral virtues +moderative of the passions; (c) it is superior to mercy, the greatest +of the virtues that relieve distress, for religion is offered to God, +not for His utility, but for His external glory and our benefit; (d) it +is greater than repentance, for it honors God, while repentance only +disposes or prepares for satisfaction to His honor; (e) it is greater +than large external offerings made to God without spirit, for +“obedience is better than victims” (I Kings, xv. 22); that is, the +internal acts of religion (reverence and devotion) are of more +importance than external acts of worship conducted with great pomp or +magnificence but without the inner reverence, the obedience or other +dispositions pleasing to God.</p> + +<p>2148. Necessity of the Acts of Religion.—(a) The internal acts +(devotion and prayer) are chiefly necessary, for these are exercised by +the soul, and it is through them that the external acts are made +truthful: “God is a spirit and those who adore Him must adore in spirit +and in truth” (John, iv. 24).</p> + +<p>(b) The external acts (adoration, sacrifice, etc.) are also necessary +to man. God does not need these acts (Psalm xlix. 13), it is true, for +no creature can add to the glory God has from Himself. But man needs +the elevation and perfection which he receives from communication with +the Supreme Being, and, as he is not all spirit, he must employ symbols +and ceremonies to arouse, hold and strengthen the affections of his +soul. Hence, although the ceremonial law of the Old Testament was +abolished by Christ (see 342), the Christian religion recognizes the +need of ceremonies, as is plain both from the Scriptures and the +teaching and practice of the Church at all times. In the New Testament +we read that Our Lord used vocal prayer, prayed on His knees, and made +use of sacred hymns; and like external acts of religion are ascribed to +Sts. Peter, Paul, and Stephen (Luke, xxii. 31; Matt., xxvi. 39; Acts, +ii. 42, vii. 59, ix. 40). Public worship is also a necessity on account +of the nature of the Church as a visible society.</p> + +<p>2149. The Internal Acts of Religion.—These internal acts are offerings +made to God of the worship of the soul itself, and they may be reduced +chiefly to two: (a) devotion, which is the offering of the will and the +highest act of religion, since from the will the other acts arise; (b) +prayer, which is the offering of the intellect; for in prayer the +thoughts of the mind rise to God as an oblation made to Him.</p> + +<p>2150. Definition of Devotion.—Devotion is defined as “the will to give +oneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service.” We +find an example of it in Exod., xxxv. 21, where it is said that the +multitude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout +mind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that +other’s interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service +of God.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of +oneself to the service of God, the Last End. But devotion will be found +in other acts in so far as they are done under the will’s impulse, such +as prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of +those who pray or take part in services of divine worship are +influenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of +honor shown to God and an inspiration to beholders.</p> + +<p>(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person +is quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select +and to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this +is Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father +(John, iv. 34).</p> + +<p>(c) Devotion is exercised in things that pertain to the divine service, +that is, to the worship or honor of God. Thus, he who offers himself to +God intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friendship +exercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of +doing good in order to glorify God exercises devotion. But devotion and +charity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion +nourishes charity.</p> + +<p>2151. Devotion should not be confused with emotion, spiritual +consolation, or pious exercises known as devotions.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, emotion or pleasure of a non-religious kind is not devotion, +though sometimes mistaken for it when the emotion or pleasure is of an +elevating kind and occasioned by religious exercises. Neither esthetic +joy (e.g., over the music, the ceremonies, the architecture of the +church), nor literary pleasure (e.g. over a sublime passage of Holy +Writ or a charming liturgical composition), nor intellectual +satisfaction (e.g., over the refinement and culture imparted by +religious truths), is necessarily joined with that strong attachment to +God and inclination to do His will which is the soul of devotion.</p> + +<p>(b) Spiritual consolations are sometimes called devotion, but they are +not the same thing as the devotion we now speak of. Substantial +devotion with which we are now concerned is in the will and consists in +the strong inclination to praise and honor God, whereas accidental +devotion is rather in the sensible appetite and consists in a feeling +of sweetness or elevation in exercises of piety which sometimes reacts +upon the body, as when a devout person weeps for joy at the thought of +God. Substantial devotion is essential and should be maintained, even +though there is no feeling of attraction or fervor. An example of this +is furnished by Our Lord, who prayed earnestly during the agony in the +garden and the desolation on the cross. Accidental devotion is not of +itself evil, nor useless, and it may be desired and prayed for; but it +is dangerous for those persons who are puffed up by it, or who become +inordinately attached to it, or who are disposed to mistake it for +substantial devotion, for, like the consoling vision of Thabor, it is +passing and is not an end in itself.</p> + +<p>(c) Devotions are various forms of external cult shown to God, Christ, +the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, celebrated shrines, etc., whether of a +liturgical or a popular, of a public or a private kind. Examples are +the Forty Hours’ Devotion, novenas, consecrated days and months, the +use of scapulars, medals, etc., pilgrimages, and the like. All these +devotions that have the approval of the Church are good and useful in +themselves. But devotees often made a bad use of them, substituting +devotions for devotion and the non-essential for the essential, as when +religion is made to center in pictures or music or a sentimental +attachment for some favorite Saint. Persons who multiply external +observances may be without the least degree of real devotion.</p> + +<p>2152. External and Internal Cause of Devotion.—The external cause of +devotion is God, who by grace bestows the will of serving Him gladly, +and therefore the Church prays God to bestow upon us the disposition of +piety and devotion, and to increase in us devotion unto salvation. But +there is also an internal cause, namely, mental prayer or consideration +of divine things, for the will follows on the intellect. Hence, it is +impossible to animate external acts of worship with true devotion, +unless one practises daily or frequent mental prayer. The subjects of +mental prayer that promote devotion are reducible to two:</p> + +<p>(a) one should think on one’s own weakness (sins, dangers, temptations, +etc.) and one’s need of God, for this serves to remove the impediments +to devotion. Those who would be devoted to God must free themselves +from presumption and self-confidence in the spirit of the pilgrim going +up to the Temple who said; “I will raise my eyes to the mountains from +which help cometh to me” (Psalm cxx, 1);</p> + +<p>(b) one should think on points that will excite the love of God, such +as the thought of His goodness, the memory of His benefits, the +mysteries of the life of Christ; for these considerations by inspiring +charity will thereby indirectly introduce devotion to God. “It is good +for me to cling fast to God and to place my hope in the Lord,” said the +Psalmist, after he had thought over the blessings received from +Providence (Psalm lxxii. 28).</p> + +<p>2153. Prayer.—Prayer can be taken in various senses. (a) Thus, in the +widest sense prayer is any act of religion or a holy life. St. +Augustine says that a good life is the best of all prayers, and the +command of Christ that we pray always has been understood to mean that +we should always follow good. (b) In a less wide sense, prayer is the +raising of the mind to God, in order to praise, adore, thank Him, etc. +The motive of veneration here present distinguishes prayer from mere +thoughts about God as when one studies or discusses theological +subjects to satisfy curiosity or to impart information.</p> + +<p>(c) In its strict sense, prayer is the asking for suitable things from +God. By suitable things are meant such as are lawful and becoming, and +hence it would not be a prayer, but a mockery, to ask God for help to +accomplish sin or for miracles in trivial matters. We are now +considering prayer in its strict and less wide senses.</p> + +<p>2154. The Psychology of Prayer.—(a) Prayer in its nature is an act of +the reason, for it is a conversation or communication with God. It +belongs, however, not to the speculative, but to the practical reason, +since it is not a mere process of apprehension, judgment or reasoning, +but the arrangement and presentation of requests, plans, etc., before +God with a view to their acceptance by Him. By prayer, then, we do not +understand thinking on God, as in meditation and contemplation (though +these are known as mental prayer), but speaking to God.</p> + +<p>(b) Prayer in its origin is an act of the will, for the practical +reason presents before God only such things as are desired by him who +prays. Prayer is the interpreter of desire. Indeed, God may take the +will for the request and grant what has not yet been asked: “The Lord +heard the desire of the poor” (Ps. ix. 17); “Before they cry I shall +hear them” (Is., lxv. 24). Moreover, prayer should spring out of an +inclination towards God Himself and a desire for union with Him (Ps. +xli. 1. 2; Ps. xxvi. 4).</p> + +<p>2155. The Necessity of Prayer.—(a) Prayer is not necessary on God’s +account, as though He needed to be informed of our wants, or could not +be happy without our homage, or might be induced to change His plans; +(b) it is necessary for our own sakes, for, although God could and +sometimes does grant favors unasked, He wishes that ordinarily we +should have the double benefit of the prayer and of the favor given in +answer to the prayer. God could grant the crops of the fields without +human cultivation, or even tools and finished articles without human +invention or labor, but man would then lose the fruits that belong to +labor of mind and body. Prayer is most beneficial, even when +unanswered: it attracts man to perform his basic duty of honoring his +Creator, to keep in use his spiritual powers, and to exercise the +necessary virtues of faith, hope and charity; it gives him the +privilege of speaking directly with God and with Christ and of asking +for what he desires—an intimacy that must in time correct and elevate +man’s whole spiritual life; then prayer is a pouring out of the heart +to God the Heavenly Father, and this will afford relief in times of +misfortune or peril.</p> + +<p>2156. The Duty of Prayer for all Adults.—(a) Prayer is necessary from +divine precept, as is declared in many passages of Scripture. Thus, we +are commanded to watch and pray (Matt, xxvi. 41), to pray always and +not to faint (Luke, xviii. 1), to ask and to knock (Matt., vii. 7 +sqq.), to pray without ceasing (I Thess., v. 17), to watch in prayers +(I Peter, iv. 7). In the Mass the Lord’s Prayer is prefaced with the +words: “Commanded by salutary precepts and admonished by divine +instructions, we make bold to say: Our Father, etc.” There is, however, +no divine precept of vocal prayer or as to the use of the form of words +given by Christ, but one must pray at least mentally and in the manner +indicated by Christ.</p> + +<p>(b) Prayer is also necessary as a means (see 360), at least generally +speaking; not that God could not save man without prayer, but that He +has made it an indispensable condition, as is true also of Baptism, +without which salvation is not conferred. This is the common opinion +and it rests on strong arguments. Thus, there are certain necessary +goods (such as perseverance) that cannot be had except through prayer, +and there are certain necessary duties (such as the acts of faith, +charity, and religion) that are not exercised apart from prayer. Then, +there is the teaching of the Church and of the Fathers and Doctors that +prayer is needed in order to observe the Commandments (Council of +Trent), that no one is assisted who does not pray (Gennadius), that +prayer is to the soul what breath is to the body (St. Benedict), that +he who prays will certainly be saved, while he who prays not will +surely be lost (St. Alphonsus).</p> + +<p>2157. Times and Frequency of Prayer.—As to the times and frequency of +prayer, in fulfillment of the obligation, there are the same opinions +and conclusions as for the acts of faith, hope, and charity (see 929 +sqq., 1095-1097, 1593 sqq.). On this point we may conclude as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) directly, or by reason of the precept of prayer itself, there is a +duty to pray at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life +(whether daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc. cannot be precisely +determined; but there is no practical difficulty, since those who +devoutly hear Mass at the times commanded comply with the duty of +prayer), and also in danger of death. At the outset of the moral life +the reason and will should turn to God, and this is prayer at least in +the widest sense; during life prayer should be frequent and continuous +according to the words of Scripture; at the hour of death, prayer is +necessary, since we are specially bidden to ask for perseverance till +the end;</p> + +<p>(b) indirectly, or by reason of some precept distinct from that of +prayer, prayer is necessary whenever one needs to have recourse to God +to fulfill some command or avoid something prohibited. Thus, one should +pray at Mass, for according to church law Mass must be heard devoutly; +one should pray when a dangerous temptation assails one, or when there +are great calamities, especially of a public character, for according +to the precept of charity one must help oneself and others in +difficulties.</p> + +<p>2158. Practical Corollaries about Prayer with Reference to +Confession.—(a) Practical Catholics, that is, those who comply with +the precepts of the Church, but who accuse themselves of neglecting +morning and evening prayers or grace at meals, cannot be judged guilty +of sin, even of venial sin, on account of this neglect; for there is no +common precept directly obliging to such prayers. But there may often +be a venial sin for other reasons, as when the omission is due to a +spirit of lukewarmness, or when indirectly there is a duty to pray at +those times for special reasons, such as daily needs or temptations. We +do not agree, then, with the opinion that omission of morning and +evening prayers, especially when it is habitual, is never sufficient +matter for absolution.</p> + +<p>(b) Unpractical Catholics, that is, those who have been away from Mass +or the Sacraments contrary to the laws of the Church as habitual +transgressors, and who say nothing about their neglect of prayer, +should be questioned whether in all the years of absence from their +duties they have also omitted all prayers. For, if this be the case, +they have sinned against the duty of prayer. Morning and evening prayer +and grace at table should be earnestly recommended to all, because +these are customs that have come down from the earliest times, and also +because those who disregard them often come to neglect all prayer, or +at least expose themselves to dangers or to the loss of precious graces.</p> + +<p>2159. To Whom May Prayer Be Offered?—Only God may be addressed as the +Bestower of favors (“The Lord giveth grace and glory,” Ps. lxxxiii. +12), but the Saints may be prayed to as intercessors before God (“The +smoke of incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God +from the hands of the angel,” Apoc., viii. 4). Hence, the Church asks +God to have mercy on us; it asks the Saints to pray for us. It is +lawful privately to invoke the prayers of an infant who died after +baptism, of a soul in Purgatory, and one may ask the prayers of those +who are still alive, as St. Paul frequently does in his Epistles. There +is no command that we pray to the saints, and hence one who did not +pray to them would not be guilty of grave sin _per se_; but there would +be grave sin, if their intercession was neglected on account of +contempt, and venial sin, if one failed to call on them (especially on +the Blessed Virgin, the Mediatrix of all graces) on account of +negligence about one’s own spiritual good.</p> + +<p>2160. The Persons for Whom Prayer Is Offered.—There is an obligation +of charity to pray for ourselves and also for others, for we should ask +for the things that we are obliged to desire (see 2161). This duty is +taught in Holy Scripture (e.g., Our Lord prayed for Peter; St. Paul +asks for the prayers of his Churches; St. James, in v. 16, admonishes +us to pray for one another that we may be saved); also in the creed and +liturgy of the Church, for we profess belief in the communion of +saints, and offer Masses and suffrages for the living and the dead. One +should pray for enemies in common prayers that are offered for all, and +in special prayers for them in particular, when there is a special +reason, such as their grave necessity or the scandal that would be +given if one refused to join in a special prayer for one’s enemy +(Matt., v. 44); but one may not pray for the success of the evil +projects of an enemy, and one is not obliged to make special prayers +for him apart from necessity (see 1151). For the excommunicated one +should pray in private prayers and also in public prayers, when this is +permitted by the law, as in the services of Good Friday and under +certain conditions in Masses (Canon 2262). For sinners prayers should +be said, unless they are already lost. The souls in Purgatory are also +to be prayed for, although the obligation does not seem grave, since it +is not certain as to any particular soul that it is in need of our +prayers. As to the blessed, one may pray for their canonization or +accidental glory, not for their essential glory, which they already +possess.</p> + +<p>2161. Things that May Be Prayed for.—(a) Evils.—One may never pray +for moral evil, even of the slightest kind, and it would be a grave +irreverence to beseech God to become our helper in the commission of +sin. As to physical evils, one may not ask them as evils or for their +own sake; but it is lawful to pray for them in the larger sense in +which they are goods. Thus, for oneself one may ask from God sickness, +poverty or death, in so far as these ills are means of correction, +improvement, merit, penance, or escape from sin; for an enemy one may +ask that God restrain him, even by the use of temporal misfortunes, if +this be necessary to keep him from sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Indifferent Things.—One may not desire an indifferent thing, if +there is no moral purpose to justify it (see 83). Hence, one may not +ask God for the gratification of idle wishes (e.g., that one win a game +in which the only purpose in gain), but it does not seem that there is +grave irreverence in so doing.</p> + +<p>(c) Temporal Goods.—These may not be asked for from a primary +intention, since we must seek first the kingdom of God and His justice +(Matt., vi. 33), which are more important; neither may we ask for any +determinate temporal thing unconditionally, since we are uncertain +whether it will prove beneficial or harmful. But temporal things may be +asked for from a secondary intention (that is, in so far as they are +means that assist us to attain spiritual goods) and conditionally (that +is, under the proviso that they will prove spiritually beneficial). +Thus, the Church prays for protection against storms and disturbances, +and asks for good weather, abundant harvests, peace, etc.</p> + +<p>(d) Spiritual Goods.—Eternal salvation and the means thereto we should +pray for as the principal objects of our desire and should ask for them +unconditionally; for God is our true End, and the things that lead to +Him cannot be harmful to us. Miracles may be asked for, but it is wrong +to beg God for privileges that are reserved for others (e.g., to sit at +the right hand of Christ in glory).</p> + +<p>2162. The Qualities of Prayer.—(a) As to its manner, prayer is either +unaccompanied or accompanied by external acts of worship, such as +bodily gestures or speech. But not infrequently the thoughts are voiced +in words, and we then have what is known as vocal prayer. Prayer made +by a private person for himself or others may be internal; but public +prayer that is offered by the ministers of the Church in the name of +the Church should be vocal, since it should be manifested to the people +for whom it is being offered. But the use of words or other external +signs is advantageous even in private prayer, since it excites greater +devotion in a person and is a help to attention.</p> + +<p>(b) As to persistence, prayer is continuous or interrupted. Prayer +should be continuous if there is question of its cause, which is +prayerfulness of spirit, or desire of salvation; and in this sense may +be understood the words of Scripture that command us to pray always +(Luke, xviii. 1; Eph., vi. 18; I Thess., v. 17 ), But if we speak of +prayer itself, it is impossible to pray unceasingly in this life, as +there are many other things that have to be done and rest is a +necessity.</p> + +<p>(c) As to quantity, prayers are lengthy or brief. Our Lord rejected the +belief of the pagans that the efficacy of prayer depends on many words +(Matt, vi. 7), but He did not forbid long prayers, since He often spent +nights in prayer. The rule about the length of private prayers is that +one should pray for such a space of time as is favorable to devotion, +and should cease from prayer as soon as it becomes tedious; similarly, +public devotions should not be so lengthened out that those present +become wearied and inattentive. The Fathers of the Desert were wont to +offer many brief but ardent ejaculatory prayers, fearing that prayer +long drawn out would fall away from the fervor of intention with which +it began. But, if devotion continues, prayer should not easily be +broken off.</p> + +<p>2163. The Confidence Requisite for Successful Prayer.—(a) Confidence +must exclude doubt or distrust in reference to God or prayer itself: +“How shall they call on Him whom they have not believed?” (Rom., X. +14); “Let not that man (that wavereth) think that he shall receive +anything of the Lord” (James, i. 6, 7).</p> + +<p>(b) Confidence does not exclude doubt about one’s own dispositions (“It +is not for our justice that we present our prayers before Thee, but for +the multitude of Thy tender mercies”); on the contrary, the prayer of +the Pharisee was not heard, because he trusted in himself (Luke, xviii. +9). Neither does confidence in prayer mean that one may ask +unconditionally for temporal things (see 2161 c).</p> + +<p>2164. Intention and Attention.—Attention is the voluntary application +of the mind to that which is done, or the consideration or advertence +of the mind given to an act. It differs from intention, which is an +act, not of the reason, but of the will, consisting in the purpose to +perform an act. Prayer requires both intention and attention.</p> + +<p>(a) There must be intention, for prayer in its origin is an act of the +will and it pertains to religion only because of the devotion by means +of which it is elicited. A man who, while reading aloud from a novel, +recites the words of a prayer contained in the novel, does not pray, +for his intention is pleasure or instruction, not worship. And even one +who says or answers prayers attentively during services does not really +pray if his motive is not one of religion. (b) There must be attention, +for prayer is of its nature an act of the mind (see 2154). A parrot or +a phonograph is not said to pray when it repeats the words of the Our +Father or Hail Mary.</p> + +<p>2165. The Intention Required in Prayer.—(a) An actual intention is had +when one either expressly or implicitly wills to offer a prayer, as +when one says internally; “I will now say a prayer,” or when without +such express act one deliberately performs that which is a prayer, +making internal acts of faith, reciting the Rosary, reading from a +prayer-book, etc. This kind of intention is necessary at the beginning +of prayer, and is the best that may be had during the course of prayer.</p> + +<p>(b) A virtual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer on +account of an actual intention previously formed and not retracted, but +here and now, on account of human weakness, one is thinking of +indifferent things impertinent to the prayer and its purpose. This kind +of intention continues unless withdrawn directly by contrary intention +or indirectly by the performance of acts inconsistent with prayer. +Virtual intention suffices during the course of prayer, for a +continuous and uninterrupted actual intention is humanly impossible. +The more the mind struggles to keep the thought fixed on one object +alone, the more do other thoughts arise to distract, as experience +proves.</p> + +<p>(c) An habitual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer, not on +account of any actual intention previously formed, but on account of a +propensity or inclination resulting from previous acts. This is not +properly an intention and it does not suffice for prayer, since with it +the acts performed do not proceed actually or virtually from any +determination of the will. Thus, a person who is asleep or intoxicated +is not said to pray when he mechanically repeats well-known words of +prayer, for his will has no part in those words, any more than the will +of the somnambulist has part in the dangerous walks he takes.</p> + +<p>2166. The Attention in Prayer.—(a) By reason of its object, attention +is external or internal, according as the mind is taken up only with +the externals of prayer (i.e., the exclusion of external acts +inconsistent with prayer and the proper bodily posture) or with the +things internal to prayer (i.e., the words, sense and purpose of the +prayer). Internal attention is called verbal or superficial when it is +directed only to the words, as when a person who does not understand +the meaning of a prayer says it carefully so as not to mispronounce the +words; it is literal, when it is directed only to the sense, as when a +person who says a very obscure prayer pays close attention so as to +follow its meaning; it is spiritual, when it is directed to the purpose +of prayer (i.e., the worship of God by an act of religion), or to the +objects of prayer (i.e., eternal salvation or the means thereto, such +as grace and the virtues, the mysteries of religion, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of its subject, attention is either perfect or imperfect. +Perfect attention excludes every distracting thought, even such as are +involuntary; imperfect attention excludes voluntary but not involuntary +distractions.</p> + +<p>2167. Acts that Exclude External Attention.—What external actions are +inconsistent with external prayer and exclusive of external attention?</p> + +<p>(a) Those acts exclude external attention which either from their +nature (on account of the great mental application they demand) or from +the weakness of a person’s mind (for it is not everyone who can like +Julius Caesar think on several things at the same time) make it +impossible to have recollection in prayer when those acts are being +performed. Acts of this kind are reading about other matters, painting, +writing, carrying on conversation with those around, boisterous +laughing, etc. But if the one who prays engages in these acts +inadvertently (e.g., if a person reciting the Breviary does not notice +that he is giving considerable attention to an inscription or +advertisement on an adjacent wall), the distraction is merely +involuntary and inculpable.</p> + +<p>(b) Those acts do not exclude external attention that either not at all +or only in slight measure interfere with internal recollection in +prayer. Such acts are slow walking, riding, looking about at the +scenery, picking a flower now and then, dressing, undressing, bathing, +combing the hair, etc, The Church prescribes certain prayers to be said +while the priest vests for Mass, and it was an old rule among the monks +to join labor and prayer.</p> + +<p>2168. When External Attention Is Sufficient.—Is external attention +sufficient in prayer when internal attention is voluntarily excluded?</p> + +<p>(a) In public prayers external attention is sufficient as to a number +of effects. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments the want of +internal attention in the minister does not make the Sacrament invalid, +since the Sacraments produce grace _ex opere operato_; in public +suffrages the indevotion and distraction of the priest do not deprive +the beneficiary of the impetratory fruit, since the public prayers are +offered in the name of the Church itself; in the Divine Office merely +external attention suffices to fulfill the positive obligation, +according to many, because it is not certain that the Church requires +more.</p> + +<p>(b) In all prayers mere external attention is insufficient for the +personal effects of impetration, merit and satisfaction. For to pray +with willful indevotion is not an act deserving of remission, reward +and a favorable answer, but rather of punishment (“Before prayer +prepare thy soul and be not as a man that tempteth God,” Eeclus., +xviii. 23); it is disrespectful to God and therefore cannot claim the +benefits of an act of worship.</p> + +<p>2169. The Kind of Internal Attention Required in Prayer.—(a) The +minimum that suffices for the personal benefits of merit and +impetration is the verbal or the literal attention, and the imperfect +attention that is mixed with some unwilled distractions or mind +wanderings. Indeed, a person who intends to pray well, but whose whole +prayer is a continual distraction in spite of his efforts to be +recollected, does not lose, but rather by reason of his good will and +effort increases, his merit. But for spiritual refreshment there must +be freedom from distraction; for, just as a student gets no mental +nourishment from a lesson if his mind is many miles away, and a +listener gets no instruction from a discourse spoken in a foreign +language (I Cor., xiv. 4), so one who prays with an absent mind loses +the devotion and joy that are afforded by actual communion with +heavenly thoughts.</p> + +<p>(b) The maximum that should be aimed at in prayer for the greater +blessing it brings is the spiritual attention fixed on the presence of +God and the perfect attention that keeps away as far as possible the +interruption from any vain, perverse or extraneous thoughts.</p> + +<p>2170. Distractions.—Just as certain external acts exclude external +attention, so also certain internal states exclude internal attention. +These latter are known as distractions, and may be defined as internal +acts or omissions opposed to the nature or purpose of prayer, but +performed during prayer.</p> + +<p>(a) Distractions are either acts or omissions. Thus, a person who +slumbers lightly or is partly asleep during prayer is inattentive or +wanting by omission; while the person who thinks out plots for stories +or plays during prayer time is distracted or wanting by commission.</p> + +<p>(b) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the nature of prayer. To the +nature of vocal prayer belong the words and the sense, and hence, even +though one is rapt in meditation, there is no vocal prayer if words are +mispronounced or left out or so changed or transposed as to make +nonsense or no sense, though negligence about a word here and there +does not necessarily exclude superficial attention. Those who from long +familiarity with forms of prayer are able to repeat them automatically, +with no thought about the words or their meaning, direct or mystical, +are not distracted if their thoughts are on the motive of prayer. But +it would not be fitting to observe no order in these matters, for +example, to dwell always on the glorious mysteries during passiontide +prayer and on the sorrowful mysteries during paschal prayers.</p> + +<p>(c) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the purpose of prayer. The +purpose of prayer itself is the union of the mind with God, while the +purpose of the one who prays is the special good to which he directs +his prayer. Union with God is necessary above all in prayer, and though +it need not be expressly thought on, as was said above (2169), yet +there must be no thought in the mind contrary to it. Thoughts, desires +and imaginations are contrary to the end of prayer when they are not +means to that end (e.g., sinful thoughts, idle thoughts, thoughts on +lawful occupations or affections that have nothing to do with the +prayer), or when they are means to that end but are perverted to a +purely natural use (e.g., when verbal attention is made an exercise in +voice culture, or literal attention a grammatical study, or attention +to the purpose of prayer means that one is speculating on foolish +questions about divinity or thinking on the money, food, or clothing, +for which one is praying as if they were the ends of prayer). +Scrupulous persons make attention itself a distraction, for they worry +all during prayer lest their thoughts be wandering, and so they are +thinking about themselves rather than about the words, meaning or +purpose of prayer.</p> + +<p>(d) Distractions occur during prayer. Hence, an interruption is not a +distraction, as when one who is praying is called to attend to some +business or leaves off prayer for the moment to make a note of some +important thought that came to mind. Neither is the breaking off of +prayer a distraction, as when one starts to pray but feels so +distracted or unwell as to give over for the time being the attempt to +pray.</p> + +<p>2171. Voluntary and Involuntary Distractions.—(a) Voluntary +distractions result in the first place from purpose, as when one who is +praying deliberately dozes at intervals when he feels drowsy, or +deliberately turns over in his mind the points of an address he intends +to give; they result in the second place from negligence, as when the +person who is praying does not expressly wish to be inattentive, but +hurries through his words with no pains to keep his thoughts on what he +is doing or why he is doing it. Those who rarely speak or read about +divine things, but give themselves much to foolish reading or talk, +prepare for themselves many distractions, unless they counteract this +by special aids to recollection, such as pictures or prayer books.</p> + +<p>(b) Involuntary distractions are those that result neither from purpose +nor from carelessness, but from human weakness. Thus, a person who is +troubled with scruples or with a severe headache or nervous strain, who +is worn out bodily or much worried mentally, or who is surrounded by +noise or disturbance, is often physically unable to concentrate his +mind for any length of time, no matter how much he may desire to do so. +Indeed, St. Thomas says that it is hardly possible for anyone to say an +Our Father without some distraction, and many persons are distracted +against their will by every slight sound or movement that falls under +their notice.</p> + +<p>2772. Sinfulness of Distraction in Prayer.—(a) Involuntary +distractions are not sinful, since one is not bound to the impossible. +Hence, a penitent who has nothing except these distractions to confess +may not be absolved, since there is no matter for absolution in his +confession.</p> + +<p>(b) Voluntary distractions are sinful, since, though one is free to +address God at any time, one is bound to do this in a respectful manner +and in spirit and in truth, as God requires. Communion with God is by +means of the mind, and it is disrespectful to turn the mind away to +other things when the communion has been sought. Besides, lip service +is displeasing to God, just as burnt offerings were not acceptable when +made without love. But the sin is of its nature only venial; for the +intention to pray, together with the essential moral goodness of the +act, is retained, and the defect consists in the circumstance that the +intention is executed remissly (see 78).</p> + +<p>2173. When is voluntary distraction a grave and when a venial sin? (a) +It is a venial sin when one says a non-obligatory prayer, even with the +express will to be inattentive, and also when one says an obligatory +prayer (such as the Divine Office) with distractions due to +carelessness, but without abandonment of the intention to pray. (b) It +is a mortal sin when one indulges in distractions from contempt, and +also when one says an obligatory prayer with distractions that last +during a notable part of the prayer and that are deliberately +entertained.</p> + +<p>2174. Distractions during Divine Office are the absence of the +attention which the Church requires under grave sin for satisfaction of +the canonical obligation. There are two opinions about the kind of +distractions that make recitation insufficient and gravely sinful.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the older opinion, internal attention is required, but +it seems that generally those who maintain this view do not hold that +internal distractions alone deprive the Office of its sufficiency. +Thus, they state that one who has had voluntary distractions may +consider that he has fulfilled his duty, unless he is certain that he +also adverted to his state of distraction and did nothing to end it.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention +suffices. Hence, in this view mortal sin is incurred by notable defect +in external, but not in internal attention.</p> + +<p>2175. The External Acts of Religion.—We proceed now to those acts of +religion which are performed in an outward manner. But it should be +noted that just as devotion and prayer find external expression (as in +vocal prayer), so the external acts of religion should proceed from +internal devotion. The outward religious acts may be classified under +three groups: (a) the acts in which one offers one’s body as a mark of +veneration to God (adoration); (b) the acts in which one offers +external goods, whether given (sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, +tithes) or promised (vows); (c) the acts in which one makes use of +divine things to honor God (Sacraments, oaths, adjuration, praises).</p> + +<p>2176. Definition of Adoration.—Adoration or worship is honor shown to +God through bodily acts offered in acknowledgment of His supreme +excellence and of our dependence on Him.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is acknowledgment of dependence on God, and as such it +differs from mere honor, which may be shown even to an equal.</p> + +<p>(b) It is an acknowledgment of supreme excellence, and so it differs +from veneration shown to creatures who are above us. Adoration +(_latria_), therefore, is not the same thing as the sacred cult or +veneration shown the Blessed Virgin (_hyperdulia_) and the Saints +(_dulia_) on account of their supernatural grace and glory; much less +is it the same thing as the civil cult shown to persons illustrious for +natural qualities, such as acquired knowledge, political dignity or +power, etc.: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou +serve” (Matt, iv. 10).</p> + +<p>2177. Unity and Variety of Adoration.—Adoration is but one, though it +has various expressions. (a) The unity of adoration depends on the +unity of its object. There is but one God to whom belong the various +divine attributes, and the three Divine Persons share the same majesty. +Hence, there is but one adoration. (b) The variety in adoration is in +the expression. The higher expression of adoration is internal: it does +not depend on bodily acts or places, and it is offered by Angels as +well as by man. The lower expression of adoration is made through +bodily acts, such as genuflections, prostrations, prayer with face to +the east, and the use of sacred places for worship, all of which +externals are employed as aids to devotion and symbols of the divine +glory (Matt., xviii, 20; Luke, xix. 46). Some of the actions here +mentioned are sometimes used in the religious or civil cult shown to +creatures, but internal adoration belongs to God alone.</p> + +<p>2178. Definition of Sacrifice.—Sacrifice is the offering to God and a +real changing of a sensible thing, made by a lawful minister, in +acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an offering or oblation; that is, one makes a gift directly +to God Himself. Thus, sacrifice differs from contributions of the +people made for the clergy or the church.</p> + +<p>(b) It offers a sensible thing, that is, some object perceptible by the +senses or hidden under sensible species; for sacrifice is an outward +sign of the inner offering, by which the soul itself is subjected to +God.</p> + +<p>(c) It is made by a lawful minister, for sacrifice is a public act +performed in the name of the community, and hence it may be offered +only by those who represent the community. St. Paul declares that a +high-priest is chosen from men to offer sacrifice, and that no one may +take the honor to himself unless he is called as Aaron was (Heb., v. 4).</p> + +<p>(d) It is made to God alone, since God alone is our First Beginning and +Last End: “He who sacrifices to other gods besides the Lord shall be +put to death” (Exod., xxii. 20). Mass in honor of the Blessed Virgin or +the Saints means that sacrifice is offered God in thanksgiving for +their merits or in petition that we may imitate their virtues. +Oblations may be made to men, but sacrifice may be offered only to God.</p> + +<p>(e) It is through a real change of the thing offered, which thus +becomes the victim of sacrifice; for the supreme act of worship +reserved to God acts upon the substance itself of an external thing to +signify that the worshipper offers his own being to God. The change in +the thing sacrificed consists in its being made sacred, or set apart as +the central object in the supreme act of worship.</p> + +<p>(f) It is made in acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our +subjection to Him; that is, it is an act whose direct and proper end is +the exercise of the virtue of religion. Thus, sacrifice differs from +acts of self-sacrifice such as continence, abstinence, martyrdom, even +when they are offered in honor of God, for the direct and proper end of +these acts is some other virtue than that of religion. The act of +sacrifice may have no purpose except worship, but other virtuous acts +have their own ends to make them praiseworthy, even when they are used +as acts of worship.</p> + +<p>2179. The Essentials of Sacrifice.—(a) The outward sign may be said to +consist of matter and form. The matter is some sensible thing used as +victim, whether it be inanimate (e.g., the bread and wine of +Melchisedech), or animate (e.g., the paschal lamb), or human (e.g., Our +Lord in His passion). The form is some sensible action that makes the +victim sacred by dedicating it to sacrificial oblation (e.g., the +breaking of bread, the libation of wine, the offering of the slain +lamb, the voluntary and visible acceptance of death by Our Lord). In +the Mass Christ is sacrificed, not as existing under His own +appearances, but as present under the sacramental species and offered +through His representatives; and hence in the Mass the Victim is +sensible by means of the species that signify and contain Him, while +the dedication by the Supreme Priest is made sensible through the words +of the ministering priest who acts for Christ.</p> + +<p>(b) The inner thing that is signified in sacrifice is primarily the +offering of self to God, in recognition that from Him we have our being +and in Him is our happiness. But secondarily it signifies the fruits we +derive from union with God (e.g., the benefits of redemption and +salvation). Thus, the sacrificial death of Christ is also a symbol of +man’s death to sin and life in God (I Peter, iv. 1).</p> + +<p>2180. The Obligation of Sacrifice.—(a) The internal or spiritual +sacrifice is obligatory for all, since all are bound to offer God +devotion of will, communion of mind, recognition of His supremacy. (b) +The external sacrifice improperly so called, which consists in the +practice of works of virtue, is obligatory for all in so far as +commanded acts are concerned, but not when virtuous deeds are of +supererogation. (c) The external sacrifice properly so called, which +consists in an outward sign indicative of internal worship of God, is +by natural law necessary, for reason itself shows to man that he is an +inferior and dependent being, and so should acknowledge the superiority +of God and his own submission by acts suitable to his nature as a being +composed of body and soul, and for whom sensible things are signs of +spiritual truths.</p> + +<p>2181. Exemptions Based on the Natural Law.—Though the external +sacrifice strictly so called is obligatory from natural law, it is not +a primary precept of nature, nor does nature determine its details.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, the fact of the obligation may be unknown to an individual, +since (though reason indicates it) it is not evident and rests upon a +number of premises from which it has to be reasoned out. Unlike the +duty of honoring parents, which is immediately inferred from natural +principles, the duty of offering sacrifice is only remotely inferred, +and hence admits of invincible ignorance (see 320).</p> + +<p>(b) The manner of fulfilling the obligation, since not defined by +natural law, has to be determined by positive laws, or, in the absence +of these, by suitability to the circumstances in which one lives. +Before the positive divine law was given, there was no obligatory rite +for sacrifice and the oblation was not entrusted to any special body of +men, and hence we read that in the times of the patriarchs there was +great freedom as to the ceremonies and the ministry employed in +sacrifice. But under the Mosaic Law the manner of sacrificing was +minutely prescribed and its office entrusted to the sons of Aaron, even +to the exclusion of monarchs; while under the law of Christ there is +but the one sacrifice of the Cross perpetuated in the Mass in an +unbloody manner, and the ministers who have power to offer sacrifice +are only the bishops and priests.</p> + +<p>2182. Is Sacrifice Superior to All the Other Acts of Religion?—(a) +Sacrifice is not superior to the internal act of religion, for devotion +or the internal sacrifice is the soul that animates and moves the +external rites (see 2149): “The multitude offered victims and praises +and holocausts with a devout mind” (II Par., xxix. 31); “Obedience is +better than sacrifice” (I Kings, xv. 22).</p> + +<p>(b) Sacrifice is preeminent among the external acts of religion. Some +acts of religion are optional (e.g., vows, oaths, adjurations), but +sacrifice is a natural obligation. Some acts of religion are +obligatory, but marks of respect similar to them may also be shown to +creatures (e.g., customary offerings, praises), whereas no kind of +sacrifice may be offered to a creature. Some acts of religion are +reserved to God, but they have no rite that is peculiar to the worship +of God and that may not be exercised by all (e.g., acts of adoration), +whereas sacrifice has a service reserved to God and which only priests +can perform. Sacraments are primarily for the welfare of man; sacrifice +is primarily for the honor of God. Non-sacrificial acts of religion may +be performed in the name of an individual (e.g., adoration), whereas +sacrifice is in the name of the community; other acts of religion may +signify dependence on God for temporal and corporal things (e.g., +offering of first-fruits), but sacrifice signifies the dependence of +the soul itself on God for existence and beatitude.</p> + +<p>2183. Offerings.—Offerings are gifts made immediately to God, to be +employed without change for divine worship or for the needs of the +ministers of divine worship, the purpose being to worship God by the +tribute paid.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, offerings are gifts; that is, they are offered to God without +the compulsion of any law, or at least without any determination by law +of the amount to be given. Natural reason teaches man that he should +bestow something from his goods in this manner as a thank offering for +the divine bounty, when there are representatives of God to whom the +gift may be given. The gift should be a free-will offering (Exod., xxv, +2), unless there are special circumstances that render it a debt, such +as contract, promise, custom, or the need of the ministers of the +Church.</p> + +<p>(b) They are made immediately to God Himself, and so they differ from +tithes or other dues that are paid to the clergy for their support.</p> + +<p>(c) They are not changed at all in the act of worship (e.g., an +offering of sacred vessels or altar furnishings), or at least they are +not changed into the sacred condition of a sacrificial victim (e.g., +offerings of candles, incense, etc., that are consumed during Mass). +Thus, simple oblation differs from sacrificial oblation.</p> + +<p>(d) They are devoted to the service of God, since they are gifts made +to Him. Hence, they are used in divine worship and, if consecrated +(e.g., chalices, vestments), may not be used for other purposes; or +they are used for the needs of the ministers of divine worship or of +the poor, since those who serve the altar should live by the altar (I +Cor., ix. 14), and Our Lord shared His purse with the poor (Matt., +xxvi. 9, 11).</p> + +<p>(e) They are given as a mark of honor to God, especially in recognition +of favors received from Him. Thus, in the Old Law the people were +obliged to give the first-fruits of their fields and crops to God, in +thanksgiving for the gift of the promised land and of its fruits +(Deut., xxvi. 10).</p> + +<p>2184. Goods Unsuitable as Offerings to God.—There are certain goods, +however, that should not be used as offerings to God.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, those goods that are forbidden by positive law may not be +offered to God. In the Old Law certain animals could not be offered to +God, either because they were legally unclean (e.g., dogs were +associated with pagan rites and were regarded as symbols of rapacity), +or because they were of inferior quality (e.g., a blind or lame sheep +or other animal worthless to its owner).</p> + +<p>(b) Those goods that the offerer has no right to give away or that are +unsuitable on account of circumstances may never be given as offerings +to God. Thus, one may not make an offering to God of money that belongs +to another (Ecclus., xxxiv. 21); a son may not give as a gift to God +the money he should spend on his needy parents (Matt., xv. 3-6). +Neither may one offer corrupted wine for the Mass, nor the wages of +prostitution to the church if there will be scandal, nor gifts that are +mean and contemptible, etc.</p> + +<p>2185. Contributions.—Contributions to the support of the clergy and +church causes are neither sacrifices nor offerings in the strict sense +of these words, since they are given not directly to God but to the +ministers of God. The manner of making contributions to the Church has +varied with time.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in the first ages of the Church clerics having the care of +souls were supported by the voluntary gifts of the people. These gifts +were made especially during Mass. Bread and wine and other things +necessary for divine worship and the support of the clergy were brought +at the Offertory (the origin of the present Offertory collection), +while food for the agapae or for the poor was presented for a blessing +towards the end of the Canon, or before Mass.</p> + +<p>(b) After peace had been given to the Church and the number of the +faithful and of the clergy had greatly increased, it was found +necessary to devise means for a more regular and certain supply of +income. As early as the sixth century the ancient customs of +first-fruits and tithes were made the subjects of conciliar enactments +and imposed as specific taxes on crops or revenues. A more permanent +system of church support was that of endowments or benefices which, +owing to the increasing difficulties of older methods, sprang up about +the sixth century and became universal in the eleventh. Fees in +connection with the administration of sacred rites and stipends for +Masses were in use in the seventh century.</p> + +<p>(c) Today the system of benefices is the rule, while first-fruits and +tithes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries +where benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the +form of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the +free-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.</p> + +<p>2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.—(a) +Natural Law.—Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual +or in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve; +for, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of +justice that these latter make a return for the benefits received. +Hence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public +officials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according +to their means to the ministers of religion.</p> + +<p>(b) Divine Law.—Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their +maintenance on those to whom they preached (“For the laborer is worthy +of his meat,” Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13, +14): “They who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the +holy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So +also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by +the Gospel.”</p> + +<p>(c) Church Law.—The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law, +namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon +1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local +customs, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and tithes and +first-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedraticum_ +(Canon 1504), etc.</p> + +<p>2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral +persons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means +requisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to +contribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the +spread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.—(a) The +obligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a +quasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and +its ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give +spiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal +sustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to +the clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not +strange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap +from the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at +his own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher +expect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves +man is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and +from religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the +Church evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine +worship his share of support.</p> + +<p>2189. Attitude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.—The duties of +the priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the +support of the Church may be defined as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty +that the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the +common opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent +church member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy +burdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the +confessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution. +Apart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not +insist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the +Corinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did +not correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered +them guilty of mortal sin;</p> + +<p>(b) as to restitution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who +has guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is +true, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with +temporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of +a sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is +really her due (see 1487);</p> + +<p>(c) as to administration of the Sacraments or sacramentals, it should +not be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary +fees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to +do what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites +were refused for reasons of money.</p> + +<p>2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.—(a) The entire +Church should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the +whole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the +Old Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay tithes to the +high-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to +Peter’s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the +contributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should +contribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary +uses, as determined by law or lawful custom.</p> + +<p>2191. Vows.—A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is +better.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself +under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4), +Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose +to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the +decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of +performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or +who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses +(e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do +not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise +or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one +who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an +ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow +of chastity (see 2234, 2262).</p> + +<p>(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the +vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made +in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one +vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the +Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow +principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to +make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity +to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of +obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to +the virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of +religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn +circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are +sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.</p> + +<p>(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since +a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and +to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God +what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would +dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not +honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him +special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence, +it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s +steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn +promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage +vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood, +for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no +intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.</p> + +<p>2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.—(a) By reason of its object, a vow is +either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a +fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise +of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the +promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine +with an offering).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a +physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow +taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).</p> + +<p>(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an +unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on +pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if +parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the +example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall +undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary +every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes +intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).</p> + +<p>(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally +manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed +by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the +subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of +celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider +celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from +ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is +explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow, +as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e., +manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the +implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to +the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and +chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which +the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a +pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to +perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as +when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).</p> + +<p>(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either +private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the +Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his +safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its +name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in +approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or +solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious +institutes.</p> + +<p>2193. Vows in Canon Law.—The canonical dispositions in reference to +vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows +are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the +effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A +fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given +here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.</p> + +<p>2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.—Is the distinction +between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of +ecclesiastical law?</p> + +<p>(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place, +age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for +there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these +matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint +conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change +these conditions as she sees fit.</p> + +<p>(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic +that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends, +not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike +other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving +over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual +consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied, +however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the +solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they +produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid +and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see +Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense +even in solemn vows.</p> + +<p>2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the +intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and +deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he +who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given +by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin +suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a +mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of +the gravity of the sin (see 177).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g., +Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms; +Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to +make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his +father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s +recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental +(e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away +is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he +would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance; +Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily +to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being +aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion, +according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of +ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not +have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good +demands that the religious state, like the married state, have +stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the +obligations that go with it.</p> + +<p>(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g., +vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by +persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring +under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the +impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of +the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation +(e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and +obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without +reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its +pronouncement).</p> + +<p>2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.—In the will of the +person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence +of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or +under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to +the vow.</p> + +<p>(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under +fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is +produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow. +The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to +Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made +under unjust pressure.</p> + +<p>(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given +under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as +meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to +force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take +the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.</p> + +<p>2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.—(a) All admit +that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause +(e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g., +vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin +without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a +lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is +involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).</p> + +<p>(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it +proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were +threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the +offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than +external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his +wish to evade punishment.</p> + +<p>2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.—In the following cases it is disputed +whether fear invalidates a vow.</p> + +<p>(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the +forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned +by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes). +Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in +itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the +real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light +reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable +to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light, +fear.</p> + +<p>(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates, +when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to +the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius +unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the +money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the +affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for +the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the +aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the +interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others +distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the +cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only +the occasion of the vow.</p> + +<p>2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.—As was said in the +explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind +oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.</p> + +<p>(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its +fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige +himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless +the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded. +On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows +validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but +he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).</p> + +<p>(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the +vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be +preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to +take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep) +does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not +deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba +forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only +the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius, +foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by +vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not +sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation. +On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit +intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations +annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by +subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make +religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is +distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case +there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).</p> + +<p>2200. The Matter of a Vow.—(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its +matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and +hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.</p> + +<p>2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.—(a) If the necessity is +absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is +invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to +avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is +impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a +vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has +no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made +by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but +only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to +which agreement is given, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be +done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the +vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment +(e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the +existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable +matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of +precept, for example, to practise celibacy.</p> + +<p>2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.—(a) If the +vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to +fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment +as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place +of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or +vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there +would be no obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the +difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the +matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he +vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound +to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes +impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really +severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if +he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to +go barefooted).</p> + +<p>(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held +to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the +erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of +the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended +an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become +impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption +(cfr. 465).</p> + +<p>2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.—(a) Vows that +promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on +account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin +promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out +either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living +being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to +the part that is sinful.</p> + +<p>2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that +have an evil end or other evil circumstances?</p> + +<p>(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the +thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be +sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to +seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify +pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain +something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in +a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done +(e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such +vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is +the author of sin.</p> + +<p>(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only +the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be +performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from +sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil +circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial +goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole +motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is +substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the +vow is substantially licit.</p> + +<p>(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither +the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus, +it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful +habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes +unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel +but to protect one’s life.</p> + +<p>2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.—(a) These vows are +invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to +God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s +earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary, +impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault +_per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and +displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The +sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.</p> + +<p>(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that +makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one +vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or +to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).</p> + +<p>2206. Meaning of a Better Good.—It is also necessary for validity of a +vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of +God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.</p> + +<p>(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to +it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not +true.</p> + +<p>(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to +its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which +is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it +is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep +the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or +subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry +than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or +leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable +to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have +little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let +him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.</p> + +<p>2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.—(a) The vow to do +what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to +embrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in +which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g., +when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to +make no other vows without advice).</p> + +<p>(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also +seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more +games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the +vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more +pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.</p> + +<p>2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.—(a) If the vows +are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first +prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the +second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige, +being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage +and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the +pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of +caring for those in distress.</p> + +<p>2209. The Obligation of a Vow.—Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment, +for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture +declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow +than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin +the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise +displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).</p> + +<p>(a) The Quality of the Obligation.—A vow is an act of religion, since +it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised +(e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other +virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and +also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by +sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing +dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would +not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is +a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same +species, namely, sins against religion.</p> + +<p>(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.—A vow, as being a duty of religion +(see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case +the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter +or imperfection of the act.</p> + +<p>2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.—A vow has the nature of a +private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily +imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the +subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict +obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on +the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to +assume a grave obligation.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself +(e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast, +a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a +vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance +(e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).</p> + +<p>(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin. +He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he +elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is +of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to +penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public +vows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and +celibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the +Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige +under grave sin.</p> + +<p>2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.—(a) In +personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave +obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the +Church (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or +abstinence, a Rosary).</p> + +<p>(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for +commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable. +The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by +the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all +things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to +Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than +that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave +matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not +grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when +the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not +inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide +as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the +circumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to +be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).</p> + +<p>2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.—(a) If the vower has +determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another, +coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower +intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is +coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and +neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the +items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows +to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are +many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others +omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to +some as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that +there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or +one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.</p> + +<p>(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of +the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows, +non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give +fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there +are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in +honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may +be to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain +amount to the poor.</p> + +<p>2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.—(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to +drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).</p> + +<p>(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for +fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as +a principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of +the Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance +was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a +secondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made +by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the +time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation +of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed +in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain +space and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for +example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the +whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the +forenoon (see 470, 471).</p> + +<p>(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time +should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for +such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better +time for fulfillment can be assigned; “When thou hast made a vow to the +Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God +will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a +sin” (Deut., xxiii. 21).</p> + +<p>2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.—Sin may be committed by delaying to +keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.</p> + +<p>(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the +subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or +three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000 +miles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one +has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has +closed up a business).</p> + +<p>(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not +notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a +Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and, +apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to +constitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.</p> + +<p>(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably +depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the +vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion +lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it +imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years +exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or +four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter +religion.</p> + +<p>2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.—(a) A personal vow obliges +only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes +on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community +may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by +ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory +custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real) +obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower’s +estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of +religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of +the estate.</p> + +<p>2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.—(a) As to Internal +Disposition.—It is not necessary that one have at the time of +fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention +exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was +promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then +hears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take +this assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.</p> + +<p>(b) As to External Performance.—If a vow is personal, one must perform +it personally, for one’s own act was promised, and hence, if personal +performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a +proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is +not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since +one’s own goods were promised.</p> + +<p>2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.—(a) Conditional +Vow.—The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is +fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is +equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to +support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts +marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of +her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he +prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful +means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the +condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if +non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the +vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a +year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through +frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the +exercise of one’s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one’s parents +consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to +consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses +unlawful means to prevent the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets +drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if +he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow +which he has made dependent on their consent).</p> + +<p>(b) Penal Vow.—The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against +which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g., +Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play +after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful +(e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain +occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against +the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g., +Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the +promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin +against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account +of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If +the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be +paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if +the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a +distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every +fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated +(e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).</p> + +<p>(c) Disjunctive Vow.—The vow is null if one of the objects to be +chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or +to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before +his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible +(e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns, +but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if +after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius +decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give +it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to +be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower’s +own fault (e.g., Claudius’ chalice was stolen before his choice because +he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen +has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give +the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).</p> + +<p>(d) Doubtful Vow.—Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow +was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution, +whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the +vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly +made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for +directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more +probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the +decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but +if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made, +or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the +Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of +this kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity, +number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of +interpretation of the mind of the vower.</p> + +<p>2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.—(a) Private +vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive +intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the +lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound +doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.</p> + +<p>2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.—(a) A +doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is, +from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually +attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant +to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of +“virginity” usually means the same as a vow of “chastity,” and should +be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation. +The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose +of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a +glass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious +metal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two +Masses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass +without assistance at Mass.</p> + +<p>(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal +evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the +custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is +understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise), +from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who +vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other +than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between +fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation +of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation, +he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to +give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that +are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others, +change in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a +religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept +and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without +prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).</p> + +<p>2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.—(a) A first advantage is +that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil. +This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and +inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and +perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in +honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim +on divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful +ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater +sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk +attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to +the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who +thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap +(Eccles., xi. 4).</p> + +<p>(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more +meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g., +abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion, +the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more +perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act +here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it +acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives +perfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with +the qualification “other things being equal”; for if we suppose that a +person who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there +is no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and +performs them carelessly and reluctantly.</p> + +<p>2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.—A vow good in itself may be +sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the +vower.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not +taking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow +one should consider carefully and consult one’s confessor or director +or some other prudent man.</p> + +<p>(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets +include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one +regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up +to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives +and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude +towards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever +took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with +obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the +obligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all, +it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or +wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation +that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and +the danger of sinning against the vow.</p> + +<p>2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.—If one regrets +having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed +better by reason of the vow?</p> + +<p>(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive +(e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good +work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the +double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue, +of a good work done and of a vow to do it.</p> + +<p>(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive +(e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some +temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but +indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God’s sake.</p> + +<p>2223. Who Can Make a Vow?—Every person living in the state of mortal +existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow, +unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.</p> + +<p>(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of +their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a +law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those +who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not +understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other +subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while +infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.</p> + +<p>(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the +validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate, +etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are +incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has +been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this +power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who +take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the +Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are +internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever +been made.</p> + +<p>2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.—Those who are not +masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their +subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold +dependence of this kind.</p> + +<p>(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of +religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in +the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must +be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means, +not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for +every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the +just will of the superior.</p> + +<p>(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject +to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who +have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity +without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon +conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting +churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents +and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he +owes them to his family.</p> + +<p>2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.—(a) If the vow is against +the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus, +if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the +vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses +his consent.</p> + +<p>(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if +he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which +according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual +force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good +in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice +bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow +is null, since it is better to keep the rule.</p> + +<p>(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the +subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge +and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do +what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by +his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid +until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous +paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his +superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is +not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.</p> + +<p>2226. Cessation of Vows.—Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, +just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, +therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.</p> + +<p>(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the +matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or +the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature +of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God. +It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed +to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition +is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s +mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).</p> + +<p>(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is +removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made +(dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will +of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the +authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to +substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).</p> + +<p>2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be +productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those +who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for +internal reasons are as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then +the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial +change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed +an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to +become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to +visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but +the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an +obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage, +but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home +and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g., +Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford +to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change +when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to +foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.</p> + +<p>(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that +induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of +money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes +wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end +(see Canon 1311).</p> + +<p>2228. Annulment of Vows.—The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, +directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found +in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.</p> + +<p>(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the +vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow +and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be +exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of +the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts. +Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal +power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the +husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious +superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to +annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached +puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for +themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private +vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects +have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic +power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the +post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to +direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of +subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law +(Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The +paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also +by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the +governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and +other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt +communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.</p> + +<p>(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the +vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the +obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be +exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, +when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the +Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his +rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of +their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere +with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices +that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul +each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul +a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due +the master.</p> + +<p>2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.—Is a just reason +necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary +that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit +condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent +is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be +a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised +Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the +sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without +sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.</p> + +<p>2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.—(a) Direct +annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing +itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not +reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect +annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only +the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power +of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to +hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service +elsewhere.</p> + +<p>(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even +though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, +or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject +and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of +annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission +or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the +vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no +longer under his control.</p> + +<p>2231. Dispensation.—A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted +in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401). +Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation +that a law is not binding.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least +in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow +itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total +removal of the vow.</p> + +<p>(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for +God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation +differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in +his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the +vower or over the matter of the vow.</p> + +<p>(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public +spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a +vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of +those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual +matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the +latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or +domestic power.</p> + +<p>2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.—A dispensation is granted +in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a +just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise +cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason. +A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even +though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the +presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient +for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good +of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads +a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of +the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult, +if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is +insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).</p> + +<p>2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.—(a) The +superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that +there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is +any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is +certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether +the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been +asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give +it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has +become harmful or useless.</p> + +<p>(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing +that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that +there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt +whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the +judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to +the superior.</p> + +<p>2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.—The Church has the +power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this +power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be +loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been +exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of +dispensation are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of +dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn +vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may +dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all +public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity +and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter +vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect +freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;</p> + +<p>(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, +such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In +certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can +also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These +matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection +with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular +confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either +in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not +made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by +him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of +chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been +made for marriage (see Canon 1045).</p> + +<p>2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.—Does the Church +dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in +the reception of Sacred Orders?</p> + +<p>(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly +celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are +granted from the religious vow of chastity.</p> + +<p>(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were +permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of +a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at +the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the +clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical +powers.</p> + +<p>2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third +Party.—(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the +third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only +obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense +from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a +deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any +particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.</p> + +<p>(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but +is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of +the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For +that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is +primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is +dispensable.</p> + +<p>(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to +benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a +vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be +given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of +a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also +of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party +to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of +stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed +without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a +contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions, +however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope, +in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his +dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just +and sufficient reasons.</p> + +<p>2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.—(a) Dispensation may be +granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus, +a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see +403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from +another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local +Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but +also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).</p> + +<p>(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of +the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It +is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.</p> + +<p>(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to +accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may +be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that +the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds +at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.</p> + +<p>2238. Commutation of Vows.—The commutation of a vow is the +substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the +transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation +differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the +obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of +the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is +commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage, +but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of +the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the +power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do +what is less.</p> + +<p>2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.—(a) The +good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which, +if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually +advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a +poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not +accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in +favor of one’s father who is also poor.</p> + +<p>(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which +morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one +prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for +another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance. +But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and +hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow +for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the +same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is +subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.</p> + +<p>(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is +clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into +a Rosary.</p> + +<p>2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.—(a) The commutation +of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made +by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid +this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the +spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally +served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for +most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an +equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And +even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than +temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal +or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his +vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.</p> + +<p>(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted +only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation +partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to +some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing +(e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have +also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of +commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less +value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is +that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute +ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of +third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.</p> + +<p>2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.—(a) For commutation +into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its +own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value, +some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore +displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But +a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger +of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value, +a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also +more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial +dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for +a full dispensation.</p> + +<p>2242. Reversion to Original Vow.—The return to the original vow by one +whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may +be obligatory.</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something +better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of +using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this +doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into +something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of +privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between +different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who +make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and +needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.</p> + +<p>(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when +the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter +has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to +extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its +place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must +be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is +extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is +immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however, +that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is +extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted +work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the +vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and +the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast, +there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It +should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious +profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the +institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the +vows revive (Canon 1315).</p> + +<p>2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.—(a) A +confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows, +since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation. +A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of +(see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow, +the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be +advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a +year or other fixed period.</p> + +<p>(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of +private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make +continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a +change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater +devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way +of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have +recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations, +and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment +(e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).</p> + +<p>2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of God.—We now pass on to +consider those external acts of religion in which the worshipper makes +use of divine things in order to show honor to God (see 2175). These +sacred things are of two classes, namely, objects whose use is the +sanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use +is the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence +towards God (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be +dealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to +God by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the +following subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others +one’s declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to +move others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine +name to express praise and invocation.</p> + +<p>2245. Oaths.—An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of +what we say.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as +the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to +others or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., “God knows +she has been a good woman”); it is an address or invocation made to God +Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring +out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to +corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it +appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in +Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present +matter. A prayer to God to prove one’s innocence or the proof of a +theological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some +creature (e.g., in the expression, “upon my word of honor”) or to some +false deity (e.g., “By Jove, I’ll do that”), there is no oath.</p> + +<p>(c) It calls on God to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of +one’s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He +who swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible +or miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases +Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the +hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv. +5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will +not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend +iniquity and falsehood.</p> + +<p>2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.—(a) By reason of the matter, an oath +is either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past +or present (e.g,, “I swear that I saw the accident,” “I swear that I am +insolvent”), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., “I swear that I +will execute my office faithfully”). The promissory oath is either +without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, “I +swear that I will prosecute, if you do that”) or with a pact. This +latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with +God or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn +contract, or a sworn vow and contract.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory) +or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness +(e.g., “God is my witness that this is true,” “I swear by God, etc.”). +The execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not +expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the +persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true +(e.g., “May God strike me dead, if this is not true!” “May the devil +take my children, if I swear falsely!”). The form commonly used, “So +help me God and these holy Gospels!” has an execratory sense, the +meaning being “May God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if +I speak falsely!”</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or +implicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., “God is my witness,” +“I speak the truth in Christ”); the latter calls on some creature as +the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the +representative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: “I +call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you +life and death”).</p> + +<p>(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple, +judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony +(e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised +hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form +of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in +reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or +delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc., +which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn +or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants +strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the +Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.</p> + +<p>2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.—(a) +Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the +principal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there +is a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one +kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account +of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its +non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have +other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to +keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).</p> + +<p>2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.—(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has +the necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as +swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men +swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23; +Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin +of oaths is man’s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of +lending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of +religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and +hence an oath is a profession of reverence for God’s superior +knowledge, truth, and justice.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality. +Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other +acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own +sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability; +hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it +should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act +of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God, +even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This +explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii. +9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of +these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From +the context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just +cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was +lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not +used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.</p> + +<p>2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.—The necessary qualities +that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: “And +thou shalt swear, ‘As the Lord liveth,’ in truth, and in judgment and +in justice.” Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who +swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which +he swears.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears +should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and +in a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks +judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears +about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.</p> + +<p>(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to +that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been +used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false +or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be +false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that +one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely +mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a +matter.</p> + +<p>(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what +one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not +say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter +of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be +good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath +that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under +oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears +about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another +person or to boast about one’s own crimes.</p> + +<p>2250. Sinful Oaths.—(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from +its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any +direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in +levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an +oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a +serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of +standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to +which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is +thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On +account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing +leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth +with simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary, +daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be +sufficient without his oath.</p> + +<p>(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see +172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God +and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be +an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived. +Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever +escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without +sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity. +Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light +sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are +debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are +subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons +1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given +before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while +subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are +also crimes or punishable offenses.</p> + +<p>(c) A wicked oath, even though the thing sworn to be true and the oath +be given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin +against religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by +reason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since +the swearer gravely insults God by asking Him to become a partaker in +sin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of +religion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not +serious disrespect to ask God to witness the truth of what is true; +others again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of +the matter or circumstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the +statement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus, +there is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to +another and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial +scandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault +of detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit +adultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small +sum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful +when it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious +detraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath +confirming a boast about past mortal sins).</p> + +<p>2251. Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation +(i.e., the internal restriction of one’s words so that the listener +cannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome, +meaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an +oath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI +(Denzinger, n. 1176).</p> + +<p>(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one’s +words that may be gathered by the listener from circumstances, as when +a servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be +seen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity +that demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of +reservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is +no sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental +reservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner +has no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use +mental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not +concerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a +mental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is +mortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to God to call on Him +to witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only +venially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice, +but only against judgment or discretion.</p> + +<p>2252. Cooperation in Sinful Oaths.—(a) Formal cooperation is never +lawful, because it makes the cooperator will the guilt of what is done. +Thus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to +swear falsely is guilty as the principal or accessory to the crime (see +1513, 1778).</p> + +<p>(b) Material cooperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason +for it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law +from a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good +demands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding +that for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the +lawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements +unnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of +proving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.</p> + +<p>2253. Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.—(a) +Incautious or Disrespectful Oaths.—It is not lawful to ask or receive +an oath, when there is no great public or private need for it; +otherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful +to ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g., +the Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear +against his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are +sinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their +solemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as +perjurers if they speak falsely.</p> + +<p>(b) Perjured Oaths.—It is not lawful for a private person to ask or +receive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit +perjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not +know whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a +sufficient reason.</p> + +<p>(c) Wicked Oaths.—It is clearly unlawful to ask or receive a wicked +oath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing +itself is then desired and there is formal cooperation. But it is not +necessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the +sinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the +dispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material +cooperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to +murder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for +which there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the +person taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.</p> + +<p>2254. Fictitious Oaths.—A fictitious oath is one in which a person +swearing externally has no intention internally to call on God as a +witness.</p> + +<p>(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real +intention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fictitious oath produces +no obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice, +as when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.</p> + +<p>(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it +includes the grave sin of external dishonor to God; if it testifies to +truth, it includes the venial sin of taking God’s name in vain. The +fictitious oath is a grave sin if the circumstances are such that a +sincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge +lawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an +important onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to +strengthen their pact.</p> + +<p>2255. Expressions Confused with Oaths.—Expressions that are sometimes +mistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane +or vulgar talk, such as “Hell,” “The devil,” “Doggone it”; (b) cursing, +such as “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” “Damn it”, (e) contumely, such as +“bastard,” “son of a bitch”; (d) vain use of the name of God, such as +“by God,” “Christ,” etc., when used as common exclamations; (e) +temptation of God, such as: “If there is a God, may He strike me +dead!”; (f) blasphemy, such as: “May God perish, if this is not true!”</p> + +<p>The expressions, “This is as true as the Gospel,” “God’s own word is +not more truthful,” “I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin,” etc., if +used to confirm the truth, are not meant to assert the speaker’s +equality to God and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of +taking the Lord’s name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error, +they are mortal sins of blasphemy.</p> + +<p>2256. Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.—An assertory oath imposes +the obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that +results from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition, +a promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one’s +promise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence, +Scripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v. +33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, xxxi. 3). But the thing +promised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks +judgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding, +for no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr. +2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige +himself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge +murder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in +keeping it.</p> + +<p>2257. Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.—The obligation of a sworn +promise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do +what is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes), +depends on the circumstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third +party involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow +acts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call God to +witness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or +which in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part +of a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved, +these oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is entitled to +from the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person +may not violate the oath by entering religion).</p> + +<p>2258. Obligation of Oath Is Personal.—An oath added to a promise made +to man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the +one who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).</p> + +<p>2259. Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.—(a) An oath should be +interpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended +to place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person +swears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be +understood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes; +if he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which +money is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath +is to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the +promise (Canon 1321).</p> + +<p>(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which +the nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an +oath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood: +“If fulfillment will be physically and morally possible,” “saving the +rights of superiors,” “unless the other party renounces his right,” +“unless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,” +“unless there comes a notable change in conditions.” If the promisor +explains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he +swears only in the sense thus set forth by him.</p> + +<p>(c) An oath follows the nature and conditions of the act (e.g., +resolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory +follows the principal. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached +cannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or +the public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no +strength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid +(e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also +invalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not +accepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to +oblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also +ceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the +oath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe +the statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that +are commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that +are merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating +those that oblige under venial sin).</p> + +<p>2260. Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.—(a) The +obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is +that it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity +owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more +trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a +promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are +other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against +religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in +case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin +against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see +2246 a).</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that +produced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God, +but the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity +seems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains +disrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only +the fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is +sacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath, +however, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater +injury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a +promise made to Him.</p> + +<p>2261. Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.—(a) The +obligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of +religion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no +doubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and +has no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and +also when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement +made under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious +matter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but, +since the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is +needed for serious matter in violation of an oath.</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the +matter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be +of venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a +promise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later +changes his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to +God, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does +not seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of +the oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity, +and, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had +sworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these +transgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe +that every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the +subject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the +breach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a +promissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a +present intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future +performance.</p> + +<p>2262. Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.—The obligation of a +promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or +extrinsically.</p> + +<p>(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in +the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in +Herod’s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has +ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the +latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich), +or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates +the obligation.</p> + +<p>(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State +or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the +right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father +nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the +Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by +commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow +into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute +vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath +is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only +the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary +reason (see Canon 1320).</p> + +<p>2263. Adjuration.—Adjuration is the invocation of the name of God used +in a request or command to another person in order to move that person +to do or omit something.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an invocation, and in this respect it is like an oath, for +both an oath and an adjuration call upon the name of God.</p> + +<p>(b) It calls upon the name of God either explicitly (e.g., “I command +you in the name of God”) or implicitly (e.g., “I beseech you for the +sake of the passion of Christ”). If command or request is made in the +name of a creature and without reference to God’s attributes reflected +in them, there is not, properly speaking, an adjuration, as when one +implores a favor from another person in the name of a Patron Saint, or +of one’s country, parents, friendship, etc.</p> + +<p>(c) It is used in a command or a request, and thus it differs from +prayer, which cannot be made in the form of a command. But adjuration +may be used in prayers to God Himself or to the Saints, as is done in +obsecrations.</p> + +<p>(d) Its purpose is to move another to an act or omission, and thus it +is different from an oath. The end of an oath is to confirm one’s words +by the testimony of God; the end of an adjuration is to influence +another to a certain course through an appeal to his respect, fear or +love of God.</p> + +<p>2264. The Species of Adjuration.—(a) Adjuration is solemn or simple +(private). The solemn adjuration is made in the name of the Church by +her ministers and in the ritual form prescribed by her, as in the +exorcisms of Baptism. The simple adjuration is made by private persons +and without ritual ceremony.</p> + +<p>(b) Adjuration is imperative or deprecative. The imperative is given in +the form of a command to inferiors or demons, as when St. Paul writes +to the Thessalonians: “I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be +read” (I Thess., v. 27). The deprecative is given in the form of a +request made to God or to any creature not damned, as when St. Paul +writes to the Romans: “I beseech you, brethren, by the love of God that +you present your bodies a living sacrifice” (Rom., xii. 1).</p> + +<p>2265. Qualities of Lawful Adjuration.—Adjuration is lawful and an act +of the virtue of religion, since it professes reverence for the divine +attributes in using them as the most efficacious motives of appeal. +But, like an oath, adjuration must be accompanied by qualities that +make it lawful.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, there must be judgment, and hence those persons are guilty of +sin who employ adjuration without necessity (e.g., those who constantly +urge the love of God and other religious motives when asking for any +favor), or without devotion (e.g., those who in anger are wont to +command “for God’s sake,” etc.). The sin committed does not seem grave, +since there is no great disrespect and the malice consists in taking +God’s name in vain, not in insult.</p> + +<p>(b) There must be truth, and hence an adjuration is sinful when used +for a lying cause, as when a well-to-do person pretends to be indigent +and begs that alms be given him for the love of God. The sin committed +does not seem grave, since the act to which the other person is invited +is good, and the act of adjuration itself does not ask God to testify +to the lie, but only uses His name without reason. If the deception is +mortally sinful, however, some authorities think that the adjuration +added to it is a grave sin against religion.</p> + +<p>(c) There must be justice, and therefore an adjuration is sinful when +used to obtain something unlawful, as when one demands in the name of +God that another person tell a lie or commit murder. The adjuration is +gravely irreverent to God if the thing sought (e.g., murder) is a +mortal sin; it is lightly irreverent, according to the common opinion, +if the thing sought (e.g., a harmless lie) is only a venial sin.</p> + +<p>2266. Persons Who May Be Adjured.—God may be adjured, but only in a +deprecative manner, as is done in the obsecrations, “through Jesus +Christ,” “through Thy Passion and Death,” etc. The purpose of +adjurations addressed to God is not to change the divine decrees, but +to obtain through His goodness what He intended from eternity that we +should obtain by prayer. But the same form of adjuration cannot be used +for all creatures.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, deprecative adjuration may be used in reference to those who +are in some way one’s superiors. Hence, we may pray the Angels and +Saints to grant a prayer for the love of God, and a beggar may ask in +Our Lord’s name that a wealthy man give him an alms.</p> + +<p>(b) Imperative adjuration may be used in addressing subjects or +inferiors. Adjuration of demons must not be made in friendly words, nor +with a view to obtaining services or knowledge from them, but in words +of reproach and only as a means to end their nefarious activities.</p> + +<p>(e) No kind of adjuration may be used in regard to irrational +creatures, since they are without knowledge sufficient for receiving a +command or a request. The adjurations of animals, the elements, +inanimate objects, etc., that are contained in the Ritual, must be +understood as deprecative adjurations addressed to God, or imperative +adjurations addressed to evil spirits, that the creatures prayed over +may be to our benefit and not to our hurt. Examples are the exorcisms +of water, salt, mice, locusts, houses, or storms.</p> + +<p>2267. The Use of Exorcisms.—(a) As to their effect, exorcisms are of +two kinds, exorcisms in the strict sense (i.e., the expulsion of demons +from possessed persons) and exorcisms in the wide sense (i.e., the +diminution of demonic influence). Examples of the former are found in +the Gospels, where Our Lord drives out many evil spirits from afflicted +persons; examples of the latter are found in the exorcisms administered +in Baptism and in the exorcisms of salt, water and other inanimate or +irrational creatures.</p> + +<p>(b) As to their manner, exorcisms are also of two kinds, the solemn and +the private. The former are made in the name of the Church in the +manner prescribed by the Ritual, and their administration is reserved +to clerics who have a special and express permission from the Ordinary +(Canon 1151, Sec. 1). The latter kind may be made even by members of the +laity, and we read that certain Saints, like St. Anthony and St. +Catherine of Siena, had great power over evil spirits. It is +recommended that priests frequently use private exorcisms, at least +secretly, for persons who are vexed by temptations or scruples, and for +which they may use the form: “In the name of Jesus Christ, unholy +spirit, I command you to depart from this creature of God.”</p> + +<p>2268. The Effects of Adjurations.—(a) Adjurations addressed to one’s +fellow-men upon earth impose no obligation of religion upon the persons +addressed. Hence, if a rich man turns a deaf ear to an appeal for +charity made in the name of God, he violates charity but not religion; +if a child disregards a command urged upon him for the love of God, he +violates obedience but not religion.</p> + +<p>(b) Adjurations addressed to demons are not of infallible efficacy, at +least as to the entire effect intended, for power over the spirits of +darkness is given only in such measure as is needed for the propagation +of the Gospel. But we believe that an exorcism pronounced lawfully by +one who has the Order of Exorcist acts _ex opere operato_, at least to +restrain the wickedness of the demons: “In My name they shall cast out +demons” (Mark, xvi. 17).</p> + +<p>2269. Praise of God.—Having discussed oaths and adjurations, in which +honor is shown the name of God, and the immediate end of which is or +may be some human advantage, we come now to the honor shown the name of +God by praise in which the immediate end is some spiritual advantage. +Praise is defined as “the declaration of another’s greatness with +approval.” The divine praises include the prayers of wonder, of honor, +of thanksgiving; but they differ from prayer properly so called or +petition (see 2153).</p> + +<p>2270. Internal and External Praise of God.—(a) Internal praise is +expressed by the thoughts and affections of the soul. This is the most +important part of praise, and without it external praise loses much of +its value. Our Lord reproved the Pharisees for honoring God with their +lips, while their hearts were far from Him (Matt., xv. 8), and St. Paul +admonishes the Ephesians to sing and make melody to the Lord in their +hearts (Ephes, v, 19).</p> + +<p>(b) External praise is expressed in words (“I will bless the Lord at +all times, His praise is always in my mouth,” Psalm xxxiii. 1), or in +song (“Admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual +canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God,” Col., iii. 16), or +by music (“Praise Him with sound of trumpet, with psaltery and harp, +with timbrel and choir, with strings and organs, with high-sounding +cymbals,” Psalm cl).</p> + +<p>2271. Excellence of Praise of God.—(a) Praise Is Due to God.—His +essence and attributes are ineffable and above all praise (Ecclus., +xliii. 33), and they must be honored by the superior acts of worship +and reverence. But the effects of His goodness shown to us should be +declared and glorified: “I will remember the tender mercies of the +Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord hath bestowed +upon us” (Is., lxiii. 7).</p> + +<p>(b) Praise of God Is Advantageous to Man.—Internal praise lifts the +soul on high and prepares it to receive benefits from God, while +external praise helps the mind to keep its attention fixed on God, +excludes those things that are contrary to Him, and offers edification +to others. St. Augustine narrates in his _Confessions_ how profoundly +he was moved in spirit, even to tears, on hearing the hymns and +canticles of the Church.</p> + +<p>2272. Qualities that Should Be Present in the Divine Praises.—(a) +Internally, there should be devotion. It is useful that those who +perform or assist at the praises of God understand what is said, but it +suffices for devotion that they know His greatness and goodness is +being proclaimed. The intention should be to honor God, and hence there +is no act of personal religion if in reciting or hearing God’s praises +one intends only ostentation or pleasure; attention should also be +given to what is said, and hence St. Augustine says that it is a sin to +think rather of the music than of the praise of God proclaimed by the +music (see 2164 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Externally, the divine praises should be respectful to God and +helpful to recollection and devotion. Hence, the law of the Church +excludes from her services all that is of a disturbing, profane or +sinful character, such as theatrical displays, musical instruments that +distract the mind from religious thoughts, lascivious airs or those +suggestive of the dance. The Code prescribes that impure music of every +kind must be eliminated from churches (Canon 1264), and Pius X in his +Motu Proprio of 1903 lays down the rule that there must be nothing in +the services of the Church that is calculated to diminish piety, give +reasonable scandal or disgust, or offend the decorum of sacred +functions or the sacredness of the place (see also Instruction on +Sacred Art [Holy Office, 30 June, 1952], AAS 44-542). The sin committed +by misbehavior or levity during divine services depends on the +seriousness of the disrespect shown to God or the scandal given the +beholders.</p> + +<p>2273. The Sins against Religion.—Inasmuch as religion is a moral +virtue and therefore consists in the observance of a golden mean, the +sins opposed to it are the extremes of excess or defect. (a) The sins +of excess offend, not because they offer too much worship to God (a +thing that is impossible), but because they exceed by giving worship +where it is not due or in a manner that is not due (superstition). (b) +The sins of defect offend by denying due religious reverence to God +Himself (temptation of God, perjury) or to sacred things (sacrilege, +simony).</p> + +<p>2274. Superstition.—Superstition is false religion, or a vice that +offers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false +god. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.</p> + +<p>(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old +Testament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of +rites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by +the Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies, +mysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice, +praises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no +way serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the +elevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is +opposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not +served by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of +meaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to +minor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the +altar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the +weather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain +prayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue +of an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and +custom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses, +alleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a +devotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that +lack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in +modes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua, +Gregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion +or ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.</p> + +<p>2275. The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.—(a) False worship is +from its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because +it offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to +man because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion. +(b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it +contains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does +not reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin, +as when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.</p> + +<p>2276. Worship of False Deity.—Worship of a false deity is performed by +offering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are +three species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as +God, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to +supreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the +credit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which +only God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is +treated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant +is sought from it (vain observance).</p> + +<p>2277. Definition of Idolatry.—Idolatry is the supreme worship of +_latria_ offered to a creature.</p> + +<p>(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of +_hyperdulia, dulia_, or civil honor, offered respectively to the +Blessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The +external signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice, +temples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration +of creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such +as genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to +adore.</p> + +<p>(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended +or is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be +idolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could +understand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were +done on the stage, or in a joking manner).</p> + +<p>(c) Idolatry is offered to a creature, and hence the relative honor +that is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the +persons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom +idolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a +departed person, a living human being), or an irrational creature +(e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g., +statues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a +fictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).</p> + +<p>2278. The Kinds of Idolatry.—(a) Idolatry is either internal or +external. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as +when a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs +an outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there +is no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death +reluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is +either perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a +false god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon. +Imperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god, +there is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of +God, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.</p> + +<p>2279. The Sinfulness of Idolatry.—(a) Idolatry is a most grievous +crime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the +virtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence +it is forbidden in the first commandment: “Thou shalt not have strange +gods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them” (Exod., xx. +3 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous +of sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him +of His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and +blasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is +not above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and +blasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and +so it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.</p> + +<p>(c) Idolatry, by reason of the dispositions of the person who commits +it, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or +deny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is +worse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise +idolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of +ignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at +all.</p> + +<p>2280. Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.—(a) Internal idolatry +is worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the +latter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect +idolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered +precisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the +latter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is +aggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more +voluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the +motive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the +Christians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the +pagans).</p> + +<p>2281. Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.—The guilt of idolatry +may be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus, +in the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least +material, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given +in communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be +idolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine +attributes.</p> + +<p>2282. Definition of Divination.—Divination (soothsaying, +fortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits +are invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of +what is future or occult.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through +natural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or +substitutes other teachers for God.</p> + +<p>(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information +sought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be +expected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the +Angels, the Saints).</p> + +<p>(c) The invocation is explicit or implicit. There is explicit calling +on the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement +with him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an +evil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which +are not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for +the desired effect.</p> + +<p>(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of +such things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by +natural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret +thoughts of the heart).</p> + +<p>2283. Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.—(a) The fact +of divination—that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of +things humanly unknowable—is not impossible, since the demons are far +superior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching +of revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind. +Their knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor +to the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of +real communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi +possessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think +that the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25); +but no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the +intervention of demons was only imaginary.</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive +occult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain +knowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or +response on the part of the spirits of evil.</p> + +<p>2284. Forms of Explicit Invocation.—Divination in which there is +explicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the +medium through which instruction is given or expected.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance +representing the demon (_praestigium_) or an internal picture in the +imagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).</p> + +<p>(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead +or living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as +necromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons +is called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both +necromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and +pythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar +spirits act as mediums).</p> + +<p>(c) The medium is indirect and irrational when it is some solid body +(such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear; +idols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from +which answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to +lead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some +liquid body (hydromancy), or air (aeromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or +the entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as +lightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of +ordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the +guilt or innocence of an accused person.</p> + +<p>2285. Forms of Implicit Invocation.—Divination in which there is only +implicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural +causes from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold. +Among the principal forms are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or +clair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have +the natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of +perceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal +means of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn +gift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities +hold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a +sixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples +and persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover, +many facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified +sufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe +telepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation +of demons, is not illicit.</p> + +<p>(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy, +phrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able +to discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret +thoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the +countenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and +moral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull. +The chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the +past, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an +individual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of +his hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;</p> + +<p>(c) divination that is made from non-human and necessary events in +astrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of +an individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of +the heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of +interpretation;</p> + +<p>(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in +augury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of +birds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance +happening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a +sneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily +chosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random, +the numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice +thrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings +being regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as +signs of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to +break a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).</p> + +<p>2286. The Malice of the Sin of Divination.—(a) The Theological +Species.—If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination +is of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter, +for it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with +the enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation. +If there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is +of its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the +devil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the +dispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults +divination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence, +the faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith +in dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual +direction of one’s life by superstition, cooperation in serious sin of +a diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young +people. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent +matter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all +sin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.</p> + +<p>(b) The Moral Species.—All forms of divination, it is commonly held, +belong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii. +10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with +evil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide +the gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that +usually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the +devil, sacrileges, etc.).</p> + +<p>2287. When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.—There is no sin of +divination when knowledge is obtained from God.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there +are examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be +guided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge, +since nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not +sinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in +which the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which +produces great spiritual good) was sent by God.</p> + +<p>(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not +superstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that +have been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of +genuineness required by the Church.</p> + +<p>(c) God has sometimes communicated through the instrumentality of +irrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words +of enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15); +Eliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the +wife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was +prescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan +by lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the +Apostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases +in which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be +superstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God. +Those who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the +teachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to +Him the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it +unlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give +answers through automatic writing (_Collect. de Prop. Fide_, 1894), or +to interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It +is not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no +ordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and +then have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed +(Prov., xvi. 33).</p> + +<p>2288. When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.—There is no +sin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is +obtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from +their necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be +predicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course +that its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around +the sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be +predicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted +that almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly +planted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in +astronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables +of life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are +inferences from known scientific laws.</p> + +<p>(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less +certainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or +indications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he +reasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the +symptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that +the use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the +discovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc., +is not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and +uncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many +means of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to +misunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their +authors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or +quackery rather than superstition.</p> + +<p>2289. Use of Lots.—Is it lawful to use lots in settlement of some +business, when there is no intention to seek preternatural oracle?</p> + +<p>(a) It is lawful to do this, if there is some reason of necessity or +utility or amusement to justify the lots, and no injustice or +prohibition of law. Hence, if there is no other convenient method of +decision, one may use the drawing of straws or cards to decide how +lands or goods shall be divided between claimants, or which of several +competitors shall receive a reward or office.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not lawful to do this, if there is a prohibition of law +(e.g., ecclesiastical elections may not be made by lot), or if there is +no necessity for the lots (e.g., it is at least foolish to use the +Gospels for deciding by lot matters that could be decided by +reflection), or if injury is done another person (e.g., to decide by +lot when the merits of two contestants are unequal, to practise +unfairness in the drawing).</p> + +<p>2290. Vain Observance.—Vain observance is a superstition that ascribes +to certain things effects for which they have no natural or +communicated power.</p> + +<p>(a) It ascribes the effects to natural things, but it supposes that in +some way supernatural forces, not of religion, are at work in or +through these things. Thus, just as in divination, there is in vain +observance either an express or an implied invocation of the spirits of +evil. The alchemists, who thought there was a philosopher’s stone able +to transmute base metals into gold or an elixir that could greatly +prolong life, looked to natural causes, and hence to that extent seem +to be guilty of false science, rather than of superstition. Scientific +materialism, though, is a crasser form of ignorance than any +superstition that trusts in super-material powers.</p> + +<p>(b) The things which vain observance makes use of are persons, acts, +objects, circumstances, happenings, etc. Even sacred things may be +employed as the material for vain observance, as happens when some +accidental and unnecessary circumstance of a sacred rite (e.g., the +size or color of candles) is given the credit of the sacred results. +Here again vain observance and divination are alike, since the same +means are employed by both.</p> + +<p>(c) The effects looked for in vain observance, or the purpose had in +view, is some fact or event. It is this characteristic that +distinguishes vain observance from divination: the latter aims at +occult knowledge, the former at supranatural results. The expected fact +or event is something that surpasses the natural powers of physical or +human agencies (e.g., sensation without sense excitants, mind-reading +without external indications, scientific knowledge without study, +bodily feats without corresponding bodily powers, detection of secret +and hidden things without human means for detection), or even of the +invisible world of spirits (e.g., creation, generation of new +substances, evocation of the dead, internal motion of man’s will).</p> + +<p>(d) There is no natural power in the things used for producing the +substance or mode of the desired effects, that is, no inherent and +sufficient force or activity. Hence, vain observance is not to be +confused with scientific marvels or natural wonders whose explanation +is unknown to the general public, or which cannot be fully explained by +scientists themselves. Thus, the baffling tricks of white magic are due +to legerdemain, ventriloquism, ocular delusions, and the like; the +physiological changes (e.g., convulsions, hysteria, somnambulism, +bodily cures) produced in mesmerism, hypnotism, thought healing, etc., +are explained by suggestion and the motor power of images excited to +produce bodily motions, passions, or changes; the mental phenomena +(e.g., hyperaesthesia, wondrous visions, increased vigor of mind) of +certain drugs such as hashish, mescal and opium, are caused by +properties of these drugs.</p> + +<p>(e) There is no communicated power in the things employed, that is, no +instrumental virtue bestowed by a higher cause. Hence, since +Sacraments, sacramentals, and miracle-working relics have from God in a +greater or less degree an efficacy for results above nature, there is +no superstition in their proper use, But, as was noted just above, +sacred things themselves may be used superstitiously, as happens when +they are regarded as principal agents, or when, contrary to fact, they +are deemed to act infallibly or independently of any human cooperation +or disposition.</p> + +<p>2291. Forms of Vain Observance.—Among the forms of vain observance are +the following:</p> + +<p>(a) those by which one puts into use vain ceremonies or objects in the +expectation that they will secure certain desired effects, or puts an +exaggerated confidence in lawful rites or sacred objects;</p> + +<p>(b) those by which one directs one’s life through fortuitous and +impertinent happenings in the belief that they have the power to +influence one’s fortunes favorably or adversely. This form of +superstition is like divination by omens; the difference is that in +using omens one chiefly seeks for knowledge of the future, while in +observing chance events one chiefly intends the direction of one’s +conduct. Examples are found in persons who fear to make a journey on +Friday or to begin any important affair during the dark of the moon.</p> + +<p>2292. Vain Observances from which Desired Effects Are Expected.—(a) +Useful results are sometimes expected, such as knowledge for the mind +(notorious art) or health for the body (healing observances). The +notorious art consisted in the repeating of certain formulas or the +gazing upon certain figures, prayers and fasts at times being added, +and it was supposed that these practices would obtain infused knowledge +without the necessity of labor or study. Healing observances are +remedies used for man or beast that manifestly have no natural curative +properties (e.g., a buckeye or rabbit’s foot carried in the pocket to +ward off rheumatism).</p> + +<p>(b) Wondrous results are sometimes expected, such as the power to bring +on storms, telekinesis, materialization, and levitation, through the +use of incantations, theurgic sacraments, spiritistic rites, etc. This +is known as the black art or black magic.</p> + +<p>(c) Evil effects are sometimes expected, such as the power to blight +another by a glance (evil eye or fascination), the power to cast a +spell over another person by certain spoken words, to bring disease or +misfortune on a person by piercing or striking his effigy, to excite +impure love for a determinate person by the administration of love +philtres or charms, etc. (sorcery, witchcraft).</p> + +<p>2293. Distinction between the Fact and the Sin of Vain Observance.—(a) +The Fact.—The demons have naturally powers over our world that surpass +those of human or physical agents, and it is not impossible for them to +produce prodigies or seeming miracles. The magicians of Egypt by +enchantments and certain secrets changed rods into serpents, etc. +(Exod., vii. 12, viii. 7); the New Testament narrates that Simon the +Magician bewitched the Samaritans by his magic (Acts, viii. 11), and it +clearly foretells the lying wonders of Satan and Antichrist (Matt., +xxiv. 24; II Thess., ii. 9). But there are limits to the power of the +fallen spirits; for example, they cannot infuse knowledge, and +occultism has contributed nothing to the advancement of science or +civilization. Moreover, many effects that have been attributed to +demonic intervention were due to natural causes or to fraud (e.g., a +large proportion of spiritistic phenomena), or they were supposed to +exist only because the popular mind was carried away by excitement or +was bent on persecution (e.g., most of the witchcraft accusations of a +few centuries ago).</p> + +<p>(b) The Sin.—Vain observance in which there is no express invocation +of evil spirits is common enough; even religious, educated and +practical persons are found to act on superstitious hopes or fears or +to put confidence in charms or amulets. But vain observance that +includes an express invocation of demons is a comparatively rare sin. +It is not impossible, however, that a person should come to such a pass +of despair or malice as to wish to have dealings with Satan, or should +be so carried away by curiosity, desire of wealth, power, fame, or +honor as to be willing to barter his soul in exchange for them. That +there were professional wizards from ancient times is a matter of +history, and Scripture contains severe prohibitions against dealings +with them (Levit., xix. 31, xx. 27; Deut., xviii. 10).</p> + +<p>2294. Superstition in Religious Observances.—Superstition is sometimes +found even in religious observances. (a) Thus, there is superstition in +the observance itself when vain additions are made to an approved usage +(e.g., the addition to a prayer against sickness of gestures, +breathings, gibberish, etc., that have no significance of reverence for +God). (b) There is superstition in the manner of the observance when +one attributes the virtue of a sacred rite or object to some +unimportant circumstance (e.g., the shape of the reliquary in which a +relic is carried, the “propitious” day on which a sacramental was +received), or expects from a sacred thing an effect which it has no +power to produce (e.g., infallible certainty of salvation from the +performance of a certain devotion or the presence of a holy picture or +blessed object). It is not superstition, however, to attach +significance to circumstances that have a sacred meaning (e.g., +holydays, figures that have a religious symbolism), or to put a +confidence in sacred things that is based on their character or +approved usage (e.g., the hope and trust that blessings will be +impetrated and salvation itself through fidelity to an authorized +devotion).</p> + +<p>2295. Sinfulness of Vain Observance.—The malice of vain observance is +essentially the same as that of divination, for in both superstitions +the same virtue of religion is offended by the sinful cult that is +performed.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, there is mortal sin from the nature of the act, when vain +observance is exercised with invocation of evil spirits or with false +religious rites (for a serious injury is done to the honor due to God), +or when a vain observance is meant to bring a curse or grave misfortune +on a neighbor (for a serious injustice is willed).</p> + +<p>(b) There is regularly only a venial sin, when a vain observance is of +a non-religious kind, consisting in foolish heed given to chance +happenings (such as a rabbit running across the road, the mention of +death, the presence of a person regarded as a Jonah), or the use of +improportionate means (e.g., to change one’s place at a card table in +order to change the luck). For usually there is no irreverence in such +practices, and at the worst they are foolish and idle acts. Often there +is no sin at all, the vain observance being due to ignorance or the +wish to joke.</p> + +<p>(c) There is no sin at all, but rather subjective virtue, in religious +practices to which on account of simplicity or invincible ignorance too +much power is attributed, as when one who is faithful to the essential +duties of religion has greater confidence in some personal devotion of +his own than in them. But superstition of this kind, though in itself +it is the least reprehensible form of superstition, may be very harmful +and disedifying.</p> + +<p>2296. Cooperation in Divination or Other Form of Superstition.—(a) +Formal cooperation is of course never lawful (e.g., to act as the +medium or one of the deceivers at a spiritistic meeting). (b) Material +cooperation is lawful only when there is a proportionately grave +reason, no danger of sin, and no scandal. Thus, it seems that no sin is +committed by a scientist who assists at a spiritistic seance in order +to discover the frauds that are resorted to, or who makes experiments +with table turning or planchette movements in order to examine into the +theory that the phenomena are due to the action of the persons present.</p> + +<p>2297. Doubtful Cases of Vain Observance.—Cases in which it is a matter +of doubt or dispute whether divination or vain observance is present.</p> + +<p>(a) There is sometimes uncertainty whether an extraordinary fact is due +to natural or supranatural causes, Thus, authorities commonly take the +position, it seems, that certain phenomena of Spiritism (e.g., the +apparently automatic movement of tables on which a group of persons +rest their finger tips, the answers to questions that are rapped out by +such tables), and of mental healing (e.g., the cure of bodily ailment +by sympathy or moral influence), are accomplished through natural +powers of matter or mind. But other authorities incline to a +supranaturalistic explanation.</p> + +<p>(b) There is also at times uncertainty whether a fact or practice has a +religious or an irreligious character. As to facts, they sometimes +appear to be so marvellous as to pass the natural, and yet it is +difficult to determine whether their source is good or evil (e.g., when +an ignorant person not noted for piety seems to have a remarkable +ability for treating and curing all kinds of diseases). As to +practices, they are sometimes susceptible of a religious or a +superstitious interpretation. Thus, one who says, “God bless us,” at a +sneeze may intend a prayer against sickness; one who knocks on wood +after boasting may intend a prayer to Him who died on the wood of the +cross, lest he be punished for boasting.</p> + +<p>2298. Licitness of Using Doubtfully Superstitious Means.—It is lawful +to use means that are only doubtfully superstitious if the following +conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) internally or subjectively, there must be a good conscience about +the use of the means. The rule can be followed that what is not +certainly of a supranatural character may be regarded as natural, but +that what seems to be supranatural is not to be ascribed to God unless +it has the marks and fruits of a divine work. When lawfully using means +of a dubious character, it is advisable to make an inner protestation +that one acts from reasonable necessity, and has no wish to take part +in superstition;</p> + +<p>(b) externally or objectively, there must be nothing in the object or +circumstances or results to make the use of the means illicit. Thus, +even though a practice be not superstitious, it may be unlawful because +of the immorality of its object or tendency (e.g., frauds used by +psychical researchers, obscene messages given by laboratory +telepathists), or of its purpose (e.g., table-rapping used as the +instrument of pretended religious revelations), or because of the evil +consequences for body or soul (e.g., devotees of the ouija board give +scandal to others and often end in insanity or suicide).</p> + +<p>2299. Irreligiousness.—We now proceed to the four sins that offend +religion by defect, namely, temptation of God and perjury, which show +disrespect to God Himself, and sacrilege and simony, which show +disrespect to holy things (see 2273). Perjury has been treated above +(see 2249), and hence we shall consider now only the other three forms +of irreligiousness.</p> + +<p>2300. Temptation of God.—Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts +God to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some +perfection.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover +whether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of +defiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.</p> + +<p>(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive +(since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He +who tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.</p> + +<p>(c) It is concerned with God, hence there is no temptation of God if +one legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself +tempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that +their virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of +spirits St. John says: “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits +if they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the +world” (I John, iv. 1).</p> + +<p>(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of +instruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or +will exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to +unbelief or to presumption.</p> + +<p>2301. Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.—(a) To seek a proof +of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only +to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in +an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a +theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further +illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the +goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine +things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).</p> + +<p>(b) To seek a sign of God’s will or a manifestation of His perfections +is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity, +ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or +great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had +spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias +called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III +Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary +means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a +sign of God’s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for +miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes +himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise +be had, in the trust that God will be with him.</p> + +<p>2302. Kinds of Temptation of God.—(a) In relation to its source, +temptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The +former, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one +disbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the +proof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the +providence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19), +or when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight +of Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God +in the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a +just cause for a miraculous manifestation of God’s will, or powers, or +of some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in +some miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his +health, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of +God is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption +(see 1081).</p> + +<p>(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or +interpretative. It is express when one intends by one’s word or act to +put God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or +other perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from +the Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or +boldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his +amusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not +intend to discover God’s perfections or make presumptuous requests, but +nevertheless so acts or omits to act that one’s conduct is useful for +nothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a +miracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any +medical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared +to his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a +quasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is +disrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God, +nor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being +laziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.</p> + +<p>2303. Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.—There +is no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts +rashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or +special intervention from God. This happens as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires +that it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a +dangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or +when a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of +moderate mortification);</p> + +<p>(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as +to believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through +chance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult +examination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he +knows will be asked.</p> + +<p>2304. Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.—(a) If there is a +sufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be +sufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are +harmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g., +St. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician, +certain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove +bodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).</p> + +<p>(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful. +Thus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is +disbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism +attributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only +cure is “faith”); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the +conduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or +homicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.</p> + +<p>2305. The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.—(a) To doubt the +perfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God +in disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the +essence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either +unjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or +presumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi. +16): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” But invincible ignorance +excuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to +ordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals, +risking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a +doubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of +temptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the +ninth century.</p> + +<p>(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call +upon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention +of the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence +(i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is +justified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations +leagued against him, Josaphat prayed: “As we know not what to do, we +can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord +promised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare +their defense on account of the persecutions to which they were +subjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19), +and that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving +mountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is +not unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really +doubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown +will), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees +of a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not +presumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do +this (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that +the promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii. +11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a +sign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it +prudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g., +the Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in +confirmation of their preaching).</p> + +<p>2306. The Malice of Temptation of God.—(a) It is a sin directly +against religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that +He prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard +the ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin +is less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God +professes doubt, while superstition professes positive error. +Temptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith +(e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one +presumes that God will do all without one’s cooperation), charity +(e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to +scandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously +averted).</p> + +<p>(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But +it may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when +from weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for +a sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of +the matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes +on the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other +small affair.</p> + +<p>2307. As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an +individual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:</p> + +<p>(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His +goodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;</p> + +<p>(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the +roof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving +health, neglecting to provide for one’s sustenance, etc., in the +expectation that God will miraculously provide;</p> + +<p>(c) when one causes grave harm to others, as when a person rashly +asking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or +scandalizes believers.</p> + +<p>2308. Sacrilege.—Sacrilege in the wide sense is any sin against the +virtue of religion. But in the strict sense, in which it is now taken, +it is defined as “the violation of a sacred thing.”</p> + +<p>(a) Sacrilege is against a thing, that is, against some person, place +or object dedicated to divine worship as a possession of God. Sacrilege +differs from the two previous sins of irreligiosity (namely, temptation +of God and perjury); for they are against the reverence due to God +Himself, while sacrilege is against the reverence due to things on +account of their use in the worship of God.</p> + +<p>(b) It is against a sacred thing, that is, against the sanctity which a +thing acquires from its dedication to God (e.g., when a church or a +chalice is consecrated to divine worship, when a virgin is dedicated to +God by vow), or from the immunity or privilege conferred on it by the +Church on account of its dedication to God (e.g., the clerical +privileges of forum and of canon in Church Law). But sacrilege is +present only when a sacred thing is attacked in that special quality or +relation in which it is sacred. Hence, he who violates the chastity of +a virgin consecrated to God is guilty of sacrilege, since it is her +chastity that was vowed to God; he who strikes her is also guilty of +sacrilege, since he attacks the sacred immunity which the law confers +on her; he who calumniates her or steals from her is not guilty of +sacrilege, since her name and goods are not consecrated to divine +worship nor protected by its special sacredness in law.</p> + +<p>(c) Sacrilege is a violation, that is, an action or omission physically +or morally injurious to the sacred character of a person, place or +thing. The difference between the injury done in sacrilege and that +done in simony is that the former injustice belongs to the class of +wrongs inflicted in involuntary commutations, such as theft or robbery +(see 1748, 1815), whereas the latter injustice pertains to the category +of wrongs perpetrated in voluntary commutations, such as buying, +selling, or lending. In both cases there is an injury to the property +or possession of God, but the difference is that in sacrilege the +parties involved are the sacrilegious person acting as aggressor +against God, in simony the parties are two men bargaining together to +buy and sell the sacred things of God.</p> + +<p>2309. What Kind of Consecration Must Be Violated to Constitute +Sacrilege?—There are various opinions about the kind of assignment to +worship necessary for the sacredness which is injured by sacrilege.</p> + +<p>(a) The opinion that seems to be common today holds that the assignment +must be made through some public rite or consecration on the part of +the Church. Hence, according to this view, the violation of a private +vow or resolution is not sacrilegious, but rather perfidious or +disloyal. The argument for this opinion is that the public acceptance +of the Church, which has control over divine worship, is a necessary +factor in making anything sacred to that worship; and that many +absurdities would follow from the principle that each individual has +the power to give the sacredness in question to his own person, acts or +possessions.</p> + +<p>(b) According to a stricter opinion, no public assignment is necessary +if the consecration is a personal one; and hence the violation of even +a private vow of chastity would be sacrilegious. The argument is that +even a private vow affecting the person sets it apart as a sacred thing.</p> + +<p>(c) According to a still stricter view, no public assignment to worship +is necessary, whether the consecration be personal or non-personal, and +hence even the violation of a vow to fast would be sacrilegious. The +argument is that anything set apart for God’s honor, either publicly or +privately, becomes sacred to Him.</p> + +<p>2310. Is Sacrilege a Special Sin?—(a) As regards its matter or subject +sacrilege may be called, though improperly, a general sin, in the sense +that many different classes of sins may be sacrilegious (e.g., murder +is sacrilegious when a sacred person is killed, lust is sacrilegious +when a person vowed to God is violated; theft is sacrilegious when +objects consecrated to divine worship are stolen, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) As regards its form or essence, and hence properly speaking, +sacrilege is a special sin, because there is a peculiar deformity +contained in the very nature of sacrilege that is not in other sins, +namely, the disrespect shown to God through contempt for things that +are sacred to Him. Moreover, there may be a sin of sacrilege that is +separate from other sins, such as murder, lust, and theft, for example, +when the right of asylum is violated.</p> + +<p>2311. The Species of Sacrilege.—(a) Personal sacrilege is committed +when the sacredness of a person is violated. This happens in the first +place when bodily or real harm (e.g., gravely sinful striking, citing +before a secular tribunal, subjecting to civil duties or burdens, such +as military service) is done to a cleric; and in the second place when +a grave sin of unchastity is committed by or with a person dedicated to +God by a vow (at least by a public vow) of chastity. Sacrilege +committed through bodily or real harm is treated by canonists under the +questions of the privileges of canon (Canon 119), forum (Canon 120), +immunity (Canon 121). Sacrilegious impurity committed with a person +vowed to chastity and sacrilegious impurity committed by a person vowed +to chastity are grave sins of lust, even though they be only of thought +or desire.</p> + +<p>(b) Local sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of a place is +injured. A place is considered sacred or religious when it possesses +sanctity as being consecrated or blessed for divine worship or for +burial of the faithful, namely, churches, public or semi-public +oratories, and consecrated cemeteries. Injury is done to the holiness +of the place by desecration or profanation. Desecration is the +performance in a sacred place of a notorious act of irreverence which +so spiritually contaminates it that the divine offices may not be +lawfully celebrated therein until the rite of reconciliation has been +performed. Canon 1172 enumerates four causes of desecration: the crime +of homicide; the injurious and serious shedding of human blood; impious +or sordid uses (e.g., if a church were turned into a brothel or +gambling den, a dump, or cattle stable), and burial of an infidel or +person excommunicated by condemnatory or declaratory sentence. +Profanation of a sacred place is a disregard for the religious respect +or immunity due to it which in some way materially contaminates it +(e.g., if a church is not kept nice and clean; if markets and fairs are +held in its precincts; if it is used for shows, plays, moving pictures, +banquets, court proceedings; if the right of asylum is violated; if the +church is broken into, seriously defaced, burned). These matters are +treated more fully in commentaries on Canons 1172 sqq.</p> + +<p>(c) Real sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of an object is +violated. An object is sacred when it contains the Author of holiness +or confers holiness (viz., the Eucharist and the other Sacraments), +when it is naturally related to the Sacraments or sacred persons (e.g., +the sacred vessels, images and relics of the Saints), when it is set +aside for the uses of worship (e.g., holy water and other sacramentals, +candles for the altar) or the maintenance of the Church or its +ministers (viz., movables and immovables of a parish, money left for +the support of the clergy, seminarians, etc.). Injury is done to the +holiness of an object by unworthy treatment or by unjust damage or +conversion. Examples of unworthy treatment are the following: the +invalid or sinful administration or reception of a Sacrament, parodies +of Sacred Scripture, scandalous manner of enacting sacred rites or +saying prayers, use of sacred chalices or other sacred vessels or of +blessed articles for profane purposes, use of unblessed holy articles +for sordid or ignoble purposes, handling of chalices, etc., by those +who have no right to touch sacred vessels (Canon 1306). Examples of +unjust damage or conversion are: contemptuous breaking or burning of +relics, oils, pictures used for worship; theft of moneys or goods +belonging to the Church.</p> + +<p>2312. Special Cases Regarding Local Sacrilege.—Local sacrilege is not +committed by every sin, even though grave, that is done in a holy +place, for the character of this sacrilege is that it be such an injury +to the sacredness of the place as to make what should be hallowed seem +horrible, or contemptible, or common. Hence, there is no sacrilege in +detractions, lies, perjuries, blasphemies, or in most internal sins, +when committed in a church or cemetery. But there are two kinds of sins +which are sacrilegious profanations of holy places, namely, theft and +impurity.</p> + +<p>(a) Theft in a holy place is certainly sacrilegious when the thing +taken is sacred (e.g., a chalice, money in the votive stands). It is +probably not sacrilegious when the thing taken is not sacred (e.g., the +pocketbook of a person kneeling in the church), and if the thing taken +was not left in the custody of the place. This matter, however, is +disputed.</p> + +<p>(b) Impurity, if external and perfect (_voluntaria effusio seminis_), +is sacrilegious, though under the Code it does not seem to be a +desecration. The same is probably true of external but imperfect sins +(such as touches, looks, words, gestures). Internal acts of impurity +are not sacrilegious, unless they include a desire to sin externally in +a holy place.</p> + +<p>2313. Cases Wherein There Is No Sacrilege.—In the following cases no +sacrilege is committed:</p> + +<p>(a) when the thing violated is not sacred. There is no personal +sacrilege in an act of unchastity committed by a person privately vowed +to chastity (common opinon). While some authors teach that personal +sacrilege is committed by the violation of poverty and obedience (see +Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, n.804, 4), it seems better +to hold the opposite opinion and restrict personal sacrilege to +violations of chastity by persons with religious vows or admitted to +the religious state. There is no local sacrilege in the profane use of +a place devoted to works of piety but not specially set apart for them +by Church authority (such as a private oratory, or a hospital conducted +by the laity), nor in the burial of infidels in an unblessed graveyard. +There is no real sacrilege in profane use of things which are not set +apart exclusively for sacred use (e.g., to use the candelabra and +candles of the altar to read by in one’s room), or which have not been +made sacred (e.g., to steal money promised but not delivered to the +Church or the personal belongings of a cleric);</p> + +<p>(b) when the thing injured is sacred, but the action or omission is not +opposed to the attribute in which it is holy, or to a law made to +ensure respect for it. Thus, a person who has the vow of chastity does +not commit sacrilege if he becomes intoxicated or uses profane +language, for he was not consecrated against those sins; a sacred place +is not sacrilegiously violated by an act not opposed to its holiness or +the respect demanded for it by the law (e.g., organ recitals or awards +for Christian Doctrine in church, sale of candles in the vestibule, +physical violence against a disturber of divine service). Sacrilege is +not done in reverently destroying an old and tattered vestment, in +respectfully handling agnus deis, relics, unused palls, and other +objects that may be touched by all.</p> + +<p>2314. Sacredness as Aggravating Circumstance of Sin.—But a sin that is +not sacrilegious is often made worse by reason of the sacredness of +some thing with which the sin is connected. (a) Thus, the sin is +aggravated by such circumstances as person and place. In this way it is +worse for a person vowed to God to blaspheme or lie than for one who +has no vow; it is worse to carry on frivolous or calumnious +conversations in church than on the street. (b) The sin receives the +additional malice of sacrilege if the sinner expressly intends the +circumstance of time, place, etc., in order to show contempt. Thus, it +is not sacrilege to get drunk on a Sunday or holyday, unless one wishes +by the sin to show dishonor to the sacred time; it is not sacrilege to +conduct oneself with levity in church, unless one wishes by the levity +to show contempt for the place.</p> + +<p>2315. The Malice of Sacrilege.—(a) The moral malice of sacrilege is +that of irreligiousness (see 2299). The three kinds of sacrilege +(personal, local and real) are commonly regarded as three distinct +species of sin; for, just as injuries done to a man’s person, to his +immovable property, and to his movable goods are looked upon in law as +different kinds of offenses, so are injuries offered to the ministers +of God, the house of God, and the objects used in the service of God +unequal in the dishonor which they give to God before the public. More +probably there are no sub-species of these three classes of sacrilege. +Hence, in so far as the disrespect to God is concerned, there seems no +essential difference between the sin of violating and that of striking +a consecrated virgin.</p> + +<p>(b) The theological malice of sacrilege is mortal from the nature of +the sin. Just as it is gravely insulting to a man to treat his +representatives or his home or chattels with contempt, likewise +disrespect for the things of God is disrespect for God Himself. The +seriousness of sacrilege is seen from the punishments visited on Core, +Dathan and Abiron (Num., xvi), on the sons of Heli (I Kings, ii. 17, +iv. 11), on King Balthasar (Dan., v. 2 sqq.), and on the sellers in the +temple (John, ii. 14). Sacrilege may be venial, however, on account of +the imperfection of the act (e.g., when one strikes a priest without +reflecting that he is a clergyman) or the smallness of the matter +(e.g., to quote Scripture in a decent joke, to use altar linen that is +only slightly soiled or torn, to touch the chalice without permission, +to steal a few pennies from a church).</p> + +<p>2316. Conditions that Govern Gravity of Sacrilege.—To decide in a +concrete case whether a sacrilege is gravely or lightly sinful, one +should consider the internal state of mind of the offender and the +external character of the offense. (a) Thus, if the purpose is directly +and formally to dishonor God, the sin is grave, but, if there is some +other purpose, it may be light. (b) If the thing dishonored is more +closely related to God, or if the act of dishonor is in public +estimation more insulting, the sin is more serious. Unworthy treatment +of the Eucharist is the worst of sacrileges; ill-usage of a sacred +person is worse than disrespect for a sacred place; treading the Sacred +Species under foot is more contemptuous than an unworthy Communion, etc.</p> + +<p>2317. Simony.—Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, the first +person in New Testament times, as far as we know, who committed this +crime. For it is written of Simon (Acts, viii. 18 sqq.) that he +attempted to buy from St. Peter the power of imposition of hands. But +the sin was not unknown in the Old Testament, as we see from the +examples of Baalam (Numb., xxii. 7), Giezi (IV Kings, v. 20 sqq.), and +Jason (II Mach., iv. 7 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2318. Definition of Simony.—Simony is defined as “the studied will to +buy or sell for a temporal price or consideration something that is +spiritual either intrinsically or extrinsically.”</p> + +<p>(a) Simony is in the will, for it is an act of injustice pretending to +have or to receive the right of dominion over spiritual things that +belong to God alone, and injustice is a vice of the will. Hence, simony +is not an internal sin of the intellect; for, though one who practises +simony externally makes to some extent a profession of belief in the +heresy that man is the owner of spirituals and gives grounds for the +suspicion that he holds that the sale of spirituals is lawful, yet he +may know well that the things of God are priceless and still wish to +give or receive a price for them. Again, simony is not to be identified +with the external act of bargaining for spirituals; for, though the law +punishes only external or completed simony, the guilt and malice of the +sin is present even when one has the desire to traffic in spiritual +things, but makes no overtures or compact.</p> + +<p>(b) Simony is a studied will; that is, it is an act of free and +deliberate choice selecting some form of internal or external simony as +a desirable means. Hence, it is not sufficient for the sin of simony +that there be an internal wish not fully voluntary on account of +inculpable ignorance or imperfect consent; nor, on the other hand, is +it necessary for incurring the guilt of simony that there be a mutual +pact, but it suffices that one party alone have the will to make the +pact or to obligate another party to simony.</p> + +<p>(c) It is a wish to buy or sell, that is, to give or receive a temporal +thing in exchange for a spiritual thing. There is question here, then, +not only of the contract of sale, but of any other form of onerous +contract, such as hire, rent, loan, exchange, _do ut des_, _facio ut +facias_, etc. To be simoniacal, however, a contract need not be +fulfilled or explicitly manifested; it suffices that it be unfulfilled +or tacitly made, if the sinful intent can be gathered from the +circumstances of the case. Hence, from the present part of the +definition it follows that there is no simony in a gratuitous contract +(e.g., when one gives a gift to another hoping and expecting that the +later from gratitude will give in return something spiritual which it +is lawful to bestow from gratitude; when a poor person offers to make a +novena for benefactors who give him an alms). It is simony, however, to +make an onerous contract under the guise of a gratuitous contract, for +example: “I give you this money as a pure gift on condition that you +will not be ungrateful but will give me this spiritual favor as a pure +gift.”</p> + +<p>(d) The price or consideration in simony is some thing, action or +forbearance which in some way is of advantage to the recipient. Simony +in the strictest sense is committed when a temporal thing is offered +for a spiritual thing (e.g., money paid for a Sacrament); simony in the +wide sense is committed when, contrary to the law on simony, things +like in character are exchanged (2323 a). Thus, if the Church forbids +Mass to be exchanged for Mass, or benefice for benefice, or the office +of sacristan for that of sexton, transgressors are guilty of the second +form of simony.</p> + +<p>(e) The matter of simony is something intrinsically or extrinsically +spiritual. In general, the spiritual is that which proceeds from God or +tends to Him as the Author or End of eternal salvation (viz., the +destiny, law, means, works, etc., proposed to us in Christian +revelation and religion). Among these things those are intrinsically +spiritual that pertain to the supernatural order on account of some +inherent character of their own (e.g., grace, Sacraments, Mass, +miracles) or some intimate union with things spiritual (e.g., benefices +attached to spiritual offices, consecration to be given a chalice); +those are extrinsically spiritual that are in themselves temporal, but +in church law are treated as spiritual for the sake of reverence to the +intrinsically spiritual (e.g., chrism in regard to the material itself +of the oil and other ingredients). If the matter of a contract is +neither intrinsically nor extrinsically spiritual, there is no simony +in buying or selling it (e.g., devotional books, household furnishings +of a rectory, personal effects of a cleric).</p> + +<p>2319. Temporal Price in Simony.—The temporal price in simony is some +temporal good or advantage. St. Gregory the Great distinguishes three +kinds of simoniacal prices as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) the price from the hand (_munus a manu_) is either money or things +that have a money value, such as movable or immovable property, +corporeal or incorporeal rights. It would be simony to give a benefice +in exchange for a sum of money, for a loan, for real estate;</p> + +<p>(b) the price from the tongue (_munus a lingua_) is any kind of +patronage, such as praise, recommendation, protection, defense, +opposition to competitors, etc. It would be simony to confer a benefice +in exchange for the influence in one’s favor which the recipient of the +benefice would exercise with some powerful person, for his vote in an +election, etc.;</p> + +<p>(c) the price in service (_munus ab obsequio_) is any kind of temporal +labor or assistance given for another’s benefit, such as the management +of his business or the instruction of his children. It would be simony +to grant a benefice in exchange for work done as secretary, treasurer, +or advisor.</p> + +<p>2320. The Spiritual Thing in Simony.—The thing inherently spiritual in +simony is also of three kinds. (a) That which is spiritual from its +nature is a thing that is supernatural in itself, such as sanctifying +grace, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the power of orders or of +jurisdiction. (b) That which is supernatural from its cause is a thing +produced by a supernatural agency or power, such as health obtained +through miracle. (c) That which is supernatural from its effect is a +thing having the virtue of producing supernatural results, _ex opere +operato_, or _ex opere operantis_, or as an occasion (e.g., Sacraments, +prayers, sermons).</p> + +<p>2321. Temporal Thing United with Spiritual.—In the two following ways +things are made spiritual in reference to simony through intimate union +with spirituals: (a) by necessary connection, when a temporal thing is +so annexed with a spiritual thing that it cannot exist without it. This +includes the things annexed consequently, and perhaps also those +annexed concomitantly and intrinsically (see 2322); (b) by contractual +connection, when a spiritual and a temporal are the partial objects of +a contract, as when in the sale of a consecrated chalice the price is +raised on account of the consecration.</p> + +<p>2322. Temporal Thing Annexed to Spiritual.—In three ways a temporal +thing is annexed to a spiritual thing.</p> + +<p>(a) The temporal thing is annexed antecedently if it precedes the +spiritual thing as its prepared or appointed or presupposed matter or +subject. Thus, all things that receive a consecration or blessing +(e.g., chalices, rosaries) or a property to which a right of patronage +is attached are of this kind. Relics are properly of this category, +but, since they have usually no material value, it is customary to +include them amongst spirituals.</p> + +<p>(b) The temporal thing is annexed concomitantly if it is simultaneous +with the spiritual thing as being the action or labor that produces it. +If the union is essential and inseparable, the temporal thing is said +to be annexed intrinsically (e.g., the work performed in saying Mass, +preaching, making a sick call); if the union is not essential, the +temporal thing is said to be annexed extrinsically (e.g., the special +work performed in saying Mass, if it has to be sung, or said in a +distant church, or at a determined hour).</p> + +<p>(c) The temporal thing is annexed consequently when it presupposes the +spiritual thing as the cause on which it depends. Thus, the revenues of +a parish are a temporal thing, but they follow on the pastoral office +which is a spiritual thing.</p> + +<p>2323. The Various Kinds of Simony.—(a) In reference to its matter or +the law violated, simony is either against natural and divine law or +against positive ecclesiastical law. Simony against divine law consists +in the exchange for temporalities of things that are spiritual or +intimately annexed to the spiritual (see 2321), such as Sacraments, +indulgences, or jurisdiction. Simony against church law consists in an +exchange that has the appearance of simony against divine law, or that +easily leads to simony against the divine law, and is consequently +forbidden by the Church in order to safeguard religious respect for +sacred things, as when one violates the law by taking money for holy +oils. In the former kind of simony, things of different orders +(spirituals and temporals) are exchanged one for the other; in the +latter kind of simony, things of the same sort (spirituals for +spirituals, temporals for temporals, etc.) are exchanged where the law +forbids (Canon 727).</p> + +<p>(b) In reference to its manner, or the way in which it is committed, +simony is internal or external. Internal simony is the will, without +the external agreement, to exchange spirituals for temporals; it is +purely mental if nothing external is done by reason of the internal +will; it is not purely mental if something external is done by reason +of the internal will (e.g., if the person who desires to commit simony +makes a money present to another in the hope that the latter will feel +morally bound to give something spiritual in return, or if one gives +something spiritual looking for a substantial gift of money as +compensation). External simony is an outward pact freely entered into +between two parties to exchange spirituals for temporals. It is called +purely conventional, if neither party has as yet performed his part of +the agreement; it is semi-real or mixed, if one of the parties has +executed his part; it is real if both parties have performed, at least +in part, what they agreed to. A simoniacal compact is explicit, if +expressed by clear words or signs (e.g., “I will pay $100 for your +vote”); it is tacit, if circumstances indicate the evil intention +(e.g., very unusual presents given before an election).</p> + +<p>2324. Confidential Simony.—Simony committed in reference to benefices +is called confidential because the contract is illegal, giving no +judicial protection, and there is only the confidence or reliance on +another’s word to give assurance that the agreement will be kept. +Canonists discuss at length the following contracts in which it is +committed:</p> + +<p>(a) the contract _per accessum_ grants a benefice with the agreement +that the grantee will later resign, so that access to it may be had by +the grantor or a third party at present incapable;</p> + +<p>(b) the contract _per ingressum_ resigns a benefice not yet taken +possession of with the understanding that the person who now enters +into possession will leave the place open for his predecessor if he +himself resigns or is promoted;</p> + +<p>(e) the contract _per regressum_ resigns a benefice already possessed +with the understanding that it may be recovered by the person now +resigning or by a third party;</p> + +<p>(d) the contract _per reservationem partis_ obtains a benefice for +another with the stipulation that he will pay a certain percentage of +its revenues to the person who obtains it for him or to a third party +(see Canon 1441).</p> + +<p>2325. Simony Against Divine Law.—Simony against divine law is +committed in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is +formally or virtually given or received for them.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it +is regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action +itself (_finis operis_), one of the things exchanged being used as the +measure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy +or sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may +be expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he +judges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as +when one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive +than that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).</p> + +<p>(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is +intended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (_finis +operantis_), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices +or comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no +other immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a +spiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service, +intending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some +spiritual benefit, or bestows a “gratuitous” temporal favor as +compensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n. +1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange, +implicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony +would be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very +simple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not +the price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous +compensation.</p> + +<p>2326. The temporal thing is not made the virtual price of the spiritual +thing, if there is a lawful proximate motive (i.e., one recognized by +the Canons or legitimate custom) for giving the temporal thing and the +desire of receiving the spiritual thing is only the remote reason or +occasion of the act. For in such a case the temporal thing is given for +a lawful purpose and is not the price of a spiritual thing.</p> + +<p>Examples: (a) If the recipient of the temporal thing has a right to it, +there is no simony. Thus, the ministers of the altar have a right to +their support (see 2186), and it is not simoniacal, when asking +spiritual things from them (e.g., the application of Mass to one’s +intention, the performance of Sacraments and sacred functions), to +offer a stipend or fee; (b) if the bestower of the temporal thing gives +it freely out of pure friendship, liberality, charity, gratitude or +good will, so that it is an absolute gift, there is no simony, even +though he hopes or expects that he will receive something spiritual as +a mark of appreciation. But “a charitable or friendly gift” may easily +be palliated simony; that is, there may be a pretense of liberality to +conceal the real purpose of purchasing spirituals with temporals.</p> + +<p>2327. Rules of Alexander III for Determining Simony.—Alexander III +gave several rules for determining whether a gift is made from +liberality or with simoniacal intent.</p> + +<p>(a) The following are marks of simoniacal intent: the quality of the +giver (e.g., that he is poor, or in great need, or not customarily +generous), the quantity of the gift (e.g., that it corresponds with the +value of a vacant benefice, that it is surprisingly large), the time of +the gift (e.g., that it is made when the donee is not in any special +need, or when he is about to confer an office, or after hints have been +made). If a gift is bestowed in connection with a spiritual thing +received, the presumption is for simoniacal intent, unless there was a +sincere and reasonable motive for the gift.</p> + +<p>(b) The following, on the contrary, are marks of a liberal intent: the +quality of the giver (e.g., that he is wealthy, noted for kindness and +compassion, or liberal to all, or is a relative of the donee); the +quantity of the gift (e.g., that it is small or normal in size), the +time of the gift (e.g., if it is made when necessity, festal occasion, +or the like calls for it).</p> + +<p>2328. Simony against Divine Law in Reference to Things Annexed to +Spirituals.—(a) It is simony against divine law to buy or sell things +annexed to spirituals consequently (e.g., the revenues of a benefice) +or concomitantly and intrinsically (e.g., the ordinary labor and +fatigue connected with preaching, saying Mass); for in the former case +the temporal grows out of a spiritual and is morally one with it, while +in the latter case the temporal has no value except in so far as it is +joined with the spiritual.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not simony against divine law to buy or sell things annexed +to spirituals antecedently (e.g., blessed candles, sacred vestments), +if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual thing, or things +annexed concomitantly and extrinsically (e.g., the extraordinary labor +and fatigue caused by saying Mass in a distant place or at a late +hour); for in both cases the temporal has its own proper value and is +not considered as inseparable from the spiritual. There is simony +against divine law, however, if the price is raised on account of the +spiritual part (e.g., if something is added for the blessing given a +candle), and simony against church law if the transaction is forbidden +as simoniacal (e.g., deductions and payments made in the act of +preferment to a benefice are contrary to Canon 1441).</p> + +<p>2329. Conditions Necessary for Simony against Ecclesiastical Law.—(a) +There must be an exchange through some kind of onerous contract, but it +suffices that the understanding be tacit and non-executed, as was +explained above (see 2323).</p> + +<p>(b) There must be a law of the Church which, from a motive of respect +for sacred things, forbids the exchange.</p> + +<p>(c) The simoniacal exchange is made, whether a temporal annexed to a +spiritual is given for another temporal annexed to a spiritual (e.g., +benefice for benefice), or a spiritual for a spiritual, or a temporal +for a temporal. Canonists enumerate the following as examples of simony +of ecclesiastical law: gifts made in connection with a competitive +examination for a parochial benefice, with ordination or grant of +certain testimonial letters (Canon 545), with erection of +confraternities; sale of blessed oil or chrism, or of the right of +patronage (Canon 1470); remuneration for collection of stipends or for +expenses of Mass (Canons 840, 1303).</p> + +<p>2330. Certain and Uncertain Simony.—(a) Cases in which simony is +certain are the administration of Sacraments or sacramentals to the +unworthy for the sake of the fee or favors, the sale of indulgences, +taxes or charges made contrary to law (e.g., for a Mass of bination). +Other examples are given in 2323 sqq. The Church demands that certain +ministrations (e.g., Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, +Orders) be gratis, but there may be local customs or conditions that +justify exceptions. Some moralists teach that there is no simony when a +stipend is exacted for an obligatory ministry, if the simoniacal motive +is absent.</p> + +<p>(b) Cases in which simony is controverted are those in which a tax or +stipend in excess of what is just or lawful is exacted (e.g., a Mass +stipend higher than custom permits). Some claim there is simony, +because the excess must be for the spiritual thing; others hold that +there is no simony, but only an unjust increase in the stipend allowed +for support; others say that there is no simony in the internal forum +if the intent is not simoniacal, but that there is simony in the +external forum on account of the presumption of simoniacal intent.</p> + +<p>2331. Doubtful Cases of Simony.—In some gifts and payments the +presence or absence of simony depends on the object for which they are +given.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, when they are given for omission of a spiritual act, there is +simony if the omission includes the exercise of spiritual power (e.g., +to omit absolution is to retain sins or censures); there is no simony +if the omission is the mere exercise of free will (e.g., to omit Mass, +confession).</p> + +<p>(b) When they are given for omission of opposition or annoyance, so +that one may be able to obtain some office or benefice, there is simony +if the temporal thing is thereby given for the benefice itself or for +the way to it (i.e., if one has no strict right to the spiritual thing, +or if the opposition is just), as when the candidate for a benefice +pays a competitor to withdraw, or pays an accuser to keep silence; +there is no simony if the temporal thing is given for freedom from +unjust vexation (i.e., if one has a strict right to the spiritual thing +and the opposition is clearly unjust, as when one who has acquired a +right to an office pays an enemy to desist from placing impediments). +The payment made by Jacob to Esau for the birthright, to which Jacob +was entitled by divine disposition, may be regarded as having had for +its end, not the paternal blessing and other spiritual rights of the +first-born, but immunity from persecution by Esau.</p> + +<p>(e) When they are given for instruction, there is simony if the +instruction has for its direct purpose the spiritual benefit of the +disciple (e.g., catechetical instructions, sermons, spiritual +direction); there is no simony if the instruction has for its direct +purpose the improvement of the mind or the utility or advantage which +the disciple will derive from it (e.g., instruction in theology, +preparation for examinations).</p> + +<p>(d) When they are given for admission to religious life, there is +simony if the money is paid for the religious state itself, the vows, +or other spirituals; there is no simony if the money is paid for the +temporal support of the religious institute, that it may be able to +meet its expenses.</p> + +<p>2332. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Lawful.—(a) +There is no simony when a temporal is given on the occasion of but not +for a spiritual. This happens when there is a just title for bestowal +of the temporal, such as right of support (e.g., pastors’ salaries, +Mass stipends, fees), extrinsic values in a work or object (e.g., the +special labor in saying Mass under certain conditions, and, according +to some, the special affection one has for a relic, the _lucrum +cessans_ on account of some function performed).</p> + +<p>(b) There is no simony when something of value is given in exchange, +but not for a spiritual, nor in contravention of an anti-simony law. +This happens whether like be exchanged for like (e.g., Mass for Mass), +or a temporal for a thing associated with a spiritual as the latter’s +subject (e.g., money for a rosary or cemetery plot which has been +blessed). In the former case there is no prohibition; in the latter, +the temporalities have their own distinct values which may be paid for, +if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual (see Canons 730, +1539).</p> + +<p>2333. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Is +Sinful.—(a) Sins against God.—One who performs functions of religion +primarily and principally, as far as his personal motive (_finis +operantis_) is concerned, for the salary, stipend or fee, is not guilty +of simony, since he does not regard the temporal even virtually as the +price of the spiritual. But he does sin by indevotion, and the sin may +even be mortal (e.g., a canon goes to choir chiefly because this yields +him a living). Offenses committed in the matter of Mass stipends are +not called simony in the Code, but the penal law classes them with +offenses against religion, as may be seen from Canon 2324. Nepotism, +favoritism in giving offices, and political and dishonest maneuvers to +obtain church dignities are not in themselves simoniacal; but they are +an unworthy and scandalous treatment of sacred things.</p> + +<p>(b) Sins against Others.—It is not simony but injustice to deny the +Sacraments to parishioners who do not contribute, to overcharge in +lawful fees, and also, according to some, to take money for the +omission of a spiritual act owed in justice (e.g., for refusal to hear +the confession of a parishioner), or to demand money as the stipend for +the performance of such a spiritual act (e.g., for hearing a +confession). It is disobedience to take money in ways forbidden (e.g., +to take Mass stipends in the confessional, to earn money by gambling or +trading forbidden in the Canons). Again, it is not strictly simony to +put up as the stakes in a game a spiritual thing (e.g., the recitation +of the Rosary) against a temporal thing (e.g., ten dollars), for there +is no intention to value the spiritual thing by the temporal; but such +a practice is scandalous. Greed about getting or keeping money pertains +to avarice, not necessarily to simony.</p> + +<p>2334. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but +Virtuous.—(a) Some acts done in God’s honor (e.g., to purchase a +spiritual object, such as a sacred vessel or relic, from a person who +would misuse it), when the purchaser intends the prevention of +profanation. It is certainly not irreverence to a sacred thing to use +means necessary to rescue it from such irreverence.</p> + +<p>(b) Some acts done for the good of others (e.g., to give prizes to +children who frequent the Sacraments or Sunday school, dowries to young +girls that they may be able to enter religion, free education to worthy +young men as an inducement to embrace the ecclesiastical state). In all +these cases there is no purchase of a spiritual thing, because the +temporal is a pure gift, and the spiritual is received, not by the +giver of the temporal, but by another. There is no simony in the fees +imposed for dispensations or in the alms sometimes prescribed for +indulgences; for the temporal is not a price paid for the spiritual, +but in the one case either a penance or a charge for expenses, and in +the other a spiritual good work and duty prescribed as a condition for +a spiritual benefit.</p> + +<p>(e) Some acts done for the spiritual good of self (e.g., if one were in +danger of death and could be baptized only by a person Who demanded +money for the service, it would not be simony to pay the money, since +the price would be offered, not for the Sacrament, but for the removal +of an unjust annoyance).</p> + +<p>2335. Theological Malice of the Sin of Simony.—(a) Simony against the +divine law is a mortal sin from its nature and in every instance. No +matter how small the spiritual thing that is sold, it is priceless, and +a grave injury is done by putting a price on it. Simony is a serious +injury to God, since it usurps His place as the only Lord of spiritual +things (I Cor., iv, 1), to the spiritual things themselves, since it +estimates their worth by vile material gain (Prov., iii. 15; Acts, +viii. 20), and to the recipients, who should receive the gifts of God +freely (Matt, x, 8). Hence, St. Peter denounced Simon Magus as +deserving of perdition (Acts, viii. 20), and in law simony is spoken of +as the worst of pests, a cancer, leprosy, a scourge.</p> + +<p>(b) Simony against ecclesiastical law is a mortal sin from its nature, +since it is forbidden as a protection to religion and under grave sin; +but in particular cases it may be only a venial sin, since the church +laws do not bind under grave sin, when the matter or the danger is not +serious, as was said in 382.</p> + +<p>2336. Moral Malice of the Sin of Simony.—(a) Simony is reducible to +real sacrilege (see 2311 c). It is treated separately for the sake of +convenience, on account of the large number of questions that pertain +to it, and also because there is reason to consider it as a distinct +species of sin (2308 c). Hence, the moral malice of simony is that of +irreligiousness.</p> + +<p>(b) Simony of divine law and simony of ecclesiastical law, according to +the more common and likely opinion, are alike in moral malice. For +although the mere prohibition of the Church does not make a non-sacred +thing sacred, it does make the non-sacred thing unsaleable precisely +because related to things that are sacred. In other words, the motive +of the law is the protection of sacred things against the appearance or +danger of simony, and the motive of the law is the factor that +determines the moral character of precepts and prohibitions of human +law. Thus, to miss Mass on Sunday is a sin against religion, because +the Church commands in virtue of religion that Mass be heard on Sunday; +to eat meat on Friday is a sin against temperance, because the Church +forbids the use of meat on Friday in virtue of temperance. Hence, it is +not merely disobedience, but simony, to violate a law which forbids a +certain contract because of its nearness to the sale of spirituals for +temporals. Moreover, he who willfully exposes himself to the immediate +danger of some sin wills the malice of that sin.</p> + +<p>2337. Invalidity and Penalties of Simoniacal Contracts.—(a) Every +simoniacal contract is invalid and of no force either in the external +or in the internal forum, because it sells what is unsaleable under +divine or ecclesiastical law. If the contract has to do with benefices, +offices or dignities (e.g., “You vote as I wish and I will give you +such and such favors,” “You obtain for me such a dignity and I will pay +you well”), the appointment to them is rendered null and void, even +though the simoniacal act be done by a third party without the +knowledge of the beneficiary, unless it be done by that third party to +injure the beneficiary or against his protest (Canon 729). Invalidity +is also produced in case of simoniacal resignations (Canon 185), +commissions (Canon 1441), presentations (Canon 1465, Sec. 2), and +prescription does not operate for one who holds a benefice obtained +through simony (Canon 1446).</p> + +<p>(b) Certain simoniacal contracts subject the guilty parties to special +punishments. Thus, the penalty for simony in appointments, elections or +promotions to office and dignities is excommunication _latae +sententiae_ reserved simply to the Holy See, and deprivation forever of +all right of nominating, voting, presenting, and suspension (Canon +2392); the penalty for simony in elevation to Orders or in use of other +sacraments is suspicion of heresy and suspension reserved to the Holy +See (Canon 2371).</p> + +<p>2338. When the Canonical Penalties for Simony Do Not Apply.—(a) Purely +mental simony is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties, since the +Church does not pronounce on internal acts. But this does not take away +the serious guilt in the sight of God. (b) External simony is subject +to ecclesiastical penalties, but canonists dispute about the meaning of +certain Canons, for example, whether only real simony falls under the +punishments _latae sententiae_, whether the penalties of Canons 729 and +2392 apply only to simony of divine law, or to simony of ecclesiastical +law as well.</p> + +<p>2339. Influence of Simony on Spiritual Effects.—(a) On Effects of the +Power of Orders.—Sacraments administered simoniacally are valid, for +the law nullifies only the contract made about the Sacrament, not the +Sacrament itself. It seems also that in the case of sacramentals (such +as simple blessings imposed on articles) the blessing is not lost by +sale of the article, provided the price is asked only for the object +and not for the blessing. A blessed or consecrated object loses its +blessing or consecration when it is put up for public sale (Canon 1305).</p> + +<p>(b) On Effects of the Power of Jurisdiction.—Acts of jurisdiction are +valid in spite of simony, unless there is special provision to the +contrary. Indulgences are lost _ipso facto_, if anything temporal is +taken for the indulgenced object (Canon 924). Religious profession, it +seems, is valid, even though simoniacal.</p> + +<p>2340. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for a Spiritual +Thing.—(a) If the simoniacal contract is semi-real (that is, if the +spiritual consideration has not been received), the price must be +restored; for we have then the case of an immoral and unexecuted +contract (see 1878 d). (b) If the simoniacal contract is real (that is, +if the spiritual consideration has been received), the price should be +given back; for the case then is one of commutative justice, a temporal +price being taken for a thing (e.g., a blessing) that has no temporal +price, or for a service that one was bound to give gratis (e.g., +parochial sermon by the pastor). But if a service was not obligatory, +it is held by some that there is no certain duty of restitution, if the +spiritual thing cannot be restored (e.g., when one received a stipend +for a Mass of bination or demanded an excessive fee for a sacred +function).</p> + +<p>2341. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for Temporal Things +Annexed to Spirituals.—Restitution is obligatory as follows: (a) when +commutative justice is violated, as when one charges for a blessed +candle or rosary in excess of its market value or just price, or when +by fear or force one compels another to exchange a chalice for a +ciborium; (b) when law or judicial sentence imposes restitution as a +penalty for an offense, as when for money one has resigned one’s +benefice in favor of another person.</p> + +<p>2342. Circumstances of Restitution for Simony.—(a) The Time for +Restitution.—If simony is against natural law, restitution is due +before sentence; if against ecclesiastical law only, restitution is due +only after sentence.</p> + +<p>(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Is to Be Made.—Satisfaction should +be given to the owner, or injured party (e.g., to the person who was +charged for a blessing), or, if this is impossible, to the poor or +pious causes. The revenues derived from a benefice simoniacally +obtained should be restored to the church to which the benefice +belongs, unless this is advantageous to the guilty parties, or probably +to charity, or religion, or the successor in the benefice.</p> + +<p>(c) Excuses from Restitution.—Impossibility, condonation or the +permission of the Church, express or presumed, excuses from the duty of +restitution.</p> + +<p>2343. Restitution of Spiritual Thing Simoniacally Received.—The +spiritual thing simoniacally received must be restored even before the +sentence of the judge (Canon 729, Sec.1). (a) Thus, if it is a benefice, +office or dignity that was obtained or conferred through simony, it +must be resigned; nor may the guilty party keep the fruits, unless he +was in good faith and permission is given. (b) If the spiritual thing +is something other than a benefice, it should likewise be given up, +provided it is of a kind that can be restored (e.g., it is impossible +to restore a Sacrament received or a consecration given to a church) +and restitution will not cause irreverence (e.g., it would be +irreverent to restore blessed objects or relics to the seller if he +meant to profane them).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_6_THE_REMAINING_POTENTIAL_PARTS_OF_JUSTICE_THE_VIRTUE_OF_PIETY">Art. 6: THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF PIETY; +THE COMMANDMENTS</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 101-122.)</p> + +<p>2344. Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice, +we shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present +group, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication, +friendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).</p> + +<p>2345. The Virtue of Piety.—In general, piety is the virtue that +inclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom +one has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:</p> + +<p>(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the +immediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;</p> + +<p>(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to +God, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being. +Hence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious +and the divine services are known as works of piety;</p> + +<p>(c) in its widest meaning, piety is applied to works of mercy, since +they are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The +merciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate +honors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is +merciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: “The Lord is +compassionate (_pius_) and merciful” (Ecclus., ii. 13).</p> + +<p>2346. Definition of Piety.—Piety in the strictest sense is defined as +“a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the +duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and +sustainers of our being.”</p> + +<p>(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it +differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country +(see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love +for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of +the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.</p> + +<p>(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion +gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our +dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold +the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the +mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other +relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s +parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and +sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or +the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and +it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and +allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country +should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed +to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.</p> + +<p>(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to +parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the +second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or +otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated +only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of +parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to +fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of +the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real +injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require +more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).</p> + +<p>(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers +of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty +owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one +is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is +obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty +is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this +nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very +like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.</p> + +<p>2347. The Reverence Required by Piety.—(a) Parents should be honored +internally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits +(not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of +respect customarily shown to parents.</p> + +<p>(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate +with the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should +treat their children with the consideration owed to members of the +family, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and +relatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and +regard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal +relatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as +grandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than +younger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).</p> + +<p>(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels +for its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the +tender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one +birth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble, +it should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External +manifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag +and symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39), +and efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.</p> + +<p>2348. The Assistance Required by Piety.—(a) Parents should be helped +in their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be +visited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need +of the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should +be provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased +father who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.</p> + +<p>(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the +necessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of +brothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to +parents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special +obligation of piety.</p> + +<p>(c) Country is helped by the aid given to fellow-countrymen who are in +moral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who +devote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion, +education and contentment among their people, to the correction of real +evils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the +preservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute +what is characteristic and best in the nation.</p> + +<p>2349. Sins against Piety.—(a) By Excess.—Exaggerated respect for +relatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or +reason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under +the pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more +devoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22), +nor neglect God’s call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv. +22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in +which country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor +into jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for +other nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.</p> + +<p>(b) By Defect.—Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised +on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by +word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or +contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by +signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule +them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by +omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or +to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one’s country is felt +when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the +principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a +class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and +that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle +of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with +love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the +individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one +speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or +prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section, +party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.</p> + +<p>2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.—(a) The moral malice is distinct +from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt +owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of +wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and +matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity +among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother +are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to +honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the +circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance +that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth +cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though +an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of +impiety.</p> + +<p>(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin’s nature, +since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special +commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account +of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or +speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of +the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother +slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes +his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their +parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation +regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only +lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents +may generally be presumed when there is amendment.</p> + +<p>2351. The Virtue of Reverence.—This virtue is known in Latin as +_observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it +carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their +commands. It is defined as “a moral virtue which inclines one to render +to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that +is due their authority.”</p> + +<p>(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the +direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it +renders to others what is due them.</p> + +<p>(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position, +that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men +distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that +make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person +who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who +shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some +reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself), +or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one +who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank +and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the +superiority which each has to many others).</p> + +<p>(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons, +that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher +dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to +direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a +distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of +veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his +father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his +life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to +his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and +reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the +nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence, +as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is +given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).</p> + +<p>(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony +given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior. +Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or +the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show +honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person +honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in +jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors, +but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not +enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.</p> + +<p>(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission +to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This +tribute of reverence is paid only to one’s own ruling superior, since +others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.</p> + +<p>2352. Species of Honor.—(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which +is shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and +Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of +homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or +servants to their superiors or masters.</p> + +<p>(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a +special form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is +shown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations, +prostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets, +titles).</p> + +<p>(c) As to motives, there is civil honor (i.e., the respect shown to the +temporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious +honor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope, +bishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect +given to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_ +(service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven, +as _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of God.</p> + +<p>2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.—(a) Common +honor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and +malignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the damned +excepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed +of superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe +that the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality +or other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii. +17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10), +and humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in +bestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable +opinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all +times or in all circumstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be +given by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of +charity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the +like, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.</p> + +<p>(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it: +“Tribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due” (Rom., +xiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due +their station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor +given their rank reverence is shown to God, whose ministers they are, +and to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not +a legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their +own sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it +is a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others, +since virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining +for many (Matt., v. 15).</p> + +<p>2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.—(a) There is no +strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, +Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for +salvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy +persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it +would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he +would also deny to God’s friends and heroes the honors they deserve +(Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious +helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least +venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there +would be sin—and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_—if the +neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.</p> + +<p>(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the +veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother +of God belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of God _dulia_; to holy +persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and +conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable, +Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be +performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and +only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to +pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the +souls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned +or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.</p> + +<p>2355. Obedience.—Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which +inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one’s +superior, because it is a command and obligatory.</p> + +<p>(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or +unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience +(which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these +lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note +also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in +this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command, +while the virtue includes also internal submission.</p> + +<p>(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in +the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship +yield to what the other desires.</p> + +<p>(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept +imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of +obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has +not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment, +not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a +son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has +received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission +according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the +second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.</p> + +<p>(d) It obeys precisely because the superior’s will has been expressed +as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other +acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience +which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general +virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God, +there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of +honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak +is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply +because it is law and as such should be kept.</p> + +<p>2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.—There are two kinds +of power that confer moral authority to impose a command—the power of +jurisdiction and dominative power.</p> + +<p>(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect +society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to +impose laws.</p> + +<p>(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society, +which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only. +This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body +composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are +necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the +parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her +husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the +employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience +becomes subject to the superior).</p> + +<p>2357. Degrees of Obedience.—Ascetical authors distinguish three +degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with +exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness +in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external +submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith +of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself +to the superior’s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not +clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.—(a) Obedience, +as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on +account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes +joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep +the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if +actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as +homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as +when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to +try a subject’s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has +been commanded is an act of obedience only).</p> + +<p>(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it +belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God +Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among +those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things, +obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence, +inasmuch as it contemns for God’s sake the noblest human good, one’s +own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the +body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to +religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law, +religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship +performed without devotion or without regard for God’s will are not to +be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and +the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that +obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that +internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship. +Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues +and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).</p> + +<p>2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.—(a) All acts of obedience are +of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of +laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on +account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be +the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands +and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the +Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.</p> + +<p>(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for +circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add +to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by +performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey +by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something +hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing +obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and +may be performed with less willingness.</p> + +<p>2360. The Duty of Obedience.—Since obedience is obligatory because a +superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on +the extent of the superior’s authority.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is +Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: “Let us do all that +the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient” (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is +not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since +God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the +creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it +is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those +whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish +that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be +lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to +perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances +(Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God +commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret +the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle +wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him, +but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred +to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of +virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.</p> + +<p>(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful +authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he +who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience +the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the +superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given +him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2, +3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful +superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii. +1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).</p> + +<p>2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.—Obedience to a human +superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the +superior has no authority to command.</p> + +<p>(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is +clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore +unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin, +even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29; +Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands +something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own +superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in +judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a +command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command +exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no +control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the +soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these +things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or +bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these +matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to +believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to +external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature +of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to +observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is +concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot +take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on +Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and +things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its +nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command +spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot +command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the +powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs +rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no +superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally +impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise +heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a +command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable +motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be +a sin to disregard it.</p> + +<p>2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.—If a +superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter +is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is +even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he +would not have authority. Such cases are the following:</p> + +<p>(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is +held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body +(e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose +virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the +conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be +ordered so to do;</p> + +<p>(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great +evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that +is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).</p> + +<p>2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.—Internal actions in +themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle +says: “Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make +manifest the counsels of the heart” (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways +these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts +themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and +acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he +may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may +pass on them and prescribe them.</p> + +<p>(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so +far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its +goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or +pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This +question was treated above in 426.</p> + +<p>2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.—(a) The vow obliges a +religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according +to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no +obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not +authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered +religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless +otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or +constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is +obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225, +2237).</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave +matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The +intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other +circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the +imposition of a grave precept.</p> + +<p>2365. Sins against Obedience.—Since obedience is a moral virtue and +therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it +avoids.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience, +for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It +is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission, +as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey. +Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to +religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should +think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command. +This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect—the former +because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and +the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to +(see 1711 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2366. Definition of Disobedience.—Disobedience is the transgression of +the lawful command of a superior.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to +perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or +omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no +disobedience if fulfillment is impossible—for example, if a subject +who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive +the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to +give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or +regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt +to observe them.</p> + +<p>(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is +morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not +disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or +steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest +blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).</p> + +<p>(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence, +it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests +made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory +(e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband +picked out for her by her parents).</p> + +<p>(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is +opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher +superior prevails (288 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.—(a) By reason of the subject, +disobedience is either material or formal, according as the +transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against +some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself. +Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a +transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is +called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special +sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in +order not to submit.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for +the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor +despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in +disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the +authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the +precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or +envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If +contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it +extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.</p> + +<p>2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if +the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions, +or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his +view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and +law.</p> + +<p>2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.—(a) From its +nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to +charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of +God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His +representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2; +Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins +of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days +(II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes +only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his +superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.</p> + +<p>(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a +venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God, +and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if +one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a +protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not +serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the +contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of +anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor +regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed +against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth +commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the +former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.</p> + +<p>2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.—(a) In formal disobedience, if +the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely, +that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the +lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third +commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience +only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out +of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed +by parents or teachers).</p> + +<p>(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of +some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as +when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but +if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is +but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between +meals against the command given by his mother.</p> + +<p>2371. Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.—One act of +formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:</p> + +<p>(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it +is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to +disobey a higher than a lower superior;</p> + +<p>(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the +intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious +to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God +always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more +serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the +lawgiver has more at heart.</p> + +<p>2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.—(a) +Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than +sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true +when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God, +for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more +serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins +against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a +less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the +other theft.</p> + +<p>(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than +contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of +greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God +than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in +contempt than to disregard his precept.</p> + +<p>2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.—Religion, piety, reverence and +obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the +virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice +on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a +moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to +repay with gladness the favors one has received.”</p> + +<p>(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good +useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus, +gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the +commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony) +or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get +rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents +made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are +due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed), +though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives, +even when it is not a favor.</p> + +<p>(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The +former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of +benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter +consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and +gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).</p> + +<p>2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.—(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the +recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from +religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to +God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause +of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or +guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense, +gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from +those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and +follows in order after reverence.</p> + +<p>2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for +the gift of repentance?</p> + +<p>(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has +been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and +other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin +than to be rescued from it.</p> + +<p>(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has +received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is +more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.</p> + +<p>2376. Circumstances of Gratitude.—(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be +Shown.—Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind +remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible +(e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings +with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less +benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or +only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed +chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened +if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is +wealthy or famous).</p> + +<p>(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.—Every person who is favored +should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his +benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it +beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither +is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some +extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his +benefactors.</p> + +<p>(c) The Time for Gratitude.—Internal gratitude should be immediate, +and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received; +but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced +or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.</p> + +<p>(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.—If the favor was bestowed by reason +of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the +benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or +liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that +prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes +more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and +willingness and disinterestedness.</p> + +<p>[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.—It is suitable that one repay +benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is +possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of +what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will +counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass +the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can +at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.</p> + +<p>2377. The Sins against Gratitude.—(a) Since gratitude is a moral +virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is +grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by +ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it +is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive +thanks.</p> + +<p>(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal. +Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the +benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for +him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against +the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor +without contempt for him or his favor.</p> + +<p>(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by +omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of +the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of +thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with +affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem., +xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in +contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.</p> + +<p>2378. The Moral Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Material ingratitude is +not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed +against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is +an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor +is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an +aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we +owe thanks than to harm others.</p> + +<p>(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a +special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one +to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special +classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).</p> + +<p>2379. The Theological Species of Ingratitude.—(a) Formal ingratitude +from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity, +which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on +account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter. +Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be +mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.</p> + +<p>(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of +the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one +gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a +valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin +is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a +benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.</p> + +<p>2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?—(a) If the +favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the +ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that +the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his +improvement (Luke, vi. 35).</p> + +<p>(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made +worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.</p> + +<p>2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.—Just as gratitude returns good for +evil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is, +the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as “a +moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the +punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or +private justice.”</p> + +<p>(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to +those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses. +The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and +pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of +commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to +justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the +equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of +the person who has been injured.</p> + +<p>(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the +infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already +committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with +lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past +but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the +virtue of vengeance.</p> + +<p>(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or +reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and +follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private +revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the “unwritten law,” etc., +which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively +excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also +exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against +malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as +are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship). +Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and +chastise their children.</p> + +<p>(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the +vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or +satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one +to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another +virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one’s act +pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to +secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of +legal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of +religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the +wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a +criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not +the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred, +cruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes +himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is +to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).</p> + +<p>2382. The Morality of Vengeance.—(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it +pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just +and is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special +virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves +man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive +ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which +prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man, +inspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the +fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally, +however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful, +as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more +heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).</p> + +<p>(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury +to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of +the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who +maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired +writers pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii, +cviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12), +and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an +injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego +punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this +course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see +1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal +wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of +God; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of +such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss +of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party, +edification, and greater claim on God’s forgiveness of self. Hence, +vengeance is called “a little virtue,” since it is so often the less +perfect way.</p> + +<p>2383. Excess and Defect.—Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence +should be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It +should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.</p> + +<p>(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the +quantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the +measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to +associate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an +offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human +being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement +in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is +unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose +rigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in +medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for +a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good +quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or +allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to +offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense. +Scripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who +spares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the +gravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself, +of the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration +must be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance +of the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age, +instruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the +circumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the +frequency). See Canon 2218.</p> + +<p>2384. Circumstances of Punitive Justice.—(a) Punishments that May Be +Used.—Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil +those who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of +penalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods +that are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through +delinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established +as punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging, +imprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy), +the chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external +things. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme +cases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to +remove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by +loss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).</p> + +<p>(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.—Punishment again is virtuous only +because it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin. +Accordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or +voluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the +guilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from +future sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal +evils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may +not become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and +may give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of +another when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as +when careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers +(Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent +person may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g., +ordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no +personal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost +to the children because the father is fined).</p> + +<p>2385. The Virtue of Truthfulness.—Having treated the virtues of +gratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an +act of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral +obligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he +communicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise +manifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not +deceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as “a moral virtue that +inclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one’s mind.”</p> + +<p>(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from +truth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First +Truth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of +a virtue, but it is a virtue.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the +words or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a +theological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to +the intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will, +and so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may +be unlearned, but he loves honesty.</p> + +<p>(c) It regulates the expression of the mind, that is, the words, +writing, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make +them conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals +with internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good +health or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as +they appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or +believes that a report is accurate).</p> + +<p>(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief. +Hence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or +untruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness +is sincerity, not correctness.</p> + +<p>(e) It is a due expression of one’s mind or belief; that is, it is +given when and where and as it should be given. A person who speaks out +his mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar, +but he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the +virtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this +are persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true +virtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or +otherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii. +9).</p> + +<p>2386. The Excellence of Truthfulness.—(a) Truthfulness is a virtue, +since it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them +for the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that +men have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul +admonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his +neighbor, since all are members of the other.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and +other interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither +exaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it +should be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.</p> + +<p>(c) It is a special virtue, for, while the other moral virtues regulate +actions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates +those objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for +signifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a +great part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence +with others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and +one whose exercise is most frequently called for.</p> + +<p>(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like +justice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of +speaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since +the debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary +intercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a +legal obligation of justice to tell the truth.</p> + +<p>2387. Sincerity and Fidelity.—Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness +are sincerity and fidelity.</p> + +<p>(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with +himself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as +lies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest +shifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.</p> + +<p>(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that +are obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from +constancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and +from virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of +legal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753, +1888). Fidelity makes an honest man’s word as good as his bond, and it +is therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21; +Psalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.</p> + +<p>2388. Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.—(a) By defect one sins against +truth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins +against truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable +disclosures.</p> + +<p>2389. Lying.—A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what +is not true.</p> + +<p>(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign +consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by +language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by +expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).</p> + +<p>(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is +found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of +mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.</p> + +<p>(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the +intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice +of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious +person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie. +Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear +understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his +efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who +do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or +inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of +indirect lying.</p> + +<p>(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the +pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as +truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the +disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely +false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as +a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give +support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to +throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.</p> + +<p>2390. Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.—A +word that sufficiently expresses one’s idea is not a lie or a +deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener +or is conveyed by its mere letter.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of +the listener, does not make one’s words untruthful, any more than it +makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given +attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded +obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would +be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.</p> + +<p>(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its +wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or +circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words. +Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words +spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as “your most +obedient servant”, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g., +when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to +discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or +of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of +disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in +argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak +according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v. +18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to +B: “Have you seen your father?” meaning, “Do you know where he is?” and +B replies: “I have not seen him,” meaning “I do not know where he is.” +Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one +another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are +not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example, +scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.</p> + +<p>2391. Divisions of Lies.—(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its +nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an +exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which +tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not +believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain, +exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful +what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.</p> + +<p>(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are +of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former +being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its +immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or +to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit +(e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard +the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there +is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only +suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior +purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for +evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to +its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a +statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes +does not deceive the auditors.</p> + +<p>2392. Classification of Lies.—Every lie is harmful from its nature, +since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of +society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil, +and hence we have the following classes of lies.</p> + +<p>(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to +please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies +include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and +descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by +one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way +(e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors +have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken +seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are +told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may +receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to +good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a +despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his +spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various +statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi. +2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).</p> + +<p>(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to +indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying +(lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person +(pernicious lies).</p> + +<p>2393. Motives for Lying.—The motives for lying are not always simple, +and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several +motives of different character.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence. +It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of +another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when +the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g., +when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).</p> + +<p>(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may +affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius +calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of +Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the +truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards +Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.</p> + +<p>2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.—(a) Lies of +exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in +both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to +overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration +is worse.</p> + +<p>(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the +harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is +that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and +the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that +harms in temporal things only.</p> + +<p>(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good +intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious +are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than +jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are +not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a +less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to +take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the +shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it +is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie +in order to prevent a financial loss.</p> + +<p>2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.—But though lies are unequal in +sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are +called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest +good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does +not justify the means.</p> + +<p>(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs +given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an +unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly +relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the +proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have +regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and +even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called +liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7; +Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and +St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point: +“Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, +for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are +generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death, +excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could +approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith +in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who +helps to deceive us even in a small matter.</p> + +<p>(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be +only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind +is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is +not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be +denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not +regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose +and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and +as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial; +but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one +lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render +them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of +untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.</p> + +<p>2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.—Lies are sometimes free from +all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or +uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great +difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of +certain defectives who seem to be born liars).</p> + +<p>2397. Pernicious Lies.—Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their +nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the +lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth +only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the +liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and +hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for +its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps. +v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone +(Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:</p> + +<p>(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary +to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins +gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if +in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct), +venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong +chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or +the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the +public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a +witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant +matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other +injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight +importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the +confession, or the testimony is under oath;</p> + +<p>(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to +injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not +opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are +found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden +others.</p> + +<p>2398. Concealment of the Truth.—Truthfulness is offended not only by +the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also +by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the +mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.</p> + +<p>(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse +to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is +lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there +is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by +newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their +questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about +his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades +their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar +questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply +in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If +the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him +in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific +terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence +or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is +obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental +reservation.</p> + +<p>2399. Mental Reservation.—Mental reservation is an act of the mind by +which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they +do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification +of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external +modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.</p> + +<p>(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal +modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural +sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them) +nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from +their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person +who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who +struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was +the club which hit Balbus directly.</p> + +<p>(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification +can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural +sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different +meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the +words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius +accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks +that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck +Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows +nothing about the matter.</p> + +<p>2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.—(a) Strict mental reservation +is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn. +1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs +words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his +mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess; +secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily +escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to +Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but +the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).</p> + +<p>(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that +forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its +use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an +answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions +parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be +inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications, +when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can +testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary +knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by +concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is +necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether +spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end +compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused. +Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a +departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which +pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth +from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37). +Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it +were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are +discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.</p> + +<p>(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient +reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of +state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the +prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the +prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the +prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being +the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not +use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should +not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be +employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The +reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double +result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation +is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and +causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because +the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural +signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their +accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by +the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a +truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener +or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own +heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury +to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest +means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets. +Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or +insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared +(John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the +daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other +cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV +Kings, vi. 19).</p> + +<p>2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?—There is general +agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following +cases:</p> + +<p>(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth +from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about +secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to +disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and +secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the +facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply +means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a +government has the right to censor the news in order to keep +information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it +obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a +clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a +slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a +gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);</p> + +<p>(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold +the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right +to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a +person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he +is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a +person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently +grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which +means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).</p> + +<p>2402. Ambiguous Answers.—Are ambiguous answers which are not given +according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no +reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?</p> + +<p>(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its +ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly +speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the +speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation +or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying. +The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of +events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite +sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.</p> + +<p>(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is +contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express +the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically +or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is +good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or +other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good +and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the +question propounded referred to moral goodness.</p> + +<p>2403. Simulation or Pretence.—A special form of untruthfulness is +simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify +the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.</p> + +<p>(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an +accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being +untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and +things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct +at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any +thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps +sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done +with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not +to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops +of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.; +David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11. +sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth +from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally +recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems, +ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and +concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.</p> + +<p>(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who +is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is +well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one +who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form +of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does +not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation +if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at +Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but +He meant not to stop without an invitation.</p> + +<p>2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.—(a) In general, simulation is a +sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the +few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their +nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more +indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy +to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie. +Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or +false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no +intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to +wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state, +and not necessarily his personal moral character.</p> + +<p>(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable; +for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of +applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks +of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our +Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited +sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.), +and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas +(“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48). +Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were +better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).</p> + +<p>2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.—(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is +the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This +sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external +pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly +denounced in Scripture.</p> + +<p>(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in +mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a +double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for +example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal +sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should +be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one’s sin +by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize +others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).</p> + +<p>(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high +degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person +of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or +to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This +sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of +some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no +hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really +has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not +good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.</p> + +<p>2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.—Two forms of lying +about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.</p> + +<p>(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends +to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one’s +means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or +tries by bluff to make one’s defects seem perfections. This sin is +mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech., +xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such +as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.</p> + +<p>(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as +when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an +excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to +him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad +quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor +accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is +usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid +offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some +circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or +seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed +braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to +acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25; +Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).</p> + +<p>2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.—It remains to speak of the +vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the +former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889; +see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask +the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?</p> + +<p>(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no +legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the +promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of +untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker +show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square +with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his +plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial +sin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that +make it mortal.</p> + +<p>(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on +account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to +keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects +referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning +(e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the +force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of +right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the +promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g., +he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he +promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become +unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been +foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his +right if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has +ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the +promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by +his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).</p> + +<p>2408. Definition of a Secret.—A secret is a matter (e.g., an +invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a +crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so +few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists +distinguish the following kinds of secrets:</p> + +<p>(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without +causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will +harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is +called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the +secret and not from any promise or contract.</p> + +<p>(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but +only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no +difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or +from some other source;</p> + +<p>(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person +promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise +here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is +one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications +between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers, +priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of +their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is +given in express terms, as when A says to B: “I have a matter of great +importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep +it secret”; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.</p> + +<p>2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.—A secret is the property of +its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret +(such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor +or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an +evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not +be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no +more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right +to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so +there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or +force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by +secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in +order to learn a secret).</p> + +<p>(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of +a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the +owner’s rights.</p> + +<p>(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret +which they were obliged not to reveal.</p> + +<p>2410. Prying Into Others’ Secrets.—To seek to discover the secrets of +others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:</p> + +<p>(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question +about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed, +one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or +private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy. +But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from +others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to +steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his +own;</p> + +<p>(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has +a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate +another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to +resort to lies or simulation or immorality.</p> + +<p>2411. Reading Another’s Letters or Papers.—When is it lawful to read +the letters or other papers of another person?</p> + +<p>(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to +anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are +written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left +open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or +one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is +secret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and +thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem +lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for, +though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has +indicated his will to keep the contents secret.</p> + +<p>(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret +as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the +writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such +permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or +lawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect +the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted +matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing +conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors +(see Canon 611).</p> + +<p>(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to +be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a +case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from +the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has +the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is +necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools +may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should +respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets; +private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of +self-defense, to read another’s letter, when there is a prudent reason +for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to +themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).</p> + +<p>2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.—One is said to use +the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one’s conduct by +the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or +omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?</p> + +<p>(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful +(see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised +secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted +secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional +person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated +will not be used against one’s interests or without one’s consent, and +hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work +for a client that the latter’s business was not prosperous, he gave +word of this to one of the client’s creditors.</p> + +<p>(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is +nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make +money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get +knowledge of another’s information and plans through reading his +letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or +if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is +uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to +take away one’s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has +learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).</p> + +<p>(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by +use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to +raise the price on one’s property when one accidentally learns through +overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher +price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to +assist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need +of one’s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by +use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could +be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has +discovered by one’s own industry some important truth in an art or +science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to +make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that +another person is one’s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.</p> + +<p>2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of +Another.—(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin +is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity. +Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is +violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by +the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or +displeasure caused.</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the +sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person’s +letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally +sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an +unimportant secret without permission.</p> + +<p>2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.—(a) The natural secret +obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity +and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become +venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or +harm is caused.</p> + +<p>(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as +a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity +alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407), +is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when +the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under +grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.</p> + +<p>(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is +a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of +the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The +violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for +contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in +officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or +assistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on +account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a +serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if +the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this +and no other damage will result (see 2065).</p> + +<p>2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.—(a) The promised +secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in +the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_ +than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed +to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the +former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a +secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided +without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory +than a secret one has given one’s word of honor to keep; a professional +secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far +more important than any secret of private individuals. The most +inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its +violation is always a sacrilege.</p> + +<p>2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.—(a) If there +has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not +necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted +under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful, +it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.</p> + +<p>(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to +be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a +certain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become +public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged, +or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret, +provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is +done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the +secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he +is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls +for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many +make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the +contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard +the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety +of the republic were involved.</p> + +<p>2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.—(a) If a secret +cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be +kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to +public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good +and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as +the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious +evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or +treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it +known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior +has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind, +and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection +extended to professional communications.</p> + +<p>(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good +of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted +and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept, +for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the +owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its +revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion +that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public +good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the +secret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus +is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the +marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to +the pastor.</p> + +<p>(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good +of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret), +distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not +done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is +done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in +confidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede +an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known +to the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If, +however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when +the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity +requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if +this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the +harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired +to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the +murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending +warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor +knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and +pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man +to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should +give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the +laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.</p> + +<p>2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the +secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for +which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?</p> + +<p>(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent +party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him), +natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the +true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of +damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the +true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other +way of saving the innocent person.</p> + +<p>(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which +the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring +the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept, +since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and +therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968). +But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to +accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him; +for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of +the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict +and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the +innocent person (see 288).</p> + +<p>2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party. +If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not +obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the +inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the +acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave +hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to +warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself +by making known the truth.</p> + +<p>2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.—Is +it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against +the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by +stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized +inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this +question, but to us the following seems the best:</p> + +<p>(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because +the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of +the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person), +or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he +cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the +owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a +case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of +lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force +is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is +sinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to +make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself +(e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);</p> + +<p>(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is +in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a +person’s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original +injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least +an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or +proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler +methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the +detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of +blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class +as thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal, +for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would +be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using +secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged +communications or state secrets) were permissible.</p> + +<p>2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.—These two virtues, +though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most +useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness) +is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters +properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.</p> + +<p>(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is, +in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and +consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than +mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary +proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman, +according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii, +10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to +make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is +considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions +or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome, +makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when +compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is +indulgent towards opponents.</p> + +<p>(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it +observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances, +suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and +observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official, +business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are +times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to +display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the +sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).</p> + +<p>(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the +ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and +therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each +one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the +displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less +than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special +benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than +polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly +in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to +its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by +friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied +by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse +compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or +little affection.</p> + +<p>(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation +of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under +temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of +games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation, +urbanity, or pleasantness.</p> + +<p>2422. Offices of Affability.—All, and especially the clergy, should +practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all +men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his +advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God +(I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the +negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the +avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the +positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the +appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a +gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.</p> + +<p>2423. The Sins against Affability.—(a) Adulation is the vice of those +who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the +complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or +extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors +for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by +exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as +by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is +not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but +circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when +one compliments another’s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the +person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the +flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to +adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display +of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.</p> + +<p>(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners, +not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant +and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready +to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in +visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence. +Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it +is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not +necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer +is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5). +Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or +laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at +table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can +be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that +seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.</p> + +<p>2424. Liberality.—Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of +riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one’s own goods +upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.</p> + +<p>(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and +esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least +improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion. +Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These +virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in +need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity +and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who +are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does +not prize external things excessively.</p> + +<p>(b) It inclines one to bestow one’s own possessions, or freely to +communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice, +since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to +others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination, +even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being +less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.</p> + +<p>(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of +magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise +of the greatest moment.</p> + +<p>(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is +needed to make one use money freely for one’s own needs or comfort.</p> + +<p>(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there +is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed +unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc. +Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal +affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income, +with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality +which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of +luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2425. The Importance of Liberality.—(a) Liberality is not the greatest +virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the +passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in +reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which +serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is +less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for +liberality has to do directly with temporals.</p> + +<p>(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes +one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one +an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28). +According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first +bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of +generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and +charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence +(see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God +and man.</p> + +<p>2426. Vice of Avarice.—The vice which is opposed to liberality by +defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as +distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or +delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as +lands or money.</p> + +<p>(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.—This sin is _per se_ venial, since +it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself +indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for +money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations +for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to +religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not +concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are +not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and +carnal vices.</p> + +<p>(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.—In regard to deformity, avarice +is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the +good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the +vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is +opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that +avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard +to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less +valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the +vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things, +which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and +of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is +rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of +avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons +avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own +necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by +an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a +willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the +most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to +part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake +of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness). +In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that +causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice +is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other +sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most +prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure +the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for +the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii. +14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and +restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse +to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv. +26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.), +and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of +the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own +soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and +one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx. +15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence +or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).</p> + +<p>2427. Vice of Prodigality.—The vice opposed to liberality by excess in +giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal +things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the +miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as +the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is +careless about earning or saving.</p> + +<p>(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the +prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not +call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should +not give.</p> + +<p>2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.—(a) From its nature it is venial. +The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who +is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not +grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he +deprives himself are of the lowest kind.</p> + +<p>(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on +account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to +seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which +makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave +need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity, +as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).</p> + +<p>2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.—(a) They are associable, +for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in +different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money +away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to +obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice. +Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed +from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to +cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the +vice of old age.</p> + +<p>2430. The Virtue of Equity.—The virtues that have been so far treated +in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have +the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list +of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to +general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see +above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).</p> + +<p>2431. Definition of Equity.—In law, equity is any court system of +extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as +declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and +procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures +where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the +United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined +special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common +law courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.348). But as here taken +equity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which +pertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity +which belongs to legal justice (legal equity).</p> + +<p>(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist +unnecessarily on one’s strict or legal rights when to do so will be +unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an +employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition +to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of +time to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity +and justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of +justice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability +or friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of +justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.</p> + +<p>(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond +the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the +law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is +said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case +would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common +good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the +prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this +way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law, +according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the +depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be +unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good +law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view +of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are +couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver +himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).</p> + +<p>2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.—(a) It is a distinct virtue, +since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of +special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds +the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the +lawgiver’s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver’s +words.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is +contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs +from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in +Articles 5 and 6.</p> + +<p>(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or +legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned +with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is +grave (see 1721).</p> + +<p>(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two +parts—good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of +morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment +(_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary +run—so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to +usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles +(viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where +the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a +madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to +commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but +equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and +one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city, +the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity +would command one to transgress it.</p> + +<p>(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal +justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is +the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common +good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all +times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in +extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.</p> + +<p>2433. The Complements of Justice.—To each of the various virtues +correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits +of the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).</p> + +<p>(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice, +piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the +completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of +justice. This Gift is defined as “an infused habit that renders the +soul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly +responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial +affection towards God.” As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly +fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: “You +have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, +Father” (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father; +filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a +child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes +the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the +Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.</p> + +<p>(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that +hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which +agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they +shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who +finds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the +suffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are +exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).</p> + +<p>(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and +kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services +for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163); +like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same +heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it +pays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps +with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally +perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one +to see in God one’s Father and in man the child of God; even that which +is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for +justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy +found in the very difficulty itself.</p> + +<p>2434. The Commandments of Justice.—The various precepts regarding +justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the +fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals +or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the +first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties +owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man +has to his equals or to all fellowmen.</p> + +<p>2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their +purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which +consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and +they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God +(Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to +man (Commandments of the Second Table).</p> + +<p>(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the +edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render +to God the things that are God’s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess +of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the +defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy +God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou +keep holy the Sabbath Day).</p> + +<p>(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to +those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country, +superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions +against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the +harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one +person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor’s +external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external +incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness +against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts +or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of +those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility +(Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt +not covet thy neighbor’s wife) they afford.</p> + +<p>2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue. +Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are +contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent. +Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present +work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can +be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience, +however, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of +this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are +explained.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.) +for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the +perceptive part.</p> + +<p>(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the +prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the +preceptive part.</p> + +<p>(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the +virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on +positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the +Church (see 2575 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence, +obedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under +charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular +states.</p> + +<p>(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily +injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on +charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on +restitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive +justice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to +property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.), +on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230 +sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_7_THE_VIRTUE_OF_FORTITUDE">Art. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)</p> + +<p>2437. The Virtue of Fortitude.—This virtue ranks next after justice +and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness +since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice +is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs; +the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of +passion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason, +and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of +reason’s enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than +temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more +difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain +from pleasure.</p> + +<p>2438. Fortitude in General.—Fortitude (etymologically, strength, +vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person +unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.</p> + +<p>(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the +requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue. +Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they +do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit +makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered +them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice +is severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside +themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand +attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted +physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect +them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them +(adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or +predisposition for moral courage.</p> + +<p>(c) Fortitude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a +general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no +virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue +(i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to +temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be +said to possess the virtue of temperance.</p> + +<p>(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers +vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and +pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude +that we now speak.</p> + +<p>2439. Definition of Fortitude.—Fortitude is defined as “a virtue which +in the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and +confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason.”</p> + +<p>(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the +sensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled +by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or +disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and +temperance with passions (see 1709).</p> + +<p>(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are +fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which +deals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that +which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is +agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of +an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling +of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.</p> + +<p>(c) The function of fortitude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to +keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in +themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and +hence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.</p> + +<p>(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even +when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of +terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we +do not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference +to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having +a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear +springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the +kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest +sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or +its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to +fortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal +evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to +some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g., +liberality regulates the fear of losing money).</p> + +<p>(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The +courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to +virtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is +exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end +of the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis +operantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous +when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of +country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending +for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of +the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue’s +sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship, +goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary, +fortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue +(e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person +who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the +daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk +ignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.</p> + +<p>2440. The Two Acts of Fortitude.—(a) The moderation of fear is +followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the +case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially +designated “fortitude.” It is not accurate to speak of it as passive +resistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is +performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and +self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles +or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing, +then, as stoical indifference or apathy.</p> + +<p>(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call +for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part +of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to +be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids +nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a +nobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles +against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its +fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of +power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is +quick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous +in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and +each is necessary at its proper time.</p> + +<p>2441. The Excellence of Fortitude.—(a) Its Rank.—Fortitude is one of +the four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that +exercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities +that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for +every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a +virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation +(since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and +discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction). +Now, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in +dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and +discretion in ruling one’s own actions, so firmness is most difficult +in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice, +temperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of +the chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called +cardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life +of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively +rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly +called on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal +enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).</p> + +<p>(b) Its Utility.—Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is +found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are +admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable +only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower, +or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are +continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job, +vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the +temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue. +Without fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven +is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who +fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).</p> + +<p>2442. Martyrdom.—As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727), +so martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most +perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as “the voluntary +acceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of +hatred of virtue.” Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to +love of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which +attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other +acts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for +which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself. +But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and “greater love than +this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John, +xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.</p> + +<p>(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the +invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more +efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii. +4; II Cor., iv. 11).</p> + +<p>2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.—The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely +or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of +martyrdom:</p> + +<p>(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one +dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy), +Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and +hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr. +Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as +when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or +in defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;</p> + +<p>(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of +martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as +in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for +infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of +water (Matt., x. 39);</p> + +<p>(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of God (theological martyrdom) +is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish +to die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act, +but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the +trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for +justice’s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that +lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme +self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the +essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has +also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete +martyrdom);</p> + +<p>(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical +martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect +martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove +their existence and character.</p> + +<p>2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.—Since martyrdom is a virtue and the +supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:</p> + +<p>(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because +the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of +faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good +(e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one’s country) is defended +for the sake of God;</p> + +<p>(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not +necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of +virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute +the sentence of death himself;</p> + +<p>(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual +intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from +guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or +at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from +vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a +condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a +condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the +former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war +cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second +opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;</p> + +<p>(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either +instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation, +death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other +hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured, +mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors +of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some +believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence +that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking, +martyrs; but others—and with better reason, it seems—deny this. Those +who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while +attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by +themselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by +suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia, +see 1856).</p> + +<p>2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.—(a) The Desire of +Martyrdom.—A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom +if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii. +16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom +is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a +desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii. +21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.</p> + +<p>(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.—Regularly it is not lawful to offer +oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion +of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons +of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.). +Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be +overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of +God or the peace of the faithful.</p> + +<p>(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.—Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a +persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally +this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are +exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils +(Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of +persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to +reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii. +15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).</p> + +<p>(d) Flight from Martyrdom.—Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes +obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was +explained in 1005, 1006.</p> + +<p>2446. Sins Opposed to Fortitude.—(a) Number.—The vices opposed to +fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear +and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other +circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he +should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears +the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect); +he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who +exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who +does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who +does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not, +is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of +a good result).</p> + +<p>(b) Malice.—These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in +emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious +disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if +from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger +(e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or +mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or +vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity +and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.</p> + +<p>2447. The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a +virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).</p> + +<p>(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very +specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no +room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree +(e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death +than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).</p> + +<p>(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for +the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers +(i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, +requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and +despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes +one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of +fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not +thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul +be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued +opposition).</p> + +<p>(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as +exercised in reference to minor dangers.</p> + +<p>2448. Greatness of Soul.—Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin, +_magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after +excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors +themselves with moderation.</p> + +<p>(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher +manifestations of every virtue—the things that are more difficult and +that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity, +great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for +both virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.</p> + +<p>(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at +their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher +honors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these +are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors +(i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are +frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of +soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue +here differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers, +which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors +which are pleasant.</p> + +<p>2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.—Greatness of +soul and humility are different, but not contrary.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great +things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed +by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the +profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things, +they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in +generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are +familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they +are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of +themselves they are weak and sinful.</p> + +<p>(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower +things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the +gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble +character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places +or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is +not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in +manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much +given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person +despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the +good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to +himself.</p> + +<p>2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed +to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or +honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.</p> + +<p>(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to +do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This +happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, +taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or +exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar +persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or +influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal +sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its +effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to +teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to +enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in +good faith and from inculpable ignorance.</p> + +<p>(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or +an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of +soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is +a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the +neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, +seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man +longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account +of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in +temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he +will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or +they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who +loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the +synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by +men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). +This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per +se_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously +sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) +or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is +ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted +dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not +ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).</p> + +<p>(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). +The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 +sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, +and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. +The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for +which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for +virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who +fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good +looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or +who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., +those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, +like ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on +account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that +are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes +one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, +or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain +about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the +capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that +chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in +consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to +action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors +bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks +unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not +inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are +the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits +(boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities +designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in +pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of +intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views +(stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others +(discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), +sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).</p> + +<p>2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.—The sin opposed to +greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul), +which does not desire great things when one should desire them.</p> + +<p>(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul, +springs from a lazy ignorance of one’s own ability and worth and from a +false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could +be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled +from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the +fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.). +Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for +humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence, +whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is +reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated +with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is +commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility +by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they +would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held +out against God’s charge to them.</p> + +<p>(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may +become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is +so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting +abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one +away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed +to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it +springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great +deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to +inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a +fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense +of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit +(Col., iii. 21).</p> + +<p>2452. Greatness of Deed.—Greatness of deed is the execution of the +great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.</p> + +<p>(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble +performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity +in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of +magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums +from his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building +churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in +founding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals, +etc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its +accomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with +sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Maecenases and the +generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of +humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for +want of support.</p> + +<p>(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and +vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great +scale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper +outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by +using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for +ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is +liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs +or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g., +charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as +when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or +when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and +waste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are +venial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence +is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this +virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to +great enterprises according to their means.</p> + +<p>2453. Patience.—Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation +so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion +neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor +produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs +from the following:</p> + +<p>(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness, +the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while +that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils, +especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;</p> + +<p>(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of +death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever +nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;</p> + +<p>(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues +is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good +which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is +an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a +desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in +good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are +included under patience.</p> + +<p>2454. The Greatness of Patience.—(a) Its Rank.—Patience is less than +the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice, +which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and +temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness; +for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser +impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other +hand, patience is a part of fortitude—a potential part, because it +does not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral +part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity +which patience imparts.</p> + +<p>(b) Its Necessity.—Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one +cannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials +man encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other +virtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of +virtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there +are degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God +neither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii. +7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to +prosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation, +which smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10, +vii. 4).</p> + +<p>2455. The Vices Opposed to Patience.—(a) The sin of deficiency in +sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved +neither by one’s own nor by others’ misfortunes. This is not a virtue, +but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man +as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively +under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining +and rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity +and impatience are _per se_ venial sins, but they become mortal _per +accidens_ on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man +gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man +blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).</p> + +<p>2456. Steadfastness.—Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to +the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the +length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue +of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition +which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but +goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has +been arrived at.</p> + +<p>(a) The Virtue.—Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence +of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the +inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the +peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or +opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one +little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful +conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke, +ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with +it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9, +10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with +exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim., +iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but +final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).</p> + +<p>(b) The Opposite Vices.—Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the +vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The +effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good, +surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or +by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person +continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to +discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept +the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These +sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an +effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous +occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the +remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.</p> + +<p>2457. The Complements of Fortitude.—We shall now speak of the Gift, +the Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and +2433).</p> + +<p>(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the +appetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy +Spirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the +Gift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of +fortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human +prudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the +Holy Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens +the soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the +Spirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the +virtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens +in difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage +but also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience +and perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us +(Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the +right in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken +confidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown +of victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of +Fortitude is the eighth: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for +justice’s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matt, v 10). The +Gift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and +security in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the +copious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv. +1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1). +Others assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who +hunger and thirst for holiness.</p> + +<p>(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing +evil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are +acts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456), +and in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is +no longer bitter but sweet.</p> + +<p>2458. The Commandments of Fortitude.—(a) Fortitude itself is commanded +both in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found +precepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: “Hear, O +Israel, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your +heart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not.” +The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; “Your adversary the +devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom +resist ye strong in faith” (I Peter, v. 8); “Resist the devil and he +will fly from you” (James, iv. 7); “Fight the good fight” (I Tim., vi. +12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers: +“Fear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul” (Matt., x. +28).</p> + +<p>(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with +greatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and +superabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and +perseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly +existence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be +perfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to +follow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the +excellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi. +11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in +the eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv. +9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is +commanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in +Rom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus., +ii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the +end shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and +in Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).</p> + +<p>2459. Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.—(a) +The precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it +is obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is +never lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy—to do +anything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But +it is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an +affirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an +extreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818, +361).</p> + +<p>(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and +hence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience, +effeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not +so difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These +latter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus, +one must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared +trials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself +never ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which +consists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which +is not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains +to effeminacy rather than to patience.</p> + +<p>2460. Subjects of Fortitude.—(a) Laws have universal extension, and +hence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine, +passive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is +expected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g., +the adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers, +policemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).</p> + +<p>(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as +regards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise +this virtue.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_8_THE_VIRTUE_OF_TEMPERANCE">Art. 8: THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 141-170.)</p> + +<p>2461. Definition of Temperance.—Temperance is a moral virtue which +regulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures +and desires of sense.</p> + +<p>(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the +sadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue +(fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions +(fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary +to bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and +desire).</p> + +<p>(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from +the use of the external senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and +touch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers +of intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology, +the reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or +of friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except +accidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is +impeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect) +may be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression +on the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the +pleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times +they vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the +body (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a +child who was thought to be dead).</p> + +<p>(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the +satisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by +other senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the +individual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse). +These passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since +they are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against +reason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make +man follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures, +on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of +any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a +perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the +enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant +roses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur +obtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the +animals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor +seductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are +not gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they +are not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance, +for their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the +joys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the +exhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy +breeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.</p> + +<p>2462. The Rule of Moderation.—The rule of moderation which temperance +imposes on the carnal appetites is this: “Indulge only as necessity +requires and duty allows.” For pleasure is a means whose end is some +reasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make +pleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But +necessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the +essentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and +desserts with food).</p> + +<p>(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not +be used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation +of children and the other lawful ends of marriage.</p> + +<p>(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged +except for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity, +quality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one’s +food or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of +less than the body demands here and now.</p> + +<p>2463. The Excellence of Temperance.—(a) Temperance is among the four +principal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions +that is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among +the virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens +the inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the +senses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). “Wisdom teaches +temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is +nothing more useful in life” (Wis., viii. 7).</p> + +<p>(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the +moral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the +common welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is +more divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects +temperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than +fortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other +virtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.</p> + +<p>2464. The Vices Opposed to Temperance.—(a) The vice of deficiency has +been called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of +the inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them +when and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed +that material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been +fanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity +(e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on +Sunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without +reason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to +them, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial +_per se_, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on +account of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly +refused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than +its opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the +sake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible +enjoyment.</p> + +<p>(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and +impurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most +unworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the +lower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself +nothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would +at all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached +when immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is +gluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure. +Immoderation is called by Aristotle a “childish sin,” because, as a +child is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless +instructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his +appetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the +discipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate +man should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while +the former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the +latter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.</p> + +<p>2465. The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of +temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. +These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the +virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those +associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of +temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; +the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act +(copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts +(kisses, touches, embraces, etc).</p> + +<p>(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for +the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and +avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) +and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). +Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a +disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a +preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and +is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things +disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an +attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a +habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful +to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.</p> + +<p>(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. +They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in +moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is +moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory +appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of +moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than +ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will +agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion +of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of +moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in +order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second +group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: +humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of +excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty +of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body +and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.</p> + +<p>2466. Abstemiousness.—Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates +according to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the +table.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very +powerful, and on account of the body’s need of nourishment is often +tempted.</p> + +<p>(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to +time, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard +amount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the +same, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual +cannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the +mean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude +within certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness +is not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately +abstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or +for optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since +he is not guided by prudence or obligation.</p> + +<p>(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is +proper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily +health, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and +hygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such +as mental power, control of passion, austerity.</p> + +<p>(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for +and actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation +in intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be +discussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or +water, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too +much whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.</p> + +<p>2467. Degrees of Abstemiousness.—(a) The lower degree practises +temperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not +only of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical +condition, yet so as to avoid all excess.</p> + +<p>(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is +necessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body, +but sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than +he could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand. +The subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his +health in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of +old Galen, “abstemiousness is the best medicine.” But even though this +austerity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate +life, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of +virtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal +goods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2468. Austerity.—The two chief forms of austerity in food and drink +are fasting and abstinence.</p> + +<p>(a) Nature.—The natural fast is the omission of all eating and +drinking, or the omission to receive into the stomach anything whatever +that has the nature of food, drink or medicine. The moral fast is the +omission to take a certain quantity of food that could be taken without +intemperance. Abstinence is the omission to take a certain quality of +food, such as meat or eggs.</p> + +<p>(b) Kinds.—Fast and abstinence are in respect to duration either +perpetual (e.g., the abstinence from meat of the Carthusians) or +temporary (e.g., the abstinence for Fridays and other appointed days of +the faithful generally); either voluntary (e.g., a fast which one +assumes under private vow) or obligatory (e.g., the fasts and +abstinences prescribed in the general or particular laws of the +Church). The ecclesiastical fast and abstinence will be spoken of later +when we treat of the precepts of the Church and Holy Communion.</p> + +<p>2469. The Excellence of Fasting and Abstinence.—(a) +Lawfulness.—Fasting and abstinence are acts of virtue, for they subdue +the unruly flesh, fit the mind for divine contemplation (Dan, x. 3 +sqq.), satisfy for sins (Joel, ii. 12), and add weight to prayers +(Tob., xii. 8; Judith, iv. 11; Matt., xvii. 20). The greatest men of +the Old and New Testaments practised fasting—Moses, Samson, Elias, +John the Baptist, and St. Paul. Our Lord Himself fasted forty days and +forty nights (Matt, iv. 2). St. Paul, therefore, numbers fasting with +other virtues: “In fastings, in knowledge, in chastity” (II Cor., vi. +5). Examples of abstinence are Daniel avoiding meat (Dan, i. 8 sqq.) +and Eleazar who died rather than eat forbidden swine flesh (II Mach., +vi. 18 sqq.). Abstention from solid or liquid nourishment is not a +virtue, however, if practised from purely indifferent or evil motives, +for example, merely in order to recover health through diet, or to +train for an athletic contest, or to preserve shape and beauty, or to +commit suicide, or to simulate virtue, or to profess false doctrines or +if carried to extremes. The forty-day fasts of Moses, Elias and of Our +Lord are for our admiration, but very few are able to imitate these +examples.</p> + +<p>(b) Obligation.—Fasting and abstinence in general are obligatory under +natural law, because without them certain necessary ends cannot be +obtained. They are remedies for past sins and preservatives against +future sins; and, as sin is the common state of man (James, iii. 2; +Gal., v. 17), it would be presumptuous to neglect these antidotes. +Under the positive law fasting and abstinence have been prescribed in +detail, and this was necessary since it is the duty of the Church to +determine the time, manner and other circumstances of natural duties of +religion which the natural law itself has not determined.</p> + +<p>2470. The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness.—(a) The sin of deficiency in +the matter of food is self-starvation. This is the sin of those who are +martyrs to fashion, who in order to have a frail figure follow a diet +(e.g., denying oneself all substantial food to reduce obesity) that +undermines their constitutions and leaves them a prey to disease. It is +also the sin of those who from unwise zeal for rigorous fasting deprive +themselves of the necessaries of life, or eat what their stomachs rebel +against. This sin does not differ from suicide or bodily injury treated +above (see 1566 sqq., 1857 sqq.). “It is the same thing to kill +yourself by slow degrees as to kill yourself in a moment. And he who +kills himself by fasting is like one who offers God a sacrifice from +stolen property” (St. Jerome).</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of excess in food is gluttony. There is no sin in desiring +food or in taking food with satisfaction, for the Author of nature has +willed that such an essential act as eating should be pleasurable, and +it is a fact that digestion and health suffer when food is taken +without appetite or a peaceful frame of mind. But the glutton goes to +excess by the inordinate and unreasonable enjoyment he takes in feeding +himself.</p> + +<p>2471. Ways of Committing Gluttony.—There are many ways of committing +gluttony, but they can all be reduced to two heads.</p> + +<p>(a) Gluttony in food is excess in the substance, quantity, or quality +of the things eaten. The gourmet is extremely fastidious about the +substance of his food; he must have the most dainty or costly or rare +viands, and nothing else will satisfy him. Cannibalism seems to be +lawful in extreme necessity, but it is not lawful to kill human beings +in order to eat them. The gorger or gourmand may not be particular +about the kind of food that is given him, but he desires a large +quantity, more than is good for him. The epicure is too hard to please +as to quality; even when there is no festal occasion, he must have a +great variety of foods and they must be most carefully prepared, so +that he may get the utmost joy of the palate. We should not class among +gluttons, however, those who require special foods or special cooking +for a good reason, as when health or hard work forces one to observe a +strict diet.</p> + +<p>(b) Gluttony in eating is excess as to the time or manner of taking +food. There is excess about the time when a person is over-eager about +the dinner bell, eats before or oftener than he should, or lingers too +long at table. There is excess about the manner when a person eats +greedily, hurriedly, or selfishly, rushing at his food like a tiger, +bolting it like a dog, or depriving others like a pig.</p> + +<p>2472. The Sinfulness of Gluttony.—(a) Gluttony is a mortal sin when it +is so serious as to turn man away from his end itself, making him +prefer his appetite to God. Thus, those sin gravely who are such high +livers that they are unable to pay their debts, to the serious +detriment of creditors; or who gormandize so much that they can do +little work and have to spend most of their time in exercising or +taking cures; or whose heavy eating is the occasion of serious sins of +anger, impurity, or neglect of religious or other duties. To all these +apply the words of St. Paul (Phil., iii. 19): “Whose god is their +belly.” To eat until one vomits seems to be a mortal sin, if the vomit +is caused by the enormous quantity of food consumed, for such an act +seems to be gravely opposed to reason; but there is no grave sin if the +vomit is due to the quality of the food or the weakness of the stomach.</p> + +<p>(b) Gluttony in itself is a venial sin since it is a disorder about the +means, and not a turning away from the end. This happens when one is +inordinately fond of gastronomic joys, but is not prepared to sacrifice +grave duties for their sakes. Thus, a person who gives too much +indulgence to a sweet tooth, or who likes to stuff himself now and +then, but who doesn’t disable himself or give scandal by his weakness, +sins venially.</p> + +<p>2473. Gluttony as a Capital Sin.—(a) The first condition of a capital +sin is that it be one of the main sources of evil attraction. This +condition is verified of gluttony, for all seek happiness, and gluttony +contains one of the ingredients of happiness, namely, pleasure in an +unusual degree. Among all sensual delights those of the palate and +stomach are admitted to be, along with those of sexual love, the most +intense. The first of the three temptations with which Satan assailed +Christ was that of gluttony (Matt., iv. 1-4).</p> + +<p>(b) The second condition of a capital vice is that it be the final or +motive cause of a large crop of sins. This condition is also verified +in gluttony, since the greedy man is so in love with his pet vice that +in order to pamper it he is ready to suffer various kinds of evils +which he should not permit. Evils of soul that are caused by gluttony +are: heaviness in the mind, for an overloaded stomach unfits the mind +to reflect on higher things or to consider the duty of moderation in +rejoicing, in words or in acts (Ecclus., ii. 3); absurd mirth in the +will, a feeling of security and gladness and unrestraint, for the +glutton thinks only of his present contentment and does not consider +the evils of his sin; loquacity in word, for his mental faculties being +dulled and his will hilarious the glutton gives free rein to his +tongue, often sinning by detraction, betrayal of secrets, contumely, +and blasphemy (Prov., X. 19); levity in act, for the glutton wishes to +give vent to his animal spirits, and he does so by unbecoming jokes and +clownishness. Evils of body due to gluttony are dirtiness and disease: +the glutton is often filthy in his manner of eating, his breath is +fetid, he is much occupied with natural necessities, excretion and +exgurgitation, and he suffers from gout or indigestion or one of the +numerous other maladies that are the price of overindulgence.</p> + +<p>2474. Sobriety.—Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps +one to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating +liquors and in their use.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with +substances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain. +It is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has +to subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony. +Alcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both +mind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those +who are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate +their movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and +elevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who +have once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual +intoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to +a disgraceful and early grave.</p> + +<p>(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and +medicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics, +such as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong +liquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.</p> + +<p>2475. Obligation to Practise Sobriety.—Sobriety should be cultivated +by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in +their regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young, +the old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly +harmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects +them more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the +strength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are +accordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are +more easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient +Romans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary +or indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems, +and they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or +who engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron +it may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.</p> + +<p>(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their +insobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain +individuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to +themselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are +more easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage +of; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men +particularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do +greater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should +instruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I +Tim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).</p> + +<p>2476. The Sins against Sobriety.—(a) The sin of excess may be called, +for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who +condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically +evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the +devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when +the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow +only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a +man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a +voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the +consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin +(active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from +drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active +drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both +voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere +state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is +lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or +forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it +seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not +merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination +of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence, +a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he +drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he +takes too much.</p> + +<p>2477. Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.—(a) Involuntary +Drunkenness.—This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact +(e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had +no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that +his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk +because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is +lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not +want it).</p> + +<p>(b) Excusable Drunkenness.—This occurs according to most theologians +when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil +of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of +life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious +disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of +severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very +painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave +case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one +may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives +(such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason +why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which +may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if +other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to +excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as +intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also +give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to +kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But +all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such +as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor +by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable +means (e.g., worry about one’s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or +conversation).</p> + +<p>2478. The Morality of Total Abstinence.—(a) Obligation.—_Per se_, +there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of +intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and +drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of +intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is +found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an +excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water +into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of +the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not +sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the +Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36), +recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23), +and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt., +xv. 2).</p> + +<p>But, _per accidens_, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a +greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good +be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health +or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them) +or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal, +Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through +drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the +most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection +to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that +particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by +impartial study.</p> + +<p>(b) Lawfulness.—_Per se_, it is also permissible to abstain freely +from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order +the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence +calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example. +But, _per accidens_, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the +celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who +cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits. +Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson +(Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist +(Luke, i. 15).</p> + +<p>2479. Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) The sin of perfect or +complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so +far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean +that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to +walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the +mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains +enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street +or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one’s own quarters without +help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated +person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates +evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs +down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot +remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.</p> + +<p>(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary +excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in +mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is +physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink, +who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows +that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel, +etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate +the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a +toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse +to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.</p> + +<p>2480. Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) Perfect drunkenness is a +mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral +judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious +crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil +oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and +to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a +human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must +put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and +that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The +opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now +obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless +it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly +rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its +nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to +make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by +artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does +not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish +person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or +scandal.</p> + +<p>(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not +considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a +slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine +or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and +talkativeness, there is no sin.</p> + +<p>Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of +circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great +scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to +inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness +is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his +business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in +consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin +when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the +habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram +of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more +harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals, +especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.</p> + +<p>2481. Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.—(a) It is not the worst of +sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they +offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good. +Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a +greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life +than to suspend the use of reason.</p> + +<p>(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see +2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime, +insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to +religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the +appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things, +for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong +drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for +drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and +has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled +stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart, +nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and +brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards +squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate +parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.</p> + +<p>2482. Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While +Intoxicated.—(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, +he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen; +for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one +who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme, +betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them +while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk. +Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is +responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a +business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to +restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused +way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.</p> + +<p>(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins +that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen, +the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins. +Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps +after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if +the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became +drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some +realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least +venially guilty of profanity and scandal.</p> + +<p>(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused +entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in +case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization +of the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon +2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse +for a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson, +_Elements of Law_, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).</p> + +<p>2483. Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness—(a) If there is +no grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is +not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of +strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good +fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another +round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents +or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty +of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction; +those who supply others with drink in order that these may become +drunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.</p> + +<p>(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515 +sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get +sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater +evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).</p> + +<p>2484. Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be +guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?</p> + +<p>(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness, +like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the +end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to +induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to +intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).</p> + +<p>(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself +for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to +intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about +to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible +or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to +make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and +could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to +make them drunk.</p> + +<p>2485. Licit Use of Narcotics.—There are a great many substances that +produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors, +namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform, +ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given +above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to +make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just +reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when +having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to +relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of +the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (_The Pope Speaks_, Summer, +1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the +use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions +submitted to him for consideration were the following:</p> + +<p>1) Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to +accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in +certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of +serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with +the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and +does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may +licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted +in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior +purification.</p> + +<p>2) Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to +make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The +Pope responded; “Yes—provided that no other means exist, and if, in +the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out +of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include +settling important business, making a will, or going to confession. +(Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist +in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without +rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed, +which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the +patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the +licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if +the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons +clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the +permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the +treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents +to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally +permissible.”</p> + +<p>3) Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be +accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every +form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in +order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one +presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and +the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed +either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of +things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be +attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the +administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the +relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is +lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable +proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the +one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is +important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does +not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means. +Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the +limits which are actually necessary.”</p> + +<p>2486. The Virtue of Purity.—As abstemiousness and sobriety preside +over the pleasures of the self-preservative instinct, so purity governs +those that pertain to the species-preservative instinct. Purity is an +inclusive name for the virtues of chastity and decency or pudicity, and +its office is to regulate proximately the internal movements of the +soul (thoughts and desires) and remotely the external words and acts +that have to do with sexual delights.</p> + +<p>(a) Chastity in its strictest sense is a virtue that moderates or +chastens through reason venereal pleasure, chiefly as to its principal +or consummated act (i.e., intercourse, semination) or as to its +principal bodily centers (i.e., the genital organs). Hence, there is a +twofold chastity, conjugal and celibate: conjugal chastity abstains +from unnatural pleasure, and uses the natural reasonably in marriage; +celibate chastity abstains from all venereal pleasure, as being +unlawful in the single state.</p> + +<p>(b) Decency (_pudicitia_) in its strictest sense is a virtue that +moderates by the sense of shame venereal pleasure chiefly in its +secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations, +touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as +being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and +accompaniment. The conjugal act, though lawful, occasions a feeling of +shame, and the same is true of the non-consummated acts; but decency is +especially concerned with these latter, because they are usually more +openly performed than the consummated act. Decency means, then, that +manifestations of carnal desire should be conducted with a sense that +this desire arises from a lower and rebellious passion, removed in +itself farthest from reason, and not more suited for unrestrained +expression or public exhibition than other lower animal acts. The sense +of shame and decency is a protection to the virtue of the unmarried and +the married, restraining the former from the unlawful and holding the +latter to moderation in the use of the lawful.</p> + +<p>2487. Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is +a circumstance of chastity. (a) Thus, chastity moderates also the +secondary acts, for reason must chastise the pleasure that is taken in +these acts, if this passion is to be kept in due bounds, (b) Decency +moderates also the primary act, for in the use of marriage there should +be nothing unworthy, nothing to bring a blush of confusion.</p> + +<p>2488. Virginity.—The highest form of chastity is virginity, which is a +purity unblemished that retains the bloom of its original innocence. +Conjugal chastity uses venereal pleasures moderately and virtuously; +virginity abstains from them entirely and virtuously. Virginity is +threefold.</p> + +<p>(a) Virginity of body is freedom from corruption in the genitals, which +means that a male has never had sexual intercourse, that the hymen of a +female is inviolate. This physical purity belongs to the virtue of +virginity accidentally, seeing that it is the result or indication of +the virtue; but it does not belong to the virtue essentially, since +virtue is in the soul, not in the body. Hence, one may be virginal in +body without the virtue of virginity (e.g., a new-born infant), or vice +versa (e.g., a woman vowed to virginity who has been raped).</p> + +<p>(b) Virginity of the lower part of the soul (the passions) is freedom +from venereal pleasure voluntarily experienced. Primarily, this refers +to pleasure in consummated acts, secondarily to pleasure in +non-consummated acts and internal acts of thought and desire. This kind +of purity belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, since sexual +pleasures are the material element or subject-matter of virginity, +whose office it is to exclude all indulgence of them. Hence, a person +who has had even one voluntary experience of these satisfactions, +lawful or gravely unlawful, has lost virginity permanently, though the +virtue of chastity may remain or may be recovered. For virginity cannot +continue when its subject-matter has been removed. It should be noted +that involuntary pleasures, as in nocturnal pollution or in rape or in +passive spermic discharges, are not detrimental to the virtue of +virginity.</p> + +<p>(c) Virginity of the higher part of the soul (the mind) is the +intention to abstain from every venereal act in the future. This purity +of soul also belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, being its +formal element, since acts of the sensitive appetites are made moral +and virtuous only from the direction and influence of reason and will. +Hence, one who has had no experience of voluntary carnal pleasure, but +who intends to marry and use its rights or to act unchastely, has not +in the first case the virtue of virginity, or in the second case the +virtue of chastity.</p> + +<p>2489. Loss of Virginity.—Physical or bodily virginity once lost can +never be recovered, for this virginity means that a certain bodily +action or passion has not occurred, whereas the loss means that such +action or passion has occurred. Of course, a miracle could restore +bodily integrity. But a more important question is this: is moral +virginity, or the virtue of virginity, also irrecoverable?</p> + +<p>(a) If the virtue has been lost as to its chief material element, it +cannot be recovered. This material element (i.e., the absence of all +voluntary seminal experience) cannot be restored, for even God cannot +make what has been experienced a non-actuality. However, it should be +noted once for all that loss of virginity does not necessarily imply +loss of conjugal chastity, and that lost chastity may be recovered by +repentance.</p> + +<p>(b) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element, and the +intention not to abstain was unlawful and naturally, though not +actually, productive of semination (e.g., copulation of a completely +aspermatic adult, or internal and intense libidinous sin from which +accidentally pollution does not result), it seems that the virtue +cannot be recovered. For in these cases the sinner wills, at least +indirectly, the loss of the chief material element of virginity, and it +seems repugnant to reason to ascribe the glory of virginity to one who +has sinned in this way. Non expedit regulariter monere poenitentes de +eorum virginitate irreparabiliter amissa, sed praestat quaerentibus +respondere omnia peccata remitti de quibus contritio habeatur.</p> + +<p>(c) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element and the +intention not to abstain was lawful (e.g., a maid not under vow decided +to marry and have children, but changed her mind and decided to remain +single), or was unlawful but neither naturally nor actually productive +of semination (e.g., external unchastity of a child incapable through +impuberty of emissions, or internal and only mildly exciting +unchastity of an adult), the virtue may be recovered, certainly in the +first case and probably also in the second case. For the matter of +virginity is certainly not taken away by the mere intention to have +lawful venereal pleasure, nor probably even by pleasures that do not +tend to semination. Recovery of virginity is made in the one case by +the retractation of contrary intention and in the other case by +repentance and renewal of good purpose.</p> + +<p>2490. Conditions Necessary for the Virtue of Virginity.—(a) As to its +manner, it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a +vow. The reason for this according to some is that virginity is a +special virtue only because of the sacred character which religion +gives it, and according to others also because of the unshakable +renunciation which is conferred by a vow. But it is also held as +probable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree of the +special virtue of virginity, At least, it is a higher degree of the +virtue of chastity.</p> + +<p>(b) As to its motive, virginity must be justified by an extrinsic +reason. Chastity is justified by its own end, which is reasonable +moderation. Virginity, on the contrary, is not self-justificatory, +since in itself it is unfruitful and without advantage. Hence, it is +not praiseworthy unless it serves some higher good than that of +propagation, such as a good of the mind (e.g., Plato remained single +for the sake of philosophy) or of the will (e.g., the New Testament +recommends virginity for the sake of greater devotion to the things of +God). Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure +would be an excess, and continence embraced merely to escape the +burdens of marriage and to lead an easy, self-indulgent, irresponsible +life would be selfishness; but virginity followed from an ideal of +self-sacrifice which reason approves observes the golden mean (see Pius +XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954).</p> + +<p>2491. The Excellence of Virginity.-(a) Virginity has the highest rank +among the various forms of chastity. Every kind of chastity +(pre-nuptial, conjugal, vidual) is of great importance, because to this +virtue is entrusted the right propagation of the entire race and the +moral and physical health of the individual in the most insistent of +passions. The material reproduction of the race is indeed a more urgent +need than virginity, since without it the human species would die out; +and if there were danger of race extinction, it would be more +imperative to marry than to remain continent. But if we confine our +attention to the ordinary course of things and compare virginity and +non-virginal chastity from the viewpoint of nobility, it must be said +virginity is more valuable both to the community and to the individual +than the other kinds of chastity. It is more valuable to the community, +since the example of its excellence is a protection to public morals, +and its permanence gives the opportunity for a more general and ready +service of society. It is more valuable to the individual, since to be +occupied with the things of God is better than to be engrossed in the +things of the world, and the unmarried have the opportunity to devote +more time with less distraction to higher things. Scripture affirms the +superiority of virginity to marriage by its teaching (e.g., Our Lord in +Matt., xix. 12, counsels virginity; St. Paul in I Cor., vii. 7 sqq., +says that it is the better and more blessed state), by its examples +(Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, St. John the +Evangelist, and in the Old Dispensation Josue, Elias, Eliseus, +Jeremias), and by its promised rewards (Apoc., xiv. 4). A popular +philosophy of materialism today makes repressed sex-urges responsible +for hysteria and other emotional disturbances, but experience proves +that continence benefits both psychical and physical health.</p> + +<p>(b) Virginity does not rank first among all the virtues. The +theological virtues surpass it, being its goal; martyrdom and religious +obedience are greater, because they sacrifice the superior goods of +life and of the will. It may happen, then, that a person in the married +state or a penitent (Luke, vii. 36 sqq.) is personally more holy than +one dedicated to continence; a married person or penitent may surpass a +virgin in faith, hope and charity, and may be therefore, simply +speaking, more perfect.</p> + +<p>2492. The Sin of Impurity.—This sin, which is also known as lust, is +an inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.</p> + +<p>(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical +enjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the +lower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation. +Hence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an +inordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher +sense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health +and comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an +over-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be +noted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that +intellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this +sensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to +impurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).</p> + +<p>(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are +indifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is +consented to by the will.</p> + +<p>(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe +dictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged +by the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a +perversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the +palate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the +nourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does +not live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained +by God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the +propagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly +attended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal +pleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature, +act unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct +guides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature +and must guide himself by religion and reason.</p> + +<p>2493. Kinds of Impurity.—(a) Impurity is consummated when the act is +continued to its natural conclusion and complete venereal satisfaction +is had. This occurs in semination, which is the termination of the +process set up by the impure thought and desire and the realization of +its full pleasure. Semination occurs either in the process of coition, +or in extracoitional issues known as “pollution.” Equivalent to +semination, morally speaking, are other emissions or secretions that +accompany complete or almost complete gratification, but in which the +fluid is not prolific (e.g., the urethral emissions in boys who have +not attained puberty or in eunuchs, the vaginal flow in women, urethral +distillations). Consummated impurity is either natural (that is, +suitable for reproduction, the end intended by nature), as in +fornication or adultery, or unnatural (that is, not suited for +reproduction), as in sodomy or pollution.</p> + +<p>(b) Impurity is non-consummated when not carried to its natural +conclusion of complete satisfaction and semination. There are two +classes of the non-consummated sins, namely, the internal (as in +thoughts and desires) and the external or lewdness (as in words, looks, +kisses). This happens without carnal commotion (e.g., when a frigid old +man thinks with mental pleasure only on the wild deeds of his youth), +or with carnal commotion, that is, with an excitement and stimulation +in the genital organs that prepares the way for semination.</p> + +<p>2494. Gravity of the Sin of Impurity.—(a) Impurity is a mortal sin, +because it is a disorder that affects a good of the highest importance +(viz, the propagation of the race), and brings in its train public and +private, moral and physical, evils of the most serious kind. Man has no +more right to degrade his body by lust than he has to kill it by +suicide, for God is the absolute Lord over the body and He severely +forbids impurity of every kind. Those who do the works of the flesh, +whether according to nature (e.g., fornicators and adulterers) or +against nature (e.g., sodomites) or by unconsummated sin (e.g., the +unclean, the impure), shall not obtain the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 19; +I Cor., vi. 9 sqq.), nor have any inheritance with Christ (Eph., v. 5).</p> + +<p>(b) Impurity is not the worst of sins, because sins against God (e.g., +hatred of God, sacrilege) are more heinous than sins against created +goods, and sins of malice are more inexcusable than sins of passion or +frailty. But carnal sins are peculiarly disgraceful on account of their +animality (see 2464 b, 224), and in a Christian they are a kind of +profanation, since his body has been given to Christ in Baptism and the +other Sacraments (I Cor., vi. 11-19).</p> + +<p>(c) Impurity is one of the seven capital vices. The capital sins have a +preeminence in evil, as the cardinal virtues have a superiority in +good. The preeminence in evil is due, first, to some special +attractiveness of a vice that makes it an end for the commission of +other sins, which are used as means to it or are incurred for its sake; +or, secondly, to a power and influence that is so strong as to hurry +those under its sway into various kinds of sin. Now, impurity is a +moral disease that ravages every part of the soul, its deadly effects +appearing in the reason, the will and external speech; for the more one +subjects oneself to the dominion of passion, the less fitted does one +become for the higher and nobler things of life; and the more ignoble +the inner life, the more vulgar, cheap and degrading will be the +conversation.</p> + +<p>Hence, the Fathers trace back to impurity the following sins of +imprudence in the mind: wrong apprehension, about the end or purpose of +life, and precipitancy in deliberation, thoughtlessness in decision, +inconstancy in direction, in reference to the means to the end (see +1693 sqq.). They also trace to impurity the following sins in the will: +as to the end, voluptuarism (which subordinates all to fleshly +pleasure) and hatred of God (which abhors the Supreme Lawgiver who +forbids and punishes lust); as to the means, love of the present and +horror of the future life (since the carnal man revels in bodily +pleasures and dreads the thought of death and judgment). Finally, they +trace the following sins of the tongue to the vice of impurity: the +subject of the lewd man’s talk is filthy, for out of the heart the +mouth speaketh (Matt., xii. 34), the expression itself is foolish, +since passion clouds his mind, the origin of his talk is emptiness of +mind which shows itself in frivolous words, and his purpose is +unsuitable amusement, which leads to farcical or vulgar jokes.</p> + +<p>2495. Evil Fruits of Impurity.—In addition to these moral +consequences, impurity is also prolific of many other evil fruits.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, for the sinner himself it is like a cruel goad that +constantly annoys him and takes away his peace (St. Ambrose), like a +sword that kills the nobler instincts (St. Gregory the Great), like a +descent from human dignity to a condition below the beasts (St. +Eusebius of Caesarea).</p> + +<p>(b) For society it is disastrous in many ways, since it propagates +dread mental and physical diseases, disrupts the peace of families, +brings disgrace and destitution on innocent children, eats away +fortunes and leads up to innumerable crimes of injustice and violence.</p> + +<p>2496. Is Impurity Ever a Venial Sin?—(a) By reason of the imperfection +of the act, impurity is venial when there is no sufficient deliberation +or consent. Invincible ignorance in reference to the sixth commandment +itself sometimes happens, especially in reference to internal sins of +thought, to external sins of pollution if the person is young, and to +other external sins when there is some complication of circumstances +(e.g., kissing and other intimacy by engaged persons, onanism when +married persons are poor or the woman sickly); and more frequently +there is invincible ignorance about details of the sixth commandment +(e.g., about the precise theological or moral malice of what is known +to be sinful).</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the matter, impurity according to the common teaching +is always mortal if directly willed, but sometimes venial if only +indirectly willed. Impurity is directly willed when one posits an act +intending to obtain from it unlawful venereal delectation, or perceives +that such delectation is already present and consents to it. No matter +how brief this voluntary assent, no matter how slight the commotion of +the animal nature, no matter how far from the consummated is the impure +act in question, there is always a serious injury done to a great good +or at least (exception is made for the case of married persons) the +proximate danger of such injury, and hence mortal sin (see 260). That +even slight yielding to impurity is a serious peril is the teaching of +Scripture (which declares that lust has killed even the strongest, +Prov., vii. 26), of the Church (which condemns the opinion that +libidinous kisses are not dangerous, see Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. +1140), of theology (which reminds us that by original sin reason has +been darkened, the will enfeebled and the passions strengthened), and +of experience (which shows that those who expose themselves to +passion’s flame will be burnt). A small spark of fire is not trivial in +the vicinity of a powder magazine, a minute flaw in a machine is not +unimportant if it may bring on disaster, a first step is not safe if it +is made on a slippery downward declivity.</p> + +<p>(c) Impurity is indirectly willed when deliberately and without +sufficient reason one posits an act which is not venereal pleasure +(whether the act be good, such as a prayer made with great sensible +fervor, or bad, such as gluttony, or indifferent, such as reading a +book, looking at a picture, taking a bath), but which produces foreseen +venereal pleasure (consummated or non-consummated) that one neither +intends nor directly consents to. Impurity thus indirectly willed is +sinful, because the pleasure is foreseen and permitted without +sufficient reason (see 102), or in other words because one exposes +oneself to danger of internal defilement (consent), or external +pollution without justification (see 260). Indirect impurity is mortal +when there is proximate danger of grave sin in the act done, that is, +when the posited act _per se_ or from its nature strongly incites the +agent to sexual passion, as when one gazes long and fixedly at obscene +pictures, knowing that always or nearly always this arouses impure +emotions. The sin is venial when there is only remote danger of grave +sin. This happens when the posited act is not of a venereal kind (an +unnecessary conversation on indifferent topics) or is only mildly +exciting (e.g., a passing glance at an obscene object), or when the +agent himself is not greatly affected by it (e.g., when an old man, or +one who is of very cold disposition, or an artist whose only thought is +the esthetic excellence, carefully studies a picture of the nude).</p> + +<p>2497. Temptations to Impurity.—Before treating the various kinds of +impurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin +and of the duties of the person tempted.</p> + +<p>(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty +of struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455 +sqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or +things are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the +principles given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that +another wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal +consent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is +hope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or +yielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).</p> + +<p>(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative +disturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve +generation (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is +produced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will, +by physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc., +due solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of +ailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g., +spontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in +these cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V +condemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of +concupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command: +“Thou shalt not covet” (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051, +1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the +passion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there +is grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly +voluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire +of it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if +there is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician +sees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his +reason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if +there is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic +book, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its +gravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself +(see 2496 c).</p> + +<p>2498. Resistance to Internal Temptations.—The fight against internal +temptations is of various kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to +which it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other +powers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will +perform acts designed to overcome temptation.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the +temptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation) +or resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension +of activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when +internally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally +nothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is +positive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways: +first, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to +other thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of +Christ), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g., +acts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or +freed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of +attack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g., +thinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will +rejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike, +disapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by +deciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body +is subjected to pain or mortification.</p> + +<p>(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either +prolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable +duration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the +act of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.</p> + +<p>2499. What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?—Opposition to +temptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation, +when the temptation is due to the continuance of one’s own sinful or +unjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the +unreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly +voluntary—for example, one who wished to experience temptation and +therefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or +(b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without +sufficient reason—for example, one who experiences carnal temptation +due to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the +book. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful +acts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be +denied the evil, but the good should be continued.</p> + +<p>2500. Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.—In other cases +opposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to +keep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate +danger of sin.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen +the will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since +it is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of +carnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being +moved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive +opposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows +out of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or +interrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers +internally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is +not permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as +in the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.</p> + +<p>(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence, +resistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be +omitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a +common teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that +dwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its +strength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and +passing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is +better to brush a mosquito away than to risk one’s neck by chasing it +up and down stairs.</p> + +<p>(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral +impossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at +intervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme +corporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When +a temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one’s own fault, there +should be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater +danger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices +to reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a +new crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.</p> + +<p>2501. Weapons against Carnal Temptations.—The most powerful weapons +against carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most +necessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21), +especially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see +Pius XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954). But corporal means, +chiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.</p> + +<p>(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken +of as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases. +Special health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are +especially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard +mental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of +unhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation), +unsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical +treatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases +that react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a +conscientious and competent physician.</p> + +<p>(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification, +such as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food +(fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive +penances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or +disciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age, +condition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises +them, and should not be used without the consent of one’s confessor or +spiritual director.</p> + +<p>2502. Sinfulness of Negligence in Resisting Temptations.—It is sinful +not to struggle against temptation, since he who in no way resists, not +even passively, surrenders or yields to sin. Hence, the Church +condemned the quietistic indifference to temptation of Molinos +(Denzinger, nn. 1237, 1257, 1267). It is also sinful to resist, but +only insufficiently, as regards promptness, vigor, manner, etc.</p> + +<p>(a) The Theological Malice.—It is mortally or venially sinful to be +negligent against temptation, according to the greatness or smallness +of the danger to which the negligence exposes one (see 256-262). Thus, +it is not a serious sin to omit all resistance to a weak and dying +temptation, or to neglect from indolence or other venial fault all +external resistance when the danger is made remote by the internal +displeasure or resolution; but it is a serious sin to trifle with any +very attractive temptation or to put off resistance until a progressing +temptation has grown formidable and made self-control difficult, and +this is true even though consent is not finally given to the impure +suggestion.</p> + +<p>(b) The Moral Malice.—Negligences in reference to carnal temptations +do not differ specifically but only in degree, according to the +approach the stimuli make towards complete lust. Even when there is an +object (e.g., fornication, adultery) before the mind, the difference in +species of the object, it seems, does not induce a difference in +species of the sin, since the sin is the general one of carelessness in +presence of temptation. Hence, it suffices to confess that one has been +remiss in banishing impure emotions or thoughts.</p> + +<p>2503. Applications.—(a) The principles here given in reference to +emotions of the sensible appetite and rebellions of the flesh should be +applied to other involuntary acts in the imagination, reason and will +(see 129). Thus, thoughts or images of impure scenes that pass through +the mind should be treated in the same way as temptations of the flesh.</p> + +<p>(b) The principles here given about the person who suffers temptation +should also be applied to the person who causes temptation. Since it is +a mortal sin to commit impurity, it is also a mortal sin to solicit +impurity; since it is a mortal sin of lust to make oneself drunk in +order to experience carnal emotions, it is also a mortal sin of lust to +make another person drunk that he may become likewise inflamed; since +it is a mortal sin to expose oneself to extreme danger by reading a +pornographic work, it is also a mortal sin to wish to expose another to +a like danger. And this is true even though the temptation is +unsuccessful. Physicians who minimize the wrong of masturbation, or who +counsel fornication to young men on the absurd plea that continence is +unhealthy or productive of impotency, share in the guilt of pollution +or fornication which they counsel; and young persons who seek to win +the sinful love of others by nourishing their hair, painting their +faces, exposing their bodies, etc., have the guilt, if not the gain, of +seduction.</p> + +<p>2504. Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.—These include all those +preparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to +completion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the +internal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next +of the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.</p> + +<p>2505. Impure Thoughts.—Impure thoughts (_delectatio morosa_) are +representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects +in which deliberate pleasure is taken.</p> + +<p>(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of +things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present. +Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction +with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds +with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.</p> + +<p>(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one +intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving +their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or +does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts, +which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are +thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a +lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not +sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it +endures (see 2497 b).</p> + +<p>(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought +of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or +by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the +pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of +medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual +knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or +willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for +him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner +of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature +of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).</p> + +<p>2506. The Malice of Impure Thoughts.—(a) The Theological +Malice.—Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately +rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of +it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also +when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the +danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when +there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary +or gravely dangerous (see 2496).</p> + +<p>(b) The Moral Malice.—Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as +the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome +guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of +the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it +follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case +with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin +(e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental +fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental +adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not +specifically different—as is the case with different non-consummated +sins of lewdness—do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to +think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful +touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that +special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind—viz., +those which in the external act do not change the species or do not +explain the venereal pleasure—and from which it does prescind, are not +incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married +and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one’s relative is +not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental +adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut +regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis +morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter +species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel +inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus +crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum +poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt. +Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum +voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus +internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon +888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment, +Holy Office, May 16, 1943.</p> + +<p>2507. Impure Rejoicing.—Impure rejoicing is a deliberate pleasure of +the mind yielded to the recollection of a past sin of impurity. Hence, +this sin of rejoicing is committed when one thinks with approval of a +fornication of former days, but the sin of rejoicing is not committed +when one confines one’s pleasure to some good consequence of a +fornication (e.g., the excellent child that was born), or to a lawful +pleasure of the past, as when a widower thinks without present carnal +commotion or danger of his former married life. The circumstances are +more readily willed here than in impure thoughts, for here the mind is +picturing an actual, not an imaginary case of sin, and the mental +representation will therefore be more distinct; nevertheless, in the +case of impure rejoicing the moral sub-species—at times even the +distinction between impure rejoicing and impure thoughts—is usually +not perceived. The principles of the previous paragraph apply to impure +rejoicing.</p> + +<p>2508. Impure Desires.—Impure desire is a deliberate intention to +commit impurity in the future.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which +consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same +thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that +he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only +that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as +a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances +that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were +lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both +he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these +velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of +danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will +consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to +fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take +away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were +it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to +practise fornication).</p> + +<p>(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure +desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual, +mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or +what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but +without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future +married relationship).</p> + +<p>2509. Malice of Impure Desires.—Impure desires are mortal sins and +have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in +mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in +performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a +woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his +heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins +of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to +impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills +external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it +is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from +actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional +investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral +impossibility.</p> + +<p>2510. Lewdness.—After the internal sins follow the external sins of +lewdness or indecency (_impudicitia_). These may be defined as +“external acts which are performed from or with deliberate venereal +pleasure that is not consummated, and which are not directed to the +conjugal act.”</p> + +<p>(a) They are external acts of the body, such as the looks of the eye, +the speech of the tongue, kisses of the lips, touches, fondling, +embraces, pressure of the hand, etc. Those also are guilty of lewdness +who permit themselves to be petted, kissed or otherwise impurely +handled, unless it is morally impossible to resist, as when a woman who +gives no internal consent cannot defend herself against a forced kiss +without being killed, or cannot without great scandal refuse to shake +hands with one whose motive is impure love. Lewdness (e.g., an impure +look) may also be directed to one’s own person, or to an animal, or to +an artificial object, such as a statue or book.</p> + +<p>(b) They are performed from or with pleasure; that is, passion either +causes or accompanies the impure look or other act. These +non-consummated acts are indifferent in themselves and may be licitly +performed for a just cause; they become sinful by reason of the evil +passion that animates them. The carnal motive appears either from the +end of the act (e.g., an indecent kiss naturally tends to impurity or +grave danger thereof, no matter what good purpose the kisser may have), +or from the end of the one acting (e.g., a decent kiss becomes an +impure act if the one who kisses is moved by carnal desire). Hence, +there is no sin of lewdness when one of the acts now considered is +performed becomingly as to externals and innocently as to the internal +motive and quality (e.g., from a sense of duty, not from pleasure).</p> + +<p>(c) The pleasure intended or consented to is venereal; that is, such as +is consummated in copulation or pollution. Hence, there is no sin of +lewdness when the acts in question are performed becomingly and with +and for pleasure of a spiritual kind (as when members of a family give +one another the customary kiss or embrace of affection), or of a merely +sensual kind (e.g., when a nurse kisses the tender skin of an infant). +On the distinction of intellectual, sensual and venereal pleasures see +above (2461).</p> + +<p>(d) The external act is not consummated by copulation or pollution. +These are often its result but they are a different degree of sin, and +lewdness is committed even without them (see 2486).</p> + +<p>(e) Lewdness is an action not directed to the conjugal act. Coition +itself is lawful in the married state, and this legitimatizes all the +preparatory or accessory endearments. Hence, the rule as to married +persons is that venereal kisses and other such acts are lawful when +given with a view to the exercise of the lawful marriage act and kept +within the bounds of decency and moderation; that they are sinful, +gravely or lightly according to the case, when unbecoming or +immoderate; that they are venially sinful, on account of the inordinate +use of a thing lawful in itself (85 a), when only pleasure is intended; +that they are mortally sinful, when they tend to pollution, whether +solitary or not solitary, for then they are acts of lewdness. The +rights and duties during courtship and engagement will be treated below +in Question III.</p> + +<p>2511. Cases Wherein No Sin Is Committed.—Since lewdness proceeds from +or is accompanied by culpable venereal pleasure, it does not exist in +the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) in children who have not attained puberty and the capacity for sex +pleasure, and hence there is no sin by reason of proximate danger in +looks or touches exercised by them, which would be gravely sinful in +those who have reached the age of puberty. These children may, however, +sin against modesty or obedience, at least venially. They should be +trained from their earliest years to reserve and decency, and it is a +most serious sin to scandalize their innocence. The question of sex +instruction for the young will be dealt with in the Question on the +Duties of Particular States. If an adult person were as unmoved as a +child by the stimulus of passion, such a one would incur no personal +guilt of lewdness by kissing and the like acts, but such an adult +person is very rare;</p> + +<p>(b) in adult persons when a dangerous act is exercised by them, without +consent or proximate danger, and with a sufficient reason for the +exercise. Thus, a student of literature may read an erotic story from +the classics, if he is proof against the danger and intends only +improvement in style, though for the young such books should be +expurgated; a professor of medicine or moral theology may discourse +prudently to his students on venereal diseases or sins; an artist may +use naked models in painting, if and as far as this is necessary; farm +hands may attend to the service of female by male animals; looks and +touches that would otherwise be immodest are lawful for proportionate +reasons of utility, as in bathing oneself, in performing the services +of nurse or physician for others, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2512. Conditions Governing Propriety of External Acts.—The +becomingness of the external acts spoken of in 2510 b includes two +conditions.</p> + +<p>(a) On the side of its object, the act must not be directed +unnecessarily to the parts of the body that are shameful and private +(i.e., the genitals and immediately adjacent parts). It is customary to +distinguish the remaining or non-shameful parts of the body into +becoming, which are uncovered (e.g., face, hands, feet), and less +becoming, which are covered (e.g., legs, breast, back). But as to less +decent parts much depends on local usage. For example, at a bathing +beach it is not unbecoming to appear in a mixed crowd with uncovered +legs or arms, and in very warm countries it is not improper to go about +in public with less clothing than is worn in colder climates.</p> + +<p>(b) On the side of its subject, the act must be performed with +moderation and respect for reasonable custom. Thus, columbine +(popularly called “French”) kissing and the ardent or prolonged +embraces known as “necking” or “petting” are admittedly indecent, even +when not accompanied by sexual excitement. Oral abuse committed by or +with either sex is indecent both as to the object, i.e., the part of +the body involved, and as to the subject, i.e., the mode of action. It +is the filthiest form of lewdness and is usually joined with pollution +(irrumation).</p> + +<p>2513. Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.—(a) _Per se_, or from +their nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed, +not only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good, +as we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the +kiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of +respectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, or from their circumstances, these acts are often +venially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other +virtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or +violence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal +or other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of +affection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a +member of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses +forced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful +sense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities +which, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the +virtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations +of sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal +commotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent +salutation customary in one’s country (e.g., to shake hands with a +lady, to kiss one’s stepmother or sister-in-law).</p> + +<p>2514. Morality of Sensual Gratification.—Sensual gratification, or the +pleasure experienced from the perfection in the sensible order of some +object, is indifferent and lawful in itself (see 2461, 2492). When it +is aroused by objects not venereally exciting (e.g., the beauty of the +heavens or scenery, the harmony of music, the tender softness of the +rose), it does not tempt to impurity; but when it is aroused by objects +that are venereally exciting (e.g., the beautiful face or eyes or sweet +voice or soft skin of a person much admired), it approaches so closely +to the confines of venereal gratification as to seem almost the same +thing. Hence arises the question; is deliberate sensual gratification +about objects sexually exciting always a mortal sin?</p> + +<p>(a) Many theologians answer in the affirmative, and give as their +reason that in the state of fallen nature there is no one who can be +assured that such gratification is not for him or her a proximate +occasion of pollution, or of what is morally the same thing, of +inchoate pollution. This opinion does not include gratifications not +deliberately sought or yielded to, nor those in which experience has +shown that the venereal attraction of the object, at least for the +subject concerned, is nil or practically nil (e.g., sensual kisses of +an infant by a nurse.)</p> + +<p>(b) Other theologians dissent from the rigorous view, and argue that, +since sensual and venereal attraction are really distinct, there is +always the possibility of intending the former and excluding consent to +the latter.</p> + +<p>(c) To the present authors it seems that there is room for a middle way +between these two extreme views. As was said above (2497), it is +sometimes sinful and sometimes not sinful to encounter temptation, +according to the intention and reason one has, and a temptation willed +unjustifiably but only indirectly is a grave or a light sin according +to the great or small danger that is risked. Now, it seems that certain +forms of sensual gratification (e.g., those derived from beautiful but +modest music or paintings) have only a very slight sexual allurement +for even the passionate; whereas other forms (e.g., those derived from +the warm kiss or caress of a handsome adult person of the opposite sex) +are vehemently alluring. Hence, if sensual pleasure of the first kind +is sought inordinately, or if it is dangerous to purity, there is a +venial sin; if sensual pleasure of the second kind is sought, there is +very likely mortal sin.</p> + +<p>2515. The Theological Species of the Sin of Lewdness.—(a) _Per se_, or +from its nature, this sin is mortal, even though the external act +(kiss, etc.) be decent (see 2512) and of the briefest duration; for +lewdness is consent to unlawful venereal pleasure, which from the +nature of the case is a serious matter, tending either to illicit +copulation or to pollution (see 2496). Hence, even a shake of the hand +made with lustful intent is a mortal sin. If the guilt of adultery is +found even in libidinous thoughts (Deut., v. 21) and glances (Matt., v. +28), much more is it found in lewd kisses, embraces, and conversations. +Scripture strongly condemns every form of lewdness: impure speech +(“Uncleanness let it not so much as be named among you, or obscenity, +or foolish talking,” Eph., v. 3, 4), impure reading (“Evil +communications corrupt good morals,” I Cor., xv. 33), impure looks +(“Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already +committed adultery with her in his heart,” Matt., v, 28), impure kisses +and other touches (“It is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for +fear of fornication let every man have his own wife,” I Cor., vii. 1).</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, this sin may be venial as follows: first, on +account of the imperfection of deliberation, as when a person under the +influence of liquor, drugs or sleep acts with only a partial +realization of what he is doing, especially if the lewd offense has not +occurred before; secondly, on account of the lightness of the matter, +when the lewd act is indirectly voluntary and the danger remote (see +2496), as when slight danger is risked in gratifying the sensual desire +to gaze at a famous painting, or in yielding to an impulse of +curiosity, levity, or playfulness, to indulge in suitable recreations +or even unnecessary conversations in which occur glances or touches +that arouse some small degree of sexual emotion. Were mortal guilt of +impurity incurred in these instances, very few could remain free from +it unless there was a general retirement into isolation. But even in +the _per accidens_ cases there may be other mortal sins (e.g., that of +drunkenness or of scandal).</p> + +<p>2516. A large proportion of the sins of lewdness are only indirectly +voluntary, and hence they are mortal or venial according to the amount +of danger to which one exposes oneself. No ironclad rules, however, can +be given to determine universally what things are gravely and what +slightly dangerous, since the force and direction of concupiscence are +not the same in all persons. Some persons are oversexed or passionate, +others are undersexed or cold; some have normal, others abnormal +inclinations (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, sexual fetishism) +in matters venereal. Hypersexuality and abnormal sexuality are not in +themselves sinful, but are manifestations of that inordinate +concupiscence that is the effect of original sin and, if yielded to, +becomes the cause of actual sin. Proximately they may be due to +disease. But since these subjective differences do exist, what we shall +set down in the following paragraphs about gravity and lightness of +danger is to be understood of the average or normal person and in the +abstract, for it is impossible to consider every individual case.</p> + +<p>2517. Circumstances That Increase or Lessen the Danger of Sin.—(a) The +Person Acting.—There is less danger before and after than during +puberty, less for an invalid than for a person full of health, less for +an inhabitant of a cold region than for a dweller in the tropics, less +for one habituated to suppress venereal passion (e.g., a bachelor) than +for one who has been accustomed to indulge it (e.g., a widower), less +in some cases for the married who can lawfully enjoy sexual intercourse +than for the single who cannot. Familiarity also can give a certain +amount of immunity (e.g., where naked bathing or naked statuary in +public places is according to custom, the natives are less disturbed by +these things than outsiders). Those who know (without self-deception) +from their experience that certain things excite them very little do +not run grave danger in encountering such things.</p> + +<p>(b) The Person or Being Who Is the Object of the Act.—There is less +allurement in an animal than in a human, less in a small than in a +large animal, less in a representation than in the original, less in +young children than in adults, less in one’s own person or sex than in +another person or the opposite sex, less in an elderly or homely person +than in one who is young and attractive.</p> + +<p>(c) The Sense Used.—Hearing (and, for a similar reason, reading) is +less dangerous than sight, for hearing is nearer to the immanent +activities of thought and desire, while sight has more of an emanant +character (e.g., to hear or read about an obscene act is farther +removed from it, and hence less seductive, than to see it in picture or +reality). Sight in turn is less dangerous than touch, for sight is a +more elevated and less material kind of perception, being exercised by +a cognitional, not by a physical contact with its object, as is the +case with touch (e.g., to behold others embrace is not so moving as to +give or receive an embrace). Thus, impure touches (kisses, embraces, +handling) are the most dangerous form of lewdness.</p> + +<p>(d) The Sense-Object Acted Upon.—The degree of danger corresponds with +the approach made to the act of generation (e.g., smutty stories are +worse when they deal with consummated than with non-consummated acts) +or to the genitals (e.g., impure touches are worse when directed to the +organs of reproduction than to the non-shameful regions).</p> + +<p>(e) The Manner.—There is greater danger when the act is prolonged than +when it is momentary, when it is ardent than when it is calm (e.g., a +passing glance or peep at an obscene picture is not as dangerous as a +leisurely inspection, a loose linking of arms not as dangerous as a +hug). The more exposed the object of attraction and the more secluded +the parties themselves, the greater the danger (e.g., love-making +between parties who are not fully clothed or who are alone in the dark +or in a closed and curtained room is more dangerous than love-making +between those who are properly dressed and seated among a crowd of +people).</p> + +<p>2518. Cases Wherein the Danger of Sin Is Grave or Slight.—A physician +must know the difference between mortal and non-mortal diseases, and +likewise a priest must know the distinction between various kinds of +spiritual leprosies. But when certain cases are listed as less +dangerous, this does not mean that they are not dangerous at all and +that no account should be taken of them. Especially in the matter of +impurity should the warning of Scripture be remembered: “He that +contemneth small things shall fall by little and little” (Ecclus., xix. +1). With this in mind, we now subjoin some examples of grave and slight +danger for cases in which a lewd act is indirectly voluntary, but is +prompted only by curiosity, joke, levity or other such insufficient +reason.</p> + +<p>(a) Speech.—Dirty or suggestive stories, conversations, songs, music, +or radio entertainments are a grave danger when the persons present are +very impressionable (e.g., on account of age or character), or if the +topic is utterly vile (e.g., descriptions of filthy or unnatural sex +acts), or if the manner is very seductive (e.g., the terms used are +unfit for polite society, or the story is very detailed, or sin is +boasted about, or the conversation is prolonged). On the other hand, +the danger is light when the persons present are of mature age and not +strongly inclined to impurity, especially if the topic and the language +are not very disgusting; but there may be serious sin on account of +circumstances, as when the speaker or approving listener is a person +from whom good example is expected. Obscene talk is generally not a +serious sin when the persons are husband and wife, or a group of +married men or of married women; on the contrary, it is generally a +serious matter when the persons are a group of young people of the same +sex, more serious when they are a mixed group, and still more serious +when they are a boy and a girl or a young man and a young woman. The +fact that those of the younger generation often do not admit this, does +not change its abiding truth.</p> + +<p>(b) Reading.—The remarks made on speech apply also to reading, which +is a kind of silent speech. A noteworthy difference between the two in +the present matter, however, is that reading is often more dangerous +than conversation, since it is usually more protracted. Love letters +and romances were once the chief temptation in this line, but today +they seem mild in comparison with the supply of pornography that is +easily accessible to all (e.,g., the magazines and papers that pander to +depraved tastes, the stories and pseudo-scientific books that corrupt +the youth of every land). Even without grave danger to self, one may +still be guilty of grave sin in reading obscene books on account of the +cooperation with the vendors of immorality, or the scandal, or the +disobedience thereby shown to the Church (see 1455 sqq., 1529, 1530).</p> + +<p>(c) Looks.—There is generally no danger in a look at the full nudity +of a small infant, or at the less becoming parts of a person of the +same sex; there is generally only slight danger when the object is the +privates of self or of another of the same sex, or the coition of +animals, unless the gaze be fixed, prolonged and the object near; there +is grave danger in beholding a completely non-infant naked person of +the opposite sex, or the coition or other grave external sex acts of +human beings (unless the glance be brief or not attentive), or even at +times the less becoming parts of the opposite sex, if the look is very +intent and continuous. Representations of the bodily parts or acts just +mentioned (pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc.) have generally the same +dangers as the originals, though the allurement in itself is less +vivid; circumstances may even make the representations equally or more +dangerous (e.g., on account of a thin veil of concealment in paintings +or sculpture that only increases the attraction; or on account of the +suggestive music, the voluptuous dance, the crowd atmosphere that +accompanies an immoral scene on the stage or screen). The saying of +Oscar Wilde that esthetics are above ethics is opposed both to morality +(since all conduct should be guided by reason) and to art (for the +highest beauty is that of virtue and the spirit and purity).</p> + +<p>(d) Touches.—Kisses are seriously dangerous to purity when warmly or +lingeringly exchanged between adults of different sex who are attracted +to one another as male and female; in other cases, kisses, if impressed +on decent parts of the body and in a decent manner, may be only +slightly dangerous. Holding or grasping between such adults is also a +serious danger when it is vehement (e.g., the tight squeeze or hug of +certain dances) or long (e.g., the repeated or hour-long fondling of +love-makers); it is of slight or no danger in other cases, as in the +customary handclasp of greeting, Handling or feeling, if passing, +hurried or light, is generally not dangerous, when it has to do with +the becoming parts of another person, or with the less becoming parts +of a person of the same sex, or with personal private parts; it is only +slightly dangerous, under the same conditions, in reference to the +verenda of animals or small infants; it is gravely dangerous when +directed to the privates of another person who has passed infancy, or +to the less becoming parts of a person of opposite sex, or to the +breasts of a woman, unless it be entirely casual, passing, or light. +Tactile contact made under the clothing is of course more dangerous +than that which is external.</p> + +<p>2519. The Moral Species of Lewdness.—(a) Theoretically, it is more +probable that the imperfect sins of impurity do not differ from the +perfect sins to which they tend; for the natural circumstances or +antecedents of an act have really the same morality as the act itself +(see 2486). In the physical order, the fetus, the infant, and the child +do not differ essentially from the full-grown man; and likewise, in the +moral order, the thought, the purpose and the external beginning do not +differ essentially from completed murder, even though for some reason +the act be not finished. Hence, immodest words, reading, looks and +touches belong to fornication, or adultery, or incest, or sodomy, +according to their tendency (e.g., to read an immodest love story with +another man’s wife and to kiss her is incipient adultery, and, if the +guilty person has a vow of chastity, it is also sacrilege). But the +species is taken only from the object, not from the purely accidental +circumstances, such as the elicitive faculty (e.g., an immodest look at +another does not differ essentially from an immodest touch) or the +intensity (e.g., incomplete pleasure in touches by one who has not +attained puberty does not differ essentially, according to some, from +the completed pleasure of which he is capable). Moreover, it seems +that, in regard to looks if not as regards touch, abstraction (see +2506) is easily made by the guilty person from various circumstances; +for example, one who looks immodestly on a person consecrated to God, +may be thinking only of his unlawful love for a person of the other +sex, and so may be guilty of incipient fornication, but not of +sacrilege, or he may be thinking, without any affection for the other +person, only of his own pleasure, and so may perhaps be guilty only of +incipient pollution. A less probable opinion makes lewdness a species +of sin distinct from pollution and the other consummated sins.</p> + +<p>(b) Practically, penitents should confess that their sin was indecent +and not completed lust (such as pollution), and they should also +confess whether the lewdness was committed by speech, reading, looks, +kisses, embraces, or touches; and also the object of the sin, whether +male or female, whether married or single, relative or non-relative, +etc. Otherwise, since few penitents know how to distinguish the moral +species of sins, there will be great danger of incomplete confessions; +and, moreover, the additional sins usually committed in cases of +lewdness (e.g., scandals, injustices, and bad company keeping) will not +be disclosed. If a consummated sin of fornication, pollution, etc., +followed the indecency, this consummated sin should be confessed +distinctly. Similarly, those who expose, incite or tempt others to +impure thoughts or to lewdness in word, reading, looks, kisses or +touches, should confess the kind of sin they intended (see 1497), even +though their purpose failed, whether it was incipient fornication, +sacrilege, sodomy, etc. But some authors admit a generic confession (in +which the penitent merely states that he sinned mortally or venially, +as the case was, by indecency), if the lewdness was solitary, or was +committed with another but certainly without scandal or lustful desire +of the other person.</p> + +<p>2520. The Consummated Sins of Impurity.—There are in all seven species +of completed acts of impurity. (a) Thus, some sins of impurity are +against reason because they do not observe the ends of sexual +intercourse. These ends are, first, the begetting of children (to which +is opposed unnatural impurity), and, secondly, the rearing of children +(to which is opposed fornication).</p> + +<p>(b) Other sins of impurity are against reason because they violate a +right of the person with whom intercourse is had (incest), or of a +third party to whom that person belongs. If the third party is injured +in conjugal rights, there is adultery; if in parental rights, there is +defloration or rape, according as the injury is done without or with +force; if in religious rights, there is sacrilege. This second category +of sins is classed under impurity rather than under injustice, because +the purpose of the guilty person and his act belong to venereal sin.</p> + +<p>2521. Comparative Malice of the Sins of Consummated Lust.—(a) In the +abuse of an act, the worst evil is the disregard of what nature itself +determines as the fundamentals upon which all else depends, just as in +speculative matters the worst error is that which goes astray about +first principles. Now, the prime dictates of nature as to sexual +intercourse are that it serve the race and the family. Hence, the sin +of unnatural lust (which injures the race by defeating its propagation) +and the sin of incest (which injures the family by offending piety) are +the worst of carnal vices.</p> + +<p>(b) In the abuse of an act a lesser evil is that which observes the +natural fundamentals, but disregards what right reason teaches about +things secondary, in the manner of performing the act. But reason +requires that in sexual intercourse the rights of the individual be +respected. A most serious violation of individual right is adultery, +which usurps the right of intercourse belonging to another; next in +gravity is rape, which violently seizes for lust a person under the +care of another or undefiled; next is defloration, which trespasses on +the right of guardianship, or removes bodily virginity, but without +violence; last among these sins is fornication, which is an injury done +not to the living, but to the unborn.</p> + +<p>2522. Multiplication of Sins of Lust.—The various kinds of lust may be +combined in one and the same act, as when unnatural vice (e.g., sodomy) +is practised with a relative (incest). Sacrilege, of course, aggravates +every other kind of carnal sin, and thus there is sacrilegious sodomy, +sacrilegious adultery, sacrilegious incest, etc.</p> + +<p>2523. Fornication.—Fornication is the copulation of an unmarried man +with an unmarried woman who is not a virgin.</p> + +<p>(a) It is copulation, or sexual intercourse suited for generation of +children. Thus, it differs from lewdness, which consists in +unconsummated acts, and from sodomitic intercourse, which is +consummated but unsuited for generation. Onanism is an aggravating +circumstance of fornication, or rather a new sin of unnatural +intercourse. (b) It is committed by unmarried persons, and thus it +differs from adultery. (c) It is committed with a woman, and is thus +distinguished from sodomy. (d) It is committed with a woman who is not +a virgin, and thus differs from defloration.</p> + +<p>2524. Sinfulness of Fornication.—It is of faith that fornication is a +mortal sin.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is gravely forbidden by the divine positive law. Hence, +whores and whoremongers are an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. +17); fornicators are worthy of death (Rom., i. 29-32), they shall not +enter the kingdom of God (Gal., V. 19-21; Eph., v. 5; Heb., xiii. 4; +Apoc., xxi. 8). The Fathers teach that fornication is a grave crime +(St. Fulgentius), and that it brings condemnation on the guilty person +(St. Chrysostom). The declarations of the Church on the evil of this +sin are found in the Council of Vienne and in the censures of Alexander +VII and Innocent XI (Denzinger, nn. 477, 1125, 1198).</p> + +<p>(b) Fornication is gravely forbidden by the natural law. For it is +seriously against reason to cause an injury to the entire life of +another human being; but fornication does this very thing by depriving +the unborn child of its natural rights to legitimacy, to the protection +of both parents, and to education in the home circle. True, in some +cases there may be no prospect of a child, or there may be provision +for its proper rearing; but these cases are the exception, since +fornication from its nature tends to the neglect of the child, and the +morality of acts must be judged, not by the exceptional and accidental, +but by the usual and natural. Those who commit fornication are thinking +of their own pleasure rather than of duty, and will generally shirk the +difficult burdens of parenthood. Society also would be gravely wounded +if unmarried intercourse were at any time lawful. Hence, St. Paul +reproves the pagans, though ignorant of Scripture, for their sins of +fornication (I Cor., vi. 9-11; Eph., v. 1-6), since reason itself +should have taught them the unlawfulness of this practice. It seems, +though, that invincible ignorance of the wrong of fornication is +possible among very rude or barbarous people, since the injury to the +neighbor does not show itself so clearly in this sin as in many others.</p> + +<p>2525. Fornication Compared with Other Sins.—(a) It is less serious +than those that offend a divine good (e.g., unbelief, despair, hatred +of God, irreligion), or human life (e.g., abortion), or the human goods +of those already in being (e.g., adultery). (b) It is more serious than +sins that offend only an external good (e.g., theft), or that are +opposed only to decency in the marriage state (e.g., unbecoming kisses +of husband and wife).</p> + +<p>2526. Circumstances of Fornication.—(a) Circumstances that aggravate +the malice are the condition of the person with whom the sin is +committed (e.g., that the female is a widow, or the employee of the +man, or his ward, or a minor).</p> + +<p>(b) Circumstances that add a new malice to fornication are of various +kinds. Thus, previous circumstances are the distinct desires of the sin +entertained beforehand, the solicitation and scandal of the other party +or parties with whom the sin was committed; concomitant circumstances +are the quality of the persons (e.g., fornication is sacrilegious if +one of the parties is consecrated to God, and also, according to some, +if one party is a Christian and the other an infidel; it is unjust if +one of the couple is betrothed to a third party), or the quality of the +act itself (e.g., if it is performed onanistically, though pollution +may be excused if it results accidentally from the good purpose to +discontinue the sinful act); subsequent circumstances are injury done +to the partner in sin (e.g., by refusal to pay the support or +restitution due) or to the offspring (e.g., by exposure, abortion, +neglect).</p> + +<p>Whether the fornication of an engaged person with a third party is a +distinct species of sin is disputed. (a) According to some, it is a +distinct species, or at least a form of adultery on account of the +infidelity. (b) According to others, it is a distinct species if the +guilty party is the woman, but not if it is the man, for the infidelity +of the former is a far more serious matter than the infidelity of the +latter. (c) According to still others, it is never a distinct species, +since engagement to marry is a dissoluble agreement and the injury to +the contract is therefore not a notable one. In this last opinion the +manner of the sin is an aggravating circumstance, not a distinct +species that has to be declared in confession.</p> + +<p>2527. Forms of Fornication.—There are three special forms of +fornication, which are all the same essentially, but which differ +accidentally in malice or in results.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, ordinary fornication is that which is committed with a woman +who is neither a harlot nor a concubine. This sin is in itself the +least grave of the three, since it is not so harmful as whoremongering, +nor so enduring as concubinage. Ordinary fornication also has its +degrees of bad and worse: thus, engaged persons who sin together +habitually are worse than those who sin only occasionally, and +circumstances such as artificial onanism and abortion add to the guilt.</p> + +<p>(b) Whoremongering is fornication committed with a harlot, that is, +with a woman who makes a business of illicit intercourse and hires +herself out for pay to all comers. Rarely does a harlot choose her life +from passion or love, but is dragged in by white slavers, or enters +from poverty, or after disgrace, or the like. This sin is worse than +ordinary fornication from the viewpoint of propagation, since few +harlots become mothers. But its most dire consequences are visited on +the guilty persons themselves and on society: for the life of a +prostitute is a most degrading slavery; to her patrons she communicates +the most terrible diseases, which are then carried to innocent wives +and children, and to the innocent she often becomes a cause of ruin, +seeking her trade in the streets and public places. Today, according to +reliable newspaper reports, many men and women have become rich in the +terrible business known as the white-slave traffic. This horrible abuse +has grown into a vast international machine which is efficiently +organized, and which profits not only from prostitution, but from many +other kinds of crime. The patrons of brothels, therefore, cooperate +with the crying injustice that is often done the fallen woman, and with +the criminals who destroy souls and bodies for their own advantage.</p> + +<p>(c) Free love is fornication committed with one’s concubine, that is, +with a woman who is not a public harlot but who has contracted with one +man for habitual sexual intercourse as if they were man and wife. +According to reports, this is quite common in Europe, where lawful +marriage is very often preceded by free unions. The trial marriage +advocated by some in this country, in which paramours agree to live +together as husband and wife for a certain term of years or at +pleasure, also falls under the category of concubinage. This sin is +worse than mere whoremongering in one respect, namely, that it includes +the purpose to continue in the state of sin, at least for a certain +length of time. Moreover, there is often the public scandal and +contempt for public opinion which other kinds of fornication may be +free from. One who practises concubinage is living in a proximate +occasion of sin, and hence he cannot be absolved unless he dismisses +the concubine, if they cohabit, or agrees to keep away from her, if +they do not cohabit.</p> + +<p>2528. The State and Places of Prostitution.—It is clear that civil +government has no right to support or provide places of prostitution, +or to give permission for its practice, since fornication is +intrinsically evil. But what should be said of toleration or license +given to prostitutes by the public authority?</p> + +<p>(a) Theoretically, the civil power has the right to give toleration or +license; for, if the common welfare will suffer from a greater evil +unless a lesser evil is suffered to go on, the lesser evil should be +endured, and it is certain that there are greater evils than +prostitution (such as rape and unnatural crimes of lust).</p> + +<p>(b) Practically, the question is open to dispute. Older moralists held +that toleration was actually more beneficial to the common good than +suppression. But under the conditions of the present time many +moralists think it is a mistake to give any recognition to prostitutes, +and much less to houses of prostitution. Even in large cities, where +alone the license could be beneficial, the purposes of toleration are +not fulfilled; for the moral evil seems to be greater, since an +appearance of legality is given to prostitution, its practice is +facilitated, its habitats become dens of every kind of iniquity, and +the purpose of segregation is not realized; the physical evils also are +not lessened, but perhaps increased, for even with medical inspection +of prostitutes, syphilis and gonorrhea cannot be prevented.</p> + +<p>2529. Defloration and Rape.—Defloration and rape are distinct species +of lust, for each of them in its very concept includes a special and +notable deformity not found in other species of impurity.</p> + +<p>(a) Defloration is unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman who is virginal +in body (1488 a). It has the special deformity of depriving the woman +of the physical integrity that is most highly prized among all the +unmarried of her sex, or at least of her own self-respect, and of +setting her on the way to become a strumpet rather than an honorable +wife or spinster. Some authors do not consider defloration a special +sin unless it is done by violence, or unless injury is done the +parental right over the virgin; and even the authors who consider +unforced defloration a special sin hold that the new or additional +malice in it is slight and venial, and therefore not a necessary matter +of confession. The first sin of fornication by a male is not a special +sin, because the consequences are not so serious for the man as for the +woman, but of course seduction is always a special sin, whether the +injured party be male or female.</p> + +<p>(b) Rape is physical or moral coercion (i.e., force or fear) employed +against any person (male or female, married or single, pure or +corrupt), or against his or her guardians, to compel him or her to an +act of lust. It has the special deformity of inflicting bodily injury +on the person ravished. The sin of rape should not be confused with the +canonical crime of rape, which consists in abduction, and which is an +impediment to marriage (Canon 1074); nor with seduction, as when an +innocent person is deceived into believing that an act of impurity is +lawful, or is tricked into sin by false promises of marriage. +Equivalent to rape is the carnal knowledge of a person drugged, +hypnotized, or otherwise unconscious, or the seduction of an infant. A +person who is ravished is obliged to deny all consent internally, and +to resist or make outcry when this is possible (see 2497 a).</p> + +<p>2530. Adultery.—Adultery is also a distinct species of lust.—(a) +Definition.—Adultery is sexual intercourse with the husband or wife of +another. If the sin is committed only in desire, there is mental +adultery; if the paramours allow themselves unlawful familiarities +without intercourse, or if a married person is guilty of solitary lust, +there is imperfect adultery.</p> + +<p>(b) Sinfulness of Adultery.—Adultery is a grave sin, since it is an +act of impurity and is expressly forbidden in the sixth commandment +(Exod., xx. 14), and is classed among the sins that exclude from the +kingdom of heaven (I Cor., vi. 9, 10). It is a special sin, because it +is a violation of the faith pledged in the contract and Sacrament of +Matrimony, and an injury to the right of one’s spouse and of the +conjugal state (Matt., xix. 5; Rom., vii. 3; I Cor., vii. 39). Even +though a husband gives his wife permission to commit adultery or vice +versa, the injustice remains, for though the individual is not formally +injured, the married state is injured, since no married person has the +right to give a permission opposed to the sacredness of the marriage +vows (Denzinger, n. 1200).</p> + +<p>(c) Degrees of Malice.—There are three degrees of malice in adultery. +The first is that in which a married man sins with a single woman; the +second that in which a married woman sins with a single man; the third +that in which a married man sins with another man’s wife. The second is +worse than the first, on account of its consequences (e.g., sterility, +uncertainty of paternity, rearing of an illegitimate child in the +family); the third is worse than the second, because in addition to the +consequences just mentioned, it contains a double injustice (viz., +unfaithfulness to an innocent wife and unfaithfulness to an innocent +husband), and it multiplies the sin. If an adulterer’s husband or wife +is also unfaithful, the injustice is lessened, but not removed; for not +merely the two married persons are to be considered, but also the +children, the family, society, and God; and the wrong done by one of +the parties does not take away the right to fidelity pledged absolutely +to all of these in marriage.</p> + +<p>(d) Effects.—The party whose marriage rights have been injured by +adultery was permitted under some former civil codes to kill a wife +taken in adultery. But such laws were against justice and charity: +against justice since no guilty person should be put to death unheard, +and no injured person should be judge and accuser in his own case; +against charity, since by such summary vengeance the adulteress would +be sent to death in the midst of sin and without opportunity for +repentance. The remedies of Canon Law for the innocent spouse will be +noted below (2542).</p> + +<p>2531. Incest.—Incest is impurity committed with a person related to +one within the degrees in which marriage is forbidden.</p> + +<p>(a) It is impurity, internal or external. Internal desires are mental +incest, while external unconsummated (e.g., kisses) or consummated +(e.g., intercourse) acts are actual incest.</p> + +<p>(b) It is committed with a relative, that is, with a person, male or +female, who is near to one by the tie of common ancestry (blood +relationship, kinship, consanguinity), or of marriage to one’s kin +(marriage relationship, affinity), or of sacramental administration +(spiritual relationship), or of adoption (legal relationship). Alias +species cognationis non pertinent ad incestum, sed novam aliquam +malitiam possunt tribuere; v.g., si partes sunt parochus et parochiana, +confessarius et poenitens, habetur scandalum, seductio.</p> + +<p>(c) The relationship is within the canonical degrees. Thus, marriage +between blood relatives is forbidden in all degrees of the direct line +(e.g., as to all female ancestry and posterity of a man) and in the +first three degrees of the collateral line, which includes, for a man, +his sisters, nieces, grandnieces, aunts, first and second cousins, +grand aunts and their daughters and granddaughters. Marriage between +those who are relatives-in-law is forbidden in all degrees of the +direct line (e.g., as to wife’s mother, daughter, etc.) and in the +first two degrees of the collateral line (e.g., wife’s sister, first +cousin, aunt or niece). Spiritual relationship which is impedient of +marriage exists between a person baptized and his baptizer, and also +between the god-child and the god-parent in baptism. Legal relationship +exists between the adopter and the adopted, when and as the civil law +makes it a bar to marriage.</p> + +<p>(d) Incest is committed within the forbidden degrees, and hence if a +dispensation from an impediment of relationship had been granted to +parties about to marry, a sin between them would not be incestuous.</p> + +<p>2532. Incest as a Distinct Species of Sin.—(a) There is a specific +distinction between incest and other forms of lust, since incest +violates not only purity, but also the piety and respect due each other +by those who are so closely related as to be unable to contract a +lawful marriage. Nature itself abhors this sin; for, apart from the +exceptional cases in which a dispensation is given, even lawful +marriage with near relatives would be an incentive to many sins before +marriage and would prevent the widening circle of friendships between +mankind which marriage with non-relatives produces, and would cause a +physical and mental enfeeblement of the race. In Scripture incest is +spoken of with peculiar horror as a nefarious deed deserving of death +(Lev., xx. 11 sqq.), and as an act unworthy even of pagans (I Cor., v. +1 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) There are three distinct sub-species of incest, namely, natural +incest (between kin by blood or marriage), spiritual incest (between +the baptized and his baptizer or god-parent), and legal incest (between +persons who are kin in virtue of 8, marriage-impeding adoption). The +first violates piety due to natural origin, the second that due to +spiritual origin, and the third that due to legal origin. And in each +species the nearer the relationship, the greater the sin (e.g., incest +with a sister-in-law is less than that with a sister, incest with a +sister is less than that with a mother).</p> + +<p>2533. Carnal Sacrilege.—Carnal sacrilege is the violation by an act of +impurity of the sacredness of a person, place or thing.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a violation of sacredness, and thus it is a special sin, +adding irreligion to lust (see 2308 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) It is an act of impurity, internal or external, consummated or +non-consummated. The impurity, however, must be so related to that +which is sacred as to treat its sanctity with injury or contempt +(formal disrespect), and there is no sacrilege if the impurity is +associated with something holy in such a way as not to show any notable +irreverence (material disrespect).</p> + +<p>(c) Its first species is personal sacrilege, and it is committed by a +sacred person (see 2309) when he is impure internally or externally, or +by a non-sacred person when in desire or act he commits impurity with a +sacred person. If two sacred persons sin together, there is a double +sacrilege, which multiplies the sin.</p> + +<p>(d) Its second species is local sacrilege, and is committed when an +impure act is done in a sacred place (2311) in such a way as to show +formal disrespect. Hence, consummated acts done in a church are +sacrilegious, and the same is probably true of non-consummated acts, at +least if they are of an enormous kind (e.g., a lascivious dance), and +even of internal desires to sin in the sacred place. But impure +thoughts or passing glances of prurient curiosity in a church are not +sacrilegious.</p> + +<p>(e) Its third species is real sacrilege, and it occurs when impurity is +committed in such a way as to show formal disrespect to a sacred object +(2311). Hence, there is sacrilege of this kind when one commits +impurity immediately after Communion, or when one uses the Sacrament of +Penance as a means to solicit impurity. But the fact that a person +commits impurity while wearing a scapular is not sacrilegious, unless +contempt for the scapular was intended.</p> + +<p>2534. Unnatural Lust.—Worst among the sins of impurity, as such, are +crimes of unnatural lust, for they exercise the sexual act, not only +illicitly, but also in a manner that defeats its purpose of +reproduction. In some non-venereal respects, however, natural sins of +impurity may be worse than the unnatural; for example, adultery is +worse as regards injustice, sacrilegious lust as regards irreligion, +etc. There are four distinct species of unnatural impurities— +pollution, unnatural coition, sodomy, bestiality (see Denzinger, n. +1124).</p> + +<p>(a) For procreation nature requires copulation, and hence pollution is +unnatural, for it exercises semination without copulation, either alone +(self-abuse, solitary vice, masturbation) or with another (softness).</p> + +<p>(b) For procreation nature requires proper copulation, that is, one +that will permit of a fertile union between the two life elements, the +sperma and the ovum. Hence, unnatural coition does not comply with this +necessity, for it does not employ the proper organ of sexual union, +substituting rectal for vaginal intercourse, or else by some form of +natural or artificial onanism it frustrates the act of its destined +conclusion. This sin is worse than pollution, since pollution omits to +use intercourse, whereas unnatural coition positively abuses it.</p> + +<p>(c) For procreation nature requires heterosexual intercourse, a +condition disregarded by sodomy, which is the lustful commerce of male +with male (pederasty, uranism), or of female with female (tribadism, +sapphism, Lesbian love). This sin is worse than unnatural coition, for +it is a greater perversity to neglect one of the two needed life +elements than to neglect the right process for their union (see Gen., +xix. 24, 25; Lev., xx. 13; Rom., i. 26, 27).</p> + +<p>(d) Finally, for procreation nature requires homogeneous intercourse, a +law violated by bestiality, which is coition of a human being, male or +female, with a brute animal. This is the worst of unnatural impurities, +since it sins against the most fundamental condition for the sexual +act, namely, that the participants be of the same nature (see Lev., xx. +15, 16). Similar to bestiality is the crime of necrophilism +(intercourse with a corpse).</p> + +<p>2535. Pollution.—Pollution is the voluntary emission of semen apart +from coition.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an emission, that is an external discharge. The internal +secretion in the so-called female semination is also included by many +under the head of pollution. The carnal motions spoken of in 2497 b are +a preparation for pollution.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a discharge of semen, that is, of the male fluid that +fertilizes the female ovum. But equivalent pollution, from the moral +viewpoint, is found in the discharge of certain non-prolific fluids +that are accessory to generation or that produce in their movement a +venereal satisfaction, such as the vaginal fluid in females (female +semination), the urethral fluid in males capable or incapable of +procreation (distillation). There is no pollution, however, in natural +discharges such as menstruation and urination.</p> + +<p>(c) It is apart from coition, and thus it differs from other +consummated sins. But pollution may be committed either alone (solitary +vice), or with another, and in the latter case it pertains reductively +to adultery, fornication, sodomy, etc., as the case may be.</p> + +<p>(d) It is voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, when one intends +it as an end (e.g., for the sake of the pleasure) or as a means (e.g., +as a relief from temptation or bodily itching, to obtain a specimen of +semen for medical diagnosis); indirectly, when one unjustifiably does +something from which one foresees that pollution will result. In all +these cases pollution is formal or sinful, and it is not to be confused +with material or natural pollution, which is a discharge of semen or +distillation that is involuntary or unimputable.</p> + +<p>2536. Cases of Material or Non-Sinful Pollution.—(a) Involuntary +pollution is passive or active. The former happens even when one is +awake. It is evoked by such slight causes as physical movement and +exertion, and is unaccompanied by pleasure; when habitual, it is a +disease due to organic debility The latter happens during sleep, and +may be caused by a superfluity of fluid. It is accompanied by pleasure +and often by libidinous dreams. It is a means used by nature to relieve +the system, and is therefore healthful and beneficial, unless the +discharges are too frequent (e.g., nightly). There is no obligation of +repressing the continuance of a pollution that began involuntarily +during sleep, since it may be regarded as an act of nature; but consent +must be withheld (2498 sqq.). Moreover, if merely natural pollution be +considered, not as to its venereal gratification but solely as to its +good effects (e.g., that it ends a temptation, that it benefits the +mind or the health), there is no sin in rejoicing at its accomplishment +or in desiring its fulfillment, provided nothing is done to produce it +and the intention is good; for then the object of the will is +indifferent and the end is good.</p> + +<p>(b) Unimputable pollution is caused by a lawful act from which one +foresees that pollution will ensue, there being no proximate danger of +consent to sin, and the pollution being only permitted, and that for a +proportionately grave reason.</p> + +<p>2537. Unimputable Pollution.—In reference to unimputable pollution the +following distinctions should be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) the danger risked by an act may be either of formal pollution +(i.e., with consent to sin) or of material pollution (i.e., without +consent to sin);</p> + +<p>(b) the danger of pollution is either proximate or remote, the former +being that from which pollution naturally and usually results and the +latter that from which it does not naturally or usually result. +Remotely dangerous are acts of a non-venereal kind, such as horseback +riding, gymnastics, drinking alcoholic beverages, and also acts of a +sexual kind that are only mildly exciting, such as conversations or +books that are slightly “off color” when the parties are of mature age +(see 2517, 2518). Proximately dangerous are acts of a venereal kind +that notably inflame passion, such as warm and lingering kisses between +persons of opposite sexes (see 2517, 2518);</p> + +<p>(c) the reason for running the danger of pollution is either grave, +serious, or slight. A grave reason is real necessity (e.g., the removal +of disease or pain or of a very painful or troublesome itch due to the +blood or disease) or great utility (e.g., the preservation of health, +cleanliness of body); a serious reason is an important convenience of +soul or body (e.g., the exercise of common politeness, the enjoyment of +reasonable comfort); a slight reason is one in which none of the +mentioned motives is found (e.g., the satisfaction of an idle +curiosity, the removal of a trifling irritation or itch).</p> + +<p>2538. Proximate and Remote Occasions of Pollution.—It is never lawful +to expose oneself to the immediate danger of sin, for he who loves the +danger loves the sin (see 258, 260); but if one uses means to make the +danger remote, one may lawfully encounter it for a good reason (see +258, 260, 261). It is lawful to permit an evil effect when there is +sufficient justification according to the principle of double effect +(see 103 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, if there is proximate danger of formal pollution (that is, +of consent to sin), no reason excuses an act even of a non-sexual kind, +such as horseback riding. But if the act is necessary, the danger must +be made remote by the use of special means, such as prayer, firm +resolves, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) If there is proximate danger of material pollution, a grave reason +suffices (e.g., the care of patients by physicians and nurses, +assistance of bathers by attendants, warm soporific drinks taken for +the sake of sleep).</p> + +<p>(c) If there is remote danger of material pollution, a serious reason +suffices (e.g., customary salutations of the country, physical +exercises, moderate comfort in posture, seasoning in food.). A slight +reason may excuse at times from mortal sin (e.g., unnecessary curiosity +about the sciences of anatomy or sexology).</p> + +<p>2539. The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.—(a) From its nature +pollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (1494) and +a perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most +injurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of +the burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it +weakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily +vigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as +gravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence, +pollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when +practised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily +irritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of semen or to +passion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger +of consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal +pollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity, +or without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution +and no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities +from which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).</p> + +<p>(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes +only a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g., +young children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students +who have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is +necessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of +incomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does +not ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not +fully responsible for his acts).</p> + +<p>(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed +indirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only +slight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496). +Examples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling +asleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution +during sleep.</p> + +<p>2540. If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as +being seriously opposed to chastity (e.g., lewdness) or to some other +virtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby +guilty of the grave sin of pollution?</p> + +<p>(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the +negative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as +regards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as +intemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a +venereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly +affect the passions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is +concerned (see 2517, 2518).</p> + +<p>(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the +affirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally +those who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as +well as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he +who repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is +not guilty of the actual pollution.</p> + +<p>2541. The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.—(a) The general species +of pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since +it is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n. +1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as +not a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence +according to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see +2519 b).</p> + +<p>(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circumstances +that give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed +by one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no +thought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification +(autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But +there are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation +(i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person +(e.g., seduction, cooperation, rape), or if committed with impure +thoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication, +sodomy, bestiality). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g., +whether cooperative pollution is active or passive, by irrumation or +concubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is _per se_ an +accidental circumstance. According to some authors, cooperative +pollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if +there is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire +of carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as +pollution from touch.</p> + +<p>2542. Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.—(a) Laymen +who are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become +infamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical +acts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation, +temporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b) +Clerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may +even be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders +are subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy, +deposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to +penalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.</p> + +<p>2543. The Potential Parts of Temperance.—The appetites of pleasure are +the most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue +like temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of +reason. The analogous or potential virtues of temperance are that one +which is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appetites +(continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent +appetites for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence, +knowledge, amusement and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.</p> + +<p>2544. Continence.—(a) Its Nature.—This quality, as here taken, is the +state of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to +keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is +firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral +virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The +temperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less +disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their +onsets.</p> + +<p>(b) Its Relation to Temperance.—Greater difficulty increases merit, if +it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a +man of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves +more credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who +enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to +the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard +because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds +it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving +than continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply +because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower +appetite to the dictates of reason.</p> + +<p>(c) Its Opposite.—The vice opposed to continence is incontinence, +which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of +passion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the +lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing +indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes +and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a +sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a +second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their +desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful +than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but +on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the +greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself +from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the +soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be +unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul +and demands a more unwearied vigilance.</p> + +<p>2545. Meekness.—Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates +anger.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right +reason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul +numbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Illustrious +models of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3), +David (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St. +Paul (Acts, xx. 31).</p> + +<p>(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in +its matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between +the extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.</p> + +<p>(c) Its matter is the passion of anger, that is, the sensitive appetite +that inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other +passions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or +evil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry +at times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his +anger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong +only after reason has shown that this is the proper course.</p> + +<p>2546. Anger.—Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its +matter or its manner.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance) +when it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is +innocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not +followed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred, +etc).</p> + +<p>(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement +felt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not +sinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord +against the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias +against the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage +at nothings or trifles is sinful.</p> + +<p>2547. Gravity of the Sin of Anger.—(a) If anger is sinful on account +of its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity +and justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell +fire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of +imperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those +who do not agree with one’s opinions) or the lightness of the matter +(e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a +word of reproof would have sufficed).</p> + +<p>(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its +nature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious +disorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of +circumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and +swears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his +position, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence +of his paroxysm.</p> + +<p>2548. Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?—(a) As to its +matter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil +under the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it +intends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is +injurious to another, or as it is a means to one’s own temporal and +external good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than +concupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure, +whereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.</p> + +<p>(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of +its violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a +scene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is +flushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he +pounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.</p> + +<p>2549. Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.—(a) It has a certain +preeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is +sweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner +is powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.</p> + +<p>(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces +indignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks +upon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self, +which fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to +anger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy +(Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind +of injury.</p> + +<p>2550. Sinful Indulgence.—Sinful indulgence, which is opposed to +meekness by excess, is often a mortal sin on account of the grave harm +it inflicts upon the common welfare and the protection it affords to +crime. Thus, Heli was seriously reproved and punished because he winked +at grave disorders, or at least was too easy-going in his corrections +(I Kings, ii, iii).</p> + +<p>2551. Clemency.—Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit +of kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as +the claims of justice will allow.</p> + +<p>(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to +others, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as +private interest: “Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is +strengthened by clemency” (Prov., xx. 28).</p> + +<p>(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the +severity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice +and of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary, +insists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the +latter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).</p> + +<p>(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of +chastisement visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness, +which deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which +deals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.</p> + +<p>(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that +is, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of +the common good and of all the interests involved, and decides +according to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circumstances +of person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict +requirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as +arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.</p> + +<p>(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and +thus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the +sense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion, +and cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who +offer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).</p> + +<p>(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are +spoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to +exercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as +possible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses +his authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but +clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.</p> + +<p>2552. The Vices Opposed to Clemency.—(a) The extreme of defect is +cruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of +others, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst +form of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the +sufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or +innocence.</p> + +<p>(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when +it should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when +a crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn +and irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or +invite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be +unwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or +customs provide for the offense.</p> + +<p>2553. Humility.—Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the +desire of greatness.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary +disposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the +humble or lowly circumstances in which a person was born) or as +involuntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who +exalt themselves).</p> + +<p>(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things +that pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no +opposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one +set such a value upon the gifts one has received from God as to aspire +to the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one +realize one’s own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the +desire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.</p> + +<p>(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of +reason the passion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of +pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).</p> + +<p>2554. The Three Acts of Humility.—(a) Its regulatory act is in the +intellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one’s +infirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with God, but also in +comparison with men.</p> + +<p>(b) Its essential act is in the appetite and consists in a regulation +of the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one’s limitations, one +does not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of +humility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by +it, or which desire dishonor.</p> + +<p>(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says +that the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his +words and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not +staring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false +humility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud +hypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).</p> + +<p>2555. Two Requirements of Humility.—Humility is chiefly an abasement +of self before God (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or +to good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self +before fellow-creatures:</p> + +<p>(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge +his neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the +former has from himself and what the latter has from God (Phil., ii. 3; +Osee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has +more of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if +there are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);</p> + +<p>(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs +of respect to one’s betters. But of persons who are in authority St. +Augustine says that, while before God they should prostrate themselves +at the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to +inferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other +virtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as +to place, time, and other circumstances.</p> + +<p>2556. The Excellence of Humility.—(a) Humility is inferior to the +theological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also +to the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose +mind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining +virtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with +this difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in +all that is right, temperance, fortitude and the rest prepare one for +submission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter +virtues, then, humility is superior.</p> + +<p>(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or +indirectly; for, since God resists the proud and gives grace to the +humble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed +by humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the +cornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach +towards God: “He who would come to God must believe” (Heb., xi. 6).</p> + +<p>2557. Pride.—Pride is an inordinate desire of one’s own personal +excellence.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing +and yet not easy of attainment.</p> + +<p>(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high +degree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame, +honor) or with superiority to others in perfection.</p> + +<p>(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is +self as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks +greatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in +accomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride, +from which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or +of those things with which the ego is identified, such as one’s own +children, one’s own family, or one’s own race.</p> + +<p>(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires +an excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality +with Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have +excellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess +one’s virtue without dependence on God or from one’s own unaided +merits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in +the latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a +disdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience +is a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for +law and for God and the neighbor (see 2367).</p> + +<p>2558. The Acts of Pride.—(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an +exaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate +desire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of +conceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves +often come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.</p> + +<p>(b) The will of the proud man worships his own greatness, and longs for +its recognition and glorification by others.</p> + +<p>(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by +boasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty +appearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence, +perfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.</p> + +<p>2559. The Sinfulness of Pride.—(a) Complete pride, which turns away +from God because it considers subjection detrimental to one’s own +excellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest +rebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the +pride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be +venial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a +semideliberate wish.</p> + +<p>(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created +excellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial +sin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise +indifferent passion. But circumstances may make this pride mortal +(e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).</p> + +<p>2560. Pride Compared with Other Sins.—(a) Gravity.—Complete pride is +less than hatred of God, for the former has as its object personal +excellence, the latter separation from God. But after hatred of God +complete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it +separates from God directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme +Being, while other sins separate from God only indirectly, since they +offend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or passion or excessive +desire.</p> + +<p>(b) Origin.—Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our +first parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to God in beatitude, +Adam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11; +Tob., iv. 14).</p> + +<p>(c) Influence.—Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven +capital vices—namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), lust (2494), +avarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)—not in the +sense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from +ignorance, passion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire +of personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of +sin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every +temporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it +steals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as +humility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step +towards hell.</p> + +<p>2561. Abjection.—The other extreme of pride is abjection. (a) As a +turning away from these higher things to which one should aspire, this +sin is the same as littleness of soul, and it is opposed to greatness +of soul (see 2451). (b) As a turning to lower things or to a submission +to others which is unreasonable, this vice is directly opposed to +humility. Examples are persons of knowledge who waste their time on +menial labor when they should be more usefully employed in other +pursuits, or who permit themselves to be corrected and guided by the +errors and false principles of the ignorant.</p> + +<p>2562. Studiousness.—Studiousness (_studiositas_) is the virtue that +makes one modest in the desire of knowledge.</p> + +<p>(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with +powers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to +desire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend, +judge, reason, etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c); +that is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so +that one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge. +On the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just +as bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental +hunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other +hand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and +hardship which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome, +one becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904, +1326, 1671).</p> + +<p>(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a +natural appetite within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and +defect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is +praised in Prov., xxvii. 11: “Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart +joyful”; and in I Tim., iv. 13: “Attend to reading.” Essentially, it is +a potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is +moderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to +fortitude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are +necessary for a student.</p> + +<p>2563. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.—(a) The vice of excess is +called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on +account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of +others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to +satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a +curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or +more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a +curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God, +Ecclus., iii. 22).</p> + +<p>(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is +a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as +when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and +negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry +into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind +their own business well).</p> + +<p>2564. The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.—(a) Curiosity in +itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy +oneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it +mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is +curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on +unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others +sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it +serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to +blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal +as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers, +etc., in order to get information.</p> + +<p>(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty +of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and +thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a +mortal sin.</p> + +<p>2565. Modesty.—Modesty should control not only the internal passions +for excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the +body (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things +(modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily +actions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful +(modest relaxation).</p> + +<p>(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals +that serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears +(modesty in dress).</p> + +<p>2566. Modest Behavior or Decorum.—(a) The Virtue.—The movements and +gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they +are indications of one’s own character and disposition, and because +they express one’s disposition towards those with whom one lives. +Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that +they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one’s sex, age, position, +etc.) and to one’s neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social +usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum +employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act +(2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of +others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and +society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus +(xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man’s +looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be +nothing offensive to others in one’s movements; and Aristotle mentions +among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and +dignified in demeanor.</p> + +<p>(b) The Opposite Vices.—Modest behavior is offended by various vices +of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and +affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration +for others by flattery and rudeness.</p> + +<p>2567. Modest Relaxation.—(a) The Virtue.—Just as the body fatigued by +manual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation +afforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind +cannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by +some kind of amusement or diversion. The desire for recreation is, +therefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special +need of its temperate management by right reason. The person who +prudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has +the virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and +which St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.</p> + +<p>(b) The Sin of Excess.—Relaxation is excessive in various ways. +Sometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies, +scandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition +of the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the +chief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for +pleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the +circumstances make an amusement unsuitable, such as the person (e.g., +when a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a +female takes part in sports unsuited to her sex), or the time (e.g., +when the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or +other Work, are spent in golfing or fishing; when Good Friday or a day +of bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place +(eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g., +when the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or +parodied), or the quantity (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres, +automobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for +duties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by +violent games).</p> + +<p>(b) The Sin of Defect.—Those persons offend here who deprive +themselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a +holiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere +with the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others +miserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those +who have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to +some extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look +pleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.</p> + +<p>2568. Gravity of the Sins Opposed to Moderate Enjoyment.—(a) The +Absolute Gravity.—The sins just mentioned are mortal or venial +according to the character of what is done and the circumstances. Thus, +it is a mortal sin to find recreation in wild revelry and debauchery, +or to drive one’s children to the devil by forbidding them necessary +diversion; it is a venial sin to spend a little too much time at the +card table or to work rather too hard.</p> + +<p>(b) The Comparative Gravity.—It is worse to relax too much than too +little, for amusement is not taken for its own sake, but is +subordinated to serious things. Just as it is more senseless to take +too much salt or other relish in food than to take too little, because +the salt is secondary, so it is more foolish to play too much than too +little.</p> + +<p>2569. Modesty in Style of Living and Dress.-(a) The Virtue.—External +goods, such as dwellings and clothing, are necessary for body and soul, +as a protection to health and decency; others, such as furnishings, +decorations, ornaments, cars, radios, entertainments for guests, etc., +are useful for convenience, beauty and the maintenance of one’s +station. But one may be immoderate in the use of these goods, and hence +there is need of a virtue to regulate their use, so that it may +truthfully be in keeping with one’s position and be not offensive to +others.</p> + +<p>(b) The Sin of Excess.—This is committed when one’s style is +extravagant according to the standards of the community, or when like +Dives, clothed in purple and fine linen, one aims only at display or +sensual gratification, or when one is too much preoccupied with +externals (e.g., when too much time is spent before the mirror or too +much money at the dressmaker’s). Dignitaries and the ministers of the +altar are not guilty of excess in the pomp and splendor which the +Church sanctions, since the honor is intended for their station and the +divine worship they perform.</p> + +<p>(c) The Sin of Defect.—This is committed when one’s mode of life is +not up to the reasonable standard of one’s community, especially if +this is due to negligence or itch for notoriety or disregard for +decency. Examples are those who through carelessness go about unwashed +or unshaven, who keep their quarters in a filthy and disorderly state, +or who wear their clothing untidily; also females who dress in male +attire, nudists who appear undressed in public places, and cynics who +scorn the conventions of refined society. It is not sinful, however, +but a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments +from the spirit of mortification and humility (Heb., xi. 37). The +clergy and religious, since they should be models of the penitential +spirit, are to be praised, therefore, when they give an example of +plainness and simplicity in personal style and dress.</p> + +<p>2570. Morality of Self-Beautification.—Is it wrong to beautify oneself +in order to improve one’s looks or to win admiration?</p> + +<p>(a) In itself there is no harm, especially for females, in using means +to improve one’s looks, such as remedies for deformities, facial +paints, powders and cosmetics, hair waves and dyes, and the like. But +accidentally there could be sin (e.g., deception). A poor man would be +a deceiver if he lived in great style to make a woman believe he was +wealthy, and likewise a woman would be a deceiver if she used an +artificial beauty to deceive a man about her age (see 2404).</p> + +<p>(b) In itself also it is not sinful to desire that others approve one’s +appearance and dress. Thus, a wife should strive to be attractive to +her husband (I Cor., vii. 34), and modest ornamentation may be used to +win a suitor (I Tim., ii. 9). It is mortally sinful, however, to attire +oneself with the purpose or in a manner to arouse carnal temptation or +to awaken sinful desire in others—for example, if one wishes to +capture the sex love of others without marriage (Prov., vii. 10); it is +venially sinful to groom oneself well from mere vanity, that is, from a +silly ambition to be regarded as handsome and fashionable. By a Decree +of the Sacred Congregation of the Council (January 12, 1930), +parish-priests, parents, and teachers are admonished to oppose indecent +female dress; and it is ordered that women and girls improperly dressed +shall be excluded from Communion or even from church, and special +services and sermons on decency are prescribed for December 8 of each +year (see 1456, 1457).</p> + +<p>2571. Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.—(a) The Gift of the +Holy Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of +temperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so +is reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence +from reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the +Heavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket +and are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as +but a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses +presumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But +secondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is +apart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid +and bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth +dispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v. +15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12 +sqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must +regulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God, +then, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to +offend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: “Pierce +Thou my flesh with Thy fear.”</p> + +<p>(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second: +“Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Those who +have the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the +evil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to +be sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure +and love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment +of God in the life to come: “Your sorrow shall be changed into joy” +(John, xx. 16).</p> + +<p>(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and +chastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful +fruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have +in them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the +fruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of +fear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency +of the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.</p> + +<p>2572. The Commandments of Temperance.—(a) Negative Precepts.—In the +Decalogue the vices of intemperance that are most directly opposed to +the love of God and the neighbor (I Tim., i. 5) are expressly +forbidden, namely, adultery in act and adultery in desire. Elsewhere +other sins are forbidden. Thus, drunkenness (“Drunkards shall not +possess the kingdom,” I Cor., vi. 10), every kind of lust (“The works +of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ... +those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom,” Gal., v. 19, +21), anger (“Let all bitterness and anger and indignation be put away +from you,” Eph., iv. 31), pride (“God resisteth the proud,” James, iv. +6), etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Affirmative Precepts.—The positive modes of observing temperance +(i.e., rules on fasting) are not prescribed in the Decalogue. For the +law confines itself to general principles that, are of universal +application, whereas the manner of practising fasts and abstinences has +to be suited to conditions of time and place. Hence, it pertains to the +Church to settle by her legislation the details of mortification in +eating and drinking, so that they may be suited to the ever-changing +conditions of human life (2469).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Question_III">Question III<br />THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN</h2> +</div> + + +<p>2573. The theological and moral virtues treated in the previous +Question are obligatory upon all states and conditions, for all men +have the same supernatural destiny, and all alike are bound to govern +their acts and their passions by the rule of reason. But not all have +the same calling or office, or consequently the same particular ends to +be striven for or the same special means to be used; wherefore, there +are moral duties proper to particular classes and particular ways of +life. Those special obligations, however, do not constitute new +virtues, but are applications of the seven general virtues to the +states of man diversified in reference to the acts and habits of the +soul. The diversities now spoken of may be reduced to the three +mentioned by St. Paul (I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.), namely, diversities of +graces (i.e., some are gifted to edify the Church in marvellous ways by +knowledge, speech or miracles), diversities of operations (i.e., some +are called to the life of contemplation, others to active life), and +diversities of ministries (i.e., there are various stations, ranks, +occupations, both in ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical life). The +higher graces and ways of the spiritual life of man are treated in +works of ascetical and mystical theology, and we shall confine +ourselves here to two subjects: (a) the duties of men as members of the +Church, that is, the general duties of the faithful and the special +duties of clerics and religious; (b) the duties of men as members of +domestic and civil society.</p> + +<p>Before proceeding any further, a word is in order regarding the role of +the laity in the Church.</p> + +<p>“We desire that all who claim the Church as their mother should +seriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who +have consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but the other +members as well of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, have the +obligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and +increase of this Body” (Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis_).</p> + +<p>The Catholic layman, long a silent partner in the Church’s apostolate, +has assumed a more active part in recent years. His role, his +apostolate, his milieu, his special claims to divine graces, his +spiritual prerogatives—all have been made subjects of theological +investigation particularly by European writers. Controversy, +uncertainty, at times even error have characterized their efforts as +they grope their way in a new area of theology. Their efforts +ultimately will lead to the elaboration of a developed theology of the +laity, an extremely important and equally necessary body of knowledge, +for “the laity are in the front line of the Church’s life; through them +the Church is the vital principle of human society. Accordingly they +especially must have an ever clearer consciousness not only of +belonging to the Church, but of being the Church....” (Pius XII, +_Allocution to the Sacred College, AAS_, 38-149).[1]</p> + +<p>[1] To detail the advances made in this new area of theology would +demand a volume for itself. We shall have to be content with indicating +a select bibliography of the outstanding works available.</p> + +<p>Francis M. Keating, S.J., “Theology of the Laity,” _Proceedings of the +Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1956, pp. 196 ff.; Ives M. J. +Congar, O.P., _Jalons pour une theologie du laicat_, (Paris, Cerf, +1953); translated as _Lay People in the Church_, (The Newman Press, +Westminster, Md., 1957); G. Philips, _Le role du laicat dans l’Eglise, +(Casterman, Tournai-Paris, 1954); translated as _The Role of the Laity +in the Church_. (Mercier, Cork, 1955); Karl Rahner, “The Apostolate of +Laymen,” _Theology Digest_, (Spring 1957), pp. 73 ff.; Jacques +Leclercq, “Can a Layman be a Saint?” _Theology Digest_, (Winter 1956), +pp. 3 ff. (This same issue contains a select bibliography on +spirituality of the laity, p. 8.); Paul Dabin, S.J., _Le sacerdoce +royal des fideles dans les livres saints_, (Blond et Gay, 1941); _Le +sacerdoce royal des fideles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne_, +(Les Editions Universelles, Brussels, 1950): Gustave Weigel, S.J., “The +Body of Christ and the City of God,” _Social Order_, (Vol. 5, 1955, p. +275 ff.).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_THE_DUTIES_OF_MEMBERS_OF_THE_CHURCH">Art. 1: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH</h2> +</div> + +<p>2574. The General Duties of the Faithful.—The Church has the power to +make laws which will promote the common good of the whole body and the +individual good of the members (see 418). Chief among the laws that +bind the faithful in general are the six known as the Precepts of the +Church, namely, the laws on the observance of Sundays and holydays, on +fasting and abstinence, on yearly confession, on Easter Communion, on +the support of pastors, and on marriage.</p> + +<p>2575. The First Precept of the Church.—This precept commands that on +Sundays and holydays of obligation Mass be heard and servile and other +like works be omitted (Canons 1247-1249) by the subjects of church laws +(427 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) This precept is of natural and divine law as to its purpose and +substance, for reason teaches and the Third Commandment of the +Decalogue prescribes that man set aside some time for the external +worship of God, and avoid those things that distract him from worship +(Catechism of the Council of Trent, pp. 396 sqq,). Hence, even +non-Catholics, though they do not sin by missing Mass (429, 430), are +guilty of sin if they do not from time to time worship God externally.</p> + +<p>(b) This precept is of ecclesiastical law only as to its details (i.e., +the time set apart and the manner of worship and sanctification +decreed). The Old Testament Law observed the Sabbath or last day of the +Week in memory of the creation of the World, and it abstained most +rigorously from work on the Sabbath, because there was a divine +prohibition and because this rest was a figure of things to come. But +in the New Law the ceremonial precepts of Judaism no longer have force, +and the Christian precepts substituted for them were not instituted by +Christ Himself but arose from the custom of the Church. During the +lifetime of the Apostles themselves Sunday (or the first day of the +week) came to be venerated as the Lord’s Day in memory of the +Resurrection, which completed the work of Redemption (Acts, ii. 46, +iii. 1, v. 12, xxi. 26); and from early times various special holydays +were appointed and made days of obligatory worship, as had been the +case with certain feasts in the Old Testament. As early as the third +and fourth centuries laws were made confirming the primitive customs of +assisting at Mass and resting on Sundays and holydays.</p> + +<p>2576. The Affirmative and Negative Parts of the First Precept.—The +first precept of the Church has two parts, an affirmative (preceptive) +part which commands the hearing of Mass, and a negative (prohibitive) +part which forbids the doing of servile works. The law is therefore +most salutary and simple, requiring that one take part in the greatest +act of worship, the sacrifice which is a commemoration of Christ, and +that one rest from the labors and cares of the week and be spiritually +refreshed. In reference to the Mass, the precept requires that Mass +itself be heard, and that it be an entire Mass and the same Mass.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, Mass itself must be heard, and hence one does not satisfy the +Sunday obligation by attending other services that precede (e.g., the +Asperges, blessing of palm), accompany (e.g., sermon), or follow (e.g., +Vespers, Benediction) the celebration of Mass. Neither does this +precept oblige one to attend other services on Sunday, although it is +most suitable to do this, also to make internal acts of faith, hope and +charity, and to read pious books and perform works of charity, and it +is sometimes necessary as a natural obligation to attend the sermon or +catechetical instruction (see 914 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) A whole Mass must be heard, that is, all the ceremonies from the +prayers at the foot of the altar until the blessing at the end, and it +is irreverent to leave church without necessity before the priest has +left the altar. He who can assist at only the essential and integral +parts of the sacrifice (i.e., from the Consecration to the Communion), +is obliged to so much; but he who arrives after the Consecration and +cannot hear another Mass is not obliged according to one opinion to +remain for the present Mass, since the Consecration, the essential +part, is already past.</p> + +<p>(c) The same Mass must be heard, and hence one cannot satisfy the +obligation by hearing the first half of one Mass being said on one +altar and the second half of another Mass being said simultaneously on +another altar (see Denzinger, n. 1203), nor by hearing the Consecration +in one Mass and the Communion in a previous or subsequent Mass, thus +dividing the sacrifice. But if one may have heard from the Consecration +to the end in one Mass, one may hear the omitted pre-Consecration +parts, it seems, in another Mass that follows, and one should do this +if possible.</p> + +<p>2577. How Mass Must Be Heard.—In reference to the person who hears +Mass, the positive part of the precept calls for external assistance +and internal devotion.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the external or bodily assistance must be such that one can +be said to take part in the divine worship. This happens when one is +physically present, that is, when one is in the same building or place +as the celebrant and can either see or hear him, or is morally present, +that is, not in the same building but able to see or hear him naturally +(e.g., by looking from the window of a neighboring house), or is unable +to see or hear him but joined with the congregation (e.g., those who +are outside the closed doors of the church but who can follow the bells +and choir to some extent, those who are inside with the congregation +but behind a pillar that shuts off the view). In a field Mass +amplifiers can carry the voice far out to the edge of a vast crowd. But +there does not seem to be a sufficient moral presence when Mass is +“seen” by television or “heard” over the radio, since in these cases +one is not present to the consecrated species or united to the +worshippers.</p> + +<p>(b) Internal or mental assistance requires the actual or virtual +intention of the will to perform what the Church requires (see 2165), +and the attention of the mind, external according to some, internal +according to others (see 2166 sqq.). Thus, he who goes to church merely +to hear the music or look at the pictures does not hear Mass for lack +of intention; he who sleeps soundly all through the service does not +hear Mass for lack of attention. One who knows what is going on before +him, but whose thoughts are not on any religious matter, complies with +the precept of the Church according to some, but he sins by irreverence +and voluntary distraction. It suffices during Mass to think either on +the Mass itself (which is the best attention), or to think on other +pious subjects (e.g., to make an examination of conscience, to say the +Rosary). Certain actions (e.g., those that are related to the Mass, +such as ringing the bell, taking up the collection, playing the organ) +do not exclude external attention, but others certainly exclude it +(e.g., writing a letter), and others are doubtful (e.g., going to +Confession).</p> + +<p>2578. Time and Place of Mass.—In reference to circumstances, the +precept requires that Mass be heard at the proper place and the proper +time.</p> + +<p>(a) Place.—The precept may be complied with by attending Mass in any +Catholic rite (Latin, Greek, etc.), and it makes no difference whether +Mass is celebrated in the open air, in a church, or in a public or +semi-public oratory (Canon 1249). But private chapels are for the +benefit of the grantee alone.</p> + +<p>(b) Time.—The precept must be complied with on the feast itself, that +is, during the period of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight. +Sunday Mass cannot be anticipated on Saturday or put off till Monday. +Likewise servile works are unlawful from midnight to midnight.</p> + +<p>2579. Servile Works.—The prohibitory part of the precept is concerned +with servile works, that is, labor of a kind that tends to make one +unfit for devotion or that shows disrespect for the sacredness of the +day, even though the labor be done gratis, or for recreation, or out of +devotion. Hence, the law forbids:</p> + +<p>(a) works given to the service of the devil, that is, sins that deprive +one of holiness, such as riotous recreations, gambling, drunkenness, +reading improper matter, and attendance at evil movie performances. But +these works are opposed to the end, not to the text, of the law; and +hence the circumstance of time aggravates their malice but does not +give them a new species (see 2314);</p> + +<p>(b) works given to the service of the body (servile works properly so +called) or to the service of external goods (forensic and commercial +works). Servile works in the strict sense cause bodily fatigue and are +taken up with material things, and hence they distract the mind from +religious thoughts. Such are manual labors (e.g., plowing, digging, +housecleaning) and mechanical or industrial labors (e.g., printing, +building, plastering, shoemaking). Forensic and commercial labors +(e.g., arguing in court, auctioneering) are also of a very worldly kind +and unsuitable for the quiet and recollection of Sundays and holydays.</p> + +<p>2580. The prohibitory part of the Sunday precept does not affect works +which are no impediment to devotion and which cast no dishonor on the +day. Such are:</p> + +<p>(a) works devoted immediately to the service of God. The purpose of the +law is to allow leisure for these works, and hence manifestly their +performance is not forbidden. Such works are saying Mass, preaching, +administering the Sacraments, singing in church, and visiting the poor +and sick (John, vii. 23; Matt., xii. 5). But works that are only +remotely related to divine worship (e.g., cleaning the church, painting +the altar, repairing the vestments, decorating the shrines) should not +be done on Sunday without necessity;</p> + +<p>(b) works devoted to the service of the mind (liberal works). These +works are of a more elevated kind, do not require great bodily +exertion, and are not looked upon as unsuitable to the Sabbath. Such +are intellectual works (e.g., teaching, reading, writing, studying), +artistic works (e.g., playing the organ, singing, drawing, painting a +picture, embroidering), and works of recreation (moderate sports or +diversions such as baseball, tennis, and chess).</p> + +<p>2581. Other Kinds of Works and Sunday Observance.—(a) Common works are +those that stand between the liberal and the servile, since they are +exercised equally by mind and body, such as walking, riding, hunting, +and fishing that is not very laborious. These are lawful.</p> + +<p>(b) Doubtful works are those that are now non-servile, now servile, +according to the manner in which they are conducted, such as the work +of painters, sculptors, typists, seamstresses, and photographers. Thus, +it is a liberal work to paint a portrait, a servile work to paint the +walls of a house. In settling the character of various kinds of work, +one must be guided by the prudent opinion of one’s locality, and in +case of doubt and need must seek a dispensation. (For a history of the +theology of servile works see Franz X. Pettirsch, S.J., “A Theology of +Sunday Rest,” _Theology Digest_, Vol. VI, no. 2, Spring 1958, pp. 114 +ff.; for a survey of modern studies on the problem see _Proceedings of +the Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1957).</p> + +<p>2582. Is it lawful without necessity to hire the servile work of +non-Catholics on Sunday, if these persons are not thereby impeded from +the natural duty of worshipping God and no scandal is given? (a) If the +non-Catholics are infidels and not bound by church laws, this is +lawful. The same would be true of those who lack the use of reason (see +427 sqq.). (b) If the non-Catholics are heretics, it is not lawful in +the case given to make them work on Sunday.</p> + +<p>2583. Obligation of First Precept.—The first precept of the Church +obliges under pain of grave sin, because it determines a necessary act +of religion (2148), and experience shows that where the Sabbath is +neglected the social, spiritual and physical interests of man are +seriously harmed (see Denzinger, n. 1202). There is always hope for +Catholics who attend Mass, whereas those who miss Mass soon become +Catholics only in name. But since neglect of worship may be only +slightly disrespectful, and since the end of the precept may be +substantially obtained without complete fulfillment, a transgression +may be only venial by reason of lightness of matter.</p> + +<p>(a) Preceptive Part.—Grave matter is a part of the Mass that is +notable on account of dignity (i.e., the essential and integral parts +of the Mass, for example, the Consecration and Communion), or on +account of its duration (i.e., a third of the whole Mass, e.g., from +the beginning to the Offertory inclusively, from the beginning to the +Gospel and from the Communion to the end, from the Preface to the +Consecration, from the Consecration to the Agnus Dei, etc.). Hence, he +who is culpably absent or asleep during a notable part of the Mass sins +gravely, but he who is absent or asleep during an inconsiderable part +of the Mass (e.g., one who arrives just at the Offertory or who leaves +after the Communion) sins venially, unless he is so disposed that he +does not care how much he misses.</p> + +<p>(b) Prohibitive Part.—Grave matter is labor that is notable on account +of its quality (e.g., forensic proceedings even for a brief space on +Sunday would be a serious distraction and scandal), or its quantity +(e.g., two and a half hours given to very exhausting manual work, such +as digging a ditch, three hours given to less arduous labor, such as +sowing). He who commands ten laborers to work an hour each on Sunday +cooperates in ten venial sins (see 219), but he may be guilty of mortal +sin on account of scandal.</p> + +<p>2584. Excuses from Observance of First Precept.—These reasons may be +reduced to two classes, namely, external reasons (i.e., a dispensation +or a lawful custom) and internal reasons (i.e., one’s own inability or +necessity).</p> + +<p>(a) External Reasons.—Dispensations may be given under certain +conditions by local Ordinaries, by parish-priests, and by superiors of +exempt clerical institutes (Canon 1245). Custom in certain places +excuses from Mass for a month women who have just given birth to a +child or who have lost their husband by death, and also—from the Mass +in which their banns are to be proclaimed—those women who are about to +marry. Custom further permits necessary labors, such as cooking, +ordinary housecleaning, barbering, the work of railroad and garage men, +etc.</p> + +<p>(b) Internal Reasons.—Impossibility or serious inconvenience excuses +from hearing Mass (e.g., those who have to walk an hour’s journey to +church or ride a two hours’ journey, regarding which, in terms of +distance travelled, it has been suggested that the figures should be +more than three miles each way if one must walk, more than thirty miles +if a car is available and the roads are good; those who will suffer +great detriment to health, honor, fortune, etc., if they go; those who +are kept away by duties of charity or employment or office that cannot +be omitted). Necessity or duty to others permits one to work on Sunday +at least to some extent (e.g., those who must labor on a Sunday in +order to live, or to keep out of serious trouble, or to perform +services or works of charity that cannot easily be done at another +time). To avoid self-deception the faithful should consult their pastor +or other prudent person if there is doubt about the sufficiency of the +excuse.</p> + +<p>2585. Though the Church does not impose excessive Sabbatarianism, +neither does she admit laxity in the important matter of the Lord’s Day.</p> + +<p>(a) Hence, not every reason excuses from the church precept. Thus, +those are guilty who unnecessarily place themselves in the +impossibility of observing the law (e.g., by moving to a place where +there is no church, by taking a position that requires work all Sunday +morning, by starting on a vacation or auto trip to a churchless +region), or whose excuses are frivolous (e.g., those who stay away from +Mass because they dislike the priest, or who work on Sunday merely to +keep busy).</p> + +<p>(b) Reasons that excuse from part of the ecclesiastical precept do not +excuse from all of it. Thus, those who are unable to hear Mass are not +thereby justified in doing servile work, those who can hear the +essential part of Mass (Consecration and Communion), but not the other +parts, should hear the essential part; those who can hear Mass only on +one Sunday a year are not excused on that Sunday.</p> + +<p>(c) Reasons that excuse from the ecclesiastical precept do not excuse +from the divine precept (see 2575) of worshipping God. Hence, those who +are really obliged to work every Sunday should sanctify the Lord’s Day +by whatever private prayer or devotion they can substitute. Some +authors very rightly believe that those who can never go to Mass on +Sunday are held by divine law to hear Mass on weekdays three or four +times a year at least, when this is possible (see 2148, 2180).</p> + +<p>2586. The Second Precept of the Church.—This precept commands that on +all Fridays of the year and certain other specified days (unless they +fall on a holyday outside of Lent) every baptized person who has +completed the age of seven and has attained the use of reason shall +abstain from eating flesh meat and from drinking the broth or soup made +from flesh meat (Canons 1250-1254).</p> + +<p>(a) Under the name flesh are included all land and warm-blooded animals +(i.e., mammals and birds). The law does not include aquatic animals +(i.e., fishes, clams, oysters and other shellfish, lobsters, shrimps, +crabs and other crustaceans), nor cold-blooded animals (i.e., reptiles, +snails and amphibians, such as frogs, tortoises). Some authors include +under aquatic animals otters, beavers, seals, walruses, loons, and +coots, though generally the birds are regarded as flesh. In doubt +whether a food is fish or flesh, it may be judged to be fish, for in +doubts laws are to be interpreted benignly.</p> + +<p>(b) Under the name meat are included all the parts of an animal (i.e., +its flesh, blood, marrow, brains, lard, meat extracts, mince-pie, +pepsin) but not its fruit (e.g., eggs, milk, and things made from milk, +such as butter, cheese).</p> + +<p>(c) Under the name broth is included any liquid made from the juice of +meat, such as beef tea, chicken broth, mutton soup, gravy, etc. But the +law does not forbid condiments made from animal fats (e.g., margarin).</p> + +<p>2587. Obligation of the Second Precept of the Church.—(a) Origin of +the Obligation.—In substance this precept is of the natural law, but +in details (time, manner, etc.) it is of ecclesiastical law (2468 b) +and has come down from customs that began in the first ages of +Christianity. The church regulation on abstinence is most wise and +moderate: the foods forbidden are those whose deprivation is a +mortification to most persons, and at the same time a great benefit to +spiritual and bodily health; the times appointed are few but +appropriate (viz., days of sorrow, special prayer, penance, +preparation, such as Fridays, Ember Days, Lent, vigils), and they are +so distributed as to sanctify by mortification each week and each +season of the year. True, no food is evil in itself (Matt., xv. 11; I +Cor., viii, 8; I Tim., iv. 3; Col., ii. 16), but just as the physician +can forbid certain foods to his patient for the sake of temporal good, +so for the sake of spiritual good God forbade to Adam the fruit of one +tree and to the Jews the flesh of certain animals; and the Church from +the days of the Apostles (Acts, xv. 29) has exercised the same right.</p> + +<p>(b) Gravity of the Obligation.—The abstinence required by the Second +Precept is a grave duty, because the Church makes it the necessary act +of the necessary virtue of abstemiousness and a serious duty of +obedience. But not every transgression is a serious injury to the +spirit of this law, and hence some sins against it are venial. Grave +matter is such a quantity of forbidden food as gives considerable +nourishment, and hence for practical purposes the rule may be given +that flesh meat which weighs two ounces (or, according to others, what +would be the size of a walnut or of a small hen’s egg) is grave matter. +Some hold for a more liberal interpretation when the food is not +strictly flesh meat, and believe that liquid from meat is not grave +matter at any time, or at least when it weighs less than four ounces. +Vegetables cooked or seasoned with meat or meat juice are also +considered light matter. He who eats meat twice on a Friday or other +abstinence day commits two sins, just as he who works twice on a Sunday +or holyday commits two sins. It is commonly held that many venial sins +against abstinence committed on the same day coalesce to form grave +matter, but on account of the separation between the eatings a larger +amount is necessary for grave matter.</p> + +<p>(c) Exceptions to the Obligation.—Those are not bound to observe a day +of abstinence who have been exempted by indult (Canon 1253), who have +been dispensed by the Ordinary, pastor or superior (Canon 1245), or who +are excused on account of real impossibility (e.g., the poor, the sick, +those obliged to perform very hard work, those who are morally forced +to eat meat but not as a sign of contempt of the law). Persons +dispensed from abstinence may not eat meat oftener than once a day on +fast days, unless they have a special grant. The faithful should be +guided by the Lenten regulations of their dioceses, and in doubt they +should consult their pastors.</p> + +<p>2588. The Obligation of Fasting.—The Second Precept also commands that +on the weekdays of Lent and certain other specified days (holydays +outside Lent excepted) every baptized person between the ages of +twenty-one years completed and sixty years begun shall eat not more +than one full meal a day (Canon 1251).</p> + +<p>(a) The law speaks of eating, that is, of solid food, and hence the +Lenten and other similar fasts are not broken by liquids which are +beverages rather than foods, or which are used to allay thirst, or +carry food or assist digestion, and not chiefly to nourish (e.g., +water, teas, coffee, light cocoa, wine, beer, lemonade, fruit juice). +Likewise, sirups taken as medicines are not considered foods, even +though they contain nourishment, unless one drinks a large quantity for +its food content. Light ices may be considered drink, but ice-cream is +food. On the contrary, liquids that are chiefly nourishing are regarded +as food (e.g., soup, oil, honey). Finally, some liquors vary between +food and drink, according to their richness or weakness, their great or +small quantity. Thus, hot chocolate as made in the United States +contains only a small amount of solid and may be considered as a drink, +but as made in Europe it is stronger and rather food than drink.</p> + +<p>(b) The law admits as an indulgence on fast days, in addition to the +one meal, a small breakfast in the morning and a light collation to be +taken either around noon (lunch) or in the evening (supper). The +quality and quantity of these two repasts are left to local custom. The +Uniform Norm for Fast and Abstinence in the United States adopted by +the Hierarchy, Nov. 14, 1951, establishes the following norm for these +two meatless meals. They are to be “sufficient to maintain strength, +may be taken according to each one’s needs; but together they should +not equal another full meal.” This norm, called the relative standard, +was adopted by many Bishops of the United States, beginning with Lent +of 1952. Thus, the amount of food is dependent to some degree on a +person’s own needs and appetite. The relative standard is distinguished +from the absolute norm which allows about two ounces for the morning +collation and eight ounces for the evening.</p> + +<p>(c) The law permits one to eat but once in the day (exception being +made for breakfast and collation), but it places no limits as to the +quality of the food at the principal meal (unless the day be also a day +of abstinence, when meat is forbidden), or as to its quantity, though +temperance bids one to eat at all times in moderation. On fast days, +therefore, one may not eat between meals, nor so divide or prolong the +dinner that it really becomes several meals. A notable interruption +(two or three hours) made without good reason divides a dinner into two +meals, and over two hours of uninterrupted eating, under ordinary +circumstances, seems to be more than the one full meal which the law +allows.</p> + +<p>2589. The Obligation of the Precept of Fasting.—(a) Origin.—The +natural law commands fasting in general, since without some kind of +austerity above common temperance certain desirable ends (such as +atonement for past transgressions, conquest of unruly passions, and +elevation of the soul) cannot be attained; and as these ends are +necessary it is also necessary to use the means as far as one needs +them. The particularization of this natural law has been made by the +positive law of the Church, and with such wisdom as to promote the good +of both soul and body. The times appointed are most appropriate (e.g., +the season when the Passion is commemorated, Luke, v. 35); the duration +of the long fast is modelled on that of Christ (Matt., iv. 1); the +curtailment of food required is not only beneficial (as an exercise of +self-control and a rest and change to the metabolism), but is moderate, +since it permits sufficient food for the day, and even in the fast of +Lent the Sundays occur to give a respite.</p> + +<p>(b) Gravity.—The precept of fasting is grave, both from the purpose of +the law (see 2469), and from the express declaration of the lawgiver +(Denzinger, n. 1123). But the spirit of the precept is not notably +deviated from by every transgression, and hence even in reference to +matter there are minor or venial violations; and moreover the precept +is probably (unlike that of abstinence) an indivisible one, since it +consists in the limitation to one meal, and hence it cannot be violated +more than once a day. Grave matter, when the absolute norm is used, +seems to be about four ounces added to the collations or taken between +meals, either all at once or at different times during the day +(Denzinger, n.1129), But if the relative norm is used, a greater +quantity is needed to establish grave matter, e.g., one fourth of a +full meal. But he who has broken his fast (e.g., by a second full meal) +does not break it again by a third or fourth full meal on the same day, +for after the second full meal the fast has become impossible for that +day. He who accidentally takes too much at breakfast can still keep the +fast by proportionately diminishing his evening repast.</p> + +<p>(c) Exceptions.—Physical or moral impossibility excuses from the fast, +and gives the right to eat meat as often as moderation allows on days +that are not meatless days. The chief persons who labor under +impossibility are those who are too weak to fast (e.g., the sick, the +convalescent, pregnant and nursing mothers, the nervous), those who are +too poor to get one square meal a day (e.g., street beggars who have +nothing may eat as often as they are given an alms, if it does not buy +them a dinner), and those who cannot do their necessary or customary +hard work if they fast. Hard work is such as is exercised for many +hours continuously, or for a less time if it is very intense, and which +is greatly fatiguing to the mind (e.g., daily teaching, lecturing, +studying, hearing confessions, preaching, etc.) or to the body (e.g., +heavy manual labor, the difficult jobs in offices or stores, work that +requires one to be on one’s feet for hours at a time, necessary +journeys made under hardship). The confessor or physician can decide +about cases of impossibility that are not manifest, but dispensation +should be had from the pastor (Canon 1245). Those who are dispensed +from the ecclesiastical fast or abstinence should remember that they +are not dispensed from the natural law of temperance, and they should +practise some abstemiousness according to their ability (e.g., by +self-denial in alcoholic beverages, tobacco, sweets, etc., or +mortification in the quantity or quality of food).</p> + +<p>2590. The Third Precept of the Church.—This precept commands that all +the faithful, male and female, who have reached the age of discretion +go to confession at least once a year (Canon 906).</p> + +<p>(a) The subject of this precept is every baptized person who has +entered the Church through valid Baptism and who has the use of reason, +which begins usually at the age of seven. Infants are incapable of +committing sin, and the unbaptized are incapable of receiving the +Sacrament of Penance.</p> + +<p>(b) The matter of the precept is a good sacramental confession of the +grave sins not yet confessed, made with the purpose of obtaining +absolution to any duly authorized priest. Hence, those who have only +venial sins on their conscience are not bound according to the common +opinion by this precept, and, on the other hand, those who make a +sacrilegious or voluntarily null confession do not fulfill the law +(Denzinger, n. 1114; Code, Canon 907). It seems that one who, after a +confession of venial sins at Easter, falls into grave sin is not bound +from this precept to confess again before the end of the year.</p> + +<p>(c) The time for fulfillment of the precept is once during the year. +The law leaves one free to confess on any day during the twelvemonth, +and to count the year either civilly (i.e., from January 1 to December +31), or ecclesiastically (e.g., from Easter time to Easter time, as is +commonly done), or from the date of the last confession. The limit is +set, however, not to terminate but to insist upon obligation, and hence +it seems that he who has not made his 1957 confession must make it as +soon as possible in 1958, but the 1957 confession made in 1958 will +satisfy for the 1958 obligation also (see 468 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2591. The Obligation of the Third Precept.—(a) Origin.—From divine +law sacramental confession is necessary for all who have fallen into +serious sin after Baptism, since Christ has given His Church the keys +of heaven and appointed His bishops and priests the physicians and +judges to cure and pardon (Matt., xviii. 18; John, xx. 23). But Our +Lord did not fix the frequency of confession, and it is this which the +present precept determines. The law of annual confession goes back to +the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).</p> + +<p>(b) Gravity.—The precept of annual confession obliges under pain of +mortal sin, for its purpose is of vital importance and the Church has +always regarded it as a grave obligation. The purpose of the law is to +ensure the use of the Sacrament instituted by Christ for forgiveness +and to keep sinners from delaying their repentance too long. If a good +business man takes stock of his assets and liabilities at least once a +year, and those who are careful of their health have medical attention +or examination at least yearly, it is most reasonable that the faithful +should settle their spiritual accounts and attend to the well-being of +their souls within an equal period of time. In the early centuries when +fervor was greater and conditions different, no general church law on +the frequency of confession was needed; but there is no doubt that the +Lateran Decree met well the need that began after the change from the +early penitential discipline, The penalties for violation of this +precept were excommunication and exclusion from ecclesiastical burial, +and, though they are not enforced today, they show the intention of the +Church to impose a grave duty.</p> + +<p>2592. The Fourth Precept of the Church.—This precept commands that all +the faithful, male and female, who have attained the use of reason, go +to Holy Communion at least once a year, and that during Easter time +(Canon 859).</p> + +<p>(a) The subjects of this precept are the same as those of the previous +precept, and consequently children of seven years or thereabout, who +are able to understand, must make the Easter duty.</p> + +<p>(b) The matter of the precept is a worthy Communion (Viaticum or +ordinary Communion) received in any parish, but preferably in one’s own +parish. Persons living in community (e.g., religious, soldiers, college +boarders) may make the Easter duty in their own chapels, strangers and +vagi in any church or chapel, and priests in the place where they say +Mass.</p> + +<p>(c) The time of the precept is the Paschal Season (i.e., from Palm +Sunday to Low Sunday, but in the United States, by privilege, from the +First Sunday of Lent to Trinity Sunday). The Easter time may be +prolonged for an individual by his pastor or confessor for a just +reason. The year within which the Easter duty is to be made begins, it +seems, with the opening of one Paschal Season and ends with the opening +of the Paschal Season of the following calendar year. Since the law +requires that the Easter duty be made, not only within the Paschal +Season, but also once a year, it follows that he who neglects Communion +during the Easter period is still bound by the law to go to Communion +before the opening of the next Paschal Season, but probably he is not +bound to go at the first opportunity. As a rule, we believe those who +do not make their Easter duty during a year are guilty of but one sin, +since they do not think of distinct violations.</p> + +<p>2593. The Obligation of the Fourth Precept.—(a) Origin.—There is a +divine precept of receiving Communion some time during life, since Our +Lord willed the Eucharist to be the necessary nourishment of the soul’s +journey (John, vi. 54) and the perpetual memorial of Himself (I Cor., +xi. 24). The Church in the present precept has prescribed both the +frequency and the time for complying with the will of Christ. Since the +Eucharist is a daily bread, the law does not permit it to be abstained +from by anyone beyond a year; and, since the Paschal Season brings the +anniversary of Christ’s sacrifice and of the institution of the Blessed +Sacrament, it is the time most fitly chosen for the obligatory +Communion.</p> + +<p>(b) Gravity.—The precept obliges under pain of grave sin, for it +determines a law given by Our Lord Himself and regulates the minimum in +the use of the Eucharist, the greatest of the Sacraments and the end of +all the others. The doctrine of theologians is that it is a grave sin +to delay culpably the Easter Communion for even a day beyond the +Paschal Season as prescribed.</p> + +<p>2594. The Fifth and Sixth Precepts of the Church.—The Fifth Precept +commands the proper maintenance of the clergy by the laity. The manner +of giving the support is left to the special statutes and customs of +each country (Canons 1496, 1502). This ecclesiastical law is but a +determination of the natural law of justice and religion, and also of +the divine law; for even in the Old Testament the Levites were +supported by the people. The duty is, therefore, grave (see 2185 sqq.). +Respect and obedience in spiritual matters are owed the clergy, and it +is sinful to usurp their functions (see 2351, 2355 sqq., and Canons +119, 683, 1931, 166).</p> + +<p>The Sixth Precept commands the proper solemnization of marriage and +prohibits the solemn blessing of marriages at stated times. Canon 1108, +Sec.2 specifies these times as “from the first Sunday of Advent until +the day of the Nativity of Our Lord inclusive, and from Ash Wednesday +until Easter Sunday inclusive.” It is to be noted that the forbidden +time excludes only the solemn blessing, and even this may be permitted +by the Ordinary for just cause, subject to liturgical laws (Canon 1108, +Sec.3).</p> + +<p>2595. Two Other Important General Laws of the Church.—(a) The +prohibition of wicked and dangerous writings (Canons 1384 sqq.) +is based on the natural law, which requires one to avoid what is +proximately dangerous to faith or morals. This subject is treated above +in 1456, 849 sqq., 1529.</p> + +<p>(b) The prohibition of the cremation of corpses (Canon 1203) is not +based on natural law or on any dogma, as though the burning of dead +bodies were intrinsically evil or repugnant to our faith in immortality +and resurrection. On the contrary, in exceptional cases (e.g., in time +of war or epidemic) cremation is permitted, if a real public necessity +requires it. The reasons for the anti-cremation law are: the tradition +of the Old and New Testaments (Gen., iii, 19; I Cor., xv. 42), and +especially the example of Christ whose body was consigned to the tomb; +the association of burial throughout the history of the Church with +sacred rites and the doctrine of the future life, and the contrary +association of cremation both in times past and today with paganism and +despair; the sacred dignity of the human body (Gen., i. 25; I Cor., +iii. 16, vi. 5), and the feeling of affection for parents, relatives, +friends, which is outraged when their bodies are consigned to the +furnace. The practical arguments offered for cremation are chiefly +hygienic and economic; but it is certain that proper burial at sea or +in the grave is no menace to public health, and is not more expensive +or difficult than cremation. A most serious objection to cremation is +that it makes exhumation impossible, and is therefore a means of +concealing murder by poison. It is not lawful for a Catholic to +cooperate (except materially in case of necessity) with cremation, or +to belong to any society that promotes the incineration of corpses; it +is not lawful for a priest to give the last Sacraments or funeral rites +to those who ordered the cremation of their bodies.</p> + +<p>2596. The Special Duties of Clerics.—From the duties of Catholics in +general we pass now to the special duties of clerics; for the clergy, +on account of their position as the salt of the earth and the light of +the world (Matt., v. 16), are bound to a greater internal and external +holiness and edification than the laity. The word “cleric” is +understood in a wide or in a strict sense. In the wide sense, a cleric +is any Christian specially set apart for the service of God, whether by +ordination or religious profession (e.g., lay brothers, nuns); in the +strict sense, a cleric (clergyman) is one who has been admitted to +Orders, or at least to their preparation through tonsure (Canon 108).</p> + +<p>(a) Duties Before Entering the Clerical State.—The person who would +enter the clerical state must have a vocation and a right intention. As +to the latter, since the clerical state has for its ends the glory of +God and the salvation of souls, it would be a serious sin to choose it +principally for temporal ends, such as wealth, dignity or pleasure; but +it is not a sin to desire secondarily and moderately the necessary +support of the clerical state (I Cor., ix, 3).</p> + +<p>(b) Duties After Entering the Clerical State.—The privileges of +clerics are treated in canonical works. Here we speak only of duties. +The obligations of a cleric are of two kinds—the positive, such as +celibacy, and the negative, such as the avoidance of unbecoming +amusements or occupations.</p> + +<p>2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.—(a) Internal Vocation.—No one +should enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by +God (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.). +The foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life, +namely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one +divine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God’s call +to embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so +necessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole +structure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_). The +signs of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a +feeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it +suffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness +(physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He +gives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able +to say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot +observe celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards) +or unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety), +do not show the signs of a priestly vocation.</p> + +<p>(b) External Vocation.—No one should be admitted to the religious life +or to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God. +Thus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of +others if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness +he was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a +Religious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is +doubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity, +since it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of +unworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons (“Let these +first be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime,” I Tim., +iii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical +life. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church +law provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the +ecclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he +receives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is +criminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical +state (Canon 971). “By a divine vocation to the religious and clerical +state a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the +Church, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this +hierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be +authoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical +rulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church” +(Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_).</p> + +<p>2598. Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.—(a) He who enters the +clerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin, +as is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who +receives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation, +commits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights +of God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the +sin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the +absence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to +all the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and +good intention, and grace will not be wanting.</p> + +<p>(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for +certain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only +negligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too +great love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or +light according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the +resistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or +uncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and +the bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial +sin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation +and exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation. +Finally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may +be no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the +clerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when +uncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of +unworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others, +not to become clerics.</p> + +<p>2599. The Positive Duties of Clerics.—(a) Duties to God.—All clerics +are held to frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance, to daily +devotions (i.e., mental prayer, visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a third +part of the Rosary, examen), and to triennial spiritual retreats +(Canons 125, 126). Moreover, clerics in Sacred Orders, benefice +holders, and solemnly professed religious bound to the choir are +obliged to the daily recitation of the Canonical Hours, each one +according to his own rite and calendar (Canons 135, 213 sqq., 1475, +610). This obligation is grave, because its purpose is the important +one of consecrating each hour of the day by the public prayer of the +Church according to the usage that goes back to the earliest centuries. +But the choral obligation of simply professed religious is light, +unless the choir is impossible without their presence.</p> + +<p>(b) Duties to Superiors.—Clerics are especially obliged to show +respect to their Ordinaries and to give them the obedience promised in +ordination (Canon 127).</p> + +<p>(c) Duties to the Clerical State.—Clerics are required to cultivate +their minds by sacred and sound studies, and to this end examinations +and conferences are also prescribed (Canons 129-131); to keep +themselves pure in soul and body by the observance of celibate chastity +(Canons 132, 133); to conduct themselves in externals (dwelling, dress, +etc.) in a manner befitting their position (Canons 134, 136). The +clerical garb in this country is the cassock or habit in the house and +church, and dark clothes and the Roman collar, or other distinctive +sign for priests and brothers elsewhere. The dress of the clergy should +avoid the extremes of dudishness and slovenliness (Second Council of +Baltimore, 148; Third Council, 77). The duty of wearing clerical dress +at least away from home and regularly is of serious importance, since +its purpose is the honor of the clerical state and the protection of +its members. It is also forbidden to clerics to cultivate their hair +(e.g., to grow long locks, to use curling irons, to oil or perfume +their head in dandyish fashion), since this is unbecoming in the +followers of a thorn-crowned Leader. The use of the beard is a thing +indifferent in itself, and hence it is forbidden in some places +(generally in the Latin Church) and required in others (as in the +Orient), according to tradition and local usage.</p> + +<p>2600. The Obligation of the Divine Office.—(a) Matter.—A cleric is +gravely obliged to recite the Office according to his own rite and in +the language of his rite, and not to make any notable change in the +Office prescribed by the Ordo, either as to quantity (e.g., by omission +of a Little Hour or of parts equally long) or as to quality (e.g., by +substitution of a minor office for that of one of the great +solemnities.) The omission of the Vespers of Holy Saturday, of +Pretiosa, or of the Rogation Litanies seems to be only a venial sin, +because in the first two cases the prayer is short, while in the third +case the precept seems to be _sub levi_. There is also lightness of +matter in the omission of an inconsiderable part of the day’s Office, +or in the substitution without good reason of an equal part for a +prescribed part.</p> + +<p>(b) Manner.—Since the Office is a prayer, of a public and daily kind, +it must be said: mentally, that is, there must be at least virtual +intention (which is present from the fact that one takes up the +Breviary to fulfill the obligation) and at least external attention +(see 2166 sqq.); vocally, that is, the words must be consciously formed +by the lips, mouth, or tongue, but it is not necessary that they be +audible, unless two or more are saying the Office together; within the +limits of the day, that is, Matins and Lauds may be anticipated from 2 +p.m. of the previous day, but the whole Office must be finished before +midnight of the current day. These are substantial requisites and bind +_sub gravi_, but there may be only venial sin when they are deviated +from inconsiderably. Next, since the Office has a continuity of +thought, an order of precedence among its hours and their subdivisions, +and a special dignity, it must be said uninterruptedly (i.e., without +break between the parts of an hour), in order (i.e., according to the +succession of Matins, Lauds, Prime, etc.), with external respect as to +place and posture (i.e., he who is bound to choral Office should say it +in choir and with the rubrical postures, while he who is bound only to +private Office should say it in church or some other becoming place, +and should observe the rubrical or at least a respectful posture). +These are accidental requisites and bind _sub levi_. For a good reason +one may interrupt the Office even for a notable part of the day (e.g., +one may discontinue in the midst of a Psalm to pay a duty of politeness +or to attend to business), and for convenience one may invert the order +of hours or of parts of hours, or may say the evening hours in the +morning.</p> + +<p>2601. Excuses from the Obligation of the Divine Office.—(a) For +Substitution.—A sufficient reason makes it permissible to substitute +another office not notably different in quantity or quality, as when +one lacks a new office, or has greater devotion for another office. +When substitution has been made unintentionally, the following rules +may be observed, though the last two are not admitted by all: office +counts for office, (e.g., he who through mistake has said the office of +another day may let that office stand for today’s office, but should +add enough to make up for any notable shortness in the office said); +hour does not count for hour (e.g., he who through mistake said Tierce +twice cannot count the second Tierce for Sext); an error should be +corrected when noticed (e.g., he who notices at Sext that he is not +saying the right office should change from Sext); an error is not +corrected by another error (e.g., he who said today’s office yesterday +should not say yesterday’s office today).</p> + +<p>(b) For Omission.—The causes that excuse, in whole or in part, from +recitation of the Office are physical inability (e.g., loss of the +breviary, blindness of one who does not know the hours by heart, +sickness or convalescence which makes the recitation a grave hardship), +moral impossibility (e.g., when an urgent duty of charity or justice so +takes up one’s time that one cannot get in all the Office), just +dispensation or commutation given by the Pope or, for temporary +release, by the Ordinary.</p> + +<p>2602. The Precept of Clerical Celibacy.—(a) Origin.—This law is not +divine but ecclesiastical, since it arose, not from any command of +Christ, but from a custom of the Church that goes back to the first +centuries. Nevertheless, celibacy of the clergy is an imitation of +Christ and the Apostles, a following of the counsel given by the Lord, +an honor to the sacrifice of the altar, and an example that single +chastity is possible. Moreover, by means of it the priest is freed from +domestic relations and better enabled to minister as the father, +pastor, confessor and counsellor of his people. The celibate is +unencumbered by family responsibilities and expenses, and is therefore +better able to respond to difficult and dangerous tasks, such as +mission work in pagan lands and ministrations to the dying in fire, +wreck, or plague, The Church does not denounce or condemn the married +clergy of non-Catholic bodies; on the contrary, she permits to some +extent a married clergy among the Oriental Catholics, who for many +centuries have been accustomed to a married priesthood. But the law of +celibacy for the Catholic clergy has not only proved itself more +suitable for their work, but it has also justified itself by the +general fidelity with which it has been observed and the attachment to +it of clergy and laity alike.</p> + +<p>(b) Obligation.—The law commands chastity as a grave duty of religion +(Canon 132); it forbids the contract or use of marriage (Canon 1072). +It forbids, where there is danger to chastity or scandal, cohabitation +and companionship with women (Canon 133). Cohabitation refers to +dwelling in the same house, even though it be only during the day, and +the woman be a servant; companionship refers to visits, conversations, +signs of friendship, and the like. The danger to good name or virtue +depends on circumstances, such as age, beauty, levity, and privacy of +association; and the law presumes that a relationship is suspicious +unless a woman is a near relative by blood or by marriage (i.e., in the +first or second degree), or is mature in age (about forty years old) +and proved in virtue and of good repute.</p> + +<p>2603. Negative Duties of Clerics.—The negative duties of clerics are +the avoidance of certain acts, occupations, or amusements forbidden as +worldly, undignified, dangerous, distracting or scandalous (I Thess., +v. 22; II Tim., ii. 4).</p> + +<p>(a) Forbidden Acts.—A cleric may not go surety without permission, +lest he or his church be involved in scandalous embarrassments (Canon +137); nor engage in trade, lest he be distracted from his spiritual +duties and exposed to the danger or suspicion of injustice or greed +(Canon 142; for penalty attached see Decree of the Sacred Congregation +of the Council, AAS, 42-33D).</p> + +<p>(b) Forbidden Occupations.—These include, first, employments and +pursuits unbecoming to clerics (such as those of butcher, actor, +innkeeper); next, those that are incompatible with the ministry (such +as the practice for profit of the medical profession, public +magistracies, government jobs, civil court functions, legislative +offices, Canon 139); finally, those that are contrary to the mildness +that should distinguish clerics (viz, the occupation of fighting man or +soldier, Canon 141; see also Canon 984 on executioners). But exceptions +may be made for a just cause.</p> + +<p>(c) Forbidden Amusements.—Clerics should not take part in undignified +diversions or cruel sports, such as the hunting of big game with great +uproar of dogs and guns (Canon 138) or in gambling, and they should not +enter saloons or similar places (Canon 138). Clerics are also forbidden +to assist at unbecoming shows, performances, dances, or at any +theatrical entertainment where their presence gives scandal (Canon +140). To gamble much (say, several times a week and for a considerable +time at each game) is considered a serious matter; but it is not sinful +to indulge in a game of chance now and then, if the stakes are moderate +and there is no scandal.</p> + +<p>2604. The Prohibition against Trading.—(a) Meaning.—Trading as here +understood is purely gainful merchandizing (i.e., buying an article at +a lower price in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price) or +industrial merchandizing (i.e., buying an article in order to sell it +at a profit after it has been changed by hired labor). Hence, there is +no canonical trading in commerce which lacks one of the conditions +mentioned, for example, if one buys goods for one’s household or +community and, on discovering that a superfluity has been purchased, +sells at a profit what is left over (see 2134, 2135). Trading includes +not only a business conducted personally or for personal profit, but +also one conducted through agents or for the benefit of others, such as +the poor or pious causes.</p> + +<p>(b) Obligation.—The violation of this law is grave in itself, but a +serious sin demands on the part of the subject that there be real +trading (i.e., a number of acts morally united and proceeding from a +purpose to continue in lucrative merchandizing), and on the side of the +object that there be a large amount involved. Hence, it would be venial +to engage in lucrative trading with a large profit once, and with a +small profit twice or thrice.</p> + +<p>(c) Excuses.—Necessity (e.g., if a cleric needs the money to live or +to maintain his state, or if a business has fallen to him by +inheritance and cannot be given up without loss) justifies trading, if +there is permission.</p> + +<p>2605. Is It Lawful for Clerics to Purchase and Sell Stocks and +Bonds?—(a) If this conduct has the character of gambling or trading +for profit, it is forbidden by Canon 138 or 142, as the case may be, +and is gravely or venially sinful according to the circumstances. Thus, +pure speculation or mere betting on the market is a game of chance, and +the frequent purchase of stocks with the thought of quick sales and +huge profits from sudden changes of the market is lucrative trading.</p> + +<p>(b) If the gambling or trading element is absent, the conduct in +question is not forbidden by Canon Law. It is generally admitted that +bond investments are permissible, since they are only a loan of one’s +money at interest. There are two views about stock dealings: the +stricter view regards them as always containing the character of +forbidden trading (since all the notes of strict negotiation are found +in them), or at least as being a game of chance; the milder view, which +is common, holds that they are no more an affair of chance than many +other business undertakings, and that there is no strict negotiation, +if the stockholder is not a member or director of the corporation, +since the buying and selling is done neither directly nor indirectly by +him. Buying of stocks, then, may be nothing more than a prudent +investment of money in a deserving enterprise with the hope of a +reasonable return, and selling out the stocks at a large profit may be +nothing more than the disposal of superfluous goods which it would be +inconvenient to retain. It must be remembered, though, that it is +unlawful to cooperate with a company whose purpose is evil or suspect, +or to have part in frauds, or to give disedification.</p> + +<p>2606. Special Duties of Clerical Superiors from Divine Law.—(a) As +individuals, they should strive to be personally more perfect than +their subjects, for they are supposed to give an example in faith, +religion, zeal, labor, and self-denial, “being made a pattern of the +flock from the heart” (I Peter, v. 3).</p> + +<p>(b) As rulers, they must have the virtues of good superiors, such as +legal justice or firm devotion to the common good, distributive justice +or avoidance of partiality and prejudice, prudence or knowledge of how +to direct men and means successfully to the glory of God and the +salvation of souls, and commutative justice or respect for the rights +of subjects.</p> + +<p>(c) As pastors, they must avoid the qualities of the wolf and of the +hireling, and cultivate those of the good shepherd, being kind and +amiable to Catholic and non-Catholic, and practising the spiritual and +corporal works of mercy.</p> + +<p>2607. Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of +Souls.—(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or +diocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock +(Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 339), of +making a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining +worthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343), +of making the _ad limina_ visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a +diocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).</p> + +<p>(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if +lawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other +spiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God +on Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect +this duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good +reason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the +necessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330, +1332), to apply the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 466), and to administer +the Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in +grave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their +flock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the +customary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church +functions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children, +and to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records +of the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions, +soldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular +cases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage +or to rules made by the Ordinary.</p> + +<p>(c) Assistant pastors are subject in the care of souls to the +instruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties +are known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and +the commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in +the parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all +the parish work, the Mass _pro populo_ excepted (Canon 476).</p> + +<p>2608. The Duty of Charity to the Poor.—(a) According to Canon Law all +beneficed clergy (Cardinals excepted) must give all the superfluous +fruits of their benefice to charitable or pious causes (Canon 1473). +But it is an extremely strict view which holds that all the secular +clergy are beneficed.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the divine law of charity (see 1226, 1252) even the +unbeneficed clergy have the duty of giving alms from their surplus +wealth. Thus, it would be unmerciful if a clergyman spent on himself +all the fortune he had inherited from his relatives without thought of +the poor; it would be often a source of scandal if a priest enriched +his relatives with money received in ministerial ways, but left nothing +to pious causes.</p> + +<p>2609. Canon 1473 on the Disposition of Superfluous Wealth by Beneficed +Clergy.—(a) The Money to be Spent.—The Canon does not refer to the +property of the Church (i.e., the foundation or endowment of the +benefice), for of this the beneficed clergyman is only the +administrator, and he would be unjust if he alienated its funds to +other purposes; nor does it refer to the clergyman’s own property, such +as goods received by inheritance or other profane title +(_patrimonialia_), or by title of personal ministerial service, such as +stipends and fees (_quasi-patrimonialia_). It refers, then, to the +revenues of the benefice (e.g., the bishop’s or pastor’s salary) and to +the amount that is left over after the deduction of all reasonable and +customary expenses that have been made, or could have been made for +decent personal support.</p> + +<p>(b) The Use of Surplus Money.—The alms should be given to any pious or +charitable cause, such as the promotion of divine worship, the +assistance of needy missions, the spiritual or corporal works of mercy. +The cleric is free to bestow his gift either during his lifetime (which +is better) or to leave it in his will.</p> + +<p>2610. The Obligation of Canon 1473.—(a) The obligation is most +probably not one of justice, since the holder of the benefice owns the +superfluous fruits, but one of obedience to the Church. Some authors +also consider this precept as binding in virtue of religion and +charity, and regard its violation as a sacrilege or sin against +charity. The holder of the benefice is not held to restitution, +however, since neglect of the precept is not an injustice. As to his +successors through gift inter vivos or testament, they are not bound to +give the superfluities as an alms, since the church precept was for the +cleric himself. Successors to an intestate should observe the wishes of +the deceased, but, if the character of the goods they inherit is +doubtful, they may usually be left in good faith.</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation is grave, since it is commanded as an act of +religion, or at least as an act of obedience in a very important +matter. From the time of the Apostles it was customary to distribute to +the poor what was left over of the goods of the Church, and the clergy +were regarded as the fathers and protectors of the needy. Again, since +the goods of a benefice originated in gifts offered to God Himself, it +is most becoming that their superfluities be devoted to the causes most +pleasing to God. Grave matter would be three times the amount required +in theft, because a violation of this precept is not the taking of what +is not one’s own, but the using in a forbidden way of what is one’s own.</p> + +<p>2611. The Special Duties of Religious.—The particular obligations of +religious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes, +just as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth +in the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here +only the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by +the common law of the Church.</p> + +<p>(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after +the perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life, +that is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute +(Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to +observe their laws, but _per se_ these laws oblige under penalty, not +under sin (see 570). _Per accidens_, however, the transgression of rule +or constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to +divine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the +transgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of +discipline.</p> + +<p>(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three +evangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his +institute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of +even community possession in some rules and of individual possession in +others). The vows oblige _per se_ under grave sin, on account of the +duty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind +himself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection +of act or lightness of matter.</p> + +<p>2612. The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.—(a) Poverty is a +renunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as +money and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical +dominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow). +Grave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as +in other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from +outsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the +monastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in +the violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money +without permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for +thefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here +does not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the +vow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment +to wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals +(such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of +poverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of +deposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts) +permitted by rule.</p> + +<p>(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and +external, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the +virtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation +of the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed). +For the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister, +which forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a +religious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598, +600-604, 679, 2342).</p> + +<p>(c) Obedience is the renunciation of one’s own will with the duty of +submission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and +constitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in +an important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience +and according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see +2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal +insubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a +Superior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of +the impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the +institute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or +probably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous +and useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior, +the vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not +expressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general +precepts of God and the Church.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_THE_DUTIES_OF_MEMBERS_OF_DOMESTIC_AND_CIVIL_SOCIETY">Art. 2: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY</h2> +</div> + +<p>2613. The Duties of Husbands and Wives.—Conjugal obligations may be +classed under three heads according to the three ends of marriage.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the first blessing of marriage is offspring, and this imposes +upon parents the obligation of providing for their children and of +training them in mind and will (see 2630 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The second blessing of marriage is fidelity to the engagement made +by husband and wife to deliver to each other exclusive power over their +bodies for procreation (conjugal debt) and to love each other with a +special but pure affection: “The wife hath not power of her own body, +but the husband; and in like manner the husband hath not power of his +own body but the wife” (I Cor., vii. 4); “Husbands, love your wives as +Christ also loved the Church” (Eph., v. 25). Conjugal love admits no +rivals; the husband must prefer his wife to every other woman, and the +wife likewise must think more of her husband than of any other man (see +1179).</p> + +<p>(c) The third blessing of marriage is the Sacrament or the unbreakable +bond of marriage: “The Lord commanded that the wife depart not from the +husband, and if she depart that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled +to her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife” (I Cor., +vii. 10). This imposes the duties of a permanent domestic society in +which the spouses dwell together permanently and each has certain +special functions of assistance to the other.</p> + +<p>2614. The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.—(a) The duty is one +of justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the +parties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter +of their pact.</p> + +<p>(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the +most momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the +propagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is +productive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and +the disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the +request is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without +danger of incontinence.</p> + +<p>2615. Absence of Obligation.—The obligation of paying the conjugal +debt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has +been lost or when the request is unreasonable.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has +broken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the +innocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account +of insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.</p> + +<p>(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g., +when it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to +health, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion +or other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly, +when it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).</p> + +<p>2616. Suspension of Obligation.—The obligation of granting and the +right of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage +is discovered to be null or uncertain.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary +until the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of +fornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical +impediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave +inconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the +dispensation cannot be obtained at once.</p> + +<p>(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not +necessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination +has yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts +that have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one +party doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done +the other.</p> + +<p>2617. Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?—(a) +_Per se_, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to +enjoy one’s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife +were free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to +consummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married +people to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from +marriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of +mortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of +chastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the +husband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, there is often an obligation of requesting +intercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage +often leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).</p> + +<p>2618. The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.—(a) Non-consummated +Acts.—These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful _per se_ +when they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as +means to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by +God to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But _per accidens_ there +may be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e., +when only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due +decency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not +referred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly +to pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of +pollution and the acts are either solitary or cooperative but performed +without sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection), +for pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the +single state (see 2539 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Natural Consummated Act.—This act in itself is not only lawful, +but meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen., +i. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and +religion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends +not only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the +allaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is +impossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the +woman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the +time of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when +one excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159); +and there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as +place (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external +immoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences +(e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease, +when abortion will likely result, etc.).</p> + +<p>(c) Unnatural Consummated Acts.—Pollution is mortally sinful (2535 +sqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an +injury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to +practise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal +copulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and +a violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal +coition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in +purpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure—the +physiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen +from the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms +or protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to +remove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.</p> + +<p>2619. Nota.—(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula +abrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona +inopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et +periculo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria +est, aut nulla.</p> + +<p>(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus, +si, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturae adjuvetur mediis +artificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam +fini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.</p> + +<p>(c) Artificial Insemination. The subject-matter of the latter part of +the preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful +practices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial +insemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear, +accurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We +append here his texts:</p> + +<p>1) The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man, +cannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the +biological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.</p> + +<p>Artificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as +essentially and strictly immoral.</p> + +<p>Natural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the +procreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only +marriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife +in the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the +well-being and education of the child.</p> + +<p>It follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on +the condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The +child conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact, +illegitimate.</p> + +<p>Artificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of +a third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned +without appeal.</p> + +<p>Only the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other’s body to +generate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be +ceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On +whoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very +strength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of +origin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between +the legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active +element of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).</p> + +<p>As far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is +concerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of +natural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by +this means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the +desire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have +a child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the +artificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.</p> + +<p>It would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of +resorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons +unable to contract it because of the _impedimentum impotentiae_.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element +can never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.</p> + +<p>Although new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason +of their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is +concerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely +excluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain +artificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to +assure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly +performed.</p> + +<p>Let it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life +according to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to +a marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed +ends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual +nature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the +healthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept. +29, 1949, _Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).</p> + +<p>2) We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen, +not to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of +artificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the +production of a new life take on an essential human significance +inseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm +to this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to +the laws inscribed in the nature of beings.</p> + +<p>We have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the +subject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation “in vitro,” +let it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral +and absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which +are posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the +expression, or “artificial insemination,” We have already expressed Our +thought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949 +(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We +refer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating +the concluding judgment given there: “With regard to artificial +fecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it +must be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily +forbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to +facilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural +act normally performed.” But since artificial fecundation is being more +and more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions +which are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the +following to add:</p> + +<p>Artificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses +have acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully +exercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment +of the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a +right to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way +expressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be +deduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the +“child,” the primary “end” of marriage. The matrimonial contract does +not give this right, because it has for its object not the “child,” but +the “natural acts” which are capable of engendering a new life and are +destined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial +fecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and +morality [1] (_Marriage and Parenthood_, May 19, 1956). See _The Pope +Speaks_, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.</p> + +<p>[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:</p> + +<p>Alia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet +latinam linguam adhibere.</p> + +<p>Quemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi +adversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est, +pariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum, +masturbatiouis ope procuretur.</p> + +<p>Hanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram +Urologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris +anno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: “Du reste le +St-Office a decide deja le 2 aout 1929 (_Acta Ap. Sedis_, vol. XXI a. +1929, p. 490, II) qu’une “‘masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur +sperma’ n’est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l’examen” +(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_ vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum +sit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere, +opportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque +iterum inculcare.</p> + +<p>Si actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse +naturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis +iudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus +tamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa +eximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum +intentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda, +ope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis +morbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus +semen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia, +numerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.</p> + +<p>Eiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad +nihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi +facultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra +conjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum +eiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu +proprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim +homo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod +facultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris +animantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque +exercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis +tribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis +traditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod +facultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius +ad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod +attinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius +legis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis +sexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam +exercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc +naturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac +facultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus, +eiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum +sexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite +circumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum +matrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed +etiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur. +Quae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni +facultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam +extra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem +omni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est, +etiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.</p> + +<p>Quae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus +potentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem +modo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive +plenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive +ab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive +coniugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae +contrarius atque intrinsece malus.</p> + +<p>2620. Contraception.—Contraception in all its forms (onanism, +condonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.</p> + +<p>(a) It is an Injury to God.—Marriage was instituted by God to +propagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with +children (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution +and a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and +degrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification. +The hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with +which Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the +case of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in +punishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).</p> + +<p>(b) It is an Injury to Society.—The perpetuation of the human race is +endangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence, +after the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in +existence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it +prevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral +degeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called +race-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act +of its own people.</p> + +<p>(c) It is an Injury to the Family.—The happiness and success of the +home depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the +other and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen +character. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar +carnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife +is deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a +prostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband +is brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex +passion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the +one or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the +luxury and laziness in which they are reared.</p> + +<p>(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.—As concerns the body, there is +a perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and +hence contraception has been described as “reciprocal masturbation.” As +regards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are +subordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the +lower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and +more difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a +rational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that +moves the beasts.</p> + +<p>2621. Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of +Contraception.—(a) Necessity for the Individual.—“This practice is +demanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to +have more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home, +to preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing +and child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives +be freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that +children receive more attention and care than is possible in large +families).” This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan +or materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than +pleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be +considered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often +happens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will +lose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from +utility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a +couple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family +limitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is +permissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by +child-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully +damaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that +mothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from +large families are very often superior in qualities and achievements +and stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.</p> + +<p>(b) Necessity for the Family.—“Large families are impossible to many +persons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing, +food, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means.” The +inability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to +insufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in +improvement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of +marriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that +race-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer +classes. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large +family, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin +of contraception or onanism.</p> + +<p>(c) Necessity for the Community.—“The cause of unemployment, +destitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world. +Moreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the +better-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of +the former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be +preserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved.” The +resources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the +present population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the +number of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human +greed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the +history of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race +improvement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has +been learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who +have the fewest children.</p> + +<p>(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.—“Contraception is a useful control of +nature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other +scientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the +end of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of +those who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very +Christian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the +better to practise one’s vocation, or in order to spare one’s wife, or +to keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be +lawful.” Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by +voluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and, +if permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence. +The motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its +character, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong +conscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or +misled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard +artificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.</p> + +<p>2622. Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?—(a) If this refers to an end +(viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their +arrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes +a duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable +to take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in +populations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up +children well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have +at least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least +a dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are +unable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or +raise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.</p> + +<p>(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is +lawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital +relations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical +means to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot +restrain themselves is really an insult to God’s grace and is +contradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be +ashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God +commands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and +single state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual +abstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right +means are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other +and higher things.</p> + +<p>Continence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions +make the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not +commanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the +more meritorious and praiseworthy: “It is wronging men and women of our +times to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many +reasons—perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in +the service of injustice—heroism is exercised to a degree and to an +extent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why. +then, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop +at the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature? +The answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is +incapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on +his own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from +God, will remain miserably disillusioned” (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution +to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).</p> + +<p>Another lawful means of family limitation is “periodic continence” or +“rhythm,” the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting +intercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural +sterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the +impression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the +Church, that it constitutes a form of “Catholic Birth-Control.” This is +not completely true.</p> + +<p>All theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile +period is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural +way; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the +secondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of +temptation, have been fostered. “If the carrying out of this theory +means nothing more than that the couple can make use of their +matrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is +nothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in +any way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural +consequences” (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).</p> + +<p>“If, however, there is further question—that is, of permitting the +conjugal act on those days exclusively—then the conduct of the married +couple must be examined more closely” (ibid).</p> + +<p>The following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:</p> + +<p>1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely +the use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial +consent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not +morally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not +violated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born +despite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic, +economic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When +present, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration +of the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4) +The married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the +positive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly, +to make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason +to withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very +meaning of conjugal life (ibid.).</p> + +<p>Pope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1) +Rhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due +safeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason, +the practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly +confirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the +common agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of +injustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.</p> + +<p>Since the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts +that the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their +marital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding +under pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the +couples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of +married life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does +not consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile +periods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods +precisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should +have made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the +practice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit +periodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against +the procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but +against the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The +couple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6) +from 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse +during a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute +numerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single +will act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of +illicit abstention during the fertile periods.</p> + +<p>Since the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of +the sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a +mortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds +the greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case +of continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent +use of marital rights during the sterile period.</p> + +<p>Diversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a +serious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g., +unjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a +serious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would +not accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or +more children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without +excusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most +theologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to +determine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the +conservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory +regard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in +such a way;</p> + +<p>a) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit +provided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;</p> + +<p>b) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a +serious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception +would be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the +common good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to +the secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this +opinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places +the gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five +years. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of +the Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)</p> + +<p>On the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the +practice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of +circumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.</p> + +<p>The present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls +for caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily +recommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of +June 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: “Married couples who +use their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be +disturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question, +cautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain +to dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism.”</p> + +<p>As to the theological censure to be attached to “rhythm,” it is not +approved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently +grave reasons. “Instead of being freely taught and commended, it is +rather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin” +(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference +Bulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).</p> + +<p>2623. Cooperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.—(a) +Cooperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem +ipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quae suis quaeremoniis de +molestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae +nec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice +congrediendi, vel quae active adjuvat abruptionem copulae, vel quae +interne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).</p> + +<p>(b) Cooperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu +fundato rixarum, molestae cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam +actio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque +causa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515 +sqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus +diu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo +incontinentiae, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum +tanto incommodo.</p> + +<p>(c) Cooperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur +possibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala +(1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se +habere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin +autem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis, +eam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa +(2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_, +June, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)</p> + +<p>2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.—(a) Illicita +graviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities +solitaria, alienae conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus +imperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt, +citra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream quae in +conjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes +fiant.</p> + +<p>(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem, +i.e., naturae matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt +pollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia quae non in copulam sed in +pollutionem tendit.</p> + +<p>(c) Illicita leviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed praeter finem, +i.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circumstantiis +aliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem +habita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita), +immoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut +si stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).</p> + +<p>(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, quae tum ex parte objecti +(scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte +circumstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut +prudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non +peccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo +mulier onanistae licite cooperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa +sit de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando +probabile videtur se semen excipisse) si ad completam voluptatem se +excitaverit.</p> + +<p>2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.—(a) Interrogationes.—Si nulla ratio +est suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, praestat ut plurimum +de circumstantiis (v.g., de motivo copulae) non quaerere, ne conjuges +taedio afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata +suspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere +debet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.</p> + +<p>(b) Monitiones.—Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per +se severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec +absolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem, +si datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura +praevidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.</p> + +<p>2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.—The third benefit of marriage is that +of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical +union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union +of Christ and the Church: “This is a great sacrament; but I speak in +Christ and the Church” (Eph., v. 32).</p> + +<p>(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with +his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded +by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is +wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of +time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home—or vice versa. +Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the +husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a +considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife +with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons +suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of +adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is +serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is +superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man +excels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical +strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how +small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home. +But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head +of the house—for example, the choice of the place of residence, the +management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but +not in the wife’s personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics, +her property)—and only in commands that do not exceed his authority, +for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no +claim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover, +since the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually +excels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager +and is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on +important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual +consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the +many things in which she is more competent than himself.</p> + +<p>(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also +the husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and +temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of +the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should +take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the +training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness +of the husband’s salary often compels the wife to work outside her +home. Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited +to their sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of +motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife +by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least +uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually +under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to +use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to +provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.</p> + +<p>2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.—We shall speak first of +the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties +which engagement imposes.</p> + +<p>(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for +the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social +duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must +take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating +is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier, +or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that +these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another. +Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the +common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married +life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the +wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage +or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account +of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated +by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to +marry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered +slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation +is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who +will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within? +Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to +live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9). +In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured +girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should +be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the +girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).</p> + +<p>2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.—(a) Before +Engagement.—Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for +without it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice +is impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of +pleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the +suitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability +in virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position, +love of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during +courtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after +engagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule +after a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they +are not well matched.</p> + +<p>(b) At the Time of the Engagement.—The parties are gravely bound +to make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be +concealed without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or +other quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the +presence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing +characteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race, +the fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to +manifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as +poverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal +them, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage. +As to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless +perhaps when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she +is actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and +can make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation, +1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these +mistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.</p> + +<p>(c) During the Engagement.—Fidelity requires that an engaged person +be true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person +(see 2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between +engaged persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not +give them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary +pollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a +familiarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful +only to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent +to it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by +acts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private, +too frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between +betrothed lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally +pollution may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should +acquaint themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the +fundamental physiological facts of sex, so as to avoid the mistakes +which often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon +itself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to +support themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a +home.</p> + +<p>(d) At the End of the Engagement.—A formal promise to marry (Canon +1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e., +at the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when +one of the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement +be broken (e.g., by mutual consent, by a circumstance that makes +marriage impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice +of the clerical state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of +a resolutory condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation +given for a just cause); or unless one of the parties has a right +not to keep the engagement on account of a notable change in the +circumstances, or a breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will +make the marriage inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of +justice, and is grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of +fidelity or justice, and grave or light according to the intention of +the promisor, when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is +no action to enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise +(Canon 1017, n. 3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not +insist on fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and +the confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just +restitution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal +promise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces +no obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a +duty of restitution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or +deceit.</p> + +<p>2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged +Persons.—(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition +of merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are +proper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone +conversations in secluded spots, are wrong.</p> + +<p>The chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for +future regrets and recriminations. “Petting” purchases a cheap physical +thrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two +persons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of +loss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated +marital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is +essentially selfish and unwise.</p> + +<p>(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate +occasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be +used for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future +marriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are +in themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely +dangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt +delectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime +praeviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem +sensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex +se tendant_ (2497 b).</p> + +<p>2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.—In addition to the duties +that belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are +special obligations incumbent on parents and children by reason of the +special relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two +kinds.</p> + +<p>(a) Duties of Charity.—Parents should give their children special love +and special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see +1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their +children, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children +from home by unkindness.</p> + +<p>(b) Duties of Piety.—Parents should, as far as they are able, give +their children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family +(see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to +dwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family +inheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and +material, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most +grave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral +training and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food, +clothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art +or profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life, +protection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at +least in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are +committed also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does +not take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband) +and young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by +strangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling +asylum or other institution because the parents are unwilling to be +bothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who +spoil or “sissify” their children by luxury and idleness, or who are +too indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastisement.</p> + +<p>2631. Compensation of Children.—A child, even though subject to +parental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for +extraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair +commission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for +which he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying +just debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need +it enough to maintain their state in life.</p> + +<p>2632. Sex Education of Children.—(a) Necessity.—Some moralists +believe that sex education of the young should be indirect. They hold +that it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that +silence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of +piety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep +them pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as +God will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition +of the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct sexual +education point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and +grown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and +misery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the +crisis of puberty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably +the minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions +or physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused +important knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by +seducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence, +there is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct +education, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children +than any evil that may be caused by the education.</p> + +<p>(b) Preparation for Direct Education.—Training for purity should be +directed both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is +powerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the +beginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from +sources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence +in parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties; +should be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and +to struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control +becomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the +Sacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in +piety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will +stand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence +which initiation into sex matters may suggest.</p> + +<p>(c) The Subject-Matter of Sex Education.—The fundamentals of sex +instruction include such points as the diversity of sex, its origin +from God and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals, +the organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity, +the grave reasons that demand sexual morality, respect for womankind, +the great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of +puberty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and +healthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the +social diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to +chastity.</p> + +<p>(d) The Method of Instruction.—It is clear that not all the details +just mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would +not understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while +fiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and +technical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is +clear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited +for the delicate task of early guardians of chastity, though the later +instruction should be supplemented in catechism class, sermon, school, +and an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in +brief space to outline sufficiently a program of sex instruction, but +parents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply +some of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.</p> + +<p>2633. Duties of Children.—The duties of children to their parents can +also be classed under those of charity and piety.</p> + +<p>(a) Duties of Charity.—Children owe their parents a special internal +and external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate +their parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great +unkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who +never visit or write to them.</p> + +<p>(b) Duties of Piety.—Children must respect and assist their parents +(see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one’s +parents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious +or mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking +them), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in +omission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual +marks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to +dislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The assistance +owed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when +they neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not +respectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life, +by not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they +need), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort +when they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at +home with their parents should contribute from their earnings or +individual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents +do not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council +of Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2634. Duties of Near Relatives.—There are similar duties of charity +and piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers +and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their +nephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to +some authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship, +but is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by +marriage is not so strong.</p> + +<p>2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of +Superiors.—Superiors both in domestic and civil society need +especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special +duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).</p> + +<p>(a) Prudence.—If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision +and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether +of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the +prudent servant who is placed over his master’s household (Matt., xxiv. +45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community +(Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and +magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent +knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what +constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should +be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common +sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of +large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a +great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or +unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will +safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and +prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Justice.—In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common +good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice +and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided +by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every +form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously +enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their +subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but +approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive, +ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to +pleasure and display.</p> + +<p>2636. Duties of Subjects.—The general duties of subjects to superiors +are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) Honor.—Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of +authority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal +character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even +in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or +courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word, +manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the +personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from +office if he is unfit or less fit.</p> + +<p>(b) Obedience.—Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they +strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their +authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey +their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely, +in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties, +avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the +hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received). +But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are +children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life, +for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior +cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to +force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry +a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are +reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his +support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the +person selected for wife will disgrace the family.</p> + +<p>2637. Taxes.—Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of +taxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions +exacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of +defraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused +with a payment (e.g., fares for passage on government railroads), or +with a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).</p> + +<p>(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are +subject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and +from aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving +privileges of residence, commerce, passage, etc.</p> + +<p>2638. Kinds of Taxes.—There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all +be reduced to two general categories.</p> + +<p>(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden +is ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property +taxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for +these charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.</p> + +<p>(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one +on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed +on outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues, +protection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such +as the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g., +licenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls +immediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.</p> + +<p>2639. Just Taxes.—Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is, +they must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good +(see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except +for just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.</p> + +<p>(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would +be unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.</p> + +<p>(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be assessed according to +their ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits +from the use of a tax fund, etc.).</p> + +<p>2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.—The obligation in conscience of just +tax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.</p> + +<p>(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer +to the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar, +replied: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” (Matt., xxii. +17-21); and St. Paul teaches: “Be subject of necessity, not only for +wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. Render therefore to all men their +due, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom” (Rom., +xiii. 5, 6).</p> + +<p>(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless +these laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of +money needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly +burdened and others unjustly favored.</p> + +<p>2641. Quality of the Obligation.—There are various opinions about the +quality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under +sin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law +and justice require that the members of society contribute the +necessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the +people live up to their implicit contract with their government by +giving compensation for the services they receive.</p> + +<p>(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only +under penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are, +first, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines +imposed) for the attainment of the laws’ purpose, and, secondly, the +common opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading +payment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were +preceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage, +for they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their +conscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on +account of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not +conscientious.</p> + +<p>(c) According to a third opinion distinction has to be made between +different cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are +preceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say +that the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and +that tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in +another. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of +restitution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after +sentence.</p> + +<p>2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.—Obedience to just laws is owed either +from legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the +burden of restitution. There are various opinions about the case of tax +laws.</p> + +<p>(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of +commutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the +government and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to +provide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure +those things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads, +postal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the +expenses of the government.</p> + +<p>(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal +justice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of +authority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of +a tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment. +Hence, though he who evades taxes is not held to restitution, he sins +against justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.</p> + +<p>(c) According to other opinions, tax laws oblige sometimes from legal, +sometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal +times there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and +therefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and +taxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the +duties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not +on any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before +the quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to +declare properly the value of one’s property, and the obligation after +assessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax +bills.</p> + +<p>2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.—(a) There is a +grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in +public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the +community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals +depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on +the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote +cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at +least with public unconcern about public matters—for example, those +who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote. +A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution), +but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble, +ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has +exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is +a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.</p> + +<p>(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either +a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to +which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The +obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact +that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility, +especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by +abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex +officio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held +to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and +perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of +restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general +election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence, +and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of +their representatives.</p> + +<p>2644. Manner of Voting.—(a) Object.—It is not necessary to vote for +the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by +character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives +indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community +well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath +beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the +person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In +minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the +candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as +President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party +principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per +accidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is +necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is +much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy +candidates are included.</p> + +<p>(b) Purpose.—The end which the voter should have in mind is the good +of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely +or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own +race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or +escape enmity.</p> + +<p>(c) Circumstances.—The voter must avoid all that is contrary to +natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes) +or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a +period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as +registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The +opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that +helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for +ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.</p> + +<p>2645. Obligation to Seek Office.—A worthy man should run for office in +the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy +(e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and +there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave +impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private +affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).</p> + +<p>2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.—Between employers and their +domestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as +between superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between +parties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we +shall now speak.</p> + +<p>2647. Duties of Employers.—(a) Justice.—The labor assigned must not +be excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or +injurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable +impediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amusement); the wage +paid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support +himself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one +that rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional +compensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g., +arbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).</p> + +<p>(b) Charity.—Liberality should be shown by preference to employees, +since they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer +should consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and +material improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when +making contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so +that his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these +worthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and +unemployment are especially deserving of his assistance.</p> + +<p>2648. Duties of Employees.—(a) Justice.—Workers are bound to give a +fair return in quantity and quality of labor for the pay they receive, +and to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation, +and property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early, +to turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage +machinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a +household spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a +consideration of the worker’s obligation to join unions see “Catholics +in Labor Unions” by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American +Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)</p> + +<p>(b) Charity.—Workers should be willing even at the expense of some +right or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave +necessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop +work promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the +farmer’s crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress +is very sick and will be left alone.</p> + +<p>2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.—(a) In +themselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of +industrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826 +sqq.). If the end, the means and the circumstances are not against +right reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.</p> + +<p>(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor’s chief means for enforcing +demands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power +between employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay +fairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may +be defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to +obtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind +of war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to +determine concretely the morality of a strike.</p> + +<p>1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long +hours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions constitute +genuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which +presupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an +ameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer’s injustice, but +consists essentially in the worker’s attempt to better conditions, +e.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems +to be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the +time of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative +strike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is +never given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike +involves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers, +employer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, +n.556.)</p> + +<p>2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike +is a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g., +arbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding +boards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable +but not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good +end.</p> + +<p>3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to +strike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without +intimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible +union in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or +arbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the +workers also. Accordingly, “wildcat” strikes are unlawful unless the +unions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by +them.</p> + +<p>4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils +inseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker’s personal +gains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the +employers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic +advantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be +proportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers +themselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a +community which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its +members. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers +are necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.) +seem to be more a strike against the community than against an +employer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not +incidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily +grave reasons can justify such strikes.</p> + +<p>5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage, +persuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands +are met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence +against an employer’s person or property constitute unjust means. +“Scabs,” or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from +depriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their +rights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless +violence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to +defend themselves.</p> + +<p>(c) Kinds of Strike. Thus far the analysis has been concerned with a +direct strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.</p> + +<p>1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but +simply a reduction in production or services while the worker is +receiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The +striker is not giving the work paid for.</p> + +<p>2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by analogy with +an act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon +from the attacker. The analogy seems defective since the place of work +is hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves +an unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from +the use of his property.</p> + +<p>3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind +of strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several +groups against the same employer and one or several groups against +different and unassociated employers. The first kind seems justified, +for it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers +are cooperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the +second case of striking against different employers, the “sympathizers” +are striking against a just employer and are violating their work +contract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike +seems to be essentially unjust.</p> + +<p>(d) The lockout is the employer’s strike. Unwilling to grant the +worker’s demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating +employment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and +restrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That +the lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent, +appears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit +to injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay +wages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.</p> + +<p>(e) A boycott is a mass refusal to patronize a certain business with +the effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it +has been used by labor to gain support from the public against an +employer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil +practice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts +of indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a +boycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place +in preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are +unjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to +prevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause. +The principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of +boycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to +secondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a +boycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should +not be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave +cause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to +bring pressure against them.</p> + +<p>2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?—(a) The State +certainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities +of work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is +compromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were +without work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would +seem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and +the State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its +subjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.</p> + +<p>(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men +with whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from +men unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime +against justice. They should also try to secure other employment for +good workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the +men the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry, +organized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically +in private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for +these are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and +charity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the +advantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good +business as well as good morals.</p> + +<p>2651. Duties of Certain Professions.—(a) Judges and Lawyers.—The +duties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on +their part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for +services, while those who have part in a judicial process must give +respect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience +to their directions.</p> + +<p>(b) Teachers and Students.—Teachers must make themselves proficient in +their matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their +teaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly; +must give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too +lenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their classes by +correcting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just, +neither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages +according to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying +important academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to +the worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their +part owe to their teachers respect and obedience in class matters, to +their parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school +avoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they +should not aim at winning for winning’s sake, or playing for playing’s +sake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the +selection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth +while is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of +learning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of +mind and of spirit.</p> + +<p>(c) Physicians, Surgeons, Nurses, and Druggists.—These persons must +have sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress +of medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come +when there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence +proportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt, +follow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his +relations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding +immoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoanalytic conversations, +or bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and +charitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or +refusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his +patients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor +slow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on +their part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his +directions, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here +said of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties +and capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling +prescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception +by selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those +purposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc., +forbidden by law.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Question_IV">Question IV<br />THE SACRAMENTS</h2> +</div> + + +<p>2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by +which man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards +through the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their +possessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through God’s +grace the good deeds done for His sake entitle the doer to the crown of +eternal life. In the present Question we pass on to consider certain +means by which God is honored by man and man is sanctified through the +application to his soul of the merits and passion of Christ; for the +Sacraments were instituted by Christ both as external acts of religion +(2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and +increase the life of holiness.</p> + +<p>2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned +with Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the +limited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient +size necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question +now beginning we speak only of man’s duties in reference to the +Sacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to +Moral. (a) Thus, the nature, institution, number and effects of the +Sacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a +similar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites, +rubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy. +(c) The legal rights of ministers, canonical requirements on +registration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the +Sacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in +commentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_1_THE_SACRAMENTS_IN_GENERAL_THE_SACRAMENTALS">Art. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)</p> + +<p>2654. Nature of a Sacrament.—In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward +sign instituted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.</p> + +<p>(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign, +which has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible +object (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the +bread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the +imposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to +another act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the +penitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony). +The determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over +the material element (e.g., in Baptism the words “I baptize thee, +etc.”) or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of +another as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or +otherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least +(in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible +sign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being +heard at least by the minister.</p> + +<p>(b) The external efficient cause or instituter of the Sacraments is +Christ, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive +and meritorious author of grace as our God and Saviour.</p> + +<p>(c) The external final cause or purpose of the Sacraments is to +symbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their +instrumental virtue the application of Christ’s redemption in the soul +of properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and +Penance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness, +of the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness +(Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments +(Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign +the soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister +of Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.</p> + +<p>2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the +Sacraments.—(a) Since the matter and form are essential constituents +without which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to +invalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts. +The matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently +to be considered and called something different from the element +appointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted +into vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as +it remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half +and half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so +modified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by +Christ. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief +ideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the +minister of Penance (e.g., “You are absolved”), or who is the subject +of Baptism (e.g., “Ego baptizo in nomine, etc.”), or what is the effect +of the Eucharist (e.g., “Hoc non est corpus meum,” “Hoc est corpus,” +“Hic meum est corpus”), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g., +“Ego abluo te a peccatis”), or the profession in Baptism of faith in +the Trinity (e.g., “Ego te baptizo, Amen”).</p> + +<p>(b) Since the matter and form are parts of a single composite sign, it +is sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial separations, +which destroy the continuity or unity of signification. There is a +substantial separation within the form when such long intervals occur +between the pronunciation of its syllables or words that it is not in +common estimation a united sentence or proposition; for example, if the +celebrant says, “Hoc est cor-,” then sneezes two or three times, and +(instead of repeating the words) concludes “-pus meum,” or says “Hoc +est corpus” and after an interruption of several minutes (instead of +repeating) finishes with: “meum.” There is substantial separation +between the matter and form, if the former is applied by one minister +and the latter is spoken by another, although the form declares that +the matter is applied by the speaker of the form: for example, if Titus +pours the water while Claudius says: “I baptize thee, etc.” Even when +the same minister applies both matter and form, there is a substantial +separation between these parts when the form is not spoken at the same +time or for the same time that the matter is posited, and thereby, from +the special character of the Sacrament, leaves the signification of the +sacramental matter unsettled. This happens when the form is spoken too +long before or too long after the presence or application of the +matter, or when the form is limited by a future condition which will +not be verified during the continuance of the matter (see 2668).</p> + +<p>2656. Simultaneity of Matter and Form.—The simultaneity of matter and +form which validity requires must be either moral or physical according +to the character of the Sacrament.</p> + +<p>(a) There is physical simultaneity when matter and form are present in +the same instants of time. This kind of union is demanded in the +Eucharist, for it has the character of a transubstantiation of bread +and Wine present at the moments the words of consecration are said over +them. There would be no Sacrament if the bread were absent even during +a part of the consecration.</p> + +<p>(b) There is a moral simultaneity like to the physical +contemporaneousness when the matter and form are partly present in the +same instants of time, and perhaps also (as some hold) when one follows +the other with such close succession that not more than a Pater or Ave +could be said between them. This kind of union is the maximum in +Penance and Matrimony, for absolution must follow after confession, and +conjugal acceptance must follow after conjugal offer. It suffices in +Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders; for these four +Sacraments do not consecrate the matter (and hence some little +separation is allowed), but they do signify in the present tense the +bestowal of grace through the application of the matter (and hence any +separation must be of the slightest).</p> + +<p>(c) There is a purely moral simultaneity when the form follows the +matter after a somewhat considerable interval of time has elapsed, but +with a connection between the two based on human usage which carries +the matter on in human estimation over to the time the form is +employed. This suffices in Penance and Matrimony. Penance has the +character of a judicial process, whose unity is not destroyed by some +little delay between the discussion and the sentence; and hence it +seems that absolution could be given validly an hour after confession. +Matrimony has the character of a contract, whose unity is preserved +even in spite of a long interval between the date of consent of the +first party and the date of consent of the second party.</p> + +<p>2657. Lawfulness of Moral Simultaneity in the Sacraments Other than the +Eucharist.—(a) In Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders, +it would seem on account of the danger of nullity to be a serious sin +to exclude all physical simultaneity between matter and form (e.g., to +pour all the water and then to begin the words: “I baptize thee, etc.,” +or vice versa). In practice the Rubrics should be followed.</p> + +<p>(b) In Penance and Matrimony it is more or less sinful to make +needless, though not invalidating, delays. In ordinary practice the +confessor should absolve as soon as the confession has been heard and +the penance accepted, and the bride should express her consent +immediately after the bridegroom has expressed his.</p> + +<p>2658. Accidental Changes or Separations as to Matter and Form.—(a) +These administrations are not invalid, for they preserve the essence of +the elements or the sense of the words appointed by Christ. Examples of +accidental change of matter are baptismal water to which a relatively +very small quantity of wine has been added, or wine for the Eucharist +to which a relatively trifling amount of water has been added. The form +is accidentally modified if translated into the vernacular or rendered +by synonymous words (e.g., “Ego abluo te, etc.”), or if an unimportant +word (e.g., “enim”) is added or subtracted, or if the words are +transposed or partially repeated or unintentionally mispronounced +without detriment to sense (e.g., “Hoc est meum corpus,” “Hoc, hoc, +est, est, etc.,” “Hoc est copus meum”). There is accidental separation +when slight pauses are made between words, or when an interval not +destructive of the sense falls between the use of the matter and the +use of the form (see 2655, 2656).</p> + +<p>(b) These administrations are unlawful and from their nature mortally +sinful, since they are transgressions of a precept of the Church meant +to safeguard respect for the Sacraments of Christ, and they are +therefore opposed to the virtue of religion (2147). But the sin may be +venial by reason of lightness of matter (e.g., omission of the word +“enim”), or of imperfection of the act. Scandal, danger of invalidity, +contempt, and bad intention would make even a small change a serious +sin. In practice the rule to follow is to observe exactly the +prescribed matter and form and entire rite, to pronounce the words +clearly and slowly, to repeat the form when any involuntary +interruption happens between its essential parts, and to unite the +matter and form as closely as possible.</p> + +<p>2659. Substantial Changes or Separations.—Substantial changes or +separations _a fortiori_ are grave sins. They offend against religion +(since they make a mockery of the sacred signs appointed by Christ), +against obedience (since they disregard a most serious precept of the +Church), against charity (since they deprive the recipient of +sacramental grace), and against justice (at least when the minister is +bound _ex officio_ to confer the Sacrament, since there is then a +quasi-contract with the recipient to administer the Sacrament +correctly).</p> + +<p>2660. Doubtful Matter.—It is sometimes probable but not certain that +an element suffices for the matter of a Sacrament (e.g., coffee or tea +for Baptism, chrism for Extreme Unction). Hence the question: “Is it +lawful to use probable matter in the administration of a Sacrament?”</p> + +<p>(a) If certain matter cannot be had and the Sacrament is urgently +necessary or very useful, probable matter may be used. For the +Sacraments were instituted by Christ to benefit man (“The Sacraments +are for men”), and hence it is not irreverent to give to one in need a +probably valid Sacrament when a certainly valid Sacrament is +impossible. Thus, a dying infant may and should be baptized with +coffee, if no pure water can be procured in time; the last anointing +may be conferred with chrism, if the oil of the sick cannot be had +before a dying man will have expired.</p> + +<p>(b) If certain matter can be had, or if the Sacrament is not urgently +necessary or useful, probable matter may not be used without grave sin; +for there is then no reason of necessity to justify the risk to which +the Sacrament and perhaps also the recipient are exposed, Thus, it is +not lawful to baptize with coffee when pure water can be secured, or to +confirm with chrism not blessed by a bishop a dying man who had just +received the last Sacraments, even though other chrism is unobtainable +(see 661, 678, 711, and Denziger, n. 1151).</p> + +<p>2661. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Means (see 360, 786, +2156)?—(a) Those Sacraments have a necessity of means without which +sanctifying grace and salvation cannot be had. Hence the necessity for +individuals of Baptism (without which there is no regeneration), of +Penance (without which there is no reconciliation), of the Eucharist’s +effect (without which there is no incorporation with Christ), and for +the Church the necessity of Orders (without which there are no +ministers and dispensers of grace, Prov., xi, 14).</p> + +<p>(b) Those Sacraments have no necessity of means without which +sanctifying grace and salvation can be had; but they have a necessity +of convenience, inasmuch as they perfect grace already had and make +salvation more easy. In this sense, then, Confirmation and Extreme +Unction may be called necessary for the individual, since the former +perfects the grace of Baptism and the latter the grace of Penance; and +Matrimony may be called necessary for the Church, since it perfects +with a sacramental grace the propagation of the children of the Church.</p> + +<p>2662. Reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in voto_.—The Sacraments +that have a necessity of means must be received either in themselves +(_in re_) or in desire (_in voto_).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, Baptism _in re_ is necessary for all infants (John, iii. 5), +Baptism _in re_ or _in voto_ for all adults (John, xiv. 21-23). Baptism +of desire consists in an act of perfect charity or contrition made by +an unbaptized person, which includes the will to do all that God has +commanded, and consequently at least an implicit or virtual desire of +Baptism of water. As is proved in Dogmatic Theology, Baptism may be +supplied for, as regards grace, by martyrdom in an infant and by +martyrdom joined with attrition in an adult.</p> + +<p>(b) Penance _in re_ or _in voto_ is necessary for all who have +committed grave sin after Baptism. The desire of the Sacrament is an +act of perfect charity or contrition, which includes at least +implicitly the wish to receive absolution. Martyrdom joined with +attrition also suffices.</p> + +<p>(c) The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not a necessary means for anyone, +either _in re_ or _in voto_; for the essential grace of justification +can be obtained through Baptism and Penance. But the proper result +(_res_) of the Eucharist, which consists in incorporation with Christ, +perseverance, and life eternal, is a necessary means _in voto_, tacitly +or interpretatively; for Baptism, as was said, is absolutely necessary +for salvation, and Baptism itself is a tacit or interpretative desire +of the result of the Eucharist, inasmuch as Baptism is but a means to +that result and the beginning of its accomplishment.</p> + +<p>2663. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Precept?—An act is said to +fall under precept _per se_, when it is directly commanded in a law +that mentions it specifically; it is said to fall under precept _per +accidens_, when it becomes obligatory in virtue of a law that does not +command it directly or specifically (cfr. 935, 1099, 1602).</p> + +<p>(a) There is a divine precept obliging _per se_ and _sub gravi_ in +reference to Baptism (“Preach the Gospel to all nations, baptizing +them, etc.,” Matt., xxviii. 19), Penance (“Whose sins you shall +forgive, they are forgiven them, etc.”, John, xx. 23), and the +Eucharist (“Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, you shall not +have life in you,” John, vi. 54). According to some authorities there +is also a divine precept obliging at least _sub levi_ to receive +Confirmation (“He commanded them to await the promise of the Father,” +Acts, i. 4) and Extreme Unction (“Is there any man sick among you? Let +him bring in the priests of the Church,” James, v. 14).</p> + +<p>(b) There is a divine precept obliging _per accidens_ and _sub gravi_ +in reference to Confirmation and Extreme Unction, when they cannot be +omitted without peril to salvation, scandal to neighbors, or other such +inconvenience which one is seriously bound to prevent. Similarly, there +might be a _per accidens_ obligation of receiving Matrimony or Orders +(see 2627).</p> + +<p>(c) There are ecclesiastical precepts determining the circumstances of +the reception of Penance and the Eucharist (see 2590-2593) and +prescribing Confirmation for candidates to Orders (Canon 974). +Moreover, the Code reminds us that no one may lawfully neglect +Confirmation when he has an opportunity to receive it (Canon 787), and +likewise that it is not lawful to neglect Extreme Unction (Canon 944).</p> + +<p>2664. Twofold Ministry of the Sacraments.—(a) The ministry of +production (_confectio_) is the application of form to matter that +makes the Sacrament (e.g., the consecration of bread and wine); (b) the +ministry of bestowal (_administratio_) is the application of the +Sacrament to the human recipient (e.g., the Communion). The Eucharist +is a permanent object, whereas Baptism and the rest are transitory +actions. Hence it is that in the Eucharist, but not in the other +Sacraments, the two ministries are separated, and hence it is also that +the Eucharist may be validly given or validly received by those who +cannot validly consecrate.</p> + +<p>2665. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Performance of a +Sacrament.—(a) The Person of the Minister.—As the minister represents +Christ, only those may perform a Sacrament to whom Christ has given +authority. Hence, ordinarily only mortals and human beings—not the +Angels or departed Saints—can administer a Sacrament. Further, as the +ministry of a Sacrament may include an act of power and authority, +there are various ranks of ministers. Thus, the ministry of Matrimony +supposes no power or orders or spiritual authority, and the ministers +are the parties themselves; that of Solemn Baptism, Eucharist, Penance, +and Extreme Unction supposes orders and lower authority, and the +minister is the priest; that of Confirmation and Orders supposes higher +authority, and the minister is the bishop.</p> + +<p>(b) The Acts of the Minister.—As the minister acts as Christ’s +responsible agent to whose wise discretion the dispensation of the +Sacraments is committed, he must have at least the external attention +of mind sufficient to perform all that the rite demands and the +internal intention of will sufficient to make his ministry an act that +is human, sacred, and definitely symbolical of the sacramental effects.</p> + +<p>2666. The Necessary Intention.—The intention or purpose of the +minister therefore must have the following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) objectively, there must be an intention of doing what the Church +does (i.e., of performing a sacred rite instituted by Christ, for the +minister acts in the name and authority of Christ). Hence a mock +sacrament—or even, more probably, a purely external performance with +no purpose to enact a sacred rite—does not suffice. But, on the other +hand, an unbeliever can administer validly if he really intends to do +what Christians do or what Christ commanded to be done. The intention +not to do what the Church does was the chief cause of the nullity of +Anglican Orders;</p> + +<p>(b) subjectively, the intention must be at least virtual, so as to +ensure a deliberate act. An actual intention is not necessary, because +it is often impossible on account of its difficulty; while an habitual +intention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the act so +as to make it human (see 2165). The interpretative intention (i.e., a +purpose that never existed, but that would presumably have existed, had +attention been given the matter) is with greater reason insufficient;</p> + +<p>(c) modally, the intention must be such as to make precise the +character of the action as a special sacred rite; for just as the +matter awaits the form or word to receive the imprint of a sacred +significance, so do the ceremonial words themselves look to the +internal purpose of the minister for their fixed meaning. Hence, the +Sacrament is invalid if the minister’s purpose is indeterminate (e.g., +if a priest wills to consecrate ten undesignated hosts out of the +hundred contained in a ciborium, or to absolve one undesignated person +of a multitude); or if the purpose is self-exclusive (e.g., if a +bridegroom has two mutually incompatible intentions, namely, to marry +the bride and also to marry her only for a time); or if the purpose is +left in suspense (e.g., if a priest makes his absolution depend on +future restitution or any other non-existent condition, and most +probably also if the minister makes the Sacrament depend on the +recipient’s predestination or other such condition known only to God).</p> + +<p>2667. Rules on Plurality of Intentions.—(a) When opposite intentions +are simultaneous, if one of them is predominant in the minister’s will +and not insociable with the Sacrament, that one prevails and the +Sacrament is valid; otherwise the Sacrament is null. (b) When opposite +intentions are successive, the later prevails over the earlier, unless +the earlier was stronger and meant to endure in spite of other +intentions, and it has not been recalled expressly by the will.</p> + +<p>2668. Requisites for Use of Conditional Intention.—(a) The use must be +valid or non-suspensive (2666 e), and hence (Matrimony excepted on +account of its special character as a contract) the minister may not +confer a Sacrament under a condition _de futuro_. But conditions _de +praesenti_ (e.g., “I absolve you, if you are repentant”) or _de +praeterito_ (e.g., “I baptize you, if you have not received Baptism”) +are valid.</p> + +<p>(b) The use of a conditional intention must be lawful, or justified by +a sufficient reason. Normally the minister should intend absolutely to +give a Sacrament, as the forms of the Sacraments are unconditional. But +if the absolute intention would be disrespectful, because there is +doubt whether all the requisites for the Sacrament are present, while +on the other hand denial of the Sacrament would be harmful because the +subject needs it, both disrespect to the Sacrament and harm to the +subject are avoided by conditional administration. The doubt spoken of +may refer to the recipient (e.g., whether he is living or otherwise +capable, whether he is contrite or otherwise disposed) or to the +Sacrament (e.g., whether it has been received or received validly, +whether the form has been rightly spoken, whether the present matter is +valid).</p> + +<p>(c) The use of the conditional intention must be legal according to the +rules prescribed by the Church. Thus, according to the Ritual the +conditional intention in Baptism and Extreme Unction (“_Si non es +baptizatus_,” “_Si vivis_”) must be expressed vocally. Moreover, +conditional marriages are not permitted as a rule except there be a +grave reason and the bishop consents.</p> + +<p>2669. Lawful Administration of Sacraments.—Lawful administration of a +Sacrament demands, in addition to the conditions for validity +(2665-2668), that the minister and his ministry be worthy, for even in +the Old Law it was strictly commanded that holy things be treated in a +holy manner (Isa., lii. 11; Lev., xxi. xxii). Hence, a person who +fulfilled the conditions for validity but who lacked one or other of +the qualities mentioned below would perform and confer a true +Sacrament, but he would sin more or less seriously on account of the +unworthy administration, unless good faith excused him.</p> + +<p>(a) The Minister’s Worthiness before God.—The state of grace is +required in consecrated ministers when they minister solemnly and _ex +officio_ in performing a Sacrament; for they act then as +representatives of Christ, who is holy, and exercise most sacred +functions which He appointed as means of holiness and which they were +ordained to perform holily. The sin of unworthiness is a grave +sacrilege. It seems there is _per se_ no grave sin, if the minister is +not consecrated (e.g., in lay Baptism), or if the ministry is not _ex +officio_ (e.g., in a Baptism of necessity given by a priest but without +the solemn ceremonies), or if a Sacrament is not made or performed +(e.g., when confession is heard but absolution not given, when +Communion is administered, when the Blessed Sacrament is carried). It +is generally admitted that there is no grave sin even in a solemn and +official performance of a Sacrament, if the Sacrament is urgently +necessary and the state of grace cannot be recovered in time; also in +the exercise of a function which is not itself a Sacrament (e.g., to be +official witness at a marriage or deacon at Mass, to preach, bless, +give Minor Orders, chant or say the Office). When the state of grace is +necessary for his ministry, one who is in sin must to the best of his +ability recover that state by going to confession or at least by making +an act of contrition.</p> + +<p>(b) The Minister’s Worthiness Before the Church.—Since the Church is +the custodian of the Sacraments, these cannot be lawfully performed or +administered by those who are under her censure or who have not +received her license. The excommunicated and the irregular sin gravely +if they administer Sacraments, unless the faithful lawfully request +administration from them (see 2683). Only priests are licensed to act +as ministers of Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist, +and the pastor of a place is the authorized minister for that +territory; but in case of need even the laity may administer Baptism, a +priest other than the pastor may give the Last Sacraments, and the sick +may confess to any confessor with due faculties.</p> + +<p>(c) Worthiness of the Ministration.—Internally the ministry should be +devout and attentive; for, if private worship should be religiously +made, much more the worship contained in the Sacraments (see 2150, +2244). Voluntary distractions, however, do not seem to be gravely +sinful, unless the validity of the rite is imperilled by them. +Externally the ministry should be dignified and rubrical. Canon 733 +requires that each one observe the accidental ceremonies of his own +Rite and liturgical books. Since ceremonies were instituted by the +Church from the earliest ages and are prescribed in virtue of religion +(Catechism of the Council of Trent, page 152), it is sinful to neglect +them unless a rubric is merely directive or optional, such as the rules +before and after Mass. The preceptive rubrics oblige _sub gravi_ as to +notable matter (e.g., the anointing in Baptism), _sub levi_ as to +inconsiderable matter (e.g., words, bows, crosses, etc. of minor +importance); but one may be excused from guilt, or grave guilt, on +account of imperfection of act (e.g., inadvertence caused by external +distractions) or impossibility (e.g., ceremonies curtailed because of +approaching death, scandal or wonder of the people). The Roman Ritual +(Title I, n. 10) advises the explanation of the ceremonies for the +benefit of those who assist at the administration of the Sacraments, +and recommends the Catechism of the Council of Trent for this purpose.</p> + +<p>2670. Multiplication of Sins of Unworthy Administration.—How many sins +are committed by the minister when Sacraments are unworthily +administered to many recipients at one time, as when several children +are baptized together, or a large gathering of penitents are heard one +after the other, etc.?</p> + +<p>(a) According to the strict view, there are as many distinct sins as +there are distinct administrations, for each Sacrament is separate from +the other. But in case of Communion, since the separate Communions are +parts of the one Eucharistic banquet, there is but one sin, mortal or +venial, according to the view taken of an administration that is not +also performance of a Sacrament.</p> + +<p>(b) According to the mild view, there is but one sin, since sins are +not multiplied numerically when they form morally but one act on +account of the unity given them by the purpose of the agent and the +circumstances.</p> + +<p>2671. Requirements for a Valid Sacrament in Reference to the +Recipient.—(a) The Person of the Recipient.—Since the Sacraments were +instituted as means of salvation, they can be given only to those who +are still wayfarers in the present mortal existence, and hence a +Sacrament administered to a brute animal or a corpse would be invalid, +or, in the case of Communion, would not be received sacramentally. As +Baptism is the preparation for the other Sacraments, but need not +presuppose personal sinfulness, its subject is any and every unbaptized +person, infant or adult, male or female. The other six Sacraments +presuppose Baptism, and only those who have been initiated into the +Church by Baptism can receive them validly. As to these six Sacraments +only males are capable of Orders, which is for the rulers of the +Church; only adults are capable of Penance, Extreme Unction and +Matrimony, which suppose personal sin or personal contract. Further, +the impotent and impeded are incapable of Matrimony, and those who are +not in danger of death from sickness are incapable of Extreme Unction. +Finally, those who have been baptized, confirmed, or ordained, cannot +be rebaptized, reconfirmed, or reordained, since these three Sacraments +can be given but once; he who is married cannot marry again while his +wife lives and the bond endures; he who has been anointed cannot be +reanointed during the same danger.</p> + +<p>(b) The Acts of the Recipient.—If the recipient is an infant, no +disposition on his part is necessary, since he does not understand. If +the recipient is an adult, it is necessary in the performance of every +Sacrament (on the Eucharist see 2664) that he have some intention or +willingness to receive the Sacrament, since Christ does not wish to +confer benefits or impose certain grave burdens on those who are +unwilling. A forced Sacrament to which the subject yielded no internal +consent would be a null Sacrament. Further, since an essential part +(namely, the matter, or according to others a _conditio sine qua non_) +of Penance is the faith and repentance of the recipient, these +dispositions are necessary in that Sacrament.</p> + +<p>2672. Qualities of the Recipient’s Intention.—(a) Objectively, the +recipient should intend to receive what the Church confers, and hence +intentions that are not serious, or are mistaken or external (e.g., +Baptism received for the sake of rehearsal, or in the belief that it is +a profane ablution, or accepted as a pure formality), do not seem +sufficient (see 2666).</p> + +<p>(b) Subjectively.—The recipient must positively will the Sacrament, +for it seems that the so-called neutral intention—in which the subject +neither consents nor dissents internally, but is passive and +indifferent, and acquiesces externally only to please another—is not a +true desire. But the strength or influence of the recipient’s intention +need not be so great as the minister’s, since the role of the minister +is to perform the rite, that of the subject only to receive the rite +(see 2665).</p> + +<p>2673. When a Virtual Intention Is Necessary.—It is generally agreed, +therefore, that while the interpretative intention does not suffice, +the actual intention and even, for the most part, the virtual intention +are not necessary. But about the virtual intention the following should +be noted; (a) a virtual and explicit intention is necessary in +Matrimony if a party be considered, not precisely as recipient, but as +minister of the Sacrament (see 2666) and as maker of the contract (see +1883); (b) a virtual and at least implicit intention is necessary in +Penance, if a penitent is considered precisely as positing the +requisite matter or condition of the Sacrament, since this consists in +repentance, and repentance includes either an express or an implied +desire of sacramental absolution.</p> + +<p>2674. When an Habitual Intention Suffices.—The habitual intention is +found in those who are not conscious (see 2165), but it suffices for +the reception of a Sacrament, since the recipient does not affect the +Sacrament, and it is enough that he had the good will to accept it and +has not retracted that will.</p> + +<p>(a) An habitual and explicit intention suffices for the three +Sacraments that impose special obligations, namely, Baptism, Orders, +and Matrimony. Hence, he who has asked for Baptism is validly baptized +after he becomes delirious; he who has asked for Orders is validly +ordained even when unconscious; he who has sent his consent to a +marriage by proxy receives the Sacrament during his sleep, if the other +party’s consent closing the contract is given at that time.</p> + +<p>(b) An habitual and implicit intention included in a particular will to +do a good act on which the Sacrament follows in natural course, +suffices for the other three Sacraments which do not impose special +obligations. Hence, a person who purposed to live as a Catholic is +validly confirmed while unconscious; a person who intended to die as a +Catholic is validly absolved and anointed, as far as intention is +concerned, at the moment of death, even though he be out of his mind. +Further, if an unbaptized person has resolved to become a Catholic but +has no knowledge of Baptism itself, he is validly baptized in virtue of +his implicit desire, even though he be unconscious.</p> + +<p>(c) An habitual and implicit intention included in a general will to do +all that is necessary for salvation or a good life is taught by some +authors, and is by them considered sufficient for Baptism, since it is +the most necessary Sacrament, and the Sacraments are for men. An +unbaptized person of good will who has supernatural contrition or +charity is justified through Baptism of desire, but if he has only +supernatural attrition the Sacrament itself is necessary for him. +Hence, in case of urgent need conditional Baptism should be given a +dying and unconscious infidel who was well disposed; but, as the +intention is not certain, the Baptism should be repeated in case of +recovery. The same principle is extended by some moralists to the +administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to schismatics and +heretics who are in danger of death.</p> + +<p>2675. Requirements for Lawful or Fruitful Reception of a Sacrament by +an Adult.—(a) Worthiness of the Recipient from Divine Law.—The two +Sacraments of the Dead, Baptism and Penance, were intended by Christ to +be means of forgiveness to the repentant, and hence they require at +least that the recipient believe himself attrite. The five Sacraments +of the Living were meant by Christ to strengthen grace and life already +had, and consequently he who approaches them must have no serious fault +on his conscience. Conscious unworthiness is a sacrilege, and only +extreme necessity can excuse reception in such a state (e.g., when a +sinner takes Communion to save the Host from profanation).</p> + +<p>(b) Worthiness from Church Law.—The recipient must be free from church +censures (Canon 2260) or impediments, and must possess the preparation +or qualification which the church law prescribes (e.g., a certain age +is required for Confirmation; the Eucharist must be received fasting; +the candidate for Orders must be approved, etc.).</p> + +<p>(c) Worthiness of Reception.—The Sacraments should be received +devoutly, with proper preparation, attention, and thanksgiving. In the +case of the Eucharist, though intention is not necessary for validity, +it is required for a sacramental or fruitful Communion; an habitual and +implicit intention suffices for the Viaticum (and Easter Communion), an +habitual explicit intention for Communion of devotion.</p> + +<p>2676. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Give Them?—(a) A +pastor is obliged to give a Sacrament to one of his own subjects who +reasonably requests it, and to do so willingly, freely (Canon 736), +and, if he has no substitute, in person; for a spiritual shepherd has a +grave duty of justice and charity to feed his flock. A request is not +reasonable, however, if compliance will put the pastor to an +inconvenience greater than that which the parishioner will suffer from +a refusal, for example, when Baptisms, Confessions, or Communions are +needlessly asked for outside the appointed hours, or when sick calls +that can be attended during the day are sent in at night. The +Sacraments necessary for salvation (Baptism and Penance) should be +given even at the risk of life, if the subject is in grave need and +there is assured hope of success (see 1167), and doubtless this should +be applied also to Extreme Unction or even the Viaticum.</p> + +<p>(b) One who is not a pastor is obliged from charity to give the +Sacraments to those who reasonably ask. He would be obliged even to +risk his life to save a soul, if there were no one else to administer a +necessary Sacrament to a person in extreme spiritual peril who could be +saved by his ministry.</p> + +<p>2677. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Deny Them?—(a) +He must always deny them to those who are incapable, for otherwise he +insults the Sacrament. Under no circumstances, then, may a priest +baptize one who is already baptized, or absolve one who is unrepentant; +and he may not assist at the attempted marriage of a divorcee. +Likewise, as is manifest, he must always deny the Sacraments to those +who ask for them out of hatred or contempt for religion, for to grant +them in such circumstances would be an act intrinsically evil.</p> + +<p>(b) He must deny them, as a rule, to those who to his knowledge are +certainly unworthy (e.g., on account of lack of requisite instruction +or moral disposition); otherwise, he casts pearls before swine, +cooperates in the sacrilege of others, and scandalizes the people. +Hence, a public sinner—that is, one whose unworthiness is notorious +(see 2053)—should not be given the Sacraments publicly, until he has +repaired the scandal he gave; and no unworthy person, even though he be +a hidden sinner whose guilt is known only to the minister, should be +given a Sacrament in private until he has shown signs of repentance. +Generally the minister is bound to assure himself beforehand of the +good disposition of the one who asks for a Sacrament, though in case of +Communion this is often impossible, and it suffices to presume that all +who approach the altar becomingly are in the state of grace.</p> + +<p>2678. Administration to Unworthy Persons.—Since material cooperation +with sin is lawful for a sufficient reason (see 1515 sqq.), one may +administer a Sacrament to an unworthy person when refusal would cause a +greater evil than ministration. This happens in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when refusal will necessitate a more wicked sacrilege (viz., injury +to a Sacrament by the minister himself). This case occurs when the +minister knows the subject’s unworthiness only from the latter’s +sacramental confession, and hence cannot exclude him without violation +of the seal;</p> + +<p>(b) when the refusal will bring on more widespread evils (viz., +discouragement of the use of the Sacraments). This happens when the +subject who asks the Sacrament is not publicly known as a sinner, but +his request is public, so that a refusal will amount to a defamation of +him by the minister. If priests had the right to inflict public +disgrace on those who approached the Sacraments, it is easily seen what +grave scandals and disorders would follow, and that a ready excuse +would present itself for personal spite and neglect of religion. Our +Lord administered Communion to Judas rather than betray his secret +guilt to the other Apostles.</p> + +<p>2679. Is the fear of bodily harm or of death a sufficient reason for +administering a Sacrament to an unworthy person? (a) If a greater evil +will be caused by bestowal of the Sacrament, it should not be bestowed. +This happens when the Sacrament is asked out of hatred or contempt of +religion, and when great scandal will result if the priest yields. (b) +If a greater evil will be caused by refusal of the Sacrament, it should +not be refused. Examples are those of the previous paragraph. The mere +private good of the minister is not preferable to the good of the +Sacrament.</p> + +<p>2680. Simulation and Dissimulation of a Sacrament?—Is it lawful in +case of difficulty to give a Sacrament only in appearance? (a) If this +means simulation of a Sacrament, or the use of its externals in such a +way as to make it null (i.e., by withholding internal intention or +using invalid matter or form), the answer is in the negative; for +simulation is always an acted lie (see 2403, 2404), and when applied to +Sacraments it produces a sacrilegious mutilation and also, in the case +of the Eucharist (e.g., when an unconsecrated host is given to a +communicant), an occasion of idolatry. (b) If this means dissimulation +of a Sacrament, or the use of some nonsacramental act to conceal the +denial of a Sacrament, the answer is in the affirmative, for it is +lawful to keep from others knowledge to which they have no right. Thus, +a priest who wishes to conceal from onlookers that he has refused +absolution to a penitent, can lawfully say a prayer and make a sign of +the cross over this person.</p> + +<p>2681. Administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to Heretics and +Schismatics.—(a) Regularly this is unlawful, even though these persons +are in good faith and ask for the Sacraments. They must first renounce +their errors and become reconciled with the Church (Canon 731).</p> + +<p>(b) Exceptionally, according to some moralists, this is lawful when +there is extreme need. Hence, according to this view a priest may +secretly give conditional absolution to an unconscious heretic or +schismatic in danger of death who has given signs of repentance; he may +absolve and anoint a dying heretic or schismatic, even though +conscious, if this person appears to be in good faith and repentant and +willing to do all that God requires of him. But the priest should first +try to convert the dying person, if this is possible and the latter’s +good faith will not be disturbed; and he must also avoid giving scandal.</p> + +<p>2682. Repetition of a Sacrament on Account of Invalid +Administration.—(a) This is unlawful when the fear of invalidity is +groundless and foolish; for it is seriously disrespectful to a +Sacrament and disedifying to others to repeat the rite without reason. +But scrupulous persons are sometimes free of grave sin, since they mean +well in repeating and are not accountable for their fears.</p> + +<p>(b) This is lawful but not obligatory when there is a prudent misgiving +about a useful Sacrament (Confirmation, Matrimony, anointing of one who +is conscious); also when there is a slight reason of law or fact for +fear about a necessary or more important Sacrament (Baptism, Orders, +absolution of a dying person, anointing of an unconscious person, +consecration of the Eucharist). For the Sacraments are for men. But if +only a small loss or an unlikely loss will be caused by their +non-repetition, the duty of repeating them cannot be insisted on.</p> + +<p>(c) This is gravely obligatory when there is a prudent fear about a +necessary or more important Sacrament; it is gravely or lightly +obligatory (to be determined in each case) when there is a well-founded +fear about a useful Sacrament, if charity, justice or religion calls +for repetition and the inconvenience will not be too great. In +Matrimony the alternate methods of convalidation or sanation may be +used as the case demands. Again, the Sacraments are for men, and hence, +if man will likely be subjected to a notable loss by the minister’s +neglect of repetition, the duty of repetition is clear.</p> + +<p>2683. Reception of a Sacrament from an Unworthy Minister.—May a +Sacrament be received from a minister who, to one’s certain knowledge, +cannot give it without sin on account of unworthiness (such as a state +of sin or censure)?</p> + +<p>(a) _Per se_, this is unlawful, for it is cooperation with sacrilege +and is often attended by scandal and danger of perversion to self.</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, this is lawful, for material cooperation is +justified when a proportionately grave reason exists (1515 sqq.). +Moreover, often the minister can put himself in the state of grace +before he gives the Sacrament, or can be excused from sacrilege on +account of the necessity. The less the irreverence or danger of +scandal, the less need be the reason for asking or taking a Sacrament +from an unworthy person. If the minister is a sinner or is under +ordinary suspension or other censure, a serious reason of spiritual +advantage suffices (e.g., the opportunity to make the Easter duty); if +the minister is under sentence (Canon 2261 n. 3), only danger of death +suffices; if the minister is a heretic or schismatic, only extreme need +suffices, and the danger of scandal and perversion must be avoided.</p> + +<p>2684. Sacramentals.—The sacramentals are the sacred things (e.g., +rosaries, scapulars, agnus deis) and actions (e.g., consecrations, +blessings, exorcisms) used by the Church in imitation of the Sacraments +to obtain through her intercession blessings chiefly of a spiritual +sort (Canon 1144).</p> + +<p>(a) Necessity.—Our Lord gave to the Church the power of instituting +sacramentals, and certain of those used by the Church are but +developments of the blessings and exorcisms that He used. Some of the +sacramentals are commanded by the Church (viz, those that are used in +the administration of the Sacraments or in other sacred services); +others are recommended, but not commanded.</p> + +<p>(b) Use.—The virtue of religion requires that the sacramentals be +administered, received and treated with devotion and respect, the +extremes of irreligion and superstition being avoided (see 2244). The +laws of the Church on the ministers, recipients, and rites of the +sacramentals are treated in works on Canon Law and liturgy.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_2_BAPTISM_CONFIRMATION_THE_EUCHARIST_THE_SACRIFICE_OF_THE_MASS">Art. 2: BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 66-83.)</p> + +<p>2685. The general duties of the ministers and recipients of the +Sacraments have been outlined in the previous Article. The principles +therein given are the basis of the special duties that pertain to each +of the seven Sacraments. In this and the remaining Articles, therefore, +it will suffice to apply without explaining anew the rules already +given and to add the special details proper to each Sacrament.</p> + +<p>2686. The Sacrament of Baptism.—The first and most essential Sacrament +is Baptism (Greek, washing), which may be defined: “The Sacrament of +regeneration by water in the word” (Catechism of the Council of Trent, +page 163). The internal grace of the Sacrament is expressed by +regeneration, the external sign by water and the word.</p> + +<p>(a) The effect of Baptism is regeneration, for it cleanses from sin and +penalty, and makes him who was a child of wrath to be a child of God +and a co-heir of Christ. Baptism also christens, since it seals one +with the indelible character of Christian, or member of the Church. As +all are under the original curse by birth from Adam, so all who would +inherit blessing are in need of this new birth through Christ (see +2661): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he +cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John, iii. 5).</p> + +<p>(b) The material element (remote matter) of Baptism is water, that is, +any and every form of liquid which in common estimation is pure and +unchanged water (e.g., water taken from the ocean, from streams, +fountains, or wells; water melted from snow, ice or hail; water +gathered from steam, dew, or mist; chemical and mineral water). But +animal and plant fluids, though they contain water, are looked upon as +distinct substances, and hence Baptism cannot be administered with +milk, blood, spittle, sweat, oil, flower or fruit juices (e.g., wine, +cider), or extracts of barks or roots. Doubtful matter are liquids +that, while in large part composed of water, seem to be generally +regarded as not water (e.g., thin soup, tea or coffee, light beer); and +hence only in necessity can these be lawfully used for Baptism.</p> + +<p>(c) The formal element of Baptism is the word or the formula appointed +by Christ. In the Latin Church the words are: “I baptize thee in the +name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” Almost +every word in this form is necessary for the sense given by Christ, and +hence almost any omission makes it necessary, or at least lawful, to +repeat Baptism (see 2655, 2682). The declaration of the form demands +that the application of the water (proximate matter) be made in the +manner of an ablution (i.e., by sprinkling, pouring or immersion). If +sprinkling or pouring is used, the body of the recipient (i.e., the +skin of his head) must be washed (i.e., the water must touch the head +and flow thereon) by the baptizer (i.e., the person who pronounces the +words must pour or sprinkle the water). But in case of necessity one +may use the opinion that Baptism is valid when the water touches only +the hair or some part distinct from the head, or even the afterbirth of +a fetus.</p> + +<p>2687. Solemn and Private Baptism.—Though in essentials Baptism is but +one, it is distinguished in reference to accidental ceremony into +solemn and private.</p> + +<p>(a) Solemn Baptism is that which is administered with all the rites +prescribed by the Liturgy. It requires consecrated water, sponsors and +special ceremonies; its minister is a clergyman (ordinarily the +parish-priest or Ordinary, extraordinarily a delegated deacon); its +place is the baptistery or church. In the Baptism of adults even +greater solemnity may be used, for there is a special rite of +administration, and the Church recommends that this Baptism be +performed when possible by the Ordinary, or at least in cathedral +churches, and on the vigil of Easter or Pentecost.</p> + +<p>(b) Private Baptism is given in danger of death, or when an adult +convert is rebaptized conditionally (Canon 759). It requires only true +and natural water, though the water should be as clean and decent as +possible, and baptismal or blessed water is preferable; generally the +simple form without other rite suffices; sponsors are not necessary, +unless they can be had without difficulty, but if possible at least one +or two witnesses should be present; the Baptism may be given in the +private home or the hospital or other place where the candidate is +staying; anyone who has the use of reason and is able to perform the +rite may act as minister. When several persons suitable to minister +private Baptism are present, the order of preference to be followed is: +priest, deacon, subdeacon, cleric, layman, woman; but a woman should be +preferred to a man if modesty calls for this, or if the woman is better +acquainted with the manner of baptizing. It is considered a serious sin +needlessly to prefer a non-priest to a worthy priest, a non-Catholic to +a Catholic, an outsider to the parish-priest. If possible, parents +should not baptize their own children, since it is more becoming that +the spiritual parent and the carnal parent be different persons.</p> + +<p>2688. Duties of Parish-Priests as to Baptism.—(a) Before +Baptism.—Baptismal water should be blessed, added to or renewed, as +the ritual regulations of one’s place require; the faithful should be +frequently admonished in sermons of the serious duty of having their +infants baptized as soon as possible (Canon 770); the people should +also be told (especially midwives, physicians and surgeons) how lay +Baptism is to be given validly (Canon 743).</p> + +<p>(b) At the Time of Baptism.—Converts preparing for Baptism should be +well instructed in the principal religious truths (viz, those contained +in the Creed), and precepts (viz., the laws of the Decalogue and of the +Church, see 914 sqq.), and prayers (viz, the Our Father, the acts of +faith, hope, charity, and contrition); and they should learn the nature +and effects of Baptism. The parish-priest may delegate a deacon to +baptize solemnly in his place, if there is a sufficient reason, as when +he himself is impeded by sickness, absence, or occupation (Canon 741).</p> + +<p>(c) After Baptism.—The pastor in virtue of his office has the +responsibility of attending to the registration of baptisms in the +proper book (Canon 777). The registration should be made without +delay—that is, before the sponsors have departed, or immediately after +the ceremony, or at least on the same day, if possible; the entry +should be made accurately and legibly. The duty of keeping proper +baptismal records is considered grave, since important evils would +follow on their neglect.</p> + +<p>2689. Duties of Parents and Guardians in Reference to Baptism.—(a) As +to Administration of Baptism.—Parents are obliged under grave sin not +to expose their children to the loss of salvation by undue delay of +Baptism (see 2344, 2630). If there is danger of death, a child must be +baptized at once; if there is no immediate danger of death, the child +must nevertheless, on account of the absolute necessity of Baptism, be +baptized as soon as possible. Some moralists consider a needless delay +gravely sinful if it exceeds three or four days; others, if it exceeds +ten or eleven days. Since infants can be baptized in the womb, a mother +is not obliged to undergo the Caesarean operation to ensure Baptism; +but she may permit the operation for the sake of a more certain +Baptism, unless her obligations to husband or other children will +suffer on account of the danger to her life. If a mother dies in +pregnancy, the fetus should be extracted and baptized. The duty here +rests with the relatives and the physician (Canon 746).</p> + +<p>(b) As to Details of Baptism.—Parents should choose suitable names for +their children, avoiding such as are obscene, ridiculous, or impious. +It is advisable that the name of a Saint or of some other person +distinguished for holiness be chosen, for this will be of a spiritual +advantage to the child and an edification to others. Parents have the +right to appoint the sponsors of their infant children, and should +choose only those who are canonically admissible. If Baptism has been +administered at home, the parents should, if the child survives, bring +it as soon as possible to the church for conditional Baptism, or for +the baptismal ceremonies (Canons 759, 760).</p> + +<p>2690. Sponsors.—From early times the Church has required in Baptism +the use of sponsors, and the reasons for this usage will appear from +the duties of these god-parents. The present law (Canons 762 sqq.) +retains the ancient tradition, and prescribes as a serious duty that in +Solemn Baptism (even of adults, whenever possible) there shall be at +least one sponsor (male or female), and that not more than two be used, +one a male and the other a female.</p> + +<p>(a) Requirements for Validity—Since the sponsor takes obligations, he +must have the use of reason and give consent to the office; since he is +charged with the duty of spiritual guidance, he must be baptized and +not be a member of a heretical or schismatic sect; since he exercises +an office of honor, he must not be under the displeasure of the Church +by sentence of excommunication or the like; since he is to act as +spiritual father, he must not be the parent or spouse of the baptized; +since he is to stand for the baptized person, he must be designated by +the latter or his parents or by the minister. The sponsor must also +indicate (in person or by proxy) his acceptance of the care of the +baptized person by physically touching him at the moment of Baptism +(either by holding the infant over the font, or by placing a hand on +the candidate), or immediately after the Baptism (by raising from the +waters or receiving from the hands of the minister the one who has been +immersed, or by taking from the font one who has been baptized by +pouring). Non-Catholics, therefore, may not be sponsors, but to avoid +great offense or other serious evil they may sometimes be admitted as +witnesses or honorary sponsors (see 956 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Requirements for Lawfulness.—The sponsor should have reached his +fourteenth year (unless the minister sees fit for a just cause to admit +a younger person), and should know the rudiments of faith; he must be a +person of respectability among Catholics, and hence one who is +notorious on account of certain penalties or on account of crime or of +membership in the Freemasons is not acceptable; he must be free to act +as sponsor, and hence religious and clerics in Major Orders must have +permission of the superior qualified in each instance to grant this +permission.</p> + +<p>2691. Duties of Sponsors.—(a) They are obliged to look upon their +spiritual children as their perpetual charges, to see to their +Christian education and to the fulfillment of the baptismal promises +for which they stood surety (Canon 769).</p> + +<p>(b) These obligations are grave, since the matter is grave; but, as the +care of children falls principally upon the parents, it is only when +the parents neglect their duty that the sponsors are held to do what +they can for the instruction and correction of their god-children +(Catechism of Council of Trent, page 175).</p> + +<p>2692. Duties of Adult Recipients of Baptism or of Those Who Have the +Use of Reason.—(a) Before Baptism.—An unbaptized person who has faith +and who sees the necessity of Baptism, is gravely obliged to ask for +Baptism at once, if he is in danger of death, or as soon as he +conveniently can, if he is not in danger of death; for since Baptism is +the divinely appointed means of entering the Church and of sharing in +its privileges, he who would delay it unduly would disobey an important +command of God and would be seriously neglectful of his own salvation. +For a sufficient reason, however (e.g., for the sake of instruction or +probation, or to avoid persecution), Baptism may be delayed even for +years; but the catechumen should then make at once an act of contrition +or charity so as to obtain the benefit of Baptism of desire. Converts +should prepare for Baptism by taking a course of instructions, or, when +there is danger of death, a summary instruction (791 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) At Baptism.—The internal dispositions include, besides intention, +faith and repentance: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be +saved” (Mark, xvi. 16); “Do penance and be baptized” (Acts, ii. 38). +There must be an explicit faith in the four chief mysteries (see 789). +In this country converts who are being baptized conditionally make an +abjuration and profession of faith before Baptism, and go to confession +and receive conditional absolution after Baptism. The Code recommends +that those who are well receive Baptism fasting; and that, unless grave +reason excuses, the neophyte assist at Mass and receive Communion after +his Baptism (Canon 753).</p> + +<p>(c) After Baptism.—Since Baptism makes one a member of the Church, +those who receive it are subject to church laws. The promises made in +Baptism are not strictly vows, but an engagement of loyalty to the +faith and the commandments (see 2191).</p> + +<p>2693. Duties of the Minister of Baptism.—(a) In Reference to the +Parents.—If the parents insist on giving an unsuitable name to their +child, the pastor should silently add a suitable name of some Saint +chosen by himself, and should inscribe both names in the register +(Canon 761). A child of non-Catholic parents should not be baptized by +Catholics, unless this can be done without injury to the natural right +of the parents of training their own children and without danger to the +future perseverance of the child. Hence these children, if infants, +should not be baptized against the will of their parents unless they +are in danger of death and can be baptized without too great +inconvenience; but if a child is able to judge for himself, or if there +is no parental opposition (at least not of both parents), and there are +good reasons to believe that the child will be brought up as a +Catholic, he may be baptized (Canons 750, 751).</p> + +<p>(b) In Reference to the Sponsors.—If a sponsor cannot be admitted, the +pastor must use great kindness and prudence, so as not to give offense. +If a non-Catholic has been appointed as sponsor, the difficulty may +sometimes be overcome by naming a sacristan or servant as sponsor and +permitting the non-Catholic to act as witness.</p> + +<p>(c) In Reference to the Capacity of the Recipient.—The minister must +give the Sacrament only to those who are capable. Hence, he cannot +baptize what is not human (e.g., uterine growths which do not pertain +to a fetus), or not living (e.g., a stillborn infant), or not +unbaptized (e.g., a convert or an infant about whose valid Baptism +there is no reasonable doubt). Speculatively there is some difficulty +about Baptism of unborn fetuses, of abortive fetuses, and of +monstrosities (e.g., an infant with two heads or two hearts). For, as +to the first, it seems that the physically unborn are incapable of +spiritual rebirth; as to the second, it seems that the soul of an +undeveloped fetus may be sub-human; and, as to the third, it may be +doubtful whether a monstrosity is one individual or several +individuals. Practically, however, one should proceed on the principle +that the Sacraments are for men, and give the benefit of a doubt to the +infants by conditional Baptism. Intra-uterine Baptism should not be +used except in case of urgent necessity, and it is then permissible to +employ a mixture of one part of chloride of mercury with two parts of +water to avoid infection. Midwives, nurses, mothers, and physicians +should be especially careful to baptize abortive fetuses, and should +know how this can be done (see Commentaries on Canons 746-748).</p> + +<p>(d) In Reference to the Willingness of the Recipient.—An infant is not +required to will the Sacrament, and hence the perpetually insane, who +are unable to distinguish between right and wrong, may be baptized +without any desire on their part. But an adult must intend to be +baptized (see 2671 b). Hence, the minister must inquire about the +wishes of an adult candidate, If an unbaptized person is now out of his +mind (insane, afflicted with lethargy or sleeping sickness, delirious), +but formerly had the use of reason, he is classed with adults, and his +intention has to be considered. He should not be baptized, therefore, +until he comes to himself, unless there is danger of death and signs of +a desire to receive Baptism were given before (Canons 745, 754).</p> + +<p>(e) In Reference to the Worthiness of the Recipient.—The minister +should remind the candidate of the duty of attrition. If the person who +asks for Baptism wishes to retain certain habits (e.g., superstition, +concubinage, or unlawful business) which cannot be reconciled with +Christianity, he cannot be regarded as suited for Baptism. But in +danger of death good faith should not be uselessly disturbed.</p> + +<p>(f) In Reference to the Pastor.—Solemn Baptism either in or out of +one’s territory may not be given without permission from the proper +pastor who has jurisdiction (Canons 738-740). And a minister who is not +the pastor of the baptized person must send notice of the Baptism to +the pastor, as soon as possible, if the latter was not present (Canon +778).</p> + +<p>(g) In Reference to Himself and the Sacrament.—The minister should +inform himself, if necessary, about the existence or validity of a +previous Baptism, and he should observe the ceremonies, essential and +accidental, of his Rite. Foundlings should be baptized conditionally, +unless it is certain that they have been already baptized validly +(Canon 749). The internal dispositions of intention and state of grace +are necessary, while for baptism of adults fasting is advisable (Canon +753).</p> + +<p>2694. The Sacrament of Confirmation.—Next to Baptism, not in necessity +or dignity but in likeness and in time, is Confirmation; for +Confirmation completes the work begun in Baptism, and it is also +frequently received immediately or next after Baptism. It may be +defined as “the Sacrament in which through the anointing with chrism +and the prayer of the bishop a baptized person is perfected and +strengthened in the grace received and signed indelibly with the +character of soldier of Jesus Christ.”</p> + +<p>(a) The element of the Sacrament (remote matter) is chrism, that is, a +mixture of olive oil and balsam specially blessed by the bishop and +applied (proximate matter) by an anointing and the imposition of hands +on the forehead of the recipient. The law of the Church requires that +the chrism be new (i.e., made at the last previous consecration of +oils), and that the anointing be made with the right thumb in the form +of a cross.</p> + +<p>(b) The form of Confirmation in the Latin Church is as follows: “I sign +thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of +salvation in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy +Ghost.”</p> + +<p>2695. The Minister of Confirmation.—(a) Qualifications.—The ordinary +minister of this Sacrament is only the bishop; but a priest may act as +extraordinary minister, either from the common law (viz., Cardinals, +Abbots, etc.), or from special indult (Canon 782). The bishop may +confirm outsiders in his own diocese, unless their own Ordinary +forbids, and with permission he may confirm outside his diocese (Canon +783). Since January 1, 1947, by force of the decree of the Congregation +of the Discipline of the Sacraments (_Spiritus Sanctus_) the following +were established as extraordinary ministers within the limits of their +territories and for subjects in danger of death.</p> + +<p>1) “pastors having their own territories, therefore excluding personal +and family pastors, unless they have also their own territory.” Under +this heading are included secular and religious pastors. It is to be +noted that, since national parishes in the United States are assigned a +definite territory, pastors of such parishes enjoy the privilege of +this decree. Pastors of Negro and Indian parishes, even if they are +considered to be personal pastors, may be included, for the +jurisdiction is both personal and territorial. Military chaplains can +not confirm in virtue of this decree.</p> + +<p>2) “the vicars spoken of in Canon 471, and also parochial +administrators (_vicarii oeconomi_).” The first group are canonically +innominate and authors adopt various titles for the personages +involved. However, the reference is always to the priests placed in +actual charge of _cura animarum_ in parishes which have been fully +incorporated. The second group mentioned are the _vicarii oeconomi_, +priests appointed canonically as administrators of vacant parishes (see +Canons 472, n.1; 473,1). All other vicars lack the power, namely, the +Diocesan Administrator (_vicarius capitularis_), Vicar General, +_Vicarius Substitutus_ (priest who takes place of absent pastor), +_Vicarius Adjutor_ (assists a disabled pastor), _Vicarius Cooperator_ +(curate), those who according to Canon 472, n.2, take temporary charge +of a vacant parish prior to appointment of a true administrator, +chaplains of schools, hospitals, and other charitable institutions (by +rescript of Nov. 18, 1948, the faculty was extended also to chaplains +of maternity hospitals and foundling homes in the United States, and +this faculty is renewable), the seminary rector, religious superiors +even in exempt communities.</p> + +<p>3) “priests to whom is entrusted exclusively and permanently within a +definite territory, and with a definite church, the complete care of +souls together with the rights and duties of pastors.” Such territorial +arrangements are not common in the United States. The reference may +be to priests established as quasi-pastors in Canon 216, Sec.3 (hence +pastors in missionary territory and prefectures), episcopal delegates +to the territories later to be erected as parishes or to maintain +the status of a perpetual vicarage. Perhaps the reference is only to +special arrangements made by particular diocesan laws.</p> + +<p>(b) Duties.—The ordinary minister of this Sacrament should confer +it when his subjects reasonably request it, and the Ordinary should +see that the Sacrament is administered to his people, if possible, at +least every five years (Canon 785). It would be unreasonable, however, +to expect a bishop to go to every sick or dying person who desires +Confirmation, as the Sacrament is not necessary for salvation and the +task would be morally impossible, The Sacrament should be performed +validly, worthily, and rubrically. When Confirmation is given, fasting +is of counsel, not of precept. The use of a sponsor in Confirmation +seems to be a grave obligation, when possible. A recipient can have but +one sponsor, and a sponsor can act for only one or two confirmandi, +unless it appear to the minister that there is sufficient reason to +have a sponsor act for more (Canon 794). The pastor of the recipient, +if he is unaware of the Confirmation, should be notified as soon as +possible (Canon 799).</p> + +<p>(c) Various prescriptions, some of them subjects of special study, +are attendant upon the grant of power to confirm to pastors and +“equivalent pastors.” The major ones are summarily stated here. The +pastor obtains this power when he acquires the office. It lasts as +long as he holds office. The exercise of his power becomes unlawful if +he falls under censure; in certain cases it may then even be invalid. +Theologians disagree as to the precise nature of the power, whether +it be of orders, of jurisdiction, of both, an intrinsic or extrinsic +modification of orders, etc. The common opinion holds that it is solely +a power of orders. Hence, Canon 209 may not be safely used here, and +an ordinary assistant who attempts to confirm would not fall under any +irregularity; a pastor, however, might, by misuse of his power, be not +only deprived of it, but be placed under an irregularity. Use of the +power is not dependent on the permission of the local Ordinary. It may +be necessary to inquire however, whether the bishop wishes to confirm +in particular cases. Episcopal instructions on this matter must be +complied with.</p> + +<p>(d) Subjects of the Extraordinary Minister. The decree, _Spiritus +Sanctus_, in its second rule lays down a condition for the valid +administration of Confirmation by the extraordinary minister and +determines the proper subject. The new faculty is strictly personal +(hence it may not be delegated to others) and strictly territorial +(hence the administration must take place within the confines of the +minister’s district and therein extends even to exempt places). The +recipient must be “in real danger of death because of a serious illness +from which it is foreseen that he will die.”</p> + +<p>Before treating the illness established as a condition for validity, +other conditions of the subject must be considered. The decree +describes the proper recipient as _fidelis_ in two places. The question +has been discussed whether this limits the subjects to Catholics and +excludes validly baptized Protestants. Authors are not agreed. Perhaps, +since the extraordinary minister can act only within the powers given +him in the decree, he would have to interpret _fidelis_ as extending +solely to Catholics. On May 1, 1948, the Congregation for the Oriental +Church issued a grant of powers to the Latin extraordinary ministers +to confer Confirmation under the same conditions to Catholics of the +Oriental rite who live under the jurisdiction of a Latin Ordinary, +who are in the territory of the Latin pastor and whose rite has no +established parish or mission in the locality. (This grant of power +was previously impossible by virtue of Canon 782, Sec.4.) In emergency +cases there would be no need to await the arrival of the proper pastor. +Since Ruthenian Catholics are not under the Latin Ordinaries in this +country, it seems that the decree might not extend to them. The point +is disputed, but it would be imprudent to act on the opinion that the +Ruthenians are included until the question is officially settled. The +recipient need not be a permanent resident in the territory by reason +of domicile or quasi-domicile; physical presence suffices.</p> + +<p>The final condition of dangerous sickness is similar to the one in +Extreme Unction; it must arise from an intrinsic cause, not from an +extrinsic cause. and includes not only sickness, but also wounds and +accident cases. The decree speaks of the subject in “_vero mortis +periculo_.” Some thought that the wording distinguished the sickness +from mere “_periculo” mortis_, and hence must be certain, not doubtful +or probable. In response to the Cardinal of Palermo, on March 6, +1947, the Congregation of the Sacraments favored the opinion that the +norms for “_urgente mortis periculo_” (Canons 1043, 1044, 1046) are +applicable. As a rule of thumb, many authors propose: if the sickness +permits the administration of Extreme Unction, it also justifies the +giving of Confirmation in accordance with the terms of the decree.</p> + +<p>2696. The Recipient of Confirmation.—(a) Qualifications.—The subject +of this Sacrament is only a baptized person, and in adults intention +is necessary. The general custom in the Latin Church is not to confirm +before the seventh year, or thereabout, has been attained; but the +Sacrament may be given even earlier, if an infant is in danger of +death, or if there seems to the minister to be a just and grave +reason for confirming one under seven years of age (Canon 788). Those +who have the use of reason should not be admitted to Confirmation +without previous instruction on the nature of the Sacrament and the +requirements for its proper reception.</p> + +<p>(b) Duties.—There is an obligation to receive this Sacrament when one +has the opportunity (Canon 787); but apart from scandal, contempt, +or danger to salvation the obligation seems light. Hence, if a +person advanced in years is ashamed to receive Confirmation with the +children, he should be advised but not reproved; nor should he be +denied absolution as if he were certainly guilty of serious fault. The +recipient should be in the state of grace, and it is advisable that he +go to confession beforehand if he have serious sin on his conscience. +Though not necessary, it is more suitable that the recipient be +fasting. A new name may be taken in Confirmation, and it is proper that +those whose baptismal name is unsuitable should either have it changed +at this time or add the name of a Saint. Those who are being confirmed +should be present for the entire ceremony (Canon 789).</p> + +<p>2697. The Sponsors in Confirmation.—(a) Qualifications.—The +requirements for validity are, _mutatis mutandis_, practically the same +as for baptismal sponsorship. Thus, the sponsor must be designated by +the parents or the candidate, or, in default of them, by the pastor or +minister; he must not be the parent or spouse of the confirmandus; he +must physically touch the confirmandus at the moment of Confirmation. +Further, it is required that the sponsor be already confirmed himself. +The requirements for licitness are the same as for Baptism, and +moreover, as a rule, the sponsor at Confirmation should be of the +same sex as the recipient and be different from the baptismal sponsor +(Canons 795, 796).</p> + +<p>(b) Duties.—The godfather at Confirmation contracts a lifelong +spiritual relationship with his godchild (which does not constitute a +matrimonial impediment). The latter should have a special place in his +prayers according to the order of charity, and, if necessity arises, +should receive his protection and assistance in spiritual matters +(Canon 797).</p> + +<p>2698. Duties of the Pastor in Reference to Confirmation.—(a) The +pastor should instruct his people on the nature and advantages of +Confirmation and should see to it that they receive the Sacrament in +due time (Canon 787). He should also instruct his parishioners about +the terms of _Spiritus Sanctus_. His power as extraordinary minister +imposes an obligation _per se_ grave to use it when the cases arise; +excusing causes, however, are possible, and neglect in a single case +would be only venial. At appointed times each year he should hold a +continuous course of instructions over a period of several days in +order to prepare the classes of children for the proper reception of +Confirmation (Canon 1300).</p> + +<p>(b) The pastor should see that the Confirmations of his parishioners +are entered in a special book of record, and should also note in the +baptismal register the fact of Confirmation (Canons 798, 470, n. 2).</p> + +<p>2699. The Sacrament of the Eucharist.—This is the chief Sacrament, +for, while the other Sacraments produce the grace or the grace and the +character of Christ, this one contains Christ Himself; and, while the +other Sacraments are means that prepare man to consecrate or to receive +the Eucharist or at least symbolize it, the Eucharist is the end of +them all. The Eucharist may be defined as follows: “The body and blood +of our Lord Jesus Christ present through the words of consecration +under the appearances of bread and wine to be offered to God and to +be received by man.” Thus, we may distinguish various aspects of the +Eucharist.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a sacrifice, since the Mass is the supreme act of worship and +is one with the sacrifice of the cross (see 2178 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) It is a permanent Sacrament, since unlike the other Sacraments +it does not consist in the passing application of a sacred sign to a +recipient, but in the abiding presence of a thing absolutely sacred +contained under sensible forms.</p> + +<p>(c) It may be considered in its passing phases of beginning, in which +it is consecrated by the priest (performance of the Sacrament), and +termination, in which it is received by the communicant (application, +dispensation of the Sacrament).</p> + +<p>2700. The Matter and Form of the Eucharist.—Since the essence of a +Sacrament is found in the outward sign, it is commonly held that the +Sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the species of bread and wine as +signifying the body and blood of the Saviour, which is really, truly +and substantially contained under them.</p> + +<p>(a) The matter of the first consecration is that which Christ used, +namely, bread. The bread must be true bread in the strict and usual +Scriptural sense of the word. Hence, for validity it is necessary that +it be made from wheat flour (bread made from beans, peas or other +legumes, bread made from non-wheaten cereals such as corn, oats, +and probably also rye and barley, is not valid matter); that the +flour be mixed with water (bread made from a notable quantity, i.e., +about one-third of other liquid, such as milk, oil, wine, is invalid +matter); further, that the mixture be sufficiently baked (dough or +half-baked cakes are invalid matter). The bread must be entire and +not substantially adulterated or changed; hence, bread from which all +the gluten has been abstracted, bread to which a notable amount of +foreign substance (such as sugar or non-wheaten flour) has been added, +bread so old that it has corrupted, cannot be consecrated. Accidental +qualities do not affect validity, and hence any kind of wheat may be +used (hard, soft, red, or white). But the church law strictly requires +that a priest observe the tradition of his own Church (i.e., among +Latins the bread must be unleavened and the host round), and that all +consecrated matter be new (i.e., not baked more than fourteen days, or, +according to others, twenty or forty days), clean, and unbroken. The +small particles for the laity should be about one inch in diameter, the +large hosts about two or three inches; and all altar breads should be +of moderate thickness.</p> + +<p>(b) The matter of the second consecration is likewise that appointed by +Christ at the Last Supper, namely, wine. Only wine strictly so called +according to Scriptural and common usage is valid matter. Hence, the +Eucharistic wine must be made from grapes, and consequently cherry +wine, currant wine, peach wine, blackberry wine, cider, wild grape +wine, artificial wine, etc., are insufficient; the grapes must be +ripe, and verjuice is therefore invalid matter. The wine must also be +entire, unadulterated, and uncorrupted; and hence wine from which all +the alcohol has been removed, brandy or cognac (i.e., spirits distilled +from wine), wine to which a notable quantity of water, tartaric acid, +sugar, alcohol or other substance has been added, and wine which has +become vinegar, are not fit matter for the Sacrament. Accidental +qualities are of no importance to validity, and hence the wine may be +red or white, dry or sweet; it may be made either from ripe or dry +grapes (raisin wine); and the Church permits the fortification of weak +wine by a process of heating that does not prevent fermentation, or +by the addition when fermentation has begun to subside of grape or +wine alcohol on condition that the final alcoholic strength does not +exceed 12%, or in some cases, if the wine possessed so much, 17% or +18%. But the church law strictly requires for licit matter that wine be +fermented, though must or new wine is permissible in case of necessity, +if it have about 5% alcohol; that it be neither souring nor frozen, nor +mixed with substances added for the sake of aroma, color or sweetness, +nor with water poured in before Mass. The tradition and law of the +Church, based on the example of Christ, make it a grave obligation that +a few drops of water be added to the wine at the altar, but, if the +water equals a third part of the wine, the matter becomes of doubtful +sufficiency.</p> + +<p>(c) The form is contained essentially in the words of consecration +used by Christ at the institution of the Eucharist, namely, “_Hoc est +corpus meum_” over the bread, and “_Hic est calix sanguinis mei_” over +the wine. But a grave precept of the Church requires that all the other +principal words of the consecration be pronounced (i.e., the “_novi et +aeterni testamenti_, etc.,” the “_Haec quotiescumque_, etc.,” the “_Qui +pridie_,” the “_Simili modo_”). The omission of the particle “_enim_” +would be only venially sinful.</p> + +<p>2701. The Minister of Consecration.—(a) Qualifications.—Every priest +and only a priest can consecrate validly, for only to the Apostles and +their successors in the priesthood were spoken the words of Christ: “Do +this in commemoration of Me.” But only those priests can consecrate +lawfully who have the faculty of celebrating Mass (see 2709).</p> + +<p>(b) Duties as regards Valid Consecration.—Internally, there must be +the intention (actual or virtual) of acting in the name of Christ, +and of effecting what the words of consecration signify; and hence a +merely narrative recitation of the form is insufficient. This actual +or virtual intention must also determine the individual matter to be +consecrated, and hence a host placed on the corporal is not consecrated +if the priest neither saw it nor took it up for consecration. Small +crumbs in the ciborium and small drops of wine on the inner side of the +chalice are consecrated, unless excluded by the priest’s intention; +but drops of wine on the outside of the chalice should be considered +unconsecrated, since it is unlawful to consecrate what is not contained +in the chalice.</p> + +<p>Externally, bread and wine must be physically present to the priest, +that is, so within his reach or range that according to human usage +they can be correctly designated by the demonstrative pronoun “this” +used in the form. Accordingly, they must be near the minister; how +near cannot be mathematically defined, and authors variously assign +about ten, twenty, thirty, forty and fifty paces as the extreme limit. +Again, the bread and wine must not be separated from the minister by +any dividing partition, such as a wall, or the altar, or perhaps even +the closed door of the tabernacle, though a closed container (such as +a covered ciborium or chalice) would not put the matter away from the +minister’s presence. Finally, they must not be behind the minister’s +back, and, even if they are before him but hidden (e.g., hosts under +the corporal or chalice), the consecration is doubtful.</p> + +<p>(c) Duties as regards Lawful Consecration.—Internally, there must be +the state of grace, which the divine law prescribes, Further, one who +is conscious of grave sin certainly committed and certainly unconfessed +(unless inculpably omitted in confession) must go to confession +beforehand, unless there be need to celebrate at once (e.g., because +otherwise there will be no parochial Mass on a day of precept, or +because grave scandal or defamation will result, or a dying person will +be deprived of the Viaticum) and confession is impossible (i.e., there +is no confessor present who has jurisdiction, or who can be resorted to +without a serious inconvenience extrinsic to confession, and moreover +it is very difficult on account of distance, health, weather, or other +like reasons to go elsewhere to confession). Under these circumstances, +he may make an act of perfect contrition and then proceed to celebrate. +But one who has consecrated without confession because of such +necessity must go to confession as soon as possible—i.e., within three +days, or, if circumstances so require, earlier than that (e.g., if a +confessor can be had the same day, but not again for a week) or later +(e.g., if a confessor cannot be had for a week). These rules about +confession are of grave obligation, from Church law at least (Canon +807). On account of disrespect, it seems that grave sin is committed +when the celebrant is voluntarily and advertently distracted during +consecration, but he should not repeat the form unless it is certain or +very probable that something essential has been omitted. Externally, +consecration must be made only during Mass, both species must be +consecrated, a larger quantity must not be consecrated than can be +conveniently used, the matter at the moment of consecration must rest +on the corporal and above the stone of the altar, and a ciborium must +be uncovered while its bread is being consecrated.</p> + +<p>2702. Inadvertent Neglect of Grave Liturgical Precept.—Is the +consecration valid when the minister inadvertently neglects some grave +liturgical precept as to the matter or manner of consecration?</p> + +<p>(a) Some authors reply in the negative, because they feel that +no priest has the will to consecrate in a way forbidden by the +Church under pain of grave sin. According to this opinion, then, if +accidentally no water were placed in the chalice, or if the chalice +were unconsecrated, or if the ciborium were left off the corporal, the +consecration would be invalid.</p> + +<p>(b) Other authors distinguish as follows: if the celebrant intended not +to consecrate with a material breach of grave liturgical prescription, +the consecration would be null; if the celebrant had only the intention +to consecrate all valid matter before him, the consecration would be +valid. This latter intention, it seems, should be formed by all priests +once for all, since it ensures the validity of their consecrations and +is not sinful, as it does not aim to violate the rubrics, but only to +provide for exceptional cases when a rubric is unintentionally violated.</p> + +<p>2703. The Minister of Communion.—(a) Qualifications.—The ordinary +minister of Communion is a priest, the extraordinary minister a deacon. +Pastors and other priests to whose custody the Blessed Sacrament +is entrusted have the right to give Communion, and others also who +have express or presumed permission. The celebrant of Mass may give +Communion during his Mass, and, if Mass is private, just before and +just after it. A sick priest who is unable to say Mass may communicate +himself, at least when there is no other minister at hand; and even +a layman may, in the absence of a major cleric, give himself the +Viaticum, or consume the Host to save it from profanation (Canons +845-850).</p> + +<p>(b) Duties.—Internally, the minister is bound _sub levi_ to be in +the state of grace, and _sub gravi_ to be free from censures (such as +suspension) which forbid him the exercise of the ministry. Externally, +he must observe the church laws on the manner, time and place for +distribution of the Sacrament (Canons 851, 852, 867-869), and also +the liturgical rules for Communion during and outside of Mass, for +Communion of the sick and the dying, and for the avoidance of defects +in giving Communion (Rituale Rom., Tit. IV; Missale Rom., de defectibus +Missae).</p> + +<p>2704. The Recipient of the Eucharist.—(a) Those Who May Receive +Communion.—According to divine law, every living person who has +received Baptism of water is capable of receiving the Eucharist, +infants and the insane not excluded. Ecclesiastical law requires other +conditions, which are justified by considerations of respect for the +Blessed Sacrament or other good reason. Communion may not be given, +first, to those who have not the use of reason (i.e., to infants and +the perpetually insane), nor to those who are unable to understand the +essential truths of religion and morality (i.e., to those who have +always been deaf and dumb or blind, and who are uninstructed); for, on +the one hand, the Sacrament is not necessary for these persons, and, +on the other hand, there is great danger of irreverence if it be given +them. Secondly, Communion may not be given to those who cannot receive +without grave peril of unbecoming treatment of the Sacrament, as in +the case of those who cough or vomit continually or frequently, or of +those who are delirious, or unconscious, or insane, But if the danger +is certainly slight (e.g., if the person can swallow an unconsecrated +host without spitting it out), Communion may be given, at least the +Viaticum or Easter Communion. Next those persons are denied Communion +who cannot receive without scandal (e.g., those who are infamous, such +as prostitutes or defamers, persons intoxicated or insufficiently +dressed). Finally, no one may receive Communion who has already +received it that day, lest the Sacrament become common and be taken +without due preparation; but exception is made when it is necessary +to communicate a second time in order to comply with the divine law +of receiving Viaticum or of saving the Host from profanation (Canons +853-858).</p> + +<p>(b) Those Who Must Receive Communion.—There is a divine precept that +adults receive the Eucharist worthily (John, vi. 54). It obliges _per +se_, when one is certainly or almost certainly in proximate danger of +death, unless one has recently (that is, according to some, within a +week’s time) received Communion; for this Sacrament is the wayfarer’s +provision for his journey to eternity. It obliges also now and then +during life, since the Eucharist is man’s spiritual nourishment for +the journey of life. It obliges _per accidens_, when Communion is +necessary to avoid grave sin, for charity to self obliges one to use +the means without which serious spiritual harm cannot be escaped. The +church law determines the details for the fulfillment of the divine +precept. All the faithful who have reached the age of reason, even +though they be under seven years, must fulfill the yearly Easter duty +(see 2592, 2593). In reference to First Communion, the Church requires +that children who are not in danger of death must have a mental and +moral fitness, consisting in a knowledge of the chief mysteries of +faith and a devotion towards the Eucharist such as is possible at their +time of life. In reference to the last Communion, or Viaticum, the Code +declares that it is obligatory, no matter what be the cause of the +danger of death; it reminds us that the duty should not be put off too +long; it recommends that the Viaticum be administered even to those who +had communicated the same day before the danger of death arose, and +that it be given on distinct days during the danger. For children who +are in danger of death it suffices that they are able to distinguish +the Eucharist from ordinary food and to adore it reverently (Canons +859-865, 854).</p> + +<p>2705. Dispositions for Worthy Communion.—(a) Dispositions of +Soul.—The divine law requires the state of grace (I Cor., xi. 27 +sqq.), and probably also the previous sacramental confession which the +Church prescribes _sub gravi_ for one who is conscious of serious sin +not yet remitted through absolution. But he is excused from the duty +of previous confession who cannot omit Communion now (e.g., because +while at the rails he remembers a grave sin and cannot leave without +being disgraced) and who is unable to go to confession (see 2701 c). +The recipient must also have a knowledge of the Sacrament suited to +his mental capacity, and he must desire it, at least habitually. Since +the Sacraments are fruitful in proportion to the cooperation given +them, and since the presence and visit of Christ deserves honor and +recognition, Communion should be received devoutly, and should be +preceded by a preparation and followed by a thanksgiving (Canons 856, +731). The faithful may receive in any Rite, but their own Rite is +advised for Easter Communion and strongly urged for the Viaticum (Canon +866).</p> + +<p>(b) Dispositions of Body.—The communicant must observe the Eucharistic +fast and must conduct himself with external reverence.</p> + +<p>By ecclesiastical law a person is bound to the fasting from midnight +to receive the Holy Eucharist lawfully (Canons 808, 858). Despite the +changes made by the Apostolic Constitution, _Christus Dominus_ (Jan. +16, 1953) and the _Motu Proprio, “Sacram Communionem_” (Mar. 19, 1957), +priests and the faithful who are able to do so are exhorted to observe +this venerable and ancient form of Eucharistic fast before Mass or +Holy Communion. The legislation of these two papal documents, intended +to increase devotion to the Blessed Sacrament by fostering frequent +Communion, decrees:</p> + +<p>1) that natural water does not break the fast;</p> + +<p>2) that the period for observing the Eucharist fast before Mass, +at whatever hour it may be said (morning, afternoon, midnight), is +three hours from solid food and alcoholic beverages, and one hour +from non-alcoholic beverages. The priest who is to celebrate computes +his time from the beginning of Mass; the faithful, from the time of +Communion;</p> + +<p>3) that the sick, although not confined to bed, may consume +non-alcoholic beverages and real and appropriate medicines, liquid or +solid, without any restriction of time.</p> + +<p>The Eucharistic fast is based on primitive tradition and is enjoined by +the Church as a grave obligation that admits of no lightness of matter. +The fast is violated by the smallest portion of food or alcoholic +drink. Food is any solid which the physician considers digestible or +alterable by the stomach, and hence the fast is not broken if wood, +string, paper, hairs or fingernails are swallowed. But the food or +drink must be eaten or drunk, that is, it must come from outside the +mouth and be taken into the stomach in the way of consumption, and +hence the fast is not broken by what comes from within the mouth (e.g., +blood from the gums, food remaining in the teeth from the previous day) +or by what is taken into the stomach in the way of saliva (e.g., the +accidental remnants of a mouth wash or of a throat gargle, or spray, +or of a chew of tobacco or gum, when one has spit out the contents as +much as possible), or in the way of breathing (e.g., snuff, tobacco +smoke inhaled, an insect or a raindrop blown into the mouth). A solid, +like a caramel, however, which is dissolved in the mouth before it is +swallowed, can not be considered as a liquid. The liquid of the _Sacram +Communionem_ must be a liquid before it enters the mouth. (See “Some +Further Elucidations on Sacram Communionem” by Cardinal Ottaviani, +_American Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXXXXVII, No, 2, August 1957, p. +74.)</p> + +<p>The reasons that excuse from the Eucharist fast, in regard to solids or +alcoholic beverages, in lay Communion, are, in case of the well, the +good of the Sacrament (i.e., its preservation from profanation), or the +good of self (e.g., avoidance of serious disgrace, as when one who is +at the altar rail remembers only then that he is not fasting); in the +case of the ill, the danger of death (the Viaticum may be received even +daily after nourishment). The salt taken in Baptism does not break the +fast, and one who has a papal indult, which is granted for sufficient +reasons, may receive Communion when not fasting.</p> + +<p>External reverence means that one should approach Communion with +cleanliness of body, respectability of dress, and modesty of behavior. +No one is unfitted for Communion because of inculpable unsightliness +(e.g., a sick man who has irremovable scars or deformities, a poor man +who cannot afford any but the simplest garb, a crippled person whose +gait is awkward). But unwashed hands and face, dirty mouth or teeth, +worn or torn dress, and the like, which one avoids elsewhere as +unsuited for human company, should be avoided when receiving the +Eucharist. Women immodestly dressed should be refused Communion, if +otherwise scandal will result (Canon 858).</p> + +<p>2706. Frequent Communion.—What dispositions are required for frequent +Communion (i.e., Communion made several times a week) and daily +communion?</p> + +<p>(a) The necessary dispositions are the same as for rare Communion, +namely, the state of grace and a right intention. Right intention means +positively that one have in view the ends that Christ intended when He +instituted the Sacrament, namely, that by means of Communion one may +please Him, may be more closely united to Him, and may receive a remedy +for one’s defects and infirmities. Those who receive devoutly have +these purposes at least implicitly, which suffices; but it would be a +serious sin wilfully to exclude all these ends. Right intention means +negatively that one must not frequent Communion merely from routine, or +from vanity, or from purely human motives, such as pecuniary profit or +advantage. If the true ends are not excluded, these improper motives do +not exceed a venial sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Useful, but not necessary, dispositions are freedom from venial +sins, especially such as are deliberate, and freedom from affection for +venial sins.</p> + +<p>2707. Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors in Reference to +Communion.—(a) Parents.—The obligation of the Easter duty for boys +under fourteen and for girls under twelve rests morally and juridically +upon the consciences of those who are charged with their care, namely, +parents, guardians, pastors, and confessors (see 2630, 2631). The +parents are the best judges of the mental development, moral +disposition and instruction of their children, and therefore of their +fitness for First Communion (Canons 860, 854, n. 4).</p> + +<p>(b) Confessors.—The decision or counsel about the fitness of children +for First Communion, of penitents for frequent or daily Communion, +about the frequency of the Viaticum, is left by the Church to the +prudence of the confessor (Canons 860, 863, 864, 858, n.2).</p> + +<p>(c) Pastors.—The Code prescribes that pastors be especially zealous in +the matter of holding Lenten classes for the instruction of children in +order that they may receive their First Communion worthily; it vests in +the pastor the duty of seeing that no child approaches First Communion +who has not the use of reason or proper dispositions, as well as of +seeing that those children who are fit receive Communion without delay; +it also requires that he provide for the fuller instruction in +Christian doctrine of children who have made their First Communion +(Canons 1330, 854, n. 5, 1331). Pastors should recommend to their +people the practices of frequent Communion and of worthy Communion at +every Mass they hear, and should take care that the dying receive the +Viaticum while they are in possession of their mental faculties (Canons +863, 865). On the duty of administering Communion see 2676.</p> + +<p>2708. Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament.—Having considered the +duties owed to the consecration and communion of the Eucharist, we +shall conclude by mentioning those that are owed to the Sacrament in +its permanency or to Christ dwelling in the tabernacle.</p> + +<p>(a) The Duty of Custody.—The Blessed Sacrament must be reserved in +cathedral, abbatial, parochial, and religious churches; and it may be +reserved with due permission of the Ordinary in collegiate churches and +in certain public oratories; but there must be someone in charge, and +it is not allowed to reserve the Eucharist in private homes or to carry +it about when travelling. Churches which have the Blessed Sacrament +should be open at least a few hours daily to the faithful. It is not +lawful to reserve the Sacrament habitually on more than one altar of +the church, and that altar should be the one that is most honorable or +most suited for worship, and it should be suitably decorated. The +tabernacle should be as precious as possible and be carefully guarded, +and the Hosts should be reserved inside in a solid pyx or ciborium. +Before the tabernacle should burn day and night a sanctuary lamp fed by +olive or other oil (Canons 1265-1271).</p> + +<p>(b) The Duty of Renewal of the Hosts.—The consecrated species kept for +Communion and adoration should be frequently renewed, lest they be +corrupted. It would be a serious sin of irreverence to neglect this +duty for over one or two months, or even for a shorter time if the +danger of corruption is great on account of local conditions, such as +dampness (Canon 1272).</p> + +<p>(c) The Duty of Worship.—Pastors and others in charge of religious +instruction should encourage devotion to the Eucharist, and especially +the practice of assistance at Mass even on weekdays and of visits to +the Blessed Sacrament. Benediction may be given frequently, and at +least once a year there should be held in every parish church the +Devotion of the Forty Hours, or at least some more solemn exposition of +the Blessed Sacrament for a number of hours (Canons 1273-1275).</p> + +<p>2709. The Sacrifice of the Mass.—In the Eucharist is contained not +only a Sacrament which confers the grace of spiritual nutrition on its +recipients, but also a sacrifice which offers to God Christ’s oblation +as an act of adoration, thanksgiving, satisfaction and intercession. It +is this sacrifice—which is one with the sacrifice of the cross, though +offered unbloodily—that is known as the Mass. The chief persons who +have duties in reference to the Mass are the celebrant and the +assistants.</p> + +<p>(a) The celebrant is the priest, who acts in the name and person of +Christ. To say Mass validly one must have the power of Orders conferred +in the presbyterate or priesthood, and must intend to consecrate (see +2701 b); to say Mass licitly one must be free from impediments which +debar from Mass, such as suspension or irregularity. Strange priests +who wish to say Mass are required to present a celebret or testimonial +letter to the rector of the church (Canon 804), without prejudice, +however, to their right to say Mass once or twice when they present +themselves in clerical garb and sign the visiting priest’s book.</p> + +<p>(b) The assistants are all those who hear Mass. Their duties were +already explained in the question on the first precept of the Church +(2576 sqq.). We shall confine ourselves here, therefore, to the duties +of the celebrant.</p> + +<p>2710. The Obligation of Saying Mass.—(a) The Obligation by reason of +Orders or Priesthood.—Divine law imposes on priests as a body a grave +obligation of celebrating Mass with such frequency that the memory of +Christ’s passion be kept alive, which is the purpose of the priesthood, +according to the words: “Do this in commemoration of Me.” Divine law +also imposes on each individual priest the obligation of saying Mass at +frequent intervals (i.e., at least, it would seem, on the greater +feasts and at dates not more than six months apart); for a priest is +ordained primarily to give glory to God and to impart blessings to man +by the Sacrifice of the Mass (Heb., v. 1). It seems, therefore, that a +priest receives grace in vain or neglects the sacrifice (II Cor., vi. +1, II Mach., iv. 14) if he omits Mass on the most solemn occasions of +the year when nearly all the faithful are accustomed to receive +Communion, or if he omits it for such a notable period as more than six +months. It seems that the sin is _per se_ venial, as being opposed to +fervor rather than to charity; but it may be mortal _per accidens_, as +when serious scandal is given. There is no sin, however, if a priest +has no opportunity to celebrate, or is lawfully impeded (e.g., on +account of humility, scrupulosity, illness, or censure). The law of the +Church recalls this obligation in Canon 805, and calls on bishops and +religious superiors to exhort their subjects to say Mass at least on +all Sundays and holydays. Daily Mass is quite customary today, and +there might be serious scandal if without reason Mass were said only +exceptionally.</p> + +<p>(b) The Obligation by Reason of Special Offices or Duties.—Pastors are +bound to say or provide Mass for their people on days of obligation as +a duty of justice, and it seems on other days also as a duty of charity +if there is a great need or demand and no reasonable impediment. There +is an obligation of justice to celebrate Mass, if one has contracted to +do so; an obligation of fidelity, if one has freely promised; an +obligation of religion, if one has vowed; an obligation of obedience, +if one has been lawfully commanded by one’s superior.</p> + +<p>2711. Dispositions for the Celebration of Mass.—(a) Dispositions of +Soul.—The celebrant must be in the state of grace, and must go to +confession before Mass if he has a serious sin on his conscience (see +2701 c). He must have the intention and attention which the validity of +the consecration requires (2701 b), and the reverence and devotion +which is due the prayers of the Mass (2153 sqq.), Voluntary and fully +deliberate distractions entertained for a considerable time during the +Canon seem to be seriously sinful. It is most suitable, though +apparently not commanded by the Church, that Matins and Lauds be said +before Mass. There is, however, a duty of religion and of charity to +self to make a suitable preparation and thanksgiving; but negligence +here is a light sin, unless there be contempt or serious scandal. +Fifteen minutes or a half-hour is recommended by ascetical writers, and +the prayers may be taken from those given in the Breviary and Missal, +Internal prayer, however, is more important than external recitation +(Canon 810).</p> + +<p>(b) Dispositions of Body.—The Eucharistic or natural fast is of grave +obligation for the celebration of Mass (Canon 808). The only excuses +are necessity according to divine law or exemption by ecclesiastical +law. Necessity occurs when one must complete the sacrifice (e.g., when +after the Communion the priest notices that he consecrated one species +invalidly), or must avoid scandal (e.g., when a priest remembers after +going to the altar that he is not fasting), or must consecrate for the +Viaticum (e.g., when there is no consecrated host for a dying person). +Since the law is ecclesiastical, the Church could dispense for a grave +reason (e.g., to enable a sickly priest to say Masses on Sunday at +widely separated points of his missions). It is clear that the +celebration of Mass calls for cleanness of body, suitableness of dress, +neatness and rubrical correctness of vestments (Canon 811). The +omission of a principal vestment (i.e., blessed alb, stole or chasuble) +is a serious sin, except in grave necessity; the omission of minor +vestments (e.g., amice) is a venial sin, unless there is a just reason. +The color of the day is not gravely obligatory, except by reason of +scandal, and a good reason makes it lawful to use another color.</p> + +<p>2712. Gravity of Regulations Concerning Circumstances of Mass.—Serious +disrespect or serious scandal is caused by disregard of important +regulations concerning the circumstances of the Mass. Hence, the +following rules oblige under grave sin, though exceptions are permitted +for cases of grave or very grave necessity.</p> + +<p>(a) The Time of Mass.—Mass may not be said on Good Friday, nor private +Masses on Holy Thursday and Holy Saturday. Only one Mass may be said a +day, except on Christmas Day and All Souls’ Day, and on other days when +there is reason for bination or trination allowed by the Church. +Ordinarily the hour for beginning Mass should not be earlier than one +hour before dawn (i.e., in the latitude of New York from about 1:27 +a.m. to 5:00 a.m., according to the season), nor later than one hour +after noon. But the time is to be understood morally, and it is not a +grave sin in being earlier or later than the times fixed, unless there +is a difference of an entire hour (e.g., if one began Mass at 2:00 +p.m.) and not just excuse or dispensation. The Holy See has extended to +local Ordinaries the power to permit the daily celebration of Mass +after noon, if the spiritual good of a considerable number of the +faithful demands it (_Sacram Communionem_). The Holy See has also +granted permission to Ordinaries to allow the celebration of an evening +Mass on Palm Sunday accompanied by the blessing of palms and +procession. On Holy Thursday the Mass of the Lord’s Supper must be +celebrated at the most convenient hour, but not before 4:00 p.m. and +not after 9:00 p.m.; Ordinaries may grant permission for one or even +two low Masses (besides the principal Mass) to be celebrated in +churches and public oratories, and for one in semi-public oratories +within the same hours, 4:00-9:00 p.m. The proper hour for the Easter +Vigil is that which permits the Mass of the Easter Vigil to be started +around midnight. Permission may be granted to conduct the vigil at a +time not before sunset (Dispositions and Regulations concerning the +Holy Week Liturgy, Feb. 1, 1957, Sacred Congregation of Rites). One +Christmas may be said at midnight. It is a serious sin to say Mass in +less than a quarter of an hour, and a private Mass should not be +prolonged beyond a half-hour.</p> + +<p>(b) Place.—Mass may not be celebrated regularly except in a church or +oratory that is at least blessed and is not polluted, execrated or +interdicted. It must be said on an altar, and it would be a serious +sin, except in grave or very grave necessity, to celebrate without at +least one altar cloth or one lighted wax candle, or without a rubrical +chalice, paten, or corporal (Canons 822, 823).</p> + +<p>(c) Rites.—The principal rubrics of the Mass are gravely obligatory, +for example, to use an acolyte unless excused by dispensation or +necessity, to say each prayer of the Canon, and each part outside the +Canon that occurs in every Mass (e.g., the prayers at the foot of the +altar, the Gospel), to perform the main liturgical actions (e.g., the +Offertory, the breaking of the host, the purification of the chalice). +The secondary rubrics oblige under venial sin (see Canons 803, 812-819).</p> + +<p>2713. Is it Lawful to Discontinue a Mass?—(a) To terminate Mass before +the end has been reached is unlawful unless there be a serious reason; +otherwise, disrespect is shown the Holy Sacrifice. A grave reason +(e.g., sudden sickness) suffices if Mass be discontinued before the +Consecration; a most grave reason (i.e., danger of death or of +profanation of the Sacrament) if Mass be discontinued between the +Consecration and the Communion. But a Mass that is broken off after the +Consecration and before the Communion must be completed by the +celebrant or another, at least if this can be done within an hour from +the time of cessation; else the sacrifice is mutilated.</p> + +<p>(b) To interrupt Mass is also unlawful without serious cause. Thus, a +grave reason excuses an interruption outside the Canon, for example, to +preach a sermon after the Gospel or Communion; but only a very grave +reason excuses an interruption during the Canon, for example, a sick +call to give a necessary Sacrament (Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction, +or Viaticum) to a dying person.</p> + +<p>2714. Application of the Mass.—All the faithful, especially those who +are present and also the celebrant himself, benefit by the Mass, but +there is a special fruit reserved to those for whose intention the Mass +is offered by the priest; for the Mass is a sacrifice of intercession, +propitiation, and satisfaction, and since the priest acts in the person +of Christ he may apply its benefits specially to some particular person +or persons. In the following cases the celebrant is bound to make this +application of the ministerial fruit of the Mass.</p> + +<p>(a) In virtue of their office, pastors are seriously obliged to say +Mass for their flocks. There is a natural obligation on account of the +relationship between the pastor and the people, and there is also a +divine obligation, inasmuch as the priest is appointed to offer gifts +and sacrifices for sin (Heb., v, 1). The details of this duty, as to +the time, place and person, are prescribed in Canons 306, 339, 466. +There is a grave duty of saying for the people the number of Masses +which the Church orders; but the non-observance of the circumstances is +not a mortal sin, unless it happens frequently and without reason.</p> + +<p>(b) In virtue of justice, a priest who has received a stipend is bound +to apply the Mass for the intention of the donor, and to observe the +conditions of the agreement (i.e., the time, place, and kind of Mass +specified by the donor). The duty of application is a grave one, +because the loss inflicted on the donor by non-application of the Mass +to his intention is serious; the duty of observance of the accidental +conditions, however, is not generally grave, but it becomes grave if +its neglect inflicts serious harm (e.g., if the donor makes the date of +the Mass a _conditio sine qua non_, or if the Mass must be said at once +on account of an urgent and immediate necessity). Restitution is +obligatory if the Mass is not applied, or if essential conditions are +not complied with; it is obligatory _sub gravi_, if the stipend equals +what is relatively grave matter in theft.</p> + +<p>(c) In virtue of obedience, subjects are held to apply Masses for the +intention of their prelates, secular or religious, though bishops are +counselled to exact this most rarely. The obligation is grave or light +according to the intention of the superior, but if the application is +also due in justice to the giver of the stipend, there is a serious +duty.</p> + +<p>(d) In virtue of religion or fidelity, there is an obligation of +application when a priest has vowed this to God, or freely promised it +to man. The duty is grave or light according to the intention of the +vower or promisor (see 2210, 2407). But if there is an onerous promise +(e.g., in a society of priests whose members agree to say Mass for +fellow-members who have died), the duty is one of justice. One Mass +satisfies several free promises, if distinct Masses were not promised.</p> + +<p>2715. Duties of the Priest as to the Application of Mass.—(a) For Whom +May Mass Be Applied?—Mass may be offered for all objects not +forbidden. From the divine law it is forbidden to offer Mass for those +who are incapable of receiving its benefits (e.g., the demons, infants +who died without Baptism, the Saints), or for intentions that are +displeasing to God (e.g., for success in evil). From the ecclesiastical +law certain restrictions are made on the application of Mass in order +to safeguard reverence and prevent scandal. Thus, Mass may be said only +privately (that is, without publicity or special liturgical solemnity) +and prudently (that is, with avoidance of scandal, for example, by the +declaration that Mass is said for the faithful departed with the +purpose of aiding also a departed unbeliever, if this is pleasing to +God) for the living and dead outside the Church, such as infidels, +heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated. Moreover, for a +_vitandus_ Mass may be applied only when the intention is his +conversion (Canon 809).</p> + +<p>(b) How Mass Must Be Applied.—The intention must be formed by the +priest, since he represents Christ. But since his application does not +produce but only bestows the fruits, it suffices that his applicatory +intention be habitual and implicit, as when the celebrant has forgotten +the intention formed before Mass, or applies according to the mind of +his superior. The person or purpose to which Mass is applied must be at +least implicitly determined, and the application must be made at least +before the second consecration. If there are two conflicting +intentions, the stronger prevails (2667), and, if it is doubtful which +one was stronger, Mass should be next offered for the intention which +God knows was not satisfied. It is unlawful to apply Mass by +anticipation for the next person who will offer a stipend.</p> + +<p>2716. Mass Stipends.—It is not unlawful to receive a stipend for the +application of Mass, but irreligion, injustice, avarice, scandal and +disobedience must be avoided. (a) Irreligion is committed if the +stipend is offered or taken as the price of the Mass, or if Mass is +said only because of the stipend, or is requested only for the sake of +human favor (see 2333); (b) injustice is committed, if an excessive +stipend is exacted; (c) avarice is committed when one is over-anxious +about large stipends; (d) scandal is given when there is commercialism +or the appearance of it in dealing with stipends; (e) disobedience is +incurred when the laws of the Church on the amount of a stipend, the +number of stipends that may be taken, their distribution, satisfaction, +etc., are violated (see Canons 824-844). It is forbidden to require two +stipends for one Mass, or one stipend for mere celebration and another +for application.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_3_REPENTANCE_PENANCE_EXTREME_UNCTION">Art. 3: REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 84-90; Supplement, qq. 1-33.)</p> + +<p>2717. Penance is the name both of a virtue and of a Sacrament of the +New Law. The virtue was at all times necessary; the Sacrament is +necessary since its institution by Christ. Having considered in the +previous Article how the spiritual life is begotten, matured and +preserved through the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and +Eucharist, we shall consider in the present Article how spiritual death +and infirmity are overcome by the remedies of Penance and Extreme +Unction. But first we shall speak of the virtue of penance or +repentance which is a requisite for the fruitful reception of the +Sacrament of Penance and of its complement, Extreme Unction.</p> + +<p>2718. The Virtue of Repentance.—This virtue is a gift of God and a +permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man +cooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a +sinner is converted through consideration of God’s goodness or of the +rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful +delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God’s justice, +and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least +virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and +usually they follow one another in that process in the order here +given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart: +“Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted” (Lament, v. +21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to +God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow +servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to +God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of +mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its +own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of +reverence.</p> + +<p>2719. Repentance.—Repentance may be defined as “a moral virtue that +inclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to +make reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights.”</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to +sin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence, +it is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose +wills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as +their former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and +satisfaction pleasing.</p> + +<p>(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of +regret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive +faculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it +does not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.</p> + +<p>(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for +the injury done Him by one’s own personal sin. Sin may be considered as +opposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by +charity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests +it; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and +in this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns +intemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last +End, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is +considered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by +others, but one is not properly said to repent of them.</p> + +<p>(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by +which reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its +accompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for +the past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs +from religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and +offers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who +has been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between +filial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back +upon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet +of God.</p> + +<p>2720. The Character of Repentance.—(a) It is a virtue, since it is +commanded (“Do penance,” Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates +according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the +extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.</p> + +<p>(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by +which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those +acts within the bounds of moderation.</p> + +<p>(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to +another’s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there +is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose +power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative +justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;</p> + +<p>2721. The Excellence of Repentance.—(a) Its Dignity.—Repentance ranks +below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man, +repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the +supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain +preeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in +justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for +justification come before those virtues.</p> + +<p>(b) Its Necessity.—In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is +remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: “Unless +you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (Luke, xiii. 5). This is +reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by +his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial +sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and +must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection +of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover, +since one should be restored to God’s friendship before being restored +to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail, +unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance +need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his +sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is, +an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the +latter is not expressly taken into consideration.</p> + +<p>2722. Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?—(a) It is +necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation +cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent +to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable +way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a +precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury, +make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be +converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law +prescribes annual confession.</p> + +<p>2723. How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?—(a) It obliges +at once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity +for it. This happens _per se_, when one is in grave danger of death, +for at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God, +which supposes repentance. It happens _per accidens_, when by reason of +some urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated +here and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to +administer a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is +gravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).</p> + +<p>(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there +is no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance +until tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of +repentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only +for a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is +committed when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since +this exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation. +Practically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of +yearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider +it a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.</p> + +<p>2724. Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.—(a) When one +mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same +time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his +separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each +individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from +God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry +for another.</p> + +<p>(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also +forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to +heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the +examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of +Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii. +13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a +just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even +for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of +Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.</p> + +<p>2725. The Fruits of Repentance.—(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous, +is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room +for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always +ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is +refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even +impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).</p> + +<p>(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His +gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is +destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins +after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.</p> + +<p>(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin +and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii. +12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not +recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and +freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part, +which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid +all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not +necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with +the greater or less excellence of repentance.</p> + +<p>2726. Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.—(a) Mortal +sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (_ex +opere operato_) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either _per +se_ or _per accidens_ (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or +Sacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or +justification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.</p> + +<p>(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite +itself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly +either first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they +may awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The +sacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the +rite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to +the rite (_ex opere operantis Ecclesiae_); for the prayers of the Church +are acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance +that will remove venial sin.</p> + +<p>2727. The Sacrament of Penance.—For those who lose grace after Baptism +the Sacrament of Penance is necessary as a part of repentance and a +means of forgiveness. This Sacrament may be defined as “a Sacrament of +the New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judicial process, in +which, through the absolution of the priest, sins committed after +Baptism are forgiven to penitents who confess them with sorrow.”</p> + +<p>(a) The remote matter of this Sacrament is the personal sins committed +after Baptism, for Baptism washes away all sins committed before its +reception. Of this remote matter, some is necessary (i.e., sins that +must be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins not yet declared +or directly absolved in confession; some is free (i.e., sins that may, +but need not be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins already +forgiven in confession, and post-baptismal venial sins, whether already +remitted or not (Canon 902). Imperfections which are not sins, or whose +sinfulness is doubtful, are not sufficient matter for absolution; and +if they alone are confessed, absolution may not be given, unless there +is necessity, and then it may be granted conditionally (see 185, 186).</p> + +<p>(b) The proximate matter of this Sacrament, according to the view +commonly held, is the three acts of the penitent—contrition in the +heart, confession in words, and satisfaction in work. Contrition must +exist actually, but the other two acts in case of necessity need not +exist actually, but are included implicitly in the act of contrition.</p> + +<p>(c) The form of the Sacrament is contained in the words of absolution +spoken by the priest. Certainly the words, “_Ego te absolvo a peccatis +tuis_,” are sufficient for validity. But lawfulness requires that one +use the entire form and the other accompanying prayers as given in +one’s approved Ritual. In case of necessity, as in shipwreck or sudden +danger of death, an abbreviated form is permitted. Absolution must be +spoken or vocal, for the Church has never recognized absolution by +signs or in writing. It must be given to one who is present, that is, +one who is in the same place and not too far away to hear and be heard. +Those who are in different rooms that do not open on each other are not +in the same place; those who are more than twenty feet apart are too +far away for presence, according to the common opinion; but in great +need a more liberal view may be followed, and even absolution by +speaking tube or telephone may be resorted to.</p> + +<p>(d) The subject of the Sacrament of Penance is every baptized person +who has committed venial or mortal sin after Baptism. If there is doubt +about the Baptism or about the sin, absolution may be given +conditionally. Besides the conditions given for the Sacraments in +general, the recipient of Penance must exercise the three acts of +contrition, confession and satisfaction. The first is essential in +every case, and the second when possible; and without the third the +Sacrament is not integral or complete.</p> + +<p>2728. Probabilism in Administration of the Sacrament.—In the +administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance it is lawful +to follow opinions that are truly probable except in the following +cases: (a) when the validity of the Sacrament is at stake (678), unless +there is a case of emergency (679). Hence, as the law of material +integrity pertains to the lawful, not to the valid use of Penance, one +may use probable opinions in its regard (see 2740); (b) when the seal +of the Sacrament is involved, lest confession become odious.</p> + +<p>2729. Contrition.—The first act of the penitent is contrition. It is +defined by the Council of Trent as a sorrow and hatred for sin +committed, with a resolution of sinning no more and a desire of doing +what is necessary for the proper reception of the Sacrament of Penance.</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, it presupposes a hatred of personal past transgressions, for +one grieves only about that which displeases one, and the acts of the +will begin with likes and dislikes.</p> + +<p>(b) It consists essentially in sorrow or affliction of spirit, for +contrition, being the chief act of repentance, looks to reparation to +God for the injury done Him, and it therefore punishes the sinner by +sadness for his misdeeds.</p> + +<p>(c) It includes as a property or consequence the resolution to avoid +future sin and to do what God requires for forgiveness; for no one is +sincerely sorry for the past unless this sorrow makes him decide not to +repeat the offense, and makes him desire to fulfill the conditions that +God lays down for reconciliation.</p> + +<p>2730. The Two Kinds of Contrition.—(a) Perfect contrition is that +which is caused by charity, or the love of benevolence or of friendship +(1109, 1110) towards God. This love is had, whether the object of one’s +affection is the divine being or persons, the divine and infinite +perfections, or a single attribute; for all of these are really God +Himself. This contrition justifies the sinner at once, for it includes +charity and the will (at least implicit) to do what God wishes, and God +takes up His abode with those who love Him (John, xiv. 23). Perfect +contrition is necessary, both as a means and as a divine precept, +whenever the duty of repentance or of the Sacrament of Penance obliges +with a like necessity, and there is no opportunity of receiving the +Sacrament; for it is then the only way of recovering grace.</p> + +<p>(b) Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is contrition caused by a +supernatural motive inferior to that of charity, i.e., by a less +perfect motive suggested by faith that leads one to grieve over sin +committed, for example, the heinousness of sin in itself, its eternal +punishment by God (i.e., the pain of loss or the pain of sense), or its +temporal punishment by God in this life or in Purgatory. This +contrition does not justify the sinner without the Sacrament, for it +does not rectify or retract the disorder introduced by sin as far as +lies within the sinner’s power (that is, _ex opere operantis_). By his +sin the sinner preferred the creature to God; by his attrition he does +not go so far as to prefer God positively to every created good, else +his contrition would be perfect. But attrition suffices for +justification of the sinner with the Sacrament of Penance, for it +includes the essentials of contrition in general, and thus removes the +impediments to the activity of the Sacrament (that is, the production +of grace _ex opere operato_). The same holds good also of the +sufficient disposition for Baptism, and more probably of that for the +Sacraments of the Living received in good faith by one who is not in +grace.</p> + +<p>2731. Is Attrition Based Solely on Fear of Punishment Laudable?—(a) +Fear of the world is sinful, because it offends God to escape evil +(1044); slavish fear of God is sinful also, because it makes self the +last end, avoiding sin solely because of the harm it will bring on self +(1053). Sorrow for sin caused by slavish fear is not attrition, and is +not laudable.</p> + +<p>(b) Servile fear of God in itself is good and supernatural (1050), and +the sorrow for sin or attrition based on such fear is also good; and if +it includes a resolution of amendment, it suffices for justification +with the Sacraments. The end (i.e., to escape punishment) is good +(Matt., x. 28); the means (i.e., sorrow for sin) is good; and the use +of the means for the end is good, for desertion of sin is the way to +escape unhappiness (Luke, iii. 7, 8). Nor is it wrong to make a nobler +good (such as avoidance of sin) a means to a lesser good (such as +escape from punishment) when the lesser good is not made the last end, +but only the immediate end, of the greater good. Thus, when we pray for +temporal goods, we make a spiritual thing a means to a material end, +but the Last End of the prayer is God Himself. Servile fear, unlike +slavish fear (_timor serviliter servilis_), does not make self the last +end (Denzinger, 818, 1146, 1525).</p> + +<p>2732. Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance.—Must attrition based on +fear of punishment be joined with love of God to justify in the +Sacrament?</p> + +<p>(a) Some form of love is required, for all contrition is detestation of +sin, and sin is not hated unless its opposite is loved. Hence, just as +attrition must be accompanied by faith and hope, so it must also be +accompanied by some form of love of God (2718).</p> + +<p>(b) Disinterested love is not required. This is certain as regards love +of friendship, for even the smallest degree of that love is charity and +justifies even without the Sacrament (1112, 2730). This is commonly +held in reference to love of benevolence, which seems practically to be +always united with love of friendship or charity. A love that inclines +to God for His own sake but that does not predominate over other loves +is held by some to be necessary, but it is difficult to understand such +a love or to see its possibility.</p> + +<p>(c) Interested love (the love of concupiscence or of hope) is therefore +necessary. The common opinion today seems to be that it also suffices, +and that it need be only virtual or implicit. In other words, the +prevalent view is that every attrition prompted by fear of punishment +contains an initial love of God which suffices to turn the sinner to +God and to remove any obstacle to the action of the Sacrament. For “the +fear of God is the beginning of His love” (Ecclus., xxv. 16), the hope +of pardon is a beginning of love of the Author of pardon and justice, +the resolve to amend is an inclination to keep the great command of +love of God (1556).</p> + +<p>2733. The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition.—(a) It must +be internal, for contrition is an act of repentance and must be in the +heart. Merely pretended sorrow, and sorrow which one mistakenly thinks +one has, are insufficient.</p> + +<p>(b) It must be supernatural, for contrition is a disposition for the +reception of the supernatural habit of grace. Sorrow for sin induced by +natural motives, such as the punishments inflicted by human agencies, +if these are not viewed in the light of faith, is not sufficient.</p> + +<p>(c) It must be universal, that is, there must be sorrow for all mortal +sins not yet forgiven, for it is impossible to be really sorry for one +serious sin while retaining affection for another. But it is not +necessary to repent of all venial sins before one is forgiven (see +2724).</p> + +<p>(d) It must be sovereign, that is, if the contrition is perfect, God +must be loved above every other good; if it is imperfect, sin must be +hated above every evil that could lead to sin. If the sinner does not +detest his dishonesty more than the privation he will suffer by being +honest, he is not really contrite. It is, however, not necessary that +contrition be sensibly felt, or be of supreme intensity, or that its +act be of long duration; and it is rash to call to mind the kinds of +evils or torments one would prefer to suffer rather than commit sin +(see 1556).</p> + +<p>2734. Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament.—Some theologians, +distinguishing between contrition as matter of the Sacrament and +contrition as a disposition of the penitent, hold that it is possible +to have a valid but unfruitful reception of the Sacrament, and that +revival of its grace is possible. They explain thus:</p> + +<p>(a) the contrition required for the matter and the validity of the +Sacrament must be such as can be known with moral certainty by the +confessor from external indications, and hence it suffices for validity +that the sorrow be true and sincere and supernatural;</p> + +<p>(b) the contrition required for the disposition of the penitent and the +fruitfulness of the Sacrament must be such as excludes all affection +for every grave sin and includes the resolution to avoid all mortal sin +in the future, and hence it is required for fruitfulness that sorrow be +also universal and sovereign. (This opinion has very few, if any at +all, adherents among modern theologians. It is retained here solely as +a matter of record.)</p> + +<p>2735. Properties of Contrition.—Since contrition belongs to the matter +of Penance, it must have the properties of sacramental matter (2655 +sqq.).</p> + +<p>(a) Thus, the matter must be sensible, and hence contrition must be +shown in some external way, as by a sorrowful confession, devout +request for absolution, or, in the case of those who are unconscious, +by a call for a priest or the practices or prayers of a Christian life.</p> + +<p>(b) The matter must be united with the form, and hence contrition must +be elicited at the moment of absolution, or a short time before (not +more than a few hours before, according to some, or even a few days +before, according to others). But if a penitent recalls immediately +after absolution a forgotten mortal sin, and is then absolved from it +also, more probably he is not obliged to renew his act of contrition, +because the act just made virtually continues; in practice, however, he +might be told to make another act of contrition and a new penance or +the same penance may be imposed before the second absolution. Moreover, +for absolution when one is unconscious and in danger of death, since an +habitual intention suffices (2674), it seems that contrition made long +ago, but not retracted, is sufficient.</p> + +<p>(c) The matter must have at least a moral unity of its own parts, and +hence the contrition must in some way be directed to the confession; +that is, either before or during or after the act of contrition there +must be an intention to confess with the sorrow for sin contained in +that act of contrition, or to apply that sorrow to the confession just +made. Otherwise it does not appear that one has the purpose to make a +sacramental confession. But there is no practical difficulty, as every +act of contrition contains implicitly the will to confess, or every +sincere confession includes the will to use the contrition one has +exercised or will exercise.</p> + +<p>2736. Resolution of Amendment.—The resolution of amendment which true +contrition calls for is at least implicit in the hatred of sin, but it +is advisable that the penitent expressly resolve to avoid sin in the +future. This determination should have the following qualities:</p> + +<p>(a) it should be firm, that is, the penitent should make up his mind +not to relapse into deliberate sin. Yet, it is not necessary that he +feel certain of his perseverance, and his resolve does not cease to be +firm, if he foresees that he will fall again, provided he is decided to +do the best he can;</p> + +<p>(b) it should be efficacious, that is, the penitent must decide to use +suitable means to fulfill his good intentions as to reparation for +scandal, calumny, and injustice, as to the avoidance of sinful +occasions, etc.;</p> + +<p>(c) it should be universal, that is, the penitent must resolve at least +generically to avoid each and every grave sin in the future. If only +free matter (2727) is confessed, the penitent may direct his resolution +of amendment to all past mortal sins confessed, or to one of the +present venial sins declared, or he may resolve to do better in +reference to a certain class of sins (e.g., deliberate sins, faults of +speech), or he may resolve to diminish the frequency of his venial sins.</p> + +<p>2737. Confession.—The second act of the penitent is confession, that +is, the declaration of one’s sins made to a duly authorized priest with +the purpose of obtaining absolution. Confession is obligatory both from +divine and ecclesiastical law.</p> + +<p>(a) According to divine law, the forgiveness of grave post-baptismal +sins is subject to the power of the keys, which is exercised in the +form of a judgment and requires confession (Matt., xviii, 18; John, xx. +23). This law obliges _per se_ in danger of death, and occasionally +during life; _per accidens_, when one in sin intends to receive +Communion, when one is unable without confession to recover the +necessary state of grace or overcome a serious temptation or bad habit.</p> + +<p>(b) According to church law, the faithful must go to confession once a +year (2590), and confession is also prescribed at times for those who +wish to receive Communion (2705) or celebrate Mass (2701 c, 2711).</p> + +<p>2738. The Qualities of Confession.—(a) Confession is an act of virtue +and should have the conditions of a virtue; that is, it should be +discreet (e.g., the penitent should not reveal the names or sins of +others), willing, and pure in motive (e.g., the penitent should not +confess for temporal ends, such as the good opinion of the confessor), +and courageous (i.e., the penitent should not be deterred by shame).</p> + +<p>(b) Confession is an act of penitence, and, as penitence includes +hatred and regret for sin and abasement of self, confession should not +be boastful, jocular or proud, but shamefaced, sorrowful and humble.</p> + +<p>(c) Confession is essentially a declaration of fact, and hence it +should avoid the defects that make a declaration valueless or +imperfect, namely, falsehood, obscurity, digression, or concealment. +Confession, then, should be truthful, clear, to the point, and entire.</p> + +<p>(d) Confession belongs to the Sacrament of Penance, which is the forum +of conscience, and hence the penitent accuses himself, submits to the +judgment of the father confessor, and is heard in secret. Public +confession is valid but not obligatory. Hence, one who does not speak +the language of the confessor is not bound to use an interpreter. +Regularly confession should be vocal, but for grave reasons (e.g., if +the penitent is dumb, or the confessor is deaf, or there is danger of +being heard by those nearby) it may be made by signs or in writing. In +case of a written confession the penitent should declare orally, if +possible, that the writing contains his confession (see Canon 903).</p> + +<p>2739. Is it a Grave Sin to Lie to the Confessor?—(a) There is a grave +sin when the lie deceives the confessor about necessary matter (e.g., +when a circumstance changing the theological species of a sin is +denied), or about free matter which is the only sin confessed (e.g., +when a penitent lyingly accuses himself of only one sin and that a +venial one), or about free matter which the confessor asks about and +needs to know (e.g., about habits or occasions of sin). He who falsely +accuses himself of a grave sin, or who exaggerates the number of his +grave sins, _per se_ sins mortally; but he is excused if he is ignorant +or is under a momentary excitement or delusion. Not only is there grave +sin in the cited cases, but the confession is made invalid by the +defect in essential matter which the lie produces; for the confessor +does not understand the true state of the penitent’s soul.</p> + +<p>(b) There is mortal sin when the lie deceives the confessor about +matter that is impertinent to the confession, but is grave in itself, +as when the penitent seriously calumniates a neighbor to the priest. In +this case the confession is made invalid by the want of disposition on +the part of the penitent.</p> + +<p>(c) There is light sin when the lie deceives the confessor about free +matter which is not the only sin confessed, or which the confessor does +not need to know in order substantially to pass judgment and give +direction; also when the lie is not serious and is impertinent to the +confession. In these cases the Sacrament is not made invalid, for the +insincerity does not change the confessor’s decision.</p> + +<p>2740. Integral Confession.—The completeness or integrity of confession +is twofold.</p> + +<p>(a) Material completeness consists in the declaration of all mortal +sins committed and not yet confessed and absolved. This kind of +completeness is sometimes impossible, and therefore unnecessary. For +completeness is obligatory in virtue of a positive law of Christ, and +positive laws do not bind in case of impossibility (361).</p> + +<p>(b) Formal completeness consists in the declaration of all the mortal +sins which here and now, all things considered, one can and should +mention. This kind of completeness is necessary for a valid and +fruitful confession, because the law of Christ calls for a complete +confession, as far as possible, and formal completeness is possible. +Since he who is obliged by a law is also obliged to use the means to +keep the law, those who are going to confession should examine their +consciences beforehand, unless this is impossible or unnecessary. The +time and diligence to be given this examination depends on the person +and his circumstances; but all should be careful about it, while +avoiding scrupulosity, and should also remember that contrition is even +more important than confession.</p> + +<p>2741. Manner of Confession.—Completeness of confession as regards +mortal sins extends to the following points:</p> + +<p>(a) the theological and the lowest moral species of a sin (197 sqq.) +must be given, for otherwise the confessor does not understand the case +before him. He who has committed a mortal theft does not satisfy by +confessing a venial theft; he who is guilty of the specific sin of +calumny does not satisfy by the generic accusation of sins of the +tongue. But impossibility excuses, as when the penitent has only a +general recollection about a sin;</p> + +<p>(b) the number of the sins must be given exactly or, if this is +impossible, approximately. He who unintentionally exaggerates the +number or tells a sin of which he is not guilty, is not bound to +correct this, but he who unintentionally lowers the number to a notable +extent should tell in his next confession what was omitted (see 202 +sqq.);</p> + +<p>(c) the circumstances that change the species of a sin must be +declared, for example, the fact that the person who was scandalized was +one’s subject, that the person who was treated disrespectfully was +one’s superior, that the amount stolen was large (see 72);</p> + +<p>(d) the external act that completed an internal sin must be declared, +and hence he who committed impurity does not confess properly by saying +that he gave consent to impure desires (see 89-93).</p> + +<p>2742. Disputed Cases.—(a) Circumstances that Notably Aggravate a Sin +without Changing Its Species.—For the obligation of confessing these +circumstances, it is argued that, if the confessor does not know them, +he is unable to guide the penitent properly. Against obligation, it is +argued that the species of the sin gives the confessor sufficient +knowledge, and that the obligation of confessing aggravating +circumstances would make the burden too heavy for the penitent. But all +admit that _per accidens_ there may be a duty of confessing a +circumstance of this kind, as when it makes a sin reserved, or consists +in an occasion of sin or evil habit, or when it produces a great change +in reference to satisfaction (e.g., the theft of $10,000 is quite +different from the theft of $1000).</p> + +<p>(b) As to the Imputable External Effects of a Sin.—One opinion is that +these must be confessed, since they are willed in their cause (96, +102); another opinion is that they need not be confessed since they are +not sins, but results that followed on a sin; a third opinion answers +that they must be confessed if the evil will was not retracted before +they happened, but otherwise not. All agree, however, that the sinner +in this case should confess that he sinned with foresight of the +consequence, and that he should confess the consequence itself if there +is attached to it something that should be known to the confessor +(e.g., censure, irregularity, etc.).</p> + +<p>(c) Sins Whose Commission, or Gravity, or Remission is Uncertain.—If +the uncertainty is about the fact or gravity of the sin, there is no +obligation to confess the sin, even though its commission or its +gravity be probable; for the obligation cannot be proved. But if it is +certain that grave sin has been committed and uncertain whether the sin +has been confessed, a mere doubt or suspicion in favor of confession +does not exempt from obligation; a probable opinion in favor of +confession excuses according to Probabilism, but it does not excuse +according to Equiprobabilism, unless the doubt is about a confession +made long ago by one who was careful in making his confessions, or +unless there is question of a scrupulous person (655 sqq., 708, 709).</p> + +<p>2743. When Material Integrity Is Not Necessary.—Material integrity is +not due because of real impossibility in the following cases:</p> + +<p>(a) when there is physical impossibility, as when one is at the point +of death and too weak to make confession, or is deaf and dumb, or +cannot speak the confessor’s language correctly, or cannot finish +confession on account of shipwreck or other great peril;</p> + +<p>(b) when there is moral impossibility, as when material integrity +cannot be had except at the expense of a great temporal or spiritual +evil distinct from the inconvenience intrinsic to the confession +itself, and there is some serious reason that makes it necessary to go +to confession here and now (e.g., the desire of not remaining long in +the state of sin). Examples are: great spiritual harm, as when a +penitent is scrupulous; great temporal harm, as when the penitent has +to flee to escape assassination. Some affirm, while others deny, the +duty of mentioning a sin that will defame an accomplice with the +confessor, and in practice it seems the duty cannot be insisted on +(cfr. 2065).</p> + +<p>2744. Completion or Repetition of Past Incomplete Confessions.—(a) +Completion of past confessions must be made when they lacked material +integrity, if the impossibility has ceased.</p> + +<p>(b) Particular repetition is necessary when a confession lacked formal +integrity or other essential; that is, if a sin was unlawfully +concealed or unrepented of in confession, the sacrilege must be +confessed and the previous confession made over, since it was invalid. +But if the new confession is made to the same confessor and he has a +general remembrance of it, the new confession may be made summarily.</p> + +<p>(c) General repetition is necessary when several past confessions were +certainly invalid on account of lack of formal integrity or other +defect. Thus, he who has made bad confessions for three months must +make a general confession of that period of time. General confession is +advisable when there is a prudent doubt about the worth of past +confessions; it is permissible when it will help a penitent to be more +contrite and lead a better life; it is not lawful when it will do harm, +as when a scrupulous penitent will be harrowed and maddened by the +thought of his past sins.</p> + +<p>2745. Satisfaction.—The third act of the penitent is satisfaction, +which is defined as “a compensation for the injury done to God by sin, +appointed by God’s minister in the Sacrament of Penance and accepted +and performed by the penitent.”</p> + +<p>(a) This act is a compensation or payment made to God as an act of +reparation and justice.</p> + +<p>(b) The compensation is appointed by the confessor, for its chief +purpose is restoration of friendship between God and the sinner, and +hence equality is not sought, but the good will to do what God’s +minister imposes.</p> + +<p>(c) The compensation is accepted and performed. This is required for +the completeness, not for the essence, of the Sacrament. He who is +really contrite desires to satisfy, he who confesses offers to satisfy; +and hence, if for any reason he does not actually satisfy, his +satisfaction of desire suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, but +his omission to perform the satisfaction makes the Sacrament incomplete.</p> + +<p>2746. The Effects of Actual Satisfaction.—(a) There is a remissive +effect, consisting in the _ex opere operato_ release of a portion or of +all the temporal punishment due to sin forgiven.</p> + +<p>(b) There is a medicinal effect, consisting in the appreciation of the +evil of sin, the caution and vigilance against future relapse, and the +removal of evil tendencies, which the penitential works inculcate and +promote.</p> + +<p>2747. The Conditions for Effective Satisfaction.—(a) For validity +(that is, for discharge of the obligation) the penitent must perform +the penance as to essentials in the way prescribed by the confessor, +and he must perform it personally, unless the confessor permits or +enjoins fulfillment by proxy (Canon 887). A penance performed during +the actual commission of or with actual affection for sin, is not a +satisfaction, but a new offense.</p> + +<p>(b) For fruitfulness it is necessary that the penitent be in the state +of grace when he fulfills the penance, for the works of His enemies are +not supernaturally pleasing to God. Or, more exactly, a penance done in +the state of sin, but without affection for sin and under the influence +of actual grace, has no strict right either of justice or of friendship +to divine acceptance; but it seems fitting that such penance be +accepted by the divine liberality in part satisfaction for sins +forgiven.</p> + +<p>2748. The Obligation of Accepting and Performing a Penance.—(a) _Per +se_, the obligation is grave, since the penance belongs to the +integrity of the Sacrament, and hence its refusal or neglect is an +injury to a sacred thing. (b) _Per accidens_, the obligation may be +light, and this is held to be the case when the penance was imposed for +free matter, or when the satisfaction prescribed is a light work (such +as one or two Hail Marys). A penitent is not bound to accept an +unreasonable penance, and he may seek a commutation if such a penance +is imposed. As a rule, negligence about the circumstances of a penance +(e.g., the time, or posture) is not a grave sin, but exceptionally it +may be serious (e.g., if one delays a gravely obligatory penance six +months, or so long as to be in danger of forgetting it; if one omits to +say a prayer on bended knees when this was chiefly intended by the +confessor).</p> + +<p>2749. Causes That Excuse from a Penance Imposed.—(a) Commutation.—If +there is a just reason (e.g., the over-severity of the penance), the +penitent may have his penance changed to something lighter. The +confessor who imposed the penance may be asked to change it, even +probably after and outside of confession, and after a long time, and +though he does not remember the confession. Another confessor may +lessen the penance, but only in confession and after he has heard at +least a summary repetition of the sins for which the penance was given.</p> + +<p>(b) Cessation.—There is no obligation to fulfill a penance in case of +impossibility, whether physical (e.g., if the penitent is dying and can +neither say the prayers ordered nor ask for a commutation), or moral +(e.g., if the penitent has forgotten the penance and cannot +conveniently ask the confessor about it).</p> + +<p>2750. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Absolution.—(a) The +divine law requires the power of Orders, for only priests were +appointed by Christ as the ministers of Penance, (b) The natural law +requires the power of jurisdiction, since the Sacrament of Penance is +exercised in the form of a judicial process, which supposes authority +to judge. (c) The law of the Church requires the approval of the +Bishop, or his decision that the priest is a fit person to hear +confessions. Approbation is always given along with jurisdiction.</p> + +<p>2751. Power of Jurisdiction.—The power of jurisdiction is so necessary +that without it absolution is null.</p> + +<p>(a) Jurisdiction in general is treated in Canons 872 sqq. of the Code. +Ordinary jurisdiction is had by the Pope for the whole Church, and by +Ordinaries, parish-priests, exempt religious superiors, etc., for their +own subjects. Delegated jurisdiction comes from the law itself in favor +of penitents who are dying (Canon 882), or who are making a sea voyage +(Canon 883), a privilege extended recently also to those who are making +air journeys, or who are outside their domicile (Canon 881), etc.; +while delegated jurisdiction from man is had by those priests who have +obtained faculties orally or in writing from the competent superior +(Canon 879).</p> + +<p>(b) Jurisdiction in special cases is treated in Canons 874, 875, 876, +519 sqq. Religious women living in community should have for each house +one ordinary confessor and one extraordinary confessor who comes four +times a year. Further, the bishop should appoint supplementary +confessors to whom the Religious may freely make their confessions, and +special confessors for individual Sisters when spiritual progress is +aided by such an arrangement.</p> + +<p>2752. When the Church Supplies Jurisdiction.—In certain cases the +Church, for the good of souls, supplies jurisdiction for the time being +to priests who lack it:</p> + +<p>(a) in case of common error, that is, when all or many of the faithful +in a place think that a priest has jurisdiction, as when he is seated +in the confessional of a public church hearing or waiting to hear those +who are going to confession. The common error is not of law, but of +fact;</p> + +<p>(b) in case of uncertainty of law (e.g., whether a certain sin is +reserved) or of fact (e.g., whether the confessor’s jurisdiction has +expired) about the confessor’s jurisdiction, if the confessor has a +positive or probable reason in favor of his right to absolve. The +Church supplies jurisdiction in the absolution of a reserved censure +whose reservation was not known to the priest, unless it be _ab homine_ +or most specially reserved to the Holy See (Canon 2247, n. 3);</p> + +<p>(c) in case of danger of death, when full jurisdiction is granted to +every priest (Canon 882).</p> + +<p>2753. Limitation of jurisdiction.—(a) Reserved Sins or Cases.—For the +sake of discipline and the good of souls the absolution of certain more +atrocious or pernicious crimes is reserved to higher superiors, namely, +to the Pope or the Ordinary. Reservation is not incurred in a case +reserved on account of censure, if the penitent’s act was not gravely +imputable; nor probably in a case reserved for its own sake (unless the +reserving authority willed otherwise), if the penitent was ignorant +(though not crassly or supinely) of the reservation (Canon 2229). To +fall under reservation, a sin must be mortal, consummated (i.e. not +merely attempted) certain and formal (i.e., perpetrated with knowledge +of the special malice that caused reservation). Reservation ceases when +confession is made by the sick who are unable to leave the house or by +those who are about to be married; when the Superior has refused the +request for faculties to absolve a reserved case, or the confessor +prudently decides that the request for faculties cannot be made without +grave detriment to the penitent or danger to the seal; when confession +is made outside the territory of the Superior who reserves the sin +(Canon 900).</p> + +<p>(b) Reserved Persons.—Those who have not special faculties cannot +validly hear the confessions of nuns (Canon 876), for the director of +consciences of these Religious should be endowed with special virtue, +knowledge and prudence. Religious Superiors, novice-masters, and +rectors of seminaries or colleges should not act habitually as +confessors of their subjects (Canons 518, n. 2, 891), lest the +distinction between the internal and the external forum be forgotten. +Finally, to prevent abuse of the Sacrament and occasions of relapse, a +confessor cannot validly absolve his accomplice in a sin against the +Sixth Commandment, consummated or unconsummated, or from the sin of +complicity itself, as necessary matter of the Sacrament, if the sin was +on both sides external, certain, and both internally and externally +grave (Canons 884, 2367).</p> + +<p>2754. Absolution from Reserved Cases.—(a) In danger of death, any +priest can absolve every reserved sin and censure, but, should the +penitent recover, there is a duty in certain specified cases of having +recourse to the lawful superior (Canons 882, 2252). The latter Canon +specifies two cases in which recourse is necessary after the person +recovers, namely, a censure _ab homine_ and one most specially reserved +to the Holy See. A third case has been added by the Sacred +Penitentiary, namely, when a priest who has attempted marriage and is +unable to separate asks for absolution from the censure of Canon 2388, +Sec.1, in danger of death.</p> + +<p>(b) In urgent cases, namely, if censures _latae sententiae_ cannot be +observed externally without grave danger of scandal or infamy, or if it +is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for such +time as may be necessary in order that the competent superior may +provide, then any confessor can, in the sacramental forum, absolve from +these censures, no matter how they are reserved, imposing, under pain +of falling back into the censure, the obligation of having recourse +within a month (at least by letter and through the confessor, if it can +be done without grave inconvenience), without mentioning the name, to +the Sacred Penitentiary or to a Bishop or other superior who has the +faculty. The confessor imposes also the obligation of fulfilling his +injunctions (Canon 2254, Sec.1). It is to be noted:</p> + +<p>1) the circumstances constituting an urgent case are the two specified +in the Canon: the difficulty of observing the censure; the hardship of +remaining in sin.</p> + +<p>2) the object of the absolution is all censures _latae sententiae_, +however reserved, with one exception, namely, the censure incurred +under Canon 2388, Sec.1, the case of a priest who, after an attempted +marriage, is unable to separate. No absolution as an urgent case under +this Canon can be given. The censure _latae sententiae_ for false +denunciation can be absolved under this Canon only if the conditions of +Canon 2363 have been fulfilled (actual formal retraction and +reparation; imposition of a grave and long penance; and the sin itself +remains reserved _ratione sui_ to the Holy See).</p> + +<p>3) Sufficient extrinsic authority is available to make safe in practice +the extension of the grant of power of this Canon to censures _ab +homine_ which are _ferendae sententiae_.</p> + +<p>4) Sections 2 and 3 of this Canon indicate the right of the penitent to +go afterwards to a privileged confessor without making the recourse to +the superior enjoined upon him or observing the _mandata_ from the +superior in case he has already made recourse, and the procedure to be +followed when recourse is morally impossible.</p> + +<p>(c) Outside of necessity, only those can absolve who have ordinary or +delegated faculties. The law itself grants to pastors the power to +absolve during the whole of paschal time from all sins which the +Ordinary has reserved to himself, and missionaries have the same power +during the time they are giving a mission (Canon 899, n. 3). This does +not apply to censures nor to cases reserved to the Ordinary by the +Apostolic See or by law, such as the excommunication _latae sententiae_ +which Canon 2350 declares against the procurers of abortion.</p> + +<p>2755. Absolution Given by One Not Possessed of Jurisdiction.—(a) +Effect.—Absolution of mortal sins given without jurisdiction is +invalid; and of venial sins, is unlawful and probably invalid. In some +cases, however, the Church supplies jurisdiction, as was said above +(2752).</p> + +<p>(b) Guilt.—There is no sin if the absolution is given in good faith, +as when a confessor is inculpably ignorant of a reservation. If +absolution is given in bad faith and the confessor knows that the +Church does not supply, there is a grave sin on account of the +irreverence to the Sacrament and the harm to the penitent. If the +confessor knows that he lacks jurisdiction, but that the Church +supplies on account of common error, it seems that no sin is committed +if there is a good reason for giving absolution (e.g., the absence of +other priests); but otherwise there is mortal or venial sin according +to circumstances.</p> + +<p>(c) Penalty.—He who with presumption hears confessions without +jurisdiction or absolves from a reserved case for which he has no +faculties, incurs in the former case _ipso facto_ suspension from the +power of Orders, and in the latter case _ipso facto_ suspension from +hearing confessions (Canon 2366).</p> + +<p>2756. Duties of the Confessor before Confession.—(a) Fitness to Hear +Confessions.—The confessor should have sufficient knowledge to be able +readily to solve the usual cases and to work out or find the solution +of the more difficult cases; sufficient prudence to be able to apply +his knowledge well and to avoid what is dangerous or suspicious; +sufficient goodness to be sincerely desirous of the spiritual advantage +of the penitent, and to be patient in hearing him and firm in +correcting him.</p> + +<p>(b) Willingness to H ear Confessions.-The confessor is obliged either +from justice or charity (2676) to hear the confessions of those who +reasonably request it. He should observe the rules of the Ritual and of +the Code as to the manner and place of confession (Canons 908-910).</p> + +<p>2757. Duties of the Confessor as Judge in Hearing the Case.—(a) Since +confession should be entire, the confessor is gravely bound to question +the penitent, when there is reason to think that the confession is not +entire. With pious and well-instructed persons, of course, there is no +need of questioning, and, since the duty of integrity rests primarily +on the penitent, the confessor’s negligence may be regarded as venial +when he is burdened by a great multitude of confessions.</p> + +<p>(b) Since confession must not be made onerous or harmful to penitents, +the confessor is bound to be very discreet in the questions he asks, +and to follow the rule that it is far better to say too little than to +say too much. He must avoid any word or remark that might teach sin to +the young or scandalize the old; he must be very reserved when speaking +of matters that pertain to the Sixth Commandment, and, if there is need +to question about them, should begin with very general queries. Neither +directly nor indirectly may he inquire the name of an accomplice of the +penitent (Canon 888); but he is allowed to investigate matters which he +has a right to know, even though the accomplice thereby becomes known +to him. If the common good requires that a complaint be lodged against +the accomplice, the confessor may oblige the penitent to make this +complaint to the proper superior; but it is seldom advisable that the +confessor agree to perform this duty himself, and then he should +require that the penitent speak to him about the affair outside of +confession, if this can be done (see 1287).</p> + +<p>(c) Since the penitent acts as the accuser in confession, he should be +believed both for and against himself. But should it happen that the +confessor knows for certain that his penitent is lying, his procedure +will depend on the source of his knowledge. If the knowledge is not of +sacramental origin but comes from the confessor’s own reliable +experience (e.g., because he saw the penitent commit a sin and is sure +that the silence about the sin is not due to forgetfulness, ignorance +or previous confession of it), he should try to induce the penitent to +confess, and, if the latter refuses, should deny absolution. If the +confessor is morally certain on account of the word of a third person +that the penitent is now concealing a sin, it seems to some authorities +that absolution may be either granted or refused, to others that it +must be refused. Finally, if the confessor’s knowledge comes from a +previous sacramental confession or other obligatory secret, he is held +to respect the secret; he may not ask any questions which he would not +have asked otherwise, and, if the penitent will not confess, he must +either grant absolution, as some hold, or dissimulate its denial, as +others think.</p> + +<p>2758. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Deciding about the Case.—(a) +The confessor should pass judgment on the past state of the penitent’s +soul as declared to him, but defect or mistake here would not make the +Sacrament null. The objective malice of the sins (i.e., their +theological and moral malice) will be recognized by the priest from his +knowledge of theology, and the subjective malice from the declarations +or replies of the penitent. At times the confessor will have to rest +satisfied with the decision that the sin or its character is uncertain.</p> + +<p>(b) The confessor should pass judgment on the present dispositions of +the penitent, or the sincerity of his sorrow and resolution; but it +suffices that the judgment be probable, and there be no strong +suspicion against it. The penitent’s devout confession, or his promise +of amendment, the trouble he took to make his confession, etc., are +indexes of good faith, just as boastful confession, disregard for +former promises, and unwillingness or carelessness about coming to +confession are signs of bad faith.</p> + +<p>2759. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Passing Sentence.—(a) The Duty +of Binding.—The confessor must impose upon the penitent such duties as +are necessitated by the essence of the Sacrament (e.g., there is no +true contrition without willingness to make due restitution, +reparation, or satisfaction, and to avoid sinful occasions and to +struggle against bad habits), or such penalties as are required for its +integrity (i.e., the priest must impose a suitable penance). To +safeguard morals, the law of the Church gravely obliges a confessor to +require his penitent _sub gravi_ to denounce another confessor +certainly guilty of the crime of solicitation, unless there be a grave +reason that excuses the penitent; and, if the penitent refuses, +absolution must be denied. On the details of this law and on the +penalties for solicitation, refusal to denounce, and false accusation, +see Commentaries on Canons 904, 2368 and 2363 of the Code.</p> + +<p>(b) The Duty of Loosing.—The confessor is bound _sub gravi_ to give +absolution at once to one who is properly disposed, for there is a +tacit contract between the penitent and the confessor that absolution +will be granted if the penitent is worthy; the penitent puts himself to +considerable trouble to obtain forgiveness, and he is deprived of a +great good if absolution is refused (Canon 886). If only free matter is +confessed, it is a venial sin now and then to deny absolution without +reason, but no sin to deny it for a good reason if the penitent +consents.</p> + +<p>(c) The Duty of Retaining.—The confessor should always refuse +absolution to those who are certainly not contrite and in whom he +cannot awaken true repentance, for absolution would be of no benefit to +such persons and would make the confessor an encourager of sin. +Likewise, absolution should be denied those who are incapable (e.g., +those who have not as yet committed sin or who confess only +imperfections). If there is doubt about the fitness or capacity of the +penitent, absolution should generally be delayed; but it may be granted +conditionally for a serious reason (e.g., if the penitent is in a state +of sin and cannot return to confession for a long time), and it should +be granted conditionally for a very serious reason (e.g., if the +penitent will probably not return, or if he is confessing in +preparation for marriage).</p> + +<p>2760. Penitents to Whom Absolution Should Be Denied.—There are three +classes of penitents especially to whom absolution should be frequently +denied on account of their lack of repentance:</p> + +<p>(a) those who refuse to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion of +grave sin, for these are impenitent and unworthy of absolution. But +absolution may be given those who promise to abandon a proximate and +voluntary occasion, or to use the proper means of safety if they are in +a proximate and necessary occasion of sin (see 263 sqq.);</p> + +<p>(b) those who have contracted the habit of some grave sin, if they are +unwilling to use the proper means to overcome it; but if they seriously +promise to use means prescribed by the confessor, they should be +considered as well disposed. A sin is habitual when it is committed +often—that is, for an external sin about five times a month, and for +an internal sin about five times a week-and when the sinner acts for +the proper motive of the vice, e.g., in injustice for disorder, in +intemperance for pleasure of the sense, in sins against charity out of +hatred, etc. But consideration should be taken also of the character of +the person (i.e., a weak-willed person is enslaved by habit more +readily than a strong-willed person) and of the vice (i.e., an alluring +sin like impurity becomes a habit more quickly than other sins);</p> + +<p>(c) those backsliders or recidivists who have confessed the same grave +sin in three or four previous confessions and have relapsed into it +again without any improvement. These persons should be absolved if they +are sincere now and give some special indication as proof of sincerity +(e.g., some effort made to conquer their habit); otherwise (except in +great necessity, when they may be given the benefit of the doubt and be +granted conditional absolution) they should not be absolved but should +be put off kindly for a short space, since there is no reason to +believe that the present sorrow is any better than that of the past.</p> + +<p>2761. The Sacramental Penance.—(a) Obligation.—The confessor is bound +to impose a penance in order to provide for the integrity of the +Sacrament and the good of the penitent. Exceptions to this rule are the +cases when the penitent cannot perform any penance, as when he is at +the point of death, and when the penitent after the imposition of a +penance and absolution remembers new and necessary matter. It is at +least a venial sin to delay the giving of a penance till after the +absolution, and it is a grave sin to give no penance at all, unless (as +some hold) only a light penance was due.</p> + +<p>(b) Quantity.—The amount of the penance should be suited as a +punishment to the degree of the penitent’s guilt, that is, a heavier +penance should be given for necessary matter and a lighter penance for +free matter. The penance should also take into consideration the moral +malice and the frequency of the sins. Works that the Church may order +under pain of serious sin suffice for necessary matter (such as a Mass, +a fast, five decades of the Rosary, or the Litany of the Saints). Light +penances are the _De Profundis_, the Litany of St. Joseph, five Paters +and five Aves. For a sufficient reason (e.g., the sickness of the +penitent, the probability that a grave penance will keep him from +future confession, the fact that his sorrow is very great or that he +has gained a plenary indulgence, the performance of satisfaction for +him by the confessor himself) the quantity of a penance may be +lessened. A grave penance may be lightened by joining it with some duty +already owed (e.g., by requiring the penitent to say the Rosary while +hearing Sunday Mass, by obliging him to hear Mass on Sunday and also to +say a few prayers after the Mass).</p> + +<p>(c) Quality.—The character of the penance should make it suitable as a +remedy for the spiritual disease of the penitent; that is, as far as +possible he should be required to perform works that tend to correct +his chief failings. Thus, for those who are uncharitable or avaricious +an alms or other work of mercy is a good penance; for those who are +given to pleasures of sense, a fast or other corporal austerity; for +those who are lax or irreligious, a prayer, a visit to the Blessed +Sacrament, a meditation, or frequentation of the Sacraments. Ordinarily +it suffices to impose prayers as penances, since prayer is a universal +remedy. Penances unsuitable to the penitent (e.g., fasts for one who +needs nourishment on account of labors), those that are too difficult +(e.g., perpetual or long-continued practices), those that are harmful +(e.g., penances that will bring the penitent into suspicion or +ridicule), must be avoided.</p> + +<p>2762. The Duties of the Confessor as Spiritual Physician.—(a) General +Remedies.—The confessor should give much attention to the study of +moral and ascetical works, so as to be able to suggest suitable means +to his penitents for overcoming their spiritual infirmities and +avoiding future relapses. Thus, if a penitent desires to know or ought +to be told how to struggle against anger, drunkenness or impurity, the +confessor should know how to advise him and what measures to recommend +to him.</p> + +<p>(b) Special Remedies.—Certain classes of penitents need special +attention. Thus, the tempted and afflicted should be told the means of +fighting temptation and sadness; the scrupulous should be forbidden to +examine their consciences too carefully, or to accuse themselves +minutely, or to spend too much time at devotions; the sick and the +dying should be encouraged to dispose themselves well and to put aside +thoughts of fear and discouragement; pious persons often need +assistance when they suffer temptations to tepidity or spiritual +desolation. The careless, lazy, malicious, and hardened should be +reproved, but sternness should not be unmingled with kindness, lest the +penitent be driven away from his duty altogether.</p> + +<p>2763. The Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide.—(a) +Instruction.—The confessor should teach children and other ignorant +persons if he finds that they do not know truths necessary to be known +for a fruitful reception of the Sacrament—that is, the mysteries of +faith that must be believed explicitly and the dispositions for +receiving absolution (924). He should instruct about duties when this +will be for the penitent’s good—that is, when the penitent falsely +believes something to be sinful which is not sinful, or to be gravely +sinful that is only lightly sinful, or when the penitent’s ignorance of +an obligation is gravely culpable, or when he is invincibly ignorant +but will be kept from a sin without graver evil if he is instructed +now. If an instruction will probably do no good, a confessor should not +instruct an invincibly ignorant penitent about his duties, unless +silence will be productive of greater evils than instruction. Thus, if +the confessor foresees that the penitent will only be put in bad faith +if he is told about a duty of restitution, it would be useless and +wrong to speak to him about it; but if he should foresee that, if he +does not speak, the penitent will do worse things with great injury or +scandal to others, it would be necessary to instruct him.</p> + +<p>(b) Direction.—In spiritual matters a confessor should be willing and +able to counsel and advise, for example, about the choice of a state of +life (marriage, clerical state, religious life), about voluntary rules +or practices (vows, austerities), and about the performance of duties +(e.g., training of children). For advice on temporal matters a priest +should either direct his penitents to lawyers, physicians or other +professional advisers, or, if he can give prudent direction himself +(e.g., on artistic, educational, or business questions), he should +preferably discuss the matter elsewhere than in the confessional.</p> + +<p>2764. The Duties of the Confessor After Confession.—(a) _Per se_, or +by reason of his office itself, the confessor is held to guard +inviolate the secret of the confessional—that is, he may not disclose, +or use to the penitent’s disadvantage, any information received from +sacramental confession. This duty is a grave one imposed by natural law +(since there is a quasi-contract that the confessor will treat the +penitent’s confession as confidential), by divine law (since Christ, in +willing that confession be used, implicitly willed that it be so +conducted as not to become a thing odious, scandalous and harmful), and +by church law (for Canons 889, 890, 1757, 2369 strictly forbid +revelations or use of sacramental knowledge and decree severe penalties +against transgressors). Since God wipes out from remembrance the sins +He has pardoned, the confessor, being God’s representative, must treat +what he has heard as not known to him. The obligation of the seal is so +strict that no one may dispense from it, that neither Probabilism nor +epieikeia may be applied to it, and that no exception is allowed unless +the penitent himself freely, unmistakably and for a serious reason +gives permission for it to the confessor.</p> + +<p>(b) _Per accidens_, or by reason of a mistake committed by him (e.g., +absolution mistakenly refused or invalidly given, erroneous notion +about the gravity of a sin imparted or not corrected, restitution +imposed where not due or not imposed where due), a confessor is held to +see that the mistake is corrected and that the penitent or a third +party is spared or rescued from the harm which will follow from the +mistake. The obligation is one of justice in those cases where there is +a violation of implicit agreement (e.g., absolution unreasonably +withheld), or damage positively and culpably caused (e.g., erroneous +advice about the gravity of a sin or about the duty of restitution); it +is one of charity in other cases where the confessor can without undue +inconvenience assist the spiritual or temporal need of the penitent or +of another (e.g., penitent’s misunderstanding about his duty of +restitution which the confessor failed to clear up). The duty of +repairing mistakes is grave when there is grave damage (e.g., invalid +absolution of mortal sins) and grave guilt was contracted by the +mistake (e.g., if the invalidity was voluntary) or will be contracted +by refusal to prevent the consequences of the mistake (e.g., if the +invalidity has been discovered, and one knows that the penitent will +die unabsolved, if one does not rectify the error). The duty is light +if there is light damage (e.g., invalid absolution of free matter, or +of necessary matter confessed by a person who will go to the Sacraments +soon again), or light culpability (e.g., failure to question about the +species or number of sins, or to impose a penance, when the failure is +due to distraction or forgetfulness).</p> + +<p>2765. Manner of Repairing Defects Made in Hearing a Confession.—(a) +The Reparation to be Made.—If the penitent has been deprived of +absolution, he should be absolved; if he has been wrongly instructed, +he should be set right; if temporal loss has been caused, temporal +restitution should be made.</p> + +<p>(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Should Be Made.—The injured person +should be compensated. Hence if restitution was mistakenly imposed on +the penitent and he cannot recover his property, the confessor should +reimburse him; if the penitent was mistakenly excused from restitution, +payment is due the third party who loses by the advice.</p> + +<p>(e) The Manner of Making Reparation.—If possible, the reparation +should be made in the penitent’s next confession, as this is less +troublesome to all concerned. But if the confessor has wrongly +instructed the penitent in an important matter, he is bound more +probably (after obtaining the penitent’s permission to speak about +confession matter) to retract, even outside of the confessional, if +this can be done without scandal or other serious evil, which would be +rare.</p> + +<p>2766. Excuses from the Duty of Repairing Mistakes.—(a) Physical +Impossibility.—If the confessor does not know who the penitent is or +cannot find him, there is nothing to do but to repent over the mistake +and to pray for the penitent that God may provide for him.</p> + +<p>(b) Moral Impossibility.—Grave inconvenience excuses, unless the +confessor has been seriously at fault against justice (e.g., by +omitting absolution, by giving incorrect instruction in an important +matter, by neglecting to warn against an occasion of serious sin, by +wrongly advising on restitution of a large sum), or the salvation of a +soul is at stake, as when an unabsolved penitent is dying (see 1797 +sqq.)</p> + +<p>2767. The Obligation of the Seal of Confession.—(a) Its +Subject.—Primarily the duty of the seal obliges the confessor, +secondarily all others to whom the matter of sacramental confession in +any way becomes known, such as bystanders, interpreters, or those who +have spied into a confession. The penitent on his part is bound to keep +as a natural secret the words of the confessor which the latter would +rightly wish to be kept confidential (e.g., it would not be fair to +excuse oneself in making necessary corrections, by saying that one was +acting under advice of one’s confessor, especially since the confessor +cannot defend himself).</p> + +<p>(b) Its Object.—Primarily, the seal extends to all sins confessed, +whether they be light or grave, private or public; and a confessor may +not confirm from his knowledge as confessor what he also knows from +other knowledge. Secondarily, it extends to all that is declared for a +fuller explanation of the sins, such as circumstances, purpose, +occasion, cooperation, and to all those things whose revelation would +endanger the seal or make the Sacrament odious, such as the denial of +absolution, the penance given, the insincerity, impatience or +scrupulosity shown in confessing, the fact that a confession was long +or a general review. Other matters not generally known and which the +penitent reasonably wishes to be confidential (e.g., the fact that he +made his confession, his natural defects of illegitimacy or deafness) +should be kept as natural secrets. But there is no duty of sacramental +or natural silence about matters which the confessor knows from other +sources and which he is free to mention (e.g., facts learned from a +non-sacramental confession made to the priest and others with a view to +its use, or from the confessor’s own perception of a theft committed by +the penitent in the act of confession).</p> + +<p>2768. Sins against the Seal of Confession.—(a) Direct violation +happens if a confessor declares, either to the penitent himself or to +another, matter protected by the seal, and with such clearness that +both the penitent and his sin can be recognized. This occurs even +though no names are mentioned, or the penitent is unknown to the +listeners, or is no longer living, or when the listeners do not +perceive that sacramental knowledge is being used. The sin is grave, +and, since the injury to religion and the public is always serious, it +admits of no lightness of matter. The penalty is excommunication most +specially reserved to the Pope (Canon 2369).</p> + +<p>(b) Indirect violation happens if a confessor so speaks or acts as to +create a danger of direct violation (e.g., if he speaks so loud in the +confessional that those outside can hear, or if he is suspiciously +silent when the penitent is being commended, or if he warns the parents +of a penitent to be specially watchful of him, or if he refuses to hear +a confession because he knows from a previous confession that the +person is very scrupulous, or if he shows less confidence or regard for +the penitent). The sin admits of lightness of matter, since the danger +of direct violation may be remote; but if there is grave culpability, +suspension or even severer penalties may be inflicted (Canons 2369, +2368).</p> + +<p>(c) Unlawful use of sacramental knowledge happens if there is no direct +or indirect violation of the seal, but the confessor’s conduct is such +as to make confession distasteful either to the penitent or to others, +as when a superior is guided in giving his vote or directing his +subject by information gathered from confession. This is forbidden in +Canon 890.</p> + +<p>(d) Apparent violation of the seal happens if there is really no direct +or indirect violation of the seal, or unlawful use of confessional +knowledge, but a priest’s language is calculated to arouse a reasonable +suspicion that some such sin is being committed (e.g., if a preacher or +retreat master or writer of moral cases uses illustrations from +confessions heard by him which will excite distrust in his own or other +penitents). Serious scandal and defamation may also be caused by public +statements unfavorable to the morals of a certain city or community or +class.</p> + +<p>2769. Special Abuses.—Two abuses to which confession is especially +exposed are defamation and impurity, and hence the law of the Church +provides special safeguards against these dangers (see 2753, 2757, +2759).</p> + +<p>(a) Defamation.—The fame of third parties is protected by the law +which forbids the confessor to inquire about the penitent’s accomplice, +the fame of the penitent by the law of the sacramental seal, and the +fame of the confessor by the law which subjects those who bring a false +accusation of solicitation against a confessor to excommunication +specially reserved to the Pope, to retractation, reparation, and severe +penance (Canons 888, n. 2, 889 sqq., 2363).</p> + +<p>(b) Impurity.—The danger that a confessor will be tempted to +solicitation by his knowledge of the frailty of a penitent is provided +for by the law which severely commands formal denunciation of those +guilty of solicitation (Canon 904); the danger that a penitent may be +induced to yield to solicitation by a promise to absolve the sin is met +by the law which invalidates absolution of an accomplice (Canon 884).</p> + +<p>2770. Absolutio Complicis.—Absolutio complicis in peccato turpi +invalida est praeterquam in mortis periculo (Canon 884).</p> + +<p>(a) Objectum legis est peccatum turpe, i.e., quodvis peccatum contra +sextum, consummatum vel non consummatum, colloquiis, aspectibus vel +factis patratum. Necesse est autem quod peccatum sit utrinque certum +(quoad factum et jus), externum, et grave (qua internum et qua +externum). Unde non agitur de peccatis contra alias virtutes, neque de +peccatis luxuriae mere internis vel levibus.</p> + +<p>(b) Subjectum de quo in lege est complex seu socius immediatus et +formalis in ipso actu peccati; et sic non sufficit ad complicitatem +cooperatio etiam proxima (1507), nec peccatum mere materiale, quale fit +ab amente, dormiente, ebrio, infante, renitente. Non requiritur tamen +quod compar sit puber vel alius sexus, neque quod confessarius tempore +complicitatis jam inter clericos adscriptus sit.</p> + +<p>2771. Effectus Legis de Absolutione Complicis.—(a) Quoad +Absalutionem.—Invalida et illicita est absolutio directa peccati +nondum remissi si extra periculum mortis datur. Est valida sed +illicita: absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis +data, quando alius sacerdos confessionem recipere potest; necnon +absolutio indirecta peccati nondum remissi, extra periculum mortis +data, quando poenitens bona fide peccatum reticet. Est valida et licita +absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis vel in +gravissima necessitate (utputa urgente praecepto ecclesiastico et divino +confessionis et communionis annuae) data, quando alius sacerdos aut +nullimode aut nonnisi cum gravi incommodo (scil. infamiae, scandali, +periculi confessionis sacrilegae) haberi potest; necnon absolutio +directa peccati jam remissi, etiam extra hoc periculum et hanc +necessitatem facta. Non una tamen est sententia auctorum in +interpretandis dubiis hujus legis, nec omnes conveniunt cum placitis +hic positis, nam de dubiis alii strictius, alii mitius judicant.</p> + +<p>(b) Quoad Censuram.—Excommunicatio specialissime reservata S. Sedi +ipso facto incurritur a confessario qui illicite absolvit vel fingit +absolvere, sive directe, sive (quando poenitens ad tacendum inductus +est a confessario ipso) indirecte. Censura non incurritur igitur si +confessio tantum auditur, si poenitens propria sponte peccatum reticet, +si sacerdos dubitat num poenitens complex sit (Canon 2367).</p> + +<p>2772. Sacerdos reus delicti sollicitationis in confessione intra mensem +denuntiandus est a poenitente loci Ordinario vel S.C.S. Officii (Canon +904).</p> + +<p>(a) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio, etiam inefficax, +poenitentis eujuscumque ut actum quemcumque gravem contra castitatem +committat. Provocatio fit vel per verba (e.g., declarationes amoris, +invitationes, laudes), per facta (e.g., dona), per sermones (e.g., +colloquia de turpibus a poenitente confessis), per tractatus (scil. +colloquia de re turpi agenda), per consensum internum-externum +sollicitationi poenitentis datum.</p> + +<p>(b) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio quae ordinem habet ad +confessionem, i.e., quae fit tempore factae confessionis (i.e., inter, +immediate ante, immediate post confessionem), vel tempore confessionis +faciendae (i.e., occasione confessionis petitae a poenitente, praetextu +confessionis falso allegatae a confessario, in loco confessionis cum +confessionis simulatione).</p> + +<p>2773. Confessarius debet, graviter onerata ejus conscientia, de onere +denuntiationis poenitentem monere.</p> + +<p>(a) Obligatio confessarii gravis est. Sed antequam moneat, serio +consideret utrum poenitens persona fide digna sit, utrum certo constet +de facto, de turpitudine, de gravitate, de ordine ad confessionem, +utrum detur causa excusans (e.g., mors sollicitantis; probabiliter, +ejus plena emendatio per plures annos manifestata; grave damnum +poenitentis quoad vitam, famam, fortunam, nisi gravius damnum simul +immineat bono communi). Si de delicto sollicitationis et de obligatione +poenitentis nullum dubium est, confessarius moneat, etiamsi poenitens +in bona fide sit et praevideatur certo non obtemperaturus, mortis +periculo autem excepto. Si poenitens irrationabiliter renuat +denuntiare, absolvi non potest, sed confessarius de casu consulere +debet Ordinarium.</p> + +<p>(b) Obligatio poenitentis etiam gravis est. Denuntiatio facienda est +intra mensem a cognita obligatione., Ordinario sollicitantis, vel loci +delicti, vel poenitentis, personaliter et judicialiter. Poenitens qui +nec comparere nec scribere potest, interea excusatur; sed ille qui +justa causa exemptionis carens scienter omittit denuntiare intra +terminum unius mensis incurrit in excommunicationem latae sententiae +nemini reservatum, non absolvendus nisi postquam obligationi +satisfecerit aut se satisfacturum serio promiserit (Canon 2368, n. 2). +Confessarius non tenetur in se suscipere onus denuntiationis, nisi +secus gravissimum damnum bono publico inferretur.</p> + +<p>2774. The Sacrament of Extreme Unction.—As Confirmation perfects +Baptism by bringing to maturity the new life of grace, so Extreme +Unction perfects Penance by strengthening against the spiritual +debility that remains after sin itself has been wiped away. +Confirmation makes ready for the battle of life, Extreme Unction +assists during the struggle of death. The fifth Sacrament is defined: +“A Sacrament of the New Law in which through the anointing with oil and +the prayer of the priest adult persons who are in danger of death +receive health of soul, and also at times health of body.”</p> + +<p>(a) The remote matter or element of the Sacrament is oil (James, v, 14, +15). For validity it is required that this be olive oil, blessed by a +bishop or by a priest having special papal delegation, with the special +blessing for the oil of the sick (O. I.); for lawfulness, _sub gravi_ +that it be oil blessed the previous Holy Thursday (Canon 734), _sub +levi_ at least that it be blessed by the bishop of the diocese, or, in +case of vacancy, by the neighboring bishop. In necessity the old oils +may be lawfully used, while chrism and the oil of the catechumens may +be used as doubtful matter. Unblessed oils and oils blessed by an +unauthorized priest do not suffice for validity.</p> + +<p>(b) The proximate matter is the anointing of the sick man with blessed +oil. In urgent necessity it suffices to anoint one sense, or rather the +forehead; in other cases the various senses should be anointed in the +order given in the Ritual. Each anointing of a double sense should +begin with the right organ (e.g., the right eye) and should be given +with the right thumb in the form of a cross. If one organ is missing +(e.g., a hand amputated), the anointing should be made, if possible, +near to its place (e.g., on the wrist); if there is danger of +contagion, the anointing may be made by means of an instrument, such as +a brush or small stick. The anointing of the reins should always be +omitted and the anointing of the feet may be omitted for any good +reason, such as inconvenience to the dying person.</p> + +<p>(c) The form of the Sacrament is the prayer used by the priest. In the +Latin Church the ordinary form is contained in the words: “_Per istam +sanctam unctionem_, etc. By this holy anointing and His most tender +mercy may the Lord forgive thee whatever sin thou hast committed by +sight (by hearing, by smell, by taste and speech, by touch, by thy +steps). Amen.” The extraordinary rite for use when there is not time to +give all the anointings is bestowed on the forehead in the words: “Per +istam sanctam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam indulgeat tibi +Dominus quidquid deliquisti. Amen.” The essential words of the form +are: “Per istam unctionem indulgeat tibi Dominus quidquid deliquisti,” +because they express the intercession and the effect of the rite. It +would probably be a grave sin to omit the reference to the senses in +the ordinary form, as that seems to be a notable part of the form; but +it would be a light sin, apart from contempt or scandal, to omit an +unimportant word such as “Amen.” If there is doubt about the +recipient’s capacity (i.e., whether he has reached the use of reason, +whether he is in danger of death, whether he is already dead, whether +he is impenitent and unwilling to receive the Sacrament), the form +should be conditional. The condition should be “_si es capax_,” not +“_si es dispositus_,” even in the last-mentioned case. For the +Sacrament is given validly even to one who is not well disposed (i.e., +who lacks repentance) and there is thus the possibility, when validity +is not made dependent on the condition of good disposition, that +sacramental fruitfulness will follow later when impenitence, the +obstacle to the Sacrament’s activity, shall have been removed.</p> + +<p>(d) The recipient of the Sacrament is a Catholic who after attaining +the use of reason has come into the danger of death through sickness or +old age. No one is capable of receiving this Sacrament unless he is +baptized, for Baptism is the gateway of the Sacraments (2671); unless +he has reached the use of reason, for the Sacrament is a remedy against +personal sin and supposes that the recipient can or formerly could +distinguish between right and wrong; unless he is in danger of death +through the infirmity of disease or of decrepitude, for St. James +teaches that the anointing is for those who are enfeebled by illness +dangerous unto death. Hence Extreme Unction cannot be administered +validly to the unbaptized, to young children who have not come to the +use of reason, to the perpetually insane, to those who are sick but not +in danger of death, to those who are in danger of death but not sick +(e.g., a strong man going to the gallows or to battle). But the +Sacrament may be administered to children who have not yet made their +first confession, if they are capable of sin, and to the insane who +once had the use of reason. The danger of death need not be immediate, +and hence Extreme Unction may be given when the disease is mortal but +the patient will last for several months or even a year, as in +tuberculosis. Illness includes not only chronic sickness, but also +fatal disorders caused by wounds, accidents, poison. The rule about the +old is that those who have reached sixty years and show some signs of +approaching death, such as great feebleness or fainting spells, even +though they have no special malady, may be anointed; for their old age +itself is a disease.</p> + +<p>(e) The minister of Extreme Unction is the priest, since St. James +directs that the presbyters (i.e., the priests) of the Church be called +to anoint the sick. Extreme Unction, unlike Penance, is not exercised +in the form of a judicial process, and hence the power of Orders +suffices for its valid administration, and any priest, even one who +lacks jurisdiction, gives it validly. But for lawful administration +church law prescribes that the minister regularly be the ecclesiastical +superior or spiritual director (i.e., the pastor for his parish, the +head of a clerical religious institute for his house, the parish-priest +or chaplain for a lay religious body, the confessor for nuns), and that +the minister extraordinarily (i.e., in necessity) be any other priest +who has permission, or reasonably presumed permission.</p> + +<p>(f) The effects of Extreme Unction are _per se_ an increase of +sanctifying grace, since this is a Sacrament of the Living; _per +accidens_ (i.e., when the recipient is not in the state of grace, but +is in good faith and has attrition) the forgiveness of sins and first +grace. Extreme Unction produces first grace more surely than does +absolution, if the penitent is unconscious, since it does not call for +any external manifestation of contrition; hence the importance of +anointing those who are dying but unconscious. The special benefit of +Extreme Unction is immediate preparation of the soul for entrance to +heaven, though restoration of the health of the body is sometimes +vouchsafed when this is for the spiritual good of the sick person. +Venial sins and the remains of past sins (i.e., the debility left by +them) are removed and the soul is strengthened with confidence as to +things past and future and with peace and resignation as to present +suffering. Since the Sacrament is given for the period of danger of +death, it cannot be repeated during the same danger; but should the +patient recover and relapse into a distinct danger through the same or +another sickness, there arises a new need and the Sacrament may then be +repeated.</p> + +<p>2775. Special Duties.—In addition to the duties that are common in all +the Sacraments, the following duties should be noted in reference to +Extreme Unction.</p> + +<p>(a) The Recipient.—_Per se_, Extreme Unction is not necessary as a +means to salvation, for sanctifying grace may be had or recovered +without it; but _per accidens_ it would be necessary as a means, if a +dying person were in mortal sin and could not recover grace except +through it. He who omits Extreme Unction unwillingly or for a good +reason (e.g., because he is well prepared for death and cannot get a +priest without very grave inconvenience) does not sin. He who omits the +Sacrament voluntarily and without good reason, is guilty of grave sin +if he acts from contempt, or gives scandal, or exposes himself to +eternal damnation; but if there is no contempt, scandal or danger to +salvation, sin is indeed committed by the neglect at such a crisis of +so important a spiritual aid, but only venial sin, since there is no +grave precept to receive this Sacrament. The recipient of Extreme +Unction should be in the state of grace; and hence, if he has mortal +sin on his conscience, he must beforehand make an act of contrition or +receive absolution with attrition, or, if neither is possible, he must +make an act of attrition. The custom of the Church calls for confession +before Extreme Unction, and divine law commands confession if one is in +mortal sin and in danger of death.</p> + +<p>(b) The Minister.—The pastor is gravely bound in justice to give or +have given the Sacrament of Extreme Unction to all his subjects who +reasonably request it; other priests not charged with the spiritual +care of the dying person are held in charity to anoint him, if he has +not received the last rites and cannot otherwise be anointed. It is +clear that sick calls should be attended to promptly, and it would be a +serious matter to delay so long as to put the sick person in danger of +dying without Extreme Unction or of receiving it when he had become +unconscious and could not dispose himself properly. If the person has +been pronounced dead before the priest’s arrival, he should +nevertheless be absolved and anointed conditionally if the last breath +was not long before; because physicians teach that death takes +possession gradually, life lingering in the body for some time after +its external signs have ceased, for about a half hour when the end has +come after long illness, for one or two hours when death is sudden or +accidental. The ceremonies are obligatory under pain of sin, and it is +considered a serious matter to neglect the more notable parts, that is, +without reason to omit all or nearly all the prayers, or to give the +Sacrament without any sacred vestment.</p> + +<p>(c) The Pastor.—The oil of the sick should be kept in a neat and +properly decorated place, and should be contained in a vessel of silver +or white metal. Only in exceptional cases is it lawful to keep it in +the rectory (Canon 946). The Catechism of the Council of Trent (page +307) declares that Extreme Unction should form a subject of frequent +instruction. It is important to exhort the people not to delay in +sending for the priest till the sick person has become insensible, nor +to omit to send for him in case of sudden death, since, as already +said, life remains for some time in the body after apparent death.</p> + +<p>(d) The People.—All those who are responsible for the good of the +dying person, such as members of the family, physicians, nurses, +relatives, friends, or neighbors, should beware of deceiving him about +his condition and his need of preparation for death; on the contrary, +they should see to it as far as they can, that he receives the last +Sacraments in good time and while he has the full use of his senses, +when the spiritual benefit and the comfort of mind will be of greater +assistance and the bodily cure more likely.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Art_4_HOLY_ORDERS_MATRIMONY">Art. 4: HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY</h2> +</div> + +<p>(_Summa Theologica_, Supplement, qq. 34-68.)</p> + +<p>2776. The first five Sacraments arc necessary for the spiritual welfare +of individuals, the remaining two, which are the subject of this +Article, are needful, not for each person, but for the Church as a +body. A member of the Church may save his soul though he remains +outside the priesthood and the married state, but the spiritual good of +the Church itself requires both Orders and Matrimony. Without Orders +the Church would be deprived of her rulers, teachers and ministers of +divine things; without Matrimony the family would lack that sacramental +protection which is so important for the Christian home and the right +rearing of members of society.</p> + +<p>2777. The Sacrament of Orders.—The spiritual office and power of a +member of the clergy is called Orders on account of the order or rank +of superiority which it gives in the Church. The rite or Sacrament by +which an Order is conferred is strictly called Ordination, and hence it +is more correct to speak of the Sacrament of Ordination than of the +Sacrament of Orders. Ordination may be defined as “a Sacrament of the +New Law in which a member of the clergy receives spiritual power in +reference to the Eucharist and the grace to exercise properly the +duties of his office.”</p> + +<p>(a) Orders is conferred only on a member of the clergy. Just as Baptism +is preceded by catechumenate and Matrimony by espousals or engagement, +so is Ordination preceded by tonsure, a ceremony instituted by the +Church whereby a man is separated from the laity and enrolled among +clerics with a view to prepare him for Holy Orders. The candidate for +tonsure must be a male who has received Baptism and Confirmation (_sub +levi_), and who has begun his course of theology; he sins if he +approaches without a divine vocation or with the purpose not to go on +for the priesthood. The privileges of clerics are those of forum and +canon, and they are capable of receiving Orders, jurisdiction and +benefice (Canons 108 sqq). In the reception of tonsure the cleric is +admonished to make his life agree with the garb which he then assumes, +or, in other words, to cultivate the special virtues of his state (see +2596 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Ordination confers spiritual power in reference to the Eucharist, +the Sacrament of Sacraments. Just as the sacred vessels of the altar +receive a permanent consecration, so likewise the ministers of the +altar are set apart by Ordination, which confers upon them an indelible +character with the power to exercise higher or lower offices in +reference to the supreme Sacrament and the sole Sacrifice of the New +Law. Hence, an Order once conferred is eternal and the Ordination +cannot be repeated.</p> + +<p>(c) Ordination confers grace, which is _per se_ second grace, or an +increase of holiness. The special feature of the grace of Orders is its +suitability for the duties of the person ordained, for, where God +imposes a special obligation, He confers also a special grace. It is +clear that the duties of the ordained in reference to the real Body of +Christ (i.e., duties as to the Eucharist and divine worship) and the +mystical Body of Christ (i.e., duties to the faithful who receive the +Eucharist and the other Sacraments) call for a high degree of virtue +and a life edifying to all. Hence the need of a special grace in +Ordination.</p> + +<p>2778. Distinction of the Orders.—The following distinctions of the +orders or ranks of the clergy should be noted:</p> + +<p>(a) an Order is either sacramental or non-sacramental, according as it +was instituted by Christ Himself or by the Church. It is the teaching +of St. Thomas that all of the Orders are sacramental in character, but +there is not the same degree of certainty in each case. As to the +priesthood, there is the certainty of defined dogma; as to the +diaconate (and also episcopal consecration according to many) there is +theological certainty, but no definition of faith; as to the +subdiaconate, and the lower Orders, there is probability;</p> + +<p>(b) an Order is Major (sacred) or Minor (non-sacred) according as its +functions are concerned with consecrated or non-consecrated matter in +the celebration of the Eucharist. The Major Orders, therefore, are the +priesthood (whose office is to consecrate the Body and Blood of +Christ), diaconate (whose office is to dispense Communion to the +faithful), and sub-diaconate (whose office is to prepare the bread and +wine of the sacrifice in the consecrated vessels, that is, the chalice +and paten). The Minor Orders are those that prepare the matter of the +Eucharist in non-consecrated vessels (acolythate), or that dispose the +people for the Eucharist by freeing them from the impediments of +demonic influence (exorcistate) or of ignorance (lectorate), or that +exclude unbelievers from participation in the sacred rites +(portership). To the Sacred Orders, on account of their closer approach +to the Eucharist, are annexed the duties of celibacy and of the Divine +Office.</p> + +<p>2779. The Hierarchy of Orders and Jurisdiction.—The Orders of the +clergy may be considered, not only in reference to power over the real +Body of Christ (i.e., the Eucharist), but also in reference to power +over the mystical Body of Christ (i.e., the Church). Those who have +power over the members of the Church belong to the hierarchy, and this +is understood in two senses:</p> + +<p>(a) the hierarchy of Orders is composed of those who receive in +Ordination a permanent superiority over others in reference to the +worship of God and the sanctification of souls by the ministry of the +Sacraments. From divine institution this hierarchy is composed of the +three ranks of bishops, priests, and deacons; and from ecclesiastical +institution of the lower clergy in Orders. Thus, the deacon is able to +baptize and administer Communion as extraordinary minister; the priest +is the ordinary minister of Baptism and the Eucharist, and only a +priest can act as minister of Penance and Extreme Unction; the bishop +is the minister, not only of the Sacraments mentioned, but also of +Confirmation and Orders;</p> + +<p>(b) the hierarchy of jurisdiction is composed of those members of the +Church who receive in their accepted election or canonical commission a +power over the faithful which can be lost or resigned, and which +relates to the instruction and government of subjects in matters of +faith and morals. From divine law this hierarchy is composed of the +Supreme Pontificate and the subordinate Episcopate; from ecclesiastical +law there are other ranks of authority, such as those of parish-priest, +prelate, abbot, archbishop, primate, patriarch and cardinal.</p> + +<p>2780. The Matter and Form of the Various Orders in the Latin +Church.—(a) In the Minor Orders the matter consists in the bestowal of +the symbols of office, and the form in the words of ordination that +accompany this bestowal. The porter is ordained when he touches with +his right hand the keys of the church which the bishop presents to him +with the words: “Conduct yourself as one who must give an accounting +for the things that are under those keys”, the reader, when he touches +the lectionary (i.e., Missal, Breviary, Bible) offered him by the +bishop with the form: “Receive this book and announce well the Word of +God, knowing that, if you perform your office faithfully and usefully, +you shall receive a portion with those who from the beginning have been +good ministers of God’s word”; the exorcist, when he touches the book +of exorcisms (e.g., the Ritual, Pontifical or Missal) presented to him +with the words: “Receive and commit to memory and have power to impose +hands on the possessed, whether baptized or catechumens”, the acolyte, +when he touches the symbols of his office (i.e., first the candle and +candlestick, next the empty cruet), while the words are said: “Receive +this candlestick and candle and know that you are deputed to light the +lamps of the church, in the name of the Lord”; “Receive this cruet to +furnish the wine and water for the Eucharist of the blood of Christ, in +the name of the Lord.” “Amen” should be added by the acolyte after each +form.</p> + +<p>(b) In the subdiaconate, ordination is given when the candidate touches +the empty chalice and the paten (the Bishop saying: “See what a +ministry is committed to you; I admonish you, therefore, so to conduct +yourselves that you may be pleasing to God”) and the Book of Epistles, +such as Missal or Bible (the Bishop saying: “Receive the Book of +Epistles and have power to read them in the holy Church of God, both +for the living and for the dead. In the name of the Father, and of the +Son, and of the Holy Ghost”).</p> + +<p>(c) Pope Pius XII in an official decree, an Apostolic Constitution of +Nov. 30, 1947 (see AAS, 40-5), determined the essential elements of +ordination to diaconate, priesthood and episcopate. Formerly this had +been a matter of discussion among theologians. In the diaconate +ordination is given by the single imposition of the hands of the Bishop +that occurs in the rite with the words of the “Preface,” of which these +are the essential: “Send into him, We ask, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, by +which he shall be strengthened by the gift of Thy sevenfold grace for +the faithful performance of the work of the ministry.”</p> + +<p>(d) The matter of the priesthood is the first imposition of hands of +the Bishop which is made in silence. The form consists in the words of +the “Preface” of which these are the essential and required for +validity: “Give, we ask Thee, omnipotent Father, to this Thy servant +the dignity of the priesthood ...”</p> + +<p>(e) In episcopal consecration the matter is the imposition of the +hands of the consecrating Bishop; the form is the “Preface,” the +essential words being: “Fill out in Thy priest the fullness of the +ministry....”</p> + +<p>It is a disputed matter whether the episcopacy is a distinct Order from +the priesthood or simply an extension of it. The common opinion favors +the negative side and consequently maintains that the consecration of a +Bishop is not sacramental. Accordingly, the supreme Order of Priesthood +includes the simple priests or presbyters and the high priests or +bishops. The episcopacy confers no new power in reference to the +Eucharist, but it extends the character of the priesthood to new powers +in reference to Christ’s Mystical Body, the Church.</p> + +<p>2781. The Minister of Ordination.—(a) For validity it is necessary +that the minister be a consecrated bishop; but the Orders of +ecclesiastical institution (i.e., subdiaconate and Minor Orders) may be +given by a priest authorized by law, or by special indult of the +Apostolic See. Thus, Cardinals, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic, and +Abbots have the power of conferring tonsure and Minor Orders from Canon +239.</p> + +<p>(b) For lawfulness it is necessary that the consecrator of a bishop be +the Pope or a bishop designated by him; that the ordainer to other +ranks of the clergy be the proper bishop of the candidate (i.e., the +bishop of his place of origin and residence or of his place of +domicile), or a delegated bishop (i.e., the bishop who has received +dimissorial letters from the proper bishop or religious superior). See +Canons 951-967.</p> + +<p>2782. The Special Duties of the Minister.-(a) As to the ordinandus, the +ordaining prelate must be morally certain from positive arguments that +the candidate is suitable according to the Canons; otherwise he would +be guilty of a very grievous sin and would expose himself to the danger +of sharing in the sins of others (I Tim., v. 22; Canon 973, n. 3).</p> + +<p>(b) As to the ordination, the minister is bound to observe the law on +time and place, and to follow carefully and exactly the ceremonies of +his own Rite. If anything essential is omitted, it has to be supplied, +absolutely or conditionally, according as there is certain or only +doubtful lack. The omission of an accidental but notable ceremony +(e.g., the anointing of hands) would be seriously culpable (Canons +1002-1009).</p> + +<p>2783. The Recipient of Orders.—(a) For validity it is necessary that +the recipient be of the male sex, for the divine law has reserved +sacerdotal and ministerial functions to men, and the church law has +properly followed this example in regard to the Orders that are of +church institution; the recipient must be baptized, for without Baptism +one has no capacity for other Sacraments; if he is an adult, he must +have at least an habitual intention freely formed of receiving the +Order to which he is raised.</p> + +<p>(b) For lawfulness it is not sufficient that the recipient be in the +state of grace, since Ordination is not merely a personal matter, but +also a matter of great consequence to the whole Church. The recipient +of Orders takes his place among the representatives and ministers of +the Church, and therefore he should have the special qualities that fit +him for his dignity and office. Intellectually, the ordinandus must be +competent in theological and profane knowledge, and must have made a +satisfactory course of studies (Canons 972, 1364 sqq., 589-591). +According to the Code, first tonsure should not be given before the +study of theology has begun, Minor Orders may be given during the first +and second years of theology, subdeaconship only towards the end of the +third year, deaconship only after the beginning of the fourth year, and +priesthood only after the first half of the fourth year (Canon 976). +Morally, the ordinandus should be of commendable life and have the +internal and external excellence which is supposed by the Order he is +to receive. Virtues to which the Pontifical especially exhorts clerics +at their ordination are love and labor given to the Church and the +things of God’s house (porter), devotion to the Scriptures and sacred +study (lector), conquest of passion (exorcist), the light of good +example and the self-sacrifice of good works (acolyte), temperance, +vigilance, prayerfulness (subdeacon), liberality to the poor, chastity, +fortitude, zeal for preaching the word of God (deacon), elderliness in +dignity, leadership in virtue, and justice in stewardship (priesthood). +No one should be admitted to a Sacred Order who is unable to overcome a +serious habit of sin (especially _in materia turpi_), even though +secret; and if there is doubt about amendment, a test during a suitable +period of time should be made.</p> + +<p>2784. Canonical Requirements for Ordination.—(a) Positive requirements +are: proper age (that is, the twenty-first, twenty-second, and +twenty-fourth years completed are necessary for subdeaconship, +deaconship, priesthood, respectively); Confirmation should have been +received before Ordination, for it is suitable that those who are to +strengthen others in the faith should have the character of soldier of +Christ; promotion from Order to Order should be from lower to higher in +proper succession, that fitness may be shown in lesser offices before +the greater are received; an interval must elapse between certain +Orders, which will give to clerics the opportunity to exercise the +powers they have received (e.g., between acolythate and subdiaconate a +year, between subdiaconate and diaconate three months); the candidate +for sacred ordination must have a title or some canonical means of +support (i.e., for secular clergy the title of benefice, or patrimony +or ministerial service; for religious the title of profession, common +life, etc.). The law allows certain dispensations from some of these +requirements (Canons 974 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Negative requirements are freedom from certain disabilities +introduced by the Church for the sake of the honor and dignity of the +sacred ministry. Some of these disqualifications are of their nature +permanent, and they are removed only by dispensation or by disposition +of the law (e.g., in certain cases by cessation of the cause, or by +baptism, or by religious profession), and these are known as +irregularities; other disqualifications, which are of their nature +temporary and cease with lapse of time or changes in circumstances, are +known as simple impediments. The effect of disqualification is to make +it unlawful to receive an Order, or to exercise an Order already +received. Irregularities are produced either by deficiency or by +delinquency, but the cause in either case must be certain; and, in case +of delinquency, it must be a personal sin committed after Baptism, +which is mortal, external, and consummated in act. The irregularities +from defect are: illegitimate birth; mental imperfection (such as +epilepsy, insanity, possession); bodily imperfection that makes one +unsuited for the service of the altar, on account of mutilation (e.g., +those who have lost hand or foot, or thumb or index finger), or of +unsoundness (e.g., the blind, the deaf, the dumb, cripples, +paralytics), or of very noticeable deformity that excites ridicule or +horror (e.g., dwarfs, giants, noseless persons, those who are +hunchbacked); successive bigamy, that is, the fact that one has been +twice validly married, for St. Paul ruled that a cleric should be a man +of not more than one wife (I Tim., iii. 2, 12; Tit., i. 5, 6); infamy +of law, that is, the commission of certain crimes which the law +declares infamous _ipso facto_ or after sentence (such as profanation +of the Eucharist or of graves, violence done to the Pope or a Cardinal, +duelling, simultaneous bigamy, and certain sexual sins); participation +in capital punishment by pronouncing (i.e., as judge or juryman) or +executing the sentence of death. The irregularities from delinquency +are: apostasy, heresy, schism; reception of Baptism from a +non-Catholic; attempt at adulterous or sacrilegious marriage; voluntary +homicide, cooperation in an abortion, mutilation of self or of another, +attempt to commit suicide; unlawful exercise of medicine or surgery by +a cleric with fatal results; unlawful exercise of the powers of Major +Orders by a cleric or layman. The simple impediments are found in the +following: in those who may be weak in faith, namely, persons whose +parents are non-Catholics, or who are themselves converts (I Tim., iii. +6); in those who are prevented by other occupations, namely, persons +held by marriage, business forbidden to clerics, slavery, military +service (II Tim., ii. 4); in those who are actually in bad repute +before the community on account of misconduct (I Tim., iii. 7). See +Canons 983-991.</p> + +<p>2785. Duties of Ordinandi According to Canon Law.—(a) Before +Ordination.—Application to the bishop must be made beforehand at an +opportune time, and testimonials of Baptism, Confirmation, Orders +already received, certificates of good character and studies, and +letters from superiors testifying to freedom from impediments and +general fitness must be presented. The candidate must undergo a special +examination and make a spiritual retreat before the day of his +ordination. The profession of faith is made before subdeaconship.</p> + +<p>(b) During Ordination.—All the ceremonies should be observed, and +especially the physical touching of the instruments (chalice and paten, +etc.), which seems to be essential in Minor Orders and the +Subdiaconate. In the imposition of the hands in the other Major Orders, +the head of the subject should be touched physically, although even +moral touch is sufficient for validity of the Sacrament (Pius XII, +Apostolic Constitution already cited). The law requires that the +recipients of Major Orders receive Communion, and the obligations seems +to be grave for the new priests, since they celebrate with the bishop.</p> + +<p>(c) After Ordination.—The nocturn (three Psalms and their antiphons) +which the ordaining prelate imposes on the newly ordained subdeacons +and deacons should be taken from the first nocturn of the day, whether +it be feria, feast or Sunday, unless the bishop appoints otherwise. The +three Masses of the Holy Ghost, Blessed Virgin, and for the dead, +imposed on the newly ordained priests, need not be applied for the +bishop’s intention, and a stipend may be taken when they are said; but +it is fitting that they be applied in thanksgiving and for the benefit +of the bishop as well as of the whole Church on earth and in Purgatory. +These prayers and Masses do not seem to oblige under sin, though some +hold them to bind _sub gravi_. On the life duties of the clergy, see +above (2596 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2786. Registration of Ordinations.—As in the case of marriage, +ordinations should be registered in a special book and notice of them +(if subdiaconate was received) should be sent to the pastor of the +parish of Baptism. A certificate of ordination is also to be given to +the cleric ordained (Canons 1010, 1011).</p> + +<p>2787. The Sacrament of Matrimony.—Marriage in general is defined as +“the conjugal union of man and woman, contracted between two qualified +persons, which obliges them to one another for life.”</p> + +<p>(a) The word union may be taken actively for the passing act of +internal and external consent, and then it refers to marriage in its +state of becoming, as it is a contract and (among Christians) a +Sacrament; or it may be taken, as it were passively, for the bond that +results from the mutual consent pledged by the parties, and then it +refers to marriage as a permanent state of life.</p> + +<p>(b) The marriage union is conjugal; that is, its end is the procreation +and rearing of children, or the making of a family, and it therefore +gives the right to the natural acts of generation. A contract which has +other ends (e.g., a business agreement of labor or of partnership), or +which excludes procreation (e.g., an agreement of onanistic +concubinage), is not a marriage.</p> + +<p>(c) Marriage is between qualified persons, for certain individuals are +excluded by natural, divine or human law from making a valid contract +of marriage.</p> + +<p>(d) Marriage is between two, one man and one woman. This unity of +marriage is its first property, resulting from its nature as a +relationship intended primarily for the propagation of the race and its +proper upbringing, and secondarily for the peace and contentment of the +married couple, their mutual assistance to one another, and their +protection against carnal temptations (299). For polyandry is opposed +to both these ends, and therefore to natural law, while polygamy does +not accord well with the secondary ends of matrimony and is forbidden +for all by the law of Christ (“They shall be two in one flesh,” Matt., +xix. 3 sqq.). On the permission of polygamy in the later Old Testament +ages, see 303, 311.</p> + +<p>(e) Marriage obliges the parties to one another for life. This +indissolubility of marriage is its second property, and also follows +from the natural ends of marriage. For the right propagation of the +human race is a matter that concerns not merely the married couple or +human society, but also God Himself, who is matrimony’s immediate +author and lawgiver, and God has decreed that marriage be unbreakable +except in the few instances allowed by Himself: “What God hath joined +together let no man put asunder” (Matt., xix. 6). Since the good of +marriage is inferior to the good of faith, the divine law permits a +dissolution of the bond in the case known as the Pauline Privilege (I +Cor., vii. 12-15); similarly, in a very few instances where there is a +serious good more important than the preservation of the bond (the +faith of a convert from infidelity, the observance of the counsel of +chastity, the public welfare), and where the bond itself has not the +strength of sacramentality (i.e., in a non-Christian marriage), or has +not been consummated in a Christian marriage, the divine law authorizes +the Church, the representative of God, to decree a dissolution (see +363, 314). Not only are these cases few, but the conditions are strict +(see Canons 1120-1127), and hence these exceptions are no menace to the +ends of marriage. But once consummation has been added to consent in a +Christian marriage, thereby perfecting the natural contract and +extending the sacramental signification from the mystical and severable +union of Christ with the soul by grace to the physical and perpetual +union of Christ with the Church by the Incarnation, the indissolubility +becomes complete and admits of no exception. The bill of divorce under +the Mosaic Law seems to have been a true and complete dissolution of +the marriage tie, but there is good reason to think that it was a +toleration of the Jewish civil code, not a permission given by God. The +valid marriages of infidels as such are not subject to the judgment of +the Church; and the civil authority has no power to dissolve them (even +when they are childless), otherwise individuals and the family and the +State will suffer, as experience proves.</p> + +<p>2788. Distinctions.—(a) In reference to validity, marriage may be true +(i.e., validly contracted), or presumed (i.e., taken by the law to be +validly contracted on account of some fact, as when the validity of a +marriage was not attacked during the lifetime of the parties), putative +(i.e., really invalid, but contracted in good faith by at least one of +the spouses and not yet known by both to be certainly null), attempted +(i.e., contracted invalidly in bad faith, at least one of the parties +being aware of an invalidating impediment).</p> + +<p>(b) In reference to perfection, marriage is legitimate (when it is +validly contracted between non-baptized persons), ratified or +sacramental (when it is celebrated between baptized persons), +consummated (when the consent given in the contract is subsequently +completed by the conjugal act). It seems that marriage lawfully +contracted between a baptized and a non-baptized person is not ratified +or sacramental, for, as the consent must be mutual, so should the +Sacrament be mutual. But a marriage free from substantial defects is +always a Sacrament, even though the contractants do not wish this, when +it is contracted between Christians, whether they be Catholics or +non-Catholics; and a marriage contracted between non-Christians becomes +a Sacrament on the Baptism of the parties.</p> + +<p>(c) In reference to its manner, marriage may be clandestine (i.e., not +celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses), or secret (i.e., +celebrated before the pastor and two witnesses pledged to secrecy, and +without the publicity the Church ordinarily requires), public (i.e., +celebrated before pastor and witnesses and with publicity such as +announcement to the people and registration in the usual marriage +book). The secret marriage is also known as a marriage of conscience +(Canons 1104-1107).</p> + +<p>(d) In reference to the law under which it is performed, marriage is +either canonical or civil. A purely civil marriage between Catholics is +invalid, as far as the bond is concerned, since their contract, as +being a Sacrament, is subject to the Church. But the civil marriage, as +far as the purely civil consequences are concerned, is a lawful +ceremony, and is obligatory if required by law. A morganatic marriage +is made between two persons of unequal condition (e.g., between a king +and a plebeian woman) on condition that the inferior spouse and progeny +shall not share entirely in the titles and property of the superior +spouse.</p> + +<p>2789. The Elements of the Contract of Marriage.—(a) The subject-matter +of the contract is the conjugal right or the lawful power of exercising +with the other party acts suitable for generation.</p> + +<p>(b) The ends of the contract are, primarily, the good of the race and +of the children, and secondarily the good of the couple through mutual +assistance and protection in spiritual and temporal matters. To these +general ends may be added others which a particular person has in view, +such as dignity, wealth, honor, lawful pleasure.</p> + +<p>(c) The essence of the contract is the consent, for every pact consists +in mutual agreement. But if marriage be regarded as a permanent state, +its essence is the bond of union, and consent is the efficient cause +productive of the bond. Marriage consent must have the qualities +(internal, external, mutual, free) that are necessary in every +contract, as explained in 1883.</p> + +<p>2790. Requirements for Valid Marriage Consent.—(a) Internal +Consent.—If both or one of the parties internally and positively wills +to exclude marriage, or the right to the conjugal act, or an essential +property of marriage, the contract is null, since there is no purpose +to contract a real marriage. Similarly, if both or one of the parties +negatively (or by lack of all intention) excludes consent, there is no +marriage. It should be noted that he who intends to get a divorce later +on does not intend a permanent union or marriage, whereas he who +intends to be unfaithful or to practise onanism may nevertheless intend +to oblige himself to the duties of fidelity and of the lawful use of +marriage, and therefore to a true marriage. Fictitious consent, unless +a serious reason excuses (e.g., when one is forced under grave fear to +marry, when one becomes aware of a diriment impediment at the altar and +cannot retire without great scandal), is a mortal sin, as being a lie +in a very important matter and an injustice. If the other party was +deceived, the party guilty of feigned consent is bound to make +reparation for the damage done, and, unless the marriage has become +impossible or inadvisable, the means of reparation should be a genuine +consent revalidating the marriage. This is especially true when there +is a conflict between the internal and the external forums on account +of the inability to establish juridically the nullity of the invalid +marriage.</p> + +<p>(b) External Consent.—Both as contract and as Sacrament, matrimony +requires some sensible manifestation of the internal consent. Since the +contract of marriage between Christians falls under the jurisdiction of +the Church, the manner of expressing the consent is regulated by Canon +Law. The solemnities required for valid and lawful marriage will be +treated below in 2826, 2827.</p> + +<p>(c) Mutual Consent.—Both parties must agree to the marriage, since no +one is obliged by a contract without his consent. But mutuality does +not imply simultaneity, for, if the previous consent given by one party +continues, the subsequent consent given by the other is joined to it +and the consent becomes mutual.</p> + +<p>(d) Free Consent.—If every contract must be deliberate and voluntary, +this is especially true in the case of marriage, since it entails very +heavy duties and its obligations are lifelong (cfr. 2195). In marriage +there must be full and perfect consent, though it is not necessary that +one think expressly on the essentials of the contract when assenting to +it.</p> + +<p>2791. Defects in Consent.—Consent supposes sufficient knowledge, and +hence it may be vitiated by a defect as to knowledge.</p> + +<p>(a) Mental Derangement.—Those who are not in possession of their +mental faculties cannot marry, whether the derangement be habitual +(e.g., idiots, the completely insane, monomaniacs on the subject of +marriage) or actual (e.g., infants, those who are completely drunk or +doped, the hypnotized or delirious, somnambulists). But defectives who +are not unbalanced all the time or on all subjects, may be able now and +then to realize the meaning of marriage and to give deliberate consent, +though the presumption is against them. Those whose mentality is of a +low grade, but who are able to judge and reason correctly (e.g., stupid +persons, the deaf and dumb, or blind), and those who have some little +fanaticism or eccentricity are not excluded; otherwise very few of +either sex could marry.</p> + +<p>(b) Ignorance.—Substantial ignorance, or the absence of knowledge +about the essentials of marriage (viz., that it is a permanent +association of man and woman for the purpose of raising children of +their own), makes the contract null, for one does not consent to what +one does not know. Accidental ignorance, on the contrary, does not +nullify, for he who understands the main facts about marriage can +intend to contract it as others do, even though he does not know its +details or secondary features. Ignorance invalidates marriage, +therefore, if one of the parties does not know that marriage is meant +for the procreation of children or that children are procreated by +carnal intercourse; but it does not invalidate if the parties are +ignorant about physiology or scientific explanations. Substantial +ignorance in persons of marriageable age (especially young women) is +not uncommon even in these days, but it is not presumed after puberty +(Canon 1082, Sec.2).</p> + +<p>(c) Error.—Error which excludes consent to the essential object of +the contract nullifies, and hence a substantial error about the person +with whom one is contracting makes marriage of no effect (e.g., if +Titus thinks he is marrying Claudia, but is really marrying her twin +sister, Sempronia; if Balbus intends to marry Caia only on condition +that she is a virgin and she is not a virgin; if Julius intends to +marry the woman who is present solely as differentiated by a personal +or individual characteristic which he mistakenly believes her to +have, such as seniority among her sisters). Error which does not +prevent essential consent does not nullify the contract. Hence, a mere +accidental error about the other party (e.g., Titus marries Claudia, +thinking she is rich, whereas she is poor, and he would never have +married her had he known her poverty) does not make marriage null, +though the Church makes the marriage of no effect when a slave is +married in the belief that he or she is free (Canon 1083, Sec.2, n, 2). +A mere speculative error about the properties of marriage (e.g., if one +believes that marriage may be lawfully dissolved for adultery) or about +the validity of one’s own marriage (e.g., if the bride erroneously +believes that the marriage she is contracting is null) does not deprive +the contract of its force, if there is really a purpose to marry as +best one may; for such an error does not act upon the will or take away +consent.</p> + +<p>2792. Forced Consent.—Consent also supposes self-determination, and +hence in certain cases force or fear makes a marriage null and unlawful.</p> + +<p>(a) Effect on Validity.—Coercion nullifies marriage from natural law, +when overpowering physical might extorts an external assent, or when +moral violence so terrifies as to unsettle the reason; from church law +at least, when being grave, external and unjustly caused, it compels +one to marry in order to escape the evil it inflicts or threatens. In +other cases fear does not void marriage, even though it be the cause of +the contract, as when the fear is slight, or when it is induced by +shipwreck or by the fear of sin, or when a seducer marries only because +he is threatened with prosecution unless he marries the girl whom he +seduced.</p> + +<p>(b) Effect on Lawfulness.—He who by intimidation impels another to +marry, sins gravely if the fear is unjust and grave, or unjust and +productive of serious evils; he sins venially if the fear, though +unjust, is light and not productive of serious evils; he sins not at +all; if the fear is justly caused, unless he offends charity by his +manner of acting; revengeful spirit, etc. He who marries knowing that +the other party is forced into the contract, is guilty of serious +injustice; and he who marries unwillingly, but with the purpose to live +as if he were validly married, sins gravely by his will to live in +impurity.</p> + +<p>2793. Conditional Consent.—Conditional consent is that in which the +agreement to marriage is made dependent on some fact or event.</p> + +<p>(a) A condition makes marriage invalid if it neutralizes consent (e.g., +if the condition is _de praesenti_ but unfulfilled; if it is _de +futuro_ and against the substance of marriage; if it is impossible but +seriously added); it suspends marriage if it is _de futuro_, possible, +and not against the substance of marriage; it neither nullifies nor +suspends if it is _de praesenti_ or _de praeterito_ and fulfilled. +In law the presumption is that _de futuro_ necessary or impossible +conditions and shameful conditions are not serious, or are modes +rather than conditions (see 1886), and of course in the external forum +invalidity on account of a condition has to be proved. Conditions +against the substance of marriage are such as deny essential conjugal +rights or duties (i.e., the right to have conjugal intercourse, +the duty of fidelity to the consort, of loyalty to the bond); but +they should not be confused with the purpose to violate marriage +engagements, or with a resolution, or a vow, or a pact in the form of a +mode, not to make use of the right to conjugal intercourse.</p> + +<p>(b) A condition added to marriage consent is gravely sinful, unless +there is a very urgent reason for it; otherwise most serious evils +would result. Moreover, there is responsibility in justice for culpable +damages, as when one party gives consent conditionally without the +knowledge or against the will of the other party. A suspensive +condition (e.g., “if my parents will consent”) is regularly unlawful +without the bishop’s permission, and marriage rights may not be used in +a marriage dependent on a condition whose fulfillment is not known to +the parties. It is unlawful to make a vow or promise of chastity in the +married life unless there is moral certainty that it will be kept.</p> + +<p>2794. The Elements of Marriage as a Sacrament.—(a) The matter and form +of marriage are found in the contract, for the Sacrament is the natural +pact elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign productive of grace. The +remote matter is, therefore, the bodies of the spouses, or the bodily +rights which they give one another (I Cor., vii. 4). Since the +indeterminate part of a contract is the offer or bestowal, and the +determinate part the approval, the proximate matter of Matrimony is +found in the grant of mutual conjugal rights externally manifested, and +the form in the acceptance of that right externally manifested.</p> + +<p>(b) The ministers and the recipients of Matrimony are the parties +themselves, since it is they alone who make and receive the contract. +In order to be a recipient of the Sacrament it is necessary that a +person be baptized and be free from all natural, divine and human +impediments that make one incapable of the contract of marriage.</p> + +<p>(c) The effects of Matrimony are _per se_ second grace, which increases +sanctity and is of help especially for the due performance throughout +life of the duties of the conjugal state and for domestic blessedness +and happiness.</p> + +<p>2795. Duties in Connection with Marriage.—The duties in reference to +marriage as a permanent state of life were treated already in 2613 +sqq., and we shall consider here only the duties that have to do with +marriage as a contract and a Sacrament. These duties can be arranged +under three heads: (a) before marriage, there are obligations in +reference to the preparation for marriage, which consists remotely in +engagement or espousals, and proximately in compliance with duties owed +to divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law (e.g., license from the State, +establishment of freedom to marry, proclamation of banns, +dispensations, confession); (b) during marriage, in addition to the +common obligations of intention and a state of grace, there are special +duties in reference to the external form or rite of marriage; (c) after +marriage, there is a duty of making canonical records and of validating +defective marriages.</p> + +<p>2796. Betrothal or Engagement.—Engagement is a promise of their future +marriage made by competent persons.</p> + +<p>(a) It is a promise, either unilateral or bilateral, the latter being +espousals or betrothal in the strict sense of the word (1749). Like +every promise, engagement is not binding unless it be made with +requisite deliberation and freedom from force and fear. But a valid +engagement to marry has not the same strength, either from divine or +from human law, as a contract of marriage, and hence fraud or light +fear unjustly produced and which induces one to become engaged leaves +the engagement rescindable at the will of the innocent party. Canon Law +requires certain formalities for a valid engagement, and without them +there is no obligation in either forum. The law is that the contract of +betrothal be in writing, and be signed by the parties and also by the +pastor or local Ordinary or two witnesses, and that, if one or both of +the parties be unable to write, this be noted in the document and an +extra witness be added (Canon 1017).</p> + +<p>(b) It is a promise made by competent persons. Hence, there is no valid +engagement if a party is incapable either naturally (e.g., one who has +not the use of reason) or canonically (e.g., one who has not attained +the age of seven years). It is against good morals to be engaged to two +persons at the same time, with the understanding that one will marry +the second after the expected death of the first; and much more is it +immoral for a married person to become engaged to marry another, the +marriage to take place after the death of the present consort. Some +canonists hold that engagements are not valid before the age of +puberty, on account of the lack of sufficient discretion.</p> + +<p>(c) It is a promise of future marriage, that is, a contract to marry, +not a contract of marriage. A nuptial engagement is invalid if the +marriage promised is invalid or unlawful, for no one can bind himself +to sin. An invalid marriage is promised if there is a diriment and not +dispensable impediment in the way, or if in spite of a removable +impediment the engagement is unconditional, unless the mind of the +parties is to marry after the impediment has ceased. The Church seems +to regard as null an engagement made on the condition that the Pope +will dispense an impediment. An unlawful marriage is promised when the +parties cannot marry without sin (e.g., when the marriage will bring +great sorrow or disgrace on parents), or when they promise to marry in +a sinful way (e.g., with the understanding that they will abuse +marriage). But an unlawful promise of a lawful marriage is not +necessarily invalid, and hence an engagement dependent on an immoral +condition not opposed to the substance of marriage would become +obligatory on fulfillment of the condition (see 1878 d, 1886).</p> + +<p>2797. It should be noted that the former diriment and impedient +impediments produced by espousals are no longer in force, and even a +valid engagement gives no right to an action for the celebration of +marriage.</p> + +<p>2798. Is an Engagement Necessary before Marriage?—(a) An engagement is +not strictly necessary. Neither the validity nor the lawfulness of +marriage depends on espousals, for there is no law that requires this. +Hence, if for a reasonable cause a man and woman married without any +previous binding pledge on either side, the marriage would be good and +lawful. The formal engagements of Canon Law are not common in this +country, but an informal engagement usually precedes matrimony.</p> + +<p>(b) Engagement is most suitable and useful. Men are accustomed to fit +themselves by long and serious study for the business of a profession +or calling, and to enter into preliminary agreements about contracts of +major importance (as in contracts to sell), and certainly marriage, a +contract and vocation that binds until death and upon which the +spiritual and temporal welfare of society and individuals rests, is +among the most momentous of human agreements. The special advantage of +engagement is that it affords a means of preventing hasty and +ill-advised unions, of discovering impediments, of securing the consent +of parents, and of preparing oneself in knowledge and virtue for the +duties of the married state. If engagements were regarded and treated +as a period of training for serious and sacred duties, not as a time +for frivolity or enjoyment, there would be fewer divorces and less talk +about trial marriages. On the duties of engaged persons to one another, +see 2628, 2629.</p> + +<p>2799. Duties to Parents or Guardians in Reference to Marriage.—(a) +There is, _per se_, a duty of consulting with one’s parents about one’s +marriage; for he who marries without their knowledge, generally exposes +himself to the danger of making a serious mistake, and moreover as a +rule the interests of parents themselves are bound up intimately with +the marriages of their children. Hence, unless a very serious reason +excuses, he who marries without advising with his parents sins +grievously by his rashness or want of filial affection. The same is +true, if a child wilfully disregards the wishes of his parents by +stubbornly marrying when for a good reason they disapprove. If their +opposition is imperative and emphatic, or if they are grief-stricken at +thought of the imprudent marriage, the sin is serious; but if their +opposition is mild and the match not a very bad one, the sin is venial. +The consent or counsel of parents is not necessary for validity, +however, since it is not they who are getting married, and no law makes +their consent or counsel an essential part of the compact. _Per +accidens_, their consent or counsel is not even necessary for +lawfulness, as when the children live far away from their parents, or +when marriage has to be contracted without delay, or when the parents +are unreasonable in their opposition.</p> + +<p>(b) There is, _per se_, no duty of obeying one’s parents in the matter +of marriage: first, because marriage supposes choice, admiration, and +love, and these do not submit to dictation, even from parents; next, +because in things that pertain to nature, such as self-preservation and +procreation, children are not subject to their parents; finally, +because the authority of parents does not extend to the whole lifetime +of their children and marriage is a lifelong union. Hence, parents may +not compel their children to marry or to remain single; they may not +make the match for their children against the latters’ will, they may +not force a child to marry a person whom he or she detests, they may +not veto a marriage that does not appeal to them if the son or daughter +has good reasons for it. Those parents sin, then, who refuse their +blessing to a marriage out of selfishness, and those parents sin +gravely who force their children into loveless unions and so make them +unhappy in this world and endanger their salvation for the world to +come. _Per accidens_, there is a duty of obeying parents in reference +to marriage when one is obliged even apart from their command to do +what they prescribe, when the marriage which they forbid is also +forbidden by law (e.g., if the child is needed at home to support his +indigent parents, if the mate selected will bring disgrace upon the +family and the match can easily be broken off), or when the marriage +which they require is also demanded by duty (e.g., if a son will surely +enter upon a wild and reckless life unless he marries). See above, +2228, 2627, 2633, 2636, 2347, 2348, 2361 sqq.</p> + +<p>2800. Duties of Parents in Reference to Marriage.—(a) If there is +question of the marriage of a child, parents should guide themselves by +the rule of St. Paul: “Let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord” +(I Cor., vii. 39). Undue pressure should be avoided, but bad marriages +should be opposed, and parents should assist their children to marry +well. (b) If there is question of a parent’s second marriage, the +children’s interests should be considered in making the choice of the +step-father or step-mother, and, if the children are grown up, they +should be consulted, or at least they should not be unreasonably +saddened or harmed by the new marriage.</p> + +<p>2801. Obstacles to Marriage.—Since marriage is a most important +contract and a Sacrament, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand with +moral certainty that there is no obstacle to its valid and lawful +celebration. This imposes duties on the pastor, the couple themselves, +and the faithful who know them.</p> + +<p>(a) The pastor in virtue of his office is gravely obliged to make +inquiries about the competency and fitness of the prospective husband +and wife, and even in a death-bed marriage the obligation does not +cease. Church law prescribes the method of inquiry, which should +include an examination and instruction of the couple and a publication +of the marriage. Of course, there is an obligation of confidential +secrecy.</p> + +<p>(b) The couple are bound to present themselves to the pastor within a +reasonable time before the marriage in order to make these +arrangements, and should bring with them the necessary papers (for +example, their baptismal certificates, license to marry, testimonials). +They are gravely obliged to make known either to the pastor or to the +confessor any impediment, even though it be of a secret and culpable +nature, in order that their marriage may be valid and lawful, unless +they wish to give up the marriage or seek a dispensation in some other +way.</p> + +<p>(c) The people who know of an impediment to a marriage are bound under +pain of mortal sin to make it known in time to the pastor or Ordinary; +for the natural and divine laws, as well as the law of the Church, hold +one to speak when this will prevent irreverence to the Sacrament of +Matrimony, sin and other serious evils to the neighbor. The obligation +ceases, however, when the revelation is either impossible or useless. +Cases of impossibility are those in which revelation will cause great +spiritual harm (e.g., public scandal), or great temporal harm of a +public kind (e.g., violation of professional secret), or a great +temporal harm of a private kind (e.g., persecution), unless a more +serious evil will result from concealment. Revelation is useless when +the marriage can be stopped or made legal in some other way (e.g., by +persuading the couple to break their engagement or get a dispensation), +or when one foresees that the revelation will have no effect.</p> + +<p>2802. Duties of the Pastor in the Examination of Engaged Persons.—(a) +He should question both the man and the woman separately and prudently +about their freedom to marry, even though he is certain that there are +no impediments. He should inquire especially whether there has been a +previous marriage, and should also ask specifically about any +impediment that seems likely. About impediments of a defamatory kind he +should not interrogate before others, leaving that matter if necessary +to his doctrinal instruction or to the confessor. (b) He should ask +both of them, and especially the woman, whether they have decided on +marriage freely, without force or pressure from any person. But +children who live with their parents should be asked whether or not +they have obtained their parents’ consent to the proposed marriage.</p> + +<p>2803. Special Proofs of Freedom to Marry.—(a) Proof of Baptism.—A +baptismal certificate should be presented by the parties (if baptized +in another parish), even by one who is a baptized non-Catholic. If a +certificate cannot be had, other proofs are necessary. In danger of +death, the sworn testimony of the parties suffices; outside danger of +death, the testimony of a reliable witness, or of the person himself, +if he can remember his Baptism, or, it seems, a certificate of +Confirmation or First Communion will do. If Baptism cannot be proved +and there is a prudent doubt, it should be administered conditionally.</p> + +<p>(b) Proof of Single State.—If it is manifest that a previous civil +marriage was null and was dissolved by divorce, the proof of the facts +suffices. If the husband or wife of a previous marriage has died, but +the pastor has no personal knowledge of this, positive proof of the +decease in the form of a public document or of sworn testimony of two +or at least one reliable witness is necessary, and if the pastor cannot +obtain these he must have recourse to the Ordinary.</p> + +<p>2804. Matrimonial Impediments.—(a) Definition.—An impediment is a +circumstance directly affecting the contract of marriage and rendering +it illicit or invalid. Thus, an impediment differs from an unfitness +that refers immediately to marriage as a sacred rite or Sacrament (such +as lack of proper intention or a state of mortal sin), or that does not +directly affect the parties (such as forbidden time).</p> + +<p>(b) Division.—In reference to effects, an impediment is either +impedient (i.e., one that forbids marriage under pain of grave sin but +does not render it null and void) or diriment (i.e., one that not only +forbids marriage, but also makes it null and void).</p> + +<p>2805. Sinfulness of Marrying with an Impediment.—(a) If the impediment +is certain, grave sin is committed; for deception and disobedience are +committed in a grave and sacred matter, and, if the impediment is +diriment, the marriage contract is made null. Great necessity, however, +would sometimes excuse.</p> + +<p>(b) If the impediment is uncertain, no sin is committed when the +impediment is one of ecclesiastical law and the doubt is one of law, +for in such a case the legislator removes the obligation (Canon 15); +nor when the impediment is impotency (Canon 1068), in view of the fact +that the general law of propagation of the race leaves a natural +presumption against impotency, which can be overcome only by a certain +impediment. It would be an intolerable hardship if marriage were made +impossible by a doubt where proof is so difficult. There is a serious +sin, however, in other cases, because one is either exposing the +Sacrament to nullity or is refusing, contrary to a serious command of +the Church, to seek a dispensation.</p> + +<p>2806. The Impedient or Prohibitive Impediments (Canons 1058-1066).—(a) +Vow.—The following simple vows make marriage illicit: the vow of +virginity, that of perfect chastity, the vow not to marry, the vow to +receive Sacred Orders, the vow to enter religious life, the simple vows +of religion. A vow to abstain from the use of marriage is not against +the substance of marriage, but it is difficult to keep in the married +state; the vows to enter religion, or take Sacred Orders, or not to +wed, are incompatible with marriage. Hence, the Church forbids one who +has these vows to marry, unless the vow be first dispensed. Those who +marry while bound by one of these vows sin gravely, and are held to +keep the vow if this is possible or the other party’s rights do not +prevent.</p> + +<p>(b) Legal Relationship.—In those countries where relationship from +adoption makes marriage illicit, there is also an impedient impediment +of Canon Law. The Church wishes, in so far as possible, to preserve +harmony between her own law and that of the State. Hence, she includes +in her Code the civil law regulations that forbid marriage to certain +persons on account of the intimate relation that exists between them +through civil law adoption. The law of some European (e.g., France, +Germany, Switzerland) and South American countries have a prohibitive +impediment of adoption, but in the United States, the British Empire, +and many other countries adoption is no such hindrance to marriage.</p> + +<p>(c) Mixed Religion.—Marriage between two baptized persons, one a +Catholic and the other a member of an heretical or schismatical sect, +is severely forbidden by the Church. Mixed marriages in themselves are +opposed to divine and natural law, inasmuch as they offer an occasion +for communication in false worship and a danger of perversion; and +hence they have been disapproved from the very beginning of the Church +(II John, X. 11; I Cor., v. 10; Tit., iii. 10). But the divine +prohibition ceases if appropriate measures are used to safeguard the +faith of the Catholic and the children, and the Church will grant a +dispensation, though reluctantly and only for just and grave causes.</p> + +<p>2807. Duties in Reference to Mixed Marriages.—(a) The Pastor.—A +dispensation should not be sought unless there is first a sufficient +reason, all things considered, and generally the reason should be the +public good (such as the relative fewness of Catholics in a district, +hope of conversion of the non-Catholic, avoidance of scandal). +Secondly, there must be guarantees given by the non-Catholic that the +faith of the Catholic will not be interfered with, and both parties +must promise that all the children will receive Catholic and no other +baptism and education. Finally, these promises must be such as to +produce moral certainty of fulfillment, and as a rule it should be +required that they be given in writing. After the marriage has been +celebrated the pastor is held both in charity and in justice to do what +he can to have the promises faithfully lived up to.</p> + +<p>(b) The Parties.—Neither before nor after the marriage in the Catholic +Church is it lawful to have any non-Catholic religious ceremony (see +956 sqq.); and if the pastor knows that this has been done or will be +done, he may not assist at the marriage without permission from the +Ordinary, which is granted for a most grave reason (scandal being +avoided). After the marriage the parties are bound in justice to keep +the promises made, and the Catholic is held in charity to seek +prudently, by good example and advice, to convert the non-Catholic.</p> + +<p>2808. Marriages with Bad Catholics.—(a) If the bad Catholic is +unworthy in the matter of faith, because he has notoriously given up +the Church (even though he has not joined any other religion), or +because he is a member of a forbidden society, there is a danger of +perversion. In such a case the pastor may not assist at the marriage +unless the Ordinary decides that there is a sufficient reason, that the +danger of perversion is made remote, and that the Catholic education of +the children is provided for.</p> + +<p>(b) If the bad Catholic is unworthy in the matter of morals, because he +is a public sinner (e.g., one who neglects the Easter duty), or +notoriously under censure and therefore a person to whom the Sacraments +must be denied, the pastor is confronted with the law that one may not +cooperate formally, even by assistance, in the profanation of a +Sacrament. As the guilt of the unworthy person is public in these +cases, there must be public reparation before the marriage can be +sanctioned by the presence of the Church’s representative. The +reparation is to be made either by the sinner going to confession or by +the censured person obtaining absolution. But since the priest’s +presence can be only a material cooperation, it may be permitted by the +Ordinary for a grave reason when the unworthy person refuses to comply +with the conditions.</p> + +<p>2809. Other Obstacles to Marriage.—Other obstacles which forbid +marriage, though they are not strictly canonical impediments, are the +following:</p> + +<p>(a) valid engagement gravely forbids marriage with a third party. This +is a natural obstacle which results from the very nature of a binding +promise;</p> + +<p>(b) special prohibition of the Church at times gravely forbids a +particular marriage, as when the Holy See in granting a dispensation +for a present marriage forbids a future marriage. If an irritant clause +is added, the prohibition has the force of a diriment impediment. The +Ordinary also may forbid a particular marriage for a time, as when +there is suspicion of a secret impediment, or when great damage will +likely ensue from a marriage. This prohibition is for a special case or +time or person, and thus it differs from the impediments of the law;</p> + +<p>(c) closed times (Lent and Advent) are the seasons when, on account of +the penitential and mournful character of the liturgy then in use, the +solemn blessing of marriage is not regularly permitted. This is not +really an impediment, since marriage itself may be contracted at any +time of the year, according to the general law.</p> + +<p>2810. Diriment Impediments to Marriage.—The diriment or nullifying +impediments to marriage are personal incapacities in a person which +render him or her incapable, from divine or ecclesiastical law, of +contracting marriage with anyone (absolute impediments), or of +contracting marriage with a certain individual (relative impediments).</p> + +<p>2811. The absolute diriment impediments are the following: (a) those +that are due to a personal defect making one unable to promise with +sufficient discretion (impediment of age) or to perform what is +promised (impediment of impotency); (b) those that are due to a +voluntary act which consecrates one to God with the obligation of +perpetual celibacy (the impediments of Orders and vows).</p> + +<p>2812. The relative impediments are the following: (a) that one which is +due to an obligation to one’s present husband or wife (the impediment +of bond); (b) that one which is due to too great a difference between +two parties (impediment of disparity of cult); those that are due to +too close a kinship between two parties, whether natural (impediments +of consanguinity and affinity) or like to the natural (impediments of +public decency, spiritual kinship, legal kinship); (d) those that are +due to a relationship caused by a crime that makes it unsuitable for +two parties to marry. If one party is perpetrator and the other the +victim, there is the impediment of abduction; if the two parties are +accomplices, there is the impediment of crime.</p> + +<p>2813. The Impediment of Age.—(a) Nature.—This impediment exists in +males who have not completed their sixteenth year, and in females who +have not completed their fourteenth year. These ages are set by the +general law, because all parts of the world have to be considered and +sufficient discretion may be presumed at those ages everywhere. But +substantial ignorance even after those years invalidates consent, and +moreover, in colder countries where development is slower, marriage is +generally inadvisable before the parties are 18 and 16 respectively. +The marriageable ages according to the statute law in most of our +States are 18 and 16 with parental consent, and 21 and 18 without it.</p> + +<p>(b) Effect.—This impediment is of ecclesiastical law in so far as the +precise determination of age is concerned, but of natural law in so far +as the use of reason is demanded. Hence, the Church may dispense, and +hence also the impediment as ecclesiastical does not bind the +unbaptized, even when being underaged they marry Christians.</p> + +<p>2814. The Impediment of Impotency.—(a) Nature.—Impotency is the +inability to exercise the sexual act in a way suitable for procreation. +The requisites for this act are _immissio membri virilis in vaginam +mulieris cum seminis effusione_, and hence those are impotent who lack +sexual organs (such as the emasculated or spayed), or who on account of +psychical or physical abnormalities are unable to have complete +intercourse (e.g., anaphrodisiacs, some hermaphrodites, those who +suffer from hypospadias, vaginism, etc.). Sterility, or the mere +inability to procreate from sexual intercourse (as in old persons), is +not the same thing as impotency, and is not an impediment to marriage. +Authorities are not agreed whether or not the operations of male +vasectomy and evariotomy produce impotency or sterility. But many +regard the former operation as unlawful except for a most grave cause +(such as the saving of life), since it takes away a power given by +nature for the benefit of society, exposes the individual to very +serious temptations, and opens the way to terrible abuses.</p> + +<p>(b) Effect.—Impotency anterior to marriage and perpetual, whether in +the man or in the woman, whether known to the other party or not, voids +marriage from the law of nature itself, and hence is not dispensable. +But impotency that arises after marriage or that is only temporary does +not invalidate, and impotency that is relative (i.e., in reference to +one person only) does not nullify marriage except in reference to a +determinate person. In justice to the other spouse, married persons who +have an easily curable impotency should have this defect removed.</p> + +<p>2815. The Impediments of Orders and Vows.—(a) Orders.—Those who are +in Sacred Orders (priesthood, deaconship and, in the Latin Church, +subdeaconship) cannot marry validly. The impediment is decreed by +ecclesiastical law alone, and hence the Church has the power to +dispense. One who was ordained through compulsion or in ignorance of +the duty of celibacy, is permitted to marry, if he does not wish to +ratify his ordination; but he then loses all right to exercise his +Order (2235).</p> + +<p>(b) Vows.—Professed religious with solemn vows or simple vows that +annul marriage cannot marry validly. It is more probable that this +impediment, in so far as solemn vows are concerned, is of divine right; +but the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, is able to dispense (see 2194, +2234, 2235, 1787 e).</p> + +<p>2816. The Impediment of Bond.—(a) A person who is already validly +married cannot marry again until the bond of the existing marriage is +removed by the death of the other spouse or by dissolution. An +exception is the case of the Pauline Privilege; but even then the bond +of the first marriage remains till the second is contracted (see 2787 +e).</p> + +<p>(b) This impediment is of natural and divine law, and it binds all men, +the unbaptized as well as the baptized. No dispensation can be granted +from the impediment as long as it continues; and moreover those who +would contract a second marriage must offer proof that the bond of the +first marriage was non-existent, or that it has ceased. Nullity of a +previous marriage must be established by canonical process (Canons 1986 +sqq.); dissolution of an unconsummated marriage through vow or Papal +dispensation is proved sufficiently by an authentic document; cessation +of bond through death of consort must be demonstrated with moral +certainty, if it is not manifest (see 2803). The procedure to be +observed in cases of the Pauline Privilege is explained by commentaries +on Canons 1120 sqq. of the Code.</p> + +<p>2817. The Impediment of Disparity of Cult.—(a) A marriage of a +Catholic (i.e., of a person baptized in or converted to the Catholic +Church) with an unbaptized person is null and void. This impediment +bars the marriage of a professed ex-Catholic with an infidel, but not +the marriage of a non-Catholic with an infidel; and by infidel is +understood here not only a non-Christian (such as a Jew), but also a +Christian unbaptized or invalidly baptized. A person accidentally +baptized by a Catholic is not considered a Catholic if born of +heretical or schismatical parents and reared by them in their sect.</p> + +<p>(b) This impediment as prohibitive is of divine ordinance, for the same +reasons as in the case of mixed marriages (see 2806 c): “Bear not the +yoke with unbelievers” (II Cor., vi. 14). But neither natural nor +divine law nullifies such a marriage with unbelievers; for the +substantial ends of marriage (i.e., procreation and education of +children) can be had even in such unions, and very holy personages have +contracted marriage even with pagans (e.g., Jacob with the daughters of +Laban, Joseph with the daughter of Putiphar, Moses with the daughter of +Jethro, Esther with Assuerus, St. Cecilia with Valerian, St. Monica +with Patricius, St. Clotilda with Clovis, etc.). The Church, however, +has made disparity of cult a diriment impediment on account of the +special danger, and it grants no dispensation unless the precautions +decreed for mixed marriages be observed (see 824, 2807).</p> + +<p>2818. The Impediments of Kinship.—(a) Consanguinity.—Marriage is null +when contracted between blood relatives, that is, persons descended +from one another or from one common ancestor within certain limits. In +the direct line consanguinity invalidates marriage between all +ascendants and descendants, legitimate or natural, that is, between a +man and all his female ancestry (mother, grandmother, etc.) and +posterity (daughter, etc.), and between a woman and all her male +ancestors and posterity. In the collateral line it invalidates to the +third degree inclusively, that is, between a man and a woman whose +parents are related as first cousins or even more closely. The degree +of consanguinity between this man and woman is first, second or third, +according as one, two or three generations separate them (i.e., both or +the one farthest removed) from the nearest ancestor of both (see Canons +96 and 1076). Consanguinity is multiplied when two parties are +descended from several common stocks. This impediment is of the natural +law as regards the first, and probably all the other degrees of the +direct line; for reverence due to parents forbids one to marry them. +Marriage between brother and sister is not opposed to the absolute or +primary law of nature, but to the relative or secondary law (see 303); +for natural inclination teaches that it is unbecoming for members of +the same family to intermarry, and further the children of their unions +are very apt to be weakly or defective. In other degrees consanguinity +is an impediment of church law only, and may be dispensed for a good +reason, but a more serious reason is necessary for nearer relationship.</p> + +<p>(b) Affinity.—Marriage is null when contracted between +relatives-in-law, or those who are kin by valid, even though +unconsummated, marriage. But the impediment exists only between the +husband and his wife’s blood relatives, and vice versa. In the direct +line it includes all degrees; in the collateral line it extends to the +second degree inclusive. Hence, a widower is impeded from marrying all +the lineal relatives of his deceased wife (her mother, grandmother, +daughter, granddaughter, etc.), and the following of her collateral +relatives: her sisters, her aunts, her nieces, her first cousins. +Affinity is multiplied by multiplication of the consanguinity on which +it is based (e.g., when a woman is doubly related to one’s deceased +wife), and by successive marriages (e.g., when a woman is the sister of +a man’s two deceased wives). The impediment of affinity is justified by +moral reasons—by the mutual reverence that should exist between those +who are closely related by marriage, by the dangers to which their +relationship would be exposed if they were able to marry, and by the +good of society, which is promoted when marriage is not confined within +to narrow a circle. But the impediment is entirely ecclesiastical, for +the Church can dispense in all degrees, and the relationship is only an +imperfect copy of consanguinity.</p> + +<p>(c) Public Decency.—This impediment, also known as quasi-affinity, +arises from an invalid, even though unconsummated, marriage, and from +public or notorious concubinage; and it annuls marriage in the first +and second degrees of the direct line between the man and the blood +relatives of the woman, and vice versa. The reason for the impediment +is the unbecomingness of marriage with the near relatives (i.e., the +mother, daughter, grandmother, granddaughter of the woman, and the +father, son, grandfather, grandson of the man) of a person with whom +one has lived in putative marriage or concubinage. The impediment is +less strict than that of affinity, and is of ecclesiastical law only.</p> + +<p>(d) Spiritual Relationship.—This impediment nullifies marriage between +a baptized person and the person who baptized him or her or who stood +for him or her in Baptism. The minister and the sponsor contract a +relationship of spiritual parenthood to the baptized person, since +Baptism is a supernatural birth and the godparents are charged with the +religious welfare of the godchild. Reasons of respect and of intimate +relationship make marriage between such persons unbecoming, and hence +the Church from early times has ruled against it.</p> + +<p>(e) Legal Relationship.—Persons who in civil law are unable to marry +one another on account of the relationship arising from legal adoption +are also barred from marriage in Canon Law. The relations between an +adopted person and the members of the family into which he is adopted +are so close that human lawmakers have often felt it necessary to +declare adoption an impediment to marriage.</p> + +<p>2819. Matrimonial Impediments Produced through Misdeeds.—(a) +Abduction.—There can be no valid marriage between a man who holds a +woman under restraint in order to compel her to marry him, if she has +been abducted by him or is violently detained by him in her residence +or elsewhere. If the woman who has been carried away or who is held +against her will marries unwillingly, the marriage is invalid according +to natural law; if she marries willingly, the marriage is invalid from +church law. Hence the impediment of abduction is of positive law only +and does not oblige infidels (see Canon 1064).</p> + +<p>(b) Crime.—There can be no valid marriage between the following: those +who during a legitimate marriage have consummated adultery together and +have mutually promised future marriage or have attempted marriage, even +though only civilly (Canon 1075); those who during the same lawful +marriage have consummated adultery together, and of whom one has +committed conjugicide; those who have cooperated physically or morally, +even though they are not adulterers, to murder the spouse of one of +them. The purpose of this impediment is to safeguard the fidelity and +rights of married persons, and to punish those who resort to adultery +or murder in the hope of a new marriage. The impediment is +ecclesiastical and does not affect infidels.</p> + +<p>2820. Duties of the Pastor After the Inquiry about Impediments.—(a) +Dispensation.—If the pastor finds an impediment of natural or divine +law (e.g., the bond of an existing marriage), or an impediment which is +never dispensed (e.g., consanguinity in the first degree of the +collateral line, notorious conjugicide, when there is no danger of +death), he cannot proceed with the marriage. If he discovers another +impediment, he must inquire whether or not there is sufficient reason +for dispensation. For the impediments of occult crime, disparity of +cult outside of mission countries, age, Sacred Orders and religious +profession (also for neglecting the form of marriage), a grave reason +is necessary to permit marriage; but for the remaining impediments, a +less grave reason is required. The usual or grave reasons for +dispensation include the public good (e.g., peace between peoples, +prevention of serious litigations), a great private good (e.g., a +suitable marriage offered to a woman who on account of age or locality +can hardly find another such chance), great spiritual good (e.g., +prevention of a mixed or civil marriage or great scandal, termination +of open concubinage), great temporal good (e.g., means to support the +family of a poor widow); but other and lesser reasons sometimes +suffice, as when the woman is illegitimate, an orphan, deflowered, +sickly, or homely, or the man needs someone to take care of him or of +his small children from a previous marriage, or when the marriage has +already been announced or will be of great advantage to the parents of +one of the parties. In case of urgent necessity or of danger of death, +the pastor and also the confessor or priest who assists at the marriage +are empowered to grant certain dispensations; in other cases +dispensation can be granted only by the local Ordinary or by the Holy +See. The petition for a dispensation must state the facts truthfully, +but must conceal the identity of the petitioner when the impediment is +occult. In executing a dispensation one must observe the conditions +laid down by the superior who granted it (see commentaries on Canons +1043 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) Publication.—Even though it is morally certain that there is no +impediment, the banns of marriage should be proclaimed beforehand and +in the place where the parties have their domicile or quasi-domicile +(or residence, if they are _vagi_), and also, if necessary, in other +places where they have lived. This is a grave duty, since its purpose +is to ensure the validity and lawfulness of marriages. If it is morally +certain that there is no impediment, the Ordinary may dispense for a +good reason (see commentaries on Canons 1022 sqq.).</p> + +<p>2821. After the Examination and Proclamation.—(a) If it is certain +that there is an impediment, the procedure will be that given in 2820 +a; (b) if it is doubtful whether there is a diriment impediment, the +matter should be investigated more fully, but without defamation of the +parties, and if the doubt remains, the question should be submitted to +the Ordinary (see above, 2805 b); (c) if no impediment, certain or +doubtful, has been discovered, the pastor should approve the parties +for marriage.</p> + +<p>2822. Duties of the Pastor as Regards the Religious Instruction of the +Engaged Couple.—(a) The pastor should require those who are not +confirmed to receive Confirmation before their marriage, if they can do +this without serious inconvenience.</p> + +<p>(b) He should instruct the parties in the essentials of Christian +doctrine, if they are ignorant in these matters (see 920 sqq.), and he +should point out to them the nature of marriage as a contract and as a +Sacrament, its purposes and properties, the grace it confers and the +conjugal and parental duties it imposes, the necessity of preparing for +the Sacrament and of receiving it in the state of grace. He should also +speak about the impediments, so that the couple may understand the +disqualifications for a valid and lawful marriage; but this should be +done prudently, so as not to shock the innocent or to help others to +evade the law. But ignorance of the Catechism is not strictly an +impediment; and if the parties are unwilling to take instruction, they +should be married without it. In a mixed marriage it is often very +useful to give the non-Catholic a short course in Catholic teaching, +and all couples who are preparing for marriage would do well to read +some of the good works prepared especially for the use of engaged or +newly married people. The Code requires of pastors that in their +sermons they instruct the people on marriage and exhort them to avoid +mixed marriages and marriages with the unworthy (Canons 1018, 1064, +1065).</p> + +<p>2823. The Pastor and the Duties of Engaged Couple.—The pastor should +also inquire about duties owed by the couple to others.</p> + +<p>(a) Duties to Parents.—He should seriously admonish minors subject to +parental authority not to marry without the knowledge or against the +reasonable wishes of their parents. If the parents are opposed to the +marriage, the pastor should decide from the circumstances whether the +opposition is justified or not; if one parent only is unwilling, the +wishes of the father _per se_ have preference over those of the mother, +as he is the head of the family. If the engaged couple will not heed +the pastor, he is seriously bound to refuse to marry them until the +case has been presented to the Ordinary for decision (Canon 1034).</p> + +<p>(b) Duties to Civil Law.—The State has no power over the Sacrament of +Matrimony, its bond, or its inseparable temporal effects (such as the +rights and duties of spouses, legitimacy of children and the like), but +it is competent in reference to merely civil effects and conditions, +which are temporal circumstances separable from the substance of +marriage. Hence, those who are getting married should comply with civil +formalities that do not trespass on church rights, such as registration +or marriage license.</p> + +<p>2824. Opposition of Parents to Marriage.—In deciding whether the +parental opposition to a marriage is reasonable or not, the pastor +should take into consideration both the motives for the opposition and +the reasons in favor of the marriage.</p> + +<p>(a) The motives for the opposition are reasonable, if the parents +object because of the undesirability of one of the couple, or their +incompatibility, or the evil consequences that will follow the +marriage. A person is undesirable on account of defects of soul (e.g., +an atheist, a drunkard, a libertine, a man or woman of ill-fame, a +cruel man, an ill-tempered woman), or of body (e.g., a person who is +deformed, or malodorous, or afflicted with syphilis or other serious +disease), or of mind (e.g., a half-witted person), or of economical +ability (e.g., a man who is a gambler or spendthrift, or who is unable +to earn a living; a woman who is loaded with debts or who cannot take +care of a home). There is incompatibility when the ages of the couple +or their rank in life, their race, their education, their tastes, or +their dispositions are utterly different. There are evil consequences +when scandals, hatreds, disgrace, or loss of temporal goods will ensue.</p> + +<p>(b) The reason for the marriage, however, may suffice to prevail over +the parental objections. Thus, if the strong disapproval of relatives +is the only reason against a marriage and its abandonment will make the +couple unhappy for life, charity does not oblige to such a sacrifice. +And the temporal advantage of a family should not be preferred to the +spiritual benefit, if their son who is wild wishes to marry a poor girl +who has a good influence over him rather than a wealthy girl whom he +does not admire.</p> + +<p>2825. Religious Duties before Marriage.—(a) Confession.—A public +sinner (e.g., one who has been living in concubinage) is obliged to go +to confession before marriage in order to repair his scandal. A sinner +whose guilt is not public must repent before receiving the Sacrament of +Matrimony, since it is a Sacrament of the Living and supposes the state +of grace; but an act of contrition strictly suffices. It is +recommended, however, that all persons go to confession as a +preparation and that they make a general confession. The confessor +should be told of any occult or incriminating impediment that was not +disclosed to the pastor, and it is therefore advisable that the +confession precede the ceremony by several days, so as to allow time +for possible dispensations.</p> + +<p>(b) Communion.—It is better that Communion be received on the day of +one’s marriage, but, if this is not convenient, it may be received +several days before or several days after. There is no command as to +this, but the Church’s counsel is most earnest.</p> + +<p>2826. The Celebration of Marriage.—(a) Requisites for Validity.—In +order to be valid, a Catholic’s marriage must be celebrated in the +presence of the parish-priest or Ordinary, or of a priest delegated by +either, and of at least two witnesses. There are two exceptions to this +law, namely, in danger of death when the priest cannot be had and in +the case of inability to appear before a priest within a month. This +law is most suitable, since marriage is not a mere profane contract, +but a Sacrament subject to the Church; the law is also necessary, since +secret or clandestine marriages would be impossible of proof, and +society and the family would be seriously harmed if they were permitted +except in very extraordinary cases.</p> + +<p>(b) Requisites for Lawfulness.—The pastor assists lawfully at a +marriage if he has assured himself of the freedom of the parties to +marry and of his own right to assist officially at their marriage. The +pastor has the right to witness a marriage when the parties are his +subjects by reason of their location in his parish, or when he has +permission from their pastor or Ordinary to assist at the nuptials. +When the bride is from one parish and the groom from another, the rule +is that the marriage should be held before the bride’s pastor (Canons +1094 sqq.)</p> + +<p>2827. The Rite of Marriage.—(a) The essential rite consists in the +words of consent spoken by the bride and groom. The assisting priest +asks for this consent, and then (except in a mixed marriage) blesses +the newly married pair and the ring. Marriage by sign language or +through an interpreter or proxy is not lawful without special +permission, and marriage by letter is not recognized (Canons 1088 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The accidental rite is the nuptial blessing bestowed during the +Nuptial Mass that follows on the marriage. This is omitted in mixed +marriages, and also as a rule during Advent and Lent. The place for +marriage is regularly in the parish church, if it is a Catholic +marriage, but outside the church if it is a mixed marriage (see Canons +1100 sqq.). The Ordinary may dispense from the requirements of place +(Canon 1109).</p> + +<p>2828. Cooperation in an Unworthy Marriage.—(a) The Priest.—The +clergyman acts as the official representative of the Church, and hence +only a serious reason will permit his assistance when the unworthiness +of one of the parties is known to him in an extra-confessional way. A +serious reason would be a threat of bodily harm to the priest or great +spiritual detriment to the parties, such as their continuance in the +state of sin. A more serious reason is required if one of the parties +is an _excommunicatus vitandus_. Finally, at times only passive +assistance is permitted, as in certain mixed marriages in which the +non-Catholic refuses to give guarantees, but there is greater danger of +perversion without than with the assistance (see 2677 sqq.).</p> + +<p>(b) The Spouses.—The bride and groom are the ministers as well as the +recipients of Matrimony, and hence, if one of the parties knows that +the other is not in the state of grace, there is an administration of a +Sacrament to an unworthy recipient. But only charity would bid one to +deny the Sacrament to that other party, if one could not induce him to +dispose himself, and charity does not oblige with great inconvenience. +Hence the worthy party, if he or she has a suitable reason for +marrying, does not sin by reason of the other party’s unworthiness.</p> + +<p>(c) The Witnesses.—The cooperation of the witnesses is less than that +of the priest and of the worthy party, and hence only in an +extraordinary case do the witnesses sin by assisting at a marriage +contracted before the Church. They may presume that all is well, if the +pastor has agreed to the marriage; and even though they are certain +that the bride or groom is in mortal sin, the fear of incurring +displeasure or harm will ordinarily excuse the best man or bridesmaid +from all sin, or at least from grave sin.</p> + +<p>2829. Registration of Marriages.—The Code requires that marriages be +recorded in the matrimonial and baptismal registers, and that +notification be sent to the pastors of the parishes where the bride and +the groom were baptized. This duty seems to be grave, since its end is +to provide for stable conditions and secure proof of freedom to marry. +The entries should be made without delay (i.e., within three days at +least), lest they be overlooked or be made incorrectly (Canon 1103).</p> + +<p>2830. When an Impediment Is Discovered after Marriage.—A diriment +impediment or other invalidating defect is sometimes discovered after +the celebration of marriage. There are various solutions of this +difficulty.</p> + +<p>(a) If the marriage can be validated (or made valid), this should be +done. The manner of simple validation of marriages null on account of +diriment impediment, defective consent or lack of form, is declared in +Canons 1133-1137.</p> + +<p>(b) If the marriage cannot be validated simply, it may be made valid in +certain cases by the special validation known as a _sanatio in radice_. +This supposes that a consent naturally sufficient, but juridically +insufficient, was given, and that a renewal of consent cannot be +obtained (see Canons 1138-1141).</p> + +<p>(c) If marriage cannot be validated in any way (as in the case of an +indispensable impediment), the parties should be separated, or +permitted to live together as brother and sister, or left in good +faith. Thus, if the nullity of the marriage is public, the parties +should be separated after a declaration of nullity; if the nullity is +secret and unprovable, the parties may be permitted to live together as +brother and sister, if they know the marriage is null, but are not +exposed to the danger of incontinence; if the parties are in good faith +about their marriage and it is foreseen that serious evils would result +were they told the truth (such as bad faith, or misfortunes for the +children), they may be left as they are.</p> + +<p>2831. The Lawfulness of Divorce and Separation.—(a) Complete divorce, +or dissolution of the bond with the right to remarry during the +lifetime of the other spouse, is never lawful, except in the cases +mentioned in 2787 e. Moreover, the civil lawgiver has no right ever to +dissolve the marriage tie, for the marriage bond of Christians is +sacramental and not subject to the State, while the marriage bond of +non-Christians is indissoluble by human authority. On the death of one +spouse, however, the survivor is free to marry again, though chaste +widowhood is more honorable.</p> + +<p>(b) Incomplete divorce, or separation from bed and board, is allowed +permanently to the innocent spouse in case of adultery, and temporarily +when there are other good reasons. Thus, if one of the parties becomes +an apostate, or gives non-Catholic education to the children, or leads +a criminal or disgraceful life, or makes common life too hard by his +cruelty, or endangers the other party in soul or body, the innocent +spouse may separate after appealing to the Ordinary, or may depart on +his or her own authority, if the facts are certain and there is danger +in delay (Canons 1118 sqq.). With permission one may even seek a civil +divorce, if it is a separation only, in order to be free as regards +civil effects of marriage (1950).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_I">APPENDIX I</h2> +</div> + +<p>SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS +(Holy Office, 17 Apr., 1943) +[placed at end of Volume I, after section 1625, in print edition]</p> + +<p>Seeing that delays and omissions in denouncing the books frequently +occur, and that many of the faithful are in a state of deplorable +ignorance regarding the denunciation and prohibition of harmful books, +the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office deems it appropriate +to call to mind the principal provisions of the sacred canons on this +subject; for it is beyond doubt that bad or harmful writings expose +purity of faith, integrity of morals, and the very salvation of souls +to the greatest dangers.</p> + +<p>Certainly the Holy See cannot by itself, with adequate care and in due +time, prohibit the numberless writings against faith and morals which, +especially in our time, are being published almost daily in various +languages all over the world. Hence it is necessary that the Ordinaries +of places, whose business it is to preserve sound and orthodox doctrine +and to protect good morals (C, 343, Sec.1), should, either personally +or through suitable priests, be watchful as to the books which are +published or sold in their territory (C. 1397, Sec.4), and forbid to +their subjects those which they judge should be condemned (C. 1395, +ASec.1). The right and duty to forbid books for just cause belongs also +to an Abbot of an independent monastery and to the Superior General of +a clerical exempt Institute acting with his Chapter or Council; nay, +in case of urgency, it belongs also to the other Major Superiors with +their proper Council, it being understood, however, that these must as +soon as possible report the matter to the Superior General (C. 1395, +Sec.3). Nevertheless, books which require a more expert scrutiny, or +in regard to which, for salutary results, the judgment of the supreme +authority seems to be required, should be referred by the Ordinaries to +the judgment of the Holy See (C. 1397, Sec.5).</p> + +<p>It is, of course, the duty of all the faithful, and especially of +clerics, to denounce pernicious books to the proper authority; but this +duty is especially incumbent on clerics who have some ecclesiastical +dignity, such as the Legates of the Holy See and the Ordinaries of +places, and on those who are eminent in doctrine, as for example the +Rectors and Professors of Catholic Universities.</p> + +<p>The denunciation is to be made either to this Congregation of the Holy +Office or to the Ordinary of the place, giving by all means the reason +why it is thought the book should be forbidden. The persons to whom +such a report is made have a strict duty to keep secret the names of +those who make it (C. 1397, Sec.1, 2, 3).</p> + +<p>Finally, Ordinaries of places and others who have the care of souls +should duly inform the faithful of the following:</p> + +<p>a) The prohibition of books has the effect that, unless due permission +is obtained, the forbidden book may not be published, nor republished +(without making the corrections and obtaining due approbation), nor +read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor +in any way communicated to other persons (C. 1398, Sec.1, 2);</p> + +<p>b) Books condemned by the Holy See are considered as forbidden +everywhere and in whatever language they may be translated (C. 1396);</p> + +<p>c) The positive ecclesiastical law forbids not only those books which +are individually condemned by a special decree of the Holy See and +placed on the Index of Forbidden Books, or which are proscribed by +particular Councils or Ordinaries for their subjects, but also the +books which are forbidden by the common law itself, that is, in virtue +of the rules contained in Canon 1399, which forbids in a general manner +nearly all books which are bad and harmful in themselves;</p> + +<p>d) The natural law forbids the reading of any book which occasions +proximate spiritual danger, since it forbids anyone to place himself in +danger of losing the true faith or good morals; accordingly, permission +to use forbidden books, from whomsoever it be obtained, in no way +exempts from this prohibition of the natural law (C. 1405, Sec.1).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_II">APPENDIX II</h2> +</div> + +<p>The “Ecumenical Movement” +[placed at end of Volume I, after the preceding Appendix, in print +edition]</p> + +<p>On December 20, 1949 the Holy Office issued an instruction on the +“Ecumenical Movement” addressed to all local Ordinaries. In its +prefatory remarks the Instruction insisted upon the Church’s intense +interest to attain to the full and perfect unity of the Church. It +noted as an occasion of joy the desire of many separated from the +Church to return to the unity of Christ’s fold, a good intention, +indeed, which, however, in being put into practice has not been +regulated by right principles. Accordingly the Holy Office prescribed +that local Ordinaries maintain due vigilance over the associations +seeking Church Unity, that they designate well-qualified priests to +pay close attention to everything which concerns the “Movement,” and +that they supervise publications on this matter by Catholics or by +non-Catholics, in as far as these are published, or read, or sold by +Catholics. The manner and method of proceeding in this work is to be +regulated by the Ordinaries, who are cautioned to prevent the growth of +indifference to Catholic truth and fallacious hopes of unity based upon +false or impossible foundations. With regard to mixed assemblies of +Catholics and non-Catholics, when there seems to be hope of spreading +knowledge of Catholic doctrine, the Ordinary is instructed to designate +well-qualified priests, to explain and defend the Church’s teaching. +Special permission, however, must be obtained from Ecclesiastical +Authority if Catholic laymen are to attend. Where no hope of good +results exists, the meetings are to be ended or gradually suppressed.</p> + +<p>The following specific instructions are given for the conduct of +“Ecumenical meetings.”</p> + +<p>All the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public, +large and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an +opportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party, for the +sake of discussion, to treat of matters of faith and morals, each +presenting on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject +to the prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the +_Monitum, “Cum compertum_” of this Congregation under date of 5 June, +1948. Hence, mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they +are not to be held without the previous permission of the competent +Ecclesiastical Authority. The _Monitum_, however, does not apply to +catechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to +conferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics +who are prospective converts, even though the opportunity is afforded +for the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so +that they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it +agrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.</p> + +<p>Neither does the said _Monitum_ apply to those mixed meetings of +Catholics and non-Catholics in which the discussion does not turn upon +faith and morals, but upon ways and means of defending the fundamental +principles of the natural law or of the Christian religion against the +enemies of God who are now leagued together, or where the question is +how to restore social order, or other topics of that nature. Even in +these meetings, as is evident, Catholics may not approve or concede +anything which is in conflict with divine revelation or with the +doctrine of the Church even on social questions.</p> + +<p>As to local conferences and conventions which are within the scope of +the _Monitum_ as above explained, the Ordinaries of places are given, +for three years from the publication of this Instruction, the faculty +of granting the required previous permission of the Holy See on the +following conditions:</p> + +<p>1. That _communicatio in sacris_ be entirely avoided;</p> + +<p>2, That the presentations of the matter be duly inspected and directed;</p> + +<p>3. That at the close of each year a report be made to this Supreme +Sacred Congregation, stating where such meetings were held and what +experience was gathered from them.</p> + +<p>4. As regards the colloquies of theologians above mentioned, the same +faculty for the same length of time is granted to the Ordinary of the +place where such colloquies are held, or to the Ordinary delegated for +this work by the common consent of the other Ordinaries, under the same +conditions as above, but with the further requirement that the report +to this Sacred Congregation state also what questions were treated, who +were present, and who the speakers were for either side.</p> + +<p>As for the interdiocesan conferences and congresses, either national +or international, the previous permission of the Holy See, special for +each case, is always required; and, in the petition asking for it, +must also be stated what are the questions to be treated and who the +speakers are to be. And it is not allowed, before this permission has +been obtained, to begin the external preparation of such meetings or to +collaborate with non-Catholics who begin such preparation.</p> + +<p>5. Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication +whatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of +the Lord’s Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is +not forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.</p> + +<p>6. Although each Ordinary has the right and duty to conduct, promote, +and preside over this work in his own diocese, yet the cooperation of +several Bishops will be appropriate or even necessary in establishing +offices and works to observe, study, and control this work as a +whole. Accordingly it will rest with the Ordinaries themselves to +confer together and consider how a proper uniformity of action and +coordination can be obtained.</p> + +<p>7. Religious Superiors are bound to watch and to see to it that their +subjects adhere strictly and faithfully to the prescriptions laid down +by the Holy See or by the local Ordinaries in this matter.</p> + +<p>In order that so noble a work as the “union” of all Christians in one +true faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of +the entire care of souls, and that the whole Catholic people may more +earnestly implore this “union” from Almighty God, it will certainly +be of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through +Pastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions +and projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the +reasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious, +should be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers +and sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be +reminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to +find the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics, +when it is confirmed by the example of upright living.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX_TO_VOLUMES_I-II">INDEX TO VOLUMES I-II</h2> +</div> + +<p>The numbers refer to the sections in the text. Nos. 1-1625 are +contained in Volume I [of the print edition].</p> + +<p>Abjectedness, definition, 2561.</p> + +<p>Abnormal Mental States, as obstacles to voluntariness of acts, 40, 55; +effect on voluntariness of acts, 55.</p> + +<p>Abortion, canonical penalties for, 1851 a.</p> + +<p>Absolute Standard, in grave matter, 1899.</p> + +<p>Abstemiousness, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition, +2466; degrees of abstemiousness, 2467 a; austerity, 2468; excellence of +fasting and abstinence, 2469 a; sins opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a. +See also Gluttony; Sobriety.</p> + +<p>Abstinence, excellence of, 2469 a.</p> + +<p>Abstinence, Total, see Sobriety.</p> + +<p>Accession, title to private ownership, 1872 a; principles of accession, +1874.</p> + +<p>Accusation, Judicial, obligation, 1966; when a malefactor is bound to +accuse himself, 1968; ethical conditions for lawful accusation or +denunciation, 1969; persons who may not act as accusers, 1970; judicial +accusation and fraternal correction, 1972; unjust accusation, 1973; +cessation of duty of accusation, 1794. See also Complaint.</p> + +<p>Accused, see Defendant.</p> + +<p>Act, Virtuous, intrinsic and extrinsic modes of performing, 1554; +essential and ideal modes, 1555.</p> + +<p>Acts, Human, 22-62; definition, 23; knowledge requisite for, 24; +ignorance renders them involuntary, 28; effect of error, forgetfulness +and inadvertence on, 32-33; consent requisite for, 34; free and +necessary, 35 a; perfectly and imperfectly voluntary, 35 b; voluntary +absolutely and under a certain aspect, 35 c; voluntary in themselves or +directly and in their cause or indirectly, 35 d; voluntary, approvingly +and permissively, 36; omissions, 37-39; obstacles which destroy or +lessen voluntariness, 40 sqq.; voluntary acts either elicited or +commanded by the will, 56-62; intellectual, 61-62; sensible, 61-62; +external corporal, 61-62; morality of, 63 sqq.; acts forbidden to +clerics, 2603 a.</p> + +<p>Acts, Meritorious, 106 sqq.</p> + +<p>Acts, Moral, 63 sqq.; good, 76-78; bad, 79-80; indifferent, 82 sqq.; +morality of external act, 89 sqq.; morality of act indirectly willed, +94-95; morality of consequences of act, 96, imputability, 97 sqq,; +imputability in cases of double result, 103 sqq.; acts that are +objectively efficaciously and subjectively unjust, 1763 a, b, c. See +also Acts, Meritorious.</p> + +<p>Acts of Charity, see Charity.</p> + +<p>Acts of Faith, see Faith.</p> + +<p>Acts of Hope, see Hope.</p> + +<p>Acts, Voluntary, 35-39. See also Acts, Human.</p> + +<p>Adjuration, definition, 2263; species of adjuration, 2264; solemn or +simple adjuration, 2264 a; imperative or deprecative adjuration, 2264 +b; qualities of lawful adjuration, 2265; persons who may be adjured, +2266; use of exorcisms, 2267; effects of adjurations, 2268.</p> + +<p>Adoration, see Religion.</p> + +<p>Adornment, when lascivious, 1456 b.</p> + +<p>Adulation, sin against affability, 2423 a.</p> + +<p>Adultery, definition, 2530; sinfulness of adultery, 2530 b; degrees of +malice, 2530 c.</p> + +<p>Advertence, full and partial, 174 sqq., 153, 196.</p> + +<p>Advisor, implicit, 1779 c.</p> + +<p>Aeromancy, form of divination, 2284 G.</p> + +<p>Affability, virtue of, 2143 b; definition, 2421; offices of affability, +2422; sins against affability, 2423.</p> + +<p>Affectation, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Afflictions, Medicinal, as remedies against sin, 283.</p> + +<p>_Agapae_, in Early Church, 2185 a.</p> + +<p>Age of Reason, Puberty and Majority, 433.</p> + +<p>Agency, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Aggression, Unjust, 1831.</p> + +<p>Albigensianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Almsgiving, external effect of charity, 1210; definition, 1216; manner +of giving, 1217; forms of almsgiving, 1218; seven corporal works of +mercy, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222; comparison of corporal and +spiritual alms, 1224; duty of almsgiving, 1226 sqq.; three classes of +needy persons distinguished, 1233; three degrees of corporal need, +1236; rules on giving alms, 1237; gravity of the obligation, 1238; +refusal of alms and restitution, 1240; alms from ill-gotten goods, 1241 +sqq.; almsgiving from the goods of another, 1244-1246; order of charity +in almsgiving, 1247; amount to be given, 1249, 1253; employment as +alms, 1249 b; when alms are excessive, 1250; clerics and almsgiving, +1252; time for almsgiving, 1255; manner, 1256; public charity cannot +take the place of almsgiving, 1257.</p> + +<p>Alphonsus Liguori, Saint, preference for Equiprobabilism, 696, 697, +698; on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to his personal +knowledge, 1951 c.</p> + +<p>Ambiguous Answers, lawfulness of, 2402.</p> + +<p>Ambition, as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness of soul, +2450 b.</p> + +<p>Amendment, Resolution of, 2736.</p> + +<p>American Law on Bankruptcy, 1788.</p> + +<p>Amusements, forbidden to Clerics, 2603 c.</p> + +<p>Anarchists, condemned by Church, 947 b.</p> + +<p>Anger, 269; immediate cause of fighting, 1431; a cause of contumely, +2017 c; definition, 2546; gravity of the sin of anger, 2547; anger +compared with hatred and envy, 2548; one of the seven capital vices, +2549.</p> + +<p>Annuities, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Anti-Nationalism, sin against piety, 2349 b.</p> + +<p>Anti-Tutiorism, 672 b.</p> + +<p>Apology, as reparation for contumely, 2023 b; manner of apologizing, +2024.</p> + +<p>Apostasy, definition, 835; comparative gravity of sins of apostasy, +837; objectively speaking, no reason can justify apostasy, 838; +apostasy to non-Catholic and anti-Catholic sects, 839.</p> + +<p>Appeal, right of accused, 1982.</p> + +<p>Appetites, Sensible, 46.</p> + +<p>Appetites, Sensitive, as subject of sin, 231.</p> + +<p>Appetites, Spiritual, 46.</p> + +<p>Arianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Art, intellectual virtue, 146 b; one of the two practical virtues of +intellect, 1627 a.</p> + +<p>Assent, External and Internal, 760 a, b; objects, 761 d.</p> + +<p>Assistant Priest, special duties of, 2607 c.</p> + +<p>Astrology, a form of divination, 2285 c.</p> + +<p>Astuteness, a form of evil prudence, 1651 a.</p> + +<p>Attrition, see Contrition.</p> + +<p>Augury, a form of divination, 2285 d.</p> + +<p>Auspice, a form of divination, 2285 d.</p> + +<p>Austerity, nature and kinds, 2468.</p> + +<p>Authority, can supply indirect certitude, 652; kind necessary to make +opinion solidly probable, 707.</p> + +<p>Avarice, 269; opposed to liberality, 2426; comparison of avarice and +prodigality, 2429.</p> + +<p>Backbiting, see Defamation.</p> + +<p>Bailments, 1749.</p> + +<p>Bankruptcy in American Law, 1788.</p> + +<p>Baptism, Sacrament of, faith necessary for adult candidate, 791; +the most necessary Sacrament, 2686; effect is regeneration, 2686 a; +material element of Baptism, 2686 b; formal element, 2686 c; Solemn +Baptism, 2637 a; Private Baptism, 2687 b; duties of pastors, 2688; +duties of parents and guardians, 2689; sponsors required by Church +from very early times, 2690; requirements for validity and lawfulness +of sponsors, 2690 a, b; duties of sponsors, 2691; duties of adult +recipients of Baptism, 2692; duties of minister of Baptism, 2693.</p> + +<p>Barter, 1749 c.</p> + +<p>Beatitudes, 159 c, 164, 1662; rewards promised, 165; Third, 811; First, +1058; Seventh, 1619; Sixth, 1662; Fourth and Fifth, 2433; Eighth, 2457; +Second, 2571.</p> + +<p>Beneficence, external effect of charity, 1211 sqq.; regulated by +the order of charity, 1213-15; sins against, 1444 sqq. See Scandal; +Obscenity; Seduction; Cooperation.</p> + +<p>Benefices, Ecclesiastical, 1758; institution of benefices, 2185 h.</p> + +<p>Bestiality, form of impurity, 2534 d.</p> + +<p>Betrothal, duties of persons engaged to marry, 2627; duties imposed by +engagement to marry, 2628; courtship, 2628; duty to manifest defects, +2628 b; fidelity during the engagement, 2628 c; right to manifest +affection, 2628 c; formal promise to marry imposes duty of marriage +within a reasonable time, 2628 d; breaking of engagement, 2628 d; duty +of restitution in breach of promise, 2628 d; signs of affection between +engaged persons, 2629.</p> + +<p>Bills, unjust refusal to pay, 1794.</p> + +<p>Birth-Control, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Bishop, interpreter of diocesan laws, 486; special duties, 2607 a.</p> + +<p>Blackstone, on purely penal character of civil laws, 570 b.</p> + +<p>Blasphemy, Sin of, 887 sqq.; heretical and non-heretical, 889; +interpreting cases of doubtful blasphemy, 894; sinfulness of blasphemy, +895; the greatest sin against faith, 895 b; species of blasphemy, 897; +circumstances which aggravate, 897 d; blasphemies against the Three +Divine Persons, 898; despair and presumption as blasphemy, 899 a; sin +against Holy Ghost, 900; state of malicious sin, 901; remedies against +blasphemy, 902; absolution, 903.</p> + +<p>Blessed Sacrament, Confraternities of, 955 a.</p> + +<p>Bluntness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Bonaventure, Saint, on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to +his personal knowledge, 1951 c.</p> + +<p>Bond, definition of, 1886 a.</p> + +<p>Bonds, purchase by clerics, 2605 e.</p> + +<p>Books, when obscene, 1456 e; forbidden, see Writings, Forbidden.</p> + +<p>Booty, obligation to make restitution, 1414.</p> + +<p>Borrowing, Sinful, 1879 b.</p> + +<p>Brahmanism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Breach of Promise, damages resultant on, 1888 a.</p> + +<p>Bribery, Judicial, see Judge.</p> + +<p>Broth, use forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.</p> + +<p>Buddhism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Buying and Selling, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Calumny, definition, 2030 e; worst kind of defamation, 2032 d. See also +Defamation.</p> + +<p>Candidates for Public Office, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.</p> + +<p>Capital Vices, Seven, 269 sqq.</p> + +<p>Carbonari, forbidden by Church, 947 h.</p> + +<p>Cardinal Virtues, 150. See also Prudence; Justice; Fortitude; +Temperance.</p> + +<p>Carelessness, caused by sloth, 1324, 1326 c, 1327.</p> + +<p>Casuistic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.</p> + +<p>Catholic Daughters of America, 955 b.</p> + +<p>Caution, integral part of prudence, 108 b.</p> + +<p>Celibacy, origin and obligation, 2602 a.</p> + +<p>Censorship, Government, not desirable, 1458 e.</p> + +<p>Censures, by the Church, 761 c.</p> + +<p>Ceremonial Law, see Law, Mosaic.</p> + +<p>Certainty, of knowledge, 1630; certainty of practical truth, 1630.</p> + +<p>Certitude, necessary for prudence, 1630.</p> + +<p>Certitude of Conscience, necessity, 641-642; kinds, 643 sqq.; +metaphysical, physical and moral, 644 sqq.; speculative and practical, +647; demonstrative and probable, 649; direct and indirect, 651; +principle of authority and reflex principles supply indirect certitude, +652.</p> + +<p>Charity, theological virtue of, 151; compared with faith and hope, +157; remains in the blessed, 158; Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; +definition, 1105; charity and natural love, 1106 sqq.; true friendship +with God, 1112; uncreated and created charity, 1113-1114; excellence +of, 1115; charity and beatific vision, 1116; production of charity, +1121; origin, 1122; may be increased, 1124; perfect charity, 1129; +three degrees, 1130; decline of charity, 1131; loss of, 1132; object +of, 1133; love of creatures not always charity, 1134; sinful, natural +and supernatural self-love, 1136; friendship and charity, 1137-1141; +love of neighbor, 1139; charity for sinners, 1142-1147; for enemies, +1148 sqq.; common signs of charity, 1154; refusal of greeting a lack +of charity, 1157; general order of charity, 1158; character of love of +God, 1160 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods for neighbor’s sake, 1163; +love of the body, 1164; order of charity between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; +order of charity between relations, 1176 sqq.; acts of, 1183 sqq.; +exercise of act, 1184; internal effects of charity, 1103; joy, 1194; +peace, 1195 sqq.; reconciliation with God effected by charity, 1196; +what reconciliation with enemies demands, 1198; manner and time of +seeking reconciliation, 1202 sqq.; external effects of charity, 1210; +beneficence (q.v.), 1211; almsgiving (q.v.), 1216; fraternal correction +(q.v.), 1258 sqq.; hate (q.v.), 1295 sqq.; sins against peace, 1347 +sqq.; opposition between schism and charity, 1371; schism greatest sin +against neighbor, 1372; duty of owner towards one in dire need, 1925 a.</p> + +<p>Charity, Commandments of, in Old Testament, 1547 a; in New Testament, +1547 b; precepts of secondary acts of charity, 1551; prohibitions of +uncharitableness, 1552; commandment of love of God, 1553 sqq.; modes +of performing act of love of God, 1554-1555; must be subjectively +and objectively great, 1556; actual and habitual, 1557; degrees of +perfection of this act, 1560; commandment of love of self, 1561; +pursuit of supernatural, intellectual and corporal goods, 1563-1564; +care of the mind, 1564; commandment of love of neighbor, 1579 sqq.; +conditions, 1582; fulfillment of the commandments of charity, 1585 +sqq.; various ways of fulfillment, 1586; external acts must be +accompanied by internal love, 1588; internal act must be explicit, +1589; proper intention, 1590; obligation is universal, 1592; times +when the precepts of charity oblige, 1593 sqq.; ignorance as excuse +for omission, 1596; cases when love of neighbor must be explicit, +1603; necessity of habit of charity, 1604; order of charity is also +commanded, 1606.</p> + +<p>Chastity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; subjective part of temperance, +2465 a; definition of chastity, 2486; fruit of Fear of the Lord, 2571 +c; vow and virtue of chastity, 2612 b.</p> + +<p>Chauvinism, sin against piety, 2349 a.</p> + +<p>Children, compensation of, 2631; sex education of children, 2632; +duties of children, charity and piety, 2633; special love of parents, +2633 a; respect and assistance owed to parents, 2633 b.</p> + +<p>Chiromancy, form of divination, 2285 b.</p> + +<p>Christian Doctrine, Confraternities of, 955 a.</p> + +<p>Christian Science, 823 b; refusal of medicine or hygienic care, 2304.</p> + +<p>Circumspection, 1638 b.</p> + +<p>Clairvoyance, form of divination, 2285 a.</p> + +<p>Clemency, definition, 2551; vices opposed to clemency, 2552 a.</p> + +<p>Clergy, duty of charity to the poor, 2608 a; disposition of superfluous +wealth by beneficed clergy, 2609 a. See also Clerics.</p> + +<p>Clerics, special duties of, 2596; duties before entering clerical +state, 2596 a; duties after entering clerical state, 2596 b; internal +vocation, 2597 a; external vocation, 2597 b; sinfulness of disregarding +vocation, 2598 a; positive duties of clerics, 2599 a; obligation of +Divine Office, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of Divine Office, +2601 a; precept of clerical celibacy, 2602 a; negative duties of +clerics, 2603; forbidden acts, 2603 a; forbidden occupations, 2603 b; +forbidden amusements, 2603 c; prohibition against trading, 2604 a; +clerics and purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, 2605 a; duties of +clerical superiors, 2606 a; special duties of those who have care of +souls, 2607 a.</p> + +<p>Clients, duties to lawyers, 2651 b.</p> + +<p>Coercion, as obstacle to consent, 40; effect on voluntariness of acts, +52.</p> + +<p>Coition, Unnatural, form of impurity, 2534 b.</p> + +<p>Commandments, natural and supernatural, 330; of faith, 913 sqq.; hope, +1092 sqq.; charity, 1547 sqq.; prudence, 1657; justice, 2434-2436; +fortitude, 2458-2460; temperance, 2572.</p> + +<p>Commandments, Ten, 2436 sqq.</p> + +<p>_Commodatum_, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Communication, Dangerous, 882 sqq.; civil and religious communication, +882; when non-religious communication is sinful, 883; when religious +communication is sinful, 884; communication in worship, 956 sqq.; +private and public, 956; participation of non-Catholics in Catholic +worship, 957-958; restriction of this participation, 959; performance +of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, 960.</p> + +<p>Communion, Holy, minister, 2703; recipient of the Eucharist, 2704; +persons who may receive Communion, 2704 a; persons who must receive +Communion, 2704 b; requirements in candidates for First Communion, 2704 +b; dispositions for worthy Communion, 2705; confession, preparation and +thanksgiving, 2705 a; Rite in which Communion may be received, 2705 +a; dispositions of body (Eucharistic fast and external reverence), +2705 b; necessary dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 a; useful +dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 b; duties of parents, pastors +and confessors in reference to Communion, 2707. See also Eucharist, +Holy.</p> + +<p>Commutations, involuntary, 1748 a; voluntary, 1748 b.</p> + +<p>Commutative Justice, see Justice.</p> + +<p>Compensation, various kinds of, 1927; lawfulness of occult +compensation, 1928; unlawful occult compensation and restitution, +1929; conditions required by commutative justice for occult +compensation, 1930; occult compensation in doubt of law, 1931 b; +where there is strict right to compensation, 1932; where there is no +right to compensation, 1933; compensation of children and employees, +1934; conditions required by legal justice for occult compensation, +1935; conditions required by charity for occult compensation, 1936; +lawfulness of open compensation, 1937.</p> + +<p>Compensationism, 731 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Complaint, duty of making complaint about private wrongs, 1967; persons +in whose favor one may denounce a private wrong, 1971. See also +Accusation, Judicial.</p> + +<p>Complicity, see Cooperation.</p> + +<p>Concupiscible Passions, 118-119. See also Passions.</p> + +<p>Condemnations, of error by the Church, 761 b.</p> + +<p>Condign Merit, see Merit.</p> + +<p>Condiments, not forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.</p> + +<p>Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Confessors, duties of, regarding obligation of restitution, 1760; need +of prudence, 1650 a. See also Penance, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Confirmation, Sacrament of, 2694; remote and proximate matter, +2694 a; form, 2694 b; minister of Confirmation, 2695; recipient of +Confirmation, 2696; sponsors in Confirmation, 2697; qualifications +and duties of sponsors, 2697 a, b; duties of pastor in reference to +Confirmation, 2698.</p> + +<p>Confucianism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Congruous Merit, see Merit.</p> + +<p>Conscience, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 575; variously divided, +576; true or false, 577; good (right) or bad (wrong), 578 a; certain +or uncertain, 578 b; obligation of, 580; authority not unlimited, 581; +no autonomous morality, 581 a; when conscience must be followed, 582; +erroneous and doubtful conscience, 585; results of following erroneous +conscience, 588; results of disobeying erroneous conscience, 589-591; +a good conscience, 593 sqq.; antecedent and consequent conscience, +594; vigilant, tender and timorous conscience, 595; scrupulous +conscience, 596; lax conscience, 596 sqq.; malicious or non-malicious +laxity (reprobate or weak conscience), 598; partial or entire laxity, +599-600; Pharisaic conscience, 600; inculpable and culpable laxity, +601; causes of a lax conscience, 601; dangers of lax conscience, 602; +rules regarding sins due to lax conscience, 603-604; opinion as state +of conscience, 662 sqq.; remedies for lax conscience, 605; scrupulous +differs from strict (tender) conscience, 607 a; scrupulous conscience +differs from scrupulosity, 607 b; rules regarding scrupulous conscience +and sins, 608; dangers of scrupulous conscience, 609; perplexed +conscience, 611 sqq.; directions of St. Alphonsus regarding perplexed +conscience, 612; scrupulosity, 614 sqq.; distinct from scrupulous +conscience, 614 a; from a tender conscience, 614 b; from anxious, +doubtful or guilty conscience, 614 c; chief subjects of scruples, 615; +signs of scrupulosity, 616; internal causes of scrupulous conscience, +617; external causes, 618; sometimes tolerated by God, 619; dangers of +scrupulosity, 620; rules for the scrupulous, 621; qualities necessary +for successful direction of scrupulous, 625; scrupulous and past +confessions, 626; scrupulous and present confessions, 627; scrupulous +and performance of duties, 628; scrupulous and commission of sin, +630; remedies for scruples, 632 sqq.; signs of a good conscience, +638; certain conscience, 640 sqq.; kinds of certitude, 643 sqq.; +uncertain conscience, 654-655; doubt and suspicion, 656; presumption, +658; reflex principles to settle doubts, 657 sqq.; opinion, 662 +sqq.; accusing or excusing, 668 a; forbidding or permitting, 668 b; +the moral systems, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 676 sqq.; Laxism, 680 sqq.; +Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilism, 688 sqq.; Probabilism, 701 +sqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; respective merits and use of the rival +systems of conscience, 740 sqq.; use by confessors, 741.</p> + +<p>Conscience, Systems of, see Systems, Moral, and Conscience.</p> + +<p>Consent, act of will, 59; consent of the will, condition of mortal +sin, 178, 184, 196; obstacles to, see Obstacles to Consent; qualities +necessary for valid consent, 1883; defects that invalidate consent, +1884.</p> + +<p>Consolations, Spiritual, differ from devotion, 2151 b.</p> + +<p>Contention, definition, 1355; sinfulness, 1357; causes, 1362.</p> + +<p>Continence, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; nature of, 2544.</p> + +<p>Continency, fruit of Fear of the Lord, 163, 2571 c.</p> + +<p>Contraception, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Contract, forms of, 1749; gratuitous contracts, 1749 a; contract +as title to private ownership, 1892 b; elements of contract, 1877; +subject-matter of contract, 1878; when contracts are immoral, 1878 +a; sinful contracts, 1879; qualities necessary for valid consent, +1833; defects that invalidate consent, 1884; when fear invalidates +consent to contract, 1884 c; form of contract, 1885; accidentals +of a contract, 1886; conditions added to contract, 1886 c; modes +of contract, 1886 d; obligation of entering into contract, 1887 a; +obligation of valid contract, 1888; quality of obligation in onerous +and gratuitous contracts, 1588 a; quantity of obligation in onerous and +gratuitous contracts, 1888 b; objects of obligation of contract, 1888 +d; obligation of quasi-contract, 1888 d; cessation of obligation, 1889; +unilateral and bilateral contracts, 1749 a; onerous contracts, 1749 +b, c; subsidiary contracts, 1749 d; immoral contracts, 1878 d; sinful +contracts, 1879; illegal contracts, 1880; unenforceable contracts, 1880 +a; voidable contracts, 1880 c; contracts _ipso facto_ void, 1880 d; +qualities necessary in the parties contractant, 1881; legal privileges +of minors in connection with contracts, 1882; principles obligatory in +all forms of contracts, 2137; gratuitous contracts, 2137 a; onerous +contracts, 2137 b; aleatory contracts, 2137 c; fraudulent contracts, +2138.</p> + +<p>Contractor’s Agreement, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Contrition, the first act of the penitent, 2729; perfect contrition, +2730 a; imperfect contrition or attrition, 2730 b; attrition based +solely on fear of punishment, 2731; servile fear of God, 2731 b; +slavish fear, 2731 b; attrition in the Sacrament of Penance, 2732; +disinterested love not required in Penance, 2732 b; interested love +necessary in Penance, 2732 e; conditions for valid contrition and +attrition, 2733; internal sorrow; 2733 a; supernatural sorrow, 2733 +b; universal sorrow, 2733 c; sovereign sorrow, 2733 d; properties of +contrition, 2735.</p> + +<p>Contumely, definition, 2010; various forms of, 2012; manner of +confessing contumely in Sacrament of Penance, 2013; sinfuless of +contumely, 2014; gravity of matter in contumely, 2015; causes of +contumely, 2017; duty of bearing with contumely, 2018; reasons for +resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019; duty of one who answers +contumely or detraction, 2020; duty of restitution for contumely, 2021; +what kind of reparation should be made, 2023; method of apologizing +for contumely, 2024; cessation of obligation of restitution, 2026; the +differences between defamation and contumely, 2029.</p> + +<p>Cooperation, and restitution, 1775; positive cooperators in injury, +1779; negative cooperators, 1780; distinction between cooperators +as equal or unequal causes of injury, 1782; cooperation in suicide, +1855; cooperation in defamation, 2076 sqq.; cooperation in sinful +oaths, 2252; cooperation in divination or other form of superstition, +2296; cooperation in the sin of drunkenness, 2483 a; cooperation and +restitution, see Restitution. See also Cooperation in Sin.</p> + +<p>Cooperation in Religious Activities, 976 sqq.; immediate and mediate, +976 sqq.; lawfulness of material cooperation, 978; most usual cases +of cooperation, 980; contributions to false worship, 981; building of +houses of false worship, 983-984; preparing for non-Catholic services, +985-986; resemblance to scandal, 1460 b.</p> + +<p>Cooperation in Sin, definition, 1506; how it differs from complicity, +1507; formal or material, 1508 a; positive or negative, 1508 b; +occasional or effective, 1509 a; immediate or mediate, 1509 b; +indispensable or not indispensable, 1509 c; unjust or unlawful, 1510; +explicit or implicit, 1511; proximate or remote, 1512; sinfulness, +1513; lawfulness of material cooperation, 1515; gravity of reasons +necessary for cooperation, 1520 sqq.; lawfulness of immediate +cooperation, 1526; special cases, 1528; formal cooperation with evil +reading matter, 1529; with evil dances or plays, 1531; material +cooperation with evil dances or plays, 1532; cooperation by manufacture +of sinful objects, 1533 sqq.; cooperation in supplying food and +drink, 1537-1539; in renting houses, rooms, etc., 1540-1541; lawful +and unlawful cooperation of employees, 1542; duties of confessors, +1545-1546.</p> + +<p>Correction, Fraternal, definition, 1258; distinct from judicial +correction and censure of vice, 1258 a, e; includes prevention of sin, +1258 d; duty, 1259-1261, 1282, 1284; when advisable and inadvisable, +1262-1263; doubtful cases, 1264; sin committed by omission or delay, +1265-1266; when person not a superior should make correction, 1267; +obligation of inquiring into suspected wrongdoing, 1269; private spying +uncharitable, 1269 c; faults that call for correction, 1270 sqq.; +correction of vincibly and invincibly ignorant, 1273 sqq.; past sins do +not demand correction, 1276; persons to be corrected, 1277; correction +of superior, 1278; persons to administer correction, 1279; persons +excused from duty, 1283; manner of correction, 1285-1291; secret and +public corrections, 1286; obligation of reporting an occult sin, 1287; +duties of superior when subject is reported for fraternal correction, +1292-1293; obligations for private individuals summarized, 1294.</p> + +<p>Council of Trent, Catechism of the, points about which explicit faith +is required, 765.</p> + +<p>Counsel, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a.</p> + +<p>Counsels of New Testament, 7, 364 sqq.; the three chief, 368; +superiority of, 366.</p> + +<p>Counterclaim, definition, 1927 a.</p> + +<p>Courage, inferior to justice, 1716 a.</p> + +<p>Courtship, see Betrothal.</p> + +<p>Cowardice, caused by sloth, 1324; sin against fortitude, 2446 b.</p> + +<p>Creditors, order of preference among, 1787.</p> + +<p>Credulity, 847.</p> + +<p>Creed, knowledge of necessary, 920.</p> + +<p>Creeds, summarize formulas of Christian teaching, 767; what articles +deal with, 767; Apostles’, Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; Summary +of teaching of Apostles’ Creed, 770 sqq.</p> + +<p>Cremation, societies for the promotion of, forbidden by Code, 946 b; +cremation of corpses, 2595 b.</p> + +<p>Criticism, when sinful, 2038; when injustice is committed by +professional critics, 2075.</p> + +<p>Cruelty, vice opposed to clemency, 2552 a.</p> + +<p>Culpability, see Guilt.</p> + +<p>Cunning, 1651 a.</p> + +<p>Curiosity, compared with impurity, 2492 a.</p> + +<p>Cursing, definition, 2111; when cursing is not sinful, 2112; sinfulness +of cursing, 2113; gravity of sin of cursing, 2114; circumstances that +change moral species of cursing, 2115; numerical multiplication in +sins of cursing, 2116; cursing of evil, 2117; unlawful cursing of an +irrational creature, 2119.</p> + +<p>Custom, effect on law, 391 sqq.; kinds of, 392. See also Customs in +Canon Law.</p> + +<p>Customs in Canon Law, 506 sqq.; may interpret, abrogate or introduce +law, 506; kinds of, 507; origin of, 508 a; legal force of, 508 b; time +required for acquisition of legal force, 511; cessation of, 513.</p> + +<p>_Damnum_, definition, 1724 b.</p> + +<p>Dances, when obscene, 1456 d; evil, formal cooperation with, 1531; +evil, material cooperation with, 1532.</p> + +<p>Danger, of formal sin, 675 a, 678; of material sin, 675 b.</p> + +<p>Dangerous Reading, see Reading, Dangerous.</p> + +<p>Debates on Religion, generally inexpedient, 998.</p> + +<p>Debt, moral and legal debt, 1692, 2141-43; moral degrees of, 2143.</p> + +<p>Debt, Conjugal, 2614-17.</p> + +<p>Decalogue, invincible ignorance of generally impossible, 321; Laws +of the First and Second Tables, 338; the precepts contained in the +Decalogue, 2436.</p> + +<p>Deceit, form of lying, 2391 b.</p> + +<p>Decency, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition of decency, +2486 b.</p> + +<p>Decision, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 b.</p> + +<p>Defamation, definition, 2028; self-defamation, 2028 e; different forms +of defamation, 2030; differences between defamation and contumely, +2029; implicit and explicit defamation, 2030 b; direct and indirect +defamation, 2030 d; examples of indirect defamation, 2031; examples of +direct defamation, 2032; defamation by innuendo, 2033 a; defamation by +plain speech, 2033 b; sinfulness of detraction, 2036; right to true and +false reputation, 2037; sinfulness of gossip or criticism about real +and known defects, 2038; moral species of defamation, 2039; species +of sins of defamation, 2040; numerical multiplication of defamations, +2041; theological species of defamation, 2042; harm done by defamation, +2043; comparison of defamation with other injuries against neighbor, +2044; rule for determining seriousness of defamation, 2046; harm done +by reason of defects revealed, 2047; revelation of secret faults, +2048; harm done by reason of person defamed, 2049; meaning of the +expression “infamous in a certain place,” 2051 sqq.; revelation about +a person juridically in disrepute elsewhere, 2054; revelation about a +person actually in disrepute elsewhere, 2055; notoriety in a closed +community, 2057; revelation about a person formerly in disrepute, +2058; when the name of person defamed is not given, 2059; defamation +of deceased and legal persons, 2060; harm done by reason of person of +defamer, 2061; defamation at second hand, 2062; harm done by reason of +listeners, 2063; detraction to one discreet person, 2065; belittling +a person to himself, 2066; disclosing matters detrimental to third +party, 2067; rights that have precedence over false reputation, 2068; +unlawful attack on another’s false reputation, 2069; conditions that +justify revelation of another’s defects, 2070; revelations about +public officials or candidates for public office, 2071; revelations +about historical personages, 2072; revelations about persons who +figure in news of day, 2074; injustice in professional critics, 2075; +cooperation in defamation, 2076; direct consent to defamation, 2077; +persons who listen to defamation from curiosity, 2078; sinfulness of +indirect consent to defamation, 2079; guilt of superior who consents to +defamation, 2080; circumstances which lessen guilt of indirect consent, +2082; inaction in face of defamation, 2083; ways of opposing defamation +made in one’s presence, 2084; restitution for defamation, 2085; gravity +of obligation of restitution, 2086; conditions which entail duty of +restitution, 2087; cooperators and restitution, 2088; circumstances +of restitution, 2089; persons by whom restitution must be made, 2089, +2090; persons to whom restitution must be made, 2001; responsibility +of defamer for spread of defamation, 2092; first way of making +restitution, 2093; other methods of making restitution, 2094; legal +reparation for defamation, 2095; time when restitution for defamation +is to be made, 2096; cessation of duty of restitution, 2097; excuses +from restitution, 2098 sqq.; right of defamed person to condone injury, +2101. See also Derision; Tale-Bearing; Reputation.</p> + +<p>Defects, Natural, of fallen man, 283.</p> + +<p>Defendant, definition, 1975; duties of defendant in civil cases, 1976; +duties in criminal cases, 1977; duty of accused to plead guilty, 1978; +rights and duties of accused in conducting own defense, 1980; rights +and duties of accused who has been found guilty, 1982.</p> + +<p>Defense of Self, see Self-Defense.</p> + +<p>Definitions of the Church, solemn and ordinary, 761 b; by the Church, +761 c.</p> + +<p>Defloration, definition, 2529.</p> + +<p>Deism, 847 b.</p> + +<p>Deliberation, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 a.</p> + +<p>Delight, 119.</p> + +<p>Demerit, definition, 107.</p> + +<p>Demon, The, 284.</p> + +<p>Denunciation, see Accusation, Judicial; Complaint.</p> + +<p>Deposit, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Derision, definition, 2106; distinction between derision and jesting, +2107; sinfulness of derision, 2109.</p> + +<p>Desire, 119; sinful, 237 sqq.</p> + +<p>Desires, Evil, 232, 240 sqq.</p> + +<p>Desires, Impure, see Impurity.</p> + +<p>Despair, definition, 1061; despondency, 1062; pusillanimity and +spiritual sloth, 1064; despair of unbelief, 1065; signs indicating +despair, 1057; malice of despair, 1068; despair compared with other +sins, 1070; causes of despair, 1071; remedies for, 1074; caused by +sloth, 1324.</p> + +<p>Detraction, reasons for resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019; +duty of one who answers contumely or detraction, 2020; definition, 2030 +c. See also Defamation.</p> + +<p>Devotion, definition of, 2150; differs from emotion, 2151 e; from +spiritual consolations, 2151 b; external and internal cause of +devotion, 2152.</p> + +<p>Devotions, different forms of, 2151 c.</p> + +<p>Discord, 1347 sqq.; definition, 1348; sinfulness of intentional and +unintentional, 1350-1351; origin, 1354; prohibition against, 1552.</p> + +<p>Disobedience, see Obedience.</p> + +<p>Dispensation from Law, 401; who may be dispensed? 403.</p> + +<p>Dispensations, in the strict or wide sense, 309, 524 sqq.; differ from +privileges, 524; persons who can grant dispensations, 525-530; manner +of seeking, 531; how invalidated, 533; when dispensation is refused, +534; interpretation of faculty of dispensing, 536-537; cessation of, +537-541.</p> + +<p>See also Matrimony, Sacrament of; Vows.</p> + +<p>Distractions, see Prayer.</p> + +<p>Distributive Justice, see Justice.</p> + +<p>Divination, see Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Divining Rods, and divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Divorce, books in favor of divorce forbidden, 855 b. See also +Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Docility, integral part of prudence, 1637 b.</p> + +<p>Doctors, as source of Moral Theology, 10.</p> + +<p>Domicile, true and quasi-domicile, 436.</p> + +<p>Double Result, effect on imputability of acts, 103 sqq.</p> + +<p>Doubt, 655 sqq.; positive or negative, 655; as state of conscience, +656 sqq.; reflex principles for solution of doubt, 657 sqq.; cases of +negative doubt to be settled in favor of obligation, 661; negative +doubt of law, 709 a; of fact, 709 b-c; rash doubts, 1743; supervening +doubt of possessor in doubtful faith, 1776; antecedent doubt of +possessor in doubtful faith, 1777.</p> + +<p>Doubt, Sin of, 840 sqq.; methodical and real, 840-841; involuntary, +indeliberate, unwelcome and ignorant, 842; negative, 844; positive, +845; passing and permanent, 846.</p> + +<p>Dress, when lascivious, 1456 b; modesty in, 2569 a.</p> + +<p>Druggists, duties of, 2651 c.</p> + +<p>Drunkenness, sin against sobriety, 2476 b; passive drunkenness, 2477 +a; degrees of the sin of drunkenness, 2479 a; malice of the sin, 2480 +a; drunkenness compared with other sins, 2481 a; responsibility of +drunkard for sins committed while intoxicated, 2482 a; cooperation in +the sin of drunkenness, 2483.</p> + +<p>Duelling, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1435; +morality of, 1436; fallacy of arguments for, 1437; penalties against, +1438.</p> + +<p>Dulia, species of reverence, 2325 c; obligation of religious cult of +dulia, 2354.</p> + +<p>Duties, with regard to habits, 140; of man, 744 sqq.</p> + +<p>Easter Communion, obligation of, 2592 sqq.</p> + +<p>Eastern Star, among societies forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Education, neglect a sin against self, 1565.</p> + +<p>Effects of Omissions, may be directly and indirectly voluntary, 38-39.</p> + +<p>Egoism, sin against piety, 2349 b.</p> + +<p>Election, act of will, 59.</p> + +<p>Embezzlement, definition, 1893 a.</p> + +<p>Emotion, differs from devotion, 2151 a.</p> + +<p>Employees, duties in justice and charity, 2648. See also Employers.</p> + +<p>Employers, duties in justice and charity, 2647; duties of, 2648; labor +disputes, 2649; obligation of giving employment, 2650.</p> + +<p>Emulation, distinct from envy, 1331 a, 1339; when it is a sin, 1332.</p> + +<p>Enemies, charity towards, 1148; general and special love of, 1151.</p> + +<p>Enfeeblement, definition, 1866 c.</p> + +<p>Engagement to Marry, see Betrothal.</p> + +<p>Enjoyment, see Relaxation.</p> + +<p>Envy, 269; sin against charity, 1328 sqq.; definition, 1328; objects +of, 1329; subjects of, 1330; distinct from emulation, fear and +indignation, 1331; lawful and unlawful emulation, 1332; lawful and +unlawful jealousy, 1333; lawful and unlawful grief at another’s +prosperity, 1334-1337; envy by nature a mortal sin, 1338; degrees of +gravity, 1341; one of capital vices, 1342; how preeminent among sins, +1344; useful considerations and practices against envy, 1345-1346; +as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; prohibition +against, 1552.</p> + +<p>Epieikeia, 358; in human laws, 385, 411 sqq.; definition, 412; limits +on use, 414 sqq.; use in determining obligation of ecclesiastical laws, +503; a. subjective part of justice, 2144. See also Equity.</p> + +<p>Equiprobabilism 688 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Equity, subjective part of justice, 2430; greatness of legal equity, +2432; definition of equity, 2431.</p> + +<p>Error, resembles ignorance, 32; practical and speculative, effect on +gravity of sin, 249; may diminish theological guilt, 1764 b.</p> + +<p>Escape from Prison, when licit, 1982 b.</p> + +<p>Espousals, see Betrothal.</p> + +<p>Ethics, and Moral Theology, 2.</p> + +<p>Eucharist, Holy, 2699; the chief Sacrament of the Church, 2699; +matter and form of the Eucharist, 2700; qualities of the bread, 2700 +a; qualities of the wine, 2700 b; grave precept of Church regarding +the form, 2700 c; minister of consecration, 2701; duties of minister +as regards valid consecration, 2701 b; confession as preparation for +consecration, 2701 c; effect on consecration of inadvertent neglect of +grave liturgical precept, 2702; reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, +2708; duty of custody, 2708 a; duty of renewal of hosts, 2708 b; duty +of worship, 2708 c; visits to the Blessed Sacrament, 2708 c; Forty +Hours’ Devotion, 2708 c. See also Communion, Holy; Mass, Sacrifice of +the.</p> + +<p>Eugenical Sterilization, 1869 c.</p> + +<p>Euthanasia, definition, 2485.</p> + +<p>Eutrapelia, virtue, 2421 e, 2567.</p> + +<p>Exaggeration, form of defamation, 2032 c.</p> + +<p>Executioners, become irregular by Canon Law, 1825.</p> + +<p>Exorcisms, use of, 2267.</p> + +<p>Extreme Unction, see Unction, Extreme.</p> + +<p>Faith, Theological Virtue of, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 151; +compared with charity, 157; ceases in the blessed, 158; excellence, +747; utility, 748-749; meaning, 750; St. Paul’s definition, 751; +St. Chrysostom’s definition, 751 a; St. Thomas’ definition, 751 b; +definition by Vatican Council, 798; material and formal objects, 754; +divine and Catholic faith, 755; divine and ecclesiastical faith, +756; private revelations, 757; human faith, 758 d; external and +internal assent, 760; solemn and ordinary definitions of Church, 761 +b; condemnations of error, 761 b; definitions and censures, 761 c; +religious assent, 761 d; explicit and implicit, 763 sqq.; obligation of +explicit faith, 928; points about which explicit faith is required by +Catechism of Council of Trent, 765; faith is necessary for salvation, +766; formulas summarized in Creeds, 767; increase in articles of faith, +768; Apostles/ Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; summary of teaching +of Apostles’ Creed, 770 sqq.; internal and external acts of faith, 782 +sqq.; supernatural and natural truths to which assent must be given, +784; act of faith necessary, 785 sqq.; what must be believed with +implicit and explicit faith, 786; mysteries that must be believed, 787 +sqq., 918, 920; substantial and scientific knowledge of mysteries, 790; +faith necessary for absolution, 792; merit of the act of faith; assent +of credibility, 795 a; preambles of faith, 795 b; habit of faith, 797; +properties of faith, 799; living and dead faith, 800; persons who have +or had faith, 801; persons who have not faith, 802; how faith must be +supreme, 803 a; faith must be universal but not necessarily explicit, +803 b; growth and decline of faith, 804-805; cause of faith, 806; +effects, 807; internal and external dangers to, 848; dangerous reading, +849 sqq.; dullness of understanding as sin, 912; blindness of mind as +sin, 912; Commandments of, 913 sqq.; commandment of knowledge, 914; +means of communicating knowledge, 915; degree of knowledge necessary, +919; knowledge of Creed, Decalogue, virtues, Sacraments, duties of +one’s state, Lord’s Prayer, 920; means for retention of knowledge, 922; +memorizing of Catechism, 923; commandment of internal acts of faith, +925; primary and secondary truths of revelation, 927; obligation of +affirmative commandment, 929; when and how often act of faith should +be made, 933-935; formal and virtual act of faith, 936; commandment of +external profession, 938 sqq.; denial of faith, 939; ways of denying +faith, 941; commandment of external profession, 987 sqq.; divine +precept of profession, 989; secret, private and public profession, 992 +sqq,; obligation to give instruction on matters of faith and morals, +1001; ecclesiastical precept of profession, 1003; flight to avoid +profession, 1005; when concealment of one’s faith is lawful, 1007; sins +of unbelief, see Unbelief, Sin of. See also Unbelief; Heresy; Apostasy; +Doubt; Credulity; Rationalism.</p> + +<p>Fame, see Reputation.</p> + +<p>Fare, travelling without paying, 1907.</p> + +<p>Fasting, excellence of, 2409 a. See also Abstemiousness.</p> + +<p>Favoritism, sinfulness declared by Revelation, 1805; sinfulness +declared by reason, 1806; gravity of sin of favoritism, 1807; +favoritism in spiritual matters, 1809; favoritism in secular matters, +1812; favoritism in marks of esteem or honor, 1813; favoritism in +judges, umpires, arbitrators and the like, 1814 a.</p> + +<p>Fear, as obstacle to consent, 40, 44; acts done with and through fear, +43; two moral species (fear of the world and of God), 1043; habitual +and actual fear, 1044; worldly fear as sin, 1045; servile and filial +fear of God, 1048 sqq.; initial and perfected fear, 1055; divine +commandments concerning fear, 1103; compared with envy, 1331 b, 1339.</p> + +<p>Fear of the Lord, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; perfects hope, 1041; +distinct from other kinds of fear, 1042; corresponds to First Beatitude +and Fruits of modesty, continency and chastity, 1058; complement of +temperance, 2571 a.</p> + +<p>Fecundation, Artificial, 2618 c.</p> + +<p>Fees, in connection with administration of sacred rites, 2185 b.</p> + +<p>Feigning of Defects, form of lying, 2406 b.</p> + +<p>Fenians, Society forbidden by Church, 947 b.</p> + +<p>Fidelity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163. See also Truthfulness.</p> + +<p>Fighting, definition, 1428; kinds, 1429; sinfulness, 1430; causes, +1431; hatred as cause of fighting, 1432; frequent occasions, 1433; evil +consequences, 1434.</p> + +<p>First-Fruits, and tithes, 2185 b.</p> + +<p>Fitness, the right standard for distributive justice, 1804 c.</p> + +<p>Flattery, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Flesh Meat, 2586 sqq.</p> + +<p>Foolhardiness, sin against fortitude, 2466 b.</p> + +<p>Foolishness, sin of, opposed to Gift of Wisdom, 1621; description of +sin, 1624; causes, 1625; cause of contumely, 2017 b.</p> + +<p>Foresight, 1638 b.</p> + +<p>Forgetfulness, resembles ignorance, 32.</p> + +<p>Form, Sacramental, see Sacrament. Formal Sin, 248.</p> + +<p>Fornication, definition, 2543; sinfulness of fornication, 2534; +fornication compared with other sins, 2525 a; circumstances of +fornication, 2526 a; fornication of engaged person, 2526 b; forms of +fornication, 2527; the State and places of prostitution, 2528.</p> + +<p>Fortitude, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; Gift of the Holy Ghost, +160 b; rank among moral virtues, 2437; definition of fortitude, +2439; two acts of fortitude, 2440; excellence, 2441; sins opposed to +fortitude, 2446; integral and potential parts of fortitude, 2447; +differs from patience, 2453 b; complements of fortitude, 2457; Gift +of Fortitude, 2457 a; fortitude and the Eighth Beatitude, 2457 b; +fortitude and the Fruits of Patience and Longsuffering, 2457 c; +commandments of fortitude, 2458; subjects of fortitude, 2460. See also +Martyrdom.</p> + +<p>Franchise, Electoral, see Voting.</p> + +<p>Fraternal Correction, see Correction, fraternal.</p> + +<p>Fraud, invalidates consent of contract, 1884 b; injustice in voluntary +commutations, 2121; definition of fraud, 2122; two kinds of injustice +in sales, 2123; injustice regarding price, 2124; criteria of a just +price, 2125; obligation of observing prices settled by law or custom, +2126; when market price may be disregarded without injustice, 2127; +unjust sales based on ignorance of real value, 2129; obligation of +restitution on account of unjust price, 2130; injustice regarding thing +sold, 2131; defects in the thing sold, 2132.</p> + +<p>Free Love, definition, 2527 c.</p> + +<p>Freemasonry, 823 b; books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; Society +forbidden by Code, 947 a.</p> + +<p>Friday Abstinence, 2586 c.</p> + +<p>Friendship, 1110; friendship of utility, pleasure and virtue, 1111; +five marks of true friendship, 1137; human friendship not a distinct +virtue, 1140; virtue of friendship, 2143 b.</p> + +<p>Fruition, as act of will, 58.</p> + +<p>Fruits of the Holy Ghost, 159 b; twelve in number, 163, 811, 1058, +1619, 1662, 2433, 2457, 2571.</p> + +<p>Gambling, sinful, 1879 d; gambling forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.</p> + +<p>Geomancy, form of divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Gift, sinful, 1879 a; when are free gifts to judges permissible? 1945 d.</p> + +<p>Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 159 a; intellectual, 160 a; appetitive, 159, +160, 160 b; Understanding and Knowledge, 808-810; Fear of the Lord, +1041-1057; Wisdom, 1609 sqq.; Counsel, 1662; Piety, 2433; Fortitude, +2457; Fear of the Lord, 2571.</p> + +<p>Gluttony, 269; sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 b; ways of +committing gluttony, 2471; sinfulness of gluttony, 2472 a; gluttony as +capital sin, 2473 11.</p> + +<p>Gnome, part of judgment, 2432 d.</p> + +<p>Gnosticism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Gnostics, 823 b.</p> + +<p>God, belief in His existence and providence necessary for salvation, +787.</p> + +<p>Golden Mean, in virtues, 153-154.</p> + +<p>Good, Common. 285 c.</p> + +<p>Goods, external, not last end of man, 20; of the body, not last end +of man, 20; of the soul, not last end of man, 20; when temporal goods +should be surrendered to avoid scandal, 1483.</p> + +<p>Goods, Abandoned, when they may be occupied, 1873 e; when vacant goods +may be occupied, 1873 f.</p> + +<p>Good Templars, Independent Order of, forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Good Will, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.</p> + +<p>Gossip, sinfulness of, 2038.</p> + +<p>Grace, 284.</p> + +<p>Gratitude, virtue of, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2373; two kinds +of gratitude, 2374; circumstances of gratitude, 2376; sins against +gratitude, 2377; moral species of ingratitude, 2378; theological +species of ingratitude, 2379; is it right to confer favors on the +ungrateful? 2380.</p> + +<p>Grave Matter, absolute and relative standards, 1899; opinions on the +amounts that are grave matter, 1900 a.</p> + +<p>Greatness of Deed, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of +virtue, 2452.</p> + +<p>Greatness of Soul, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of +virtue, 2448; greatness of soul and humility, 2449; vices opposed to, +2450 sqq.</p> + +<p>Grief, at another’s prosperity, when lawful and unlawful, 1334-1337.</p> + +<p>Guaranty, 1749 d.</p> + +<p>Guilt, formal guilt, 248; material guilt, 248; causes that remove or +diminish theological guilt, 1764 a.</p> + +<p>Habits, as obstacle to voluntariness of acts, 40, 53; definition, 53; +antecedent and consequent, 53; in general, 132 sqq.; definition, 133; +entitative and operative, 134 a; good and evil, 134 b; infused and +acquired, 134 c, 135-136; strengthening and weakening of, 137 sqq.; +exercise great influence on morality, 140; our duties regarding, 141. +See also Virtue; Vice.</p> + +<p>Half-Truths, form of lying, 2030 c.</p> + +<p>Haruspicy, form of divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Hate, 119 (see also Passions, concupiscible); sin against charity, +1295; definition and kinds, 1296; hatred of God, 1297; interpretative +and formal hatred, 1299, 1315; hatred of God as a special sin, +1300; gravity of this sin, 1301; degrees of malice, 1303; hatred of +creatures, 1304; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to +self or others? 1308; wish for death or spiritual evil, 1310-1311; +gravity of sin of hatred of neighbor, 1312; comparison with other sins, +1313; hatred not a capital vice, 1314; species of sin, 1317; manner +of confessing sin, 1318-1319; as cause of fighting, 1432; prohibition +against, 1552.</p> + +<p>Health, Injury to, a form of injustice, 1871.</p> + +<p>Heresy, 822 c, 826 sqq.; as a sin and canonical crime, 827; positive +and negative, 828 a; internal and external, 828 b; occult and public, +828 c; material and formal, 828 d, 829-830; sinfulness of, 831; +circumstances that modify guilt, 832; penalties, 833; books in favor +of, forbidden, 855 b; heresy compared with schism, 1370.</p> + +<p>Hibernians, Ancient Order of, 955 b.</p> + +<p>Hire of Labor, form of onerous contract, 1 749 b.</p> + +<p>Historical Personages, lawfulness of revelations about, 2072.</p> + +<p>Holy Ghost, Fruits of, see Fruits of the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>Holy Ghost, Gifts of, see Gifts of the Holy Ghost.</p> + +<p>Homicide, definition, 1816; when homicide is lawful, 1819; unlawful +killing of offenders, 1823; lawfulness of tyrannicide, 1824 a; +homicide in self-defense, 1826; killing of the innocent, 1844 sqq.; +unintentional killing of the innocent, 1847; destruction of the unborn, +1848 sqq.; canonical penalties for, 1851 a; accidental homicide, 1862; +moral and legal guilt of homicide, 1865. See also Punishment, Capital, +1820.</p> + +<p>Honor, definition, 2010 b; persons who are deserving of honor, 2011; +species of honor, 2352; obligation of showing honor, 2353; honor due to +superiors, 2636 a.</p> + +<p>Honors, Pursuit of, sometimes demanded by charity to self, 1574.</p> + +<p>Hope, Theological Virtue of, 151, 157, 158, 1009 sqq.; definition, +1009-1012; supernatural and natural hope, 1013; animated and inanimated +hope, 1016; disinterested and interested hope, 1017 b, 1033; object of, +1018; excellence of, 1027; comparison with faith, 1029; with charity, +1030; pseudo-hope (egotistical, Epicurean, and utilitarian), 1032; hope +overcomes spiritual discouragement and aridity, 1034; means for growth +in hope, 1035; subject of hope, 1036; certainty of, 1040; perfected by +Fear of the Lord (q.v.), 1041; sins against hope, 1059 sqq.; despair +(q.v.), 1061 sqq.; spiritual desolations, 1064; pusillanimity and +spiritual sloth, 1064; presumption (q.v.), 1075 sqq,; commandments +of hope, 1092; acts of hope obligatory, 1093; unlawful to surrender +beatitude, 1094; when the commandment of hope obliges, 1095 sqq.</p> + +<p>Horror, 119. See also Passions, concupiscible.</p> + +<p>Houses of Study, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.</p> + +<p>Human Acts, see Acts, Human.</p> + +<p>Humanitarianism, sin against piety, 2349 b.</p> + +<p>Humility, greatness of soul and humility, 2449; potential part of +temperance, 2465 c; definition, 2553; the three acts of humility, 2554 +a; two requirements of humility, 2555; excellence of humility, 2556 a.</p> + +<p>Hunting, forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.</p> + +<p>Husbands, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Hussism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Hydromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Hyperdulia, species of reverence, 2352 c.</p> + +<p>Hypocrisy, form of lying, 2391 b; sinfulness of hypocrisy, 2405.</p> + +<p>Iconoclasm, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Idleness, 1326 e.</p> + +<p>Idolatry, see Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Ignorance, various kinds, 24 sqq.; concomitant, consequent and +antecedent, 26, 29; vincible and invincible, 27, 30; influence on +voluntariness of acts, 28; effect on sin, 249; sins of ignorance, see +Ignorance, Sin of; invincible, in relation to Natural Law, 320; of +Christian Law, possibility of, 356; confessors should examine penitents +who show signs of ignorance, 924.</p> + +<p>Ignorance, Sin of, 250 b, 904 sqq,; culpable ignorance as distinct sin, +907. See also Ignorance.</p> + +<p>Images, when obscene, 1456 a.</p> + +<p>Immoderation, vice opposed to temperance, 2464 b.</p> + +<p>Immorality, see Impurity.</p> + +<p>Impatience, vice opposed to patience, 2455 b.</p> + +<p>Impediments, simple impediments to reception of Holy Orders, 2784 b; +matrimonial impediments, 2804 sqq.</p> + +<p>Imperfections, Moral, 185; when they become sin, 186.</p> + +<p>Impossibility, Physical, 361 a; moral, 361 b.</p> + +<p>Impurity, definition, 2492; sensuality, luxury and curiosity, 2492 n; +kinds of impurity, 2493 a; gravity of sin, 2494 a; one of the capital +vices, 2494 c; evil fruits of impurity, 2495; when venial and mortal, +2496 a; when directly willed, 2496 b; when indirectly willed, 2496 c; +temptations to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations, +2498; what opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient, +harmful and unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal +temptations, 2501; sinfulness of negligence in resisting temptations, +2502; non-consummated sins of impurity, 2504; impure thoughts, 2505; +malice of impure thoughts, 2506 a; impure rejoicing, 2507; impure +desires, 2508; malice of impure desires, 2509; sins of lewdness, 2510; +consummated sins of impurity, 2520; comparative malice of the sins +of consummated lust, 2521 a; multiplication of sins of lust, 2522; +fornication, 2523; incest, 2532; carnal sacrilege, 2533; unnatural +lust, 2534; pollution, 2535; non-sinful pollution, 2536; unimputable +pollution, 2537; proximate and remote occasions of pollution, 2538; +theological malice of sinful pollution, 2539; moral species of sinful +pollution, 2541; canonical penalties for immorality, 2542. See also +Lewdness; Fornication.</p> + +<p>Imputability of Acts, 97 sqq.</p> + +<p>Inadvertence, resembles ignorance, 32.</p> + +<p>Incest, definition, 2531.</p> + +<p>Inconvenience, degrees of, 1520.</p> + +<p>Index of Forbidden Books, 862 c.</p> + +<p>Indifferentism, 823 a.</p> + +<p>Indignation, differs from envy, 1331 c, 1339.</p> + +<p>Indolence, 1326 d.</p> + +<p>Infamy, 2051 sqq.</p> + +<p>Infidelity, 822 ff.</p> + +<p>Ingratitude, see Gratitude.</p> + +<p>Inhabitant, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.</p> + +<p>Inheritance, title of private ownership, 1872 b.</p> + +<p>Inhibition, of passions, 131.</p> + +<p>_Injuria_, definition, 1724 b.</p> + +<p>Injuries, Bodily, a form of injustice, 1866.</p> + +<p>Injustice, definition, 1719; species of legal and particular injustice, +1720; theological species of legal and particular injustice, 1721; +when injury to private or public right is mortal sin, 1722 a, b; moral +species of injustice, 1723; profitable and unprofitable injustice, +1724 c; when injury is no injustice, 1725; internal injustice, 1726; +distributive injustice alone does not oblige to restitution, 1754; +cooperators in injustice and restitution, 1778 sqq.; mandator of act +of injustice, 1779 a; advisor of act of injustice, 1779 b; protector +in act of injustice, 1779 d; consenter in act of injustice, 1779 e; +partaker in injustice, 1779 f; sin of injustice, 1866 s; judicial +injustice, 1939; principal sins of verbal injustice, 2009.</p> + +<p>Injustice in Buying and Selling, see Fraud.</p> + +<p>Innocent, unintentional killing of, 1847.</p> + +<p>Insensibility, sin against fortitude, 2446 b; vice opposed to +temperance, 2464.</p> + +<p>Insurance, 1749 c.</p> + +<p>Intellect, art and prudence the two practical virtues of, 1627.</p> + +<p>Intention, as act of will, 58. See also Prayer.</p> + +<p>Internationalism, False, sin against piety, 2349 b.</p> + +<p>Interpretation, of law, 315 sqq.; verbal or emendatory, 315; by private +or public authority, 316; of ecclesiastical laws, 483 sqq.; rules for +doctrinal interpretation, 485.</p> + +<p>Invocation, of a demon, 2284; invocation of spirits, see Religion, Sins +against.</p> + +<p>Irascible Passions, 118, 120.</p> + +<p>Irregularities, as disqualifications for reception of Holy Orders, 2784 +b.</p> + +<p>Irreligiousness, see Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Jail-breaking, and restitution, 1983.</p> + +<p>Jealousy, lawful and unlawful, 1333.</p> + +<p>Jesting, distinction between derision and jesting, 2107.</p> + +<p>Jingoism, sin against piety, 2349 a.</p> + +<p>Joy, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; sinful, 237; as effect of charity, +1193-1194.</p> + +<p>Judaism, 822 b.</p> + +<p>Judaizers, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Judge, office of, 1940; qualifications, 1943; conduct, 1944; accepting +gifts from litigants, 1945; obligation to restore bribes, etc., 1946; +duties during a trial, 1947; duties on conclusion of a trial, 1948; +obligation in connection with a law manifestly unjust, 1949; Catholic +judge and degrees of divorce, 1950; obligation when evidence is +contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951; when judge is unjust cause of +damaging evidence, 1952; obligation in doubtful criminal cases, 1955; +obligation in doubtful civil cases, 1956; standard by which he should +weigh evidence, 1958; when a judge is bound to restitution, 1962; when +he is not bound to restitution, 1963; right to question prisoner about +his guilt, 1979; judges who pass death sentence become irregular by +Canon Law, 1825. See also Witness.</p> + +<p>Judgment, virtue of, 1727; public and private judgment, 1727 a; three +conditions of righteous judgment, 1729-1731; necessary quality of +lawful oath, 2249 e.</p> + +<p>Judgment, Rash, 1731 b; sinfulness of rash judgment, 1734; rules +on perfect advertence to rashness of judgment, 1736; rules on +insufficiency of reasons for unfavorable judgments, 1737; rules on +gravity of matter in rash judgments, 1738; moral species of the sin of +rash judgment, 1739; chief reasons for rash conclusions about character +of others, 1742; rash doubts, 1743.</p> + +<p>Judgments, Moral, 672 sqq.; the safer and more likely, 673.</p> + +<p>Jurisdiction, of a judge, 1942.</p> + +<p>Justice, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; precedence over charity, +291 b; compared with other virtues, 1714; private justice, 1715 b; +legal justice, 1715 a; justice superior to courage, 1716 a; superior to +liberality, 1716 b; regarded by some as inferior to virtue of religion +and mercy, 1718 a, b; justice demands proper motives in those who seek +or pass judgment, 1728 a; legal justice distinct from distributive +and commutative, 1745 a; distributive justice, 1745 b; commutative +justice, 1745 c; resemblance between distributive and commutative +justice, 1746; special differences between distributive and commutative +justice, 1747; commutations of commutative justice, 1748; equality +sought by commutative justice, 1750; distributive justice and violation +of individual rights, 1755; commutative justice and violation of +individual rights, 1756; vice opposed to distributive justice, 1804; +distributive injustice frequently accompanied by commutative injustice, +1808; vices against commutative justice, 1815; legal justice, classes +of courts, 1941; jurisdiction of 9, judge, 1942; quasi-integral parts +of justice, 2139; potential parts of justice, 2141; degrees of moral +debt, 2143; necessary qualities of lawful oath, 2249 c; complements of +justice, 2433; Beatitudes that correspond to justice, 2433 b; Fruits +of the Holy Ghost that correspond to justice, 2433 c; commandments of +justice, 2434; justice, a duty of superior, 2635 b. See also Equity; +Restitution.</p> + +<p>Killing, of animals, 1818 a; of human beings, see Homicide.</p> + +<p>Kindness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.</p> + +<p>Kinsfolk, order of charity between, 1176 sqq.</p> + +<p>Kissing, morality of kissing and similar acts, 2513.</p> + +<p>Knights of Columbus, 955 b.</p> + +<p>Knights of Pythias, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Knowledge, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a; given to perfect theological +virtues, 808.</p> + +<p>Lands, how they may be occupied, 1873 b.</p> + +<p>Larceny, definition of, 1893 b; petit and grand larceny, 1893 b.</p> + +<p>Last End of Man, existence of, 19; nature of, 20; how attained, 21.</p> + +<p>Latitudinarianism, 823 a.</p> + +<p>Law, 284 sqq.; definition, 285; eternal, natural and positive divine, +286; collision of laws, 288; precedence, 289 sqq,; basis of all laws, +293; customs may interpret, abrogate or introduce law, 506.</p> + +<p>Law, Christian, comparison with Mosaic Law, 346 sqq.; as regards their +aims, 347; as regards their precepts, 348; as regards their difficulty +of observance, 349; as regards external and internal works, 350-351; +moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of New Testament, 352; duration +of, 354; subjects of, 355; ignorance of, 356; dispensation from, 357; +interpretation of, 358-359; when observance of law is impossible, +360-361; Counsels of (q.v.), 364 sqq.; the three chief Counsels, 369. +See also Law, Mosaic.</p> + +<p>Law, Civil, 542 sqq.; persons in whom legislative authority is vested, +543; acceptance by people not necessary for obligation of law in +itself, 544; obligation of laws made by one without authority, 545; +subject-matter, 546; relation to natural law, 547; relation to divine +and ecclesiastical law, 548; and human rights and liberties, 549; +persons subject to, 550; obligation of, 551; when penalty is incurred +before sentence, 552; special kinds, 557 sqq.; laws that determine +ownership, 557; irritant or voiding laws, 558; four kinds of laws with +reference to penalty, 561; moral obligation, 561 sqq. See also Laws, +Human.</p> + +<p>Law, Ecclesiastical, precedence over civil, 290, 418 sqq.; charter +of, 418; character of, 419; general law of Church, 420; effects of +Code on liturgical and disciplinary laws and customs, 421; rules +governing interpretation of Code, 422; lawgivers in Church, 423-429; +subject-matter of Church Law, 425; kinds of acts governed by Church +Law, 426; persons bound by general laws, 427 sqq.; persons bound by +particular laws, 435; promulgation, 447; acceptance of, 448; irritant +laws, 450 sqq.; effects of ignorance, force or fear on acts irritated +by law, 456; when an irritant law ceases to bind, 457; obligation +of law based on presumption of common danger, 460; obligation of +law based on presumption of particular fact, 461; personal, minute, +partial and simultaneous fulfillment of laws, 462 sqq.; time of +fulfillment, 468 sqq.; unwilling fulfillment, 476; intention required +in fulfillment, 477 sqq.; virtuous dispositions in fulfillment, 480 +sqq.; interpretation of, 483; cessation of obligation, 487; exemption +from, 488; ignorance and impossibility as excuses for non-observance, +489 sqq.; cessation of, 500 sqq.; use of epieikeia in determining +obligation, 503.</p> + +<p>Law, Eternal, The, basis of all laws, 293.</p> + +<p>Law, Mosaic, began with promise to Abraham, 332 a; promulgation, 332 +b; excellence, 333; subjects of, 334; duration of obligation, 335; +precepts, ceremonies and judgments, 336 sqq.; ceremonial laws, 340; +sacred times and places, sacraments and customs, 340; four periods of +ceremonial law, 342; four kinds of judgments or judicial laws, 343-345; +comparison with Christian Law, 346 sqq.</p> + +<p>Law, Natural, precedence over positive, 289; definition, 295; relation +to other laws, 296; division, 297; common and proper, 297 b; primary +and secondary, 298; first principle and secondary principles, 300 a; +precepts (axiomatic and inferred, general and particular), 300-301; +necessary and contingent laws, 302; absolute and relative laws, 303; +properties of, 305; of universal obligation, 306; unchangeable, 307 +sqq,; possibility of dispensation from, 309, 314 sqq.; possibility of +modification, 313; when observance is physically or morally impossible, +317-318; promulgated by light of reason, 319; ineradicable from human +heart, 324; wrong applications of, 326.</p> + +<p>Law, Positive Divine, definition, 328; necessity, 328 c; differs +from Natural Law in certain respects, 329; natural and supernatural +commandments, 330; division of, 331; in state of original innocence, +331 a; in law of nature, 331 b; Mosaic Law, 332 sqq.; Christian Law, +346 sqq.</p> + +<p>Lawgivers, in the Church, 423-424.</p> + +<p>Laws, Administration of, see Judge.</p> + +<p>Laws, Ceremonial, of Old Testament, 340 sqq., See also Law. Mosaic.</p> + +<p>Laws, Ecclesiastical, in a wide sense, 514 sqq.; precepts, 519; +rescripts, 520; privileges, 521-523; dispensations, 524.</p> + +<p>Laws, Human, 370 sqq.; definition, 370; divisions, 371; qualities, +372; should not prescribe what is too difficult, 372; obligation, +375; necessity, 375; when unjust, 376; obedience to unjust laws not +obligatory, 377; degrees of obligation, 373 sqq.; interpretation, +385-386; epieikeia, 385; those subject to law, 387-388; change of, 389; +constitutional law, 390; effects of custom on law, 391; dispensation +from, 401 sqq. See also Law, Civil.</p> + +<p>Laws of New Testament, 7.</p> + +<p>Laws of the First and Second Tables, 338. See also Decalogue.</p> + +<p>Lawyer, general duties, 1995; qualifications, 1996; duties in +introducing case, 1997, obligation in charity towards persons in +distress, 1998-99; duty when cause is unjust, 2000; duties when justice +of cause is doubtful, 2001; duty when he discovers case is really +unjust, 2003; duties towards client, 2004; duties toward other parties, +2005; concealment of truth in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness +of introducing false or corrupted documents, 2007; when bound to +restitution, 2008.</p> + +<p>Laxism, see Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Laziness, as distinct from sloth, 1326; various forms, 1326 a-e.</p> + +<p>Lease, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Leniency, Undue, vice, 2552 b.</p> + +<p>Lenten Fast, 2588.</p> + +<p>Lesbian Love, form of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Lewdness, definition, 2510; propriety of external acts, 2512; morality +of kissing and similar acts, 2513; morality of sensual gratification, +2514; theological species of the sin of lewdness, 2515; circumstances +that increase or lessen the danger of sin, 2517; cases wherein the +danger of sin is grave or slight, 2518; lewd books, 2518 b; lewdness in +speech, 2518 a; in reading, 2518 b; in looks, 2518 c; in touches, 2518 +d; moral species of lewdness, 2519 a.</p> + +<p>Libel, definition, 2030 d.</p> + +<p>Liberality, inferior to justice, 1716 b; virtue of liberality, 2143 b; +definition of virtue, 2424; importance of liberality, 2425. See also +Avarice; Prodigality.</p> + +<p>Lies, see Lying.</p> + +<p>Lipstick, morality of use, 2570.</p> + +<p>Liquids, may or may not break fast, 2588.</p> + +<p>Loans, 1749 a; loan at interest, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Longsuffering, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.</p> + +<p>Looting, forbidden by modern international law, 1415.</p> + +<p>Loss, definition, 1724 b.</p> + +<p>Lots, Use of, when lawful, 2289.</p> + +<p>Lottery, when lawful, 1879 e.</p> + +<p>Love, definition, 119; root of all appetites of soul, 1106; effects, +1107; degrees, 1108; love of desire and love of benevolence, 1109; love +of creatures not always charity, 1134; kinds of self-love (q.v.), 1136; +obligatory, 1608 a; of supererogation, 1608 b.</p> + +<p>Love of God, see Charity.</p> + +<p>Love of Neighbor, see Neighbor, Love of.</p> + +<p>Love of Self, see Self-Love.</p> + +<p>Lukewarmness, 1327.</p> + +<p>Lust, 269. See also Impurity.</p> + +<p>Luxury, compared with impurity, 2492 a; modesty in luxury, 2569 a.</p> + +<p>Lying, definition, 2389; misunderstanding a form of lying, 2390 a; +misinterpretation a form of lying, 2390 b; divisions of lies, 2391; +hypocrisy, 2391 b; simulation, 2301 b; misrepresentation and deceit, +2391 b; classification of lies, 2392; lies of inclination, 2392 b; +pernicious lies, 2392 b; motives for lying 2393; jocose lie, 2392 +a; officious lie, 2392 a; comparison of gravity of various lies, +2394; sinfulness of all lies, 2395; when lying entails no formal +sin, 2396; pernicious lies, 2397; concealment of the truth, 2398; +mental reservation, 2399; morality of strict mental reservation, +2400; morality of broad mental reservation, 2400 b; when broad mental +reservation is lawful, 2401; ambiguous answers, 2402; simulation or +pretence, 2403; sinfulness of simulation, 2404.</p> + +<p>Macedonianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Magnanimity, see Greatness of Soul.</p> + +<p>Majority, Age of, 433.</p> + +<p>Malefactor, when bound to accuse himself, 1968.</p> + +<p>Malice, sins of, 250 e; caused by sloth, 1324.</p> + +<p>_Mandatum_, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Manicheans, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Manicheism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Marriage, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Marriage, Trial, definition, 2527 c.</p> + +<p>Marriages, Dangerous, 875; canonical consequences, 879; prenuptial +guarantees, 880; remedies against mixed and dangerous marriages, 881.</p> + +<p>Martyrdom, definition, 2442; kinds of martyrdom, 2443; conditions for +martyrdom, 2444; practical questions about martyrdom, 2445.</p> + +<p>Mass, Sacrifice of the, 2709; obligation of saying Mass, 2710; +dispositions for the celebration of Mass, 2711; confession before +Mass, 2711 a; distractions during the Canon, 2711 b; preparation and +thanksgiving before Mass, 2711 a; Eucharistic or natural fast, 2711 +b; rubrical vestments, 2711 b; time of Mass, 2712 a; place, 2712 b; +rites, 2712 c; when it is lawful to discontinue Mass, 2713; application +of the Mass, 2714; obligation of pastors to say Mass for flocks, 2714 +a; obligation of Mass stipends, 2714 b; persons for whom Mass may be +applied, 2715; how Mass must be applied, 2715 b; lawfulness of Mass +stipends, 2716.</p> + +<p>Masturbation, form of impurity, 2534 a.</p> + +<p>Material Sin, 248.</p> + +<p>Matrimony, Sacrament of, first blessing of marriage (offspring), 2613 +a; second blessing of marriage (fidelity), 2613 b; third blessing +of marriage (sacrament), 2613 c; obligation of paying the conjugal +debt, 2614; absence of obligation, 2615; suspension of obligation, +2616; obligation of requesting conjugal intercourse, 2617; morality +of venereal acts of marriage, 2618; unnatural consummated acts, +2618 c; artificial fecundation, 2618 c; rectal copulation, 2618 c; +contraception, 2620; contraception an injury to God, 2620 a; an injury +to society, 2620 b; an injury to the family, 2620 c; an injury to the +individual, 2620 d; arguments of Neo-Malthusians and other advocates of +contraception, 2621; is birth-control ever lawful? 2622; _cooperatio +uxoris ad onanismum vel contraceptionem_, 2623; _recapitulatio de +licitis et illicitis in conjugio_, 2624; marriage as a Sacrament, +2626; reasons that justify separation, 2626 a; husband superior to +wife in authority, 2626 b; husband has duty of providing for wife, +2626 c; no obligation for individual to marry, 2627 a; unity of +marriage its first property, 2787 d; indissolubility of marriage its +second property, 2787 e; Pauline Privilege, 2787 e; dissolution, 2787 +e; divorce under Mosaic Law, 2787 e; marriages of infidels, 2787 e; +true, presumed, putative and attempted marriage, 2788 a; legitimate, +ratified, consummated marriage, 2788 b; clandestine, secret, public +marriage, 2788 c; marriage of conscience, 2788 c; marriage is canonical +or civil, 2788 d; elements of contract of marriage, 2789 a; ends of +contract, 2789 b; essence of contract is the consent, 2789 c; valid +consent, 2790; defects in consent, 2791; mental derangement as defect, +2791 a; ignorance as defect, 2791 b; error as defect, 2791 c; effect +of forced consent on validity, 2792 a; effect of forced consent on +lawfulness, 2792 b; conditional consent, 2793; elements of marriage +as Sacrament, 2794; ministers and recipients of Matrimony, 2794 b; +effects of Matrimony, 2794 c; duties in connection with marriage, 2795; +obligation of betrothal or engagement, 2796; is engagement necessary +before marriage? 2798; duties to parents or guardians in reference +to marriage, 2799; duties of parents in reference to marriage, +2800; obstacles to marriage, 2801; duty to make known impediment to +marriage, 2801 c; duties of pastor in examination of engaged persons, +2802; special proofs of freedom to marry, 2803; proof of Baptism, +2803 a; proof of single state, 2803 b; matrimonial impediments, +2804; sinfulness of marrying with an impediment, 2805; impedient or +prohibitive impediments, 2806; vow as impediment, 2806 a; impediment +of legal relationship, 2806 b; impediment of mixed religion, 2806 +e; duties of pastor and parties in connection with mixed marriages, +2807; valid engagement forbids marriage with third party, 2809 a; +special prohibition of particular marriage by the Church, 2809 b; +closed times, 2809 e; diriment impediments to marriage, 2810; absolute +diriment impediments, 2811; impediment of age, 2813; impediment of +impotency, 2814; impediment of bond, 2816; impediment of difference +of religion, 2817; impediment of kinship, 2818; consanguinity, 2818 +a; affinity, 2818 b; public decency, 2818 c; spiritual relationship, +2818 d; legal relationship, 2818 e; matrimonial impediments produced +through misdeeds, 2819; impediment of abduction, 2819 a; impediment +of crime, 2819 b; duties of pastor after inquiry about impediments, +2820; dispensation, 2820 a; publications of banns of marriage, 2820 +b; duties of pastor after examination and proclamation, 2821; duties +of pastor as regards religious instruction of engaged couple, 2822; +pastor and duties of engaged couple, 2823; pastor’s duties to parents, +2823 a; pastor’s duties to civil law, 2823 b; opposition of parents +to marriage, 2824; religious duties of parties before marriage, 2825; +confession, 2825 a; Communion, 2825 b; celebration of marriage, 2826; +requisites for validity, 2826 a; requisites for lawfulness, 2826 b; +rite of Matrimony, 2827; Nuptial Blessing and Nuptial Mass, 2827 b; +cooperation in unworthy marriage, 2828; registration of marriages, +2829; when impediment is discovered after marriage, 2830; lawfulness of +divorce and separation, 2831. See also Betrothal.</p> + +<p>Matter of Sin, grave, 171-172; light, 182.</p> + +<p>Matter, Sacramental, see Sacrament.</p> + +<p>Meanness, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.</p> + +<p>Medicinal Afflictions, as remedies against sin, 283.</p> + +<p>Meekness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; potential part of temperance, +2465 c; definition, 2545.</p> + +<p>Memory, 1637 a.</p> + +<p>Mental Derangement, removes theological guilt, 1764 a.</p> + +<p>Mercy, result of charity, 1193; definition, 1193 c; natural and +supernatural, 1205; causes of unmerciful spirit, 1206; mercy compared +with other moral virtues, 1207; compared with charity, 1208; +obligation, 1209; seven corporal works of mercy, 1221; seven spiritual +works, 1222-1223; regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 b.</p> + +<p>Merit, definition, 107; human and divine, 108; natural and +supernatural, 109; condign and congruous, 110; the right standard for +distributive justice, 1804 c.</p> + +<p>Merits, former merits recovered by repentance, 2725 c.</p> + +<p>Methods in Moral Theology, Casuistic, Positive and Scholastic, 13.</p> + +<p>Minors, legal privileges in connection with contracts, 1882.</p> + +<p>Misrepresentation, form of lying, 2391 b.</p> + +<p>Moderation, see Temperance.</p> + +<p>Modernism, 822 c, 841 b.</p> + +<p>Modesty, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; of bearing and living potential +part of temperance, 2465 e; definition of modesty, 2565; modest +behavior or decorum, 2566 a; vices opposed to modesty, 2566 b; modesty +in style of living and dress, 2569 a; morality of self-beautification, +2570; fruit of the Fear of the Lord, 2571 c.</p> + +<p>Mohammedanism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Monophysitism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Morality, definition, 64; constitutive norm, 65; manifestative norm, +67; perceptive norm, 68; three species of, 69; three sources, the +object, circumstances, and end, 70 sqq.; moral value of passions, 121 +sqq.; important influence of habits on, 140.</p> + +<p>Moral Science, office of, 1631 b.</p> + +<p>Moral Systems, see Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Moral Theology, objects, 4; medium, 4; sources, 6; use of natural +reason, philosophy and natural sciences in, 11-12; Positive, Scholastic +and Casuistic Methods, 13; history of, 15; Patristic Period, 15 a; +Medieval Period, 15 b; Modern, 15 c; division and order of parts, 17; +General and Special, 18.</p> + +<p>Mormonism, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Mortgage, 1749 d.</p> + +<p>Motions of the Soul, First and Second, 129.</p> + +<p>Motives of Sin, 268 sqq.</p> + +<p>Munificence, virtue, 2452 e.</p> + +<p>Murder, see Homicide.</p> + +<p>Murmuring, definition and sinfulness of, 2120.</p> + +<p>Mutilation, definition, 1866 a; when lawful, 1867.</p> + +<p>_Mutuum_, definition, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Mysteries, that must be believed, 787 sqq., 918, 920; substantial and +scientific knowledge of, 790.</p> + +<p>Narcotics, licit use, 2485.</p> + +<p>Naturalism, 847 b.</p> + +<p>Necessity, Spiritual, degrees of, 1165.</p> + +<p>Necessity, Temporal, degrees of, 1236; extreme necessity justifies +conversion of others’ property, 1921 a.</p> + +<p>Necromancy, form of divination, 2284 b.</p> + +<p>Necrophilism, form of impurity, 2534 d.</p> + +<p>Negligence, 1326 a.</p> + +<p>_Negotiorum gestio_, definition, 1749 a.</p> + +<p>Neighbor, Love of, three kinds, 1139 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods +or bodily welfare for neighbor’s sake, 1163 sqq.; order of charity +between neighbors, 1171 sqq. See Charity; Friendship; Emulation; +Jealousy; Hate; Correction, Fraternal.</p> + +<p>Neo-Malthusians, arguments in favor of contraception, 2821.</p> + +<p>Nestorianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>New Testament, ordinances, 7; counsels, 7; laws, 7; temporary +regulations, 7; law of, see Law, Christian.</p> + +<p>Nihilists, society forbidden by Church, 947 b.</p> + +<p>Non-Catholics, participation in Catholic rites, 957 sqq.</p> + +<p>Non-Combatants, treatment during war, 1412.</p> + +<p>Nurses, duties of, 2651 c.</p> + +<p>Oaths, moral effects of accidentals added to contracts, 1886 b; +definition of an oath, 2245; assertory or promissory oaths, 2246 a; +comminatory or confirmatory oaths, 2246 a; contestatory or execratory +oaths, 2246 b; explicit or implicit oaths, 2246 b; solemn or simple, +judicial or extrajudicial oaths, 2246 d; moral difference between +various kinds of oaths, 2247; lawfulness of oaths, 2248; necessary +qualities of a lawful oath, 2249; sinful oaths, 2250; incautious +oath, 2250 a; perjured oaths, 2250 b; wicked oaths, 2250 c; mental +reservation in oaths, 2251; cooperation in sinful oaths, 2252; sinful +oaths demanded or accepted by private persons, 2253; fictitious oaths, +2254; expressions confused with oaths; obligation imposed by promissory +oath, 2256; obligation imposed by negative oath, 2257; obligation of +oath is personal, 2258; interpretation of promissory oath, 2259; kind +of obligation produced by a valid promissory oath, 2260; cessation of +obligation of promissory oath, 2262. See also Adjuration.</p> + +<p>Obedience, definition of virtue, 2355; power of jurisdiction and +dominative power, 2356; degrees of obedience, 2357; comparison of +obedience with other virtues, 2358; comparison of acts of obedience, +2359; duty of obedience, 2360; when obedience is not lawful or +obligatory, 2361; internal actions and human superiors, 2363; +obligation of vow of obedience, 2364; sins against obedience, 2365; +definition of disobedience, 2366; kinds of disobedience, 2367; +theological sinfulness of formal disobedience, 2369; moral species of +disobedience, 2370; circumstances that aggravate formal disobedience, +2371; comparison of formal disobedience with other sins, 2372; vow and +virtue of obedience, 2612 c; obedience due to superiors, 2636 b.</p> + +<p>Objects, Sinful, formal cooperation by manufacture of, 1533; material +cooperation, 1534 sqq.</p> + +<p>Obscenity, definition, 1455; internal and external, 1455 a-b; general +rules for determining what is obscene, 1456; persons who give scandal +through obscenity, 1458; government suppression of obscenity aim of +League of Nations, 1458 e.</p> + +<p>Obstacles to Consent, 40 sqq.; fear, 41; ignorance, 40, 24 sqq.</p> + +<p>Occasions of Sin, 263 sqq.</p> + +<p>Occult Heresy, 828 c.</p> + +<p>Occult Sin, 1287.</p> + +<p>Occupation, title to private ownership, 1872 a; chief ways of +occupation, 1873; when occupation of others’ goods is lawful, 1921 sqq. +See also Theft.</p> + +<p>Occupations, forbidden to clerics, 2603 b.</p> + +<p>Odd Fellows, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Offerings, act of religion, 2183.</p> + +<p>Office, Divine, distractions during, 2174; obligation of matter and +manner, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of the Divine Office, 2601 +a.</p> + +<p>Officials, Public, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.</p> + +<p>Offset, definition of, 1927 a. Old Testament, moral precepts still +binding, 7; ceremonial laws no longer obligatory, 7.</p> + +<p>Omen, form of divination, 2285 d.</p> + +<p>Omissions, voluntary, 37; effect of may be voluntary, 38.</p> + +<p>Oneiromancy, form of divination, 2284 a.</p> + +<p>Opinion, as state of conscience, 662 sqq.</p> + +<p>Ordeal by Fire, sin against religion, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Order of Charity, 1158; between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; in almsgiving, +1247.</p> + +<p>Orders, Holy, Sacrament of, 2777; distinction of the Orders, 2778; +Major and Minor Orders, 2778 b; hierarchy of Orders, 2779 a; hierarchy +of jurisdiction, 2779 b; matter and form of the various Orders in +the Latin Church, 2780; episcopal consecration, 2780 a; minister of +ordination, 2781; special duties of minister, 2782; recipient of +Orders, 2783; conditions for validity of reception, 2783 a; conditions +for lawfulness of reception, 2783 b; canonical requirements for +ordination, 2784; irregularities, 2784 b; simple impediments, 2784 +b; irregularities from defect or delinquency, 2784 b; duties of +ordinandi according to Canon Law, 2785 a; registration of ordinations, +2786; ordination of acolyte, 2780 a; ordination of exorcist, 2780 a; +ordination of porter, 2780 a; ordination of reader, 2780 a; ordination +of subdeacon, 2780 b; ordination of deacon, 2780 c; ordination of +priest, 2780 d.</p> + +<p>Ordinances, of the New Testament, 7.</p> + +<p>Orientals, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Original Sin, 272 sqq.</p> + +<p>Ouija Boards, form of divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Ownership, Private, allowed by natural and divine law, 1872; chief +titles to private ownership, 1872.</p> + +<p>Pacifism, Extreme, not inculcated by Christ, 1381.</p> + +<p>Pain, of loss, 281 a; of sense, 281 b.</p> + +<p>_Palpo_, definition, 1779 e.</p> + +<p>Pan-Christianism, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Parents, duties of charity and piety, 2630; compensation of children, +2631; sex education of children, 2632.</p> + +<p>Participation of Catholics in Non-Catholic Services, 961; active +and passive participation, 962-973; things wherein communication is +possible; 963; simulated active assistance, 965; cases of communication +in false worship, 967 sqq.; cases where a communication in another +Catholic Rite is allowed, 970; participation in non-sacramental rites, +971; participation in religious places, times and objects, 972.</p> + +<p>Partnership, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Passion, as obstacle to consent, 40, 45; antecedent, makes act less +free, 48; consequent, does not affect voluntariness of acts, 49; when +it removes or diminishes theological guilt, 1764 a.</p> + +<p>Passions, definition, 45, 116 sqq.; definition, 117; concupiscible, +118-119; irascible, 118, 120; moral value of, 121 sqq.; physical, +mental and moral dangers of, 126; antecedent or involuntary (first +motions of the soul), 129; consequent or voluntary (second motions of +the soul), 129; inhibition of, 131; important influence of habits on, +140.</p> + +<p>Pastor, duty to give Sacraments, 2676 a; duties in reference to +Baptism, 2688; to Confirmation, 2698; to Communion, 2707 c; to worship, +2708 c; to celebration of Mass, 2710 b; to application of Mass _pro +populo_, 2714 a; jurisdiction for confession, 2751 a; on reserved +cases, 2754 b; duty to hear confessions, 2756 b; to give Extreme +Unction, 2775 c; rank among the clergy, 2779 b; duties in reference to +marriage, 2802, 2807, 2808, 2820 sqq., 2826, 2829.</p> + +<p>Pathological States, see Abnormal Mental States.</p> + +<p>Patience, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; act of fortitude, 2447 b; +definition, 2453; patience differs from temperance, 2453 a; differs +from longsuffering and constancy, 2453 c; greatness of patience, 2454; +vices opposed to patience, 2455; virtue of steadfastness, 2456.</p> + +<p>Patriolatry, sin against piety, 2349 a.</p> + +<p>Patriotism, very like to religion, 2346 d.</p> + +<p>Pawn, 1749 d.</p> + +<p>Pawning, unjustifiable, 1879 g.</p> + +<p>Peace, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; as effect of charity, 1195 sqq.; +reconciliation with God, 1196; reconciliation with enemies, 1196; +reconciliation with enemies demanded by charity, 1198; what duty of +reconciliation demands, 1199; what this duty necessitates, 1199 sqq.; +person who should make the first advances, 1202; manner and time of +seeking reconciliation, 1203-04; sins against peace, 1347 sqq. See +Discord; Contention; Schism; War; Fighting; Duelling; Sedition.</p> + +<p>Pederasty, kind of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Pelagianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Penance, Sacrament of, 2727; remote matter, 2727 a; proximate +matter, 2727 b; form of, 2727 c; subject of, 2727 d; Probabilism in +administration of Sacrament, 2728; contrition the first act of the +penitent, 2729; valid and fruitful reception of the Sacrament of +Penance, 2734; resolution of amendment, 2736; confession, second act +of penitent, 2737; qualities of confession, 2738; gravity of lying +to confessor, 2739; integral confession, 2740; material and formal +completeness, 2740 a, b; moral species of sin must be confessed, 2741 +a; number of sins must be given, 2741 b; circumstances that change +the species must be declared, 2741 c; external act that completed an +internal sin must be declared, 2741 d; circumstances that notably +aggravate a sin without changing its species, 2742 a; external effects +of a sin must be confessed, 2742 b; uncertain sins must be confessed, +2742 c; when material integrity is not necessary, 2743; completion +or repetition of past incomplete Confessions, 2744; when a general +Confession should be made, 2744 c; satisfaction, the third act of the +penitent, 2745; effects of actual satisfaction, 2746; conditions for +effective satisfaction, 2747; obligation of accepting and performing +a penance, 2748; causes that excuse from a penance imposed, 2749; +requirements in the minister for valid absolution, 2750; power of +jurisdiction, 2751; when the Church supplies jurisdiction (cases of +common error and of uncertainty of law or fact), 2752; limitation +of jurisdiction, 2753; reserved sins, 2753 a; reserved persons, +2753 b; absolution from reserved cases, 2754; absolution given by +one not possessed of jurisdiction, 2755; duties of confessor before +confession, 2756; duties of confessor as judge in hearing the case, +2757; duties of confessor in deciding about cases, 2758; duties of +confessor in passing sentence, 2759; penitents to whom absolution +should be denied, 2760; backsliders (recidivists), 2760 c; obligation, +quality and quantity of sacramental penance, 2761; duties of the +confessor as spiritual physician, 2762; duties of the confessor as +teacher and guide, 2763; spiritual direction, 2764 b; duties of the +confessor after confession, 2764; Probabilism or epieikeia may not be +applied to sacramental seal, 2764 a; attitude of confessor to tempted +and afflicted, 2762 b; attitude to scrupulous, 2762 b; treatment of +sick and dying, 2762 b; attitude towards the pious, 2762 b; attitude +towards the hardened sinner, 2762 b; manner of repairing defects made +in hearing a confession, 2765; excuses from duty of repairing mistakes, +2766; obligation of seal of confession, 2767; sins against the seal of +confession, 2768; special abuses to which confession is exposed, 2769; +danger of defamation, 2769 a; danger of impurity, 2769 b; _absolutio +complicis_, 2770; _effectus legis de absolutione complicis_, 2771; +_sollicitatio in confessione_, 2772; _denuntiatio sollicitantis_, 2773.</p> + +<p>Perception, 1637 b.</p> + +<p>Pessimism, defective judgment, 1731 f.</p> + +<p>Philanthropy, as distinguished from almsgiving, 1219.</p> + +<p>Philosophy, use in Moral Theology. 11, 12.</p> + +<p>Phrenology, form of divination, 2285 b.</p> + +<p>Physicians, duties of, 2651 c.</p> + +<p>Physiognomy, divination by, 2285 b.</p> + +<p>Pictures, when obscene, 1456 a.</p> + +<p>Piety, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; a potential part of justice, +2142 b; various senses of, 2345; definition of virtue of piety, 2346; +reverence required by piety, 2347; assistance required by piety, 2348; +sins against piety, 2349; malice of sins against piety, 2350; Gift of +Piety directed to Our Father in Heaven, 2433 a.</p> + +<p>Plants, when they may be occupied, 1873 b.</p> + +<p>Plays, when obscene, 1456 c; formal cooperation with evil plays, 1531; +material cooperation with, 1532.</p> + +<p>Pleasures, Sensible, and temperance, 2461 b.</p> + +<p>Pleasures, Spiritual, and temperance, 2461 b.</p> + +<p>Pledge, 1749 d.</p> + +<p>Pollution, see Impurity.</p> + +<p>Pope, authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws, 486; three ways +of rejecting papal decisions, 1369.</p> + +<p>Positive Method, in Moral Theology, 13.</p> + +<p>Possessors, Unlawful, three kinds of, 1770 sqq.; obligations in +reference to the property and its fruits, 1771 sqq.</p> + +<p>Poverty, vow and virtue, 2612 a.</p> + +<p>Power of Jurisdiction, and dominative power, 2356.</p> + +<p>Practicality, 1645.</p> + +<p>Praise of God, 2269; internal and external praise of God, 2270; +excellence of praise of God, 2271; qualities that should be present in +the divine praises, 2272.</p> + +<p>Prayer, definition, 2153; the psychology of prayer, 2154; the necessity +of prayer, 2155; a duty for all adults, 2156; times and frequency +of prayer, 2157; corollaries about prayer and confession, 2158; to +whom prayer may be offered, 2159; persons for whom prayer is offered, +2160; things that may be prayed for, 2161; qualities of prayer, 2162; +confidence requisite for successful prayer, 2163; attention and +intention in prayer, 2164; actual, virtual and habitual intention in +prayer, 2165 a, b, c; internal or external, verbal or superficial, +literal, spiritual, perfect or imperfect attention in prayer, 2166; +acts that exclude external attention, 2167; when external attention is +sufficient, 2168; kind of internal attention required in prayer, 2169; +distractions in prayer, 2170; voluntary and involuntary distractions, +2171; sinfulness of distraction in prayer, 2172; distractions during +Divine Office, 2174.</p> + +<p>Precepts, axiomatic and inferred, 300; general and particular, 301; +ecclesiastical, 515-519.</p> + +<p>Precepts of the Church, First derived from natural and divine as well +as ecclesiastical law, 2575 a; affirmative and negative parts of First +Precept, 2576; how Mass must be heard, 2577; external and bodily +assistance, 2577 a; internal or mental assistance requires actual +or virtual intention of will, 2577 b; the necessary attention, 2577 +b; time and place of Mass, 2578; servile works, 2579; forensic and +commercial labors forbidden, 2579 b; liberal works tolerated, 2580 b; +definition of common works, 2581 a; doubtful works, 2581 b; lawfulness +of hiring non-Catholics to do servile work, 2582; obligation of First +Precept, 2583; excuses from observance of First Precept, 2584; scope +of Second Precept, 2586; definition of flesh meat, 2586 a; broth and +condiments, 2586 c; obligation of Second Precept, 2587 21; exceptions +to the obligation, 2587 c; the obligation of fasting, 2588 sqq.; scope +of Third Precept, 2590; subject and matter of Third Precept, 2590 a; +time for fulfillment of Third Precept, 2590; origin and gravity of +Third Precept, 2591; scope of Fourth Precept, 2592; origin and gravity +of Fourth Precept, 2593 a; Fifth Precept, 2594; Sixth Precept of the +Church, 2594.</p> + +<p>Prescription, title to private ownership, 1872 b; conditions for valid +prescription, 1875; may terminate the obligation of contract, 1889 b.</p> + +<p>Presumption, sin of, 1075 sqq.; definition, 1078; objects of, 1079; +comparison with temptation of God and blasphemous hope, 1081; malice +of, 1082; gravity compared with other sins, 1083; presumption and +unbelief, 1084; presumption takes away virtue of hope, 1085; causes of, +1091; vice against greatness of soul, 2450 a.</p> + +<p>Presumption of a Pact, 652.</p> + +<p>Pretence, see Simulation.</p> + +<p>Price, just and unjust, see Fraud.</p> + +<p>Pride, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; cause of +contumely, 2017 a; definition of pride, 2557; acts of pride, 2558 a; +sinfulness of pride, 2559 a; pride compared with other sins, 2560 n; +pride mother of the seven capital sins, 2560 c.</p> + +<p>Principles, first and secondary, 300 a; reflex, see Reflex Principles.</p> + +<p>Prison, escape from, lawfulness, 1982 b.</p> + +<p>Prisoners, treatment during war, 1412, 1417.</p> + +<p>Privilege, Pauline, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Privileges, 521 sqq.; definition, 521; wide and strict interpretation +of, 522; obligation to accept and use, 523.</p> + +<p>Probabiliorism, see Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Probability, intrinsic signs of, 665 a; extrinsic signs of, 665 b; +kinds of, 703; of law, 711 a; of fact, 711 b, 712.</p> + +<p>Probabilism, see Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Prodigality, a vice opposed to liberality, 2427; sinfulness, 2428; +comparison of avarice and prodigality, 2429.</p> + +<p>Promotion of Undeserving Candidates, 1758.</p> + +<p>Profession of Faith, commandment of, 938 sqq. See Faith.</p> + +<p>Propensities, Natural, effect on voluntariness of acts, 54.</p> + +<p>Property, Private, chief ways in which it may be occupied, 1873; when +lost property may be occupied, 1873 d; conversion of property against +the wishes of owner, 1891 b; conversion of property, 1891.</p> + +<p>Propriety, integral part of temperance, 2405 b; propriety of external +acts, 2512.</p> + +<p>Protestantism, 822 e.</p> + +<p>Providence, 1638 b.</p> + +<p>Prudence, 146, 150; ranked first among cardinal virtues, 1626; +definition of prudence, 1627; one of the two practical virtues of +intellect, 1627 a; inferior to the Gift of Wisdom, 1627 b; objects of +act of prudence, 1628 a; prudence concerned with application of truths +and first principles of morality to contingent and particular cases, +1628 b; formal object of prudence, 1629 a; material object, 1629 a; +prudence needs certitude, 1630; relation of prudence to the other moral +virtues, 1631 a; prudence rules the inferior virtues and serves the +superior, 1632; prudence and the intellectual virtues, 1632 a; prudence +and the theological virtues, 1632 b; the exercise of prudence, 1633; +the three acts of prudence, deliberation, decision, direction, 1633; +qualities of prudence, 1634; moral, integral, subjective, potestative +parts of prudence, 1635, 1636; integral parts of prudence, 1637; +prudence knows how to reason correctly, 1638 a; subjective parts of +prudence, 1639; individual prudence, 1639 a, 1644 a; social prudence, +1639 b; political prudence, 1640 a, 1644 c, 1648; domestic prudence, +1640 b, 1644 b, 1650; governmental prudence, 1642 a; military prudence, +1642 b, 1644 d; utility of prudence for society, 1643; potential parts +of prudence, 1646; persons who possess prudence, 1648; evil prudence, +1651 a; imperfect prudence, 1651; indifferent prudence, 1651 b; good +prudence, 1651 c; infused prudence, 1654 a; prudence in young people, +1655 a; formed habit of prudence, 1655 a; prudence a duty of superior, +2635 a; formative prudence, 1655 b.</p> + +<p>Puberty, Age of, 433.</p> + +<p>Punishment, eternal and temporal, 280.</p> + +<p>Punishment, Capital, lawfulness of, 1820; when it should not be +imposed, 1821; unlawful killing of offenders, 1823 a.</p> + +<p>Punishments, Bodily, 1870.</p> + +<p>Punitive Sterilization, 1869 b.</p> + +<p>Purity, Virtue of, 2486; definition, 2486; definition of chastity, 2486 +a; definition of decency, 2486 b. See also Virginity; Impurity.</p> + +<p>Purpose, Wrong, may make venial sin mortal, 191; or mortal venial, 195.</p> + +<p>Pusillanimity, 1084; as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness +of soul, 2451 a.</p> + +<p>Pyromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.</p> + +<p>Pythian Sisters, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Pythonism, form of divination, 2284 b.</p> + +<p>Quickness, 1637 b.</p> + +<p>Rancor, caused by sloth, 1324.</p> + +<p>Rape, 2529.</p> + +<p>Rash Opinion, 1733. See also Judgment, Rash.</p> + +<p>Rationalism, 847.</p> + +<p>Reason, Age of, 433.</p> + +<p>Reason, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 11; as subject of sin, 231.</p> + +<p>Reading, Dangerous, 849 sqq.; forbidden by natural and ecclesiastical +law, 850.</p> + +<p>Rebeccas, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Rebellion, not schism, 1364.</p> + +<p>Recoupment, definition of, 1927 a.</p> + +<p>Reflex Principles, for solution of doubts, 657 sqq.; may supply +indirect certitude, 652 b.</p> + +<p>_Regulae pro confessariis de licitis et illicitis, in conjugio_, 2625.</p> + +<p>Relationships, various kinds, 1175.</p> + +<p>Relatives, order of charity among, 1176 sqq.; duties of near, 2634.</p> + +<p>Relaxation, as virtue, 2567 a, b; sins opposed to moderate enjoyment, +2568 a.</p> + +<p>Religion, Virtue of, regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 +a; a potential part of justice, 2142 a; definition of the virtue, +2145; religion as a moral virtue, 2146; superiority of religion as a +virtue, 2147; necessity of the acts of religion, 2148; internal acts +of religion, 2149; definition of devotion, 2150; external and internal +causes of devotion, 2152; external acts of religion, 2175; definition +of adoration, 2176; difference between _latria_ and _hyperdulia_ and +_dulia_, 2671 b; difference between _latria_ and civil homage, 2176 +b; unity and variety of adoration, 2177; definition of sacrifice, +2178; essentials of sacrifice, 2179; obligation of sacrifice, 2180; +exemptions from sacrifice based on the natural law, 2181; sacrifice +compared with the other acts of religion, 2182; goods unsuitable as +offerings to God, 2184; contributions to religion, 2185; obligation +of contributing to the support of the clergy, 2186; quality of the +obligation of contributing to the Church, 2188; priest’s attitude +towards persons refusing to contribute, 2189; those to whom religious +contributions are due, 2190; external acts of religion in honor of God, +2244.</p> + +<p>Religion, Sins against, 2273; superstition, 2274; false worship, 2274 +a; superfluous worship, 2274 b; sinfulness of improper worship of God, +2275; worship of false deity, 2276; definition of idolatry, 2277; +kinds of idolatry, 2278; sinfulness of idolatry, 2279; comparison +of different sins of idolatry, 2280; idolatry possible in Christian +worship, 2281; definition of divination, 2282; distinction between the +fact and sin of divination, 2283; forms of explicit invocation, 2284; +forms of implicit invocation, 2285; malice of the sin of divination, +2286; when knowledge is obtained from God, 2287; when knowledge +is obtained through natural causes, 2288; use of lots, 2289; vain +observance, 2290; forms of vain observance, 2291; distinction between +fact and sin of vain observance, 2293; superstition in religious +observances, 2294; sinfulness of vain observance, 2295; cooperation in +divination or other form of superstition, 2296; doubtful cases of vain +observance, 2297; licitness of using doubtfully superstitious means, +2298; irreligiousness, 2299; temptation of God, 2300; cases wherein +there is no temptation of God, 2301; kinds of temptation of God, 2302; +causes that exclude the interpretative temptation of God, 2303; refusal +of medicine or hygienic care, 2304; sinfulness of temptation of God, +2305; malice of temptation of God, 2306. See also Sacrilege; Simony.</p> + +<p>Religious, special duties of, 2611; perfection of charity, 2611 a; +evangelical counsels, 2611 b; obligation of the three principal vows, +2612 a.</p> + +<p>Remorse of Conscience, penalty of sin, 279.</p> + +<p>Repentance, Virtue of, 2718; character of repentance, 2720; excellence, +2721; dignity, 2721 a; necessity, 2721 b; repentance as a means and as +a precept, 2722; accompaniments of repentance, 2724; fruits of, 2725; +restores infused virtues and former merits, 2725 c; removes every sin, +2725 a.</p> + +<p>Reproach, definition, 2012 b.</p> + +<p>Reprisals, in war, 1417.</p> + +<p>Reputation, when charity requires one to seek good reputation, 1575; +when sacrifice of reputation is lawful and unlawful, 1576; when +self-detraction is lawful, 1577; definition of good, true, false, +ordinary and extraordinary reputation, 2034 a-c; right to good +reputation, 2035; right to true and false reputation, 2037; meaning of +the expression “infamous in a certain place,” 2051; rights that have +precedence over a false reputation, 2068; unlawful attack on another’s +false reputation, 2069; conditions that justify revelation of another’s +defects, 2070; revelations about public officials or candidates for +public office, 2071. See also Defamation.</p> + +<p>Rescripts, 520.</p> + +<p>Reservation, strict and broad mental reservation in an oath, 2251. See +also Lying.</p> + +<p>Resident, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.</p> + +<p>Restitution, distinct from payment, restoration and satisfaction, +1751; difference between satisfaction and restitution, 1752; when +restitution is due, 1753; confessor’s duties regarding the obligation +of restitution, 1760; roots of restitution, 1762; when unjust damage +obliges to restitution, 1763; restitution for damages that are +only venially sinful but seriously harmful, 1765; for damages only +juridically culpable, 1766; for careless discharge of fiduciary +duties, 1768; restitution when culpability seems doubtful, 1769; +cooperators and restitution, 1778; circumstances of restitution, 1781; +restitution _in solidum_ or _pro rata_, 1783; order of restitution +among cooperators, 1784; person to whom restitution must be made, 1786; +creditors with right _in re_ have preference over creditors with right +_ad rem_, 1787; “thing” to be restored, 1789; “amount” of restitution +in certain cases, 1790; “manner” of making restitution, 1791; second +restitution, 1792; “time” when restitution must be made, 1793; unjust +refusal to make restitution, 1794; “place” where restitution must be +made, 1795, 1796; causes that excuse temporarily from restitution, +1797; causes that excuse permanently from restitution, 1798; excuse +from restitution on account of doubtfulness of obligation, 1800; +restitution for frustration of another’s good, 1802 a; restitution for +injury done to goods of fortune, 1802 b; restitution for injury done +to goods of body or personal goods, 1802 c; restitution for unjust +homicide or mutilation, 1803; restitution for fornication or adultery, +1803 b; restitution for injuries of soul, 1803 c; restitution for +occupied goods, 1922; restitution of bribes, etc., 1946 c; restitution +for jail-breaking, 1983; obligation of witness to make restitution, +1992; when a lawyer is bound to restitution, 2008; restitution for +contumely, 2021 sqq.; cessation of obligation of restitution for +contumely, 2026; restitution for defamation, 2085 sqq.; restitution +of temporal price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of +temporal price received for temporal things annexed to spirituals, +2341; circumstances of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of +spiritual thing simoniacally received, 2343; restitution necessitated +by breach of promise to marry, 2628 d; restitution for theft. See also +Compensation.</p> + +<p>Restraint, definition, 1866 d.</p> + +<p>Revelations, private, 757.</p> + +<p>Reverence, potential part of justice, 2142 c; definition of virtue, +2351; species of honor, 2352; obligation of religious cult of _dulia_, +2354.</p> + +<p>Revilement, definition, 2012 b.</p> + +<p>Rights, precedence in case of collision, 292.</p> + +<p>Robbery, comparison with theft, 1892 a; kinds of theft and robbery, +1893 a; what constitutes grave matter in robbery, 1896. See also Theft; +Injustice.</p> + +<p>Rubrics, directive and preceptive, in administration of the Sacraments, +2669 c.</p> + +<p>Rudeness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Sacraments, of Old Testament, 339; denial of Christian Sacraments in +cases of scandal, 1493; nature of Sacrament, 2654; outward sign, 2654 +a; instituter of Sacraments, 2654 b; purpose of Sacraments, 2654 c; +Sacraments of the Dead and of the Living, 2654 c; indelible character +of some Sacraments, 2654 c; matter and form of the Sacraments, 2655; +substantial changes in matter or form, 2655 a; substantial separations +of matter and form, 2655 b; simultaneity of matter and form, 2656; +accidental changes or separations of matter and form, 2658; substantial +changes or separations, 2659; doubtful matter, 2660; Sacraments that +have a necessity of means, 2661; reception of Sacraments _in re_ or +_in voto_, 2662; Sacraments that have a necessity of precept, 2663; +twofold ministry of the Sacraments (production and bestowal), 2664; +requirements in the minister for valid performance of Sacrament, 2665; +necessary intention, 2666; virtual, actual, habitual and interpretative +intention, 2666 b; rules on plurality of intentions, 2667; requisites +for use of conditional intention, 2668; lawful administration of +Sacraments, 2669; minister’s worthiness before God, 2669 a; minister’s +worthiness before Church, 2669 b; worthiness of ministration, 2669 c; +directive and preceptive rubrics, 2669 c; explanation of ceremonies +advised, 2669 c; multiplication of sins by unworthy administration, +2670; requirements for valid Sacrament in recipient, 2671; qualities of +recipient’s intention, 2672; neutral intention, 2672 b; when virtual +intention is necessary, 2673; when habitual and explicit intention +suffices, 2674 b; when habitual and implicit intention suffices, 2674 +b; requirements for lawful or fruitful reception of Sacrament by adult, +2675; obligation of minister to confer Sacraments, 2676; obligation of +pastor to confer Sacraments, 2676 a; when minister is bound to deny +them, 2677; administration to unworthy persons, 2678; simulation and +dissimulation of Sacrament, 2680; administration of Penance and Extreme +Unction to heretics and schismatics, 2681; repetition of Sacrament on +account of invalid administration, 2682; reception of Sacrament from +unworthy minister, 2683; forgiveness of sin through use of Sacraments, +2726.</p> + +<p>Sacrament, Blessed, see Eucharist, Holy.</p> + +<p>Sacramentals, definition, 2684; necessity and use, 2684 a, b.</p> + +<p>Sacrifice, see Religion, Virtue of.</p> + +<p>Sacrilege, definition, 2308; violation of what kind of consecration +involves sacrilege? 2309; is sacrilege a special sin? 2310; species +of sacrilege, 2311; personal sacrilege, 2311 a; local sacrilege, +2311 b; desecration, a form of sacrilege, 2311 b; profanation, a +form of sacrilege, 2311 b; real sacrilege, 2311 c; special cases +regarding local sacrilege, 2312; cases wherein there is no sacrilege, +2313; sacredness as aggravating circumstance of sin, 2314; malice of +sacrilege, 2315; conditions that govern gravity of sacrilege, 2316; +carnal sacrilege, 2533; personal sacrilege, 2533 c; local sacrilege, +2533 d; real sacrilege, 2533 e.</p> + +<p>Sadness, concupiscible passion, 119.</p> + +<p>Sapphism, form of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Satisfaction, for sin, 283. See also Penance, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Scandal, various uses of word, 1445-46; definition, 1447; causes of, +1448; directly intentional (diabolical) and indirectly intentional, +1450; active and passive, 1453; acts that give scandal, 1454; obscenity +(q.v.), 1455 sqq.; results of scandal, 1459; scandal resembles +solicitation and complicity, 1460; persons apt to be scandalized, +1461; scandal given and scandal taken, 1464; Pharisaic scandal and +“scandal of little ones,” 1464 b; sinfulness, 1465; is scandal a +distinct species of sin? 1466; how scandal should be confessed, 1467; +responsibility of scandalizer for injuries to third parties, 1470-71; +gravity of sin, 1472; is any person immune from scandal? 1475; duty of +avoiding, 1477; scandal of the weak forbidden by the natural law, 1479; +surrender of temporal goods to avoid scandal, 1483; surrender of Church +goods to avoid scandal, 1486-87; duty of repairing scandal, 1488; ways +of repairing, 1489; public and private scandal, 1490 a; ordinary and +extraordinary, 1490 b; denial of Sacraments in cases of scandal, 1493; +prohibition against, 1552.</p> + +<p>Schism, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1364; +principal schismatic movements, 1365; directly and indirectly voluntary +schism, 1366; schism committed in two ways, 1368; three ways of +rejecting decisions of Pope, 1369; schism compared with heresy, 1370; +opposition between schism and charity, 1371; greatest sin against +neighbor, 1372 a; not so serious as unbelief, 1372 b; formal and +material schism, 1373.</p> + +<p>Schismatics, spiritual powers of, 1374.</p> + +<p>Scholastic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.</p> + +<p>Schools, Dangerous, 867 sqq.; sectarian and neutral, 867; absolution of +parents of children attending, 872; Catholic teachers in non-Catholic +schools, 874.</p> + +<p>Sciences, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 12.</p> + +<p>Scripture, as Source of Moral Theology, 7.</p> + +<p>Scrupulous, see Conscience.</p> + +<p>Seal of Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Second Sight, 2285 a.</p> + +<p>Secret, violation of (infidelity), 2407; definition of a secret, 2408; +natural, promised, entrusted or committed secret, 2408; sinfulness of +violating secret, 2409; prying into others’ secrets, 2410; reading +another’s letters or papers, 2411; lawfulness of utilizing knowledge +of secret, 2412; sin committed by stealing or unduly using secret +of another, 2413; obligation of keeping secret, 2414; comparison +of secrets as regards binding force, 2415; cases wherein it is not +necessary to keep secret, 2416; cases wherein it is not lawful to keep +secret, 2417; lawfulness of revealing secret learned by stealth or +force, 2420.</p> + +<p>Sedition, definition, 1440; distinct species of sin, 1441; resistance +to tyrannical government not sinful, 1443.</p> + +<p>Seduction, 1495 sqq.; definition, 1496; malice, 1497; differs from mere +permission to sin, 1500; sinful request, 1501; advice to commit evil, +1502; prearrangement of circumstances that lead to sin, 1504.</p> + +<p>Self-Abuse, form of impurity, 2534 a.</p> + +<p>Self-Beautification, morality of, 2570.</p> + +<p>Self-Defamation, sin opposed to charity, 2028 e.</p> + +<p>Self-Defense, Right of, 1826; conditions for exercise of this right, +1826 a; self-defense must be moderate, 1833; when it is obligatory, +1836; when it is not obligatory, 1837; defense of neighbor’s life +against unjust aggressor, 1838; defense of material goods against +unjust aggressor, 1840; defense of bodily purity against an unjust +aggressor, 1841; defense of bodily integrity against an unjust +aggrossor, 1842; defense of honor or reputation, 1843.</p> + +<p>Self-Depreciation, form of lying, 2406.</p> + +<p>Self-Glorification, form of lying, 2406.</p> + +<p>Self-Love, commandment of, 1561; understood in many senses, 1561; +sinful, natural and supernatural, 1136; charity demands an elicited +supernatural self-love, 1562; demands pursuit of all goods necessary +for attainment of happiness, 1563; care of the mind, 1564; neglect of +education sinful, 1565; care of the body and health, 1566; care as to +food and drink, 1567; fresh air, rest, physical exercise, 1568-1573; +pursuit of honors and good name, 1574-1575; when self-detraction is +lawful, 1577; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to self? +1308.</p> + +<p>Self-Starvation, sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.</p> + +<p>Seminaries, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.</p> + +<p>Sensuality, 232, 117 sqq.; compared with impurity, 2492 a.</p> + +<p>Sentence, Judicial, when it may be resisted, 1982 c; moral obligation +when this is certainly just, 1959; moral obligation when this is +certainly unjust, 1960.</p> + +<p>Separation, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Servility, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Set-off, definition, 1927 a.</p> + +<p>Shamefacedness, integral part of temperance, 2465 b.</p> + +<p>Shintoism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Simony, origin of name, 2317; definition, 2318; temporal price in +simony, 2319; spiritual thing in simony, 2320; temporal thing united +with spiritual, 2321; temporal thing annexed to spiritual, 2322; +various kinds of simony, 2323; confidential simony, 2324; simony +against divine law, 2325; rules of Alexander III for determining +simony, 2327; simony against divine law in reference to things annexed +to spirituals, 2328; simony against ecclesiastical law, 2329; certain +and uncertain simony, 2330; doubtful cases of simony, 2331; cases +in which transaction is not simoniacal, 2332; theological malice of +simony; 2335; moral malice of simony, 2336; invalidity and penalties +of simoniacal contracts, 2337; canonical penalties for simony, 2338; +influence of simony on spiritual effects, 2339; restitution of temporal +price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of temporal price +received for temporal things annexed to spirituals, 2341; circumstances +of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of spiritual thing +simoniacally received, 2343.</p> + +<p>Simulation, form of lying, 2391 b; definition, 2403; sinfulness of +simulation, 2404. See also Hypocrisy.</p> + +<p>Sin, definition, 167; spiritual and carnal, 168 a, 224 sqq.; against +God, neighbor or self, 168 h; mortal and venial, 168 c, 169; of +commission or omission, 168 d; stages of (heart, mouth, work), 168 e; +by excess or defect, 168 f; original and actual, 168 g; when matter +of sin is grave, 171-172; advertence and consent conditions of mortal +sin, 174 sqq.; mortal, condition of, 169 sqq.; venial, definition, 180; +conditions, 181 sqq.; when imperfections become a sin, 186; when venial +sin becomes mortal, 187-189; coalescence of, 189; multiplication of, +190; possible effect of wrong purpose, circumstances and harm foreseen, +191 sqq,; when mortal sin becomes venial, 194 sqq,; causes of sin, +246; effect of ignorance, passion and malice on, 249; external causes +of, 252; distinct from temptation, 253; proximate and remote danger +of, 258; possibility of, 259; guilt of one who exposes himself to sin, +2150; occasions of (proximate or remote, necessary or free, present or +absent), 263 sqq.; motives of, 268 sqq.; results and penalties of, 272 +sqq.; original and actual, 272 sqq.; stain of, 276; every sin removed +by repentance, 2725 a; forgiveness of sin through the use of the +Sacraments, 2726. See also Sins.</p> + +<p>Sincerity, see Truthfulness.</p> + +<p>Sinners, charity for, 1142; association with, 1145; friendship with, +1146.</p> + +<p>Sins, theological and moral species, 197; specific distinction, +198; numerical multiplication, 197, 202 sqq.; rules of numerical +distinction, 207 sqq.; comparison of, 220; sins against God, 227; +against creatures, 228; subjects of (sensitive appetites, reason, +will), 230 sqq,; sins of sensuality, 232; sins of thought, 233 sqq.; +sins of desire, 237 sqq.; material (or objective) and formal (or +subjective), 248; sins of weakness, ignorance and malice, 250. See also +Sin.</p> + +<p>Slander, definition, 2030 d. See also Defamation.</p> + +<p>Sloth, 269; spiritual, 1064, capital sin, 1320 sqq.; definition, 1320; +sinfulness, 1321; qualities of sin, 1322; sins that spring from sloth, +1324; conquest of sloth, 1325; prohibition against, 1552.</p> + +<p>Sluggishness, sin opposed to diligence, 1326 b.</p> + +<p>Sobriety, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition, 2474; +obligation to practise sobriety, 2475; sins against sobriety, 2476 a; +morality of total abstinence, 2478 a; licit use of narcotics, 2485. See +also Drunkenness.</p> + +<p>Societies, Forbidden, 945 sqq.; forbidden by Code, 946; absolution of +members, 949.</p> + +<p>Sodomy, form of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Softness, 2534 a.</p> + +<p>Solicitation, resemblance to scandal, 1460 a. See Seduction.</p> + +<p>Sons of Temperance, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Soul, First and Second Motions of the, 129.</p> + +<p>Sortilege, form of divination, 2285 d.</p> + +<p>Speculation, Sinful, 1879 f.</p> + +<p>Spiritism, 823 b; sin against religion, 2284 b.</p> + +<p>Sponsors, see Baptism, Sacrament of; Confirmation, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>Stain of Sin, 276.</p> + +<p>State of Life, Duties of, knowledge of obligatory, 920.</p> + +<p>Statesmanship, 1642 a, 1649 a.</p> + +<p>States of Man, Four Historical, 331.</p> + +<p>Steadfastness, act of fortitude, 2447 b.</p> + +<p>Sterilization, morality of, 1869 a.</p> + +<p>Stiffness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.</p> + +<p>Stipends, Mass, institution of, 2185 b. See also Mass, Sacrifice of the.</p> + +<p>Stocks, purchase by clerics, 2605 a.</p> + +<p>Stocks and Bonds, 1749 b.</p> + +<p>Stolidity, vice opposed to patience, 2455.</p> + +<p>Stranger, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 439-446.</p> + +<p>Students, duties of, 2651 b.</p> + +<p>Studiosity, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; definition of +studiousness, 2562; vices opposed to studiousness, 2563 a; malice +of the sins against studiousness, 2564 a; negligence, a sin against +studiousness, 2564 b.</p> + +<p>Subjects, duties to domestic and civil superiors, 2636.</p> + +<p>Suffrage, Power of, 1649 b. See also Voting.</p> + +<p>Suicide, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; voluntary and +involuntary, direct and indirect, 1852 a; sinfulness of suicide, 1854; +cooperation in suicide, 1855; authorization to commit suicide, 1856; +when indirect suicide is lawful, 1857, 1858; when indirect suicide +is unlawful, 1859; is it suicidal to refuse s necessary surgical +operation? 1860; canonical penalties for suicide, 1861 a.</p> + +<p>Sunday, Sanctification of, see Precepts of the Church.</p> + +<p>Superfluities, from which alms must be given, 1227-1229.</p> + +<p>Superior, Clerical, duties of, 2606 a; special duties to flock, 2607 a.</p> + +<p>Superiors, Domestic and Civil, duties of, 2635. See also Employers; +Subjects.</p> + +<p>Superstition, see Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Surety, 1749 d.</p> + +<p>Surgeons, duties of, 2651 c.</p> + +<p>Surliness, sin against affability, 2423 b.</p> + +<p>Syncretism, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Synesis, part of judgment, 2432 d.</p> + +<p>Synteresis, and Moral Theology, 2; directs the moral virtues, 1631 a.</p> + +<p>Systems, Moral, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 672 a, 676 sqq.; Anti-tutiorism, +672 b; condemned by Church, 676; Laxism, 680 sqq.; condemned by Church, +681; Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilisrn, 688; Probabilism, 701 +sqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; practical conclusions, 739; respective +merits and use of the rival systems, 740; use by confessors, 741.</p> + +<p>Tale-Bearing, definition, 2103; sinfulness, 2104; circumstances which +affect the species of tale-bearing, 2105.</p> + +<p>Taoism, 822 a.</p> + +<p>Taunting, form of contumely, definition, 2012 b.</p> + +<p>Taxes, definition, 2637; kinds of taxes, 2638; just taxes, 2639; +obligation to pay taxes, 2640 sqq.; obedience to tax laws, 2642.</p> + +<p>Teachers, duties of, 2651 b.</p> + +<p>Telepathy, and the virtue of religion, 2285 a.</p> + +<p>Temperance, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; differs from patience, +2453 a; definition of temperance, 2461; temperance and sensible +pleasures, 2461 b; temperance and spiritual pleasures, 2461 b; rule +of moderation, 2462; excellence of temperance, 2463; vices opposed to +temperance, 2464; subjective parts of temperance, 2465 a; potential +parts of temperance, 2465 c; integral parts of temperance, 2465 b; +sobriety, 2476 sqq.; continence, 2544; incontinence, 2544 c; sinful +indulgence, 2550; complements of the virtue of temperance, 2571 a; +commandments of temperance, 2572 a.</p> + +<p>Temptation, not a sin, 253; implicit or explicit, internal or +external, direct or indirect, virtual or actual resistance to, 255; +rules regarding resistance to, 256; exterior and interior temptations +to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations, 2498; what +opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient, harmful and +unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal temptations, 2501; +negligence in resisting temptations, 2508.</p> + +<p>Temptation of God, see Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Tepidity, consequence of sloth, 1327.</p> + +<p>Testament, New, see New Testament.</p> + +<p>Testament, Old, see Old Testament.</p> + +<p>Testimony, see Witness.</p> + +<p>Theft, sin of injustice, 1872; definition of theft, 1890; plagiarism +is form of theft, 1890 c; copyright infringement, a form of theft, +1890 c; kidnapping, a form of theft, 1890 c; comparison of theft and +robbery, 1892 a; kinds of theft, 1893 a; sinfulness of theft, 1894 +a; grave matter in theft of sacred objects, 1901; grave matter in +domestic theft, 1903 a; theft by wife or minor child, 1904 a; theft +by employees, 1905 a; theft of things about whose loss owner is less +concerned, 1906 a; travelling without paying fare, 1907; when small +thefts amount to grave matter, 1908 sqq.; moral connection between +repeated acts of theft, 1912; interval of time between acts of theft, +1913; theft from joint owners, 1917; restitution in cases of theft, +1918 a; cases of doubt as to grave matter, 1919 a; occult compensation, +1920 b; when conversion of others’ property is permissible, 1920; +conditions for lawful occupation of others’ goods, 1921 a; restitution +for occupied goods, 1922; occupation in case of merely grave necessity, +1923; occupation of large sum by one in dire need, 1924 a; lawfulness +of receiving support from thief, 1926; compensation for theft, see +Compensation; condonation of domestic thefts, 1799.</p> + +<p>Theologians, as source of Moral Theology, 10.</p> + +<p>Theological Virtues, 151; golden mean in, 154 c; rank among virtues, +156. See Faith, Hope and Charity.</p> + +<p>Theology, Ascetical and Mystical, 2573.</p> + +<p>Theology, Moral, definition, 1; relation to Dogmatic Theology, 3.</p> + +<p>Theosophical Societies, forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Theosophy, 823 b.</p> + +<p>Third Orders, Secular, 955 a.</p> + +<p>Thomas Aquinas, Saint, as source of Moral Theology, 10; arrangement of +Moral Theology, 17; opinion on obligation of judge when evidence is +contrary to his personal knowledge, 1951 c.</p> + +<p>Thought, Sins of, 233 sqq.</p> + +<p>Thoughts, Impure, see Impurity.</p> + +<p>Thoughts, Sinful, 234.</p> + +<p>Timidity, sin against fortitude, 2446 b.</p> + +<p>Trading, definition, 2134; morality of trading in the strict sense, +2135; trading forbidden to clerics, 2604 a.</p> + +<p>Tradition, 8; divine, Apostolic, ecclesiastical, 9.</p> + +<p>Treasure Trove, when it may be occupied, 1873 c.</p> + +<p>Tribadism, form of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Truth, necessary quality of lawful oath, 2249 b. See also Truthfulness; +Lying.</p> + +<p>Truthfulness, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2385; excellence, 2386; +sincerity and fidelity, 2387; vices opposed to truthfulness, 2388. See +also Lying.</p> + +<p>Truths, Natural and Supernatural, to which assent must be given, 784.</p> + +<p>Tutiorism, see Systems, Moral.</p> + +<p>Tyrannicide, lawfulness of, 1824 a.</p> + +<p>Unbelief, Sin of, negative and positive, 813; ordinary and apostasy, +814; direct and indirect, 815-816; non-assent, 817; dissent (private +and contrary unbelief), 818; infidelity, 822 a; order of gravity in +unbelief, 824; dangers which lead to external expression of unbelief, +944 sqq. See also Heresy; Apostasy.</p> + +<p>Unction, Extreme, Sacrament of, 2774; remote matter, 2774 a; proximate +matter, 2774 b; form, 2774 c; recipient, 2774 d; minister, 2774 e; +effects of, 2774 f; special duties of recipient, 2775 a; special duties +of minister, 2775 b; special duties of pastor, 2775 c; special duties +of faithful, 2775 d.</p> + +<p>Understanding, integral part of prudence, 1637 a.</p> + +<p>Understanding, Gift of, 160 a; given to perfect theological virtues, +808.</p> + +<p>Unity of the Church, threefold, 1367.</p> + +<p>Uranism, form of impurity, 2534 c.</p> + +<p>Use, act of will, 59.</p> + +<p>Usury, definition, 2136.</p> + +<p>_Vagus_, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.</p> + +<p>Vainglory, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362.</p> + +<p>Vanity, vice against greatness of soul, 2450 c.</p> + +<p>Vengeance, definition, 2381; morality of vengeance, 2382; excess and +defect in vengeance, 2383; circumstances of vengeance, 2384.</p> + +<p>Viaticum, see Communion, Holy.</p> + +<p>Vice, definition, 167; and sin, see Sin.</p> + +<p>Vices, Capital, Seven, 269 sqq.</p> + +<p>Vindication, virtue, 2143 a. See also Vengeance.</p> + +<p>Violence, invalidates consent to contract, 1884 d. See also Coercion.</p> + +<p>Virginity, definition, 2488; loss of virginity, 2489; conditions +necessary for virtue of virginity, 2490 a; excellence of virginity, +2491 a.</p> + +<p>Virtue, subjective parts, 1639 h, 1745; integral parts, 1637, 2139; +potential parts, 1646, 2141; parts, 1635, 1636, 2447, 2465.</p> + +<p>Virtues, definition, 142; division, 143; practical intellectual, +146-148; moral, definition, 149; four cardinal virtues, 150; +theological, 151; three causes of virtues (nature, practice and +infusion), 152; inchoative and perfected, 152; properties of, 153; +golden mean in, 154 b; rank among virtues, 156-157; in the blessed, +158; complements of, 159; properties of seven infused virtues, 745; +order of theological virtues, 746; priority of a virtue in duration, +by nature, and in excellence, 1028. See also Faith; Hope; Charity; +Cardinal Virtues; Act, virtuous.</p> + +<p>Vision, Beatific, relation to charity, 1116.</p> + +<p>Vocation, internal, 2597; external, 2597 b; vocation to the clerical +state, 2597 a; sinfulness of disregarding vocation, 2598 a.</p> + +<p>Volksverein, 955 b.</p> + +<p>Voting, duty of exercising the electoral franchise, 2643; manner of +voting, 2644; obligation to seek office, 2645.</p> + +<p>Vow, definition, 2191; personal, real and mixed vows, 2192; singular +and common vows, 2192 b; temporary and perpetual vows, 2192 c; absolute +and conditional vows, 2192 d; penal and non-penal vows, 2192 d; +explicit and implicit vows, 2192 e; determinate and disjunctive vows, +2192 e; private and public vows, 2192 f; simple and solemn vows, 2192 +f; vows in Canon Law, 2193; distinction between solemn and simple +vows, 2194; knowledge and deliberation necessary for valid vow, 2195; +freedom of will necessary for valid vow, 2196; cases in which fear does +not invalidate vow, 2197; vows of doubtful validity, 2198; intention +necessary for valid vow, 2199; matter of vow, 2200; vows that promise +something necessary, 2201; when fulfillment of vow is only partly +possible, 2202; vows that promise something displeasing to God, 2203; +vows that promise something indifferent, 2205; meaning of better good +in vow, 2206; vows invalidated by promise of lesser good, 2207; when +one has taken two opposite vows, 2208; obligation of vow, 2209; gravity +of obligation, 2210; rules for determining what is important matter in +vow, 2211; coalescence of light into grave matter in vow, 2212; delay +in fulfilling vow, 2214; time when vow obliges, 2213; person obliged +to fulfill a vow, 2215; manner of fulfilling vow, 2216; obligation of +certain kinds of vows, 2217; interpretation of doubtful vows, 2218; +advantages of vows to vowers, 2220; when good vow may be sinful, 2221; +merit of fulfilling vow that one regrets, 2222; persons who can make +vow, 2223; dependence of vower on will of another, 2224; validity of +vows made by subjects, 2225; cessation of vows, 2226; annulment of +vows, 2228; reason necessary for annulment of vow, 2229; differences +between direct and indirect annulment of vow, 2230; dispensation of +vow, 2231; reasons sufficient for dispensation, 2232; sinfulness of +unnecessary dispensation, 2233; persons who have power of dispensation, +2234; dispensation from religious vow of chastity, 2235; dispensation +from vow made for benefit of third party, 2236; commutation of vows, +2238; good works that may be substituted for vows, 2239; persons who +have authority to commute vow, 2240; cause required for commutation of +vow, 2241; reversion to original vow, 2242; duties of confessors in +reference to private vows, 2243; obligation of vow of obedience, 2364; +religious vows, obligation of the three principal vows, 2612 a.</p> + +<p>Vulgarity, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.</p> + +<p>Wagers, Sinful, 1879 c.</p> + +<p>Waldensianism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>War, definition, 1376; just and unjust, 1377; offensive and defensive, +1378; not against law of God, 1380; nor against law of nature, 1383; +three conditions for lawfulness, 1384; who may declare war? 1385; what +is just cause of war? 1386; sufficient causes, 1389 sqq.; insufficient +causes, 1393; when justice of cause is doubtful, 1394; can there be +justice on both sides? 1396; duties before beginning war, 1398-99; +duties during war, 1401 sqq.; lawful means of warfare, 1403; acts +of war and sacred times, 1405; and sacred places, 1406; and sacred +persons, 1407; combatants, non-combatants and neutrals, 1408; killing +or wounding of combatants, 1409; of non-combatants, 1410; punishment of +military crimes, 1411; imprisonment and restraint of enemy subjects, +1412; destruction and seizure of property, 1413; booty and looting, +1414-1415; lawfulness of stratagems, 1416; of reprisals, 1417; duties +of victor, 1418; rights, 1419; obligation of victor whose cause was +unjust, 1420-21; indemnities, 1422; guarantees for future, 1424; +punishment for crimes committed during war, 1425; preparation for +future wars, 1426; preparation for peace, 1427.</p> + +<p>Weakness, Sins of, 250 a.</p> + +<p>Whispering, form of defamation, 2103 sqq.</p> + +<p>Whoremongering, definition, 2526 b.</p> + +<p>Wicliffism, 822 c.</p> + +<p>Will, acts elicited or commanded by, 56-62; three acts of, 58; consent +of, condition of mortal sin, 174, 184, 196; as subject of sin, 231.</p> + +<p>Will (Testament), definition, 1876; defects of a will, 1876.</p> + +<p>Wisdom, intellectual virtue, 157 c.</p> + +<p>Wisdom, Gift of, 160 a; corresponds with and serves charity, 1609; +nature of Gift, 1610; object of, 1610 d; in its cause, Wisdom belongs +to the will, 1611 a; in its essence, to the intellect, 1611 b; Wisdom +is both speculative and practical, 1612; practical uses of, 1613; +likeness to the other Gifts, 1614 a; difference from, 1614 b; persons +who possess Wisdom, 1615; differs from the “word of wisdom,” 1616 b; +varying degrees, 1617; exercise of Gift, 1618; corresponds to Seventh +Beatitude, 1619 a; and to certain Fruits, 1619 b; direction given by +Wisdom to human actions, 1620; sins opposed to Wisdom, 1621; false +wisdom, 1623.</p> + +<p>Wish, as act of will, 58.</p> + +<p>Witness, reliability of, 1984; obligation of freely appearing as +witness, 1985; obligation of appearing under lawful citation, 1986; +obligation to answer truthfully, 1987; witness and concealment of +facts, 1993; payment of witnesses, 1994; matters regarding which +witness should not testify, 1988; sinfulness of false testimony, 1990; +obligation of witness to make restitution, 1992; concealment of truth +in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness of introducing false or corrupted +documents, 2007.</p> + +<p>Wives, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.</p> + +<p>“Word of Wisdom,” 1616 b.</p> + +<p>Words, Unjust, see Injustice.</p> + +<p>Works of Mercy, seven corporal, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222.</p> + +<p>Worship, False, communication in, 956 sqq.; cooperation in, 976 sqq.; +contributions to, 981; building of houses of false worship, 983. See +also Religion, Sins against.</p> + +<p>Wounding, definition, 1866 b.</p> + +<p>Writings, Forbidden, 861; when use allowed, 862; permission to read, +865; censures incurred through use, 866; formal cooperation with, 1529. +See Books and Reading, Dangerous.</p> + +<p>Y.M.C.A., Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.</p> + +<p>Young Men’s Institute. 955 b.</p> + +<p>Zoroastrianism, 822 a.</p> + + + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL THEOLOGY ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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